Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam urged for the continuation of an international force in south Lebanon during a meeting last week in Paris with French President Emmanuel Macron.

“We will always need an international presence in the south, and preferably a UN presence, given the impartiality and neutrality that only the UN can provide,” he told reporters a day after the meeting.

There is a general understanding that the international community cannot simply abandon south Lebanon once UNIFIL withdraws, especially given that the area remains highly volatile. Despite a November 2024 cease-fire, south Lebanon is subject to near-daily Israeli air strikes against alleged Hezbollah military infrastructure and militants. Nearly 65,000 Lebanese residents of the southern border district are unable to return to their homes in villages heavily damaged by the 2023-2024 war, and by a subsequent campaign of controlled demolitions by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The IDF has constructed five imposing Forward Operating Bases on hills in Lebanese territory and enforces a no-go buffer zone adjacent to the Blue Line, the UN’s term for Lebanon’s southern border.

Given this volatility, some European countries are mulling deploying a new military force to the South Litani Sector (SLS), the 1,057-square-kilometer area between the Blue Line and the Litani river that serves as UNIFIL’s Area of Operations (AO). No concrete proposals have yet emerged; it remains unclear whether the preference is to establish a formal European Union (EU) mission led out of Brussels, to mold an ad hoc coalition of willing countries that would operate under a bilateral agreement with the Lebanese government, or, indeed, to create some other formulation.

Either way, proponents of a new mission to south Lebanon should be modest in their expectations and goals. There is little point in replacing UNIFIL with another military mission that could face the same mandate constrictions and potential threats as experienced by UNIFIL over the past nineteen years since it expanded from two thousand armed observers to a force of more than ten thousand peacekeepers following the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. UNIFIL was seen to have fundamentally failed in its mission, resulting last August in the UN Security Council (UNSC) agreeing to terminate the force at the end of 2026. UNIFIL was unable to halt Israel’s daily aerial violations of Lebanese air space, nor block Hezbollah’s accelerated military expansion in the UNIFIL AO from around 2020, which included erecting observation posts along the Blue Line and even building several firing ranges. If UNIFIL, with its ten thousand troops drawn from more than forty countries, backed by the moral and political weight of the UNSC, ended up impotent before the competing actions, objectives, and interests of Hezbollah and Israel, what makes anyone think that a new European-dominated military force in the SLS would fare any better?

Furthermore, if a proposal emerges for a new EU-dominated military force to deploy into south Lebanon, Hezbollah would vehemently oppose it. Even if the Lebanese government chose to ignore Hezbollah’s objections and approve the mission, the soldiers comprising the new force would be deploying into a hostile and potentially dangerous environment. As UNIFIL knows all too well, Hezbollah controls the public space in the SLS, and it has the proven ability to escalate or de-escalate hostile sentiment toward the peacekeepers according to its will.

That is not to say that the international community should abandon any notion of a military mission to the SLS once UNIFIL departs and simply wash its hands of south Lebanon. There are a number of important stabilizing elements that should be implemented during, and after, UNIFIL’s withdrawal.

The first is the necessity of the international community maintaining an eye on south Lebanon to ensure that the two main players, Hezbollah and Israel, cannot act with unseen impunity. To this extent, it may not be necessary to raise a new military force for south Lebanon. When UNIFIL departs Lebanon in 2027, it will leave in place another, albeit much smaller, UN mission, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

UNTSO Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) has been patrolling the Lebanon-Israel border for nearly eight decades to monitor compliance with the 1949 Armistice Agreement. OGL consists of fifty officers (captains and majors), operates from two patrol bases, and since 2006 has been embedded logistically inside UNIFIL. Perhaps a realistic and suitable solution to the post-UNIFIL vacuum would be to boost OGL’s numbers as required and slightly adjust the mandate to allow it to monitor the cease-fire arrangement and UNSC Resolution 1701 (which in part called for a weapons-free zone between the Litani and Lebanon’s southern border with Israel) as well as its original mission of observing the Armistice Demarcation Line (the original UN name given to the border).

As for any force protection concerns, its unarmed status and lack of any mandate enforcement capacity mean Hezbollah should not object to its expansion and continued presence. Furthermore, UNTSO-OGL has an institutional experience of operating alone in a worsening security environment. In the mid-1970s, before UNIFIL arrived in March 1978, the Palestine Liberation Organization was deeply entrenched in south Lebanon from where it launched attacks into Israel. The IDF erected a security fence along the border, maintained day-time observation positions just inside Lebanese territory, and regularly staged cross-border air strikes and commando raids, a situation not greatly removed from the one that exists today. Through all that, UNTSO-OGL diligently patrolled, observed, and reported.

A second critical element of stability is the continued maintenance of a tactical liaison channel between the Lebanese and Israelis. UNIFIL has long served as a vital intermediary between Lebanon and Israel, providing a trusted tactical-level channel for communication, de-escalation, and incident management along the Blue Line that has helped contain crises that might otherwise have spiraled into wider confrontation. Currently, there is a group composed of delegates from Lebanon, Israel, France, the United States, and UNIFIL, known as the “Mechanism,” which was formed after the November 2024 cease-fire agreement. The Mechanism has been criticized for focusing more on the process of disarming Hezbollah rather than ensuring both sides adhere to the cease-fire. Nevertheless, in November, Lebanon and Israel added civilian diplomats to the Mechanism, allowing for a potential expansion of discussions away from purely military matters directly related to the SLS. In the absence of such a third-party interlocutor, routine incidents, misunderstandings, or localized clashes would carry a far higher risk of rapid escalation, miscalculation, and unintended conflict between two adversaries with no direct diplomatic or military liaison mechanisms.

The third imperative for prolonged stability in the SLS is to ensure continued international support for the LAF. The LAF is seriously overstretched with a required deployment of up to ten thousand troops into south Lebanon, while simultaneously reinforcing its presence along the potentially volatile border with Syria as well as its daily internal security taskings. This is where foreign military support to Lebanon could be more usefully employed. Instead of dispatching a new military mission to south Lebanon to emulate UNIFIL’s vague mandate of supporting a weapons-free zone south of the Litani, a small LAF support mission could focus on enabling a sustained LAF presence in the SLS through logistics, training, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance sharing, mobility support, and joint planning, areas where the LAF’s constraints are structural rather than political. This would shift the optics and substance of enforcement away from foreign troops and toward the Lebanese state with the LAF at the center of security provision. This new mission could operate in coordination with, and alongside, an expanded UNTSO-OGL, leaving monitoring tasks to the latter while the former concentrates on supporting the LAF.

Additionally, indirect support for the LAF could be achieved by bolstering the capabilities of the Internal Security Forces (ISF), Lebanon’s police force. For decades, the LAF has had to compensate for the ISF’s weaknesses by engaging in public order operations and pursuit of criminals which should be the remit of the ISF. ISF capacity building would in time allow the LAF to divert its scant resources to its core tasks of maintaining security and protecting the borders.

The imminent departure of UNIFIL, after nearly five decades of presence in south Lebanon, offers opportunities to redress the failings of the UN mission by adopting realistic and focused alternatives. Those alternatives could combine a monitoring and reporting capacity, a third-party tactical liaison channel to allow communication between Lebanon and Israel, and strengthening support to the LAF. A failure by the international community to deliver the requisite support risks overstretching the LAF to a breaking point, paving the way for a potential resurgence of Hezbollah in the SLS and further aggressive behavior from the IDF, which could lead to the resumption of a broader conflict.

Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, covering the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria. He is an acknowledged expert on Lebanese Hezbollah. Blanford is a Beirut-based defense and security consultant.

The post When UNIFIL leaves, south Lebanon still needs an international presence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

So, what’s next for Maduro, Venezuelans, and US efforts in the region? Below, Atlantic Council experts share their insights.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: The US needs to remain committed to a democratic transition

Matthew Kroenig: A win for regional security, the Venezuelan people, and the US military

Alexander B. Gray: This operation sends a signal to Beijing and Moscow

David Goldwyn: Opening up Venezuela’s energy industry will come down to the details 

Celeste Kmiotek: The US strikes most likely fall afoul of international law

Iria Puyosa: Delcy Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability Trump wants

Geoff Ramsey: The mission is not accomplished until Venezuelans get free and fair elections

Nizar El Fakih: Multilateralism failed Venezuela. But it failed long before today.

Tressa Guenov: Success will require years-long US diplomatic and economic efforts in Venezuela

Kirsten Fontenrose: Watching Venezuela from Tehran

Thomas S. Warrick: Maduro’s ouster will cause shock waves in the Middle East

Alex Plitsas: Three scenarios for what could come next 

The US needs to remain committed to a democratic transition 

Many Venezuelans are hopeful that today marks the beginning of a new era. The removal of Nicolás Maduro from power is a reality that Venezuelans in the country and the nearly eight million forced to flee under his regime have long sought.

Here are three key takeaways from the operation:

First, this is the most consequential moment in recent Venezuelan history—and for the broader Latin American region. Trump’s Saturday announcement made it clear that this operation goes beyond a simple extradition: It is a regime-change effort. Maduro is now en route to New York City to face criminal charges, but the United States intends to “run the country” until “a safe and judicious transition” takes place. That means Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president, cannot simply take power and continue his policies. In assuming the presidency, she is constitutionally obligated to hold elections within thirty days. But remember, there was a prior election in July 2024 which opposition leader Edmundo González won, according to released vote tallies.

Second, the US military operation is the start—not the end—of a new level of direct US engagement in Venezuela. Trump confirmed that a team has been designated to run Venezuela, with key figures such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio engaging with Rodríguez. While US forces are expected to provide security around critical infrastructure, broader public security and the protection of citizens remain pressing challenges in a country plagued by gangs, paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and transnational cartels. Hundreds of political prisoners still remain locked up, with their fate of top importance.

Third, today’s actions are the first concrete deliverables of Trump’s new National Security Strategy with its heavy emphasis on the Western Hemisphere. And the president has made it clear that future US operations in the region are fair game as well. Trump mentioned Colombia and Cuba as countries whose leaders should now know the consequences of not cooperating with the United States.

Fourth, the United States now bears responsibility for the eventual outcome in Venezuela. The challenge will be ensuring a “safe and judicious transition” in a country where many entrenched actors are likely to resist meaningful change, but where real change is fundamental to US interests and to the Venezuelan people.

​Some commentators are arguing that the strike is illegal under international law. I am not a legal expert, but it’s worth noting that even though heads of state do enjoy immunity from prosecution under international law, few world leaders recognize Maduro as a legitimate head of state. Since 2019, the Organization of American States, the premier multilateral body for the hemisphere, has refused to recognize Maduro as president following that year’s stolen elections.

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

A win for regional security, the Venezuelan people, and the US military 

There are five winners of the successful US operation to remove Maduro from power in Venezuela: 

1. US, regional, and global security. The world is better off without an anti-American dictator who traffics narcotics, prompts irregular migration flows, and provides a foothold to the “axis of aggressors” (China, Russia, and Iran) in the Western Hemisphere.
2. The Venezuelan people. They now have the opportunity for a better government and a freer and more prosperous future.
3. US military power. This shows that the US military is still the finest fighting force in the world and may help Washington find its confidence and get over its Iraq-Afghanistan hangover.
4. Special operations forces. They have been eager to show higher-level officials in Washington that they are still relevant after the war on terror—and indeed even more so now.
5. Trump’s foreign policy. This is a dramatic foreign policy victory, among the top three of the first year in Trump’s second term, alongside degrading Iran’s nuclear program and increasing NATO defense spending.  

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies. 

This operation sends a signal to Beijing and Moscow 

The “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, as outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy, is officially in effect. Just days after the Chinese People’s Liberation Army was reported to be war-gaming combat operations in the Western Hemisphere, and a new official Chinese strategy for Latin America refused to recognize the region as of special significance to US security, Washington has demonstrated a long-overdue commitment to hemispheric security.

The Trump administration’s removal of Maduro from power in Venezuela is not simply a message to antagonistic regimes in the hemisphere, like Cuba and Nicaragua; it is a global reestablishment of deterrence that will be seen in Beijing and Moscow as an unambiguous sign of the Trump administration’s commitment to a security order compatible with American interests.

Going forward, the administration has a unique opportunity to build upon the success of its pressure campaign against Maduro to reestablish overwhelming US strategic predominance in the hemisphere, including by tacitly shaping a post-Maduro settlement that ensures extra-hemispheric powers like China and Russia are excluded from meaningful influence in Caracas. The success of this operation creates a once-in-a-generation opportunity for Washington to translate its security preferences into strategic reality.

—Alexander B. Gray is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Gray most recently served as deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff of the White House National Security Council.

Opening up Venezuela’s energy industry will come down to the details 

From an energy perspective the key questions will be who governs the country, the timeline and nature of a transitional government, the security situation in the country at large and in the oil production sites and ports, and if the US government modulates the sanctions regime and the blockade to financially support a potential transitional government. At this writing, Trump has declared that the United States will run the country until the situation is stabilized, and he declined to endorse González. Trump also asserted that US oil companies would return to Venezuela. 

It remains to be seen whether there will be resistance from loyalists of the regime and remaining members of Cuban intelligence. Few US companies are likely to return to the country until there is a reliable legal and fiscal regime and stable security situation. Companies that have existing operations are much more likely to revive and expand them if the environment is secure.

It is highly uncertain how the US administration will approach exports and management of those revenues. It could allow oil currently on tankers to be exported, expand licensing, and permit Venezuela to sell oil at market prices, all for the purpose of maximizing national revenue. It is also possible that those revenues would go into a blocked account for the benefit of a new Venezuela government.

But for now, we have no details about how these fiscal and legal arrangements will evolve. Until there is clarity on sanctions and licensing and more information on who is actually managing the central bank and ministry of finance, the prospects for Venezuelan oil production and exports will remain uncertain.

—David Goldwyn is president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC, an international energy advisory consultancy, and chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group.

The US strikes most likely fall afoul of international law

Maduro oversaw a brutal regime engaged in violent human rights violations against Venezuelan citizens. Regardless of this, the US strikes on Venezuela were illegal under international law.

The United Nations (UN) Charter forbids use of force against a state’s “territorial integrity or political independence,” with exceptions permitted for self-defense and Security Council authorizations. Self-defense requires that the force used be necessary and proportional, and that the threat be imminent. None of these conditions appear to have been met. As such, the attacks appear to fall under Article 3(a) of the UN General Assembly’s definition of the crime of aggression. This provision is customary, meaning it is binding and applies regardless of US arguments that the actions are legal under domestic law.

The use of force also marked the onset of an international armed conflict between the United States and Venezuela, triggering the applicability of international humanitarian law. While so far most targets appear to have been military, Trump threatened a second “and much larger” attack “if needed.” Trump’s announcement that the United States will “run” Venezuela and may deploy forces also raises alarms around potential occupation.

Finally, as sitting head of state, international law affords Maduro full personal immunity under domestic courts—including in the United States. Since 2019, the United States and other countries have not recognized Maduro as head of state, in response to widespread election fraud, and he is widely considered an illegitimate ruler. However, as argued by the French Cour de Cassation, this immunity should apply regardless of whether a state recognizes a head of state’s leadership—precisely to prevent politically motivated arrests.

While Maduro must be held accountable for the human rights violations he has inflicted, the United States’ unlawful actions must be condemned. Allowing such precedents to go unchallenged will further undermine respect for international law, state sovereignty, and civilian protections.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Delcy Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability Trump wants

The US decapitation operation against the autocratic regime that ruled Venezuela for over twenty-five years—first led by Hugo Chavez, then by Maduro—marks the beginning of the restoration of democracy in the country. The regime was unable to mount any effective defensive military actions. Its usually strong communication apparatus failed catastrophically during the first twelve hours following the US operation to take Maduro from his residence inside Fuerte Tiuna, the principal military base of the Venezuelan army. The military command-and-control chains were clearly disrupted.

Venezuelans are eager to reclaim their country and restore democracy. There is hope that González—who was rightfully elected president in 2024—will soon take the oath, and many trust that María Corina Machado will successfully lead the transition process, which may take months or even years. The second-in-command figure in the regime, Rodríguez, who was sworn in today to take Maduro’s place, does not appear to have the backing of all factions within the ruling party. Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability required for the business operations Trump emphasized several times during his remarks on the operation. Chavismo no longer enjoys the widespread popular support it had two decades ago.

The Venezuelan people who have fought nonviolently against a highly repressive regime for over two decades will continue their struggle until freedom and democracy are fully restored.

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Democracy+Tech Initiative. Puyosa was previously an associate professor at the College of Social Sciences at the Central University of Venezuela.

The mission is not accomplished until Venezuelans get free and fair elections 

With Rodríguez appearing on state television Saturday afternoon and convening a “National Council in Defense of the Nation” made up of every heavyweight in the ruling party, it seems likely that she is indeed serving as the country’s de facto leader—for now.

While she claimed that Maduro remains “the only president,” called for his release, and said that Venezuela would never be “a colony of any empire,” she also noted that the Supreme Court will be reviewing a national emergency decree signed by Maduro as his last executive act. This points to further announcements to come, in which Rodríguez will almost certainly claim that she is now the country’s interim leader.

Whoever emerges on top of the power struggle in Caracas, it is fundamental that the United States use its considerable leverage to incentivize a roadmap for a transition. It is essential that the Venezuelan people are presented with a credible plan for free and fair elections, the release of political prisoners, and a path toward economic recovery. The United States can help pave this path by offering gradual, phased sanctions relief in exchange for verifiable progress toward democratization.

It is logical for the United States to advance its own energy, migration, and broader geopolitical interests in Venezuela, but US policymakers should not consider their mission accomplished until Venezuelans’ fundamental right to elect their own leaders is restored.

—Geoff Ramsey is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Multilateralism failed Venezuela. But it failed long before today.

Many today are emphasizing the importance of multilateralism and warning about its erosion as a result of the unilateral US actions in Venezuela. But the reality is different: Multilateralism in the face of the Venezuelan crisis did not fail today—it failed years ago.

That failure—resounding, stark, and undeniable—is measured in millions of exiles, many now undocumented or living in precarious conditions across dozens of countries, constituting one of the largest forced displacements in the world without a conventional war or internal armed conflict. It is measured in millions of families torn apart by a regime that systematically destroyed its own society: opposition parties dismantled, dissidents disappeared, deaths under custody, widespread torture, the mass closure of independent media, expropriations that crippled the productive economy (years before any international sanction), hyperinflation that impoverished millions of working families, and sustained repression.

Meanwhile, diplomacy and multilateral institutions proved unable to deliver a single effective negotiation process leading to an orderly, peaceful, and negotiated transition—despite years of appeals by millions of Venezuelans who voted, protested, and exhausted every available civic mechanism at enormous personal cost.

And international justice? The International Criminal Court, with an investigation open since 2021, has yet to issue a single indictment—despite extensive documentation of crimes against humanity by the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and hundreds of victims. Their testimonies provided detailed accounts of a sophisticated, systematic, and nationwide apparatus of repression designed to crush dissent that has been operating in the country for several years under this regime.

Looking ahead, a central concern among Venezuelans—both inside and outside the country—is whether stability will follow, and what political order will emerge from the vacuum left by Maduro, particularly given the competing factions within the former regime. What is clear is that Venezuelans expressed their will at the ballot box: In the July 2024 presidential election, the opposition—led by González and Machado—won decisively, a result the Maduro government refused to recognize, further deepening the crisis that culminated in today’s events.

Any sustainable transition will require that this legitimate leadership, with broad and demonstrable support inside Venezuela, be empowered to lead a democratic transition through a credible and legitimate process.

—Nizar El Fakih is a nonresident senior fellow with the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Success will require years-long US diplomatic and economic efforts in Venezuela

While it’s far too soon to know Venezuela’s ultimate disposition following today’s operations, we do know that Trump says that the United States will essentially “run” the country for now. Trump has prided himself on touching many conflicts around the world—from those between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Azerbaijan and Armenia to Gaza and Ukraine—quickly claiming several as resolved. But one thing the administration has yet to prove in nearly all cases, especially Venezuela, is whether it has the sustained attention span for the years-long diplomatic and economic efforts required to bring societies out of chaos and repression.

Even a short-term endeavor of running Venezuela will cost significant US military and taxpayer resources. It will also require real diplomatic finesse to ensure that the United States remains a credible leader in the region, which has now become the centerpiece of US national security strategy. Meanwhile, China will likely continue its lower-key but serious commitment to economic development in Latin America and elsewhere around the world.

Venezuela will be a test of Trump’s strategy for US dominance in the region and whether his collective peace and security efforts—from Caracas to Kyiv—can result in real strategic advantages for the United States. The alternative would be a stack of unfinished US projects that leave real lives affected in the wake.

—Tressa Guenov is the director for programs and operations and a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. She previously served as the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Watching Venezuela from Tehran

From a technical and military standpoint, the US operation in Venezuela signals to Iran that Washington is increasingly confident operating against Russian-derived, layered air-defense architectures without needing to dismantle them through a prolonged, overt suppression of enemy air defenses (or SEAD) campaign. Venezuela’s inventory—anchored by S-300VM, Buk-M2, and point defenses such as Pantsir-S1, supported by Russian and Chinese radars—closely resembles the architecture Iran fields around critical sites. Yet the US operation appears to have achieved its objectives without forcing visible air-defense engagement.

Available reporting suggests the US operation evaded detection and engagement by leaning on standoff effects; persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); electronic attack; and compressed timelines. Under such conditions, systems like Buk and Pantsir may never generate a usable firing solution, while high-value S-300-class assets become difficult to employ without sustained targets, clear attribution, and political authorization. The issue is not only theoretical capability, but whether layered defenses can meaningfully influence outcomes during brief, tightly sequenced operations.

This reinforces a broader pattern Iran will recognize. Russian air defenses have struggled to impose decisive effects in other theaters—including Syria, where Israeli strikes have repeatedly penetrated layered systems, and Ukraine, where Pantsir, Buk, and S-300 variants have suffered attrition under modern ISR-strike cycles. 

Equally relevant is the diplomatic dimension. In Venezuela, as with Iran, US military action coincided with standing diplomatic offers—sanctions relief, normalization steps, and elements of proposed deals—kept on the table before and during the use of force. The combined signal to Tehran is that neither reliance on Russian air defenses nor the slow-rolling of US proposals necessarily alters the pace or structure of US action.  

Recent US strikes in Nigeria send a reinforcing signal. There the United States acted without prolonged warning or phased escalation, using remote airstrikes supported by the Nigerian government. These operations underscore a reduced tolerance for drawn-out escalation dynamics and a preference for short-duration, outcome-oriented use of force.  

For Iran, the relevance lies not in the specific targets or theaters, but in the demonstrated willingness of the United States to move decisively once thresholds are crossed. 

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She was previously the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council.

Maduro’s ouster will cause shock waves in the Middle East

The success of Trump’s bold operation to remove Maduro will cause global shock waves, including in the Middle East. Saturday’s successful operation puts Trump’s “locked and loaded” message on Friday to Iran’s leaders in a different perspective. However, the Venezuelan operation took months of planning, and there are no signs that the United States has the capability, or the intention, to pull off something similar in Iran.

Still, as a demonstration of Trump’s willingness to back months of rhetoric against Maduro with dramatic—and effective—action, Saturday’s operation should concern Iran’s leaders. Those who know their history—and the Trump administration has some like Sebastian Gorka who do—will remember that in 1956 the United States failed to follow up on its encouragement of Hungarian protesters against Soviet rule. The Trump administration ought to be aware of the dangers of vague rhetoric that cannot be followed up with action. Trump’s words to Iran and the Middle East in the coming weeks need to be made with steely-eyed capability and intention.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

Three scenarios for what could come next 

The US operation to capture Maduro and transfer him to stand trial in the United States on criminal charges dating back to 2020 marks a decisive inflection point for Venezuela. What follows will hinge less on Washington’s next move than on the calculations of the regime’s remaining power brokers, military commanders, intelligence chiefs, and political enablers who are now confronted with a stark choice: negotiate an orderly exit or risk annihilation alongside a collapsing system.

In the best-case scenario, Maduro’s arrest catalyzes elite defection. Faced with legal exposure, sanctions, and loss of patronage, regime underlings could seek guarantees for safe passage, limited amnesty, or third-country exile in exchange for transferring authority to the legitimately elected opposition. Such a negotiated handover would avert mass violence, stabilize institutions, and open a narrow but viable path toward economic recovery and international reintegration. 

Another scenario is that the United States has been working secretly with elements of the Venezuelan government who will take over. 

The worst-case scenario is far darker. If regime remnants reject negotiation and fragment, Venezuela could descend into a protracted guerrilla conflict. Armed colectivos, criminalized military units, and narco-linked factions could wage asymmetric warfare, turning parts of the country into contested zones and prolonging civilian suffering long after the regime’s formal collapse. 

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The post Experts react: The US just captured Maduro. What’s next for Venezuela and the region? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There are compelling reasons for the United States to increase its footprint in Nigeria, but fears of a genocide against Nigeria’s Christian population are unfounded. In fact, both Christians and Muslims are victims of violence and terrorism in Nigeria, as Trump’s own senior advisor for Arab and African affairs, Massad Boulos, has noted. If the United States is genuinely interested in helping the Nigerian government address violence and terrorism, then it must change course. After all, applying pressure on Nigeria risks driving it toward greater economic dependence on China or deeper military reliance on Russia, as has occurred with some of Nigeria’s Sahelian neighbors in recent years.

Why Nigeria matters

Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, is a major oil producer, and has the potential to become an African superpower. Contrary to the trajectory of many Sahel states in recent years, Abuja stands as a bulwark against further destabilization in West Africa and is a leader within the Economic Community of West African States. Though the country experienced democratic backsliding under former President Muhammadu Buhari from 2015 to 2023, Nigeria has been an electoral democracy since 1999—and it remains politically stable despite last month’s unconfirmed coup plot and military reshuffle.

Among African countries, Nigeria had the most favorable view of the United States in 2025, according to surveys by the Pew Research Center. While US favorability ratings in Kenya have dropped by double digits over the past year, Nigerian favorability ratings have remained relatively stable. Last year, two-thirds of Nigerians expressed confidence that Trump would do the right thing in world affairs, putting him three points ahead of former US President Joe Biden. By applying overt pressure in dealing with Nigeria, the United States would risk alienating a key regional partner whose population still expresses confidence in US leadership.

Moreover, if US ties with Nigeria were to deteriorate, this could provide an opening for China or Russia to gain influence. The Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity Index shows a steep rise in Chinese influence in Nigeria over the past decade and a half. China has become Nigeria’s largest trading partner, and Nigeria is one of the most active participants in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Last September, Tinubu met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, where the two leaders formally elevated China-Nigeria relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”

Russia, too, has increased its influence over Nigeria in the past decade, signing a military cooperation agreement with Abuja in late 2021. In May 2025, the head of Nigeria’s military visited Moscow for discussions with top Russian military officials. Russia offered additional weaponry and training, which the Nigerian military saw as a reaffirmation of Russian support. Following Trump’s comments about potential US military action in Nigeria, Russia warned that such a step could escalate global tensions.

Given these dynamics, US pressure on Nigeria could backfire, inadvertently driving the country into the arms of Russia and China. This would ultimately weaken US influence in a strategically vital region and mirror the path of some members of the Alliance of Sahel States—a bloc comprising Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—that have come to depend on Moscow for security and on Beijing for economic support.

Surveying political violence in Nigeria

Violence is a big problem in Nigeria, but it’s also a complex one. It’s local and it’s regional, occurring both between groups and within them. To shape effective US policy, it is important to understand the country’s complex landscape of political violence.

Nigeria ranks sixth among countries most afflicted by terrorism, according to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project lists Nigeria as one of ten countries globally—and three in Africa—experiencing “extreme” levels of conflict. As the charts below show, political violence in Nigeria has grown significantly since 2020, reaching all-time highs in 2025, though fatalities have not increased proportionally.

Political violence in Nigeria has risen—though fatalities have not grown at the same rate

Political violence in Nigeria    Demonstrations in Nigeria    Fatalities in Nigeria

Source: ACLED, accessed November 1, 2025

Terrorism in the northeast

The terrorist group Boko Haram has been militarily active in Nigeria’s northeastern states since 2009. The group’s violent attacks surged in 2014 and 2015, after it infamously abducted 276 schoolgirls in the town of Chibok and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). However, internal disputes prompted the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) to split from Boko Haram by 2016. Since then, an inter-jihadist turf war has been waged, leaving Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau dead in 2021. In 2024, armed conflict involving the two groups killed nearly 1,400 people, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)—and in 2025, they attempted at least twenty ambushes on military positions in Nigeria’s northeastern Borno State. On November 17, ISWAP militants claimed to have captured and killed a Nigerian brigadier general.

Banditry and kidnappings in the northwest

Nigeria’s northwest is a hub for criminal violence. Kidnappings in this region and throughout Nigeria are generally carried out by criminal gangs rather than ideologically motivated groups. In November, twenty-five schoolchildren were kidnapped in Kebbi State in northwest Nigeria and fifty-two more in Niger State in the country’s Middle Belt region. In March 2024, militants kidnapped 280 schoolchildren in the northwest state of Kaduna. Ansaru, a Boko Haram offshoot, is also active in this region. It is responsible for a series of kidnappings for ransoms and attacks against the Nigerian government.

Middle Belt violence

The crisis in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, one of the country’s most ethnically diverse regions, is mostly driven by farmer-herder conflicts. Violence in the Middle Belt occurs primarily between ethno-religious groups amid disputes over resources and land. These conflicts have long and complex roots, exacerbated by climate change and desertification. However, conflating violence by primarily Muslim Fulani herders against mostly Christian farmers with jihadist violence has, in part, led to misconceptions of a “Christian genocide” in the country. In some years, pastoral violence has indeed resulted in more fatalities than Boko Haram-ISWAP insurgencies—for instance, in 2018. However, this was not the case in 2025.

Oil militancy and piracy

Decentralized networks of oil militants, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), have attacked oil infrastructure and kidnapped oil workers in Nigeria’s southeast for two decades. While less threatening than in the 2000s, oil militants remain active, as evidenced by a MEND attack on an oil facility earlier this year. Piracy off Nigeria’s coast, once more severe than Somali piracy, has declined due to shipping security measures, but both pirates and militants continue to evolve and collaborate whenever opportunities arise.

Separatist troubles

Aiming to restore the short-lived Republic of Biafra, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) was established in 2014. Protesting the marginalization of the Igbo people, IPOB’s militant wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), has waged a low-level insurgency against the Nigerian government. In 2024, this conflict caused about two hundred fatalities, according to UCDP data. On November 6, just days after Trump’s statements about Nigeria, IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu appealed to the US president to investigate state-sponsored killings of Christians in eastern Nigeria. On November 20, Kanu was sentenced to life in prison for terrorism, raising the risk of further clashes between the ESN and security forces.

Neighboring problems

In neighboring Mali, the deadliest Salafi jihadist terrorist group, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), continues to expand its influence. JNIM launched its first attack in Nigeria’s Kwara State on October 28, killing one soldier. Of additional concern are potential links between JNIM and Ansaru. In late August, Nigerian security officials arrested two Ansaru leaders who allegedly underwent substantial training from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, now a part of JNIM. Boko Haram also operates in Cameroon’s Far North region.

How the United States can support Nigeria

Nigeria faces major security challenges, but carrots, rather than sticks, are more likely to succeed when it comes to US-Nigeria security cooperation. Two primary areas for strategic cooperation should be prioritized:

First, help professionalize Nigeria’s security services. A new US-supported working group presents opportunities for increased engagement with Nigerian military and security forces. This can help Nigeria build a force that appreciates the importance of professionalization, training, and respect for human rights. In late November, Nigeria’s national security advisor met with US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth in Washington. According to a State Department official, the United States is considering an “expansive” engagement plan, including intelligence sharing. Given Nigeria’s record of operational mishaps—including incidents that have killed civilians—this is an opportunity for the United States to help train the Nigerian military on intelligence analysis and mission planning.

Similarly, the United States can support Nigeria as it incorporates advanced technology into its military. In recent years, the country has expanded its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but there are risks to such rapid UAV adoption. In fact, the proliferation of drone technology can exacerbate domestic conflicts—and Nigeria is no exception. Between 2017 and 2023, at least three hundred Nigerian civilians were killed in Nigerian air force strikes. Extensive training and engagement, potentially including better communication systems and intelligence integration, could reduce casualties.

In addition to broader military engagement, the United States has pursued specialized partnerships with Nigerian forces. Last year, for instance, the US Coast Guard proposed a partnership with the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, and in the past, US special forces have trained the so-called Special Boat Service, a special forces unit of the Nigerian Navy—though this hasn’t occurred since 2021. Such efforts can both strengthen the integrity of the bilateral relationship and professionalize Nigerian forces. This cooperation can also help shape the force into a pro-Western military and build relationships between Nigerian and US soldiers that could foster future collaboration.

Second, support anti-corruption efforts. Nigeria’s security challenges exist within a context of widespread government corruption, which fuels the grievances of various rebel groups. In Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, Nigeria ranks 140 out of 180 countries, with 180 indicating the highest level of perceived corruption. For many Nigerians, working toward changing this status quo is a priority—and both the US administration and the Nigerian government should keep that in mind. Security cooperation alone isn’t enough. There must also be political action that improves government performance and accountability more broadly—something the United States could assist with. Recently, the Nigerian president warned public officials about corruption and government theft, opening the door for the United States to offer support for and encourage anti-corruption programs. 

Despite its myriad security challenges, Nigeria remains a major regional power. Trump is not wrong to focus on the country, but a punitive approach or unauthorized military action risks missing key opportunities to deepen engagement. If the United States relies solely on sanctions and threats, then it may find itself on the outside looking in. A more effective strategy is to engage Nigeria from within—offering carrots rather than sticks.

Haleigh Bartos is an associate professor of the practice in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. She teaches courses on policy writing and national security at Carnegie Mellon University.

John Chin is an assistant teaching professor of political science in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. He is the lead author of the Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups D’état, which was named one of the best historical materials published in 2022-2023 by the American Library Association.

Julien Derroitte is completing a BA in architecture with dual minors in international relations and political science and in American politics and law at Carnegie Mellon University.

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On November 18, the United Nations (UN) secretary general briefed the UN Security Council on “a moment of profound urgency” and the risk of “a disastrous domino effect” across West Africa and the Sahel. The ongoing blockade is an escalation by JNIM, with the group extending its reach further south than ever before. It is possible that the blockade forces the junta, led by Mali’s President Assimi Goïta, to the negotiating table, or in a replay of 2012 events, militant advances could provoke a coup d’état. A JNIM seizure of power, though less likely, is possible—and threatens to turn Mali into Africa’s Afghanistan, similar to the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 2021, where terrorists can train, operate, and plan freely in a safe haven.  

How did the situation arrive here? And what are the implications of a jihadist takeover in Mali? A JNIM takeover in Mali would represent the first time an al-Qaeda affiliate had taken power in a country, with major regional and underappreciated global implications. This strategic turning point in Mali’s decade-long insurgency could, in the short term, mark the beginning of the end of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, as well as Russian influence in the region. In the long term, a JNIM regime heightens risks of transnational terror.

A jihadist takeover is now on the board

Since 2012, Mali has suffered three military coups (in 2012, 2020, and 2021) and an escalating separatist-turned-Islamist insurgency. Domestic insecurity contributed to growing public and military unrest that led to the ouster of two democratically elected presidents, Amadou T. Touré and Ibrahim B. Keïta.

Attempts to restore democracy and stability have only had temporary successes since. In 2012, major population centers fell to Islamists and Tuareg rebels who sought to establish a regime in the north (sometimes referred to as the “Azawad” by some northern groups). French intervention with Operation SERVAL in 2013 saved Mali’s government and prevented extremists from moving further south on Bamako. The UN launched the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali in 2014 to bolster stabilization efforts. 

In 2017, a conglomerate of four smaller organizations, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), merged to form JNIM. Problematically, the security situation worsened in spite of the presence of UN and French forces, prompting calls for the West to leave Mali after the 2020 and 2021 coups. Ultimately, both France and the UN withdrew their forces, as Malian protestors waved Russian flags and called for Moscow’s support. They got it. By 2022, the Russian private military Wagner Group became Mali’s principal security partner. Human rights abuses and armed conflict only increased.

In 2024, Mali was ranked fifth among countries most affected by terrorism in the Global Terrorism Index. Armed conflict in Mali caused at least 1,900 fatalities last year, the third-highest figure on record (behind 2022 and 2023). JNIM expanded its geographical reach in central, northeast, and southern Mali. With the army and Wagner Group unable to protect many communities, pro-government Dozo militias have mobilized for self-defense across central Mali, often exacerbating insecurity. Army and Dozo operations to combat the fuel blockade brought record levels of violence and mass atrocities to Mali’s Segou and Sikasso regions last month.

The beginning of the end of the Sahel alliance

Burkina Faso and Niger have similar stories—a poor security environment as a result of JNIM and ISIS-Sahel attacks, military coups, and a fragile post-coup political environment as juntas repudiated Western security assistance and turned to Russian forces (initially Wagner Group, which morphed into Russia’s Africa Corps).

In September 2023, the three countries withdrew from the long-standing regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and in its place established the AES, a defense pact to defeat jihadists and maintain power. The fall of Bamako would lead one of three core members to leave the Sahel alliance; the rump Burkina-Niger axis would be imperiled and on the defensive.

A setback for Russia in the Sahel

Although JNIM sees itself as an alternative to “puppets of the West,” a JNIM takeover would first and foremost see Russia’s star over the Sahel dim. JNIM, which has been fighting Russian mercenaries for years, will not be lining up to deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The failure of the AES and Russia to defend Mali serves as a cautionary tale that Russian intervention often exacerbates conflicts on the ground. Ditching security cooperation with Western democracies for Russia’s Africa Corps in the name of national sovereignty may have been popular, but it is a losing strategy.

Russia’s influence across the African Sahel has expanded since 2017, with Russian forces arriving in Burkina Faso in January 2024 and Niger in May 2024. Russia will not receive such invitations from others at this rate.

Inviting the French back in may be out of the question in light of public opinion in the Sahel on French intervention, but regime change in Mali by either a rival military faction or JNIM extremists might provide a window of opportunity for the United States to bolster cooperation with eager states outside of the Sahel alliance—especially among the West African littorals and Mali’s neighbors. 

Risks of state-sponsored terrorism in Africa

If there is one group to watch on the continent other than al-Shabaab (one of al-Qaeda’s most competent branches that once had a pilot in flight training for a 9/11-style attack), it’s JNIM. If it were to capture the state apparatus in Mali, the country could easily become a haven for jihadists in the region and become a leading state sponsor of terrorism on the continent, much like Sudan became after Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood affiliate National Islamic Front) came to power following a 1989 coup.

Many terrorist groups in Africa that have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda senior leadership or ISIS remain fixated on local grievances despite rebranding—but JNIM has the potential to evolve given its al-Qaeda identity is baked into its roots. JNIM’s DNA is comprised in part of an organization, AQIM, that, despite also having local gripes, had leadership (though now deceased) that fought the Soviets in Afghanistan and had historical links to Osama bin Laden. JNIM maintained its allegiance to al-Qaeda senior leadership and maintained AQIM’s relevance and reach in the Sahel with a newer, larger, and more lethal brand under the leadership of Iyad al-Ghali.

Countries beyond the Sahel could become targets, and JNIM could expand its area of influence. At the end of October, JNIM claimed responsibility for its first attack in Nigeria, which killed a Nigerian soldier. It is worth noting that a Boko Haram spinoff, Ansaru, operates not terribly far from where this attack occurred—this group was once believed to have a connection to AQIM, though to what extent is unclear.

Bamako faces a stronger enemy than ever, but unlike in 2013, it now lacks Western support to defeat it. The African Union offers rhetorical support, but no boots on the ground. Military support from ECOWAS seems like the only plausible intervention. Despite the Sahel alliance rebuking Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso’s membership earlier this year, ECOWAS offered to keep the door for reengagement open. If there is a lifeline, Bamako should grab it. If left unchecked, JNIM could grow bolder, bigger, acquire additional affiliates, and, one day, sponsor or enable operations beyond the region.

Haleigh Bartos is an associate professor of the practice in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. She teaches courses on policy writing and national security at Carnegie Mellon University.

John Chin is an assistant teaching professor of political science in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. He is the lead author of the Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups D’état, which was named one of the best historical materials published in 2022–2023 by the American Library Association.

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These key decisions include removing al-Sharaa from the Specially Designated Global Terrorist list, renewing the pause on Caesar Act sanctions to help spur investments, and allowing Syria to reopen its embassy in Washington to “exercise its diplomatic role with full freedom on US soil,” as Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted. Both are important and strategic gestures highlighting where the United States stands on Syria’s future.

Syria’s head of state did not come empty-handed to the White House meeting. One day after al-Sharaa’s visit, the US embassy in Damascus announced that Syria became the ninetieth member of the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS. This marks a significant shift in Syria’s regional and international alignment—from one that was deeply seated in the Russian and Iranian spheres of influence under Bashar al-Assad, to its current position in the regional orbits of NATO allies and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. While US-Syria coordination against ISIS began shortly after Assad’s fall, in close cooperation with neighboring countries including Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, this formal participation underscores Damascus’s readiness and commitment to strategically partner with the United States, enhance its own security, and advance Washington’s counterterrorism interests in the region.

Nevertheless, Syria joining the coalition presents multifaceted opportunities, as well as key challenges and inherent risks—especially considering al-Sharaa’s violent jihadist background as head of Jabhat al-Nusra, which was Syria’s al-Qaeda offshoot earlier on in the country’s civil war.

Regional endorsements and emerging opportunities

The opportunities include the potential for increased intelligence sharing between Damascus and Washington. It also means enhanced military coordination and deeper regional cooperation in the fight against ISIS and other extremist groups rebooting in Syria. The intelligence sharing includes foreign fighter flows and money tracing, as well as disinformation and misinformation campaigns, according to former US diplomats familiar with the coalition’s work.

Diplomats from both Jordan and Iraq reinforced that Syria joining the coalition is a constructive and positive step toward enhancing their own national security interests, while strengthening Amman’s and Baghdad’s relations with Damascus. This is an important priority, especially for Iraq, given al-Sharaa’s violent past in the country amid the US occupation beginning in 2003. According to the authors’ diplomatic sources, both countries shared intelligence about one of the two ISIS plots to assassinate al-Sharaa, which the Syrian government announced on the heels of his historic US visit.

GCC members welcomed Syria’s entry into the anti-ISIS coalition. From the Gulf Arab states’ perspective, ISIS resurfacing is always a challenge, so having Syria on board is key to reducing the threat posed by the terrorist group.

The GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have played a significant role in persuading the Trump administration to view al-Sharaa as a legitimate and reliable partner. For example, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s influence was a factor contributing to Trump deciding to lift sanctions on Syria earlier this year. Gulf Arab leaders broadly believe that Syria should be reintegrated into the regional and international fold rather than left isolated. Without sustained external support and cooperation, officials across the GCC worry that the Syrian state could be too weak to govern effectively—creating power vacuums, and worsening economic and humanitarian crises that extremist groups like ISIS could exploit. In this context, Syria’s decision to join the coalition aligns with the Gulf states’ view that deeper international engagement with Damascus is essential to addressing the country’s challenges, including the renewed threat posed by ISIS in Syria.

That enhanced security cooperation also encourages the reopening of trade and transit routes, benefiting the Syrian economy through increased investment pledges beyond those already secured from key GCC members—namely Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Further, coalition-related stabilization funds, channeled through the United Nations or regional bodies, could indirectly support reconstruction in areas previously liberated from ISIS if the right oversight mechanisms are in place. The coalition also oversees humanitarian and developmental assistance to the areas affected by ISIS.

Complexities, contradictions, and risks of partnership

There are also complexities tied to these opportunities. Partnering with a government that, to varying degrees, remains politically and ideologically contentious domestically in Syria presents potential pitfalls—especially given al-Sharaa’s past. This history drives a reluctance in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—the group most instrumental to fighting ISIS with the coalition—to integrate into the Syrian state. While some diplomats in Washington see this as an opportunity to nudge the SDF to accelerate its integration into the new Syria, other policy analysts believe Syria’s joining undermines the SDF’s role in the coalition. Nevertheless, from the perspective of key allies in the region, including GCC states, a unified Syria is key, and thus, working on SDF-Damascus integration should be prioritized.

Reactions from violent Islamist militias aligned with ISIS who see al-Sharaa as an “infidel” remain a significant risk: one that al-Sharaa is aware of. One preemptive and timely measure taken last week was the fatwa issued by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) mufti Abdullah Al Mheissni supporting Syria’s decision to join the coalition to beat ISIS, which he called Khawarij/Kharijites, or a group of heretics. The fatwa affirmed that the presence of the international coalition necessitates “organizing the situation and controlling matters to ensure unity of decision and sovereignty, until the new state’s conditions stabilize, and the threat of ISIS is not used as a pretext for greater interventions or infringement.”

Other key challenges include the enduring influence of certain pro-government militias in Syria, some of which appear to be ideologically tied to specific global terrorist organizations, as well as the relative fragility of Damascus’s political authority and the broader security landscape. Armed factions aligned with the Syrian Ministry of Defense, such as the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade and the Hamzat Division, were implicated in sectarian-motivated massacres of Alawites along Syria’s coast in March. Such actions may cast serious doubt on the wisdom of treating the new Damascus government as a trustworthy partner in the fight against a virulently sectarian Sunni extremist organization such as ISIS. Compounding these concerns is the reality that foreign jihadists from China, the Western Balkans, the North Caucasus, and other parts of the broader Islamic world now occupy roles within the Syrian state apparatus. Their backgrounds, affiliations, and ultimate loyalties remain opaque, further complicating the picture for al-Sharaa’s government.

It remains to be seen what Syria’s membership looks like in the coalition, which continues to operate without a formal charter, according to Jim Jeffrey, Washington’s former special presidential envoy to the coalition during the first Trump administration. As Jeffrey elaborated, active membership in the coalition includes two pillars: military and diplomacy. Most members designate a military representative to the coalition, which Syria has yet to name. Rotating foreign ministerial meetings make up the main function of the coalition’s diplomatic pillar, which Syria can most certainly participate in.

“For now,” Jeffrey noted, “Syria joining the coalition is largely symbolic as it is unlikely to contribute financially or provide troops.”

However, he adds, al-Sharaa and “his colleagues know something about fighting ISIS,” and can be constructive in future US-led operations against the terrorist group. According to our sources from the Gulf, Syria joining the coalition formalizes a relationship that began during the Assad years when HTS was the de facto government in Idlib, and it cooperated with the coalition at a time when HTS was successfully driving out al-Qaeda and ISIS elements in the province.

Ultimately, Syria’s entry into the coalition represents an opening for deeper cooperation with the United States and its regional partners. However, the challenges posed by sectarian militias and foreign fighters embedded within the state underscore how fragile and conditional this partnership could prove. Ultimately, the success of Syria’s membership in the coalition will depend not on symbolism alone, but on whether Damascus can demonstrate consistent, credible commitment to countering ISIS while stabilizing its fractured political and security institutions. Syria’s strategic partners in the region and globally should also support its efforts as it deepens its engagement with the coalition to eliminate the threat of terrorism once and for all.

Merissa Khurma is the founder and chief executive officer of AMENA Strategies, an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute, and nonresident fellow at the Baker Institute. She formerly headed the Middle East program at the Wilson Center. 

Giorgio Cafiero is the chief executive officer of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He is also an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.

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Taken together, the trips, the visuals, and the massive investment of political capital that they represent for the Trump administration clearly signal that Syria is one of Trump’s top foreign policy priorities, that there is no alternative to al-Sharaa, and that Washington is not daunted by the likelihood of a long stabilization process with a significant price tag—as long as regional allies are doing much of the heavy lifting.

In October 2024 Trump had not yet been re-elected, Bashar al-Assad still ruled Damascus, al-Sharaa was on US terror lists, and US-Turkish relations remained stubbornly chilly. Thirteen months later, the new government in Damascus has arguably become the central focus of Trump’s Middle East policy, and Turkish partnership so central to that effort that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s right-hand man was in the room for Syria’s momentous Oval Office meeting.

The al-Sharaa element may be the most jarring. Much of Washington remains deeply skeptical of al-Sharaa’s intentions and ability to rein in extremism in his country, despite energetic and sustained support for sanctions relief and full engagement from the Trump administration. This is understandable given al-Sharaa’s past record of fighting against Western troops in Iraq and later helping al-Qaeda expand into Syria. But Westerners including former CIA Director David Petraeus had sensed a decade ago that al-Sharaa and his organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), were candidates for moderating and evolving into a force compatible with Western interests.

After breaking from and later targeting both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, HTS refocused its mission on representing all Sunnis in Syria and, since November 2024, all Syrians in a growing embrace of inclusivity and moderation. The Trump administration has taken the rhetorical and aspirational change as both substantive and likely to succeed. It has shown this by embracing the interim president of Syria in a high-profile manner—welcoming al-Sharaa to New York in September and Washington in November—that would have been almost inconceivable under any other US president.

Fidan’s visit and trilateral working meeting with his Syrian and American counterparts was equally remarkable. Fidan’s working relationship with Rubio’s predecessor, Antony Blinken, was cordial but focused more on mutual grievances than opportunities and reflected the process-heavy, results-challenged approach that marked Biden administration foreign policy more broadly. And Fidan’s predecessor, Mevlut Cavusoglu, had a fairly acrimonious relationship with Mike Pompeo, secretary of state during Trump’s first term in office. To see Rubio and Fidan working with their Syrian counterpart on details to keep a key Trump foreign policy initiative—stability in Syria—on track indicates a level of coordination and trust absent heretofore in the twenty-first century.

The hands that tied these two trips together belong to a man who appeared in some press photos but received scant mention otherwise—Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack. Barrack sees Turkey as critical to regional stability in multiple directions and Syria as critical to the security of both Israel and Turkey. Writing after the twin visits, Barrack assessed the results as potentially transformative on a range of US interests: peace in Gaza, Turco-Israeli rapprochement, containing Iran, and suppressing the Islamic State and other terror groups. Trump and Rubio have invested enough political capital in this embrace of Damascus and Ankara that it is clear Barrack has made the case for it convincingly. It also bears mention that Barrack’s close and supportive relationship with US Central Command chief Admiral Brad Cooper has amplified the voice and views of both men in Washington—they are the backstory of the dramatic changes reflected in last week’s visits. Such comity has not always pertained between senior Pentagon and State Department officials on the Syria file in the past.

What do the visits portend for the rest of the second Trump administration?

First, Syria will remain a top foreign policy priority for Trump, Rubio, Barrack, Cooper, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and others in Washington. It is the lynchpin of Trump’s Middle East approach: success there will have implications on the portfolios of regional counter-terrorism, security of Israel, countering Iranian militias, progress in Gaza, regional trade and development, and associated humanitarian concerns in Syria and surrounding countries.

Second, “there is no Plan B” to al-Sharaa—neither actively deconstructing Syria nor leaving it to its own devices is workable—and his survival will require continued close coordination with the Turks.

Third, after the headlines fade, an enormous amount of negotiation, business development, advisory efforts, investment, and deconfliction will be required for at least the rest of Trump’s term. Whether Washington has the patience to continue leading efforts with the degree of energy and salience seen in recent months remains an open question, especially with US midterm elections less than a year away. But at the end of a remarkable week, it may suffice to know that the path is open if the will is present.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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This escalation comes as senior US officials have warned the Lebanese government that its failure to uphold central provisions of the November 2024 cease-fire would lead to “grave” consequences. As tensions approach a boiling point, Israel must internalize the lessons of its October 7 security failures to ensure that no hostile actor can again pose an existential threat to the Jewish state.

Hezbollah’s return to the battlefield

Israeli officials report dwindling patience as they near a decision point on the northern front. On October 30, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz held a “special consultation” to discuss the Israeli response to Hezbollah’s ongoing violations. This follows calls by US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack for Hezbollah’s immediate disarmament and reports that the United States is no longer convinced by Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s claims that disarming the group is impossible. Barrack’s demands signal a hardening US stance on the issue: If Lebanese forces are not deployed to the south, Hezbollah is not disarmed, and direct negotiations with Israel are not undertaken, Israel will reserve the right to act unilaterally.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah is actively rebuilding and rearming, smuggling weapons across the Syrian border. Western intelligence officials have reportedly found that the group is replenishing its rocket stockpiles, recruiting new fighters, and restoring military sites in violation of the cease-fire agreement. Hezbollah has also shifted parts of its operations north of the Litani River to avoid confrontation with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and to subvert stipulations in UN Resolution 1701 and the November cease-fire, both of which call for the area south of the Litani to be free of non-state armed groups.

In response, Israel has stepped up its operational tempo. In recent weeks, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has intensified its campaign in southern Lebanon, carrying out frequent air sorties and precision strikes on Hezbollah infrastructure. Israeli officials claim that roughly 330 Hezbollah operatives have been killed since the cease-fire. Simultaneously, the IDF is conducting large-scale exercises simulating an October 7-style attack by Hezbollah.

Lebanon’s political paralysis

While the Lebanese government has made nominal efforts to disarm Hezbollah and restore a state monopoly on weapons, this objective appears largely unattainable within the parameters of the cease-fire due to Hezbollah’s political influence and the LAF’s lack of capability. Lebanon’s sectarian power-sharing system has allowed Hezbollah to become deeply embedded in national politics. Though the organization typically controls less than 15 percent of parliamentary seats, its alliances and grassroots mobilization ensure it remains a central actor in Lebanese governance.

In certain Shia communities, Hezbollah enjoys greater legitimacy than the central government. Although the Lebanese government presented an action plan to disarm the group—and Israel even agreed to scale back operations and withdraw from five outposts— Israeli and foreign sources maintain that “the road to complete disarmament is still long.” This comes as the LAF has reportedly exhausted its supply of explosives, while one Western intelligence official warned that “Hezbollah is rebuilding faster than the Lebanese army is dismantling.”

Lebanese officials contend, as Reuters put it, that “the army wants to avoid inflaming tensions and to buy time for Lebanon’s politicians to reach a consensus about the terror group’s arsenal in other parts of the country.” Hezbollah, for its part, has publicly refused to relinquish its weapons caches north of the Litani, hinting that conflict is possible if confronted by the LAF.

Avoiding the mistakes of October 7

With the LAF unable or unwilling to neutralize Hezbollah, Israel’s security establishment must integrate the lessons of October 7 into its strategic calculus as it prepares for a renewed confrontation on its border. Before that day, the IDF’s assumptions about Hamas deterrence proved fatally flawed. First, Israel fell into a mirror imaging trap. Israel assumed Hamas would act rationally as a governing entity, prioritizing the welfare of Gaza’s population and maintaining a functioning civil order. Moreover, the IDF expected periodic, limited escalations rather than a large-scale coordinated war. As a result of these assumptions, Israel pursued a “mowing the grass” strategy—frequently targeting the strip to degrade Hamas’s capabilities—which ultimately fostered complacency and a misleading sense of stability. The core lesson of October 7 is that deterrence cannot be taken for granted, and unaddressed threats inevitably metastasize into crises.

Israel must not repeat these errors with Hezbollah, even while the group appears weakened. The Israeli government cannot assume Hezbollah is deterred or constrained by domestic Lebanese politics or past fighting. Instead, the group’s rearming and rebuilding efforts are designed to threaten Israel directly and to bolster Iran’s regional deterrence strategy. Hezbollah has also likely learned from Hamas’s surprise attack and its own miscalculations during the 2024 conflict. The group likely underestimated Israel’s rapid escalation doctrine, expecting gradual tit-for-tat exchanges that would favor Hezbollah’s attritional strategy. Instead, the precision strike campaign—from the detonation of thousands of Hezbollah-linked pagers to an airstrike on Hassan Nasrallah’s underground headquarters—demonstrated Israel’s willingness to escalate rapidly and decisively. As a result, Hezbollah will likely adopt a more aggressive and risk-tolerant posture, seeking to preempt or complicate Israel’s ability to manage escalation.

Emerging from October 7 as a battle-hardened regional superpower, Israel must shift from deterrence by denial to deterrence by punishment. Lebanon’s fragile institutions appear to lack the capacity and the political will to dismantle Hezbollah. Therefore, Israel must be prepared to sustain calibrated military pressure while simultaneously building international legitimacy and regional partnerships to establish a durable security architecture in southern Lebanon. Only by combining military strength, diplomatic coordination, and strategic foresight can Israel prevent another front from exploding—and keep Hezbollah in check for the foreseeable future.

Jonathan Rosenstein is a program assistant on the Forward Defense team of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he supports work on nuclear strategy and space security.

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For Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, the designation and threat of military intervention couldn’t have come at a more politically fraught moment. With a population of more than 230 million people, Nigeria continues to grapple with inflation, a struggling currency, and widespread poverty despite recent reforms. With the CPC designation, Washington is questioning the government’s ability to protect its citizens from religiously motivated violence. The moment demands Nigeria to deliver a more coherent diplomatic posture toward the United States.

A relationship built on mutual interests

The US–Nigeria relationship has historically been one of pragmatic partnership. The United States is Nigeria’s largest foreign investor, with US investments concentrated in oil and gas, wholesale trade, and services. Bilateral trade surpassed thirteen billion dollars in 2024, and Nigeria ranks among the top African markets for US exports.

Washington also provides strategic security support, including military training, counterterrorism assistance, and limited arms sales to help Nigeria confront groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province, while also addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria, in turn, remains a strategic partner for US interests in West Africa, which faces overlapping crises of extremism, migration, and democratic backsliding. Under Tinubu, however, the relationship appears to be drifting—not through open hostility, but mutual disengagement.

A diplomatic drift

Since his inauguration in May 2023, Tinubu has not traveled to Washington and allowed a diplomatic vacuum to fester. In September 2023, Tinubu recalled all Nigerian ambassadors worldwide and still has yet to appoint permanent replacements. What’s more, he was conspicuously absent from Trump’s meeting in July with West African leaders. Tinubu’s distance from the White House may also reflect political caution on his part, following renewed reporting on his past in the United States, including his connection to a federal criminal case and questions about his academic records.

Although Tinubu appointed a handful of consuls-general and chargés d’affaires (including in Washington) earlier this year, Nigerian foreign policy experts note that these temporary measures fall far short of the representation expected of a country of Nigeria’s stature, and reports have detailed the poor state of Nigerian diplomatic missions. Officials in Abuja cite financial constraints for the delay in appointing ambassadors. Amid the dispute with the United States, Tinubu is now reportedly finalizing a list of ambassador nominees.

Tentative diplomacy

Tinubu’s contacts with the Trump administration appear to be limited. In April in Paris, he met for the first time with Massad Boulos, Trump’s senior advisor for Africa and a citizen of Nigeria among other countries. While that encounter signaled a tentative opening, there is no indication of any ongoing back-channel relationship.

Boulos himself recently stirred debate in Nigeria when he remarked publicly that it is not only Christians who are victims of violence in Nigeria. The comment diverged from claims made by Christian advocacy groups that a genocide against Christians is taking place in Nigeria, a claim that resonates with segments of Trump’s political base. Boulos’s attempt to bring some nuance to the conversation appears to have done little to shift Washington’s broader perception that Abuja has not done enough to contain extremist violence or to demonstrate accountability for religiously targeted attacks.

But even before the religious freedom debate, there was friction on other fronts. Earlier in July, Nigeria’s government vowed to resist pressure from the Trump administration to accept deportees from Venezuela and other third countries.

What the CPC designation means for Nigeria

Being named a “Country of Particular Concern” is not merely symbolic. Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), it places a country in the category of states that have “engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” It can trigger diplomatic censure and, in some cases, targeted sanctions or aid restrictions, unless the president grants a waiver for national-security reasons.

Nigeria was first placed on the CPC list in 2020, during the first Trump administration, but was removed in 2021 by the Biden administration ahead of then Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Nigeria. The decision drew sharp criticism from the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), an independent body created by the IRFA. And last month, US Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) introduced a bill calling for the CPC designation and the imposition of sanctions on Nigeria, including measures against Nigerian officials who “implement or support blasphemy and Sharia laws.” The redesignation, therefore, represents a policy reversal and a warning that Washington expects progress on religious-freedom protections or further consequences may follow.

At a crossroads

Tinubu, himself a Muslim, faces a delicate balancing act in a country roughly evenly divided between Muslims and Christians. Ahead of the 2023 presidential election, his selection of a Muslim vice presidential running mate from Nigeria’s northeast Borno state drew opposition from voters who considered the move at odds with Nigeria’s religious diversity. While his administration has vigorously rejected the notion of a “Christian genocide” in Nigeria—arguing that that framing does not reflect the true situation in the country—terrorist organizations have targeted churches, kidnapped clergy, and committed massacres in Christian farming communities. Washington’s renewed CPC designation challenges Nigeria’s leadership to confront Christian-targeted extremist violence more decisively.

For Tinubu, who has already clinched his party’s endorsement for re-election in 2027, his approach to this issue will define his foreign-policy credibility and political legacy. Domestically, as a politician from Nigeria’s predominantly Christian south, he must avoid alienating Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim north or feeding perceptions of Western bias in framing the country’s security crisis. Internationally, he must reassure partners that his government is committed to defending pluralism and prosecuting those responsible for faith-based atrocities.

The cost of inaction could be severe. Nigeria’s CPC status could complicate security cooperation—including military training and intelligence sharing—and add to concerns over the foreign investment environment unless Abuja demonstrates measurable improvements.

More profoundly, the designation exposes the fragility of Nigeria’s social contract. When Nigeria gained independence in 1960, its founders envisioned a country where ethnic and religious pluralism would coexist. Decades later, deepening religious and ethnic polarization poses a threat to that vision. Unless the Tinubu administration tackles corruption, poverty, and insecurity, any diplomatic fallout will be secondary to the domestic unraveling already underway.

A path forward

Restoring confidence will require concrete steps. Tinubu should:

1. Reassert Nigeria’s diplomatic presence in Washington. Nigeria, as the world’s largest Black democracy, should project the diplomatic stature befitting its status on the world stage. The absence of robust diplomatic representation has left Nigeria increasingly vulnerable in Washington. The country has been hit hard by the new US tariff policy and could face further repercussions if the Trump administration expands its travel ban. This diplomatic gap is particularly striking given that Nigeria is the most common country of origin for African immigrants to the United States and those of African descent. Restoring a full ambassadorial presence in Washington can help send a message that Abuja has the will and resources to revitalize US–Nigeria relations. A credible diplomat with bipartisan connections in Washington could help reset the tone of engagement and re-establish trust.
2. Open Nigeria’s doors to transparency and external scrutiny. It is not enough for the government to dismiss claims of a “Christian genocide.” Nigeria must cultivate an atmosphere of transparency that allows external observers to assess the facts firsthand. That should include inviting assessments by USCIRF or multilateral partners such as the United Nations or the African Union, along with greater access for journalists, civil society organizations, and independent researchers.
3. Restore accountability in Nigeria’s fight against sectarian violence. Many Nigerians have grown accustomed to government complacency and the impunity that has characterized the violence across parts of Nigeria. Abuja’s credibility at home and abroad depends on visible consequences for perpetrators of sectarian violence—regardless of faith or region—and protection of witnesses who can testify to atrocities. That starts with better funding for security forces. Nigeria’s fight against insecurity may remain a myth if its police force remains underfunded and ranked among the lowest globally in capacity and morale. The government must also address growing concerns that former Boko Haram fighters and other defectors are evading rehabilitation and reintegrating directly into local communities. Compensating victims, whether Christians or Muslims, while empowering them to rebuild and resettle, could further signal that the state values every Nigerian life equally.
4. Prioritize the welfare of Nigerians and address the root causes of violence. Nigeria’s minimum wage stands at 70,000 naira (about $48) per month—one of the lowest in Africa—while legislators, among the highest paid globally, earn between $150,000 and $190,000 annually, and there has been a recent push for increased pay. This disparity reflects a failure to align the cost of governance with the realities of most citizens. Long-term security will depend on tackling the roots of instability: poverty, youth unemployment, and social exclusion. With eighty million Nigerian youths out of work, the government must expand education, job creation, and rural development, especially in conflict-prone areas. Prioritizing these domestic investments would signal commitment to reform and help shift Nigeria’s global image from a country that manages crises to one that builds resilience.

For its part, the United States should moderate its pressure with an open door for engagement. Blanket condemnation risks provoking defensiveness in Abuja. Constructive partnership could yield better results. US policy should aim not merely to punish but to strengthen Nigeria’s capacity to protect its own citizens. Without a doubt, Nigeria’s renewed CPC designation is a diplomatic alarm bell, but it need not herald a breakdown in US–Nigeria relations or escalate into a wider geopolitical standoff, with Beijing already warning against US “interference” or “use of force.” As an African adage cautions, “when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”—and in this case, ordinary Nigerians stand to bear the cost of great-power rivalry in the region. The current imbroglio could instead become an inflection point, prompting both governments to re-evaluate their priorities and restore the principled cooperation that once defined their ties.

But the ball is now in Tinubu’s court. With Nigeria on the brink of a major diplomatic crisis with one of its most important strategic partners, he must confront extremist violence without inflaming sectarian divides, rebuild diplomatic trust with Washington, and prove that Nigeria’s diversity is its strength, not its death knell. If he can navigate that delicate balance, Nigeria might yet emerge from this moment of scrutiny stronger, more credible, more prosperous, and more united.

Ohimai Amaize is a Nigerian journalist and the senior editor for social media strategy and audience engagement at the Atlantic Council.

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A coup that promised stability—and delivered chaos

When Colonel Assimi Goïta seized power in back-to-back coups in 2020 and 2021, he vowed the “refoundation” of a sovereign and secure Mali. Instead, the Malian army—trained to fight terrorism—ended up dismantling what was left of the state’s institutional foundations.

Initially expected to strengthen the military, the power grab only deepened its divisions, splitting the army between privileged loyalists of the regime and those sent to the front lines. Coupled with the departure of international forces from Mali, this fragmentation led to abandoned positions, weapons falling into the hands of separatists, and jihadists expanding their hold over the rural north.

Meanwhile, internal purges multiplied and intelligence services—once meant to hunt terrorists—turned inward, redirecting their focus toward political opponents of the regime. The recent imprisonment of former prime ministers Choguel Maïga and Moussa Mara epitomizes a security apparatus more obsessed with loyalty than with counterterrorism.

Bamako’s isolation has deepened

Mali’s internal fragility has been exacerbated by the fact that it has methodically cut itself off from regional and global partners. While its break with France could be framed as a quest for independence and a response to two decades of unsuccessful anti-terrorist operations, Bamako’s estrangement from African allies—particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—and its withdrawal from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission underscore the junta’s preference for isolation over cooperation.

Even relations with Algeria, which once maintained relatively cordial ties with Mali, have sharply deteriorated. In April, Mali accused its northern neighbor of sponsoring terrorism after the Algerian military shot down a Malian drone. Algiers responded by closing its airspace to Malian aircraft. Meanwhile, Turkey’s recent diplomatic overtures in Algeria suggest that Ankara—which had deepened cooperation with Mali over the past years—might also adjust its policy away from Bamako.

The Russia illusion is fading

The junta’s hope that new alliances could fill this gap has not materialized. Initially optimistic that cooperation with Russia’s paramilitary Wagner Group would help the Malian military suppress jihadist insurgencies, the partnership has instead produced disastrous outcomes. After the Russian mercenaries failed to make meaningful gains, the Kremlin announced in June that it would restructure the paramilitary organization into a new entity called the “Africa Corps,” leaving behind a gaping security and political vacuum.

According to internal reports, Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries have since repeatedly clashed on the ground, and northern Mali has once again become a contested battlefield. In January 2024, the official abrogation of the 2015 Algiers Accord—a peace agreement with armed insurgent groups—reignited separatist tensions. As a result, the war in the north now stretches almost one thousand miles of front lines across territory the army struggles to control.

Amid this chaos, Mali has become a proxy battleground. Diplomatic sources cite indirect Ukrainian involvement—including intelligence assistance, drone supplies, and support for groups hostile to pro-Russian mercenaries. Meanwhile, Turkey advances its influence by supplying Bayraktar drones and technical support to the Malian army. Mali has essentially become a geopolitical chessboard, where foreign interests and competing local ambitions collide.

The economic asphyxiation of a landlocked nation

Adding to the chaos is Mali’s dependence on supply routes that are increasingly vulnerable. The landlocked country relies heavily on the Dakar-Bamako corridor to import essential goods. Senegal exports nearly 60 percent of its petroleum products to Mali, representing over 20 percent of its foreign trade. Meanwhile, the Casablanca-Nouakchott-Bamako corridor is blocked, as the commune of Diéma in the Kayes region is under siege by armed groups. The Abidjan-Bamako corridor is also disrupted, and even the internal route between Bamako and the city of Ségou in the northeast has come under growing threat, with attacks and kidnappings on the rise.

For weeks, fuel supplies have been interrupted by convoy attacks and restrictions imposed by armed groups, creating endless lines at Bamako gas stations. In a country where transportation, electricity, and logistics depend on diesel, this shortage is tantamount to a national shutdown. For the army, the consequences are severe: Without fuel, armored vehicles are immobilized, convoys are grounded, and northern bases are left exposed.

A fractured and demoralized society

Mali’s diversity has historically been a strength. Between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries, the Mali Empire, founded by Soundiata Keïta, was one of West Africa’s largest and most powerful civilizations. Stretching from the Senegal River to Gao and from the Sahara to the Gulf of Guinea, it thrived on multiculturalism and trade among different groups. In the fourteenth century, Mali was essentially a global commercial crossroads, supported by a flexible system that ensured stability across vast and diverse lands while maintaining a tradition of religious tolerance.

Today’s Mali tells a different story. Ethnic tensions in the central and northern regions, amplified by military abuses, have shattered intercommunity trust. The advent of self-defense militias has fractured national cohesion, and entire villages now refuse to cooperate with the armed forces. The demoralized population oscillates between fear and resignation.

Paths to reconstruction

The US evacuation call could foreshadow Mali’s imminent collapse. Yet, an end to the junta’s reign would not be cause for triumphalism, as Malians’ legitimate desire for sovereignty would persist.

For the time being, the urgent task is to mend the national fabric, restore constitutional order within a renewed governance framework, and rebuild alliances. To that end, the army must return to its primary role: defending the homeland, not governing it.

Counterinsurgency presents the most daunting challenge in this regard. France spent almost a decade on the ground, and while it had some early success, it abandoned its counterinsurgency effort.

While intelligence and counterinsurgency will be important going forward, it will be important not to repeat the mistakes of the past. Given the country’s fragmented state, dialogue with jihadists may be unavoidable. Still, their Wahhabi-inspired ideology remains marginal in Mali—and excessive concessions could spark conflict. Is there a potential institutional framework that reconciles demands for Islamization with maintaining a federal republic?

Addressing geographic challenges through deep decentralization or pragmatic federalism could restore power and responsibility to Mali’s regions. Engagement with the Atlantic—via Morocco’s proposals to enable access to the ocean for Sahel countries and Senegal’s historical cooperation—remains critical. Rebuilding ties with the subregion to jointly combat terrorism and reintegration into ECOWAS, even if it requires reform, is equally urgent.

Finally, Mali will need patriots capable of enlightened leadership—something the immediate predecessors of the junta failed to provide—to chart sustainable economic prospects. Mali’s assets remain vast: It is among Africa’s top gold producers; has untapped reserves of lithium, iron, bauxite, phosphates, manganese, and uranium; and has significant agricultural potential from cotton and livestock. Moreover, Mali maintains a strategic position in West Africa, with strong hydropower and solar potential, and, above all, a large and determined youth population.

All it needs is the right leadership to seize that potential.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Hussein Ba is a Senegalese columnist who frequently covers security and political issues in Mali.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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So what should this next phase include? Who or what might play the spoiler in further peace-building efforts? And what moves should we expect from the different sides and stakeholders? To better understand what could come next, Atlantic Council experts answer twenty pressing questions below.

1. Will Hamas return deceased hostages to Israel? 

The question of Hamas’s ability to return deceased hostages still in Gaza not only concerns the human aspect of returning their bodies and bringing closure to their families, but also the future of phase two of the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas. 

If Hamas fails to return all the bodies and Israelis do not sense that Hamas is doing everything in its power to return them, an already fragile level of trust between the parties will be further damaged. It will complicate the capacity to implement the following stages of the deal. In fact, we are already seeing this dynamic play out in the deal’s opening days. 

It is certainly possible that Hamas has lost contact with the areas where it buried the bodies, due to the aggressive Israeli military campaign waged in the Gaza Strip. Yet the central question is not whether all the bodies will be returned—and I certainly hope that all affected families will have a grave to visit—but rather Hamas’s willingness to help. Will Hamas go to great lengths to find all of them as a means of trust-building with Israel and the mediators, in a way that will show a deep willingness to lead to an end to the war and comply with the terms of the deal? We don’t yet know the answer. 

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He is also a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. He previously served for twenty-five years in Israel Defense Intelligence.

2. Will Israeli forces exit Gaza? 

When it comes to the question of whether the Trump-brokered cease-fire deal will progress out of “phase one” into a full Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from Gaza, caution is in order.  

First, although the Trump plan calls for a timed phasing of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, elements in the plan are clear “yes or no” conditions. These include critical matters such as the verification of Hamas’s disarmament, the establishment of international security forces, and an alternative governance structure for Gaza. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated on October 10 that “in the second phase of the deal, Hamas will be disarmed, and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized. It will happen either diplomatically, according to the Trump plan, or militarily, by us.”  

Second, Israel’s security requirements will override any political concerns regarding US dissatisfaction with its adherence to any withdrawal timeline. Elements number thirteen and sixteen of the comprehensive plan indicate that Israel has the latitude to maintain IDF presence in Gaza to ensure that Hamas’s military capability is eliminated and that the group cannot be reconstituted. In addition to disarmament requirements, Israeli security officials have repeatedly insisted on the importance of maintaining geographic control over strategic areas inside Gaza. For example, Israeli officials previously insisted that Israel will not withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor despite terms indicating that Israeli will eventually need depart the security buffer zone. This almost nine-mile buffer zone along the Gaza-Egypt border remains under Israeli control, and it is likely to continue to represent an obstacle to Israel withdrawing from the strip. Third, Gaza’s political vacuum must be filled with a competent governing authority. The Palestinian Authority is not trusted by Israel to manage this task, nor does it have the capacity to govern, secure, and oversee the rebuilding of Gaza.  

Finally, even if the above conditions are all met, Netanyahu’s political coalition remains a formidable constraint. Netanyahu leads a government dependent on far-right parties that vehemently oppose any withdrawal. Senior Israeli officials, through the Israeli press, have emphasized that the cease-fire creates only “a ‘reduction in fire,’ not a full cease-fire,” and that the IDF will remain “deep inside Gaza.” An Israeli official described the deal’s novelty as allowing Israel to “get all the hostages, stay in Gaza, and keep negotiating.” This framing suggests that Israel already sees the cease-fire as a net benefit for the country, with both the release of hostages and the preservation of an ongoing presence as key achievements. Consequently, the most realistic projection for phase two is partial, tactical Israeli redeployments within Gaza. These movements will include reducing troop presence in some areas while maintaining control over strategic corridors, buffer zones, and border areas, instead of the complete exit that phase two formally stipulates. After what Israel experienced on October 7, it is unwilling to do anything less. The full withdrawal of Israel Defense Forces from Gaza will depend on the US administration’s ability to oversee the implementation of Trump’s plan. 

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

3. What are Gaza’s humanitarian needs—and will they be met? 

Much of Gaza is destroyed, Israel is still occupying half of the strip, and the vast majority of the population is displaced. Gazans, therefore, need everything from food and nutrient packages to bring famine under control to resources such as baby incubators for hospitals and parts to repair water and sewage lines. Additionally, winter is approaching, and the population needs tents and other winterization items.  

While a cease-fire deal earlier this year permitted food entry in sufficient quantities, it did not permit shelter items. Medical evacuations also need to be permitted to surge, and countries need to step up and agree to accept cases. Road- and rubble-clearing machinery is needed to open more routes for aid trucks, and the trucks themselves need spare parts so that more vehicles can be put back on the roads. The humanitarian organizations on the ground in Gaza know how to get the job done, but that’s if and only if they are allowed to do so. And that is very much up to Israel and the Trump administration continuing to turn the pressure screws. 

Israel controls how many trucks are permitted to enter Gaza and the routes that the humanitarian community can use to access pick-up points. These routes, especially the main one that goes through Rafah to the Kerem Shalom crossing, have historically been nicknamed “looter alley.” As humanitarians have long stated, and as a recent Sky News investigation revealed, looting along these routes has been carried out by gangs that Israel has armed. So another big question is whether Israel will force these gangs to stand down. Desperate Palestinian civilians also have looted convoys. Allowing sufficient aid into Gaza will eliminate both these dynamics, as civilians will no longer be as desperate, and the aid that the armed gangs sell on the market will no longer have financial value. In other words, the scarcity that creates looting will be eliminated.  

—Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need lifesaving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

4. Will Hamas renounce political power and disarm?

Hamas will try to maintain a significant political role in postwar Gaza, and it will resist proposals to totally disarm. The group’s acceptance of the cease-fire and return of hostages represents pragmatism, not moderation. 

Hamas apparently agreed to the cease-fire and return of all remaining hostages under heavy pressure from regional states ready for the war to end. The group also recognized that the leverage it had gained from holding the hostages was declining significantly. Israel’s military operations were taking a heavy toll, and Israel had a green light from the United States to continue its assaults on Hamas positions in Gaza City if the group did not agree to exchange the hostages for Israel’s Palestinian prisoners. And Palestinian civilians in Gaza, after two years of being displaced from their homes and experiencing dire humanitarian conditions, were increasingly demanding an end to the war, risking Hamas being blamed by Gazans for refusing Trump’s plan for peace. 

But even as it signed onto the cease-fire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange that mark the first phase of the US peace plan, Hamas has registered its opposition to key terms of phase two: that it disarm and end its role in the governance of Gaza. The group also objects to the plan’s call for an international security force to police Gaza, arguing that postwar security and governance should be handled by Palestinians. And the group quickly backed up its rhetoric with action, placing uniformed Hamas police on the streets as the cease-fire went into effect, and the Israeli military withdrew from parts of Gaza.  

Hamas may try to deflect pressure for its full disarmament and removal from governance in Gaza by offering partial measures and securing the backing of key regional states. In negotiations earlier this year, Hamas leaders signaled some flexibility on these issues, saying they would consider giving up the group’s heavy weapons, such as rockets and missiles, and were willing to have some senior Hamas officials leave Gaza. Hamas also will likely try to enlist support from Egypt, which has advocated that the group have a voice in future Palestinian governance in Gaza, and Turkey, whose leaders call the group a legitimate resistance movement and oppose Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Egypt has announced plans to convene a Palestinian national dialogue on the future of Gaza in which Hamas will take part, allowing the group to exercise significant influence over the postwar debate. 

—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He previously served for thirty-seven years at the Central Intelligence Agency, covering the Middle East and counterterrorism.

5. What’s next for the Abraham Accords? 

US experts on the Middle East are trained by experience to be pessimists. After all, given the nature of the region, a reflexive fatalism generally allows one to appear prescient. But this tendency can also blind us from recognizing truly positive developments when they occur. The Gaza cease-fire agreement, which reflects Hamas’s defeat (but not destruction), is one such development. The US decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities was another, as was the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus, and so were the Israeli military and covert action successes against Hezbollah. And all these geostrategic earthquakes followed the most important positive change in the region in the last decade, the announcement and expansion of the Abraham Accords—a development that at the time I called a strategic victory for everyone except Iran.  

So, what’s next for the Abraham Accords? The conventional wisdom today among US experts is typically pessimistic, that any further movement on the integration of Israel into its wider region has been set back immeasurably by the horrors that Israel has inflicted upon the Palestinian people in Gaza, including tens of thousands of innocents who were used as pawns and shields by Hamas. There is obviously a degree of truth to this conclusion. The images of real Palestinian suffering at Israeli hands that dominated social media across the Arab and Muslim worlds for the last two years will not be forgotten anytime soon. Indeed, the prevention of any further expansion of the Abraham Accords, especially to Saudi Arabia, was almost certainly a major driver of Hamas’s decision to murder and kidnap Israeli innocents, and thus intentionally trigger so much destruction upon the Palestinians.  

Nevertheless, this conventional wisdom is wrong. Indeed, this is the time for newfound optimism. Depending on what diplomatic steps follow the recent agreement, it wouldn’t be surprising if the Abraham Accords are expanded again even before the end of Trump’s second term. This is certainly a priority for the White House, and the events of the last few weeks demonstrate how much that still matters within the region. Much of this hinges on whether the agreement’s first phase can be followed by others—building along the path laid by the intentionally vague twenty-step plan that is now on the table—and thus whether Trump, Arab leaders, and the Israeli and Palestinian peoples can relaunch a legitimate peace process that leads toward a two-state solution. 

This is the real opportunity ahead of us, a once-in-several-generations opportunity that has been won from the blood and pain of Israelis and Palestinians, and the remarkable Israeli military victories over Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, all critically assisted by Washington across two administrations. The opportunity is to remake the region geopolitically, economically, and militarily into one in which the Iran-led so-called “Axis of Resistance” is defeated both ideologically and physically, and the Middle East is at peace, prosperous, and finally inclusive of Israel. It would be a historic tragedy if those who took so many risks in wartime fail now to have the courage to take the diplomatic risks necessary to secure a lasting peace.  

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director for Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council. His last position in the US government was deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combatting terrorism.

6. Will Israel agree to a Palestinian state?

Trump’s twenty-point plan contains political kryptonite for Netanyahu in one provision: the call for discussions on a credible pathway to a Palestinian state. This was surely an element Trump forced Netanyahu to swallow. Ahead of the 2026 Israeli elections, Netanyahu likely will argue that the conditions for Palestinian Authority reforms and reconstruction in Gaza have not been met. But he will also likely go further, asking Israeli voters who they trust to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state—him, with his long record of opposition to that outcome, or less experienced rivals. The argument may have salience with some voters he needs to win back, as many Israelis after October 7, 2023, are not open to the prospect of a Palestinian state, although it is unclear if converting those voters would be enough. That theme in Israeli political discourse could also depress the enthusiasm of Arab states to play their part in the day-after in Gaza—from reconstruction funding, to stabilization forces, to supporting Palestinian Authority reforms and Gaza governance. 

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East.

7. What’s coming next in the West Bank? 

October 7 and the war that followed shifted public attention away from a sharp rise in Israeli settler and IDF attacks on Palestinian people and property in recent years. With a cease-fire now allowing for the broader redeployment of Israeli forces, that trend is likely to continue.  

Already in 2025, the United Nations has documented 180 Palestinian deaths linked to settler and military violence, and the IDF has bolstered its presence in the West Bank significantly in recent weeks in advance of the Jewish holidays. Levels of violence are likely to rise as the security situation there becomes even more unstable.  

This instability will be fueled by renewed Palestinian and international attention on the long-expired and corrupt mandate of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Trump’s long-term peace plan envisions a role for the Palestinian Authority in both the governance and security of Gaza, but only after key reforms addressing these issues are undertaken. Netanyahu, however, opposes such an expanded role for the Palestinian Authority. As Abbas continues to benefit from his long-extended time in office, he and Netanyahu may find themselves unlikely allies in stymieing any move to greater Palestinian Authority legitimacy even as violence continues to spike. 

—Jennifer Gavito is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. She previously served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Iraq and Iran.

8. What’s the future of the Trump-Netanyahu relationship?

During Trump’s speech before the Knesset on Monday, he had a surprising request for the Israeli president, regarding the corruption case hanging over Netanyahu: “Why don’t you give him a pardon?”  

Netanyahu was already going to be relatively indebted to Trump, but the US president’s support is even more important now politically, even a pardon is unlikely anytime soon. While a permanent cessation of the war is likely to eventually thaw some of the hostility that Jerusalem is facing from much of the international community, Netanyahu’s reliance on US support has only grown since the beginning of Trump’s second term. Netanyahu’s popularity in Israel is diminished. And while the hostages coming home may give him a bump in support, a large swath of the population will never stop blaming him for October 7 and its aftermath—as Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and former senior adviser, experienced firsthand. 

At the same time, Trump—who will relish the lavish praise Israelis across the ideological and political spectrum are giving him—will likely recognize that his leverage with Netanyahu is at an all-time high as the future of the US-Israel bilateral relationship is in flux. For example, the ten-year US-Israel memorandum of understanding will expire in 2028, and negotiations on a new one will have to begin long before then. They will do so at a time when Trump’s “Make America Great Again” wing of the Republican Party increasingly aligns with the left of the Democratic Party in its skepticism of support to Israel.  

Given Trump and Netanyahu’s relationship today, Jerusalem may need to be more deferential to Washington’s preferences in the coming months. But history has repeatedly demonstrated that if the United States and Israel aren’t aligned on a policy, then the Israelis are unlikely to simply defer to Washington’s preferences. And if that happens, the mirage of today’s unbreakable relationship between Trump and Netanyahu could end up evaporating quicky, just as it did at the end of the president’s first term. 

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

9. How will the far-right in Israel react?

Elated over the release of the hostages from Gaza, Israelis nonetheless are torn over the parameters of the bargain that has won their freedom. Nowhere is that dilemma felt more intensely than among the ranks of Religious Zionism (RZ) and Jewish Power (JP), the two far-right partners to Netanyahu’s government, which were most ideologically invested in the prime minister’s promise of “total victory.”

In the days since the cease-fire took effect, the IDF has withdrawn from approximately half of the Gaza Strip, where armed Hamas operatives have redeployed prominently to the streets. Those developments alone—without consideration of additional Israeli concessions yet to come—already stand in direct contravention to red lines set by RZ and JP, whose leaders are telegraphing that their days in the Netanyahu coalition may be numbered.

But those threats belie a complex political reality confronting those two parties, which are both in danger of shrinking sizably when Israelis next go to the polls. RZ and JP apparently have resolved to keep their powder dry and remain in the coalition for the time being. Resigning against the backdrop of captives being reunited with their families would be a losing strategy. It could also prove to be in vain. With details and timelines of the agreement’s subsequent phases still amorphous, and the possibility that negotiations could thus run aground, RZ and JP have cause to wait and see whether their hopes of resuming the war until Hamas is totally eradicated might materialize after all.

Conversely, plenty of triggers could accelerate their departure and a collapse of the government. There are a few possible scenarios that could send RZ and JP running for the exits, including a formal declaration that the war has ended—something that the United States and other mediators are proclaiming openly, despite Israel not acknowledging this—and any degree of tolerance demonstrated for renewed attacks against Israel.

All that said, many of the cards remain in Netanyahu’s hands. The prospect of snap elections—far from certain, but possible if Netanyahu decides to try and capitalize on the deal—would make any ultimatum by RZ and JP moot. In that case, ironically, the far right could then find itself embedded within a caretaker government but stripped of its leverage.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administrations of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.

10. Will an international security force for Gaza be created?

The current Trump plan is based on a plan by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, which calls for the Gaza International Transitional Authority (GITA) to be supported by an International Security Force (ISF) of troops from Arab, Muslim, and other nations. GITA and ISF need to provide security and reconstruction under a common command structure, which it looks like former British Prime Minister Tony Blair will lead. If Hamas refuses to lay down its weapons, as seems likely, GITA and the ISF should take over the parts of Gaza where Hamas is not present. Hamas will try to force out the ISF, so the ISF will need to have the backbone to stand its ground and resist Hamas’s destructive efforts. Security and reconstruction are linked: where there is no security, there will be no reconstruction. 

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

11. Who will be involved in the postwar governance of Gaza?

The Gaza International Transitional Authority will be overseen by a “Board of Peace” that Trump will chair. Heads of state or other very senior international figures want to join the board. This board will set policy guidance for GITA, with Blair playing a leading role. Expect to see Egypt, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Indonesia, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries involved. But the key question is, who will contribute troops to the International Security Force? 

—Thomas S. Warrick

12. Will the Palestinian Authority be involved in Gaza?

Yes, eventually. The current violence among the remnants of Hamas and other gangs in Gaza is a stark reminder that there must be a clear and strong Palestinian hand in charge in the strip. The continued violent jockeying for power only deepens the disaster for Gazans. 

Hamas agreed to a Palestinian Authority (PA) role, and it will not stop fighting any Palestinian faction it sees as being backed by Israel. As imperfect as the PA is, it does have credibility as a governing body and is best placed to attract wide support among Gazans. Both credibility and support would only be strengthened if PA officials and the international community take seriously the efforts to reform the PA that the Trump peace plan demands. Good governance standards must be enforced among a reinvigorated PA. 

Though Palestinian leadership elections haven’t been held in years, the PA would be the strongest partner to help organize them. Elections are critical to build trust and sustain credibility in the long-term process. 

—Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley is a distinguished fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She served as the US ambassador to the Republic of Malta and as special assistant for the Middle East and Africa to the secretary of state. Her Middle East assignments included election monitoring in the Gaza Strip.

13. What role will Arab states play in Gaza going forward?

Determining the role of Arab states in the subsequent stages of Trump’s peace plan is challenging, given the plan’s lack of a comprehensive framework beyond phase one. Arab nations, as well as Turkey, are anticipated to contribute to an international stabilization force focused on monitoring cease-fires, ensuring security, training a new Palestinian police force, and establishing local law and order. While these states have expressed support for such a force, most have not publicly committed troops yet, likely opting for financial and diplomatic assistance instead. 

In addition to security efforts, Arab states are expected to play a crucial diplomatic role in overseeing Gaza’s new governance structure. Their economic contributions will also be vital. But substantial financial support is unlikely without guarantees regarding Israel’s future actions, its illegal settlements, and the establishment of Palestinian statehood. Addressing these issues is essential to resolving the root causes of the conflict. At this stage, it is important to remain cautious and maintain modest optimism. The effectiveness of Arab states in this process, their level of involvement and influence in shaping Gaza’s future, will largely depend on the outcomes of negotiations in the next phase, which will determine their level of involvement and influence in shaping Gaza’s future. 

—Ali Bakir, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

14. What role will Turkey play in Gaza going forward?

Ankara has been a key supporter of Trump’s drive for a lasting cease-fire in Gaza, the return of Israeli hostages, an Israeli military withdrawal, and a path toward Hamas’s demilitarization and removal from power in the strip. Turkish intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın has been a central player in multilateral negotiations, and Turkish observers are set to join those from Egypt, Qatar, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates in a cease-fire monitoring organization, the Civil-Military Coordination Center. Deep mistrust and antagonism between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Netanyahu may limit the scope of Turkey’s role in what comes next, but for stabilization to succeed in Gaza, Turkish assets—including construction capabilities, working relationships with the Palestinians and Arab states, and experience in aid and relief operations—must play a role.  

There have been previous instances of Erdoğan and Netanyahu setting aside their mutual antagonism to pursue a modus vivendi, and the current trade and diplomatic cutoff between Jerusalem and Ankara could unwind if both sides move pragmatically. This will require Trump to make good on his April 7 offer to help “work it out” between the two countries. The ruling parties in both countries see one another as threats and competitors in the region, but there is no path or profit for either in sustained confrontation. In Gaza, as in Syria, the elements are present for a constructive if wary coexistence that contributes to peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. 

—Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian.

15. How is Iran viewing these developments—and will it try to intervene?

The official response to the Gaza cease-fire and peace plan was given on social media by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s foreign policy advisor, Ali Akbar Velayati: “The beginning of the ceasefire in #Gaza may be behind the scenes the end of a ceasefire elsewhere. #Iraq_Yemen_Lebanon.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also mentioned the cease-fire as a positive step, while explaining that Iran could not accept Egypt’s invitation to the peace summit chaired by Trump in Sharm el-Sheikh. He said it was not possible for Iran to engage with the United States while it threatened to strike Iran again. Clearly, the US decision to refuse visas for the Iranian delegation to attend the United Nations General Assembly last month and the snapback of UN sanctions promoted by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany also factored into the decision.

More broadly, the regime and its supporters have presented the peace agreement as a victory for Hamas and the resistance network of Iran’s allies and proxies.

Among the Iranian population, there is a wide range of views, including calls from the reformist camp to engage with the United States and accept the Egyptian invitation. Some suggest that there is an opportunity to restart negotiations with Washington around the nuclear program and the lifting of sanctions. In fact, that also seems to be in Trump’s mind as he has started to look beyond the present cease-fire for a wider regional settlement. 

Some Iranians are also critical of Hamas, questioning why Iran ever supported the terrorist group. Hamas has been described as ungrateful and blamed for bringing death and destruction to Iran, and the region, through the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks. It is noteworthy that Hamas did not thank Iran in its statement on the cease-fire, while mentioning Arab countries that helped mediate. 

At this point, it seems likely the Iranian regime will focus on rebuilding its own facilities destroyed by Israeli attacks and its posture against Israel. This could include the rebuilding of Tehran’s air defense systems, cracking down on internal dissent, seeking out so-called Israeli spies, and gradually looking for ways to reinforce allies in Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere. The wiser voices in Tehran may also call for relaunched negotiations with the United States and look to capitalize on Iran’s newfound integration into the wider Arab and Islamic community facilitated by Israel’s Gaza campaign, as well as its attacks on Qatar, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. 

—Nicholas Hopton is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as British ambassador to Libya (2019–2021), Iran (2015–2018), Qatar (2013–2015), and Yemen (2012–2013). 

16. How is Hezbollah in Lebanon reacting?

Hezbollah has yet to explicitly comment on Hamas’s decision to accept the Gaza cease-fire terms. However, Hezbollah’s general statements on the end of the Gaza war tend to validate the necessity of ongoing resistance narratives against Israel, which fits into its efforts to retain its weapons as the Lebanese government moves to disarm Hezbollah and bring all arms under the control of the state. 

Hezbollah has generally abided by the November 2024 cease-fire that ended thirteen months of conflict in Lebanon, although Israel continues to stage near-daily air strikes mainly against Hezbollah personnel and facilities. There is much speculation in Lebanon that if the cease-fire holds in Gaza, it could allow Israel to pay more attention to its northern front in Lebanon, possibly expanding and escalating its attacks against Hezbollah. The end of the conflict in Gaza may also refocus international attention on the goal of disarming Hezbollah, which could place further pressure on the Lebanese government and raise tensions in the country in the weeks and months ahead. 

—Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, covering the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria.

17. How are the Houthis in Yemen reacting?

The current Israel–Hamas truce is not regarded by the Houthis as an optimal outcome, as they see it merely as a tactical maneuver by Israel. At a deeper level, the truce undermines their broader ambitions, eroding the regional relevance and political momentum they gained through Red Sea hostilities and attacks on Israel. Not to mention, the Houthis have become the strongest member of the Iran-linked “Axis of Resistance.”  

Ideologically, the Houthis are unlikely to refrain from their war against Israel in the future. Their cause is deeply rooted in a doctrine encapsulated by their slogan: “Death to Israel.” It is also a political necessity. The Palestinian cause is the Houthis’ key entry into this fight as part of the Axis of Resistance. Consequently, they will seek to monitor and exploit any loophole in the current cease-fire or future events as justification to resume hostilities. So, what happens next is still an open case.  

From Israel’s perspective, the Houthis continue to be a long-term threat that transcends the Gaza conflict. Israel, thus, intends to eliminate that threat. Expect their confrontation to persist, at least for the foreseeable future. 

—Osamah Al Rawhani is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

18. How do Iraqi militias view the cease-fire and what is the impact on Iraq?

Iraq’s Iran-aligned militias, such as Kataib Hezbollah, have issued statements welcoming the cease-fire and condemning Israel. But the groups had already taken steps to divorce their own actions from the fighting in Gaza, largely halting strikes against the United States and Israel long before the end of the Gaza conflict and release of the hostages. October 7 and Israel’s war in Gaza prompted nearly two hundred strikes by Iraqi militias against US bases in Iraq and Syria, as well as repeated efforts by the militias to strike Israel.  

For many of these militias, Israel’s war in Gaza was an opportunity to put pressure on the US military presence in Iraq, but launching kinetic strikes was also necessary to demonstrate their solidarity with the Axis of Resistance. However, none of these groups—unlike the Houthis in Yemen—have a strong ideological commitment to the Palestinian cause, and so the combination of US strikes, the threat of Israeli retaliation, pressure from the Iraqi government, and Iranian guidance effectively halted militia strikes in 2024.  

While Iraq’s militias remain linked to and are supported by Tehran, many of the groups are increasingly becoming political and economic actors with their own domestic interests. Right now, that means a focus on Iraq’s November 11 parliamentary election rather than the next phase of the Israel-Hamas cease-fire agreement. For the Iraqi government, the cease-fire is a welcome development that eliminates one potential source of instability. The post-October 7 period has shown that Iraq’s stability is highly vulnerable to regional developments—whether from the war in Gaza or any escalation between Israel and Iran.

—Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

19. Does an end to hostilities affect cases at the International Criminal Court?

The end of attacks on Gaza does not change the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) jurisdiction over the situation in the State of Palestine, nor the Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP’s) mandate to investigate—but it may impact the OTP’s investigation. If investigators can access Gaza, or if victims and witnesses are able to leave Gaza, then they may be able to access more evidence. However, the OTP has reportedly declined to apply for new arrest warrants for Israeli officials over fear of additional US sanctions. Such concerns may continue to delay progress.

That said, the OTP’s investigation is not just into Israeli officials. The OTP applied for arrest warrants for three Hamas leaders in May 2024. Israeli forces killed two before the Pre-Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants in November 2024 and killed one after. Increased access to evidence in Gaza and a more stable situation may allow the OTP to more swiftly build cases against surviving Hamas perpetrators.

Regardless, ending attacks on Gaza better allows states and international bodies to document the harms committed there, to hold both Israeli and Hamas leaders accountable, and to support Palestinians as they build transitional justice processes.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

20. How will Israel’s military campaigns over the past two years impact a potential new Memorandum of Understanding with the US? 

With the current US-Israel Memorandum of Understanding set to expire in 2028, Israel’s military campaigns over the past two years will inform a new agreement, requiring an alignment between operational realities and strategic commitments. US policymakers will insist the assistance strengthens Israel’s legitimate sovereign security needs while reducing risks of unintended civilian harm. The US Congress will likely press the statutory mandate to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge, but it will also likely attach enhanced civilian protection protocols and cooperative training. 

Operational lessons—counter–unmanned aerial systems, missile defense integration, subterranean countermeasures, precision strike coordination, and intelligence fusion—will drive joint investment priorities and industrial cooperation, creating opportunities to engender accelerated technology transfer and co-development. Similar to the transfers associated with the Abraham Accords in 2020, diplomatic sensitivity will require calibrating public messaging and managing allied concerns, ensuring that the capabilities provided do not exacerbate regional escalation. Success will rest on candid US‑Israeli dialogue bolstered by the ongoing senior bilateral Joint Political Military Group, and a forward‑looking commitment to interoperability and innovation, producing an agreement that supports an Israel at peace with its neighbors. The new Memorandum of Understanding should signal to regional partners and adversaries that deterrence is durable and cooperation remains central to shared security. 

—R. Clarke Cooper is a distinguished fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State.

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The answer is yes, but. . . On Friday, Hamas agreed to release all of the remaining hostages that it captured during its October 7, 2023, terrorist attack on Israel, and the Israeli government said it was preparing for the hostages’ “prompt release.” But at the same time, Hamas called for further negotiations over a US- and Israeli-backed proposal for ending the Israel-Hamas war. US President Donald Trump responded by saying that “Israel must immediately stop the bombing of Gaza” to allow for the hostages’ release. What does Hamas’s statement signal about a potential cease-fire? And how will Israel respond? Our Middle East experts share their insights below.  

• Jennifer Gavito: Nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former US acting principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs 
• Jonathan Panikoff (@jpanikoff): Director of the Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former US deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East 
• Ahmed F. Alkhatib (@afalkhatib): Director of the Atlantic Council’s Realign For Palestine project and native of Gaza City

What has Hamas agreed to?

• Hamas’s statement is “no question a positive development,” says Jen, “albeit one that is likely to expose all sides’ intentions and constraints going forward.” 
• Jonathan called the Hamas announcement, “a play out of Iran’s playbook.” That’s because instead of a simple yes or no, Hamas is trying “to buy time through a muddled response that seeks to redirect the pressure” to the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. 
• Ahmed expected a “yes, but” response from Hamas. But he said it is “surprising” that the Hamas “has defied the US president’s take-it-or-leave-it offer” in “foundational areas.” Hamas, Ahmed notes, essentially divided the deal in two: first, a “cease-fire and hostage deal,” then “security and political arrangements.” 
• “Trump’s statement welcoming Hamas’s agreement reaffirms a positive vision for the end of the conflict, but likely unrealistically so,” Jen tells us, laying responsibility at the feet of Israel and Hamas to carry that vision forward. 
• Ahmed, however, was surprised by Trump’s positive response, saying that the US president’s social media post reflects either “a desperate desire to end this war at all costs or a grave misunderstanding” of what Hamas has agreed to. 

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What is Netanyahu thinking? 

• Netanyahu will “almost certainly” be “disappointed” with Trump’s post, Jonathan tells us, since it could signal US support for reopening negotiations on the peace proposal. But he adds that the proposal’s “insistence that Hamas be disarmed,” among other conditions, “were never going to be accepted by the group.” 
• For Hamas’s announcement to develop into a cease-fire, it will require “immediate and politically painful reciprocation” from the Netanyahu government, Jen says.  
• But, as Jonathan tells us, Netanyahu’s “domestic politics have not been this flexible since the beginning of the war.” That’s because even if “ultranationalist” members of Netanyahu’s coalition were to withdraw in opposition to the agreement, members of the opposition “would almost certainly fill the void to secure a hostage deal that ends the war,” he says. And if a coalition collapse triggers an early election, Israel must hold legislative elections by October 2026 anyway.

What’s next?

• Whether these developments will lead to an end of the war in Gaza in the coming days “will ultimately turn on the question of Hamas’s disarmament, as well as on the sequencing of Israeli hostages being released and Israel Defense Forces’ withdrawal from Gaza,” says Jonathan.  
• Another aspect of peace negotiations that “will be fraught,” says Jen, is the nature of a proposed postwar international security force and who would participate. 
• “Some Arab countries have already made clear their participation is contingent on a clear Israeli commitment to Palestinian sovereignty and a return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza,” Jen notes, conditions that right-wing members of Netanyahu’s coalition are likely to block. 
• Ahmed finds it “concerning” that “Hamas wants to have influence and a role in how the Strip is governed” in a postwar settlement. This demand, he says, “presents a very serious risk of Hamas realizing one of its long-sought goals, which is to reign but not directly rule” over Gaza, which he says is a “cheaper and more palatable option” to Hamas. 
• Even given the uncertainty around the future of peace negotiations, says Ahmed, “there is hope that any end to the fighting will still bring a desperately needed reprieve for a population that has suffered so horrendously over the past two years.” 

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Beyond this most recent poster, ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K; ISIS’ affiliate based in Afghanistan) has actively worked to recruit TIP fighters, including by increasing its Uyghur-language propaganda, offering economic incentives for TIP members to join ISIS-K, and encouraging its followers to attack Chinese targets. ISIS-K’s recruitment efforts and propaganda targeting Uyghurs have already proven effective. In January, ISIS-K killed a Chinese national at a mine in Afghanistan (which was reportedly a joint attack with the TIP). ISIS-K members also conducted a shooting in late 2022 at a hotel in Kabul popular with Chinese travelers, and in 2021 an ISIS-K fighter using the kunya “al-Uyghuri” attacked Shia Muslims in Kunduz.

The Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group which generally practices Islam and speaks a language related to Kazakh, face systemic oppression and human-rights violations from the Chinese government. China’s atrocities against Uyghurs, who primarily live in the Western Chinese province of Xinjiang, include forced labor, religious persecution, separation of families, and mass surveillance. The United Nations describes China’s campaign against the Uyghur minority as “crimes against humanity,” as Chinese policies are aimed at destroying the Uyghur language and culture.

Beijing, for its part, views the majority of Uyghurs as a security threat following several small-scale attacks by the TIP in the early 2000s, and it claims that its harsh measures in Xinjiang are meant to eradicate terrorism. 

The TIP is a jihadi group primarily composed of Uyghurs from the Western Chinese province of Xinjiang; estimates of its size range from 1,500 to four-thousand fighters. Beijing’s oppressive policies against the Uyghurs underpins and helps to fuel their goal of establishing an Islamic Uyghur separatist state in Turkestan, in northern central Asia—including parts of China’s Xinjiang Province. Although the TIP has not yet made any territorial claims to establish Islamic Turkestan, its attacks against Chinese interests in Afghanistan demonstrate its capabilities and intent to pose an ongoing threat to China. These attacks drive the cycle in which Bejing paints all Uyghurs as terrorists then cracks down on Muslims in Xinjiang, providing TIP with leverage to generate propaganda and continue attacks.

Furthermore, the TIP has longstanding links to al-Qaeda, with its former leader serving on al-Qaeda’s Shura council during the 2010’s. This alliance, underpinned by a shared Salafi ideology and commitment to violent jihad, ultimately led to a brigade of about 2,000 Uyghur TIP members fighting alongside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), al-Qaeda’s affiliate in northern Syria, in the Idlib province during the Syrian Civil War. 

Although the TIP aligned with al-Qaeda after ISIS and al-Qaeda split in 2014, ISIS is currently  targeting the group for recruitment and partnership, likely as part of a broader recruitment campaign. ISIS-K is recruiting from multiple disaffected groups across Central Asia and Afghanistan, including  Tajiks, disillusioned former Taliban fighters, and other ethnic minorities to bolster its capability to conduct external operations. To date, ISIS-K’s recruitment efforts targeting minorities have been successful, as evidenced by the arrests of Tajiks and other Central Asians for their 2023 involvement in several attack plots against soft targets in Europe. To maintain cohesion amongst these disparate groups, ISIS-K portrays itself as the sole protector and promulgator of Salafi Islam, routinely promoting its views of a global caliphate. ISIS-K’s narrative of protecting Islam, establishing a global caliphate, and killing all takfiris (infidels), including the Chinese, is a key narrative in its current push to attract Uyghur recruits.

There are two key drivers for ISIS-K’s drive to recruit TIP members and Uyghur jihadis more broadly: first, it pragmatically seeks to expand its ranks with experienced fighters from Syria. Even though the recent recruitment poster was broadly aimed at all Uyghur Muslims, it is likely that ISIS seeks to capitalize on the flow of Uyghur jihadis from Syria. The TIP brigade that fought alongside HTS in Northwest Syria is now facing pressure from the new Syrian government to leave the country. As recently as last December, reports indicate that TIP representatives held discussions with the Taliban about transferring Uyghur foreign fighters to Afghanistan from Syria, leveraging al-Qaeda’s (and by extension, the TIP’s) historical ties to the Taliban. This group of fighters represents a prime recruitment opportunity for ISIS-K: the TIP’s experience fighting in some of the most intense battles of the Syrian Civil War could provide ISIS-K with battlefield proficiency, which many of its other, younger recruits lack.

Although the TIP has historically aligned with al-Qaeda, TIP’s new alignment with ISIS-K is driven by changes in the global terrorist environment. Its expulsion from Syria, al-Qaeda’s diminishing influence, and ideological overlap are all factors that may nudge the TIP to expand cooperation with ISIS-K. ISIS-K has established itself as an effective jihadiorganization with a worldwide reach, which regularly substantiates its calls to violence against takfiris and positions it to attract currently-unemployed jihadis from other groups. Ideologically, the TIP’s narrow focus of incorporating China’s Xinijang Province into Islamic Turkestan meshes with ISIS-K’s goal of developing a global caliphate and presents an area of overlap that ISIS-K can leverage to recruit TIP fighters. Should ISIS-K and the TIP formally align, the establishment of Islamic Turkestan under an alliance with ISIS-K could expand the caliphate into Central Asia.

Second, ISIS-K is well-positioned to capitalize on the Taliban’s recent turn against the TIP.  The Taliban seeks to court Chinese investments in Afghanistan, but China views the TIP’s presence in Afghanistan as a threat to its interests—and has pressured the Taliban to crack down on Uyghur militants. The TIP’s presence in Afghanistan has been detrimental to the Taliban’s relationship with China; for example, in February, the UN reported that the TIP maintains a presence in Badakhshan, a mountainous province bordering China that has long been a hotbed of terrorism. Since 2001, a wide variety of terror groups have established training camps in Badakhshan, including ISIS-aligned militants, allowing the province to become a critical location for cross-training among terrorist organizations. China had previously pressured the Taliban to remove the TIP from Badakhshan, but the Taliban’s spotty counterterrorism record—along with ISIS-K’s entrenchment in the province—indicates that the Uyghur group is sharing territory with, and likely building ties to ISIS-K. As the Taliban cracks down on its former ally, the TIP, ISIS-K’s burgeoning recruitment efforts indicate it is primed to bring TIP fighters into the fold to expand its own ranks.

The burgeoning ISIS-K/TIP partnership is likely to further threaten Chinese interests. As China continues to expand its investments in Afghanistan, including a recent promise to develop the Belt and Road Initiative there, Chinese workers and representatives are likely to face attacks from both TIP and ISIS-K members. China’s repeated human rights violations against Uyghurs in Xinjiang fuel the TIP’s anger and provide ISIS-K with propaganda material to continue to recruit disaffected Uyghurs and TIP members alike. Finally, as China pressures the Taliban to crack down on the TIP, those fighters may join forces with ISIS-K, which has taken up the cause of Islamic militancy against China—continuing to drive the cycle of violence. 

Morgan Tadych is an open-source intelligence professional, Army veteran, and Atlantic Council Counterterrorism Project member. She spent much of her military career researching strategic Eurasia issues and deployed to conduct counterterrorism missions, and is currently pursuing a graduate degree in the field.

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On September 24, Alexander B. Gray, nonresident senior fellow of the GeoStrategy Initiative of the Scowcroft Center, appeared on Fox News to discuss President Trump’s desire to reclaim the Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

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1. How is the US military’s role in the region changing?

The Trump administration’s actions to increase US military capability and presence in the Caribbean and Latin American region are decisive, send a very clear message, and, I believe, are long overdue. However, we shouldn’t be surprised by this. During the administration’s first term, it launched one of the largest US military operations in this region against drug cartels under the operational command and control of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which laid the groundwork for what we’re seeing in the second term. 

In April 2020, US SOUTHCOM received Navy destroyers, Coast Guard cutters, surveillance aircraft, and Army units for this counternarcotics mission that continued into 2021. In his January 2025 inauguration speech, US President Donald Trump announced his intention to designate drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists, which took place in February. Trump also called for the total elimination of cartels and TCOs, and he is following through with his mandate. The designation unlocks new tools for US law enforcement and the US military to target these groups and their financial networks. 

For decades the United States has been interdicting drug vessels in the Caribbean. As I have said many times, the United States can’t simply interdict its way out of this. Deadly drugs continue flooding into the United States and killing Americans. Venezuela is one of the largest humanitarian crises of our time, with over eight million Venezuelans having fled the country into Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries whose economies were greatly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and are having a really hard time supporting this continued increased migration flow.  

Maduro, who stole the 2024 Venezuelan election from Edmundo González, is a bad actor aligned with US adversaries Iran, Russia, and China (known as the “Axis of Aggressors”) and the drug cartels and TCOs. With his close relations with Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing, Maduro facilitates relationships with Cuba and Nicaragua, perpetuating illegal activities close to the southern coast of the United States and destabilizing the wider region. Last year at US SOUTHCOM, we determined that the drug cartels/TCOs amassed over $310 billion in revenue in 2023, which is more than five times the combined defense budgets of the thirty-one nations in LAC. Also, the administration increased the bounty on Maduro to fifty million dollars, and it has said this is a war on narco-terrorists. 

In order for US SOUTHCOM to be successful in this counternarcotics mission for Team USA, it needs persistent military capability and presence all the time—not just one or two times a year for a couple of weeks. The Western Hemisphere is the hemisphere we live in, and it has desperately needed our consistent and persistent attention for many years. While in uniform, I testified that the region needed an Economic Recovery Act similar to the Marshall Plan in 1948, due to the crime wave that ensued after the COVID-19 pandemic. The actions taking place today are getting after this deficit of US presence, and Team USA is on the field with their jerseys on, and strategically engaged in the region. 

—Laura J. Richardson is a retired four-star general in the US Army who commanded SOUTHCOM from 2021 to 2024. She is on the Atlantic Council’s board of directors and the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center‘s advisory council.

2. Could US strikes in Venezuela be next?

We should take Trump at his word when he hints that the United States is evaluating the possibility of striking targets inside Venezuelan territory. It’s a bad time to be operating a drug smuggling business off the coast of the eastern state of Sucre, to be posted in a guerrilla encampment in western Táchira, or to be running a cocaine lab along the Colombian border in Zulia state. One big challenge for US military planners, however, is that Venezuela has a functional air defense system, which it has kept running with the help of Russian advisors. Any strikes in Venezuelan territory may have to first take out air defenses, which could further complicate US relations with Moscow at an already tense moment.  

There is also the risk that any strikes on Venezuelan infrastructure or military assets could provoke an escalatory response from the Venezuelan armed forces. So far, the United States has carefully avoided striking any target that could destabilize the country or risk provoking an internal armed conflict. Last week, the USS Jason Dunham kept a cool head when two Venezuelan F-16s flew over the vessel twice in less than twenty-four hours, suggesting that—for now—the White House is interested in avoiding direct engagement with the Venezuelan military. That could change, but for now I think we’ll see continued saber rattling that appears aimed at signaling to disaffected elements of the Venezuelan armed forces that now is the time to rise up against strongman President Nicolás Maduro. The problem with this approach is that US-backed operations have failed to produce such cracks inside the Venezuelan government over the past twenty years.  

All of this points to the big question: Is the United States looking to advance regime change, or is it looking to advance democracy at the same time as it advances energy, migration control, and other geopolitical interests? The past few weeks have seen a military buildup and mounting pressure, but as recently as July, Washington eased restrictions on Venezuela’s oil exports after negotiating a prisoner release. Even now, in spite of the tensions, the United States and Venezuela are cooperating on the president’s migration agenda. The US government is funding twice-weekly Immigration and Customs Enforcement deportation flights that take off directly from US military installations and land in Venezuela’s largest airport. All of this suggests that the White House is moving forward an “America first” approach that is focused on advancing US core interests while also taking transnational drug trafficking seriously. Careful targeting, clear communication, and a focus on the importance of restoring democracy through targeted pressure and strategic engagement will be crucial in the weeks to come. 

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and former director of the Venezuela program at the Washington Office on Latin America.

3. How are US military operations affecting the wider Caribbean? 

In the wake of the US deployment of naval assets to the region, most Caribbean leaders have issued statements for the region to remain a “zone of peace.” However, the region currently is far from peaceful. The Caribbean is a transit point for small arms and drugs, both of which fuel gang activity, homicides, and crime in many of the islands. In fact, some Caribbean countries have among the highest homicide rates in the Americas. Further, Maduro’s persistent aggressive antics on the border with Guyana—via naval, land, and air incursions—have dissipated the mirage that the Caribbean region remains peaceful. Therefore, the United States should work closely with Guyana to ensure that the country does not become a victim to any aggression from Maduro as he gets backed into a corner by current and future US operations.  

Still, while a more aggressive approach toward counternarcotic operations might be warranted, ad-hoc operations will not provide long-term security in the Caribbean. What’s needed are sustained efforts backed by financial and technical assistance. Fortunately, the Trump administration and the US Congress have the tools at their disposal to do so through pending renewal of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). Increasing the budget of CBSI is a must. Presently, the proposed $88 million allocated to the Caribbean across thirteen islands barely puts a dent in stemming the movement of illegal guns and drugs. Further, continued diplomatic outreach to Caribbean leaders is needed to ensure that counternarcotic operations are a cooperative mechanism, ensuring that most governments come onboard. In addition to helping stem the flow of drugs in the region, US-Caribbean cooperation will have the added benefit of potentially isolating Maduro further from his regional allies.   

—Wazim Mowla is the fellow and lead of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

4. How can the United States declare victory in this operation? 

Trump came to office promising to put an end to “forever wars” abroad, while also promising to take seriously the threat of transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, and to address it with US force if necessary. Thus far, that’s what this operation is seeking to achieve—and balance. The challenge for the White House is clear: What is a win in this counternarcotics operation and how could it be sustained? If the operation ratchets up to strikes inside Venezuela, then how is this done in a way to avoid further destabilization that could have cross-border impacts? With multiple armed groups operating in Venezuela and a military that has so far shown allegiance to Maduro, a US missile strike on drug labs, for example, could bring secondary ramifications. And would any strikes inside Venezuela be limited to only counternarcotics targets or could they include Venezuelan military installations?  

The last major US military operation in Latin America came during Operation Just Cause to oust Panama’s Manuel Noriega over thirty-five years ago, but that was an operation where the US relied on precision bombs rather than long-range missile strikes. Success in this operation would likely involve long-term, significant ratcheting up of US military presence to halt drug smuggling operations at sea. 

Maduro is clearly thinking of a plan B, one that involves sparking an internal armed conflict if this US operation goes beyond counternarcotics and attempts to remove him from power—through direct US actions, an internal uprising, or a combination of both. Venezuela’s militia may not number four million, as Maduro has claimed, but there are certainly enough fighters to fuel a years-long civil war that could accelerate outward migration and fuel instability in South America. In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas numbered just twenty thousand at their peak in the 1990s, and they unleashed havoc on the country. With that number they were able to threaten not just the Colombian countryside but the power centers in Bogotá and other major cities. That should be a cautionary tale for anyone who thinks that regime change in Venezuela will be quick or easy if it leaves out segments of the Venezuelan population. 

So, what’s next? In the coming days, Maduro may reach out via his ongoing communication with the White House, potentially making offers around oil and critical minerals, or otherwise seeking to leverage Venezuela’s natural resources to strike a deal. If this happens, then the administration should proceed with caution and press for democratic reforms, the release of political prisoners, and an end to the persecution of opposition activists. Maduro is a serial abuser of dialogue, so any offers should be clearly weighed against past noncompliance. Of course, the focus of any kind of future talks should be on how to advance a peaceful, democratic solution—one based on credible commitments rather than false promises. 

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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How much progress has Sharaa’s administration made in its aims to revive the economy, centralize the government, and ensure the country’s security? Several of our Middle East experts recently visited Damascus, and they share their on-the-ground insights below. 

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Ibrahim Al-Assil: The mood is cautious but forward-looking

Jonathan Panikoff: Sharaa’s most urgent challenge is unifying the country’s religious and ethnic minorities 

Alex Plitsas: Syria should join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS

Gershom Sacks: Transforming Syria into a positive force

The mood is cautious but forward-looking

Landing in Damascus to examine the transition and engage with local actors and government officials, the city felt both determined and precarious. Ministries gutted by years of war and sanctions are being rebuilt almost from the ground up. Technocrats and private-sector veterans have stepped forward to “volunteer for the state,” working long hours with scarce resources to restore basic services and credibility. Yet the picture is more complex, and the challenges go well beyond a hollowed-out bureaucracy: fragile legitimacy, violent domestic episodes, and intricate regional dynamics present deep and serious obstacles. 

The officials we spoke with underscored the stakes: stability, they said, is essential to containing the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and preventing Syria’s fragmentation, yet it remains undermined by foreign powers backing different factions. Negotiations with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces remain tense as the government seeks full integration. On the Kurdish side, distrust of Damascus’s willingness to share power and guarantee security runs deep, and Israeli strikes further heighten a sense of vulnerability. Even as Syrian officials emphasize inclusivity, the conversations in the streets reveal lingering divisions, with minorities voicing fear for their future after this year’s bloodshed in the coastal region and Sweida. 

Economic efforts reflect this tension between ambition and constraint. The Ministry of Economy is courting investors, drafting an investment map, and pursuing both microfinance and capacity-building initiatives alongside mega-projects. Officials candidly acknowledge the enduring effects of sanctions while touting asset recovery and public-private partnerships. Yet transparency concerns, repeatedly raised by investors and entrepreneurs, remain a significant obstacle to attracting sustainable investment. 

The mood is cautious but forward-looking. Syria’s transition is neither orderly nor secure, but it represents a rare window where institutional rebuilding and political recalibration are actively underway, carrying opportunities and risks in equal measure. 

—Ibrahim Al-Assil is the Syria Project lead for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Sharaa’s most urgent challenge is unifying the country’s religious and ethnic minorities

Last December, I watched from Doha as the Syrian regime fell. I could not have imagined then that less than a year later I’d be in Damascus with Atlantic Council colleagues meeting with ministers of the Sharaa government. The joy of Assad fleeing Syria remains palpable across the population. And there is a challenging but real pathway for Syria to emerge from its current economic ruin, political instability, and ongoing security threats, including from ISIS.  

But the euphoria over Assad’s demise has given way to the sobering realities associated with rebuilding a deeply fractured state. The most urgent challenge facing Sharaa’s government is how to unify Syria’s diverse and varying minority groups. 

Damascus must meaningfully integrate and bring together the many factions and portions of the populations not inclined to be part of a broader Syrian state fabric—especially one that is centralized and run by Sharaa and his former compatriots from the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Druze in the south, Alawites in the west, Kurds in the northeast, and Christians throughout the country—these are among the minorities ranging from skeptical to hostile of the new Syrian government, unconvinced that the government will truly protect their rights and ensure them an equal voice. 

Damascus will need to either cajole them to accept a centralized government or begrudgingly accede to a more federated model. Time is not on the government’s side. The longer the situation lingers without resolution, the greater the likelihood of sustained sectarian violence—which would undermine Sharaa’s goal to turn the page on Syria’s civil war and reintegrate the country into the broader Arab and global communities.  

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle East Program. 

Syria should join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS

I was in Damascus last week and met with senior Syrian ministers. During my visit, I witnessed firsthand a secular culture where minority sects openly practiced their faiths, communities coexisted peacefully, and women were treated with dignity—free to dress as they chose without elements of forced religious observance. This environment of tolerance is an important foundation upon which the new Syrian government can build as it seeks legitimacy at home and abroad. 

What Syria should do next is join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, a nearly ninety-member strong group committed to combating the terrorist organization. By joining the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, Syria could help reinforce a commitment to pluralism by decisively confronting extremist elements that threaten its stability. ISIS cells remain active in parts of the country, undermining security and preventing displaced Syrians from returning home. Cooperation with the coalition would bring access to intelligence, training, and coordination that could hasten ISIS’s defeat. 

Stability is also essential for the future of Syria’s economy. Without improved security, foreign direct investment will not flow into the country at the scale required for meaningful reconstruction. A credible counterterrorism partnership would not enhance the country’s safety while signaling to investors that Syria is ready to re-engage economically. 

Moreover, coalition membership could increase trust with Israel by demonstrating that Damascus is serious about countering groups that destabilize the region, while also opening the door to greater partnership with the United States. At the same time, collaboration against ISIS alongside the Druze community and Syrian Democratic Forces would strengthen the government’s hand in pursuing peaceful unification and inclusive governance. 

What I witnessed in Damascus left me cautiously optimistic. By embracing coalition membership, Syria could demonstrate its secular and tolerant character, restore stability, attract investment, build regional trust, and unite its people under a shared vision for the future. 

—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs’ Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and leads the Initiative’s Counterterrorism Project. 

Transforming Syria into a positive force

Syria under Sharaa has an opportunity to transform the Middle East, if he and the West can seize it. The new government has expressed a desire for regional peace and security and alignment with the West on core issues. It wants to prevent Iran from using Syria as a platform for chaos, dismantle Hezbollah’s supply networks, and challenge remaining ISIS cells. It is pursuing a security agreement with Israel that could bring calm to its southern border and one day, under the right conditions, normalized relations. This new Syria is within reach but requires both bold leadership and for the West to establish itself as Syria’s preferred partner to help increase the odds of Sharaa’s success.   

To increase these odds, the United States and its partners—and Israel, once a security deal is reached—should take steps to increase security, military, and counterterrorism cooperation. Sharaa will need help countering threats that could drive instability, in particular ISIS activities and ongoing coordination between Iran and Hezbollah. This would reinforce Syria’s internal security, prevent broader instability in the Levant, especially in Lebanon, and bolster Sharaa’s legitimacy as he seeks to reunite the country. Perhaps most important, this would give an opportunity for the West to build trust, deconflict, and test Syria’s security apparatus as it anchors its interests in Damascus. 

At the same time, Syria’s economy is in desperate need of investment. The West should invest in industries that would help Syria rebuild, including cement, transportation, logistics, and finance. Syria’s partners should look to help sectors that can support the country’s prosperity, such as power plants, renewable energy, desalination, petrochemicals, and advanced technologies. These investments could provide unique opportunities for US companies and support the Syrian economy. The Trump administration’s decision in June to lift sanctions is a good first step, but it’s incumbent on the West to shape this cooperation and anchor its interests in Damascus.  

This future is only possible if Syria can establish trust in the international community, better integrate and protect minority communities, and prevent the troubling scenes from Sweida in July from happening again. Damascus should find an appropriate formula for governing the Druze, Kurds, and Alawites, and finalize the security deal with Israel, including the humanitarian corridor into Sweida. Israel should give Sharaa some room to maneuver to finalize the deal by avoiding attacks on regime targets, such as the Ministry of Defense in July and Syrian military personnel. Sharaa and the West have an opportunity to transform Syria into a positive force, with an opening for near-term cooperation and future normalization with Israel. Policymakers should seize this moment while conditions are ripe. 

—Gershom Sacks is the deputy director of the N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and the Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation dedicated to strengthening cooperation between the United States, Israel, and Arab and Muslim countries.

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On July 23, 2025, Daniel B. Shapiro, distinguished fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, testifies before the US Senate Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism on US diplomatic strategies for a dynamic Middle East. Below are his prepared remarks.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rosen, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today at this critical moment for U.S. policy in the Middle East.

It is a critical moment because it presents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to help reshape the Middle East in ways that will bring more peace and prosperity, and less conflict and violence to those who live in the region, and will bring significant benefit to the interests of the United States. In every moment of opportunity, there is also risk, including the risk of missing the mark and losing the window to achieve the greatest possible gains. So I thank you for this timely hearing that I hope can shed some light on the best path forward.

The huge opportunity flows from the steady progress in the region toward greater integration from 2020 to 2023, then the tragedy of Hamas’ vicious terrorist attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023, and then the response of various actors in the war that followed.

In the nearly 21 months since the attacks, a combination of Israeli and U.S. military power has dealt blow after to blow to the Iranian-aligned Axis of Resistance: Hamas, which began the war; Hezbollah, which entered the war on October 8; the Houthis in Yemen; Shia militia groups in Iraq and Syria; and, ultimately Iran itself. Along the way, Iran’s key regional partner, the Assad regime in Syria, crumbled when neither its Iranian, Russian, nor Hezbollah allies were able to rescue it. All told, Iran is at its weakest point in decades.

The scale of the Iranian miscalculation is immense. First, Iran encouraged their chief proxy, Hezbollah, to engage in a war of attrition with Israel. At a moment of Israel’s choosing, in a series of dramatic attacks, Israel decimated Hezbollah’s strategic weapons, leadership, and fighters, which left the organization unable to carry out the mission for which it was built — to serve as a deterrent or second strike capability to protect Iran from Israeli or American attack. Hezbollah’s collapse also produced a dramatic change in the policy of the Lebanese government, which may result in the terror group’s disarmament and marginalization.

Second, Iran twice abandoned its longstanding caution, wherein it sought to avoid direct confrontation with Israel or the United States and to fight asymetrically and via proxies. On April 13 and October 1 of last year, Iran launched two massive, overt, state-on-state acts of war against Israel — hundreds of ballistic missiles, cruse missiles, and drones. Israel’s air and missile defense, buttressed by U.S. support, and in April, by an international coalition, largely defeated these attacks. But these events are critical context to the events last month when Israel and the United States conducted strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. That war did not begin on June 13, 2025. It began 14 months earlier.

I believe the military confrontation with Iran that unfolded over 12 days in June was necessary and inevitable. President Trump was right to seek a diplomatic deal with Iran, and right to demand that Iran give up its uranium enrichment capability — which enables them to produce the material needed to produce nuclear weapons. It was never likely that Iran would agree to those terms, and certainly not without a credible military threat. 

I supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action when it was signed in 2015 as the best available way to buy the most time on the Iranian nuclear program. I opposed the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA without a better plan in 2018, which cost us some of that time. But those positions ten and seven years ago were not relevant to the situation we faced in 2025. The fact is that Iran was far too close for comfort to producing a nuclear weapon, and it had to be stopped.  

Three things had changed. First, the IAEA documented that Iran possessed over 400 kg of 60 percent enriched uranium, enough for 10 bombs, with the ability to enrich it to 90 percent (weapons grade) within days. Second, Iranian nuclear scientists over the previous year had engaged in various activities and research that would significantly shorten the time for them to build a weapon — a separate process from enrichment — if and when they got the order from their leadership to do so. And third, Iran’s decision to attack Israel directly twice last year fundamentally changed the calculus of what they were willing to do and what they could do. If any one of the ballistic missiles that reached Israel were tipped with a nuclear warhead, we would be in a different world. The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has long called for Israel’s destruction, was dangerously close to having the ability to carry it out.

The Israeli campaign, fueled by deep intelligence penetration of the Iranian system, did significant damage to Iranian nuclear facilities, air defenses, its ballistic missile production and launching capabilities, and high value targets in the Iranian military, IRGC, and nuclear program. Operation Midnight Hammer ordered by President Trump against Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, using unique U.S. capabilities, caused additional grave damage to those sites. President Trump’s initial comment that their nuclear sites were “totally obliterated” preceded the technical collection of a battle damage assessment, which takes weeks, and implied, probably inaccurately, that their nuclear program is completely out of business. But based on my understanding of the munitions used and the success of their deployment, those sites will not be usable for enrichment or uranium conversion for a significant period of time — time we can perhaps extend through a range of means.

None of this means the threats posed by Iran and its proxies are eliminated. They may be down but not out. Iran likely retains its highly enriched uranium stockpile, although it may or may not have current access to it, and it could have the ability and motivation to try to sprint to enrich it to weapons grade and build a crude nuclear device. A much-degraded Hamas continues to fight Israel in Gaza, and Hezbollah has not given up hopes of rearming. The Houthis — which the Biden Administration struck in a series of deliberate and self-defense engagements over months, and the Trump Administration struck in an intense campaign over weeks — retain capability to attack Israel and to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea, which they have recently resumed doing with deadly results.

But the gains produced by military power over the last 21 months are significant. Now we need to use all the tools at our disposal, not just military tools, to consolidate those gains.

In a moment, I will pivot to the main focus of this hearing, which is the diplomatic path forward. But, following my service at the Department of Defense in the last year of the Biden Administration, I would be remiss if I did not emphasize that there will remain a critical need to maintain a robust U.S. military capability in the region in the period ahead, and that doing so enhances our ability to seize diplomatic opportunities.

Briefly, Israel’s military dominance in the region is undisputed, with air superiority from the Mediterranean to Tehran. Not every problem in the region is a nail that should be addressed with a military hammer. But that capability can work in tandem with a steady U.S. posture to deter our adversaries, who, as mentioned, continue to pose threats — whether Iran’s reconstitution of its nuclear program, its threat to shut down shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, or Houthi aggression. A sustained U.S. presence also provides reassurance to our friends that we will not abandon the field. These friends include Egypt and Jordan, in whom we invest with military assistance, and Gulf states, which host many of our forces and which President Trump visited and secured further investments in our military partnerships. Our partnerships also help ensure these countries will not turn to Russia or China as security partners.

Perhaps most important is the role of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). With Israel’s integration into CENTCOM in 2021, and the deep trust and interoperability built up by CENTCOM and the Israel Defense Forces over these past 21 months, we have an extraordinary combined ability to deter and respond to threats. Beyond cooperation with Israel, CENTCOM serves as the convener and integrator of U.S. military partners across the region. Thanks to our unique capabilities, enduring presence, and CENTCOM’s exceptional leadership, U.S. partners in the Middle East look to us to shape the security environment and coordinate responses to key threats, strengthen their capabilities, conduct bilateral and multilateral exercises, convene high-level strategic exchanges, improve interoperability, and continue to build out an Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture.

Turning to the diplomatic opportunities, we should keep our eyes on these mutually reinforcing strategic objectives of: 1) bringing this period of regional conflict to a close and transitioning to a period of sustained stability; 2) expanding the circle of regional integration that was broadened by the Abraham Accords; 3) deterring and defanging the threats to the United States and our allies and partners posed by Iran, and preventing a resurgence of Iran’s regional influence through its terrorist proxies; and, 4) building a more sustainable regional order led by a network of U.S. partners including Israel and Arab states, with the United States as an active participant but at a scale that also enables adequate attention to critical interests in other regions.

With the remainder of my time, I would like to propose a number of key initiatives in support of these objectives.

First, help achieve a permanent end to the war in Gaza, with a fully developed day-after plan that releases all hostages, protects Israel’s security, removes Hamas from power, provides relief for Palestinian civilians, and enables regionally-supported reconstruction for Palestinians who want to live in peace with Israel.

Our other goals of expanding regional integration cannot get off the ground until the Gaza war ends. A 60-day ceasefire would bring much-needed relief, but it must transition into the end of the war without a return to fighting. That will require Israel agreeing to certain terms, but also intense pressure on Hamas brought by Qatar and other international actors. That is the first key to getting Arab states involved with the next phase of reconstruction. 

At the moment, the risk is that we will a slide into the only alternative: a full-scale Israeli occupation of Gaza, with more dead hostages, more dead Palestinian civilians, more dead Israeli soldiers, no positive involvement by Arab states, and deepening isolation of Israel. In the immediate period, which we all hope will soon see a ceasefire, the United States should:

• Withdraw President Trump’s misguided Gaza Riviera proposal, which has emboldened the most extreme members of the Israeli cabinet to press for full occupation, the massing of Palestinian civilians in a camp along the Egyptian border, and the removal of much of the Palestinian population from Gaza. Those Gazans who wish to leave should, of course, have the freedom to do so, and many countries should be encouraged to receive them. But the mass evacuation of hundreds of thousands or more to a handful of receiving states is not going to happen. If it were done involuntarily, it would be a violation of international humanitarian law and constitute ethnic cleansing. These ideas are widely rejected across the region, will discourage Arab states from helping stabilize Gaza, and even delegitimize more reasonable efforts to help individual Palestinians who wish to relocate to do so.

• Enable a vastly improved mechanism to provide humanitarian aid to Palestinian civilians in Gaza. There is a legitimate problem of Hamas hijacking aid provided through international organizations and using it for themselves and for political power. Hamas bears much responsibility for the hunger crisis in Gaza. But the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) alternative is vastly insufficient, and has been deeply flawed and dangerous in its design, leading to far too many deaths of civilians attempting to access it, many caused by IDF fire. Getting aid directly into the hands of Palestinian civilians and prevent its hijacking to Hamas’s benefit is a worthy goal, and the only solution is to flood the zone with so much aid that it is easy to access and loses its market value. With hunger becoming more widespread across Gaza, Israel should be enabling international organizations and GHF to distribute aid across the entirety of Gaza, not limited to a handful of distribution points.

• Press Israel to revise their targeting protocols to minimize civilian casualties. Hamas leaders and fighters remain legitimate targets, and the challenge of their using civilians as human shields remains. But the civilian toll of many recent strikes has been too high, and Israel has admitted to numerous recent mistakes.

Regarding day-after planning, the United States should:

• Make clear that the terms for the permanent end of the war require the release of all Israeli hostages and the departure from Gaza of a critical mass of Hamas leaders and fighters, with the support of Arab states, for exile in distant locations, sufficient to ensure Hamas is completely removed from power. Arab states should be encouraged to speak in unison and join Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’ call for Hamas to leave Gaza. A U.N. Security Council resolution could follow. The United States should organize plans for this departure, drawing on the 1982 evacuation of the PLO from Beirut.

• Organize an Interim Security Mission for Gaza (ISMG), with U.S. leadership based outside Gaza, enabling troops from Arab states such as Egypt, the UAE, and Morocco, and possibly non-Arab states such as Indonesia, to secure humanitarian aid delivery, border crossings, and basic law and order. The ISMG would enable the gradual introduction of Palestinian Authority Security Forces, which should be trained for this mission under the supervision of the Office of the Security Coordinator in Jerusalem under the continued leadership of a U.S. 3-star general or flag officer.

• Work with Arab states on the installation of improved leadership of the Palestinian Authority and the establishment of Gaza leadership linked to the PA and supported by Arab states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with help in governance, training, and education, and reconstruction funded by a range of Arab and international states. Arab states will only play this role, however, if they see it linked to the establishment of a future Palestinian state. So it will be necessary to find the proper expression of this vision, even if the timelines will be longer and the dimensions different than those envisioned in previous peace efforts. 

• Articulate strong opposition to any Israeli moves toward annexation in the West Bank, and urge Israeli and Palestinian security forces to act to prevent violence by their own sides, as instability in the West Bank could damage prospects for stability in Gaza and harm prospects for regional integration. I commend U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee for his recent highlighting of the importance of Israel holding extremist Israelis who commit violent acts to account.

Second, work toward the continuation and expansion of the normalization and integration process marked by the Abraham Accords, which has stalled but not receded during the war. Specifically, the United States should:

• Prioritize discussions with Saudi Arabia on the timing, conditions, and mechanism of normalization with Israel. Nothing would do more to reshape the politics of the region that normalized relations between the most influential Arab and Muslim state and Israel. The Saudis seek expanded security cooperation with the United States, which we should be prepared to grant, provided the Kingdom meets U.S. needs that protect our interests in the region and regarding competition with China, including strict limits on Saudi-Chinese military cooperation. We should be mindful that Saudi officials have consistently made clear that a requirement for them to normalize relations with Israel is the establishment of a pathway to a Palestinian state — a bar that may be impossible for the current Israeli government to clear — and they are sensitive to extensive Israeli operations and holding of territory in Syria and Lebanon. Continued work on the framework of this triangular deal can take place even if its ultimate fulfillment may be more likely in 2027 than this year.

• Prepare to resume the work of the Negev Forum as soon as possible after the war ends. This standing group of Israel, the United States, and four Arab states (UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and Morocco) includes six working groups and a structure for multilateral projects aimed at bringing the benefits of regional integration to their citizens. As early as possible, a Negev Forum ministerial should be held, with additional invitees such as Jordan, Mauritania, and Indonesia, and activity should resume in the working groups. The Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative, which I led in 2022-2023, is poised to support the Negev Forum as it has in the past.

• Appoint and confirm the Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords that Congress created in the NDAA for FY2024. The appointment of a high-profile envoy in this role will communicate the United States’ seriousness about expanding these agreements, and provide important buttressing to the work of Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff.

• Elevate the work of the House and Senate Abraham Accords Caucuses, which is essential to add the expertise and jurisdictional focus of their diverse members and to convey the bipartisan commitment to expanding regional integration.

• Continue work toward a non-belligerency agreement between Israel and Syria that reaffirms the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, supports connections between Israeli and Syrian Druze communities, and allows for limited economic, environmental, water, and health cooperation, without the need to address the final status of the Golan Heights. A return of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), enhanced by visits and supervision from CENTCOM representatives, can help stabilize the border region. President Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria is a gamble, but the right gamble, to give the greatest possibility for stabilization of Syria after years of brutal rule and civil war and preventing Iran from exploiting chaos to reestablish a foothold. But the government in Damascus must be held accountable, including for its treatment of minorities and establishment of inclusive governance. Israeli strikes on central government facilities in Damascus are destabilizing and have already become a dangerous factor in Syrian domestic politics; they must be avoided. Finally, it is critical that the United States not withdraw all its forces from Northeast Syria until adequate preparations are in place for proper sustainment of counter-ISIS operations, supervision of ISIS detention centers, and peaceful integration of Syrian Kurdish factions into national institutions.

Third, capitalize on the severe damage to the Iranian nuclear program and the weakening of the Iranian-led axis to secure a long-term improvement in the regional security environment. The United States should:

• Seek renewed negotiations with Iran to sustain the gains of the military strikes on its nuclear program and prevent the program’s reconstitution. 

• Insist on full access for IAEA inspectors, the location and removal of Iran’s HEU stockpile, and an assurance of zero enrichment going forward. Separate negotiations will also need to commence on meaningful limits on Iran’s ballistic missile inventory

• Maintain pressure on Iran toward those ends, by coordinating with UK, French, German, and EU officials on the leverage of, and if necessary the implementation of, JCPOA snapback sanctions, and by devoting additional attention and resources to scaling back Iranian oil exports to China.

• Make clear that additional military strikes by Israel or the United States are possible if Iran seeks to move, hide, or reconstitute elements of its nuclear program, or if it refuses to give access to IAEA inspectors or exits the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Congress should be properly consulted before any such strikes. While the United States maintains escalation dominance, we must nevertheless remain vigilant to deter and defend against potential Iranian or Iranian-sponsored attacks on U.S. bases and personnel or asymmetric attacks on American, Israeli, or Jewish targets anywhere. Iran should be on notice that any attempt to harm current or former U.S. officials will bring an automatic kinetic response, and the United States should coordinate with allies on a common set of diplomatic and economic penalties that would be triggered by hostage taking.

• Prepare for the possibility of internally-driven regime change. It should not be a policy goal of the United States, nor a project to be achieved by military means. But we must recognize that the regime and its ideology remain the main fuel of destabilization across the region, and are deeply unpopular among the Iranian people due to the regime’s brutality and corruption. We should provide appropriate support to the Iranian people, much as we did for anti-Communist movements in countries under Soviet domination during the Cold War. Our efforts should include enhancing Iranian citizens’ ability to communicate via internet access and to receive accurate information, publicly condemning repression by the regime, sanctioning regime officials responsible for abuses, and highlighting regime corruption that harms the Iranian people. We should develop now a plan to support a transition so we are not caught flat-footed if the Iranian people take matters into their hands, including organizing reconstruction funding from international donors, preparing to unwind U.S. and international sanctions with targets and incentives for the new authorities, planning to provide support for post-conflict transition and institution-building, and coordination with responsible elements of the Iranian diaspora.

• Continue to support and pressure the Lebanese government and Lebanese Armed Forces in the disarmament of Hezbollah and establishing state institutions as the sole legitimate possessors of the means of force.

• Develop a whole-of-government approach to combatting and weakening the Houthis, drawing on diplomatic, political, economic, public messaging, intelligence, and military tools, in coordination with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others. 

• Negotiate with Iraqi authorities to secure a sustained, limited U.S. military posture to support counter-ISIS missions, with full self-defense authorities and capabilities. Our presence in Iraq helps the Iraqi Security Forces succeed in this ongoing effort, provides reassurance to our Kurdish partners, and enables us to balance Iranian influence in Iraq.

Finally, as the war winds down, work should begin now on negotiating the next U.S.-Israel military assistance MOU. 

The current MOU expires in 2028, which means it would be best to have a new MOU in place within a year or so, to ensure no delay in necessary acquisitions. A new MOU should ensure that the United States upholds its legal obligation and national interest to ensure Israel’s qualitative military edge, be grounded in planning for the threats of the next two decades, and provide sufficient funds to rebuild, sustain, and upgrade Israel’s air defense inventory, which has been stretched in multiple defensive engagements. I should note that it is entirely legitimate and appropriate in the context of MOU negotiations and our enduring close security partnership with Israel for the United States to raise questions and concerns about the need for Israel to minimize civilian casualties in its operations and the obligation to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance to civilians in need. 

This is a hefty list of objectives and priorities to pursue to advance U.S. interests in the Middle East. It takes significant resources to carry out foreign policy initiatives at this scale: personnel with a range of diplomatic experience and expertise; functional and adequately resourced foreign assistance programs in key countries; international broadcasting; and more. If it is left to just a few high-level officials with access to the president, much of the implementation work will not get done. Meanwhile, China is deepening its activity and influence in all these areas everywhere the United States pulls back. 

I am deeply concerned that the Trump Administration’s drastic cuts to personnel at the Department of State, including experts in nuclear diplomacy, sanctions enforcement, and counterterrorism, the elimination of the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the decimation of our international broadcasting capabilities, are leaving us ill-prepared and under-resourced to properly seize the opportunities before us. It will be a terrible own-goal if our own lack of preparation and denial of tools in our own toolkit prevent us from being effective in executing on the long list of priorities we must pursue, thereby providing an advantage to our competitors.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to answering your questions.

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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The terrorist designations are important; they are an escalatory change and an acknowledgment of the national security threat that these organizations represent. This new designation differs from the historical classification of these groups as simply criminal organizations, which denotes an ability for typical justice systems to handle them.

At the same time, the new designations raise a question as the United States reflects on its more than two-decade-long war on terrorism: What should be done about newly designated terrorist groups operating just across the US southern border? With four states sharing a land border with Mexico, and trade revenues between the United States and Mexico that surpassed $800 billion in 2024, ignoring this labeled threat while it grows would be at best a failure, and at worst negligence. 

As Sheinbaum made clear on May 3, Mexico is not willing to allow foreign militaries to act on its sovereign territory. This reality, however, does not eliminate the ability for the United States to take steps to counter these organizations; it simply means that it must accomplish this task with brains rather than brawn.  

What’s needed next are smart US investments and support to improve the odds of countering these threats along the southern border through US-Mexican cooperation. By acknowledging that the cartels are economic-based organizations, rather than ideology-based organizations such as those targeted in the war on terrorism, several avenues are open to the United States to counter the threat they pose. 

Economic investment in recruitment-prone regions  

The first issue is stemming recruitment. The adage that “idle hands are the devil’s workshop” applies far beyond unruly children—it also applies to regions vulnerable to cartel recruitment. As individuals struggle to survive and provide for their families, regions of limited economic resources provide an excellent recruitment base for these organizations even outside circles inclined to criminal activities. This reality can create a cycle: increasing crime in the region and reducing the likelihood of economic investment and legitimate sources of income, as businesses and individuals see increasing investment risk.

Instead of relying on private investors to shoulder the risk, the US government could step in with targeted economic investments—reducing recruitment incentives while potentially generating long-term returns. It should be made clear that this investment does not need to be, and arguably shouldn’t be, aid or grants. The US Development Finance Corporation, for example, could use loans as well as other financial tools that could boost local economies in Mexico while providing returns to the United States.

There is precedent for this approach: In the 1990s, the “broken windows” hypothesis was tested in New York City. Economic revitalization reduced poverty and significantly reduced some crime rates when coupled with stricter police enforcement (e.g., felony arrest rates). As economic opportunity increased along with the odds of arrest, the “pull factor” of criminal behavior and organizations decreased. Increasing the willingness to invest economically and providing legitimate sources of income directly could reduce the attraction to crime. 

Infrastructure investment throughout high-risk regions 

The second issue is breaking cartels’ chokehold on specific areas. Areas with substandard infrastructure—such as roads, transportation services, healthcare, education, and security—are where criminal organizations entrench themselves. As criminal organizations identify a gap in essential services, they fill this gap and replace the government, gaining the support of the local populace and further insulating them from government intervention. Even in areas where the willingness of local law enforcement and governments to counter these organizations remains high, limited wherewithal can undercut their ability to pursue criminals and bring them to justice.   

The United States has two distinct opportunities in this realm. Washington can incentivize US companies to conduct infrastructure-building projects in these regions, providing jobs and contracts to US businesses. The United States can also invest resources in projects in these regions with capital and loans, increasing the job opportunities for local individuals and businesses while providing a future return to the United States.

Studies of India’s rural transportation infrastructure projects, for instance, have shown that if the benefits are evenly distributed throughout a community, the building of new roads may help reduce crime rates. Such projects also help expand security programs while increasing economic opportunity; individuals can travel for economic opportunities more freely while criminals are within easier reach of security forces. 

Training, expertise, and equipment 

The third issue is ensuring a strong counterforce to the cartels. After more than two decades of combating terrorist groups, the US military has hard-earned experience, tested procedures, and proven capabilities that can be shared with partner nations. These resources can be leveraged—without impinging on a partner’s national sovereignty.

In an advisory capacity, the US military can offer to share its knowledge with Mexican forces that want to improve the readiness and survivability of the country’s security forces. In fact, the basis for this approach already exists with the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, an organization with a history of deployment to Latin America, increasing partner nations’ organizational structures and capacities. In addition to training and sharing knowledge, the US military can also provide defense trade and arms transfers to partner nations, including through foreign military sales, excess defense articles programs, and direct commercial sales.   

As recently as May of this year, the United States provided Colombia with decommissioned Island-class patrol boats to enhance its security while divesting unused military equipment from the United States. These vessels are a critical asset for Colombia to counter illicit activity over maritime domains quickly and cheaply. Simultaneously, the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade has conducted training and provided advice to enhance Colombia’s counternarcotics operations. If the US military increases its coordination and training with Mexican forces, with the Mexican government’s approval, it could help to keep cartels in check.

Timely action

Now that these transnational criminal organizations have been officially recognized as US national security threats, time is of the essence. Without timely, appropriate action, their influence could expand. The best, most sustainable way to counter their growth is a coordinated use of national power to weaken these groups without resorting to US military intervention in Mexico.

But a failure to take additional, appropriate action to combat these terrorist groups could render the terrorist designations as mere saber-rattling.

Aaron Kolleda is a major for the US Army and is currently a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The views in this article are personal and do not reflect the position of the US Department of Defense or the US Department of the Army.

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This post will be updated as the story develops and more expert reactions come in.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Alex Plitsas: The world cannot afford to wait until the brink again

Srujan Palkar: The US should correct its strategic imbalance in South Asia

Shuja Nawaz: By focusing on water, extremism, and trade, the cease-fire can become an enduring peace

Rudabeh Shahid: What the cease-fire and its violations mean for South Asia’s non-nuclear states

Manal Fatima: India suffers a reputational blow, while the fate of Kashmiris remains perilous

The world cannot afford to wait until the brink again

The recent cease-fire between India and Pakistan marks a critical juncture in averting a potentially catastrophic escalation in South Asia. The decades-long rivalry, rooted in territorial disputes over Kashmir and fueled by mutual distrust, has repeatedly brought these nuclear-armed neighbors to the brink. This latest de-escalation, while fragile, underscores the urgent need for restraint and timely international intervention, both of which were dangerously absent as tensions spiraled.

The conflict had gone too far. Cross-border skirmishes, artillery exchanges, and inflammatory rhetoric intensified, with each side miscalculating the other’s resolve. India’s aggressive posturing, often tied to domestic political pressures, clashed with Pakistan’s defensive yet provocative responses. Both nations’ militaries, equipped with advanced weaponry and nuclear arsenals, risked missteps that could have triggered a broader conflict. The 2019 Balakot airstrike and subsequent retaliation demonstrated how quickly localized incidents can escalate, yet lessons from that crisis were poorly applied. Mismanagement was evident in the failure to prioritize diplomacy over brinkmanship, with both governments amplifying nationalist sentiments rather than seeking de-escalation.

World powers, particularly the United States, China, and the United Nations, were alarmingly slow to intervene. Their delayed response allowed the situation to fester, emboldening hardline factions and undermining moderates who sought dialogue. Global attention, distracted by other crises, underestimated the stakes of a potential India-Pakistan war, which could destabilize the region and disrupt global security. The cease-fire, brokered only after significant loss of life and economic strain, highlights the need for proactive international mediation.

This truce is not a solution but a reprieve. It averts immediate disaster, preserves economic stability, and opens a window for dialogue. However, without sustained global pressure and a commitment to address root causes like Kashmir, the cycle of escalation will persist. The world cannot afford to wait until the brink again.

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The US should correct its strategic imbalance in South Asia

Saturday’s cease-fire had a degree of US involvement. But India’s recent counterterrorism operations under Operation Sindoor, followed by retaliatory strikes and escalation, have exposed an imbalance in US policy toward South Asia. As negotiations continue in the coming weeks, there is one policy shift the United States could take that would ensure it builds trust with India while putting the onus on the Pakistani establishment to play its part in counterterrorism—and that is revoking Pakistan’s Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status.

Despite deepening ties with India—a key Indo-Pacific partner—the United States continues to extend MNNA status to Pakistan, a country whose military-intelligence apparatus has long tolerated, if not enabled, cross-border terrorism. The recent Pahalgam attack, timed with a high-level US visit, highlights a recurring pattern of militant violence during diplomatic moments—echoing the 2000 Chittisinghpura massacre on the eve of a visit by President Bill Clinton.

From New Delhi’s perspective, the MNNA designation for Pakistan—which India does not have—sends contradictory signals. While US policymakers express solidarity with India during crises, they continue to offer Pakistan privileged military status without conditioning it on measurable counterterrorism compliance. This undermines deterrence, weakens regional crisis management, and emboldens actors who operate outside the norms of accountability from Pakistani soil.

The original justification for Pakistan’s MNNA status—logistical cooperation during the US war in Afghanistan—has expired. Today, China is Pakistan’s primary defense partner, and US assistance has largely dried up. Revoking MNNA would rebalance Washington’s ties with Islamabad and recognize strategic realities. It would also reinforce India’s role as an independent regional security provider, not dependent on US largesse, while establishing that Washington will hinge its support on alignment with counterterrorism and regional stability goals.

—Srujan Palkar is the global India fellow at the Atlantic Council. 

By focusing on water, extremism, and trade, the cease-fire can become an enduring peace

Now that both India and Pakistan have executed their military responses to each other’s real or perceived actions against the other in Kashmir, good sense has prevailed in the shape of a cease-fire. If the announcement holds, this stops the ratcheting up of hostilities that were putting both nuclear-armed rivals on a steep escalation ladder. Historically, both sides try to gain some tactical advantages by extending the cease-fire limits. And there are many trigger-happy local commanders on both sides of the line of control in Kashmir, which would explain reports of clashes in the hours after the cease-fire announcement.  

I am hearing from Pakistani sources that the agreement to cease hostilities emerged after closed and direct talks between the directors general of military operations of both armies and representatives of the two national security advisors. It helped that in the case of Pakistan, the national security advisor, Lt. Gen. Asim Malik, was also the current director general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (likely preparing himself for that generally civilian role post-retirement in a few months). Helping the process to put the lid on this regional flashpoint was the behind-the-scenes encouragement of US President Donald Trump, his Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and possibly Saudi Arabia.

What next? Having raised domestic emotions to a high pitch, leaders on both sides will want to take a much-needed pause and then begin the process of what Rubio identified as the beginning of “talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.” It will be interesting to see what is considered a neutral site. The Gulf is one possibility.

Three main items should be on the agenda.

1. The Indus Basin Water Treaty

Front and center should be the discussion of the effects of climate change on both India and Pakistan and the need to update the Indus Basin Water Treaty, originally agreed upon with US help and under the aegis of the World Bank. That treaty, signed in 1960, took nine years of negotiation. Both countries have been dancing around the shared waters issue in the past. India recently unilaterally abrogated the treaty—a debatable action. Regardless, the Himalayan and Karakoram glaciers feeding their rivers are declining, and time is running out for measures to counteract that reality. Both nations will suffer the consequences of dying waterways. Moreover, the shared aquifers of the Indian and Pakistani Punjabs badly need recharging. The misuse of tubewells has dropped the water tables, and overwatering has produced waterlogging and salinity. Combined efforts to revive underground water resources will help fight climate change. Otherwise, agriculture will suffer, and the population may die of thirst. …

Read more from Shuja Nawaz, a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, here:

New Atlanticist

May 10, 2025

By focusing on water, extremism, and trade, India and Pakistan can turn this cease-fire into an enduring peace

By Shuja Nawaz

Having raised domestic emotions to a high pitch, leaders on both sides will want to take a much-needed pause and then begin negotiations.

What the cease-fire and its violations mean for South Asia’s non-nuclear states

The recently brokered cease-fire between India and Pakistan, hailed just this morning as a sign of returning stability, was violated shortly thereafter—underscoring the fragility of such diplomatic pauses in South Asia. The shaky agreement, facilitated by the Trump administration, highlights a deeper regional truth: while the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction may avert full-scale war, it does little to halt the cycles of escalation driven by mistrust and historical grievance.

In a region marked by volatility and deep-seated animosity, cease-fires are never just about halting gunfire. They are signals of restraint, tactical pause, or strategic recalibration. Their violation carries meaning too: It hardens political rhetoric, narrows diplomatic space, and amplifies insecurity far beyond the Line of Control in Kashmir. For South Asia’s non-nuclear states, this renewed conflict is more than a bilateral affair. It is a regional stress test with asymmetric consequences.

In Bangladesh, where an interim government has replaced Sheikh Hasina’s long-standing pro-India administration, anti-India sentiment has intensified further. The recent protests, which have successfully pressured the interim government to ban the Awami League under the country’s Anti-Terrorism Act, are now also inflected with broader regional anger. India’s posture during and after the cease-fire may be seen as coercive, deepening the backlash and weakening Dhaka’s willingness to align with New Delhi on strategic matters.

Sri Lanka, navigating domestic fragility and a delicate geopolitical balance, will attempt to remain neutral. Yet neutrality is not invisibility. Muslim communities in the country remain attuned to wider Islamophobic narratives, and Indian pressure may provoke political ripples. Meanwhile, China’s deepening footprint in Colombo further constrains Sri Lanka’s room for maneuver.

Nepal’s balancing act between India and China might also come under strain. Heavily reliant on Indian trade and remittances, India may grow increasingly wary of Kathmandu’s neutrality, especially amid heightened security anxieties. In this environment, Nepal’s neutrality could be interpreted as disloyalty, thereby placing the landlocked country in an increasingly untenable position.

Bhutan, while closely tied to India through the 1949 Treaty of Friendship, is not insulated either. Bhutan may again face increased Chinese pressure along its contested border, particularly if India redirects strategic focus northward—just as it did during the Doklam standoff in 2017.

The Maldives, too, might face growing pressure. As India reasserts its strategic role in the Indian Ocean, Malé’s policy of hedging between New Delhi and Beijing becomes harder to sustain. Domestic political undercurrents, including Islamist sentiment, may complicate Malé’s ability to respond to Indian pressure without facing internal pushback.

Above all, the shaky cease-fire underscores the chronic dysfunction of South Asia’s regional institutions. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) remains paralyzed, thereby lacking any mechanism for mediation, de-escalation, or collective response. Non-nuclear South Asian countries remain vulnerable to the centrifugal pull of India-Pakistan tensions, without a regional forum to cushion the fallout.

For the United States, the original cease-fire may have seemed like a diplomatic win. Saturday night’s violations, however, reveal the limits of transactional diplomacy. More significantly, it reflects a broader regional transformation: A more assertive regional posture by India will be perceived by non-nuclear neighbors as encroaching on their strategic autonomy—prompting deeper engagement with China as a counterbalance.

The real challenge is no longer merely avoiding the next crisis. It is about envisioning a regional order where diplomacy is consistent, non-nuclear South Asian states are not treated as collateral, and cooperation—not coercion—defines the regional norm.

—Rudabeh Shahid is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.  

India suffers a reputational blow, while the fate of Kashmiris remains perilous

Saturday’s US-mediated cease-fire between India and Pakistan is a welcome development after a tense week that brought South Asia alarmingly close to a broader military confrontation. This recent exchange revealed not only the heightened lethality of modern warfare between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, far surpassing past skirmishes, but also reinforced a recurring pattern in contemporary conflicts—the emergence of social media as a significant new front. With widespread misinformation circulating, the narrative war was self-evident. Against this backdrop, Pakistan lifted its fifteen-month ban on X, while India ordered the takedown of over eight thousand X accounts for allegedly spreading disinformation.

However, this pause also invites deeper scrutiny into the outcomes of the past few days. India’s decision to launch airstrikes based on unproven allegations of Pakistani involvement in the tragic April 22 Pahalgam massacre naturally raises questions about their effectiveness. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s India, eager to assert its role as a rising global power, arguably emerges from this crisis with a dented posture. Reports confirm the loss of at least two Indian military aircraft, including a French Rafale reportedly brought down by Pakistan’s Chinese-made J-10. Analysts have viewed the downing of the Rafale by a comparatively lower-cost Chinese aircraft as a blow to India’s defense credibility and a sign of tactical underperformance. Additionally, while some Indian media outlets circulated lists of terrorists allegedly killed in the initial strikes under Operation Sindoor—individuals linked to Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba—the unclear results of the operation make it difficult to ascertain New Delhi’s actual achievements and the effectiveness of these measures in realizing its intended goals.

Interestingly, Pakistan’s government finds itself on a relatively stronger footing. It has been under considerable scrutiny in recent months, particularly following the contentious 2024 general elections, or reasons including its handling of unrest in Balochistan and Balochi human rights activists, and its dealings with internal opposition. The external threat appeared to unify fractured political forces domestically. Amid this, the Pakistani Supreme Court’s controversial decision to allow civilians accused in the May 9, 2023 riots to be tried in military courts simply faded into the background as nationalist fervor dominated the country’s political atmosphere.

On the international/diplomatic front, Islamabad also appears to hold an advantage over New Delhi, which seems displeased with the Trump administration’s tone in mediations, viewing it as unfairly equating Pakistan with India. Further, Trump’s commitment to work with both countries “to see if … a solution can be arrived at concerning Kashmir” aligned more with Islamabad’s preference for international involvement rather than New Delhi’s desire to keep it a bilateral matter.

However, the fate of Kashmiris still hangs perilously between the two countries. While the ceasefire may have halted the immediate escalation toward all-out war, unrest in the disputed territory and the deeper conflict persist. For Kashmiris, caught between militants, military crackdowns, and political repression, the reality remains largely unchanged. In fact, there is a potential for an increase in the crackdown that followed the April terrorist attack by the Indian government, and within the ambiguous category of “suspected” terrorists, many may be unjustly targeted.

—Manal Fatima is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. 

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Srujan Palkar: These strikes follow a predictable pattern—and a water treaty could provide an off-ramp

Shuja Nawaz: Further escalation is possible in this combustible conflict

Michael Kugelman: The Gulf states are well placed to provide much-needed mediation

Manal Fatima: Ordinary Kashmiris continue to bear the brunt of these tensions

Atman Trivedi: The question is not if Pakistan will retaliate, but when and how

Alex Plitsas: Escalation appears unlikely after calibrated strikes

Rudabeh Shahid: India-Pakistan tensions will cause spillover problems across the region

These strikes follow a predictable pattern—and a water treaty could provide an off-ramp

This is not a surprise attack. In such military operations, predictability and patterns are important. India has upheld its reputation for reliability while preparing the world by briefing diplomats from Group of Twenty (G20) countries and others. The surgical 2016 strikes in response to the killing of nineteen Indian soldiers, the 2019 Balakot airstrike in response to the killing of forty Indian paramilitary personnel, and now Operation Sindoor, in response to a targeted, religiously motivated terrorist attack killing twenty-six men, follow a strategy that India has showcased since 2001. (In 2001, Operation Parakram, in response to terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament, lasted ten months in the form of a military standoff, the second since both countries tested nuclear weapons in 1998. It did not result in wider war.) 

The Indian Defense Ministry’s statement immediately following the strikes assures non-escalatory intentions. Given this reliable history and a two-week diplomatic blitz following the terrorist attack, a further, immediate escalation or mobilization from India is unlikely.   

The Pakistani leadership’s responses declaring that Indian actions constitute an act of war are also part of the pattern. Pakistan’s former foreign minister and its current defense minister have admitted to previous Pakistani involvement in funding extremist groups, and Pakistan must be transparent if it is to prove that it is not training terrorists or arming them with deadly military-grade weapons such as the AK-47s and M4 rifles used in the terrorist attacks.

India too ought to remain transparent and communicative with the global diplomatic community, while continuing its approach of counterterrorism. It should not take the bait of the terrorist attacks or of Pakistani leadership, and should instead play to its tactical, economic, and diplomatic advantages. In the long run, that will prove to be the most effective way to protect against further terrorist threats to the lives of Indian citizens and preserving Kashmir’s path to peace. 

The United States, for its part, must push for transparency and dialogue. A key method of dialogue could be the renegotiation of the Indus Water Treaty, which was signed in 1960 and does not take into account modern climate and technological changes. Indian peacetime requests for renegotiations went unanswered. The treaty does not have an exit clause or renegotiation mechanism, and as such the parties need to be willing to converse. Water, instead of a source of tension, can be a source of conversation. 

—Srujan Palkar is the global India fellow at the Atlantic Council. 

Further escalation is possible in this combustible conflict

After deliberating and planning, India has attacked several sites inside Pakistan and in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Jammu and Kashmir), while claiming it chose to avoid military targets. Pakistan has a policy of “quid pro quo plus.” So expect a tougher response inside India and Indian-administered Kashmir, perhaps using standoff air-to-air weapons. Unlike in 2019, chances are that Pakistan may also target the launch or control centers responsible for the Indian missile attack. It has built up its electronic warfare capacity over the years.

The escalation ladder is steep. And, as in the past, captive local media and jingoistic politicians across the spectrum are baying for blood.

The world doesn’t need another flashpoint where both sides possess nuclear weapons, and standoff air and drone attacks could easily lead to the use of heavier weapons.

Sadly, the United States seems to have little clue about how to handle this situation. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s calls to leaders in both countries didn’t stop escalation. Is it time for China to play a positive role?

—Shuja Nawaz is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

The Gulf states are well placed to provide much-needed mediation

India and Pakistan are experiencing their most serious crisis in several decades. The airstrikes that India carried out in Pakistan early Wednesday morning represented some of the most high-intensity and large-scale military activities that India has deployed there since 1971. A muscular Pakistani response is all but inevitable. Unlike the last two military crises between India and Pakistan, in 2016 and 2019, there is a strong likelihood of additional hostilities—and greater escalation risks—beyond an initial strike and counterstrike. This is no small matter given that India and Pakistan are both nuclear-armed states.

International mediation is of the essence to ensure the current confrontation doesn’t reach a point where nuclear escalation risks come into play. While there’s a strong international consensus in favor of de-escalation, few countries have the deep relationships and leverage to be effective mediators in this dangerous crisis. The United States has previously played the role of mediator, including during the 2019 India-Pakistan crisis under the first Trump administration. But the Arab Gulf states—especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—may be best placed to intervene. They all have deep ties to both New Delhi and Islamabad. They’re also key suppliers of fuel and other assistance to Pakistan. And there is at least one precedent: In 2021, the UAE helped mediate an India-Pakistan border truce—an accord that kept bilateral ties relatively stable until the events of recent weeks.

Careful diplomacy from trusted interlocutors can help bring the two sides back from the brink. But given the scale of hostilities up to this point and the mood in each capital—and across the Indian and Pakistani publics—it won’t be easy.

—Michael Kugelman is a South Asia analyst and the writer of Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.

Ordinary Kashmiris continue to bear the brunt of these tensions

India’s airstrikes, launched amid Pakistan’s call for an evidence-based inquiry into the April 22 Pahalgam terrorist attack that killed twenty-six civilians, underscore the fragile and volatile dynamics of the region’s security environment. The response was anticipated, shaped by domestic pressure on the hyper-nationalist government in New Delhi and a long-standing precedent, including the 2019 Pulwama attack, which similarly escalated into cross-border hostilities. This cyclical exchange of strikes, rhetoric, and retaliations is not new. However, this very familiarity underscores a disappointing failure to learn from past mistakes. 

In the immediate aftermath of the Pahalgam attacks, both governments reverted to entrenched narratives: India pointed to Pakistan’s record of harboring insurgent groups, and Pakistan alleged that the attack was a false-flag operation. This mutual blame game reflects a deeper strategic paralysis, an inability or unwillingness to address the root causes of the conflict. 

At the center of this confrontation are the people of Kashmir. In recent days, Kashmiris have faced harassment and physical assaults in parts of Indian-administered Kashmir, reportedly targeted in retaliation for the Pahalgam attack. These incidents, compounding decades of political repression and securitized control in the region, highlight how ordinary Kashmiris continue to bear the brunt of both state and societal backlash amid renewed India-Pakistan tensions. 

Strategically, a full-scale war serves neither side. Pakistan’s military strength would be offset by economic precarity, and military action would harm the country’s focus on attracting foreign investment. India, which is positioning itself as an emerging global economic power, cannot afford instability. In a nuclear neighborhood, the costs of escalation, whether accidental or intentional, are simply incalculable. 

The United States has so far been very engaged on the issue in a neutral manner. Rubio has engaged both New Delhi and Islamabad in recent days, indicating that Washington would urge for de-escalation. “I just hope it ends very quickly,” US President Donald Trump said Tuesday evening in Washington. The administration should apply all possible pressure to make sure of it. Further, a broader diplomatic push that includes behind-the-scenes efforts by the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and others with regional influence is essential. This brinkmanship endangers regional economic endeavors and threatens both countries’ security. Regional prosperity is dependent on sustained peace, which is not possible with the persistent specter of a confrontation between two nuclear-armed states. 

—Manal Fatima is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. 

The question is not if Pakistan will retaliate, but when and how

The latest confrontation between India and Pakistan provides a stark reminder that the nuclear-armed nations have recently grown all-too-comfortable flexing their military muscle. India characterized its military strikes as measured and restrained. Nevertheless, the decision to target purported terrorist camps deep inside Pakistan, well beyond the disputed Kashmir region, will likely be interpreted by Pakistan’s generals as a significant escalation.  

The question now is not whether Pakistan will respond, but when and how. Earlier this week, Pakistani Ambassador to Russia Muhammad Khalid Jamali threatened to use the country’s “full spectrum of power” in reply to an Indian military strike. Pakistan’s “quid pro quo plus” defense strategy is intended to inflict greater damage in retaliation than it first suffers, to deter Indian military action in the first instance. Pakistan’s powerful chief of army staff, Asim Munir, is a wild card, known to indulge in provocative rhetoric about Kashmir. He may prioritize ideological convictions over pragmatism. Meanwhile, China’s heightened involvement in and around South Asia, highlighted by its growing military and economic ties with Pakistan, introduces additional risks. The region finds itself at a moment where miscalculation, accidents, or plain bad luck could conspire to produce a major conflict. 

In the past, the United States and other countries have used quiet diplomacy to help defuse regional crises. In the first Trump administration, for instance, senior US officials worked the phones to help de-escalate tensions in South Asia. Six years later, Washington and like-minded partners are distracted and inward-focused.   

The dangerous mood on South Asia’s streets, fueled by jingoistic media outlets that border on hysteria, is hardly conducive to disciplined and careful crisis management. Cooler heads may yet prevail, but not before the region edges closer to war. 

—Atman Trivedi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and a partner at Albright Stonebridge Group.

Escalation appears unlikely after calibrated strikes

India’s “Operation Sindoor” is a limited counterterrorism operation targeting nine terrorist camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The strikes were a direct response to the April 22, 2025, Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, where militants from the Resistance Front (TRF), allegedly linked to Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, killed twenty-six civilians, mostly Indian tourists. India’s Ministry of Defense described the operation as “focused, measured, and non-escalatory,” emphasizing that it struck only terrorist infrastructure, such as training camps in Muzaffarabad and Kotli, and avoided Pakistani military or government facilities. However, Pakistan denied that the strikes hit terrorist targets, claiming that they hit civilian areas. Indian forces used precision missiles, and aircraft did not cross into Pakistani airspace, signaling restraint meant to prevent broader conflict.  

India’s actions aimed to neutralize immediate threats while minimizing the risk of escalation. By publicly framing the strikes as counterterrorism-focused and avoiding sovereign Pakistani targets, New Delhi sought to limit retaliatory pressure on Islamabad. Pakistan condemned the strikes, alleging civilian casualties. In response, there have been reports of clashes along the line of control with artillery and small arms fire being exchanged by both sides with unconfirmed reports of limited civilian casualties. The operation’s design mirrors India’s 2016 and 2019 strikes, which targeted militants without triggering full-scale war, suggesting a pattern of calibrated responses. 

Despite heightened tensions, including prior diplomatic and economic measures like trade suspensions and airspace closures, escalation appears unlikely. Both nations, aware of their nuclear capabilities and under international pressure from the United States and United Nations, have incentives to avoid war. Diplomatic channels, including back-channel communications, remain open, and historical precedents show both sides can de-escalate after limited actions. While the situation in Kashmir remains volatile, India’s restrained approach and Pakistan’s cautious rhetoric suggest a mutual interest in containing the crisis. 

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

India-Pakistan tensions will cause spillover problems across the region

As non-nuclear members of the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) surrounding India, countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives would find themselves increasingly constrained in a scenario of India-Pakistan escalation over Kashmir—a development that would further entrench the paralysis of regional cooperation under SAARC. 

If tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors escalate, the geopolitical and domestic consequences for these smaller South Asian states will be complex. Most exposed is Bangladesh, where the recent regime change has removed Sheikh Hasina’s pro-India administration and installed an interim government navigating a deeply polarized landscape. Anti-India sentiment is running high, fueled by perceptions of Indian interference and growing frustration at India for hosting the former Bangladeshi prime minister. The interim leadership, lacking a political mandate, will face acute pressure from sections of civil society to adopt a more assertively nationalist, possibly anti-India, stance. At the same time, India is likely to increase expectations of diplomatic alignment, leaving Dhaka in a highly precarious position. 

In Sri Lanka, the government is likely to maintain a cautious neutrality while quietly accommodating India’s regional security posture. However, an intensification of the Kashmir conflict could create unrest within Sri Lanka’s Muslim communities, particularly if the issue is framed as part of a broader crackdown on Muslim populations. These internal dynamics could destabilize a government already managing economic fragility. 

Nepal would attempt to preserve its balancing act between India and China, but India may view Nepal’s neutrality with suspicion. Recent bilateral tensions, including territorial disputes and Kathmandu’s assertion of greater sovereignty, make it vulnerable to diplomatic pressure. Nepal’s large labor force in India also adds an element of economic dependency that could be leveraged. 

Bhutan is most likely to align quietly with India, given its close strategic ties, but any Indian military distraction could embolden Chinese activity along the contested northern border.  

The Maldives, meanwhile, will face rising Islamist sentiment at home if Kashmir becomes a rallying point. At the strategic level, increased Indian Ocean militarization will reduce space for Malé’s hedging strategy. 

Overall, a Kashmir flashpoint would harden regional alignments, reduce strategic autonomy, and raise the domestic political costs of neutrality for South Asian non-nuclear states. 

This, in turn, would have implications for US Indo-Pacific strategy. Washington views India as a cornerstone of its regional balancing efforts against China, particularly through platforms such as the Quad. A protracted India-Pakistan crisis would not only divert India’s strategic focus away from the maritime Indo-Pacific and toward its western land borders, but also constrain its ability to act as a net security provider in the region.

—Rudabeh Shahid is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. 

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Previously, the US Treasury Department sanctioned MS-13 as a Transnational Criminal Organization under Executive Order 13581. The Trump administration similarly designated Foxtrot, which has been used by Iranian intelligence, under the same authority last month.

This should lay the groundwork for Washington to respond to an increasingly aggressive Iran, which has rallied more extraterritorial operations in both the United States and Europe, using a network of criminal gangs.

The statutory criteria for the Secretary of State to designate FTOs are as follows: it must be a foreign organization; the organization must engage in terrorist activity or retain the capability and intent to do so; and it must threaten the security of US nationals or the national security of the United States.

Washington and its allies should capitalize on the momentum from the Trump administration’s increased designations and begin sanctioning these criminal networks as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).

Iran’s expanding criminal gang network

Tehran has long offered a safe harbor and a platform for dangerous organized criminal syndicates to plot assassinations, kidnappings, and sabotage around the world. These partnerships with criminal gangs are often flexible, offering plausible deniability for Tehran’s attempts to silence its foes, especially in the West.

In a recently unearthed interview with Mohsen Rafighdoost, the former cabinet minister in charge of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the 1980s, he admitted the regime employed the Basque separatist movement to carry out killings on its behalf in Europe. Both Iran’s Intelligence Ministry and the IRGC retain relationships with these organizations, which are non-Iranian and have access to the United States and Europe in ways that the Iranian regime itself lacks.

These groups include the Mocro-Mafia, which engages in murder-for-hire and drug trafficking across Europe. The organization was implicated in the attempted killing of Alejo Vidal-Quadras, a Spanish politician and former member of the European Parliament. Last year, the Mocro-Mafia’s leader, Riduoan Taghi, was sentenced to life imprisonment for his campaign of violence in the Netherlands, including the murder of an Iranian in Amsterdam. There is evidence that Taghi visited Iran multiple times to engage with the regime and was arrested in Dubai, from where he was plotting killings for Tehran.

Others include the Foxtrot Network, a criminal gang in Sweden that was responsible for an attack on the Israeli embassy on behalf of Iran’s Intelligence Ministry. There exists another such gang active in Sweden and beyond, Rumba, which enlisted a 14-year-old boy to engage in a shooting targeting the Israeli embassy in Stockholm. Iran was also behind that episode. Rumba is led by Ismail Abdo.

Thieves-in-Law, an eastern European organized criminal enterprise, schemed to assassinate journalist and activist Masih Alinejad on behalf of the Iranian government in New York. Two of its operatives were convicted in U.S. federal court last month for this crime. The IRGC has also employed the Hell’s Angels gang to commit arson attacks against synagogues in Germany, as well as the attempted murder of an Iranian defector living in Maryland. A leader of the Hell’s Angels, Ramin Yektaparast, found refuge in Iran until he was killed there in 2024. Narcotics trafficker Naji Ibrahim Sharifi-Zindashti, whom Iran’s Intelligence Ministry has contracted, has also used his network to enlist Hell’s Angels for similar Iranian extraterritorial operations. The Irish Kinahan Organized Crime Group likewise has links to Iran, which is thought to have afforded shelter for its leader.

The case for US FTO designations

The entities listed above are foreign organizations given their operations, predominantly throughout Europe. There are some questions as to the cohesiveness of some of the groups as formal organizations, but in cases where they exist, the Trump administration should sanction them as such.

These organizations also engage in “terrorist activity,” as defined by US law. Under the legal definition, “terrorist activity” can mean “assassination.” Given the long history of the Islamic Republic’s use of these criminal gangs, which engaged in both attempted and actual assassinations—for example, Thieves-in-Law—they have participated in terrorist activity. In the US State Department’s designation of Cártel de Sinaloa as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, it also cited its use of “violence to murder, kidnap, and intimidate civilians, government officials, and journalists.” Organizations like Hell’s Angels, Foxtrot, and Rumba have done the same, with attacks against Israel’s embassies in Europe, which were geared to threaten government officials there. Incidents of arson against synagogues in Germany—in which Hell’s Angels was implicated—also fall into this category.

Lastly, the Islamic Republic’s roving extraterritorial gangs undoubtedly threaten the security of US nationals or US national security. The documented history of their targeting of American citizens—for example Masih Alinejad—make them an acute threat. Their ability to penetrate U.S. soil also positions them as a risk to American national security, as successive Worldwide Threat Assessments produced by the US intelligence community have highlighted Iran’s commitment “to its decade-long effort to develop surrogate networks inside the United States” for violence.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted in his January confirmation hearing that Iranian surrogate groups “have long planned contingencies for attacks” against the American homeland. Should Washington and/or Israel decide to launch military operations to destroy Tehran’s nuclear program, Iran could potentially respond by activating these terrorist contingency plans, in part because they would camouflage Iranian complicity via use of non-Iranian criminal gangs to avoid the very US military escalation against Tehran that the Islamic Republic seeks to keep away from. This would enable the system to thread the needle in responding to such a US strike while attempting to duck a direct confrontation with the American military.

This very architecture, using criminal gangs, necessitates their designation as FTOs. The sanction would further reduce the space such groups have to operate on US soil, especially by criminalizing the provision of material support or resources to them. It would also pressure US allies and partners to sanction them under their respective national authorities. Trump has been creative in designating international cartels as FTOs. He should apply the same standard to those criminal syndicates under the tutelage of the Iranian intelligence services.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). His research specialties include Iranian leadership dynamics, Iran’s military and security services, and Iran’s proxy and partner network. He is on X @JasonMBrodsky.

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Islamist insurgents, including al-Shabaab and the Somali affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS-S), are making territorial gains. These two groups represent distinct but overlapping threats—each transnational, each integrated into broader jihadist ecosystems, and each capable of destabilizing regional and global security if left unchecked. They are also quickly evolving, including by increasing connections with other groups and malign state actors such as the Islamic Republic of Iran—creating larger geostrategic implications.

To address this evolution, the United States must remain engaged in Somalia; but that does not necessarily require escalation. Strategic engagement through a forward embassy, regional partnerships, and calibrated intelligence operations can disrupt the evolution of the terrorist threat in Somalia—and it costs far less than what it would take to contain fully metastasized, adaptive adversaries down the road.

Increasingly adaptive

For too long, ISIS-S has been treated as an afterthought in Somalia’s counterterrorism landscape, but the group can no longer be ignored: Since 2019, it has evolved significantly, becoming the Islamic State’s most agile, digitally integrated, and externally operational franchise. This has aligned with the Islamic State’s global shift toward a decentralized, node-based network managed by the General Directorate of Provinces. Formerly a localized insurgency attempting to replicate elements of the core caliphate in miniature, ISIS-S is now modular, externally focused, and nonterritorial, with unique technical capabilities that elevate its threat beyond that of traditional insurgent groups.

It does not seek to hold Mogadishu; rather, ISIS-S bypasses the Somalian capital to exploit ungoverned spaces through coordinated disruption. Its efforts destabilize governance; it coordinates its operations via encrypted messaging apps, blockchain-based payment systems, commercial off-the-shelf obfuscation tools, and artificial intelligence-generated multilingual propaganda that enables large-scale recruitment.

The ISIS-S threat is transnational and no longer confined to Somalia; that is apparent with the group’s implication in terror plots overseas, including in Sweden. Perhaps most critically for the United States, the ISIS-S al-Karrar office is understood to serve as a funding node for ISIS-Khorasan, which has proven capable of devastating terror plots, including the 2021 Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan that killed thirteen US service members.

Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s East African affiliate, has also proven to be far more than a local insurgency—it is a deeply entrenched and militarily assertive force in Somalia, capable of executing complex operations, controlling territory, and challenging both national and international security efforts. This transnational terrorist organization has already exerted influence beyond Somalia, having executed mass-casualty attacks in Kenya and Uganda. In 2020, its operatives struck US and Kenyan forces in Manda Bay, killing three Americans. The group explicitly targets US and Western interests throughout East Africa. Withdrawing now, as al-Shabaab regains momentum, risks allowing it to strengthen its position and expand its influence.

Metastizing menace

Of parallel concern is the mounting evidence of cooperation between al-Shabaab and the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. This partnership represents a dangerous escalation. The Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to strike maritime targets in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden using anti-ship missiles, drones, and explosive-laden boats. These asymmetric maritime attacks have disrupted vital shipping lanes, endangered commercial vessels, and necessitated multinational naval responses. They also offer a template for al-Shabaab’s future posture.  

Growing evidence exists that Houthi weaponry, supplied by Iran, has been transferred into Somalia and reached both al-Shabaab and ISIS-S. These transfers suggest an intensifying convergence of interests but not ideologies. While al-Shabaab, ISIS-S, and the Houthis remain doctrinally divergent, they share three critical traits: a reliance on illicit maritime logistics, the use of asymmetric tactics, and a willingness to cooperate when it serves operational goals. This alignment adds complexity to counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa, blurring the lines between ideological enemies and functional partners.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, just north of Somalia, is a critical chokepoint for global trade, funneling approximately 12 percent of seaborne oil trade flows. Increased attacks or insecurity in these waters would drive up insurance costs, increase shipping expenses, and worsen instability across East Africa and the Middle East. Should al-Shabaab or ISIS-S, either independently or in partnership with the Houthis, begin to harass this artery, it would have immediate implications for the global economy.

But in addition to the potential economic impact, there is also a clear strategic threat from this cooperation. Hostility to the West and asymmetrical warfare exercised by these groups and the militias included in Iran’s Axis of Resistance could pose an enduring threat to US allies and partners in the region. For example, the US Navy could see its operational freedom eroded, and militant activity in the sea lanes around the Horn of Africa—which connect the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific—could complicate the United States’ ability to surge naval forces in response to crises involving China in the Taiwan Strait or Russia in the eastern Mediterranean.

Continuity as containment

The 2021 US withdrawal from Somalia offered a preview of what disengagement would yield. Following the withdrawal, al-Shabaab and ISIS-S regrouped, expanded their respective operations, and forged deeper regional ties that present the greater challenges that the United States faces today. Although US forces returned in 2022, the withdrawal had already proved costly.

Today, ISIS-S internally exploits the geography of Somalia, clan connections, and instability to thrive. Al-Shabaab forces inch ever forward in their ongoing campaign to isolate and potentially capture the capital of Mogadishu. Each debate over whether to stay or go provides strategic space that the groups use to adapt.

The post-9/11 experience has demonstrated that power vacuums can be quickly filled by hostile actors. The 2011 withdrawal from Iraq enabled ISIS’s rapid rise. Strategic ambiguity in Libya yielded terrain for jihadist experimentation. Afghanistan’s rapid collapse under the Taliban offered ISIS-Khorasan and al-Qaeda a second wind. Somalia is not an exception: It would be the next domino.

But it’s not just a matter of being present. For example, the 2012 Benghazi attack was not a failure of presence; it was a failure of planning, coordination, and establishing an adequate security posture. Similarly, abandoning Somalia without a coherent containment strategy creates the risk of empowering a transnational terrorist organization with international ambitions while simultaneously allowing Iran to extend its strategic reach. 

To maintain its foothold at the most critical junction of East Africa’s security architecture, the United States must prioritize continuity. This includes keeping the US embassy in Mogadishu open, as it provides a platform for intelligence coordination, interagency operations, and diplomatic leverage. Without it, the United States cannot assess—let alone contain—a threat that is actively recombining in real time and posing risks to maritime security, the regional balance of deterrence, and potentially the US homeland.

The terrorist groups based in Somalia are adapting faster, making broader connections, and integrating deeper than Washington’s withdrawal advocates seem to realize. To misread that evolution as localized or static is strategic negligence. A decision to withdraw at this moment will not be remembered as a tactical recalibration but as an unforced error. To leave is to license the evolution of these terrorist groups; to stay is to disrupt it. 

Danielle Cosgrove is a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group. She is a distinguished guest lecturer at Stanford University, a Stanford Medicine X scholar, and the founder of an acquired threat mapping startup.

Doug Livermore is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group, the national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the authors’ and do not represent official US government positions.

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On March 18, Thomas Warrick, a nonresident senior fellow with the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative, was quoted in the Associated Press on personnel cuts to the Department of Homeland Security’s Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships. He argues that the center is central in averting terrorist attacks by identifying individuals before they perpetrate acts of violence.  

Fellow

Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative GeoStrategy Initiative

National Security Terrorism

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Given the threat that the Houthis continue to pose to the region, the United States is seeking to weaken the militant group. But to be successful in that goal, Washington needs a strategy that considers Yemen from within, rather than solely through the lens of the Houthis. A comprehensive strategy toward Yemen is the best way—and really the only way in the medium and long term—to avoid causing further pain to the Yemeni people while weakening the Houthis’ grip on power and deterring it from regional aggression.

So, what should this comprehensive strategy include? To begin with, the United States should work with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to empower the internationally recognized Yemeni government and weaken the Houthis to force the group into pursuing peace with its domestic opponents. A US Yemen policy that has a defined political goal and leverages Saudi and UAE is the best way to both ensure stability in Yemen and protect US interests in the Middle East by hindering the Houthis’ ability to menace the region and maritime trade.

Why the Houthis cannot be ignored

The Houthis’ behavior at the onset of the war in Gaza left the world with no option but to view the Houthis as a global security threat. First, the rebel group attacked maritime trade in the Red Sea, disrupting one of the world’s main trade arteries. Then, it launched missile and drone strikes at Israel. Since the start of this campaign, a concern that the Houthis might next target Saudi Arabia and its oil infrastructure has been constant. 

After the blows suffered by Lebanon’s Hezbollah in 2024, the Houthis have become the leading player in Iran’s network of regional allies. They pose a threat to the United States’ regional ally, Israel, and while the direct damage that Houthi attacks have inflicted against Israel so far has been limited, the militant groups has nevertheless threatened Israel’s economy through its attacks. Moreover, there is the persistent possibility that the Houthis will increase their collaboration with other radical nonstate actors, such as al-Qaeda in Yemen and al-Shabaab in Somalia. 

Locally, the Houthis have been the main obstacle to achieving peace in Yemen since the civil war ended with a shaky truce in 2022. The group has been unwilling to engage in genuine peace talks with the internationally recognized Yemeni government and its various factions on an equal basis. Prior to the October 7 attacks, Yemen was on the verge of a peace process that, while imperfect, offered a glimmer of hope for the Yemeni people. But instead of committing to peace with other Yemeni factions that could save the country from further fragmentation and economic deterioration, they chose the false heroism of targeting international shipping. Building regional status and winning populist plaudits have now become the Houthis’ major preoccupations.

The Houthis’ regional threat

Roughly three years ago, Saudi Arabia, in its attempt to exit the conflict in Yemen by presenting itself as a neutral broker, was closing in on an agreement with the Houthis that was to encompass basic issues. This included a comprehensive cease-fire, salary payments to public sector employees, and the resumption of talks among the Yemeni parties themselves. But the deal was negotiated exclusively between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, keeping the other Yemeni players in the dark. This allowed the Saudi side to offer one concession after the other in the absence of the internationally recognized government. As a result, the Houthis became bolder in their demands and less interested in genuine talks with their Yemeni rivals.

It was with the objective of neutralizing security threats from their south that the Saudis reopened backchannel talks with the Houthis in 2022. This resulted not only in a cease of hostilities in 2022 but also in an unforeseen, unprecedented level of closeness between the two sides.

But in one important respect, Saudi Arabia’s policy of rapprochement with the Houthis was short-sighted: it allowed the group to refrain from engaging directly with the Yemeni government, preventing a lasting peace agreement.

Today, Saudi Arabia is at more risk militarily than it likes to admit. The Houthis have expanded coordinated military operations with Iraqi militias that are also tied to Iran, including some that operate in the Saudi-Iraqi border area. Such encirclement against Saudi Arabia by Iran and its allied militias are what provoked Riyadh into launching its war against the Houthis in the first place. For now, though, Riyadh seems unconcerned, perhaps out of an optimistic sense that its recent rapprochement with Iran has neutralized the threat the Houthis and its allied groups pose. 

But the Houthis understand Saudi concern about any attacks on its $1.3 trillion worth of giga-projects at the heart of its Vision 2030 economic development plan, which includes major sporting events in the coming years, such as the Asian Winter Games and the World Cup. By the later years of the civil war, the Houthis were able to strike Aramco energy facilities and to do so during international sporting events such as a Formula 1 race in Jeddah. Riyadh does not want to risk any more such attacks in the future, so it has likely concluded that peace with the Houthis on the militant group’s terms is a small price to pay.

Now that the Houthis have become a key player in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” and they have tested their powers to impact regional politics, however, they are unlikely to remain quiet. There is a growing sense that the Houthis need a war to distract from a deteriorating economic situation in Yemen, which the FTO will certainly worsen. In recent years, the Yemenis who live under Houthi control—a majority of the population—have suffered the worst economic and humanitarian conditions in living memory. This has been coupled with an apparent rise in arbitrary detentions, disappearances, and sometimes the outright murder of civilians under the Houthis.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two regional backers of the recognized Yemeni government and its various elements, have gravitated toward a policy of neutralizing the Houthi threat through political and economic deals with Iran, China, and Russia that in different ways integrate Yemen and recalibrate Saudi ties with the Houthis. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have taken this course in part because of a lack of trust in the United States for, in their view, having let them down in the past. A key turning point was the US decision to help end the battle in Hodeidah in 2018 through the Stockholm Agreement. Both countries also viewed the lack of a US reaction to Iranian and Houthi attacks on their respective soils in recent years as a sign of Washington’s unwillingness to support its Gulf partners. The United States took no retaliatory action in the wake of the Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil plant in September 2019, during the first Trump administration, or to the Houthi attacks on Aramco installations in Jeddah and on Abu Dhabi airport in early 2022, during the Biden administration. 

An approach that addresses Yemen as a whole

The United States and its regional partners and allies need to recognize the threat that the Houthis continue to pose to the region. The responses to the group’s aggression so far have been highly reactive—imposing sanctions, restricting humanitarian aid, and conducting military strikes. But these measures hurt the civilian population while Houthi leaders hide in Yemen’s mountainous recesses. Removing them militarily seems like a tall order; indeed, continuing with the current policies may only further entrench their rule. A better approach is to seek to weaken the Houthis to force them into serious talks with the recognized Yemeni government.  

Recent US actions are likely to be counterproductive to this goal. For example, cutting off aid to Yemen that flowed through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) amounts to giving up on Yemen, among other parts of the world. For Yemen, the blow is particularly harsh given the lack of a supporting hand to help it out of its economic and political crises. This will destabilize parts of the country, giving more space for radical groups such as al-Qaeda and other nonstate actors to prevail, not to mention exacerbating the suffering of the people. It will also increase the leverage of regional actors such as Iran and international actors such as Russia, to the detriment of the interests of US allies in the region. That will not make the United States safer or stronger, the rubric for foreign policy decisions recently set out by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. 

So, what should the United States do? The Trump administration should press Saudi Arabia and the UAE to work together to strengthen the fragmented Yemeni government. Each country has its roster of clients within the government, but their bickering and infighting needs to stop if there is to be real hope of forcing the Houthis into peace talks. The Houthis believe that the Presidential Leadership Council, the internationally recognized government’s executive body, will sign off on whatever they are presented with by the Saudis. Thus far, they have no reason to think otherwise. The Saudis have kept the government deliberately weak to ensure there is no resistance to the final Saudi-Houthi normalization deal, which is currently in the works.  

Without sufficient diplomatic support, economic aid, and coordinated military assistance that reinforces the official Yemeni government’s capacity to rule and negotiate on equal terms, the Houthis are going to continue to be the number one political player in Yemen, a de facto authority en route to de jure. The Houthis will not be deterred from their aggression in the region as long as their domestic opponents are weak and fragmented. The Houthis’ increasing grip on parts of Yemen and their ability to threaten its neighbors is not in the interests of the United States, the Gulf countries, or the Yemeni people.

For all these reasons, the Trump administration needs to have a comprehensive Yemen policy; not just a policy against Houthis. In partnership with the Yemeni government, its Gulf partners, and other regional actors, the United States must fashion a strategy that weakens the Houthis, curbs Iran’s reach, and contributes to a more stable and prosperous Yemen. Such a policy would not only protect US interests but also render the world more secure and prosperous—for example, by preventing a repeat of the Houthis’ attacks on Red Sea shipping. It may seem counterintuitive to the Trump administration’s stated goals of reducing entanglements in distant conflicts, but a comprehensive Yemeni and regional approach to combating the Houthis is in fact the best way to put “America first.”

Osamah Al Rawhani is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the executive director for policy and partnerships at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies.

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Daniel E. Mouton: The US will now need to ramp up diplomacy and other resources

Emily Milliken: Expect Houthi retaliation against US targets in the region

Danny Citrinowicz: An important change in strategy for coping with the Houthis

Osamah Al Rawhani: The bombings risk prolonging Yemenis’ suffering—which the Houthis can exploit to rally support

Alex Plitsas: Saturday’s airstrikes are probably the first of many

Andrew Borene: A more comprehensive allied approach will be needed

Thomas S. Warrick: A few days of strikes alone will not end Houthi attacks

The US will now need to ramp up diplomacy and other resources

Between March 2015 and March 2022, the Saudi-led coalition conducted between 25,054 and 75,135 airstrike sorties against Yemen’s Houthi movement. The Saudi-led coalition operated modern US and European aircraft, launched precision guided munitions, and received indirect US military support. Seven years of airstrikes across the breadth of Houthi-controlled territory failed to inhibit the Houthis’ ability to conduct counter-strikes against Saudi Arabia’s energy, aviation, and other civil infrastructure. In the face of the massive amount of ordnance the Saudi-led coalition dropped on Yemen and the amount of Saudi air-defense missiles fired at Houthi drones and missiles, the Houthis’ demonstrated their ability to increase their attacks over time. 

Importantly, large-scale Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia and corresponding coalition airstrikes ended with a truce in March 2022. Although a formal cease-fire remains unfulfilled, the Saudis, at least, have no desire to see a resumption of hostilities as the Houthis could just as easily target Saudi Arabia’s NEOM project or energy infrastructure. This explains why Saudi Arabia called for restraint when the United States and United Kingdom began airstrikes against the Houthis in 2024. Despite multiple rounds of strikes in Yemen, the Houthis demonstrated the same level of resilience that they demonstrated against the Saudi-led coalition.

Moving to the most recent round of strikes against the Houthis, Trump’s statement, if followed through, gives us a clear indication of the US direction in the Middle East. Trump wrote that he “ordered the United States Military to launch decisive and powerful Military action against the Houthi terrorists in Yemen,” and concluded with the threat that if Houthi attacks don’t stop, “HELL WILL RAIN DOWN UPON YOU LIKE NOTHING YOU HAVE EVER SEEN BEFORE!” 

Given the long history of Houthi resistance, first against the central Yemen government that they overthrew and later against the Saudi-led coalition, the current round of airstrikes are unlikely to deter the Houthis. Given that the Houthis receive support not only from Iran, but also from procurement networks in China and Russia, the United States will need to employ more resources than Saturday’s airstrikes. 

These additional resources will include diplomatic engagement with Russia and China, additional maritime resources to interdict resupply to the Houthis, and effective pressure on Iran. These resources do not include the potential need to increase the defenses of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both of which the Houthis have targeted in the past. These resources will be considerable in terms of military assets and international coordination. Signs of the seriousness of US intentions to do more than in the past will be clear in the coming days and weeks. This level of commitment, more than Saturday’s strikes, will be what sends a message of US seriousness to Iran and the region.

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 as the director for defense and political-military policy for the Middle East and North Africa for Coordinator Brett McGurk.

Expect Houthi retaliation against US targets in the region

The latest US strikes targeted Houthi strongholds that are known locations for Houthi leadership and infrastructure. These operations align closely with previous statements by Trump and members of his administration that the United States needs to take a tougher stance against the rebel group. 

While strikes targeting the Houthis’ bases, leaders, and missile defenses may impact their ability to operate in the short term, the Houthis have proven resilient in the past and were able to still pose a regional threat after successive strikes by the Saudi-led coalition and more recently the United States and United Kingdom. Looking ahead, the group will likely launch a retaliatory strike, potentially on the USS Truman strike group in the Red Sea or US bases in the region, in an attempt to demonstrate to Yemenis living under their control, their backers in Tehran, and the wider international community that they remain undeterred by US operations.

The rebels may also continue ground operations in Marib, the last remaining Yemeni government stronghold and a key hub for oil and gas resources, or launch attacks on key Saudi infrastructure, in an attempt to force the government in Riyadh into a vulnerable position ahead of potential peace negotiations.

—Emily Milliken is the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

An important change in strategy for coping with the Houthis

The attacks conducted in Yemen by US Central Command, which mark the beginning of a targeted campaign against the Houthis, constitute an important change in the US policy toward the Yemeni terrorist organization. 

The US military has taken the initiative and begun targeted operations against the Houthi leadership and weapons production sites in Yemen.

These attacks highlight the US administration’s view regarding the need to prevent the Houthis from disrupting the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and are an important signal to US friends in the region about Washington’s willingness to seriously confront the Houthis.

In order for the campaign to be effective, it must be continuous and ongoing while damaging the Houthis’ command and control sites and their ability to produce and launch missiles and drones. The campaign also must block Iran’s ability to support the Houthis’ power-building (via the Arabian Sea and Oman) while relying on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which are well acquainted with the Yemeni arena. 

Looking ahead, this campaign must also lead to the overthrow of the Houthi regime, a step that will seriously harm Iran’s presence in this strategic region and its ability to threaten Saudi Arabia.

Given the existing high tensions, these attacks—especially if the United States suspects that Iran is continuing to assist the Houthis—also bring Tehran and Washington closer to confrontation.

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group.

The bombings risk prolonging Yemenis’ suffering—which the Houthis can exploit to rally support

The US bombing on Saturday in Sana’a and elsewhere in Yemen marks another escalation of the war with the Houthis. Purportedly aimed at weakening the group’s military, the attack is a direct response to persistent Houthi assaults on Red Sea shipping and broader regional aggression and threats. The difference between these attacks and those in the past is that Saturday’s attacks are meant to directly target Houthi leadership.

Although the attacks themselves may not show results at the moment, they deliver a strong deterrence message from the United States to Houthi leadership. However, the Houthis are likely to show resistance, meaning the US policy of deterrence will take time to show its effectiveness.

While the attacks also focus on military installations and equipment, draining Houthi resources, the group has consistently demonstrated the ability to adapt and recover.

Beyond their direct impact on the Houthis, these airstrikes deeply affect civilians, as Houthi-controlled territory represents more than 60 percent of Yemen’s population. This instills fear and increases resentment toward the United States from citizens who do not support the Houthis. Large-scale destruction and civilian casualties are bound to provoke outrage, which the Houthis can exploit to rally more support. Without a comprehensive approach that disrupts weapons and parts smuggling from Iran, and addresses the political and economic drivers empowering the Houthis, this week’s bombings risk prolonging the suffering of Yemenis.

—Osamah Al Rawhani is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the executive director for policy and partnerships at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies.

Saturday’s airstrikes are probably the first of many

Since late 2023, the United States, alongside coalition partners, has conducted repeated strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen, aiming to curb the Iran-backed group’s escalating aggression. The Houthis’ attacks on Red Sea shipping have inflicted significant economic damage, disrupting international trade routes and slashing traffic on the Suez Canal, a critical artery for global commerce. Their campaign, which they tie to solidarity with Palestinians amid the Israel-Hamas war, has forced shipping firms to reroute, leading to spiking costs and delays.

Beyond merchant vessels, the Houthis have launched unprecedented drone and missile assaults on US naval ships, alongside ballistic missile and drone strikes targeting Israel. Despite over a year of US-led airstrikes, these efforts have failed to deter the Houthis, who have exploited the conflict to bolster their domestic and regional legitimacy. In early 2025, they threatened to resume Red Sea ship attacks, underscoring their resilience.

The Houthis’ ability to persist stems from their dispersal of weapons across Yemen’s rugged terrain, complicating targeting efforts. A lack of actionable intelligence has further hampered coalition strikes, despite extensive collection efforts spanning months. The group’s adaptability—hiding assets and leveraging Iran’s support—has rendered suppression elusive.

The extensive US airstrikes carried out Saturday were likely driven by months of painstaking intelligence work and are likely the first of many if they are to be successful in achieving the goal of stopping attacks on international shipping and US interests in the region.

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

A more comprehensive allied approach will be needed

Counterterrorism can be a powerful unifying force. In a time of challenges to some military alliances elsewhere, this may be one area where the United States, European powers, Israel’s allies, and a Saudi-led Arab coalition can all agree on needed action. Each shares motivations to combat the terrorist group and begin degrading Iran’s decades-long role as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.

History suggests that without a more comprehensive allied approach to the Houthi-Iran connection, airstrikes alone won’t be enough to push the Houthis out of Yemen or restore stability to one of the world’s most vital trade routes. Understanding the history behind these tensions is key to making sense of the present and what might come next.

The Houthis, an armed political and religious movement, have controlled large parts of western Yemen since 2015 and—despite years of airstrikes and some ground offensives led by Saudi Arabia, augmented by targeted US and UK strikes in response to last year’s attacks on commercial shipping—the Houthis remain entrenched. Airstrikes alone have not been enough to dislodge them, as they’ve adapted with asymmetric tactics, fortified defenses, and, most critically, sustained support from Iran.

That Iranian backing is central to their operations. The Houthis have positioned themselves within Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” alongside Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Without direct Iranian arms, training, and intelligence, their battlefield resilience and ability to target commercial shipping with precision would not be possible.

The first Trump administration already demonstrated a willingness to aggressively confront Iran’s most direct proxies and even Iranian top military leadership. That precedent may be relevant now as the United States responds again to Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping that have disrupted a sea route critical to 15 percent of global trade, forcing major companies to at times abandon the waterway and reroute around Africa, driving up costs and causing economic ripple effects worldwide.

—Andrew Borene is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project and a former senior official in the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

A few days of strikes alone will not end Houthi attacks

Most Americans have learned not to think of the Trump administration as patient, but the Houthis got a very pointed lesson this week of Trump’s impatience. Virtually every outside observer had concluded long ago that the Biden administration’s limited strikes since the Houthis started attacking international shipping in the Red Sea were not deterring the Houthis from continuing to strike when it suited them. 

Now, the Trump administration has decided to ramp up the attacks to see if a more painful demonstration will stop the attacks. The biggest risk for both the United States and the Houthis is that no amount of destruction short of targeting both the Houthi leadership and its military capabilities may actually achieve what the Trump administration wants. A few days of strikes will probably not bring about an end to the Houthis’ attacks—unless the Trump administration is prepared to go even further.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

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On February 1, AFRICOM conducted airstrikes targeting a local branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in the remote Golis Mountains in northern Somalia. AFRICOM later announced that the airstrikes managed to kill their main target: Ahmed Maeleninine, an ISIS recruiter, financier, and leader responsible for the deployment of jihadists to the United States and Europe. Following that strike, there have been a series of strikes against both al-Shabaab (a branch of al-Qaeda) and ISIS-Somalia, firmly placing the region at the forefront of the new administration’s kinetic military activities.

While most of the conversation about US military presence around the world has focused on paring back, in Somalia, the United States appears to be taking the opposite approach. The approach surprised some, in part because US President Donald Trump had withdrawn seven hundred US troops from Somalia during his first term. But the shift shouldn’t come as such a shock. It shows a broader understanding of a new reality: That combating terror globally starts in Africa.

Africa is at the forefront of the war on terror; in 2024 alone, the African Union reportedly recorded more than 3,400 terrorist attacks and 13,900 resulting deaths on the continent. And what is happening on the continent affects the wider world—Somalia in particular is an unfortunate showcase of that.  

ISIS-Somalia, for example, shows how terrorist groups have become embedded in the continent. Since breaking away from al-Shabaab in 2015, the Somali branch of ISIS has been growing exponentially. AFRICOM reported that just last year, the group had doubled in size. What’s more, rumors persist that Abdul Qadir Mumin, the leader of ISIS-Somalia who reportedly became the global leader of ISIS in 2023, survived a US strike last year. Thus, it’s clear why the United States is placing such attention on the group. While unconfirmed, the mere possibility that the leader of ISIS is not of Arab decent and is based in Africa signifies just how terror and the continent have become intertwined.

The involvement of terrorist groups on the continent is by no means limited to Somalia. From the Great Lakes of Central Africa to Mozambique, terrorist groups are prevalent—as are their financiers. Nowhere, however, are terrorist groups more prevalent than in the Sahel, where they have been expanding and strengthening for years. An array of groups—including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, the Islamic State in West Africa Province, and Boko Haram, among others—now call the Sahel home. They even battle each other for territory and power.

In the past several years, a series of coups have driven out democracies from the Sahel and sought to replace US and European Union support with Russian mercenaries. But, as has been seen across the region, Russian support has hard limits. For example, in Mali—where leaders turned to Russia for military support—al-Qaeda jihadists briefly took over Bamako’s airport last year and posed for photos with the presidential jet. Even away from the hotbed of the Sahel, the limits of Russian mercenary support were made clear in Mozambique, where the Wagner Group was pulled from an operation targeting al-Shabaab after twelve mercenaries died. As this broader dynamic changes in the Sahel, jihadists groups are still gaining power.

So, what’s next?

Expect increased US attention toward Africa from a counterterrorism perspective. From what has been displayed so far, the United States’ tactics are looking quite muscular. Will this attention include rapprochement with the Sahelian juntas? That is still unclear. In weighing rapprochement, the Trump administration is sure to remember the lessons of the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush in Niger, in which a joint US-Nigerien mission pursuing a leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara was attacked, resulting in the deaths of four US Special Forces soldiers. At the time, the ambush was the deadliest attack against the US military in Africa in decades. 

In recent years, global attention has focused on Eastern Europe and conflict in the Middle East rather than African conflicts. Yet, with international terror and jihadist groups now entrenched in the continent and pursuing global aspirations greater than carving out territory in Africa—presenting a major threat to the United States and its allies—attention is needed. The war on terror will be fought in Africa, and whatever direction that takes, the United States will need to be involved.

Some involvement is already underway. Notably, at a time when discourse about US global deployments is focused on withdrawals and wind-downs, discussions over US presence in Africa are taking the opposite direction. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, whose first visit overseas conspicuously included the AFRICOM base in Germany, said, “Africa is very much the front lines of a fight from Islamists . . . We’re not going to allow them to maintain a foothold, especially to try to strike at America.” Notably, it was in a meeting with AFRICOM leaders that Hegseth signed a directive easing restraints and executive oversight on foreign US airstrikes and the deployment of US commandos.

Last month’s airstrikes in Somalia are likely the first of many. And while many analysts are loath to guess what this US administration will do on the foreign affairs front, the fact remains that combating terror in the modern era will require action in Africa.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Trump indeed should take a close look at the Arab plan as a starting point for negotiations, as there is no other realistic plan on the table. Trump’s proposal for forced displacement is counterproductive; a group of 144 Democrats in the US House of Representatives pointed out that Trump’s plan undermines the United States’ principled moral position. Trump’s plan also threatens the long-standing peace between Egypt and Israel, according to Egyptian officials. But beyond the fact that the Egyptian plan is the only realistic one on the table, it is still in the United States’ interest to embrace a version of this plan, because it is politically and financially affordable for Washington.

The Egyptian plan, swiftly endorsed by Arab leaders last week, allows Palestinians to remain in the Gaza Strip while reconstruction takes place. Such reconstruction includes three phases: interim measures (six months), which would include the clearing of damage and initial construction overseen by a group of Palestinian technocrats paving the way for the Palestinian Authority to return to Gaza; reconstruction (two years), which would involve building additional housing and restoring services such as water and electricity; and governance (three years), which would see industrial zones built and would ensure that the technocratic committee has oversight over aid and governance.

The plan’s $53 billion price tag would be sourced from international organizations and investments. In calling for a group of Palestinian technocrats to manage the reconstruction, and for the Palestinian Authority to eventually lead Gaza, the plan stresses Palestinian ownership of the process. The Arab leaders who have backed the plan have committed to making their case for this plan internationally and for hosting an international conference in Cairo in April dedicated to Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction, in cooperation with Palestinians and the United Nations.  

On the other hand, Trump’s plan neglects the Palestinians, echoing policies and plans he released during his first term. But the Palestinian question remains pivotal in the Middle East and can’t be disregarded in favor of broader regional peace that doesn’t include the Palestinians. Trump’s Gaza plan also fails to answer many questions about the logistics of moving two million Palestinians out of the Gaza Strip (likely against their will) and about strategies for the countries that will receive them and how to secure Arab cooperation. Meanwhile, the Egyptian plan answers critical questions, specifically ones about Gaza’s political future (one without Hamas in power).

The Trump administration would benefit from supporting the Egyptian plan. Throughout his campaign and initial months in office, Trump has vowed to bring peace to the Middle East; backing the Egyptian plan would enable him to keep his word. Any attempted forced removal of Palestinians from Gaza, as implied by the Trump plan, would likely lead to armed resistance—and a return to war. That war would be costly for the United States, at a time when the Trump administration has prioritized reducing the government’s expenditures. The resumption of war would likely lead to more US aid to Israel: Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, Israel received at least twelve billion dollars in military aid from the United States. This estimation doesn’t include the cost of the US military operations in the wider Middle East (including around the Red Sea) or any economic assistance to Israel. Trump’s plan would be costly morally, politically, and financially, not only for the United States, but any other party that would cooperate to implement this plan. Given that the White House has said that the United States won’t pay for this plan, it will be challenging to find partners to fund it. 

Witkoff’s comments on the Egyptian plan last week reflected two main sticking points for the Trump administration. The first is the timeline. While the Egyptian plan outlined reconstruction that would take place over five years without displacing Gazans, Witkoff suggested a longer period between ten and fifteen years and reiterated the administration’s concerns that the Strip would be uninhabitable during that time. A joint technical committee of engineers from Gaza and other parties could help resolve this issue by recommending what is possible in terms of the reconstruction timeline and process. The second point is the future of Hamas. Witkoff has concerns about the future of Hamas as a militant group. The Egyptian plan did not deal with this point, but it did suggest a political process in Gaza that results in the return of the Palestinian Authority. US officials should engage with different Palestinian groups, including the Palestinian Authority, as they did with Hamas. This may carry the promise of a long-term security arrangement in parallel with a political horizon to settle this conflict.    

Israel also dismissed the plan last week, arguing that it “fails to address the realities of the situation,” in a statement that focused on the political and security future of Gaza. Although the Egyptian plan emphasizes the Palestinian ownership of this process, it does overlap with Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid’s vision for Egypt to assume responsibility of Gaza for eight to fifteen years. That echoes an Israeli request from 2005—when Israel said it disengaged from Gaza—to no longer bear responsibility for the Gaza Strip. With the Egyptian plan, Arab countries have taken a leadership role that will likely amount to taking de facto responsibility of Gaza, even if the Palestinian Authority is in power.   

The Egyptian plan offers a base to secure many parties’ interests and create the required regional stability to buy time for diplomacy. US backing would help in the implementation of the plan and in addressing threats to the plan such as the resumption of war in Gaza, tensions resulting from the Israeli military operations in the West Bank, Israeli rejection of Palestinian power in Gaza after the war ends, and Israeli refusal of a Palestinian state. Trump should support the Egyptian plan or at least engage with it, both for the plan’s political and financial benefits and also for regional peace.

Ahmed Nabil is an adjunct lecturer at the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at Wayne State University.

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Hezbollah desperately needed a lifeline to secure its future in Lebanon. The massive turnout to Nasrallah’s funeral on February 23 may have provided one, deterring Beirut from either seizing its arms or undermining its domestic standing.

Hezbollah derives its domestic strength—and its longstanding immunity from disarmament or restraint by the Lebanese government—not through force of arms alone but through widespread popularity among Lebanese Shiites, Lebanon’s likely largest and fastest-growing sect. In Lebanon’s May 2022 parliamentary elections, the group garnered 356,000 of the 1.8 million votes cast—the most of any party by approximately 150,000 votes. Polls from January and September of 2024 showed that between 89 percent and 93 percent of Lebanese Shiites support Hezbollah.

This extensive support reflects the group’s “Nation of Hezbollah” model of membership, first articulated in its foundational 1985 Open Letter, which prioritized a party’s “responsiveness with the masses” over territorial control. As a result, Hezbollah developed a broad, flexible concept of membership to attract as much support as possible. 

This served a pragmatic purpose. Gaining Shiite support at all granted Hezbollah domestic legitimacy and secured its place in Lebanon’s sectarian-power sharing system. The larger that support, the more influence Hezbollah had within that sectarian system—and therefore adopting a membership model designed to maximize support was vital.

Road to reconstruction

Popular support will also prove critical to Hezbollah achieving its post-war priorities, the first of which is retaining its arms. In his December 5 speech, the group’s new Secretary-General Naim Qassem bowed to reality and the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement, agreeing that “the presence of armed individuals and the resistance’s weapons” would be “banned south of the Litani River”—amounting to a tactical withdrawal from most of south Lebanon. However, Qassem and the rest of Hezbollah have insisted that the agreement does not apply north of the Litani, meaning that the question of Hezbollah’s arms in the rest of Lebanon must be resolved through Lebanese consensus and dialogue on a national defense strategy. 

Hezbollah’s other, equally important priority is ensuring that post-war reconstruction funds reach its battered community. Qassem insisted that this must also be the Lebanese government’s priority, after ensuring Israel’s complete withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Seeking to shifting the onus of reconstruction—and the potential backlash if aid does not materialize—from Hezbollah squarely to the Lebanese state, Qassem stated that Beirut had a “responsibility” to “attract donations or call for [aid] conferences or rely on [help] from [foreign] countries” for reconstruction. 

Securing these two priorities is of existential importance for Hezbollah as they are essential to regain whatever trust Shiites lost in the group for inviting the recent war with Israel. Without its arms, the group could no longer claim to be “The Resistance.” After all, that image is the basis of much of Hezbollah’s appeal, and it also serves as its justification for retaining the figurative stick it uses—often as a last resort—to deter hostile action within Lebanon and, more vitally, dissent from within the Shiite community. 

As for reconstruction, Iran has allegedly been channeling funds to its main regional instrument—one billion dollars the day after the ceasefire went into effect. However, that’s a pittance compared to the estimated eight billion to eleven billion dollars in war damage. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s access to Iranian coffers has been complicated by a combination of Assad’s downfall and Israeli threats, which led Beirut to temporarily clamp down on Hezbollah’s alternate funding route through Hariri International Airport by, for example, seizing cash shipments. If reconstruction aid does not materialize, Hezbollah will likely face an unprecedented eruption of anger from within its own support base. 

Numbers game

Enter Nasrallah’s funeral, the purpose of which, as Qassem stated, was not only an outpouring of grief but also a domestic show of force. Vast attendance was therefore necessary. 

Turnout numbers varied. Citing event organizers, Al-Jadeed and the Lebanese National News Agency offered a slightly implausible preliminary estimate of 1.4 million people, while Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International reported “hundreds of thousands” both in Camille Chamoun Stadium, Lebanon’s largest sports arena where the funeral began, “and surrounding areas.” Meanwhile, Reuters estimated one million attendees based on an unnamed “Lebanese security source,” anonymous Hezbollah sources told AFP that the event drew “around 800,000” participants, and a Lebanese official speaking on condition of anonymity to the Associated Press put the number at 450,000. The newspaper Al-Joumhouria claimed that 200,000 people from the Beqaa valley alone had headed to Beirut to participate in the funeral.

The final say on turnout, however, goes to the Beirut-based research and consultancy firm Information International. It dismissed both the inflated 1.4 million figure provided by the funeral organizers and the minimal estimate of a 200,000-person turnout, calling the latter “very low” and illogical, “given nearly 40 percent of attendees were in the stadium.” Instead, they estimated that 700,000 to 900,000 people attended Nasrallah’s funeral, with “no more than 15,000” of them coming from abroad, “based on [Hariri International Airport’s] daily activities.”

For comparison, the February 16, 2005, funeral of slain former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri attracted around 150,000 people.

Arms control

Hezbollah’s gambit, it would therefore appear, paid off—seemingly rebutting claims that the war and its effects had drained the group of a critical mass of supporters and left it domestically vulnerable. But that turnout now also serves to forestall any potential action by Lebanese authorities, who are already wavering on reining in the group. Both the ostensibly sovereigntist President Joseph Aoun and longtime ally, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, have accepted Hezbollah’s position on resolving the question of its arms.

This is also likely to critically impact Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who has already made concessions to Hezbollah while forming his cabinet—Lebanon’s real executive authority—in recognition of the country’s political realities. Salam, if his government and its policy statement win a parliamentary vote of confidence, will hold the premiership until Lebanon’s May 2026 parliamentary elections, when his government will dissolve by operation of law. Meanwhile, Salam has a long list of vital tasks to accomplish during his short term in office, including steering Lebanon through economic recovery, repairing and upgrading the country’s dilapidated infrastructure, enacting political and judicial reforms, and overseeing post-war reconstruction. These would be monumental tasks in a functioning state. In Lebanon, accomplishing them will require all hands on deck and avoiding political infighting. 

With the numbers it brought out on February 23, Hezbollah can threaten the premier with—at a minimum—obstructionism if the group senses his government is moving against its arms or withholding or conditioning reconstruction aid to areas under its control. At worst, clashing with a Hezbollah that has retained pre-war levels of Shiite support could risk igniting a civil war.

Most Shiites who support Hezbollah are not unwavering Khomeinists. They back the group for practical reasons: its extensive social-clientelist network, the protection from external threats they believe Hezbollah’s private arsenal provides, and the domestic dignity and equality the traditionally disenfranchised sect derives from the group’s domestic political weight. But the relationship between party and population isn’t entirely transactional. Hezbollah has spent decades building an emotional symbiosis between the two—one that has remained relatively unchallenged by Shiite opposition alternatives, whose already small numbers are disunited and lack resources.

By bringing the community out to Nasrallah’s funeral in the hundreds of thousands, Hezbollah sent a message to its domestic opponents and the government: An attack on Hezbollah is an attack on the Shiites writ large. That doesn’t mean Hezbollah’s survival is absolutely guaranteed. But it has now, to Lebanon’s and the region’s misfortune, created a bridgehead that it can widen—over years, perhaps decades, and quite likely in fits and starts—to ensure it remains a fixture in Lebanon’s future.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on Hezbollah, Israel, and Lebanon issues. Follow him on X: @DavidADaoud.

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After having withdrawn from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during his first term, Trump has since expressed an interest in a negotiated settlement with Tehran. But with all deals, the details matter. And while it is true that the Trump administration has not yet given its blessing to Israel for military strikes against Iran—as US intelligence reportedly portends—it was unrealistic to expect such a move from Trump as the opening act of his presidency. Trump needed time to build his team, formulate a policy, and secure international legitimacy and support for military action should it become necessary. The third task requires leaving open a lane for diplomacy to make it possible to blame Tehran should negotiations fail and to secure political support from US allies and partners.

Right now, signs indicate that the United States and Iran are headed towards confrontation, not a successful diplomatic outcome.

The Islamic Republic has not yet softened its position on the nuclear file, even after being weakened by a series of killings of leaders across its proxy network and by the degrading of a chunk of its air defenses and missile capacities. While Iranian decisionmakers have recognized the reality that the 2015 text of the JCPOA is long dead, they have clung to the vision of resurrecting a new deal premised on the basic bargain of temporary nuclear constraints in exchange for sanctions relief, using the JCPOA as a reference point or framework. 

Some Iranian officials have taken to the airwaves to hint that there may be willingness to discuss nonnuclear concerns, but those who are the real decisionmakers on these issues—the supreme leader and commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—have shunned talks over its missile and drone programs and other regional files. Their stances speak louder than the propagandists trying to give an impression to Western constituencies and others that such fundamental change is possible. History has shown that it is not.

In February, the supreme leader himself delivered public remarks warning against negotiations with the Trump administration: “One shall not negotiate with a government like this,” he said. “Negotiating is unwise, unintelligent, not honorable.” Already this has triggered hardened rhetoric from Iranian officials, such as President Masoud Pezeshkian, who had previously made more conciliatory comments towards the Trump administration. Since Khamenei’s speech, the Pezeshkian administration has experienced further headwinds with the impeachment of Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati as well as the resignation of Vice President for Strategic Affairs Javad Zarif, who has long been seen as the face of the Islamic Republic’s engagement with the United States.

But Khamenei’s warning last month was not the sweeping ban he laid down in September 2019, when he said, “the policy of maximum pressure on the Iranian nation is of little importance, and all the officials in the Islamic Republic unanimously believe that there will be no negotiations at any level with the United States.” The Islamic Republic under Khamenei will likely never truly walk away completely from the negotiating table, as its political weaponization is a valuable tool to buy time for the regime and divide the United States from within and from its allies. This does not necessarily mean there will be direct and public diplomacy with the Trump administration at this juncture. However, Khamenei’s latest comments seem to leave some room for diplomacy in that they do not necessarily rule out indirect discussions. Such discussions could take place through various channels of communication that Tehran has long maintained with Washington, including through Arab regional interlocutors and European governments. Russia has also reportedly agreed to serve as an intermediary. Still, the obstacles are significant.

For now, on substance, Iran and the United States are talking past each other about “deals.” Iran is still speaking in the language of the JCPOA. But US officials appear to have something different in mind. In a recent interview, Trump publicly disavowed the JCPOA formula, complaining about its short-term duration. This was followed by his national security advisor expressing a willingness to talk to Iran as long as Tehran wants to give up its entire nuclear program. The US secretary of state hinted at a similar demand, noting that in the past, “efforts that Iran has undertaken diplomatically have been only about how to extend the time frame” for its nuclear program and to continue to enrich, sponsor terrorism, build long-range weapons, and “sow instability throughout the region.” 

Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) included related pledges, vowing to “deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and end the regime’s nuclear extortion racket.” NSPM-2 also employed mandatory language stating that the US ambassador to the United Nations will “work with key allies to complete the snapback”—or restoration—”of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran.” This language evokes past US demands for zero enrichment or reprocessing in Iran, which the first Trump administration endorsed. Triggering snapback would also restore previous UN Security Council resolutions, inked before the 2015 JCPOA, which included demands for Iran to suspend “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities . . . and work on all heavy-water related projects.”

NSPM-2 likewise declared that it is US policy that “Iran be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles,” among other measures to counter Iran’s malign behavior beyond its nuclear program. These US positions are reminiscent of the 2003 Libya disarmament deal, in which the country pledged to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs, including nuclear, and to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime. However, this is a fundamentally different paradigm from the JCPOA, which allowed Iran to enrich uranium up to 3.67 percent purity and did not touch its missile program.

In fact, Iran’s supreme leader has warned that US officials “intend to systematically reduce Iran’s nuclear facilities, similar to how they did with a North African country”—a hint at Libya—”ultimately leading to the shutdown of Iran’s nuclear industry.” In 2011, Khamenei (referring to Libyan dictator Muammar Ghaddafi) said that “this gentleman wrapped up all his nuclear facilities, packed them on a ship and delivered them to the West and said, ‘Take them!’” He added, “Look where we are, and in what position they are now.” In 2023, after talks about reviving the JCPOA stalled, Khamenei reiterated that “there is nothing wrong with the agreement [with the West], but the infrastructure of our nuclear industry should not be touched.” 

Despite forty-six years of failed diplomacy, outside observers have been insisting Iran is ripe for a durable diplomatic arrangement with the United States. Some supporters of negotiations with Iran have also been wishcasting that Trump suddenly adopted the Obama administration’s Iran policy based on an overreading of the new president’s rhetoric and the absence of certain officials, such as former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who took a hardline stance, from the policymaking process. But this is a false narrative, one that even some Islamic Republic officials like to promote while arguing that Trump was suckered into an Iran policy that was not his own, despite him expressing disapproval of the JCPOA during his first presidential campaign, well before his national security team was assembled.

There is no public evidence to date that the maximum Tehran is prepared to give—a JCPOA-style arrangement—will meet the minimum the Trump administration is prepared to accept. If current positions hold, this sets the stage for a showdown, not a deal, in the near term, necessitating the development of a robust pressure architecture to further sharpen Tehran’s choices.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). His research focus includes Iranian leadership dynamics and Iran’s military and security apparatus. He is on X @JasonMBrodsky.

The post The stage is set for a US-Iran showdown—not a deal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The cease-fire announcement comes after Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK (which is designated a terrorist group by the United States, European Union, and others), issued a long-awaited statement on Thursday telling the group to lay down its arms and dissolve. His message touched upon the themes of respecting national borders, renouncing armed struggle in favor of political engagement, and shifting from an ethnonationalist agenda to a broader push for democratic reforms.

Many are questioning whether this is truly the beginning of a historic resolution, seeing as it would depend on PKK-linked groups to follow through with disarming dissolving. But, as the Kurdish question has become a regional one, the significance of the cease-fire and Öcalan’s call will also depend on how regional alliances and power balances unfold.

The backdrop

The statement wasn’t unexpected. It comes after a political development in October 2024—one that caught everyone off guard.

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli, known not only as a staunch defender of Turkish nationalism but also as a pillar of the state tradition, signaled a potential shift in policy when he shook hands with pro-Kurdish political party representatives in the Turkish parliament. He later stated that Öcalan could see his prison conditions eased if he called on the group to lay down its arms. This moment marked a profound shift in the Turkish state’s approach to the Kurdish issue, signaling a potential departure from its long-standing policies.

For those observing the issue from within Turkey, this turning point was deeply perplexing. Key leaders of the Kurdish political movement, including its most popular political figure Selahattin Demirtaş, remained behind bars. In 2024 and 2025, the Turkish government appointed trustees to replace elected mayors from the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy and Equality Party (DEM Party) and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) following arrests on terrorism charges. This practice impacted Kurdish-populated municipalities including Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, and Istanbul’s Esenyurt district. The Kurdish opposition also faced a large-scale crackdown. Concerns over Turkey’s democracy had reached their peak as discussions on the Kurdish issue were gaining momentum.

Analysts argued that Erdoğan’s efforts were aimed at amending the constitution to extend his presidency as, after being elected three times, he would be constitutionally banned from running in the 2028 elections. In this context, securing new coalition partners—particularly Kurdish support—became crucial for obtaining the backing needed to pass constitutional changes that would enable him to seek another term.

But throughout discussions on the Kurdish issue, Erdoğan refrained from taking a direct role and largely delegated communication of the process to Bahçeli, in what seems to be a deliberate effort to separate his political future from the negotiations. This choice reinforces the notion that the “opening” was not merely a political maneuver but a broader state-driven initiative. In fact, the first statement from the government side came from Justice and Development Party Deputy Chairman Efkan Ala, who said, “The essence of the call is for the laying down of arms and the dissolution of the terrorist organization. We focus on the outcome.”

Ala’s response not only seeks to frame the issue primarily as one of disarmament but also underscores the uncertainty surrounding its feasibility. This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that a call from an imprisoned leader does not guarantee compliance, especially given the internal divisions, conflicting interests, and shifting power dynamics that often characterize armed movements such as the PKK. Over time, factions may develop autonomy from their original leadership, further complicating the prospects of a unified response. Given these complexities, the likelihood of a definitive outcome remains uncertain.

All this raises a critical question: Why would the PKK be willing to lay down arms?

The Syrian dimension

These events appear to be part of a broader strategic realignment with far-reaching geopolitical implications, particularly concerning Syria. It is a realignment not only for Ankara—which is shifting its approach to the war in Syria—but also for the PKK, whose regional strategy is evolving. Both actors are recalibrating their positions in response to changing regional dynamics, international pressures, and the balance of power in Syria.

The PKK’s regional strategy is closely intertwined with the trajectory of Syrian Kurds. First, while the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria is formally distinct from the PKK, its connection to the PKK is rooted in recruitment patterns and strong sociological ties. Historically, Syria has been a crucial source of PKK fighters, with fluid movement between the two organizations. Additionally, the PKK’s leadership and ideological influence have played a significant role in shaping the PYD’s political vision, resulting in continuity between their strategies and objectives. But while the PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, the PYD is not classified in the same manner, leading to differing international approaches toward the two groups.

Second, when the Ba’athist regime withdrew from Kurdish-majority areas at the beginning of the civil war, Syrian Kurds established a quasi-state with military, administrative, and judicial structures. For the first time, they governed autonomously, consolidating territorial control and legitimizing their authority through legal and institutional mechanisms. This transformation not only solidified the PYD’s position as a key regional actor but also secured the party international support; notably, the group’s participation in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) attracted the support of the United States. Consequently, Syrian Kurds’ self-governance and efforts to strike international alliances demonstrated the strategic advantages of state-building and diplomacy, making the goal of securing the PYD’s future appear both more feasible and strategically sound for the PKK.

Following the ousting of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Syrian Kurds find themselves at a pivotal moment. Beyond maintaining their autonomous enclave, they seek formal recognition and legal integration into Syria’s evolving political structure. Öcalan’s call aligns with this broader geopolitical shift as it implicitly advocates for Kurdish groups in Syria to be recognized as legitimate legal entities within the state framework. Like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS’s) transition from an insurgent group to a governing force, the PYD is undergoing a parallel transformation, seeking to establish itself as a legally recognized political actor in the region.

Turkey’s calculations

Whether this transformation materializes depends on Turkey’s readiness to soften its stance toward the PYD in Syria and willingness to reconsider its perception of Syrian Kurdish governance as an existential threat. However, for Turkey to shift its position, two key conditions must be met: first, a clear decoupling of the PYD from the PKK, and second, the neutralization of the PKK threat through disarmament and credible guarantees that current borders will remain unchanged. In essence, while Öcalan’s call for disarmament does not directly pertain to the PYD (as Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, immediately clarified), it remains a sine qua non for Turkey to reconsider its stance and open the door for political negotiations with the PYD.

If Turkey were to soften its stance, it would not only ease US policy concerns and reduce US-Turkey tensions but also contribute to a more stable security framework in Syria. The Kurdish-led administration acts as a counterbalance to HTS, maintains close cooperation with the United States, and is widely regarded as a secular alternative to Islamist factions. Moreover, the inclusion or exclusion of Kurds in Syria’s governance structure is a crucial factor in shaping the regional power balance, particularly in influencing dynamics between Turkey, the United States, Israel, and Arab states (many of these Arab states remain cautious of Ankara’s expanding influence in the region). The political integration of Kurdish actors into Syria’s future governance is thus a crucial step in, specifically, the United States’ efforts to ensure long-term stability in the region. This significance was underscored when the White House publicly welcomed Öcalan’s statement.

From ethnopolitics to geopolitics

While the Kurdish question has always had a geopolitical dimension, groups over the past decade have shifted from using ethnopolitical tools—such as cultural rights and political representation—to geopolitical strategies focused on regional security and strategic realignment. No longer confined to matters of identity and minority rights, the Kurdish question has become a regional issue, both shaping the broader power dynamics of the Middle East and being influenced by them.

As this shift blurs the distinction between internal and international politics, the nature of any potential resolution also changes. The terms of negotiation are no longer about cultural recognition or political inclusion but about strategic positioning and regional security. As Middle East academic Arzu Yılmaz points out, this is why the current process cannot be seen as a traditional peace initiative aimed at resolving historical grievances; rather, it is a process of alliance-building, in which regional alliances and power balances dictate the framework of engagement.

Whether the cease-fire and Öcalan’s statement mark the beginning of a lasting resolution or merely another phase in an ongoing regional power struggle remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that it can no longer be understood—let alone resolved—within the borders of a single state.

Evren Balta is a professor of political science at Özyeğin University and a visiting scholar at the Harvard University Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. Follow her on X at @Evreki.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Despite the significant weakening of Hamas’s military capabilities after fifteen months of conflict, the group’s political control over Gaza remains intact, complicating any roadmap for postwar recovery. This deadlock largely stems from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s extended military campaign in Gaza and his government’s lack of any clear strategy for the strip’s day after. Netanyahu has failed to pursue a sustainable political path that could bring stability to Gaza and ensure Israel’s long-term security. Instead, recent rhetoric from Netanyahu’s government seems to have doubled down on the Trump administration’s proposal of displacing the entire Palestinian population of Gaza as a potential avenue to address the crisis. Any Israeli move in this direction would escalate the conflict, not resolve it.

Moving forward with the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza would only fuel support for Hamas’s extremist ideology and exacerbate tensions throughout the region. For a sustainable peace, the Israeli government must agree to a postwar governance framework for Gaza that provides an alternative to Hamas and allows Palestinians to govern themselves.

The absence of a postwar plan for Gaza

Since the war began, Israel’s primary objective has been to dismantle Hamas and secure the return of the hostages taken on October 7, 2023. While Israel has successfully degraded Hamas’s military infrastructure and eliminated some of its top leaders, the group continues to wield control over Gaza, raising questions about the effectiveness of Israel’s approach.

The main Israeli failure lies in the absence of a credible governance alternative for Gaza. Netanyahu’s rejection of any role for the Palestinian Authority in postwar Gaza has created a power vacuum that Hamas continues to exploit. Without a clear plan for Gaza’s postwar governance, the Israeli military effort alone cannot achieve long-term stability for the enclave or for Israel. US, Israeli, and regional leaders have all made clear that they view Hamas rule over Gaza in the war’s aftermath as unacceptable. This month, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Hamas “pure evil” and said it must never govern Gaza again. Last year, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry described Hamas as “a faction outside the Palestinian consensus.” Yet despite this rhetoric, the failure to establish a viable alternative governing structure for Gaza risks prolonging Hamas’s control by default.

New Atlanticist

Feb 14, 2025

A plan for postwar Gaza: Instead of removing Palestinian civilians, remove Hamas

By Daniel B. Shapiro

Drawing inspiration from an approach that worked in 1982, US President Donald Trump should put forward a landmark plan to rid Gaza of the terrorist organization.

Conflict Israel

Netanyahu’s political calculations

With the fragile cease-fire hanging by a thread and mounting pressure from the families of Israeli hostages, Netanyahu appears to be prioritizing his own political survival over a sustainable peace settlement. Indeed, at various points during the current phase of the cease-fire, he has both threatened a renewed military offensive—despite the Israeli military’s claims in September that Hamas’s military wing had been defeated—and embraced Trump’s proposal for the mass displacement of Gaza’s population.

Further, Netanyahu appointed his close political ally, Ron Dermer, as the lead negotiator for phase two of the Gaza cease-fire, replacing Mossad head David Barnea. This decision centralized authority over the cease-fire talks within Netanyahu’s inner circle, giving him greater oversight and influence over the negotiation process and the flexibility to shape the narrative and outcomes of the cease-fire in a way that aligns with his political agenda.

Netanyahu’s direct involvement is particularly significant given his track record of altering cease-fire terms to serve his political interests, which has repeatedly led to the breakdown of prior rounds of negotiations. Prolonging the war in this manner has jeopardized the hostages, whose lives are further endangered every additional day they spend in Hamas captivity. This was made painfully evident by tragic incidents such as Hamas’s execution of six hostages, including American-Israeli Hersh Goldberg-Polin, in September, just days before Israeli forces arrived and discovered the victims’ remains.

Moving ahead with the plan for the mass displacement of Gazans would align with the hardline stance of prominent members of Israel’s far-right, including Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, a member of the Knesset who resigned as national security minister in protest of the January cease-fire agreement. Both figures hold significant sway over the stability of Netanyahu’s fragile governing coalition.  

However, forcing civilians out of Gaza would neither weaken Hamas nor bring security to Israel. On the contrary, it risks intensifying radicalization and reinforcing extremist narratives, potentially destabilizing the broader region. By intertwining his own political survival with a dubious military strategy, Netanyahu’s approach threatens to further escalate regional tensions, making a sustainable resolution even more elusive.

New Atlanticist

Feb 14, 2025

A plan for postwar Gaza: Reconstruction will fail unless these two challenges are addressed

By Ahmed F. Alkhatib

Gaza’s reconstruction will require creativity and an understanding that there is no simple US real-estate solution for the strip.

Israel Middle East

How mass displacement would fuel radicalization

The argument for mass displacement is fundamentally flawed because it blames Palestinian civilians for Hamas’s actions. In reality, Gazans have suffered under Hamas’s authoritarian rule, where dissent is crushed and civilians are used as human shields.

The idea that Palestinians are a homogeneous block that supports Hamas is simply not accurate. The only Palestinian legislative election in which Hamas participated, in 2006, showed a divided electorate, with Hamas winning 44.45 percent of the vote and Fatah garnering 41.43 percent. Since then, Hamas has ruled Gaza by brute force and coercion after taking over the enclave militarily in 2007. More recently, an Arab Barometer poll that was conducted just before the October 7 terrorist attacks indicated that 72 percent of Gazans believed Hamas was corrupt while 44 percent expressed no trust in the group. Considering how brutally Hamas suppresses dissent, one can only imagine how low support for the group in Gaza really is. Further, nearly half of Gaza’s population is under eighteen, meaning Hamas is the only government many Palestinians have ever known.

Therefore, blaming the whole population of Gaza for Hamas’s actions is not just a moral failure. It is also a strategic mistake. It shifts the focus away from the real issue: Hamas’s reign of terror. Treating civilians as perpetrators rather than victims feeds extremist narratives, fueling radicalization and hatred. If the goal is to eradicate extremism, foster stability, and achieve long-term security for Israel, then the focus should be on freeing Gazans from Hamas’s oppression, not displacing them.

Displacement would spread Hamas’s influence across the region, solidifying its image as a “resistance movement” rather than exposing it as a failed terrorist entity. This move would inflame tensions across the Middle East, destabilize neighboring countries, and fuel anti-Israel sentiment around the world.

History shows that forced displacement breeds extremism. The Nakba of 1948 created generations of refugees who would became the backbone of militant movements. This includes the late high-ranking Hamas officials Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, both of whom were born in refugee camps in Gaza after their families were displaced during the Nakba. A similar mass expulsion today would reinforce the idea that violence is the only way to reclaim lost land, further entrenching cycles of radicalization.

Breaking Hamas’s grip

Defeating Hamas militarily is not enough. To truly end its control over Gaza, Hamas must be defeated strategically by degrading its legitimacy and freeing Gazans from Islamist authoritarianism. This cannot be achieved by weakening the so-called “Axis of Resistance” alone, but only by breaking Hamas’s grip on power.

Gaza’s reconstruction is impossible as long as Hamas controls the strip. The group has repeatedly manipulated international aid to build its military capabilities, fueling radicalization and extremism. Without a postwar governance framework liberating Gaza from Hamas’s influence, Gazans will continue to suffer under a humanitarian catastrophe.

This cannot be achieved through forced displacement or by obstructing efforts to establish a legitimate and credible alternative to Hamas. For long-term stability to be achieved, international actors must support the development of Palestinian institutions capable of effective governance. This requires fostering an Arab-led, Palestinian-owned transitional process with a nonpartisan, technocratic government that can implement the rule of law and carry out structural reforms in education, law enforcement, and media. Economic development initiatives must also be prioritized to reduce extremism by creating real employment opportunities.

Gaza’s reconstruction must be designed to empower civilians, not Hamas or its backers. The only way to defeat extremism is by offering Gazans hope, opportunity, and the means to govern themselves responsibly.

Netanyahu’s failure to agree on a clear day after plan for Gaza has prolonged Hamas’s rule and exacerbated the suffering of both Israelis and Palestinians. By embracing mass displacement, he is not solving the crisis but escalating it. This strategy threatens to radicalize a new generation of Palestinians, solidifying Hamas’s narrative of resistance and fueling long-term instability.

Achieving security and stability requires a strategic shift from military dominance and displacement to cooperation with Arab countries, empowering Gazans through governance reform and economic opportunity. A credible political alternative to Hamas is essential for lasting peace.

Ignoring this will only perpetuate cycles of violence, deepen regional instability, and ultimately undermine Israel’s security. The future of Gaza lies not in forced migration but in breaking Hamas’s grip on power and creating opportunities for Gazans to build a better future.

Mohamed Farid is a member of the Egyptian Senate.

The post Egyptian senator: The mass displacement of Gazans will only fuel Hamas’s extremist ideology appeared first on Atlantic Council.

1. Who is Abdullah Öcalan, and why is his statement such a big deal?

Öcalan is the imprisoned symbolic leader and driving co-founder of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK), a US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization rooted in radical leftist ideology and revolutionary violence. It has fought the Turkish state in Turkey since 1984 and spawned affiliates in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Tensions stemming from the PKK conflict have roiled Turkey, the region, and US-Turkish relations for decades, and thwarted the search for stability, prosperity, and security for Turks, Kurds, and other peoples of the region. The statement marks the first serious attempt in over a decade to end the PKK’s armed campaign and normalize politics in Kurdish-majority areas affected by the conflict. 

—Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Programs, with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian.

Since the PKK’s establishment in 1984, Turkey’s conflict with the group has resulted in at least forty thousand deaths. Some unofficial estimates put this number as high as one hundred thousand. And that’s just the human toll. It is hard to quantify the economic losses from a war that has lasted over forty years.

Öcalan is the founder of the PKK, and he has been imprisoned in Turkey since 1999. His call to end the PKK, even though he is still in jail, is a big deal. But Öcalan left the final decision to the PKK’s current leadership, and we still need to wait for the PKK party congress for the final word. The timeline of this congress is not yet known. If Öcalan’s call is ratified there and then is followed by all Kurdish militias in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, as well as in Europe, then this will be a big win for all parties. 

—Defne Arslan is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Programs.

2. What are his possible motivations for making this statement?

If we can read between the lines of Öcalan’s statements today, he sounds like he has lost his hope to win against the Turkish military and is looking for a more official and political ground to continue their battle. He also called the PKK an outdated organization rooted in Marxist/Leninist ideals that do not exist anymore. 

—Defne Arslan

Öcalan presumably wants to cement his legacy as something more than a militant or terror detainee and to be remembered as a peacemaker who translated violence, or “resistance,” into political gains. He has previously espoused partnership between Turks and Kurds and in his new statement embraced the Turkish Republic as the vehicle to do so—another step in a long evolution from anti-state, separatist dimensions of PKK ideology. He likely sees the writing on the wall regarding his movement’s Syrian branch (the People’s Protection Units, or YPG) given the new post-Assad reality, and he knows the time is now for political developments to remove the motive for new Turkish military operations to eradicate it.

—Rich Outzen

3. What does this mean for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s agenda?

Erdoğan pursued a peace process with the PKK from 2011 to 2014, which was interrupted by events in Syria and domestic political struggles. He intends to be the Turkish leader who ended PKK terrorism while improving the conditions of Kurds in Turkey and the region. A resumed peace process will help Turkey’s economy and relations with the United States, and it will remove an obstacle to reintegration of Syria (and Iraq) into a Turkey-driven regional economy. Moreover, it may strengthen his hand in terms of domestic politics as he re-attracts liberal Turks and leftist Kurds who rejected his more hardline stance on the PKK over the past decade. 

—Rich Outzen

If all PKK-linked Kurdish groups follow Öcalan’s call to disarm and dissolve, then this will be a big win for all sides, ending a conflict that has persisted for more than forty years. Such an outcome could also help Erdoğan receive the support of most of the Kurdish population for the amendment to the Turkish constitution he needs to stand for reelection.  

—Defne Arslan

4. What can we expect next from PKK affiliates throughout Turkey and the wider region?

The PKK seems likely to heed Öcalan’s call for a congress of leadership and affiliates to act on his statement. I expect there will be caution and conditionality—a process of phased implementation rather than an immediate transformation. The Syrian affiliate is most exposed and probably will comply most readily. There may be dissident factions that refuse to disarm or stop fighting. (Think, for instance, of the “Real IRA,” the version of the Irish Republican Army that broke away from the IRA and Provisional IRA in 1997.) The aging cadres in the Qandil Mountains may be looking for an honorable way to come down off the mountain, and the organization is highly centralized in ideological terms despite its regional distribution. Within Turkey, the organization has in any case lost most of its capacity to sustain armed attacks, so the question there is political process, while across the border in Iraq and Syria, the question is compliance. 

—Rich Outzen

5. What does this mean for US cooperation with PKK affiliates in Syria?

The United States has already developed plans to withdraw its forces from Syria, and I suspect indirectly has been advising its partner force that the best strategy moving forward is political reconciliation with Damascus and Ankara. Prudence dictates a gradual approach by which the United States signals, coordinates, and executes the withdrawal in a way that avoids a sudden vacuum or provides incentives not to comply with the peace process. There is a continuing need for coordination among the United States, Turkey, Damascus, and the YPG to prevent any resurgence of the Islamic State. That said, if the PKK disarms and disbands as an armed force, there will be no basis for a continued US affiliation.

The commander of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) said this call doesn’t apply to the group, because it sees itself as something other than the PKK. But the SDF would likely abide by a cease-fire, and it is in separate talks on integration into the new Syrian security structure, in any case.

—Rich Outzen

6. Could this help pave the way to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state?

That is highly unlikely, because Öcalan essentially committed with his statement to Turkish-Kurdish solidarity within the existing Turkish Republic. Trends in the region—dictator Bashar al-Assad’s fall and the advent of a new Syrian government, the weakening of Iran’s proxy network, Washington’s inclination to end wars and avoid imperial projects in the region, the likely resumption of a peace process in Turkey—all point to Kurdish communities pursuing their interests within the existing states. 

—Rich Outzen

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These choices signal that the United States is focused on countering the Houthis’ weapon supply chains, while also suggesting that the White House is keeping the political door open for a possible stronger military engagement against the Iran-backed group. For the United States, a stronger maritime partnership with Yemen’s government and allied forces in southern Yemen can be the first step to curb armed groups’ rising offensive capabilities in the Red Sea region. This would support Yemeni institutions to restore a degree of sovereignty in the country; weaken the emerging, weapons-driven cooperation among the Houthis, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); and would make it more difficult for Russia to develop game-changing military relations with the Houthis. 

In a break from the past, the main international and regional stakeholders (the United States, the European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Israel) now share converging perspectives on the global threat emanating from Houthi-controlled areas. Degrading their offensive capabilities is widely perceived as the only viable option left, as the Yemeni government is calling for international support to regain Houthi-held territories, starting from the coastal Red Sea area. 

Supporting the Yemeni Coast Guard 

When empowered through equipment and training, which increased in the final months of the Biden administration, and also with regular payment of their salaries, the YCG can tackle the arrival of smuggled weapons to the Houthis. Task forces of the US-led Combined Maritime Forces have often seized dhows carrying Houthi-destined weapons in international waters, while the YCG could effectively complement the effort within Yemeni territorial waters. 

As part of the US-endorsed Yemen Maritime Security Partnership, the United Kingdom will provide boats, training, and assistance to the YCG to protect Yemen’s coasts and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea; the United Kingdom will also fund training programs for the Coast Guard via the Technical Assistance Fund for Yemen. In December, then-US ambassador to the United Nations (UN) Linda Thomas-Greenfield stated that Washington “will continue to work” with the YCG “to control illicit activity along the country’s coastline.” In early February, a senior Yemeni official visited US Central Command to discuss how to counter Houthi threats and propaganda.

In recent months, the YCG has increased the interception of Iranian-provided weapons bound to the Houthis. For instance, on February 13, the YCG intercepted a cargo vessel carrying a substantial number of weapons that had departed from Djibouti towards the Houthi-controlled port of Al-Salif in Hodeida. The interception occurred in coordination with the National Resistance Forces, the armed group led by Tareq Saleh, whose fiefdom is in Mocha, close to the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, and whose forces control the Red Sea division of the YCG. The nephew of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the younger Saleh isn’t part of the government but one of eight members of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).  

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, most of the Coast Guard’s vessels operate in the Red Sea, not in the Arabian Sea. This is the case even though much of the Houthis’ smuggled weapons enter Yemeni territory through the Arabian Sea (Hadhramaut and Mahra) and the Gulf of Aden because of transhipment off the Somali coast. 

However, routes have partly changed since Yemen’s 2022 national truce. Although the truce is no longer technically in place, the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) continues to inspect ships arriving at Hodeida to prevent weapons and munitions from being transferred to the Houthis, in compliance with the UN arms embargo. But the UNVIM now has to deal with more vessels than before, in particular container ships that previously couldn’t dock at the Hodeida port, increasing the risk that inspections are not accurate. Therefore, a stronger and better-organized presence of the YCG in the Arabian Sea would help Yemen to be more effective against weapons smuggling in territorial waters. 

Preventing the expansion of a smuggling network

In the Red Sea region, the smuggling of weapons goes beyond the Houthis, but the Houthis—with Iran’s backing—increasingly are the actor driving this trade. The rise of instability on both shores of the Red Sea (Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia), with non-state armed groups developing growing offensive capabilities, makes the task of curbing arms smuggling even more urgent for the United States and regional allies. It starts with going after the financing.

Since late 2023, the Houthis’ attacks against shipping and Israel have allowed the group to increase its visibility and influence and to shape new alliances in the Red Sea. While weapons provided by Iran are key to these tactical alliances, the Houthis are using these alliances to carve out a network of financing, supply, and support that is autonomous from Tehran. 

According to the UN, the Houthis established an “opportunistic alliance” with AQAP in Yemen, providing drones to the Sunni terrorist group. Furthermore, what the UN described as “increased smuggling activities” between the Houthis and al-Shabaab (the Somali terrorist group affiliated with AQAP) are taking place via Somalia’s Puntland State, as previously warned by US intelligence. 

A more proactive stance by the United States against weapons smuggling off the coast of Yemen would also reduce risks of strengthened military ties between the Houthis and Russia. According to several media reports, the Iranian-backed group has been in talks with Moscow for the provision of weapons, a development facilitated by the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership. Russia’s military intelligence personnel have reportedly been spotted in Houthi-held areas of the country, and Moscow reportedly recruited Yemenis through Houthi intermediaries to join the battlefield in Ukraine. However, a de-escalation between the United States and Russia on Ukraine likely would limit—at least in the short term—Moscow’s appetite for stronger military cooperation with the Houthis aimed at damaging Western interests. 

Strengthening Yemen’s government and institutions 

The more the United States supports Yemeni forces to curb the Houthis’ smuggling activities, the more Yemen’s government and allied forces in the southern and southwestern regions can try to restore a degree of institutional presence in the country. Since the Houthis started attacks against maritime vessels, the Yemeni government and allied forces have increasingly called for US and international support to regain Houthi-held territories. 

Speaking at this month’s Munich Security Conference, PLC Chairman Rashad al-Alimi stated that the Yemeni government “must be empowered to exert full control over its territory” and this can be achieved only with “international support,” enforcing measures to prevent the flow of Iranian weapons to Yemen. 

Previously, at the Rome MED Dialogues in November, Yemeni Foreign Minister Shaya Mohsin al-Zindani explicitly asked the United States and international partners to enhance the capabilities of Yemen’s security and military forces, especially the Coast Guard.

As the Trump administration’s Yemen policy takes shape, it is clear that choking off the Houthis’ weapons routes is a central part of the president’s strategy, and US partners in Yemen are eager to play an active role. The benefits of a strong, holistic strategy to disrupt these networks would reverberate across the region—and on global maritime traffic. 

Eleonora Ardemagni is an expert on Yemen and the GCC states, a senior associate research fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, and an adjunct professor at ASERI (Graduate School of Economics and International Relations, Milan).

The post How Trump can deliver on disrupting Red Sea weapons smuggling by the Houthis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What stand out most are the potential of cross-border attacks, the lower technological barriers to causing major damage, the escalatory risks arising from coordination among terrorist groups, and the power of psychological warfare to shape a conflict.

Securing the border

The inciting attack of October 7 was not a “typical” terrorist act; it was meticulously planned and executed as both an invasion and a declaration of war on Israel. While the attack included elements traditionally associated with terrorism—such as the mass murder of civilians, including women and children; heinous acts like rape; and the abduction of hostages, mostly civilians, taken to Gaza—it went far beyond the conventional scope of terrorism.

The attack underscored for Israel, and probably for other nations, the urgent need to reevaluate its approach to border security, as the threat of terror-attack-as-invasion has become a tangible reality. In the aftermath of October 7, there is a growing possibility that other terrorist organizations, or even some established armies, may attempt to replicate such operations, combining invasion tactics with acts of terror.

Israel learned this lesson the hardest way. But other nations—particularly those with adversaries along their borders—should now consider preparing for similar scenarios to ensure the security of their borders and the safety of their civilian populations, thereby minimizing the risk of similar attacks. This includes actively protecting borders, even when an immediate threat is not expected. Israel’s experience has shown that technological measures alone are not always sufficient. In defending against terrorist organizations, the best approach is to prepare based on their capabilities rather than their often difficult-to-predict motivations. Also, we can expect a rise in investments in anti-missile armor, as capabilities such as Israel’s Iron Dome can play a crucial role in maintaining and protecting civilian lives.

Low-tech terror

Another important lesson learned from the tactics and capabilities used by Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and even Iran is that low-cost technology is now transforming the nature of armed conflicts around the world—from the Middle East to Ukraine. Tools such as drones and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as low-cost rockets and outdated and primitive missile launchers, are enhancing the precision and effectiveness of attacks, demonstrating that terrorist organizations do not require advanced, high-tech capabilities to achieve strategic goals and inflict significant damage on their adversaries. Terrorist organizations, as well as sovereign countries and established armies, can use simple tools, some of which are purchased online, and adapt them to their needs without necessarily relying on arms industries to challenge their enemies. These methods can prove effective against Western militaries that have chosen to defend against attacks by investing in capabilities such as fighter jets, sophisticated radar systems, naval vessels, and high-end ammunition. 

This should serve as a wake-up call for countries to adapt to the evolving threats posed by inexpensive and accessible technologies. For example, countries should develop solutions to counter drones and other precision capabilities in areas where the Iron Dome system has only partial success. Most importantly, countries must closely monitor developments in their enemies’ capabilities as threats will continue to evolve. This understanding is crucial, as low-tech attacks can persist for extended periods and cause significant damage to both civilian and military targets.

The risk of escalation

The October 7 attack and subsequent active involvement of other terror groups and countries demonstrated how attacks of this nature can quickly escalate into full-scale wars with multiple participants. Besides Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, the Houthis, and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria also became involved in the wide-scale war, although they were not initially part of the attack and could have chosen to remain uninvolved. These groups’ involvement also drew in the United States, the United Kingdom, and others who hit back against them.

This expansion of the conflict had profound consequences for the civilian populations and governments of the countries where these groups operate. More than one million civilians fled their homes in Lebanon during the armed conflict with Israel, following counterattacks by the Israel Defense Forces. This is not to mention the tremendous damage and suffering to the people in the Gaza Strip.

It is now clear that Hamas’s attack not only dramatically damaged Hamas itself, but also weakened the broader Axis of Resistance, as the region’s Iran-backed armed groups are known. This dynamic may lead some terrorist groups to reconsider their actions in the future. These groups likely will seek prior confirmation and support from their allies—meaning Iran, in the case of Hamas and Hezbollah—before any future large-scale operations. 

The important lesson, once again learned from Israel’s harsh experience, is that large-scale, multi-arena wars can erupt unexpectedly, even when the parties’ interests do not fully align. Initially, it was not clear that the October 7 attack would draw Hezbollah into the conflict given that it had not been strong allies with Hamas, but the two groups took greater risks for one another than Western analysts expected. Their initial motivation was driven by hatred toward Israel, a commitment to their terrorist agenda, and a desire to avoid standing idle while another terrorist organization waged a large-scale fight against Israel. Additionally, they sought to avoid appearing less committed to terrorism or less opposed to Israel. 

Therefore, countries must take this into account and understand that previously unconnected terrorist organizations may cooperate toward the same goal—requiring preparation for war scenarios involving multiple fronts. It is likely that their cooperation will be based on a shared ideology, such as resistance to Western influence. It is difficult to determine if external intervention can eliminate such collaborations between terrorist organizations, but terrorist groups must be made to understand that becoming involved in a full-scale war will come at a significant cost to them and their host countries. 

In addition, the United States and Israel, with the support of Western allies, should focus on disrupting cooperation, however limited, between terrorist organizations during peacetime. These efforts should complement other steps aimed at reducing the empowerment of terrorist organizations in the future. This includes capitalizing on the vulnerabilities of the Axis of Resistance to disrupt its empowerment and arms transfers, and strengthen alternatives within their home countries to provide the civilian services previously offered by these organizations—ensuring that, unlike in recent decades, these groups do not take over their countries. 

Additionally, the United States and Israel, along with Western allies, should apply pressure to the countries where these terrorist organizations originate to prevent them from using civilian areas for operations, including by threatening to withhold financial backing. Furthermore, those allies should take action against terror facilities in civilian areas as soon as they are identified. This could come in the form of military action, exposing these facilities so the terrorist organizations would be reluctant to use them, and pressuring countries to take action against these facilities themselves. The goal should always be to minimize civilian harm, reduce the threat posed by such facilities, and deter terrorist groups from operating in these areas due to the risk of destruction and loss of resources.

The psychological war

Following the catastrophe of October 7, Israel quickly regained its military effectiveness and succeeded in inflicting substantial damage on its enemies. This recovery was further strengthened by the remarkable support of its allies, which enhanced both its capabilities and strategic position. This model could also apply to other countries that may be attacked in the future. 

Although Israel managed to recover from the shock of the October 7 attack, the broader perspective of the Gaza war highlighted the significant impact of psychological terror on both the civilian population and government decision-making. This represents a new type of warfare, one that involves not only mainstream media and news reports but also underground sources. Actions by Hamas, such as releasing hostage videos, spreading rumors, and leaking information, profoundly influenced public sentiment, contributing to the chaos seen in Israel, particularly in the war’s early months.

This is another shared lesson from both the Middle East conflict and the Russia-Ukraine war. It’s hard to predict whether future conflicts with terrorist organizations will necessarily involve these kinds of psychological threats and tactics. However, it is clear that the flow of information today—via social media, messaging apps, and other platforms—not only shapes public opinion but also influences the battlefield.

The conflicts across the Middle East that erupted in late 2023 will carry a lasting legacy for the entire region. As policymakers turn to the future of Gaza and other political negotiations, they should also take note of the lessons learned over the past sixteen months as they seek to reshape the region and reduce the impact of terrorism. This particular series of conflicts may be coming to a close, but the threat is not going away.

Maayan Dagan is a visiting research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, from the Israeli military. The views in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of any other entity.

The post What the Middle East conflicts reveal about the future of terrorism appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 1, Elliot Ackerman, a nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, published a piece in the New York Times that discussed the hundreds of remaining Afghan refugees, especially those who assisted US and allied forces, still struggling to find a new home abroad. In the opinion piece, Ackerman argued that accepting the “stranded” Afghans into the US would serve as not only a moral imperative to the US, but a strategic one as well.

Fellow

Elliot Ackerman

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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The post Elliot Ackerman outlines the strategic case for taking Afghan refugees after 2021 Taliban takeover in a New York Times article appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Trump’s pre-presidency was frenetic. Never a disciple of the “one president at a time” school, he injected himself aggressively into the spotlight, dispatching Steve Witkoff, his new Middle East envoy, to that region within weeks of the November election and threatening (amorphously) that there would be “ALL HELL TO PAY” unless hostages in Hamas custody were released by the time of his inauguration. Mike Waltz, Trump’s national security advisor, was quick to attribute Israel’s ceasefires with both Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza to the advent of a new administration.

Palpable apprehension in world capitals about what courses of action Trump might—or might not—pursue has been a powerful driver of events. However, the significance of January 20 as an inflection point cannot be overexaggerated. With Trump now ensconced firmly in the Oval Office, rhetoric alone will prove insufficient to induce tangible cooperation from the United States’ counterparts, who will be monitoring the pulse of his intentions rigorously.

Washington watchers in Jerusalem have been, unsurprisingly, surveying the appointments topography for clues to decipher Trumpland, but they have found its landscape equivocal. Israeli officials are encouraged by the nominations of friendlies Mike Huckabee and Elise Stefanik—as ambassadors to Israel and the United Nations, respectively—but diplomats are not policymakers, and the perspective of Trump’s executive cadre is by no means monolithic. The president himself has toggled in recent months between pledging to “stop all wars” and, on the other hand, telling Netanyahu to “do what you have to do” when it comes to Israel’s enemies. (Relations between the two leaders have known highs and lows.)

Soon after his victory, Trump unceremoniously disinvited Mike Pompeo and Nikki Haley, two trusted interlocutors of Israel during his previous tenure, from returning to his leadership team. That vacuum has been filled apparently by Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who both advocated on Capitol Hill for a strong US-Israel bond, but few other principals share their level of prior, high-level engagement with the intricate dynamics of that alliance. Meanwhile, senior bureaucratic echelons at the Pentagon—which has been an essential partner in enhancing Israel’s national security—are being populated by staffers who favor greater detachment from the Middle East.

It is against this backdrop that Netanyahu arrives in Washington to plead his case. His wish list from Trump will include US acquiescence for Israel to continue its campaign to dislodge Hamas rule from Gaza; normalization with Saudi Arabia; and a kinetic effort—or, at least, US backing for a potential solo Israeli endeavor—to terminate the threat of a nuclear Iran. The paradox of Netanyahu’s predicament is that Trump’s favorable disposition toward that agenda does not mean their approaches will be similarly aligned.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich—a stalwart critic of the current truce—is touting assurances from the prime minister to intensify the Gaza war and initiate “a gradual takeover” that ensures “humanitarian aid will not reach Hamas as it has been until now.” Smotrich, a proponent of exercising Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, has also vowed repeatedly to scuttle any diplomatic breakthrough with Riyadh that would entail territorial concessions to the Palestinians. On the Iranian front, Israeli military planners are training their sights increasingly on the near term, before Tehran can recover from the blows that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has inflicted on its defenses and on its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies.

Those parameters are almost certain to conflict with the president’s thinking. By all accounts, Trump, as evidenced through Witkoff’s interventions, is interested actually in extending the suspension of combat in Gaza, for the sake of securing the release of all captives and stabilizing the area. The track would then be cleared for Israeli-Saudi rapprochement—along lines that would likely be anathema to Smotrich—and a coveted Nobel Peace Prize for Trump. As for Iran, indications suggest that the president might prefer initially to try and settle that standoff through negotiations.

The ball is very much in Trump’s court now. Witkoff met on January 30 with Smotrich and Shas chairman Aryeh Deri, two key stakeholders of Netanyahu’s government, in an attempt to enlist their support for his mission, but their consent will hinge ultimately on the specifics involved. (Right-wing Israelis, who are hoping anxiously that Trump will adopt their cause, have latched tightly onto his manifest enthusiasm for transferring Gaza’s residents to neighboring Egypt and Jordan, although the wisdom and feasibility of that program—opposed stridently by those countries and by Palestinians themselves—are dubious.) The time for command decisions is close at hand.

Cessations of hostilities in Lebanon and Gaza are both fragile. Netanyahu’s coalition is also in crisis, with saber-rattling between its various members—who are at loggerheads over controversial legislation to exempt Ultra-Orthodox Jews from military service—jeopardizing the passage of a national budget before a March 31 deadline. Separately, Smotrich has committed to bolt unless the IDF resumes its Gaza incursion, in parallel with expanding counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank. Not only the prime minister’s political fate, but also the future of the entire Middle East is hanging in the balance, waiting for Trump to decide how much slack he is prepared to grant Netanyahu.

Much will depend on the president’s definition of friendship for Israel: Will it entail space for the IDF to keep fighting Hamas until the achievement of “total victory”—as Netanyahu has promised and many Israelis are still demanding—at the possible cost of derailing progress with Saudi Arabia? Will it, rather, obligate Israel to wind down its offensive and satisfy Saudi requirements for a pathway to Palestinian statehood, thus, in all likelihood, precipitating the collapse of Netanyahu’s majority in the Knesset? Or might it entertain tradeoffs such as greater Israeli flexibility vis-à-vis the Palestinians in exchange for an augmented US role in confronting Iran?

There will be inherent risks in any strategy that Trump chooses to embrace. The only certain thing is that now, as commander in chief, he controls an arsenal of formidable carrots and sticks to deploy in the service of his administration’s objectives. On February 4, the world will be watching to see whether he offers Netanyahu a deal that he can’t refuse.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. Follow him on X: @ShalomLipner.

The post Waiting on a friend: Will Netanyahu get a sweet deal—or a raw deal—from Trump? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In Season 2, Episode 9 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi chats with modern warfare expert Andreas Krieg about the sudden deployment of three private military companies to the Netzarim corridor in the Gaza Strip. Andreas examines the risks and opportunities in outsourcing a key task of stabilization to the market and depending on low-profile companies for a high-profile job.

He argues that the Israeli Defence Forces have a poor track record when it comes to stabilizing any of the territories they have controlled and that Gaza might be a case where the profit motive of PMCs is preferable to the motivations driving two deeply traumatized societies. Still, Andreas outlines how the deployment of PMCs deepens the “gray zone” because we now have contractors operating on the ground whose status in international law is not well-defined.

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

Podcast Jan 10, 2024

Mercenaries and Gaza

By Alia Brahimi

Host and Nonresident Senior Fellow Alia Brahimi speaks with Iraq expert Renad Mansour about what motivates the non-state actors who are leading the bid to avenge Gazans.

Conflict Crisis Management

Podcast Apr 24, 2024

American Hit Squad in Yemen

By Alia Brahimi

Host and Nonresident Senior Fellow Alia Brahimi speaks with BBC investigative journalist Nawal Al-Maghafi about her film on American mercenaries in Yemen.

Conflict Defense Industry

Podcast Jul 30, 2024

‘I was a Blackwater mercenary in Iraq’

By Alia Brahimi

Host Alia Brahimi is joined by former Blackwater contractor Morgan Lerette to reflect on Loretta’s experience a private military contractor in Iraq.

Conflict Defense Industry

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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The post “No, really”: American PMCs in Gaza appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 2, Marc Polymeropoulos, a nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, was invited to give his expert analysis on MSNBC about the role of foreign terror groups in the New Year’s Day attack in New Orleans. In his words, the attack was “very concerning” due to the ‘lone wolf’ nature, and was “straight out of the ISIS playbook.”

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

Learn more

The post Marc Polymeropoulos on MSNBC discusses the influence of foreign terrorist groups on the New Orleans attack appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Modern statehood has eluded Lebanon since its independence in 1943. As a result, Lebanon—which Michael Hudson termed “the precarious republic”—has seen a surge of disasters, leaving the country a battlefield for the wars of others and inflicting economic ruin on an enterprising, innovative populace.

Between 1958 and 1964, then President Fouad Chehab—Lebanon’s first army commander-in-chief, who was elevated to the presidency to end the low-grade civil war of 1958—tried his best to overcome the Ottoman legacy of sectarianism and feudalism and replace that legacy with a state. He instituted a series of administrative reforms designed to increase the effectiveness and reach of Lebanon’s central government and, by virtue of his personal modesty and incorruptibility, provided a model of selfless public service to his countrymen, a model rarely replicated by his successors. Indeed, Lebanon’s political class blocked him in the end. In 1970, the sectarian feudalists elected, by a single vote margin, one of their own to the presidency: Suleiman Frangieh. Lebanon’s trajectory has been straight downhill ever since.

Over a half-century later, Franjieh’s grandson—another Suleiman—was the presidential candidate of choice of Iran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. Hezbollah, at the behest of Iran, has for decades supported a ravenously corrupt and ruinously incompetent Lebanese political class. In return, the politicians have recognized the group as “The Lebanese Resistance,” a designation elevating it above the status of armed militia and permitting it to bear arms. Twice, in 2006 and 2023, Hezbollah initiated hostilities with Israel, causing massive destruction falling mainly on its Shia Lebanese constituents. Finally, in late 2024, much of that kinetic destruction fell on Hezbollah itself.

Unlike several of his predecessors, Aoun neither mentioned nor paid obeisance to “The Lebanese Resistance” in his inaugural speech. Instead, he pledged “to carry out my duties as the supreme commander of the armed forces and as the chairman of the Higher Defense Council, working to ensure the state’s right to hold a monopoly on weapons, and to invest in the army to monitor the borders, maintain their security in the south, define the boundaries in the east, north and at sea, prevent smuggling, fight terrorism and preserve the unity of the Lebanese territory.” Indeed, much of the analysis following Aoun’s accession to the presidency has, quite understandably, mined his speech for references to Hezbollah, but Aoun did not mention the group by name. 

Aoun’s first task will be to ensure that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) implements Lebanon’s role in the ceasefire with Israel by removing and replacing Hezbollah as the armed Lebanese presence south of the Litani River. He will, to be sure, require the cooperation of Iran’s proxy, which retains considerable military capabilities notwithstanding the pounding it has absorbed from Israel. To succeed, Aoun must perform a diplomatic high-wire act: He must, in effect, mediate between Hezbollah and Israel.

The mediation tool most readily at his disposal is the 1949 Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement. The ongoing validity of the armistice, unilaterally (and unjustifiably) renounced by Israel in 1967, is cited by the 1989 Taif Agreement and is, therefore, a tenet of post-civil war Lebanon’s constitutionalism. 

Aoun could signal to Israel his interest in implementing and consolidating the current ceasefire by offering Israel the opportunity to update and fully implement the armistice, a critical first step toward eventual peace and diplomatic normalization. Israel could, in turn, assure Lebanon of its own commitment to making the ceasefire work by revoking its 1967 renunciation, completing its withdrawal behind the Blue Line (demarcated by the United Nations in 2000), and declaring its readiness to resolve diplomatically all territorial disputes with Lebanon. It could even suspend its overflights of Lebanese airspace, perhaps as part of a third-party arrangement providing ceasefire-related aerial reconnaissance services. Given that the armistice is anchored in Lebanese constitutionalism, Hezbollah—which acknowledges the need to focus on reconstruction, for the sake of its constituents—might be hard-pressed to object and obstruct. Ideally, Hezbollah’s constituents will urge the organization’s leadership cadre to put Lebanon first by becoming part of a Lebanese political party instead of a proxy for Iran.

Aoun knows what must be done to stabilize the Lebanon-Israel frontier. But the long game he wishes to contest and win centers on Lebanese statehood. This is how he put it in his inaugural speech: “if we want to build a nation, we must all be under the roof of law and justice, where there will be no more mafias or security islands, no more leaks or money laundering, no more drug trafficking, no more interference in the judicial system, in police stations, no more protections or clientelism, no more immunity for criminals and the corrupt. Justice is the bulwark, it is the only guarantee that every citizen has. This is my commitment!” This will be a tall order because the collaboration between Hezbollah—meaning Iran—and Lebanon’s abysmal political class (which still dominates parliament) has left the country awash in all the depravities cited by Aoun.

The Lebanese presidency in 2025 is not endowed with the same powers it enjoyed before the 1989 Taif Accord, and in any event, such powers were insufficient for Chehab to build a state. Aoun will not be able administratively to compel governmental decency, honesty, and competence, even if he proves able to broker a respectable cabinet of ministers and even if he retains the full, enthusiastic support of the LAF. If he wishes to succeed, he must build a mass political movement from the ground up, one dedicated not to him personally but to the idea that it is time, at long last, for Lebanon to graduate from Ottomanism, and that it is time for citizenship-based statehood to emerge. As Aoun put it in his acceptance speech, “No sect should be favored over another, and no citizen should have privilege over another. This is the time for respecting the Constitution, building the state and applying the laws. This is the oath of Lebanon!” 

Aoun must, in short, use his office to build the political infrastructure needed to win elections, to ultimately replace the parliamentarians who have used that which has passed for the “government of Lebanon” as a feeding trough. Only with the support of enough Lebanese people willing to abandon political sectarianism and localism can he build a foundation for a nation-state willing and able to meet the needs of all Lebanese citizens, especially the poorest and most vulnerable.

As Aoun embarks on a journey to complete the work of Chehab, he will need both external support and internal protection. Lebanon’s reconstruction needs are enormous, as are the operational challenges faced by the LAF. And there are, to be sure, those in Lebanon who correctly see Aoun as a threat to their ability to steal the fruits of Lebanese diligence, ingenuity, and enterprise. 

It is only the gratuitous and often unspeakable suffering and impoverishment of most Lebanese and their consequent desperation that makes Aoun’s quest something other than mission impossible. Some three-quarters of all Lebanese people are now experiencing poverty, and they know that business as usual by a dysfunctional political class is no longer tolerable. The people of Lebanon now have a president willing to say the following: “My commitment is your commitment, honorable members of parliament, and that of every Lebanese person who wants to build a strong state, a productive economy, stable security, a united nation and a promising future.” 

The duty of all Lebanese people and all friends of Lebanon is to give Aoun the support he needs to build the “strong” state that the people of Lebanon require to thrive and to live in peace.

Frederic C. Hof is a senior fellow at Bard College’s Center for Civic Engagement. Hof served as a military attaché during Lebanon’s civil war and mediated both maritime and land disputes between Israel and Lebanon from 2009 to 2012 as a State Department official. He is the author of Reaching for the Heights: The Inside Story of a Secret Attempt to Reach a Syrian-Israeli Peace (2022).

The post The quest ahead for Lebanon’s new president: Secure a modern statehood appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The deal, mediated by US, Qatari, and Egyptian officials, will take place over three phases, each slated to last six weeks. During the first phase, Hamas will release thirty-three hostages—women, children, and those over fifty years of age—and Israel will release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, begin to withdraw from some areas, and facilitate a significant increase in humanitarian aid into Gaza. In the second phase, Hamas is slated to free the remaining male hostages while Israel withdraws from Gaza. The third phase would include the return of deceased hostages and the beginning of reconstruction.

Does this deal, which now heads to the Israeli cabinet for approval, really mark the end of the war? What’s next for Gaza’s reconstruction, Israel’s security, and wider regional efforts such as Israeli-Saudi normalization? Below, Atlantic Council experts share their answers to these and other pressing questions.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jonathan Panikoff: The war has widened the gap over the prospect of a two-state solution

Shalom Lipner: The “Trump effect” will help Netanyahu sell this deal to his hard-liners

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: The deal risks freezing the conflict with no political horizon

Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley: Israel’s military victory has come at immeasurable cost to its global standing

Carmiel Arbit: Is this the end of the “bromance” between Trump, Netanyahu, and the Israeli far right?

Liz Cathcart: The disparities are striking, but there is never an “equal” hostage deal

Danny Citrinowicz: Now Israel needs to aim for normalization with Saudi Arabia

Thomas S. Warrick: Who governs postwar Gaza when the shooting stops?

Marc Polymeropoulos: The human cost of the war in Gaza is about to become clear—with repercussions for the region

Alex Plitsas: Now for the hard part—a long-term solution for Gaza

The war has widened the gap over the prospect of a two-state solution

The cease-fire between Israel and Hamas is likely to end this long and painful chapter for both Israelis and Gazans. Gaza is completely destroyed, with tens of thousands of innocent lives lost over the past fifteen months. Israel is safer today than it was on October 6, but at a painful cost of more than four hundred Israel Defense Forces (IDF) members killed and hundreds more injured. 

In addition to the deaths and devastation in both Gaza and Israel, the war will be remembered for widening the gap over the prospect of a two-state solution. For many Arab states and European nations, the conflict was a turning point to reprioritize or declare their support for a sovereign and independent state of Palestine. At the same time, Israelis across the political spectrum remain fundamentally horrified and gobsmacked by the idea that after the suffering they’ve experienced—October 7 was the greatest single-day loss for the Jewish people since the Holocaust—anyone would think that now is the time to create an independent state of Palestine. Many in Israel would view such an outcome as increasing the odds of more October 7–type attacks happening. Moreover, the war may also be remembered as leading to a rise in global anti-Semitism, with a recent study finding a worldwide surge of such views among adults, especially younger ones.

But the war has also reshaped the Middle East in more unexpected ways. After months of tit-for-tat attacks between Hezbollah and Israel—prompted by the Lebanon-based group attacking Israel on October 8 and originally vowing not to stop until there was a cease-fire in Gaza—Hezbollah today is utterly diminished. Most of its military capabilities have been destroyed, and its leadership has been eliminated. That result is reshaping Lebanon, where a new president and prime minister are taking power, giving hope to many in the country that, for the first time in decades, Hezbollah will not be controlling the strings. The war has also helped lead to the end of the Assad regime in Syria, and it has put Iran in its weakest position in the region since the 1979 Revolution. 

What comes next for Israel, Gaza, and the region is less clear. The ceasefire has multiple stages that if broken could result in a resumption of fighting. But the reality is that Hamas is battered and much of the group’s leadership has long sought an end to the conflict. In Israel, the Netanyahu government is also unlikely to break the ceasefire. President-elect Donald Trump has made clear that he wants a sustainable ceasefire in place by the time he gets into office. Breaking the deal could endanger Israel’s relationship with the new Trump administration and it could potentially jeopardize coordination and Israeli policy preferences being given due consideration when it comes to Iran. Iran is, after all, the issue that Netanyahu views as the most important in the relationship. Longer term, the reconstruction of Gaza, the security of Israel, and the future of normalization all remain unclear.

But those will all be the next set of challenges to address. Today, most people in Gaza will simply rejoice at not having to fear explosions from Israeli missiles and gunfire; and in Israel, most will rejoice in the knowledge that the hostages, at long last, will come home.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

The “Trump effect” will help Netanyahu sell this deal to his hard-liners

The hopeful moment of an imminent cease-fire between Israel and Hamas comes with the subtext of circumstances that have facilitated the signing of this agreement—which has been on the table since last May—only now. US President Joe Biden has attributed apparent changes of heart to “extreme pressure” on Hamas, a transformed “regional equation” that has put Iran and Hezbollah on the defensive, and also “dogged and painstaking American diplomacy.” Israel’s calculus has been impacted similarly by mounting IDF casualties, vociferous calls to liberate the hostages and, in a different vein, Netanyahu’s improved prospects to garner political support for the controversial bargain.

But the real game-changer has been, to quote incoming National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, “the Trump effect.” The president-elect’s ominous (if amorphous) threat that “all hell will break out in the Middle East” unless the captives are released before his inauguration energized the parties to reach a compromise before that deadline, lest they suffer those consequences. Additionally, from the perspective of Israel’s government, expectations that the incoming administration will offer strong support for Jerusalem on a host of issues—e.g. confronting Iran, cementing relations with Saudi Arabia, and supporting Jewish settlement in the West Bank—provided extra impetus to placate Trump.

Those aspirations will also play a pivotal role in Netanyahu’s struggle to keep his parliamentary majority intact. Although he should have enough votes to approve the deal, many of his core allies are vehemently opposed to any framework that would suspend the pursuit of “total victory” over Hamas, as he has promised repeatedly to achieve. Their objections will feature prominently when the cabinet convenes to consider the package on Thursday. The prime minister, who has assured these critics that Israel will not relent in its campaign to dismantle Hamas, will be encouraging their instincts to remain in the coalition and wait to advance their policy priorities under Trump—however dubious that opportunity may prove to be.

Meanwhile, this latest halt in the fighting will be no less tentative. Under the terms of the arrangement, Hamas will be securing freedom for about one thousand convicted terrorists, doubling the quantity of humanitarian aid coming into Gaza, and benefiting from extensive IDF pullbacks. The pledge of Waltz that “Hamas has to be destroyed to the point that it cannot reconstitute” notwithstanding, the possibility of the group’s resurgence—in the absence of any other authority—cannot be discounted.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administration of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.

The deal risks freezing the conflict with no political horizon

The declaration of a ceasefire and hostage deal between Hamas and Israel is a welcome respite for the more than two million Palestinian civilians trapped in a vicious war they didn’t start and were powerless to stop. Though much can go wrong between now and the time of the implementation of the deal on January 19, not to mention the potential impasse once the first phase is over, the absence of war may indeed provide space for a more optimistic pathway forward. Gazans will experience relief from the horrors of the relentless Israeli bombardment and attacks that have killed and maimed so many in the coastal enclave. However, Palestinians in Gaza will emerge out of this deal with the greatest humanitarian, political, and strategic losses. Not a dollar of reconstruction money will go into Gaza as long as Hamas controls the coastal enclave and in the absence of a political horizon.

The most significant risk ahead is that there will be a potential freezing of the conflict, in which Gaza remains destroyed and in ruins, entirely dependent on a few hundred trucks per day to sustain the population and stabilize the humanitarian catastrophe. This, of course, would allow Hamas the best of two worlds: It would not be responsible for actual governance or providing for its populace, but it would benefit from a steady stream of goods and items it can siphon and tax. Once again, such a scenario would be horrendously painful for the civilian population in Gaza, many of whom have no homes to return to and are unable to sustain themselves beyond the scope attainable through basic humanitarian and commercial aid and supplies. 

It’s tempting for analysts to examine alternatives to Hamas’s rule now that there is an impending cease-fire. Such discussions are not only premature but also have ultimately proven irrelevant to the intractably static nature of Gaza’s governance landscape, which has hardly changed for almost two decades. This remains true even though Hamas is financially, politically, and militarily severely weakened, with little to no prospect for replenishing the material resources and geopolitical ballast that have enabled it to remain afloat for so many years in Gaza.

Most painful of all, many in Gaza are asking why their loved ones are dead or maimed, their homes destroyed, their businesses shattered, and their lives in shambles. These sacrifices were imposed upon them and feel utterly useless to the Palestinian national project for freedom and independence. The incoming US administration’s regional priorities, coupled with the possibility of a rejuvenated push for a peace process, may be the only hope for Gaza’s recovery, reconstruction, renaissance, and evolution.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Israel’s military victory has come at immeasurable cost to its global standing

The forty-two-day cease-fire just agreed to by Israeli and Hamas negotiators is a whimpering close to a conflict that began with shock and awe. It started, of course, with a heinous attack that left more than one thousand people dead in Israel and humiliated the vaunted IDF. More than a year of bombing and fighting followed, which left tens of thousands of Palestinians dead and injured and destroyed the basic infrastructure that supports health, education, housing, and more. The very futures of Palestinian survivors and those coming into the world soon have been blighted by a deliberate strategy. The full extent of the impact of that strategy will be known soon.

The cost for the release of even one thousand prisoners is one Palestinians likely count as far too dear. Hamas, in the short term, is the clear loser.

Israel won. But it may be a Pyrrhic victory.

The conflict gave Israel the opportunity to strike crippling blows against its most dangerous foes: Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. But the brutality of its conduct has undoubtedly cost Israel in terms of economic strength, global reputation, and international standing. The latter two will not be revived soon. Israel is more isolated from the region and beyond than anyone could have imagined on October 8, 2023.

In the long term, however, Hamas’s actions reminded the world of Occupied Palestine. This war reminded the world that Palestinians are not a “non-people,” as acknowledged by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Tuesday at the Atlantic Council. And Hamas’s provocation led the Israeli government to show just how ruthless its treatment of Palestinians can be. The unrelenting response to the October 7 attack stripped away Israel’s reasonable, humane, peace-loving, good guy image for millions of people around the world, including in the United States.

That image will take a long time to restore.

Hamas is likely to abide by the cease-fire. Palestinians have everything to lose if it doesn’t. As we saw during the war, the driver of what happens next—whether the cease-fire lasts past the first phase—is Israel.

—Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Abercrombie-Winstanley served as the US ambassador to the Republic of Malta and as special assistant for the Middle East and Africa to the secretary of state. Her Middle East assignments included election monitoring in the Gaza Strip and an assignment where she supported gender equality in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the first woman to lead a diplomatic mission there.

Is this the end of the “bromance” between Trump, Netanyahu, and the Israeli far right?

Wednesday’s announcement of a cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas was met with a feeling of elation around the world and agony for many in Israel. In its first phase, the agreement would ensure the release of at least thirty of Israel’s hostages and would be accompanied by much-needed relief in Gaza. The agreement marks a clear victory for both Trump and Biden, Biden who had worked tirelessly to secure a cease-fire for the past fifteen months and whose terms were largely adopted, and Trump for his ability to push it over the finish line through threats alone. That the incoming and outgoing administrations were able to work together hand in glove to push this over the finish line is not only a powerful demonstration of the United States’ bipartisan approach to the region; it also signifies a decorum in the transition of power that many in the United States crave.  

However welcome by many, the agreement and its timing also expose Netanyahu for his deluge of failures in handling the war, thus explaining his continued reticence to accept it. Netanyahu had promised to secure the release of all hostages–and to the devastation of so many Israelis, too many will come home in body bags. Hamas has not been decisively defeated in the ways that he had promised his people—to the contrary, Netanyahu’s failure to support a meaningful pathway to new governance in Gaza has only created a power vacuum in the Strip where extremism will fester and Hamas—either in name or ideology—could reemerge in time. And while details of the agreement are still unfolding, it would appear that Netanyahu’s maximalist positions demanding Israeli control over both the Philadelphi and Netzarim corridors through the final stages of a cease-fire have both been largely abandoned, at least in practice.   

If the agreement proceeds, the beginning of Trump’s term could mark an end to Netanyahu as chief negotiator in this conflict and, more strikingly, an end to the “bromance” between the two leaders before Trump even moves into the Oval Office. Members of the Israeli far-right—once proudly donning their MAGA hats—are faced with the reality that their ambitions for a continued conflict and possible resettlement of Gaza are not shared by the United States’ new president.  

Netanyahu’s woes in managing his far-right flank will worsen and yet their power in Israel will diminish as Trump, who has made clear that he wants the conflict to be over and to move on to a long sought-after regional deal with the Saudis, will exert only greater influence in determining whether a second or third phase of the cease-fire is achieved. Perhaps this will give Netanyahu the political cover he will need to survive, but it will also only bring him closer to a moment of reckoning in which he must face his public for his responsibility in allowing October 7 to happen—and his failure to deliver a decisive victory in response.

—Carmiel Arbit is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

The disparities are striking, but there is never an “equal” hostage deal

As part of a deal reached between Israel and Hamas, thirty-three living and deceased Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza are set to be released. In exchange, Israel will reportedly release thirty Palestinian prisoners for every Israeli civilian and fifty for every Israeli female soldier released.

Does this disproportionate exchange make for a bad deal? On the surface it may seem so, making it difficult to remember the core of the problem of hostage taking—the hostages that Hamas took and held for nearly fifteen months were innocent individuals: civilians, soldiers, parents, and children. There would be no “equal” deal for these hostages when talking about humans being held as pawns. Countries negotiating for hostage releases must do what is needed to get their people home. And, in this case, Hamas effectively used the hostages they are holding to get to this point.

These releases only represent a third of the approximately one hundred hostages Hamas continues to hold. It was expected that this deal would not include the release of all hostages held, as the agonizing and lengthy negotiations to reach a deal involve not only the exchange of people held but also a cease-fire and options for increased aid. While the release of thirty-three hostages held by Hamas in Gaza is not the perfect outcome, it is a good one. It means thirty-three fewer individuals suffering the horrific conditions of being held hostage and thirty-three families who can have closure, in addition to the other positive outcomes for civilians in Gaza.

This deal will reportedly last forty-two days. Looking past those forty-two days for the hostages and Gaza alike, there is little clarity. Though the deal could allow for more hostage releases in subsequent phases, the work continues as there is no certain path for the release of the remaining hostages, prolonging their suffering and that of their families, communities, and countries fighting for their freedom.

—Liz Cathcart is a member of the Atlantic Council Counterterrorism Project and the executive director of Hostage US.

Now Israel needs to aim for normalization with Saudi Arabia

The prisoner-of-war deal concluded between Israel and Hamas is a bad deal for Israel, but one that it had no choice but to implement. Israel has a moral obligation to return its abductees even at the heavy price of releasing terrorists and accepting Hamas remaining in the Gaza Strip. 

But in order for this deal to serve Israel’s strategic interests, there must be political continuity in the form of Israeli consent to the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, and the utilization of this move to promote diplomatic normalization with Saudi Arabia.

Because 2025 appears to be a decisive year regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, the deal in Gaza will make it possible to focus international attention on Iran. Together with an Israeli-Saudi normalization, greater focus on Iran will strengthen the Israeli posture in the Middle East.

If Israel seeks to return to the war in Gaza, then it will find the Trump administration and the whole international community against it. Israel must complete the cease-fire agreement in Gaza and Lebanon. It must also work with the new US administration and with Arab neighbors to strengthen the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank, and offer a political horizon based on what US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the “deal of the century” during Trump’s first term.

“Absolute victory” for Israel will only come from normalization with Saudi Arabia, not any other military move.

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence.

Who governs postwar Gaza when the shooting stops?

Despite the talk about the sticking points in the negotiations, the real sticking point underlying everything still has not been resolved: Who will control postwar Gaza? Hamas wants to ensure it has the ability to rebuild and re-arm, and Israel is equally determined to prevent this. The agreement calls for postwar arrangements to be discussed during phase two, but make no mistake, no one is ready for what this will really require.

Both the outgoing Biden administration and the incoming Trump administration, as well as the Netanyahu government, understand that the essential requirement for a lasting peace is that Hamas has no role in postwar Gaza. Even Hamas surrogates are signaling that Hamas knows it will have to step back from governing Gaza—for now. What is needed is a workable postwar plan that puts Gaza under international administration for a transitional period. But how that is set up, and who participates in it, will make the difference between success and failure. The bare-bones plan outgoing US Secretary of State Antony Blinken described on Tuesday at the Atlantic Council would not succeed as is in preventing Hamas’s eventual return. 

Given the tensions in Israeli politics—Netanyahu reportedly agreeing to the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank carries real dangers—prospects for a negotiated outcome in the next twelve weeks are extremely slim. Fighting could resume. Trump’s presidency will toughen Netanyahu’s position, and the Palestinians really need to take to heart what incoming Trump National Security Advisor Mike Waltz said on January 15: “There is nothing but downside” to holding out. The Trump administration will likely step back for a while and wait to see what the Israelis and Palestinians are able to do on their own. 

The tensions in Palestinian politics also create a different danger. Just as Israel has failed to come up with a viable postwar plan, the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah is in even worse shape. The voices that dominate Palestinian civil society want international recognition of the justice of the Palestinian cause, apparently failing to recognize that the people they are talking to are not able to deliver what they want. Ramallah and Palestinian civil society need to broaden who they talk to about the future of Palestine.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

The human cost of the war in Gaza is about to become clear—with repercussions for the region

The human cost of the war will become even more evident as a cease-fire takes effect. The visuals over the next several days and weeks will not only be jarring, but also may have political repercussions.

The Israeli hostages, who have likely endured unspeakable suffering, including rape and torture, will now be seen up close and personal by the Israeli public, who will then relive the trauma of October 7. This may reignite anger against Hamas and the Palestinians as a whole and further harden Israeli views toward a future two-state solution. 

At the same time, this outcome may cause a backlash against Netanyahu, who essentially accepted an agreement that was on the table for many months. It was a delay that increased suffering and likely led to the death of some of the hostages. Let’s not forget that a tenet of Israel’s social compact with its citizen soldiers is that it will go to any lengths to bring them home if they are captured. There is a legitimate question as to whether Netanyahu adhered to this sacrosanct compact. 

In addition, as Gaza opens up to the international press and to aid organizations, and as reconstruction efforts begin, the world is going to see devastation and death at every corner, on a truly dramatic scale. There are likely hundreds of bodies (or more) still buried in Gaza under tons of rubble. Entire neighborhoods are flattened. The humanitarian situation is dire. While some countries in the region may now see an opportunity for further normalization with Israel, many in the Arab world will get even more of a sense of the immense horror in Gaza as it opens up, and they could then question any rapid pace of change with Israel. 

—Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He worked for twenty-six years at the Central Intelligence Agency before retiring in July 2019 at the senior intelligence service level.

Now for the hard part—a long-term solution for Gaza

Despite the length of time and difficulty of the negotiations, this interim deal is actually the easier part. The difficult part is the long-term solution to the conflict and release of the remaining hostages. There is still no clear picture of the long-term governance and security in Gaza that would be required to facilitate reconstruction at the end of the conflict.

Hamas wants complete and total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and a permanent end to hostilities. Israel still sees Gaza as a security issue that will require a military presence, and there is currently no partner for peace or stability who can be relied upon to administer Gaza. 

If Hamas and the Palestinian people in Gaza reject a security force and governing authority, then it could lead to a protracted insurgency in Gaza. As previously noted, Israel and Hamas had reached an interim security deal a year ago that failed to advance a broader peace. So, while the deal should be celebrated, there is still a lot of difficult work ahead to define Gaza’s future and Israel’s security.

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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After US forces in Iraq toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Assad regime effectively turned Syria into a training ground, with terrorist groups entering Iraq to commit heinous acts. That played a major role in destabilizing Iraq, and the Assad regime ultimately contributed to the killing of thousands of Iraqis. The Iraqi government worked diligently to cast a light on the Assad regime’s practices, including by referring these violations to the United Nations when, in 2009, former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appeared to accuse the Assad regime of being behind two bombings on government buildings in Baghdad and asked the United Nations envoy to form a fact-finding commission to investigate these terrorist acts. 

But the Iraqi government’s position changed after the Syrian uprising in 2011 and the rise of an assortment of terrorist organizations (many active in Iraq) that were vying to replace the Assad regime. The Iraqi government pragmatically preferred Assad as the lesser evil and refused to contribute to his downfall. While Assad was not able to cause Iraq any harm, as he was preoccupied with the existential threat he faced in the civil war, threats from Syria have not subsided. Then in June 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) began an offensive from Syria, overrunning the Nineveh province and proceeding to occupy one-third of Iraq’s territory. It took Iraq and an international coalition three years of brutal fighting to defeat ISIS and liberate the areas the terrorist group controlled.  

With Assad out of Syria, Iraq once again is in a vulnerable position. As a matter of principle, it is untenable for the Iraqi government to accept the new Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa who, under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, ran atrocious terrorist operations in Iraq for many years and was responsible for the killing of numerous innocent Iraqi civilians. While almost all relevant governments in the region (and many beyond) seem to be looking past the new Syrian leadership’s terrorist affiliations and are opening lines of communication with them, Iraq cannot ignore the security risks arising along its 372-mile border with Syria. Such dangers may come as a result of direct hostility by the new regime, but they also may come from the ungoverned territories of northeastern Syria, where the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are on the verge of collapse under threats from Turkey and the new Syrian government, a collapse that could be avoided if the United States expresses a strong commitment to the Kurdish group. The SDF currently keeps several detention camps, and the most concerning among them is al-Hol, which hosts some forty thousand detainees, including alleged ISIS affiliates, families, and sympathizers. The majority of them are Iraqis.

In recognition of these dangers, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani sent the newly appointed director of national intelligence, Hamid al-Shatri, to meet the new Syrian government in December last year to discuss Iraqi security concerns. The Iraqi government also sent Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Hussein to represent Iraq at January 12 meetings in Saudi Arabia, which gathered partner and neighboring countries in a conversation about supporting Syria. By engaging in this way, the Iraqi government has shifted the burden of establishing good-faith security cooperation to the new Syrian leadership.

The challenge for Iraq in the coming months will be twofold: On the one hand, there is the long border with Syria, where several hostile armed groups operate without any opposition from the Syrian side. The Iraqi security forces will have to multiply their resources and vigilance to maintain border security. The scale of this threat will depend on whether Syria is heading toward stability or disintegration into conflict. On the other hand, Iraq will face serious internal pressure from changing geopolitical conditions. For example, Assad’s fall marks the beginning of a new era, one in which Turkey could see its influence spreading across what used to be an Iranian sphere of influence. The Iraqi leadership will be under great pressure from Iran, which seeks compensation for its recent loss of influence, including by having a better political, economic, and security posture in Iraq. At the same time, Iraq will also be under pressure to recalibrate its bilateral relations with the United States. The new reality in Syria will push Iraq and the United States to revisit the recently reached troop-withdrawal agreement, with the Iraqi government simultaneously navigating its need to ensure its territorial security and the scrutiny of rival groups who call for the timely adherence to troop withdrawal.

To test the new geopolitical reality, Sudani made an important visit to Iran on January 8 where he met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The visit resulted in a lot of analysis and speculation about a possible Iraqi effort to persuade the Iranians to agree to a deferment of the US troop withdrawal and the demilitarization of the Iraqi armed groups that identify primarily with Iran. The speculation was put to rest by the X account of the Iranian supreme leader, which put out several concise statements. On the first issue, the ayatollah said the presence of US forces in Iraq is “illegal and contrary to the interests of the people and the government.” On the question of the Iraqi fighting forces, he said that the Popular Mobilization Forces represent “a crucial component of power in Iraq, and more efforts should be made to preserve and strengthen it”—adding that Sudani “emphasized” this as well. The supreme leader argued, in a third statement, that “the more developed and secure Iraq is, the more it will also benefit the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Whatever the bilateral talks may have accomplished, it all has been overshadowed by these three short statements. 

It is now up to the government of Iraq to balance its regional policies with full consideration of the opportunities and the challenges the fall of Assad has put forward. At the same time, it will have to be mindful not only of the new Syrian political order but also the change of posture that major regional and international actors will make in the post-Assad era.

Abbas Kadhim is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Follow him on X: @DrAbbasKadhim.  

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Strategic competition is likely to intensify over the next decade, increasing the demands on the United States to deter and defend against wide-ranging and simultaneous security challenges across multiple domains and regions worldwide. In that time frame, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint Force should more effectively leverage the competencies of US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) to compete with US strategic adversaries.

Three realities facing the DOD over the next decade lend themselves toward leveraging USSOF more in strategic competition. First, the growing need to counter globally active and increasingly cooperative aggressors, while the broader Joint Force remains focused on the Indo-Pacific and Europe, underscores the value of leveraging USSOF to manage competition in other regions. Second, the desire to avoid war and manage competition below the threshold of conflict aligns with USSOF’s expertise in the irregular aspects of competition. Third, unless defense spending and recruitment dramatically increase over the next decade, the Joint Force will likely have to manage more security challenges without a commensurate increase in force size and capabilities, which underscores the need for the DOD to maximize every tool at its disposal, including the use of USSOF to help manage strategic competition.

The US government must harness all instruments of national power, alongside its network of allies and partners, to uphold international security, deter attacks, and counter efforts to undermine US security interests. Achieving this requires effectively integrating and leveraging the distinct roles of the DOD, interagency partners, the intelligence community (IC), and the Joint Force, including components like USSOF that have not been traditionally prioritized in strategic competition. For the past two decades, USSOF achieved critical operational successes during the Global War on Terror, primarily through counterterrorism and direct-action missions. However, peer and near-peer competition now demands a broader application of USSOF’s twelve core activities, with emphasis on seven: special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, unconventional warfare, and direct action.

Over the next decade, the DOD should emphasize USSOF’s return to its roots—the core competencies USSOF conducted and refined during the Cold War. USSOF’s unconventional warfare support of resistance groups in Europe; its support of covert intelligence operations in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America; its evacuation missions of civilians in Africa; and its guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations helped combat Soviet influence operations worldwide. During that era, special operations became one of the US military’s key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict, and that is how USSOF should be applied in the next decade to help manage strategic competition.

This report outlines five ways the Department of Defense should use Special Operations Forces over the next decade to support US efforts in strategic competition. USSOF should be leveraged to:

1. Enhance the US government’s situational awareness of strategic competition dynamics globally.
2. Entangle adversaries in competition to prevent escalation.
3. Strengthen allied and partner resilience to support the US strategy of deterrence by denial.
4. Support integration across domains for greater effect at the tactical edge
5. Contribute to US information and decision advantage by leveraging USSOF’s role as a technological pathfinder.

This report seeks to clarify USSOF’s role in strategic competition over the next decade, address gaps in understanding within the DOD and the broader national security community about USSOF’s competencies, and guide future resource and force development decisions. By prioritizing the above five functions, USSOF can bolster the US competitive edge and support the DOD’s management of challenges across diverse theaters and domains.

Fellow

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Staff

Theresa Luetkefend

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy German

Report Mar 7, 2024

Stealth, speed, and adaptability: The role of special operations forces in strategic competition

By Clementine G. Starling and Alyxandra Marine

Clementine G. Starling and Alyxandra Marine discuss how special operations forces enhance US readiness in an era of strategic competition.

Conflict Defense Policy

New Atlanticist Apr 19, 2024

Great power competition is back. What does that mean for US special operations forces?

By Alyxandra Marine

With their wide array of capabilities, US special operations forces can play a central role in strategic competition.

China Conflict

Issue Brief Oct 13, 2023

Where do US Army special operations fit in a world of strategic competition?

By Richard Angle, Leo Blanken, and Philip Swintek

General Richard Angle, Leo Blanken, and Lieutenant Colonel Philip Swintek argue that building and maintaining relationships is the true competitive advantage of Army Special Forces (ARSOF).

Defense Policy National Security

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

Learn more

The post The next decade of strategic competition: How the Pentagon can use special operations forces to better compete appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Central to this strategy is Turkey’s proclivity to leverage military interventions, political agreements, and economic tools to advance its objectives. In Libya, Turkey’s 2019 intervention secured it a critical foothold through the deployment of drones, Syrian mercenaries, and direct military support. This allowed Ankara to negotiate an EEZ agreement that, from its vantage point, redefined maritime boundaries and challenged the claims of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. The agreement was not merely an economic gambit; it was a strategic move to confront Mediterranean rivals over territorial waters and energy resources. Five years later, Ankara is seeking to establish an EEZ agreement with Syria’s new government that would extend its maritime claims further into the Eastern Mediterranean. While Turkey frames these actions as legitimate assertions of its rights, regional powers are likely to view them as provocations that deepen tensions in an already volatile environment.

Balancing Russia in Libya 

Libya occupies a central role in Turkey’s Mediterranean strategy, serving as a gateway for Ankara’s regional ambitions and a platform for projecting influence. The 2019 Memorandum of Understanding with the GNA, which established a long-contested maritime boundary, has been criticized for raising unresolved sovereignty issues and its questionable legality under international law. Beyond these legal challenges, Turkey’s position in Libya is further complicated by Russia’s entrenched involvement. Through the Wagner Group—recently rebranded as the Africa Corps—Moscow has bolstered Libyan National Army Commander Khalifa Haftar’s forces, securing itself its own foothold in Haftar’s areas of control. Reports of Russian arms transfers over Turkish-controlled airspace from Syria’s Hmeimim airbase to eastern Libya after the fall of Damascus exemplify the paradoxical nature of the Turkey-Russia rivalry. On the surface, such developments may appear transactional, but they reflect Ankara’s broader strategy: maintaining escalation dominance by setting boundaries on Russian operations while leveraging its role as a regional balancer to extract strategic advantages.

This balancing act underscores Turkey’s calculated pragmatism in Libya, where collaboration with Russia acts as both a counterweight to regional adversaries and a measured gamble. By permitting Moscow’s logistical transfers, Ankara has transformed a potential liability into a tool of strategic leverage, subtly positioning itself to influence Russian ambitions in Africa while reaffirming its indispensability to NATO and fortifying its regional clout. However, this strategy is not without vulnerabilities. The delicate balancing required to manage Moscow’s activities leaves Ankara exposed to the risks of miscalculation, overreach, and dependency. Disruptions in its arrangement with Russia—or fractures in its relationships with NATO allies, regional powers, or Libyan factions—could unravel Ankara’s hard-won gains, imperiling its broader Mediterranean ambitions and leaving its geopolitical foothold exposed.

Flexing muscle in Syria

In Syria, Turkey’s intervention was initially driven by the need to address immediate security threats, primarily removing the self-proclaimed Islamic State and containing Kurdish forces seeking to expand territorial control in northern Syria. However, with the fall of dictator Bashar al-Assad, Ankara recalibrated its approach, merging economic and geopolitical ambitions with its security objectives. The prospect of an EEZ agreement with Syria mirrors the dynamics of the 2019 Libya pact. While such a pact could offer maritime gains and deepen Turkey’s influence in the region, it is fraught with risks. Greece, Cyprus, and other European powers are likely to view such an agreement as an illegal and destabilizing move, further polarizing regional dynamics and intensifying disputes over energy and sovereignty.

Turkey’s approach in Syria also reflects its broader ambitions to integrate its strategies across theaters, enhancing its influence through interconnected policies. The country’s pursuit of maritime gains in Syria builds on the successes of its Libya agreement while highlighting the risks inherent in replicating this strategy in a different geopolitical context. The overlapping tensions in Libya and Syria demand constant recalibration, as Ankara navigates volatile rivalries and shifting alliances. The integration of its strategies underscores Turkey’s vision of the Mediterranean as a unified arena for projecting power.

However, significant challenges loom in Syria, the most salient of which stem from Israel. Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Israeli airstrikes have escalated, targeting countless military installations and destroying aircraft, radar systems, and missile sites. Simultaneously, Israeli forces have conducted incursions and expanded their presence beyond the occupied Golan Heights, particularly in the Quneitra province of southern Syria. These actions reflect dissatisfaction with Syria’s current trajectory. There is a widespread perception within Israel that Syria risks becoming a Turkish protectorate, a scenario that would severely constrain Israel’s military latitude in the region. This concern is compounded by the belief that Iran will continue to maneuver for influence, viewing Syria’s strategic assets as too valuable to relinquish. In this context, a Syria rebuilt under the leadership of Arab states is seen as a far more desirable outcome, curbing the influence of both Turkey and Iran while pre-emptively neutralizing their resurgence.

Should this vision prove unattainable, Israel may resort to curbing Turkish influence by undermining Syria’s unity, channeling support to ethnic and religious minorities to fragment the country and weaken Ankara’s position. This could set the stage for a potential collision course between the two. The interplay of this rivalry highlights the fragile nature of Ankara’s ambitions, with Israel emerging as perhaps its most formidable challenge. Tel Aviv’s ability to operate beyond traditional international norms, as starkly demonstrated in Gaza, and to secure the unwavering support of Ankara’s traditional Western allies—regardless of its methods—exposes the looming asymmetry Turkey faces in this geopolitical contest.

Strengthening influence in the Mediterranean

Anticipating the challenges to its broader Mediterranean aspirations, Turkey is building synergies between its strategies in Libya and Syria to maximize its leverage, reflecting its broader ambition to reshape the Mediterranean’s geopolitical map and strengthen its negotiating position. In Libya, Ankara has adapted to the shifting political landscape, engaging with Eastern Libyan factions and the Haftar family to expand its influence. This outreach signals a pragmatic shift from confrontation to cautious diplomacy, as Turkey seeks to transform former adversaries into cooperative stakeholders while navigating the crowded Libyan geopolitical arena. In Syria, Turkey’s political influence has positioned it as a linchpin for regional engagement with the Syrian government, mediating between Damascus and key external actors, including Arab states, European Union countries, and potentially Russia. Ankara’s subtle gatekeeper role sharpens its leverage, turning regional rivalries into stepping stones for its own ascent.

By aligning its strategies in Libya and Syria, Turkey seeks to consolidate influence and amplify its leverage across both theaters. This calculated approach underscores Ankara’s effort to position itself as an indispensable actor in the Mediterranean, translating tactical maneuvers into broader geopolitical gains while pre-empting challenges that threaten its ambitions. Yet, this high-stakes strategy leaves Turkey exposed. The overlapping tensions in Libya and Syria demand constant recalibration, as advances in one arena could rapidly unravel in another. 

The return of US President-elect Donald Trump to the White House this month looms as perhaps the most significant determinant shaping the region’s dynamics. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy could offer Ankara opportunities to assert itself more aggressively, particularly as it leverages its strategic position in the Mediterranean. However, this same approach raises the specter of greater US disengagement from regional conflicts, leaving Turkey to face escalating challenges from Moscow, Israel, and other regional powers without the backing of its traditional Western allies. The uncertainty of this geopolitical environment underscores the precariousness of Turkey’s gains, where advances in one theater could rapidly unravel in another, placing its broader Mediterranean strategy on a knife’s edge.

Ultimately, Turkey’s Mediterranean strategy reflects both ambition and vulnerability, a delicate dance on shifting sands where every advance risks triggering a cascade of challenges. Much like Ankara views Libya and Syria as interconnected theaters, Western actors should embrace this moment of change to recalibrate their bilateral relations with Turkey, recognizing shared interests in maritime stability and regional development. 

In Libya, this means supporting a political process that moderates a Turko-Russian oligopolistic arrangement while promoting stability and inclusivity to align with shared Turko-Western priorities. In Syria, targeted sanctions relief and reconstruction efforts tied to an inclusive political framework can support stabilization efforts and address immediate needs. By anchoring their engagement with Turkey in mutual interests and shared goals, Western actors can transform competition into cooperation. This recalibration will be pivotal in shaping whether Turkey’s Mediterranean gambit becomes a cornerstone of regional stability or a foundation of enduring fragility.

Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Abdullah al-Jabassini is an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Europe.

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The Israeli military has designated the two access points to the Netzarim Corridor as no-go zones to provide force protection for troops inside the zone, threatening to shoot those “trespassing” the area around the Salah al-Din Road in central Gaza and the Al-Rashid coastal highway, where most of the civilian population has been moving out of the north and heading south. 

The corridor has become significant because those seeking to leave northern Gaza have been forced to pass through it on their journey south. Meanwhile, those facing cramped and unbearable humanitarian conditions in the crowded central and southern Gaza seeking to take their chances on returning to what’s left of Gaza’s north attempt to traverse the deadly corridor. As ceasefire negotiations appear to be making progress, the incoming Trump administration must ensure that any deal, regardless of its phased implementation, includes mechanisms for protecting Palestinian civilians traversing the corridor to return to their homes and monitoring the IDF’s compliance with the terms of the agreement.

A sobering investigation

The Haaretz investigation describes in harrowing detail how civilians were repeatedly targeted by careless, reckless, and, in a few instances, even joyous soldiers who applied overwhelming firepower against civilian targets who were clearly visible through drones and cameras as nonthreatening people, only to be mercilessly and ruthlessly gunned down without any apparent military necessity. 

Time and again, the officers, soldiers, and commanders interviewed describe how arbitrarily designated kill zones were regularly littered with dead Palestinian bodies who were counted as “terrorists” without any confirmation of their identities, affiliations, crimes, or wrongdoing. Israeli officials regularly assert that IDF attacks and operations only strike military targets based on intelligence, battlefield assessments, and reactions to incidents and threats. Though this claim has been repeatedly challenged by evidence, footage, and even the IDF’s own admission at times, the Israeli government maintains that it vigorously investigates incidents and takes appropriate action against soldiers who violate established codes of conduct and rules of engagement.

However, the report details how the excessive use of helicopters, drones, tanks, and hundreds of bullets was regularly deployed against targets that did not pose an imminent threat and likely could have been spared with simple warning shots instead of being obliterated. Even when those killed were confirmed not to be militants based on IDF intelligence databases, murdered civilians were added to a daily count of eliminated combatants, left to be eaten by packs of stray dogs, as some officers congratulated their soldiers on a supposed job well done. 

Despite the details being difficult and depressing to read, perhaps the silver lining throughout was that there are still IDF soldiers with consciousness, awareness, and recognition of the horrors that they are technically part of who are speaking out. They wanted to defend their people after the October 7 massacre but feel that the Israeli public deserves to know the full picture of the brutality that some of their soldiers and commanders are committing. They questioned their orders and the necessity of what they were doing, knowing that they would have to live with the consequences of what they were witnessing for the rest of their lives. 

If Israel doesn’t trust any external mechanism for legal accountability for its conduct in Gaza, then the only way that its internal checks and balances can work is for brave soldiers to speak out against war crimes and for courageous journalists to expose these stories so that there can at least be a record of what took place.

What’s next for the corridor?

There are intensive rounds of negotiations to reach a new ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, though it remains unclear whether this could occur in the final days of the Biden administration or in the early days of the incoming Trump administration. Regardless of when such an agreement may be struck, serious questions will have to be answered about the Netzarim Corridor and Palestinian civilians’ ability to return to northern Gaza. Some reports suggest that as part of pending negotiations, Palestinian civilians would be able to return north without conditions, but vehicles would be inspected in accordance with a new mechanism. This would necessitate a partial or complete withdrawal of IDF troops from the corridor, something that is difficult to envision after the Israeli military expanded the corridor last month to vast areas and built more than a dozen bases throughout the space, which encompasses over twenty-one square miles of the coastal enclave’s territory. 

The incoming Trump administration will have to wrestle with tactical-level details—especially what happens with the Netzarim Corridor and civilians’ return to the north—if it wants to play a role in mediating a ceasefire and ending the war. The carnage associated with the forced deportation of Palestinian civilians from the north and the prevention of their return has been an exceptionally bloody chapter in this war; the road to Gaza’s recovery and the prospects for lasting peace will require addressing this issue. 

President-elect Donald Trump’s incoming secretary of state, working with special envoys and the National Security Council, should ensure the inclusion of specific guidelines for how the corridor—and indeed, all territories held by Israel during a ceasefire—would be administered and secured. This would entail pushing for stricter rules of engagement that involve higher-ups in the chain of command, higher thresholds for engaging suspects, mechanisms for issuing warnings before opening fire, and a clear strategy for how to discriminate targets based on a tangible threat matrix, not hunches or an overzealous field officer and commander. 

Additionally, if the IDF maintains a presence in the corridor or other parts of Gaza that would be traversed by civilians seeking to return to their neighborhoods, there should be a mechanism for an independent observer, including regional players with US support, who could assess the behavior and compliance of Israeli soldiers with the ceasefire agreement, much like what the United States is doing in southern Lebanon. 

The incoming Trump administration can play a positive role in dialing back some of the battlefield excesses that have caused immense, unnecessary loss of life to Palestinian civilians. The testimonies of IDF soldiers should give serious pause to policymakers, who must register the irreparable geopolitical damage that these stories inflict on regional stability and the hope for lasting peace between Palestinians and Israelis.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Marc Polymeropoulos: A lone wolf is far more dangerous than a terrorist cell

Danielle Cosgrove: The attack shows the evolving threat of ISIS’s Digital Caliphate

Morgan Tadych: The attack indicates a troubling pattern of online radicalization

Doug Livermore: ISIS is diminished in the Middle East, but is persisting elsewhere

Mike Nelson: The US must remain vigilant against the appeal of ‘leaderless jihad’

A lone wolf is far more dangerous than a terrorist cell

As the investigation unfolds in New Orleans, I get a sense that some in the media and law enforcement are a bit relieved that this may “just” be the work of a lone wolf attacker. It may be counterintuitive, but I’d argue that a lone wolf is far more worrisome and dangerous for US counterterrorism officials, as it is so much harder for both law enforcement and the intelligence community to penetrate the operation itself. This is exacerbated further if the attacker self-radicalized, receiving inspiration and guidance virtually from ISIS propaganda, for example.

Officials in the counterterrorism world actually prefer to investigate terrorist cells, as this provides significant opportunities to uncover and recruit the cell members, and also potentially intercept communications between cell members and the terrorist mothership. The more individuals involved in a terrorist plot, the larger chance that one makes a mistake. While of course it would be a relief to know that there are not ISIS adherents running around New Orleans posing a direct public safety threat, we should not rest easy, as this modus operandi of a lone wolf conducting a vehicle attack poses immense challenges to the traditional detect/disrupt/deter counterterrorism model that has worked so effectively in the past.  

—Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a member of the Council’s Counterterrorism Project. He worked for twenty-six years at the CIA in a variety of field and headquarters operational assignments focusing on counterterrorism, the Middle East, and South Asia.

The attack shows the evolving threat of ISIS’s Digital Caliphate

Following their formal defeat by coalition forces in 2019, the Islamic State leveraged its technological expertise to establish a Virtual Caliphate—a digital refuge where disaffected individuals seeking community and purpose converge around the vision of a state governed by sharia law under a caliph. The Virtual Caliphate has expanded rapidly, driven by shifting refugee populations, unresolved border disputes, decentralized planning needs, the use of generative AI as a knowledge hub, and the role of protests.

The Digital Caliphate signifies a new chapter in ISIS’s technological evolution, building on the Virtual Caliphate by advancing from the dissemination of ideas to the orchestration of action and violence through digital and technological means. In essence, the Digital Caliphate bridges the proliferation of ideas with the execution of actions through digital tools.

The New Year’s attack in New Orleans highlights the evolving threat of the Digital Caliphate. The attacker’s actions reflect its hallmarks, including likely radicalization via unregulated platforms. The shift from physical territories to digital domains has made it harder to detect and disrupt lone actors operating independently but aligned with extremist ideologies.

This attack serves as a stark reminder that extremism has fully adapted to the digital age. The United States’ counter-strategies must evolve at scale and speed. Policymakers must act decisively to disrupt the Digital Caliphate’s ability to weaponize commercial technology and protect communities from future attacks.

—Danielle Cosgrove is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project as well as a technology executive and distinguished lecturer at Stanford University who previously led high-impact conflict zone operations and strategic stability initiatives.

The attack indicates a troubling pattern of online radicalization

The terror attack on our homeland on New Year’s Day shares several horrifying characteristics with other recent terror arrests made in the United States and Canada. In all three cases, men disaffected with their lives started to interact online with ISIS-linked influencers and sites. While the specifics of Jabbar’s online interactions are not yet clear, the presence of an ISIS flag in his rental truck in addition to early reports of videos that he posted promoting extremist content indicate that he was radicalized online. Prior to the last few years, Jabbar appeared to lead a relatively normal life; as his personal life fell apart, he became further radicalized. 

In particular, Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K, the Central Asia/Afghanistan-based branch of ISIS) has demonstrated a particular social media savvy to expand its Digital Caliphate. In several foiled attack plots in 2024, IS-K leveraged online contact with men seeking an Islamic community to radicalize and encourage them to commit attacks against symbolic Western targets. The New Orleans attack follows a similar pattern, with a recently radicalized US citizen terrorizing a symbolic soft target that is in opposition to IS-K’s perception of morality. The United States must monitor online spaces to attempt to detect and deter radicalization before it happens—in cases such as this, it is critical to stay “left of boom.”

—Morgan Tadych is an open-source intelligence (OSINT) professional, Army veteran, and member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project. She spent much of her military career researching strategic Russia/Eurasia issues and deployed to conduct counterterrorism missions.

ISIS is diminished in the Middle East, but is persisting elsewhere

ISIS’s territorial caliphate in the heart of the Middle East has largely crumbled and the group’s continued influence now relies on various “provinces” across the globe, from the Sahel to Afghanistan. These affiliates continue to pose notable challenges, surviving in regions marked by instability, weak governance, and other active insurgencies.

Throughout 2022, I served as the deputy commander of the NATO Special Operations Advisory Group in Iraq, a role in which I worked closely with the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service and Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency to root out the few legitimate ISIS fighters hiding out in caves in the mountainous north. Despite the group’s increasingly diminished capacity in Iraq and Syria, it continues to exploit the fragmented security environments there and elsewhere to persist despite international pressure. In the Sahel, ISIS affiliates compete with other larger terrorist groups for influence, while IS-K, operating in Afghanistan, remains a small but persistent threat to regional security—as was seen in the Moscow attack of March 2024.

Iran has strategically used ISIS as a bogeyman to justify its malign activities in the region, particularly its influence in Iraq and, until recently, Syria. By portraying itself as a bulwark against the return of ISIS, Iran aims to maintain its presence and control over strategic territories, consolidating its influence among local militias and proxy groups. This dangerous narrative obscures Iran’s broader regional ambitions and its role in exacerbating the very conditions that foster extremism. This ongoing dynamic allows Iran to continue using proxies to smuggle weapons and launch attacks against Israel and threaten other interests from within Iraqi territory. 

Even though ISIS is a diminishing shell of its former self, it still bears continued attention given both the exploitation of its existence by strategic competitors and potential for resurgence.

—Doug Livermore is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group, national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, senior vice president for solution engineering at the CenCore Group, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment—Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard.

The US must remain vigilant against the appeal of ‘leaderless jihad’

The New Orleans attack represents the latest in a series of attacks and threats that have plagued the United States and its allies for decades. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, there was speculation that this was an act of a larger cell or potentially a complex attack with improvised explosive devices placed as a second wave. Perhaps this was part of a multicity simultaneous attack connected to the bizarre events in Las Vegas. However, while details are still emerging, it appears that this was a tragic but unsophisticated attack by a solo actor who had recently become more radicalized by digital messaging and content against a soft target. In many ways, it was reminiscent of attacks like those in San Bernardino in 2015 and Orlando in 2016, in that the perpetrators were individually radicalized and inspired by Islamist jihadism as opposed to being directed by larger organizations or conducting attacks that required specialized training. Jabbar’s status as a veteran is reminiscent of the attacks of Sergeant Hasan Akbar and Major Nidal Hasan, in that those who had volunteered to serve the United States became influenced to attack it. 

These kinds of attacks are the manifestation of al-Qaeda strategist Abu Musab al-Suri’s concept of “leaderless jihad,” that mujahideen distributed throughout the world would take it upon themselves to conduct attacks against enemies near and far. They are potentially the hardest to anticipate in that there are no cells to infiltrate, no specialty items or explosives to trigger attention, and, given that Jabbar was a native-born US citizen, no immigration screening to have blocked the threat at the border. 

The attack should not be taken as an indication of re-emerging ISIS strength, rather as what appears to be the radicalization of an imbalanced malcontent. The danger, however, is that there are many more who are susceptible to this kind of extremism. As such, the United States must remain vigilant against all forms of radical Islamism—both the armed formations and the online influence operations.

—Mike Nelson is a retired Army special forces officer and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project.

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At this moment, HTS is eager to build goodwill inside Syria and internationally. The United States should act swiftly and strategically to help ensure the country’s transition toward a more stable and democratic system. The United States can leverage its diplomatic, economic, and political tools to influence the post-Assad landscape in Syria. Here are several critical steps the United States should consider.

1. Provide diplomatic recognition to the new government

The political situation in Syria is fluid, and the future government will likely be a coalition of opposition groups, civil society organizations, and representatives from various ethnic and sectarian groups, including HTS. One of the most significant actions that Washington could take is to provide early diplomatic recognition to this emerging government—contingent on commitments to a peaceful transition, democratic reforms, and the protection of human rights. Recognition may be contingent upon specific steps, including:

• Formation of a transitional government: This government should be representative of Syria’s diverse political and ethnic groups, and include women, youth, political structures currently in exile, and opposition military factions.
• Commitment to a democratic process: The interim government should agree to hold free and fair elections with international oversight and establish a justice and accountability mechanism to address past atrocities.
• Constitutional reform: A new, inclusive constitution should be developed with input from all Syrian stakeholders to lay the foundation for a democratic governance system.
• International oversight: The United Nations should be allowed to oversee the transition, including monitoring justice and accountability processes and ensuring the dismantling of Syria’s chemical weapons program. Encouragingly, HTS has indicated its readiness to cooperate with the international community to monitor Assad regime military sites.  

2. Provide humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance

Syria faces an enormous humanitarian crisis. Millions of Syrians are displaced, and much of the country’s infrastructure is in ruins. The United States should work with international organizations to ensure that aid is distributed effectively. Given the opposition’s experience in governance, existing structures on the ground can be leveraged to channel aid, minimizing the risks that would come from trying to create entirely new systems from scratch. However, this aid should be conditional on:

• Political inclusivity: The transitional government must equitably provide aid to all regions of Syria.
• Anti-corruption measures: Donors must insist on transparency and accountability mechanisms to prevent misuse of funds.

3. Begin the process of removing sanctions on HTS and the new Syrian government

HTS is currently designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The group’s evolving stances, including its recent public commitments to protect religious minorities and refrain from retributive violence, suggests that HTS may be open to political accommodation. The United States should initiate a gradual, good-faith process for removing sanctions and designations on HTS and the new Syrian government. Additionally, the United States has designated the government of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism since the 1970s and has since added additional sanctions beginning in 2011 in response to the Assad regime’s exercise of violence and repression. This process could include:

• Phased sanctions relief on HTS: The United States should start by removing sanctions on individuals who demonstrate a willingness to engage in a political transition, particularly HTS leaders. Over time, as HTS shows concrete steps toward reconciliation, further sanctions can be lifted. 
• Quick sanctions relief on Syria: Removing broader sanctions on Syria can be done swiftly, as the new Syrian government will likely be hostile to US-designated terror groups like Lebanese Hezbollah or Iraq’s Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which were instrumental in bolstering the previous Syrian regime. As for the second batch of sanctions on Syria related to the regime’s exercise of violence on civilians, if HTS follows through on its promises to refrain from retributive violence against civilians, the United States should lift this second set of sanctions as well.
• Diplomatic engagement: Engaging with HTS and other opposition groups is critical. Past US policy on similar groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), shows that delisting a group from the FTO list is possible if the organization demonstrates a genuine commitment to peace.

4. Cooperation on counter-terror measures

HTS has a law enforcement body that has since 2017 conducted dozens of operations against Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) cells operating in northwestern Syria, including arresting many members of its leadership. HTS has also arrested members of the al-Qaeda branch in Syria, Hurras al-Din, largely dismantling the organization. HTS will have an interest in preventing more extremist actors from trying to reform in Syria as the rest of the state rebuilds. The United States may thus find HTS willing to cooperate on counterterror measures. 

• Intelligence sharing: Intelligence sharing on counterterrorism measures can build good faith on both sides and prevent extremist groups from proliferating.  

5. Encourage SDF participation in the political process

Syria’s Kurdish population, particularly those in the northeast, will play a crucial role in the country’s future. The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been key allies in the fight against ISIS, but tensions with other opposition groups remain. The United States should encourage dialogue between the SDF and HTS, as well as other opposition factions. This dialogue could include:

• Inclusion of Kurdish leaders in the political process: A future Syria should represent the interests of all Syrians, including Kurds, Arabs, and other minorities. The United States can mediate discussions between the SDF and HTS to ensure Kurdish representation in the future government.

Seizing the moment

Failure for the United States to engage with Syria’s new leadership can lead to several negative outcomes. HTS could radicalize further if it does not have international checks or relies on other actors for diplomacy, trade, and support. Russia and Iran could fill the vacuum and partner with the new Syrian government to sideline the United States in the region. A new Syrian government without international support could fall into chaos and sow instability, leading to further mass displacement throughout the rest of the region. The United States must seize this moment to help influence the future of Syria, rather than waiting to see what happens. No potential path forward for Syria or HTS is inevitable. The sooner the United States takes concrete action, the more likely it can positively impact Syria’s future.  

HTS leader Ahmed al-Shara, formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, entered the political scene in Syria over ten years ago. He has long been mindful of the lessons learned from the failures of al-Qaeda to win the support of the Iraqi people. HTS was formed by military officials who wanted to work within the contexts of the societies they lived in. HTS has continuously moderated since its inception and break from Jabhat al-Nusra—al-Qaeda’s Syria branch—in 2017. Of course, part of its strategy may be for optics, but much of the group’s rhetoric about moderation has taken the form of concrete actions. HTS has a Directorate of Minority Affairs that has guaranteed the safety of Christians and Alawites under its control. HTS has ordered its fighters not to disturb public institutions. And the larger and more diverse the population that comes under its governance, the more HTS will need to evolve and the less power it will have to determine what governance looks like on the ground. 

It is important not to overstate the current moderation of HTS. The group is not a bastion of liberal democracy, and its political evolution is still ongoing. However, HTS is actively seeking diplomatic recognition and has expressed a willingness to engage with the international community. The United States should not expect perfection but should recognize that political entities are capable of evolving, especially when faced with the realities of governance and international expectations. Shara has already reached out to regional countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Russia, reassuring them that he intends to have good relations despite past support their past support for Assad. If HTS proves genuinely open to dialogue and reform, the United States should pursue engagement rather than exclusion.

As long as HTS is willing to evolve and accept constructive criticism, the United States should engage with the group. Ignoring Syria’s new leaders will not make them go away. US outreach to HTS is not just engagement for the sake of engagement. A post-Assad Syria, especially one with leaders willing to engage with Washington, presents an opportunity for the United States to promote stability and democracy in the Middle East, curb Iranian and Russian influence in the region, and provide a safe and secure home for Syrians both inside and outside Syria. 

Sana Sekkarie is a digital threat analyst focusing on the Middle East. She was previously a researcher focused on Syrian opposition groups at the Institue for the Study of War and the University of Virginia.  

The post A US blueprint for Syria’s fragile transition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Wall Street Journal’s Yaroslav Trofimov writes that now those two US allies, whose relations have grown far worse since the war in Gaza began last year, are set on “a collision course” in Syria and beyond.   

Assessing what Israel hopes to get out of the dramatic geopolitical realignment of the Middle East isn’t hard, as its national interests are well known and existential in nature. Its decisions are driven by its need for security, by its desire to maintain military and technological superiority, and by its enduring need to deter, contain, and counter Iran and its proxies.

Events of the past few weeks, which have so deeply weakened Iran and the armed groups that it supports across the region, have put Israel in its strongest security position in recent memory. In a powerful interview with the Wall Street Journal, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recounts the key decision points that produced that outcome. “Power isn’t merely guns, missiles, tanks, and aircraft,” Netanyahu says. “It’s the will to fight and seize the initiative.” Now, Israel’s leaders are reflecting on how best to leverage and extend their gains.

Until now, the world hasn’t focused as much on Turkey’s own aspirations, but President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan isn’t shy about discussing them. “Every event in our region, and especially Syria, reminds us that Turkey is bigger than Turkey itself,” Erdoğan said this week. “The Turkish nation cannot escape from its destiny.”

Erdoğan frames that “destiny” in civilizational terms, positioning the “new Turkey” as a continuation of its Ottoman legacy and an Islamic world leader. This notion is sparking concern not only in Israel, but among Gulf monarchies and the United States, too.

“For Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel, the shift in Damascus is a gamechanger that could pit them against a regional rival,” Hassan Hassan, the founder and editor-in-chief of New Lines Magazine, writes in the Guardian. “For western policymakers, views of Ankara’s growing assertiveness range from concerns over its Islamist ties to recognition of its centrality to Middle Eastern politics. This plays into Ankara’s hands, as it is a marked difference to Iran’s power projection that was unanimously challenged in the west and the region.”

Turkey’s rise, writes Hassan, disrupts Riyadh’s narrative depicting itself as the undisputed leader of the Sunni Muslim world, countering Shia Iran. “Ankara’s Islamist-leaning policies resonate with a broad swath of Sunni Muslims and political Islamists, offering an alternative to the Gulf monarchies,” he writes.

At a time when Israelis can sigh in relief at the diminished threat from Shia Iran, they are expressing new worries about a Turkish-led group of Sunni Islamists. Meanwhile, European and US diplomats are meeting in Damascus with Ahmed al-Shara, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which led the recent push that ousted the Assad regime.

On Friday, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf met with Shara and announced that the United States will drop a ten million dollar bounty it had offered for his capture. Leaf also said that the HTS leader agreed on the need to prevent terrorist groups from operating in Syria.

Shara says that he wants to build his country and not start new fights, but he’s still designated by the United States as a terrorist bearing the nom de guerre Muhammad al-Jawlani. 

Where will all of this land? With so much in motion, one can’t be sure.

What’s clear is Turkey will have the most important voice in Damascus in the period ahead, and an increasingly large voice far beyond. Writes Trofimov: “This brings Erdoğan closer than ever to reaching his ambition for a sphere of influence that stretches across former Ottoman lands, all the way to Libya and Somalia.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post The Middle East’s shifting balance of power favors Turkey and Israel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the immediate aftermath of the US-led departure from Afghanistan, US officials reassured the public that over-the-horizon intelligence would be sufficient to track and take needed action against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and IS-K. There was an expectation that this approach would be sufficient to prevent a reemergence of terrorist groups that pose a threat outside of Afghanistan. The opposite has occurred. Afghanistan is once again a hub of extremist leadership, training, and plotting of attacks against Western interests.

Now a new challenge is emerging. Despite early optimism, the new leadership in Syria poses serious concerns to US and third-country officials who are moving more cautiously than in Afghanistan. The toppling of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in recent days is a major win for the people of Syria, but Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS’s) origin as a consortium of al-Qaeda-aligned groups, including the Nusra Front, strongly suggests that the group’s domestic and foreign policies are unlikely to be moderate by regional standards. An already fragile situation in the Levant with on-going Israeli operations, a fragile Jordanian economy with concerns about domestic stability, and the imminent mass return of Syrian refugees could result in global leaders taking HTS leader and new Syrian Prime Minister Mohammed al-Bashir at his word when a skeptical and measured approach is needed.

All these regional developments speak to a need for the United States to stay vigilant—and present—in the fight against terrorism.

They are back

In the chaos of the coalition departure from Afghanistan, prisons were emptied of extremists and known al-Qaeda fighters, the Taliban was unable to establish governance across the country, and an already established IS-K in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar saw an opportunity to expand its recruitment from mostly Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns to third-country nationals. At the same time, terrorist organizations around the world took note that the United States and its allies moved on from terrorism. The US resources required to keep groups in check were no longer available. 

In short, over-the-horizon intelligence was not interfering with the day-to-day operations or leadership of Afghanistan-based groups, and it was only marginally impacting operations in Syria, the Sahel, Yemen, and Somalia.

IS-K quickly expanded its operational activity and recruitment in Afghanistan. As a result, it has built a hub of strongholds or camps in thirteen provinces with an estimated four to six thousand fighters as of July 2023, according to the United Nations (UN). More and more Islamic State fighters from different parts of the world now travel to Afghanistan because they find this territory safer in the absence of a capable force to effectively counter them. Though US officials dispute the UN’s figures, few dispute that IS-K is present in the country and can direct and coordinate attacks around the world. Such attacks include the March 2024 mass shooing at a concert hall in Moscow that killed 139 people, as well as several thwarted efforts to disrupt the 2024 Paris Olympics. 

In the United States, an Afghan on a special immigrant visa was arrested in early October after his plans to conduct an Islamic State-inspired attack on Election Day surfaced. Contrary to the Taliban’s claims that it has reduced the capacity of IS-K, all the major leaders of the group are alive and active in Afghanistan; these individuals have direct external operations as well as internal operations experience.

It’s a small world after all

Today, despite Taliban rule and the numerous sanctions and restrictions put on the government, as well as on many al-Qaeda- and IS-K-affiliated leaders, Afghanistan is more connected to the outside world than at any previous time. It has access to the internet and a budding 4G mobile phone network. It has regular direct flights to international hubs such as Dubai, Doha, and Istanbul available several times per week, and some daily. And its largely open borders with neighboring countries enable Afghanistan-based terrorist groups to act as a command-and-control center for operational planning both inside Afghanistan and abroad. The problem becomes compounded by the fact that more than six thousand Afghan passports were distributed to some known foreign terrorist operatives, including al-Qaeda, under fake names, per reports from sources allied with the former Afghan Directorate of National Security (NDS) to its former leadership. 

More broadly, no single terrorist group operates in a silo. Communication between groups, be it voice or digital, through social media or chat apps, is common. Several investigations by the NDS supported the conclusion that, despite various names and goals, terrorist groups extensively shared expertise and new tactics with each other, as noted in lectures and presentations given by former NDS senior leaders. The movement of fighters from one group to another is also a common practice. A successful attack or operation is often viewed as a shared win across groups and a means to recruit, fundraise, or validate a group’s credibility. Moreover, the ongoing fighting between Israel and the consortium of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and various Sunni groups such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad inspires and mobilizes previously dormant or undermanned groups globally, providing a rallying call against Western interests.

What the West can do

The Taliban seems to have neither the intention nor the ability to counter the growth of terrorist groups in Afghanistan. While the Taliban rolls out new rules to restrict the behaviors and movement of women, IS-K and al-Qaeda are actively recruiting new fighters, indoctrinating future fighters and supporters around the world, and planning attacks abroad. As a result, Afghanistan has once again become a hub of transnational terrorist activity under a Taliban regime. At the same time, the resilience of Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic State, and African-based al-Qaeda affiliates highlights that the terrorism problem is far from under control.

The West must be willing once again to view the terrorism fight as worthy of time and resources, starting with an admission that countering terrorism cannot be done well from a great distance. There are three ways to put that change of mindset into practice.

1. Reestablishing relationships and programs with third-country political leaders and intelligence services can provide the frontline information, insights, and trip wires needed to better forecast terrorist operations and attacks. For Afghanistan, many former NDS and Afghan military leaders remain in close contact with former colleagues, sources, and family and friends on the ground who are able to provide information and insights that cannot be gathered through technical means. In other nations, funding and on-the-ground partnerships with operational units in intelligence services, security and policing services, and some military units which were common in the 2000s and early 2010s can once again build vital source networks and capabilities for nations to reduce or eliminate terrorist groups on their soil.
2. Devoting resources to grassroots and opposition organizations can help to prevent new recruitment and reduce community support for existing resident terrorist groups. Applying direct political pressure on the Taliban and other governments that provide a safe haven for terror is necessary to hold these governments accountable for the terrorist activity happening on their turf.
3. Outside of the normal sanctions or withholding of aid, pressuring countries to cease allowing the Taliban’s or other terrorist groups’ leadership to visit, send their children or family members for education or medical care, and invest in businesses outside of Afghanistan or their home country could be easy wins that negatively impact Taliban members’ daily lives. For nations that support or permit terrorist activities, naming and shaming, reducing or eliminating financial aid and support, and actively supporting opposition political actors would all garner attention and encourage substantive changes. 
4. Maintaining a robust US and coalition military presence in Syria may not be politically popular, but it would be a constant reminder to HTS that a highly capable global power is watching. On-going support to Israel to take this opportunity to further degrade the Islamic State in partnership with the United States will help to reduce the threat the group poses in the region, and would send clear signals to Bashir, the new prime minister, that threats with ties back to Syria will be dealt with quickly and severely. 
   

Despite the robust attention currently being paid to conflicts like Ukraine, the upcoming change in US presidential administrations, and the global economy, the threat of terrorism continues to once again gain steam, often quietly, in the background of our daily lives. As was learned previously, turning a blind eye to or wishing the problem away is not a viable policy or political position, and prevention is far more impactful than relying on responses after the fact.

Ahmad Zia Saraj is on the faculty of the King’s Centre for the Study of Intelligence at King’s College London and was the director general of the Afghan National Directorate of Security from 2019 to 2021. 

Jennifer Counter is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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While Hamas initially demonstrated sincere interest in a negotiated ceasefire and potential diplomatic resolution to the conflict Israel in the Gaza Strip, the last month has seen it largely withdraw from and refuse to participate in these efforts. In early November, the Qatari government ceased its mediation efforts, citing a lack of good-faith negotiations and stating that the “Hamas political office no longer serves its purpose.” It is likely that Israel’s successful operations to degrade both Lebanese Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force (IRGC-QF) have severely reshaped the strategic calculus of the remaining Hamas senior leadership.

Sinwar’s fatalism was often interpreted as a willingness to accept heavy losses in exchange for long-term ideological goals. He embraced a narrative of martyrdom that resonates with the base of Hamas’s support, with death in conflict against Israel seen as a worthy end. Under Sinwar’s leadership, Hamas has shown little hesitation in confronting Israel even when it appears militarily disadvantageous, highlighting Sinwar’s focus on ideological rather than pragmatic calculations. This approach aligns with the long-standing Hamas principle of resistance (muqawama) but adds an intensity that escalates the risk of broader and more destructive conflicts.

However, beyond fatalism, there was a strategic component to Sinwar’s leadership. He had previously overseen periods of tactical ceasefires and negotiations, showing that—despite the group’s extreme rhetoric—he was not opposed to temporary pauses in fighting if it meant regrouping and fortifying Hamas’s position. This pattern has been particularly evident when Hamas faces significant setbacks or needs time to reorganize its military and political structures. This makes Hamas’s current recalcitrance to negotiate for a ceasefire all the more vexing.

It is likely that Hamas’s current approach to negotiations with Israel stems from an acceptance of the IRGC-QF’s clear prioritization of restoring Hezbollah. Recent Israeli military successes against Hezbollah, particularly through targeted strikes and intelligence operations, have severely weakened Hezbollah’s operational capacity and severely undermined Tehran’s regional capabilities. 

Hezbollah’s losses have not only reduced its military capabilities but also eliminated a number of senior leaders and key intermediaries between the group and its Iranian patrons. The pressure on Hezbollah to rebuild will limit Iran’s ability to support Hamas in the short term. This shift could also relieve some of the Israeli pressure on Hamas, allowing Hamas a window to reorganize without being drawn into the broader conflict dynamics with Hezbollah and Israel. Sinwar’s death will further undermine any efforts by Iran to bolster Hamas as the IRGC-QF struggles to reestablish effective relations with the replacement leadership.

The IRGC-QF likely finds it easier—and ideologically prefers—to focus on restoring Hezbollah, given the physical proximity of Hezbollah to Iranian bases of operation in Syria and Iraq and its shared Shia religious ideology. As a Sunni-majority group, Hamas has historically enjoyed less support from Iran in comparison Hezbollah and other Shia-dominated groups, leading to Hamas accusing Tehran of “betrayal” last year. By comparison, to reconstitute Hamas in Gaza, the IRGC-QF must smuggle munitions and other supplies along a far more circuitous route through Oman, Yemen, the Red Sea, Sudan, and Egypt. 

The situation is complex for Hamas. On one hand, it loses a powerful ally with Hezbollah’s weakened state, particularly one that has provided significant complementary military and logistical support in the past. On the other hand, Israel’s clear shift to focusing on destroying Hezbollah might afford Hamas breathing room to consolidate its resources and reorganize.

With Hamas being further down on Iran’s priority list, the group’s leadership likely sees less advantage in negotiating a ceasefire right now, as Iran would be less likely to send assistance for reconstituting. Iran’s backing, although critical, is not as reliable or consistent as it once was. With Iran’s economic limitations, exacerbated by sanctions and its own need to focus resources on rebuilding Hezbollah, Hamas will likely face reductions in Iranian financial and military support in the near future. In response, Hamas has already shown signs of diversifying its revenue and supply streams, a necessity for sustaining its operations. 

One avenue for diversification involves forging new alliances with regional actors that are sympathetic to the Palestinian cause but not directly aligned with Iran. Since 2007, Qatar has provided Hamas nearly $2 billion in financial support, focusing on humanitarian aid that bolsters Gaza’s infrastructure. Turkey has also extended significant diplomatic and fundraising support, though Qatar and Turkey need to balance these actions with broader geopolitical calculations and relationships with other regional powers, including Israel.

Moreover, Hamas could deepen its covert ties with actors in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, where smuggling networks provide a critical lifeline for weapons and other supplies. While Egyptian authorities have cracked down on these networks, Hamas has shown a capacity to adapt and work around such challenges. The ongoing civil wars in Egypt’s neighbors Libya and Sudan also help ensure the region is awash in weapons available to the highest bidder, providing another potential source of arms.

Hamas has significantly ramped up its domestic production of rockets and other munitions. Leveraging locally sourced materials, Hamas’s engineers have managed to build a substantial stockpile of crude, but effective, projectiles. This shift toward self-reliance has been a critical factor in sustaining the group’s military capabilities, especially as external support fluctuates. Hamas will likely continue this trend, focusing on upgrading its weapons programs to maintain operational readiness, even in the face of tightened sanctions and supply shortages. What remains to be seen is the impact that Israel’s sustained combat operations against Hamas in Gaza will have on Hamas’s effort to become more self-reliant.

Over several years, Hamas has been increasingly using cryptocurrencies as a means of circumventing international banking restrictions and sanctions (although, as a proportion, cryptocurrency remains small in comparison to other sources of funding). Bitcoin and other digital currencies offer Hamas a relatively anonymous and decentralized means of transferring funds, making it difficult for international authorities to track or block these financial flows. This method of financing has seen increased use in recent years, with reports of Hamas soliciting cryptocurrency donations via online platforms.

In parallel, Hamas is likely to increase its reliance on black-market activities and other forms of illicit financing, such as smuggling and money laundering through front companies and charities in sympathetic states. Hamas has used sham charities to exploit sympathy for Palestinians in the West, raising funds through donation campaigns with pro-Palestinian messages. While these avenues of raising funds come with risks for Hamas, particularly as international counterterrorism financing efforts intensify, they offer alternative revenue streams for Hamas to supplement reduced Iranian support.

Predictive paths for the Israel-Hamas conflict

Given these dynamics, several potential scenarios could unfold in the Israel-Hamas conflict, each shaped by regional shifts, international interventions, and Hamas’s ability to adapt to its changing environment.

One likely scenario is the continuation of the current pattern of sporadic escalations followed by periods of relative calm, punctuated by rocket attacks and retaliatory Israeli strikes. The current Israeli focus on Hezbollah and Iran could create time and space for Hamas to reestablish this pattern. Hamas might opt to engage in periodic confrontations to maintain its image of resistance, without pushing for a full-scale conflict that would strain its resources. 

This would allow the group to reconsolidate its position in Gaza and focus on rebuilding its military capabilities while avoiding the kind of overwhelming Israeli response that could decimate its leadership and infrastructure. Despite, or perhaps because of, the devastation Israel has wreaked in Gaza, it is unlikely that Hamas will have significant issues attracting new recruits to its cause.

Alternatively, a full-scale conflict could erupt if internal pressures within Gaza, such as economic collapse or political unrest, push Hamas to escalate as a means of redirecting public anger toward Israel. In such a suicidal assault, Hamas might throw all its remaining combat power into last-ditch offensive operations against Israel using tactics similar to those of its October 7 attack. Additionally, external factors—such as conflict between Israel and Hezbollah—could trigger broader regional instability that draws Hamas into a larger confrontation.

Given Israel’s military superiority, Hamas would likely face significant losses in this scenario. However, echoes of Sinwar’s confrontational approach suggest that Hamas might be willing to accept such losses if it believes that it could emerge with its ideological legitimacy intact, or even enhanced, in the eyes of its supporters. Absent strong commitments from Iran and Hezbollah to support Hamas far better than they have in the current conflict, it is unlikely that Hamas will instigate a full-scale conflict.

A third scenario involves increased international mediation efforts, particularly efforts led by regional powers such as Egypt and Qatar, which have a vested interest in preventing Gaza from descending into chaos. While Qatar recently ceased its own mediation, its long history with Israel and Hamas makes it a preferred interlocutor. This could lead to temporary ceasefires or agreements that would provide Gaza with much-needed humanitarian aid and economic relief in exchange for de-escalation.

In this case, Hamas would likely use the lull to regroup and focus on internal governance, balancing its need for legitimacy as a resistance movement with the practical demands of governing Gaza’s population. Given Israel’s clear understanding of this pattern, by which Hamas has sustained its resistance over several decades, it is unlikely that Israeli leadership would acquiesce to a mediation that allows Hamas to retain political and military power in Gaza.

Policy recommendations for the next US administration

As the Israel-Hamas conflict continues to evolve, the incoming Donald Trump administration will need to adopt a nuanced and forward-looking approach that builds upon prior efforts to avoid further destabilization while maintaining US interests in the region. It should consider the following actions.

1. Support for regional mediation efforts: The United States should continue to support regional mediation efforts, particularly those led by Egypt and Qatar, aimed at maintaining temporary ceasefires and providing humanitarian aid to Gaza. Such efforts can help prevent full-scale conflict while allowing time for more sustainable solutions to be explored. 
2. Countering illicit financing and smuggling networks: The United States should work with international partners to enhance counterterrorism financing efforts, particularly in targeting the cryptocurrencies and smuggling networks on which Hamas relies for funding. This will require closer coordination with financial institutions and governments in the region to monitor and block illicit financial flows.
3. Humanitarian aid and infrastructure development: Providing humanitarian aid to Gaza through carefully monitored channels will be essential for reducing the suffering of the civilian population and preventing Hamas from capitalizing on economic desperation. However, this aid must be closely tied to ceasefire agreements and efforts to reduce Hamas’s ability to divert resources for military purposes.
4. Supporting Israeli defense and regional security: The United States must continue to support Israel’s right to defend itself against Hamas attacks, while encouraging Israel to take measured responses that minimize civilian casualties and avoid the war spiraling into broader regional conflict. At the same time, the United States should enhance regional security cooperation to counteract Iran’s influence and reduce the potential for escalation involving Hezbollah and other actors.

The current leadership of Hamas reflects a blend of confrontational ideology and pragmatic adaptability. While recent regional dynamics might offer Hamas some breathing room, its long-term survival will depend on its ability to diversify revenue streams, maintain military capabilities, and navigate a complex geopolitical landscape. For the United States, balancing support for Israel with efforts to mitigate humanitarian suffering and prevent full-scale conflict will be critical to ensuring stability in the region.

Doug Livermore is the national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, senior vice president for solution engineering at the CenCore Group, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. 

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.

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The capture of Hama is a significant strategic victory for the rebels, but Damascus remains the biggest prize. Here’s what to watch as the rebel offensive continues to unfold.

Why Hama matters

The rebels’ operation, named “Deterrence of Aggression,” was a response to increased shelling of civilian areas by government forces since the 2020 ceasefire agreement. With the control of strategic heights surrounding rebel-controlled northwest Syria, the regime and Iranian proxies utilized artillery, rockets, and first-person view drones to attack civilian infrastructure across Idlib province. Just a day before the operation launched, Assad regime forces attacked an elementary school in Ariha, killing three children and injuring fourteen. The rebels’ success so far has been attributed both to external factors, such as diminished Iranian and Hezbollah support for the regime, and to internal coordination among opposition forces in Idlib and neighboring Aleppo.

As the rebels advance in Hama province, the power dynamics are dramatically shifting in their favor. The collapse of government defenses suggests a tactical failure and a broader strategic disarray within the Assad regime.

Taking Aleppo is a major feat by the rebels, but securing Hama holds a special political and strategic importance. Hama is the city from which Syria’s early uprising in the 1960s and 1970s started. In 1982, it was subjected to a brutal military campaign, during which tens of thousands of its residents were killed and displaced. The event remains alive in the collective memory of Syrians as a demonstration of the willingness of the regime, then under Hafez al-Assad and now under his son Bashar, to exercise violence to remain in power. Hama also played a prominent role in the 2011 uprising as a site of large-scale popular protests.

Hama is also strategically positioned in central Syria between major cities, making it a critical node for controlling supply lines and transportation routes across the country. The province hosts a significant military airbase used by the SAA and its allies, including Russian forces. The airbase has been critical for launching airstrikes, reconnaissance, and logistical operations throughout the conflict. The city and its surroundings, which the rebels are currently taking over, also house several military barracks and artillery positions, making it a vital operational center. 

In all, the rebels’ advance in and around Hama will seriously weaken the Assad regime’s ability to counter rebels’ attacks, reverse its losses from the past week, and defend its remaining strongholds in central Syria.

What’s next for the rebels?

Next, the opposition forces will likely advance southward and push toward the capital, Damascus. But after successfully capturing Aleppo and Hama, the rebel forces will face military, social, and governance challenges as they move south.

The rebels will need to cement their gains in Hama province. The area will be important to maintain military and strategic leverage against Assad, and it is likely to be the first target for any attempt by Assad to the reverse the course of the rebel offensive. The rebels may also face logistical and operational challenges, including the need for supplies. Open-source intelligence indicates that as the SAA withdraws from different military bases, it is leaving enough military equipment and ammunition to power the rebel advances. However, the area captured in Hama province may stretch the rebel forces and expose them to counterattacks.

As the rebels head south toward Homs, they will be faced with new challenges. Homs is Syria’s third-largest city and serves as a critical transit hub connecting Damascus to the northern and western provinces, including the coastal strongholds of Latakia and Tartus, where the Russian military has bases. Entering Homs province requires going through large Alawite communities, many of which strongly support Assad. This poses a challenge for rebels to establish local support. A decade of fighting between Assad-allied militias and rebels within the province has resulted in more fortifications being build there. Homs is also home to a significant concentration of Syrian government forces, bolstered by allied militias and a large Hezbollah presence. 

More importantly, the rebels advancing toward Homs will test Russia’s redlines in Syria. So far, Russia has been absent from providing serious military support to uphold Assad’s defenses across areas he’s losing to the rebels. While Russia has conducted some airstrikes in Idlib and Aleppo to counter rebel advances, it has not engaged directly in Hama. This restraint reflects Moscow’s strategic calculations to avoid overextension.

However, Russia appears committed to preserving the Assad regime, its primary foothold in the Middle East, and it has reportedly promised additional military aid to Damascus. If the rebels now advance toward Homs, Russia will have to decide where it draws the line, whether that is in preventing an advance toward Assad in Damascus or the protection of its major naval and air hub in western Syria.

The evolution of HTS

Syria’s rebels also face challenges in Hama and other areas under their control. Rebel factions in Syria have long had differing ideologies, and over the past decade they have often struggled to present a unified governance structure. This lack of cohesion led to internal conflicts and weakened their overall ability to govern. So far in Hama, however, the rebels appear to be taking a different approach. Led by HTS, the rebels participating in Deterrence of Aggression have shown discipline in their military conduct, their control of civilian infrastructure, and their outreach to minority communities. Statements from rebel leadership emphasize the protection of civilians and Syria’s cultural heritage, reflecting efforts to gain local and possibly international legitimacy. This approach draws on HTS’s experience in Idlib province, where it has maintained control through a combination of military dominance, localized governance structures, and a focus on community relations, including outreach to minority groups.

While previously associated with al-Qaeda, HTS has evolved into a locally focused group, abandoned al-Qaeda’s cross-national jihadism ideology, and become the main force to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and al-Qaeda in northwest Syria. Yet the group remains controversial due to its past militant and extremist activities. HTS also remains a designated terrorist organization by the United States and the United Nations, which presents challenges for foreign governments to deal with it. HTS has announced its willingness to dissolve itself, again, and work with partners on the ground to develop a more representative governing structure, in what seems to be a signal of its pragmatism toward the European Union (EU) and the United States. Diplomats have also indicated that HTS has communicated with different EU capitals its willingness to work with them to facilitate a safe return for Syrian refugees in Europe.

The control of Syria’s second- and fourth-largest cities and their advances toward Homs present Syria’s rebels with challenges and opportunities. Aleppo is one of only two metropolitan centers in Syria with a population of more than four million. Hama is home to more than a million Syrians. In contrast to long-held Idlib, the rebels will be dealing with diverse religious, cultural, and ethnic communities, and they will have to adapt relatively quickly to the challenges ahead. If the rebels are successful in providing good governance in Aleppo and Hama, then it bodes well for their ability to successfully govern Damascus, and ultimately the whole of Syria. The world is watching.

Qutaiba Idlbi is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, where he leads the Council’s work on Syria.

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IS-K was formed in 2015 and operates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. Initially, the group seemed to focus on recruitment and on conducting attacks within Afghanistan. The group experienced a slowdown between 2018 and 2021 because of US and Afghan military operations targeting the group in Afghanistan. The Taliban, too, fought against IS-K during this period. However, after the US troop withdrawal in 2021, the Taliban became the only force combating the group on the ground, which allowed the terrorist organization to regroup and build operations in Afghanistan and beyond. With this resurgence, IS-K seems to have pivoted its strategy away from attacks within Afghanistan to a more global agenda.

In the first half of 2024, IS-K carried out three successful attacks abroad that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians in Iran, Turkey, and Russia. The attack in Moscow on Crocus City Hall, which claimed the lives of more than 140 people, made headlines and stoked fears of a resurgent and coordinated global IS-K threat. The success of the attack might also provide motivation for the group to attempt similar mass casualty attacks elsewhere. 

In addition to these attacks, there have been a number of publicly disclosed foiled plots and arrests connected to IS-K across the globe. Authorities reportedly disrupted IS-K plots to attack the Olympic Games in Paris and Taylor Swift concerts in Austria this past summer. In August, a United Nations official called IS-K the “greatest” terror threat to Europe. And the threat is not only in Europe; eight Tajik nationals suspected of connections to ISIS were arrested this year after entering the United States. 

IS-K is simultaneously increasing its online propaganda output and tailoring it to a wider audience. Last summer, IS-K began releasing more multilingual content, with an uptick in Uzbek- and Tajik-language materials in particular. Shortly after the Crocus City Hall attack, a media group connected with IS-K created a new Tajik-language magazine, a change from its infrequent and low-profile usage of Tajik in previous materials. 

US officials have reported that the group has rolled out a “sophisticated propaganda campaign” targeting disaffected individuals in the Muslim diaspora to carry out attacks in Western countries, including in the United States. This represents an expansion from previous recruitment efforts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. On top of the group’s new efforts, Israel’s war in Gaza has also likely contributed to radicalizing a new generation.

There is another change that further complicates US and European counterterrorism efforts: Russia is making the IS-K threat worse. 

Two weeks before the Crocus City Hall attack, the United States alerted Russia about the possibility of an impending terrorist strike on large gatherings in Moscow. The public warnings and private communication on the matter with Russian authorities in the lead-up to the attack proved futile. Only three days before the tragic attack, Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the warning, citing it as “propaganda” meant to “intimidate and destabilize” Russian society.

Intelligence sharing has been an integral part of counterterrorism efforts since 9/11, and the United States and Russia have successfully cooperated on the issue in the past. But the deterioration of US-Russian relations amid the Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a greater blind spot in the US response to the global threat of IS-K. It remains unclear whether Russia simply didn’t trust the Western tip or failed to react effectively to it, although both constitute a faulty policy with deadly consequences.

In addition, most Central Asians recruited to IS-K have been radicalized in Russia. For decades, Russia has been a major destination for Central Asian migrants seeking work, but the harsh living conditions, economic struggles, and widespread hostility they face there make this population more vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Central Asians, particularly Tajiks, have been involved in much of IS-K’s recent activities, with some experts estimating that they may make up as much as half of the group’s recruits. With Russia a fertile recruiting ground for Central Asians, who make up much of IS-K’s ranks, Moscow’s counterterrorism policy would play a key role in mitigating the threat. 

In response to the March attack, Russia has tightened restrictions on Central Asian migrants. In the summer, the State Duma passed a new batch of laws that curb the rights of migrants, while raids against migrant communities have become more frequent. These official actions, accompanied by increased instances of xenophobia on the street, contribute to a growing hostile environment for Central Asians in Russia. These hardships, which have pushed some to extremism already, will likely worsen as Putin’s crackdown continues, leaving an already vulnerable population even more exposed to IS-K’s recruitment pitch. 

Russia has shown no clear intention to effectively tackle the growing threat of IS-K. The Kremlin has blamed the Crocus City Hall attack and others on the West or Kyiv, likely as an attempt to deflect responsibility for failing to stop the attacks. Moscow remains an unreliable partner with a diminishing willingness to engage in counterterrorism cooperation while pursuing ineffective policies to mitigate this threat. Indeed, its policies likely created more fertile ground for recruitment in the country. 

US policymakers should expect a growing blind spot coming out of Russia resulting from Moscow’s ineffective counterterrorism measures and increasingly hostile policy to a population already vulnerable to extremist recruitment. Russia cannot be relied on to deal with this threat, which makes the attention of the United States and its allies on this issue all the more urgent.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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While working with foreign liaison services, it is essential to note that the CIA also partners closely with other US intelligence community agencies and/or US Special Operations Forces in supporting them. This brings a far more holistic and comprehensive approach to foreign partnerships and typically occurs with the US’ most valued intelligence relationships. Such efforts result in some of the US government’s highest-impact intelligence successes, often against its most critical adversaries. According to a 2022 Politico article, the CIA, National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI), British counterparts, and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) all reportedly worked together in 2006 to disrupt an al-Qaeda airliner plot where UK-based operatives, directed by al-Qaeda leadership hiding in Pakistan, were attempting to smuggle peroxide-based liquid explosives onto multiple planes simultaneously, and then planning to detonate them mid-flight. The disruption of this plot, through arrests in Pakistan and the United Kingdom, prevented a catastrophic attack. Separately, though not specifically related to counterterrorism, a 2012 New York Times article reported that the CIA, NSA, US Cyber Command, and Israeli intelligence agency Mossad all collaborated to sabotage Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, reportedly delaying the country’s nuclear ambitions while avoiding the direct consequences of military strikes, which could have risked a regional war. While reportedly a successful joint effort, it was also reported that the targeted malware used in the operation accidentally spread beyond the intended target, infecting systems worldwide.

As these examples demonstrate, robust investment in foreign liaison relationships enables the fundamental conditions required for an effective global counterterrorism strategy, and not just within the countries where these partnerships are enabled. Here, “robust investment” includes an array of opportunities. First, the forward deployment of a sufficient number of subject matter operational and analytic counterterrorism experts in every country with a terrorist presence, with language fluency where required. Second, using every inch of US authority to share critical intelligence with liaison partners, with an emphasis on transparency given the compatibility of the underlying content, while encouraging liaison to share back with the same bias in favor of robust sharing. Third, aggressively resourcing training courses for liaison to continuously improve their capabilities against an evolving threat landscape, with the opportunity to learn from local experts as well on the latest enemy tactics observed. Finally, funding and/or acquisition of the appropriate equipment for partner units to be as effective as possible for the threats they face.

These investments enable a range of fundamental conditions that are required for an effective global counterterrorism strategy and also provide several secondary and even intangible critical benefits that would otherwise be unavailable in their absence. First and foremost, these investments provide a consistent seat at the foreign liaison decision table. There is simply no substitute for this in counterterrorism work, as this seat is “skin in the game” and the genesis of every other opportunity that follows. It is here where robust two-way intelligence sharing is made possible, as well as exchanges of threat assessments and terrorist order of battle assessments, and training/capacity-building measures. These actions move relationships from “nice to have” status to “essential” for both sides. Through these investments and the partnerships themselves, the US is also able to maintain the closest proximity to terrorist strongholds. In whatever form this takes within a country, there is no substitute for having all forms of intelligence collection as close as possible to the problem and, where possible, always reducing the enemy’s safe haven. 

Additionally, when these investments are maximized, it allows the US to plug this foreign liaison relationship into a more effective transnational counterterrorism network community of interest to better go after ongoing transnational threats. Furthermore, through close partnership with foreign liaison services as described above, the US is also in the best possible position to monitor behaviors, both those observed and those learned about by other means, to ensure these behaviors are in line with the US and its partners’ laws, policies, and values. Such crucial insights allow the US to ensure proper accountability and continuous improvement for its partners’ culture and practices. Finally, in those rare instances requiring a unilateral US action to solve a problem, all of the parameters above, when enabled to the fullest, put policymakers in the best possible position to know when to make such a call.

When these investments are made through intelligence channels, they build valuable goodwill with the partner country outside the public eye. This is particularly important in countries where the United States is not viewed favorably. Counterterrorism work is perhaps the most compatible subject across virtually all of the countries of the world. And while that is a sad reality owing to the ubiquitous state of the global terrorist threat, it is also an opportunity. In limited places, it is the US’ only channel for engagement, which can be used for other critical needs in limited instances. Relatedly, great power competition adversaries would rather not see the United States be successful in many countries with the most entrenched terrorist threats and will actively work to undermine the US in these regions. Robust, productive, successful, and indeed necessary foreign liaison relationships are much harder to disrupt. And those partners are much more likely to share intelligence regarding attempts at such disruption, thereby improving the US’ overall counterintelligence posture when done right.

The United States must embrace this challenge of counterterrorism foreign liaison relationships as it manages national security priorities in a resource-constrained environment. Withdrawing from commitments is the wrong message to send, and adversaries will fill the gaps if the US leaves. If anything, in an age of great power competition, the United States needs to double down on liaison relationships that focus on counterterrorism. And doubling down here means being there, in appropriate numbers, cultivating deep counterterrorism and foreign liaison expertise, with language skills as needed, as the US is positioning itself against great power competition adversaries. In fact, such efforts will be mutually enabling.

What can history teach the United States? For one, foreign liaison partners are not perfect, and there are a wide range of categories of effectiveness. There are crown jewel liaison partnerships that have consistently mattered. Some relationships are messy, with human rights issues complicating valuable cooperative efforts. Some relationships show wildly mixed results over time. Some attempts fail, while others can be highly controversial. George Tenet said about the CIA, “We do hard stuff.” In this context, that means working with sometimes capable and willing but often imperfect partners who periodically cause policy and legal challenges for the United States. The reality is that these challenges are also, in part, derivative of imperfect US policies, derivative from the US’ past policy failures, and derivative from times when it failed to live up to its promises. Despite episodic policy and legal challenges, the legal framework for leveraging foreign liaison, of course, matters. The United States does not necessarily need any new authorities in 2024, as it can and must use the existing ones that have remained in place since September 11 to meet its needs. Partnerships can be messy to include in both directions, but they absolutely are required to keep the American people safe. That should be what drives the United States beyond 2024.

Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He worked for twenty-six years at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) before retiring in 2019 at the senior intelligence service level.

Edward Bogan is a retired CIA Operations Officer with twenty-four years of experience in national security and intelligence operations and policy.

James Petrila is an adjunct professor of law at George Washington University School of Law. He previously had a thirty-year career as a lawyer at the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The post Managing counterterrorism foreign liaison relationships in an increasingly competitive world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On October 1 of this year, Israeli troops returned to south Lebanon for the first time in eighteen years—the latest phase in a year-long conflict that has escalated steadily over this past month. This time, however, the Israeli army appears to have absorbed some of the lessons of its troubled 2006 experience fighting against Hezbollah.

Four divisions have been mobilized for what the Israeli military says are “limited, localized, and targeted ground raids” in south Lebanon. The first troops across the border were drawn from the Ninety-First Galilee Division’s elite units, the Golani Reconnaissance Brigade and the Egoz commandos, which were established in 1995 specifically to fight Hezbollah. The intention appears to be to locate and destroy Hezbollah’s military infrastructure close to the Blue Line, the United Nations’ term for the boundary running along Lebanon’s southern border. Israel says Hezbollah could use these positions to attack vulnerable Israeli communities in the north. Israel hopes that the operation will allow for the return of the more than 60,000 residents of northern Israel who evacuated their homes months ago because of the threat posed by Hezbollah rocket fire. So far, Israeli troops have uncovered several bunkers and tunnels, captured at least four Hezbollah fighters, and dynamited civilian structures in border villages, including an entire neighborhood in the village of Mohaibib. Nevertheless, it does not appear that the Israelis are physically occupying any of the incursion points for any length of time. The ground operations more closely resemble in-and-out raids rather than an invasion and occupation and, so far, are limited to a depth of around three kilometers.

As of this writing, the Israelis appear to be operating at six locations in Lebanon close to the border:

• Labboune is an unpopulated, brush-covered hillside that lies just southeast of Naqoura, a coastal village where the headquarters of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) are located. Hezbollah had a visible military presence on the hillside before the outbreak of hostilities in October 2023, including several observation posts linked to Hezbollah’s environmental non-governmental organization, Green Without Borders. The Blue Line follows an escarpment at Labboune that offers sweeping southward views to the coastal town of Nahariyeh and, beyond that, to Haifa, Israel’s third-largest city.
• Ramieh-Aitta Shaab-Qawzah is a triangle of villages that reportedly saw fierce clashes on October 13, October 14, and again on October 16. Five Israeli soldiers from the Golani Reconnaissance Brigade were killed in this sector during a Hezbollah ambush on October 17.
• Yaroun-Maroun er Ras-Aitteroun is a three-kilometer axis a few hundred meters from the Blue Line. Hezbollah also had a military presence in the area, particularly on a hill overlooking the border south of Aitteroun.
• Blida-Mohaibib-Meiss al Jabal-Markaba is a stretch of the border that runs north to south for about ten kilometers, some of which overlooks the flat plain of northern Galilee to the east. Israeli troops have made several probes toward these villages and have been attacked by Hezbollah fighters armed with rockets, anti-tank missiles, and mortar rounds.
• Addaisseh-Kfar Kila is a narrow chokepoint where the Blue Line lies only three kilometers from the Litani River. The main road hugs the Blue Line between these two villages.
• Kfar Shuba is a Sunni-populated village on the edge of the Shebaa Farms, a rugged mountainside claimed by Lebanon that has been occupied by Israel since 1967. Israeli soldiers from the Mountain Brigade have reportedly carried out raids against Hezbollah infrastructure in this area.

Hezbollah has suffered a series of powerful blows in the past month, including the September 27 assassination of its veteran secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, in a massive air strike on what Israel said was the group’s underground command headquarters in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Several other senior leaders and top commanders have been killed and wounded since mid-September, demonstrating that Israeli intelligence seems to have thoroughly penetrated Hezbollah, an organization once known for its tight internal security. On September 23, Israel launched a widescale aerial bombing campaign against what the Israeli military said were Hezbollah infrastructure sites, claiming to have struck 1,600 targets in the first day. Nearly 500 people in Lebanon were killed in the first twenty-four hours of the raids.

Israel has warned the residents of dozens of villages and towns in southern Lebanon to leave their homes and move north of the Awali River, which lies some fifty-five kilometers from the border. UNIFIL sources say that the airstrikes against Hezbollah’s rocket launchers in the south appear to have been effective. One officer said that the peacekeepers have seen numerous destroyed launchers, some loaded with unfired rockets and others soaked in blood, presumably from the operators.

Despite its leadership having been badly mauled, Hezbollah’s surviving officials remain defiant. Naim Qassem, now Hezbollah’s acting secretary-general, said in a televised speech on October 7 that “the longer the war continues, the more difficult impasse Israel will face.”

He added, “We are striking the enemy and expanding the range of fire. We will reach any place at the time we decide according to our plan. We are steadfast, and we will emerge victorious.”  Reports have claimed that Qassem has since left Lebanon for Iran to avoid being assassinated.

Indeed, in the first twenty-four hours of ground operations, eight Israeli soldiers were killed and more than thirty wounded in separate clashes. Six of the soldiers died when an Egoz commando unit was ambushed by Hezbollah fighters, believed to be drawn from its elite Radwan Brigade, in the border village of Addaisseh.

Hezbollah has greatly increased the number of operations it carries out each day, according to the group’s statements. Most of the attacks use stand-off munitions such as mortar rounds and anti-tank missiles to target Israeli troop movements along the Blue Line. Some of the attacks hit what Hezbollah says are Israeli troop gatherings in towns set some distance from the Blue Line, which suggests that despite Israeli ground incursions, Hezbollah retains good reconnaissance capabilities, perhaps by employing drones or having a physical presence within eyeshot of the targets. Hezbollah has staged several ambushes against Israeli soldiers using improvised explosive devices and close-quarter small-arms fire.

So far, Hezbollah has relied mainly on its arsenal of relatively short-range, unguided surface-to-surface rockets to pound areas of northern Israel. However, Hezbollah announced on October 17 that it intended to “transition to a new and escalating phase in the confrontation with the Israeli enemy,” a possible indicator that it might employ precision-guided missiles on a more regular tactical basis. Indeed, before the announcement, Hezbollah sent warning shots to Israel by firing four precision-guided ballistic missiles in three separate sorties, a reminder that the group has the capacity to inflict far greater damage on Israel. Two missiles, Qader-1 and Qader-2, were fired on separate occasions toward the Tel Aviv area. A pair of Nasr-1 missiles were launched at an Israeli army barracks site east of Netanya on October 16. Since the announcement, Hezbollah has fired several volleys of what it calls “precision missiles” at targets in and around Haifa and Netanya. Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s increased use of precision-guided missiles over the past week falls well short of the mass barrages one might expect to see in a full-scale war. By the same token, Hezbollah has not used its arsenal of anti-ship missiles, and its air defense systems have been limited to challenging Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Lebanese airspace. Hezbollah shot down three UAVs last week—two Hermes 450s and one Hermes 900—bringing the total to eight UAVs shot down since hostilities began a year ago. Some Israeli officials claim that half of Hezbollah’s precision-guided systems have been destroyed in multiple air strikes and that the wave of assassinations of top political and military leaders may have damaged Hezbollah’s command and control system. It is impossible to judge the accuracy of such claims.

Nevertheless, Hezbollah is a structured organization that should have the capacity to replace slain commanders with equally capable deputies relatively quickly. Israeli military intelligence has reportedly noted that Hezbollah forces on the front lines remain disciplined and maintain a “strict military hierarchy.” Hezbollah units on the ground are given a great deal of autonomy to confront Israeli forces. They know the mission and can proceed without having to remain in constant contact with the chain of command. The fighters tend to operate in the areas where they live, so they are intimately familiar with the terrain. There are probably only a few hundred fighters deployed along the six main axes of confrontation who have contact with Israeli ground forces. Other fighters will be deployed in villages and underground positions further north, awaiting the Israeli forces should they advance deeper into Lebanon.

For now, Hezbollah’s use of mainly unguided rockets is sufficient to prevent the Israeli government from sending Israeli evacuees back to their homes in the north, its primary war goal. Furthermore, Hezbollah and Israel are not yet engaged in a full-scale war, although it may look like it. Unlike the 2006 war, civilian state infrastructure has not been deliberately targeted to date. In 2006, Beirut’s airport was put out of action on the very first day, and bridges and roads were destroyed across Lebanon. Hezbollah may resort to more advanced missile systems in greater numbers and frequency if the war escalates to targeting infrastructure. It is in Hezbollah’s nature to act incrementally when confronting the Israeli military, reserving some of its more advanced weaponry for when it is needed and to retain the element of surprise. If Israel escalates, Hezbollah needs to be able to match that escalation. Hezbollah’s more advanced missiles could also form part of Iran’s counter-retaliation to the long-anticipated Israeli retaliation to Iran’s mass rocket barrage of Israel at the beginning of the month. The continued threat posed by Hezbollah’s existing arsenal was amply demonstrated when four Israeli soldiers were killed and more than sixty were wounded on October 13, following a Hezbollah drone strike on a dining hall in the Golani Brigade’s training base in Binyamina, midway between Haifa and Netanya and some fifty-five kilometers south of the Lebanese border. In another striking incident, a drone launched from Lebanon evaded air defense assets to strike the Caesarea home of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu was not at home at the time. Curiously, Hezbollah did not claim responsibility for the drone attack.

While Israel appears to have had some tactical on-the-ground success in south Lebanon, its strategic goal—beyond returning the displaced Israelis to their homes in the north—is still unclear. Israel reportedly intends to prevent Radwan fighters from entering villages and designate the area immediately adjacent to the border fence on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line as off-limits to all civilians. There have been several reports of Israeli troops dynamiting houses and even neighborhoods in border villages in a possible bid to make them uninhabitable for a long period of time. Israel reportedly demands the ability to enforce the no-entry zone to the extent of opening fire on anyone the army considers a combatant. It is hard to imagine Hezbollah, let alone the Lebanese government, agreeing to such terms, regardless of how heavily Israel bludgeons the group. Yielding to such terms would be tantamount to total defeat for Hezbollah, undermining the group’s self-stated raison d’être as a “resistance” force defending Lebanon and casting doubt about the future durability of the group.

From Hezbollah’s perspective, despite the pounding it receives, the group has the benefit of time. Assuming it can weather the blows from the daily torrent of air strikes, all Hezbollah needs to do is maintain the flow of rockets into northern Israel and confront Israeli troop movements on the ground. Doing so will deny Israel the ability to return the evacuees to their homes. At some point, Netanyahu may have to decide whether to move toward a negotiated solution or escalate the conflict even further, perhaps by going after Lebanese infrastructure. If he opts for the latter, the current conflict will worsen considerably.

Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The post Israel versus Hezbollah: Not a full-scale war—yet appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jonathan Panikoff: Pressure will increase for a Gaza ceasefire, but the Lebanon campaign will continue

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Sinwar’s death could provide an off-ramp for the war in Gaza

Shalom Lipner: An opportunity for Israel to ‘declare victory’ and shift focus

Carmiel Arbit: Sinwar’s death aside, Israel intends to operate in Gaza for many years

Emily Milliken: Hamas and Hezbollah leadership are diminished. Are the Houthis next? 

Danny Citrinowicz: Sinwar’s assassination won’t solve Israel’s strategic problems

Alia Brahimi: Israel’s guns are unlikely to fall silent soon

Thomas Warrick: Sinwar’s death opens the way to a resolution of the Gaza conflict

Mark N. Katz: Even Iran and Hezbollah might want a ceasefire after Sinwar’s death

Karim Mezran: What does Sinwar’s death mean for the remaining hostages?

Masoud Mostajabi: Hamas will now seek to frame Sinwar’s death as an act of martyrdom and heroism

Gissou Nia: With its Hamas targets dead, the ICC still must move forward its cases against Israeli leaders

Pressure will increase for a Gaza ceasefire, but the Lebanon campaign will continue

In July, when Israel killed Hamas’s previous leader, Haniyeh, at a government guest house in Tehran, the Hamas Shura council chose its Gaza-based leader and October 7 mastermind, Sinwar, to be the overall chief of the group. Today, the choice of a successor is likely to be more challenging. Much of Hamas has clamored for a respite from the conflict and favored a hostages-for-prisoners deal that would also mean at least a temporary cessation of hostilities. Sinwar was not nearly as inclined to have an end of hostilities, and for months Israeli leaders insisted that he was the true impediment to a ceasefire deal, having changed his demands. That culpability will quickly be put to the test. 

A new leader, especially one coming from outside Gaza, may be more inclined to finalize a deal than Sinwar was. At minimum, his death provides a renewed opening, the best that’s existed in months, for US President Joe Biden to again push for a ceasefire. For Israelis, Sinwar’s death will be viewed as a victory and as perhaps the best opportunity to convince their political leadership to make a deal for the hostages, ensuring that domestic political pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be greater than at any point since the war began.

But even if Netanyahu is inclined to consider such a deal at this point—which is far from a sure thing—the interrelated challenges Israel is working through are unlikely to dissipate simply because Sinwar is no longer leading Hamas.

For more than a year, Hezbollah’s leaders have insisted on tying Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israel to Israel’s operations in Gaza. Israel’s operations in Lebanon have already begun and are not likely to stop, no matter the result in Gaza, unless the parties are able to strike a deal so broad that it also includes Hezbollah’s Radwan Force moving away from the border, allowing some 70,000 Israelis finally to return home. Even then, while the IDF was in conflict with Israeli political leaders about a hostage deal in Gaza, there is far more unity related to operations in Lebanon. With air and ground operations already under way, the IDF is likely to want to continue eliminating Hezbollah’s cache of its most lethal weapons, such as ballistic and cruise missiles. 

Sinwar’s death almost certainly won’t prompt Israel to reverse course and decline to strike Iran in retaliation for its ballistic missile attack on October 1, even if it comes as new negotiations are underway for a deal in Gaza. The necessity to ensure deterrence is reestablished has never been of greater importance to Israel.

Today marks an opportunity to begin to close one of the most painful chapters in Israel’s recent history, something that will only be completed once the hostages are released. But it is far from the end of the book. How Israel chooses to further leverage today’s success will determine whether the next chapters are better than this one. 

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He is a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Sinwar’s death could provide an off-ramp for the war in Gaza

The death of Sinwar was inevitable the minute that he decided to launch the October 7 attack, which triggered a disastrous war that shattered the Gaza Strip’s people and infrastructure. 

Sinwar’s elimination could provide the Israeli government with several off-ramps and openings to start to end the war in Gaza. The chaos within Hamas following Sinwar’s death may provide a chance to exploit uncertainties and divisions to expedite the release of the remaining Israeli hostages and the implementation of a general stand-down and demobilization within Hamas. Israel, Arab nations, and the United States should now offer mass amnesty for remaining Hamas members who lay down their arms and stop fighting. They should also offer financial rewards to those who either turn in Israeli hostages or provide information leading to the whereabouts of remaining abductees. Israel should make clear its intention to pull out of Gaza and avoid the reoccupation of the Strip in the immediate future. And Gaza should be opened up for Arab, international, and Palestinian Authority figures and professionals to come in and begin stabilizing the war-torn Strip to initiate the “day after.”

But the “day after” is not here yet. And Sinwar’s death raises eight more pressing questions in the meantime:

1. Who can Israel and Arab nations negotiate with when it comes to Gaza and Hamas’s future role?
2. Who within Hamas in Gaza will control the issue of Israeli hostages, and who could command enough authority to make the group’s rank-and-file members release the hostages?
3. How much tactical and operational control did Sinwar have over Hamas’s day-to-day activities throughout the Gaza Strip?
4. Will Hamas splinter into small, disconnected cells inside Gaza, or can an interim leader emerge to keep the organization together?
5. Will elements of Hamas use Sinwar’s killing as an opportunity to step back and negotiate an end to the war that effectively amounts to a soft surrender?
6. Was Sinwar holding back more “moderate” elements within Hamas from making concessions to end the war, and could they emerge now to stop the war that he initiated?
7. Sinwar likely prepared contingencies for his eventual assassination. What could such scenarios entail? Do they include potential harm to remaining Israeli hostages? Did he intend for his killing to trigger a series of irrational and criminal actions? What sort of leadership transition did Sinwar envision for this eventuality?
8. How will Hamas’s leadership abroad react to this development? Can they credibly force Hamas in Gaza to make concessions or follow the commands of the group’s leadership in Qatar, Lebanon, and Turkey?

The answers to many of these important questions will be answered in the coming days and weeks.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

An opportunity for Israel to ‘declare victory’ and shift focus

The now-confirmed death of Sinwar offers a potential off-ramp for Israel from its year-long Gaza offensive. Having decapitated Hamas’s leadership convincingly—remaining members of its hierarchy include Khaled Mashal and Musa Abu Marzook, both residing outside of Gaza—Israel could leverage this moment to “declare victory” and shift sharply toward a ceasefire/hostage deal with a severely downgraded Hamas. In that scenario, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would then shrink its Gaza deployment drastically, devoting more of its limited resources to inhibiting Hamas’s rejuvenation, and pivot to focusing almost exclusively on other theaters, most prominently Iran. Initial indications are that Netanyahu might be interested in precisely such an outcome, which could open the door to more practical discussions on the future of Gaza reconstruction involving international partners. It remains to be seen whether conditions on the ground, including his political circumstances, facilitate—or resist—that trajectory.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administration of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.

Sinwar’s death aside, Israel intends to operate in Gaza for many years

Eliminating Hamas leadership—and most importantly, killing Sinwar, the mastermind of the October 7 massacre—has been a central goal for Israel in its Gaza war. The achievement will mark yet another personal victory for Netanyahu, whose polling has been bolstered with each targeted assassination, and for Israel’s military.

But Sinwar’s death alone does not guarantee the circumstances necessary for Netanyahu to declare an end to the war as so many hope. The United States is likely to further increase its pressure on both sides to come to a ceasefire agreement, hoping that a weakened Hamas and an empowered Israel will be more ready to bring the conflict to its close. And while Hamas, for its part, has been thrown into disarray, it will need time to reestablish leadership and for that leadership—likely with Sinwar’s brother at the top—to solidify power. As Israel has made clear, in order for the war to end, the hostages must be released and Hamas must fully disarm. But it is not clear that any successor to Sinwar will take a new approach.

At the same time, Netanyahu now has an easy off-ramp from war in Gaza at a moment when Israel’s northern front now takes priority, but he is unlikely to take it. Israeli officials and opposition leaders have made it clear that Israel intends to operate in Gaza for years. Any official end to the war will require Netanyahu to reconcile both with the atrocity that took place under his watch and to articulate a strategy for a day after in Gaza. So far, he has not been prepared to do either—and Sinwar’s death alone is unlikely to change that.

—Carmiel Arbit is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

Hamas and Hezbollah leadership are diminished. Are the Houthis next?

Israel’s elimination of Hamas’s Sinwar and Hezbollah’s Nasrallah has left both organizations diminished in the near term, but it has created an opportunity for Yemen’s Houthis and their leader, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, to step into a new and more prominent role within Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” With greater importance placed on the Houthis, Tehran will likely prioritize providing the group with advanced weapons and weapon components to enable more accurate and devastating maritime operations and strikes on Israeli territory. One way Iran might do this is through brokering an agreement with Moscow to provide the group with anti-ship missiles. Continued Houthi threats to Israeli territory and international maritime traffic could lead the IDF to shift the focus of its operations in Yemen to targeting al-Houthi and other senior members, which could degrade the group’s ability to operate, spur a leadership crisis, and widen the leadership vacuum within Iran’s network of allies and proxies.

—Emily Milliken is the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Sinwar’s assassination won’t solve Israel’s strategic problems

Since the tragic events of October 7, Israeli leaders vowed to eliminate Sinwar, the man who was in charge of Hamas’s vicious attack against Israel. Today, it seems that this goal was achieved, as the IDF was able to kill Sinwar in the Gaza Strip.

But, as important as this event is, it won’t solve Israel’s strategic problems if the current policy of the Israeli government does not change. It is safe to say that even after Sinwar, the Hamas organization will not collapse. Thus the war will continue, with no political solution on the horizon.

In order to utilize Sinwar’s elimination, Israel will need to rethink its strategy in Gaza. First and foremost, that means reaching a ceasefire deal while allowing the Palestinian Authority to return to Gaza, taking control of all civilian activities. This move would allow the moderate Gulf states to increase their involvement in Gaza’s rehabilitation and would significantly improve Israel’s international legitimacy.

A ceasefire in Gaza will also lead to the end of hostilities with Hezbollah along the northern border of Israel and of course will lead to the release of hostages—a main goal of the current Swords of Iron War.

If Israel continues its current strategy of holding parts of Gaza and maybe building settlements there (like some ministers want), then despite the importance of Sinwar’s elimination, no dramatic change will occur in the near future. The war will continue with no end in sight. 

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence.

Israel’s guns are unlikely to fall silent soon

What began as a hunt for Sinwar and for vengeance for the October 7 attacks has transformed into an expansive quest by Israel to fundamentally reshape control over the West Bank and Gaza, to weaken Iran, and to violently remake the region. It’s therefore unlikely that Israel’s guns will fall silent soon, imperiling many thousands of civilian lives as well as any long-term prospects for normalcy or peace.

—Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow in the Middle East Programs and host of the Guns for Hire podcast.

Sinwar’s death opens the way to a resolution of the Gaza conflict

Yes, this is a big deal. To many Israelis, the death of Yahya Sinwar a year and ten days after October 7 will likely mean as much, if not more, than the fate meted out to Osama bin Laden did to Americans nine and a half years after 9/11. To Israelis, the death toll on October 7 was proportionately many times the death toll in the United States on 9/11. More importantly, by May 2011 bin Laden had ceased to be the driving operational force behind al-Qaeda, while until today Sinwar was very much both the military and political driving force behind Hamas’s unwillingness to agree to a ceasefire and the return of hostages on any terms that Israel could accept.

Those cautious voices claiming Hamas is an idea that cannot be defeated militarily are about to see their theory tested. While some terrorists and warlords make plans for after their deaths, many do not. It is widely believed that Sinwar accepted that he would be killed, and so he may have made plans for Hamas to carry on his brutal rule and unrealistic ambitions after his death. Other terrorist groups have fractured after the death of their leader, but Hamas is rare among terrorist groups in having been the de facto government of Gaza, which gives it more organizational depth and a bigger war chest than smaller terrorist groups.

There will probably be a short window for Hamas’s new leaders to work out a ceasefire-for-hostages deal through Egyptian, Qatari, and US mediators. If not, and depending on the US election on November 5, the United States and its Arab and European partners should push the Israelis and the Palestinians to authorize a temporary international administration for Gaza, overseen by an international contact group, backed by an international policing force, to ensure that Hamas does not return to power. Detailed plans for this exist, and the United Arab Emirates has been leading efforts to bring the United States and Israel around to what would be required to make something like this work. The Biden national security team has reportedly been considering this. Celebrations today in Israel and mixed emotions in Gaza and the West Bank need to give way to pragmatic decisions toward an end to the fighting and a lasting peace for both Israelis and Palestinians.

—Thomas Warrick, the former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security and senior advisor to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Institute.

Even Iran and Hezbollah might want a ceasefire after Sinwar’s death

The death of Sinwar may provide the opportunity, if Netanyahu is looking for one, to bring about a ceasefire in Gaza. Sinwar was reportedly the mastermind behind the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. It was always doubtful, in my view, that the Netanyahu government would agree to any ceasefire so long as Sinwar remained the leader of Hamas.

It is not clear, of course, whether either Sinwar’s successors or the Netanyahu government will now agree to a ceasefire. Western governments (including the United States) and most Arab governments would welcome a ceasefire. Even Iran and Hezbollah—both of whom have voiced support for Hamas—might welcome a ceasefire, if only to raise the possibility of tamping down their own conflicts with Israel. Russia and China, too, might breathe a sigh of relief about reducing the possibility of war in the Middle East expanding.

Whether a ceasefire occurs, though, will depend on whether Israel and Hamas can agree on the terms of one.

—Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and professor emeritus of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government.

What does Sinwar’s death mean for the remaining hostages?

The assassination of Sinwar, the leader of Hamas who was considered to be the mastermind of the October 7 massacres, was expected by most observers of the IDF operations in Gaza. Coming after the elimination of Haniyeh, the leader of the political wing of Hamas, and of Muhammad Deif, the head of the military wing, it sent a clear message from the Israeli security establishment that anyone who crosses Israel could be reached anywhere and dealt with effectively. This leaves one big open question: what does this mean for the hostages taken by Hamas?  

On the one hand, the hostages may have a better chance now that the whole leadership of Hamas has been wiped away, and thus no one within the organization would be willing to take the deadly risk of looking after them, meaning the hostages may be left to their own devices and able to escape. On the other hand, the hostages’ fate may now be sealed for the simple reason that there is no one left to negotiate their release. The fear is also that mid-level Hamas operatives may be tempted to eliminate the hostages to protect their own identities from the eventual retaliation of Israeli forces.  

Many other readings and predictions are circulating, but the truth is that nobody knows with any degree of certainty what will happen to the hostages. One thing is certain though: the decision of the then-elite of Hamas to unleash last year’s horrible attacks against the Israeli population in nearby settlements has only brought pain and suffering to everyone and not only to those directly involved. At the same time, the brutality of the IDF reaction, while it may be seen as advantageous in the short term, in the longer term will only cause the rise of another generation of terrorists imbued with a desire for revenge and hate for everyone in the world who didn’t stand by them. Israel has traded short-term gains for long-term losses.

—Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Hamas will now seek to frame Sinwar’s death as an act of martyrdom and heroism

The assassination of Sinwar, Hamas’s leader and mastermind behind the October 7 attack on Israel, is seen by many as a pivotal moment for the Israeli government and its stated objective of dismantling Hamas in Gaza. The decapitation of Hamas’s leadership will hopefully move the conflict in a new direction toward a ceasefire. To that end, the Israeli government would be best off offering amnesty to those who lay down their arms, facilitating the release of Israeli hostages, and clarifying a postwar plan for Gaza that guarantees no future occupation of the Strip by Israel.

However, with many hostages still being held by Hamas and some Israeli leaders openly discussing the possibility of settling northern Gaza (in direct violation of international law) and “operating in the Strip for years to come,” the prospects for a peaceful resolution in the near term still seem remote.

On the ground, Sinwar’s death will likely be framed as an act of martyrdom and heroism, particularly amid reports that he was killed in combat garb alongside his soldiers. As Amos Yadlin, a former IDF intelligence chief, pointed out, every leader has a successor. The pressing question now is whether the new leadership, within Gaza’s deeply entrenched insurgency, will be willing to de-escalate and negotiate—and if there is anyone on the other side willing to reach out with an olive branch.

—Masoud Mostajabi is the deputy director of the Iraq Initiative at the Middle East Programs of the Atlantic Council.

With its Hamas targets dead, the ICC still must move forward its cases against Israeli leaders

The reported killing of the Hamas leader by Israeli forces has wide-ranging implications for an expanding regional conflict—and also necessitates a firm spine in The Hague. 

Karim A.A. Khan, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), announced the filing of applications for arrest warrants against Hamas leaders and Israeli leaders back in May. Nearly five months and many reports of intimidation and public condemnations from Israel later, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber has yet to issue those warrants. The delay has come under fire by many observers, since warrants in most cases at the ICC have been issued within one or two months of the initial application. While the arrest warrant application has been pending, the Hamas leaders named as perpetrators have been killed by Israel one by one, with Israel killing Haniyeh in Tehran at the end of July and Israel claiming that it killed Mohammed Deif in a strike in Gaza in mid-July. 

Israel has clearly committed to settling its disputes through kinetic means. Those brutalized in Gaza, however, are still waiting for justice. It will be incumbent on the court to move ahead with the issuance of arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, regardless of any pressure resulting from the Israeli state’s claims of false equivalency or imbalance. 

—Gissou Nia is a human rights lawyer and the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

The post Experts react: Yahya Sinwar is dead. Here’s what’s next for Hamas, Gaza, Israel, and the Middle East. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 30, Marc Polymeropoulos, nonresident senior fellow at at Forward Defense, was quoted by NBC in an article analyzing the future of Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ after Israel’s significant blows to Hamas and Hezbollah. In his words, “The one concern we should have is a return to the old kind of terrorist game, soft targets such as embassies overseas, both Israeli and U.S.”

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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The post Marc Polymeropoulos on NBC about the future of Iran’s ‘axis of resistence’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

No Western partner is swooping in to assist Mali’s overburdened military, as France once did. Mali’s current approach, reliant on show-of-force air strikes and support from the Russian Wagner mercenary group, has failed to deliver a decisive victory. In late July, armed groups killed as many as forty-seven Malian soldiers and eighty-four Wagner mercenaries near the Algerian border, sparking a new round of fighting.

There is only one way to avert further loss of life and territorial contestation: mediation. Algiers, which has brokered multiple hostage releases and peace deals in northern Mali—including the 2015 Algiers Accord—is no longer a welcome interlocutor. Bamako has accused Algiers of meddling in its affairs by meeting rebel leaders. Mali’s neighbors to the east, Burkina Faso and Niger, are too consumed with their own domestic security challenges to play a meaningful role. But Mauritania, Mali’s neighbor to the west, is in a unique position to foster peace.

The case for Mauritania

Mauritania is a relatively stable country, whose historic neutrality in regional disputes has earned it generally positive foreign relationships. Previous attempts at mediation have failed to install an enduring peace in northern Mali, largely because they were not inclusive. But with its neutrality, Mauritania has the ability to talk to all conflict parties in northern Mali—nonterrorist armed groups, terrorists, and government-aligned forces. This offers distinct advantages.

Mauritania’s president, Mohamed Ould El Ghazouani, was recently inaugurated for a second and final term, which he is serving concurrently with the African Union (AU) chairmanship. The AU has substantial convening power, and Ghazouani is an ideal mediator because of Mauritania’s neutrality, making the timing optimal for a push for regional peace.

Peace would advance Mauritania’s interests, too. Mali’s widening conflict has destabilized its eastern border. More than 55,000 Malians fled to Mauritania last year, flooding refugee camps. Mauritania accused the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and Wagner of crossing the eastern border and killing Mauritanians. Mediation offers Ghazouani an opportunity to stem the refugee flow and permanently end the violent cross-border incursions that have killed his constituents.

It won’t be easy

The two primary parties in the conflict, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Malian transition government, have opposing goals. JNIM is an al-Qaeda affiliate and aims to displace the government, whereas Bamako aims to eradicate terrorism and assert control over its territory. At the same time, an anti-government, nonterrorist armed group coalition—the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA)—is fighting for greater regional autonomy and economic opportunity. The CSP-DPA’s relationship with JNIM is unclear.

Regardless, none of the parties have given Mauritania consent to mediate, so Nouakchott will need to operate outside of a formal peace process, at least at the outset. This is risky but necessary. Bamako has gradually driven away French, European Union, and United Nations (UN) troops over the past few years, demonstrating its hostility to international stabilization efforts. The Malian transition government would probably reject a request to engage terrorist or nonterrorist armed group leaders.

The conflict still merits mediation. After months of fighting, no actor has achieved sustained momentum on the battlefield. There are clashes, of course, but the conflict is nowhere near over. The FAMa and Wagner have expended large amounts of munitions during offensive operations. These operations have displaced and killed northern civilians while failing to meaningfully degrade the capabilities of armed groups. Armed groups have withdrawn to more remote areas of the Sahara Desert, where they are expending scarce resources to survive. This cannot go on forever.

Ending the war

Here’s how Mauritania can bring all the parties to the negotiating table:

1. Open a direct line of communication with northern leaders

Mauritania is well-positioned to initiate contact with the leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups, given the historic relationship that its Beidane (White Moor) population has with Mali’s Tuareg population. The two ethnic groups have historically adopted similar migration patterns, and their personal, religious, and business connections persist to this day. Mauritanian citizens have maintained ties with populations in northern Mali by traversing age-old transhumance routes.

Mauritania should leverage these relationships and routes to initiate contact with leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups, many of whom are Malian Tuareg, without arousing suspicion. Once contact is made, Mauritania should arrange low-profile in-person meetings with select leaders of these armed groups to determine whether they are amenable to further engagement.

2. Persuade JNIM leaders to defect from al-Qaeda

Mauritania must clearly articulate the value of further engagement to leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups. JNIM is particularly important, as its members never reconciled with Bamako or laid down their arms. Their operations, as well as their continued recruitment of northern populations, made true peace impossible. JNIM’s leaders are thus critical to the installation of an enduring peace in northern Mali.

Mauritania can offer incentives for armed group leaders to engage in mediation. For example, it can offer to intercede with the Malian transition government on their behalf, push for pauses in military operations, and legitimize their bid for northern leadership.

JNIM’s Tuareg leaders may be receptive to the argument that, without this support, it will be impossible for them to evade persecution and exert true leadership over northern Mali, their homeland. Their ambition to secure leadership in their homeland predates JNIM’s establishment, after all. Ultimately, however, only engagement can reveal whether they are open to mediation.

Mauritania’s offer to mediate must come with conditions: JNIM’s Tuareg leaders must commit to disaffiliation with both al-Qaeda and JNIM. They must permanently cease all terrorist activity, and they must stop attacking civilians or permitting youth to serve as fighters. The leaders may choose not to accept these conditions; if that is the case, they must not be included in talks.

This step assumes that mass Tuareg defection from JNIM will not prompt conflict with one of its major factions, the Fulani-dominated Macina Liberation Front (MLF). Evidence suggests that the MLF will not instigate a violent conflict, as this would ultimately drain their resources. There is a strong incentive for the MLF to accept mass defection, and the risk of fratricidal conflict is thus low. It is far more likely that severing JNIM improves Mali’s long-term stability.

3. Solicit formal consent to mediate the conflict in northern Mali

Mauritania should make a formal bid to mediate this conflict. Ghazouani can arrange meetings with each conflict party and seek their consent to initiate multiparty talks. If the previous steps succeeded, leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups may have already agreed to talks. Ghazouani can thus “deliver” JNIM and the CSP-DPA to Malian officials. 

The Malian transition government will be difficult to persuade to enter multiparty talks. This year, the FAMa deployed and held territory in northern Mali. The recapture of Kidal in November 2023 was a major symbolic victory. Bamako may wish to continue fighting. If this is the case, the best strategy for engaging government officials would be to praise Mali’s strength.

Ghazouani should personally travel to Bamako to meet the interim president, Colonel Assimi Goïta. Ghazouani and Goïta are both military commanders who participated in coups d’état in their respective countries. Ghazouani is the elder of the two, and he has successfully navigated the transition from military to civilian leader. He can advise Goïta.

Ghazouani can praise Goïta’s leadership and make the argument that the Malian leader played a decisive role in bringing CSP-DPA and JNIM leaders to the table. He should also highlight the benefits of participating in multiparty talks. Settling the conflict in the north would allow the FAMa and Wagner to shift focus and dedicate more troops to the faltering counterterrorism campaign against the MLF in central Mali. The MLF recently launched a deadly attack against military facilities in Bamako. In light of this, Goïta may be receptive to this argument.

4. Seek international support for the peace process

After acquiring Goïta’s consent, Mauritania should seek backing from the international community and begin planning the first round of talks in Nouakchott. Ghazouani can capitalize on his position as AU chairman to form a Northern Mali Contact Group. The contact group would help coordinate, fund, and execute programming in support of negotiated outcomes of the multiparty talks.

It is very important that the group balance different perspectives and international alliances. Mali’s military junta swapped the country’s Western security partners for Wagner, and Bamako would object if the group contains a disproportionate number of Western states. Ghazouani’s initial efforts should focus on the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Two are not part of the West, and all are involved in regional initiatives.

Mauritania’s neutrality affords it positive relations with all the UNSC permanent members. Accordingly, it is well-equipped to navigate any tensions among them. It must emphasize that the permanent members have a common interest: improving stability. This is only achievable if they collaborate.

Within North and West Africa, Ghazouani should focus initial efforts on recruiting former members of the Algiers Accord Monitoring Committee: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania. Morocco should be included as well, to avoid upsetting the regional balance of power. These six states all stand to benefit from a peaceful and secure northern Mali.

Once the Northern Mali Contact Group is established, Ghazouani and the AU should focus on coordinating, funding, and executing programs in parallel to the multiparty talks. The parties to the conflict are extremely sensitive to external meddling. The Northern Mali Contact Group must keep the parties’ goals at the center of this deliberative process.

Parting shots

This is an ambitious concept, but it seizes upon the many advantages afforded by Mauritania’s current position. It generates momentum for multiparty talks by engaging terrorist and nonterrorist armed group leaders. It then uses their willingness to negotiate as a bargaining chip with which to compel the government to permit multiparty talks. It concludes by seeking external backing.

Considering and including representatives from all conflict parties in northern Mali is the pathway to a more durable, inclusive political settlement that brings peace to a region historically beset by violent conflict.

Jordanna Yochai is a defense analyst, whose portfolio includes the West African Sahel. She is currently on leave from the Department of Defense, pursuing a master’s degree at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA).

The positions expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the US Department of Defense. The US Department of Defense does not endorse the views expressed in hyperlinked articles or websites, including any information, products, or services contained therein.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post Mauritania should mediate in Mali. Here’s how. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

ISIS-K seeks to establish a caliphate and expand beyond what it labels Khorasan, or Central and South Asia—and the group demonstrated its capability and intent to do so through a series of successful attacks in early 2024. In January and March of this year, ISIS-K conducted three separate mass-casualty attacks in Iran, Turkey, and Russia, killing hundreds of civilians. These attacks turned the spotlight on ISIS-K’s growing ability to conduct external operations, especially in Europe, and demonstrated the expanding threat that the group poses to the West. This summer, ISIS-K and individuals associated with and inspired by the group threatened to attack the Cricket World Cup, which took place in New York; the Paris Olympics; and the European Soccer Championship. Interestingly, each of these threats was phrased in such a way as to encourage an ISIS-inspired, lone-wolf actor to conduct the attack.

ISIS-K published the calls to action through its English-language magazine, Voice of Khorasan, which began publication in 2022. The English-language Voice of Khorasan is disseminated through various social media channels, particularly on Telegram, and is intended to spread ISIS propaganda to a Western audience. In the May edition of Voice of Khorasan, ISIS-K published a photo of a fighter standing in a German soccer arena, inviting its members to “score the last goal.” In June, following this call to action, German authorities arrested an ISIS-K-linked individual who intended to work at the Euro Cup soccer finals. That individual was likely a lone-wolf actor, but his pursuit of employment at the Euro Cup immediately following ISIS-K’s call to action underscores the realistic possibility of attacks against soft targets in the West.

To date, ISIS-K’s attacks against Western targets have involved suicide bombs and gunmen. Still, there are concerns that future attacks may be more sophisticated and conducted by dispersed cells, which are harder to deter. For example, one of ISIS’s recent English-language calls to action included a detailed manual explaining how to adapt commercially available drones to carry explosives—instructions that a sympathizer circulated in terrorist social media channels. This vignette encapsulates the use of new technologies in attack planning, which can result in an attack that could be carried out from a standoff distance. Furthermore, it demonstrates cyber-coaching, a term that describes ISIS-K’s strategy of providing guidance and support to cells of fighters from a distance. Cyber-coaching allows senior Afghanistan-based ISIS-K members to provide attack planning guidance and coordination from afar, potentially expanding ISIS’s reach and ability to plan and conduct attacks against Western targets. 

ISIS-K’s cyber-coaching has enabled the group’s Europe-based sympathizers to plan attacks locally, often using communication apps, like the walkie-talkie simulator Zello or the encrypted chat app Telegram, and cryptocurrency apps that are common in their areas. In 2020, for example, German officials disrupted a plot against US military facilities in Europe. For this attack, senior Afghanistan-based leadership provided “radical lectures” to a cell of Tajikistani nationals in Germany via a messaging app. The group’s ability to conduct and inspire attacks through cyber-coaching almost certainly enables its burgeoning capability to conduct external operations.

As with the 2020 plot in Germany, Tajiks frequently conduct ISIS-K attacks outside of Afghanistan and Central Asia. Tajiks were involved in all three of the group’s major 2024 attacks, and over a dozen have been arrested on terrorism charges in the United States and Europe this year alone. The quantity of terror-related arrests of Tajiks in the West indicates the emphasis ISIS-K has placed on recruiting from the tiny Central Asian country. This recruitment trend has become even more pronounced over the last year.

In March, ISIS’s media arm published the first edition of its Tajik-language online magazine, also titled Voice of Khorasan, which included topics such as the history of the caliphate and contact information for individuals seeking to join the jihad. The publication of Voice of Khorasan in Tajik highlights the expanding role Tajiks play in ISIS-K’s external operations and the importance to the group of recruiting these individuals. The group’s leader, Sanaullah Ghafari, is himself Tajik and seeks to expand recruitment through Central Asia by leveraging flashy, high-profile attacks.

While it is not precisely clear why ISIS-K seeks to radicalize young men, specifically from Tajikistan, to conduct its external operations, a host of domestic problems—such as systemic poverty, limited religious freedom, and a lack of social mobility—plague that country. These factors can leave individuals feeling disenfranchised and push them towards radical beliefs, including terrorism, as an outlet for finding meaning in life. These conditions also drive thousands of Tajiks to become migrant workers abroad, where they often face discrimination, cramped living conditions, and low pay—all of which can further build an environment for radicalization to terrorism. There is evidence that these migrants have radicalized both inside and outside of Tajikistan, with some joining extremist Islamic groups in their new countries. Many Tajik migrants can legitimately claim economic refugee status to access Western nations, and these individuals can blend into immigration flows into Europe via Ukraine and into the United States via the Southern border and pose a terrorism threat to their new countries.

Addressing these issues within Tajikistan, especially by countering systemic poverty and the lack of economic opportunities, may present one vector for reducing recruitment for ISIS-K and potentially diminish the group’s ability to conduct external operations. Decreasing the number of Tajikistani economic migrants—and the associated opportunities for overseas recruitment—could ultimately decrease the number of potential terrorists from the region. Research from Nigeria demonstrates the impact of human rights fixes—including foreign assistance—on reducing the number of individuals joining Boko Haram, an ISIS affiliate. Although this research focused on attacks within Nigeria, the solutions and reductions in radicalization applied there may have strong parallels with the situation Central Asia. Additionally, diplomatic counterterrorism solutions, including US engagement and information sharing with regional governmental authorities, may present an avenue to increase pressure on ISIS-K.

Although US engagement with Dushanbe may help reduce ISIS-K’s ability to recruit, the situation is complicated by the fact that Tajikistan and Russia share a long history. Moscow considers Central Asia within its sphere of influence and has historically pressured Central Asia to curtail engagement with the West. (Moscow is also uneasy with China’s economic clout in the region.) Recently, however, Tajikistan has meaningfully engaged with Western nations on a wide variety of topics, including security, economic, and environmental issues. In the last several years, Tajikistan has pursued significant foreign engagement independently of Russia, and these emerging partnerships have proven beneficial for the country. For example, the US Agency for International Development recently introduced a substantial economic and environmental aid package for Tajikistan, and the Virginia National Guard held training exercises with the Tajikistani military—neither of which attracted Moscow’s attention. Building upon existing successful partnerships with Dushanbe presents the best framework for US efforts to reduce ISIS-K recruitment in Tajikistan.

ISIS-K’s recruitment focus on Central Asia, specifically in the impoverished nation of Tajikistan, underscores the group’s desire to expand its ability to conduct attacks in the West. While there is no reliable, timely data on the number of Central Asians the group has recruited, the recent arrests of Tajiks for overseas plots suggest a strategy of relying on these men, many of whom are economic migrants, to carry out attacks in the West. Furthermore, the group’s emphasis on attracting fighters from Tajikistan suggests that there are several pathways for reducing recruitment and deterring overseas attacks, including increased Western engagement to help lift Tajikistan from poverty and traditional counterterrorism measures like information-sharing with regional authorities. As these Tajik men continue to travel overseas, they are likely to increase ISIS-K’s ability to achieve its stated goal of expanding its caliphate and killing infidel Muslims, Christians, and Jews. This goal, combined with the group’s three successful attacks, multiple disrupted plots in 2024, and expanded recruitment attempts, highlights the potential for the group to develop into a major counterterrorism problem.

Morgan Tadych is an open-source intelligence (OSINT) professional and Army veteran. She spent much of her military career researching strategic Russia/Eurasia issues and deployed to conduct counterterrorism missions.

The post From Dushanbe to Berlin: The emerging ISIS-K threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 28, Elliot Ackerman, non-resident senior fellow at Forward Defense, published a piece in the Atlantic entitled “Hezbollah’s Long War Is With America Too.” Ackerman speaks on his experience as a US Marine Corps officer participating in the evacuation of American citizens during the Second Lebanon War. He explains how his experience informs his understanding of the current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah as well as the broader conflict between the United States and its adversaries in Iran, Russia, and China. He writes that “our leaders have proved reluctant to call enemies ‘enemies’ and friends ‘friends.’ If America wishes to remain at peace, or at least not find itself in an active war, we must speak clearly in defense of our friends.”

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Elliot Ackerman

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Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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The post Elliot Ackerman in the Atlantic on the death of Nasrallah appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iran’s advanced missile capabilities pose a threat not only to Israel and the United States’ Arab allies, but to US and partner forces throughout the Middle East and beyond. Graphic courtesy of Design by Soapbox.

The wild swings in US policy toward Iran over the last decade have directly helped speed Iran’s malign influence in the Middle East and significant progress toward a nuclear weapon.

Iran is a deeply ideological regime unlikely to change its fundamental outlook on the world. But the geostrategic context has changed over the last two decades: Iran’s foreign ties are now so bolstered and buoyed, particularly by China, that isolating Tehran is far more difficult than ever before. These circumstances demand a bipartisan, long-term strategy that can span administrations.

The weapons, capabilities, and finances of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran’s other proxies have benefited from sanctions evasion and weak enforcement, allowing Tehran to funnel probably hundreds of millions of dollars to its proxy militias. Illicit oil sales to China have earned the regime around eighty billion dollars.

Iran has advanced close to the nuclear-weapon threshold and has come to believe it can defy international warnings regarding its nuclear activities with impunity. Since the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal (aka the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) in 2018, Tehran has advanced its nuclear program, stockpiling uranium enriched to 60 percent, installing more advanced centrifuges, experimenting with uranium metals that could be used in making a bomb, and restricting International Atomic Energy Agency access to nuclear sites.

Over the next two decades, the United States should pursue a long-term strategy with three main goals.

Reduce Iran’s influence in the region by strengthening weak states and countering Iran’s support to proxy militias.

• What to do: Tighten sanctions enforcement, crack down on sanctions evasion by China, and go after third-party brokers—but keep sanctions sensitive to qualitative change in Iranian behavior and the effect on ordinary Iranians.
• Shore up regional weak spots, pressing Middle Eastern and global allies to take the lead on diplomatic and economic efforts.
• Continue pursuing Israeli-Saudi normalization.
• Maintain an adequate US military presence in the region and be willing to respond with appropriate force to every attack by an Iranian proxy against US and allied interests.
• What to say: Use public diplomacy to draw attention to the destructive impact that Iran’s proxies are having on the region, including in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, the Palestinian territories, and Syria.

Prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.

• What to do: Recognize that attempting to revive the JCPOA is a dead end, and that “maximum pressure” cannot be the goal unto itself. Constantly relitigating both of them has impeded the development of new policy.
• Increased pressure on the regime needs to be an immediate focus of US policy—but that pressure must be connected to a strategic end, namely new negotiations aimed at placing restrictions on its nuclear program that would leave Iran at least several months from a breakout capability and would concurrently address its regional malign influence.
• Reimposing snapback sanctions and developing a credible military option against Iran’s nuclear program are important steps to increase pressure.
• What to say: The United States needs to maintain a declaratory policy, explicitly enunciated by the president, that it will not tolerate Iran getting a nuclear weapon and will use military force to prevent this development if all other measures fail.

Where possible, support the aspirations of the Iranian people to have the freedom to choose the direction of their country’s future—without pursuing regime change through military action.

• What to do: Choose policies that can be maintained for years, even though these might not have an immediately visible impact: increased funding for educational tools and access to independent media and voices, more Persian-language news.
• Use the United States’ support for the Polish Solidarity movement and other anti-communist movements during the Cold War as a model.
• On the human rights front, lead a multilateral effort to target regime officials and their family members who engage in or benefit from corruption, or who engage in human rights abuses. Work with international allies to oust Iran from United Nations institutions whose raison d’être Iran violates on a consistent basis.
• What not to say: Anything about regime change, which could push Iran in the wrong direction. It has to be up to the Iranian people to decide for themselves the future direction of their country.
• What to say: The United States and its allies need to publicize the corruption and behavior of regime officials in a way that highlights the disparity between leadership and common Iranians.

The Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project brought together a bipartisan, ideologically diverse group of experts and former senior officials to develop a holistic US policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran for the next four years, regardless of who sits in the Oval Office. This report is the result of nearly two years of work by the project’s advisory committee, working group, contributors, and staff.

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The future of US strategy toward Iran: A bipartisan roadmap for the next administration

The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative will unveil a pressing and comprehensive report on what a holistic US policy toward Iran should look like and how to execute it—no matter who is elected president in November.

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The Iran Strategy Project is designed to synchronize and bring together the Atlantic Council’s policy and analytical efforts on Iran under a single banner, reflecting the unprecedented level of discord and uncertainty in Iran.

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After Nasrallah, three quandaries shape the future of the war—and the Middle East

By Jonathan Panikoff

Hassan Nasrallah’s death creates interrelated quandaries for Hezbollah, Iran, and Israel that will determine if the region erupts in conflict and shape what it looks like for years to come.

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IranSource Oct 2, 2024

Iran has a strategy for Israel. Now Israel needs one for Iran.

By Alan Pino

Israel needs a long-term plan that can secure regional cooperation, rehabilitate its international image, maintain the support of the United States, and give the Israeli people hope of a future without endless war.

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The Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative (SMESI) provides policymakers fresh insights into core US national security interests by leveraging its expertise, networks, and on-the-ground programs to develop unique and holistic assessments on the future of the most pressing strategic, political, and security challenges and opportunities in the Middle East. 

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1. How does this Lebanon campaign differ from past Israeli operations?

Context makes Israel’s latest offensive in Lebanon unique from previous forays in that theater of operations. One year into its Gaza campaign, the Israeli military is moving up the Iranian food chain, now focusing its energies on Hezbollah—a more intimate and ferocious client of Tehran than Hamas—while signaling, in Yemen and other places, that it expects to continue pushing back forcefully against all adversaries (and their sponsors). The methodical approach that Israel has employed thus far opposite Hezbollah, surgically decapitating its leadership before inserting Israel Defense Forces (IDF) boots into the battlefield, speaks to the fact that Hezbollah is an enemy that the IDF has long been preparing to face, and also stands in stark contrast to its undisciplined response after the rude surprise of October 7.

2. Will Israel be able to sustain the advantage it has had so far in its air campaign?

Israelis are hopeful that their tides may have turned finally, but their infantrymen should anticipate encountering more resistance than their pilots have. A positive outcome to this gamble is far from guaranteed. The “we’re not going to take it anymore” strategy of the Netanyahu government—which insists that it is “winning”—aspires to fundamentally shift the regional balance of power in Israel’s favor, but its obvious risk is the accompanying potential for a punishing, full-scale war in the Middle East.

3. What should the US government do now?

The Biden administration has remained broadly supportive of Israel’s objectives. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin acknowledged, as the formal IDF ground incursion into Lebanon commenced, the imperative of “dismantling attack infrastructure along the border to ensure that Lebanese Hizballah cannot conduct October 7-style attacks on Israel’s northern communities.” Given those sentiments, US principals should continue engaging with Israel to ensure that this task is accomplished clinically and swiftly, and with other actors to contain a possible escalation that would certainly undermine the administration’s goal of a ceasefire.

4. What does this ground campaign mean for regional normalization efforts?

Israel’s integration into the region was facilitated by, among other factors, its close friendship with the United States—which has been an enabler of Israeli security and prosperity—and the desire of other countries in the region to join that exclusive club. Accordingly, if Israel can emerge from its current predicament and restore itself to full military and economic health, and if it proves sufficiently adept at keeping its alliance with Washington intact, there is every reason to believe that the upward trajectory of normalization will resume.

The post Four questions (and expert answers) about Israel’s ground operation in Lebanon appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 30, Transatlantic Security Initiative nonresident senior fellow Beniamino Irdi was featured on RAI Radio 1’s Zapping discussing regional implications of Hassan Nasrallah’s death.

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It is no difficulty to find crises across the Sahel and its adjacent neighborhoods: Economic stagnation, extreme weather and climate degradation, multiple terrorist organizations and jihadist groups claiming territory, a series of military coups and democratic backsliding, various non-jihadist rebel and separatist alliances, a youth bulge and widespread unemployment, and a genocide all compete for sparse outside attention.

Yet, sailing from distant shores comes yet another crisis: An increase in drug trafficking, with flows originating in the Americas, crossing the Atlantic, and making their way into the markets of Europe.

This influx of drugs will have a marked impact, not only on the region itself, but also on the wider world should the worst happen.

The best-case scenario is merely the introduction of additional groups of well-funded armed criminal enterprises with international connections in an already volatile region. The worst-case scenario is the emergence of narco-terrorism on a scale hitherto unheard of and the entrenchment of partnerships between drug smugglers and increasingly well-funded terrorist groups, armed with cash and boasting access to international connections and smuggling routes.

In short, the worst-case scenario is one in which organizations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) are fueled and financed by one of the largest drug markets in the world.

A bad situation getting worse

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), between 2015 and 2020, an average of thirteen kilograms of cocaine was seized per year in the region. In 2021, the amount seized rose to forty-one kilograms. Then in 2022, it spiked to 1,466 kilograms.

In comparison to 2015 seizures, that is an increase of 11,176 percent.

Before complete data for 2023 became available, the UN cited that 2.3 tons (just over two thousand kilograms) of cocaine had been seized in Mauritania alone between January and June 2023. These statistics are alarming, and they don’t even show the full picture: Amounts seized are not amounts trafficked—that amount is likely far higher.  

While domestic drug use is rising across the Sahel, sparking public health crises that are ill-afforded in many countries, the region is becoming a drug trafficking corridor. The drugs are bound for outside markets, with the increase in activity attributed to Europe’s surging demand for illegal narcotics and trafficking groups searching for new routes to markets.

The region is a drug smuggler’s paradise.

Located on the doorstep of Europe and the Middle East, the region is vast and often sparsely populated. It is also riddled with economic deprivation, with an ever-increasing population of youth desperate for opportunity. The countries in the Sahel often have weak governance, widespread corruption, and ongoing battles with insurgents and fundamentalists.

On top of that, Sahelian officials and individuals are vulnerable to the influence of drug gangs—but they are not alone. There are numerous documented cases from across the world of drug gangs using officials to further their work, such as a premier of the British Virgin Islands. Following recent seizures and arrests in the Sahel, the UN expressed concerns about the range of individuals—including the political elite, community leaders, and armed groups—who appear to be involved in facilitating drug trafficking.

While the involvement of key individuals in facilitating drug trafficking is widespread, what makes the situation in the Sahel worrisome are the “armed groups” involved. In Latin America, armed groups facilitating drug trafficking are organizations such as FARC and in Southeast Asia they are militias tied to regional forces or even the drug traffickers themselves. In the Sahel, they are international jihadist organizations, ones with global ambitions and a willingness to export terror and war from their base of operations.

Worrying signs

An array of terrorist organizations operate in the Sahel region: Groups include al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Boko Haram.

These groups control vast swaths of land in the Sahel, are expanding and entrenching their control, and are also competing with each other, propelling their searches for more resources. Because of this, they are among the groups that can most stand to financially benefit from the burgeoning drug trade.

While the drug smuggling flows are opaque, the UNODC highlights that the “limited evidence” of violent extremist armed groups involved in drug trafficking “does not mean that such groups are not involved.” These groups, the UNODC adds, are “likely to benefit indirectly” from drug trafficking, explaining that groups such as JNIM and ISGS demand taxes or fees from traffickers in areas where they operate.

Even if these organizations are not directly managing the drug trade, they stand to benefit from the routes and from facilitating drug smugglers’ operations in the territories they control. Such a partnership could be devastating for the region and beyond.

The UNODC notes that information about these groups’ involvement in the drug trade could still emerge. Historically, terrorist and jihadi organizations have embraced a more hands-on approach to the drug trade to fund their organizations and operations. The Taliban in Afghanistan has long been linked to the opium trade (and the drug trade has supported terrorism), ISIS in Syria has produced drugs for market in Europe and smuggles drugs across the Middle East, and Hezbollah has been tied to Columbian drug rings.

With the Sahel becoming an increasingly major drug trafficking corridor, terrorist groups could shift from merely facilitating the drug trade toward actively managing and participating in it, spreading narco-terrorism and expanding the funding for these groups. A war on drugs and narco-terrorism in the Sahel would be a devastating addition to the current war on terror across the region, where 43 percent of global terrorism deaths take place. A development such as this would not only be dangerous for the Sahel, but for the wider Middle East and Europe as well. Drug routes are known to facilitate other forms of international smuggling and for hiding activities from authorities—ever more dangerous when involving jihadist groups.

What the West can do

Unfortunately, the West can’t do much in the Sahel.

Both the United States and the European Union (EU) have retreated from the region, driven away by military juntas that do not share the West’s democratic values and concern for human rights. Various joint military efforts that had been underway to combat terror groups have fallen apart as the United States and EU left the region and lost partners. This is unlikely to change, and if the United States and EU lack the partners necessary to combat jihadist groups in the Sahel, they will likely also lack the ability to combat drug smuggling.

What they can do, however, is support and strengthen partnerships with the costal democracies in West Africa, preventing drugs from entering the Sahel in the first place.

West African democracies are on the frontlines of combating jihadists. Terrorists are attempting to expand operations and territory in countries including Senegal, Benin, Togo, and Ghana. These democracies are also on the frontlines of combating drug smuggling and are making waves with seizures. For example, last November, Senegal’s navy seized three tons of cocaine that was headed towards Europe. In April this year, the country made headlines for seizing 1,140 kilograms of cocaine (the most ever intercepted on land), which was headed toward Mali. More seizures followed in June. In Ghana, authorities have also clamped down on trafficking, making headlines after arresting a duo attempting to smuggle an amount of cocaine worth six million dollars through Accra’s airport and to London. On September 7 in Guinea-Bissau, authorities (with help from the US Drug Enforcement Administration and a European organization called the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre) seized 2.6 tons of cocaine that had arrived from Latin America.

As drugs continue to flow, and as the domestic use of drugs continues to rise, West African politicians and societies are just as interested in addressing drug trafficking as the United States and EU are. These West African democracies would be willing partners in combating the twin threats of expanding terrorist groups and a burgeoning drug trade.

Should the Sahel become home to narco-terrorism, the consequences would be catastrophic, not only for the Sahel but for the world. The international community must not ignore yet another crisis.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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These attacks have displaced tens of thousands of Israelis from their homes. Early Tuesday, Israel’s security cabinet voted to add their safe return to Israel’s official war aims. The vote came hours after Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told US Special Envoy Amos Hochstein that he was not confident in a ceasefire deal and “the only way left to ensure the return of Israel’s northern communities to their homes will be via military action.”

This follows months of failed mediation attempts by Hochstein and Biden administration officials. Hochstein reportedly told Gallant and others on Tuesday that military action would not ensure the safety of Israeli civilians and would instead risk a wider regional war. However, since Hochstein’s many previous mediation attempts failed, and absent an alternative solution for the crisis on Israel’s northern border, Israeli leaders are signaling that they feel compelled to degrade this threat.

Hezbollah is getting stronger

The Biden administration’s pressuring of Israel to avoid a larger-scale conflict with Hezbollah has forced Israel into a series of low-intensity exchanges. Following the killing of twelve Israeli-Druze children, for example, White House spokesperson John Kirby stated that “there’s no reason, in our view, that this has to lead to some sort of dramatic escalation.” In line with the United States’ desire to avoid dramatic escalation, Israel responded with a targeted assassination against Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in July that failed to reduce tensions. While the White House may believe that limited engagements are preferable to a larger military operation, this strategy prevents Israel from achieving its security goals. It also pushes the region closer to broader conflict as each side intensifies the scope of its attacks over time. This creates the exact scenario that the administration is desperate to avoid.

Additionally, delaying the conflict allows Hezbollah’s capabilities to grow as Iran pours resources in, increasingly jeopardizing US security interests. The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s 2024 Annual Threat Assessment states that Hezbollah “seeks to limit US influence in Lebanon and the broader Middle East,” goals it shares with the Iranian government. The stronger Hezbollah becomes, the more capable it will be in threatening US allies, personnel, and influence in the region. In addition to countering Hezbollah’s goals, US involvement and support would help to rein in and deter Iran, as well as signal to Russia, China, and other states that the United States supports its allies and wants to maintain its influence in the region.

With IDF capabilities stretched thin across multiple fronts since the Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023, Hezbollah has exploited the opportunity to test the limitations of Israel’s air defenses. It has also leveraged its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to develop a catalog of important military, civilian, and infrastructure targets within Israel. The full extent of Hezbollah’s military capabilities are unknown, but the group is estimated to have more than 150,000 ground-to-ground missiles, which is more than ten times what it possessed at the beginning of the Second Lebanon War in 2006. The group is also reported to have around 2,000 drones, 25,000-30,000 active personnel, and the same number of reservists. Critically, these forces now have combat experience, having fought on behalf of the Assad regime during the Syrian Civil War. Other fighters from Iraq and Syria are pouring into Lebanon to reinforce Hezbollah’s ranks, too, according to reports. Taken together, the data show an aggressive increase in Hezbollah’s capabilities over time. This threat is compounded by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran in the near future, which could back Hezbollah with the ultimate deterrent. The longer Israel waits to deal with Hezbollah, the more time it allows Iran to arm and train its proxy and work toward creating a deliverable nuclear weapon, which would likely increase the difficulty and destructiveness of a future conflict.

What Israel needs from the United States

If Israel does conduct a military operation in southern Lebanon, Israel will need weapons sales and military aid without delay to ensure the IDF’s efficacy in southern Lebanon and the safety of the population. Israel’s Iron Dome and David’s Sling interceptor stores will be pushed to the brink with the likely overwhelming nature of the aerial attacks by Hezbollah. To keep the air defense systems fully operational, the United States should provide the military aid needed for Israel to continue to purchase crucial equipment.

To further support its ally, the United States should station the necessary naval forces in the region, increasing the two militaries’ interoperability and supporting Israel’s complex but still vulnerable air defense systems. US Central Command should coordinate regional efforts to defeat incoming projectiles from Iran and its proxies, similar to what the United States did during April’s Iranian attack. Israel’s strike on Hezbollah launch vehicles in August showed Israel’s intelligence capabilities in preempting a massive attack. To support this effort, the United States can provide passive support by augmenting sensing and targeting capabilities through Aegis systems and E-2 Hawkeyes, as well as with broader intelligence sharing. US sensing and targeting assistance in combination with regional efforts would allow Israel to focus its capabilities solely on Hezbollah, best positioning Israel to minimize the effectiveness of Hezbollah’s aerial attacks.

The final means by which the United States can aid Israel’s efforts is through vocal backing on the international stage. Following the October 7 attacks, Israel received broad support for its military campaign in Gaza. As the war has continued and the public is increasingly exposed to the horrors of urban combat and information warfare campaigns, this international support has diminished. Israel’s rationale for conducting an operation in Lebanon would be justified, as Hezbollah has been attacking Israel since October 8, 2023, launching more than 7,500 rockets, missiles, and drones since that date. Malign actors on the international stage would attempt to paint Israel’s actions as illegitimate. To support the rules-based international system, it is important for the United States to support military operations that defend a democratic and allied state’s sovereignty.

While many Americans are justifiably cautious about the country getting entangled in another war in the Middle East, Israeli officials have declared that, even though forces are stretched across multiple fronts, they are willing to do the heavy lifting. Israel will need US support through military aid, intelligence, missile defense support, and vocal support on the international stage. There are clear incentives for the United States to support this effort, as confronting Iran through the degradation of Hezbollah improves regional stability by weakening Iran’s strongest deterrent threat over Israel. Additionally, with Hezbollah further degraded, Israel can play a greater role in fighting against Iranian proxies, further advancing US security interests in the region.

In the same sense that supporting Ukraine has allowed the United States to degrade one of its near-peer adversaries without deploying US personnel on the battlefield, supporting Israel would allow the United States to degrade another revisionist actor in Iran without US troops on the ground. The growing links between the United States’ adversaries across the globe—mainly China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—must be addressed, and the most effective way to do so is by leveraging the United States’ robust alliance network. By supporting Israel’s efforts to secure its northern border, the United States can show its resolve and start to reestablish its regional deterrence, as well as signal to revisionist actors that it is still committed to the defense of its allies globally. This is especially relevant as China, Russia, and Iran continue to establish geopolitical footholds in the region, looking to upend the United States’ role as the region’s security guarantor.

The Lebanese government cannot control the actions of Hezbollah and, whether willingly or not, has allowed Hezbollah to turn the nation into a forward operating base for Iran’s terror activities. Given this and the direct attacks from Hezbollah, it is understandable why Israel feels compelled to conduct a military operation in southern Lebanon. While Israeli officials have made it abundantly clear that they will fight alone, if need be, it is in the United States’ strategic interest to support Israel as it seeks to remove the threat from Hezbollah. Supporting Israel in this campaign would be an important step in deterring and reining in Iran, and it would demonstrate that the United States can create credible security guarantees and prevent Russia and China from filling a US power vacuum in the region.

Jonathan Rosenstein is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Eliana Aiken is a former young global professional in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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