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The NDS’s emphasis on allies is reassuring for Japan, but questions over commitments remain

For Japan, the United States’ new NDS and its emphasis on working with Indo-Pacific allies to strengthen “collective defense” in the First Island Chain provided some assurance. But the NDS also further underlined long-standing questions about the Trump administration’s intentions and expectations toward allies. 

To some extent, the NDS brought a sigh of relief in Japan, given that there were concerns about how the Trump administration’s focus on the Western Hemisphere and the administration’s arguably somewhat softer posture toward China in recent months would impact Washington’s defense efforts and regional partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. In this light, the NDS was reassuring, as it did not completely de-prioritize the Indo-Pacific region.

Still, some concerns remain. Above all, while the NDS suggests that the United States will deter full-scale aggression by China, much remains unknown about Washington’s posture toward the gray-zone situations that persist in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the NDS makes clear its demand that allies and partners “take on a greater share of the burden,” adding pressure on states like Japan to increase defense expenditures and take on a more proactive defense role. Combined with the United States’ strategic ambiguity toward China and North Korea, Japan remains concerned about when and how Washington will respond if a contingency were to erupt. Such ambiguities and gaps undermine progress toward enhancing strategic, operational, and tactical readiness of the bilateral alliance US-Japan alliance, as well as US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation and other vital frameworks in the Indo-Pacific region.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

The NDS’s call for collective defense of the region is thin on details 

From Seoul’s vantage point, two phrases stood out most: “critical but limited support from U.S. forces” and “collective defense” along the First Island Chain.  

If the premise is that Seoul—and other regional allies—assume primary responsibility in the conventional domain, a central question is whether (and how far) that logic could bleed into the nuclear backstop. This would mark, not a “shift” in declaratory terms, perhaps, but a perceptible change in the visibility, tempo, and scope of the United States’ provision of extended deterrence.

At the same time, while the latest NDS and National Security Strategy both prescribe building “collective defense” in the region, both documents are notably thin on how Washington intends to operationalize it. The NDS states that the United States will seek to “make it as easy as possible for allies and partners to take on a greater share of the burden of our collective defense, including through close collaboration on force and operational planning and working closely to bolster their forces’ readiness for key missions.” Yet it avoids specifying the connective tissue—South Korea–US–Japan trilateral cooperation, or other mini- or multilateral pathways—that could be the key means to implement the concept.

None of this, however, makes me doubt that the South Korea–US alliance will keep adapting; if anything, Seoul’s description in the NDS as a “model ally” reinforces that expectation. But precisely because adversaries look for seams, the United States and South Korea need tighter communication, coordination, and signaling—so that capability shifts or posture adjustments do not create deterrence vacuums or generate unnecessary provocation in the region. 

—Bee Yun Jo, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and research fellow in the Security Strategy Division at the Sejong Institute. 

Manila has a ‘pragmatic’ response to the NDS amid tensions with China

The reaction in Metro Manila to the Pentagon’s 2026 NDS has been largely pragmatic and firmly Philippine-focused. The softer language on China has not generated public backlash among government officials, politicians, and policymakers. This is largely because Philippine policy debates are driven less by Washington’s terminology than by concrete security conditions in the West Philippine Sea, domestic development imperatives, and existing military cooperation with the United States anchored by the National Defense Authorization Act.

At the same time, there has been a subtle recalibration among some Philippine policymakers toward a more pragmatic approach to economic engagement with China. This shift has been hinted at by the Philippines’ ambassador to the United States, Jose Manuel “Babe” Romualdez, who has argued that persistent geopolitical frictions should not preclude selective economic cooperation with China. This recalibration reflects growing concern that the Philippines is falling behind regional peers, particularly Vietnam, whose manufacturing sector has expanded rapidly through export-oriented growth and deeper integration into global supply chains. Economic underperformance has also become increasingly visible in tourism vis-à-vis neighboring countries, prompting policy responses aimed at stimulating demand. One such measure has been the introduction of fourteen-day visa-free entry for Chinese citizens, a move widely interpreted in Manila as economically motivated rather than geopolitical signaling.

However, this pragmatism has not translated into accommodation toward Beijing on sovereignty issues or political influence. This week, Philippine senators across party lines signed a resolution condemning what they describe as verbal attacks and intimidation by Chinese officials against Philippine institutions defending the West Philippine Sea. In addition, the publicly disclosed meeting between the Chinese ambassador to the Philippines and Davao City Mayor Sebastian “Baste” Duterte drew scrutiny in Manila political circles. The meeting’s timing coincided with heightened tensions in the West Philippine Sea, reinforcing concerns about political signaling and elite influence pathways, anxieties that have been shaped by China’s prior patterns of elite engagement across Southeast Asia.

—Alvin Camba is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

Australia will welcome clear messaging on China and an emphasis on re-industrialization 

On the surface, the 2026 NDS is a radical departure from its predecessors. Its bombastic rhetoric, political focus, and sharp tone make it an unconventional document and in key areas it represents significant policy shifts, particularly as it relates to European allies and the threat Russia presents. Moreover, while it repeatedly states that it is not isolationist in nature, the document also heavily emphasizes a refocus to its own region through the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Beneath the surface, however, there is also a lot of continuity, and for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific there is a lot in the document to be reassured by.

For Australia, the clear articulation of the threat China poses, the need to deter rather than confront, along with a clear message to China on what the United States considers an acceptable balance of power in the region will be encouraging, particularly as China has often exploited the strategic ambiguity of previous policy documents. However, the lack of any mention of Taiwan or how the United States will view a potential crisis there will create uncertainty and anxiety.

But the acknowledgment of the speed and scope of the threat China poses, and reassurances that the United States will continue to support efforts to stand up to it will be well received in Canberra. The need for increased burden sharing and re-prioritization of effort have reverberated throughout the national security community for over a decade and will come as no surprise to Australian policymakers. Moreover, the emphasis on re-industrialization is a trend already under way there, and the NDS’s language will be viewed as a seriousness of intent on the part of the United States. While the document is simplistic and short on details, its strength is the clarity of messaging and pragmatic views on the reality of regional and global threats. For those in Australia, that statement will be well received.

—John T. Watts is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served as a senior policy advisor to the US Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy and a staff officer at the Australian Department of Defence.

The NDS leaves unanswered questions about what a ‘decent’ US-China peace would mean for Taiwan

Taiwan is concerned about being left out of US defense perimeters and becoming seen as primarily an economic issue, rather than a security one, for Washington.

The clearest sign is that the 2026 NDS does not mention Taiwan by name at all. There is also the softening in NDS language concerning China. The 2018 NDS from Trump’s first term referred to China and Russia as “revisionist powers”; the 2026 NDS no longer does. This raises the question of whether China’s repeated claim that it will annex Taiwan, by force if necessary, is no longer considered an act of revisionism.

The NDS does talk about the importance of deterrence by denial and pledges to “make clear that any attempt at aggression against U.S. interests will fail.” But is defense of the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait still a US interest?

The answer is unclear. The NDS mentions five areas where the United States will prioritize the provision of “critical but limited support from U.S. forces,” and the Taiwan Strait is not one of them.

Furthermore, while it may be reassuring for some to read the NDS’s promise “to prevent anyone, including China, from being able to dominate us or our allies,” Taiwan is not a US ally.

The NDS does say that all nations should “recognize that their interests are best served through peace and restraint.” Is “restraint,” then, what the United States expects from Taiwan?

The NDS also calls for reaching a “decent peace” with China, stating later that such an accord “on terms favorable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under is possible.” This language brings back the long-standing specter of a US-China “grand bargain” over Taiwan. Especially since Beijing has long seen Taiwan as nonnegotiable and a core interest, Washington seeking to strike a deal on “terms that China can accept” is not generating much optimism inside Taiwan.

Yet with crisis comes opportunity. Taiwan’s strategy should be threefold. First, Taiwan needs to reassure domestic audiences that Taiwan is not mentioned in the NDS because strong US-Taiwan relations are now a given. Second, increase Taiwan’s defense spending to show that Taipei is not a security free-rider and is doing its fair share. To this end, Taiwan’s defense spending is set to reach 3.32 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2026, and Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te has pledged to reach 5 percent of GDP on defense spending before 2030. Third, Taiwan needs to contribute to the Trump administration’s reindustrialization agenda. Taiwan has made progress in this area as well. This month, Taiwanese companies committed to investing at least $250 billion in the United States, especially in the semiconductor and technology sectors.

Taken together, Taiwan is seeking to signal that it is an understanding, responsible, and helpful partner to the United States, one that is too valuable to let fall into Beijing’s hands.

—Wen-Ti Sung is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

The post What the Indo-Pacific thinks of the new US National Defense Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introduction

Following a brief respite after a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas brokered by US President Donald Trump, and in the wake of the twelve-day war and US-backed strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Middle East appears once again to be sliding toward broader instability. Fractures among the Gulf states over Yemen’s future, growing instability inside Iran, and ongoing efforts to stabilize Syria are only some of the complex challenges confronting the region.

Despite these pressures, the Abraham Accords have endured, reinforcing their long-term significance. The United States—through both executive and congressional leadership—has continued to champion their success. Yet after Congress failed to reintroduce the Regional Integration Normalization Act (RINA) following the disgraceful exit of its former sponsor, Senator Bob Menendez, congressional engagement has largely become incremental and narrowly focused on defense relationships. This need not be the case.

In the summer of 2025, the Atlantic Council’s regional integration project—dedicated to strengthening cooperation between the United States, Israel, and Arab and Muslim countries—led its first-ever congressional delegation focused on the Abraham Accords to the Middle East amid the twelve-day war. Bipartisan engagement with Abraham Accords countries—then, as now—across areas such as interfaith dialogue, trade, and regional investment demonstrates that meaningful progress on normalization is possible, and may even accelerate, during turbulent times. This issue brief offers recommendations for Congress to reassert its leadership role in supporting the Abraham Accords and to expand the scope of US engagement on normalization and regional prosperity.

Advance regional prosperity through the Abraham Accords

Recommendation one: Expand business and commercial delegations supporting the economic integration of Abraham Accords countries. 

US trade missions are an essential bridge for US and foreign companies to connect and identify areas of mutual interest. Congress should consider requiring an annual US trade mission focused on a topic of high interest for regional integration, including travel to multiple Abraham Accords countries.

Following the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, then Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin led a trade delegation to Israel, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to support the “expanded economic cooperation” promised by the Accords and announced the Abraham Fund—a planned $3 billion fund designed to support private-sector-led development projects. However, lower-level but consistent missions are also crucial to facilitate regional economic integration and prosperity. In 2022, the US Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration led two trade missions to the Middle East: one to Israel, Bahrain, and the UAE, engaging aerospace and defense industries, and a flagship “Trade Winds” mission to the UAE that included an optional visit to Israel or Morocco before the main event. While these missions succeeded in connecting US firms with regional industries, there have been fewer recent US-led trade missions supporting regional integration through multi-country engagement. Against this background, Congress should make regional integration a clear priority when it benefits US commercial interests and consider codifying support for the Abraham Accords.

Recommendation two: Expand Abraham Accord Caucus engagement on regional economic projects, including the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a proposed transportation, energy, and digital corridor designed to provide more efficient and resilient infrastructure capable of meeting the needs of a changing global economy. It could serve as the backbone for regional integration while unlocking substantial economic incentives by leveraging the Middle East’s role as a bridge between Europe and Asia. If the United States can help shape IMEC development—setting standards for ports and digital infrastructure, identifying opportunities for US companies, and countering influence from Russia and China—it could effectively balance against China’s Belt and Road Initiative while reasserting US economic leadership in a critical region.

The Abraham Accords Caucus co-chairs and congressional committee leaders should organize regular briefings with both the administration and relevant private-sector stakeholders to explore how the United States can influence the development of IMEC and ensure opportunities for US companies. While Congress has advanced political and security integration initiatives, economic integration, which is foundational for regional peace and prosperity, has received less attention. IMEC and similar initiatives offer an opportunity for Congress to do more on this front. The Abraham Accords Caucuses should also establish staff-level working groups for frequent engagement on economic integration projects. Recent efforts by Representatives Brad Schneider (who joined the June congressional delegation) and Blake Moore to launch a House Abraham Accords Caucus trade working group offer excellent platforms for such briefings. Additionally, the Abraham Accords Caucus should coordinate with the US Department of Commerce to identify businesses and industries that could benefit from regional integration, generating district- and state-level connections that strengthen Middle East prosperity.

Recommendation three: Formally authorize and support the Abraham Fund and prioritize regional Abraham Accords projects for US International Development Finance Cooperation support.

After the signing of the Abraham Accords, the United States, Israel, and the UAE established a $3 billion fund to support private-sector investments and development initiatives advancing regional economic integration. Efforts by the US International Development Finance Cooperation (DFC) late in the first Trump administration attempted to energize the fund, including a call for proposals for projects in Morocco and a $50 million commitment from Uzbekistan. However, since a 2021 interagency review under then-US President Joe Biden, no public activity has been registered regarding the Abraham Fund.

In 2023, Congress signaled continued interest in supporting economic integration through Section 8 of the RINA, which would have authorized the creation of the “Abraham Accords, Negev Forum, and Regional Integration Opportunity Fund” with $105 million, enabling the US secretary of state to support interagency projects including the Abraham Fund. While this number was far lower than the Abraham Fund’s announced $3 billion, it demonstrated robust bipartisan support for US diplomatic leadership and the potential for a rigorous approach to leveraging development finance. Congress should build on the RINA example by authorizing and appropriating funds for regional economic integration projects while maintaining the current framework for special envoy leadership of the fund and clarifying the role of such an envoy in fund dispersal. By building on recent changes to DFC through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 , Congress can advance the Abraham Fund in parallel with other new initiatives.

Institutionalize and expand US diplomatic leadership on the accords

Recommendation four: Allow exceptions for a dual-hatted Abraham Accords envoy.

Both the Biden and Trump administrations have demonstrated commitment to senior official engagement on expanding the Abraham Accords. Under Biden, this included the appointment of Dan Shapiro, former ambassador to Israel, as the first Abraham Accords envoy. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, Congress codified the role of Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords, Negev Forum, and Related Integration and Normalization Fora and Agreements. However, despite the creation of this new role, no one has been nominated to the Senate-confirmed position. Members of Congress have expressed interest in seeing the vacant slot filled, including in a widely signed letter in January 2025. One possible reason for the vacancy is that legislation codifying the role explicitly requires that the individual “. . . shall not be a dual-hatted official with other responsibilities,” which may have discouraged both the Biden and Trump administrations from making a nomination. While there is significant value in having a senior official dedicated to advancing the Abraham Accords, the reality is that the kinds of strategic economic, security, and diplomatic cooperation associated with the accords can overlap with existing portfolios within the US government. For example, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff engaged on the Abraham Accords, but this represents just one of his many priorities.

Congress should consider modifying this restriction, enabling more senior US officials with synergistic portfolios to fill the position. This would enable the administration to formally designate a “lead” for the accords, elevating their priority.

Recommendation five: Authorize the State Department to lead a new strategic multilateral forum reflecting US and regional priorities.

While the Negev Forum had a robust start in 2022, a new strategic approach is needed to operationalize the goals of the Abraham Accords. Congress should direct the State Department to develop an updated plan for a new multilateral forum that regularly brings together senior officials, advancing strategic US and regional priorities in energy, investment, and security—topics not fully covered by the Negev Forum. This forum should learn from the disruption that the Negev Forum has experienced over the past two years and adapt to evolving regional dynamics. Congress should consider constructs similar to previous regional integration legislation, such as the Deterring Enemy Forces and Enabling National Defense (DEFEND) Act and the Learning Integrated National Knowledge for the Abraham Accords Act, which authorize specific objectives and activities for the executive branch to carry out and require measurable progress—through strategies, reports, and direct action—to meet congressional intent. Priority areas for multilateral coordination among accords countries include:

• Regional security cooperation: While the present environment might not be conducive to a comprehensive security partnership, a new multilateral forum should incorporate a pathway for regional security cooperation. This could include building on existing platforms such as the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA) and leveraging ideas associated with past initiatives, such as the Middle East Strategic Alliance. Section 1299 of the recently passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 provides a foundation for the further expansion of C-SIPA by requiring an assessment of the agreement’s strategic importance and its potential expansion.
• Traditional energy: Many Gulf states are seeking to diversify their economy away from fossil fuels. However, growing energy demand and the need for resilient, diverse energy systems mean that traditional energy sources will remain a critical part of the equation for the foreseeable future. Consequently, Israel, Egypt, and others have continued to develop natural gas and other traditional energy sources and have worked to integrate their projects across the region, leading to regional bodies such as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which includes both Israeli and Palestinian representation. In line with Trump’s executive orders titled “Unleashing American Energy,” the State Department should use a revived accords multilateral framework to explore how initiatives like the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum can support regional economic integration.
• Investment: In addition to traditional energy, the State Department should encourage more integration in the financial space, including cooperation on regional investments and domestic barriers to intra-regional investments. This could include new forms of cooperation, such as around coordinated regulation of cryptocurrency consistent with the goals of the recent GENIUS Act. While this will take time and trust to build, integrating wealthier states with regional entrepreneurial projects would allow for an immediate and tangible demonstration of how the Abraham Accords advance participants’ prosperity. Efforts to advance investment and financial partnerships are familiar to Congress. Section 9 of the RINA, a bipartisan effort by the then-leadership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and all four Abraham Accords Caucus co-chairs in the Senate, outlines a directive for the special envoy for the Abraham Accords to negotiate the creation of such a financial forum.

Mobilize and deepen people-to-people and legislative exchanges

Recommendation six: Authorize and appropriate funds for interfaith religious dialogues to support tolerance and understanding across Abraham Accords countries.

The second paragraph of the Abraham Accords declaration supports promoting “interfaith and intercultural dialogue” to advance the accords’ mission of peace and prosperity. However, no State Department grants have yet been publicly made available to support interfaith dialogues across Abraham Accords countries. Such grants could support the work of organizations such as the Mimouna Association, which connects Jewish and Muslim youths through interfaith programming. The State Department’s reluctance to issue such grants contrasts with a bipartisan and bicameral effort by all eight House and Senate co-chairs of the Abraham Accords Caucus who formally requested their issuance in 2023. In addition to encouraging the use of existing funding for such efforts, the Senate included $1 million for such grants in Section 10 of the RINA. While the act remains only proposed legislation, Congress should revisit the oversight and appropriations efforts from 2023 and renew calls for interfaith and intercultural dialogue grants. The Trump administration has clarified that advancing and expanding the Abraham Accords is a priority. The Abraham Accords declaration clearly supports interfaith dialogues, and the promotion of such dialogues in the Middle East is particularly important in the current environment, as the region seeks to move past historical biases toward new bonds. Few interfaith efforts are as worthy of support.

Recommendation seven: Expand bilateral-focused congressional travel to Abraham Accords countries to support the accords.

While more than a dozen congressional delegations travel to the Middle East annually and engage with Abraham Accords partner countries, fewer delegations travel with the explicit objective of supporting regional integration. Unfortunately, even fewer congressional delegations spend sufficient time in a partner country to build the government-to-government ties essential for moving Abraham Accords countries toward further integration. The Abraham Accords Caucus, or another member-driven initiative, should organize more regular congressional delegations to Abraham Accords partner countries. These delegations should focus on specific projects or initiatives that can generate tangible improvements in bilateral cooperation, such as trade, and ultimately promote regional integration. Congress should look to the US Departments of Commerce, State, and Agriculture to help identify issues and topics that members can use to advance the bilateral relationship toward greater integration. Agencies can also assist in supporting the identification of shared commercial interests or frictions based on members’ constituencies.

Model legislation annex

The following legislative text is provided solely for educational and informational purposes as illustrative “model” language. It is not intended to advocate for or against the passage of any particular bill, nor to influence specific legislation pending before Congress. The sample provisions are offered to demonstrate how recommendations in this report could be operationalized in statutory form. Inclusion of this text should not be construed as lobbying activity but, rather, as a nonpartisan resource for policymakers, researchers, and stakeholders.

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Adam Kozloski

Nonresident Senior Fellow, N7 Initiative

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

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Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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The March 10 agreement between Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi and interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa was intended to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian army. The Aleppo Agreement, signed in Syria’s second largest city in April, was the first practical implementation of the March 10 agreement, because it entailed the integration of local police forces: the Kurdish Asayish and Internal Security Forces linked to the interim government.

When I visited Aleppo several months after that agreement was signed, it was still largely holding. I interviewed Hefin Suleiman and Nouri Sheiko, the two Kurdish signatories of the agreement, as well as officials from the Aleppo governor’s office. Both sides were committed to continuing to work together. 

I also met a dozen Kurdish and Arab women in the Sheik Maqsoud Women’s House. The new flag of the Syrian government was on display in their spacious office. They told me proudly how they had applied for—and received—official permission to operate as a non-governmental organization (NGO) from Minister of Social Affairs and Labor Hind Qabawat, who is also the only female minister in the cabinet of the interim government in Damascus. They were genuinely eager to work with her and were planning a conference for women all across Syria. These Kurdish women in Sheik Maqsoud were literally working with Damascus down to the minutiae of complying with their rules and regulations for NGO registration. They, too, appeared committed to the Aleppo Agreement.

The Kurdish Asayish and Arab Internal Security Forces were already operating shared check points in Aleppo.  In October, the SDF has submitted a list of their commanders who could serve in the Ministry of Defense in Damascus, as part of integration talks. And in other parts of Syria, the SDF and certain units of the new Syrian army aligned with Damascus had already begun coordinated activities under US supervision, as I learned during fieldwork in Syria in December.

But on January 6, Damascus launched an assault on Aleppo.

Some 150,000 people were displaced just in two days of fighting, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. An estimated 1,200 Yezidi families were caught up in the fighting, some of whom were resisting what Iraqi Member of Parliament Murad Ismael described as a “brutal attack” by the factions of the Damascus authorities. 

Why did al-Sharaa launch an assault on the very people with whom he had signed not one, but two agreements? What went wrong?

A stalemate in negotiations

Both agreements were due to quiet US diplomacy. It was hoped they would help reunify the fractured country after over a decade of conflict.

US mediation efforts have been led by Tom Barrack, who is dual hatted as the US ambassador to Turkey and also special envoy to Syria. The mediation was a tough job, but it had already achieved important progress. The two sides did not trust each other, having fought against each other in the past. Al-Sharaa is the former commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which evolved out of Jebhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda offshoot. In an earlier phase of the war, Jebhat al-Nusra had fought against Syrian Kurds in the Kurdish People’s Defense Units, or YPG (the predecessor of the SDF).

This distrust was only compounded after sectarian killings of Alawites in the coastal regions in March, and then another round of killing in the Druze stronghold of Sweida. A Reuters investigation of the massacres of Alawites found that the “chain of command led to Damascus.” A United Nations investigation into the events in Sweida is still ongoing.

Kurds had reason to be skeptical of the new authorities in Damascus. After assuming power in Damascus, al-Sharaa has promoted several rebel leaders into positions of power who have been sanctioned by the United States for serious human rights violations. They include two notorious warlords. Sayf Boulad Abu Bakr, who had been sanctioned for kidnapping Kurdish women and abusing prisoners, was promoted to commander of the Seventy-Sixth Division overseeing Aleppo. And Mohammed Hussein al-Jasim, known as Abu Amsha, was promoted to lead the Sixty-Second Division in Hama. The US Treasury estimated that his militia generated tens of millions of dollars a year through abduction and confiscation of property in Afrin, where Turkey maintains a large security presence.

But Kurds were under significant US pressure, and the Syrian Kurdish leadership is pragmatic.

Furthermore, Kurds in Aleppo had survived under siege and managed to preserve control of the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah neighborhoods throughout the civil war. Now Assad was gone and al-Sharaa had made verbal promises about Kurdish rights—although no constitutional guarantees until now. So in April the Kurds agreed to withdraw their military forces from Aleppo and only maintain police forces, which would also fully integrate with the Syrian government’s police forces. 

In other words, they agreed to place their trust in Damascus, knowing they would have no military forces of their own once the SDF withdrew—knowing they would be surrounded on all sides. For years, the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration has controlled a vast oil-rich region in the northeast, but it is not geographically connected to Aleppo.

The Aleppo Agreement in April was celebrated as a success story by both sides.

The Aleppo offensive, hate speech, and disinformation

Leading up to and during the government’s offensive in Aleppo and eastern Syria in January, there was an alarming rise of anti-Kurdish hate speech and disinformation, as well as more subtle attempts to undermine the SDF.

For example, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Interior in Damascus, Nour al-Din Baba, referred to them as the “so-called SDF” in an interview with Al Jazeera in late December. In the initial days of the Aleppo offensive, false news was circulated claiming that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi had said that the SDF intended to “fully recapture all of Aleppo.”  Verify Syria debunked this as disinformation. In reality, the SDF had agreed to withdraw and had never controlled all of Aleppo to begin with. Less than a week later, a video clip was circulated on social media claiming to feature a former officer of the Assad regime who was positioned alongside the SDF in Deir Hafer. Verify Syria documented that it was a fake video generated using AI techniques.

The armed groups who carried out the assault on Aleppo have made their own videos where they refer to Kurds as “sheep” or “pigs” and posted them on social media. In one particularly horrific video, which has since been verified, the corpse of a woman was thrown out of a building as men celebrated and chanted Allahu Akhbar. The Kurds identified the woman as having been a member of the Internal Security Forces—according to reports—the very police force created by the Aleppo Agreement.

The Aleppo violence is even more tragic because Damascus and the SDF were on the verge of a larger national agreement to integrate their forces.

According to reporting by Al Monitor, it was Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani who interrupted the last round of US-brokered talks on January 4 between the SDF and Damascus. After abruptly entering the room, he asked that US Brigadier General Kevin Lambert leave the meeting, and promised that the talks would resume on January 8.

But before talks could resume, Damascus launched its assault on Aleppo on January 6.

Moving forward

On January 10, Barrack called for a return to the March 10 and Aleppo agreements.  Turkish Ambassador to Syria Nuh Yilmaz said he also welcomed the return to the Aleppo Agreement, which allows for local governance in the two Kurdish neighborhoods.

In the days that followed, al-Sharaa’s forces continued their offensive against SDF-held areas, capturing large parts of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, areas the SDF had held after defeating the Islamic State. On January 17, US Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper called on al-Sharaa’s forces to “cease any offensive actions.” But the offensive continued. 

As al-Sharaa’s forces moved east, chaos ensued and numerous detention facilities housing Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) militants were opened. According to one report, at least four separate detention facilities were opened, which collectively held some 33,500 ISIS militants. It remains unclear how many have escaped.

Forces aligned with Damascus have also taken videos of themselves desecrating SDF cemeteries in Hasakah in the northeast, an area controlled by the SDF for many years. 

Understanding the origins of the violence in Aleppo is critical. While each side blames the other for the escalation, a full investigation will be needed to establish the facts. But it is equally important to examine the underlying conditions that made this eruption possible. 

The Aleppo Agreement was proof that both decentralization and integration could work in practice.

Damascus had agreed that the two Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo could continue to provide their own local security, could continue to offer Kurdish language instruction, and that women could continue to serve in the police—just not at shared checkpoints with men. Both sides agreed to all of this, illustrating that the two major power blocs could come to a peaceful compromise and coexist. This set an important precedent for how other contested regions of Syria could potentially be integrated.

But Turkey remains influential in these negotiations. As early as 2015, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had said he will “never allow” a Kurdish statelet in Syria. After the fall of the Assad regime, he has continued to publicly state his opposition to  the continuation of Kurdish-led local governance or decentralization in Syria. Al-Sharaa’s desire to assert control over all Syrian territory appears to have aligned with Erdogan’s own opposition to Kurdish self-rule. Furthermore, Erdogan may believe that by dealing the SDF another blow, that he can extract greater concessions from the peace process with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The PKK is a US and EU designated terror organization. The SDF is dominated by the People’s Defense Units (YPG), which Turkey views as an offshoot of the PKK.

On January 16, al-Sharaa announced a presidential decree “affirming the rights of Syrian Kurds.” While this is an important step, it could also be easily revoked by another presidential decree. Meanwhile, al-Sharaa’s forces continued their offensive into Kurdish-held areas. On January 18, a four-day new cease-fire agreement was announced. It has since been extended by another 15 days. This new timeline is divorced from the new realities on the ground.

Rebuilding trust will be even harder than before, and will take time.

Proper vetting of the various armed factions will also take time. The Islamic State militant who killed three US troops in December was a member of the Syrian government’s security forces. Al-Sharaa should prioritize rooting out jihadists from within his own ranks, rather than attempting to seize more territory and subjugate minorities. 

Instead of pressuring the SDF to integrate on a rushed timeline that carries serious risks, President Trump should pressure al-Sharaa to remove sanctioned warlords from his army and guarantee equal citizenship rights for all Syrians. Al-Sharaa must accomplish this through a constitutional guarantee, not a presidential decree that could be easily revoked.

Amy Austin Holmes is a research professor of international affairs and acting director of the Foreign Area Officers Program at George Washington University. Her work focuses on Washington’s global military posture, the NATO alliance, non-state actors, revolutions, military coups, and de-facto states. She is the author of three books, including most recently, “Statelet of Survivors: The Making of a Semi-Autonomous Region in Northeast Syria.”

The post Syria’s Kurds could be al-Sharaa’s partners in rebuilding. Why did Damascus assault them instead? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At the same time, Trump’s current NSS is more explicit than its 2017 predecessor in delineating a hierarchy of regions and interests. Whereas earlier versions still treated the Middle East as a central theater of policy execution, the new strategy bluntly states that not all regions matter equally at all times—and that the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific should receive the lion’s share of strategic attention. The NSS also reinforces the notion that economic security, energy dominance, and revival of the defense industrial base are fundamental to national security, not peripheral to it. Although the NSS is a statutory planning document and therefore binding on departments for implementation, Trump’s foreign policy style has always been adaptive, personalized, and operationally flexible. Thus, the NSS should be treated as a reliable directional guide, one that shapes expectations, alliances, budgeting, and bureaucratic activity, while leaving room for Trump’s preference for personal diplomacy and transactional deal-making where needed.

It is in this context that the Middle East—and particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—emerges not as a downgraded region, but as a strategically redefined one: less central to day-to-day US force planning, yet still pivotal to the administration’s concepts of burden-sharing, deterrence, and regional stabilization.

The Middle East: Enduring interest, but no longer central

Among the most striking elements of the new NSS is its recalibration of the Middle East’s place in US foreign policy. For decades, the region consumed disproportionate diplomatic attention, military deployments, and crisis-management resources because it supplied vital energy, served as a Cold War battleground, and generated conflicts with global spillover potential. Today, those foundations have weakened: the United States is a net energy exporter with greater resilience to supply shocks, and great-power competition now plays out far more in the Indo-Pacific and in technological and economic domains than through Middle Eastern proxy wars.

However, the fact that the Middle East no longer dominates US strategic planning does not imply disengagement or irrelevance. The NSS is careful to define the Middle East as a region of enduring interests that must not be relegated to instability or hostile domination. The United States retains core objectives: preventing any adversarial power from controlling Gulf hydrocarbons or the chokepoints through which they transit, ensuring freedom of navigation of waterways such as the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, countering terrorism and radical movements, supporting Israel’s security, and expanding the normalization dynamic of the Abraham Accords.

The regional focus is therefore shifting from militarized management toward political stabilization, strategic deterrence, investment collaborations, and cost-efficient conflict management. The NSS frames the Middle East increasingly as a zone of partnership, innovation, and capital exchange rather than as the site of long, resource-intensive wars. The NDS adds an important nuance: while confirming that the Middle East is no longer the central theater for US force planning, it explicitly commits to retaining the capability for “focused, decisive action” in the region, illustrated by operations such as Midnight Hammer against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and Rough Rider against the Houthis, while expecting regional actors to manage most of the security workload between such interventions.

Burden-shifting: The GCC as regional security providers

One of the clearest implications for GCC states is the NSS’s burden-shifting logic. Washington does not intend to underwrite regional security in the same way it once did. Instead, the White House expects capable regional actors, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and to a lesser extent Qatar, to assume leadership in securing maritime routes, deterring hostile adventurism, stabilizing proximate conflict zones, and countering terrorist networks. The United States will remain a strategic backstop, especially at the high end of military power, but the NSS encourages a division of labor where Washington leverages diplomatic influence, advanced deterrent capabilities, and intelligence, while expecting Gulf capitals to provide financial, logistical, and regional operational support. The NDS makes this division of labor more explicit by directing the Department of Defense to “empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies,” while the United States concentrates on high-end enablers, surge operations, and global priorities such as homeland defense and the Indo-Pacific.

This is not a sudden change, but rather a deeper institutionalization of trends that have been emerging for a decade. The GCC has long demonstrated an increased appetite for autonomous security roles, whether through counter-piracy patrols, Yemen interventions, Red Sea stabilization efforts, or investments in Central African and Horn of Africa equilibria. Trump’s NSS validates these ambitions and situates them within a US strategic architecture, rather than treating them as ad hoc regional experiments. For Gulf capitals, this recognition is beneficial: their regional activism is not only tolerated, it is encouraged as a core element of maintaining regional stability in lieu of direct US military domination.

From conflict theater to economic and technological platform

Another significant shift in the NSS narrative is the re-casting of the Middle East as an economic, technological, and financial platform, rather than a theater for perpetual conflict. The NSS recognizes that regional leaders have embraced diversification, industrial development, and sovereign wealth strategies that expand beyond hydrocarbons. It also emphasizes US opportunities in nuclear energy, artificial intelligence (AI), defense industrial cooperation, logistics networks, and supply chain localization. The Middle East is treated as an increasingly strategic geography for future economic corridors, especially those linking Africa, South Asia, and the Mediterranean.

This framing aligns neatly with GCC trajectories. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have long sought to position themselves as global logistics hubs, aviation nodes, sovereign wealth investors, and technology accelerators. With the NSS emphasizing US economic security, energy dominance, and domestic manufacturing revival, Gulf states can leverage bilateral partnerships to show how investment projects, whether in nuclear energy, AI, aerospace, or critical minerals, support American jobs, reindustrialization needs, and technological gains. If packaged correctly, a Gulf-US economic deal now has political value in Washington that goes far beyond foreign direct investment: it can be framed as contributing to domestic industrial revival and strategic supply chain safety. The NDS reinforces this economic-security linkage by treating arms sales and defense industrial cooperation with GCC states as part of a broader effort to “supercharge” the US defense industrial base, making Gulf procurement and potential co-production not only a regional stabilizer but also a mechanism for sustaining US military capacity.

From deterrence to decisive operations: The NSS–NDS approach to Iran

The NSS conveys a strong view that Iran’s disruptive influence has weakened due to Israeli military pressure and to targeted US actions designed to degrade Iran’s nuclear potential. However, the situation has shifted dramatically in recent weeks. Widespread protests across Iran, triggered by deep socioeconomic grievances and political repression, have created an atmosphere of internal volatility not fully captured in the NSS released in late 2025. The Trump administration has responded with forceful rhetoric, warning Tehran that further repression or attempted regional escalation could trigger additional US military strikes. These warnings, coupled with reports that Washington is actively considering another limited, targeted strike on Iranian military infrastructure, have generated both reassurance and unease in GCC capitals. Here, the NDS adds two revealing elements: first, it publicly frames Operation Midnight Hammer as having “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program and weakened the regime and its Axis of Resistance. Second, it explicitly states that Gulf partners and Israel are now expected to carry primary responsibility for containing Iran’s conventional and proxy capabilities, with the United States stepping in episodically when decisive force is required.

The ongoing instability in Iran introduces a new variable into the regional equation. While the NSS presents Iran as strategically weakened, current developments demonstrate that internal unrest can make the regime simultaneously vulnerable and unpredictable. The possibility of US kinetic action raises concerns about Iranian retaliation across the Gulf, whether through drones, cyberattacks, missile strikes, or activation of regional proxies. GCC leaders therefore view current tensions through a dual lens: understanding that US pressure aligns with long-standing Gulf concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, yet also wary of the escalation risks that accompany any US–Iran confrontation.

The NSS balances deterrence with an emphasis on pursuing peace deals and post-conflict stabilization, including in Gaza and Syria. Trump’s political style is highly confident about presidential diplomacy and conflict resolution, and the NSS treats mediation as a strategic tool to bring difficult bilateral environments into a more stable architecture. This dynamic underscores that while the NSS prioritizes stability and “realignment through peace,” the Trump administration remains fully prepared to use force when it believes core US and allied interests are threatened, a stance entirely consistent with the NSS’s emphasis on “peace through strength.”

Although this is broadly reassuring for the GCC, residual anxiety remains. If Washington chooses to secure regional stability through big-ticket diplomatic bargains, especially where Russia or Israel are involved, Gulf capitals will expect assurances that their security will not be traded for conflict de-escalation. However, many Gulf leaders now possess significant diplomatic capacity and mediation credibility of their own. The NSS creates an opening for GCC states to position themselves as mediators or stabilizers rather than as passive recipients of US decisions. The Gulf’s growing diplomatic centrality, from Gaza cease-fire talks to Sudan, Libya, or the Horn of Africa, fits well with an NSS that prefers localized responsibility and regional realignment rather than direct US intervention. Still, the current crisis underscores a critical reality: any US–Iran confrontation, even a limited one, will have immediate consequences for Gulf security, energy markets, and maritime stability, reinforcing the importance of GCC preparedness, joint air and missile defense integration, and sustained coordination with Washington as the situation continues to evolve. In this sense, the NDS largely confirms the NSS’s direction of travel but narrows the margin for ambiguity: it signals that future Iran-related crises will be handled through short, sharp US operations nested within a regional architecture in which the GCC and Israel shoulder greater routine responsibility.

Will GCC capitals be surprised or concerned?

Little in the NSS will shock senior decision-makers in the GCC. Most regional governments have already experienced Trump’s approach firsthand, benefitted from strong bilateral ties, and understand that Washington’s foreign policy has permanently moved away from nation-building, democracy promotion, and open-ended security commitments. The more consequential shift in recent weeks has been the intensification of US–Iran tensions, which has temporarily elevated the Gulf within Washington’s strategic focus despite the NSS’s assertion that the region is no longer central. GCC capitals now find themselves preparing for multiple scenarios, ranging from a calibrated US strike on Iran to potential Iranian retaliation, even as they recognize that none of this contradicts the NSS’s underlying logic of deterrence, burden-shifting, and threat-management rather than long-term occupation or nation-building.

Overall, the NSS is more likely to produce re-calibration than alarm. The strategy is consistent with Gulf countries’ expectations that they will be treated as indispensable pillars of regional stability and as partners in defense technology, energy investment, and maritime security. The NDS largely reinforces this assessment: it does not downgrade GCC importance, but instead clarifies the price of being central—greater spending, deeper integration with Israeli and US forces, and a willingness to absorb more day-to-day risk in managing Iran and regional crises.

How the NSS will guide GCC responses

The NSS will provide Gulf policymakers with an actionable framework for deepening relations with Washington. First, Gulf capitals can present themselves as regional security providers, offering maritime patrols, counter-terrorism support, Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab stabilization, and specialized capacity-building. Second, GCC countries can frame investment deals as US industrial wins, emphasizing how AI, aerospace, nuclear, and defense co-production create US jobs and secure American supply chains. Third, Gulf states can symbolically align with Washington on sovereignty narratives, emphasizing secure borders, state authority, and skepticism toward external ideological intervention, areas where their domestic priorities already converge.

Finally, GCC states will possibly manage their relationship with China more carefully, offering Washington assurances that high-sensitivity sectors will remain insulated from Chinese involvement while still leveraging Chinese trade and capital where appropriate. In doing so, Gulf leaders can demonstrate that multi-vectorism increases stability and economic growth without jeopardizing strategic trust.

A strategically manageable landscape

The Trump administration’s NSS is a sophisticated refinement of “America First.” It sets clear priorities, clarifies regional hierarchies, and emphasizes economic and technological competition as the foundation of power. For the GCC, the implications are significant, but manageable. Rather than being marginalized, Gulf partners are now expected to assume greater security responsibility, serve as stabilizers, and act as premium platforms for bilateral economic and technological exchange. The NSS ultimately positions GCC countries not as passive dependents of US security guarantees, but as mature strategic actors capable of shaping their region while deepening mutually beneficial ties to Washington.

Read together with the NDS, the picture becomes sharper: the GCC is central to a burden-sharing model in which the Middle East is no longer the main theater of US strategy, but remains a crucial test case for how America First can combine limited, decisive US force with empowered regional allies to deliver “peace through strength” without returning to the era of open-ended wars.

Kristian Alexander is a senior fellow and lead researcher at the Rabdan Security & Defense Institute (RSDI) in Abu Dhabi.

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Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam urged for the continuation of an international force in south Lebanon during a meeting last week in Paris with French President Emmanuel Macron.

“We will always need an international presence in the south, and preferably a UN presence, given the impartiality and neutrality that only the UN can provide,” he told reporters a day after the meeting.

There is a general understanding that the international community cannot simply abandon south Lebanon once UNIFIL withdraws, especially given that the area remains highly volatile. Despite a November 2024 cease-fire, south Lebanon is subject to near-daily Israeli air strikes against alleged Hezbollah military infrastructure and militants. Nearly 65,000 Lebanese residents of the southern border district are unable to return to their homes in villages heavily damaged by the 2023-2024 war, and by a subsequent campaign of controlled demolitions by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The IDF has constructed five imposing Forward Operating Bases on hills in Lebanese territory and enforces a no-go buffer zone adjacent to the Blue Line, the UN’s term for Lebanon’s southern border.

Given this volatility, some European countries are mulling deploying a new military force to the South Litani Sector (SLS), the 1,057-square-kilometer area between the Blue Line and the Litani river that serves as UNIFIL’s Area of Operations (AO). No concrete proposals have yet emerged; it remains unclear whether the preference is to establish a formal European Union (EU) mission led out of Brussels, to mold an ad hoc coalition of willing countries that would operate under a bilateral agreement with the Lebanese government, or, indeed, to create some other formulation.

Either way, proponents of a new mission to south Lebanon should be modest in their expectations and goals. There is little point in replacing UNIFIL with another military mission that could face the same mandate constrictions and potential threats as experienced by UNIFIL over the past nineteen years since it expanded from two thousand armed observers to a force of more than ten thousand peacekeepers following the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. UNIFIL was seen to have fundamentally failed in its mission, resulting last August in the UN Security Council (UNSC) agreeing to terminate the force at the end of 2026. UNIFIL was unable to halt Israel’s daily aerial violations of Lebanese air space, nor block Hezbollah’s accelerated military expansion in the UNIFIL AO from around 2020, which included erecting observation posts along the Blue Line and even building several firing ranges. If UNIFIL, with its ten thousand troops drawn from more than forty countries, backed by the moral and political weight of the UNSC, ended up impotent before the competing actions, objectives, and interests of Hezbollah and Israel, what makes anyone think that a new European-dominated military force in the SLS would fare any better?

Furthermore, if a proposal emerges for a new EU-dominated military force to deploy into south Lebanon, Hezbollah would vehemently oppose it. Even if the Lebanese government chose to ignore Hezbollah’s objections and approve the mission, the soldiers comprising the new force would be deploying into a hostile and potentially dangerous environment. As UNIFIL knows all too well, Hezbollah controls the public space in the SLS, and it has the proven ability to escalate or de-escalate hostile sentiment toward the peacekeepers according to its will.

That is not to say that the international community should abandon any notion of a military mission to the SLS once UNIFIL departs and simply wash its hands of south Lebanon. There are a number of important stabilizing elements that should be implemented during, and after, UNIFIL’s withdrawal.

The first is the necessity of the international community maintaining an eye on south Lebanon to ensure that the two main players, Hezbollah and Israel, cannot act with unseen impunity. To this extent, it may not be necessary to raise a new military force for south Lebanon. When UNIFIL departs Lebanon in 2027, it will leave in place another, albeit much smaller, UN mission, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

UNTSO Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) has been patrolling the Lebanon-Israel border for nearly eight decades to monitor compliance with the 1949 Armistice Agreement. OGL consists of fifty officers (captains and majors), operates from two patrol bases, and since 2006 has been embedded logistically inside UNIFIL. Perhaps a realistic and suitable solution to the post-UNIFIL vacuum would be to boost OGL’s numbers as required and slightly adjust the mandate to allow it to monitor the cease-fire arrangement and UNSC Resolution 1701 (which in part called for a weapons-free zone between the Litani and Lebanon’s southern border with Israel) as well as its original mission of observing the Armistice Demarcation Line (the original UN name given to the border).

As for any force protection concerns, its unarmed status and lack of any mandate enforcement capacity mean Hezbollah should not object to its expansion and continued presence. Furthermore, UNTSO-OGL has an institutional experience of operating alone in a worsening security environment. In the mid-1970s, before UNIFIL arrived in March 1978, the Palestine Liberation Organization was deeply entrenched in south Lebanon from where it launched attacks into Israel. The IDF erected a security fence along the border, maintained day-time observation positions just inside Lebanese territory, and regularly staged cross-border air strikes and commando raids, a situation not greatly removed from the one that exists today. Through all that, UNTSO-OGL diligently patrolled, observed, and reported.

A second critical element of stability is the continued maintenance of a tactical liaison channel between the Lebanese and Israelis. UNIFIL has long served as a vital intermediary between Lebanon and Israel, providing a trusted tactical-level channel for communication, de-escalation, and incident management along the Blue Line that has helped contain crises that might otherwise have spiraled into wider confrontation. Currently, there is a group composed of delegates from Lebanon, Israel, France, the United States, and UNIFIL, known as the “Mechanism,” which was formed after the November 2024 cease-fire agreement. The Mechanism has been criticized for focusing more on the process of disarming Hezbollah rather than ensuring both sides adhere to the cease-fire. Nevertheless, in November, Lebanon and Israel added civilian diplomats to the Mechanism, allowing for a potential expansion of discussions away from purely military matters directly related to the SLS. In the absence of such a third-party interlocutor, routine incidents, misunderstandings, or localized clashes would carry a far higher risk of rapid escalation, miscalculation, and unintended conflict between two adversaries with no direct diplomatic or military liaison mechanisms.

The third imperative for prolonged stability in the SLS is to ensure continued international support for the LAF. The LAF is seriously overstretched with a required deployment of up to ten thousand troops into south Lebanon, while simultaneously reinforcing its presence along the potentially volatile border with Syria as well as its daily internal security taskings. This is where foreign military support to Lebanon could be more usefully employed. Instead of dispatching a new military mission to south Lebanon to emulate UNIFIL’s vague mandate of supporting a weapons-free zone south of the Litani, a small LAF support mission could focus on enabling a sustained LAF presence in the SLS through logistics, training, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance sharing, mobility support, and joint planning, areas where the LAF’s constraints are structural rather than political. This would shift the optics and substance of enforcement away from foreign troops and toward the Lebanese state with the LAF at the center of security provision. This new mission could operate in coordination with, and alongside, an expanded UNTSO-OGL, leaving monitoring tasks to the latter while the former concentrates on supporting the LAF.

Additionally, indirect support for the LAF could be achieved by bolstering the capabilities of the Internal Security Forces (ISF), Lebanon’s police force. For decades, the LAF has had to compensate for the ISF’s weaknesses by engaging in public order operations and pursuit of criminals which should be the remit of the ISF. ISF capacity building would in time allow the LAF to divert its scant resources to its core tasks of maintaining security and protecting the borders.

The imminent departure of UNIFIL, after nearly five decades of presence in south Lebanon, offers opportunities to redress the failings of the UN mission by adopting realistic and focused alternatives. Those alternatives could combine a monitoring and reporting capacity, a third-party tactical liaison channel to allow communication between Lebanon and Israel, and strengthening support to the LAF. A failure by the international community to deliver the requisite support risks overstretching the LAF to a breaking point, paving the way for a potential resurgence of Hezbollah in the SLS and further aggressive behavior from the IDF, which could lead to the resumption of a broader conflict.

Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, covering the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria. He is an acknowledged expert on Lebanese Hezbollah. Blanford is a Beirut-based defense and security consultant.

The post When UNIFIL leaves, south Lebanon still needs an international presence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With Ukraine’s Western partners unlikely to defend the country against a new Russian invasion, the most realistic option is to build up Kyiv’s own military capabilities. This process is already well underway. Since 2022, the Ukrainian army has expanded dramatically to become by far the largest fighting force in Europe and a world leader in drone warfare. Ukraine’s transformation into a major European military power has been supported by the country’s allies, who have provided large quantities of weapons and equipment along with the financial support needed to power the rapid expansion of the Ukrainian defense industry.

The growing strength of the Ukrainian military has been instrumental in stemming the tide of Russia’s invasion. Despite holding the battlefield initiative throughout 2025, Putin’s army was able to seize less than one percent of Ukrainian territory while suffering heavy losses. The priority now is to freeze the front lines further and reach a point where even minor Russian advances become increasingly unfeasible. However, effective defenses alone will not be enough to end the war or prevent a new Russian invasion. In order to deter Putin, Ukraine must also be able to strike back effectively at targets across Russia.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s arsenal of long-range weapons has evolved significantly since 2022. Over the past four years, the country has managed to develop a variety of strike drones with the capacity to reach targets located well over a thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Ukraine also now boasts an expanding selection of domestically produced cruise missiles. This enhanced long-range firepower has made it possible for Ukraine to conduct an escalating bombing campaign inside Russia that has already changed the geography of the war.

Since summer 2025, long-range Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory have reached record highs. Ukraine has struck dozens of military facilities and defense industry enterprises, while also paying special attention to the oil and gas infrastructure that fuels the Russian war economy. Ukraine has hit refineries, pipelines, oil rigs, ports, and a number of tankers belonging to the Kremlin’s so-called shadow fleet. These strikes have complicated the logistics of the invasion while contributing to a significant decline in Russia’s energy export revenues.

In addition to hampering the Kremlin war machine and causing economic damage, Ukraine’s mounting campaign of long-range strikes has also had a major psychological impact that is helping to bring home the reality of the war to the Russian public. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin has worked hard to shield ordinary Russians and contain the conflict within the borders of Ukraine. However, with air raid sirens becoming an increasingly routine feature of daily life in Russian towns and cities, the Putin regime is no longer able to control the narrative.

A recent survey conducted by Russia’s only remaining independent pollster, the Levada Center, has highlighted the impact Ukrainian strikes are having on Russian public sentiment. Asked to name the most notable event of the past year, 28 percent of respondents cited Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian cities and industrial facilities, making this the third most popular answer. Clearly, Ukraine’s long-range bombing campaign has succeeded in breaking through the Kremlin propaganda bubble and has made a strong impression on the Russian population.

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For Ukraine’s partners, the objective now should be to boost Ukraine’s long-range capabilities to the maximum in order to equip the country with the kind of strike power that can deter Russia. Numerous Western leaders have shied away from providing Kyiv with long-range missiles from their own arsenals due to escalation fears. The solution is simple: Western partners should focus their efforts on helping Ukraine produce sufficient quantities of drones and missiles domestically.

Ukrainian officials are well aware that the ability to hit targets across the Russian Federation may be their country’s most effective security guarantee against further Kremlin aggression. They are now appealing to Kyiv’s international partners for increased support as they seek to exploit the country’s considerable spare defense industry production capacity and crank up output.

“The modern arms race is not about nukes. It is about millions of cheap drones. Those who can scale up production quicker will secure peace,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha in late 2025. “This requires quick and sufficient funding for Ukraine’s defense industry, which is now the greatest source of defense innovation in the world. We can produce up to twenty million drones next year if we get sufficient funding.”

Throughout the past year of faltering US-led peace efforts, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that he has no intention of ending the invasion. As long as the war is being fought predominantly inside Ukraine, he is unlikely to change his position, regardless of Russian combat losses. However, if Ukrainian drone and missile strikes inside Russia continue to expand during 2026, the economic and social impact may become too serious to ignore. This could force Putin to abandon his stalling tactics and finally enter into genuine negotiations. It would also oblige him to think carefully before restarting his invasion in the years ahead.

Serhii Kuzan is chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). He formerly served as an adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (2022-2023) and as an advisor to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (2014).

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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As Ukraine focuses on preventing further Russian advances and solidifying the front lines of the war, Kyiv has invested consideration resources in a major upgrade of the country’s defenses. This has resulted in what Britain’s The Economist recently described as a “massive fortification system” up to two hundred meters in depth covering much of the Ukrainian battlefield. “Ukraine now has the fortress belt it wishes it had in 2022,” the publication reported in early January.

Physical obstacles play an important role in this approach. Anti-tank ditches, razor wire, and concrete obstacles are layered to slow Russian advances. Defensive lines are often spaced within mortar range of one another, allowing Ukrainian units to trade space for time and counterattack against exposed enemy assault groups before they have had an opportunity to consolidate. The emphasis is on attrition and disruption rather than rigid territorial defense.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s defensive strategy goes far beyond a reliance on traditional static barriers. Over the past year, there has also been a growing emphasis on dispersed, concealed, and flexible defensive networks. These small-scale fortified positions are often located underground or embedded in tree lines at strategic locations, and are supported by remote fires and decoys. Each individual node in these networks is designed to shape enemy movement rather than stop it outright, channeling attackers into deliberately prepared kill pockets without exposing defenders. By creating choke points for Russian troops, Ukraine aims to maximize Kremlin casualties and capitalize on its in-built advantages as the defending party in a war of attrition.

There are growing signs that this approach is working. Ukraine’s top military commander Oleksandr Syrskyi commented recently that the current strategy has proved particularly effective on the Pokrovsk front, which has witnessed some of the heaviest fighting of the entire war over the past year. According to Syrskyi, “timely and high-quality fortifications and engineering obstacles” enabled Ukrainian forces to inflict maximum losses on Russian units close to Pokrovsk and disrupt their plans, even when facing numerical superiority.

Where Ukrainian defenses have failed, the reasons are instructive. In areas such as Toretsk and parts of the Kharkiv front, troop rotations occurred without sufficient time or equipment to construct proper fortifications, leading to Russian gains. Constant Russian drone surveillance made the use of heavy engineering machinery dangerous, leaving units unprepared when assaults followed. These cases serve as confirmation that fortifications are not optional enhancements but foundational to battlefield survival under drone saturated conditions.

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Drones are at the heart of Ukraine’s defensive strategy, serving as a ubiquitous presence over kill zones and preventing localized Russian advances from consolidating into more substantial breakthroughs. Meanwhile, in some sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk, ground robotic systems are now being used to deliver the vast majority of supplies to troops. With this in mind, Ukrainian commanders argue that all future defensive lines should be optimized for both aerial and ground drones.

These technological advances do not eliminate the need for manpower. Even the most sophisticated fortifications require soldiers to react to emerging threats. When Russian units manage to infiltrate defensive lines or push into urban areas, infantry forces remain essential in order to clear and secure ground. While Ukraine’s improved fortifications are an encouraging development for the war-weary nation, no physical barrier can realistically stop Russia unless it is supported by sufficient quantities of well-trained troops.

Strengthening Ukraine’s fortifications and addressing manpower shortages will be among the top priorities for incoming Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, who took up his post this week. Fedorov made his name in government as Minister of Digital Transformation. Since 2022, he has been one of the driving forces behind Ukraine’s rapidly expanding drone warfare capabilities.

Fedorov’s extensive defense tech background, along with his reputation as a modernizer who has countered institutional corruption through the digitalization of state services, has led to considerable optimism over his appointment. He is now faced with the twin challenges of improving Ukraine’s front line defenses while addressing the mobilization and desertion problems hindering the Ukrainian war effort. If he is able to make progress on these two fronts, Ukraine’s prospects for 2026 and beyond will begin to look a lot better.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s enhanced fortifications are increasing the cost of Putin’s invasion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This followed a series of similar recent statements from Kremlin officials reiterating Moscow’s uncompromising position and dismissing a 20-point peace plan prepared by Ukraine, Europe, and the United States. Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared in December that Russia’s war aims in Ukraine will be met “unconditionally” and vowed to “liberate” what he termed as Russia’s “historical lands.”

Moscow’s approach toward peace talks has remained consistently uncooperative ever since US President Donald Trump returned to the White House one year ago. While Putin has been careful not to directly rebuff Trump in order to avoid provoking fresh sanctions, there have been ample indications that the Kremlin is not ready to engage seriously in US-led diplomatic efforts. Instead, Russia seems intent on stalling for time while escalating its invasion.

There are no signs that this trend will change anytime soon. Despite mounting economic challenges on the home front amid falling energy export revenues, Russia’s defense budget for 2026 remains close to record highs. Moscow will continue to prioritize domestic drone production this year, while also allocating large sums to finance the system of generous bonus payments and salaries for army recruits who volunteer to serve in Ukraine.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia’s refusal to embrace the idea of a compromise peace should come as no surprise. After all, Putin has built his entire reign around the promise of restoring Russian greatness and reversing the perceived humiliations of the Soviet collapse. After nearly four years of full-scale war, a negotiated settlement that secured Ukraine’s status as an independent country would represent a major political failure.

Since 2022, Kremlin officials and Russian state media have consistently portrayed the invasion of Ukraine as an existential struggle against Western aggression with the aim of establishing a new world order and returning Russia to its rightful place as a great power. However, a peace deal based on the current line of contact would leave approximately 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and firmly anchored in the West. Such an outcome would be viewed in Moscow as an historic Russian defeat.

This framing creates a political trap of Moscow’s own making. Putin knows he would face a potentially disastrous domestic backlash if he accepted anything less than a clear Russian victory in Ukraine. Peace terms that failed to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit would raise difficult questions about the enormous costs of the invasion. Russians would want to know why the country had spent vast sums of money and sacrificed so many men in order to achieve so little. Putin would risk entering Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Putin has begun 2026 in a challenging position. He remains reluctant to upset Trump, but he dare not accept the compromise peace the US leader is proposing. Instead, Putin needs either total victory in Ukraine or indefinite conflict. Any attempt to end the war without establishing complete political control over Ukraine would threaten the stability of Putin’s own regime. His interests are therefore best served by seeking to prolong negotiations while working toward a military solution.

If Western leaders wish to change the current political calculus in Moscow, they must first acknowledge that there is no alternative to increasing the pressure on Putin. At present, the Kremlin dictator views escalation as necessary for regime survival and has no plans to end the war.

Two scenarios could disrupt this trajectory. A collapse in global oil prices combined with successful secondary sanctions enforcement could create an economic crisis that would force Putin to revise his priorities. Alternatively, mass casualties during a failed spring 2026 Russian offensive could trigger domestic instability, while also highlighting the fading prospects of a military breakthrough.

Both these outcomes are realistic but would require significant additional action from Ukraine’s partners. If the West is unable to muster the requisite political will, escalation remains Moscow’s most rational path in 2026. Putin has little choice but to continue his invasion. Even if Russian victory remains out of reach in the coming year, he knows he cannot accept any peace deal that secures Ukrainian statehood.

William Dixon is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Service Institute specialising in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security. 

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jan 7, 2026

Ukraine security guarantees are futile without increased pressure on Putin

By Peter Dickinson

Western leaders have hailed progress toward “robust” security guarantees for Ukraine this week, but until Putin faces increased pressure to make peace, Russia will remain committed to continuing the war, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict France

UkraineAlert Jan 8, 2026

Russia’s war on Ukrainian farmers threatens global food security

By Oleksandr Tolokonnikov

By attacking Ukrainian farmers, Russia seeks to undermine Ukraine’s food security, just as it targets the country’s energy infrastructure to deprive the civilian population of access to electricity and heating, writes Oleksandr Tolokonnikov.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Jan 8, 2026

Ukraine’s robot army will be crucial in 2026 but drones can’t replace infantry

By David Kirichenko

Ukraine’s growing robot army of land drones will play a vital role in the country’s defense during 2026, but they are not wonder weapons and cannot serve as a miracle cure for Kyiv’s manpower shortages, writes David Kirichenko.

Artificial Intelligence Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Putin cannot accept any peace deal that secures Ukrainian statehood appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In a sharp decrease from the past level of military assistance for Ukraine, the NDAA includes $400 million in funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) for new arms intended for Ukraine for 2026 and 2027. To put this into context, the April 2024 Ukraine supplemental aid bill included nearly $14 billion in USAI funding.

Even so, the bill is a significant step given that Washington has ended almost all direct assistance to Ukraine. The Trump administration still holds billions in authority for USAI but hasn’t made use of the program, instead opting to sell arms to Ukraine via European allies.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

In June, the Department of Defense redirected 20,000 anti-drone air defense interceptors specially made for Ukraine under USAI to Israel and US forces in the Middle East. Congress is now using the NDAA to make it more difficult for the Pentagon to repeat this, while also requiring that any arms redirected into US stocks are ultimately replaced for Ukraine.

Though Congress doesn’t expect the White House to make use of USAI in the near future, the NDAA modifies the program so that these funds will now remain available until 2029. As the Trump administration looks for ways to both revitalize the US defense industrial base and provide Ukraine with credible security arrangements, USAI could make a return as a useful way to bolster Ukraine’s defenses.

During 2025, the Trump administration has sought to pressure Ukraine with the prospect of withholding US intelligence support. The NDAA creates strict new reporting requirements to discourage any such moves. As recently as November, the White House said that unless Kyiv agreed to a new US proposal to end the war, it would stop sending weapons and providing the intelligence Ukraine uses in its defense, including to detect Russian air raids.

The new legislation requires the US Secretary of Defense to submit reports to Congress within 48 hours of any decision to “pause, terminate, or otherwise restrict or materially downgrade intelligence support, including information, intelligence, and imagery collection,” to Ukraine. This does not concretely prevent the administration from ending intelligence support, but it is a clear signal from Congress that any action to do so would be met with sharp political backlash.

The NDAA also creates significant new reporting requirements related to the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), the primary mechanism for arms sales to Ukraine. In order to increase the transparency of the PURL system, Congress will use its oversight power to mandate quarterly reports.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

The NDAA includes the Abducted Ukrainian Children Recovery and Accountability Act, a bipartisan bill introduced by Senators Chuck Grassley (R-IA) and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) to support efforts to locate, return, and rehabilitate Ukrainian children abducted by Russia. The mass abduction of Ukrainian children has united Republicans and Democrats in Washington. In early December, Congress held a hearing with Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States and experts working to rescue and rehabilitate abducted children.

The bill authorizes the State Department and Department of Justice to assist Ukraine in locating and returning Ukrainian children as well as prisoners of war and civilian detainees, and to support the rehabilitation of returned children and seek accountability for the Russians who abducted them. It also authorizes the Secretary of State to provide support to Ukraine’s government and civil society groups in providing rehabilitation services for victims.

The NDAA includes the best legislative support from Congress that Ukraine has received all year. At the same time, it also underscores the dramatic reduction in overall US support for Ukraine during 2025.

As it stands, unless Congress exercises its foreign policy powers, efforts to end Russia’s invasion will be stymied by limited US assistance to Ukraine. However, there are some signs that Congress is taking critical steps forward. Recently, Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA) reportedly worked with Democrats to advance a discharge petition to force a vote on Russia sanctions and potential new military assistance to Ukraine. If passed, new Russia sanctions could deliver a much-needed shot in the arm to the Trump administration’s peace efforts.

While it includes measures that will be welcomed by Kyiv, the NDAA’s Ukraine provisions are largely about mitigating potential harm from the Trump administration. In order to provide significant new material assistance to Ukraine, Congress will need to advance other legislation that it has so far kept on ice while awaiting approval from the White House.

Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and the deputy director for policy and strategy at Razom for Ukraine, a nonprofit humanitarian aid and advocacy organization.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 16, 2025

The only winner from Ukrainian wartime elections would be Putin

By Yuriy Boyechko

Ukrainians are fighting to defend their democracy against Kremlin authoritarianism, but they are also in no rush to hold wartime elections amid relentless Russian bombardment and with millions of Ukrainians displaced, writes Yuriy Boyechko.

Conflict Elections

UkraineAlert Dec 11, 2025

Russia’s insistence on a defenseless Ukraine betrays Putin’s true intentions

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s key demands during US-led peace talks all appear designed to leave Ukraine disarmed and defenseless. This is a clear indication of Vladimir Putin’s intention to continue his invasion and complete the conquest of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Dec 10, 2025

Russian drones and blackouts test the resilience of Ukraine’s second city

By Maria Avdeeva

With Putin’s army now advancing to the east and the Russian bombardment of civilian targets intensifying, Kharkiv residents are now facing what may become the most difficult winter of the entire war, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Defense Technologies Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post What’s in the new US defense bill for Ukraine? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In Season 2, Episode 13 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by the Iraqi political analyst Mohammed Salih to discuss the legion of Iraqi men turning up on the frontlines of the war in Ukraine. They explore how poverty and political dysfunction in Iraq have been weaponised by mercenary recruitment networks – and how death in Europe has been packaged as an economic opportunity. They consider the possible complicity of prominent Iran-backed militias in Iraq, or even parts of the Iraqi state itself, and the ways in which Iraq’s recent history has made the sale of martial services a normalised part of survival.

Mohammed also talks listeners through the implications of Iraq’s November elections, which he describes as the most expensive in its history, with an average of $4-5 million paid in patronage spending for each seat. He also reflects on recent attacks against Iraqi Kurdistan by suspected Iranian proxies, and what options there might be for “disarming” pro-Iran militias in Iraq.

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it examines the causes and implications of the increasing use of mercenaries in armed conflicts.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare reveals about the world we currently inhabit, the future of the international system, and what war may look like in the coming decades.

Podcast Jan 30, 2025

“No, really”: American PMCs in Gaza

By Alia Brahimi

Host Alia Brahimi chats with modern warfare expert Andreas Krieg about the sudden deployment of three private military companies to the Netzarim corridor in the Gaza Strip.

Conflict Crisis Management

Podcast Jul 30, 2024

‘I was a Blackwater mercenary in Iraq’

By Alia Brahimi

Host Alia Brahimi is joined by former Blackwater contractor Morgan Lerette to reflect on Loretta’s experience a private military contractor in Iraq.

Conflict Defense Industry

Podcast Mar 3, 2025

Mercenaries in DRC: “Do not come for adventure here”

By Alia Brahimi

After 300 Romanian mercenaries were cornered by M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo in January, Ben reflects on the reasons behind the rebels’ advance, as well as the perennial need for DRC’s government to look to external security providers for help with managing threats.

Africa Arms Control

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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The post “Youth as merchandise”: Iraqi mercenaries in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The fact that Pakistan’s commitment pales in comparison with the US contribution to Saudi security quickly led commentators to dismiss the defense pact as a mere message to the United States that Riyadh would pursue other partners. Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman’s visit to Washington in early November and the accompanying arms sales (including the F-35s) further supported this view. However, this framing of the Saudi-Pakistani deal omitted one significant dimension: its negative implications for India. In fact, the agreement is much more consequential and more detrimental to Indian interests in the Middle East than to the United States.

Saudi-Pakistani ties are nothing new. Both countries have long-standing ties that involve Pakistan’s migrant labor and close security cooperation. Saudi armed forces have historically relied on Pakistani officers for training purposes. Since 1963, Pakistani soldiers have regularly been deployed to secure the kingdom’s territory, including holy cities like Mecca and Medina. Back in the 1980s, the intelligence services of both countries coordinated (with the United States) their support and training of the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia is also widely believed to have financially supported Pakistan’s nuclear program.

For a long time, this Pakistani influence in Saudi Arabia—and, to a lesser extent, across the Gulf—limited India’s ability to expand its footprint in the area. India’s presence in the Gulf is first a matter of its diaspora: Approximately 9.7 million Indians live in the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In 2024, they sent $47 billion in remittances back home. However, over the past decade, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s premiership went beyond this demographic dimension and raised Indian ambitions to become a strategic player in the Gulf. Modi’s policy toward the region translated into a surge in high-level visits. It also included new trade deals, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement of 2022, and Gulf investments to support the modernization of Indian infrastructure. Finally, it also involved greater cooperation on security issues, such as counterterrorism and maritime security.

It helped that during this period, Gulf-Pakistani diplomatic relations deteriorated. In March 2015, after Saudi Arabia formed a coalition to intervene in Yemen against the Houthi insurgency, Pakistan declined Riyadh’s request to participate. Islamabad’s refusal angered Saudi and Emirati officials, who saw it as an ungrateful move from a country that relied heavily on Gulf financial support to avoid bankruptcy. Seen from Abu Dhabi or Riyadh, the growing gap between India, a rising power, and Pakistan, a nation on the brink of financial collapse, prompted Gulf leaders to reevaluate their South Asian partnerships.

However, ten years later, India’s momentum has slowed down. Many Gulf investments in India took years to materialize due to the local byzantine bureaucracy, casting doubt on Delhi’s ability to become the great power it aims to be. As a result, the Asia-Gulf partnerships that truly took off during that period were with China, not India.

And just like with Pakistan, Gulf states moved closer to China in sensitive areas that directly undermined Indian interests. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE procured missiles and unmanned systems from China. Then Western governments started suspecting that the UAE and Oman had been discussing with Beijing the provision of Chinese warships with a permanent facility in their ports. The prospect of Chinese naval basing in the Gulf triggered warning signals in Washington. But the presence of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy in Oman, whose shores are about 2,084 kilometers from India, is an even bigger worry for Delhi. 

Until recently, Indian officials were careful not to pressure their Gulf partners (at least publicly) on policies that ran counter to Delhi’s interests. When asked, Indian diplomats acknowledge that the scope of Beijing’s influence in the Gulf may be worrisome, but, as elsewhere in Asia, they also recognize that India can’t yet compete with China in the Middle East on business deals or security cooperation.

Likewise, in my discussions with Gulf officials and intellectuals, India is rarely mentioned in their strategic equation, as if the only actual great power competitors that matter in Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, or Muscat are Beijing and Washington. That is not to say India is neglected, but it is seen as an Asian power—not a global one—that mainly represents a destination for investments and a potential partner on regional issues. In other words, Gulf states believe they can decouple their India policies from their China and Pakistan ones, and Indian officials do not challenge that belief.

The gap between Gulf and Indian perceptions stems from Delhi’s lack of a clear regional ambition. To date, India has not articulated a strategy for the Middle East or the Gulf. China has one (to promote trade and investment while refraining from domestic interference), and so does the United States (to deter Iran, counter terrorist organizations, and contain China’s influence).

Conversely, India only has a collection of bilateral relations. Some remain strong (Israel, the UAE); others are stable, though limited (Saudi Arabia, Iran). Altogether, they do not form a cohesive regional strategy. This is not because Delhi cannot develop one, but because not having one allows its decision-makers to avoid facing inconvenient contradictions in those bilateral policies. For example, India heavily relies on Israel for military procurement (the third supplier of Indian arms imports), but it keeps buying oil from Iran. The Modi government supported Israel for most of its Gaza operation after October 7, but it also increased its financial aid to the United Nations’ Palestinian relief agency, UNRWA, despite Jerusalem’s allegations of ties between the agency and Hamas. (The International Court of Justice rejected in October Israel’s allegations about UNRWA “infiltration by Hamas”).

Indian diplomats may argue that it exemplifies their multi-aligned approach, i.e., maintaining good relations with everyone. However, this multi-alignment can have adverse effects for India, especially when Gulf states adopt it as well and deepen security cooperation with China and Pakistan—the two most significant security threats to India’s national security. 

Eventually, India’s difficulties in the Gulf also affect US policy. Over the past five years, Washington has viewed India as a potential new partner in the Middle East. It has engaged Delhi in several new initiatives, including I2U2 (alongside Israel and the UAE), and the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor. However, if Gulf states increase their strategic engagement with China and Pakistan, that will weaken India’s ability to play such a role and could jeopardize the development of those initiatives. US diplomats should take stock of those constraints on Washington’s plans.

Despite these challenges, India’s Middle East policy could still evolve. Noticeably, after Riyadh announced its new defense agreement with Pakistan, Delhi did not stay silent. Asked by the media, the spokesperson from India’s Ministry of External Affairs emphasized the need for Saudi Arabia to remember “sensitivities” surrounding its pact with Pakistan. The diplomat did not dwell on it, but his statement revealed that multi-alignment eventually has its limits. It’ll be worth watching if India also gets more vocal when Gulf states engage with China in the security domain. When push comes to shove, if India wants to be treated as a major power in the Middle East, it must develop a clearer and more assertive regional strategy.

Jean-Loup Samaan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a senior research fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore.

The post Is India losing clout in the Gulf? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Trump’s team is now working with counterparts in Ukraine and the rest of Europe to agree on a potential common framework for a settlement with Russia. Despite tensions between Republicans in Congress worried by White House pressure on Kyiv, US efforts to end the war will only be strengthened by a more activist Congress that resumes legislating on foreign policy.

The original US plan envisioned a peace built on twenty-eight points. These included a cap on Ukraine’s armed forces, a ban on Ukraine joining NATO, and the surrender of some of the most heavily fortified land in eastern Ukraine to Moscow.

The proposal drew criticism from a number of congressional Republicans. “Those who think pressuring the victim and appeasing the aggressor will bring peace are kidding themselves,” wrote Senator Mitch McConnell, who likened the plan to “a capitulation like [former US President Joe] Biden’s abandonment of Afghanistan.”

“This so-called ‘peace plan’ has real problems, and I am highly skeptical it will achieve peace,” said Roger Wicker, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

A Wall Street Journal report that Trump would withhold arms sales to Ukraine if Kyiv didn’t accept the proposal by Thanksgiving elicited a rebuke from Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick, who wrote: “Correction: The United States wants Russia’s answer on an unconditional withdrawal of Ukraine by Thursday. This Russian-drafted propaganda must be rejected and disregarded for the unserious nonsense that it is.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Comments from US Vice President JD Vance indicate that the White House has received significant pushback from Republicans in Congress over its recent handling of the Russia-Ukraine peace process. “The level of passion over this one issue when your own country has serious problems is bonkers,” he posted on November 24.

Perhaps the biggest challenge to the Trump administration’s position on Ukraine peace talks has come from Fitzpatrick, who filed a discharge petition to force a vote in the House of Representatives on Russia sanctions once a majority of members have signed on. This is the same mechanism used in 2024 to pressure Speaker of the House Mike Johnson to pass a $61 billion aid package for Ukraine.

A more prominent congressional role in Russia-Ukraine peace efforts would mark a departure from recent trends. At present, 2025 is the first year since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion that Congress has not passed any legislation to assist Ukraine. From the US-Ukraine minerals deal to shuttle diplomacy in Istanbul and arms sales to NATO, the White House has made it clear that ending the war in Ukraine is Trump’s portfolio.

This helps to explain why the Sanctioning Russia Act, introduced in April 2025 by Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), has gone nearly eight months without a vote despite pledges of support from 85 percent of senators. Originally written to signal strong congressional support for Russia sanctions, the legislation has since undergone technical changes to improve the effectiveness of the sanctions and gain Trump’s approval, according to congressional staff.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Fitzpatrick’s initiative could now change things. The discharge petition, which he says would force a vote on a version of the Sanctioning Russia Act and potentially also the Democrat-led Ukraine Support Act, which includes both sanctions and new military support for Kyiv, could mobilize Republicans uneasy with current peace efforts.

After nearly a year of deferring to Trump to manage a peace process, Republican criticism in Congress is growing. “The President’s appeasement plan to Russia is forcing our hand,” commented Rep. Don Bacon (R-NE), who says he considered resigning from Congress in protest over the recently proposed peace plan.

To force a vote, the discharge petition will require majority support from House members. Most Democrats will likely back the move, though some are privately sharing concerns about granting Trump increased authority to levy tariffs, should that provision remain in the final legislation attached to the petition. A handful of Republicans could push it over the line.

Further action to back Ukraine and pressure Russia is likely to find support among Trump’s base. Fresh polling from the right-leaning Vandenberg Coalition found that only 16 percent of Trump voters agree with the proposal that Ukraine should surrender territory to the Kremlin, while 76 percent support sanctioning Russia.

The reality is that without serious additional pressure on Russia, Putin is unlikely to agree to any of the peace frameworks currently being floated. However, if Congress pushes to enact crippling sanctions, extend military assistance to Ukraine, and codify security guarantees, the Trump administration’s peace efforts could finally bear fruit.

The last few days have shown that Congress is eager to help Trump force Russia to end its war in Ukraine. Capitalizing on the revised peace framework agreed by US and Ukrainian negotiators in Switzerland will now require action from both sides of Pennsylvania Avenue.

Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He also serves as deputy director for policy and strategy at Razom for Ukraine, a US-based nonprofit humanitarian aid and advocacy organization.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 18, 2025

Vladimir Putin fears entering Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Throughout his reign, Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin has become increasingly obsessed with the idea of erasing Ukrainian independence, but his decision to invade has backfired disastrously, eroding centuries of Russian influence and accelerating Ukraine’s European integration, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Oct 23, 2025

Russia’s ‘human safari’ in southern Ukraine is a warning to the world

By Oleksandr Tolokonnikov

Russia’s escalating campaign of drone attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine’s Kherson region highlights the destructive power of modern drone technologies, writes Oleksandr Tolokonnikov.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Nov 20, 2025

Any serious Ukraine peace plan must address Putin’s imperial ambitions

By Mykola Bielieskov

The new US plan to end the war in Ukraine fails to recognize that Putin is not driven by limited political goals. He believes he is engaged in an existential struggle to revive Russia’s great power status and will never accept a compromise peace, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Trump’s latest Ukraine peace proposal sparks strong Republican reaction appeared first on Atlantic Council.

South Korea and Australia have consistently built upon cooperation as two “middle powers” in a region of ever-growing global importance and dynamism. At the same time, the two countries have bolstered their respective alliances with the United States, building regional bilateral and multilateral collaboration. Ultimately, capitalizing on the potential for growing collaboration and cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Australia could be key to maintaining security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. However, when it comes to bringing several countries together in a collaborative environment, there are inherent challenges to reaching a consensus.

To meet that challenge, the Atlantic Council and the Korea Foundation gathered mid-career and junior experts from the United States, South Korea, and Australia in two private workshops. The group identified several obstacles to cooperation—namely, differing geostrategic circumstances, diverging threat perceptions, different strategies for engaging with China, and a lack of consistent engagement between the countries. Despite this, there are several key opportunities to bolster cooperation—namely, defense industrial cooperation, joint endeavors in science and technology, developing maritime security, and collaborating on engaging additional partner countries and multilaterals.

The rising generation of policymakers we spoke with zeroed in on four ways to improve the trilateral relationship:

• cultivate defense industry collaboration and public-private cooperation;
• institutionalize relationships and expand joint exercises;
• foster expanded R&D of critical technologies; and
• develop disaster-resilient infrastructure projects and early warning systems.

Lauren D. Gilbert is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In this role, she oversees research and programming focused on engaging with US, allied, and partner governments and other key stakeholders to shape strategies and policies to mitigate the most important rising security challenges facing the region.

Kester Abbott is a research associate at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and a non-resident James A. Kelly Korea fellow at the Pacific Forum. He works on US Indo-Pacific strategy, defense industry issues, and Northeast Asian security dynamics, with a focus on South Korean foreign relations.

Hannah Heewon Seo is the events administrator at The Australia Institute, with a background in international affairs organizations in Australia and South Korea. Her focus centers on foreign relations and diplomacy, particularly engagement with the Asia-Pacific, and the opinions expressed do not represent those of The Australia Institute.

New Atlanticist Aug 26, 2025

Five questions (and expert answers) about where the US-South Korea alliance goes from here

By Atlantic Council experts

The US and South Korean presidents met on Monday in Washington to discuss a range of bilateral issues, from security to shipbuilding.

Korea Nuclear Deterrence

Issue Brief Sep 11, 2024

A next-generation agenda: Bridging Indo-Pacific and European perspectives on security

By Lauren Gilbert, Malthe Munkøe, Hyunseung David Yu

This next generation agenda proposes policy recommendations designed to improve security cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and European NATO countries in the context of current global security threats, diverging national security perspectives, and imminent leadership changes.

Economy & Business Europe & Eurasia

Issue Brief Dec 20, 2022

A next-generation agenda for US-ROK-Japan cooperation

By Lauren D. Gilbert, Kyoko Imai

Trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea has proved challenging over the years, owing largely to historical tensions. As a result, this project has sought perspectives from next-generation leaders of the three countries to define areas where targeted, flexible, and informal cooperative arrangements can provide clear mutual benefit to all.

Coronavirus East Asia

The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.

Learn more

The post A next-generation agenda: South Korea-US-Australia security cooperation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A coup that promised stability—and delivered chaos

When Colonel Assimi Goïta seized power in back-to-back coups in 2020 and 2021, he vowed the “refoundation” of a sovereign and secure Mali. Instead, the Malian army—trained to fight terrorism—ended up dismantling what was left of the state’s institutional foundations.

Initially expected to strengthen the military, the power grab only deepened its divisions, splitting the army between privileged loyalists of the regime and those sent to the front lines. Coupled with the departure of international forces from Mali, this fragmentation led to abandoned positions, weapons falling into the hands of separatists, and jihadists expanding their hold over the rural north.

Meanwhile, internal purges multiplied and intelligence services—once meant to hunt terrorists—turned inward, redirecting their focus toward political opponents of the regime. The recent imprisonment of former prime ministers Choguel Maïga and Moussa Mara epitomizes a security apparatus more obsessed with loyalty than with counterterrorism.

Bamako’s isolation has deepened

Mali’s internal fragility has been exacerbated by the fact that it has methodically cut itself off from regional and global partners. While its break with France could be framed as a quest for independence and a response to two decades of unsuccessful anti-terrorist operations, Bamako’s estrangement from African allies—particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—and its withdrawal from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission underscore the junta’s preference for isolation over cooperation.

Even relations with Algeria, which once maintained relatively cordial ties with Mali, have sharply deteriorated. In April, Mali accused its northern neighbor of sponsoring terrorism after the Algerian military shot down a Malian drone. Algiers responded by closing its airspace to Malian aircraft. Meanwhile, Turkey’s recent diplomatic overtures in Algeria suggest that Ankara—which had deepened cooperation with Mali over the past years—might also adjust its policy away from Bamako.

The Russia illusion is fading

The junta’s hope that new alliances could fill this gap has not materialized. Initially optimistic that cooperation with Russia’s paramilitary Wagner Group would help the Malian military suppress jihadist insurgencies, the partnership has instead produced disastrous outcomes. After the Russian mercenaries failed to make meaningful gains, the Kremlin announced in June that it would restructure the paramilitary organization into a new entity called the “Africa Corps,” leaving behind a gaping security and political vacuum.

According to internal reports, Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries have since repeatedly clashed on the ground, and northern Mali has once again become a contested battlefield. In January 2024, the official abrogation of the 2015 Algiers Accord—a peace agreement with armed insurgent groups—reignited separatist tensions. As a result, the war in the north now stretches almost one thousand miles of front lines across territory the army struggles to control.

Amid this chaos, Mali has become a proxy battleground. Diplomatic sources cite indirect Ukrainian involvement—including intelligence assistance, drone supplies, and support for groups hostile to pro-Russian mercenaries. Meanwhile, Turkey advances its influence by supplying Bayraktar drones and technical support to the Malian army. Mali has essentially become a geopolitical chessboard, where foreign interests and competing local ambitions collide.

The economic asphyxiation of a landlocked nation

Adding to the chaos is Mali’s dependence on supply routes that are increasingly vulnerable. The landlocked country relies heavily on the Dakar-Bamako corridor to import essential goods. Senegal exports nearly 60 percent of its petroleum products to Mali, representing over 20 percent of its foreign trade. Meanwhile, the Casablanca-Nouakchott-Bamako corridor is blocked, as the commune of Diéma in the Kayes region is under siege by armed groups. The Abidjan-Bamako corridor is also disrupted, and even the internal route between Bamako and the city of Ségou in the northeast has come under growing threat, with attacks and kidnappings on the rise.

For weeks, fuel supplies have been interrupted by convoy attacks and restrictions imposed by armed groups, creating endless lines at Bamako gas stations. In a country where transportation, electricity, and logistics depend on diesel, this shortage is tantamount to a national shutdown. For the army, the consequences are severe: Without fuel, armored vehicles are immobilized, convoys are grounded, and northern bases are left exposed.

A fractured and demoralized society

Mali’s diversity has historically been a strength. Between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries, the Mali Empire, founded by Soundiata Keïta, was one of West Africa’s largest and most powerful civilizations. Stretching from the Senegal River to Gao and from the Sahara to the Gulf of Guinea, it thrived on multiculturalism and trade among different groups. In the fourteenth century, Mali was essentially a global commercial crossroads, supported by a flexible system that ensured stability across vast and diverse lands while maintaining a tradition of religious tolerance.

Today’s Mali tells a different story. Ethnic tensions in the central and northern regions, amplified by military abuses, have shattered intercommunity trust. The advent of self-defense militias has fractured national cohesion, and entire villages now refuse to cooperate with the armed forces. The demoralized population oscillates between fear and resignation.

Paths to reconstruction

The US evacuation call could foreshadow Mali’s imminent collapse. Yet, an end to the junta’s reign would not be cause for triumphalism, as Malians’ legitimate desire for sovereignty would persist.

For the time being, the urgent task is to mend the national fabric, restore constitutional order within a renewed governance framework, and rebuild alliances. To that end, the army must return to its primary role: defending the homeland, not governing it.

Counterinsurgency presents the most daunting challenge in this regard. France spent almost a decade on the ground, and while it had some early success, it abandoned its counterinsurgency effort.

While intelligence and counterinsurgency will be important going forward, it will be important not to repeat the mistakes of the past. Given the country’s fragmented state, dialogue with jihadists may be unavoidable. Still, their Wahhabi-inspired ideology remains marginal in Mali—and excessive concessions could spark conflict. Is there a potential institutional framework that reconciles demands for Islamization with maintaining a federal republic?

Addressing geographic challenges through deep decentralization or pragmatic federalism could restore power and responsibility to Mali’s regions. Engagement with the Atlantic—via Morocco’s proposals to enable access to the ocean for Sahel countries and Senegal’s historical cooperation—remains critical. Rebuilding ties with the subregion to jointly combat terrorism and reintegration into ECOWAS, even if it requires reform, is equally urgent.

Finally, Mali will need patriots capable of enlightened leadership—something the immediate predecessors of the junta failed to provide—to chart sustainable economic prospects. Mali’s assets remain vast: It is among Africa’s top gold producers; has untapped reserves of lithium, iron, bauxite, phosphates, manganese, and uranium; and has significant agricultural potential from cotton and livestock. Moreover, Mali maintains a strategic position in West Africa, with strong hydropower and solar potential, and, above all, a large and determined youth population.

All it needs is the right leadership to seize that potential.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Hussein Ba is a Senegalese columnist who frequently covers security and political issues in Mali.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post Mali has not just plunged into crisis. It has been unraveling for years. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Alex Serban: A transition from reassurance to co-ownership of defense 

Philippe Dickinson: This is far from the worst outcome for Europe 

A transition from reassurance to co-ownership of defense

BUCHAREST—The big question across NATO’s eastern flank today is: Should this development be understood as a retreat by the United States or a strategic reconfiguration? 

Romanian authorities confirmed that approximately one thousand US troops will remain stationed in the country. Key allied strategic assets will remain untouched, such as the Deveselu missile-defense site and the Mihail Kogălniceanu (MK) Air Base, which is undergoing a two-billion-dollar expansion to become one of NATO’s largest and most capable bases in Europe. Reuters reported that a NATO official also underscored on Wednesday that the overall US military presence in Europe “remains larger than it has been in many years,” framing the decision as part of a regular adjustment in posture rather than a withdrawal. 

Indeed, Romanian President Nicușor Dan had already informed Parliament in August about approving the pre-positioning of military equipment and new US contingents at MK Air Base, describing it as “a strategic reconfiguration, not a withdrawal,” in the context of rising instability in the Middle East and NATO’s ongoing consolidation. 

But Washington’s decision may bring unintended consequences. This regional brigade was a reminder that in the face of populist politics and Russian interference—via drones, sabotage, and disinformation—weakened democracies such as Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary still had a Western commitment and troops to rely on. Instead of reflecting confidence that allies like Romania can host, integrate, and operate advanced assets within a broader NATO command structure, populist politicians and extremist voices may use this pullback as a signal that Moscow is once again setting the region’s clock.  

For Bucharest, it is a call to maintain momentum in modernizing its armed forces, investing in logistics and surveillance systems, and aligning its defense planning with both NATO and the European Union’s (EU’s) emerging defense initiatives, including within the Bucharest Nine format of NATO’s eastern flank countries.  

From Moscow’s perspective, the move will be applauded and seen as a weakening of US resolve. In reality, however, if the United States and Europe make strong commitments, a more agile and networked posture—anchored in Romania—strengthens deterrence by enhancing mobility, intelligence, and rapid reaction capacity across the Black Sea. 

Ultimately, this decision could mark a transition from reassurance to co-ownership of defense. The transatlantic partnership is not retracting; it is evolving and transforming, requiring Europe, and Romania in particular, to turn political reliability into operational capability. Romania is looking to its US ally to send clear messages and commit firmly to continue its presence across the region as a deterrent to Russian aggression. 

That’s why Pentagon and NATO leaders should go the extra mile and further underscore that no future retrenchment will take place in the next three years. US military investments in Romania should remain steadfast and continue to expand, particularly at MK Air Base. 

Meanwhile, Europe should step in and backfill for the departing brigade. Romania and the EU must deepen their own defense investment, financially, industrially, and in troop commitments, to ensure that NATO’s forward presence is matched by credible European capabilities. 

—Alex Serban is the senior advisor for the Atlantic Council’s Romania Office and a nonresident senior fellow in the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

This is far from the worst outcome for Europe

WASHINGTON—This is a day that many in Europe have feared for some time. But it shouldn’t come as a surprise—this is a clearly stated policy direction that the Trump administration has communicated for several months. 

It also shouldn’t be a time to panic. The administration has been trying to reassure European allies that the planned reconfiguration of the US presence on the ground in Europe will be gradual and moderate, returning US troop numbers over time to levels similar to those before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This move in Romania is broadly in line with that direction. In the range of potential force posture moves the administration could take, this is far from the worst outcome for Europe. The suggestion today from the Estonian defense minister that US troops will remain in the Baltic nation should provide more reassurance. 

The administration has generally been pleasantly surprised by the broader European response to the Trump administration’s demands that Europe take on greater responsibility for its own security, with the NATO 5 percent spending target being the standout success. Europe’s cooperation should strengthen the hand of those within the administration arguing for a phased and moderate reorientation done in coordination with NATO and European allies. 

The lesson for European leaders should be that showing progress on their own defense spending and capabilities is the best way to keep the Americans on board and engaged in the project of European security. And it helps them frame as more reasonable their critical asks of Washington: US enablers that are not easily replaced (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; long-range strike capabilities; command and control; logistics and transport; and the US nuclear umbrella) and the maintenance of a thin but broad US physical presence along the eastern flank that can be scaled at speed in a crisis. 

With that said, Moscow will inevitably interpret this move as a message that, while the United States is most certainly not abandoning Europe, it is serious about its efforts to reconfigure its European force posture. To neutralize any potential emboldening of Moscow, the United States should find other ways to signal clear, long-term resolve to deter further Russian aggression. The recent sanctions package is an excellent start. Providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles and committing critical enablers to Ukraine after a cease-fire would be even better. 

—Philippe Dickinson is a deputy director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative. Prior to joining the Council, he was a career diplomat with the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 

The post What does the US drawdown in Romania mean for European defense?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On October 27, 2025, Andrew Michta, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, was published in RealClearDefense. He argues for closer strategic alignment between the US and its allies.

Fellow

Andrew A. Michta

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta published in RealClearDefense on strengthening US alliances appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The reasons for the recent downturn 

The downward trend began three years ago—before the Trump administration took office. In September 2022, at his first United Nations General Assembly speech, Petro condemned the anti-drug efforts that have been a cornerstone of bilateral ties. This began a period of tensions between the two historically stalwart allies in which relations deteriorated further. During an April 2023 Capitol Hill visit, for example, Petro got into tense exchanges with US members of Congress Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL) and Maria Elvira Salazar (R-FL). 

And now, in the past month, tensions have come to a head. On September 15, the United States decertified Colombia as cooperating to fight drug trafficking – although it did grant a national interest waiver to maintain aid and security cooperation. Several days later, Petro took to the streets of New York City during the United Nations General Assembly to call for the US military to disobey the US president. And thus, for the first time in thirty years, the US State Department revoked the visa of the Colombian president. Add to that the latest Trump-Petro exchanges, which sprung from the US strikes on boats in the Caribbean. The background here: Petro accused the US government of “murder,” saying a wayward Colombian fisherman was killed in an airstrike, and Trump responded by calling Petro an “illegal drug dealer” as he revoked US aid to the country. Both parties are at a new low that would have been unimaginable at any point since bilateral ties were strengthened in 2000 with the launch of Plan Colombia. 

The longer-term story of cooperation 

In fact, the US-Colombia partnership has historically been more than just a bilateral relationship. In 2022, to celebrate two hundred years of US-Colombia diplomatic ties, the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center commissioned a series of essays and released a book titled Allies. In it, Kiron Skinner, who served at the US Department of State as the director for policy planning in the first Trump administration, wrote that Colombia had become “an indispensable security partner to the US, training police and prosecutors in Latin America and other regions.” That essay went on to acknowledge that “US intelligence and security cooperation with Colombia bore positive results for both countries over the past two decades.”

That cooperation—built over decades—is what should define the relationship. Intelligence sharing has led to the disruption of illicit trafficking routes, the dismantling of armed groups, and the strengthening of operational ties that have borne fruit in Colombia and in broader US efforts to impede narcotics smuggling.

China is another concern. In Allies, then Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO) wrote: “Colombia will be an excellent partner in countering the influence of our competitors. Chief among these competitors is China.” Two years later, Colombia, in another about-face from longstanding policy, joined the Belt and Road Initiative. And in August, Colombia signed an agreement with China to even further advance bilateral cooperation.

The trade and investment ties at stake

Petro’s pullback from the United States may be politically beneficial with some limited sectors in Colombia, but Colombians still see the United States as their principal ally, even though their preference for the United States has dropped. And that US preference is also seen among Colombia’s businesses—and the US businesses that export to Colombia. Strong people-to-people ties define the relationship as well as strong commercial ties.

Perhaps most notable in the commercial sphere is that the United States has a trade surplus with Colombia, and trade has continued to deepen. Since the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement entered into force in 2012, Colombia’s exports of crude oil, coffee, flowers, avocados, bananas, apparel, and light manufacturing have increased to maximize favored tariff preferences. Likewise, US agricultural exports to Colombia have surged, hitting nearly five billion dollars in 2024—up over 20 percent from the previous year and the highest increase among the top twenty-five export markets for US agriculture. Two-way trade supports people and businesses in both countries.

Colombia has, for instance, become the fifth largest destination for US yellow corn in the world and the largest in South America, accounting for more than one billion dollars per year. This is all thanks to the benefits of the current bilateral free trade agreement. In terms of investment, the United States is the top source of foreign direct investment into Colombia, with an average of $2.5 billion going into the country each year since the free trade agreement started back in 2012. A deteriorating relationship between Washington and Bogotá could put this trade at risk.

Amid this accelerating decline in bilateral ties, both sides should remind themselves of the historical importance of this relationship in security, commercial, and broader geopolitical terms. That is ultimately what led to decades of bipartisan support for the relationship in the United States. As Colombia gears up for presidential elections in 2026, resurrecting a stronger bilateral relationship will be a top foreign policy issue across campaigns. Rightfully so. This is a relationship that cannot be lost. There’s way too much at stake.  

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post With Petro and Trump at odds, what’s next for the US-Colombia relationship?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• A brief history: Turkey in Central Asia until the 2010s
• Assessing attitudes towards Turkey today
• Understanding Turkish soft power
• Regional integration, changing dynamics, and the Organization of Turkic States
• Economic presence
• Security
• The Russia question and limits to Turkish ambitions
• Spotlight on Turkmenistan
• Interpretations for the American policy maker

Introduction

In an increasingly turbulent world, the importance of Central Asia has grown rapidly. Abundant with mineral and energy resources, burgeoning markets, and strategically located between China, Russia, and Iran, the region that includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan is quickly drawing the attention of actors from around the globe—while Turkey burnishes its Central Asia ties. 

Russia and China still dominate the economic and political landscape of Central Asia, though the region is increasingly engaged by a diverse cast of characters. The rise of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route—a project also known as the Middle Corridor, which functions as a multilateral transport network linking China and the European Union through Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Turkey—has opened the door to billions of dollars in funding and associated projects, including over £20 billion ($26.78 billion) from the United Kingdom, and €12 billion from the European Union since 2024. ¹ France, Germany, the UK, and India have all fostered ties to the region in recent years, while Japan, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates have long maintained an economic presence.² In recent years few countries have so successfully integrated themselves into the cultural, political, or economic fabric of Central Asia as Turkey.

As the region rises in importance, understanding the increasingly complicated field of actors in Central Asia and its implications for US policy goals is key. A major NATO member with a complicated bilateral relationship with the United States, Turkey’s extensive presence in Central Asia deserves exploration, as well as an analysis of the opportunities and challenges surrounding Ankara’s influence in the region. This report seeks to understand Turkey’s policy toward and presence in Central Asia and offer interpretations for US policymakers.

For this report, the author interviewed thirty-seven foreign policy experts, including former and current government officials from across Central Asia, many of them speaking anonymously given consideration of their respective countries’ political environments. Information that could not be substantiated by open-source media is only included if it was widely agreed upon and regarded as “common knowledge” across several interviews and is explicitly indicated as such.

A brief history: Turkey in Central Asia until the 2010s

Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, Turkey quickly engaged Central Asia’s Turkic states and, to a lesser degree, Tajikistan, leaning heavily into the perception of shared linguistic, cultural, and religious ties to strengthen relations. The region’s opening coincided with Turkish politicians seeking greater global influence.

In 1991, Turkey swiftly recognized the independence of Central Asian countries, in particular building ties through its development agency, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), and co-founding the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY). Turkish businesses were some of the first to enter newly opened Central Asian markets.

The reception to Turkey’s overtures in the early 1990s was mixed. Relishing their newfound independence from Russia, many Central Asian states were skeptical of Turkish intentions and feared exchanging one “big brother” for another. At the time, Turkey was in an economically precarious situation and unprepared to assume the role it may have imagined; in addition, its growing and complicated relationship with Russia did not aid its outreach in Central Asia. Combined with Turkish aspirations to rapidly liberalize the region economically, many Central Asian leaders feared a loss in their newly gained sovereignty.

The religious aspects of Turkish engagement also raised alarm for many. While Kemal Atatürk’s secular legacy was largely respected by regional post-communist elites, outreach in the 1990s prominently featured religious elements through religious schools and the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). Still a major soft-power institution today, the Diyanet established the Eurasian Islamic Council in 1994 and financed mosques across the region. Despite progress, by the mid-1990s, Turkey’s momentum in the region had notably declined, a product of economic constraints, Russia’s return to the region, and Turkey’s lukewarm reception among the Central Asian states.³

Uzbekistan represented the most severe fallout from mismatched expectations. President Islam Karimov deeply distrusted Turkish intentions, linking them with growing domestic terrorism from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).⁴ In 1993, Uzbekistani opposition leader Muhammed Salih fled to Istanbul, further fueling Uzbekistani suspicions. Subsequently, Uzbekistani authorities targeted Turkish-associated political movements including the Erk and Birlik parties.⁵ Tensions peaked in 1999 when Uzbekistan accused a Turkish citizen of attempting to assassinate Karimov. Over the ensuing years, Uzbekistan would go on to target several Turkish businesses with severe restrictions.⁶ Relations did not recover until Karimov’s death in 2016.

By the late 1990s, pan-Turkic ambitions had given way to quieter, steady cultural and economic interactions.  Under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s regime, Turkey reemerged in the late 2000s within a transformed geopolitical environment: Russia’s resurgence and China’s growing influence. Erdoğan’s administration balanced ideological outreach with more pragmatic strategies, emphasizing aid, infrastructure work, military cooperation, and expanded trade.

This era marked a shift toward more inclusive engagement, supporting broader mutual interests, while retaining some of the pan-Turkic undertones. Multilateral forums emerged, notably the Turkic Council (today’s Organization of Turkic States, OTS), which was founded in 2009 on the basis of shared “historical ties, common language, culture, and traditions.”⁷ Although Turkish media and politicians continued emphasizing ethnic narratives, relations became driven primarily by pragmatism and Central Asia’s desire for diversification away from China and Russia. Erdoğan’s strong personal relationships with other Central Asian leaders also play a key role in deepening connections. Similarly, Erdoğan’s son, Bilal, is famously interested in and has spent extensive time in the region—both as an unofficial representative of his father and the head of the Turkish Youth Foundation and World Ethnosport Confederation, which was originally established in Bishkek before moving to Istanbul.⁸

Assessing attitudes towards Turkey today

Turkish cultural and business presence across Central Asia has elicited mixed reactions in the region, generally ranging from “lukewarm” to “brotherly.” A 2023 Central Asia Barometer (CAB) survey ranked Turkey as the most favorable country among respondents from Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, ahead of Russia, Iran, China, and the United States. Kyrgyzstan displayed the greatest affection, with 40 percent of respondents holding “very favorable” views and 44 percent holding “somewhat favorable” views.⁹ Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan placed Turkey second, behind Russia. Turkish goods, particularly textiles, carry positive cultural associations of quality, bolstered by Turkish companies often importing European goods. Turkish diplomatic visits receive prominent coverage in Central Asian media. In non-Turkic Tajikistan, favorability remains notably lower but positive despite historical Turkish support for its then-regional rival Kyrgyzstan (the survey predated the landmark Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border agreement).

Among the political and business elites with warm attitudes toward Turkey, motivations vary. Some genuinely support pan-Turkic ideals; others view Turkey pragmatically as a reliable partner or gateway to the West. Debate persists over Turkey’s ideal role, with ideological factions including traditional pan-Turkists, pro-Russian groups, pragmatic nationalists, and advocates for regional integration as independently as possible from major powers.

Central Asia is increasingly trending toward regional integration, yet critical questions persist: How should non-Turkic Tajikistan be incorporated? How close should ties remain with Russia? What is Turkey’s appropriate regional political role? Such discussions remain contentious and vary significantly from country to country.

These questions are particularly important to Uzbekistan, which generally favors regional integration yet appears to remain among the most skeptical of pan-Turkic messaging, especially due to its deep economic and cultural ties with Tajikistan. Beyond the large populations of Tajikistani migrant workers, and a dependence on the Amu Darya and Zeravshan rivers,¹⁰ the two nations are culturally linked at the hip: Tajik is spoken widely in several important Uzbekistani cities, including Bukhara. Many Uzbekistanis interviewed for this project echoed the words of an Uzbekistani political analyst asked about the topic: “Uzbekistan will always put the idea of ‘Central Asia’ above Turkey.”

Despite ideological divides, interviewees across the region expressed that Ankara has cultivated strong institutional trust and bilateral relationships, particularly among senior state officials and younger diplomats who began their careers after the dissolution of the USSR. In contrast, older career bureaucrats trained or educated in Moscow tend to identify more with their Russian past.

Turkey’s reputation and diplomatic standing is not without its limits, however. Several Uzbekistanis and Kazakhstanis interviewed for this paper commented that the “big brother” attitude of Turks famously documented in the 1990s persists in the minds of many Turkish businessmen and diplomats,¹¹ though most agreed this has improved in recent years. In interviews with Uzbekistani experts, there was a consensus that the decision of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) to admit the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) as an observer state was done with great apprehension. This aligns with Uzbekistan’s later public downplaying of the situation and ensuing confusion about the status of the TRNC in Uzbekistani and Central Asian politics.¹² In April 2025, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan appointed ambassadors to the Republic of Cyprus, and affirmed support for UN Security Council resolutions 541 and 550 which calls “attempts to create a ‘Turkish Republic of North Cyprus’ invalid,” to bolster ties with the EU—marking the pragmatic limits of Turkish influence.¹³ A joint declaration at the 2025 OTS summit held in Gabala called for the need to “reach a negotiated, mutually acceptable […] settlement,” to the “Cyprus issue”, and expressed “solidarity with the Turkish Cypriot people,” a statement likely designed to strike a neutral tone that balances both Ankara and Brussels.¹⁴

Understanding Turkish soft power

Media

Central Asian news media remains dominated by Russia and Russian-language sources, except in Uzbekistan, where local-language media promotion is vigorous. The Turkish state-owned Turkish Radio and Television company (TRT) is the sole major Turkish media outlet distributing content in Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Kazakh. In December 2024, it expanded to include broadcasts in Farsi, spoken in Tajikistan.¹⁵ TRT also runs Avaz (meaning “voice”), a channel largely focused on promoting pro-Turkey and Turkic narratives through the form of soap operas, documentaries, news, and movies, which is distributed throughout the region in local languages. Other Turkish outlets typically publish only in Turkish or English, restricting local accessibility, while Turkish media that publishes in Russian, such as Anadolu Ajansi (the Turkish state-run news agency), rarely cover Central Asia. Turkish news is not widely consumed, except in Turkmenistan, where 47 percent of respondents in a CAB survey reported “occasionally viewing” Turkish news.¹⁶

In entertainment media, Turkish films and soap operas enjoy broad popularity throughout the region, including Tajikistan. Kazakhstan’s state television regularly airs Turkish dramas, and the two states have intensified cooperation in the field including jointly producing TV series and hosting a “Turkic film festival”.¹⁷ Some Turkish musicians are well-known, although Uzbekistani, Russian, and Kazakhstani artists still dominate the music scene. Media exchanges are increasingly reciprocal: Kazakhstan’s state-owned Silk Way TV began broadcasting in Turkish in May 2024, and many Turkish shows are filmed in the region. These Turkish TV exports are part of a broader trend, with global demand for Turkish series increasing 184 percent from 2020 to 2023.¹⁸

Development aid and projects

Turkey’s global development aid programs extensively engage Central Asia, historically prioritizing Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan resisted Turkish aid until rapprochement in 2017, while resource-rich Turkmenistan has shown fluctuating interest  and non-Turkic Tajikistan fell lower on the list of priorities. Between 1991 and 2018, Turkey ranked as Kyrgyzstan’s largest official development assistance provider ($1.156 billion) and the second largest to Kazakhstan ($669 million).¹⁹ Turkish aid often focuses on prominent infrastructure projects—including museums, mosques, hospitals, and universities—typically built by Turkish construction firms.

Recently, Turkey’s soft power model appears to be moving away from direct development aid however, influenced by rising alternative donors such as India, Gulf countries, and the European Union, Turkey’s own economic constraints, and its increasing prioritization of Syria and Africa. Importantly, rapidly developing Central Asian states like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan prefer investments and technical assistance over traditional aid. Kazakhstan has rebranded itself as an aid provider, establishing the Kazakhstan Agency for International Development (KazAID) in January 2021.

Despite this shift, Turkish aid’s legacy continues to enhance its image in the region. TIKA’s projects are often strategically located and visible. Examples include the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Bishkek Kyrgyz-Turkish Friendship State Hospital, adorned with Turkish flags, and the renovated Kyrgyz State History Museum, featuring a plaque thanking Turkey, adjacent to the Kyrgyzstani parliament.

Turkish-supported projects, such as archaeological excavations in Akmola (Kazakhstan) and a traditional handicrafts center in Khiva (Uzbekistan), frequently reinforce pan-Turkic narratives. Education initiatives explicitly promote Turkic cultural and historical studies, particularly the creation of “Turkology” departments, including in autonomous public universities.  Despite the creation of numerous faculties of Turkology across the region, there is still a major disconnect with everyday people, many of whom assume it is simply the study of Turkey, with one Kazakhstani professor of Turkology describing “even our students didn’t know about Turkology before they came to the department.”²⁰

Beyond supporting Turkology departments, the Turkish government maintains a network of schools in the region both through its Maarif program and two joint universities: Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University (Kazakhstan) and Manas University (Kyrgyzstan), alongside quotas designed to encourage Central Asians to study in Turkey. In 2020, Central Asians received 793 university scholarships, comprising 21 percent of all Turkish international scholarships despite representing 6.5 percent of applicants.²¹

Regional integration, changing dynamics, and the Organization of Turkic States

Originally founded as the Turkic Council in 2009, the OTS has grown increasingly influential in Central Asia. Since its 2021 rebranding, OTS has moved toward more concrete regional integration and coordination, addressing significant economic and political issues. OTS’s evolution has involved the establishment of  several working bodies like the Civil Protection Mechanism for disaster relief, the Union of Turkic Chambers of Commerce (TCCI), and the Turkic Investment Fund (TIF), which launched in May 2024 with $500 million in starting capital,²² and increased to $600 million with Hungary’s entry in February 2025.²³ As of September 2025, the TIF has yet to post its first tenders, which are largely expected to focus on supporting SMEs, renewable energy, and transportation. An announcement from OTS heads of state at a meeting in Budapest suggested the TIF may begin operating  in full by the end of 2025, though few details remain available.²⁴

OTS’ primary focus has  increasingly transitioned from cultural to economic integration, supporting standardized customs processes, transport infrastructure development, and logistics improvements through its Transport Connectivity Program and Turkic Investment Fund. These projects have received broad international support, aligning with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR/Middle Corridor), backed by institutions like the Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the EU. Instead of working through these routes, Turkey prefers to support these initiatives via OTS and the Eurasian Transport Route Association, cofounded in September 2024 with Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Austria.²⁵

It should be noted that OTS is not a military alliance, something that would conflict directly with the charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization,²⁶ but is increasingly moving toward security cooperation. The most recent development in this area came during the 2025 OTS summit in Gabala, Azerbaijan, when Azeri President Ilham Aliyev called for joint OTS military exercises, a significant step.²⁷ Similarly, Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for the establishment of a Turkic cybersecurity council designed to jointly prepare for and respond to cyberattacks and threats.²⁸

While Turkey remains a major economic, military, and demographic power within OTS, it does not appear to dominate unilaterally. Experts interviewed from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan broadly emphasized their satisfaction with their representation in OTS, highlighting, for example, the foundational role of the former president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and Azerbaijan’s active participation. Nonetheless, Turkey has secured notable policy victories through OTS, such as establishing the curriculum for the International University of Turkic States, based on Turkey’s university system, and admitting the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an observer state.²⁹

Economic presence

Turkish businesses have established significant presence across Central Asia, leveraging shared language, culture, geographical proximity, and Western business connections. Predominantly active in construction, hospitality, and manufacturing (especially textiles), nearly 4,000 Turkish businesses currently operate in the region.³⁰ By 2025, eight years after Uzbekistan’s reproachment with Turkey, nearly 1,900 Turkish companies operated in the country, ranking only behind China and Russia.³¹ Since 2008, Turkey has consistently ranked in Kyrgyzstan’s top three sources of foreign direct investment (FDI), sometimes as number one on the list, most recently in 2022.³² Additionally, Turkish markets are increasingly attracting Central Asian investors, exemplified by Kazakh fintech firm Kaspi.kz’s acquisition of Turkish e-commerce giant Hepsiburada in October 2024.³³

Turkish businesses enjoy key competitive advantages in Central Asia, particularly easier access to capital and financial transactions through established Turkish banks. Demir Bank in Kyrgyzstan, now owned by HSBC, has operated for over twenty years and was Kyrgyzstan’s first fully foreign-capitalized bank.³⁴ In September 2024, the Turkish state-owned Ziraat Bank announced plans to open a Bishkek branch, and was already operating subsidiaries in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.³⁵ By 2018, shortly after Turkey’s rapprochement with Uzbekistan, Ziraat’s Uzbek subsidiary had roughly 1,000 institutional customers and 13,000 individual clients, and it secured a $350 million credit line.³⁶

Turkish businesses also maintain extensive connections and experience working alongside Russian banks and corporations, which are crucial to regional operations. Turkish companies often serve as intermediaries for Western firms hesitant about local market conditions, particularly in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Three of sixteen US businesses in Kyrgyzstan operate through Turkish intermediaries. Additionally, US Chambers of Commerce (aka AmChams) in Central Asia increasingly welcome third-country involvement, promoting regional dialogues with Western businesses. Central Asian AmChams established partnerships with those from Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria during the October 2024 Eurasian Economic Summit in Istanbul.³⁷

Turkey’s economic footprint in Central Asia is increasingly shaped by bilateral agreements and diplomatic ties. Public pledges to aggressively increase bilateral trade often follow high-level meetings. Between 2018 and 2024, Turkey announced bilateral trade targets of $5 billion with Turkmenistan, $2 billion with Kyrgyzstan, $15 billion with Kazakhstan, $5 billion with Uzbekistan, and $1 billion with Tajikistan. Despite the goals, actual bilateral trade has only increased substantially with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, largely stagnating or inching forward elsewhere, according to UN Comtrade data.³⁸ Nonetheless, Turkey has struck several deals to support its economic position in the region in recent years like preferential trade agreements with Uzbekistan or Turkey’s November 2024 commitment to purchase Kazakh beef at double China’s offered price.³⁹ Though the economic impact of deals such as these is often limited, they are widely covered in local news, serving to strengthen Turkey’s local image. Economic policy increasingly underpins diplomatic ties, exemplified by an April 2024 memorandum of understanding for central bank cooperation between Turkey and Kazakhstan; Turkey’s November 2024 decision to waive Kyrgyzstan’s $59 million debt in exchange for renewable energy projects; and plans for a Turkish-backed industrial zone in Kyrgyzstan’s Chui province.⁴⁰

Competition is intensifying as Central Asia’s geopolitical importance grows. Gulf-based companies are rapidly entering sectors traditionally prized by Turkish firms, particularly energy and hospitality in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In Uzbekistan alone, Saudi Arabia recently launched $3 billion in renewable projects,⁴¹ the UAE has signed several agreements on tourism,⁴² and Qatar Airways launched flights to Uzbekistan in February 2024, challenging Turkish Airlines’ near monopoly on long-distance routes following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Energy diversification ambitions significantly influence Turkey’s Central Asian strategy. Kazakhstan holds substantial gas reserves and thirty billion barrels of crude oil; Turkmenistan has the world’s fifth-largest gas reserves alongside major oil deposits. Uzbekistan, though comparatively smaller, has considerable undeveloped fossil-fuel reserves. While currently minor suppliers, these countries have long entertained increasing westward exports via Turkey, benefiting both Central Asian energy producers and Turkey by reducing Turkish dependence on Russian energy, enhancing Turkey’s energy hub ambitions, and allowing Central Asian states to gain direct European market access. Accessing Europe’s markets may be increasingly important for Turkmenistan, which exported 70 percent of its gas to China in 2024, while China has taken steps to diversify its energy sources, and Russia moves to corner the Central Asian gas market.⁴³ Though the theoretical potential for western movements of Central Asian gas is often entertained by some outspoken Turkish energy analysts, there is a wide gap between potential and reality.⁴⁴

The political environment may be changing to make these projects more feasible: Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, international interest in the Middle Corridor, and major infrastructure advancements present new opportunities for westward energy exports. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), initially designed for Azerbaijani oil, now increasingly sources from Central Asia. Kazakhstan began BTC oil shipments from its Tengiz field in 2008; Turkmenistan followed in 2010.⁴⁵ Discussions are reported to be underway for Turkmenistan to export gas via the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), bolstered by plans to double the pipeline’s capacity from 16 billion cubic meters to 32 bcm.⁴⁶ By 2024, Kazakh and Turkmen oil accounted for about 18 percent of BTC’s throughput.⁴⁷ In November 2024, Kazakhstan’s energy minister, Almasadam Satkaliyev, announced intentions to significantly reduce oil exports via Russia’s Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), shifting instead to BTC and boosting exports from 1.5 million metric tons annually to 20 million tons.⁴⁸

Security

Over the past decade, defense and intelligence cooperation has become increasingly central to Turkey’s Central Asia strategy, driven by the rapid growth and quality of Turkish arms. Turkish weapons exports grew 29 percent in 2024 alone, with Turkish ships, drones, and armored vehicles appearing in regions including Libya, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Ukraine.⁴⁹ Central Asia is no exception, as all four Turkic states now utilize Turkish defense technology, notably the competitively priced Anka, Akinci, and TB drone series to fill gaps left by Russian assistance. Historically reliant on neighboring Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese arms, Central Asian countries are cautiously exploring diversification. Kazakhstan’s agreements with Turkish firms YDA and Asfar to expand its Caspian fleet,⁵⁰ and Kyrgyzstan’s October 2021 purchase of Turkish armored vehicles, exemplify this slow but steady shift.⁵¹ Turkey also pursued weapons sales to Tajikistan, including a July 2023 agreement offering  to front $1.5 million of arms purchases⁵² and, according to Turkish media reports, drone sales.⁵³ However, Tajikistan’s procurement remains uncertain, even after its landmark February 2025 border agreement with Kyrgyzstan—a recipient of Turkish weapons and military aid. With Russia maintaining its sole regional military base there, and China having built an extensive security apparatus, including private contractors—and a “secret” base, according to The Telegraph (a British newspaper) but denied by China and Tajikistan—external pressures severely limit Tajikistan’s maneuvering space.⁵⁴ Considering little has been heard from either Tajikistan or Turkey since their July 2023 agreement, these and other factors may indicate that further cooperation has stalled.

Turkey’s military cooperation in Central Asia extends beyond arms sales. Uzbekistan signed agreements for military and technical cooperation in 2022 and intelligence sharing in 2024.⁵⁵ Kyrgyzstan, which first partnered militarily with Turkey in 1993, benefited from Turkish, Uzbek, and Russian support in defeating the IMU’s 1999 Batken incursion.⁵⁶ By 2024, Kyrgyzstan-Turkey relations elevated to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” explicitly incorporating security issues.⁵⁷ All four Turkic Central Asian nations regularly join military exercises with Turkey and send personnel for training in Turkish military institutions.

Kazakhstan’s security relationship with Turkey is the deepest, particularly in defense industrial collaboration, beginning with the establishment of Kazakhstan Aselsan Engineering (KAE) in 2011, a joint venture between Kazakh Engineering JSC and Aselsan. Operational since 2013, KAE quickly expanded from electronics and optics to aircraft components and complete weapon systems refurbishments.⁵⁸ Importantly, KAE is increasingly focusing on producing more sophisticated technologies including circuit-boards and cryptographic communication systems.⁵⁹ Beyond KAE, Kazakhstan and Turkey reportedly signed agreements on broader defense-industry cooperation and intelligence sharing in 2020 and 2023.⁶⁰ In 2022, both countries agreed to jointly produce Turkey’s Anka unmanned aerial vehicle, with additional reports of potential collaboration with Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar.⁶¹ Similarly, in August 2024 Turkey and Kazakhstan drafted an agreement opening their airspace to each other’s military personnel and equipment, although the current status remains unclear.⁶²

Turkey’s NATO membership is a key consideration for its security engagement with Central Asia. Turkey has actively supported NATO’s Partnership for Peace program’s expansion to the region since the 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit,⁶³ which also appointed a Turkish official as NATO’s first special representative to the region.⁶⁴ Though NATO’s work in the region is collaborative and distributed among members, it is not uncommon to encounter Central Asians who perceive Turkey as a “bridge” to the Alliance. Many Central Asians “count on Turkey, as a member of NATO and the international order, to assist [Central Asian states] with sensitive international issues,” according to a former senior Uzbek foreign policy adviser. Still, Turkey does play a role in boosting NATO’s Central Asia presence through its sale of NATO-compliant arms as well as support for projects like Kazakhstan’s Military Institute of Foreign Languages. The institute has received funding from the United States and United Kingdom because of its perceived value to NATO relations.⁶⁵

The Russia question and limits to Turkish ambitions

Russia remains an unavoidable factor in Central Asia, deeply influential in almost every sector ranging from agriculture to defense, telecommunications to aid (despite low formal official development aid rankings, Russia often acts through intermediaries like the World Food Programme.)⁶⁶ Beyond economic and military might, Russians, along with many Central Asians, view the region as firmly within even the most conservative definitions of its sphere of influence, and essential to its interests.

So far, the Russian government’s official reaction to Turkey’s increasing regional presence appears largely muted; Turkey has historically balanced its approach to the region carefully, with consideration for Russia. Russian and Turkish officials in Central Asian countries reportedly maintain amicable relations and have cooperated previously. Yet Russia likely feels increasing discomfort with Turkey’s expanding security and political involvement—domains Russia guards zealously. Turkish firms are gaining market share in sectors prized by Russian companies such as defense, energy, and construction. In just the three months following December 2024, Turkish companies announced major infrastructure projects in areas historically dominated by Russia and China, including a 400 megawatt power plant in Kashkadarya, Uzbekistan;⁶⁷ a seaport in Kuryk, Kazakhstan;⁶⁸ and four power plants across Kyrgyzstan.⁶⁹

Russia’s policy toward Turkey in Central Asia remains complex. First, Russians generally do not categorize Turkey as a blatantly “Western” entity despite its NATO membership, reflecting the pragmatism that exists between the two countries and Turkey’s often complicated relationship with the West. Additionally, Russia’s regional strategy has suffered from complacency, assuming Central Asia’s permanent alignment despite significant advancements in Central Asia’s economic wealth and development, cultural and political trends favoring increased autonomy, and the entrance of other actors in the region. Only in recent years has Russia begun to refocus on the region, due to both economic necessity amid the war in Ukraine and a response to geopolitical changes in the region. Second, increasing levels of economic interdependence between Turkey and Russia, particularly after the latter’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, complicates direct confrontation; as of August 2025, Turkey is now Russia’s largest purchaser of oil products and third-largest buyer of both crude oil and pipeline gas.⁷⁰ This economic interdependence helps ensure Russia and Turkey compartmentalize any issues to avoid broader disruptions; the two countries have sparred in Libya, the Caucasus, and elsewhere, with little impact on broader diplomatic and economic engagement. Third, while Turkey’s regional influence grows, it neither fully replaces nor directly threatens Russia, unlike a US presence would. Instead, Turkey merely provides a degree of relief to Russia’s dominance in security, intelligence, and energy, cautiously pushing boundaries without provoking extreme Russian reactions. Turks, Russians, and Central Asians recognize this dynamic, granting Turkey some protection; any severe Russian response would undermine Russia’s narrative as the region’s “benevolent protector.”

Nonetheless, there are signs that Turkey’s deepening security and economic ties may increasingly unsettle Russia. A leaked internal Russian document addressed to Russian Federation Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in April 2023 explicitly warned that Central Asian states sought integration “without Russia,” highlighting the Organization of Turkic States.⁷¹ The same document expressed anxiety over the region’s shifting worldview, including English replacing Russian as a second language. Shortly after, all OTS members except Kyrgyzstan adopted new Latin-script alphabets closely aligned with those of Azerbaijan and Turkey.⁷² In response, Russia initiated a campaign promoting Cyrillic script in Kyrgyzstan, including launching russian.kg, a website explicitly promoting Cyrillic and Russian use.⁷³ A September 2025 analysis done by renowned Kazakhstani foreign policy expert Eldaniz Gusseinov found that Russia is increasingly promoting a “Greater Altai narrative” in its outreach to the region as a cultural counterweight to OTS’ pan-Turkic underpinnings, and that “Russia is beginning to see OTS as a challenge to its presence in Central Asia.”⁷⁴ Though anecdotal and unquantifiable, many of the Uzbekistan experts interviewed for this paper noted a perceived uptick in “anti-Turkish” and “anti-pan-Turkic” sentiments in Russian-language news media over the past two years.

The drive to diversify relations intensified following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Symbolic incidents such as Tokayev’s last-minute decision to switch a speech to Kazakh to rebuke Putin’s claim that “Kazakhstan is a Russian speaking country,”⁷⁵ or Tajik President Emomali Rahmon’s emotional demand for “respect” from Russia,⁷⁶ though small were meaningful enough to garner millions of views. Such events do not imply sudden hostility between Russia and Central Asian states but illustrate a trend towards empowerment and regional autonomy.

Despite these subtle shifts, underestimating Russia’s profound influence remains unwise. Turkey, like all other external players, must tread carefully: The decision to expand its presence more aggressively than its current rate could lead to push back from not only Russia but also Central Asians. Beyond political leverage, and despite recent conversations raising a pan-Turkic or pan-Central Asian identity, the lingering cultural impact of nearly 150 years of Russian rule is impossible to ignore; as one Kyrgyzstani former cabinet minister mused when asked about relations with Turks: “I think in Russian.”⁷⁷

Spotlight on Turkmenistan

Special attention should be paid to Turkey’s uniquely strong relationship with Turkmenistan, a reclusive, neutral country that tightly controls its media, economy, and security apparatus. Most countries struggle to engage meaningfully with Turkmenistan despite its vast resources, including the world’s fifth-largest gas reserves, significant oil deposits, critical minerals, and strategic location along the Caspian Sea.⁷⁸ Turkey, however, enjoys exceptional access, rooted in its greater linguistic similarities than other Central Asian nations, prompting Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to frequently describe relations as “one nation, two states.”⁷⁹

Energy and construction form the pragmatic foundation of their relationship, initially driven by Turkish businessmen in the 1990s who actively lobbied for deeper economic ties. Today, Turkish-led projects are substantial, including an active role in the construction of the new smart-city project, Arkadag,⁸⁰ and a major seaport in Turkmenbashi.⁸¹ Over 600 Turkish companies operate in Turkmenistan, with contractors undertaking $216 million in projects in 2024 and $50 billion since independence.⁸² A notable milestone occurred in February 2025, when the two countries agreed on their first gas swap via Iran. They exchanged a modest yet symbolic 1.3 bcm, representing progress toward linking their energy sectors. In March 2025, Turkey publicly invited Turkmenistan to “jointly develop its oil and gas deposits” as well as expand cooperation on electricity transfers, according to Hurriyet Daily News.⁸³

The growing economic partnership has expanded into media and security, positioning Turkey alongside a select group of states—including Russia, Azerbaijan, and China (notably, Turkmenistan supplies more than 28 percent of China’s gas imports).⁸⁴ Turkey has previously acted as a diplomatic bridge between Turkmenistan and the West, promoting broader regional engagement. Turkmenistan has indicated some receptiveness to the idea of joining OTS as a full member but progress remains slow.⁸⁵

Signs of Turkmenistan’s gradual opening have emerged recently, including the Caspian Sea-Black Sea transport corridor agreement with Romania, Georgia, and Azerbaijan,⁸⁶ and a free trade agreement with Uzbekistan.⁸⁷ In March 2025, Turkmenistan announced it was considering joining the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, another meaningful step.⁸⁸ However, optimism should be tempered, as prior hopeful developments have been undermined by Turkmenistan’s deep-rooted isolationism and stringent security priorities.

Turkmenistan’s potential role in the Middle Corridor

Meaningful engagement with Turkmenistan remains valuable to the West, as the country occupies a critical position between Russia and Iran and could significantly bolster Europe’s energy and mineral security. Turkmenistan’s complicated relationship with Russia, aggravated by Russia’s expanding interests in Central Asian gas markets⁸⁹ and China’s ongoing diversification away from Turkmen gas, underscore this opportunity.⁹⁰ Furthermore, Turkmenistan’s full participation in the Middle Corridor could notably improve the viability of the project. This would alleviate Uzbekistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s reliance on Kazakh transit routes, previously a source of concern for Bishkek,⁹¹ and ease congestion in Kazakh ports such as Kuryk and Aktau, enhancing overall transportation efficiency. Despite major progress in the creation of key infrastructure—including port expansion projects in Kuryk, Poti, and Anaklia; Kazakhstan’s plans to purchase 446 new locomotives by 2028;⁹² and a 70 percent increase in Middle Corridor freight volume in 2024—significant challenges remain.⁹³ These include inefficient Caspian port operations, overloaded rail infrastructure in Georgia, outdated logistics software, and inconsistent customs standards. Transportation via the Middle Corridor remains roughly 150 percent more costly than via the Northern Corridor, according to multiple interviews with experts. Turkmenistan seems unusually eager to expand its outside connectivity through corridors beyond the Middle Corridor project, including exploring coordination with Afghanistan.⁹⁴

Interpretations for the American policy maker

Over two decades, Turkey has steadily grown into a major player in Central Asia across economic, security, and cultural spheres. Even in Tajikistan, the region’s sole non-Turkic state closely aligned with Russia and China, Turkey now ranks among the top five import and export partners, having accrued substantial economic and cultural presence.⁹⁵ Similarly, Turkey has gained exceptional access to isolated Turkmenistan despite the nation’s restrictive political environment.

Despite Turkey’s significant presence in the region, Russia continues to dominate security, telecommunications, and media, while China holds unmatched economic influence. While Turkish media frequently emphasizes shared ethnic ties as the foundation for Turkey-Central Asia relations, pragmatism likely remains the primary driver of warm relations, with linguistic and cultural commonalities supporting, though not forming, the basis-of deep ties. Yet as the Organization of Turkic States strengthens and cultural and economic exposures increase, ethnic bonds will likely genuinely strengthen over time.

Turkey’s influence in Central Asia faces some external constraints, particularly from Russia, China, and to a lesser extent, Iran, all holding significant leverage over Turkish and Central Asian affairs. By gradually expanding its presence, Turkey can maintain control over its regional narrative and avoid overly provoking nationalist or pro-Russian elements. Attempting a more aggressive strategy risks backlash, both internally within Central Asia and externally from Russia or China. Internally, Turkey’s constraints have somewhat eased as it shifts from foreign aid to energy and security issues, thereby reducing the direct financial burden. Despite this, Turkey’s potential to project power in the region also remains constrained by its increasing commitments to other regions, including Somalia, Libya, and Syria.

On the flip side, the array of international actors interested in transport connectivity across Central Asia may end up bolstering Turkey’s presence and goals in the region, including the EU and China, due to Turkey’s key geostrategic position along the Middle Corridor route. The EU, which has already begun investing billions of euros in Central Asia’s energy, mining, and transport sectors, finds common ground with Turkey on this issue, which has long sought to function as an energy hub for Europe.⁹⁶

All told, American policymakers should regard Turkey’s growing regional presence favorably, even amid broader disagreements between Washington and Ankara. Turkey has historically shown the ability to compartmentalize relations—collaborating and competing simultaneously with other states. Considering geographic distance, local attitudes, domestic politics, and budget constraints, US goals and expectations towards the region should be focused and pragmatic, a far cry from any dreams of hegemony.

US official policy objectives for Central Asia have not been publicly updated since 2019.⁹⁷ Based on interviews and existing public documents, this paper proposes defining America’s core objectives in Central Asia today as:

• Securing European and US critical mineral and energy security.
• Providing viable political and economic alternatives to China and Russia to bolster Central Asian autonomy.
• Promoting regional stability.
• Countering Islamic terrorism, especially as radicalized Central Asian fighters and groups have demonstrated their reach as far as Russia, Syria, and Afghanistan, while continuing to threaten the stability of the region.⁹⁸
• Facilitating American business access to Central Asia’s growing markets.

Investing and engaging in Central Asia is in the United States’s interests, though this will inevitably remain severely limited by lack of political will and geographical difficulties.⁹⁹ Though there is no substitute for fully focused American economic and military might, these goals may be more achievable at minimized political and economic cost by supporting partner countries already committed to and invested in the region, including Turkey. There is already established business collaboration, with many American businesses opting to partner with companies from friendly nations in joint ventures or as intermediaries to navigate the complexities of the region. Most importantly, Turkey’s activities in the region largely align with US interests, whether by promoting autonomy from Russia and China or developing transport and energy infrastructure. Areas of Turkish policy that don’t align with US interests, such as the emphasis on Turkic heritage or cultural overtures, are largely benign to US goals. Major opportunities for increased coordination remain, bolstered by the Trump administration’s already-indicated interest in working with Turkey on other foreign policy areas such as Libya and Syria.¹⁰⁰ This paper recommends the following cost-effective policy actions:

• Consider informal or technical engagement with the Organization of Turkic States, particularly to coordinate on transit and economic issues. Unlike the C5+1 format, OTS includes Azerbaijan and Turkey, both of which maintain deep and strategic ties to Central Asia and are essential players in projects like the Middle Corridor.¹⁰¹ Appointing a special envoy may be a solution that allows dialogue without full endorsement of OTS, akin to the US approach to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). At the September 2025 OTS summit in Azerbaijan, the ensuing joint declaration also called for the establishment of an OTS+ framework to significantly expand cooperation with other states, though details remain to be revealed.
• Create a regular multilateral dialogue platform involving major US-allied regional partners with strong existing ties to the region, especially Turkey, South Korea, and Japan, to coordinate Central Asian policy and facilitate greater dialogue. Partially inspired by the 2023 Camp David trilateral summit—which established annual trilateral dialogues, outlined common policy goals, and included a commitment to coordinate policy in the Indo-Pacific—this could further institutionalize policy coordination in Central Asia.¹⁰²
• Contribute targeted technical expertise to partner-led aid programs, especially in agriculture, water management, and resource mapping—fields where US technology outperforms that of many regional donors. For example, American seed and soil management technologies demonstrated superior results in Kyrgyzstan during prior USAID programs compared to a similar Turkish program.¹⁰³ With direct US aid scaled back, supporting partner agricultural or environmental initiatives by contributing American tools or knowledge can yield significant development gains and enhance regional food and water security—at minimal cost and without expanding a direct US aid footprint.
• Invest selectively in critical transport and energy infrastructure projects through minority stakes, with Turkish or other allied countries’ firms as primary operators. Though American companies have a long-established presence in Kazakhstan and in Uzbekistan to a lesser degree, elsewhere they often hesitate to lead due to regional complexities and geopolitical sensitivities. Indirect investment through trusted intermediaries, with consideration for political and environmental, social, and governance compliance, when necessary, could mitigate risk while advancing US objectives to link Europe and Central Asia economically.¹⁰⁴
• Explore consolidating intelligence sharing, particularly regarding Afghanistan and Taliban threats, among NATO allies, particularly Turkey and the UK, with the intention of coordinating with Central Asian states. The Taliban are a source of significant unease to Central Asian states, particularly with their diversion of 20 percent to 30 percent of the Amu Darya River’s water, which poses a serious security threat to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan.¹⁰⁵ Uzbekistan has made progress in overtures to resolve the issue in recent months, though major concerns remain. Leaked documents widely circulated on Russian and Central Asian social media platforms allege that the United States and the UK may already have intelligence-sharing agreements with Uzbekistan;¹⁰⁶ extending this partnership across the region, as is safe and feasible, would bolster security against Taliban-linked extremism such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.¹⁰⁷
• Assist partner-led migrant labor exchange programs to reduce Central Asian dependence on Russian remittances,which form the supermajority of total remittance inflows in the region. Remittances are a major portion of the economies of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, representing 49 percent of Tajikistan’s gross domestic product in 2024, for example.¹⁰⁸ Uzbekistan already actively sends migrant workers to Turkey, South Korea, and several European countries through exchange programs. Expanding such programs with US diplomatic and modest financial support would further loosen Russia’s economic grip at minimal cost.
• Leverage Turkey’s relationship with Turkmenistan to advance US relations with this strategically critical but isolated state. Turkish President Erdoğan’s close ties with the Turkmen father-son presidential leadership of Gurbanguly and Serdar Berdimuhamedov, combined with American private-sector interest in partnering with Turkish corporations already trusted in Turkmenistan, represent strategic opportunities for enhancing Western access.

Over the past twenty years, Turkey has managed to secure a significant foothold in Central Asia, presenting as both a pragmatically useful economic and security partner, while reinforcing its standing through common linguistic and cultural ties. The bonds between Turkey and the region appear to be growing in strength. Though pragmatism largely motivates high-level relations today, future generations will likely bear increasingly tight bonds that supersede only the pragmatic.

Though Turkey’s influence is still overshadowed by the titans of the neighborhood—Russia and China—it is nonetheless noteworthy. For the United States, Central Asia represents a region with great potential value, though the current political and geographic circumstances make major investment difficult. By critically assessing and coordinating with other partners that are far more established and dedicated to working in the region, the United States could see significant progress toward goals that match its foreign policy objectives.

Kiran Baez is a research assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Turkey program focusing on Central Asia and energy issues. Add him on LinkedIn and X.

Issue Brief Aug 15, 2025

The future of US and Japanese engagement with Central Asia

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The post Why Washington should pay attention to Turkey’s presence in Central Asia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In an October phone call, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani the “urgency of disarming Iran-backed militias that undermine Iraq’s sovereignty.” The use of the terms “militias” and “disarming” was notable and revealing, as Rubio appeared to be referring to groups within the PMF. It was the first time a senior US official explicitly used the word “disarm” to describe Washington’s stance on the fate of these groups. Indicative that the request was not well received on the Iraqi side, the readout of the call released by al-Sudani’s office made no mention of the armed factions. It also appeared to contain a veiled criticism of “unilateral” US measures affecting Iraq, calling instead for prior “communication and consultation”—likely alluding to recent US actions targeting PMF groups.

Washington has now clearly communicated its demand that PMF groups disarm. Yet key questions remain: what does “disarming” actually mean, how and when would it be implemented, which groups within the PMF would it target, and by whom? The US government appears intent on leveraging the post–October 7 regional environment to intensify pressure on the Iran-led axis, including in Iraq. The real test of this strategy will come during post-election government formation, when it becomes clear how serious Washington is, whom it classifies as “Iran-backed militias,” and what role it is willing to allow them to have in Iraq’s next civilian and military structures.

Increasing US action, and a sharpened PMF commission law

Recent US actions against the PMF include the State Department in September designating four Shia armed factions—Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali—as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. In its announcement, the department cited the groups’ links to Iran and their attacks across Iraq—including against the US embassy in Baghdad and bases hosting US and coalition forces—as grounds for the designations. It also framed the move as implementing Trump’s recent national security presidential memorandum, issued in February, to impose “maximum pressure” on Tehran and its aligned groups.

Additionally, on October 9, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on the Muhandis General Company—a conglomerate operating under the PMF—and on financial networks affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for “divert[ing] funds from Iraqi government contracts” to the PMF and facilitating “money laundering for Iran.” The Iraqi government reacted by calling the US move “extremely unfortunate and incompatible” with the “spirit of friendship and mutual respect” that characterized the two countries’ bilateral ties.

An intense diplomatic campaign by Washington to dissuade the Iraqi government and Shia leaders from passing a new PMF commission law preceded these US designations, including a warning from Rubio that passing the legislation “would institutionalize Iranian influence and armed terrorist groups undermining Iraq’s sovereignty.” Critics of the detailed amendment bill are concerned that the legislation goes further than a previous, more brief 2016 PMF commission law. Critics also say the bill cements Iran’s influence in Iraq, gives the force a new and permanent institutionalized status, increases the PMF’s independence, implicitly allows it to intervene in politics on the grounds of “protect[ing] Iraq’s constitutional and democratic system,” and expands PMF activity to the economy and culture. This would replicate the model of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, known for its broad tentacles across Iranian life, including government.

The bill was initially proposed by Iraq’s cabinet and sent to the parliament in March. This combined two earlier bills that were drafted partly due to internal power struggles over the PMF’s leadership and partly as an attempt to use the final months of the current parliament, in which Shia groups hold a majority, to push the law through. However, amid intense US pressure, the Iraqi Parliament and major Shia groups did not move forward with a vote on the law after repeated attempts in July and August failed to reach a legal quorum. Kurdish and Sunni groups opposed the passing of the law.

Both moves point to Washington’s strong interest—largely an extension of its Iran policy—to contain the reach and influence of pro-Iran armed factions. Although not all PMF groups are aligned with Iranian policy, it is dominated by pro-Iran factions and figures such as the Badr Organization, Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). Given the PMF’s incorporation into the state as a key pillar of Iraq’s security-military apparatus and, increasingly, into politics via its party offshoots, a confrontational US posture could further complicate Washington’s relations with Iraq.

Amid Washington’s growing opposition, expanding the depth and breadth of PMF’s role in Iraq’s military-security complex—as the PMF bill would facilitate—could further strain US-Iraq security cooperation. This could prompt tighter curbs on intelligence sharing, complications for US training and advisory engagements, limits on operational support to counterterrorism missions involving mixed formations that include PMF units, and stricter end-use monitoring of US-provided weaponry and equipment. In 2017, PMF units were found to possess US Abrams tanks and used them in operations against the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, prompting controversy in Congress. It could also reduce Washington’s willingness to intervene to shield Iraq from potential strikes on PMF forces by outside actors such as Israel. The United States has been credited with helping keep Iraq out of the region’s post–October 7 turmoil despite PMF groups’ attacks on Israel, primarily to keep its troops out of the line of fire from pro-Iran factions.

Impacts on Iraq and the US partnership

The US campaign against the PMF groups will likely have significant implications for Iraq’s political process moving forward. PMF-aligned parties have played a prominent role since 2022, becoming key partners in the coalition that formed the government after the Sadrist Movement withdrew from parliament. The movement, led by Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, had won the most seats in the 2021 elections but boycotted the political process after failing to form a government. Key PMF groups such as Badr, AAH, and KH hold important roles in the federal government and provincial administrations. The continued Sadrist boycott paves the way for PMF groups to retain a prominent hand in forming the next government and to potentially push through the new PMF law in the next parliament.

This could further complicate Iraq’s political process and post-November government formation, as Washington will likely seek to use the current momentum against the Iran-led regional front to oppose a prominent role for, or even possibly the inclusion of, pro-Iran PMF groups in the future government as part of its broader effort to counter Iranian influence. Given the deep fragmentation of Iraqi politics, US opposition to these actors could make the process even more protracted. One possible outcome might be for Washington to support a prime minister not tied to the PMF groups, while not opposing some role for those groups in other capacities within the government. Iraq’s ethnic-sectarian system of governance and partisan bargaining notoriously draw out the government formation process after elections. For instance, after the 2021 elections, it took parties a year to form a cabinet. In the Kurdistan Region, there is still no new government despite parliamentary elections held last October.

Given the PMF’s expanding footprint in Iraq’s economy, US measures against PMF and Iran-linked actors could also weigh on Iraq’s economic sector. Washington has sanctioned entities and individuals tied to PMF networks for activities Washington deems illicit—from entities involved with banking to oil smuggling, and airlines—creating compliance risks for Iraqi ministries, state firms, and private contractors. The Muhandis General Company conglomerate of PMF-affiliated companies has assumed a growing role across construction, logistics, and public-works concessions, further blurring lines between state and parastatal actors. As sanctions widen and Washington’s aggressive posture toward the PMF intensifies, banks and vendors might over-comply, slowing payments, disrupting supply chains, and complicating dollar access, prompting more intrusive end-use and vendor due-diligence requirements.

All this raises what the next government and dominant actors after the November elections can—and will—do to address US concerns.

Will the US push for integrating the PMF into Iraq’s military-security apparatus under the firm control of Iraq’s commander in chief? Or will it attempt to dissolve the PMF (not dissimilar to what is happening to the Lebanese Hezbollah at the moment), fold its rank-and-file into other security forces, and steer its higher echelons into formal civilian politics? All such scenarios seem unlikely absent a major shift in the regional balance of power—such as a collapse or further weakening of the regime in Iran.

As far as the Iraqi government is concerned, PMF Commission Chief Falih al-Fayyad said in August that “dissolving the PMF would be tantamount to suicide, and I do not expect it to come from the religious authority or the state.” Either Washington shows flexibility on the PMF question or the issue will continue to strain and undermine the US-Iraq relationship. Judging by current rhetoric on both sides, the next year or two could prove particularly tumultuous for bilateral ties.

Mohammed A. Salih is a non-resident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s National Security Program. He has two decades of experience writing on Middle Eastern regional affairs, including Iraqi and Kurdish affairs and ethnic and sectarian relations, in various capacities as a journalist, analyst, and scholar. He is available on X @MohammedASalih

The post Why Washington’s anti-PMF moves are testing the Iraq partnership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Primarily driven by a major economic crisis and distrust with the incumbent Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party, Bolivians have joined a regional shift away from leftist leadership. Yet, unlike the populist pendulum swings seen in neighboring Argentina and El Salvador, Bolivians appear to have chosen a more centrist and reformist path, rather than a far-right approach.

As Paz begins his five-year presidential term on November 8, expect to see shifts in the country’s approach to the economy, foreign policy, and security.

Who is Paz and why did he win?

Paz was born in exile in Spain. Son of former president Jaime Paz Zamora, he studied in Washington and was elected senator from Tarija, and later mayor of the city. Edman Lara, Paz’s running mate, also drew in support. A former police officer, he first made headlines in 2024 for calling out corruption within Bolivia’s law enforcement, leading to his removal.

Paz’s win comes after the incumbent MAS party lost the first-round elections on August 17. For the past two decades, MAS was one of South America’s most prominent parties under former President Evo Morales and then under incumbent President Luis Arce. But over time, Bolivians’ support for the party has waned as the country has dealt with economic crises and prominent MAS members have been implicated in scandals.

The rivalry between Arce and Morales fractured the MAS party, further damaging its electoral chances. Arce, suffering from some of the region’s lowest approval ratings, declined to run for reelection, claiming he didn’t want to further divide the vote and help a “right-wing candidate win.” His withdrawal ultimately contributed to the party’s collapse and Morales, who is term-limited from running for president again, motivated his followers to cast null votes to protest his absence from the ballot. In the first round, about 20 percent of votes were null. This signified somewhat diminished support for Morales, though the null ballots made up a much larger vote share than the MAS’s official candidate, Eduardo del Castillo.

The MAS party has also been hurt by scandals involving its members. For instance, in September, Felipe Cáceres, Bolivia’s former vice-minister of social defense and controlled substances under Morales, was detained after anti-narcotics authorities found a cocaine laboratory on his property. Cáceres’ arrest raised questions about potential links between Morales’s partners and connections to drug trafficking.

What might Paz mean for Bolivia’s economy?

Bolivia faces a major economic crisis and gas shortages that will require steady attention from the new administration. Annual inflation has reached 24 percent, and international reserves have plunged from around fifteen billion dollars in 2014 to under two billion dollars in 2024.

Paz’s campaign slogan was “capitalism for everyone,” promising to open markets while maintaining welfare programs. During the campaign, he spoke about his plans to secure US fuel supplies to stabilize the economy and appoint an envoy to strengthen US-Bolivia trade. He has met with US officials and oil and gas companies, arguing that these sources of supply would ease shortages that accelerated inflation and reduced production.

One issue to watch is lithium. Nearly 21 million metric tons of lithium reserves lie in the nation, giving Bolivia the opportunity to become a critical supplier in the global energy transition. The metal is also important for defense, technology, and telecommunications applications in global supply chains. Arce’s government signed several lithium deals with Chinese and Russian firms in the past two years, but progress has been slow and the terms of the contracts are opaque. Paz has said his administration would review these contracts, as well as enact a new law on lithium mining to improve environmental oversight and strengthen support for local workers. If done properly, it could open investment opportunities for Western and regional partners. These reforms may eventually help transform Bolivia from a state-run extractive economy to an important member of the clean energy supply chain.

How might Bolivia’s foreign policy change?

It is likely that a new diplomatic language will emerge from La Paz. In contrast to the outgoing MAS government’s support for the Maduro regime in Venezuela, Paz has said he would suspend, though not totally sever, ties with Caracas. For decades, Bolivia was one of Venezuela’s major political allies and this change could begin to reshape the political dynamics of the Latin American left. In addition, the United States may now have an opportunity to rebuild a partnership in the Andes to advance mutual commercial interests and fight against narcotrafficking.

As Bolivia is likely to strengthen ties with the United States and other South American countries such as Ecuador, Brazil, and Argentina, expect the country’s relations with Cuba and Iran to diminish. Nevertheless, the foreign ministry remains likely to prioritize pragmatism when it comes to trade and regional cooperation.

How might Bolivia’s approach to security change?

As Bolivia is a key transit route and supplier in the cocaine trade, the new administration may prioritize combating illicit markets by revitalizing intelligence sharing and cooperation with regional partners.

It’s expected that Paz will work to reduce crime by promoting rehabilitation and reintegration programs. He has also signaled that we would work to restore counternarcotics partnerships with the United States, an approach that Washington seems to welcome. On October 19, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the “United States stands ready to partner with Bolivia” on issues such as “combatting transnational criminal organizations to strengthen regional security.”

Although public trust in institutions is low, security is a top issue for Bolivians, and the new administration has an opportunity to make strides in this area. For years, the judiciary and law enforcement networks have undermined rule of law through politicization, but Paz’s administration could take steps to modernize the country’s justice system. Whether these initiatives succeed in combating corruption and promoting transparency will help determine whether Bolivia’s new chapter is structural shift or merely rhetorical one.

If Paz’s government can deliver greater economic resilience, institutional trust, and innovative foreign partnerships, Bolivia could emerge as an example of centrist stability in a region often viewed as turbulent. However, the new administration should take a slow and steady approach, as avoiding sudden shocks will be essential for Paz to maintain his mandate for reform.

Miguel Escoto is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post What Bolivia’s move to the center means for its economy, foreign policy, and security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On October 21, Imran Bayoumi, associate director of the GeoStrategy Initiative, published an article for the Irregular Warfare Initiative titled “Policing the Pacific: How China Expands Influence Where the US Looks for Allies.” In the article, Bayoumi examines China’s use of police partnerships in the Pacific Islands and how Washington can adapt this strategy to counter Beijing’s influence.

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

Associate Director

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The post Bayoumi for the Irregular Warfare Initiative on countering Chinese influence in the Pacific Islands appeared first on Atlantic Council.

He also condemned the attack on Doha as “reckless” and “in grave violation of international law” and warned the Israeli people that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government was “endangering the peace agreement with Egypt” and “making further normalization with countries in the region impossible.”

But apart from the fiery rhetoric, the summit of Arab and Muslim leaders stopped short of threatening Israel with retaliatory measures. That said, Israel’s Doha strike has nonetheless shifted the dynamics in relations between Jerusalem and Cairo—likely stemming from concerns that Egypt may be next for Israeli crosshairs.

Despite the harsh exchange of accusations and increased hostility toward Israel, the peace treaty cited by el-Sisi—reached in 1979—remains intact.

Some analysts like Emad Gad, deputy director of al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, argue that the Egyptian leadership is neither ready nor willing to jeopardize the peace treaty or widen the rift with Israel.

“Security cooperation between Egypt and Israel remains strong and Egypt is one of the parties involved in negotiations to reach a diplomatic solution to the Gaza crisis,” he told me. 

The Gaza war has generally strained Israel-Egypt relations—especially since Israel’s seizure of the Philadelphi Corridor in May 2024, with the declared intent of destroying underground tunnels, Jerusalem claims, which were used by Hamas to smuggle weapons into Gaza.  

Yet, Gad remains hopeful that the Gaza crisis will be resolved through diplomatic channels—a step that he said “would subsequently defuse tensions between Egypt and Israel and restore relations to where they were before the Gaza war.”

And there are further signs of a breakthrough, including the announcement this week that phase one of a Gaza cease-fire deal had been achieved after negotiations in Egypt.

“This means there will be no more talk of relocating the Palestinians—the issue causing the tensions with Egypt,” Major General Samir Farag, senior strategist at the Security and Defense Advisory Board of Egypt, told me.

Related Reading

Fast Thinking

Oct 8, 2025

Israel and Hamas just struck a ‘phase one’ deal to return hostages. Is the end of the war near?

By Atlantic Council

In this initial phase, Hamas will return living hostages, while Israel will begin to pull back its forces in the Gaza Strip.

Israel Middle East

The Egypt-Israeli peace treaty

The 1979 peace treaty originally allowed only 450 security personnel with light weapons to be stationed in Area C (the closest area to the Israeli border) of northern Sinai, but was modified after Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 to allow for an additional 350 soldiers to be deployed. In 2018, Israel gave Egypt the green light to double the number of troops in North Sinai to support the Egyptian army and security forces in their counter-insurgency against Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)-affiliated Jihadists. Israel’s goodwill gesture prompted a warming of ties and enhanced security cooperation between Egypt and Israel.  

But concerns are now mounting in Cairo after Netanyahu defiantly vowed to”hunt Hamas everywhere.” Addressing a joint press conference with US Secretary of State Marc Rubio in Jerusalem in mid-September, Netanyahu warned Hamas that its leaders and members “have no immunity anywhere,” insisting that “Israel has a right to defend itself beyond its borders.” The chilling warning heightened fears in Cairo of a similar Israeli attack targeting Hamas inside Egypt; as mediator in peace negotiations between Israel and Hamas alongside Qatar and the United States, Cairo often hosts senior leaders of the Palestinian Islamist group.

Cairo has met Netanyahu’s threat with equal defiance; the Egyptian leadership reportedly warned Washington of “devastating consequences” if Hamas leaders were targeted inside Egypt. A senior Egyptian security official speaking on background vowed to the London-based Middle East Eye that any such attack would be considered a declaration of war and would be “met with force.”

Gad did not altogether rule out the possibility of war breaking out and urged Israel not to push Egypt to the brink.

“Egypt would likely retaliate to any attack by Israeli forces on its territory,” he cautioned, adding that any attempt by Israel to forcibly displace the Palestinians into North Sinai “could spell the demise of the peace treaty.” 

Concerns of military buildup

Another bone of contention between Cairo and Jerusalem is Israel’s claim of an Egyptian military build-up in the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula near its shared border with Israel and the Egypt-Gaza border. In a meeting with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces on October 5 to discuss border security, el-Sisi urged the arm to remain on high alert—Cairo is likely worried about a potential mass exodus of Palestinians into Egypt.

The alleged Egyptian military build-up has caused concern in Israel, according to media reports in outlets like WION Pulse and Middle East Eye. Meanwhile, Yechiel Leiter, the Israeli ambassador to the United States, has accused Egypt of  “a very serious violation” of its peace treaty with Israel, citing the building of bases which “can only be used for offensive operations.” Netanyahu has also asked the Trump administration to press Egypt to scale down its military presence in the Sinai Peninsula, according to a recent Axios report quoting anonymous Israeli officials.

Hossam Hamalawy, an Egyptian researcher and journalist who publishes a weekly online newsletter focusing on Egyptian security and politics, meanwhile dismissed the allegations of Egyptian military build-up as “fake news.”

“There can be no troop deployment in the Sinai without prior coordination with Israel,” he told me. 

Hamalawy also insists, “it is business as usual between Egypt and Israel,” citing an unprecedented $35 billion agreement signed by Israel’s Leviathan natural gas field in August to supply natural gas to Egypt.

“If Egypt and Israel are cementing their energy ties, relations between them can’t be as tense as some media would have us believe,” Hamalawy argues. 

A security source who spoke to me on condition of anonymity said that the continued presence of  Israeli forces in the formerly demilitarized buffer zone stretching fourteen kilometers along the Gaza-Egypt border—despite Cairo’s repeated demands that Israel withdraw from the strategic corridor—has also put a heavy strain on relations between Egypt and Israel and suggested it was another reason for the beefing up of Egyptian troops in north Sinai.

The legacy of the war in Gaza

Following its Doha strike last month, Israel intensified its attacks on Gaza City in mid-September, forcing thousands of displaced Palestinian families to move south close to the Egyptian border. The escalation has fueled fears in Egypt that Israel was seeking to “clean out Gaza (as suggested by US President Donald Trump in January) by forcibly displacing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and relocating them in the Sinai Peninsula—a plan categorically rejected by Cairo. El-Sisi has, on several occasions, voiced his opposition to the plan, arguing that the displacement of Palestinians “would liquidate the Palestinian cause.” Egyptian officials and state-controlled media have slammed the idea of relocating Palestinians in the Sinai as “an existential threat.” 

Despite Cairo’s strong condemnation of Israel’s Doha strike, the Egyptian leadership has so far avoided escalation into military confrontation or a complete rupture in diplomatic ties. This reflects Egypt’s strategic interests: border security, preventing a spill-over of the war into Egypt, and economic interests. Meanwhile, Egypt continues to engage in mediation between Israel and Hamas and is using the outcome of the Doha summit to boost its regional influence. Cairo is also using Israel’s Doha strikes to prop up its image at home, where public sentiment and opinion are largely pro-Palestinian. 

On the other hand, the Doha strike was a strategic miscalculation for Israel as it has weakened trust with new Arab allies that have normalized relations with Israel, such as the United Arab Emirates. Other states that have yet to normalize, like Saudi Arabia, will likely re-evaluate the costs of such a move.  Criticism of Netanyahu’s policies—both at home and abroad—has grown louder; pro-Palestinian rallies have gained strength and are winning new converts. International media and public opinion are increasingly challenging Israel’s narrative of acting in self-defense. By acting unilaterally, Jerusalem has already reversed some of the political and diplomatic gains it has made over the years.

If it does not change course, it risks moving into even deeper regional isolation.

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, focusing on Egypt, economics, energy, water access, and women’s issues.

The post Amid Gaza cease-fire hope, where does the Egypt-Israel relationship stand? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s drone warfare prowess was a hot topic at this week’s European Political Community Summit in Copenhagen. “The only expert right now in the world when it comes to anti-drone capacities is Ukraine, because they are fighting the Russian drones almost every day,” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen commented. “We need to take all the experiences, all the new technology, all the innovation from Ukraine, and incorporate it into our own rearmament.”

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte agreed with the Danish leader’s assessment of Ukraine’s pivotal role. “Ukraine is a powerhouse when it comes to military innovation and anti-drone technology,” he noted, adding that Ukraine’s readiness to share its insights with the country’s NATO partners was “very important.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s rapid rise to drone superpower status confirms the old adage that necessity is the mother of invention. When Putin first launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it was clear that the Ukrainian military could not realistically hope to compete with Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower and conventional firepower. Instead, Kyiv would have to rely on a combination of raw courage and innovative technological solutions.

From the early stages of the war, Ukraine began pioneering the large-scale deployment of drones in combat roles. By 2023, this was enabling Ukrainian commanders to compensate for artillery shell shortages and blunt Russian advances. This emphasis on relatively cheap and highly effective drones has transformed the battlefield and created a kill zone along the front lines that Ukrainians have dubbed the “Drone Wall.”

With drones now ubiquitous above the battlefield, any soldier or vehicle that breaks cover in a zone stretching for many kilometers on either side of the zero line risks becoming an instant target. This has made it extremely challenging to concentrate large quantities of troops and armor, which helps explain the lack of major front line breakthroughs over the past three years.

Ukraine has also employed drone technologies to great effect far beyond the battlefield. Kyiv’s innovative use of marine drones has turned the tide in the Battle of the Black Sea, breaking the Russian blockade of Ukraine’s southern coastline and forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his warships from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports. More recently, Ukrainian marine drones have been modified to carry anti-aircraft missiles and have reportedly shot down Russian helicopters over the Black Sea. This unprecedented success has revolutionized naval warfare and led to growing global interest in Ukraine’s domestically developed marine drones.

Kyiv has dramatically expanded its long-range drone fleet in recent years as part of a strategy to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia. As a result, Ukraine has been able to mount a highly effective bombing campaign since August 2025 targeting oil refineries, logistics hubs, and military industrial sites deep inside the Russian Federation. This has led to a fuel crisis across Russia, with some regions forced to introduce gasoline rationing amid supply shortages and record price hikes. Ukraine’s long-range strikes have helped to reshape perceptions of the war and have demonstrated how Kyiv’s technological edge can offset its material disadvantages.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Former Ukrainian Commander in Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi was one of the architects of Ukraine’s drone warfare doctrine until being relieved of his position in early 2024. In a recent commentary, he argued that innovation must remain the foundation of a sustainable Ukrainian resistance strategy against Russia. Zaluzhnyi stressed that Ukraine’s embrace of drone technologies has helped offset the imbalance between the two countries while inflicting disproportionate costs on the Kremlin. “Ukraine must compensate for its relative lack of resources by constantly introducing military innovations,” he commented.

Ukraine and Russia now find themselves locked in a relentless race to innovate, with the window between the appearance of new weapons systems and the development of effective countermeasures now sometimes reduced to a matter of weeks. The intensity of this competition has turbo-charged Ukraine’s domestic drone industry and propelled it far ahead of its Western counterparts.

If NATO members wish to close this gap, they must lean heavily on the technical and strategic lessons learned by the Ukrainian military over the past three and half years of full-scale drone warfare. Training initiatives are already underway, with President Zelenskyy expressing his readiness to share Ukraine’s experience with more of the country’s NATO partners.

A growing number of countries are also looking to establish joint drone production in order to benefit from Ukrainian defense tech know-how. In late September, Britain announced that it would soon launch the mass production of interceptor drones developed in collaboration with Ukraine. Romania has also recently unveiled ambitious plans to manufacture drones in partnership with Ukraine for domestic use and for potential export to NATO allies. Meanwhile, a Ukrainian delegation is reportedly in the United States this week to negotiate a landmark deal with the Trump administration that would see Kyiv sharing battle-tested drone technology with the US.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the world’s first fully fledged drone war and represents a watershed moment in military history. With drones now set to play a dominant role in the wars of the future, Ukraine’s unique experience in this technologically advanced form of warfare makes the country a key partner for NATO and an indispensable ally in the defense of Europe.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 25, 2025

Trump called Russia a ‘paper tiger’ because he believes Putin is losing

By Peter Dickinson

US President Donald Trump now says Ukraine can defeat Russia. His dramatic change in tone reflects growing recognition that Putin’s invasion is not going according to the Kremlin plan, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Ukrainians are acutely aware that Russia remains determined to erase Ukraine and understand that the war will not truly be over until the Kremlin has been decisively deterred from pursuing its imperial ambitions, writes Yaroslava Shvechykova-Plavska.

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By Maksym Beznosiuk

Putin has clearly been encouraged by Trump’s efforts to downgrade America’s involvement in transatlantic security and feels emboldened to escalate his own hybrid war against Europe, writes Maksym Beznosiuk.

Belarus Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Drone superpower Ukraine is teaching NATO how to defend against Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Denmark is not the only NATO country looking to learn from Ukraine’s experience. When Russian drones penetrated Polish airspace in early September, Poland’s response included plans to establish joint anti-drone training together with the Ukrainian military. Meanwhile, The Times reported earlier this year that Ukrainian military instructors had been dispatched to the UK to train British forces in the use of drones on the modern battlefield.

Ukraine is also increasingly recognized as a global leader in the development of drone technologies. The country boasts a rapidly expanding domestic drone industry that has been turbo-charged by more than three and a half years of full-scale war with Russia. This has created a fertile climate for relentless innovation and made it possible to test new drone designs in combat conditions on a daily basis.

The results speak for themselves. Ukrainian drones have excelled along the front lines of the conflict and have allowed Kyiv to turn the tide in the Battle of the Black Sea. Far beyond Ukraine’s borders, the country’s growing fleet of bomber drones now routinely strike targets deep inside the Russian Federation.

Many partner countries are understandably eager to incorporate Ukrainian drone technologies into their own defense doctrines. Britain recently confirmed that it will begin mass producing drones developed in collaboration with Ukraine as part of efforts to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank against the threat of Russian incursions. A Ukrainian delegation reportedly set off for the United States in late September to begin discussions on a potentially major drone production cooperation agreement.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is well aware of his country’s rising military profile and sees the current mission to Denmark as a potential model for a more comprehensive approach to Ukrainian drone warfare training initiatives with other European countries. “Our experience, our specialists, and our technologies can become a key element in Europe’s future Drone Wall initiative,” he commented on September 30.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s burgeoning reputation as a key player in the field of drone warfare reflects the dramatic shifts currently taking place in Europe’s security architecture. Until quite recently, Ukraine was treated as a military minnow struggling to adopt NATO standards. Strikingly, it is now NATO that is seeking to adopt Ukrainian standards.

The emergence of Ukraine as a drone superpower is only one aspect of the country’s remarkable recent transformation into a major military force. The Ukrainian army is also at the cutting edge of innovation in defense tech sectors including electronic warfare, robotic systems, and cyber security. It came as no surprise that the recent Defense Tech Valley industry showcase event in western Ukraine attracted at least 5000 participants from over 50 countries, with Western companies pledging more than $100 million in investments.

The technological progress made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2022 is certainly eye-catching, but the country’s human capital remains its greatest asset. Today’s Ukraine boasts Europe’s second-largest army, with almost one million men and women currently in uniform and a large reserve of battle-hardened combat veterans. This dwarfs anything else on the continent, even before Ukraine’s unrivaled experience of modern warfare is taken into account. With the United States seeking to reduce its role in European security, the Ukrainian military is now the biggest single barrier between an expansionist Russia and an unprepared Europe.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Ukraine’s newfound status as one of Europe’s leading military powers is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s worst nightmare. It is nightmare entirely of his own making. Indeed, this military metamorphosis would have been inconceivable without the impetus of Russian imperial aggression.

When Putin began the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Kyiv had only a few thousand combat-ready troops at its disposal. At first, things went according to plan for Moscow, with minimal Ukrainian resistance to the seizure of Crimea. However, Russian efforts to push further into mainland Ukraine then sparked a wave of popular resistance, with thousands of ordinary Ukrainians forming improvised volunteer battalions to block the Kremlin advance. This epic grassroots response saved Ukraine and laid the foundations for the subsequent expansion and modernization of the Ukrainian army.

Despite this stunning setback, Putin refused to accept defeat. With his initial plans to extinguish Ukrainian statehood thwarted, the Kremlin dictator made the fateful decision to escalate further and began preparing to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

On the morning of the invasion, Putin identified the “demilitarization” of Ukraine as one of his two key war aims. This made perfect sense. After all, in order to effectively subjugate Ukraine, it would first be necessary to render the country defenseless. However, it is now abundantly clear that Putin’s plan to demilitarize Ukraine has backfired disastrously.

Russia’s invasion has spurred the creation of a formidable military machine in Ukraine that has quickly come to occupy a pivotal role in European security. In capitals across Europe, there is a growing sense of recognition that the Ukrainian army is indispensable for the defense of the continent and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Kyiv’s partners now have an obvious and urgent self-interest in supporting Ukraine’s defense industry and financing the Ukrainian war effort. Indeed, the choice currently facing European leaders is disarmingly simple: Support Ukraine today or face Russia tomorrow.

With Russian troops still advancing and Russian drones and missiles pummeling Ukrainian cities, it remains far too early to declare Putin’s invasion a failure. Nevertheless, it is already difficult to conceive of any outcome that would leave Ukraine undefended and at Moscow’s mercy. Instead, the Ukrainian army is likely to emerge from the war stronger than ever and fully capable of defending the country’s place within the European community of nations. Putin had hoped to disarm and decapitate the Ukrainian state, but his self-defeating demilitarization campaign has inadvertently created the strong and fiercely independent Ukraine he feared most of all.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 25, 2025

Trump called Russia a ‘paper tiger’ because he believes Putin is losing

By Peter Dickinson

US President Donald Trump now says Ukraine can defeat Russia. His dramatic change in tone reflects growing recognition that Putin’s invasion is not going according to the Kremlin plan, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Sep 16, 2025

Only Ukraine can teach NATO how to combat Putin’s growing drone fleet

By David Kirichenko

NATO must urgently learn from Ukraine’s unique experience of Russian drone warfare as the alliance seeks to address the growing threats posed by Putin’s drone swarms, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Sep 18, 2025

Putin’s Polish probe demands decisive response to restore NATO deterrence

By Zahar Hryniv

Putin’s recent drone escalation in the skies over Poland is an unmistakable signal that NATO’s credibility is under threat. Western leaders must now respond decisively to deter further Russian aggression, writes Zahar Hryniv.

Conflict Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Putin’s dream of demilitarizing Ukraine has turned into his worst nightmare appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Israel, as it expands its military campaign in Gaza, is a nation deeply divided. Prospects of a deal to broker a ceasefire and secure freedom for hostages in Hamas captivity have pit its elected leaders, who are pressing to intensify Israel Defense Forces (IDF) control over the Gaza Strip, against a security establishment that favors acceptance of a proposal to halt the fighting. Parallel divides are evident among a deeply traumatized Israeli populace, where raging protests and counter-protests speak to an ideological chasm which is eroding cohesiveness within society.

On the political front, Netanyahu’s ruling coalition has been flailing since the departure of the Ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism and Shas factions from the government in July. Their return to the fold, for which Netanyahu is pining desperately, appears infeasible in light of their demand for a draft exemption whose preferential terms for yeshiva students will be rejected likely by both parliament and the courts. Meanwhile, Netanyahu’s already tenuous chances of surviving in office—his cohort has been lagging consistently in the polls—are being stretched further by the absolutism of his Religious Zionism and Jewish Power partners, whose cabinet ministers are lobbying aggressively for Israel to rebuff negotiations on a Gaza compromise and also to annex the entire West Bank.

Trapped between that rock and the hard place of growing international opprobrium, Netanyahu is playing his ace—or rather, his Trump—card in Washington to try and gain the upper hand. To a degree, Lady Luck has smiled upon him.

Engaging the president through a potent mix of effective diplomacy and flattering gestures, the prime minister has elicited a series of unprecedented moves from the Trump administration that align conveniently with his ambitions. Netanyahu’s frequent appearances on Trump-friendly media—the October 7, 2023 Hamas massacre in Israel that launched the war in Gaza would “probably not” have happened under Trump’s watch, he told the PBD Podcast last month—and his nomination of Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize are working their magic. Serious consideration of a US trusteeship for Gaza, the dispatch of US Air Force bombers to strike Iranian nuclear facilities and earlier indications that the US could back Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank are nuggets of the windfall. That said, Trump’s subsequent declaration on September 25 that he “will not allow Israel to annex the West Bank” implies a course reversal on that last score.

But being all-in with Trump is an exceedingly dicey proposition for Israel. Even if Netanyahu has private assurances from the US president, wild cards abound. Trump has blindsided the prime minister on multiple occasions, including with decisions to pursue dialogue with Hamas and Tehran, cut an exclusive bargain with the Houthis, and impose steep tariffs on Israeli imports.

Netanyahu is not immune to Trump’s reprimand, either: “ISRAEL. DO NOT DROP THOSE BOMBS. IF YOU DO IT IS A MAJOR VIOLATION. BRING YOUR PILOTS HOME, NOW!,” he declared on his Truth Social platform as IDF fighter jets were speeding toward Iran in June.

US officials have been similarly riled by Israeli raids on Syria, where they are cultivating the new government headed by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, including through the removal of US sanctions on his country.

Trump, who has told the Daily Caller that Israel “may be winning the war, but they’re not winning the world of public relations,” has little tolerance for those he perceives to be “losers.” By that measure, his latest assessment that “Israel was the strongest lobby fifteen years ago that there has ever been, and now it’s, it’s been hurt, especially in Congress,” could spell serious trouble for Netanyahu.

The botched Israeli strike on US-allied Doha this month, from which Trump has taken pains to insulate himself—pronouncing that the attack “was a decision made by Prime Minister Netanyahu, it was not a decision made by me”—impaired Israel’s standing undoubtedly in the eyes of a US president who insists that the (White) House always wins.

That predicament is exacerbated by the fact that Israel is hemorrhaging support just about everywhere else. In the United States, it’s not only Democrats who are overwhelmingly critical of Israel’s performance, but loud swaths of the Republican Party now, as well. Prominent voices among the right-wing “America First” caucus—which holds cachet among the Trump administration’s isolationist branch—are encouraging the president to part company with Israel. Enthusiasm among the Republican Party’s under-fifty age bracket is also slipping markedly.

Circumstances are no less dire in other countries, where Israel has become a lightning rod for condemnation and boycotts. A drive to extend unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood that commenced in the run-up to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)—Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom made announcements to that effect already on September 21—continues to gain steam in world capitals.

None of this bodes well for Netanyahu as the IDF mobilizes sixty-thousand additional reservists for an exceptionally controversial takeover of Gaza City. Trump, with whom the prime minister has clashed over the veracity of reports attesting to starvation in the Gaza Strip, is fast running out of patience.

“I think within the next two to three weeks, you’re going to have a pretty good, conclusive ending,” he announced on August 25, adding that “I think we’re doing a very good job, but it does have to end.”

The US president’s wishes notwithstanding, IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir—who estimated originally that maneuvers could continue there for at least five months—warned Netanyahu’s security cabinet on August 31 that the definite outcome of its strategy will be “military rule” of Gaza, possibly as early as November.

More alarm bells clanged on September 3, when Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich presented his blueprint—on the letterhead of Israel’s Ministry of Defense, where he holds the settlement portfolio—for annexing 82 percent of the West Bank, triggering an immediate backlash.

The official response of the United Arab Emirates, which labeled the move “a red line” that would “foreclose the idea of regional integration,” cast the Abraham Accords, the signature achievement of Trump’s last term, into jeopardy. The president’s hopes of an imminent, formal peace agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia are vanishing that much further into the rearview mirror.

With Israel’s future hanging in the balance, Netanyahu has put all of his chips on Trump. He’d best recall that the foray of the US president—whose third-largest 2024 campaign donation came from none other than Adelson’s widow, Miriam—into the casino business didn’t end well. And while the prime minister may believe that he’s won the jackpot, he doesn’t have an open tab in the Oval Office, where frustrations have peaked since Israel’s assault in Qatar. Matters could come to an explosive head shortly, if he balks at Trump’s anticipated twenty-one-point US program for Gaza’s future.

Netanyahu’s acknowledgement on September 15 that Israel, amid creeping diplomatic isolation, may have to transform itself into a “super Sparta” only underscores the gravity of the situation. Ending the war and scrambling to repair his relationships with other constituencies may be the only hedges left for him to safeguard that his wager on Trump doesn’t wind up bankrupting Israel.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive Israeli premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. X: @ShalomLipner

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The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) “states that any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both”, and “aims to develop aspects of defense cooperation between the two countries and strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression.”

Although no further content has been made public, the pact “encompasses all military means,” from armed forces and nuclear cooperation to intelligence sharing. Islamabad openly stated that it “will make available” its nuclear program to Riyadh if needed. This agreement is also designed to support Saudi defense autonomy in the long-term: defense industry collaboration, technology transfer, military co-production, capacity-building and training are also part of the pact.

The agreement strengthens Riyadh’s defense with respect to Iran and its partners, and vis-à-vis Israel. Signed in the wake of Tel Aviv’s shocking attack on Qatar earlier this month, the announcement’s timing is a warning message to discourage Tel Aviv from considering further attacks on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. However, the pact is the outcome of a long-negotiated agreement primarily aimed, in Riyadh’s perspective, at reshaping the Gulf security equation.

Washington’s response over Israel’s unprecedented strike on one of its most key allies in the Gulf put on display for Saudi Arabia that Gulf security can no longer be assured by a single external security provider. US President Donald Trump’s administration, in fact, reaffirmed its support to the Israeli government, only providing verbal reassurances to Doha and the GCC states. Looking at Gulf-Asia ties, the pact may have implications on the Saudi-India partnership, which has been on the rise in recent years, since it may complicate efforts to deepen the Saudi-India economic partnership, slowing the implementation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Furthermore, the mutual defense pact introduces a new security layer in the Gulf that could be replicated by other actors, triggering further mutual defense agreements between Gulf and Asian powers, likely the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and India.

The landmark pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan highlights Saudi Arabia’s evolving calculus with respect to its special relationship with the United States. In Riyadh’s multi-aligned policy, signing a mutual defense deal with Pakistan is complementary, not alternative, to Washington’s security guarantees—even though Islamabad is an ally of China.

Three emerging dyamics are challenging established balances for Saudi: the waning of US deterrence, Israel’s unrestrained military strategy, and the persistency of the Iranian menace. These factors are all pushing Riyadh, and the wider GCC to step up national defense through multiple deterrence strategies.

The mutual defense agreement: Upgrading historical Saudi-Pakistani cooperation

The agreement develops from the historical security and defense cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, from the “Treaty of Friendship” signed in 1951 to the 1982 Organization Agreement that allowed Pakistani troops to station in the Kingdom for training, inked three years after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Regarding the Saudi-Pakistan relationship, both parties have incentives to cooperate: Saudi Arabia is the leader of the Islamic world, a major economic power, and close to become Islamabad’s largest external financier with over $6 billion in loans and deposits; Pakistan, meanwhile, possesses nuclear weapons and larger armed forces personnel.

Deterring Israel, Iran, and the Houthis

The Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense agreement is the clearest sign of the evolution of Saudi relations with the United States and, more broadly, between GCC states and Washington.

For Riyadh, the mutual pact isn’t aimed at replacing the United States, but it instead fits into Saudi efforts to diversify defense providers and security guarantees: Washington is still Saudi Arabia’s first weapons supplier. Likewise, the tight defense cooperation level achieved by Riyadh and Washington—from joint ventures in defense industry to training—makes it very difficult for the Kingdom to replace it. However, Saudi diversification efforts have quickly turned into urgency due to the weakening of US deterrence in the Gulf: Washington’s external defense hasn’t prevented Qatar to be targeted twice in three months, first by Iran in June, and then by Israel in September. For For Saudi Arabia, there is an increasing threat perception over Trump’s “unwavering support” to Israel’s escalating regional military actions since the launch of the war in Gaza. Therefore, Saudi Arabia needs to deter now both Washington’s enemies—namely, Iran—and its friends—namely, Israel—since the security of the GCC states is “indivisible.”

In Riyadh’s perception, Gulf security also includes Yemen. Saudi Arabia started to doubt the endurance of US regional deterrence in 2015, when the Iranian-backed Houthis came to power in Sanaa, then developing drones and long-range missile capabilities able to strike the Saudi territory, especially in 2019-2022, before a truce was brokered. The apparent Iranian attack against Saudi Aramco’s oil facilities, for which the Houthis claimed credit to disguise Tehran’s role, occurred in September 2019, further undermined Saudi trust in the US security provision. For Saudi Arabia, security threats coming from Yemen can’t be de-coupled from considerations on Gulf security, given also the Houthis’ military partnership with Tehran.

In 2015, Riyadh tried to convince Pakistan to join the Arab Coalition against the Houthis, but Islamabad refused. In 2025, before the announcement of the mutual defense pact, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan strengthened naval cooperation, with a focus on training and defense coordination. With the Houthis’ multi-domain threat still active, Saudi mutual defense pact with Islamabad can also serve to deter and counter pro-Iranian attacks from a broader area ranging from the Gulf to the Red Sea.

Risks for the Saudi-India partnership

Saudi Arabia’s mutual defense pact with Pakistan is not likely to change Iran’s confidence re-building efforts with the GCC states—though it could slow Saudi’s rising economic partnership with India due to New Delhi’s historical tensions with Pakistan.

India stated it will “study” the pact’s “implications for national security,” but whatever consideration regarding India’s possible reaction to the mutual defense deal hasn’t prevented Saudi Arabia from signing the Pakistan agreement. Likely, this means the Saudis are confident enough on the possibility to upgrade defense relations with Pakistan without risking too much the important partnership with India, starting from the IMEC, since investments in and from the Gulf are pivotal in India’s “Look West” policy. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and India deepened defense cooperation in April, creating a ministerial committee and drafting an annual collaboration plan as a result of their first army-to-army talks: this means that top-level military communication channels exist and can help to overcome political hurdles.

After Israel’s strike in Qatar, Tehran is trying to rebuild political dialogue with the GCC states to break regional isolation, so the Saudi-Pakistani pact is not going to affect Iran’s strategy. For instance, Ali Larijani, the chief of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, visited the Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh this month. In this context, Iran doesn’t have alternative options to de-escalate tensions with its Arab neighbors, so Tehran is trying to capitalize on growing Arab unity against Israel to portray itself as a constructive player in the Gulf.

In the Middle East and wider Asia, the Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense pact can boost established alliances, or even generate new ones. More mutual defense pacts could follow, also in the Gulf. In such a context, the UAE and India could have an interest, for instance, in exploring a mutual defense pact, although any evidence has emerged so far. Both are Washington’s Major Defense Partners, have a free trade agreement, and are the most dynamic participants to the IMEC project.

A possible UAE-India mutual defense pact would not, in the perspective of the GCC states, counter-align the Saudi-Pakistan one, since all the Arab capitals of the Gulf are interested in strengthening national security vis-à-vis external threats, and considers GCC states’ security as “indivisible”. Rather, it would be a further defense tool aimed at strengthening Gulf security through multiple deterrence. Similarly, the UAE and France renewed in 2009 a defense cooperation agreement, with Paris reportedly adding a “secret clause” allowing the use of any military means to support the UAE as the French permanent military base in Abu Dhabi opened. Although the Emirati-French agreement isn’t about mutual defense (entailing support only from Paris’ side), it didn’t provoke backlashes, as it was perceived by the other Gulf monarchies as a contribute to GCC states’ collective security.

By transforming its defense alliance with Islamabad in a mutual pact, Saudi Arabia is likely to accelerate alignments and reshuffles in the Middle East and beyond. Aimed at deterring Iran, its allies and Israel, the Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense pact mirrors the evolution of Saudi-US relations, adding a new variable to the Gulf security equation.

Eleonora Ardemagni is an expert on Yemen and the GCC states, a senior associate research fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, and an adjunct professor at ASERI (Graduate School of Economics and International Relations, Milan).

The post The Saudi-Pakistan defense pact highlights the Gulf’s evolving strategic calculus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Much of Trump’s post focused on taunting Putin over his faltering invasion. In characteristically abrasive language, the US leader mocked the Russian army’s lack of progress in Ukraine and suggested Moscow was facing major economic problems due to the spiraling cost of the war. “Russia has been fighting aimlessly for three and a half years a war that should have taken a real military power less than a week to win,” Trump wrote. “This is not distinguishing Russia. In fact, it is very much making them look like a paper tiger.”

Many commentators chose to leap on Trump’s statement as proof of a major change in US policy toward Ukraine. In fact, the post contained nothing that suggested a new approach to relations between Washington and Kyiv. On the contrary, Trump stressed that it would now now be up to Europe to take the lead in supporting Ukraine.

While the US President repeatedly asserted that Ukraine could defeat Russia, there was no indication that America was ready to increase its support for the Ukrainian war effort or expand sanctions against Moscow. Instead, Trump limited himself to confirming that the US will continue to sell weapons to Ukraine via NATO partners. In other words, the Trump administration’s stance on the war is set to remain largely unchanged. However, instead of pressing Ukraine to accept a Kremlin-friendly peace deal, Trump is now openly talking about Ukrainian victory.

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What caused President Trump’s rather radical change in tone? Putin’s relentless stalling tactics and his shameless backtracking have no doubt played a role, exhausting the US leader’s patience and making him look foolish for touting their alleged personal friendship. Trump himself has suggested that his new assessment of the war is based on a detailed understanding of the current military and economic situation in Russia and Ukraine. This version has been endorsed by US Vice President JD Vance, who commented this week that Trump has “grown very confident this war is bad for Russia.”

It is not difficult to imagine how intelligence briefings on the current state of the war in Ukraine might have convinced Trump to revise his earlier assumptions regarding Russia’s economic and military might. Putin’s recent summer offensive was billed as a potential turning point in the war but has clearly failed to achieve its objectives. Russian troops were unable to secure any major breakthroughs during the summer months and have made little progress toward the establishment of a border buffer zone in northern Ukraine. This underwhelming outcome was entirely in line with broader battlefield trends that have seen Russia forces seize less than one percent of Ukrainian territory over the past three years.

Russia’s modest gains have come at a terrible price. While neither Moscow nor Kyiv release official casualty figures, independent research based on open source data and intelligence reports indicate that hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine, with even greater numbers wounded. This dwarfs the losses suffered in all the wars waged by the Kremlin since World War II.

In order to replenish the depleted ranks of his army, Putin has been forced to offer ever-larger bounties to new recruits. Nevertheless, the catastrophic casualty rate in Ukraine means that even the present steady flow of Russian volunteers may not be enough to sustain the invasion. In an indication of Moscow’s mounting manpower challenges, Putin brokered a deal with Pyongyang last year that saw more than ten thousand North Korean soldiers deployed to fight alongside the Russian army.

Putin is also visibly in struggling in the wider geopolitical arena. With the vast majority of Russia’s military resources already committed to the invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has found itself unable to project strength elsewhere. Russia could do nothing when the simmering war between Azerbaijan and Armenia flared up in 2023, and has since been largely excluded from the peace process between the two countries, leaving centuries of Russian imperial influence in doubt. Similarly, when the regime of Kremlin client Bashar al-Assad was under threat in late 2024, Moscow was unable to intervene to save the Syrian dictator. Iranian officials encountered the same toothless response more recently when they appealed to their Russian allies for help during Israel’s brief air war against the country.

As Russia’s international influence declines, Putin is facing growing economic woes on the home front. These problems are being compounded by an escalating Ukrainian bombing campaign targeting the Russian oil and gas industry. Since the beginning of August, Ukraine has launched dozens of airstrikes against Russian refineries, pipelines, pumping stations, and ports. This Ukrainian aerial offensive has dealt the biggest blow to the Russian economy since the start of the war, Reuters reports, with refining capacity significantly curtailed and energy exports down. Crucially, Ukrainian attacks have sparked a worsening fuel crisis in regions across Russia, with long queues forming at gas stations amid supply breakdowns and record price hikes.

Russia’s inability to defend its economically vital energy industry against Ukrainian long-range drones has highlighted just how overstretched the country’s military currently is. With the army’s limited supply of air defense systems deployed to the front lines in Ukraine or guarding major Russian cities along with the palaces of Putin and his cronies, there is simply not enough spare capacity to protect the vast oil and gas infrastructure that serves as the engine of Putin’s war machine.

This does not bode well for the Kremlin. Ukraine is clearly intent on methodically destroying Russia’s energy industry and is developing its own domestically produced cruise missiles to do so. If these weapons become more readily available in the coming months as anticipated, Kyiv’s capacity to strike targets deep inside Russia will be drastically enhanced.

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The unfavorable current military and economic outlook helps to explain why Trump chose to brand Russia a “paper tiger.” The jibe seems to have struck a nerve among Russians, many of whom are no doubt already beginning to feel uneasy about the worsening domestic situation and their army’s lack of progress in Ukraine. Pro-war bloggers and Kremlin pundits lined up to attack Trump and ridicule his “paper tiger” assertion, while Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov felt obliged to directly address the insult. “Russia is by no means a tiger. Russia is traditionally seen as a bear. There is no such thing as paper bears. Russia is a real bear,” he somewhat bizarrely insisted during a radio interview.

Putin has so far remained silent but is likely to be seething. The Kremlin dictator is well known for his gangster-like obsession with respect, and has made no secret of his bitter resentment over Russia’s humiliating loss of superpower status following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin was said to have been deeply offended when US President Barack Obama dismissed Russia as a mere “regional power” in 2014 during the initial stages of Moscow’s attack on Ukraine. He will now also be haunted by Trump’s “paper tiger” taunt, which strikes at the very heart of his imperial insecurities.

The invasion of Ukraine was conceived by Putin as a decisive step to reverse the injustice of the Soviet breakup and revive the Russian Empire. He had hoped for a rapid victory that would transform the wider geopolitical landscape and return Russia to its rightful place among the world’s great powers. Instead, the war has ruthlessly exposed the limitations of the Russian military.

Today, Putin’s armies remain bogged down in brutal fighting for control over villages that lie within walking distance of the original front lines when Russia’s invasion first began more than three and a half years ago. At sea, Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports has been broken, with the bulk of Putin’s fleet forced to retreat from Crimea. Despite possessing one of the world’s largest air forces, Russia has been unable to secure air superiority in Ukraine and cannot even prevent the Ukrainians from striking targets deep inside the Russian Federation itself.

In light of this poor performance, it is hardly surprising that Russia’s military reputation has taken such a battering since 2022. Putin still possesses a vast and powerful war machine that is capable of inflicting untold harm and misery, but few would now classify Russia as a global superpower. Trump’s “paper tiger” barb was meant as an insult, but it may be closer to the truth that Putin’s pretensions to great power status.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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This unity was on display when the President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Mohammed bin Zayed, arrived in Doha one day after the attack, and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman condemned Israel’s “brutal aggression” against Qatar and vowed that Riyadh would stand with Doha “without limit.” Such solidarity speaks volumes about how much intra-GCC dynamics have changed since the Emirati and Saudi-led blockade of Qatar, which ended less than five years ago.

Beyond the GCC, leaders and representatives from across the Arab-Islamic world convened in Doha on September 15 for an emergency summit organized by the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Together, they issued a unified condemnation of Israel’s strike on Qatar. In his address, Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani warned of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s expansionist ambitions, calling the notion of turning the Arab world into “an Israeli sphere of influence” a “dangerous illusion.”

US security guarantees under scrutiny

For decades, Gulf governments have depended on the United States as their primary security guarantor, particularly against Iran and Ba’athist Iraq. However, a series of US foreign policy decisions in the twenty-first century—including Washington’s response to the 2010–11 Arab Spring, the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, and its limited reaction to the 2019 attacks on Saudi Aramco and the 2022 Houthi strikes on Abu Dhabi—have, to varying degrees, gradually eroded Gulf states’ confidence in America’s commitment to their security. Israel’s recent military strike on Qatar, however, brought those concerns to the forefront, sharply intensifying doubts among Gulf monarchies about the reliability of the US security umbrella.

As CNN and Axios have reported, US and Israeli officials claim that Netanyahu notified the Trump administration prior to the launch of this operation. If true, this contradicts the White House’s claims that the notification only came after Israel’s military launched the missiles at Doha. Nonetheless, Trump responded to Israel’s bombing of Qatar by referring to the Gulf country as a “great ally” and warned Netanyahu’s government to be “very careful.”

Regardless of the timing and which version of events is accurate, Doha’s key lesson is that the American security umbrella failed to prevent this unprecedented attack from occurring. Given that Qatar has hosted the US Central Command’s forward headquarters at al-Udeid Air Base for over two decades and was designated a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2022, Doha is now questioning what these aspects of its defense partnership with Washington truly mean in practice if Washington permits (or at least fails to prevent) an Israeli strike on Qatari territory.

This incident has also prompted similar concerns among other GCC members, who are now asking what protections, if any, they have that Qatar did not. If Israel is willing to carry out such an operation with apparent impunity, what would stop it from targeting individuals deemed “terrorists” by its government elsewhere in the Gulf—such as a Houthi representative based in Muscat?

Against the backdrop of Israel’s increasingly assertive regional posture—including its strike on Doha, the June attack on Iran that launched the Twelve Day War, ongoing military operations against the Houthis in Yemen, and frequent airstrikes across Syria since last year’s fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime—the GCC states are finding themselves more closely aligned in their threat perceptions. As each of the six monarchies pursues ambitious economic development and diversification agendas, regional stability has become a shared strategic imperative. Attracting investors, business leaders, and tourists depends on maintaining a secure environment—not just within their own borders, but across the broader region. From the Gulf’s perspective, Israel’s actions are casting a long shadow over the viability of these visions for economic transformation.

In this context, it was unsurprising that Gulf leaders swiftly condemned Israel’s strike on Qatar and expressed unequivocal solidarity with Doha. For all six monarchies, the imperative is clear: to signal that such acts of aggression must not be normalized or allowed to become a precedent. While Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian territories, and Yemen have become routine, Gulf states are united in their determination to prevent any GCC member from being added to that list. There is a growing consensus across the Gulf that Israel must face consequences for its actions to deter any future attacks on Gulf monarchies.

Gulf options

Lacking the military capacity to respond directly to Israel, GCC states are compelled to explore alternative, non-military options. Chief among these is the strategic use of their close relationship with US President Donald Trump and key figures within his administration. Gulf leaders are likely to press Washington to exert its considerable leverage over Israel to prevent any future attacks on a GCC member. Aware of the Trump administration’s reliance on the Gulf monarchies for advancing US economic, geopolitical, and security objectives, these states possess diplomatic and economic levers that could be employed skillfully.

Given the UAE’s status as the Gulf state with the closest ties to Israel, Doha and possibly other GCC capitals are quietly encouraging Abu Dhabi to reassess its relations with Tel Aviv. Although a full abrogation of the Abraham Accords in response to the September 9 Israeli strike on Qatar remains unlikely at this point, Emirati officials may consider recalibrating bilateral ties to convey that aggression against any GCC member carries consequences. Even if short of abrogating the Abraham Accords, Abu Dhabi and Manama could expel ambassadors, downgrade diplomatic relations (as the UAE did with Iran in January 2016), or decrease their public engagement with Israel. Looking ahead, should Israel continue to act with impunity and Washington fail to restrain its behavior, Abu Dhabi could retain its option to withdraw from the Abraham Accords altogether as a form of leverage. Nonetheless, aside from strong rhetoric condemning the attack on Doha, so far the UAE’s only diplomatic action in response to Israel’s bombing of its fellow GCC state has been to summon the deputy Israeli ambassador to Abu Dhabi.

Ultimately, GCC members face an inflection point as they grapple with new regional realities. Israel’s willingness to strike a Gulf state and Washington’s tacit acquiescence have exposed a critical vulnerability in the Gulf’s longstanding reliance on the United States as its principal security guarantor. Should further Israeli attacks occur, Gulf leaders will be confronted with the challenge of managing a growing security threat absent the protective umbrella they have long depended on. With no alternative global or regional power both capable and willing to replace Washington in this role, the Gulf monarchies may be increasingly driven to deepen intra-GCC defense coordination and revive aspirations for a more autonomous, NATO-style security framework. Developing robust missile defense systems and credible deterrent capabilities will require time and sustained investment. Yet, this trajectory appears increasingly necessary.

In parallel, Gulf states are likely to expand strategic partnerships with Pakistan and Turkey. Both of these countries have their own vested interests in preserving Gulf security and sovereignty amid an increasingly assertive Israeli posture and perceived US disengagement. Just eight days after the Israeli attack on Doha, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a defense treaty, which puts the Kingdom under Islamabad’s security umbrella. This is particularly relevant given Pakistan’s increasingly grave concerns about an Israeli-Indian nexus within the context of the armed conflict between Islamabad and New Delhi earlier this year, as well as Turkey’s perception of a growing Israeli threat in Syria.

Iran can be counted on to opportunistically seize this moment to capitalize on its Arab neighbors’ growing distrust of Washington and try to bring Tehran closer to Doha and other GCC capitals. Although it is extremely doubtful that the fallout from this Israeli strike on Qatar will lead to any major GCC-wide pivot toward Iran as a security partner, Tehran will be positioned to gain in mostly symbolic ways while advancing its anti-Israeli rhetoric and narrative of standing with other Muslim-majority nations in opposing Israel.

In sum, while the precise trajectory of GCC responses remains uncertain, Israel’s strike has served as a shock, compelling all six members to re-examine long-standing assumptions about the reliability of their US security guarantor. In its wake, the Gulf monarchies have displayed strong unity at a time when rethinking twenty-first-century Gulf security is no longer optional. Whether through greater intra-GCC coordination, diversification of external partnerships, or renewed efforts toward strategic autonomy, the region now stands at a critical juncture—one that will shape the contours of Gulf security for years to come.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He is also an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University.

The post How Israel’s strike on Doha is forcing a Gulf security reckoning appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Over the past week, numerous Western leaders have condemned Russia’s “reckless” incursion. Meanwhile, NATO has announced the launch of the Eastern Sentry deterrence initiative, with plans for more integrated air defense, intelligence sharing, and new assets. Despite these steps, some believe the response has so far been insufficient. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has criticized NATO’s “lack of action,” suggesting that European countries need to go further and work on a joint air defense system to create “an effective air shield over Europe.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

If the West fails to credibly deter further Kremlin escalations, this would have potentially disastrous consequences for international security. At stake is not only Ukraine’s survival as a sovereign state, but NATO’s continued existence as the main guarantor of peace and stability in Europe. A conventional Russian invasion of Poland or the Baltic states remains within the realm of possibilities if Moscow is successful in Ukraine. However, a far more likely scenario would be some kind of gray zone aggression on NATO’s eastern flank with the aim of discrediting the alliance’s core commitment to collective security.

This could take many forms. For example, Russia could launch a significantly larger drone attack against Poland. Alternatively, the Kremlin could stage a hybrid cross-border incursion into Estonia, utilizing the same kind of plausible deniability employed during the 2014 seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. Moscow’s goal would be to demonstrate that the NATO alliance lacks the resolve to act on its collective security commitments, while remaining below the threshold that could trigger a full-scale war.

Even prior to the recent appearance of Russian drones over Poland, there were already ample indications that the scale of the threat posed by the Putin regime was not fully understood in Western capitals. Recent diplomatic efforts to end the invasion of Ukraine via some form of compromise peace deal suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of Russia’s maximalist war aims. Putin’s ambitions extend far beyond limited territorial gains in Ukraine; any attempt to appease him with “land swaps” will merely whet his imperial appetite and encourage further aggression.

Members of the so-called Coalition of the Willing led by France and the UK have spoken recently of providing Ukraine with “robust” security guarantees, but only after a ceasefire is in place. This gives the Kremlin dictator no incentive to back down. While Putin’s recent summer offensive in Ukraine has failed strategically, Russia continues to make marginal gains on the battlefield while mercilessly striking Ukrainian cities and civilians with drones and missiles. It is therefore imperative to compel the Kremlin to agree to a ceasefire first, separating this from discussions over security guarantees while retaining a commitment to both.

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A far more united, assertive, and multi-pronged approach is required in order to deter Russia. Western governments must make full use of the extensive economic leverage at their disposal. Washington and Brussels should seize Russia’s frozen assets and implement tougher sanctions that drastically cut Russia’s income from oil exports, including measures targeting Moscow’s shadow fleet of tankers. Applying additional secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that facilitate the purchase of Russian oil will force buyers like India and China to comply with US sanctions or risk losing access to the global financial system.

At the same time, the US and Europe must ensure Ukraine becomes a “steel porcupine” capable of defending itself and deterring future Russian aggression on its own. This should involve guaranteed weapons deliveries, an end to all restrictions on Ukrainian long-range strikes inside Russia, increased intelligence sharing, and enhanced industrial cooperation between Western and Ukrainian defense companies, especially in terms of drone technologies and electronic warfare.

This combination of intensifying economic pressure on Russia and increased military support for Ukraine could set the stage for a ceasefire agreement. If this is achieved, the West must then unilaterally implement security guarantees and deploy troops from as many countries as possible to Ukraine to ensure maximum deterrence. Any deployments should take a layered approach. The initial step would be a monitoring mission on the line of contact, followed by the deployment of soldiers across Ukraine, along with air and naval patrols.

While American troops will almost certainly not be involved on the ground in Ukraine, it is vital that US President Donald Trump sticks to his commitment to back any reassurance force with continued intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support, along with a potential aviation component. The Trump administration has successfully encouraged NATO members to spend more on defense and support Kyiv, but Trump’s skepticism toward alliances and his often ambiguous position on Ukraine increase the likelihood of a Russian challenge to NATO’s Article 5 in the near future.

Putin’s latest escalation in the skies over Poland is an unmistakable signal that NATO’s credibility is under threat. In order to reduce the potential for a larger European war, a new approach to engagement with the Kremlin that projects strength and resolve is clearly required. Failure to act accordingly will place the entire international security architecture in question, including the foundational principle that borders cannot be changed by force.

Zahar Hryniv is a Young Global Professional at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 16, 2025

Ukraine’s skies are Europe’s first line of defense against Russian drones

By Alina Zubkovych

As NATO leaders respond to Russia’s recent drone incursion into Poland, they should recognize that Ukraine’s skies are now European first line of defense against Putin’s growing drone fleet, writes Alina Zubkovych.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Sep 16, 2025

Only Ukraine can teach NATO how to combat Putin’s growing drone fleet

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NATO must urgently learn from Ukraine’s unique experience of Russian drone warfare as the alliance seeks to address the growing threats posed by Putin’s drone swarms, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Aug 28, 2025

Putin wants to capture Ukraine’s crucial fortress belt without a fight

By Mykola Bielieskov

As US-led efforts to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine struggle to gain momentum, Vladimir Putin’s latest territorial demands include the surrender of strategically vital and heavily fortified Ukrainian land in the east of the country, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Putin’s Polish probe demands decisive response to restore NATO deterrence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s unprecedented drone raid was widely interpreted as a test of NATO’s readiness and resolve. Former US Army Europe commander General Ben Hodges said the operation was a Kremlin rehearsal with the objective of checking NATO response times and capabilities. “Using F-35s and F-22s against drones shows we are not yet prepared,” he noted.

Many analysts joined Hodges in commenting on the inefficiency of employing NATO fighter jets and expensive missiles to counter relatively cheap Russian drones. The obvious shortcomings of this approach have underlined the need to radically rethink how NATO members address air defense amid the rapidly evolving threats posed by Russian drone warfare. Ukraine’s experience of combating Putin’s drone fleet will prove crucial in this process.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Like many other NATO members, Poland has invested heavily in recent years in high-end air defense systems such as Patriots and F-35 warplanes. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has revealed a new kind of war that requires alternative solutions. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three and a half years ago, unmanned systems have emerged as the decisive weapon above the battlefield and have also been used extensively for longer range attacks on land and at sea.

With Russia and Ukraine locked in a relentless race to innovate, the Kremlin has prioritized the mass production of deadly strike drones capable of hitting targets hundreds of kilometers away. The number of drones involved in Russian aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities has risen dramatically over the past year from dozens to hundreds, with record waves in recent months featuring as many as eight hundred drones. Europe remains dangerously unprepared to address the unprecedented challenges posed by these large-scale Russian drone swarms.

Ukrainians have been advising their European colleagues for some time of the need to reassess their air defense strategies in line with the growing dominance of drones. Ukrainian drone warfare specialist Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, who leads the country’s Unmanned Systems Forces, warned in July 2025 that NATO commanders must urgently review their air defense doctrines in order to focus on the dangers posed by swarms of Russian attack drones.

Brovdi’s call to Kyiv’s Western partners and his offer to share Ukraine’s unique experience of drone warfare did not initially provoke much of a response. However, following Russia’s recent escalation in the skies above Poland, that may now be changing. Within days of the Russian drone incursion, Polish and Ukrainian officials announced plans for Ukraine to provide anti-drone training in Poland. Other NATO members are now expected to follow suit, reflecting Ukraine’s status as a leading authority on drone warfare.

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Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski is one of numerous senior European politicians to acknowledge the need for NATO countries to learn from Ukraine. “The Ukrainians have better equipment for dealing with Russian drones and more up-to-date experience,” he commented during a visit to Kyiv last week. “This is something that the public and governments in the West need to urgently integrate into their thinking. It is the Ukrainians who will be training us on how to stand up to Russia, not the other way around.”

US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg echoed this sentiment, commenting on September 12 that Ukraine has emerged in recent years as a “world leader” in drone warfare. Noting that the evolution of drone technologies was changing the nature of modern war, Kellogg credited Ukraine with playing a leading role in this trend while acknowledging that other nations including the United States were now “well behind.”

In addition to offering air defense training to the country’s allies, Ukraine is also ready to help NATO partners identify and procure the necessary defensive tools to combat Russian drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently stressed that nobody in the world has enough missiles to shoot down the large volumes of drones currently being deployed by the Kremlin. Instead, a more eclectic approach is needed, featuring ground-based air defenses and jet fighters together with defensive drones, helicopter patrols, and propeller planes.

Ukraine has already developed and begun deploying a number of interceptor drones that serve as a cost-effective solution to Russia’s expanding swarms of strike drones. Work is now underway to increase production in order to keep pace with Russia’s growing output. Kyiv’s partners are engaged in these efforts. A new initiative was recently unveiled that will see Britain support Ukraine by mass producing interceptor drones based on existing Ukrainian technologies. This should make it possible to deliver thousands of drones to Ukraine every month.

Ukraine’s sophisticated anti-drone defenses will now set the standard for NATO as the alliance adjusts to the changing face of modern warfare and the mounting threat posed by Putin’s drones. At present, Putin is using drone incursions to test NATO and probe the alliance’s military and political responses, but his appetite for escalation has never been more apparent. European countries must therefore prepare to defend themselves against potential large-scale attacks involving hundreds of Russian drones. As they scramble to do so, Ukraine’s experience will prove absolutely indispensable.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 4, 2025

Ukrainian bombing campaign turns Russia’s sheer size into a weakness

By David Kirichenko 

For centuries, Russia’s sheer size has been its greatest asset. Ukraine now intends to transform this vastness into a weakness with a long-range bombing campaign targeting Putin’s economically vital but vulnerable energy industry, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Aug 28, 2025

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By Mykola Bielieskov

As US-led efforts to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine struggle to gain momentum, Vladimir Putin’s latest territorial demands include the surrender of strategically vital and heavily fortified Ukrainian land in the east of the country, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Disinformation

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Putin’s failed summer offensive shatters the myth of inevitable Russian victory

By Peter Dickinson

The failure of Putin’s summer offensive should help to debunk the persistent myth of inevitable Russian victory and persuade Western leaders to increase their support for the Ukrainian war effort, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Only Ukraine can teach NATO how to combat Putin’s growing drone fleet appeared first on Atlantic Council.

One of China’s most prominent guests was Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was accorded a place of honor alongside the Chinese leader at a military parade in Beijing to mark eighty years since the Japanese surrender and the end of World War II. On the eve of the parade, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was pictured in friendly discussion with Putin and Xi at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin.

The optics coming out of China were unmistakable. While the main message was one of Chinese economic and military might, the Tianjin summit and Beijing parade also allowed China, India, North Korea, and others to underline their continued backing for Russia and their rejection of Western efforts to isolate Vladimir Putin over the invasion of Ukraine.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The Chinese and Russian leaders held a series of meetings during Putin’s visit, with Xi hailing his Kremlin counterpart as an “old friend.” This warm welcome came as no surprise. While China officially claims to have a neutral stance toward the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Beijing stands accused of playing a pivotal supporting role in the Russian war effort. Since 2022, China has emerged as the key client for Russian energy exports, helping the Kremlin to compensate for the loss of European markets. Chinese companies also reportedly provide “nearly 80 percent” of the sanctioned dual-use items Russia needs to continue the war.

China and Russia indicated their commitment to further energy sector cooperation by signing a deal to build the long-delayed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline connecting the two countries. While the agreement leaves a number of key questions unanswered, Moscow is signaling that it has energy export markets beyond Europe. Even if only smaller oil and gas projects move forward, they could prove jointly consequential for the two countries.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un joined Xi and Putin for the Beijing military parade and used the occasion to reaffirm his “full support” for Russia, which he framed as a “fraternal duty.” While China continues to deny directly supporting the Russian war effort, North Korea has reportedly provided Russia with over 12 million rounds of artillery, rocket launchers, self-propelled guns, over 100 ballistic missiles, vehicles, and other forms of heavy artillery, while also sending around 15,000 soldiers to fight alongside the Russian army. By summer 2025, Pyongyang was supplying up to 40 percent of the ammunition used by Russia in Ukraine, according to Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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India’s Modi also displayed warm ties with Putin, praising his “excellent” bilateral meeting with the Russian leader in Tianjin. Delhi has stressed the need for peace in Ukraine while emphasizing a business-focused relationship with Russia, but India has recently faced a Trump administration backlash over the country’s expanding imports of Russian energy resources. Since the start of the invasion, India’s Russian crude purchases have risen dramatically. In 2024, Russian crude represented around 40 percent of Indian imports, up from just 3 percent three years earlier.

Modi and Putin came together in China against a backdrop of tariffs imposed by the United States in response to India’s continued purchase of Russian oil, a move slammed by Delhi as “unfair, unjustified, and unreasonable.” Amid mounting tensions with the US, Modi’s very public show of support for Putin was interpreted by many as a calculated act of defiance.

None of this went unnoticed in Western capitals. Indeed, numerous politicians and commentators saw events in China as confirmation that an “anti-Western alliance” was taking shape, with Beijing and Moscow leading the way. The most striking response came from US President Donald Trump. “Looks like we’ve lost India and Russia to deepest, darkest China. May they have a long and prosperous future together,” the US leader quipped on social media. While Trump later walked this comment back in regard to India, he repeated his “disappointment” with Delhi over its Russian oil purchases.

Not everyone is convinced by talk of a new global order. Skeptics noted that beyond the pomp and pageantry, last week’s events in China did not produce much in the way of concrete results. The single biggest breakthrough was the agreement over a new Russia-China pipeline, but even this was far from conclusive. Meanwhile, although China, Russia, and India may be able to find common ground in their mutual dislike of Western dominance, they also disagree on a wide range of important issues.

It is still too early to proclaim the emergence of a fully-fledged anti-Western alliance, but major geopolitical shifts are clearly underway that will shape the global order for decades to come. In the short term, the support of China, India, and North Korea for Russia’s war in Ukraine will allow the killing to continue while undermining Trump’s efforts to pressure the Kremlin into ending the invasion.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 28, 2025

Putin wants to capture Ukraine’s crucial fortress belt without a fight

By Mykola Bielieskov

As US-led efforts to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine struggle to gain momentum, Vladimir Putin’s latest territorial demands include the surrender of strategically vital and heavily fortified Ukrainian land in the east of the country, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Sep 4, 2025

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By David Kirichenko 

For centuries, Russia’s sheer size has been its greatest asset. Ukraine now intends to transform this vastness into a weakness with a long-range bombing campaign targeting Putin’s economically vital but vulnerable energy industry, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Sep 2, 2025

Putin’s failed summer offensive shatters the myth of inevitable Russian victory

By Peter Dickinson

The failure of Putin’s summer offensive should help to debunk the persistent myth of inevitable Russian victory and persuade Western leaders to increase their support for the Ukrainian war effort, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post China, India, and North Korea back Russia as changing global order takes shape appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Polish and other NATO jets reportedly shot down a number of Russian drones in the skies above Poland early on September 10. This was the first time in NATO history that alliance fighter pilots have engaged Russian targets in allied airspace, officials stated. Addressing members of the Polish parliament in Warsaw, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said the incident was “the closest we have been to open conflict since World War II.”

Moscow’s decision to target Poland with drones was the latest in a series of alarming escalations by the Kremlin following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s August summit meeting in Alaska with US President Donald Trump. This has served to significantly raise the stakes ahead of Russia’s military drills in Belarus. While the authorities in Minsk have sought to downplay the significance of the joint exercises, they are a timely reminder that Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka is a key accomplice in Russia’s war effort who poses a security threat to NATO’s eastern flank.

Even before this week’s unprecedented appearance of Russian drones over Poland, Belarus’s European neighbors were already stepping up security measures along the frontier. Lithuania and Poland are accelerating construction work on enhanced border defenses, while the Polish authorities have announced the closure of border crossings with Belarus during the military exercises, citing the risk of provocations tied to the drills.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The “Zapad” military exercises, meaning “West” in Russian, are large-scale drills that have been jointly organized for a number of years by Russia and Belarus. The planned 2023 iteration was canceled as Russian troops and equipment were needed for the ongoing invasion of Ukraine. This year’s war games are set to be significantly smaller in scale that the 2021 exercises, which were used as cover for preparations ahead of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Following Russia’s recent drone incursion, NATO forces across the border from Belarus will be on high alert for any further escalations during the drills.

This week’s Zapad 2025 military exercises will underline the transformation of Belarus into a forward base for the Russian army and will further normalize Moscow’s military footprint in the country. Infrastructure for hosting Russian troops is already in place including missile facilities, fortified munitions depots, and expanded rail links. Almost 300 Belarusian state enterprises are also reportedly involved in the production of weapons or munitions for the Russian military.

Lukashenka has been steadily trading Belarusian sovereignty for regime security ever since 2020, when he became dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival following the brutal suppression of anti-regime protests across Belarus. Hosting Russian troops, supplying Putin’s war machine, and supporting the invasion of Ukraine are all part of this bargain. Russian backing has made it possible for Lukashenka to transform Belarus into an increasingly repressive dictatorship, with regime opponents exiled and over a thousand political prisoners currently behind bars.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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While Lukashenka has little choice but to continue playing the role of junior partner in Putin’s anti-Western crusade, there are signs that he may not be entirely comfortable with his current predicament. In fact, the Belarusian response to this week’s Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace says much about how cornered the Lukashenka regime has become.

Early on Wednesday morning, officials in Minsk reportedly contacted their Warsaw counterparts to offer advance warning that drones were heading their way from the direction of Belarus. Poland said this information was unexpected but helpful. “It was surprising that Belarus, which is really trying to escalate the situation on our land border, decided to cooperate in this way,” commented Polish military officials. While the Belarusians were ready to help the Poles, they also avoided blaming Russia directly for the incident, highlighting just how carefully Lukashenka is treading.

The message from Minsk seems straightforward. Lukashenka is desperate to demonstrate to his EU neighbors and the wider international community that he is not fully tied to Moscow’s war machine and can still act independently of the Kremlin. He is probing for geopolitical space and signaling a cautious openness to dialogue with the West, while trying to avoid provoking a furious response from his Russian patrons.

This should not be interpreted as a sudden thaw. Moscow will certainly fight to keep Belarus as a key pressure point against NATO for many years to come, and is in a position to do so. Over the past five years, Russia has managed to establish extensive levers of influence throughout Belarus’s political, military, business, and cultural establishments in a process that some have characterized as a “creeping annexation.” Meanwhile, Lukashenka may have earned a reputation as a wily political operator, but he will almost certainly always gravitate back toward the Kremlin, regardless of any overtures from the West.

Lukashenka’s room for maneuver is clearly limited. But at the same time, his fear of being dragged directly into Putin’s war against the West creates a potential opening for pragmatic diplomacy. The September 11 visit by a US delegation to Minsk, which secured the release of dozens of political prisoners, shows that this diplomatic path is already producing tangible results. Western governments should now build on this momentum to press Lukashenka harder for the release of all political prisoners and an end to the repression of domestic opponents.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 9, 2025

What is the Coalition of the Willing actually willing to do in Ukraine?

By Mykola Bielieskov

European troops in Ukraine could serve as a meaningful element within a broader deterrence package, but Coalition of the Willing leaders should focus on making the Ukrainian military strong enough to deter the Kremlin, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert Sep 4, 2025

Ukrainian bombing campaign turns Russia’s sheer size into a weakness

By David Kirichenko 

For centuries, Russia’s sheer size has been its greatest asset. Ukraine now intends to transform this vastness into a weakness with a long-range bombing campaign targeting Putin’s economically vital but vulnerable energy industry, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Sep 2, 2025

Putin’s failed summer offensive shatters the myth of inevitable Russian victory

By Peter Dickinson

The failure of Putin’s summer offensive should help to debunk the persistent myth of inevitable Russian victory and persuade Western leaders to increase their support for the Ukrainian war effort, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Belarus hosts Russian war games as Putin’s drones probe Poland appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As August gives way to September, it is now abundantly clear that Putin’s big summer offensive has failed. The Russian army has been unable to secure any front line breakthroughs or capture a single major city, with overall Russian advances during the three summer months limited to an estimated 0.3 percent of Ukrainian territory. Crucially, key strategic objectives like Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine remain in Ukrainian hands.

The Kremlin’s ambitious plans to expand the war into northern Ukraine’s Sumy and Kharkiv regions have also fallen flat. During the initial weeks of the summer offensive in June, a swaggering Putin confidently declared that “all Ukraine is ours” and threatened to seize regional capital Sumy as part of efforts to establish a so-called “security buffer zone” stretching deep inside Ukraine. With the summer season now over, his invading troops find themselves pinned down in a handful of border villages, having been forced to retreat after a series of battlefield reverses.

Russia’s extremely modest recent gains have come at a terrible price. While the Kremlin does not release information about its war dead, conservative estimates of Russian casualties based on open source data suggest catastrophic losses during the summer months numbering tens of thousands. As German journalist and BILD correspondent Julian Röpcke has noted, any sober assessment of Russia’s summer offensive must conclude that it has been a “debacle.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The failure of Putin’s summer offensive should now help to debunk the persistent myth of inevitable Russian victory. For far too long, international perceptions of the war in Ukraine have been distorted by exaggerated notions of Russia’s military might. Perhaps most notoriously, this has led US President Donald Trump to criticize Ukraine for daring to defend itself against a far larger aggressor, while suggesting that Russia is somehow uniquely accustomed to waging and winning wars.

In reality, Russian history has been shaped to a significant degree by military defeats, including a long list of lost wars in the past few centuries alone. Russia suffered a comprehensive defeat against an Anglo-French coalition in the Crimean War of the 1850s. This was followed by a humiliating loss to Japan in 1905, which sparked a revolution. Russia then contrived to lose World War I, despite starting the war on what would eventually be the winning side. This led to the downfall of the Czarist Russian Empire.

In the immediate aftermath of the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks lost the 1920 Polish-Soviet War. The Soviet era would also end in defeat, with Russia retreating from Afghanistan in 1988 before losing the Cold War itself. Following the collapse of the USSR, post-Soviet Russia went on to lose the First Chechen War in the mid 1990s.

Despite this very mixed military record, modern Russia has managed to convince much of the outside world that it remains an unstoppable superpower. Putin has embraced the militarism of the Soviet era and brought it into the digital age, combining traditional elements such as annual parades and Hollywood-style blockbusters with viral social media messaging and rampant disinformation campaigns designed to cultivate an image of overwhelming strength.

Putin’s militaristic myth-making has played an important role in shaping the international response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ever since the outbreak of hostilities in February 2022, Western leaders have allowed themselves to be intimidated by Putin’s projections of power and his liberal use of nuclear blackmail. Rather than providing Ukraine with everything it needs to secure victory, the West has consistently hesitated while citing fear of escalation. This timid approach has merely served to embolden Moscow and prolong the war.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

With little actual progress to report on the battlefield, the Kremlin is now reportedly scrambling to inflate its gains in an apparent bid to overawe Western policymakers and persuade them that their continued backing of the Ukrainian war effort is futile. “The Kremlin is trying to convince the West that Russia will inevitably achieve its war goals on the battlefield, such that Ukraine should concede to Russian demands and the West should therefore cease its support of Ukraine,” the US-based Institute for the Study of War noted on August 30.

The facts on the ground tell a different story. While Putin boasts of relentless advances and irresistible battlefield momentum, his army is in many instances still fighting over villages located within walking distance of Russia’s original positions at the start of the full-scale invasion more than three and a half years ago. Over the past one thousand days, Russia has occupied around one percent of Ukraine, while failing to capture a single Ukrainian regional capital. Indeed, the largest city occupied by Russian forces during the whole war remains Rostov in Russia itself, which was briefly seized in June 2023 during the short-lived Wagner mutiny.

Putin’s ability to intimidate Western leaders is his greatest single achievement in a war that has seen his army perform far below expectations. The success of his saber-rattling is a triumph of style over substance that conveniently ignores unfavorable battlefield realities while relying heavily on the West’s own obvious reluctance to confront the Kremlin. As evidence of the Russian army’s limitations continues to mount, this reluctance looks harder and harder to justify.

It would be extremely foolish to underestimate the threat posed by Putin’s war machine, of course. The Russian army dwarfs anything in Europe and is backed by vast quantities of drones, missiles, and air power, along with the kind of ruthless political will that is almost entirely absent in most European capitals. But at the same time, it is vital to recognize that Russian victory in Ukraine is anything but inevitable.

The costly failure of Russia’s recent summer offensive is a clear signal that Putin’s invasion is not going according to plan. For now, the Kremlin dictator shows no sign of compromising and still thinks he can bluff his way to victory, but his army is obviously far more vulnerable that he would like us to believe. If the Ukrainians receive the necessary backing from their allies, recent evidence suggests that they are more than capable of turning the military tide in their favor and forcing Putin to the negotiating table.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 21, 2025

Putin is facing a fuel crisis as Ukraine escalates attacks on Russian refineries

By David Kirichenko

Historically, Russia’s sheer size has always been considered one of its main strengths. By launching waves of airstrikes across the country, Ukraine now intends to exploit this vastness and transform it into Russia’s greatest weakness, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Technologies

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Russia attacks Zelenskyy’s legitimacy to derail US-led Ukraine peace talks

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Moscow’s efforts to portray Zelenskyy as illegitimate fall apart when weighed against Ukraine’s Constitution and the country’s political practice, along with international precedents and legal tradition, writes Serhii Savelii.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Aug 28, 2025

Putin wants to capture Ukraine’s crucial fortress belt without a fight

By Mykola Bielieskov

As US-led efforts to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine struggle to gain momentum, Vladimir Putin’s latest territorial demands include the surrender of strategically vital and heavily fortified Ukrainian land in the east of the country, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Putin’s failed summer offensive shatters the myth of inevitable Russian victory appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The recent summit between South Korean President Lee Jae-myung and US President Donald Trump, despite looming anticipation of large-scale changes in the alliance, such as restructuring of US Forces Korea (USFK), ended with Trump touting his “very good relationship” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Yet as Trump hinted about seeking “ownership” of military bases, his demands for greater burden-sharing from Seoul remain. This particularly reflects Washington’s apparent shift toward a “China-first” strategy as reportedly outlined in the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance. South Korea can expect continued pressure to assume greater regional security responsibilities, with alliance discussions over key issues such as troop reduction, strategic flexibility, and wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer. Echoing the latest call of Markus Garlauskas, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, to upgrade the ROK-US alliance from “ironclad” to “titanium,” I also contend in this paper that the brewing changes in the alliance can provide momentum for a renewal befitting the changing security environment. With specific focus on the possibility of USFK reduction or adjustments, I contend that while strategic simultaneity fragments traditional alliance roles, it also generates new imperatives and opportunities for conventional-nuclear integration and refining the division of labor to create a more adaptive and credible alliance.

Strategic simultaneity and USFK transformation

The concept of strategic simultaneity has posed new questions for alliance structures. Amid rising tensions with both a US nuclear peer and a near peer—the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) also is expanding its nuclear weapons capabilities, assisted by its mutual defense pact with Russia. These factors demand the sustained attention and readiness of US forces in the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, the US military has ongoing commitments of support for Ukraine and in the Middle East, leading to a reprioritization of resources.

Faced with such a congested security environment, the US military presence on the Korean Peninsula appears to be at the edge of transformation. The Wall Street Journal, for instance, reported in May that the approximately 4,500 troops of USFK’s Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)—which currently rotates into South Korea every nine months—could be withdrawn for possible redeployment to Guam or even the US southern border for domestic missions. The retirement of twenty-four A-10 aircraft by September 2025 also necessitates reconfiguration of the forces.

In Seoul, these possible USFK adjustments arouse concerns, particularly given the backdrop of  Trump’s approach to alliances. The withdrawal of the SBCT, for instance, would leave the Eighth Army—which commands US Army forces in South Korea—without any maneuver elements. Although artillery, Apache helicopters, missile defense units (e.g., Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms are expected to remain, this shift increases the burden on the ROK military to fill operational gaps, especially in early-phase ground operations. The Stryker team, designed for rapid response and equipped with real-time targeting sensors, plays a key role in ground warfare; its absence would degrade US immediate tactical responsiveness in South Korea.

Moreover, there is growing concern in Seoul about US interest in enhancing USFK’s strategic flexibility to address contingencies beyond the Korean Peninsula. Although key military leaders including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John D. Caine, the USFK commander, General Xavier T. Brunson, and the commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Paparo, have publicly underscored the continuing need for the US presence on the Korean Peninsula for credible deterrence against North Korea, the issue of strategic flexibility is reemerging as a critical topic within the alliance.

This is particularly true amid Washington’s prioritization of its military readiness vis-à-vis China. Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, currently leading the drafting of the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy, has repeatedly emphasized—prior to entering office—the need to reorient USFK to better address what he regards as the primary threat: China. Robert Peters, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, has also recently urged that “all geographic combatant commands should be directed to plan for a China contingency.” Such calls underscore the United States’ growing strategic rationale behind transforming USFK into a force better aligned with transregional deterrence priorities. The United States has reaffirmed the ROK-US alliance as “ironclad,” as Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it, and emphasized the alliance’s capacity to “continue to thrive” under Seoul’s new leadership of President Lee Jae-myung. Yet the US perception of a congested threat environment in the Asia-Pacific region, its priority focus on China, and its vision of a more flexible USFK all point to the potential for alliance fissure.

New mission for alliance: Strategic reconfiguration

In short, Seoul should anticipate a possible transition toward fewer ground forces and a more flexible US presence. Washington’s increasing emphasis on airpower and missile defense over heavy ground units suggests a redefinition of US priorities in the region. The upcoming withdrawal of legacy platforms and restructuring of USFK may reflect this shift. The current administration’s apparent interest in the transfer of wartime operational control will accelerate such a shift.

What’s important for the alliance, however, is to ensure that the transformation constitutes a strategic reconfiguration rather than fragmentation. Both Seoul and Washington’s stakes are too high to diminish deterrence and the extended deterrence values of the alliance. Therefore, even though US military forces are stretched thin in a multi-adversary environment, Seoul does not have the luxury of foregoing the combined deterrence and extended deterrence mechanisms of the ROK-US alliance. The DPRK’s continued nuclear threats, the revived DPRK-Russia mutual defense pact, and China’s increasing encroachment at sea and air have also congested Seoul’s security environment.

To reconfigure the alliance without risking a kind of deterrence vacuum on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul and Washington should pursue new initiatives for conventional-nuclear integration and refined division of labor in the region. To elaborate, since the 2023 Washington Declaration and the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), South Korea and the United States have focused on improving the conventional-nuclear integration (CNI) of their forces, including US nuclear weapons. For South Korea, the motivation behind pursuing CNI has centered on two key objectives. First, CNI enables the ROK to specify and expand its conventional role, by which it can seek to better lock in the US security commitment to provide, per the State Department’s NCG fact sheet, the “full range of US capabilities including nuclear.” Second, by delineating its conventional responsibilities, South Korea can upgrade both its operational and hardware capabilities. Altogether, CNI is an effort to signal the alliance’s credible resolve and capability to deter DPRK.

First and foremost, this CNI context would enable Seoul to ensure that any reduction of USFK troops or withdrawal of US legacy platforms is followed by the United States’ continued provision of extended deterrence and also to push for new US assurance measures. Seoul should seek to reaffirm the declaratory policy that, should North Korea employ nuclear weapons in an attack, the United States will employ “the full range of US capabilities” and bring about “the end of the Kim regime.” Sustaining the operation of key deterrence coordination mechanisms such as the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group and NCG, as well as regular maintenance of combined training and exercises, will be critical.

Second, regarding capability, the legacy platforms can be replaced with new and advanced capabilities. Indeed, with the retirement of the A-10 aircraft, there is proposed permanent deployment of one F-35A squadron at Kunsan Air Base, with rotation of another squadron. The F-35, with its stealth and electronic warfare capabilities, offers better survivability and precision strike options against critical targets than the A-10. Technologically, it surpasses the F-16 in versatility, integrating electronic warfare and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor suites for multi-role missions. More importantly, the anticipated deployment of F-35As may be a window of opportunity for Seoul and Washington to discuss possible utilization of F-35As for dual-capable aircraft (DCA) missions—given their capability of deploying and operating US tactical nuclear weapons. Flexible and temporary deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons, as well as Seoul’s participation in DCA missions, could be the next steps of alliance transformation as well. Moreover, the United States also is prepping for consolidation of sixty-two F-16s into two “super squadrons” at Osan Air Base (one super squadron is already in place). The consolidation of the F-16 fleet into super squadrons reflects a new US approach to maximizing combat readiness by integrating aircraft and personnel for rapid, high-intensity operations. For Seoul, such consolidation at Osan Air Base would shorten response times to North Korean threats by more than 100 kilometers—e.g., Kunsan to Kaesong in 5 minutes 20 seconds at Mach 2, Osan to Kaesong in 2 minutes 30 seconds. Its effect on the adversary is already salient as Rodong Sinmun, the official Party newspaper of North Korea, in May condemned the first super squadron’s establishment as “a dangerous military move aimed at preemptive strikes against our state.” In addition, with Trump’s push for a missile defense system dubbed the Golden Dome—with an earmark of $25 billion in the FY2026 defense budget—Seoul may also seek to reinvigorate missile defense cooperation. As recent Israel-Iran conflict demonstrated, missile defense is not only a central means to enhance deterrence (and extended deterrence) by denial but also to damage limitation and survivability or resilience if deterrence fails.

Third, aside from capabilities, thinking about a larger scope of deterrence beyond the Korean Peninsula may be necessary for Seoul as well. As the US burden to deter multiple, simultaneous threats grows heavier, it serves South Korea’s strategic interest to actively contribute to efforts aimed at reinforcing the credibility and resilience of US regional deterrence, including its nuclear umbrella. While Seoul remains committed to its preference for a Korean Peninsula-centric posture, it must also recognize that reluctance to engage in broader regional deterrence initiatives may weaken US resolve, erode deterrence coherence, and embolden adversaries to exploit perceived gaps, especially under Trump’s approach to alliances.

Last but not least, the transformation of USFK—and the broader evolution of the ROK-US alliance—will serve as a powerful external driver compelling Seoul to undertake a comprehensive overhaul of its national defense posture. As USFK shifts toward a more agile and airpower-oriented configuration, with fewer ground forces, the onus will fall increasingly on South Korea to fill capability gaps across multiple domains. This will likely require a significant increase in defense spending, acceleration of military procurements, and deep structural reforms in force structure, doctrine, and training—particularly in areas such as ISR and missile defense. Close strategic synchronization—as urged by Ham Hyeong-pil, director for the Center for Security Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis—with an evolving US force posture would help secure Washington’s continued political and operational support for Seoul’s force modernization efforts. Above all, strategic synchronization will be critical to ensure that any reduction in the scale or change in role of USFK does not lead to a deterrence vacuum, which could embolden adversaries such as North Korea, China, or even Russia to test the credibility of the alliance.

Conclusion

The second Trump administration’s priorities and the evolving reality of strategic simultaneity—exacerbated by the growing threats from North Korea, China, and a realigned Russia bolstered by North Korean military support—have ushered in an era of transformation for the ROK-US alliance. As Washington reallocates both attention and US military assets toward transregional challenges, Seoul faces mounting pressure to absorb a greater share of operational responsibility, strategically recalibrate its force posture, and align its defense planning with a shifting alliance architecture. If mismanaged, this shift could lead to alliance fragmentation, fatigue, or hollow deterrence. However, as this article contends, if managed carefully and strategically leveraged, the anticipated transformation of USFK presents Seoul with a critical window of opportunity: to deepen the alliance’s CNI, refine the division of labor, and lay the foundation for a more adaptive and strategically credible alliance.

The future of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula—and indeed, the wider Indo-Pacific region—will hinge on Seoul’s ability to reframe US force realignments not as unilateral disengagements but as catalysts for indigenous capability development, coevolution in defense planning, and new forms of assurance through extended deterrence mechanisms.

Fellow

Bee Yun Jo

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Director for Northern Europe, Anna Wieslander gave her assessment of the Russia-Ukraine negotiations after the Alaska and White House-summit in a longer interview in “Superpowers” by Times Radio, August 22.

Wieslander comments on the three main dimensions of the peace talks, how the Europeans leaders succeeded in increasing leverage for Ukraine at the White House meeting and the potential composition of security guarantees.

Wieslander also calls for more pressure on Russia from both the “superpower” US and Europe, stating that neither is using all its instruments at the moment. “Europe must step up and take a bit more risk towards Russia”, says Wieslander proposing the creation of a reconstruction fund for Ukraine based on frozen Russian state assets as one possible action.

“This is the moment, this is where Europe has to change and increase its support to Ukraine”, says Wieslander.

The post Wieslander interviewed on Times Radio appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy both achieved a number of specific goals during their meetings with US President Donald Trump. The red carpet treatment Putin received in Anchorage was a symbolic victory that ended the Kremlin dictator’s international isolation in some style, while the subsequent summit allowed him to sidestep the threat of new US sanctions and deflect calls for an immediate ceasefire.

Zelenskyy, meanwhile, secured Trump’s tentative commitment to participate in security guarantees for Ukraine and managed to avoid making any dangerous territorial concessions. Crucially, the White House meeting also provided the Ukrainian leader with an opportunity to demonstrate that his relationship with Trump has improved considerably since their infamous Oval Office spat six months ago.

These limited gains were welcomed in Moscow and Kyiv, but they could not mask the overall lack of progress toward peace. White House officials initially indicated that Trump had reached preliminary agreement with Putin over security guarantees for Ukraine and a bilateral meeting with Zelenskyy, but the Kremlin has since contradicted these claims.

Speaking on August 20, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov downplayed the prospect of any direct talks between Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart, while demanding that Russia play a key role in any security guarantees for Ukraine. Lavrov’s absurd insistence on a Russian veto over Ukraine’s future security speaks volumes about Moscow’s lack of interest in a lasting settlement. Russia then underlined its uncompromising stance by launching a massive bombardment of Ukraine early on August 21 that included a targeted missile strike on an American-owned electrons plant in the west of the country.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

It should now be abundantly clear that Russia will continue to reject Trump’s peace overtures until Putin faces significantly more pressure to end the war. At present, the Russian ruler believes he can stall for time and ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine while slowly but steadily pummeling the Ukrainians into submission. Economic measures including increased sanctions and secondary tariffs can certainly impact his thinking, but Putin’s position is unlikely to undergo any fundamental changes unless he loses the battlefield initiative and is forced to confront the possibility of military defeat.

While others put their faith in diplomacy, Ukraine appears to be well aware that the key to success remains stopping Putin’s army. With this in mind, Kyiv is working hard to counter misleading perceptions among the country’s allies that Russian military victory is somehow inevitable. During Monday’s White House meeting with Trump, Zelenskyy made a point of stressing that in the last one thousand days of full-scale war, Russia has managed to occupy less than one percent of additional Ukrainian territory. This information was news to Trump and helped swing his mood, according to the BBC.

The ongoing Battle of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine offers important insights into the Russian army’s diminishing offensive potential. Since the summer of 2024, Putin has sacrificed tens of thousands of soldiers and thousands of armored vehicles in an attempt to seize the small but strategically significant city of Pokrovsk in the Donbas region. Despite these heavy Russian losses, the city remains under Ukrainian control.

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Beyond Pokrovsk lies Ukraine’s most heavily fortified zone, a fortress belt of industrial towns and cities that many see as the key to the defense of eastern Ukraine. Unlike the largely rural terrain close to Pokrovsk, the northern Donbas area around the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk is dotted with networks of concrete fortifications and layered defensive lines that have been under construction since the start of Russia’s invasion more than a decade ago in 2014.

If Russian commanders attempt to replicate their meat grinder tactics against Ukraine’s sophisticated defenses in the northern Donbas, the outcome will likely be catastrophic for Moscow. Indeed, many Ukrainian analysts believe a Russian offensive to seize the region would lead to the bloodiest battles of the entire war and result in hundreds of thousands of Russian casualties. This helps to explain why Putin is now calling for Ukraine to hand over the region without a fight as part of any peace settlement.

Russia remains understandably eager to present the invasion of Ukraine as a resounding military success, with Kremlin officials including Putin himself frequently boasting of relentless advances and battlefield victories. However, these triumphant depictions are increasingly at odds with reality. A recent intelligence update from Britain’s Ministry of Defense estimated that at the current pace, it would take Russia almost four and a half years to completely seize the four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces claimed by the Kremlin.

Russia’s inability to achieve a decisive battlefield breakthrough should encourage Kyiv’s partners to become more ambitious in their military support for Ukraine. Putin may currently have no interest in ending the war, but his army has already been exposed as anything but invincible and is far more vulnerable than he would like us to believe.

The United States and Europe can now make a decisive intervention of their own by dramatically strengthening the Ukrainian military. If Ukraine is provided with the tools it needs in order to prevent further Russian advances and expand attacks on the Kremlin war machine inside Russia, Putin may be forced to rethink his invasion and seek a lasting settlement. Unless that happens, the war will continue indefinitely against a backdrop of further futile summits and diplomatic distractions.

Elena Davlikanova is a senior fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis and Sahaidachny Security Center. Yevhenii Malik is a veteran of the Ukrainian Army’s 36th Marine Brigade.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Sorry, Trump, but Putin will not pursue peace until he is facing military defeat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Anna Wieslander, Director for Northern Europe, appeared on Swedish TV program “Nyhetsmorgon”, Wednesday August 20, to comment on the developments in the negotiations for peace in Ukraine.

Wieslander argues that Europe needs to do more to put pressure on Russia by transfering the frozen Russian state assets in European banks to a Ukrainian reconstruction fund and by increasing the efforts against the Russian shadow fleet among other measures.

The interview begins approximately 3 hours and 54 minutes into the broadcast.

The post Wieslander interviewed on TV4 Nyhetsmorgon appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite this positive spin, the White House talks did not result in any specific steps toward peace in Ukraine. Instead, the meeting was primarily an opportunity for Ukraine, Europe, and the United States to demonstrate their unity in the aftermath of Trump’s recent summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The most significant outcome to emerge from Monday’s discussions was a commitment from Trump that the United States would contribute to security guarantees for Ukraine. The British PM, who has been pressing for a US role in security guarantees for months, hailed the news as a “breakthrough.” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte shared Starmer’s enthusiasm, calling Trump’s willingness to participate in security guarantees a “big step.”

This congratulatory mood may have been somewhat premature. In reality, it remains far from clear exactly what kind of security commitments Trump has in mind. Hours after hosting the White House gathering, the US leader was already attempting to downplay expectations by offering his assurances that no American troops would be deployed to Ukraine.

European officials have promised to provide greater clarity over potential security guarantees in the coming weeks. Intensive discussions are already underway, with the aim of establishing how any guarantees might work in practice. Military planners charged with this task will face an array of challenges. Crucially, they must identify triggers for potential Western military involvement while also determining the rules of engagement for any European soldiers involved in the monitoring of a future peace deal between Ukraine and Russia.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The debate over security guarantees and the potential deployment of a European “reassurance force” to monitor a ceasefire in Ukraine has been underway since early 2025. For the past six months, Britain and France have led efforts to form a so-called “Coalition of the Willing,” but neither country has so far been unable to define exactly what this coalition is willing to do. Instead, the entire issue of Western security guarantees for Ukraine remains shrouded in ambiguity.

At this stage, we have more questions than answers. If Western troops are deployed to Ukraine, would they be authorized to defend themselves, or would they be limited to a more passive role as observers reporting on ceasefire violations? If Russia attacks European military personnel in Ukraine, would this be treated as an act of war against the countries in question? A great many other practical matters in the military and political spheres must also be addressed before any potential participating country will be ready to sign up for what promises to be a long-term and high-risk foreign policy commitment.

Technical speaking, of course, none of these obstacles are insurmountable. However, they require a degree of political will and old-fashioned courage that have been markedly absent from the Western response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine since 2022. At heart, therefore, the sense of uncertainty over security guarantees boils down to one simple question: Would Western governments be prepared to go to war with Russia on behalf of Ukraine? The answer is surely a resounding “no.”

This is not to say that the entire notion of security guarantees should be forgotten. Far from it, in fact. After all, Ukraine obviously cannot be expected to defend itself against Russia without continued Western support. But at the same time, a degree of realism is necessary. The West will almost certainly not fight for Ukraine and anyone who argues otherwise is dangerously delusional. However, Western countries can commit to strengthening the Ukrainian military in ways that will contain the Kremlin and make Putin think twice before embarking on another of his criminal imperial adventures.

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The good news is that Ukraine’s military is already the largest and by far the most battle-hardened in Europe. While serious doubts remain over the readiness of modern European populations to defend their homelands, Ukrainians have proven themselves in battle for more than three years against a ruthless and relentless military superpower. Today’s Ukrainian army is also technologically advanced and has earned a stellar reputation as a world leader in drone warfare.

With sufficient backing from Kyiv’s Western partners, Ukraine is more than capable of defending itself and serving as Europe’s bastion against resurgent Russian imperialism. For this to become a reality, Western leaders must end the current piecemeal approach to military aid for Ukraine and commit their countries to providing consistent support for many years to come, regardless of any political changes in their respective capitals.

In addition to dramatically increased supplies of weapons and equipment, this enhanced Western support must include investments in Ukraine’s rapidly expanding domestic defense industry. In other words, Ukraine must become Europe’s front line defender and the arsenal of the continent. The goal is to provide Ukraine with the tools it needs in order to defeat Putin’s army on the battlefield, secure a front line stretching thousands of kilometers, and strike deep inside Russia if necessary to target the Kremlin war machine and the economy that fuels it.

At this dangerous moment in European history, only a strong Ukraine backed by the overwhelming financial, industrial, and technological might of the Western world can prevent further Russian wars of aggression. It is hopelessly naive to believe Putin could be deterred by mere written promises from the same European countries that have repeatedly demonstrated their lack of stomach for a fight. Instead, military partnership with Ukraine should be recognized as a national security priority for any European country that would prefer not to fight Russia themselves.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The post A strong Ukraine is the only realistic security guarantee against Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Recently, such reports resurfaced when Israeli media outlets reported that Burhan’s special envoy visited Israel in April. According to these outlets, the envoy allegedly explained that the SAF had turned to Iran for military assistance only after failing to secure Israeli backing, and that Burhan was ready to fulfill any conditions set by Israel to expedite the completion of the agreement, although an SAF spokesperson denied such reports.

Given that the security rationale for finalizing normalization remains compelling, it is possible that Israel may still consider pursuing relations with the SAF. There is no doubt that the normalization of relations between Sudan and Israel holds great promise—particularly in areas such as technology, education, security, and agriculture. But for this promise to be realized, normalization must occur under a legitimate, civilian government and in a time of peace—not during war and authoritarian rule.

On October 23, 2020, Sudan and Israel announced their intention to normalize relations in a video call that included US President Donald Trump, then serving his first term, and Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. Then, on January 13, 2021, I (serving as the Sudanese minister of justice at the time) signed the Abraham Accords on behalf of Sudan. Within months, Sudan repealed the long-standing Israel boycott law that had been in force since 1958.

The official signing of the full normalization agreement was supposed to take place in Washington, DC, in November 2021. However, a military coup led by Burhan on October 25, 2021, derailed this significant step. The outbreak of war on April 15, 2023—waged between the SAF, led by Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as “Hemedti”)—upended normalization efforts and extinguished the hope of returning to a civilian-led democratic transition.

Israel may indeed be tempted by immediate security considerations to engage with the de facto authorities in Port Sudan. Yet, doing so would be a grave strategic miscalculation.

Security is a fundamental responsibility of any state. It is entirely reasonable for Israel and any other state, for that matter, to prioritize security in its foreign relations. However, security must be understood and prioritized in broad and strategic, not tactical, terms. A short-sighted alliance with Sudan’s military regime—currently unconstitutional, illegitimate, and destabilizing—would not promote true security for Israel, Sudan, or the region.

Normalizing relations with Sudan’s military elite, who publicly glorify war and vow to fight for another one hundred years, poses a direct threat to Sudan’s unity, Israel’s security, and the region’s stability. The SAF’s alignment with self-proclaimed jihadist forces, such as the Al-Bara ibn Malik brigade forces, and its growing ties with Iran signal the return of a dangerous and destabilizing political order. As stated in a report by the Sudan Peace Tracker, this alignment is deeply troubling; the SAF is providing them with official backing, military infrastructure, and battlefield coordination. This partnership has not only legitimized this and other extremist groups within the SAF’s structures but also enabled their rapid expansion and radicalization efforts under the cover of popular resistance—transforming these groups from tactical proxies into powerful actors, posing a long-term threat to Sudan’s stability and the wider region.

SAF’s rapprochement with Iran has enabled the latter to reestablish a strategic military foothold in Sudan—with tunnel networks, advanced weaponry, and strengthened ties with Islamist factions within the army. Iran has undertaken this as part of a broader effort to leverage Sudan’s instability to threaten Israel, counter US influence, and expand its regional power projection.

While some view the SAF’s outreach to Iran as an act of desperation, the relationship is, in point of fact, rooted in shared ideological foundations: anti-democracy, anti-West, and anti-Israel. Like Iran’s regime, the SAF targets activists advocating for democracy and civilian rule. Such voices have been arrested and tortured by the security agencies in the areas they control. The SAF and Islamists are ideologically against the West for reasons including that the West supports pro-democracy organizations. They are also inherently against Israel, especially considering suspicions that the 2009 and 2012 attacks on Sudan are believed to have been carried out by Israel, with the aim of preventing Iranian arms from being transferred to Hamas along what has been called a deeply entrenched arms corridor. Reiterating a well-known Islamist rhetoric, the SAF assistant commander-in-chief earlier this year blamed “powerful actors in the region” for the war in Sudan, claiming the war and destruction of Sudan is part of a strategy to permanently secure the state of Israel. 

The SAF has given too much power to Sudan’s Islamist movement and is aligned with the former ruling National Congress Party. The same network once hosted Osama bin Laden and built strong ties with Tehran. Iran’s provision of drones, military training, and intelligence support is part of a broader effort to reassert influence in the Red Sea region through ideologically aligned proxies; Sudan’s geostrategic location makes this alignment all the more dangerous.

Finally, the current de facto authorities have reversed the progress made by Sudan’s transitional civilian government in dismantling former Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir’s Islamist regime. The transitional government had worked to remove party loyalists who were appointed illegitimately or illegally and repeal policies of “empowerment” that Bashir’s former regime had utilized to control the bureaucratic and military institutions of the state. However, the current de facto authorities have reinstated most elements of Bashir’s regime and are, therefore, reviving the very order that once endangered regional and international security. For example, in July, the newly SAF-appointed de facto Prime Minister Kamil Idriss appointed Lemia Abdel Ghaffar as minister of cabinet affairs. She is an Islamist whom Hamdok had previously dismissed from her post as secretary-general of the National Population Council. Idriss also appointed Abdullah Darf, one of Bashir’s lawyers and an Islamist who had held numerous state and local posts during Bashir’s era, as minister of justice. 

Backing the SAF would not bolster a stabilizing partner; it would empower a military institution that has incorporated extremist groups intent on reviving an Islamist-authoritarian regime. History offers clear warnings that tactical cooperation with Islamist forces has consistently backfired, from Afghanistan to the Sahel. Port Sudan could—and likely would—exploit normalization to gain military and political leverage while continuing to oppose civilian governance and harbor animosity towards Israel.

Additionally, Sudan’s history has shown that sustainable peace and stability are impossible without democratic governance. Its complex political, ethnic, and cultural diversity cannot be managed through authoritarian rule. The current Port Sudan military regime is deeply unpopular among the vast majority of Sudan’s pro-democracy and pro-peace organizations and groups. Pro-democracy civilian opposition remains strong and determined. The establishment and continuation of autocratic or authoritarian rule will only deepen instability and create space for extremist actors to operate.

Israel should align itself with Sudan’s genuine pro-democracy civilian forces—not its military elites. These civilian actors represent the future of a stable, inclusive Sudan and do not pose a threat to Israel or the region. On the contrary, a democratic Sudan would be a true partner for peace, cooperation, and development.

The signing of the Abraham Accords between Sudan and Israel was historic and reflective of a regional movement toward peace and cooperation. Both countries stand to benefit immensely from a genuine partnership grounded in legitimacy and mutual respect.

If Israel is truly committed to long-term security and regional stability, it must unequivocally support peace and democratic governance in Sudan. Doing so will not only help Israel avoid the perception of propping up a military dictatorship but also prevent strategic misalignment with actors who view normalization as a means to gain power, while remaining ideologically opposed to Israel and civilian rule.

Sudan and Israel have much to gain from normalized relations, both economically, diplomatically, and strategically. But normalization must be rooted in legitimacy, not desperation; in peace, not war; and shared democratic values, not transactional opportunism. The road to genuine and enduring normalization and full diplomatic relations between Sudan and Israel runs through Sudan’s democratic forces—not the Islamist, anti-democratic generals entrenched in Port Sudan or elsewhere in the country. 

Nasredeen Abdulbari is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative and formerly served as Sudan’s minister of justice during the transitional government. He signed the Abraham Accords on behalf of Sudan. 

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Wieslander says that it is vital that President Stubb cooperates with the rest of the Nordic Countries to bring forth a joint message of the Nordic perspective on Russia.

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On August 18, Samantha Vinograd, nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative, appeared on CBS News to discuss takeaways from President Trump’s White House meeting with senior European leaders about the war in Ukraine.

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Samantha Vinograd

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Arabic Defense Policy

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On August 16, Alexander B. Gray, nonresident senior fellow of the GeoStrategy Initiative, published an article in The Diplomat titled “America’s Support for Taiwan Is at a Critical Juncture.”

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Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

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On August 14, 2025, Andrew Michta, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, was published in National Security Journal where he argues that the key to ending the war against Ukraine lies in Beijing, not Moscow.

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Andrew A. Michta

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

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The United Kingdom’s accession, first proposed on the sidelines of the 2024 Manama Dialogue, marks the first expansion of C-SIPA beyond its founding members. With a permanent naval base in Bahrain and a history of defense and intelligence cooperation, the United Kingdom strengthens the deterrent value of the agreement while enhancing its institutional credibility. 

Beyond that, bringing the United Kingdom into the agreement is an important step as the United States and Bahrain, through C-SIPA, look to solidify a new model for multilateral security cooperation in the Middle East. The United Kingdom’s accession shifts C-SIPA from a bilateral initiative to a trusted multilateral platform, positioning it to attract additional partners and withstand political transitions in Washington. Additionally, the inclusion of a dependable transatlantic ally affirms C-SIPA’s potential as a foundation for broader regional integration.

The question now is, as the United States and Bahrain continue to build an integrated defense framework in the Middle East, who will be next to join C-SIPA?

What the United Kingdom just agreed to

Bahrain and the United States signed C-SIPA just weeks before the October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorist attack. 

The agreement lays the foundation for multilateral cooperation on defense, intelligence sharing, economic initiatives, and emerging technologies. While the United States and Bahrain already maintained strong security cooperation prior to C-SIPA, the agreement formalized their partnership and elevated it to a mutual defense partnership that has been given the nickname “Article 4.5,” since C-SIPA is the strongest public security agreement the United States holds outside of NATO’s Article 5. C-SIPA accelerated joint efforts and positioned Bahrain as one of the United States’ most reliable regional defense partners. 

Bahrain has lived up to its end of the bargain. Notably, in response to Houthi attacks on commercial shipping that escalated in late 2023, Bahrain was the only Arab country to publicly join each US-led military operation, including the multinational Operation Prosperity Guardian. Bahrain continues to purchase advanced US military hardware, including M1A2 Abrams tanks, which it purchased in a $2.2 billion deal in March 2024. Bahrain has also taken steps to ensure its technological ecosystem is aligned with the United States’. 

The June escalation between Israel and Iran demonstrated the agreement’s importance to Bahrain. Home to the US Fifth Fleet, Bahrain braced for potential fallout during the clashes, and just days before the United States struck Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, it coordinated with US personnel, prepared thirty-three emergency shelters, and conducted nationwide siren tests. Expecting it could be in the crosshairs of Iranian retaliation, Bahrain was ultimately spared when Iran targeted Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, yet the potential of a direct incident demonstrated why the agreement remains vital to Bahrain’s security.

C-SIPA can also help facilitate cooperation well beyond defense. For example, during Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa’s visit to Washington this July (which included discussions with UK officials about the importance of C-SIPA), Bahrain announced $17 billion in new investment deals with the United States. The agreements include plans to replace Chinese servers with Cisco products, strengthen partnerships with Oracle, and increase Bahraini investments in US energy, tech, and manufacturing. A separate memorandum signed by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani also laid the groundwork for peaceful nuclear cooperation, a demonstration of trust and confidence. These announcements show that C-SIPA can pave the way for real economic and technological benefits in addition to defense cooperation. 

On a larger scale, C-SIPA was forged with ambitions to “build a fully integrated regional security architecture in the Middle East,” in the spirit of the Abraham Accords and the Negev Forum, “with the expectation of welcoming in . . . future additional parties.” The United Kingdom’s joining the agreement, in the wake of the Twelve Day War, is a bold initial step to make C-SIPA multilateral. But to fully realize the regional security architecture that the United States and Bahrain envision, policymakers will need to expand C-SIPA within the Middle East region.

Who’s next?

I accompanied the N7 Initiative’s bipartisan congressional delegation to Bahrain this June, where Bahraini leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the agreement and emphasized its potential to serve as a foundation for broader regional cooperation. The participating members of Congress also signaled political support for the agreement’s implementation. 

But to realize the agreement’s full potential, officials must continue to expand C-SIPA across the region.

To advance the agreement’s stated integration goals, which align with and support the Abraham Accords, C-SIPA should pursue a phased expansion strategy that begins with Arab partners who already maintain formal ties with Israel or share core security priorities. This is so that C-SIPA, which supports the security cooperation necessary to sustain deeper political and economic integration, can have a magnified impact in the Middle East. By beginning with these Arab partners, the agreement can help create the conditions for the Accords’ long-term success, including the eventual goal of broader regional participation.

Given its existing peace treaty with Israel and its status as a close defense partner of the United States, Jordan is well-positioned to join C-SIPA. Jordan has previously expressed support for the creation of a regional security framework, with King Abdullah II stating in a 2022 interview with CNBC that he would “be one of the first people that would endorse a Middle East NATO”—aligning well with C-SIPA, since it has been dubbed as “Article 4.5.” Early efforts to engage Jordan could focus on cooperation around border security, counterterrorism, and cyber defense. 

Egypt, which also maintains a long-standing peace treaty with Israel and plays a central role in regional security, would be a valuable addition to C-SIPA, particularly given its strategic position along the Red Sea and its leadership in counterterrorism and maritime security efforts.

Jordan and Egypt joining C-SIPA would advance the Abraham Accords by turning their largely symbolic peace with Israel into deeper regional cooperation alongside the United States, the United Kingdom, and Bahrain. Their participation would reinforce the Abraham Accords’ broader goals without requiring direct bilateral engagement with Israel.

Additionally, the eventual inclusion of more Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries would significantly strengthen C-SIPA’s regional credibility and operational capabilities. With long-standing defense cooperation agreements and joint training exercises with the United States, and with countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) hosting US military bases, GCC members are already integrated into the US security architecture. Moreover, shared concerns about Iranian proxy activity, missile threats, and maritime security in the Gulf align closely with C-SIPA’s focus. The UAE stands out as a strong first GCC partner. It hosts US forces at Al Dhafra Air Base, has a growing technology industry, and was one of the first countries to normalize relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords. Expanding the agreement to include Gulf partners would amplify C-SIPA’s deterrent value and create new avenues for regional integration if additional GCC members sign on. 

To attract new members, however, current signatories must deepen cooperation and showcase the benefits that make participation attractive. One way to do this is by standing up the defense working group stipulated in Article II of C-SIPA and adding working groups focused on areas such as economic integration and emerging technologies. Regularly convening these groups annually or biannually can yield visible outcomes and highlight the agreement’s value. These meetings could also allow for limited participation by prospective partners, offering them a chance to engage prior to formal accession and see how involvement could help further their own interests. Allowing prospective partners to participate in a limited capacity could strengthen trust with current members and lay the groundwork for eventual accession.

When Israel joins in

While immediate efforts should prioritize expanding C-SIPA among Arab partners, Israel’s inclusion should remain a long-term objective. C-SIPA has already enabled indirect alignment with Israel; following the air defense operation against Iranian missiles that took place in April last year, Bahrain hosted senior Israeli and Arab military officials as part of a meeting led by the US Central Command, which reflects quiet, practical cooperation with Israel under the umbrella of regional security coordination. Israel’s formal inclusion in C-SIPA, though likely years away, would significantly enhance the agreement’s operational effectiveness, enabling structured collaboration on missile defense, intelligence sharing, maritime security, artificial intelligence and technology, and strategic infrastructure projects such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor.

Israel’s future inclusion in C-SIPA would also strengthen the political durability of its normalization agreement with Bahrain. Officials in Manama have stressed that cooperation with Israel must yield visible results to sustain domestic support. Israel’s experience countering Iranian missile and drone attacks, combined with its advanced early warning systems and cyber capabilities, would strengthen C-SIPA’s value. Along with traditional defense support, Israel could also contribute to the development of joint innovation platforms in emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, where it already has a competitive edge. Integrating Israel into C-SIPA could deliver tangible outcomes for Bahrain, shifting normalization from symbolic diplomacy to a platform for practical cooperation and mutual defense.

For the United States, integrating Israel into C-SIPA would constitute a shift from decades of bilateral defense coordination to a more multilateral framework. The United States and Israel have a history of collaboration on missile defense systems such as the Iron Dome and David’s Sling, which are co-developed and co-funded. Including Israel in C-SIPA would elevate this cooperation to a regional scale by allowing for potential integration with GCC air defense systems and US command structures, enhancing interoperability and minimizing redundancies. 

However, bringing Israel into C-SIPA too early could discourage Arab participation and raise expectations for formal US security guarantees. Prioritizing the inclusion of Arab partners would help build regional consensus and demonstrate that C-SIPA is intended to support shared regional interests, rather than simply advancing a narrower US-Israeli agenda. Focused cooperation on shared priorities such as air and missile defense, maritime security, and cybersecurity among aligned regional and international partners can create the conditions for Israel’s future participation. 

Focusing on Arab participation first would also give countries that cannot currently justify formal engagement with Israel, given the ongoing war, an opportunity to join the agreement and gradually build comfort with the idea of Israeli partnership in the future. Over time, this phased approach would allow C-SIPA to develop into a durable regional security framework.

In an increasingly volatile region, the kind of integrated planning and coordination outlined in C-SIPA is essential. With the right political investment, C-SIPA can serve as the foundation for a durable, multilateral architecture that strengthens collective security, bolsters deterrence, and advances long-term regional integration.

Cassidy McGoldrick is the assistant director for the N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation.

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International backing for Ukraine is more fragile than many people may appreciate, and is particularly vulnerable to shifts in the domestic politics of partner countries. This support is also at risk of being eroded by the tendency to publicly criticize Ukraine whenever a controversial or unpopular decision is made in Kyiv.

Scrutiny is an important aspect of international support for Ukraine. After all, a healthy democracy depends on accountability. But there is a big difference between constructive engagement and unqualified condemnation. Every time Ukrainian diaspora groups or international allies choose to attack the Ukrainian authorities on the world stage, this provides ammunition for those pushing to cut aid or abandon Ukraine altogether.

It is no secret that Ukraine’s detractors are always watching for any excuse to argue that Ukraine is hopelessly corrupt, terminally divided, or otherwise undeserving of further support. Their arguments are all the more persuasive when they are able to quote pro-Ukrainian voices. Why give them such gifts?

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The recent debate over controversial legislation limiting the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies illustrates the challenges of addressing Ukrainian domestic politics in a responsible manner during wartime. While concerns over the need for transparency and democratic integrity are entirely legitimate, not everyone has rushed to judgment. This more cautious approach should not be confused with passive acceptance. On the contrary, sometimes being a true partner means seeking clarity and offering solutions rather than shouting from the sidelines.

Too often, diaspora voices and international observers fall into the trap of reacting to sensational headlines without digging deeper. This kind of armchair criticism rarely helps Ukraine. Instead, the country needs allies who understand that mistakes will happen in wartime, while also acknowledging that even troubling developments do not justify withdrawing support entirely. I’ve lost count of the number of times I’ve heard members of the Ukrainian diaspora use corruption as an excuse to justify their lack of support for Ukraine.

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It also helps to maintain a sense of proportion. With the largest European invasion since World War II now in its fourth year, the real scandal that should be occupying the attention of Ukraine’s supporters is the sluggish pace of international aid. According to the Kiel Institute, European countries need only allocate 0.21 percent of GDP to the Ukrainian war effort in order to replace military support from the United States. While countries like Estonia, Denmark, and Lithuania are easily surpassing this target, wealthier European nations like Germany, France, Italy, Portugal, and Belgium continue to fall short.

Ukraine cannot hope to prevail against a military superpower like Russia without sufficient backing from the country’s allies. Wherever they are located, Kyiv’s supporters and members of the Ukrainian diaspora should be laser-focused on convincing their respective governments to meet or exceed the 0.21 percent threshold. This could prove decisive in determining whether Ukraine survives as an independent state.

The vast majority of Ukraine’s friends and allies are committed to a shared vision of the country’s future as a European democracy. They recognize that this means upholding basic human rights and core democratic principles, including the need to rigorously combat corruption and hold power to account. At the same time, it should be abundantly clear to anyone who cares about Ukraine that the country’s fight for survival is the current priority.

Ukraine needs unity. Even when the country’s supporters bitterly disagree, it is important to remember exactly what is at stake. We will hopefully have decades to continue the debate over building a better Ukraine. However, if Russia is not stopped, there may be no Ukraine at all.

Pavlo Grod is President of the Ukrainian World Congress.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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On July 23, 2025, Daniel B. Shapiro, distinguished fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, testifies before the US Senate Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism on US diplomatic strategies for a dynamic Middle East. Below are his prepared remarks.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rosen, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today at this critical moment for U.S. policy in the Middle East.

It is a critical moment because it presents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to help reshape the Middle East in ways that will bring more peace and prosperity, and less conflict and violence to those who live in the region, and will bring significant benefit to the interests of the United States. In every moment of opportunity, there is also risk, including the risk of missing the mark and losing the window to achieve the greatest possible gains. So I thank you for this timely hearing that I hope can shed some light on the best path forward.

The huge opportunity flows from the steady progress in the region toward greater integration from 2020 to 2023, then the tragedy of Hamas’ vicious terrorist attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023, and then the response of various actors in the war that followed.

In the nearly 21 months since the attacks, a combination of Israeli and U.S. military power has dealt blow after to blow to the Iranian-aligned Axis of Resistance: Hamas, which began the war; Hezbollah, which entered the war on October 8; the Houthis in Yemen; Shia militia groups in Iraq and Syria; and, ultimately Iran itself. Along the way, Iran’s key regional partner, the Assad regime in Syria, crumbled when neither its Iranian, Russian, nor Hezbollah allies were able to rescue it. All told, Iran is at its weakest point in decades.

The scale of the Iranian miscalculation is immense. First, Iran encouraged their chief proxy, Hezbollah, to engage in a war of attrition with Israel. At a moment of Israel’s choosing, in a series of dramatic attacks, Israel decimated Hezbollah’s strategic weapons, leadership, and fighters, which left the organization unable to carry out the mission for which it was built — to serve as a deterrent or second strike capability to protect Iran from Israeli or American attack. Hezbollah’s collapse also produced a dramatic change in the policy of the Lebanese government, which may result in the terror group’s disarmament and marginalization.

Second, Iran twice abandoned its longstanding caution, wherein it sought to avoid direct confrontation with Israel or the United States and to fight asymetrically and via proxies. On April 13 and October 1 of last year, Iran launched two massive, overt, state-on-state acts of war against Israel — hundreds of ballistic missiles, cruse missiles, and drones. Israel’s air and missile defense, buttressed by U.S. support, and in April, by an international coalition, largely defeated these attacks. But these events are critical context to the events last month when Israel and the United States conducted strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. That war did not begin on June 13, 2025. It began 14 months earlier.

I believe the military confrontation with Iran that unfolded over 12 days in June was necessary and inevitable. President Trump was right to seek a diplomatic deal with Iran, and right to demand that Iran give up its uranium enrichment capability — which enables them to produce the material needed to produce nuclear weapons. It was never likely that Iran would agree to those terms, and certainly not without a credible military threat. 

I supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action when it was signed in 2015 as the best available way to buy the most time on the Iranian nuclear program. I opposed the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA without a better plan in 2018, which cost us some of that time. But those positions ten and seven years ago were not relevant to the situation we faced in 2025. The fact is that Iran was far too close for comfort to producing a nuclear weapon, and it had to be stopped.  

Three things had changed. First, the IAEA documented that Iran possessed over 400 kg of 60 percent enriched uranium, enough for 10 bombs, with the ability to enrich it to 90 percent (weapons grade) within days. Second, Iranian nuclear scientists over the previous year had engaged in various activities and research that would significantly shorten the time for them to build a weapon — a separate process from enrichment — if and when they got the order from their leadership to do so. And third, Iran’s decision to attack Israel directly twice last year fundamentally changed the calculus of what they were willing to do and what they could do. If any one of the ballistic missiles that reached Israel were tipped with a nuclear warhead, we would be in a different world. The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has long called for Israel’s destruction, was dangerously close to having the ability to carry it out.

The Israeli campaign, fueled by deep intelligence penetration of the Iranian system, did significant damage to Iranian nuclear facilities, air defenses, its ballistic missile production and launching capabilities, and high value targets in the Iranian military, IRGC, and nuclear program. Operation Midnight Hammer ordered by President Trump against Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, using unique U.S. capabilities, caused additional grave damage to those sites. President Trump’s initial comment that their nuclear sites were “totally obliterated” preceded the technical collection of a battle damage assessment, which takes weeks, and implied, probably inaccurately, that their nuclear program is completely out of business. But based on my understanding of the munitions used and the success of their deployment, those sites will not be usable for enrichment or uranium conversion for a significant period of time — time we can perhaps extend through a range of means.

None of this means the threats posed by Iran and its proxies are eliminated. They may be down but not out. Iran likely retains its highly enriched uranium stockpile, although it may or may not have current access to it, and it could have the ability and motivation to try to sprint to enrich it to weapons grade and build a crude nuclear device. A much-degraded Hamas continues to fight Israel in Gaza, and Hezbollah has not given up hopes of rearming. The Houthis — which the Biden Administration struck in a series of deliberate and self-defense engagements over months, and the Trump Administration struck in an intense campaign over weeks — retain capability to attack Israel and to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea, which they have recently resumed doing with deadly results.

But the gains produced by military power over the last 21 months are significant. Now we need to use all the tools at our disposal, not just military tools, to consolidate those gains.

In a moment, I will pivot to the main focus of this hearing, which is the diplomatic path forward. But, following my service at the Department of Defense in the last year of the Biden Administration, I would be remiss if I did not emphasize that there will remain a critical need to maintain a robust U.S. military capability in the region in the period ahead, and that doing so enhances our ability to seize diplomatic opportunities.

Briefly, Israel’s military dominance in the region is undisputed, with air superiority from the Mediterranean to Tehran. Not every problem in the region is a nail that should be addressed with a military hammer. But that capability can work in tandem with a steady U.S. posture to deter our adversaries, who, as mentioned, continue to pose threats — whether Iran’s reconstitution of its nuclear program, its threat to shut down shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, or Houthi aggression. A sustained U.S. presence also provides reassurance to our friends that we will not abandon the field. These friends include Egypt and Jordan, in whom we invest with military assistance, and Gulf states, which host many of our forces and which President Trump visited and secured further investments in our military partnerships. Our partnerships also help ensure these countries will not turn to Russia or China as security partners.

Perhaps most important is the role of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). With Israel’s integration into CENTCOM in 2021, and the deep trust and interoperability built up by CENTCOM and the Israel Defense Forces over these past 21 months, we have an extraordinary combined ability to deter and respond to threats. Beyond cooperation with Israel, CENTCOM serves as the convener and integrator of U.S. military partners across the region. Thanks to our unique capabilities, enduring presence, and CENTCOM’s exceptional leadership, U.S. partners in the Middle East look to us to shape the security environment and coordinate responses to key threats, strengthen their capabilities, conduct bilateral and multilateral exercises, convene high-level strategic exchanges, improve interoperability, and continue to build out an Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture.

Turning to the diplomatic opportunities, we should keep our eyes on these mutually reinforcing strategic objectives of: 1) bringing this period of regional conflict to a close and transitioning to a period of sustained stability; 2) expanding the circle of regional integration that was broadened by the Abraham Accords; 3) deterring and defanging the threats to the United States and our allies and partners posed by Iran, and preventing a resurgence of Iran’s regional influence through its terrorist proxies; and, 4) building a more sustainable regional order led by a network of U.S. partners including Israel and Arab states, with the United States as an active participant but at a scale that also enables adequate attention to critical interests in other regions.

With the remainder of my time, I would like to propose a number of key initiatives in support of these objectives.

First, help achieve a permanent end to the war in Gaza, with a fully developed day-after plan that releases all hostages, protects Israel’s security, removes Hamas from power, provides relief for Palestinian civilians, and enables regionally-supported reconstruction for Palestinians who want to live in peace with Israel.

Our other goals of expanding regional integration cannot get off the ground until the Gaza war ends. A 60-day ceasefire would bring much-needed relief, but it must transition into the end of the war without a return to fighting. That will require Israel agreeing to certain terms, but also intense pressure on Hamas brought by Qatar and other international actors. That is the first key to getting Arab states involved with the next phase of reconstruction. 

At the moment, the risk is that we will a slide into the only alternative: a full-scale Israeli occupation of Gaza, with more dead hostages, more dead Palestinian civilians, more dead Israeli soldiers, no positive involvement by Arab states, and deepening isolation of Israel. In the immediate period, which we all hope will soon see a ceasefire, the United States should:

• Withdraw President Trump’s misguided Gaza Riviera proposal, which has emboldened the most extreme members of the Israeli cabinet to press for full occupation, the massing of Palestinian civilians in a camp along the Egyptian border, and the removal of much of the Palestinian population from Gaza. Those Gazans who wish to leave should, of course, have the freedom to do so, and many countries should be encouraged to receive them. But the mass evacuation of hundreds of thousands or more to a handful of receiving states is not going to happen. If it were done involuntarily, it would be a violation of international humanitarian law and constitute ethnic cleansing. These ideas are widely rejected across the region, will discourage Arab states from helping stabilize Gaza, and even delegitimize more reasonable efforts to help individual Palestinians who wish to relocate to do so.

• Enable a vastly improved mechanism to provide humanitarian aid to Palestinian civilians in Gaza. There is a legitimate problem of Hamas hijacking aid provided through international organizations and using it for themselves and for political power. Hamas bears much responsibility for the hunger crisis in Gaza. But the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) alternative is vastly insufficient, and has been deeply flawed and dangerous in its design, leading to far too many deaths of civilians attempting to access it, many caused by IDF fire. Getting aid directly into the hands of Palestinian civilians and prevent its hijacking to Hamas’s benefit is a worthy goal, and the only solution is to flood the zone with so much aid that it is easy to access and loses its market value. With hunger becoming more widespread across Gaza, Israel should be enabling international organizations and GHF to distribute aid across the entirety of Gaza, not limited to a handful of distribution points.

• Press Israel to revise their targeting protocols to minimize civilian casualties. Hamas leaders and fighters remain legitimate targets, and the challenge of their using civilians as human shields remains. But the civilian toll of many recent strikes has been too high, and Israel has admitted to numerous recent mistakes.

Regarding day-after planning, the United States should:

• Make clear that the terms for the permanent end of the war require the release of all Israeli hostages and the departure from Gaza of a critical mass of Hamas leaders and fighters, with the support of Arab states, for exile in distant locations, sufficient to ensure Hamas is completely removed from power. Arab states should be encouraged to speak in unison and join Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’ call for Hamas to leave Gaza. A U.N. Security Council resolution could follow. The United States should organize plans for this departure, drawing on the 1982 evacuation of the PLO from Beirut.

• Organize an Interim Security Mission for Gaza (ISMG), with U.S. leadership based outside Gaza, enabling troops from Arab states such as Egypt, the UAE, and Morocco, and possibly non-Arab states such as Indonesia, to secure humanitarian aid delivery, border crossings, and basic law and order. The ISMG would enable the gradual introduction of Palestinian Authority Security Forces, which should be trained for this mission under the supervision of the Office of the Security Coordinator in Jerusalem under the continued leadership of a U.S. 3-star general or flag officer.

• Work with Arab states on the installation of improved leadership of the Palestinian Authority and the establishment of Gaza leadership linked to the PA and supported by Arab states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with help in governance, training, and education, and reconstruction funded by a range of Arab and international states. Arab states will only play this role, however, if they see it linked to the establishment of a future Palestinian state. So it will be necessary to find the proper expression of this vision, even if the timelines will be longer and the dimensions different than those envisioned in previous peace efforts. 

• Articulate strong opposition to any Israeli moves toward annexation in the West Bank, and urge Israeli and Palestinian security forces to act to prevent violence by their own sides, as instability in the West Bank could damage prospects for stability in Gaza and harm prospects for regional integration. I commend U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee for his recent highlighting of the importance of Israel holding extremist Israelis who commit violent acts to account.

Second, work toward the continuation and expansion of the normalization and integration process marked by the Abraham Accords, which has stalled but not receded during the war. Specifically, the United States should:

• Prioritize discussions with Saudi Arabia on the timing, conditions, and mechanism of normalization with Israel. Nothing would do more to reshape the politics of the region that normalized relations between the most influential Arab and Muslim state and Israel. The Saudis seek expanded security cooperation with the United States, which we should be prepared to grant, provided the Kingdom meets U.S. needs that protect our interests in the region and regarding competition with China, including strict limits on Saudi-Chinese military cooperation. We should be mindful that Saudi officials have consistently made clear that a requirement for them to normalize relations with Israel is the establishment of a pathway to a Palestinian state — a bar that may be impossible for the current Israeli government to clear — and they are sensitive to extensive Israeli operations and holding of territory in Syria and Lebanon. Continued work on the framework of this triangular deal can take place even if its ultimate fulfillment may be more likely in 2027 than this year.

• Prepare to resume the work of the Negev Forum as soon as possible after the war ends. This standing group of Israel, the United States, and four Arab states (UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and Morocco) includes six working groups and a structure for multilateral projects aimed at bringing the benefits of regional integration to their citizens. As early as possible, a Negev Forum ministerial should be held, with additional invitees such as Jordan, Mauritania, and Indonesia, and activity should resume in the working groups. The Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative, which I led in 2022-2023, is poised to support the Negev Forum as it has in the past.

• Appoint and confirm the Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords that Congress created in the NDAA for FY2024. The appointment of a high-profile envoy in this role will communicate the United States’ seriousness about expanding these agreements, and provide important buttressing to the work of Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff.

• Elevate the work of the House and Senate Abraham Accords Caucuses, which is essential to add the expertise and jurisdictional focus of their diverse members and to convey the bipartisan commitment to expanding regional integration.

• Continue work toward a non-belligerency agreement between Israel and Syria that reaffirms the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, supports connections between Israeli and Syrian Druze communities, and allows for limited economic, environmental, water, and health cooperation, without the need to address the final status of the Golan Heights. A return of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), enhanced by visits and supervision from CENTCOM representatives, can help stabilize the border region. President Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria is a gamble, but the right gamble, to give the greatest possibility for stabilization of Syria after years of brutal rule and civil war and preventing Iran from exploiting chaos to reestablish a foothold. But the government in Damascus must be held accountable, including for its treatment of minorities and establishment of inclusive governance. Israeli strikes on central government facilities in Damascus are destabilizing and have already become a dangerous factor in Syrian domestic politics; they must be avoided. Finally, it is critical that the United States not withdraw all its forces from Northeast Syria until adequate preparations are in place for proper sustainment of counter-ISIS operations, supervision of ISIS detention centers, and peaceful integration of Syrian Kurdish factions into national institutions.

Third, capitalize on the severe damage to the Iranian nuclear program and the weakening of the Iranian-led axis to secure a long-term improvement in the regional security environment. The United States should:

• Seek renewed negotiations with Iran to sustain the gains of the military strikes on its nuclear program and prevent the program’s reconstitution. 

• Insist on full access for IAEA inspectors, the location and removal of Iran’s HEU stockpile, and an assurance of zero enrichment going forward. Separate negotiations will also need to commence on meaningful limits on Iran’s ballistic missile inventory

• Maintain pressure on Iran toward those ends, by coordinating with UK, French, German, and EU officials on the leverage of, and if necessary the implementation of, JCPOA snapback sanctions, and by devoting additional attention and resources to scaling back Iranian oil exports to China.

• Make clear that additional military strikes by Israel or the United States are possible if Iran seeks to move, hide, or reconstitute elements of its nuclear program, or if it refuses to give access to IAEA inspectors or exits the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Congress should be properly consulted before any such strikes. While the United States maintains escalation dominance, we must nevertheless remain vigilant to deter and defend against potential Iranian or Iranian-sponsored attacks on U.S. bases and personnel or asymmetric attacks on American, Israeli, or Jewish targets anywhere. Iran should be on notice that any attempt to harm current or former U.S. officials will bring an automatic kinetic response, and the United States should coordinate with allies on a common set of diplomatic and economic penalties that would be triggered by hostage taking.

• Prepare for the possibility of internally-driven regime change. It should not be a policy goal of the United States, nor a project to be achieved by military means. But we must recognize that the regime and its ideology remain the main fuel of destabilization across the region, and are deeply unpopular among the Iranian people due to the regime’s brutality and corruption. We should provide appropriate support to the Iranian people, much as we did for anti-Communist movements in countries under Soviet domination during the Cold War. Our efforts should include enhancing Iranian citizens’ ability to communicate via internet access and to receive accurate information, publicly condemning repression by the regime, sanctioning regime officials responsible for abuses, and highlighting regime corruption that harms the Iranian people. We should develop now a plan to support a transition so we are not caught flat-footed if the Iranian people take matters into their hands, including organizing reconstruction funding from international donors, preparing to unwind U.S. and international sanctions with targets and incentives for the new authorities, planning to provide support for post-conflict transition and institution-building, and coordination with responsible elements of the Iranian diaspora.

• Continue to support and pressure the Lebanese government and Lebanese Armed Forces in the disarmament of Hezbollah and establishing state institutions as the sole legitimate possessors of the means of force.

• Develop a whole-of-government approach to combatting and weakening the Houthis, drawing on diplomatic, political, economic, public messaging, intelligence, and military tools, in coordination with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others. 

• Negotiate with Iraqi authorities to secure a sustained, limited U.S. military posture to support counter-ISIS missions, with full self-defense authorities and capabilities. Our presence in Iraq helps the Iraqi Security Forces succeed in this ongoing effort, provides reassurance to our Kurdish partners, and enables us to balance Iranian influence in Iraq.

Finally, as the war winds down, work should begin now on negotiating the next U.S.-Israel military assistance MOU. 

The current MOU expires in 2028, which means it would be best to have a new MOU in place within a year or so, to ensure no delay in necessary acquisitions. A new MOU should ensure that the United States upholds its legal obligation and national interest to ensure Israel’s qualitative military edge, be grounded in planning for the threats of the next two decades, and provide sufficient funds to rebuild, sustain, and upgrade Israel’s air defense inventory, which has been stretched in multiple defensive engagements. I should note that it is entirely legitimate and appropriate in the context of MOU negotiations and our enduring close security partnership with Israel for the United States to raise questions and concerns about the need for Israel to minimize civilian casualties in its operations and the obligation to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance to civilians in need. 

This is a hefty list of objectives and priorities to pursue to advance U.S. interests in the Middle East. It takes significant resources to carry out foreign policy initiatives at this scale: personnel with a range of diplomatic experience and expertise; functional and adequately resourced foreign assistance programs in key countries; international broadcasting; and more. If it is left to just a few high-level officials with access to the president, much of the implementation work will not get done. Meanwhile, China is deepening its activity and influence in all these areas everywhere the United States pulls back. 

I am deeply concerned that the Trump Administration’s drastic cuts to personnel at the Department of State, including experts in nuclear diplomacy, sanctions enforcement, and counterterrorism, the elimination of the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the decimation of our international broadcasting capabilities, are leaving us ill-prepared and under-resourced to properly seize the opportunities before us. It will be a terrible own-goal if our own lack of preparation and denial of tools in our own toolkit prevent us from being effective in executing on the long list of priorities we must pursue, thereby providing an advantage to our competitors.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to answering your questions.

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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A broadening partnership

Turkey’s engagement in the Sahel predates the region’s security crisis, though it has grown in recent years. Trade between Turkey and Mali increased 32,000 percent over the previous two decades, from $5 million in 2003 to $165 million in 2022. Turkish firms have also played a key role in infrastructure development, constructing both an airport and a five-star hotel in Niamey, Niger. These relationships provide a strong base for defense cooperation.

Sahel-Turkey defense cooperation has steadily increased since 2018. What began as a five-million-dollar Turkish pledge to the now-defunct G5 Sahel Joint Force has matured into a broader, deeper partnership. Additionally, coups d’état in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger prompted the United States to halt its defense assistance, impeding these states’ ability to maintain and procure US equipment. Turkey became a more attractive partner as regional security deteriorated and Western assistance stagnated.

Military equipment sales are the cornerstone of Sahel-Turkey defense cooperation. They began in earnest in 2022, when Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger each took delivery of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. These drones rapidly proliferated across both the region and the continent, drawing comparisons to the AK-47 assault rifle because of their affordability, reliability, and ubiquity. These acquisitions heralded a shift in procurement, as Sahel states increasingly turned toward Ankara.

As time went on, drone sales continued apace. Chad obtained Anka-S drones in 2023 and Aksungur drones in 2024, while Mali expanded its TB2 fleet. Burkina Faso and Mali both procured Akıncı drones in 2024, signaling a shift toward more advanced systems. “Our defense capacity consists of the famous Bayraktar TB2s. We now have a new [drone] called Akıncı,” boasted Burkina Faso’s president, underscoring the centrality of Turkish equipment in Burkina Faso’s arsenal.

But it’s not just drones: Burkina Faso and Chad each acquired Turkish armored vehicles in 2022. Cooperation expanded further when Niger procured Turkish planes in late 2022, becoming the first export customer of an entirely Turkish-produced aircraft. Chad followed soon thereafter, acquiring the same aircraft in 2023.

Turkish equipment has addressed Sahel militaries’ acute security gaps and afforded them new capabilities. Turkish aircraft and drones offset ground mobility constraints by enabling militaries to surveil their territory and project force into contested areas. Turkish TB2 drones reportedly played a decisive role in Mali’s 2024 reconquest of Kidal, a rebel stronghold situated deep in the Sahara Desert.

Military equipment sales help grow Turkey’s relationships and influence. Partnering with Sahel states offers Turkey new avenues through which it can pursue its regional interests and bolster its image as a leader among Muslim-majority countries. A Turkish intelligence report from 2024 assessed that Niger was a “strategic partner,” capable of extending Ankara’s influence in Africa.

These relationships also enable Turkey to compete with rivals. Some analysts contend that Turkey’s outreach helps it outflank France and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, relations with Sahel states have helped Turkey constrain the Gülen movement, which the Turkish government labeled a terrorist organization and blames for the 2016 coup attempt. For example, Chad and Mali handed over control of Gülenist schools to a Turkish state-run organization in 2017.

Sahel states consider Ankara an important security partner. “We are taking a new course,” said the Malian minister of defense in November 2024. “[Turkish equipment] will help strengthen the territorial grid and neutralize threats wherever they are.” Burkina Faso awarded its highest state medal to the head of a Turkish defense company in 2023.

Defense cooperation may reach even further than equipment sales. In 2024, a report from Agence France-Presse indicated that SADAT International Defense Consultancy, a Turkish private military company, was deployed in the Sahel. It cited the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights as saying that one thousand Syrian personnel who had signed contracts with SADAT were deployed to Niger “to protect Turkish projects and interests.” (SADAT and the Turkish Ministry of National Defense denied these allegations). Africa Defense Forum, a magazine published by US Africa Command, reported that “Turkey said the fighters are in Niger to consult and guard Turkish interests, such as mines.” A deployment to Niger has not been confirmed.

Another report from Jeune Afrique suggested that SADAT had deployed to Mali and trained the country’s military in mid-2024. According to the report, SADAT personnel embedded with elite units loyal to the president and trained them to prevent coups d’état. This has not been verified, but, if accurate, would suggest that Turkey is employing new tools to deepen partnerships and address regimes’ desire for security.

There is also a small body of reporting indicating that Turkey is expanding its overt military presence. In February 2025, Military Africa reported that Chad granted Turkey control of a military base in the city of Abéché. If confirmed, this would be Turkey’s first base in the Sahel. It would also constitute a new element in defense partnerships that, to this point, have largely been driven by Turkish private industry and Sahel states’ demand for military hardware.

So what?

There are some conditions under which cooperating with Turkey could advance US regional objectives. Sahel states need defense assistance to fight a growing terrorist threat, which the United States often cannot provide. Turkish assistance does not face the same legal restrictions and thus fills urgent capability gaps. Turkish aircraft, armored vehicles, and drones improve force mobility and help militaries take the fight to terrorist strongholds. As terrorists expand operations, partnering with Turkey could help regional militaries manage the threat.

Turkey’s growing involvement in the region also presents opportunities to counter US adversaries. Turkish military equipment offers an affordable, high-quality alternative to Chinese or Russian products. In a similar fashion, SADAT could reduce states’ reliance on Russia’s Africa Corps, which has provided training and regime security to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. SADAT offers a suite of similar services, and its deployment to Mali, if confirmed, would suggest that Mali’s president may be looking to move beyond Russian assistance.

That said, there are also risks in working with Turkey, and Washington must approach any partnership with clear eyes. The United States requires recipients of advanced military equipment to submit to end-use monitoring, but Turkey does not enforce recipients’ compliance with the law of armed conflict in the same manner. Moreover, private military companies operate under different rules of engagement than conventional militaries, underscoring the risks associated with possible SADAT deployments in the Sahel. Turkish defense assistance often comes with fewer asks than US assistance, and the United States may incur reputational harm if it chooses to partner with Turkey.

Partnering with Turkey is not a panacea for declining Western influence either. Ankara oscillates between cooperation and competition with Russia, frustrating European leaders. Turkey has been accused of fueling anti-colonial sentiment in Africa; this once irritated the French president who, in late 2020, alleged that Ankara and Moscow had inflamed anti-French sentiment in Africa. The European Union has since expressed interest in partnering with Turkey to “generate a wide international coalition that can support [the Sahel].” Even so, Turkey’s foreign policy suggests that it may not share the West’s precise goals.

Any partnership with Turkey must be carefully calibrated and closely monitored. Partnership has the potential to advance some US objectives, but it alone cannot resolve the broader challenges posed by terrorism’s dramatic expansion and states’ pivot from the political West. The United States must be prepared to work with Turkey where objectives align, while preserving the capacity and flexibility to act independently in pursuit of its vital interests.

Jordanna Yochai is an analyst whose research examines West African security, with prior experience in the US Department of Defense.

The positions expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the US Department of Defense. The US Department of Defense does not endorse the views expressed in hyperlinked articles or websites, including any information, products, or services contained therein.

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The 2025 URC event was the largest so far in terms of participants and featured solid high-level representation, with national leaders including Georgia Meloni, Friedrich Merz, Pedro Sanchez, Donald Tusk, Maia Sandu, and Petr Pavel among the speakers. All reiterated their backing for the Ukrainian war effort and their support for Ukraine’s EU membership bid. Dozens of agreements were signed pledging international aid and investment.

The size of this year’s conference was particularly significant. Over 6,000 delegates spent two days making connections, sharing experiences, finding new partners, or simply expanding the community of people interested in making Ukraine a success story.

In just two days, I met a wide range of people engaged in efforts to build a better Ukraine. This included Ukrainian veterans leading rehabilitation initiatives, charities expanding their operations in Ukraine, American business owners trying to bring green energy facilities to Ukraine, and Ukrainian architects designing underground shelters. Many law firms were present, offering advice to companies seeking to enter the Ukrainian market. New relationships established in Rome could end up bringing a wide range of benefits to Ukraine. 

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The scale of destruction and trauma in today’s Ukraine is daunting. Dozens of towns and cities lie in ruins. Millions have been forced to flee their homes. Every fifth person is a veteran or has a family member who has served in the armed forces, while between 30 and 50 percent of the Ukrainian population require mental health support. Addressing these unprecedented challenges will require huge effort and bold solutions.

Clearly, the top priority is to defend Ukraine and prevent further destruction and loss of life. For the first time, this year’s conference featured a focus on military issues including defense tech innovation and investment in key areas such as drone production. Many participants reiterated that Europe as a whole cannot be truly secure without Ukrainian victory.

Europeans are also increasingly acknowledging the need to learn from Ukraine as they look to defend themselves against the mounting threat posed by Russia. Slowly but surely, the rhetoric is shifting away from humanitarian support for Ukraine as a country under attack, toward recognition of the need to invest in Ukraine as a country that will play a vital role in the future of European security. This change in tone was on full display in Rome.  

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Not everything about this year’s conference was ideal. The event would benefit from an extended schedule lasting more than two days. It would also help to have fewer overlapping sessions. The current format meant impressive initiatives often only received a few minutes of attention. Meanwhile, lack of audience interaction felt like a missed opportunity given the thousands of well-informed and experienced professionals in attendance from a diverse range of sectors and different countries.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of this year’s conference was the human dimension. Key themes included the return of refugees, engagement with the Ukrainian diaspora, integration of internally displaced people, and the need for Ukrainian society to prepare for the eventual reintegration of hundreds of thousands of military veterans. Participants also discussed labor shortages and investment in Ukraine’s education system.

My overall conviction is that the Ukraine Recovery Conference has immense value in strengthening Ukraine today and shaping the country’s future. Russia is trying to destroy Ukraine by inflicting death by a thousand cuts. “We need to find 1000 partnerships that will allow Ukraine to persevere in this war of attrition, achieve technological and strategic breakthroughs, and ultimately win this war,” noted my Chatham House colleague Orysia Lutsevych. The URC format can help do just that. 

Supporting Ukraine’s wartime recovery and reconstruction is a good way to boost resilience by giving Ukrainians a greater sense of confidence in the future. Crucially, this approach also helps provide urgently needed practical support in a timely fashion. Neither Ukraine nor the country’s partners can afford to wait until the war is over before addressing the many profound security, economic, and social issues arising from Russia’s invasion. The Ukraine Recovery Conference is the best tool to facilitate this process.   

Anna Morgan is manager of the Ukraine Forum at Chatham House.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The international system forged after 1945 is being tested by an increasingly aligned confederation of authoritarian states. For decades, rules and norms upheld global order, but inaction, complacency, and institutional stagnation now threaten their collapse. Authoritarian aggression cannot be appeased—only deterred through credible military power, strong economies, and united diplomacy. The United States cannot shoulder this responsibility alone. The broader free world must strengthen regional defenses and support global collective security. Yet current mechanisms face two flaws: widespread disarmament among free world nations and outdated collective security institutional structures.

The next National Defense Strategy needs to address the seriousness of the situation by resourcing a multi-theater war strategy centered on the Indo-Pacific. This strategy must set the goal of completing the pivot to the Indo-Pacific by the end of the current US administration’s term. Key to completing the pivot will come through implementing a reverse of the Guam doctrine, which will require America’s European allies to take the lead in their own defense. The next defense strategy should avoid the mistake of focusing the pivot only to the west of the international date line.

For the pivot to be successful, the Western Hemisphere must be made more secure—politically, economically, and militarily—by rebooting the Monroe Doctrine to reenable the Organization of American States as an economic security bloc and the reshoring of supply chains to the hemisphere, and to revitalize the Rio Pact to defend the Americas against twenty-first century imperialist coercion and aggression.

Lastly, the next National Defense Strategy must squarely take on the topic of global unified command and implement a winning command and control architecture to ensure the United States military is organized to fight a multi-theater, large-scale war.

The state of collective security

Europe relies on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for its security. NATO, a once-capable alliance, has lapsed, and presently suffers from a diminished martial culture and a state of unpreparedness. NATO relies on Russian weakness rather than allied strength, underscoring its vulnerabilities. More must be done in Europe to strengthen NATO, and, while the United States has a role, most of the heavy lifting must be carried out by Europe because the Indo-Pacific requires much more attention by the United States.

At present, the Indo-Pacific lacks a security system—even one as fragile as NATO. The nexus of China, North Korea, and Russian Far East power poses an increased risk to peace and security across East Asia and the Indian Ocean region and beyond the second island chain of the Western Pacific. American bilateral alliances, along with multilateral security partnerships like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) team, provide cooperative frameworks, strategic alignment, and some deterrence, but they remain fragmented and inadequate against aligned authoritarian strategies.

Historically, the free world attempted collective defense in Asia through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the United Nations Command (UNC). SEATO failed due to its weak regional foundations and colonial baggage. The UNC, however, successfully coordinated international resistance against North Korean aggression and Chinese intervention. Though still operational, UNC was relegated to a diminished support role in 1978 when warfighting responsibilities transitioned to the Republic of Korea—United States Combined Forces Command (CFC).

What the UN Command is, and what it is not

On June 25, 1950, Communist North Korea invaded the United Nations (UN) recognized democratic South Korea. In response, the US president authorized the US Far East Command (FECOM), under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, to provide material support to the beleaguered South Korean government. The president then directed US forces to intervene in the conflict to repel the invasion. Other nations (the United Kingdom and Australia) also provided forces to assist the Korean government alongside the United States before the UN acted.

The UNC emerged from four key United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR)—82 through 85—adopted in 1950. These resolutions authorized a US-led unified command to repel North Korean forces and coordinate humanitarian efforts. While the Security Council requested that the United States lead the international response and authorized the unified command to fly the UN flag, the resolutions did not establish UN oversight. The US government retains full executive control, with the UNC still led by a senior US general.

The UNC was established to separate and compartmentalize the aforementioned UNSCR actions in support of the defense of South Korea from unilateral US government actions in East Asia being exercised by FECOM.

The UNC is not a neutral party nor a peacekeeper. It is a belligerent in the Korean conflict, formed to repel North Korean forces, later joined by Chinese forces, that were both being supported by the Soviets.

In 1953, the UNC became a party to the Korean Armistice Agreement with the opposing side’s belligerents, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) of North Korea and the thinly veiled Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As a party to the armistice, the UNC is responsible only for friendly force compliance. The UNC is not responsible for keeping North Korean forces compliant, nor is it a referee between the two Koreas.

The confusion surrounding the UNC stems from its name and authorization to fly the UN flag. Originally embraced as a symbol of global unity, the naming convention reflects post-WWII idealism. In military doctrinal terms, the UNC is a lead nation multinational command. Once dominated exclusively by a US staff, the UNC headquarters expanded to include international staff contributions from the contributing nations—the “sending states”—and maintains an active political apparatus through the resident ambassadors in South Korea.

The UNC also maintains a rear command in Japan, managing designated UN bases under a multinational Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the government of Japan. These bases are critical to future multinational deployments, granting strategic depth and legal protections to non-US UNC forces. Since 2010, the rear command has been led by a multinational officer, reinforcing the UNC’s international character.

While the CFC is now the responsible command for the defense of Korea, the UNC’s role has evolved toward armistice maintenance and multinational integration. Since 2015, revitalization efforts have improved staff capacity and multinational coordination, though more is needed to address the expanding regional threat.

UN Command’s ‘credible legacy’ complements other forces in the region

Given the fractured state of Indo-Pacific security architecture, the region lacks a robust collective defense mechanism. Bilateral alliances and multilateral partnerships like AUKUS and the Quad are insufficient. A future war would be difficult to organize amid crisis. Thus, enhancing an existing structure like the UNC, with its historical legitimacy and multinational foundation, is the pragmatic choice.

The UNC already boasts a credible legacy, a seventeen-nation multilateral presence in Korea and Japan, access to bases, and international agreements to permit military support. These assets make it uniquely positioned to transform the command back into a multinational warfighting headquarters.

The Korean Peninsula has historically served as the competition space and battleground of the great powers. Korea remains the strategic high ground of Northeast Asia, and Northeast Asia is the decisive security and economic terrain for East Asia and the greater Indo-Pacific. Northeast Asia is a position of strength for the free world in the Indo-Pacific, and it should be reinforced as such to maintain it as a strong point—with strategic, operational, and tactical implications for both China and Russia.

Skeptics will argue that the 1950 UNSCRs limit the UNC to the defense of South Korea. Yet UNSCRs 83 and 84 both emphasize the objective to “restore international peace and security to the area.” Korean security is inseparable from broader East Asian stability. With China and North Korea both supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine, the linkages between regional and global conflicts are becoming clearer.

A resumption of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula can be expected to draw in regional powers, including China and Russia—both security treaty allies of North Korea. Moreover, any war in East Asia is likely to involve the Korean Peninsula. South Korea’s strategic location and hosting of sizable US forces make it an unavoidable, even if reluctant, actor in future conflicts.

The UNC’s transformation back into a multinational warfighter does not alter the CFC’s mission and role as the designated alliance warfighter for the defense of South Korea. The UNC would be positioned to martial and organize free world military and humanitarian contributions, ready to intervene and reinforce the CFC to repel authoritarian aggression and return peace and security to the area. A militarily capable UNC would relieve the CFC from managing a wide range of sending-state contributions, allowing each command to focus on specific missions and improve overall 360-degree combat readiness.

Restoring the UNC to its collective security roots would also push necessary reforms in Northeast Asia’s security posture. South Korea and the United States must conclude additional foundational agreements, such as a SOFA (or visiting force agreement), for non-US sending-state forces. Past agreements granting SOFA-like privileges and immunities—such as the 1952 Meyer agreement—must be updated or reaffirmed to ensure legal clarity for free world powers contributing military forces. The UN SOFA with Japan should also be expanded from the nine current signatories to include all seventeen non-US sending states. 

In parallel, South Korea needs to continue developing its military’s operational capabilities, completing its obligations under the bilaterally agreed Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP). Doing so best protects South Korean sovereignty in a very dangerous neighborhood, and paves the way for greater Korean leadership within its alliance with the United States and across the region. A more militarily capable and operationally focused UNC would help facilitate this transition by reducing administrative and operations burdens on the CFC.

Returning the UN Command to ‘warfighter status’

One option to seriously consider is to move the UNC’s main headquarters back to Japan (where it resided from 1950-1957), with a small residual forward headquarters in Korea to provide day-to-day oversight over the command’s armistice functions. Stationing the UNC in Japan would better position the command to exercise the designated UN bases and reinvigorate the reception, staging, and onward movement planning and preparations at and through the designated UN bases.

Having the UNC in Japan would catalyze the deployment of free world military forces to the region for training and exercises, a critical function for testing the validity of operational plans and for deterrence. Doing so positions the UNC to become the multinational offshore balancer for the Korean Peninsula, serving as a threat in the strategic calculus of the North Korean regime—and its Chinese and Russian patrons.

Beyond warfighting, the UNC can serve as a framework for broader international cooperation. Nations with limited military capabilities can contribute to non-combat roles, such as humanitarian relief or logistics. Germany’s recent joining of the UNC speaks to the command’s potential to expand beyond countries that were involved in the Korean War.

Returning the UNC to warfighter status and positioning the command in Japan would necessitate internal US force posture reforms. The hard truth is the Indo-Pacific is too large a theater for a single unified command—United States Indo-Pacific Command—to manage in time in space. If the Indo-Pacific was too large a theater for the likes of Nimitz, MacArthur, Slim, and Stilwell to singly manage during World War II, what makes the United States think its current crop of flag officers can handle it from Hawaii? Furthermore, the US force posture in Northeast Asia is divided, duplicative, and too narrowly focused, leaving immense gaps and seams for the authoritarians to exploit.

A consolidated command for Northeast Asia should be considered, merging US Forces Korea and US Forces Japan under a single commander. The consolidated command could be a unified or a sub-unified command. Headquarters consolidation in Northeast Asia would force further conversations within the US Department of Defense to establish additional unified/sub-unified commands to cover the operational flanks in the Southwest Pacific area, South Asia, and the communication zone between the West Coast and the second island chain, similar to how the US military organized itself in WWII.

Finally, a restored, combat-capable UNC would provide strategic flexibility to the free world to meet aggression across the breadth and depth of the Indo-Pacific by serving as a standing multinational unified command. During an East Asian crisis that does not immediately involve the Korean Peninsula—beyond the scope of UNSCR 83-85—the command could reflag under a new multinational banner, exercising collective defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. In such a situation, the UNC main headquarters in Japan could temporarily transfer its UNSCR 83-85 and armistice responsibilities to the UNC forward headquarters in Korea for the duration of the crisis. In this way, the reflagged UNC staff—already trained and functioning as an operational warfighter—could once again be committed to defeat aggression, if required.

Conclusion

The authoritarians are growing in strength, aligning, and collectively placing increasing pressure on the rules-based international system. The free world must stand up to coercion and aggression. Collective security works but is most effective when it is put in place pre-war. Europe, despite NATO’s major shortcomings, has a reasonably effective collective security mechanism in place. Much work is required to return European military power and NATO to its Cold War status. The Indo-Pacific—the decisive region for the twenty-first century—does not have a multilateral collective security mechanism in place, at least not one that is militarily capable. The next National Defense Strategy must address global unified command and put in place a winning command and control architecture for the Indo-Pacific.

The UNC offers the free world a standing collective security mechanism that can be combat credible, providing peace and security for the free world’s northern flank in the Indo-Pacific. The sobering truth is life is not fair, but it is just. What one sows, one will reap. Those who sow carelessly end up paying the price for wishing away reality. Now is the time to move out on collective security in the Indo-Pacific. The UNC is one option available and returning it to a multinational warfighter should be seriously considered. For those who disagree, forward a better alternative so the free world can realize collective security in the Indo-Pacific and protect the rules-based international system.

Richard D. Butler is a retired US Army colonel. His last active duty posting was as the inaugural director for the China Landpower Studies Center, which conducts research, analysis, and education on the rise of China from a military perspective. Originally commissioned in 1995 as a surface warfare officer in the United States Navy, Butler deployed worldwide on multiple destroyers and commanded USS Firebolt (PC 10) during two tours early in the Iraq War. During a joint assignment with III Corps, US Army, he deployed two more times to Iraq as a lead planner. In 2010, he changed his commission to the United States Army, where he performs duties as a strategist. He served in Jerusalem working the two-state solution and has over twelve years of experience in the Indo-Pacific, serving in various capacities as plans chief, strategy chief, and senior strategist at US Army, Pacific; Indo-Pacific Command; and Combined Forces Command.

Shawn P. Creamer is a retired US Army colonel. He served as an infantry officer for thirty years, with more than fourteen years assigned to or directly working on Indo-Pacific security issues, including assignments to US Forces Korea, the ROK/US Combined Forces Command, the United Nations Command, commanding a battalion in Korea and a brigade in Hawaii. He was a US Army War College Fellow with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program. In retirement, Creamer is serving as a fellow with the Institute for Corean-American Studies and as a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

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In a war against China, the US could quickly exhaust its weapons. A new Indo-Pacific defense initiative might be the answer.

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The new Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience could enable faster provisioning of resources to Taiwan, the Philippines, South Korea, or even the United States if a war breaks out. 

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This report highlights two emerging and interrelated deterrence challenges in East Asia with grave risks to US national security: 1) Horizontal escalation of a conflict with China or North Korea into simultaneous conflict; 2) Vertical escalation to a limited nuclear attack by either or both adversaries to avoid conceding.

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The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.

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The post Collective security in the Indo-Pacific: Rethinking the United Nations Command appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This sharp rise in Ukrainian civilian casualties is the result of a Russian air offensive that has expanded dramatically in scope since late 2024. During June, the number of drones and missiles launched at Ukrainian targets was ten times higher than the volume one year earlier.

“Civilians across Ukraine are facing levels of suffering we have not seen in over three years,” commented UN Monitoring Mission head Danielle Bell. “The surge in long-range missile and drone strikes across the country has brought even more death and destruction to civilians far away from the frontline.”  

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The trend of increasingly deadly Russian bombardments continues to gain momentum at an alarming rate with a series of record-breaking aerial attacks in early July, each featuring more than 500 drones along with cruise and ballistic missiles. Based on the current trajectory, analysts warn that Russia will soon be able to conduct regular bombing raids involving in excess of 1000 drones.

Russia has managed to increase the scale of its bombing operations thanks to progress made since 2023 in the domestic production of drones. During the first year of the full-scale invasion, Iran supplied Russia with the long-range Shahed drones used to bomb Ukraine. Moscow has since reduced its reliance on the Iranians by securing the necessary Shahed drone blueprints from Tehran and establishing production lines inside the Russian Federation.

A growing number of dedicated Russian facilities are now manufacturing thousands of drones each month for the invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin has reportedly imported laborers from a number of Asian and African countries to bolster the workforce in these factories. China has also been accused of providing vital components in large quantities.    

In addition to ongoing increases in output, Russia has also introduced a series of upgrades to Iran’s Shahed drones. The most recent models are faster and able to operate at higher altitudes, making them significantly more difficult to intercept. They are equipped with video cameras and in some cases utilize AI technologies, paving the way for autonomous flight operation and target selection. Crucially, the new generation of Russian bomber drones can also carry much larger warheads, leading to far greater destruction and loss of life.  

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

The escalation in Russia’s air war comes as Putin’s army struggles to make progress on the ground while suffering catastrophic losses. The Russian military has held the battlefield initiative since early 2024, but has managed to seize less than one percent of additional Ukrainian territory during this period, raising doubts over Putin’s ability to achieve his maximalist war aims. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently reported that the Russian army had lost over 100,000 soldiers during the first half of 2025 alone.

With no sign of an imminent breakthrough along the frontlines of the war, Putin’s bombardment strategy appears aimed at terrorizing the Ukrainian civilian population and undermining the country’s will to resist. The US-based Institute for the Study of War recently assessed that Russia’s ongoing large-scale air strikes seek to degrade Ukrainian and Western morale while underscoring Ukraine’s need for continued Western support.

Ukrainian officials have reached similar conclusions regarding the Kremlin’s intentions. “The Russians are intensifying terror against cities and communities to increasingly intimidate our people,” commented Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on July 13. “Russian terror against the rear is an attempt to break the nation,” stated Andriy Yermak, head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office. “Russia can’t achieve Putin’s goals on the frontline, so it keeps targeting civilians.”  

The recent geographical expansion of Russia’s nightly bombing raids certainly seems to support these claims and appears designed to demoralize the entire Ukrainian population by sending a message that nowhere in Ukraine is now safe. Key targets in early July included cities in western Ukraine that had little previous experience of major bombardment such as Lutsk and Chernivtsi.    

Ukraine is now seeking to address Russia’s terror bombing strategy with a combination of technological innovation, expanded military capabilities, and increased Western support. While additional air defense systems like US-made Patriots are a priority, Kyiv is developing and testing its own domestically produced interceptor drones as the most cost-effective way to combat Russia’s massive drone raids.

Long-range weapons are also vital as Ukraine seeks to strike back. Some commentators believe Ukraine can never have enough air defenses to neutralize the threat posed by Russia’s ever-expanding bombardments. They argue that the only way to stop Putin from bombing Ukrainian cities is by boosting Ukraine’s ability to hit targets deep inside Russia including production facilities and launch sites.   

With Putin’s war machine cranking out missiles and drones in even greater quantities, larger Russian raids in the coming months are inevitable. The Ukrainian authorities must urgently come up with effective solutions before the civilian death toll rises further. Putin appears to believe he can bomb Ukraine into submission. While there is currently no indication that the civilian population is approaching breaking point, the horror of Russia’s increasingly deadly air raids is weighing heavy on the war-weary nation.   

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.  

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 14, 2025

A Western-funded drone surge could end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

By Mark Boris Andrijanič

Ukraine has the technology, talent, and industrial potential to prevail in the war with Russia, but currently lacks the funding to scale drone production to the necessary levels, writes Mark Boris Andrijanič.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Jul 8, 2025

Putin is winning the drone war as Russia overwhelms Ukraine’s defenses

By Maksym Beznosiuk

Russia is now winning the drone war against Ukraine thanks to a massive increase in domestic drone production and a series of technological upgrades, writes Maksym Beznosiuk. This is enabling Putin to dramatically escalate the bombardment of Ukrainian cities.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jul 8, 2025

Cautious optimism in Ukraine as Trump vows to send more weapons

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainians have welcomed US President Donald Trump’s July 7 announcement that he intends to provide Ukraine with more weapons, but many remain deeply cynical over the longer term prospects for continued US support, writes Peter Dickinson.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Russia’s bombing campaign is killing record numbers of Ukrainian civilians appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Overwhelmingly, commentary regarding Chinese military aggression focuses on the area known as the “first island chain,” stretching from the Philippines to the south, through Japan in the north, with Taiwan at the centerpiece. Taiwan remains the focus because control of Taiwan, whether by military force or other coercive means, remains a national security objective of the Chinese Communist Party. As this geography includes mutual-defense treaty allies of the United States, it is understood as a multinational chain restraining Chinese hostility. Should China attempt a military seizure of Taiwan, the likelihood of the conflict expanding to include the entirety of the first island chain—and US forces stationed or deployed there—remains high.

However, this discussion largely omits another likely participant that could prove decisive in deterring such a fight and in determining its outcome: South Korea. Indeed, while an island only in the sense that its infrastructure is not connected to the Asian mainland because of the obstacle of North Korea, South Korea is geographically the “anchor” of the first island chain and could operationally serve in that role. By addressing the assumptions that lead analysts to exclude Korea from assessments of Chinese military aggression, the advantages to regional security that arise from Korean investment become clear.

Why is Korea excluded from discussion of a US-China conflict involving Taiwan? The United States currently assesses China as the country’s pacing threat, and a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could likely be a catalyst for war between the United States and China. South Korea’s primary threat—North Korea—is not perceived to be as dangerous to US national security interests relative to China. US defense planners compartmentalize the threats posed by China and North Korea, and there is an incorrect perception that US military assets stationed in Korea cannot be used in a fight against China. As a result, Korea gets short shrift in this discussion. But the assumption that Korea would be excluded from such a conflict is baseless.

First, this bias is premised on the assumption that South Korea would only fight alongside the United States in a war against North Korea and not become involved in a war between the United States and China. However, the US-South Korean mutual defense treaty does not contain this limitation. Rather, it states clearly: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties . . . declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Moreover, attitudes within South Korea are becoming more supportive of military assistance to Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. An attack against the United States in the Pacific is increasingly likely to facilitate South Korean participation in that conflict, regardless of the belligerent. And in a US-China war over Taiwan, China has many sound operational reasons for attacking US forces across the region and in Korea.

Second, analysts assume that US forces and matériel placed in South Korea is held hostage there, so to speak, and may only be used to defend South Korea against North Korea. Within US military planning circles, this is referred to as the “black hole theory” of the Korean peninsula. Indeed, Combined Forces Command, the warfighting headquarters that fully integrates US and South Korean forces, is optimized for and conducts exercises to defend South Korea from North Korean aggression.

However, the mission of Combined Forces Command is not exclusive to North Korean threats and includes deterring and defeating “outside aggression” against South Korea. Similarly, US Forces Korea, which is separate from Combined Forces Command, deters and defends against any aggression to maintain stability in Northeast Asia. The former commander of both organizations, General Paul LaCamera, publicly noted that planning for his forces encompasses any contingency, including those that occur outside of Korea. His successor and the current commander, General Xavier Brunson, reinforced this notion by highlighting the proximity of South Korea to China and the broader, regional, strategic utility of US forces in South Korea beyond the threat posed by North Korea.

Finally, there is no agreement, regulation, or document that traps US forces on the Korean peninsula. If the Pacific becomes a war zone, no matter the threat, the United States gets a decisive vote in how its forces are employed, whether on or off the Korean peninsula. US forces have historically been deployed far from Korea for combat operations elsewhere. In the most recent example, a Patriot missile unit deployed from Korea defended the Al Udeid airbase in Qatar from Iranian missile attacks in June of 2025. In short, the black hole theory is a myth. That it is a myth is illustrated perhaps most clearly by the other side of this coin—the North Korean threat. North Korea has shifted munitions and troops from the Korean peninsula in support of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. Troops and matériel will be committed wherever each nation’s security interests lie, regardless of their geography.

These facts should be contextualized against the real threat of simultaneity of conflict throughout the region. Great power wars tend to expand horizontally and there are many paths by which a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could lead to a North Korean attack on South Korea and vice versa. Further, the likelihood of Chinese interference in a Korean crisis will only increase as Chinese-US tensions rise. Finally, an increased footprint of US forces in Japan as a check against these threats is an untenable solution, as the US started honoring its legal obligation to start reducing total forces in Okinawa last year.

To summarize:

• the United States should expect South Korean co-belligerency if the United States is attacked in the Pacific region per the US-ROK mutual defense treaty;
• there is nothing preventing the use of US assets staged on the Korean peninsula in contingencies that occur off the Korean peninsula;
• any Chinese-initiated conflict will almost certainly expand to Korea in some fashion; and
• a North Korean-initiated conflict will almost certainly involve Chinese belligerency to some degree.

This being the case, opportunities exist for integrating South Korea into a wider defense across the first island chain.

First, investing US resources in South Korean security should rightly be seen as simultaneously defending against both North Korean and Chinese aggression. This form of dual deterrence is akin to moving a chess piece to simultaneously threaten two enemy pieces. The Chinese certainly view it this way, illustrating their perception quite clearly in their angry reaction to the 2016 deployment of a US Terminal High Altitude Anti Area Defense anti-missile battery in South Korea. While explicitly deployed to intercept North Korean missile strikes, this battery could also intercept Chinese missile launches, and this reality triggered a plethora of Chinese retaliatory and coercive actions against South Korea, to which South Korea did not yield.

Second, South Korea should be viewed through the lens of its proximity to the decisive space for any potential fight and not through the outdated view of compartmentalized conflicts. This immediately solves fundamental operational problems of time, space, and force. Forces stationed outside of the first island chain, especially those based in the continental United States, likely won’t be able to safely enter the conflict zone once it becomes contested in time to influence the decisive, opening phases of any conflict. Forces stationed within South Korea, meanwhile, are in position to support the defense against threats from both North Korea and China.

With these views informing policy, forces that could be useful in either a Korea or China scenario currently stationed in the United States could instead be based in South Korea. For example, US Army Pacific continues to advertise its potential as the linchpin of the joint force in a China fight, but it is hard pressed to fill this role because its forces are overwhelmingly based in the United States—over 5,000 miles away from the first island chain. Moving such mass across the Pacific Ocean without dominance of the air and maritime domains will only sacrifice an unacceptable number of US troops for no operational gain. But basing them instead in South Korea closes this distance, steals a march against two adversaries at once, allows for a much more rapid shift of these forces to key terrain at the start of a fight, and contributes meaningfully to deterrence before a fight.

Similarly, viewing South Korea as a more regionally focused power-projection platform allows other options for US forces departing from Okinawa, per the terms of the Defense Policy Review Initiative: The US government is obligated by the government of Japan to remove 9,000 US Marines from Okinawa, of the over 18,000 stationed there, a movement that has already begun. The US military is currently on track to move these troops to Guam and Hawaii. This places nearly one-half of this element of the US stand-in force beyond the first island chain, undermining a key element of US defense posture across that chain. But Korea is thousands of miles closer to any place US forces will fight. Moreover, Korea, where anti-Chinese attitudes are on the rise, would likely accept the additional investment. Korea would foot much of the bill for infrastructure supporting these additional forces per the terms of the Special Measures Agreement and is likely to continue to pay for their sustainment in the future.

Finally, the US military could store critical munitions and other material required for a fight against either North Korea or China in South Korea. The extensive lines of communication between the first island chain and resupply points in Guam, Hawaii, and the continental United States would impose great cost on any US campaign in the region. Again, South Korea’s proximity and available space make it ideal as an anchor for the first island chain. Moreover, South Korea has demonstrated its willingness to tap into its own wartime stocks, illustrated by its donation of more artillery shells to Ukraine than all of those donated by Europe combined. Similarly, South Korea won’t prevent the United States from using its munitions for any fight it chooses to, whether against North Korea or China.

The risk of simultaneous wars with China and North Korea only seems to increase, and such an occurrence would undermine regional and global stability. Neither of these fights are isolated. Should the United States defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression, South Korea will inevitably become involved. So, too, will China become involved in any US effort to defend South Korea from North Korean attack, likely seizing the opportunity to make coercive and military gains against Taiwan.

US planners should build these assumptions into their planning frameworks to seize the opportunities that exist. Peninsular stability and Taiwan Strait stability are one and the same. Investing in South Korean security serves as an investment in Taiwan security.

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Kerg is an active-duty US Marine Corps operational planner and a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also a 2025 nonresident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a 501(c)3 partnered with Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the positions or opinions of the US Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the US government.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

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Washington and Seoul must set a new foundation for the seventy-year-old alliance that reflects the current strategic environment.

Crisis Management Defense Policy

New Atlanticist Jun 9, 2025

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With China escalating its operational tempo in the Taiwan Strait, the United States must enhance its forward defense posture in the Indo-Pacific.

China Conflict

Issue Brief May 30, 2025

New presidents and new nuclear developments test the United States–Republic of Korea alliance

By Heather Kearney, Amanda Mortwedt Oh

In the coming years, the US-South Korea (Republic of Korea, or ROK) alliance is likely to be tested in at least three fundamental ways: by a concerning growth in North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile weapons program; by changes to ROK defense capabilities and structures, including the establishment of ROK Strategic Command (ROKSTRATCOM); and by potential strategy and policy changes under new US and ROK political administrations.

Arms Control Elections

The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.

Learn more

The post South Korea is the ideal anchor for the first island chain appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Trump’s comments came one week after news broke of a partial pause in US military aid to Ukraine, a decision that sparked considerable alarm in Kyiv and among Ukraine’s European allies. White House officials framed the pause on shipments of crucial weapons categories as an attempt to “put America’s interests first” following a Pentagon review of military stockpiles that reportedly revealed potential shortfalls.

Trump unveiled his apparent U-turn over military aid for Ukraine in Washington DC on Monday evening. “We are going to send some more weapons. We have to. They have to be able to defend themselves. They’re getting hit very hard now,” he commented. According to Trump, the new military deliveries will primarily focus on defensive weapons.

This abrupt change in Trump’s position followed on from two very different phone calls with the leaders of Russia and Ukraine. Last Thursday, Trump came away from a long conversation with Vladimir Putin voicing his disappointment and expressing frustration at the Kremlin dictator’s evident determination to continue the war. One day later, The American and Ukrainian leaders held what both sides praised as a friendly and productive call that raised hopes of continued US support for Ukraine in crucial areas such as air defense.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Efforts to end the bloodshed in Ukraine have dominated US foreign policy during the first six months of the Trump presidency. Critics have accused the US leader of being too eager to offer Russia concessions while maintaining an uncompromising stance toward Ukraine.

Following Trump’s inauguration in January 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy initially struggled to find common ground with the new US administration. The relationship got off to a disastrous start, with Trump branding Zelenskyy a dictator and blaming him for starting the war with Russia. The nadir came in late February, when an Oval Office meeting degenerated into a shouting match that saw Trump accuse Zelenskyy of “gambling with World War III.”    

Zelenskyy has since taken a number of steps to improve bilateral ties. He has repeatedly praised Trump in public, has backed a US proposal for an unconditional thirty-day ceasefire, and has signed off on a minerals deal that grants American businesses preferential access to Ukraine’s natural resources. Meanwhile, Putin has shown no interest in peace. Instead, he has engaged in transparent stalling tactics and issued a series of maximalist demands while dramatically escalating the bombardment of Ukrainian civilians. 

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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There was a degree of guarded optimism in Ukraine on Tuesday morning following Trump’s talk of new weapons deliveries. While the rollercoaster experience of the past half year has left many deeply cynical about the likelihood of further US support, some Ukrainians also saw a certain logic behind Trump’s sudden change in tone. After all, it is now painfully obvious that Putin does not intend to end the war and has been stringing his American counterpart along for months.

Golos Party leader and member of the Ukrainian Parliament Kira Rudik was one of numerous Ukrainian public figures to suggest that Trump may have finally run out of patience with Putin. “President Trump said the US will send more weapons to Ukraine,” she stated. “This is good news for us, but bad news for Russia. No one will endure Putin’s games forever. It is time to strike back.”

Others underlined that US support for Ukraine remains very much in America’s national interests. Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak noted that by denying Russia victory in Ukraine, the United States could prevent a more general European war in the coming years. “The most significant benefit comes from reducing the likelihood of Russian aggression against other European nations,” he commented. “By stopping Putin in Ukraine today, the White House avoids the astronomical future costs of defending NATO allies tomorrow.”

The initial response from Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense was somewhat more cautious. While expressing appreciation for continued US support, ministry officials stressed the need for greater clarity. It was “critically important” for Ukraine to maintain “stability, continuity, and predictability” in the delivery of military aid, especially air defense systems, a statement from the ministry read.

More details are likely to emerge in the coming days as senior Ukrainian and US officials meet on the sidelines of this week’s Ukraine Recovery Conference, which is taking place in Rome. Any additional military support from the United States will certainly be welcome, but many in Kyiv will also be looking for further signals that Trump now recognizes the need to get tough with Russia.