Bottom lines up front

• Greenland and Ukraine will continue to dominate the European security agenda in 2026.
• The Nordic-Baltic states are increasingly taking the lead on these issues through coordinated action, joint funding, and operational support.
• Their approach shows that when small and medium-size states act together, they can have an outsized impact on European and transatlantic security.

STOCKHOLM—When US President Donald Trump escalated the Greenland crisis in early January by insisting on US ownership of the island and not ruling out military force, Denmark quickly received support from its Nordic and Baltic neighbors. This was no coincidence. Over just a few years, the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8)—Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—has become far more proactive and agile in shaping European security policy. 

Unity matters, and strong joint statements matter too. But in a European security debate characterized by constant declarations and uneven follow-through, matching words with action is what has truly built credibility for this Northern European forum.

If 2024 marked the year the Nordic-Baltic states became more “visible and relevant” in European security, and 2025 the year they emerged as Europe’s forward security hub—acting early and speaking clearly—then 2026 is shaping up to be the year their model will be tested under pressure. 

A regional forum with strategic intent

As the year begins, Estonia assumes the rotational chairmanship of the NB8, with an agenda focused on strengthening cooperation and raising the group’s international profile. This ambition underscores that the group’s influence is not tied to a single crisis or a particular leadership term. It is becoming structural. Coordination rotates, but strategic intent remains stable, backed by a growing track record of action and results. 

Even as Greenland dominates headlines, Ukraine remains the issue that anchors the NB8’s credibility. Throughout 2025, the group turned recurring joint signaling into a near-institutional voice, with coordinated statements issued in February, August, September, and November. Together, the members formed a sustained narrative: rejecting any settlement imposed on Kyiv, insisting that borders cannot be changed by force, and reaffirming that support for Ukraine must continue as long as Russia refuses a genuine cease-fire. 

What gives the NB8 credibility, however, is not just what it says but what it does—specifically, what it funds and delivers. Not only are the Nordic and Baltic states well on track—or already meeting—NATO’s defense spending target of 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), they are among the leading contributors of military support to Ukraine relative to GDP. Increasingly, this support is coordinated. In November, all eight Nordic-Baltic states jointly financed a $500 million package of US-sourced military equipment and munitions for Ukraine through NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List. This was one of the largest coordinated European contributions of the year and a clear example of what a European coalition looks like when political alignment translates into operational effect. 

Over the course of 2025, Nordic-Baltic states moved from drawing down stockpiles to building sustainable capacity, including co-production with Ukraine. Sweden’s work with Kyiv on future air capabilities and Denmark’s efforts to facilitate Ukrainian defense manufacturing on Danish territory signal a shift from short-term transfers to enduring war-fighting capacity. 

That industrial turn has been matched by a dense ecosystem of Nordic-Baltic-led coalitions: Latvia driving Europe’s most dynamic drone procurement for Ukraine, Lithuania anchoring multinational demining efforts, Estonia committing a fixed share of GDP to sustained military support, and a broader Nordic-Baltic initiative training and equipping Ukrainian brigades alongside Poland. Together, these efforts translate political will into deployable capabilities, reaching the battlefield faster and with fewer institutional frictions than those of larger European formats.  

Countering Russia in the Baltic Sea is yet another example of Nordic-Baltic action. Today, the Baltic Sea is one of the most monitored maritime spaces in Europe, with continuous naval patrols, air surveillance, and undersea infrastructure protection driven largely by Nordic-Baltic contributions. The launch of NATO’s Operation Baltic Sentry in early 2025, combined with Sweden’s first major NATO maritime deployments, signals that the Alliance’s northern defense posture is moving from political concept to operational reality. 

This effort has expanded beyond ships and aircraft to the legal and regulatory domain. Countering Russia’s shadow fleet and grey-zone maritime activity, enforcing sanctions, and coordinating maritime regulation have become part of the same security logic, reflecting a Nordic-Baltic approach that treats coercion at sea as both a governance and a military challenge. 

The signal to Moscow is clear, and Beijing is registering it too. Coordinated European action, when sustained and enforced, carries strategic weight.

This message is particularly poignant today, as deterrence is increasingly about the ability to stay the course for years—whether in supporting Ukraine, countering hybrid threats, or maintaining political clarity on values and interests. Against this backdrop, Nordic-Baltic states are far from the “small” actors they’re often assumed to be. Together, their combined economic weight rivals that of Europe’s largest powers—a reminder that scale in security is often a political choice. The Nordic-Baltic states have acted on this insight, translating pooled resources into procurement decisions, industrial planning, and sustained policy commitments.  

The next phase of Nordic-Baltic leadership

What comes next is likely to follow two main tracks. First, Greenland will remain a test of allied norms and Nordic-Baltic cohesion, requiring sustained political backing as diplomacy with the United States continues. For years, Nordic-Baltic defense policy rested on a familiar logic: stay close to Washington, prove seriousness, and earn reassurance. That logic still matters, but the Greenland crisis shows it can no longer be taken for granted. In response to the US escalation, Denmark and its Nordic-Baltic partners have focused on keeping the issue firmly within a diplomatic and legal framework, while reinforcing the principle that Arctic security remains a collective NATO responsibility.

Second, Ukraine will remain the central credibility test, demanding resistance to premature settlements and continued investment in military, industrial, and political support. 

There is also a broader strategic task. The NB8 is well-positioned to strengthen the European pillar within NATO while bridging gaps between NATO and the European Union, particularly in areas where security, industrial capacity, and sanctions enforcement increasingly overlap. Equally important, the group must avoid becoming a northern island detached from the rest of Europe. The new habit of including Poland and Germany in the NB8 meetings is wise in this regard. However, credible deterrence and resilience across Europe require wider networks beyond the region, including engagement with partners in the south and the ability to connect regional leadership to continental cohesion. 

The deeper lesson, however, is the same across Greenland and Ukraine: credibility is cumulative. It is built by acting together early, speaking clearly about principles, and turning solidarity into capabilities and delivery. 

In 2026, Europe will spend more time debating which coalitions can be relied upon, which will hold under pressure, and which can shoulder responsibility amid ongoing geopolitical uncertainty. Increasingly, the answer points north—not because the members of the NB8 are Europe’s largest powers, but because they consistently deliver on their promises.

The post How the Nordic-Baltic states became Europe’s reliable security engine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Today started with ice and ended with a thaw. Shortly after a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland—in which he made his case for why the United States should own the “big, beautiful piece of ice” that is Greenland—Donald Trump announced that he had reached a “framework of a future deal” on the issue. The breakthrough came after Trump met with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, and led to the US president dropping his tariff threats against European nations that had opposed the US acquisition of the semiautonomous Danish territory. According to Trump, the deal will concern potential US rights over Greenland’s minerals, as well as the island’s involvement in his administration’s proposed “Golden Dome” missile defense system. Below, our experts shed light on all the transatlantic tumult. 

• Josh Lipsky (@joshualipsky): Chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council, senior director of the GeoEconomics Center, and former International Monetary Fund advisor  
• Matthew Kroenig (@MatthewKroenig): Vice president and senior director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
• Tressa Guenov: Director for programs and operations and senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and former US principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs 
• Jörn Fleck (@JornFleck): Senior director of the Europe Center and former European Parliament staffer

Tariff troubles

• Now that Trump appears to have backed down from both his military and economic threats, “Europe is breathing a sigh of relief,” Josh reports from the World Economic Forum, but it’s one that “will be short-lived.”
• Don’t expect Europe to jump back in to last year’s US-EU trade deal, which Brussels paused in recent days. European leaders “feel like they’ve been burned by the volatility, paid a political price at home, and want commitments that next weekend they don’t wake up to new tariff threats,” Josh tells us. “Businesses, many of which said as much privately to the Trump administration this week in Davos, want the same” sort of commitments. 
• “Markets had their say” as well, Josh writes, noting that fears of a US-EU trade war drove up bond yields in recent days. That’s “the exact kind of pressure point that made Trump relent” in April 2025 when he paused his “Liberation Day” tariffs. “With mortgage rates shooting up” in response to the volatility, says Josh, “Trump showed that he can be especially sensitive to the bond markets.”

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NATO’s next steps

• “The idea that Trump would attack a NATO ally was always hard to imagine,” says Matt, who argues that “Trump’s threats were clearly part of his now-trademark style of building leverage to force a negotiation.”
• Matt now expects a future deal to include “increased military presence in Greenland from Denmark and other NATO allies and increased access and basing for the United States.”
• The “hard work” ahead for negotiators, he explains, will be “hammering out an agreement that addresses Trump’s legitimate security concerns while also respecting the sovereignty of NATO allies.”
• Matt identifies several cases that could provide “creative solutions,” including “the United Kingdom’s ‘sovereign base area’ in Cyprus, the bishop of Urgell and the president of France’s ‘shared sovereignty’ over Andorra, and the United States’ possession of a perpetual lease in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”

The bigger picture

• But even if a deal gets done, says Tressa, Trump’s pressure campaign against Europe over Greenland could have consequences for security issues that must be solved on both sides of the Atlantic: “A sustained atmosphere of crisis has the potential to detract from Trump’s own success in getting NATO countries to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense and, he hopes, buy American products.” She points out that “many of the countries that he threatened with tariffs are the ones who have stepped up defense spending the most.” 
• Jörn agrees on the lasting impact of “Trump’s willingness to engage in brinkmanship with the Alliance, Europe’s economy, and personal relationships with key leaders.” The approach “has destroyed much of the domestic political space in Europe for those arguing that Europe has a weak hand and therefore few options but to engage, assuage, and accommodate” the US president, “even if few European leaders will say this out loud for now.”  
• Still, while “Davos is sometimes criticized for a lot of talk but little action, this year no one can doubt the forum mattered,” Josh adds. “Having Trump meet in person with leaders—privately—is where the US-European alliance was, at least temporarily, put back on track.”

The post The future of Greenland and NATO after Trump’s Davos deal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• To spend larger defense budgets wisely, European NATO allies will need to develop an ecosystem that fosters innovation.
• To increase innovation and the adoption of new technologies, NATO allies will need to address regulations that too often inhibit cooperation.
• Among other steps, NATO should establish a Defense Innovation Unit modeled after the US organization of the same name.

WASHINGTON—From the specter of US retrenchment to ongoing Russian revanchism, European NATO members must face up to a harsh reality: the Alliance lacks the industrial capabilities to meet today’s security challenges. Their recent promises to increase defense spending, while substantial and welcome, will not be enough alone to change this. 

To adapt quickly enough to confront evolving threats, NATO allies must get the basics right. This means adopting functional and flexible financing mechanisms, streamlining regulatory frameworks, and building production foundations that prioritize scalable and sustainable innovation.

These challenges that NATO faces, as well as the need for the Alliance to get the basics right, are being actively discussed, including at the 2025 Netherlands-US Defense Industry Days conference in Washington, DC, this past October. At this event, organized by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Atlantic Council, policymakers, industry leaders, financiers, and experts discussed how transatlantic allies can accelerate defense innovation while strengthening their defense industrial bases. Below are a few of the authors’ major takeaways from this conference on how NATO can meet these challenges.

Don’t just spend more—spend smarter

Increasingly, the battlefields of the future will be won in the realm of innovation. Building ecosystems to support technology development will require allies to use newly unlocked defense dollars to fill immediate capability gaps and build flexible financing pathways to foster innovation. If done right, these defense ecosystems can allocate more resources directly to innovators, boosting returns on investment and generating cutting-edge capabilities in North America and Europe. 

To do this, allies should take a two-pronged approach to financing innovation:

Accept risk to accelerate adoption. Many innovation initiatives—such as NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) organization—too often fall short because they prioritize immediate return on investment or quick-turn results over long-term innovation development. This places a strain on innovators, limiting their access to seed money and signaling to the private sector that the Alliance does not prioritize lasting defense technology innovation. Instead, NATO should give these initiatives greater latitude to prioritize experimentation and iteration rather than meeting often arbitrary metrics and quotas. 

Protect research and development budgets. From the rise of the space domain to electromagnetic warfare, NATO allies must win not just a single innovation race; they need to win many at once. Research and development (R&D) budgets are critical to this effort. Yet, far too often, as participants at the conference noted, R&D budgets for defense technologies are cannibalized in favor of immediate operational needs, particularly during periods of heightened security pressure. By prioritizing R&D budgets, governments can send a clear signal to defense industries, investment bankers, and venture capitalists that NATO members see investment in defense technology as a long-term and sustainable demand. These signals can help spur greater private-sector investment in these technologies.

To produce at scale, regulate at scale

Current regulatory environments on both sides of the Atlantic are not designed for the speed of innovation or adoption needed in today’s rapidly evolving security environment. Instead, NATO allies must strike a careful balance: NATO countries should impose regulations that protect sensitive technologies and intellectual property while also encouraging cooperation among allies on innovation development. Two main principles should inform this approach: 

Break down barriers to transatlantic defense industrial cooperation. In the United States, having to navigate dense bureaucracy can stifle innovation, hamper collaborative partnerships, and stretch lead times for critical defense technologies. However, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently made several announcements that show promise in this area—including loosening restrictions on defense contractors and emphasizing speed—indicating that the Pentagon will work to streamline defense cooperation for allies looking to buy US capabilities. Despite this positive momentum, meaningful changes to US foreign military sales and armaments cooperation will require sustained efforts to reform these overly burdensome bureaucratic processes. 

Keep agile firms top of mind when writing regulations. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will make or break the next era of warfare. Yet defense industrial and innovation regulations often impose disproportionate costs on SMEs because they are designed only for the largest defense companies. For example, the US Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification rightly protects sensitive data through third-party audit and monitoring requirements. But as written, the cost of compliance with these regulations is prohibitively expensive for SMEs, risking pushing many smaller defense firms out of the market altogether. Therefore, policymakers and military planners must establish more frequent, institutionalized relationships with SMEs to better understand how regulations affect these new players. A good step in the right direction would be for policymakers to apply regulations on a sliding scale, setting thresholds for how large a defense company must grow before it has to comply with certain requirements.

Build integrated innovation ecosystems

NATO should adopt a holistic approach to capability development that marries research, design, and production to turn industrial development into more than just the sum of its structural parts. Three ways to build this holistic approach are: 

Champion defense industrial cooperation. To innovate at the necessary pace, the Alliance must build defense industrial co-development, co-production, and co-assembly pathways. Working industry-to-industry or industry-to-partner, such collaborative efforts can help enable allied industries to scale up production and develop cutting-edge defense technologies. This approach defrays risk for industry, builds stronger transatlantic bonds, and shortens lead times for capability delivery. 

Advance a model that combines expertise across sectors. To build more resilient and sustainable defense innovation ecosystems, allies should foster a defense innovation model that integrates government, industry, and academia. With these three sectors working together, allies can coordinate experimentation, testing, and manufacturing efforts to accelerate development and deployment timelines. Applied across the Atlantic, such a model could replace isolated national pilot projects with a coordinated framework for sustained, interoperable innovation.

Establish a NATO Defense Innovation Unit to spur development. Modeled after the United States’ own Defense Innovation Unit, a NATO version of the institution would help the Alliance coordinate funding, regulation, and capability development. A NATO Defense Innovation Unit would maintain shared test facilities, align technical standards, and guide the transition of prototypes into fielded systems. It would serve as a permanent platform connecting NATO’s innovation initiatives—such as DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund—with national and private-sector efforts.

Building transatlantic innovation ecosystems must begin with the basics: financing innovation wisely, regulating for speed and scalability, and building integrated defense innovation models across sectors and allied capitals. A roadmap grounded in smart investment, adaptive regulations, and collaborative production can transform innovation into readiness.

The post To adapt to today’s security threats, NATO should prioritize the basics of defense innovation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 19, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in The Wall Street Journal on the Trump administration’s policy toward Greenland, arguing that threats are a negotiating tool.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Wall Street Journal on Greenland appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 9, Alexander B. Gray, a GeoStrategy Initiative nonresident senior fellow, published an article in The Wall Street Journal titled “A Defense of the Donroe Doctrine in Greenland.”

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The GeoStrategy Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leverages strategy development and long-range foresight to serve as the preeminent thought-leader and convener for policy-relevant analysis and solutions to understand a complex and unpredictable world. Through its work, the initiative strives to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system in order to foster peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.

learn more

The post Gray in The Wall Street Journal on the Donroe doctrine in Greenland appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 8, Imran Bayoumi, associate director of the GeoStrategy Initiative, was quoted in a CBC News article titled “With Trump’s Venezuela move and Greenland threats, are Canadians vulnerable?” discussing Trump’s renewed focus on the Western hemisphere. He argues that US threats of military action against Greenland are unproductive, urging for bolstered cooperation without threats.

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

Associate Director

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The GeoStrategy Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leverages strategy development and long-range foresight to serve as the preeminent thought-leader and convener for policy-relevant analysis and solutions to understand a complex and unpredictable world. Through its work, the initiative strives to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system in order to foster peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.

learn more

The post Bayoumi quoted in CBC News on Trump’s approach to Greenland appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Following the recent US operation in Venezuela, the Trump administration has revived the idea of the United States taking Greenland, and it has not ruled out using US military force to do so.
• The Danish prime minister has responded by suggesting such a move by the United States could lead to the end of NATO, the most successful alliance in history.
• A collapse of NATO over Greenland would be contrary to US national interests as defined in the Trump administration’s own recently published National Security Strategy.

STOCKHOLM—After a bumpy start with the new Trump administration in 2025, NATO enters 2026 facing what could become the worst crisis of its existence. “We need Greenland from the standpoint of national security,” US President Donald Trump said on Sunday, ignoring the warnings of Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen that the United States should stop threatening the Kingdom of Denmark or it might lead to the end of NATO.

Following the US intervention in Venezuela and the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro on Saturday, the wife of Trump’s close adviser Stephen Miller, Katie Miller, a Republican podcaster, posted on social media a map of Greenland covered by the American flag and accompanied by one word in capital letters: “SOON.” Sparking harsh reactions in Europe, the remarkable post was followed by Stephen Miller himself, who stated that Greenland should be part of the United States and that no one would militarily challenge a US takeover.

For NATO, this means the worst possible start to the year. The possibility that the United States, the leading member of the Alliance, would use its might to annex part of another ally’s territory is almost beyond imagination and a nightmare for NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. As expressed in the first paragraph of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance rests on the principles of the United Nations Charter that international disputes are settled by peaceful means, and that the parties refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the charter.

Denmark is a founding member of the Alliance, and it has been a loyal ally since 1949. In Afghanistan, Denmark fought alongside the United States in the tougher mission areas and suffered the most casualties in relation to its population of all NATO allies, apart from the United States.

There is nothing new about Greenland’s importance to US national security. An autonomous part of the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland has hosted a US military base since the 1950s for exactly that reason. A 1951 treaty between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark allows for increased US presence on Greenland if requested. But that is not what Trump is looking for, as the harsh dialogue between Copenhagen and Washington over the past year has revealed. The Trump administration argues that Greenland is part of the Western Hemisphere, and as such it should belong to the United States, which Greenland clearly opposes. This extraordinary US stance, in flagrant disrespect of international law, has caused the Danish defense intelligence service to flag the United States as a concern to Danish national security.

More broadly, the Trump administration’s stance risks dissolving the transatlantic community and putting an end to the most successful military alliance in history.

Trump has nurtured the idea of US ownership of Greenland for a long time. In his first term, he suggested a US purchase of the island on several occasions. When reelected, Trump renewed his interest, stating that “the United States of America feels that the ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity.” This time, he did not rule out the use of military force to get it. A few months later, when Rutte visited the White House, Trump suggested that NATO could help him get Greenland, a request that Rutte declined.

Trump has defended his stance, saying there are “Chinese and Russian ships everywhere” near Greenland and that Denmark cannot protect it. Former National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has emphasized the need for the United States to access Greenland’s vast natural resources. But since Denmark has signaled that the United States is welcome to increase US troop numbers on Greenland should it so wish, and Greenland has announced that it is open for business if US companies are interested, neither of these arguments make sense.

Perhaps importantly, there is a parallel interest in Greenland stemming from the tech giants with close connections to the Trump administration. As reported by Reuters and The Guardian, a circle of US tech entrepreneurs and venture capital figures is promoting Greenland as a potential site for so-called “freedom cities” and large-scale extraction and infrastructure projects. These ideas are framed through libertarian concepts of minimal corporate regulation and ambitions spanning artificial intelligence, space launches, and micronuclear energy. Several of these actors are among Trump’s largest campaign donors and investors, including investors linked to mining operations in Greenland, fossil fuels, and cryptocurrency ventures. Collectively, this cohort reportedly contributed more than $240 million to his 2024 campaign and potentially stand to benefit from a US takeover of the island.

As the United States starts implementing the “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, first by intervening in Venezuela and then quickly threatening Cuba, Colombia, Mexico, and Greenland, Europe is witnessing its strongest ally voluntarily retreat from global leadership to excel in regional dominance. “This is OUR hemisphere”, the State Department declared in an X posting on Monday to underline the launch of its new strategy, presumably sending a message to Russia and China. However, from a NATO perspective, where does this leave allies such as Canada and Denmark? Are they targets of this message as well?

Copenhagen certainly feels that way. In the past year, Denmark has substantially increased its military support in the Arctic. In January 2025, it committed 14.6 billion kroner ($2.05 billion) to Arctic defense, followed by an additional 27.4 billion kroner ($2.7 billion) later in the year. Denmark has also invested in its relationship with Greenland, including a formal apology for government abuses against Inuit women involving forced birth control in the 1960s and 1970s. On Monday, Greenland’s prime minister, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, downplayed concerns of a military takeover and repeated to the Trump administration that Greenland is not for sale. Nor, he said, are the people of Greenland interested in voluntarily becoming part of the United States.

The Trump administration’s latest escalating rhetoric about seizing Greenland has sparked intense activity in European capitals in support of Greenland and Denmark. Statements clarifying that Greenland belonged to the Greenlanders came quickly from the Nordic and Baltic capitals, and then British Prime Minister Keir Starmer followed suit, before he was joined in a statement on Tuesday by France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Denmark. NATO ally Canada has been explicit in its support as well, and Ottawa is opening a consulate in Greenland to strengthen relations further.

For NATO, Rutte’s ambition to keep the issue off the table in the Alliance is getting increasingly difficult. Rather, he is cautiously joining the diplomatic efforts to prevent a US intervention. On Tuesday, he said that NATO “collectively . . . has to make sure that the Arctic stays safe.” He added, “We all agree that the Russians and Chinese are more and more active in that area.”

Meanwhile NATO officials continue their important work to strengthen the role of the Alliance in Arctic security through increased surveillance, patrolling, exercises, and training. This work embodies the Alliance’s collective efforts to ensure security while addressing the concerns of underinvestment expressed by the Trump administration. Allies should promptly increase these efforts even further.

So far, Denmark has rejected an offer from France to send troops to Greenland as a signal of European solidarity, likely to avoid provoking the United States. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has also signaled a preference for negotiations to US lawmakers, indicating that the military threat is primarily being used to force Denmark to sell Greenland.

Regardless, diplomacy seems like the most reasonable, albeit challenging, option. Those European countries that have been able to establish good communication channels with the Trump administration, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Finland, should side with Denmark and lead efforts to settle the crisis, in a similar manner as Europe was able to support Ukraine in the peace process after Trump’s Alaska summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Rutte, another voice that has good relations with Trump, needs to engage further, as well.

The argument should be that the survival of NATO is at stake if the United States intervenes to seize Greenland, and that such a development would be contrary to US national interests. For example, the Trump administration’s own National Security Strategy (NSS) emphasizes that it is a US interest to maintain strategic stability with Russia. For that, the United States needs its European bases. Proximity matters, as the operation this past summer against Iran’s nuclear facilities clearly illustrated. Furthermore, the NSS outlines how the United States depends on Europe to succeed with its economic agenda elsewhere.

The US Congress recently went further and conditioned a range of measures in its latest defense bill to preserve NATO and US engagement in Europe. Engaging with members of Congress in Washington, DC, and with the delegations soon visiting the World Economic Forum in Davos and the Munich Security Conference is therefore crucial, as well.

Should the darkest hour come and the United States uses military force to annex Greenland, the essence of Article 5 and collective defense within NATO would lose its meaning. As Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Espen Barth Eide recently put it: “The idea of NATO will be broken if the US takes Greenland.” It would be perfectly clear to Russia, China, and other adversaries that credible extended deterrence no longer exists for Europe or Canada, and that the United States has lost its closest and most powerful allies.

The post Trump’s quest for Greenland could be NATO’s darkest hour appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 7, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation on recent developments in US foreign policy. He explains that Trump’s threats of military action in Greenland are a negotiating tactic, defends the decision to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, and argues that the administration will shift its focus to Cuba and its collaboration with the People’s Republic of China next.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig interviewed on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation on Trump’s foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 6, Alexander B. Gray, a GeoStrategy Initiative nonresident senior fellow, was interviewed on RealClearPolitics podcast about the futures of Venezuela and Greenland. He explains that, due to historical precedent and divisions within opposition groups, Venezuela will likely require a transitional government before elections take place. He also argues that as the Arctic emerges as a key strategic region, closer collaboration with Greenland is essential to US security interests.

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The GeoStrategy Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leverages strategy development and long-range foresight to serve as the preeminent thought-leader and convener for policy-relevant analysis and solutions to understand a complex and unpredictable world. Through its work, the initiative strives to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system in order to foster peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.

learn more

The post Gray interviewed on RealClearPolitics podcast on Venezuela and Greenland appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Executive summary
• Introduction
• A comprehensive approach to defense and resilience
• Key pillars of Latvian resilience
• Challenges and future imperatives for resilience
• Annex 1: Management structure
• Annex 2: Framework of concepts, plans, laws, and regulations

Executive summary

Latvia has significantly evolved its defense and security policy, focusing on national resilience as a cornerstone of its statehood, as analyzed in LVARes: The Evolution of Latvia’s Defense and Security Policy in Resilience Building, a project of the Centre for East European Policy Studies and the Atlantic Council. This transformation is anchored in Latvia’s Comprehensive National Defense (CND) framework, a whole-of-society strategy that integrates civilian, military, and private-sector efforts to deter aggression and manage crises. Key to this approach are legal underpinnings from evolving state defense concepts and amendments to foundational laws like the National Security Law.

Pillars of this resilience include ensuring the continuity of essential services and critical infrastructure, with a shift from mere asset protection to guaranteeing operational functionality through public-private partnerships and an enhanced role for municipalities. Regular exercises like Namejs and Pilskalns test these preparations.

To counter hybrid threats, Latvia formally recognizes the information space as a defense domain, implementing multilayered strategies that combine government-led strategic communications, support for independent media, civil-society engagement against disinformation, and international cooperation, notably through hosting the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence. Societal resilience is further boosted by public-preparedness campaigns like “72 Hours: What to do in case of a crisis,” media literacy programs, and integrating national defense education, including psychological defense and nonviolent civil resistance, into curricula.

Significant reforms are modernizing Latvia’s crisis management, with the planned National Crisis Management Center (CMC) under the prime minister, centralizing coordination and decision-making. Civil-protection measures are strengthening as well, with new legislation for public shelters and updates to the State Civil Protection Plan.

International cooperation is indispensable, with NATO providing collective defense, the EU offering funding and policy coordination, and robust bilateral ties with the United States and regional cooperation with Baltic and Nordic partners. The LVARes project itself exemplifies Latvia’s proactive international engagement in studying national capabilities, raising awareness, and sharing best practices.

Challenges persist, including resource constraints, interagency coordination complexities, evolving threats, and the need to bolster societal cohesion. Future imperatives involve fully operationalizing the CMC, implementing the shelter program, sustained investment in capabilities, and deeper public engagement in CND. Strategic recommendations for policymakers emphasize CMC effectiveness, civil-protection investments, public-private partnerships, psychological resilience, volunteer engagement, and integrating nonviolent resistance. For international partners, continued support for Latvian capability development, amplifying LVARes findings, facilitating resilience benchmarking, and supporting cross-border exercises are crucial. Through these efforts, Latvia fortifies its security and contributes valuable lessons to the Euro-Atlantic community.

Introduction

The contemporary security environment is characterized by an array of complex and interconnected threats. These range from the potential for conventional military aggression to the more pervasive and persistent challenges of hybrid warfare, sophisticated information operations, and malicious cyber activities. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy and its full-scale war against Ukraine have significantly amplified these threats, underscoring the vulnerability of states in the region and the urgent need for robust national preparedness. Latvia’s position as a frontline state of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), sharing a direct border with the Russian Federation, has inherently shaped its national security posture and necessitated a continuous adaptation of its defense strategies, pushing for an essential shift in Latvia’s defense thinking.

The traditional focus on military defense, while still fundamental, is increasingly understood as insufficient on its own. Consequently, Latvia has progressively embraced a broader concept of national resilience encompassing not only military strength but also the resilience of its society, the continuity of government and essential services during crises, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the cultivation of psychological defense among its populace. This evolution reflects a growing understanding that national security in the twenty-first century is a whole-of-society endeavor.

Latvia’s pursuit of national resilience is not confined to a single strategy but is realized through a multifaceted approach that addresses various dimensions of security. These include ensuring the operational continuity of essential services and the resilience of critical infrastructure, actively countering hybrid threats in the information and cyber domains, fostering broad societal resilience through public preparedness and education, and acknowledging the potential role of nonviolent civil resistance. The aim of this report is to systematically analyze the evolution in Latvia’s defense and security policy, particularly its implementation of a comprehensive national defense framework, and to share the insights and lessons learned with allies, partners, and the broader public to enhance collective security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

A comprehensive approach to defense and resilience

Latvia’s approach to national defense has undergone a significant evolution, moving from a primary focus on conventional military capabilities and professional military service orientation toward a more encompassing strategy known as Comprehensive National Defense (CND). Adopted in 2018, the CND system is designed to ensure security and crisis preparedness across all sectors of the state and society, thereby enhancing Latvia’s overall deterrence posture and its resilience against armed conflicts or a wide spectrum of potential crises. The overarching aims of CND are the following:

• Preparing the Latvian population to actively participate in the defense of their country. 
• Facilitating efficient and effective crisis management at the national level. 
• Ensuring the continuity and support of critical state functions, including government operations, energy supply, healthcare, and logistics, even under duress. 

A fundamental and defining characteristic of Latvia’s CND is its “whole-of-society” approach, which recognizes that national defense and resilience are not the sole responsibility of the armed forces or government ministries but require the active involvement and cooperation of every element of society. This comprehensive vision entails the systematic integration of municipalities, the owners and managers of both public and private critical infrastructure (spanning sectors such as energy, communications, finance, and healthcare), nongovernmental organizations, the broader business community, and individual citizens into national defense planning and preparedness efforts. 

A significant emphasis within this approach is placed on building and nurturing mutual trust and robust partnerships between public authorities at all levels and private-sector entities. These collaborative efforts are seen as essential for creating a networked civil and military defense system where each component is prepared and able to work in sync. The success of the CND model hinges on the ability to overcome traditional challenges and foster a shared sense of responsibility for national security.

The whole-of-society approach is further strengthened through the way the CND is managed and its legal basis, both of which are designed as a multitiered framework to ensure a whole-of-government and -societal approach to national resilience. The management structure (detailed in Annex 1) integrates political leadership, ministerial responsibilities, operational agencies, local governments, and societal actors to prepare for and respond effectively to a diverse spectrum of threats, ranging from military aggression to civil emergencies. Whereas the framework of strategic concepts, national plans, legal acts, and supporting regulations (a detailed list provided in Annex 2) ensure that CND is not merely a theoretical construct but a systematically planned and implemented national effort. Strategic concepts like the National Security Concept and the State Defense Concept, both approved by the parliament, articulate Latvia’s high-level strategic assessments, goals, and priorities in response to the evolving security environment, providing the overarching vision and direction for the development of the CND.

This approach also aligns with the direction set by NATO at its 2016 Warsaw Summit, where the Alliance adopted seven baseline requirements for national resilience. For the first time, NATO established clear conditions that member states’ civilian institutions must meet to support Article 4 and 5 military operations. These requirements include: continuity of government and critical services; resilient energy, food, and water supplies; the ability to manage uncontrolled population movements; resilient civil communication and transportation systems; and the capacity to handle mass casualties. In this regard, Latvia’s CND system goes beyond these NATO requirements by also incorporating societal resilience and the involvement of the private sector in defense operations and other aspects.

Alongside NATO’s framework, relevant EU-level initiatives provide significant complementary support for resilience. These include the EU’s crisis-management framework, particularly its Civil Protection Mechanism, and the Military Mobility initiative, which supports development of civilian infrastructure to facilitate the rapid movement of military forces across Europe. These efforts directly reinforce both NATO and national resilience objectives, providing practical tools and funding to enhance collective defense.

Beyond multilateral alliances, Latvia cultivates strong bilateral partnerships and engages actively in regional cooperation formats to enhance its security and resilience. The 2020 State Defense Concept emphasizes the strong military cooperation between Latvia and the United States, highlighting the long-standing and highly valued partnership between the Latvian National Armed Forces and the Michigan National Guard. The United States is widely regarded as a major strategic partner for Latvia’s security and independence.

The three Baltic states also work closely together to develop their collective security and defense capabilities. This cooperation includes joint efforts to strengthen their external borders, deepen collaboration in civil protection and crisis management, combat disinformation through shared intelligence and strategies, and enhance overall societal resilience. Joint military exercises are also a regular feature of this trilateral cooperation.

Nordic-Baltic cooperation provides another layer of security collaboration. Latvia’s comprehensive defense approach shares many similarities with the strategies adopted by Nordic countries, facilitating mutual learning and coordinated efforts. The Nordic and Baltic countries have also demonstrated solidarity through joint statements and coordinated actions, for example, in reaffirming their support for Ukraine.

Latvia’s multifaceted international engagement—spanning NATO, the EU, key bilateral relationships such as with the United States, and intensive regional cooperation—is not merely about receiving security assistance or aligning with external frameworks. It increasingly reflects a strategy of proactive contribution. As a frontline state that has rapidly developed its resilience concepts and capabilities in response to direct and evolving threats, Latvia is well-positioned to share valuable expertise and lessons learned.

Key pillars of Latvian resilience

Since the adoption of CND, Latvia has pursued a comprehensive approach to defense based on an understanding that every element of the government and population plays a part in creating a networked civil and military defense system—and recent lessons from Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression have further reinforced this understanding. This approach grew out of necessity: Latvia, a small country with limited strategic depth, neighbors Russia, a large, aggressive military power that has attacked countries in its so-called near abroad. Latvia’s approach, like those of its fellow Nordic-Baltic countries, is built on a straightforward idea that the country’s civil and military defense systems can achieve a greater deterrence and defense impact if they collaborate and if each part is prepared. Meanwhile, Latvia’s pursuit of national resilience is not confined to a single strategy but is realized through a multifaceted approach that addresses various dimensions of security. 

While the CND concept encompasses eight dimensions, ranging from military development to psychological resilience, our report examines it through four perspectives: military, civil, societal, and governmental resilience. This approach allows for a cohesive, strategic evaluation of the dimensions of readiness without sacrificing the scope of the original concept.

Military resilience

Latvia’s military resilience is a central aspect of its national defense, resting on the fundamental pillars of domestic responsibility for developing its own capabilities and a robust collective defense provided by its allies.

Lessons learned from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine since 2014 have driven initiatives to ensure that Latvian institutions and society can respond effectively to any unconventional or hybrid threat scenarios. Changes to the National Security Law have empowered the National Armed Forces (NAF), from the lowest level up, with the authority to respond to any military threat, conventional or unconventional, even without immediate orders from the political leadership. The law explicitly states that armed resistance may not be prohibited in times of war or occupation and affirms that every citizen has the right to take up arms to resist an aggressor. This legal framework solidifies the principle of total defense, ensuring that the entire nation is prepared and authorized to contribute to the defense of the country.

To maintain this posture, Latvia has steadily increased its defense budget. By 2018, Latvia had met the NATO defense spending goal of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), which has significantly contributed to the development of military capabilities, including within the National Guard. Military resolve is evident in the budget’s rapid growth, which is projected to reach approximately 3.65 percent of GDP in 2025, with announcements indicating a further increase to 5 percent by 2026. This funding is crucial for keeping military modernization on track through the strategic procurement of advanced weapon systems. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Latvia has significantly increased investment in conventional war-fighting capabilities to enhance its deterrence posture. The commitment to acquiring advanced systems—such as High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers, IRIS-T air defense systems, and coastal defense missiles—sends a vital message that the country is serious about bolstering its defense. National resilience also necessitates forging a cohesive fighting force from diverse sources of manpower. Latvia is proactively addressing manpower challenges, most notably through the reintroduction of mandatory conscription in the form of the State Defense Service (SDS). Introduced in 2023, the SDS aims to increase recruitment and build a larger, well-trained reserve force. This policy of eleven-month mandatory service has shown early signs of success. Latvia plans to enlist four thousand new recruits annually by 2028 and, notably, 40 percent of the 2024 intake opted for professional careers after their mandatory service. Current military plans envision 31,000 troops by 2029, complemented by an equally large reserve contingent thereafter. However, this rapid expansion presents significant challenges. The primary obstacles include a lack of sufficient modern training infrastructure to accommodate the larger number of recruits, a shortage of qualified instructors to lead the training, and the immense organizational task of building a functional reserve system that can effectively manage and retrain thousands of new reservists annually after their active service ends. Successfully overcoming these hurdles is critical to ensuring the SDS translates into a genuine increase in combat-ready forces.

Advanced capabilities and increased manpower are only effective if they are maintained at a high state of readiness. This is achieved through a rigorous schedule of military exercises designed to test plans and ensure interoperability. The flagship event is the annual Comprehensive Defense Exercise “Namejs,” which tests the armed forces in joint operations at every level.

These exercises are crucial for more than just military units, serving as the primary mechanism for implementing the whole-of-society defense concept in practice. During Namejs, the NAF systematically drills its cooperation with the civilian sector. This includes collaborating with municipalities and state-owned companies to support military mobility and countermobility efforts, and working with private-sector entrepreneurs on resource mobilization. Similarly, through this whole-of-society approach, Latvia has demonstrated both ingenuity and cooperation. It is exemplified by efforts to formalize the roles of civilian groups in national defense, such as the involvement of hunters in the national defense system—a patriotic and armed segment of society that can be integrated with the National Guard and tasked with support assignments. As comprehensive defense evolves into a societal reality, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia.

Civil resilience

Civil resilience in Latvia focuses on the comprehensive preparedness of its civilian structures and population, encompassing robust civil-defense planning across all government levels, from national ministries to local municipalities. This emphasis recognizes the critical role of municipalities in fostering a society-wide culture of preparedness and resilience.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine beginning in 2014 and 2022 deeply reverberated across Latvian society, creating significant momentum for action. The latter created public demand that pushed local governments beyond mere declaratory contingency plans to proactively explain preparedness strategies to their constituents. Latvia has adopted the necessary legislative basis that mandates that Latvian municipalities ensure the continuity of essential services during crises or war, therefore actively participating in developing a society-wide culture of preparedness and resilience.

Another key aspect of civil resilience involves ensuring the continuity of essential services and protecting critical infrastructure. Latvia has strategically shifted its crisis-management thinking from solely focusing on infrastructure protection to prioritizing the uninterrupted delivery of essential services and functions. While this shift presents additional planning challenges, it stems from the understanding that critical infrastructure cannot operate in isolation from broader national defense factors; it is rendered ineffective without skilled personnel, operational processes, and supporting services vital for its functioning. Businesses are consequently required to develop robust continuity plans.

The ability to ensure the flow of money for goods and services constitutes another critical service. Societal upheavals, crises, and wars often disrupt peacetime payment systems, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s experience. To address this, the Bank of Latvia (which is analogous to the US Federal Reserve) is developing crisis payment solutions, both cash and noncash, for a society with a high adoption rate for noncash transactions. For example, the Bank of Latvia is collaborating with major commercial banks to develop approved offline solutions, ensuring individuals can use their bank cards for basic necessities even if bank communications are down. Similarly, during a crisis or war, banks are required to maintain a predefined network of ATMs, with at least one ATM per municipal center, and have developed a map of critical ATMs that would operate in case of crisis.

Latvia also has proactively sought to improve the integrity of its communications systems. This involves ensuring that critical data—including sensitive healthcare, defense, security, and economic data—remains within Latvian territory and that critical information technology systems continue to function without interruption even if the connection to the global internet is disrupted. To achieve this, the government now mandates that national and municipal institutions, companies, and owners/managers of critical IT infrastructure prioritize using a single national internet exchange point, GLV-IX, a statewide and state-operated local internet ecosystem, for their data flows if the outer perimeter of electronic communications is compromised.

Finally, Latvia has actively addressed two common challenges in building preparedness: improving the communication of preparedness requirements and funding resilience efforts. Many national governments struggle with effectively communicating military crisis and war preparedness expectations to municipalities and private industries. While both disseminating information and issuing legislation are important, these efforts must be augmented by activities that encourage thoughtful planning, accurate understanding of requirements, and knowledge development. Indeed, Latvian municipalities have sometimes voiced concerns about insufficient resources for civil preparedness, arguing it should be a national responsibility. Similarly, even large, well-funded hospitals struggle to meet the three-month supply requirement for medicine and supplies, while smaller hospitals lack adequate funding altogether.

Latvia has sought to address these questions through legislative changes, clarifying responsibilities and tasks, and mandating regular exercises. Over time, continuous cooperation and the mandatory requirement of yearly exercises are expected to foster a better understanding of the overall defense system, individual roles within it, and mutual expectations among all parties involved. Regular exercise schedules significantly benefit Latvia’s preparedness across sectors by stress testing developed plans, building knowledge, and informing participants about potential organizational challenges during a military crisis or war. For example, the yearly state-wide comprehensive defense exercises Namejs involve municipalities, allied forces, and local companies playing out different scenarios alongside the National Armed Forces. On a local level, Pilskalns exercises, in use since 2020, test municipalities’ planning and practical response capabilities under wartime scenarios, involving national and local institutions, the NAF, and local companies. These exercises are crucial for stress testing plans, identifying gaps, and building practical experience among all involved parties. Ultimately, however, private enterprises are expected to fund their own preparedness planning and implementation activities.

Societal resilience

Societal resilience in Latvia is built on the principle that national security is a shared responsibility that extends to every citizen, empowering individuals with the practical knowledge and tools needed to withstand a crisis. The government has fostered a “culture of readiness” through regular information campaigns and hands-on materials that include tips to spot false information.

The most visible example of this is Latvia’s “72-hour preparedness guide,” a practical tool aimed at bolstering individual and, by extension, societal resilience. This campaign advises citizens on how to be self-sufficient for the first seventy-two hours of a crisis, a critical period before state emergency services may be able to provide widespread assistance. The booklet provides practical guidance on reliable information sources, identifying and countering disinformation, essential supplies to stock like water and food, preparing an emergency kit, and developing a family crisis action plan. This proactive approach is rooted in both general emergency-management principles and Latvia’s specific geopolitical and historical context. It not only promotes self-sufficiency that reduces the immediate burden on state resources, but also empowers citizens with concrete actions they can take, which reduces feelings of helplessness and fosters a sense of control and readiness. Public preparedness campaigns like this booklet encourage citizens to volunteer and self-organize, which are foundational elements for any form of collective resistance. The State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD) plays a vital role in this public preparedness effort by actively informing the population on safety measures. To significantly enhance these capabilities, Latvia fully implemented a national cell broadcast system in early 2025. This modern alert system allows the VUGD to instantly send critical warnings directly to all mobile phones within a specific geographic area during an emergency, functioning without requiring users to install an application. This technology provides an immediate and widespread communication layer, complementing existing tools like sirens and the “112 Latvija” mobile application, which is also promoted by the VUGD as a key resource for emergency information.

These practical and educational efforts are underpinned by a broader national defense strategy that formally acknowledges psychological defense and nonviolent civil resistance as crucial components of CND. A noteworthy aspect of Latvia’s posture is the formal integration of nonviolent civil

resistance, where the 2020 State Defense Concept explicitly includes “nonviolent civil resistance against occupation forces” as a component of the societal dimension of “total defense.” This signifies a preparedness to resist aggression through a wide spectrum of means, not limited to armed conflict. This is, in large part, a direct response to Russia’s information manipulation and its treatment of the information space as a critical front. Securing an open media space and bolstering psychological resilience against manipulation is now a paramount security goal, involving the cultivation of critical thinking skills to withstand attempts to sow discord.  

To defend this front, Latvia employs a multilayered approach. The state has bolstered strategic communication resources, with a dedicated unit under the State Chancellery that coordinates messaging and works to disarm foreign malign information activities. Quality journalism is supported by funding and policy, and authorities have banned most of the Russian propaganda channels. In 2021, Latvia became the first Baltic state to prosecute individuals for willfully spreading dangerous falsehoods as per the criminal law, though there have been few convictions due to legal ambiguity in Article 231 around the definition of “fake news.” This state-led approach is complemented by a vibrant ecosystem of nongovernmental organizations, academics, and volunteers—such as the “Baltic elves”—who actively debunk falsehoods. Investigative journalists, fact-checkers, and initiatives like the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence also work to expose disinformation and promote high standards in journalism.

At the community level, these principles are put into practice through societal and municipality-led initiatives. Continuing work started in the previous year, the Riga municipality has organized a cycle of seven practical civil-defense seminars across various city neighborhoods. During the workshops, residents learn about specific risks in their area, such as nearby high-risk objects and evacuation routes, as identified by the Riga city municipality. They also receive practical training on how to: adapt a basement into a safe shelter; properly assemble a seventy-two-hour emergency bag; and build mental resilience with psychological self-help techniques.

To address the wider Russian threat to Western society, Latvia is sharing what it is learning with its allies and partners. It hosts NATO’s Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, and it works with allies and partners to combat malign influence. Examples of this kind of cooperation are IREX (International Research and Exchanges Board), which conducts media training in the Baltic area, and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, which investigates disinformation and debunks narratives, educates media consumers, and has had staff based in Latvia since 2017.

Governmental resilience

Governmental resilience is the central pillar that ensures the state can continue to lead and function during a crisis, providing the necessary command, control, and coordination within the CND system. This is achieved through a robust legal framework, a clear institutional hierarchy, contingency and crisis-response planning, and a commitment to testing these plans through regular exercises to guarantee the continuity of government.

The crisis-management system of Latvia is multilayered. The State Civil Protection Plan clearly outlines the responsibilities and leading roles of all state institutions in case of state-level contingencies. The system is designed to be flexible; for example, the Ministry of Health has the leading role and responsibility for management of pandemics, as was the case with COVID-19, with all institutions (including the armed forces) supporting these efforts. Meanwhile, in the case of a military threat or war, civilian institutions have the role of supporting the armed forces and ensuring continuity of governance and essential services. At the practical level, the system envisions the establishment of the Civil Protection Operational Management Centre (abbreviated in Latvian as CAOVC), that is formed in case of state-level contingencies, including war. It would be led by the Ministry of the Interior and composed of delegated experts from across the government, tasking it with coordinating interinstitutional response, compiling a comprehensive situational picture, and providing support to the NAF.

This role is to be complemented by municipal-level responsibility through the establishment of municipal civil-protection commissions that are obliged to plan and execute response activities on a regional level, as well as coordinate with state-level efforts.

The “Kristaps” series involves the Cabinet of Ministers in simulating strategic decision-making, as well as NATO Crisis Management Exercises (CMX), while the operational comprehensive defense exercise Namejs includes tests of civil-military cooperation, the practical implementation of civil defense plans, and the coordination functions of the planned CAOVC.

Latvia’s current push to improve its crisis-management system and governmental resilience is a direct response to lessons learned from a series of major crises. The COVID-19 pandemic served as a stark, real-world test of cross-sectoral crisis management, exposing significant shortcomings in interministerial coordination, public communication, and the ability to manage state material reserves effectively. The 2021 hybrid attack and instrumentalization of migration organized by Belarus on the EU’s eastern border tested the state’s ability to coordinate a response between interior, defense, and foreign policy bodies under “gray zone” threat conditions that are, as another Atlantic Council report put it, diffuse and hard to attribute. Most significantly, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022 has provided an invaluable, albeit grim, case study in the requirements of modern national defense. It underscored the absolute necessity of a resilient government able to overcome the massive scale of civil-defense challenges and pervasive hybrid threats. These events collectively created a clear need for reevaluation and reform of the crisis-management system in Latvia, highlighting systemic challenges in achieving effective horizontal coordination across ministries.

To resolve these issues, Latvia is establishing a new centralized National Crisis Management Center (CMC). The concept for the CMC, approved by the government in early 2025, represents the keystone of the nation’s reformed resilience architecture. Its creation is a direct answer to the lessons learned from past crises, designed to provide the professional, permanent, and agile coordination that was previously lacking. Operating under the direct authority of the prime minister, the CMC is designed to provide a single, empowered hub for analysis, planning, and, crucially, to improve coordination in crisis management between key state institutions, especially in complex threat scenarios, and provide support to decision-makers and political leadership.

The core functions of the CMC will include: continuous monitoring of the situation and information gathering; identifying potential risks and threats; conducting analysis of information and data to assess these risks and threats; strategic planning and coordination of operational planning; coordinating the planning, logistics, and recovery of state-level civilian crisis-management resources, including state material reserves; and coordinating crisis-communication efforts. Meanwhile, in the specific context of a military crisis, the CMC will be responsible for coordinating the civilian sector’s response and ensuring seamless cooperation with the military sector.

In essence, this new structure, continuously validated through planning and exercises, aims to ensure the leadership and effective whole-of-government coordination deemed essential for navigating these complex security challenges.

Challenges and future imperatives for resilience

Latvia has been systematically working to integrate all societal elements into its national defense posture, particularly since 2014. This ongoing effort, while showing significant progress, presents a range of challenges and necessitates clear future developments to ensure sustained and enhanced security in a complex geopolitical landscape.

Latvia’s commendable strides in building a comprehensive national resilience model are met with several persistent and evolving challenges; therefore, for the continued evolution and strengthening of Latvian resilience it is crucial to address them in a timely manner:

1. Building and maintaining robust military defense capabilities. Maintaining momentum in military modernization programs and ensuring the capacity to sustain combat operations beyond an initial phase are crucial for credible deterrence and defense. This includes addressing the timeline for military buildup in relation to potential Russian force reconstitution. While Latvia’s defense spending is projected to reach 3.45 percent of GDP in 2025, with ambitions for 5 percent by 2026, efficient allocation across diverse needs—from military modernization to civil protection and societal programs—remains a complex undertaking. This financial strain also impacts critical infrastructure operators and municipalities tasked with new preparedness responsibilities. Therefore, continued investment in critical military capabilities, including air defense, coastal defense systems (like Naval Strike Missile systems), and long-range precision fires (HIMARS) should be pursued.
2. Expanding the National Armed Forces. Planned expansions of the NAF and the full implementation of the State Defense Service face manpower constraints, requiring substantial investment in training infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative recruitment policies. The current reserve system also requires significant overhaul. Latvia should continue the expansion of the NAF, overhaul the reserve system to effectively integrate SDS graduates, and implement both dedicated reservist training and early military education. Ensuring adequate infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative policies for recruitment and training is crucial.
3. Developing targeted strategies for critical areas. The development of industry-specific expertise for business and service continuity, particularly for critical infrastructure, can be a bottleneck. Cultivation of a deeper culture of shared responsibility with the private sector through targeted incentives, joint training programs, and secure information-sharing platforms should be continued. Additionally, mechanisms for improving intermunicipal coordination and resource sharing can alleviate the burden or strain associated with this issue. Latvia should also move beyond awareness campaigns to foster active participation, skill building, and a sense of ownership among the citizenry. Relatively low levels of public trust in certain state institutions can potentially hinder the full engagement of society in defense and resilience efforts. Actively integrating civilian agencies, businesses, and citizens into national resilience and defense planning through practical taskings and drills could help resolve this challenge. A primary challenge is also extending the intensity of preparedness from military threat scenarios to encompass nonmilitary crises across all civilian institutions. Intermunicipal coordination, particularly in resource sharing, needs strengthening. Consistent funding for new municipal responsibilities in civil defense is also a point of discussion, which the municipalities have on previous occasions cited as one of the reasons for their inability to build up civil defense capacities.
4. Interagency coordination and centralized leadership. Ensuring seamless collaboration and clear, consistent communication of preparedness requirements across all sectors and among numerous actors remains a continuous task. Latvia faces persistent interagency coordination complexities. While the spirit of comprehensive national defense promotes collaboration, the practicalities of aligning different ministries, agencies, and even different levels of government can be challenging. Each entity has its own priorities, budgets, and institutional cultures. The MoD, while a key actor, cannot guarantee or ensure the engagement and resource commitments of other ministries. Effective comprehensive national defense requires a process led by a centralized authority with the power to direct and synchronize efforts across government—ideally the prime minister’s office or a dedicated high-level body. This is especially true for distributing tasks effectively among ministries and bodies of equivalent hierarchical power. Therefore, the establishment of the new Crisis Management Center is a promising development that could further leadership in the implementation of comprehensive national defense and serve as a central actor for confronting crisis situations. However, its mandate, authority, and resourcing will be critical. It must be empowered to not just coordinate but also to direct and enforce; it also must avoid becoming yet another silo and instead act as a true hub for national crisis response and comprehensive national defense implementation. The assurance that the CMC is rapidly and effectively staffed, resourced, and empowered to coordinate across all government levels, municipalities, and the private sector is paramount. The CMC should also be tasked with leading institutionalized, regular, complex cross-sectoral crisis-management exercises. Engaging all nongovernmental organizations and local media more consistently in preparedness exercises and overcoming local political inertia are both ongoing efforts. Effective Comprehensive National Defense coordination across ministries, especially in horizontal tasking, presents difficulties. 
5. Countering evolving threats in the information landscape. Democratic countries like Latvia must counter influence within political, ethical, moral, and legal constraints, while adversaries often operate without such limits, giving them an advantage in proactive narrative projection. Latvia must continuously adapt its resilience strategies to counter new and evolving hybrid threats, sophisticated disinformation techniques, and novel cyberattack methods. Sustaining and enhancing programs to equip the population to withstand long-term information influence operations and maintain morale during crises is crucial. Further exploration and integration of nonviolent resistance concepts into national defense training and public guidance could promote the adaptability of resilience in this area. Latvia’s main approach to countering malign activities in the information space has been blocking narratives rather than proactively projecting its own strategic messages. A shift in policy is also needed from primarily blocking disinformation to more proactive narrative projection by developing and disseminating national strategic narratives that reinforce democratic values and societal cohesion. Expanding media literacy and critical thinking education is still an option; so, too, is allocating more support to independent and local media. Collaboration with allies on resilience benchmarking particularly for critical services, countering hybrid threats, and protecting critical infrastructure could bring about collective benefits in resilience building. 
6. Reviewing the conceptual framework of national defense. Latvia has made impressive progress in defining and implementing the CND concept. However, we believe that the evolution of its conceptual framework must continue to better adhere to the complexities of real-life challenges and diverse crisis situations. As time passes, a review of the initially laid out core principles is needed. A primary concern is preventing comprehensive national defense from becoming a catch-all concept. While its all-encompassing nature is a strength there is risk that its boundaries are too wide and therefore its core purpose can become diluted, leading to a diffusion of effort and resources. For instance, if every societal issue is framed as a comprehensive national defense matter, prioritization becomes difficult and the focus on core security and defense preparedness could be lost. Future work should aim to refine the operational scope of the comprehensive national defense, ensuring it remains a focused and effective framework while clearly delineating its relationship with broader societal well-being initiatives. We need to clearly define what falls within comprehensive national defense and what is supportive but distinct to maintain its strategic integrity. 
7. Deepening societal engagement and cohesion. Latvia should continue its efforts to make its comprehensive defense concept a nationwide reality not just a government policy on paper. As comprehensive defense evolves into a social reality, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia. Although we have seen great examples of civil engagement from businesses in actively pursuing their role in the defense system, challenges remain with broad-based individual and community-level engagement. Latvia, for various historical and societal reasons, doesn’t always exhibit the strong deeply embedded community culture seen in some other nations. This can make reaching individuals and fostering grassroots resilience initiatives more challenging. Simply put, many individuals may not yet fully internalize their role or feel connected to a local preparedness network. Achieving genuine societal cohesion and developing the resilience of individuals within their respective communities must become a more pronounced strategic goal. This requires more than just information campaigns. It means investing in local leadership development, supporting community-based organizations, designing exercises that actively involve ordinary citizens in practical ways, and perhaps leveraging existing structures like schools, cultural centers, or even hobby groups to build networks of mutual support and preparedness. The aim should be to empower individuals and communities to self-mobilize for constructive action in crisis rather than relying solely on top-down directives.
8. Continued advocacy for enhanced support from NATO, the EU, the United States, and regional allies for Latvia’s capability development, military modernization, joint exercises, and resilience projects is crucial, as is maximizing the prepositioning of allied military equipment and stocks. The current strategic window, while Russian forces are degraded by the war in Ukraine, should be used to rapidly build up defense capacity and societal resilience, secure continued US commitment, generate a greater NATO forward presence, deepen regional integration, and refine reinforcement mechanisms. Other regional resilience priorities include transitioning the Baltic defense line from a concept to a concrete reality with fortified positions, leveraging natural terrain, and ensuring forces train to fight effectively from these prepared positions.

Editors: Armands Astukevičs, Elīna Vrobļevska.

Contributors: Mārcis Balodis, Hans Binnendijk, Marta Kepe, Beniamino Irdi.

Annex 1: Management structure

A. Strategy and policy level

President of Latvia and National Security Council (NSC): The president, as NAF supreme commander, chairs the NSC. The NSC, comprising top state officials and security heads, advises and coordinates on national security and defense, and offers recommendations to the Saeima (see below) and Cabinet.

Saeima (Parliament): Enacts national security, defense, and civil-protection laws; approves key strategic concepts (National Security Concept, State Defense Concept); and provides parliamentary oversight.

Key committees:

• National Security Committee: Prepares national security policy documents for Saeima approval.
  • Defense, Internal Affairs and Corruption Prevention Committee: Oversees relevant ministries, legislation, and budgets.
  • Comprehensive National Defense Subcommittee: Monitors government implementation of Comprehensive National Defense (CND) elements within the National Security and State Defense Concepts.
  • Other committees: May address specific CND implementation aspects as needed.

Cabinet of Ministers (CoM): The highest executive body, implementing national CND policy, approving strategic plans and regulations, allocating resources, and directing ministries.

Key bodies:

• Crisis Management Centre (CMC): Concept approval in early 2025; planned to be fully operational when legislation has been passed. Envisioned as the central, national crisis-management coordinator (monitoring, analysis, strategic planning. Its potential role in leading overall CND coordination is under active discussion.
  • Ministerial-Level Working Group for CND: Chaired by prime minister or lead minister. Ensures political alignment and high-level interministerial CND strategy coordination.

B. Planning and coordination level

State Secretary-Level Working Group for Comprehensive Defense (CND): Chaired by MoD state secretary. Coordinates CND plan development, harmonization, and monitoring across ministries at the senior-civil-servant level, translating Cabinet decisions into actionable plans.

Ministry of Defense (MoD): Lead institution for the State Defense Concept/Plan and CND concept development; responsible for military defense, NAF development, and civil-military cooperation planning.

Ministry of Interior (MoI): Lead institution for public order, internal security, and the State Civil Protection Plan; oversees the State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD), State Police, and Border Guard; coordinates the Civil Defense Operational Management Centre.

Line ministries (e.g., health, transport, economy): Develop and implement sector-specific resilience plans and CND measures, ensuring continuity of essential services and participating in relevant working groups and exercises.

Bank of Latvia: Ensures financial-sector resilience, including payment systems and cash circulation, in cooperation with commercial banks.

C. Implementation and operations (state level):  

National Armed Forces Headquarters (NAF HQ): The NAF’s highest military headquarters and main operational command and control entity under the chief of defense; manages NAF operations, plans/executes joint operations (peacetime, crisis, war), and coordinates with civil authorities such as the Operational Control Centre of Civil Protection.

Operational Control Centre of Civil Protection: A state-level coordination body for major crises or military threats; integrates multiagency expert groups and works closely with NAF HQ to coordinate civil-military efforts.

State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD): Primary state agency for firefighting, rescue operations, and practical civil-protection measures; implements elements of the State Civil Protection Plan.

Other key state agencies and services (e.g., Emergency Medical Service, State Police, Border Guard): Implement crisis response and resilience measures according to their mandates and plans, participating in exercises and interagency coordination.

Municipal and private-sector actors:

Civil Defense Commissions (thirty-seven at municipal level): Develop and implement local civil defense plans; coordinate local resources and crisis response (including public notification, evacuation, basic services, shelters); cooperate with regional NAF units and state services.

Private sector/critical infrastructure operators: Develop and implement business continuity plans for essential service resilience; cooperate with state and municipal authorities; may be involved in resource mobilization.  

Annex 2: Framework of concepts, plans, laws, and regulations

Armands Astukevičs is a researcher at the Center for East European Policy Studies in Riga, Latvia. Currently, he is working on his doctoral dissertation on authoritarian regime resilience. He has a master’s degree in political science from University of Latvia. Astukevičs’ previous work experience includes policy analysis and planning in the Latvian Ministry of Defense, where he focused on crisis management and comprehensive national defense issues. His current research interests relate to topics on the defense and security policy of the Baltic states, national resilience and resistance to hybrid threats, and analysis of Russia’s foreign policy processes.

Elīna Vrobļevska is a researcher and deputy director at the Center for East European Policy Studies in Riga, Latvia. She has a doctoral degree in international relations from Rīga Stradiņš University, with her thesis on “Russia’s foreign policy identity ideas and their manifestation in foreign policy (2012–2022).” Vroblevska serves as a lecturer and researcher at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Rīga Stradiņš University. Her research interests include the analysis of Russia’s foreign policy narratives and their impact on political processes, the study of Russia’s foreign policy and the security challenges it poses, as well as the examination of Russia’s activities in the information space.

Mārcis Balodis is a researcher and a member of the board of the Center for East European Policy Studies. His primary research focuses on Russia’s foreing and security policy as well as Russia’s use of hybrid warfare.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Marta Kepe is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a senior defense analyst at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization.

Beniamino Irdi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also the head of strategic and international affairs at Deloitte Legal Italy and founder and CEO of HighGround, a political risk consulting firm.

New Atlanticist May 14, 2025

Inside Latvia’s race against time to build deterrence against Russia

By Armands Astukevičs and Hans Binnendijk

Latvia must convince its NATO allies to commit the necessary resources for its defense before Russia reconstitutes its forces.

Conflict Defense Industry

New Atlanticist May 7, 2025

Lessons from Latvia’s efforts to keep essential services running during a crisis

By Mārcis Balodis and Marta Kepe

Latvia has shifted its crisis-management thinking from a focus on infrastructure protection to an emphasis on continuity of essential services and functions.

Crisis Management Europe & Eurasia

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

Learn more

The post The evolution of Latvia’s defense and security policy in resilience building appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At the June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, allies committed to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense, with 3.5 percent focused on core defense and 1.5 percent on related defense expenditures. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney says his country is committed to reaching NATO’s new defense spending target of 5 percent of GDP by 2035—and his government is also on track to meet the previous 2 percent target for the first time by spending an additional C$8.7 billion ($6.58 billion) this fiscal year (which ends in March 2026). Canada has struggled to meet NATO goals in the past. In 2023, it failed to meet both of NATO’s defense spending targets of 2 percent of GDP on defense and 20 percent of that spending allocated for research, development, and equipment. 

Although there is now support for increased defense expenditure at the highest levels of government, Canada has underinvested in its defense industrial base for decades and will need renewed focus, resources, and support to meet the country’s Hague commitments. How will Canada’s defense industrial base adapt to meet the current moment? Carney has put forward the bold claim that “Canada is meeting this moment with determination and resolve—modernising our defence capabilities, strengthening our industrial base, and reaffirming our role as a reliable partner in global security.” But what must its defense industrial base do to match this commitment?

In late 2025, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative hosted a workshop with government officials, academic experts, and participants from the public and private sectors of Canada, the United States, and Europe. The insights gathered from these conversations helped inform this issue brief, which assesses challenges, recommendations, and opportunities for Canada’s defense industrial base in an era defined by multiple conflicts and increased coordination by adversaries.

Canada’s defense industry at a crossroads

Canada has an extensive list of military equipment it needs to either produce domestically or purchase internationally, such as new warships, submarines, coastal defense vessels, fighter aircraft, and surveillance aircraft. This new equipment is needed for both national defense and to modernize Canada’s military to meet the current threat environment. In addition to renewing its leadership of the multinational NATO forces in Latvia, Canada has needed to strengthen its military capabilities along its three seas: in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans. This comes at a time when Canada is also juggling bilateral border security cooperation and engaging in a major renewal of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in close cooperation with the United States.

Central to Canada’s defense industry is its reliance on the US market and US companies, which supply much of Canada’s defense needs. Carney has often noted that one challenge facing Canada’s defense industry is that approximately 75 cents of every dollar in capital spending on defense winds up going to firms based in the United States. The relative size of the Canadian defense industrial base and its ability to compete internationally for contracts remain concerns as new funding flows to industry at an unprecedented rate. 

For the first time, Canada’s military is poised to receive additional funding through the new federal budget and facing “the uncomfortable position of having so much cash it will be hard to keep up.” This represents a dramatic mindset shift for the military, which has had to cope with deficits of people, equipment, training, and sustainment. Now, with more funding allocated for defense, the hard work begins as Canada tries to use that funding effectively to address gaps in equipment, personnel shortages, and better training opportunities for its military. 

With this increased available funding, the question matters of Canada’s procurement process and how to adapt it to meet the current moment. Canada’s procurement process, sometimes described as “glacial,” has received more attention lately and has a new agency focused on eliminating waste and accelerating the process. At the same time, Canada should recognize the constraints it faces regarding the size and scope of its defense industry; it should instead focus on niche areas in which it can excel, such as the maritime or Arctic domains. Many hurdles remain for Canada to meet the current moment, including personnel shortages in both the Canadian Armed Forces and industry roles. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), in its army modernization report, outlines the challenges facing the CAF to modernize, with at least another fourteen thousand recruits needed to meet the current security environment.

Recommendations for the Department of National Defence

1. Create consistent and predictable defense contracts for industry

A frequent refrain from industry is that the lack of consistency and predictably about defense contracts makes it challenging to scale and expand. A stable defense industrial base can foster innovation and address evolving challenges facing Euro-Atlantic security. The Canadian defense industry contributes about $10 billion annually to the economy and supports an estimated eighty-one thousand jobs. By investing in its domestic defense industry, niche capabilities, and evergreen infrastructure in the near term, the Canadian government can not only meet its NATO commitments but also expand job growth and economic performance. The long-term timeline for this investment in Canada’s defense industrial base will be key—Carney leads a minority government and this inevitably leads to a degree of uncertainty about long-term government commitment. Canada’s defense industrial base will not be able to meet the current moment with a one-off surge in available funding; it requires consistent and predictable funding over a longer-term horizon.

To get a sense of the importance of consistent and predictable defense contracts, look no further than the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) modernization process. Canada has been in the market for a new submarine fleet that is deployable in the Arctic with extended range and endurance. Two qualified suppliers—a German company and a South Korean company—will work with the Canadian maritime and defense sectors to deliver new submarines by 2035. So far, there is no project budget for this initiative, leading to uncertainty from an industry perspective. The Justin Trudeau government frequently made promises about defense spending that failed to materialize. The Parliamentary Budget Office recently quantified past underspending: between 2017 and 2023, efforts to buy new equipment fell short by C$18.3 billion. Ammunition producers claim they need at least C$800 million to open new production lines. Ultimately, for industry to respond to government decisions regarding its defense and security needs, a level of consistency and predictability must be provided, which has been a challenge for Canada’s defense industrial base in the past.

2. Streamline and strengthen the procurement process 

If defense spending is now a given, the question then turns to how the Canadian Armed Forces will acquire the materiel they need. On October 2, Carney announced the formation of a new agency, the Defence Investment Agency (DIA), to facilitate and accelerate the defense procurement process. The procurement process had previously been fragmented across multiple departments, resulting in significant slowdowns in obtaining critical equipment. The DIA removes some of the red tape and redundancies with a centralized review and approval process. The agency has a specific aim to bolster Canada’s domestic defense industry, to empower Canadian companies to compete globally while also investing in dual-use capabilities. This will specifically address a frequent criticism that by the time equipment is delivered it is either out of date or unfit for the current mission. Additionally, the agency hopes to bridge the divide between industry and government by bolstering awareness on both sides of the timelines, costs, and expectations for equipment deliveries.

The formation of the DIA is the first step in an overdue streamlining and strengthening exercise for procurement. As the Canadian government seeks to foster innovation and create national champions in the defense space, it needs to continue bridging the divide between industry and government. Additional work can be done to ensure a role for Canada’s many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in its industrial base, which is critical to ensure agility and flexibility. The current conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the significance of drones, but the next conflict might look very different and, in turn, might require industry to adapt to changing battlefield conditions. SMEs are better poised to adapt and pivot as technology evolves at a rapid pace and ensure Canada’s military is ready to respond to future conflicts. 

3. Balance “Buy Canadian” with buying the right equipment for the mission

Despite the improvements to the procurement process, the Canadian Armed Forces still needs to ensure they are buying the best possible equipment for the mission. As the CAF seeks more expeditionary and proactive capabilities, this modernization effort places a premium on not just buying domestically but buying the best possible equipment. The prime minister’s new goal of focusing investment on domestic manufacturers will naturally come into conflict with the army’s modernization efforts if Canada’s defense industrial base cannot produce equipment to meet its operational needs. In turn, this decision to “Buy Canadian” will impact Canada’s ability to export its materiel and potentially raise barriers to other markets. Canada exports about half of the defense materiel it produces, with 63 percent destined for the United States and a further 12 percent to the Middle East and Africa. Striking the right balance between investing in its domestic industrial base and strengthening ties to international markets will be key to the long-term sustainability of Canada’s defense industrial base.

4. Strengthen ties with Europe

The conversation around bolstering Canada’s defense industrial base mirrors those conversations taking place in Germany, France, and elsewhere across Europe. Indeed, a deepening of Canada-Europe relations has been on display in the last year in response to the growing complexity of international conflicts and crises. This includes a landmark security and defense partnership between the European Union (EU) and Canada, which was agreed to in June 2025. This defense pact paves the way for the two to cooperate on cyber, maritime, and space security, and also opens the door to joint weapon procurement. Additionally, Canada has been proposed as a potential participant in the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program, offering low-interest loans to accelerate procurement and investment in defense capabilities.

Diversifying and increasing the number of strategic partnerships globally, instead of over-relying on a single provider for its defense materiel, is a logical step to strengthen Canada’s defense industrial base—and also spurs innovation and supply chain resilience. Beyond the EU, Canada has sought to strengthen opportunities to collaborate with its fellow Five Eyes members, particularly the United Kingdom and Australia. The newly formed Canadian DIA aims to facilitate conversations with its counterparts in France, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Due to the similarity of their intentions to spend more on defense, Canada will have natural partners in European nations, as well as the EU more broadly. 

5. Focus on doing a few things well rather than trying to do everything all at once

A consistent theme across the various challenges facing Canada’s defense industry—its size, speed, and reliance on the US market—can all be partially solved by specializing in a few niche areas rather than doing too much all at once. Three specific areas in which Canada has both urgent needs for development and the opportunity to specialize are: unmanned autonomous systems (aerial and underwater vehicles in particular); Arctic-specific technologies, including icebreakers; and maritime capabilities leveraging Canada’s three-ocean geography. The Arctic region emerges repeatedly as a unique domain in which Canada should invest more, for both its own national security purposes and for enhancing wider Alliance capabilities. Canada has the most icebreakers of any NATO ally and is working through the trilateral ICE Pact (with Finland and the United States) to build even more of these highly specialized vessels. Capitalizing on the dearth of icebreakers within NATO would give Canada a unique opportunity to leverage its Arctic capabilities to support its shipbuilding industry while enhancing Alliance capabilities in the Arctic.

Conclusion

Carney’s government is taking unprecedented steps to strengthen Canada’s armed forces, invest in the country’s industrial base, and reaffirm Canada’s role as a reliable partner within NATO and the wider global security context. While his government’s approach and announcements so far are laudable, Canada now must turn to the task of how to support and expand its defense industrial base to meet these goals. Without this foundation, Carney’s pledges will fail to translate into improved capabilities and will hinder attempts to modernize the CAF. Time is short, the amount of work ahead is significant, and history will remember how Canada meets the current moment and security environment. 

Fellow

Jason C. Moyer

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Europe & Eurasia NATO

New Atlanticist Jul 23, 2025

To meet NATO’s 5 percent benchmark, allies need more industrial capacity. Here’s how they can build it.

By James Hursch, Kristen Taylor

Without more industrial muscle to increase defense production, the positive momentum coming out of The Hague summit could grind to a halt.

Defense Industry Europe & Eurasia

Issue Brief May 30, 2025

The frontier is the front line: On climate resilience for infrastructure and supplies in Canada’s Arctic

By Jeffrey Reynolds, Kristen Taylor

The front lines of strategic competition now run through the Arctic. Ottawa must do more to enhance its military readiness and infrastructure preparedness in the region.

Climate Change & Climate Action Defense Policy

Report Aug 1, 2025

Defining Canada’s threat landscape: Resetting for a new reality

By Peter Engelke, Ginger Matchett, Samantha Wong

In a changing strategic landscape, Canada must reinforce its national security and confront the threats of geopolitics, climate change, and emerging technology.

Climate Change & Climate Action Defense Policy

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

Learn more

The post How to equip Canada’s defense industrial base to meet NATO’s Hague summit commitments appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The new US National Security Strategy seeks to divide the world into spheres of interest, a formulation reminiscent of the nineteenth century.
• The United States adopting this approach would put Europe, which faces a revisionist Russia to its east, in a bind.
• To ensure their security and interests, Europeans should now look to the EU, which is able to exert global influence more than any single European state.

STOCKHOLM—A prominent feature of the new US National Security Strategy (NSS) is the United States’ voluntary retreat from its role as the world’s dominant superpower. Indeed, the strategy rests on a peculiar buy-in of Russia’s and China’s visions of a multipolar world. This is in part why it was welcomed by Russia, with Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov calling it “largely consistent” with Moscow’s view of the world.

The new NSS stands in sharp contrast to the previous one released in 2022, which laid out the ambition of preserving US world dominance and pushing back contenders by working with allies and partners. The new NSS takes a clear stance against the notion of the United States as the leader of a unipolar world order that was created after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The NSS argues that after the Cold War, US elites pursued “permanent American domination of the entire world,” an approach it explicitly rejects. Instead, it declares of the United States that “the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests.” This reorientation has far-reaching consequences for US security policy. While some of the implications are acknowledged in the strategy, others are overlooked. The United States’ closest allies in Europe are likely to feel the effects most acutely, as the NSS emphasizes that “the days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over” and calls for Europe to assume “primary responsibility for its own defense.”

One can argue that the United States’ new self-styled position as one great power among others is not a voluntary retreat but an acceptance of an inevitable reality. By adapting now, the argument goes, the United States will be better positioned to face challenges ahead. However, that is not how world systems work—they are not shaped preemptively by the choices a single country makes. Rather, the international system emerges from the long-term trajectories of states’ relative power.

The NSS seems to take the remarkable step of dividing the world into spheres of interest, a formulation that is reminiscent of the multipolar world of the nineteenth century. In this view of the world order, great powers have a right to a sphere of influence over smaller states, usually in their vicinity. For the United States, as the NSS asserts, this means a return to the Monroe Doctrine with the goal of regaining US preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.

In Asia, the United States is seeking strong relations with China based on strength, not force. In a speech on December 6, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth outlined the Trump administration’s approach to Asia, which he said was based on “flexible realism” and “aimed not at domination, but rather a balance of power.” 

The consequences for Europe in a world once again divided into spheres of influence would be severe. It would mean an end to the transatlantic community, which is based on the indivisible link between the security of Europe and that of the United States. 

Since the second Trump administration came to office, the United States has repeatedly sent shock waves across Europe. By now, the alarm bells have gone off so many times that the noise has become constant. Europe is now being pushed from both the east and the west.

To the east, Europe neighbors Russia, a revisionist state that wants to expand its political power and territory at Europe’s expense. The primary aim of Russia’s decade-long campaign of hybrid warfare against Europe is to prepare the ground for a fragmented continent that is weak enough to accept an extended Russian sphere of influence. Between its recent proposed Ukraine peace plans and the NSS, the United States has suggested restoring strategic stability, blocking Ukraine and other countries from joining NATO, and deepening economic cooperation with Russia. But this approach will not satisfy Russia—it will only whet its appetite. What the NSS fails to account for is that revisionist states are not satisfied with the status quo.

To its west, Europe is military aligned with a United States that is signaling that it is preparing to hand over responsibility for the conventional defense of the continent to the Europeans, while only maintaining the nuclear umbrella. According to some sources, Europe will need to take on this responsibility as soon as 2027. If Europe is to navigate as a pole of its own in a brave new multipolar world, it will be through the European Union (EU). Only the EU—not Germany or France alone—is big enough to exert the influence needed for a global power posture. 

The NSS does not treat Europe like a respected partner. It severely criticizes Europe’s performance on the economy, defense, and democracy, all while threatening the continent with abandonment. At the same time, the strategy underscores the fact that the United States cannot manage the world without Europe. The strategy calls for “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations,” which would mean interfering in European countries’ domestic affairs to weaken the EU. If carried out, such an initiative would undermine US ambitions to work with Brussels to make economic gains in Asia and the Global South, which the strategy also proposes. The United States would be better off refraining from interfering in Europe’s domestic affairs and cooperating with the EU on economic issues of mutual interest.

However, as the EU was not designed as a military alliance, it will need to accelerate the ongoing buildup of its defense capabilities to function as a global player. As long as NATO exists, the core of European defense efforts must be anchored in the Alliance. The United States can be helpful in this regard by supporting the European defense industrial base and an orderly shift of capabilities and responsibilities within NATO.

With the United States adopting a spheres-of-influence approach to the global order, Europe needs to rise to the occasion. If Europe is to fend off an aggressive Russia, it will need to urgently invest in innovation, military capabilities and readiness, energy security, and societal resilience. The continent probably didn’t need another wake-up call, but it has arrived.

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These tensions have resulted in a new geopolitical landscape in the region, one in which any crisis should be analyzed through the lens of possible Russian subversion or interference. This reality is already reordering regional dynamics. The Kremlin’s militarization of the Black Sea has highlighted littoral allies’ vulnerabilities, including energy availability, gaps in the defense and technological industrial base (DTIB), reinvigorated nationalist and secessionist movements, and challenges to maritime traffic and commercial activity. And the Black Sea’s insecurity has implications far beyond its regional boundaries. Most recently, Russia’s drone and fighter jet actions have violated the airspace of Romania, as well as that of Poland and Estonia, demonstrating that Moscow’s hybrid aggression in the region threatens to spill over into equally vulnerable neighboring states.

To help secure the region and deter further Russian aggression, littoral allies must enhance their energy security and bolster the DTIB, those enterprises and institutions that provide the materials, products, and services vital to national defense. The wider Black Sea region boasts vast oil and gas reserves, and new offshore discoveries link the region with the global economy, while pipelines and commercial maritime activity act as a conduit. As a high-value commodity, hydrocarbons are a prime target for an adversary willing to destabilize an enemy’s economy, military readiness, and civil society.

For example, hybrid threats to offshore energy infrastructure could cause considerable disruptions to countries’ entire energy sectors. Romania’s Neptun Deep and Turkey’s Sakarya gas fields are especially exposed to such risks, requiring new technologies, such as unmanned undersea systems, to counter these hybrid threats. The Black Sea littoral states are also vulnerable to Russian-sponsored lawfare and maritime coercion, including the use of floating mines and other threats to maritime traffic and naval operations. Russia has designated large sections of the Black Sea off limits to maritime traffic for the purpose of military exercises, which impede freedom of navigation and commercial activity. These exercises are often unannounced or conducted with little advance warning, reducing investor confidence, creating timetable delays, and eroding the Black Sea’s longstanding maritime legal regime.

Black Sea regional stability is key to deterring Russian expansion into Eastern Europe, where the Kremlin wishes to splinter NATO and widen its sphere of influence. China and Iran are also trying to gain regional influence, leading to greater tensions on NATO’s southeastern flank. As Russia’s long-term goals in the wider Black Sea region are diametrically opposed to those of the West, much remains to be done to advance a counterstrategy. The Black Sea region’s instability demands greater transatlantic engagement across all domains and economic sectors. The United States’ Black Sea strategy, which was proposed in 2023 under the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, has languished. On May 28, 2025, the European Commission submitted a Black Sea strategy, but it is too soon to evaluate its impact.

Over the long term, there is a need for more resilient civil-military infrastructure, as well as for increased military capability and interoperability in the region. While all the Black Sea littoral states will benefit from a continued transatlantic presence, three nations in particular stand out. Ukraine is bearing the brunt of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Romania’s size, strategic location, and strong transatlantic credentials have positioned it to become a military and economic hub, particularly as more NATO assets are deployed there. Turkey, with its burgeoning defense industry, has NATO’s second-largest military and serves a vital security role as the Alliance’s guardian of the straits, as codified under the Montreux Convention of 1936. NATO’s Black Sea states have taken the initiative in the face of growing regional threats from Russia. For instance, in January 2024, Romania, Turkey, and Bulgaria signed the Mine Counter Measures, which creates a framework for joint efforts to address naval mine threats and improve operational coordination among Black Sea NATO allies.

Countering Russian aggression in the wider Black Sea region will be expensive in both funds and political capital. It will also require greater collaboration among the Black Sea’s non-Russian littoral states. While not a NATO member, Ukraine has emerged as Europe’s most seasoned military power, capable of rapidly innovating and deploying new technologies. For example, Ukraine’s use of unmanned systems has inflicted considerable losses on the Russian Black Sea fleet, forcing it to disperse to safer ports and diminishing its effectiveness. In this regard, the Alliance has much to learn from Ukraine, particularly in twenty-first century multi-domain operations.

Whether or not a lasting cease-fire is implemented in Ukraine any time soon, Russian aggression has forever altered the Black Sea region’s security landscape. This escalation of the Black Sea’s militarization has heightened tensions, forcing regional governments to allocate increasing portions of their budgets to defense. All this portends greater destabilization, increased national debts, and the absence of a predictable commercial environment well into this century.

An effective response from NATO allies and partners requires novel and forceful policies that energize governments and private sectors to address key weaknesses in energy security and the DTIB. Indeed, a special emphasis should be placed on the private sector, which has demonstrated tremendous innovation and flexibility in the rapidly evolving battlespace.

While Kyiv’s role as a bulwark against Russian aggression deserves the greatest attention, Romania and Turkey have a major role to play in the Black Sea region’s security, as well. Both countries have increased their defense expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product, stepped up joint exercises, and enhanced cross-border collaboration. But further actions will be needed if Turkey, Romania, and their littoral allies and partners are to help defend the Black Sea from Russian aggression. While Turkey has a generally robust DTIB, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s are underfunded and in need of reform. Additionally, the region’s infrastructure is in need of rapid expansion and modernization, especially when it comes to trade routes running north-to-south and energy interconnectors. Admittedly, there have been positive steps on this front, including the launch of the Gas Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria, which became operational in October 2022, among other successful Black Sea infrastructure projects. Romania’s efforts to increase its energy interconnection with Moldova are laudable, as well. And in December, Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria announced a joint project to build three new bridges over the Danube. Even so, time is not on NATO’s side.

These states and their neighbors cannot secure the Black Sea alone; this will require greater support from the transatlantic community. Moreover, the Black Sea states will need to find solutions with limited US involvement; the new 2025 US National Security Strategy makes it clear that Washington’s attention will be on the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific.

As Russia continues to destabilize and militarize the wider Black Sea region, helping bolster its security will require a concerted focus on informed government policies supported by a robust private sector to advance resilience, capabilities, and interoperability in the face of these growing security threats.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Program.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The post How NATO and its partners should respond to Russia’s militarization of the wider Black Sea region appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• US officials have spent the past two days meeting with the Ukrainian president and other European leaders in Berlin.
• One proposed element of a deal to end the war is Ukraine giving up the Donbas in exchange for US security guarantees—but it’s not clear yet what Russian action would oblige a US response.
• Meanwhile, Russian officials speak openly of rejecting any deal and forcing complete Ukrainian capitulation instead. 

WASHINGTON—The likelihood of a cease-fire by Christmas is low, but the Trump administration’s latest effort to achieve a negotiated end to the Kremlin’s aggression in Ukraine continues in hope. Today, US envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law, wrapped up two days of meetings with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and other European leaders in Berlin. 

While the exact details of the current White House plan are not publicly available, reporting suggests that the key points include a renewed US proposal for Ukraine to cede the strategic regions in western Donbas that Russia has been unable to conquer and create a demilitarized zone there. Kyiv rejected this initiative when initially presented in mid-November, and it was widely criticized in the United States, including by Republicans in Congress, as dangerously favorable to the Kremlin. Kyiv still considers this proposal—an effort to meet Moscow’s demand that Ukraine give up all of the Donbas—extremely risky. If Russian troops were to move into this highly fortified “demilitarized zone,” then it would be much easier for them to move west and take far more Ukrainian territory. 

In order to persuade the Ukrainians to accept this, Washington is willing to give Ukraine, according to Axios’s Barak Ravid, “a guarantee based on NATO’s Article 5 that would be approved by Congress and be legally binding.” The exact details of this guarantee are not public. But talks regarding the guarantees have been underway since Zelenskyy and seven other European leaders met in August with Trump, following his Alaska summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. For months, Team Trump has been reluctant to provide Ukraine concrete guarantees, preferring to reach agreement on the terms of a cease-fire first, and only then to turn to the issue of guarantees—a position Kyiv thought unsatisfactory. This is understandable given the fact that Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal under the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 in exchange for “security assurances” from Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China that they would not permit any infringements on Ukraine’s territorial integrity—assurances that proved worthless. 

If Washington is now willing to provide Ukraine strong guarantees, either alone or, better yet, with at least some of its European allies, then that might be enough for Zelenskyy to consider a withdrawal from western Donbas. In connection to that, the Ukrainian president said publicly late last week that he was willing to consider a public referendum on handing over western Donbas. This step would likely meet his constitutional requirement not to make, without public approval, any change to Ukraine’s borders. 

In his December 12 report, Ravid quotes an unidentified senior US official as saying, “We want to give the Ukrainians a security guarantee that will not be a blank check on the one hand but will be strong enough on the other hand. We are willing to send it to Congress to vote on it.” This is certainly a gesture to Zelenskyy, but it does not make clear if the administration is talking about a (legally binding) treaty—Zelenskyy’s position—or something less.

There is also little public information on the critical elements of those guarantees. How would this work? Zelenskyy worries that Russia might secretly place troops in the demilitarized zone. This past Friday, senior Putin adviser Yuri Ushakov said that while “it’s entirely possible that there won’t be any troops [in the Donbas], either Russian or Ukrainian” in a postwar scenario, “there will be the Russian national guard” and “police.” Russia’s national guard is a paramilitary force, and it would not be difficult to conceal a build-up of troops in the zone as national guardsmen. In 2014, Russian troops without any markings seized Crimea. Would the security guarantees under discussion respond to a significant build-up of the Russian national guard in this zone? More broadly, what Russian violation of the demilitarized zone or offensive action beyond it would oblige a strong US response? 

It is worth noting that this proposal poses an unnecessary risk to the United States. To persuade Ukraine to give up strong defensive positions, the guarantees must offer strong US action if Russia breaks the cease-fire and moves troops into this area. That would immediately put any US forces—even from the air—in unnecessary danger because Russian troops would be operating from an advantageous position both for defensive or offensive operations. The United States would have to be prepared for this contingency. 

Trump’s envoys are claiming serious progress in the talks, but there are still no clear indications that the Kremlin is willing to accept conditions that would lead to a sustainable peace. Indeed, Ushakov said on Friday that while Moscow had not seen the latest draft following talks between the United States and Ukraine, “when we see them, we may not like a lot of things, that’s how I sense it.”  

Trump’s stated aim is still a peace that lasts. And despite nearly a month of talks since the launch of this latest Trump initiative, there is no indication that Putin has given up his objective to achieve effective political control of Ukraine, which would require Russia to take far more Ukrainian territory. Even Trump seemed to acknowledge this when criticizing Zelenskyy on December 7 for not responding favorably to the latest US proposal. While he felt that Russia would accept that proposal, Trump stated that “Russia . . . I guess, would rather have the whole country when you think of it.”  

Andrei Kelin, Russia’s ambassador in London, made this clear in a December 10 interview when he said that what was on the table was not a “deal” so much as Ukrainian “surrender.” As US envoys push Ukraine to accept even previously rejected Russian conditions, and as the United States and its European allies spar about the terms of the plans to end the war, Moscow watches, with no incentive to make concessions to achieve a durable peace.

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Thirty years after the Dayton Accords brought peace to Bosnia, a former war correspondent investigates how a conflict that ended in 1995 still shapes warfare and world affairs in 2025.

By Thom Shanker

Before Vladimir Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine spawned the largest war in Europe since World War II, that grim distinction belonged to a conflict that accompanied the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s—the fighting to carve up or hold onto Bosnia-Herzegovina by Eastern Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croatians, and Muslim Bosniaks. In Bosnia, less than fifty years after the horror of the Nazi “final solution,” genocide returned to Europe.

The Bosnian war was fought with medieval tactics and twentieth-century weapons. Its signatures were siege, mass expulsion, the burning of villages and leveling of houses of worship, and mass rape and mass murder. The carnage ended thirty years ago this week, on December 14, 1995, with the signing of the US-brokered Dayton Accords.

The Balkans produce more history than can be consumed, goes the aphorism usually attributed to Winston Churchill, and that is true of the Bosnian war. Yet too many in the United States and around the world—though certainly not in the Balkans—have consigned the conflict to history or forgotten about it entirely.

Several decades on, the war’s consequences and lessons still have influence and resonance in many areas of modern warfare, including conflict diplomacy, intelligence gathering, war reporting, humanitarian relief missions, justice for war criminals, and the application of military power. In some instances, the Bosnian war has had concrete, lasting impact on more recent conflicts. In others, the war has offered relevant lessons that have nevertheless gone unheeded.

In reflecting on my nearly three years covering the Bosnian conflict for The Chicago Tribune, and the ways in which it has stayed with me in the three decades since, I have concluded that when you go off to cover a war, the war covers you. That is true not just for the journalists who risked all to witness and report on the conflict, but also for those who worked to provide assistance to civilians at risk, negotiate a peace plan, enforce an eventual cease-fire, and bring some measure of justice to the region when the guns finally fell silent. And it is true for all of us—even those with no firsthand experience of the conflict—in ways that should be more fully appreciated.

Conflict diplomacy

Militaries do not win wars. Militaries set the conditions—or, more often, impose the conditions—under which governments and their representatives end wars.

That is the conclusion of an American diplomat who played a pivotal role in ending the fighting in Bosnia—Christopher Hill, who served as a deputy to the late Richard Holbrooke, chief architect of the Dayton Accords.

“People felt that it was our willingness to use force that ultimately was the success at Dayton,” Hill told me, referring to the punishing bombing campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, that NATO carried out on Bosnian Serb targets in late summer 1995 after Bosnian Serb troops massacred eight thousand Muslims of fighting age around the town of Srebrenica. “There’s no question that we used force—but force was in support of diplomacy. It wasn’t the other way around.”

Hill, whose résumé includes posts as US ambassador to Serbia, the Republic of Macedonia, Iraq, South Korea, and Poland, and special envoy to Kosovo, identified a key element beyond military power that forced signatures on the peace plan from leaders of three warring republics—Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia. (The leadership of the self-declared Republika Srpska inside Bosnia were deliberately excluded.)

“We ended the war on terms that left no one terribly happy—but everyone got something from it,” Hill said. “We ended it in a way where we understood the equities on all sides. We did not try to create a situation where someone is a total loser and someone is a total winner, because that is just a recipe for more war.”

Hill credited Holbrooke as an example of how sometimes a strong, even overbearing, individual is needed to knock heads of autocratic bullies. The strategy of strong-arm negotiations under pressure of military punishment proved, Hill said, “that American diplomacy is not an oxymoron.”

Hill, who is now a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, grew pensive when assessing why the slaughter in Bosnia was allowed to continue for more than three years before decisive Western action. “Yes, it took a while, obviously, for people to understand that this situation, Bosnia, was making a mockery of a ‘Europe whole and free,’ and at peace. It took a while to realize that if we—the US and our European allies—pulled together instead of finger-pointing, we could get something done. And it ultimately succeeded in halting the killing.”

Underscoring the enduring value of the Atlantic alliance, Hill argued that “relationships between nations extend your reach, rather than inhibit your reach.” At the time of the Bosnian war, he added, “we had trust issues with some countries. But I’ve never seen it like it is today. If we can rebuild trust and a sense that, ‘together, we can do more,’ we can go further.”

The Bosnian war also was a defining moment for Europe. The initial response from European powers when war broke out on their continent in the 1990s was mostly hands-off. Then the Europe-backed United Nations Protection Force that did respond was handcuffed by insufficient personnel, the absence of effective weapons deployments, and rules of engagement distributed across so many capitals that it weighted the power of “no.” But out of that experience—of European capitals standing by powerlessly and watching Washington halt slaughter in Europe’s southeastern corner—came the roots of the still-evolving European common defense, foreign, and security policy, as well as Europe’s efforts to play a much stronger role in helping defend Ukraine than it did in protecting the victims of aggression in Bosnia.

Hill identified another essential ingredient in the success at Dayton in ending the war: “The intelligence was really good. We understood what the Serbs were after. By the way, I didn’t feel that way when I was in Iraq, nor did I feel that way when I was dealing with the North Koreans. But on Bosnia, the intel people really had it right.”

Intelligence gathering

The American intelligence community saw it coming.

A year before fighting broke out in Croatia, and two years before the far bloodier and longer war in Bosnia began, a detailed National Intelligence Estimate predicted with stunning accuracy that Yugoslavia—once a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, peaceful, nonaligned communist country with a standard of living far above its Soviet-bloc neighbors—would convulse with violence: Serbian Eastern Orthodox versus Croatian Catholic versus Bosnian Muslim.

“Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within one year, and will probably dissolve within two,” the National Intelligence Estimate, titled Yugoslavia Transformed, declared—a timeline that proved correct. The report’s only significant error was one of sequencing, as it predicted that violence would most likely start in Serbia’s Muslim region of Kosovo; the Kosovo war did not begin until 1998, after fighting in Croatia ignited in 1991 and in Bosnia in 1992.

The report, stamped SECRET when it was completed on October 18, 1990, was declassified in 2006, and it now offers a lesson of what good intelligence looks like—even if its assessments did not inspire action by American and Western European leaders, who were hoping to reap the benefits of a peace dividend after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

After all, many Americans could not find Bosnia on a map and did not grasp its importance. US leaders incurred no political cost in looking the other way, certainly not in the early years of the war. The US-led NATO bombing and muscular diplomacy leading to Dayton only occurred after Bosnian Serbs cuffed and humiliated Dutch peacekeepers, and the discovery of the Srebrenica massacre.

The National Intelligence Estimate contained this prophecy: “The most plausible scenario for interrepublic violence is one in which Serbia, assisted by disaffected Serbian minorities in the other republics, moves to reincorporate disputed territory into a greater Serbia, with attendant and bloody shifts in population.”

The report also predicted, correctly, that Serbia would inherit the bulk of the armor and other weapons of the Yugoslav National Army when the central government dissolved, and would cite protection of fellow Serbs in neighboring republics as an excuse to turn those guns on Croatia and Bosnia to carve out a Greater Serbia. (In Croatia, people tended to live in communities that were mostly segregated, and war there was shorter. In Bosnia, as an accidental result of history, the different communities were intermingled.)

The National Intelligence Estimate assessed that a system designed to turn nonaligned Yugoslavia into a porcupine in the event of invasion from the west or the east—the creation of local militias, with command-and-control and plentiful small arms—would allow each minority group to take up arms against the others. That is precisely what happened.

The intelligence in advance of the war in Bosnia contrasts sharply with the community’s work on weapons of mass destruction held by Saddam Hussein, which was used by President George W. Bush to make a case—falsely—for invading Iraq a decade later, in 2003.

Yet three decades after the war in Bosnia and two decades after the invasion of Iraq, in the weeks before Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the intelligence community again showed what getting it right looks like—and, this time, how good intelligence could be put to good use in advance of conflict erupting. The CIA director at the time, William Burns, was a veteran diplomat who had served as ambassador to Moscow, and who often said that his insights into gathering and assessing intelligence stemmed from his decades as a consumer of intelligence at the State Department. With a diplomat’s sense for what it would take to rally a coalition to counter the Kremlin, he declassified and shared intelligence—with Ukraine, with European allies, and with the US media—predicting a Russian invasion. The world was warned, again. But, in an echo of what transpired in Bosnia, too few accepted the truth about Putin’s imminent intentions for Ukraine until blood was shed.

War reporting

Bosnia was a war crime masquerading as a war.

That dawned on Roy Gutman, who covered the conflict for Long Island’s Newsday newspaper. Like so many others in the band of brothers and sisters who took immense risks to relay the tragedy in Bosnia to the world, he devoted much of his time to tracking artillery, mortars, and troop movements. (As ever, since Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, scribes chase the sound of fighting.)

“That fighting was right in front of you,” Gutman told me. “Bosnian Serbs were doing normal military operations in some ways, like the siege of Sarajevo—but the real action was deep in the provinces, far from the cameras, where they were cleansing the population by using methods of terror—war crimes.”

Gutman was the first to widely publicize the Bosnian Serbs’ chain of concentration camps in Bosnia, where the mostly Muslim detainees were deposited after transport by bus, by forced march, or in cattle cars to be tortured and murdered. He wrote about the Serb campaign of systematic mass rape of Muslim girls and women and documented the destruction of mosques.

“I decided that was going to be my coverage, not just the bang-bang,” Gutman said. “I was going to cover the expulsions, the deportation of the populations—but looking carefully for examples where you can prove that the government is involved and responsible.” Gutman received the 1993 Pulitzer Prize in international reporting for “his courageous and persistent reporting that disclosed atrocities and other human rights violations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.” (He shared the prize that year with John Burns of The New York Times, who put the Bosnian war on the map for global readers with his heartfelt stories documenting the siege of Sarajevo and the destruction of what once had been an Olympic city and a multicultural gem.)

In earlier conflicts, the press often traveled with military units, and could hope for assistance in emergencies from those forces or their embassy. Not in Bosnia. Diplomats had been withdrawn, and the United Nations Protection Force proved unable to protect Bosnians, its own troops, or anybody else.

The Bosnian conflict accelerated a trend of war reporting becoming increasingly dangerous. Journalists were targeted by snipers, mortars, and artillery, and getting the story often required traversing a series of roadblocks and checkpoints guarded by angry men with guns.

Every time I crossed into Bosnia, I brought a flak jacket with ballistic plates on the front and back (and my name and blood type stenciled on the front), a helmet, food, and a sleeping bag—and made sure that I had filled two five-gallon canisters of fuel in the trunk of my vehicle. Larger news organizations provided their reporters with armored cars and satellite phones. Also required were supplies of Marlboros, Deutsche marks, and whiskey—to bribe your way past Serb militia checkpoints. (After the Tribune’s accounting department initially kicked back my receipts—“We don’t pay for your booze and tobacco”—I created a new category called General Reporting Expenses. One colleague filed his receipts for checkpoint bribes as “chemische Reinigung,” German for dry cleaning.)

Getting to the story also required creativity. Early in the war, when Bosniak refugees reached safety and told of a new and vicious cycle of ethnic cleansing in the east of the republic, Serb forces on the Serbian side of the Drina River shut the border, obviously to assist their Bosnian Serb mates in continuing the violence with no outside witnesses.

At the time a group of us were working with a brilliant interpreter and “fixer,” a local journalist who was enterprising and courageous to the point that we fondly nicknamed her “Mad Alex.” Alex and I once made an appointment at the Bosnian Serb legation in Belgrade. While we were kept waiting in the reception area, we managed to lift a dozen sheets of formal Republika Srpska letterhead. We forged official-looking papers conferring the right to pass first the Serb and then the Bosnian Serb checkpoints on both banks of the Drina. (Think “letters of transit” in the film Casablanca.) Over several days, our band of reporters was the first to document a well-organized offensive to force the expulsion of thousands of Muslims from eastern Bosnia—a brutal ethnic-cleansing campaign accompanied by the looting and torching of their villages, and the toppling of the minarets of their mosques.

Attempts to prevent reporters from witnessing atrocities “is what drew me to Syria later,” Gutman said. “I just saw Bosnia all over again—where all the operations of the war were war crimes. But [Bashar al-Assad] learned the lesson of Bosnia: Don’t let in the media.”

And Putin has learned that lesson too. “On the Ukrainian side of the war, reporters have what looks like almost total freedom, and are doing a really fine job of on-the-ground war reporting,” Gutman said. “How many can go to the Russian side of the lines?”

Humanitarian relief

The fragmentation of Bosnia along ethnic and religious lines challenged the efforts of international relief organizations to an extent that they had rarely faced before—challenges intensified by the large scale and long duration of the conflict.

Many previous relief efforts around the world had followed a model of bringing aid to people in need on one side or the other of identifiable frontlines.

Before Bosnia, large-scale humanitarian aid missions were mostly “dancing with one devil,” said Amir Shaviv of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, or JDC, a relief organization founded in the shadow of World War I.

Instead of negotiating with a single aggressor to funnel relief to a population in need, aid organizations in Bosnia were forced to negotiate with numerous ethnic militias and rogue warlords to deliver help across a terrain contested by three factions, with large Muslim populations pushed from villages across swaths of Bosnia and locked mostly inside the besieged areas of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Zepa, and Bihac.

Shaviv’s title during the three years of the Bosnia relief effort said it all: assistant executive vice-president for special operations of the Joint Distribution Committee—a military-sounding title that reflected the need for strict command-and-control, discretion to the point of secrecy, and negotiations with a criminal lineup of local militia captains.

“To move people out of Sarajevo and to bring them to safety in Croatia, we had to sometimes cross, literally, more than thirty checkpoints staffed by different militias, all armed and all ready to shoot,” Shaviv recalled when we spoke. “Some wanted money. Others wanted medications, which we happily gave them. Often, a case of whiskey settled it.”

Over the course of the war, JDC evacuated about 2,500 people from besieged Sarajevo. Women, children, and the elderly. Muslims, Christians, and Jews. All of the evacuations, he said, “were accomplished without a single injury or death.”

Many humanitarian aid groups did heroic work in Bosnia. But those identified with one faction or another risked failure at checkpoints operated by a rival group. What was JDC’s secret for success, even as the efforts of other, larger relief organizations were sometimes stymied?

“JDC operated in a nonsectarian, nonpolitical way,” he said. “When we brought food in, they cooked for Jews, Muslims, Christians, anybody. When we took people out, it was also the same thing—same with medicines.”

JDC even established a wireless radio connection after the Sarajevo phone system was destroyed by Serb artillery. Time slots for communicating outside the siege zone were allotted to the range of Sarajevo’s diverse residents.

Shaviv said that one of the Bosnian war’s lessons for today is that relief missions must be designed with stamina and resilience, since contemporary armed conflict seems never-ending and tends to feature complex webs of combatants. There are “no longer ‘slam dunk’ rescue operations” in which “you deal with a regime, execute a swift operation, get your people out—and celebrate,” Shaviv noted.

International law

Rape, enslavement, and the torching of entire villages by invading armies are tactics as old as human history. In the time of the Ancient Greeks, military commanders prayed to their gods atop Olympus for guidance on how to adjudicate whether people, property, and titles were fitting spoils of war. More recently, mortals have tried to legislate against and sit in judgment of war crimes, with varying effectiveness.

The war in Bosnia increased understanding and scrutiny of war crimes and conduct of aggressors. In subsequent conflicts—from Myanmar and Ukraine to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and South Sudan—military acts of mass murder, mass rape, and ethnic cleansing have been identified for what they are: not an expected if horrific part of the battlefield, with spoils going to the victor, but illegal actions that deserve the world’s attention and legal penalties. The term “ethnic cleansing” itself—now a core part of the world’s lexicon for conflict—is a product of the Bosnian war, stemming from the Serbo-Croatian phrase etnicko ciscenje.

“The Bosnia conflict made war crimes as a concept an important part of the global vernacular,” said Diane Orentlicher, a professor of international law at American University who specializes in war crimes tribunals. “The phenomenon is hardly new, but attention to war crimes used to be largely the province of human rights organizations and military lawyers. As a result of the Bosnia conflict, I think awareness of war crimes was globalized.” Orentlicher is the author of Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY’s Impact in Bosnia and Serbia, the definitive account of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as it sought to hold political and military leaders accountable for war crimes.

Until the conclusion of its final case in 2017, the UN-established International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia worked to prosecute those responsible for crimes committed during the Yugoslav wars, including Bosnia’s. (Data courtesy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia)

The UN Security Council established the tribunal in May 1993 with a mandate to prosecute “those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991 and thus contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the region.” The court delivered justice to victims of the Balkans wars by bringing to trial and convicting ninety-three people—Bosniak, Croat, and Serb—including Radovan Karadzic, the political leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military commander. Both are serving life sentences. The mastermind of the wars across the former Yugoslavia, Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic, also was brought to trial at The Hague on charges including genocide, but he died before a verdict was handed down.

While she acknowledges that the court was flawed, Orentlicher said its impact on efforts to deliver justice (however imperfect) after peace (however fragile) continues today.

“The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was the template that provided guidance for all subsequent international and hybrid tribunals, both in a positive and negative way,” she said. “For all its achievements, it wasn’t a perfect tribunal, and tribunals created since then have tried to improve on its example by, for example, enhancing victims’ participation in their work.”

The tribunal raised awareness about specific war crimes, especially the use of sexual violence as a tool of combat.*

“When there were reports of mass rapes in Bosnia, before the ICTY was even created, a global women’s rights movement demanded that these atrocities be prosecuted as war crimes, and their advocacy helped create momentum to create the Yugoslavia tribunal itself,” she added. “So the Bosnia conflict brought unprecedented attention to the issue and helped galvanize global efforts to combat sexual violence in war.”

Military power

With war in Ukraine now overshadowing the Bosnian war as Europe’s largest conflict since 1945, no lessons of the Balkans bloodshed are as relevant today as those on the smart application of military power—when to use it, how much to use, and how to do so with a clear eye on the adversary’s pressure points.

General Wesley Clark was the US Defense Department’s representative to the US negotiating team for Bosnia, and he was by Holbrooke’s side for treacherous trips into and out of Sarajevo and throughout the Dayton peace talks. He returned to the continent in 1997 with one of the military’s most prized assignments: NATO’s supreme allied commander, Europe. In 1999, he oversaw Operation Allied Force, the bombing campaign to punish Milosevic’s Serbia for its cleansing of ethnic Albanians in the province of Kosovo—in some ways, unfinished business from the Bosnian war.

Clark, who is now a member of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors, recalled that following the Dayton Accords, NATO deployed a US-led Implementation Force (or IFOR) into Bosnia that, unlike previous United Nations efforts, went in with armaments that clearly overmatched those of the three warring parties—and, just as importantly, with clear approvals for punishing violators of the peace deal.

“We gave the military more or less unlimited authorization in Bosnia,” Clark said. “We gave the military commander what was essentially a silver-bullet capacity so he could intervene at any time on any issue in any manner he chose. This was necessary to assure that we had US congressional support for the troops that went in—but it was also a powerful warning to the warring factions: No more messing around.”

A forgotten footnote of the IFOR mission was how clearly Serbians, Croatians, and Bosniaks heard the message. Not a single American combat death occurred during the peacekeeping—really peace-enforcement—mission.

Assessing the war in Ukraine in light of the lessons of Bosnia, Clark argues that the still-tentative proposals for deploying forces to support any armistice in the country should approach a peacekeeping mission with all of the tools required for a warfighting mission in order to deter further aggression. And those forces have to be forward-deployed at whatever border between Ukraine and Russia is set by an agreement, and with clear authorities to deal forcefully with cease-fire violations.

And just as the Dayton Accords required the assent of Serbia’s strongman Milosevic, peace in Ukraine is dependent on one person: Putin.

“The reason Dayton worked was because the Serbs wanted a deal,” Clark said. “Milosevic realized he had reached the end of the line, militarily, in Bosnia.”

In contrast, Putin has not reached that point. “The lesson of Bosnia is that you’re not going to be able to bring the war in Ukraine to an end until Putin thinks he’s losing,” Clark said. “And Putin does not think he’s losing, and right now sees no reason to think he is going to lose.”

What finally brought the vile war in Bosnia to a conclusion was a form of American idealism personified in Holbrooke, “a man who believed passionately in America’s power to do good in the world and to spread—it seems almost quaint today to talk about them—American values.”

That assessment came from Roger Cohen of The New York Times, speaking at an Atlantic Council panel convened by the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative to reflect on risks to journalists and diplomats thirty years after the negotiations in Dayton ended the slaughter.

The horrors of the war drove Holbrooke to Dayton. But so too did values: freedom, democracy, the right of peoples to govern themselves, the sanctity of borders, and the rule of law.

Holbrooke “wanted very much, and fought very hard, to bring that to Bosnia,” Cohen said.

“And if we forget those values, if we lose sight of those values, if we allow those values to be trampled in a way that they die,” Cohen warned, “then I think that will be at once a terrible thing for the world, and a very dangerous one.”

*This sentence was updated December 22 to clarify wording related to the legal definitions of genocide and sexual violence as a tool of combat.

Thom Shanker covered the war in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995 for The Chicago Tribune, before joining The New York Times as a national security reporter and editor. He directs the Project for Media and National Security at George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs, and is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

Inflection Points

May 28, 2025

Dispatch from Dayton: What Trump can learn about ending war

By Frederick Kempe

A recent visit of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to Ohio—thirty years after the Dayton Accords ended the Bosnian War—raised important questions about what lessons can be applied to ending Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Conflict Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Report

Oct 7, 2024

Working on a new transatlantic approach toward the Western Balkans

By Maja Piscevic, Ilva Tare

The United States and the European Union must work together, and play to their own respective strengths, to prioritize democratic and economic growth and alignment with the West.

Corruption European Union

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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Video footage of Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, filmed May 19, 1994, courtesy of Reuters.

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Director for Northern Europe, Anna Wieslander was interviewed in the Swedish Radio podcast “USApodden” (The USA podcast) on the European reactions to the new US NSS and its implications for European security and policy.

While Europe remains important for the US Administration, it is perceived to have several challenges that Europe needs to deal with, says Wieslander. Wieslander argues that we are in a new era of European security and that the current Administration’s take on European security appears to be a longterm policy. “Europe must react and not remain passive”, Wieslander says.

It is “completely unrealistic”, argues Wieslander, that Europe would take over all US NATO responsibilities on European soil by 2027, as has been circulating over the weekend, adding that this may be a tactic from the US Administration to get European countries to do more on defense and quicker.

Listen to the whole episode to know more. It is recorded in Swedish.

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However, a premature deal that favors Russia or leaves Ukraine without credible and functional security arrangements would threaten Turkey’s own security, influence, and strategic position in the region. For Ankara, the consequences of a lopsided peace deal that advantages Moscow will continue to be felt long after the immediate cessation of hostilities. Any peace that cements Russian gains would alter the balance of power in the Black Sea region and constrain Turkey’s geopolitical footprint for decades.

The downside for Turkey in recent “peace” proposals

A “Russia-friendly” peace deal—one that legitimizes occupation or implicitly accepts the Kremlin’s claims to expand its territorial gains in Ukraine—would destabilize the region and seriously damage Turkey’s long-term position. A weakened Ukraine, stripped of its territorial integrity and military capacity, would alter the balance of power in the Black Sea in Russia’s favor—a scenario for which Turkey would pay a heavy price. From Crimea to the Caucasus, the consequences would reverberate across Ankara’s geopolitical environment.

As Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said last month, a peace plan can only be acceptable if it “meets the legitimate expectations and security needs of both sides, without creating new instability.” And Turkish analysts warn that an unfavorable settlement for Kyiv would directly undermine Turkey’s strategic interests, as Russia has not abandoned its imperial ambitions to reassert control over the former Soviet space—from the South Caucasus and Central Asia to the Baltics.

For its own interests, Turkey should take a strong stance—particularly in its diplomatic interactions with the United States—that any proposal that cements Russia’s territorial gains and prepares the battlefield for Moscow’s next offensive is unacceptable and dangerous for the region.

If territorial concessions formalize Russia’s control over eastern and southern Ukraine and the Sea of Azov, Moscow would effectively turn it into a Russian inland sea. Combined with Russia’s attempts to militarize and dominate the wider Black Sea, this would reverse the naval balance of power, which has been favorable to Turkey since Ukraine’s successful attacks on Russia’s Black Sea fleet.

Crimea is a particularly sensitive issue. For Turkey, it is not an abstract bargaining chip—it defines forward posture in the Black Sea and is home to a Tatar community with deep cultural and historical ties to Ankara. Any deal legitimizing its illegal annexation would not only be a diplomatic defeat for Ukraine; it would be a strategic blow to Turkey. Any deal that allows Russia to expand or consolidate territorial gains would embolden Moscow, enable it to revive its naval capabilities, and deepen its foothold in the wider Black Sea region. Such an outcome would not only threaten Ukraine but also constrain Turkey’s influence from the Caucasus to the Middle East and North Africa and beyond.

What can Ankara do?

While the current talks are being held between US, Russian, and Ukrainian negotiators, European countries have also been conducting diplomatic outreach to Washington to advocate their positions on elements of a potential peace deal that are critical for their interests. Turkey should do the same. Turkey possesses real leverage—diplomatic, economic, and military—to influence the outcome of the peace talks aimed at ending the war. The country’s leaders should not shy away from using it.

Turkey’s role as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, especially on the humanitarian track, remains important. For Ukraine, the return of abducted Ukrainian children and all prisoners of war and political detainees, including Crimean Tatars and religious prisoners, is a “mandatory element” for any peace process. During Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Ankara last month, these issues were at the core of his discussions with Erdoğan. Taking a proactive role in advocating for the return of Ukrainian prisoners of war and abducted children—including by raising these issues in bilateral engagements with Russia and in multilateral diplomatic fora—would bolster Turkey’s reputation as a key regional actor, humanitarian power, and credible mediator.

Beyond pressing for a fair deal in peace negotiations, Turkey must also take the lead in the maritime coalition of the willing and step up efforts to restore rules-based order and stability in the Black Sea. As NATO’s largest naval power in the region, Ankara is central to regional deterrence. Moscow’s aggression has increasingly spilled into NATO’s maritime space, directly affecting Turkey and Romania. Last month, a Turkish liquefied natural gas tanker operating in the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail—mere meters from the Romanian border—was struck by Russian drones. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, several other Turkish or Turkish-flagged vessels have been struck by missiles in Ukrainian ports, including the seaports of Odesa and Kherson. According to the Black Sea Monitoring Group, more than 40 percent of vessels entering Greater Odesa ports this year belong to Turkish companies, the largest share of any country. Thus, these attacks significantly undermine Turkish trade across both the Black Sea and the Danube.

Overall, this year alone, at least fourteen vessels have been hit in Ukrainian Black Sea ports. These are not isolated incidents, but clear indicators of Russia’s attempt to weaponize maritime trade, intimidate neighbors, and test the resolve of Turkey and NATO. Russia has targeted logistics nodes such as the Orlovka–Isaccea ferry terminal, struck Danube ports, and breached Moldovan and Romanian airspace with drones.

On the economic front, Russia has intensified the use of a “shadow fleet” of unregistered, sanctions-evading tankers transporting oil and military dual-use cargoes. This past week, Ukrainian naval drones struck two shadow fleet vessels, demonstrating that Kyiv is determined to deprive Russia of this source of revenue for its war machine. To keep the Black Sea stable, Turkey should step up efforts to counter the shadow fleet, prevent illicit maritime traffic, and ensure that the Black Sea does not become a safe haven for sanctions evasion.

Turkey has expressed concern over the attacks on oil tankers off its Black Sea coast arguing they “have posed serious risks to navigation, life, property and environmental safety in the region.” While Turkey’s call to protect commercial vessels is legitimate, it can hardly extend to unregistered—and therefore unlawful—vessels. Moreover, no comparable arrangements exist to safeguard official commercial shipping bound for Ukrainian ports, which remains subject to sustained Russian attacks.

Limits to only Ukraine’s actions cannot credibly be framed as de-escalatory, as they increase the risk of Russia’s unilateral escalation. Given that sea lanes and energy-export revenues are central to the Kremlin’s war effort, targeting oil tankers and related infrastructure is one of the few effective means of imposing costs and constraining Moscow’s ability to finance the conflict—an approach that may bring an end to the war closer.

To deter Russia’s maritime and aerial attacks, Ankara should invest more political capital and capabilities into the maritime coalition of the willing. Turkey should encourage the expansion of trilateral formats such as the Bulgaria–Turkey–Romania demining group, broadening its mandate to include sea patrols, critical infrastructure protection, and maritime domain awareness. It should deepen coordination with Romania on air defense and contribute to a “Black Sea sky shield” capable of monitoring Russian drone incursions and protecting critical maritime infrastructure and port facilities. Turkey must also continue to restrict the passage of Russian warships through the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits under the terms of the Montreux Convention—a measure that has prevented Moscow from rapidly reconstituting its naval forces. These steps could serve as real “security guarantees” under any peace plan, rendering Russia’s war in the maritime and air domains operationally pointless.

Turkey has a right to protect its regional interests

Turkey should oppose several potential terms that have been discussed in recent rounds of peace talks.

First, any cap on Ukraine’s armed forces would undermine Turkey’s own deterrence posture. A militarily constrained Ukraine is not a buffer; it is an invitation for renewed Russian aggression and a weakened front line for European security. Ankara does not benefit from a disarmed Ukraine. It benefits from a capable Ukraine that can prevent Russia from projecting power across the Black Sea.

Second, Turkey should reject restrictions on Ukraine’s international defense-industrial cooperation. Ankara has invested heavily in joint development with Kyiv—in drones, naval systems, and engines—which strengthens both countries’ strategic autonomy. Blocking Ukraine’s access to advanced defense ecosystems would weaken Kyiv and strike at Turkey’s ambitions to become a leading regional producer of defense technologies.

Third, Turkey should resist attempts to impose “neutrality” on Ukraine. Turkey has historically supported Ukraine’s integration into NATO because a NATO-aligned Ukraine strengthens the collective deterrence against Russia in the wider Black Sea region. Ukrainian membership would reinforce NATO’s southeastern flank, helping protect the Alliance against Russia, Iran, and other revisionist actors.

More fundamentally, the idea that great powers may unilaterally impose their terms on other nations contradicts Turkey’s worldview: that sovereign states—including regional powers—must have agency to decide their own geopolitical orientation.

The interests of Ukraine, Turkey, and NATO are aligned: deterring Russia, protecting maritime infrastructure, preserving sovereignty, and preventing the normalization of territorial aggression. At this critical moment, Turkey cannot wait until the United States and Russia negotiate outcomes that reshape its neighborhood. It must reassert regional leadership, defend its strategic interests, and help secure a sustainable peace in Ukraine and in the Black Sea.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program. She previously served as a Ukrainian foreign policy adviser and diplomat, including serving in the Ukrainian embassy in Ankara from 2014 to 2018. 

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not represent the official positions of the Atlantic Council or any other institution or government.

The post Any peace deal that empowers Russia is a direct security threat to Turkey appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This opt-out has made Spain an outlier within the Alliance. In October, US President Donald Trump even suggested that NATO should consider Spain’s expulsion over its unwillingness to contribute more, calling the country a “very low payer” and hinting at potential trade retaliation.

Spain’s persistent spending shortfall

Spain’s defense spending has long fallen short of NATO’s benchmarks. Under the previous NATO benchmark of reaching 2 percent of GDP in military spending by 2024, Spain consistently underperformed, spending only about 1.2 percent in recent years. In 2024, its military budget stood at approximately €17.2 billion, or 1.24 percent of the country’s GDP, the lowest among NATO members as a percentage of economic output.

Meanwhile, most allies have increased spending to levels closer to or above 2 percent in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. As Atlantic Council Fellow Andrew Bernard noted, Spain’s promise to reach 2 percent, which it only committed to in April of this year, has yet to translate into the modern military capabilities the Alliance needs. Although Spain contributes approximately three thousand troops to NATO missions from the Baltics to the Sahel, deployment alone does not substitute for investment in equipment, readiness, and modernization.

Few within the Alliance believe Spain can meet NATO capability requirements by spending just over 2 percent of its GDP. This gap only deepens the impression that Spain is benefiting from NATO without fully contributing to it.

Domestic politics: The main barrier to higher spending

Why does Spain lag so far behind in defense spending when it is one of the fastest-growing economies in the eurozone? The answer lies mainly in domestic politics and public opinion.

Sánchez leads a fragile minority coalition dependent on left-wing and regional nationalist parties that are skeptical of increased military spending. His Socialist Party governs in partnership with the far-left parties Unidas Podemos and Sumar, and it relies on small Basque and Catalan nationalist parties to maintain a parliamentary majority. These partners view military investment with suspicion, fearing that higher defense budgets would come at the expense of social spending programs.

As Ione Belarra, one of the leaders of Podemos, bluntly put it, these parties refuse to help the government “continue licking the boots of the United States.” Pro-independence Catalan and Basque parties are equally unwilling to strengthen the Spanish army, which they historically distrust.

Public opinion reinforces these pressures. The legacy of Francisco Franco’s dictatorship left Spaniards skeptical of the military for decades, and while the armed forces have gradually gained trust through peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, there remains limited enthusiasm for large budget increases. In a recent poll by the national polling institute CIS, only around 14 percent of Spaniards supported significantly increasing the military budget, as most prioritize healthcare and education.

Spain’s official neutrality during both world wars and its largely peripheral role during the Cold War helped shape a political culture that views defense as secondary to social welfare.

A weaker ally means weaker influence

Spain’s unwillingness to spend on defense comes at a cost, particularly to its image abroad. Eastern European NATO members such as Poland and the Baltic states, which are investing heavily in defense, may interpret Spain’s stance as a troubling lack of solidarity at a critical time. Burden-sharing in NATO is ultimately about sharing risk. Spain’s refusal to invest in new capabilities raises concerns over its willingness to do so. And that reluctance carries risks of its own, given the security challenges it faces at home, including tensions with Morocco over the bordering Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla, migration pressures, and instability across the Mediterranean, which could require NATO support in the near future.

The practical implications of this credibility gap are already visible. Diplomatically, Spain has found itself sidelined in some high-profile discussions on European security. In August, for instance, Sánchez did not take part in a White House meeting of key European leaders on Ukraine, a signal of its second-tier status among allies. If Madrid is perceived in Washington or Brussels as an unreliable partner on defense, it risks further losing influence, not just on defense and security issues, but in crucial areas such as trade, as well.

The spectacle of being publicly singled out by the US president only deepens the damage. Trump’s sharp criticism of Spain and his threat of tariffs have reinforced the country’s image as an underperforming and unreliable ally. The idea that Sánchez leads “an anti-Trump coalition” may play well domestically, but it has done little to strengthen Spain’s standing abroad. In reality, no such coalition exists, and the Spanish government has failed to find allies or present any credible alternative approach, leaving Spain isolated and exposed. Consequently, Spain’s internal vulnerability is translating into external weakness.

Spain needs to make hard choices

Spain now faces a strategic choice. On the one hand, the Sánchez government can continue trying to appease its domestic political partners, delaying or limiting defense investments to maintain the support of far-left and regional factions. This path may ensure short-term governmental stability, but it will likely further erode Spain’s standing within NATO and Europe.

On the other hand, it could make the hard political choices needed to shift course, accepting that Spain’s internal fragility is already damaging its international credibility. Until then, Spain will continue to be seen as NATO’s easy target.

The Sánchez government cannot have it both ways. A country cannot expect to benefit from NATO membership with deterrence, geopolitical influence, and allied solidarity, while not meeting the targets that almost all allies, even poorer ones, are striving to meet. If Spain wants to become a reliable ally, it will need to demonstrate, not just declare, a stronger commitment. That means real budgetary increases that translate into modern jets, ships, and infrastructure.

Ultimately, the more Spain appears divided and hesitant on defense, the more it invites actors such as Russia to exploit those divisions within NATO. With Europe’s security environment the most dangerous it has been in decades, the margin for underperformance is thin. The country’s friends and even some of its critics would welcome a Spain that robustly funds its defense and contributes its full weight to transatlantic security, in accordance with its status as the European Union’s fourth-largest economy. But getting there requires the political courage to prioritize long-term national and allied security interests over short-term parliamentary survival. Until that shift occurs, Spain’s own political choices will continue to undermine its international credibility and Europe’s collective defense.

Jacobo Ramos Folch is an international policy consultant, Contributor at Newsline, and a visiting professor at Universidad de Navarra and IE University. He is part of the Atlantic Council’s European Leadership Accelerator program.

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The recently renewed push for a peace agreement between Kyiv and Moscow is once again testing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to abandon his maximalist goal of fully subjugating Ukraine. The previous failure to get Putin to negotiate earlier this year led the West to intensify energy sanctions against Russia, while Moscow engaged in nuclear saber-rattling and probed NATO territory through aircraft and drone incursions, as well as hybrid attacks on European infrastructure.

Overall, the prospects for peace appear grim: In October, a US intelligence assessment reportedly concluded that Putin has “dug in” and is committed to a long war. And NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has warned that even if there was a settlement over Ukraine, Moscow was preparing for a “long-term confrontation” with the West and could develop the capabilities to attack NATO in five years. If these current talks run break down, expect renewed escalation.

In part concerned about strategic divergence with Washington—especially in the context of US resources moving to the Asia-Pacific to deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan—European NATO members pledged in June to raise defense spending to 5 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP). And in October, the European Union (EU) approved the €800 billion “Readiness 2030” program to boost defense investment and industrial capacity.

The prospect of a prolonged, wider European war in the coming years is reshaping strategic calculations in Europe’s vulnerable “gray zones”—especially the Balkans. British officials have described the Balkans as the Kremlin’s “next playground,” a pressure point that could divert Western resources from NATO’s eastern flank. Because Russia is geographically distant from the Balkans, it has and will continue to rely on its partners—militarily-neutral Serbia and pro-Russian Serbian proxies around the region—to agitate and reopen the question of the regional borders set by the West after the 1990s wars in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

NATO has deterrence, but ‘everyone is preparing for war‘

So far, NATO countries have limited Russian troublemaking in the Balkans. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, Milorad Dodik, the Kremlin-friendly former president of Republika Srpska, repeatedly threatened the entity’s secession from Bosnia and Herzogovina only to retreat after Western pushback. And in 2023, when Belgrade-backed Serbs led by Milan Radojičić launched an armed insurgency in northern Kosovo, Kosovo’s police repelled the attack within a day while NATO—which controls Kosovo’s borders—drew clear red lines to deter Serbia’s military involvement.

Meanwhile, Belgrade has maintained plausible deniability from Dodik’s and Radojičić’s actions, conveniently gaining leverage in the West as a “moderating force.” Serbia has also sought to ease Western concerns over its intentions by purchasing French warplanes, supplying weapons to Ukraine, and offering the West access to its lithium reserves.

Yet since 2022, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has notably avoided steering Serbian society toward the West, despite Russia’s aggression in Ukraine providing an opening to do so. On the contrary, an International Republican Institute poll published in September found that in a country where the government tightly controls media narratives, 78 percent of Serbs view Putin favorably and only 6 percent see Russia as solely to blame for the war. 

Russian proxies continue to use Serbian territory for disruptive operations. Moscow favorite Aleksandar Vulin—who was discharged as Serbia’s intelligence chief two years ago under Western pressure—actively promotes the “Serbian World” project to unite Serbs across the region. Radojičić enjoys state protection, despite NATO calls for accountability over the attack on Kosovo. Officers from Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) are reportedly receiving Serbian citizenship with expedited procedures, enabling them to travel to Europe visa-free. And earlier this year, Russia even reportedly used Serbia as a base to train saboteurs to interfere in Moldova’s elections.

Serbia’s neighbors are growing increasingly wary of Belgrade’s continued ties to Russian proxies and its major military build-up over the past decade. In the event of a war between Russia and the West, neighbors worry that Serbia would use the opportunity to enact its own designs on the region. Serbia has military preponderance—it is not only the largest country in the Balkans, but also the only one spending at least 2 percent of its GDP on defense, dwarfing Kosovo’s spending by tenfold.

In line with the broader rearmament wave throughout Europe, several of Serbia’s neighbors are now ramping up their defense spending and taking joint steps to strengthen deterrence. Kosovo, for example, is planning major investments in drone and ammunition production, largely with Turkish support. In March, Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo signed a defense cooperation pact to boost interoperability, pursue joint military investments, and coordinate the procurement of arms, including US weaponry.

Earlier this year, the regional pact triggered a furious reaction from Vučic, who cast it as a sign of aggression against Serbia. Then in September, he responded with Serbia’s largest-ever military parade, displaying a mix of Western, Russian, Iranian, and Chinese equipment. In October, when it was announced that Turkey had supplied Kosovo with Skydagger kamikaze drones, Vučić posted an unusually harsh tirade against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, accusing him of “dreaming to restore the Ottoman Empire.”

Vučić’s extreme sensitivity to his neighbors’ military upgrades only reinforces their doubts about his long-term intentions. In October, Vučić remarked that “since everyone is preparing for war. . . it means there will be one”—a statement widely perceived as a threat in the region.

Insulating the Balkans from a Russian escalation

Much of this regional fearmongering is driven by domestic politics. Vučiċ’s military parades and his emphasis on threats from neighbors conveniently diverts attention from the mass protests that have shaken his rule. Regional military build-ups also have other geopolitical motives, such as securing political favor from countries through arms purchases. In Albania, for instance, defense spending is also seen as a chance to rebuild an industrial base long abandoned after it shut down its communist-era plants.

Some may therefore be tempted to downplay the motives behind the regional military build-up and argue that short-term deterrence against attempts to change Balkan borders remains strong. NATO and the EU still have decisive leverage, and the region’s fresh memory of war is a powerful restraint. Trump’s “peace through strength” approach may also have curbed troublemaking in a region reliant on US security.

But a broader war—one Europe is now arming for—would erode these deterrence factors, deepen security dilemmas, and heighten the risk of miscalculation, creating openings for Russia to incite and enable a new front. The United States and its European partners must therefore use this moment to insulate the Balkans from Moscow’s leverage.

Serbia’s continued nonalignment remains the core problem, giving Russia room to operate and fuel revisionism in the region. Vučić’s geopolitical balancing is the oxygen of his rule: it lets him coerce the West by casting himself as the guarantor of stability. The West’s tolerance for this has enabled democratic backsliding in Serbia and stalled the prospects of EU accession for Western Balkan countries, a goal that was originally intended to make the region’s borders irrelevant and sustain peace.

There are signs that the West is moving to constrain Vučić’s maneuvering. The Trump administration’s decision last month to push Gazprom out of Serbia’s energy sector and end sanctions exemptions on the country’s oil and gas companies is a good start to reduce Belgrade’s dependency on Moscow. EU officials are also speaking more plainly about Serbia’s trajectory and emphasizing the costs of Vučić’s policies. Moreover, Brussels is now accelerating the EU path of neighboring Albania and Montenegro while sidelining Serbia, making clear the opportunity costs of nonalignment.

Going forward, the United States should continue supporting allies in the region that are investing in their own defense, enabling them to become security contributors and to deter threats by increasing the costs of aggression. But nothing will reduce the risk of future escalation in the region more than the consolidation of the region’s security architecture. Getting Kosovo recognized by Serbia and fully embedded in Western security structures such as NATO, for example, would be a regional game changer.  

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

The post What prolonged Russian aggression against Europe could mean for the Balkans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 26, 2022, the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines began leaking gas in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Sweden and Denmark. It quickly became clear that the leak was not a technical fault but the result of explosions. In the months and weeks before the leak, Germany, the main importer of the Russian gas carried by Nord Stream, had completely cut its Russian gas imports.¹ It had also declined to certify Nord Stream 2, the second pipeline, which was full of gas and ready to commence operations.² Nord Stream AG—Nord Stream 1’s owner—had, in turn, scheduled maintenance suspensions, some of which were not part of standard maintenance. The two pipelines, conceived of during the peak of globalization but long opposed by the Baltic states and Poland, had become so geopolitically fraught that the explosions were quickly interpreted as an act of state-linked sabotage. Most analysts reasoned that Russia must have orchestrated the explosions as an act of revenge against Western countries slashing their imports of Russian gas.

Almost precisely one year later, on October 8, 2023, the Balticconnector pipeline connecting Finland and Estonia began leaking gas in the Gulf of Finland, the easternmost part of the Baltic Sea.³ Investigators soon established that the pipeline had been hit by the Hong Kong-flagged, Chinese-owned boxship Newnew Polar Bear.⁴ So had an undersea data cable. Even though different countries and outfits launched individual responses, the Newnew Polar Bear managed to sail through the Baltic Sea and along Norway’s coast before reaching Russian waters, where it was completely out of investigators’ reach.

Just over a year later, the Baltic Sea region was struck by another suspicious undersea incident. On November 17, 2024, a data cable connecting Sweden and Lithuania was damaged. So was a data cable connecting Finland and Germany, the only cable connecting Finland with the European continent. Authorities quickly identified a suspect, the Chinese-owned and Chinese-flagged bulk carrier Yi Peng 3.⁵ Vessels from different Baltic Sea states shadowed the bulker, but they could not detain it because it was sailing in EEZs, not territorial waters. After sailing through the Danish Straits—which count as international waters, not territorial ones—the ship stopped in Denmark’s EEZ.⁶ It remained there with China, the flag state, blocking Danish and other local investigators from boarding the ship. On December 20, the Chinese authorities allowed investigators from Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Germany to board, but only under Chinese supervision and only for a truncated visit.⁷ The following day, the bulker left.

A few weeks later, on Christmas Day, the Cook Islands-flagged tanker Eagle S struck one interconnector (power cable) and four data cables in the Gulf of Finland.⁸ Because the tanker was a shadow vessel known to the Finnish and Estonian authorities, both had been monitoring it.

There is no standard intergovernmental definition of “shadow vessel,” but the Atlantic Council’s Threats to the global maritime order project has developed this set of criteria.

After the Eagle S had struck the fifth cable and was approaching yet another cable, the Finnish police and coast guard dramatically boarded and detained it.⁹ They did so in Finland’s EEZ—a highly controversial move because coastal states only have jurisdiction in their territorial waters, with limited rights in the EEZ.¹⁰ However, the Finnish authorities reasoned that they had no choice but to detain the ship in the EEZ, because not doing so would have resulted in even more cables being struck.¹¹

The following month, the Maltese-flagged bulk carrier Vezhen struck a data cable connecting Sweden and Latvia. When the bulker approached Sweden, authorities escorted it into Swedish territorial waters, then seized it.¹² However, because the prosecutor couldn’t prove that the bulker’s crew had intentionally released the anchor, the investigation was shelved and the ship and crew were released.¹³

Between and after these high-profile incidents, ships were spotted behaving suspiciously near undersea cables and pipelines. The sightings, and especially the incidents, have highlighted a troubling reality: governments and undersea-infrastructure operators can no longer assume that ships will only hit undersea installations by accident. On the contrary, they must now assume that the waters above the cables and pipelines are frequented by state and non-state actors wishing to damage these installations.

This matters because existing cables and pipelines are indispensable to the functioning of the countries they connect. What is more, the continuing digital transformation and the advance of artificial intelligence (AI) will require even more undersea data cables, and the green transition will require even more undersea power cables. These undersea power cables transport electricity between different countries, between countries and islands, and between offshore wind farms and the mainland. For Europe, the need to replace Russian gas imports makes undersea pipelines providing gas from Norway essential.

A coordination cell takes on saboteurs and the shadow fleet

Even though it has long been known that saboteurs could target undersea cables and pipelines, countries and organizations affiliated with them have historically refrained from doing so, if only because the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) bans deliberate damage of undersea installations. Terrorist organizations, for their part, have had little interest in conducting attacks that would not result in dramatic footage. Although some damage to undersea cables and pipelines over the decades has been attributed to criminals, nation-state involvement has been exceedingly rare.

That explains why, in September 2022, the Nord Stream explosions caught Baltic Sea nations and the rest of the world by surprise.¹⁴ Because the explosions occurred in the EEZs of Sweden and Denmark, the two countries launched investigations. As one of two countries connected by the pipelines, Germany also launched an investigation. Russia, the other country connected by the pipelines, repeatedly accused the three other countries of not sharing information about their investigations with Russian authorities.¹⁵ These protestations were widely condemned and ridiculed by Western commentators, who assumed that Russia was behind the explosions.

Even after the incident, Nord Stream’s extremely high profile led the three countries to believe the attack had been a one-off incident. NATO and the Baltic Sea nations did not see a need to establish protocols in case further attacks occurred, though NATO tasked Hans-Werner Wiermann, a retired German general, with mapping out what role the Alliance could play in coordinating the response to future incidents. Wiermann responded by establishing a coordination cell, based at NATO headquarters, which would function as a clearinghouse of information between different agencies in different member states. The coordination cell began operations in early 2023.¹⁶

The coordination cell was, however, dependent on receiving all necessary information from authorities in NATO member states, and that stream of information was not yet fully functional when the Balticconnector began leaking gas. The lack of a NATO-wide protocol for such incidents meant that Finland and Estonia activated their national protocols, but that information was not systematically shared across NATO and national authorities. As a result, a few allies and NATO institutions independently discovered that an incident had taken place and began investigating. However, there was no regular coordination between the different entities. That meant that it took hours before the Newnew Polar Bear was identified as a suspect and, by that point, the boxship had left the EEZs of Finland and Estonia and struck a nearby data cable.¹⁷ The authorities later realized that the Chinese-owned ship appeared to have cut a data cable in Sweden’s EEZ before hitting the Balticconnector.

Precisely because there were no NATO-wide protocols for such situations, and also because Sweden was not yet a member of NATO, the information did not reach the right authorities and officials quickly enough. That enabled the Newnew Polar Bear to make its way through the Baltic Sea, through the Danish Straits, along the Norwegian coast, and into Russian waters before the respective countries’ authorities—and NATO—could decide what actions to take. (The Newnew Polar Bear had, in coordination with Russian authorities, recently undertaken a pioneering journey through Russia’s Northern Sea Route.¹⁸) “Where we were in 2023 was that damage to undersea cables and pipelines was in the risk scenarios, there was acknowledgement that these kinds of incidents could happen,” said Erkki Tori, Estonia’ national security advisor. “But I don’t think that we truly acknowledged the multinational nature of these incidents. What we learned in Estonia after the Newnew Polar Bear incident was that you need to have a very operational relationship with different nations that you share the undersea infrastructure with. And not only on one level, but on multiple levels: the government level, the agency level, but also on the level of the companies that use or co-own the infrastructure.”¹⁹

Since then, communication protocols and coordination have improved. Tori added: “On a bilateral basis [with Finland], we have tried to maintain and enhance the relationships that we built as a response to the Newnew Polar Bear incident. If you move further from there onto a regional perspective, you need such relationships across the region as well, because even just one moving ship might be a problem for various critical undersea infrastructure objects. You need to have the same kind of awareness, the same kind of response protocol throughout the region as well.”²⁰

A new NATO task force patrols the Baltic Sea

In March 2024, Sweden was finally admitted to NATO after Turkey dropped its opposition. A few months later, in October, Germany stood up Commander Task Force (CTF) Baltic.²¹ While NATO has other CTFs, CTF Baltic took on special significance the moment it was created, as it was seen as another response to the undersea incidents, with a role completely different from that of NATO’s coordination cell.

CTF Baltic, based in the German port city of Rostock, has some ninety naval officers, most of them from the Bundeswehr, with others on loan from Baltic Sea nations and even southern European countries like Italy. It also commands a fleet of naval vessels and some aircraft, most of which belong to the Bundeswehr while others are on loan from allies.

While CTF Baltic’s official task is “to coordinate naval activities in the region with Germany’s allies and provide them with a current joint maritime situational picture around the clock,” its focus since its inception has been on the shadow fleet and threats to undersea installations. “The Baltic Sea may seem like a small ocean, but it’s a significant body of water to patrol,” said Brian Svendsen of the Danish Navy, CTF Baltic’s assistant chief of staff for current and future operations. “We focus on the shipping lanes, on ships that have previously been identified as a potential source of concern, and naturally monitoring the undersea installations.”²²

Although CTF Baltic is a German entity, it undertakes its activities on behalf of NATO’s Maritime Command (MARCOM). It does so not only by patrolling selected parts of the Baltic Sea, but also by monitoring ship movements from land, including through radar. When the leaders of NATO’s Baltic littoral states announced the creation of Baltic Sentry in January 2025, it was not a matter of a new organization but rather a new component for CTF Baltic.²³ Baltic Sentry essentially added more vessels, patrol aircraft, and staff to the setup already in place in Rostock.²⁴ “We had found that in order to show that we take the threat to undersea installations seriously, we need allied presence on top of our national presence,” Tori said. “And by we, I don’t mean just Estonia and Finland. On a national basis, we already have ships patrolling. Baltic Sentry is there to show solidarity and as a very practical measure, a way of demonstrating vigilance.”²⁵

Around the same time that NATO allies launched Baltic Sentry, the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) activated Nordic Warden, a monitoring system that “harnesses AI to assess data from a range of sources, including the Automatic Identification System (AIS) ships use to broadcast their position, to calculate the risk posed by each vessel entering areas of interest.”²⁶ Nordic Warden was also integrated into CTF Baltic’s operations. (The United Kingdom-led JEF also comprises Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.)

Only a few weeks after CTF Baltic was launched, the Yi Peng 3 incident occurred, and the Eagle S and Vezhen incidents occurred after that, but the Baltic Sea has not experienced any suspicious undersea incidents since January 2025. “That is a sign that the deterrence we provide is working,” Svendsen said. As with all deterrence, it is impossible to ascertain whether the deterrent has worked or whether no further incidents were being planned, but mounting deterrence is better than testing one’s luck without it.

Either way, the Baltic Sea countries today have in place collaboration, monitoring, and response options that are a far cry from where they were when the Newnew Polar Bear struck the Balticconnector in October 2023. When shadow vessels approach undersea cables and pipelines, CTF Baltic monitors them. Should another vessel start behaving suspiciously around undersea installations, the task force will detect that too. Also, coastal states’ coast guards and navies conduct regular patrols, and the countries’ authorities systematically share updates in a manner that simply was not in place in mid-2023 and earlier. Their efforts also show how NATO member states can succeed in addressing regional threats without the entire Alliance needing to become involved.

In addition, Tori noted, the European Union (EU) is also part of the efforts to restore order in the Baltic Sea, not just through its sanctions on specific shadow vessels. EU officials also engage with counterparts in the countries that flag the shadow vessels. Today such countries—flags of extreme convenience, to use the phrase coined by this author—include the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Comoros. In a noteworthy development that reflects European outreach, Barbados, Gabon, and the Cook Islands—which had been popular flag states for shadow vessels—have announced they will de-flag ships sanctioned by Western governments.²⁷ While incidents involving undersea infrastructure are not limited to shadow vessels, the fact that shadow vessels skirt rules and have opaque ownership structures makes them more likely candidates for suspicious incidents than conventional ships.

In addition, the EU is implementing its Action Plan on Cable Security, which it passed in February 2025. Among other measures, the plan involves steps to further develop information exchange and strengthen joint repair capabilities.²⁸

If, or when, another suspicious incident involving undersea cables or pipelines occurs, it is less clear how NATO, the EU, or the nations and entities now involved in the efforts to protect this infrastructure would respond. “We’d deploy there straight away, and it’s important to remember that the Baltic Sea is bigger than it seems,” Svendsen explained. “We can’t be everywhere all the time. In case of an incident, we’d deploy to the site and monitor it, but the response is up to the coastal state because it decides what can be done depends on that country’s legal system. And it’s important to remember that the owners of cables and pipelines have primary responsibility for their security. CTF Baltic and NATO are there to assist, but not to provide all-round security.”²⁹

As a military alliance, NATO is also not in charge of responding to suspected underwater sabotage; coastal states are. In the Baltic Sea, vessels seconded to CTF Baltic can return to national command if needed in incident response. But the question remains how the coastal states and NATO would respond. For now, they seem to bet that patrolling and monitoring the Baltic Sea will deter sabotage of undersea installations—but like all deterrence efforts, these activities are at best an educated guess. The real test for the Baltic Sea nations, and NATO, will arrive if—or when—a vessel ignores CTF Baltic’s patrols and coastal states’ instructions to change course.

From the Baltics to the South China Sea

The Baltic Sea is the region most affected by Russia’s shadow vessels and—together with Taiwan—the region most affected by suspicious incidents involving undersea cables and pipelines. At the time of the Newnew Polar Bear incident in October 2023, individual countries had impressive response protocols, but there were no real protocols involving information sharing and response with other countries. That situation has dramatically improved. Today, the Baltic Sea countries systematically share information, aided by NATO’s coordination cell, and consistently exchange updates and information with cable and pipeline operators, while national authorities and CTF Baltic monitor traffic around the clock and are able to deploy in case of an incident.

What is less clear is how CTF Baltic and national authorities would respond in case of an incident in which a vessel refuses to obey orders to move or has already struck a cable or pipeline and refuses orders to halt. Such rules of engagement cannot be established by CTF Baltic or national authorities. Instead, they depend on what NATO decides constitutes an aggressive act that could trigger Article 5.

CTF Baltic and Baltic Sea countries can bring further attention to suspicious incidents by adopting the Philippines’ strategy of total transparency. In contested parts of the South China Sea, where the Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia harass Philippine and other vessels, the Philippine Coast Guard patrols the waters and films each dangerous Chinese activity. At times, the Philippine Coast Guard also invites reporters on board its vessels. This gives the public at home and abroad a better understanding of the dangerous activities transpiring in the South China Sea. A similar strategy could help educate the public about the situation in the Baltic Sea. As in the South China Sea, those involved in dangerous activities in the Baltic Sea are likely to be immune to naming and shaming, but public attention would increase the pressure on them and, at the same time, educate the public about actions their governments might need to take.

Fellow

Elisabeth Braw

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Resilience & Society

Threats to the global maritime order

Learn more about the Atlantic Council’s project Threats to the global maritime order: Protecting the freedom of the seas.

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Geopolitical tensions are undermining the mostly apolitical system that has regulated shipping since the 1950s, but hazards remain on the high seas. Countries interested in curtailing the rise of shadow vessels and the associated risks of accidents and environmental damage should band together to keep their waters places where the highest standards apply.

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On November 26, Andrew Michta, nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Scowcroft Center, was interviewed for an article in “Defense24”. He argues that as proposed, the deal could reward Russia and prove costly for Ukraine.

Fellow

Andrew A. Michta

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta interviewed in Defense24 on Ukraine peace plan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“Thursday is it.” Today US President Donald Trump gave Ukraine a Thanksgiving deadline to approve a twenty-eight-point peace plan. The proposal reportedly gives Russia large chunks of Ukrainian territory and restricts Ukraine’s armed forces, while providing Ukraine a new security guarantee—though without Western troops. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the choice could come down to “loss of dignity, or the risk of losing a key partner.” As always, we turned to our plan of asking our experts to assess the proposal and what to expect next. 

• Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser Family distinguished fellow and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe 
• John E. Herbst  (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine 
• Leslie Shedd (@leslieshedd): Nonresident fellow at the Eurasia Center and former senior advisor to members of the US Congress, as well as US senatorial and presidential candidates

What’s in the deal

• Dan calls the US proposal “a hot mess” because it “is sloppy, internally inconsistent, and retreats from Trump’s stated position on ending the conflict—for example, that the current front line be the cease-fire line.” 
• The idea of granting Russia all of the Donbas region even without the Kremlin having conquered it on the battlefield is “a fatuous idea,” John argues, “rewarding the aggressor.” 
• But John adds that the inclusion of language on security guarantees is “a possible positive,” and a strong bilateral guarantee from the United States “would certainly deter future Russian aggression, because the Russians are afraid of our military.” 
• Dan also notes the deal’s “workable elements, including a provision that all commitments to Russia fall if it again attacks Ukraine” and points out that “we saw earlier this year how a bad initial US proposal—the ‘minerals deal’—could be transformed into a reasonable deal for development and a plus for US-Ukraine relations.” 

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Trumpology

• Leslie says Trump believes that the refusal of his predecessor, Joe Biden, “to send Ukraine the weapons it needed to fully repel Russia early in the invasion (and before Russian troops became entrenched inside the country) created a stalemate that Ukraine is unlikely to break.”  
• So in Trump’s mind, Leslie says, “a negotiated settlement that includes giving up some land is likely the only way to stop the killing.”  
• With European leaders now trying to get involved, John says he expects Trump to be receptive to their views, given that “several of those European leaders have terrific relations with Trump.” European leaders’ moves to increase “defense spending and willingness to put European troops on the ground in Ukraine have been important in making it harder for Putin to sell snake oil to the White House.”  
• John notes that “Trump is a mercurial figure,” who moves in different directions as he seeks a solution. “There have obviously been times when that’s worked for him. I don’t think that works in the current war because Putin’s aim has not changed. He is not going to give up his desire of achieving effective political control of Ukraine.” 

The next moves

• “The Ukrainians are in a tight place,” Dan says, because if they reject the plan “they are apt to trigger another Trump explosion and even more US withdrawal of support for Ukraine.”  
• So Dan advises Zelenskyy to work with Trump on the text. “It will not be pretty. But the Ukrainian objective should be to make sure the peace plan is not a disaster and to avoid blame for its likely failure.”  
• If they do reach a deal, Leslie says the Trump administration should submit the agreement to the US Senate to ratify as a treaty. “This will send a powerful message to Putin that Republicans and Democrats in both the executive and legislative branches are united in their commitment to following through on the security guarantees if [Putin] puts a toe into Ukraine again.”  

The post The good, the bad, and the ugly in the US peace plan for Ukraine  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This month, a deliberate act of sabotage occurred on the Polish-Ukrainian railway corridor, where an explosion destroyed a section of track used to transport goods to Ukraine. The suspects reportedly escaped across the border into Belarus. A year earlier, Warsaw faced a high-profile arson attack that nearly destroyed a large shopping warehouse on the city’s outskirts; the Polish government attributed the incident to Russian involvement.

Throughout this year, drone sightings have forced temporary closures and flight cancellations at major airports in Copenhagen, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Brussels, Liège, Oslo, Riga, and Gothenburg. These disruptions remain under investigation, but authorities across the continent increasingly view them as part of a broader pattern of hostile activity.

In response to the recent railway sabotage—and amid mounting evidence of Russian responsibility—Poland has launched Operation Horizon. The operation is a nationwide security initiative designed to prevent further attacks on rail corridors, logistics hubs, and other critical sites that could be targets of arson, disruption, or coordinated cyber operations. Up to ten thousand military personnel will be deployed, with the Territorial Defense Forces and Poland’s rapidly expanding cyber units playing a central role.

The scale and visibility of this effort recall the internal security measures introduced in several Western European countries after terrorist attacks in the early 2000s, including in Spain, France, the United Kingdom, and Belgium. But the situation in Poland today is different. Here, the threat comes not from a dispersed extremist network but from a nuclear-armed state deliberately probing the defenses of a NATO ally.

Russia’s “platformization” of sabotage

Before 2022, Russian-linked acts of sabotage appeared only sporadically and were usually directed at military targets. They also tended to occur at times of political significance. Over the past two years, however, such incidents have multiplied across NATO states and begun to form a recognizable pattern.

The incidents tend to share several traits: They are cheap to execute, hard to attribute quickly, and carry psychological weight. They create the impression that Europe’s security architecture is penetrable even inside NATO and the European Union (EU). That atmosphere of uncertainty is the intent.

A major driver behind the rising tempo of these operations is Moscow’s shift away from its traditional intelligence networks. After the expulsion of hundreds of Russian diplomats across Europe, many of whom served as intelligence officers, the Kremlin adapted. What has emerged is a fragmented, semi-outsourced approach that resembles a gig-economy model. Individuals recruited through Telegram or other online platforms, often with little understanding of who they are working for, carry out disruptive tasks for modest payments. Cryptocurrency transfers replace diplomatic pouches, and encrypted messages substitute for direct handling.

This approach gives Moscow several advantages: 

• It reduces exposure: When someone is caught, tracing responsibility becomes difficult.
• It lowers operational costs: Sabotage turns into a low-budget tool of statecraft.
• It exploits existing local tensions, especially when the perpetrators appear to be migrants, fringe activists, or opportunistic locals.

The goal is not just to damage infrastructure but also to sow distrust inside Western societies. Involving Ukrainians, EU citizens, or individuals with no political motivation helps Moscow feed narratives that allied states are infiltrated or internally divided.

Why the Kremlin feels free to escalate

Three strategic calculations underpin Russia’s willingness to intensify such operations.

First, Western responses so far have not created meaningful deterrence. Diplomatic notes, investigations, and targeted sanctions signal concern but do not carry meaningful consequences for Russia. For a regime that habitually probes boundaries, this looks less like a warning and more like permission to continue.

Second, even disruptions that serve no military value can have a profound psychological effect. A fire in a warehouse or a derailed train can dominate headlines and fuel anxiety at minimal cost.

Third, Russia wants to wear down long-term support for Kyiv. If Western publics begin to link aid to Ukraine with rising domestic insecurity, pressure on governments to rethink their commitments might increase. In Poland, this dynamic also feeds anti-migrant and anti-Ukrainian narratives, amplified by the fact that a pro-Russian presidential candidate attracted 1.2 million votes in the 2025 presidential election.

From Moscow’s perspective, this approach is producing results. Western (and more specifically Polish) unity holds, but its endurance is being tested more often, and the political price is rising.

A missing counterstrategy

Europe has improved infrastructure protection and intelligence cooperation, but the overall approach remains mostly defensive. If sabotage is now a permanent element of Russia’s confrontation with the West, then the response needs to match that reality.

This means agreeing on a common framework for hybrid deterrence, speeding up joint investigations to establish attribution quickly, and strengthening societal resilience against disinformation and panic. In practice, this would mean shared alerting procedures, joint threat-analysis cells, and faster intelligence exchange to trigger automatic, coordinated responses of all EU member states. Poland here has a bigger role to play as it has more skin in the game (it borders Russia from the north and Belarus from the east). And also it has the growing military and intelligence capacity other EU member states lack. 

Russia is waging a long, low-cost pressure campaign that targets not only the battlefield but everyday life across EU countries. The Kremlin wants Europeans to feel that they are at war, or close to it, and therefore that supporting Ukraine is no longer worth the risk. Now is the time for Europe to develop and use countermeasures to deter Russia’s hybrid threats and bolster societal resilience in the face of Moscow’s sabotage campaign. Because tomorrow, a successful attack could mean hundreds or even thousands of lives lost.

Piotr Arak is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post Russia’s shadow war: How the Kremlin uses sabotage to wear down Europe appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the US role in the Sahel is weakening, Turkey’s role is rising. With new defense agreements, increasing diplomatic engagements, and joint economic development projects with new, junta governments that espouse anti-colonial rhetoric in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, Turkey finds itself working in the same theater as the Kremlin to fill the void left after Western forces departed. Turkey’s new trusted status among Sahelian governments and its state-led approach make it one of the nations positioned to influence regional security dynamics during a time when other Western powers are constrained. Although Turkish efforts in the Sahel have been primarily based on its own strategic ambitions and national interests, Ankara’s growing influence offers a rare channel through which the United States and its allies could recalibrate their approaches to the region. 

The Sahel’s break with the West 

Since these coups and the establishment of military juntas in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, France and the United States have faced the annulment of defense agreements in the region, French and US troops have withdrawn from the region, the European Union’s Takuba Force ceased anti-Jihadist operations in Mali, and, in January, Niger revoked a counterterrorism accord with the United States, demanding the withdrawal of 1,000 US troops from the country. The United States has laws that prohibit it from assisting governments that have overthrown democratic governments, including clear guidance from the US State Department against foreign assistance to Niger, and now Washington finds itself without a clear role in the Sahel.

The region’s Western-backed security architecture has collapsed: Three withdrawals (i.e., Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger) prompted the dissolution of the Group of Five (G5) for the Sahel. The same three departures from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has left the Sahel searching for new patrons and new strategic frameworks. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, for example, have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a political and defense bloc that rejects old alignments. To fill the new defense void, alternative partners without the baggage of colonial legacy—most notably Russia and Turkey—have stepped in, offering defense cooperation without the governance conditions demanded by the West. 

The United States, which provided humanitarian aid, economic investment, and security forces to the region for roughly a decade prior to the coups, lost much of its ability to advance regional security interests when it was pushed out of the region. Its ability to monitor threats in the region and in neighboring countries like Libya, coordinate strategies with local forces, and access crucial intelligence was significantly degraded. Although US security operations in the region have been constrained by new partnerships, it still has options. Opportunities remain through indirect engagement—particularly with actors that retain both credibility on the ground and diplomatic standing in the West. Turkey is one of the only powers operating in the Sahel that meets both criteria.

​Turkey’s role amid a shrinking Western presence, rising Russian influence

Turkey’s military cooperation in the Sahel draws on nearly two decades of experience positioning itself as a rising power in Africa, rooted in its 2003 ​​​​Strategic Depth​ doctrine and early initiatives like the “Strategy for the Development of Economic Relations with Africa” and the “year of Africa” in 2005—the same year it secured observer status in the African Union. Initially, Turkey relied on soft power, leveraging shared Ottoman heritage, cultural diplomacy, and economic partnerships to expand its influence. However, what began as a soft-power push—through development aid, cultural ties, and embassy openings—has evolved into a defense and infrastructure strategy, especially under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s aim to position Turkey as a leader among emerging powers. Turkish delegations have conducted regular visits to AES capitals, striking arms and infrastructure deals while pursuing bilateral military agreements.  

At the same time, Russia, too, has made swift inroads. It is capitalizing on anti-colonial sentiment and offering support through its largest private military company, the Wagner Group, to provide “training, close protection, and counter-terrorism operations.” Through proxy forces, Russia has gained access to political influence and resource extraction in exchange for security-force training, arms deals, and protection of junta leaders. Russia’s use of proxy forces has allowed it to distance itself from Russian casualties and military failures. 

However, Russia’s war in Ukraine has slowed its operations in the Sahel. Across AES, Russian forces are stretched thin. Despite Russia’s success in stabilizing the Touadéra regime in the Central African Republic in 2021—a conflict that gave Russia defense legitimacy despite the fact that Sahel—Russian forces have largely been unsuccessful. In 2024, fifty-one percent of global terrorism-related deaths took place in the Sahel. This was the deadliest year in the Sahel’s history as the region remains mired in conflict and plagued by violent insurgencies, fragile state institutions, and waning international engagement. 

​​​​In the Sahel, Turkey can play the same role as Russia. Turkey can offer Sahelian militaries affordable, “rapidly deployable” equipment. And Russia, which has been struggling to keep up with military-industrial demands, is an increasingly unreliable partner. Sahelian clients grew more discontented with the Russian proxy forces’ unsuccessful operations and inability to fulfill weapons contracts, and the Wagner Group officially left Mali, announcing on Telegram that its mission was accomplished. In its place, Russia plans to consolidate its troops under the Russian Ministry of Defens​​​​e-backed Africa Corps. Reestablishing connections, building trust, and establishing higher capacity supply lines will take time; meanwhile, alternative partners like Turkey are in place in the Sahel and can take advantage of the Kremlin’s declining foreign-operations capacity. 

In contrast to Russia’s focus on mercenary deployments and ​​​​direct-combat missions, Turkey offers a more varied tool​ ​kit: combining diplomacy, state-to-state defense deals, economic engagement, intelligence sharing, and technology transfers. Turkey’s defense industry, particularly its drone sector, made early moves into the African market, supplying low-cost, high-capability platforms like Baykar’s Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci drones. These have become cornerstones of AES air power, and are ​​​​​often more cost-effective​ than systems from Iran, Israel, or even Russia. 

Turkey is now the main producer of combat drones for Africa, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (part of the US Department of Defense). In December 2024 Mali received Turkish Akinci drones in addition to its eight TB2 drones; Niger has purchased six TB2 drones, five Karayel-SU drones, and Aksungur drones; and Burkina Faso has purchased at least six TB2s and two Turkish Akinci drones. These drones are managed and operated out of local airbases, like the Niamey air base in Niger or the Bamako Air Base 101 in Mali, and are managed by a “hyper-closed circle” of high-ranking officials. In early April 2025, Mali was also found to be using MAM-T bombs 20 kilometers from its border with Algeria when a Turkish-made Akinci drone was shot down. This was the first time the Malian armed forces were found to be using MAM-T bombs, which are guided, high-explosive fragmentation munitions that can be strapped to Bayrak drones, and are manufactured by Turkish company Roketsan. 

On the ground, Turkey’s engagement increasingly makes up for declining Russian power. Turkish drones and, ​​​​​​reportedly, Turkish-hired Syrian mercenaries disrupt insurgent operations in areas where state forces are absent, helping to alleviate local manpower shortages. ​​​​​Although unconfirmed, Sadat, a private Turkish military contractor often referred to as Erdogan’s “parallel army,” was alleged to have sent more than one thousand Turkish-trained Syrian mercenaries to Niger and Burkina Faso in 2024, ​​​​tasked with protecting mines, petroleum infrastructure, and military installations​. This is not the ​​first time​​ Sadat has been accused of using Syrian ​​mercenaries​​ in foreign conflicts.

Already, Turkey has increased intelligence-sharing capabilities in the region through its intelligence agency, Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, which recently opened a hub in Niger. Its growing network​ of embassies, companies, and security personnel across the Sahel gives Ankara access to critical information, which can influence security operations.

Turkey’s economic expansion in the Sahel

Turkey has slowly expanded its influence in the Sahel by expanding its security operations simultaneously with its commercial agreements. 

While the AES has implicitly distanced itself from former colonial powers through new security partnerships and arms contracts, the three states are also turning to alternative partners for economic support. They had perceived prior Western economic conditions as unfair and are seeking more beneficial economic relationships. After revoking mining licenses and pulling out of economic partnerships with the West, the Sahel now needs new partners to help develop its potentially lucrative energy and raw materials sectors.  

Since the 2010s, Turkey has increasingly engaged with Africa’s energy sector, leveraging its 2017 National Energy and Mining Policy to enhance its energy independence. It has signed agreements with at least seventeen African countries across North, West, and East Africa, as well as the Horn of Africa, focusing on renewables and critical minerals. Trade volumes between Turkey and Africa increased from ​​​​$5.4 billion in 2003 to $40.7 billion in 2022, and a ​​​​growing number of Turkish companies are expanding their operations in Africa. 

Turkey now has greater reason to diversify its imports away from Russia and Iran— given the disruption of trade patterns by conflicts in Ukraine, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East—and toward Africa. The Sahel’s underdeveloped energy sector offers Turkey a foothold in new supply routes and economic opportunities.  

A Turkish energy company has taken a leading role in Mali, supplying 60 megawatts of power and building a heavy fuel oil power plant. Turkish exports to Mali rose from $87 million in 2021 to $111 million in 2023. Similarly, Turkey has boosted trade with Burkina Faso, despite regulatory hurdles in the mining sector. Exports rose from less than $100 million prior to 2020 to $166 million in 2024, reflecting Ankara’s deeper economic engagement with the new military government. 

In the Sahel region, Niger has traditionally been Turkey’s strongest energy partner in the region. Turkey and Niger have signed bilateral mining agreements and oil and natural gas agreements, established a working committee​ to expand economic cooperation, and held leadership-level discussions about infrastructure development projects​ in northern Niger. Turkish firms have been uniquely willing to engage in high-volatility regions, implementing critical infrastructure, energy, and mining projects simultaneously with increased defense cooperation. 

The Sahel’s mineral wealth is critical to Turkey’s industrial ambitions and plans to become a processing hub for critical minerals. Turkey’s defense industry depends heavily on critical minerals used in advanced weaponry, aerospace systems, and batteries and, at the same time, Turkey’s rising clean technology industry has accelerated the need for lithium, nickel, copper, and other raw minerals. While Turkey is beginning to build up its raw mineral processing capabilities in an attempt to limit foreign control over critical supply chains, Ankara is in search of suppliers for these materials.  

With limited domestic reserves and rising industrial needs, Ankara is targeting the region’s large supplies of raw materials. Mali is Africa’s second-largest lithium producer; Niger is a leading exporter of uranium; and Burkina Faso is a major gold supplier. Though Turkey has domestic reserves of tungsten, graphite, and cobalt, access to the Sahel’s minerals enables Turkey to compete in global markets and develop its own processing base. 

Through diplomatic and corporate efforts, Turkey has tried to secure access to gold and uranium in Niger, the world’s seventh-largest producer of uranium; Turkish and Azerbaijani companies have discussed joint mining projects in the Sahel; and, until recently, a Turkish company held the industrial exploitation rights of the largest gold mine and the largest manganese mine in Burkina Faso. Russian companies have likewise expanded their economic presence in the Sahel; Russian companies ​​​​have signed lithium mining deals with Mali, lithium and uranium mining deals with Niger, and deals on nuclear cooperation with Burkina Faso. While Western companies have been sidelined, governments in the Sahel remain open to cooperation with both Ankara and Moscow. Turkey, as a NATO ally that retains the political space to operate in these markets, is a potential counterbalance to Russia’s growing influence while advancing its own strategic and industrial objectives.

Solution-based diplomacy in a security-first landscape

What sets Turkey apart from other external actors—especially Russia—is the diversity of its engagement. Unlike Moscow’s arms-for-access model, which is often viewed as exploitative and destabilizing, Ankara has prioritized a ​​​​multifaceted approach that includes trade, infrastructure, defense, diplomacy, and development. Turkish-African trade spans sectors from textiles to healthcare and energy, and Turkey’s public and private sectors have actively invested in education and capacity building across the continent. This “solution-based” diplomacy contrasts sharply with Russia’s security-first playbook. 

Yet Turkey’s growing presence in contested regions comes with risks. Infrastructure investments in unstable political environments require security guarantees—and that often means greater military involvement. As Ankara deepens its footprint, it must decide whether to align more openly with Russia, or to use its position to mediate and potentially counter Russian influence. 

Turkey is viewed by many African leaders as a reliable, noncolonial partner. This gives Ankara access that Western powers now lack. While Turkey has not publicly aligned with US or European policy in the Sahel, its access and credibility in the region offer an opportunity to bridge the growing gap between Western interests and Sahelian realities. 

If Ankara chooses to leverage this position, it could quietly support Western objectives—sharing intelligence, coordinating security policies, or shaping development strategies that undercut Russian influence. Turkey would not be acting as a Western proxy, but as a sovereign actor leveraging its credibility and access to serve both its own interests and those of the broader international order. In a region where Western engagement is rapidly shrinking, Turkey’s role may become indispensable—not as a rival, but as a crucial partner.

Not a proxy but a pathway: The West’s reentry point in the Sahel

The power balance between Russia and Turkey is markedly different from conflict zones where they stood or stand on opposite sides—such as Syria, Libya, Ukraine, and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. In the Sahel, both powers are engaging the same postcoup regimes—Russia through mercenary-led counterinsurgency and Turkey through state-led arms deals, drone operations, and economic development. They are not in direct confrontation in the Sahel, nor are they locked in zero-sum competition. Instead, they operate in parallel, often in the same theaters and with the same governments, but with divergent methods, capabilities, and long-term goals. 

Parallel engagement between Russia and Turkey raises security concerns for Western powers who have lost their influence in the region, but it also creates a unique opening. While Russian security forces have been largely unsuccessful in their efforts to mitigate threats in the Sahel, Turkey has an opportunity to increase its engagement with local forces. And as the only Western partner force that is directly engaging with the region, Ankara can potentially disrupt Russian influence and coordinate with the West on security strategy. Its access to critical mineral assets, defense infrastructure, and high-level political relationships across the AES bloc can offer the West indirect access to a region from which it has been largely expelled. 

Since President Donald Trump returned to office at the beginning of 2025, both Washington and Ankara have shown renewed willingness to deepen their bilateral partnership on regional matters and cooperate in third countries, most notably Syria. In addition to diplomacy, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Secretary of State Marco Rubio meeting in Washington and Brussels, both capitals have continued demonstrating top-level cooperation on Syria with the trilateral gathering in Riyadh, where Trump and Erdoğan met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, together with the creation of the joint Syria Working Group to further enhance closer cooperation on Syria’s reconstruction and stability efforts. This dynamism and strategic alignment can be a strong foundation for extending the US-Turkey partnership into Africa, where shared interests in stability and security could help reshape the dynamics of great​-​power competition in the region. 

Turkey’s pragmatic foreign policy is not without complications. But in the Sahel, that very pragmatism can work to the West’s advantage. If Washington moves beyond its reflexive skepticism and recognizes Turkey’s intermediary potential, the Sahel could shift from a symbol of Western retreat to a frontier of renewed influence—anchored by a partner that understands and navigates both the streets of Niamey and the corridors of NATO.

Alp Burak Ozen is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program.

Haley Nelson is a Boren Scholar and a Georgetown University alumna. She is an independent geopolitical consultant with a focus on energy and infrastructure security in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Turkey.

TURKEYSource Oct 28, 2025

Working within a ‘Central Asia Quartet’ can strengthen US ties in the region. The foundations for it have already been laid.

By Kiran Baez

To strengthen their ties to Central Asia, the United States, Turkey, Japan, and South Korea should work together on their engagement with the region.

Central Asia Geopolitics & Energy Security

TURKEYSource Oct 9, 2025

How energy and trade are redefining US–Turkey regional cooperation

By Pınar Dost

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AfricaSource Sep 10, 2025

To counter Chinese and Russian influence in Africa, Turkey could be a decisive ally for the US and Europe

By Rama Yade, Defne Arslan

As Turkey continues to develop closer ties to African nations, the United States and Europe should work with Turkey as a partner in its efforts to gain soft power throughout the continent.

Africa Economy & Business

The Atlantic Council Turkey Program aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

Learn more

The post Why Ankara’s rising power in the Sahel could benefit the West appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Colleagues from the Atlantic Council and I spent two intense days in Warsaw this week, meeting with senior officials, former officials, entrepreneurs, executives, and experts from across Poland’s divided and contentious political spectrum. We also met with the newly arrived US Ambassador Tom Rose. This came after four days in Prague and meetings with Czech senior civilian and military officials, and with the new US Ambassador Nicholas Merrick.

News of the rail line sabotage broke the last day of our Warsaw visit. Russian sabotage and aggression against Europe—drone and fighter jet overflights; attacks against Baltic Sea cables; and various incidents in Germany, Czechia, Poland, and other countries—are not new. Everywhere we went, Poles spoke, quietly and earnestly, of the possibility of war returning to their country. Poland, like its neighbors in Central Europe, has enjoyed more than a generation of peace, democracy, and rapidly increasing prosperity. To many of the Poles we spoke with, these times may soon seem like the “before times” of wistful memory.

The Poles are neither alone nor “Russophobic” or alarmist. Senior German officials, burned and now wiser after their long and futile search for accommodation with Putin’s Russia, now speak in similar terms. The head of Germany’s intelligence service, Bruno Kahl, testified in October to the Bundestag about the possibility of a Russian attack on Europe. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has spoken of the possibility of open conflict with Russia as early as 2026.

What then should Europe and the United States do about this trend of actual and suspected Russian aggression? This was the question that formed the basis of many of our discussions in Warsaw and Prague.

First, Europe and the United States need to face the music. Putin is not interested in doing business with the United States or Europe except on his terms, terms that include a demand for tacit recognition of his empire acquired through war. He will not break with China; he will not do a “deal” for peace in Ukraine, except when faced with insurmountable strength. His aggression against Europe is intended to intimidate the West into stunned acquiescence while he seeks to reverse the fall of the Soviet and Russian empires.

The Trump administration has spent a lot of energy pushing for a sustainable settlement of the war in Ukraine. And rightly so. The core of the administration’s outline of a settlement could work: a cease-fire in place and security for Ukraine, with Europe in the lead but with strong US backup. But the US administration still sends mixed messages, seemingly reflecting different schools of thought within it. That won’t do. The Trump team needs to be as steady and internally united in its pushback against Putin’s aggression as it has been against Iran and other adversaries.

Second, Europe needs to get real, and fast, about doing more for its own defense. The Trump administration has often, and rightly, put that in terms of a push for greater European spending on its military. That push has met with success in the form of NATO’s agreement at its 2025 Hague summit to a target of 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense, broken down into 3.5 percent on “hard” military expenditures and 1.5 percent on associated defense spending.

But spending is an input, and the output in military capability is what matters. We spent much of our time meeting with business executives from the Czech and Polish defense sectors, talking about the rapidly changing technological challenge of new weapons such as drones and the need to move fast from a sluggish peacetime procurement cycle to rapid turnaround. That’s no abstract challenge but an immediate necessity.

Fortunately, there is good news coming from Central Europe. High-tech start-ups that move fast, working with Ukrainians to apply battlefield lessons to production, are springing up all over both countries. Some are small. Others are mid-sized and growing fast. Still others, such as one Czech company we met with, are already investing in large-scale military production, including in the United States. A Polish firm is building state-of-the art reconnaissance satellites and launching them on SpaceX rockets.

One big task for these companies is to scale up and work with their US and European counterparts to turn topline defense spending into frontline military capacity. The United States can help. The United States and Europe have been sparring over trade and risk looking at their respective defense industries on what sometimes seem like zero-sum terms. That won’t do, especially in the face of the near-term danger of Russian aggression. To use the vocabulary of the Trump administration, there are a lot of good deals to be done in the defense sector. By helping remove barriers to technology transfer, defense trade, and investment, the United States can do the right thing for common security and make good money along the way.

Third, the United States and Europe can tighten the screws on Russia’s economy. The Trump administration has finally introduced its first new Russia sanctions, on the energy giants Rosneft and Lukoil. Now the administration must enforce them. And if it turns out that Russia is behind the latest attack on Polish rail lines, the United States and Europe should scale up sanctions. A full financial embargo, with limited and defined exceptions, might be a good place to start.

Fourth, the United States and Europe should speed up provision to Ukraine of weapons to target Russian infrastructure. And they can consider asymmetrical measures to counter Russian physical sabotage. These can be covert, but Russia should not have the luxury of taking action against the West without fear of countermeasures.

Even a brief visit to Warsaw, with its history of wartime destruction, communist oppression, and present prosperity and vulnerable peace, can concentrate the mind. Poles, whatever their politics, look to the United States, whatever its politics. And the Poles are pulling their weight on defense, with other Europeans starting to do the same. Putin represents the latest incarnation of the old adversary of the twentieth century—an aggressive tyranny. He’s on the march. But countries of the free world have good options if they will take them.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

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• Executive summary
• Introduction
• Pull factors
  • Clarity of conflict
  • Business alignment
• Push factors
  • Difficulty of coordination
  • Risk of retaliation
• Key takeaways and conclusion
• Author and acknowledgements

Executive summary

The war in Ukraine has seen Russia launch and sustain a full-scale invasion across the information and physical domains against a country that has embraced technological development and increased technological and geopolitical connections to the United States, Canada, and Europe. Private technology companies have provided essential and often irreplaceable support to Ukraine following Russia’s invasion in 2022 and—especially in the early months of the conflict—did so largely without a request from an allied state or payment from Ukraine.

However, more than three years on, although the private sector’s assistance in Ukraine has been well-documented, the policymaking community at large is still largely unaware of how companies decided whether and how to provide technological support to and in Ukraine. Through open research as well as interviews and roundtable discussions with various private sector and government representatives, this report posits that companies were primarily motivated by a complex combination of factors in tandem, which pulled them toward or pushed them away from support. The factors pulling companies toward cooperation were the moral clarity of the conflict, and alignment with existing business opportunities. At the same time however, among factors pushing companies away from involvement in Ukraine was the difficulty of coordinating assistance in-country, as well as the risk of Russian retaliation. Meanwhile, both sets of factors were either enhanced—or mitigated—due to various actions taken by Ukraine, allied states, and international bodies. This includes Ukrainian tech diplomacy; the development of Ukraine’s technical capabilities; aid facilitations and coordination efforts by both various groups and entities; and risk mitigation efforts undertaken by both states and private companies.

Dependency on the private sector in the cyber domain has become a somewhat frequent refrain in domestic cybersecurity conversations. However, prior to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, no one—not supranational bodies, states, or even companies themselves—was prepared for the role they would assume once the tanks rolled and the missiles fired.  The Russia-Ukraine conflict’s cyber dimension has revealed an underlying dependency on products, services, and infrastructure owned and operated by private companies. This has proved to be both a source of opportunity to enhance Ukraine’s defenses, while at the same time revealing fundamental risks and vulnerabilities. Given the heft and impact of technology companies in today’s digital infrastructure, let alone in conflict, it is essential that policymakers grasp this complex interplay of factors that influenced companies‘ decision-making as they headed in Ukraine, to inform planning or preparedness for future conflicts where the private sector will inevitably play a key role.

Introduction

Amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the private sector was and is a crucial line of defense and source of cyber resilience to a greater extent than any conflict previously observed. As the first case study of this phenomenon in an overt, conventional war, the past three years in Ukraine have clearly demonstrated how crucial the cyber and informational domain, and the private companies at its forefront, will be in competition, conflict, and war to come.

More than three years following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in the early morning of February 24, 2022, the war—and the crucial role of the international community in it—continues, but not unchanged. The war that Putin expected to end in Russian victory within a handful of days is now well into the third year of the largest and deadliest war in Europe since World War II.

This study examines the characteristics of this conflict that influenced companies’ decision-making regarding the type and degree of their involvement in Ukraine. Which factors and actions taken by states shaped tech companies’ decisions throughout the conflict as to whether and how to lend their support to Ukraine? These include both pull factors, those that increased the likeliness and degree of technology company involvement in Ukraine, and push factors, those that decreased the likeliness or degree of the same. Additionally, a key element influencing this space was the response by the Ukrainian government, allied governments, and international bodies to either build on the effects of the pull factors or mitigate the effects of the push factors throughout the conflict.

These factors and reactions are explored through open research, individual interviews with executives from tech companies active in Ukraine,¹ and workshop discussions including private sector, civil society, and representatives from various governments. It puts forward the private sector’s perspective on its own involvement in Ukraine since the 2022 invasion, reflecting on opinions and actions as they stood at the time of initial decision but also on the lessons learned since. The intention is to contribute to a baseline of understanding of public-private cooperation in Ukraine so that future policy decisions, whether in the Ukraine context or beyond, are built upon a full evaluation of experience.

Pull factors

Clarity of conflict

Clarity of conflict refers to the perception of the “right” and “wrong” or “victim” and “perpetrator” in a conflict, among one or more set audiences, whose support has the potential to provide materiel aid. In examining the role of this factor in the provision of tech aid to Ukraine, these audiences are primarily state policymakers, general populations, and technology leaders in Europe and North America. Overwhelmingly, in both public reporting and private interviews, the central reason given by companies themselves for why private companies provide aid and services supporting Ukraine is the moral clarity that these companies, their employees, and a large portion of their customers saw in the conflict and its conduct. Many interviewed commented on how the Russo-Ukrainian War, distinct from most other conflicts, has a clear and binary “right” and “wrong” side in the perspective of at least most of the Western world, from governments to individuals. 

Russia engaged in continuous overt and covert aggressive action through a wide variety of coercive, though largely nonescalatory, tools in an attempt to exert control on Ukraine and its population. On February 24, 2022, however, Russia unleashed coordinated missile strikes on Ukrainian cities, airborne deployments of soldiers to key locations beyond the border region, conventional advancement across the border, and coordinated cyber aggression.

In March 2022, Amnesty International released a statement saying, in part, that “In less than a week, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a massive human rights, humanitarian, and displacement crisis that has the makings of the worst such catastrophe in recent European history.”² Photos and videos poured out of Ukraine, documenting Russian violence and war crimes against the people of that country. Reports on Russian atrocities and Ukrainian resistance dominated the headlines and news discussions in the West for months.  A Monmouth University survey conducted in March 2022 found that 89 percent of Americans believed that Russia’s actions in Ukraine were not justified.³ Similarly, a poll of public perceptions of responsibility for war, taken across ten European countries showed that a clear majority in all countries attribute the primary responsibility to Russia.⁴

During these early months of 2022 the private sector quickly became an essential pillar of support for the Ukrainian war effort. As one expert put it, “If you had ordered a generic villain, you would have gotten Putin. From a moral standpoint, it was really easy for companies to take a stand, you have a moral highpoint.”⁵ Russia’s long decade of slowly escalating violence toward Ukraine, culminating in a brutal conventional assault and now, yearslong war, created an unusually stark geopolitical environment in which both Western states and the majority of their populations not only supported the defense of Ukraine but did so enthusiastically.

Across interviews and roundtable discussions, industry experts demonstrated an appreciation of the clarity of the “right” and “wrong” in the case of Ukraine. Nearly every private sector individual interviewed highlighted the importance of this factor in determining whether and how their company decided to begin or deepen its involvement in Ukraine following the invasion. One expert from a leading tech company said that “This was the easiest of all scenarios I could imagine for the private sector to seek to help an entity like Ukraine. The clarity on the conflict made the decision to assist Ukraine clear.”⁶ As several experts attested, much of the cyber aid provided to Ukraine required technical expertise that was not only limited to a few companies but also limited to a relatively small population of skilled individuals. At this level of analysis, the degree of available assistance had to take into account the bandwidth and possible burnout risk for these individuals as well as a strong, prevalent reluctance to work with a government or, especially, a military. The perceived clarity of the war in Ukraine, however, was critical to overcoming these concerns—at least for a while.⁷

Reaction – Ukrainian tech diplomacy

Tech diplomacy is the engagement between state authorities and tech companies, civil society organizations, other states, and multilateral fora to influence the development of both technology itself and the policy that surrounds it.⁸ Within the early days of the conflict, members of the Ukrainian government and especially the Minister for Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov, rallied for aid across the technology sector. These calls, and the generally positive reception to them, built on arguments regarding the clarity of the conflict. Although this tech diplomacy has been the project of various Ukrainian officials and offices, both before the 2022 invasion and in the years since, a focus in on Fedorov is illustrative of the Ukrainian approach to cultivating and extracting mutual benefit from relationships with international technology companies.

In 2019, Fedorov was tapped as deputy prime minister and minister of digital transformation and was subsequently named deputy prime minister for innovation, education, science and technology and minister for digital transformation and most recently first deputy prime minister of Ukraine—minister of digital transformation of Ukraine.⁹ Fedorov and his team have been adept, according to government affairs executive from a US-based multinational technology corporation, at creating and using “carrots and sticks” to influence company leadership and employees to more favorably view Ukraine and to augment their willingness to contribute to its defense.¹⁰

Fedorov cultivated a strong social media presence with an audience both within Ukraine and across Europe and North America. He emphasized the importance of social media platforms—using primarily English to connect with an international audience—to bring awareness to the dire situation in Ukraine. He pointed to the social media platform X (formerly Twitter), saying it “has become an efficient tool that we are using to counter Russian military aggression.”¹¹ In efforts like United24, the Ukrainian government’s official fundraising platform, which began with Fedorov tweeting the government’s crypto wallet addresses with an ask for donations,¹² he saw it not just as a fundraising tool, but as a tool that is “keeping people around the world aware of what is going on in Ukraine.”¹³ Crowdfunding efforts, even if donations are small, make people feel that their contributions are making a difference and fosters a closer relationship between that person and the Ukraine regardless of the distance.

Fedorov leveraged this engaged global audience to incentivize company action, effectively mobilizing his audience’s attention. A look at Fedorov’s social media presence shows a clear pattern of this strategy in action. Between March 2022 and July 2024, Fedorov posted fifty-two requests for aid from specific companies, celebrated companies and individuals taking positive action, and called out companies engaging in business practices that he deemed detrimental to Ukrainian defense efforts. These posts served as additional public acknowledgement of the contributions of specific companies to Ukraine in a global public forum that other states were watching, as were individuals, aid organizations, and companies. One tech executive explained that not only did these callouts serve as thanks, they also leveraged the competitive nature of these companies that “one up” each other with aid as an additional driver.¹⁴

The Starlink case provides an interesting example of this strategy in action. Fedorov tagged Elon Musk in an X post and asked him directly to instruct SpaceX to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations, calling him out for trying to “colonize Mars” instead of helping civilians on Earth.¹⁵ Musk responded publicly on X less than twelve hours later that, “Starlink Service is now active in Ukraine. More terminals en route.” Two days later these stations, which would come to serve critical functions for civilians, government entities, and even military personnel, arrived. Fedorov again publicly responded on X with a photo of a truck full of terminals saying, “Starlink – here. Thanks, @elonmusk.”¹⁶

According to Fedorov’s deputy minister, Alex Bornyakov, in the months leading up to the Russian invasion, Fedorov’s office was unable to secure a meeting with Elon Musk. However, SpaceX President and COO Gwynne Shotwell indicated in March of 2022 that the company had been coordinating with Ukraine as part of its European expansion effort for several weeks before the invasion and were awaiting final approval from the Ukrainian government.  According to Shotwell, “they tweeted at Elon and so we turned it on … that was our permission. That was the letter from the minister. It was a tweet.¹⁷ These early interactions show that at the very least, Fedorov’s social media engagement functioned as a nontraditional method to accelerate the provision and delivery of essential technical equipment that would enable connectivity for civilians, government entities, and even military units.¹⁸

Six months before the February 2022 invasion, Fedorov went on a tech diplomacy tour to Silicon Valley, intent on building stronger relationships with key technology companies with Ukraine’s digital transformation on the agenda. Fedorov‘s tech diplomacy work laid a solid foundation for coordination between the Ukrainian government and these technology companies by the time the war began. These relationships and Fedorov and his ministry’s direct approach with private companies meant that his office could seek solutions in the private sector directly and more swiftly than in traditional government acquisition. For example, in less than a month, a new and improved air raid alert system was implemented across the country as a result of a direct and informal conversation between Ajax Systems Chief Marketing Officer Valentine Hrytsenko, Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation Valeriya Ionan, and a team of digital transformation officers.¹⁹ 

Therefore, Ukraine’s approach to tech diplomacy represents a significant shift in how states, especially small or mid-power states, should conceptualize and shape their relationships with technology companies. Given that global technology companies’ (“big tech”) yearly revenue continually overshadows the gross domestic product (GDP) of many states,²⁰ this evolution in states’ relationships with big corporations suggests that corporate ties are sometimes more important than a state’s relationship with another state. This was echoed in a statement from the Danish government, recognizing the extent to which technological disruption affects societal and geopolitical change, nothing that the companies driving that innovation “have become extremely influential; to the extent that their economic and political power match—or even surpass—that of our traditional partners, the nation states.”²¹ Fedorov’s actions therefore proved the importance of tech diplomacy as a key government priority to secure the cooperation of the tech sector in a crisis, aided by the moral clarity that many companies saw in assisting Ukraine in a time of war.

Business alignment

For companies examining whether and how to provide tech-based support to Ukraine in its defense, business alignment can take a variety of forms, but typically refers to some combination of benefits that the company receives from these activities. Although the primary driver cited publicly for tech companies’ involvement has been the desire to aid Ukraine, their customers, and employees in Ukraine against blatant Russian aggression, another factor in companies’ decision-making was in fact how the provision of assistance to Ukraine fit into and supported the overall health and security of their organizations. This included the character of preexisting relationships with both Ukraine and Russia, direct financial profit, and indirect benefits such as instructive experience, field-testing products, and reputational benefits.​

Preexisting relationships

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was not the start of the conflict between the two nations, nor was it the beginning of technology companies’ relationships with Ukraine and Russia. The nature and tone of these relationships provided a key foundation for these companies’ decisions throughout the post-2022 conflict. Ukraine and Russia, both as partners and as markets, had different starting points and were also on different active trajectories that informed the types and depth of engagement that tech companies wished to have with each country, both individually and comparatively.

One of the primary motivations cited for company involvement in Ukraine after the Russian invasion was the simple fact that many of these companies were already active in Ukraine to some extent and their leadership felt a responsibility to protect its employees and continue to serve its customers within Ukraine. For example, threat intelligence companies like Mandiant and CrowdStrike had been engaged in Ukraine since at least 2014, actively tracking cyber espionage, influence, and attack operations, while companies like Microsoft and Google were actively building capacity in the country despite Ukraine’s prohibitions on cloud services. In 2020, Google opened its second research and development center in Ukraine and Microsoft signed a memorandum of understanding with Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation to include a $500 million investment to build two data centers.²²

Several private sector and government representatives conveyed in private interviews that one of companies’ greatest concerns in the first few weeks of the conflict was the safety of their employees in Ukraine.²³ Many companies set up or contributed to programs intended to help employees leave the country, if they wished, or to provide protection measures for those who remained.²⁴ Additionally, companies with existing customers in Ukraine saw their mission as largely unchanged, seeking to serve their customers regardless of their location.²⁵ Companies with these preexisting relationships had more reason to continue or expand their work in the country due to these long-term connections.

By contrast, many of these companies also had preexisting, albeit weaker, ties with and in Russia. According to a 2024 report from the Center for Security and Emerging Technology, however, of the eighteen US tech companies that provided “direct assistance on the battlefield and/or services to maintain critical infrastructure or government functions,” none had “significant economic or financial linkages to Russia.”²⁶ While Ukraine had undertaken concerted steps to foster mutually beneficial relationships, Russia had been largely coercive. The Kremlin in the years before the 2022 reinvasion sought to tighten control over the Russian information space and exert influence over international tech companies’ activities in Russia. For example, in 2021 Russia passed a law requiring large technology companies with a presence in the Russian market to establish Russian offices registered with the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media, commonly known as Roskomnadzor, or risk severe punitive measures.²⁷ Some in the industry viewed the move as an attempt to blackmail tech companies into complying with Russian censorship.²⁸ Google was one such target of these coercive measures—in a push to force Google to censor the content available on its platforms within Russia, Russian authorities seized the company’s bank accounts. In response, Google’s Russian subsidiary declared bankruptcy and ceased all but its free services within Russia.²⁹

Amplified by the clarity of conflict discussed above, and Ukrainian tech diplomacy efforts for companies to sever financial ties with Russia and the Russian market, the decision calculus for these companies was less complex than it may have been otherwise.

Not all companies chose to leave the Russian market completely. Despite the coercion that Google faced, the company chose to keep YouTube available in Russia; however, without ads for users in Russia and without the ability to monetize content that would “exploit, dismiss, or condone Russia’s war in Ukraine.”^“30 As discussed previously, many companies decided to continue services in Ukraine out of an obligation to existing customers. Depending on the company and the type of product sold or service provided, this same motivation was seen with respect to Russia as well. One tech executive explained that some of these products and services remained active because they provided a benefit to the Russian public, as opposed to the Russian government. For example, YouTube remained partially active, with restrictions, so that the platform could continue to serve as an alternate source of information for Russians.³¹

Direct profit

For companies, both those with an existing presence in Ukraine and those without, providing technical services in and to Ukraine could also serve more clear-cut business interests. Some were at least partially motivated by direct financial gain like new paid contracts and revenue potential such as additional value generated through the delivery of services and the possibility of positive publicity for the company or their products.

Although much of private companies’ work in Ukraine was (or started as) free of charge, many others were acquired in a more traditional contractual manner, with either Ukraine or an allied government footing the bill. Company representatives said in several interviews and roundtables that while they wish to continue their work in the country, as the war continues, they will require financial support to do so.³²

Indirect benefit

Some of the tech companies active in Ukraine derived value from the very act of providing a service itself, with indirect gains that included instructive experience with Russian cyber operations, the ability to field-test products, and reputational benefits.

For more than a decade, many multinational threat intelligence companies have been tracking Russian cyber aggression in Ukraine as part of their core function. These services helped to drive the development of Ukrainian cyber infrastructure, but it was not solely a charitable effort. It was in these companies own interests to gain the closest possible insights into areas like Ukraine that experience a high degree and sophistication of cyberattacks. As a result, these companies sowed valuable intelligence from their experience, and improved their business offerings across the board. As one executive in threat intelligence at a US cybersecurity nonprofit put it: “for threat intelligence companies, having this depth of access is a gold mine, the details delivered out of Ukraine on Russian tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are quite amazing.”³³

These benefits are not only limited to threat intelligence companies. Companies that run active platforms used by and in Ukraine, such as cloud platforms, also gained greater direct experience against Russian cyber operations. As one executive put it, “while acting as a shield, [these] companies are collecting vast intelligence that can be used to improve their products and protect all their customers.”³⁴ The experience of defending against Russian activity at that scale and volume served as training of sorts for companies’ cybersecurity teams.

Both representatives from private companies and the Ukrainian government cited an additional benefit to working in Ukraine during the current war: it served as a testing ground for technology. As Fedorov stated, Ukraine “is the best test ground for all the newest tech … because here you can test them in real-life conditions.”³⁵ Several company executives privately seconded this notion, saying that alongside their company’s desire to do the right thing, their work in Ukraine provided proof of concept for their capabilities.³⁶ Ukraine also offered a means to demonstrate to potential customers the effectiveness of their offerings. Founding partner of Green Flag Ventures Deborah Fairlamb said at a European defense conference that “no one would even look at a product unless it had ‘Tested in Ukraine’ stamped on it.”³⁷ During a roundtable conversation, a company executive said that governments were more likely, having seen a company’s work in Ukraine, to purchase their products and trust that they are secure.³⁸

Finally, companies working actively in Ukraine were also motivated by the benefits to public perception and reputation. Popular support of Ukraine meant that companies’ support may have improved their reputation by association. In a TIME article from early 2024, author Vera Bergengruen argued that this reputational concern was part of Palantir’s decision calculus for its work in Ukraine, by helping to dispel characterization of the company’s work as a tool to support intrusive government surveillance. This would situate Palantir’s work in Ukraine among its similar efforts to “shed its reputation as a shadowy data-mining spy contractor.”³⁹ Clearview AI’s reputational concerns also likely motivated its assistance to Ukraine. The company was sanctioned multiple times throughout Europe for privacy violations and was lambasted in a 2020 New York Times article for its controversial use by law enforcement and private companies to track people through AI-enabled facial recognition.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the company received an outpouring of positive press following public announcements that Ukraine  was using this same AI-enabled facial recognition software to identify Russian soldiers, including deceased soldiers and those suspected of committing war crimes in Ukraine.⁴¹ Whether trying to capitalize on a positive reputation or counter negative perceptions, companies benefit from their association with a cause popular across their customer base.

Reaction – Ukrainian technical capability and posture

In both the buildup to war and the conduct of it, some companies with interest in setting up operations in or with Ukraine were reluctant      to do so out of concern regarding Ukraine’s ability to act as a capable and trustworthy recipient of goods and services. Executives working in threat intelligence and information security at US-based multinational technology companies have pointed to corruption in Ukraine as a barrier to engagement prior to the invasion and a factor that was carefully considered when deciding how to provide aid in Ukraine.⁴² This challenge is openly acknowledged in Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2021-25, which states that “corruption prevalence and distrust in the judiciary are the key obstacles to attracting foreign investment to Ukraine.”⁴³

To mitigate these factors, Ukraine and its partners have invested heavily over the past decade to take on corruption and build out legal, economic, and technical frameworks to transform Ukraine so as to make it a more appealing target for assistance and cooperation from the public and private sectors. According to Alex Bornyakov, Ukraine’s deputy minister of digital transformation, Ukraine’s sought to develop “the largest IT hub in Eastern Europe with the fastest growing GDP, industrial parks, and its own security-focused ‘Silicon Valley.’”⁴⁴

Anti-corruption efforts

The Ukrainian government’s commitment to anti-corruption efforts has been an important factor for the success of the process, which began well before the buildup of Russian tanks on its border. According to the 2025 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Integrity and Anti-Corruption Review of Ukraine, since 2013 Ukraine “significantly reformed its anti-corruption framework to fight what were then historically high corruption levels in the country.”⁴⁵

Ukraine’s public and private IT sectors have long been a breeding ground for software acquisition-related fraud, a scheme in which an individual reports the purchase of a legitimate software license but actually buys a pirated or outdated version of that software and pockets the difference. Before 2014, approximately 80 percent of Ukrainian government and private entities were using network software that had either never been or was no longer supported by the associated software vendor,⁴⁶ making Ukraine a difficult and unappealing market for software vendors.

In 2014, anti-corruption activists started the ProZorro project, which over the past decade moved public sector procurement, including that of IT infrastructure, to a central platform built around the tenets of transparency, efficiency, and cross-sector collaboration and competition.⁴⁷ According to a report by Dr. Robert Peacock, through the use of ProZorro and other anti-corruption efforts, senior officials at Ukraine’s State Special Communications Service estimated that “the share of pirated and unsupported software on the country’s networks had dropped from more than 80 percent in 2014 to only 20 percent in 2020.”⁴⁸

As the conflict in Ukraine escalated into a full-scale war, Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts became even more urgent and essential. For example, UNITED24, the country’s official fundraising platform to fund the Ukrainian war effort that has raised approximately $350 million since the beginning of the war, sends money directly into transparent national accounting systems depending on the choice of the donor, with the leading global accounting firm Deloitte auditing platform.⁴⁹ In addition, in the first year of the war Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his government dismissed several high-ranking government officials based on allegations of corruption. This included two of the top Ukrainian cyber officials after they were accused of participated in corrupt procurement practices. According to the country’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the accused allegedly embezzled $1.7 million between 2020 and 2022 through fraudulent software acquisition.⁵⁰ The Ukrainian government’s efforts  largely mitigated companies’ concerns regarding corruption, and those companies that cited corruption as a barrier to working with Ukraine have since commenced programming previously denied to Ukraine on those grounds.⁵¹

For a private company to make the decision to invest more heavily in Ukraine, the benefits—financial or otherwise—must outweigh the risks. By addressing corruption within the government, and especially tech-related corruption, the Ukrainian government effectively diminished the weight of this factor in companies’ overall decision calculus. Crucially, such efforts take time to implement and yet more time to create meaningful change. Had these anti-corruption programs not been well underway before 2022, the question of corruption may have significantly deterred companies from deeper involvement in Ukraine.

Ukraine turns toward tech

Instead of sowing distrust in the idea of cyberspace as a safe space for economic and even government services, the past decade of Russian aggression against Ukraine in cyberspace motivated Ukraine to invest heavily in that space and turn its former weakness into a newfound strength. It could even be said that the continuous Russian aggression against Ukraine, through cyberspace and otherwise, helped Ukraine to better defend itself against Russia. Before the 2022 Russian invasion and even more so since, the Ukrainian government sees a flourishing technology sector within Ukraine as a key component to the economic strength of the country.⁵² However, to foster such a flourishing tech environment, Ukraine needed to first invest in its legal and economic foundations.

As a response to escalating Russian aggression in 2014, Ukraine began what would be an intensive decade of government reform and policy advancement on cyber issues. The figure below highlights various investment and development programs aimed at enhancing Ukrainian technological capacity, including efforts of the Ukrainian government itself and in partnership with various international entities such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

These, among other efforts, were essential steps to creating and expanding a technologically capable and developed Ukraine. Especially important was the increased relative cybersecurity of the Ukrainian digital environment, the development of Ukraine’s cyber workforce and general cyber literacy, and an influx of capital enabling increased investment in private sector tools and services.

On the economic front, the Ukrainian government made strides to create an attractive environment for investment. The government’s mission has been to shift the conversation from purely one of donations and aid to a direct appeal to the companies’ more pecuniary concerns. According to Bornyakov, “The best way to help Ukraine is to invest in Ukraine.”⁵³ This call is both international and domestic. The Ukrainian government has implemented a number of projects and programs dedicated to fostering the local tech ecosystem. As of December 2024, the IT sector accounted for 4.4 percent of Ukraine’s GDP and 38 percent of the country’s total service exports. Much of this technological energy is being dedicated back to the war effort—according to a report compiled in cooperation with the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, 97 percent of Ukrainian IT companies are “actively supporting projects that contribute” to Ukrainian defense.⁵⁴

Diia City in particular, launched just two weeks before the invasion, is a tool intentionally designed to make it easier and more appealing for foreign companies to set up and run operations within Ukraine. Diia City is a “virtual free economic zone for tech companies in Ukraine” that offers a variety of legal and tax benefits.⁵⁵ The connected Brave1 initiative launched in early 2023 to “create a fast track for innovation in the defense and security sectors,” especially those projects of high importance to Ukrainian military leadership, such as “drones, robotic systems, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence tools, cybersecurity, communications, and information security management systems.”⁵⁶

These efforts, both domestic and international, bolstered the defense of Ukraine by building and demonstrating trustworthiness, capability, and economic value for the private sector. In other words, the political and economic engine driving technological development in Ukraine was composed of more than a decade of concentrated action from Ukraine and its international partners, and was in place well before tanks began rolling across the borders. This vital work ultimately helped to bring about conducive conditions for private sector investment or provision of services, as long-term structural factors indirectly shaping company decision-making to aid Ukraine.

Push factors

Difficulty of coordination

Difficulty of coordination refers to the friction that private companies experienced along the lifecycle of technical assistance to Ukraine—from understanding which products or services would be impactful, knowing who to coordinate with and how, or the logistics of providing that assistance. Friction, as in all domains of warfare, is the imposition of the constraints of reality upon one’s plans and impulses, and therefore each additional complexity that stands between a certain technology and its use in Ukraine increases the likelihood that that desired provision will not occur, will take longer, or will be provided in a less helpful form.

One of the most persistent hindrances to the provision of tech-related assistance from private companies in Ukraine was the difficulties that all parties involved faced, which was to effectively coordinate the assistance available with the assistance that Ukraine needed most in a fast-moving and high-pressure environment, particular as more Ukrainian organizations expressed a need for more threat intelligence, licenses, or training for tools. In almost every conversation with industry representatives about their experience in this space raised this coordination problem. The factors that most significantly impacted coordination effectiveness included whether a company had a preexisting presence in or relationship with Ukraine, the clarity with which Ukraine communicated its technical needs, and the ability to assess the effectiveness and impact of products or services provided.⁵⁷ 

Especially in the early months of the full-scale Russian war, much of the assistance that private tech companies provided was coordinated by companies themselves and in a largely ad hoc manner. In addition, Ukraine experienced communications challenges such as a lack of secure channels or limited visibility into networks and infrastructure on the ground.⁵⁸ Companies that did not have a strong relationship with the Ukrainian public sector prior to the conflict found that direct coordination was difficult to establish once the conflict had begun.⁵⁹ For some, not having a direct relationship with or in Ukraine had been an intentional choice, due to regulation complexity or corruption concerns.⁶⁰ Initially, companies without a preexisting presence often struggled to pinpoint the correct office or person with which to speak. They bridged this gap most often with some combination of brand recognition driving direct outreach from the Ukrainian government and facilitation by Ukrainian private companies that had established relationships with international tech companies and could act as middlemen.⁶¹

Even in cases of existing relationships within Ukraine, complexities abound for companies. A threat intel executive indicated that, for many, there is a tension between what companies thought they could provide and what the Ukrainian government knew about its own needs. While Ukraine was effective in communicating its technical needs at the tactical level, according to various company representatives, effective coordination was somewhat hampered by their ability to effectively communicate and coordinate technical assistance needs across government at a strategic level lagged behind.⁶²

An additional point of friction was the high degree of difficulty in deconflicting the assistance provided to Ukraine from different companies. Understandably, the Ukrainian government—and various individuals and agencies working within it—were responding to imminent threats and thus would send out the same or similar requests to various companies in the hope that one would respond.⁶³ This meant that at times various companies were devoting time and resources to developing an assistance measure that was not actually needed and would not be implemented, or if it was in part, had a lesser relative impact on Ukrainian defense because of duplicative measures. This inability to understand and plan around the impact of assistance was broader than just the duplication issue; dozens of company representatives reported difficulties in getting a clear view as to whether their assistance was actually effective once provided.⁶⁴

Without this data, future requests for and fulfillments of technical aid will continue to be based on theory rather than evidence from their growing experiences together. A 2024 paper from the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative (CDAC) and Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, made strides in its effort to collate and assess the effectiveness of those companies and organizations that provided cyber defense assistance to Ukraine through their program. The report identified both direct indicators, where effectiveness can be assessed via concrete measures, and proxy indicators, where possible contributing factors are assessed on a scale of perceived impact.⁶⁵

Reaction – Ukrainian coordination and adaptation

On top of domestic development efforts, Ukrainian government officials spent concerted time and effort to build relationships that would serve as the foundation for future cooperation. Fedorov‘s tech diplomacy work forged new connections with these companies, as well as their leadership and employee bases, that in many ways enabled the speed of company response following Russia’s February 2022 invasion. “When the invasion began, we had personal connections to these companies,” Fedorov said. “They knew who we are, what we look like, what our values are and our mission is.”⁶⁶

According to Fedorov, in the first month of the war he sent “more than4,000 requests to companies, governments, and other organizations, each one personally signed.”⁶⁷ Some of these connections built on existing relationships, but companies without preestablished links either initiated conversations directly with or received direct requests from the Ukrainian Government. Beyond the Ministry of Digital Transformation, various Ukrainian offices like the State Special Communications Service of Ukraine, Security Service of Ukraine, National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, and Ukrainian National Cybersecurity Coordination Center were engaging in relationship building and outreach efforts in order to coordinate the provision of tech assistance.⁶⁸ According to Bornyakov, the early days of coordination with the international private sector were chaos.⁶⁹ Various offices and employees sent out messages and requests without internal coordination, and products or services were provided without sufficient due diligence to ensure that they were truly useful to the Ukrainian war effort.

The Ukrainian government quickly updated its practices to facilitate more efficient cooperation. Among the first of these moves was a Ukrainian policy change to directly enable increased private sector participation. In February 2022, prior to the invasion, the Ukrainian parliament Verkhovna Rada amended the laws that had barred government use of Cloud services. This change meant that just days before the Russian invasion, companies including Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Cloudflare were able the aid the Ukrainian government and several critical sector entities in migrating their critical data to their cloud servers—a critical move, as Russia’s attacks during the first few weeks of the war specifically targeted physical data centers.⁷⁰ In addition, due to the imposition of martial law, Ukraine adopted two resolutions to streamline public procurement. Resolution 169, adopted on February 28, 2022, enabled government contracting authorities to ignore, when necessary, the procurement procedures required by the laws on public and defense procurement.⁷¹ Resolution 723, passed four months later, added new, more efficient requirements to the procurement process, amending both resolution 169 and resolution 822, most important of which was the introduction of the ProZorro platform as the mandatory electronic procurement system.⁷² As previously discussed, this platform was both a tool to facilitate procurement and to counter corruption in the procurement process at large.

Despite improvements to coordinate more effectively with private tech companies, and even as international coordination mechanisms emerged, a significant contingent of companies has maintained a preference for direct coordination. One government affairs executive noted that their company, like many others, preferred direct coordination with the Ukrainian government since it enabled more immediate and relevant support, and they were skeptical that third-party mechanisms would be as effective.⁷³

Reaction – International aid facilitation

Since the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and even before that, international entities—states, supranational bodies, and non-state groups— played an important role in coordinating technical-focused aid in support of Ukraine.

However, states’ coordination efforts were notably inconsistent. In the first year and a half after the Russian reinvasion, the United States allocated $113 billion in response to the war in Ukraine—largely allocated to the Department of Defense at 54.7 percent, USAID at 32.3 percent, and the Department of State at 8.8 percent.⁷⁴ This money should not be viewed like a check signed over to the Ukrainian government, but rather as money allocated to respond to the Russian invasion through a combination of forms and recipients, primarily the defense industrial base in the United States.⁷⁵ By contrast, private companies publicly announced and celebrated their digital and tech aid to Ukraine. In an interview, one leading tech executive observed a clear dearth of focus from the US government toward digital and tech aid, instead opting for significant humanitarian and more traditional military assistance.⁷⁶ This prioritization was likely an intentional choice—the US government’s perspective seems to have been that it was leading conventional aid by a significant margin and wanted others, like European governments and the private sector, to take the lead on digital and tech matters.⁷⁷Though not speaking specifically on cyber and tech elements, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in February 2025 called publicly for European states to provide the “overwhelming” majority of defense funding for Ukraine, bemoaning what he saw as an “imbalanced relationship.”⁷⁸ Hegseth specifically pushed for the expansion of existing Europe-led coalitions—discussed below—dedicated to coordinating technological aid.⁷⁹

By contrast, industry experts agreed that the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) was a very effective facilitator of private sector aid.⁸⁰ The UK’s efficiency on this issue was due in part to fewer restrictions on aid money between distinct civilian- and military-designated buckets.⁸¹ According to an assessment from the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, which scrutinizes UK aid spending, this flexibility enabled the FCDO to respond and adapt to the constant evolutions of the war and geopolitical environment—thereby acting as an effective channel for private sector assistance into Ukraine.⁸²

The ad hoc nature of many of the early digital assistance programs provided by private companies was in some ways a double-edged sword. In many cases they were present and able to move more quickly than government programs, and in some places they stepped into de facto political roles—shaping the conflict and public understanding of it. However, this efficiency and effectiveness became difficult to sustain in the long run as governments and government-sponsored mechanisms were slow or insufficient to step in to support these efforts.⁸³ US government entities were instrumental in facilitating support from private companies to Ukraine through purchase agreements, such as that of hundreds of Starlink devices and subscriptions in coordination with other governments⁸⁴ and partnerships. US government entities also participated in intelligence sharing and collaboration efforts regarding Russian cyber capabilities and activities⁸⁵ and even conducted hunt forward operations to assist in Ukrainian defense against Russian cyber aggression both before and after the February 2022 Russian invasion.⁸⁶

In various conversations, both industry and government representatives confirmed the lack of effective governmental and supranational coordination and its impact on the private sector, and on Ukrainian defense.⁸⁷ Company representatives across the United States and Europe shared the same refrain: “we can’t keep supporting Ukraine ourselves forever without government assistance.⁸⁸

In addition to bilateral assistance efforts, various entities emerged across the conflict focused on cooperation organization and facilitation of digital and tech aid. The first of these was the CDAC, not a government entity, but a nonprofit organization that brought together a number of cybersecurity and technology organizations to better coordinate assistance efforts. The organization was founded by Gregory Rattray and a coalition of cyber executives to address the impediments and complications that accompanied the early days of digital and tech assistance provision from the private sector. A CDAC representative said in May 2024 that the group had facilitated $20-30 million in tech-related assistance for Ukraine since its inception.⁸⁹ As Ukrainian and CDAC representatives noted, CDAC’s facilitation efforts have since slowed for a variety of reasons: decreased ability to act as an intermediary as requests have become more specific, a stabilization among companies that no longer require a coordinator after their relationships in Ukraine were established, and a lack of sufficient financial support for both CDAC and the companies willing to provide assistance.⁹⁰

The vacuum noted by industry representatives and CDAC founders in the shape of a true digital and tech aid coordination body with the resources and remit to execute that mission is the planned role of the IT Coalition and the Tallinn mechanism. The IT Coalition, part of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG; also known as the Ramstein Group), was established in September 2023 as “a dedicated group of donor nations led by Estonia and Luxembourg within the UDCG framework, focused on delivering support to Ukraine’s Defense Forces in the area of IT, communications, and cyber security.”⁹¹ The group consists of eighteen member countries, with the European Union, NATO, the United States, and France acting as observers.⁹² In 2024 and 2025, the coalition had raised “€1,1 billion in both financial and material assistance.”⁹³ The coalition aims to support Ukraine cyber defense capability and command and control integration while also delivering on more long-term goals such as fostering innovation and cloud adoption. The United States is currently an observing member of the IT Coalition and have thus far has declined taking a more active role. Those familiar with the inner workings of the mechanism have emphasized the clear benefit of a more active US role in the mechanism, as most of the tech companies with whom the organization would like to coordinate are headquartered out of the United States.⁹⁴

The Tallinn Mechanism was established in December 2023 with 11 states to “coordinate and facilitate civilian cyber capacity building” within Ukraine, and is intended to be complementary to military-focused cyber aid facilitation bodies like the IT Coalition.⁹⁵ The Tallinn Mechanism is focused on “amplifying the cyber support of donors to Ukraine in the civilian domain.”⁹⁶ The mechanism raised approximately $210 million by the end of 2024 and has focused on bolstering cyber defense capabilities, especially that of critical national infrastructure, through the public and private provision of hardware and software, incident response, satellite communication provision, and cybersecurity training for government officials.⁹⁷

The international community has certainly made strides to better facilitate technology aid to Ukraine, to counteract the pushing effect that complicates such coordination for technology companies. However, it is yet unclear whether these programs and practices will meet the demands of this conflict, or those of conflicts to come. The most effective element of the tech sector at large’s efforts in Ukraine has been its speed, both in its response to the invasion itself and to individual challenges that have arisen over the course of this war. Meanwhile, government and supranational coordination—aside from those programs already in place—were much slower to implement.

Risk of retaliation

A significant factor shaping the behavior of companies’ work in and with Ukraine is the heightened threat state created by active warfare. Various technology company officials cited their concern about potential backlash—whether financial, cyber, or physical violence—from Russia against their infrastructure, products, and people.⁹⁸ The real risk that these companies took on was informed by a number of factors, such as the application of their products or services by and for military ends, the required physical presence of personnel, products, or infrastructure, and also the degree to which increased Russian aggression against these companies might be a meaningful increase from prewar conditions.

Defense application

An undeniable yet complex risk that companies face as a result of providing support to Ukraine is the threat of Russian retaliatory action. Private sector behavior in Ukraine is shaped by the degree to which the goods and services provided are connected to the conduct of the conflict itself. Products and services provided to civilian groups for purely humanitarian purposes come with a different risk profile than goods that underpin government functions. Though not discrete or exhaustive, cyber and technical aid to Ukraine can be understood in four categories: humanitarian aid, critical infrastructure protection, government support, and military application. In practice, this division exists on a continuum, from purely humanitarian support to products or services that the state itself has come to rely on for the continued provision of government services, with particular importance placed on whether the good is for military use and whether that use is in direct support of combat operations. 

By and large, companies have made their own determinations as to how to amend their work in Ukraine, looking not only at the direct military application of their product or service but also examining existing and potential products or services to determine potential applicability for offensive operations—and where to avoid their abuse. A clear example of this is Google’s cessation of the live traffic display functionality within Google Maps. A team of open source researchers at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, under the leadership of Professor Jeffrey Lewis, were allegedly able to infer the early movements of the February 2022 Russian invasion before official reporting by analyzing Google Maps traffic data in combination with radar imagery.⁹⁹ Following these reports, Google announced that it would temporarily disable live traffic data so that it would not be used to plan military operations.¹⁰⁰ An internal task force at Google largely coordinated these and similar decisions to coordinate aid to Ukraine and, most importantly, to examine their actions and decisions in order to identify and address programs that had a potential to cause harm.¹⁰¹ However, even after these amendments were made, Google Maps was again the subject of controversy. In November 2024, Ukrainian defense chiefs accused Google of revealing the location of key military positions following an earlier Google Maps update. According to Russian military bloggers, among these revelations was the position of new air defense systems, including US-made Patriot anti-aircraft missiles, surrounding an airport near Kyiv. According to the head of Ukraine’s counter-disinformation unit Andriy Kovalenko, Google representatives reached out to Ukrainian government officials to address the issue shortly thereafter.¹⁰²

Similar in many ways was the SpaceX effort to restrict use of the Starlink satellite network close to the active front of the war. Though controversial in the public eye, and significant for military operators and planners, the SpaceX decision to restrict the use of Starlink devices near the front was an intentional one—to limit escalation directly supported by their devices. SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell explained “our intent was never to have them use it for offensive purposes.”¹⁰³ The Starlink network, despite these imposed limitations, has undeniably been an extremely useful tool for the Ukrainian military,¹⁰⁴ but its network also supports a much wider geography of users, from individuals to government entities. The inherent dual-use nature of the Starlink network poses a much greater risk should its network be considered a military object. This risk framework is likely a significant part of the drive behind Space X’s creation of Starshield, announced in early December 2022. A partner project to Starlink, Starshield operates on a separate network and is specifically and exclusively for government—rather than consumer and commercial—use.¹⁰⁵ With this application in mind, reports still vary as to whether such a contract, like the $1.8 billion deal with the National Reconnaissance Office, would be operated by the contractee, in this case the NRO, or whether, like Starlink, the service would remain operated by SpaceX.¹⁰⁶ It is possible that this case will follow, in practice, the principle that the closer that the operation of a technology sits to strategic and sensitive national priorities, the higher the risk for both state and company of that technology being operated by said company, and the more likely that technology will come to be operated from within a government body.

Physicality

Products and services that require the physical presence of personnel, products, or infrastructure within Ukraine are the riskiest to undertake. Providing support in this way carries a level of risk that most companies did not have either the willingness or the infrastructure to take on.¹⁰⁷ While some companies, for certain products, chose to partner with government entities to deliver products or services where physical presence was necessary, as in the preceding example, others chose instead to eschew options with such a requirement. In an interview, one expert said, “there were some products that you wanted to go forward with, but you couldn’t. Your informational security can only be as good as your physical security, so projects requiring new physical infrastructure development, or new infrastructure dependencies, was a major stumbling block.”¹⁰⁸

Russia’s cyber-offensive impact

To some degree, most of the technology companies in question—especially those with a preexisting presence in Ukraine—were already a target of a significant volume of Russian cyber intrusion attempts as well as other coercive actions. As one industry executive put it when asked about the role of risk assessment in decisions to deepen their work in Ukraine following the invasion, “we knew the risk, we were already targeted on a daily basis.”¹⁰⁹ The risk of Russian aggression and retaliation remains, but for many large tech companies, their work already took them into spaces where they were in direct or indirect conflict with Russian or Russian-affiliated groups. However, the risk of Russian cyber intrusions against their networks was already a built-in calculation for their existing cybersecurity plans.

In addition to the experience and expectations of many of these private companies, Russian cyber operations accompanying and following its February 2022 invasion were less disruptive than previously anticipated. The most prominent case of coordinated disruption in the information space remains the ViaSat satellite communications system hack during the invasion. As cyber scholar Jon Bateman writes, this intrusion demonstrated clear “timing (one hour before Russian troops crossed the border), clear military purpose (to degrade Ukrainian communications), and international spillover (disrupting connectivity in several European countries).”¹¹⁰ However, the incident appeared to be limited in duration and unclear in impact—senior Ukrainian official Victor Zhora acknowledged the loss to communications during the early hours of the invasion, but later stated that the incident was less disruptive than it could have been because of redundancies in Ukrainian communication methods.¹¹¹

As nonresident senior fellow Justin Sherman explored in May 2025 Atlantic Council report, Unpacking Russia’s cyber nesting doll,¹¹² the comparably muted effectiveness of Russian cyber operations during the war is the result of a multitude of factors including:

• Cross-domain coordination difficulties
• Resource constraints
• Interagency competition
• Intentional strategic prioritization
• Ukrainian defensive strength

Sherman goes on to explain that while cyber operations against Ukraine did not have that catastrophic impact expected by some—the promised cyber Pearl Harbor—Russian cyber capabilities should not be underestimated.¹¹³

In just the first year of the war, Russia and—importantly—non-state actors in Russia’s orbit, launched a multitude of cyberattacks and intrusions against the public and private sector in Ukraine—including those entities relying on products, platforms, or infrastructure owned and operated by Western tech companies.¹¹⁴ In May 2025, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency released a joint cybersecurity advisory highlighting this threat, and explicitly calling out Russian targeting of “those involved in the coordination, transport, and delivery of foreign assistance to Ukraine.”¹¹⁵ The question at hand, then, is not what level of risk is associated with these actions but how prepared the company is to encounter such risks.

Reaction – Risk definition and mitigation

In response to the risk of Russian retaliatory action, either through cyber or kinetic means, states and intranational bodies had a role to play in helping companies to navigate and mitigate these risks. The first method by which this was attempted was in an increased clarity on the types of actions that may be considered military or escalatory in nature. Additionally, in many cases states were necessary partners in securing any element of product delivery or operation required new physical presence in or movement into and across Ukraine.

Definition

Throughout the conflict, industry executives and civil society displayed a great deal of concern about where the line falls between civilian actors and military objectives, and how to ensure that their activities fall squarely on the civilian side of this line. Individuals and companies reiterated a desire for increased clarity on this question from Western governments and international legal bodies.¹¹⁶ Current humanitarian law requires the country at war to target only military objects, defined as objects “whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage” in a manner proportional to the military gain foreseen by the operation.¹¹⁷

In a 2023 report, the International Red Cross posited that, “tech companies that operate in situations of armed conflict should understand and monitor whether the services they provide may amount to a direct participation in hostilities by their employees and whether the company might qualify as a military objective.”¹¹⁸ Essentially, the line between civilian and military object is determined by Russia in its assessment of the battlespace, as well as the broader question of whether the Kremlin is concerned about staying within the bounds of international humanitarian law. The subjectivity of this divide allows for some range in interpretation.¹¹⁹ Indeed some, like Lindsay Freeman at UC Berkeley School of Law, argue that “civilian objects have been intentional, direct targets and not simply collateral damage.”¹²⁰ Ukraine and its allies cannot simply dictate where such a line exists. However, greater clarity from national and supranational entities would provide some measure of cover to these companies and help solidify their ability to make more accurate risk calculations.¹²¹

Mitigation

For products and services that require physical presence, either of people or products, many companies view some kind of partnership with government, local or otherwise, as a virtual necessity to bridge the risk imposed.¹²²

Cisco’s Project PowerUp, led by Senior Security Strategist Joe Marshall of Cisco Talos Intelligence Group,¹²³ is a clear demonstration of this. The project innovated and delivered a new industrial ethernet switch that could ensure continued effective power grid management even when Russian GPS jamming blocked Ukrenergo substation synchronization, and avoid the resulting forced outages across the Ukrainian power grid.¹²⁴ The delivery of these devices into Ukraine was coordinated via a phone call to a US government official who coordinated the first shipment on an upcoming cargo shipment to Poland and then onto a train into Ukraine to be installed by Ukrenergo engineers.¹²⁵ While this project was conceived of and executed by Cisco employees, those involved in the project emphasized the importance of Cisco’s partnership with the US government on this, as well as other private assistance programs.¹²⁶

Several governments and international organizations have established insurance programs, particularly political risk insurance to help shield companies from the financial risk of investment into Ukraine. In 2023, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank issued guarantees of $9.1 million to support the construction and operation in the M10 Industrial Park in Lviv.¹²⁷ Additionally, the US International Development Finance Corporation has established several financial packages guaranteeing millions in political risk insurance for a variety of projects.¹²⁸ Within Ukraine, war and political risk insurance is offered by the Export Credit Agency, which insure loans for qualifying Ukrainian businesses against such risks, as well as for direct investment from or into Ukraine.¹²⁹ The Ukrainian Ministry of Economy also drafted a law, in cooperation with the National Bank of Ukraine, which would create a unified framework for political or war risk insurance, with a focus on mitigating risks that may deter foreign investments.¹³⁰

The physical element of presence in Ukraine and especially near the battlefield remains a clear demarcation between activities that are the realm of the public sector and those that are the realm of the private sector. In this area, cooperation and coordination between companies and governments could largely follow established practices and procedures. But, for technology whose infrastructure does not touch the territory of Ukraine, the question of where the line is between civilian product and military object, and where bodies like NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations would define that line to be, resembles a gradual gradient rather than a stark line.

Key takeaways and conclusion

Behind much of the discussions and debates among various groups on the role of the private sector in in the war in Ukraine is a deeper anxiety about the evolving character of warfare as we reach the quarter marker of the twenty-first century. The integration and implementation of new technologies and its effect on the practice of war is familiar territory for theoreticians and practitioners alike, from Douhet’s theories on the supremacy of air power to the revolution of military affairs (RMA) school of thought, to those today that focus on the effect of evolving drone tactics on the operation and strategy of war. Less comfortable, however, is the analysis of what changes in technology may mean in practice not just for the conduct of war itself, but more fundamentally for the very nature of actors whose abilities and choices shape the conduct of war.

Over the past few years, private companies, especially technology companies based in North America and Western Europe have made decisions as to whether and how to contribute to the Ukrainian war effort in ways that have greatly impacted the ability of the Ukrainian government to direct and effectuate its own defense. In other words, they have moved beyond the status of resource providers in this conflict toward something more resembling actors in and of themselves, at times approaching the importance of states in their contributions.

Clarity of conflict

The war in Ukraine—especially in the first months and years of the war— was notably less divisive in the court of public opinion in the West than many other contemporary conflicts. The historical context of the Russia-Ukraine relationship, along with the sustained aggression launched against Ukraine for more than a decade prior to this invasion and the nature of the invasion itself, combined with myriad factors including those discussed throughout this report, created conditions conducive to widespread sympathy and support across much of Western Europe and North America. The efforts of the Ukrainian government proactively built on these conditions both before and after the invasion. Ukrainian leaders, Zelenskyy in particular, both publicly and in private conversations with government and private sector representatives, clearly communicated the effects of Russian aggression against Ukraine and the actions undertaken by the Ukrainian government and its people.

Clarity of conflict, as a motivating factor for tech companies’ decision-making over the course of this conflict, was important in creating favorable conditions for such choices, but is not determinative. Most important as a lesson applicable in potential future conflicts, is that the seeds that grew these conditions into place were planted well before Russian forces rolled across the Ukrainian borders in February 2022.

Business alignment

Many firms had preexisting operations, employees, or customers in Ukraine—generating both a sense of duty and a pragmatic incentive to safeguard assets and personnel. Firms that were already active in Ukraine, or whose services directly contributed to protecting their employees and customers, were the most proactive and consistent contributors. Additionally, companies could derive direct or indirect benefits from their engagement. Several firms leveraged their involvement as an opportunity for product testing, cybersecurity innovation, and real-world validation of technologies under extreme conditions. In doing so, companies not only supported Ukraine’s defense but also advanced their own technical capabilities and reputational standing.

Ukraine’s long-term digital transformation further enhanced this alignment. Over the past decade, the government has implemented legal and technical reforms aimed at combating corruption and promoting digital industry growth, positioning the country as a prospective regional tech hub and a credible, innovation-friendly partner. This proactive transformation reassured corporate partners that their investments and assistance could be practicable and impactful.

For future conflicts, states will need to account for business alignment factors as an important driving factor in private sector’s decision-making. This includes the uncomfortable, yet important finding that this includes companies’ ability to profit, or at a minimum, sustain their operations in a conflict in a way that maintains their organizational health, noting that companies’ motivations will not always align with that of the states in which they are headquartered. While moral conviction catalyzed early engagement, sustained corporate involvement in Ukraine depended on alignment between ethical action and business strategy.

Difficulty of coordination

Even amid broad goodwill, the initial months of the war revealed the challenge of coordination. Companies often struggled to identify appropriate Ukrainian counterparts, assess needs accurately, or ensure that their offerings were deployed effectively. Early efforts were marked by confusion—with multiple government offices issuing overlapping requests and little centralized control. As Bornyakov later acknowledged, the early days of outreach “were chaos.”

Many of the most significant factors that shaped company involvement were already in place and being acted upon before the February 2022 Russian invasion. Preexisting relationships were key, both as a motivating factor and a facilitating factor, effectively minimizing coordination friction. Additionally, the technological and policy developments well underway before the February 2022 invasion created the appealing Ukrainian tech landscape and improved coordination necessary once the conflict was underway.

While private companies excelled in speed and agility, governments brought scale, reliability, and regulatory legitimacy. The war illustrated how preparedness for potential future conflicts will depend on preestablished coordination frameworks that merge these strengths—enabling rapid mobilization of technological capabilities, matching private capabilities with public needs in real time.

Risk of retaliation

Providing assistance to Ukraine exposed technology companies to new security risks from cyberattacks, sanctions, or kinetic threats against personnel or infrastructure. The degree of perceived risk—and retaliation—varied depending on each company’s exposure, particularly for firms whose technologies had direct military applications or some kind of physical presence.

Ambiguity around international law, cyber norms, and export controls can delay or discourage private assistance. Companies must understand whether providing certain technologies or services could be construed as escalatory, illegal, or sanctionable. Private firms are increasingly targeted in state-level cyber operations. The possibility of retaliation, in any of a myriad of forms, was a serious risk for companies aiding Ukraine; managing and sharing that risk is essential to sustaining long-term cooperation.

To mitigate these risks, Ukraine and allied governments played an essential supportive role, clarifying the boundaries between civilian and military assistance, helping companies avoid escalatory missteps and, in some cases, underwrote contracts or insurance to shield firms from loss. Such measures demonstrate the emerging need for risk-sharing frameworks between states and corporations. In cases where physical operations within Ukraine were necessary, governments provided logistical and security coordination to protect personnel and assets. Such collaboration underscores an emerging model of public-private security cooperation, wherein states and corporations jointly navigate the blurred boundaries between national defense and digital resilience.

If private technology companies’ decisions and actions are so impactful to the conduct of war, as they have shown themselves to be, then the character of warfare has evolved in such a way as to require states to likewise evolve in the ways that they provide military assistance and plan for potential future conflicts. The foundation for this evolution needs to be a greater understanding of the factors in the case of Ukraine that most greatly impacted company decision-making regarding their participation, or not, in the conflict space, starting with the four factors identified in this report: those that pulled companies toward cooperation, and those that pushed companies away. By assessing the factors that drove companies’ decision-making in Ukraine, states can better plan and prepare for future crises and conflicts—and not leave such critical capabilities, once again, to chance.

Emma Schroeder is an associate director with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Tech Programs. Her focus in this role is on developing statecraft and strategy for cyberspace useful for both policymakers and practitioners. Her work focuses on the role of cyber and cyber-enabled technology in conflict and crime.  

Originally from Massachusetts, Schroeder holds an MA in History of War from King’s College London’s War Studies Department. She also attained her BA in International Relations & History, with a concentration in Security Studies, from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. 

This report was made possible by the participation of dozens of scholars and practitioners who shared their expertise and experiences with the author.

Thank you to the Cyber Statecraft Initiative team for their support, particularly Nikita Shah and Trey Herr for their guidance. Particular thanks to Emerson Johnston, Grace Menna, and Zhenwei Gao for their research assistance, as well as to Nancy Messieh, Samia Yakub, and Donald Partyka for the creation and review of language and digital assets. All errors are the author’s own.

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs, works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

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The deal underscores both London’s aggressive push to break into the lucrative Turkish weapons market and Ankara’s urgent need to modernize its air warfare deterrent as its efforts to secure F-16V modernization and return to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters program have stalled. The procurement could lead to deeper intra-NATO defense-industrial cooperation between two non-European Union nations located on Europe’s western and eastern flanks.

Turkey’s air warfare choice: A non-stealth fighter that can still matter in contested airspace

The Eurofighter Typhoon is one of Europe’s three principal combat aircraft options alongside the French Dassault Rafale and Sweden’s Saab Gripen. US dominance in the continent’s weapons markets is becoming more pronounced, as evidenced by the F-35’s consecutive wins in European tactical combat aircraft tenders. Nevertheless, the Eurofighter forms the backbone of various countries’ airwings, where it operates as a bridge between legacy capabilities and future air warfare concepts. Telltale indicators suggest that the baseline will keep flying until the 2060s, though some nations will likely phase it out sooner. The four-nation program, involving the British, German, Italian, and Spanish defense industries, also supports the production of military aerial engines in Europe.

To provide the Turkish Air Force with the Eurofighter Typhoons, Britain’s BAE Systems will lead major airframe manufacturing and weapons integration, primarily in Lancashire and other production pipelines. The British government estimates that the deal will create twenty thousand new jobs throughout the United Kingdom. The Turkish order will likely involve a comprehensive weapons systems package, including Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles and Brimstone air-ground munitions. Unlike the AMRAAM missile’s solid-propellant power pack, the Meteor, with a range of some 124 miles, uses a rocket-ramjet combination that enables it to endure longer flight paths. As a major munitions producer in NATO, ranging from aero-ballistic missiles to cruise missiles and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles, Turkey will likely ask the Eurofighter Typhoon’s European consortium to certify its indigenous weapons systems to the Turkish Air Force’s forthcoming tactical airwing. Doing so will offer Ankara more freedom of movement in operational planning without being desperately reliant on the Eurofighter Typhoon’s European weapon systems configurations. As the war in Ukraine has demonstrated, a strong national munitions portfolio is essential when fighting prolonged showdowns via high-tempo combat operations.

From Britain to the Gulf: Scaling the Typhoon fleet to meet Turkish air-warfare demand

The British aircraft will be new, hailing from the latest Tranche-4 variant of the Eurofighter Typhoon baseline. However, the delivery timeline will extend to 2030. Turkey needs the Eurofighter Typhoons as a stopgap capability between its aging F-16 fleet and its forthcoming, fifth-generation airpower asset, KAAN. Recognizing this five-year gap, the Turkish government is eying Gulf Arab Eurofighter arsenals. Turkish defense outlets suggest that Ankara is looking to procure a twelve-platform Eurofighter Typhoon package from the Qatari Tranche-3A AESA radar-equipped pool. Oman’s small Typhoon arsenal could also be a modest source for the Turkish Air Force, though Turkey has closer ties to Qatar and more diplomatic capital in Doha than it does in Muscat. Buying immediately from Qatar or Oman would allow Turkey to develop its pilot pool’s and ground crews’ understandings of the Eurofighter Typhoon and achieve operational capability within a few years. Such a move would make the Turkish Air Force a Eurofighter-flying branch before the British Tranche-4 deliveries kick in. At this juncture, it is important to monitor if Ankara will pursue a parallel track to finalize F-16V modernization amid price disputes and negotiations with the US defense giant Lockheed Martin. Given the United States’ decades-long dominance in the Turkish tactical aircraft market, this dispute with Lockheed Martin, at a time when Turkish and European defense cooperation is expanding, could lead to further defense trade reshuffles.

A fourth-generation answer to a fifth-generation problem

Strategically, Turkey’s Eurofighter deal with Britain is far more than an off-the-shelf purchase. It anchors deeper Turkish-British defense ties and preserves a key European production line. For Ankara, the deal modernizes its fleet, improves allied interoperability, and positions Turkey in a stronger air warfare posture within NATO. The Eurofighter can also provide the industrial bridge that Turkey needs while facing shortfalls in fifth-generation capabilities caused by its exclusion from the United States’ F-35 program and the lengthy development runway of its indigenous KAAN multirole platform. If realized, shared maintenance, logistics, avionics, and weapons integration for the Eurofighter Typhoon can even lay some groundwork to help KAAN’s co-development, allowing Turkey to evolve from being merely a buyer to a defense partner, although there is little, if any, chance that Ankara will join the European consortium behind the Eurofighter baseline.

Turkey’s Eurofighter Typhoon procurement delivers an immediate NATO-standard boost to its airpower, offering credible air superiority and standoff strike capacity across the nation’s troubled neighborhood, which has been shaped by wars. High-end weapons, such as the Meteor and the Brimstone, will enhance the Turkish aerial deterrent’s firepower, while the Eurofighter’s agility, twin-engine reliability, and modern sensors will offer more advantages.

Still, the Eurofighter Typhoon is not the F-35. The combat aircraft lacks low observability. Thus, combat-deploying the Eurofighters in heavily defended airspace would require very careful planning, intensive electronic warfare support, and coalition enablers. It is not the legacy F-16, either: keeping highly combat-ready Eurofighter Typhoon squadrons will require allocating more resources and money. They are more demanding and expensive beasts to operate. Moreover, flying a dual tactical airwing, consisting of the F-16s and the Eurofighter Typhoons, would inevitably lead to swollen defense expenditures for Ankara and Turkish taxpayers: it will be sustainable but surely costlier.

Nonetheless, amid political fluctuations, this diversification of suppliers is an insurance policy for Turkey in a world that has been losing its once-predictable diplomatic patterns. The Eurofighter Typhoon deal does not mean that the Turkish Air Force would no longer need the F-16V modernization, nor would it end the nation’s quest for achieving the fifth-generation tactical combat aircraft capability. In practical terms, the twenty-piece Eurofighter Typhoon package for the Turkish Air Force, one of the largest operators of the F-16s around the globe, is like a good protein bar for an Olympic athlete. It would not compensate for a full meal, but would still offer a feasible, interim solution under time pressure.

Can Kasapoğlu is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a co-editor of the Atlantic Council Turkey Program’s Defense Journal.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Alex Serban: A transition from reassurance to co-ownership of defense 

Philippe Dickinson: This is far from the worst outcome for Europe 

A transition from reassurance to co-ownership of defense

BUCHAREST—The big question across NATO’s eastern flank today is: Should this development be understood as a retreat by the United States or a strategic reconfiguration? 

Romanian authorities confirmed that approximately one thousand US troops will remain stationed in the country. Key allied strategic assets will remain untouched, such as the Deveselu missile-defense site and the Mihail Kogălniceanu (MK) Air Base, which is undergoing a two-billion-dollar expansion to become one of NATO’s largest and most capable bases in Europe. Reuters reported that a NATO official also underscored on Wednesday that the overall US military presence in Europe “remains larger than it has been in many years,” framing the decision as part of a regular adjustment in posture rather than a withdrawal. 

Indeed, Romanian President Nicușor Dan had already informed Parliament in August about approving the pre-positioning of military equipment and new US contingents at MK Air Base, describing it as “a strategic reconfiguration, not a withdrawal,” in the context of rising instability in the Middle East and NATO’s ongoing consolidation. 

But Washington’s decision may bring unintended consequences. This regional brigade was a reminder that in the face of populist politics and Russian interference—via drones, sabotage, and disinformation—weakened democracies such as Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary still had a Western commitment and troops to rely on. Instead of reflecting confidence that allies like Romania can host, integrate, and operate advanced assets within a broader NATO command structure, populist politicians and extremist voices may use this pullback as a signal that Moscow is once again setting the region’s clock.  

For Bucharest, it is a call to maintain momentum in modernizing its armed forces, investing in logistics and surveillance systems, and aligning its defense planning with both NATO and the European Union’s (EU’s) emerging defense initiatives, including within the Bucharest Nine format of NATO’s eastern flank countries.  

From Moscow’s perspective, the move will be applauded and seen as a weakening of US resolve. In reality, however, if the United States and Europe make strong commitments, a more agile and networked posture—anchored in Romania—strengthens deterrence by enhancing mobility, intelligence, and rapid reaction capacity across the Black Sea. 

Ultimately, this decision could mark a transition from reassurance to co-ownership of defense. The transatlantic partnership is not retracting; it is evolving and transforming, requiring Europe, and Romania in particular, to turn political reliability into operational capability. Romania is looking to its US ally to send clear messages and commit firmly to continue its presence across the region as a deterrent to Russian aggression. 

That’s why Pentagon and NATO leaders should go the extra mile and further underscore that no future retrenchment will take place in the next three years. US military investments in Romania should remain steadfast and continue to expand, particularly at MK Air Base. 

Meanwhile, Europe should step in and backfill for the departing brigade. Romania and the EU must deepen their own defense investment, financially, industrially, and in troop commitments, to ensure that NATO’s forward presence is matched by credible European capabilities. 

—Alex Serban is the senior advisor for the Atlantic Council’s Romania Office and a nonresident senior fellow in the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

This is far from the worst outcome for Europe

WASHINGTON—This is a day that many in Europe have feared for some time. But it shouldn’t come as a surprise—this is a clearly stated policy direction that the Trump administration has communicated for several months. 

It also shouldn’t be a time to panic. The administration has been trying to reassure European allies that the planned reconfiguration of the US presence on the ground in Europe will be gradual and moderate, returning US troop numbers over time to levels similar to those before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This move in Romania is broadly in line with that direction. In the range of potential force posture moves the administration could take, this is far from the worst outcome for Europe. The suggestion today from the Estonian defense minister that US troops will remain in the Baltic nation should provide more reassurance. 

The administration has generally been pleasantly surprised by the broader European response to the Trump administration’s demands that Europe take on greater responsibility for its own security, with the NATO 5 percent spending target being the standout success. Europe’s cooperation should strengthen the hand of those within the administration arguing for a phased and moderate reorientation done in coordination with NATO and European allies. 

The lesson for European leaders should be that showing progress on their own defense spending and capabilities is the best way to keep the Americans on board and engaged in the project of European security. And it helps them frame as more reasonable their critical asks of Washington: US enablers that are not easily replaced (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; long-range strike capabilities; command and control; logistics and transport; and the US nuclear umbrella) and the maintenance of a thin but broad US physical presence along the eastern flank that can be scaled at speed in a crisis. 

With that said, Moscow will inevitably interpret this move as a message that, while the United States is most certainly not abandoning Europe, it is serious about its efforts to reconfigure its European force posture. To neutralize any potential emboldening of Moscow, the United States should find other ways to signal clear, long-term resolve to deter further Russian aggression. The recent sanctions package is an excellent start. Providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles and committing critical enablers to Ukraine after a cease-fire would be even better. 

—Philippe Dickinson is a deputy director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative. Prior to joining the Council, he was a career diplomat with the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 

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In recent years, Russia and China have expanded their commercial, research, and military footprints in this region, directly threatening US territory and economic interests. But too often in the United States, Arctic security debates have centered on shipbuilding delays, procurement gaps, and the dual-use risks of adversary research facilities, while overlooking the imperative of building a lethal cold-weather force. Conversely, discussions on US homeland defense seem narrowly centered on the southern border and shoreline. 

To secure all US borders and deter adversary bellicosity in a critical frontier, the Pentagon should take three steps: harmonize command structures through liaison officers and exercise synchronization, expand the Army’s Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center in Alaska, and deepen NATO non-Arctic member participation in polar training.

Harmonize

The US military divides the world into different geographic sections, each governed by a combatant command. Given its position at the planet’s northern pole, the Arctic spans three US geographic combatant commands—Northern Command (NORTHCOM), which oversees North America; Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), covering the Indo-Pacific; and European Command (EUCOM), responsible for Europe. These commands must work diligently to build cohesion through liaison exchanges and coordinated exercises. Although some argue for consolidating the Arctic under a single command, entrenched bureaucratic dynamics within the Pentagon make any redefinition of responsibilities unfeasible—no one wants to relinquish control. Indeed, there is pressure to reduce, not increase, command footprints. The Arctic thus presents a jurisdictional challenge for the US military, making it more difficult for the United States to form a strong, coherent Arctic strategy and presenting a gap adversaries can exploit.

To enable a unified Arctic strategy, EUCOM, INDOPACOM, and NORTHCOM should exchange liaison officers at both senior and mid-levels. Senior officers, O-6 and above, should align strategy, plans, and policy, while mid-level officers, such as O-4s, should integrate daily work in intelligence, logistics, and exercises to foster cohesion. 

Another area for linkage between EUCOM, INDOPACOM, and NORTHCOM lies in the training exercises that each command orchestrates. In the Arctic, NORTHCOM operates exercise Arctic Edge annually, and INDOPACOM holds exercise Northern Edge once every two years. This year, the exercises occurred concurrently in Alaska for the first time, which officials said enabled NORTHCOM and INDOPACOM “to enhance cross-combatant command coordination, integrate missions and demonstrate the ability to position and sustain operations around the theater.” 

Consequently, at minimum, NORTHCOM and INDOPACOM should align their training calendars to institutionalize Arctic Edge and Northern Edge concurrence going forward. More ambitiously, they should consider establishing a combined exercise. Full EUCOM participation in Alaskan exercises may be unfeasible given its leadership in NATO-run Arctic exercises, but embedding EUCOM liaison officers from planning to execution would still strengthen coordination across Arctic geographic commands. 

By emphasizing seamlessness across bureaucratic divides, the United States would help close a gap adversaries could exploit and would signal its resolve to deter aggression at the United States’ Arctic border.

Expand

A more service-specific approach to bolstered Arctic lethality lies in expanding the Army’s freshly inaugurated Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center in Alaska (JPMRC-AK). 

In the Army, units cycle through training rotations at different centers throughout the nation. Currently, the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 11th Airborne Division is the only Army unit to have cycled through Alaska. The Army should expand Alaskan training beyond the 11th Airborne Division and make JPMRC-AK a mandatory training cycle for more units across the force. While this undoubtedly poses logistical hurdles, the status quo risks siloing cold-weather training into a niche reserved for a limited number of soldiers instead of a force-wide requirement. 

In building a capable cold-weather fighting force, the United States will also show adversaries that the strongest military in the world has a ferocious might that extends to its Arctic theater. The presence of US troops and their ability to perform in all border-region terrains, from the sandy deserts of the Sonora to Alaska’s polar tundra, is essential for protecting the homeland. 

Deepen

In addition, the United States should leverage its leadership in NATO to advocate the inclusion of non-Arctic NATO countries in cold-weather-specific training. 

Historically, NATO Arctic training exercises, run on the United States’ end by EUCOM, have featured NATO members with Arctic borders. The US Navy, for example, has participated in Arctic Specialist, an explosive ordnance disposal and expeditionary mine countermeasures exercise, alongside Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. The United States could propose rotating participation by non-Arctic NATO allies to strengthen their specialized cold-weather military capabilities and enhance multinational military coordination. While this risks slowing an exercise’s rhythm, rotating NATO militaries could arrive earlier for introductory training or complete pre-assigned modules to hit the ground running. The higher the number of Arctic-trained NATO member forces, the better positioned the Alliance will be to credibly deny adversary objectives in the region.

The administration’s anticipated new emphasis on the Western Hemisphere presents a unique opportunity to forge a more streamlined and lethal Arctic fighting force to secure the United States’ northernmost border. 

Charlotte Bertrand is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Initiative and is currently pursuing her master’s degree in security studies at Georgetown University. She has previously interned in Congress, in the executive branch, and at US Central Command. 

The post Three ways the US can build a more lethal fighting force in the Arctic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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• Introduction
• Key findings summary
• Methodology
• Part I: Russian intent
• Part II: Deterrence
• Part III: Response
• Recommendations and key findings
• Conclusion

Introduction

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the Atlantic Council project, Sustaining Allied Responses to the Threat of Russian Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Escalation. The objective of the project was to analyze the prospects for Russian use of chemical or biological weapons specifically in Europe over the next five to ten years; identify how the United States and its European allies and partners could deter and prevent Russian use of these weapons in Europe; and, should deterrence fail, assess response options.

Background

Russia has a well-established and clearly demonstrated strategic objective of undermining stability in the Euro-Atlantic region to reverse its loss of status following the end of the Cold War.¹ This strategy is characterized by hostility toward the United States and its allies and partners in Europe.²

Over recent years, Russia has demonstrated its intent to provoke instability in Europe by acting with malign aggression that is both overt and hybrid in nature. The starkest example of Russia’s revanchist aggression is its full-scale illegal invasion of Ukraine, launched in 2022. Russia has also been conducting hybrid attacks—hostile activities using tools of statecraft below the threshold of conventional warfare to shift the balance of power in its favor—against the United States and its allies in Europe.³

A willingness to use chemical weapons has long been a feature of Russian aggression, both on the battlefield in Ukraine (specifically chloropicrin), and on the streets of Europe.⁴ As a result, Russia was described as “the most acute nuclear, biological, and chemical threat in the near-term” in the United States’ 2023 Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction.⁵ This parallels the same terminology used in the 2022 National Defense Strategy and 2022 National Security Strategy.⁶ Undermining the cohesion of the United States and its NATO allies is a core goal of Russia’s political and military strategy. The Kremlin has shown that it is willing to use, or threaten to use, whatever capabilities it possesses, including CBRN weapons, to achieve this goal.

Research question

Our primary research question was, “What are the prospects for Russian use of chemical or biological weapons in Europe over the next five to ten years, and how can the United States and its European allies and partners counter such threats?” To address this question, the project team examined the following:

• In what scenarios might Russia use its arsenal of chemical and biological capabilities to achieve its geopolitical goals in the five-to-ten-year time frame? What developments in European security more broadly over the same period would increase or decrease the risk of Russian use of chemical or biological weapons?
• How might the United States and its European allies and partners enhance their overall defense and deterrence posture to reduce the risk of potential chemical or biological weapons use in the next five to ten years?
• How can the United States work with European allies and partners to coordinate and standardize comprehensive responses to the potential deployment of Russian chemical and biological weapons?
• To what extent could Russian use of chemical or biological weapons in Europe escalate further to the use of nuclear weapons, and how can the United States work with its European allies and partners to reduce the risk of escalation?

Key findings summary

Our project illuminated several findings for US and European decision-makers:

• Russia will likely continue using chemical weapons in Europe in a range of scenarios over the next five to ten years, particularly if doing so undermines Alliance unity and disrupts Ukraine’s integration into the West. Based on its recent behavior, however, Russia appears less likely to use biological weapons. Furthermore, while Russia has threatened nuclear use, a large-scale nuclear attack appears unlikely.
• To credibly deter Russia from nuclear escalation, the United States and its European allies and partners must ensure that Russia understands that using—or threatening to use—chemical and biological weapons would both fail to achieve its intended outcome and incur intolerable costs.
• Since the end of the Cold War, CBRN defense has been deprioritized among NATO allies, including the United States. Amid calls for increased defense spending, CBRN defense capability development is an area primed for greater investment.
• The United States should leverage NATO to facilitate greater coordination between civilian and military entities to enhance whole-of-society resilience to CBRN threats.
• Information and intelligence sharing is critical to achieving a common threat perception among NATO allies and partners. Expanded information sharing and effective strategic communications can deter Russian use of chemical or biological weapons and ensure a coordinated response if deterrence fails.
• The United States and its European allies and partners should take steps to raise the public IQ related to CBRN threats, particularly as it pertains to chemical and biological threats.
• The governance of emerging and applied technologies is difficult within the bounds of existing treaty regimes. Sanctions and export controls can complement treaty organizations to monitor and contain potential CBRN threats from such technologies, including dual-use systems and components.

Methodology

The project team adopted two principal research methods for this project: a series of scenario-based workshops and interviews with subject matter experts and officials from the United States, Europe, and NATO. The team also conducted secondary research to develop the workshop methodology and to corroborate information and insights gleaned during the workshops and interviews.

Scenario-based workshops

In January 2025, the project team convened experts and officials to take part in two scenario-based exercises. The first group, which was convened virtually, consisted of subject matter experts and researchers from the United States and Europe, while the second group (convened in hybrid format) consisted of officials from the United States, NATO, and European governments. See Appendixes B and C for more information about the participants and the methodology, respectively.

The project team created a plausible exploratory scenario in which tensions between Russia and the United States and its European allies and partners (primarily Ukraine) had grown over a five-year time frame. The scenario provided a framework for participants to consider the key questions of Russian strategic intent, and implications for allied deterrence and responses to Russian aggression.

The workshops presented two scenarios in the year 2030: one in which Russia carried out a chemical attack against NATO allies based in Ukraine, and one in which Russia carried out targeted biological attacks against allied officials in Europe. These attacks concerned low-level use of chemical and biological agents, rather than major battlefield use of such weapons. Thus, the focus was on how Russia might use these capabilities to test escalatory dynamics, rather than to achieve major military objectives. The workshops divided participants into two groups; each group focused on either the chemical or biological scenario. The workshops primarily asked participants to analyze why Russia might consider the use of chemical or biological weapons strategically advantageous in these scenarios; propose how to deter Russia from further use of chemical and biological weapons; and recommend how the United States and Europe should respond to Russia’s use of such weapons. The two groups reconvened after the exercise to share key findings from their discussions.

Interviews with officials and experts

Informed by the insights from the workshops, the project team conducted interviews with US, European, and NATO officials and experts. The interviews provided direct perspectives on the potential for Russian CBRN escalation over the next five to ten years and how the alliance can deter and respond to possible Russian chemical and biological escalation. The interview stage also enabled the project team to explore the additional question of nuclear escalation following Russia’s potential use of chemical or biological weapons.

The following report presents our analysis of Russia’s intent to use CBRN weapons, possible deterrence considerations to be employed by the United States and its European allies and partners, and response options for the United States and Europe to respond should deterrence fail. The report concludes with our overall findings and recommendations.

Part I: Russian intent

Vladimir Putin described the breakup of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”⁷ NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept makes clear that Putin’s ambition to reverse the outcome of the Cold War is at the heart of Russia’s efforts to reestablish spheres of influence and direct control over its former Soviet empire, including NATO allies.⁸ Russia’s hostile actions seek to undermine the rules-based international order that defines the worldview of NATO and its members.⁹

At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin signaled clearly to the world that he believed undermining the international rules-based system was necessary to carry out his revanchist ambitions.¹⁰ Russia has since demonstrated repeatedly that it is willing to use violent and aggressive means to further this ambition. This includes conventional military aggression, as demonstrated by Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, 2014 annexation of Crimea, and 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.¹¹

Russia’s hybrid campaign of aggression

In addition to conventional military aggression, Russia’s campaign has included a well-documented and long-running “shadow war” of hybrid tactics against NATO and its allies.¹² This hybrid campaign has included critical infrastructure attacks, acts of violence, weaponized migration, election interference, and information campaigns, which have intensified in volume since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.¹³

The threat and the use of Russia’s CBRN capabilities has been a feature of Moscow’s hybrid campaign. In spite of the long-standing norms against using CBRN weapons, enshrined in international treaties and conventions, Russia has demonstrated that it is able and willing to deploy these weapons,¹⁴ including in NATO territory.¹⁵ Russia has also demonstrated a willingness to use chemical weapons during its illegal invasion of Ukraine and long supported the former Assad regime in Syria that used chemical weapons against civilians.¹⁶

The psychological value of chemical and biological weapons

For Russia, chemical and biological weapons have many potential uses and bring many advantages. At their most basic level, chemical and biological weapons, either in a battlefield scenario or a civilian context, are agents of terror. Several interviewees noted the Russian state employs these weapons—or threatens to—to instill fear in European populations and among Russian dissidents in exile.¹⁷ Russian willingness to use chemical weapons in this manner also sends a clear signal to the domestic Russian population about the Putin regime’s tolerance for any potential threats and challenges. A clear demonstration of this tactic was the 2020 Novichok poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, which took place in Russia.¹⁸ While untested, it can be safely assumed that Putin would resort to extreme measures, including using CBRN weapons as necessary, to ensure the survival of his regime.

Some participants described public awareness in much of Europe about how chemical or biological weapons are used and the effects they can have as generally low. Those participants suggested that Russian use of CBRN weapons would be a means of causing widespread panic and manipulating emotions and public actions. The confusion they could potentially sow could create fertile ground for disinformation campaigns designed to undermine public trust in their governments.¹⁹ Such an attack could also expose frailties in broader social resilience in the target community.

Challenging norms–and NATO

Many participants in both the workshops and interviews reflected that a significant incentive for the use of chemical or biological weapons is to further degrade the broadly accepted international norms and standards in place since World War II. Russia’s documented use of chemical weapons sends a signal that it does not consider itself to be constrained by rules, norms, or obligations like other countries. It is an assertion that, as a supposed great power with an extensive and sophisticated CBRN toolbox (a legacy maintained from the Soviet era), and a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, Russia can act with relative impunity to flout and degrade the rules-based system that it opposes. Allies should continue to acknowledge and challenge this behavior, but more public reporting on Russian chemical and biological weapons and how they compare to restrictions outlined in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) could improve awareness of Russia’s possible intent.

In more general terms, the actions of the Russian regime demonstrate that Russia places lower value on human life than the United States and its allies, whether that is of Ukrainian civilians, unwitting bystanders to Russian crimes, or its own military personnel.²⁰ This cultural disregard for the suffering of even its own people affords Russia the space to conduct more reckless attacks and bear the subsequent consequences that the United States and its European allies and partners would not.

By their nature, different chemical and biological weapons have a broad range of properties, methods of delivery, rates of contagion, and lethality.²¹ While the CWC includes verification measures, the BWC does not. Participants noted that Russia could calibrate the nature, scale, and target of any chemical or biological weapon attack to create maximum uncertainty, exploit potential differences in threat perceptions and willingness to stand up against Russian aggression, and degrade international conventions. In many senses, the greater utility of chemical or biological weapons is not their lethality, but their impact on the adversary’s thinking. As one participant put it, “the intention isn’t to kill, but to complicate.”

This coercive element confers chemical and biological weapons and the range of effects they can create, with significant strategic value for Russia. Through the use (or threatened use) of different chemical or biological weapons in a range of scenarios, Russia might hope to influence allied decision-making and actions, such as potential Ukrainian integration into Western-oriented institutions. Participants observed that Russian use of chemical and biological weapons in these scenarios could be a means of Russia signaling that it considers the West has crossed its political red lines.

In a hypothetical battlefield context, the threat of chemical weapons use could limit the efficiency of allied military operations by imposing extra precautionary measures and influencing battlefield planning. In Iraq, the fear that Saddam Hussein could use chemical weapons degraded efficiency on the battlefield.²² After decades of underinvestment and neglect in the principles of operating in CBRN contaminated environments, Russia may be tempted to expose shortfalls in allied CBRN readiness on the battlefield.

For Russia, chemical and biological weapons serve an additional military function of making up for potential conventional military shortcomings. Where the Russians might be outmatched by NATO in conventional terms, unencumbered by moral or legal constraints, they might consider it a legitimate part of their doctrine to use asymmetric capabilities that can tilt the scales in their favor.²³ Participants in our exercises speculated that the likelihood of Russia resorting to chemical or biological weapons would increase should Russia face imminent conventional defeat on the battlefield, either against Ukraine or NATO. This assumption is supported by the 2024 change in Russian nuclear doctrine, which lowered the threshold for first use of nuclear weapons to a new, lower standard.²⁴

The escalatory dilemma

Russia’s recent changes to its military doctrine, and the potential use of chemical and biological weapons either in civilian or battlefield contexts, must be considered within the framework of political and military escalation.²⁵ Several interviewees noted that, because these are weapons that NATO allies do not and would not use, Russia’s previous use of chemical weapons and potential willingness to turn to biological weapons give the Kremlin an extra rung on the escalatory ladder.

Unlike nuclear escalation—which is well-studied, more clearly defined, and more widely considered taboo in the case of first-use of nuclear weapons—the escalatory dynamics of chemical and biological weapons use are more ambiguous and less certain. The scale and severity of chemical or biological weapon use could be calibrated to avoid crossing an obvious threshold that demands a military response, while at the same time clearly crossing a normative line that NATO allies would not cross, all the while posing a difficult conundrum about the appropriate and proportionate response.

Additionally, the dual-use nature of many of these chemical or biological agents (which may have legitimate and peaceful origins and uses) makes attribution challenging and presents sufficient deniability. This makes it difficult to establish clear lines of acceptable use and potentially hampers efforts to cohere a forceful and united response. At the same time, it allows Russia to simultaneously send a message of intent to allies and sow further confusion and distrust, while mostly avoiding (or limiting) punishment. In short, per one workshop participant, “it helps Russia to establish escalation dominance without committing to war.”

However, in many discussions throughout the project, there was considerable uncertainty over whether and how escalation to chemical and biological weapons use would increase the subsequent prospects of nuclear escalation. While many participants recognized that Russia’s willingness to disregard norms when it comes to chemical weapons in particular could logically lead to nuclear escalation and that Russia had invoked rhetoric around nuclear weapons use in recent years, participants agreed that taboos around nuclear weapons use exert more of a constraining force on Russia. Several participants noted the reported influence that China and India were able to wield against Russia in October 2022 to help de-escalate Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric at the time.²⁶

Participants noted that where chemical or biological weapons can be deployed in such a way as to sow confusion and inject escalatory ambiguity, the line that nuclear weapons use would cross is much more definitive. No participants envisaged these scenarios escalating to the use of nuclear weapons unless Putin felt it was the last and only option for his personal survival.

Part II: Deterrence

As outlined above, Russia has and could continue to use chemical or biological weapons depending on the state of its conventional capabilities. The United States and its European allies and partners play a crucial role in deterring Russia from using any CBRN weapon. It is therefore critical to consider the scenarios in which Russia might turn to such weapons. Russia might even assume that previous responses to chemical attacks give them scope to escalate to larger-scale strategic weapons.²⁷

For deterrence to be effective, like-minded nations must make clear that they are prepared to impose intolerable costs (economic, geopolitical, or military) on Russia should it use chemical or biological weapons, while also maintaining some ambiguity as to the exact nature of a response. Demonstrations of intelligence sharing among allies to present a unified threat assessment may clarify how the United States observes the Russian threat in the CBRN domain. Given how critical it is for civilian institutions to be integrated in the response to a potential CBRN attack, particularly related to chemical and biological threats, a whole-of-government approach to deterrence is essential for how the United States and its European allies and partners should position themselves vis-à-vis Russia. Outside-the-box thinking around potential partners and nontraditional allies may also aid in strengthening deterrence. The following takeaways emerged from our analysis, including discussions with key stakeholders in the United States and Europe.

Deterrence can yield powerful results

Deterrence by punishment would be harder to inflict if Russia were to use a chemical or biological weapon, given that there would not be a proportional response.²⁸ However, the United States and Europe still have options for precise, measured, and consequential actions. Workshop participants agreed that specific actions or escalation using CBRN threats from Russia would have severe consequences warranting a response, including stringent economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure campaigns, and, in some instances, retaliatory military strikes. With the nuclear deterrent as the foundation for any response from the United States (alongside that of the United Kingdom and France), any threat of retaliation against Russia will be stronger.²⁹ In addition, the United States and European countries could implement measures such as export controls, sanctions, international condemnation, or stationing NATO troops closer to Russia’s borders to deter Russian CBRN use.

Participants reflected that the most likely scenario in which Russia would turn to CBRN threats would include hybrid attacks on the United States and Europe. Deterrence of such threats remains a “riddle” as one interviewee put it, where more degrees of ambiguity are present that do not apply to conventional (or nuclear) escalation. When approaching the more tactical use of chemical or biological weapons, there is more opaqueness given the dual-purpose nature of substances, technologies, and delivery systems. Workshop participants did not come to consensus on how the United States and its European allies should view (or respond to) such threats within the hybrid domain or at the tactical applications of chemical or biological weapons.

The role of attribution in deterring CBRN use

During the workshops and interviews, participants continuously reiterated that attribution is critical to deterring Russian chemical and biological threats and holding Russia accountable for past use of chemical weapons. Intelligence and information sharing play an important role in attribution. One interviewee remarked that Russia may think twice about staging chemical and biological attacks if there is more publicly available information about their chemical and biological capabilities, facilities, and deployment means.

However, timely technical collection and forensic analysis capabilities are lacking among NATO allies, leading to questions about the accuracy and reliability of attributing attacks. Several existing capabilities—including detection, intelligence, and surveillance systems—could prevent escalation with chemical and biological weapons, but these systems are not well resourced across the Alliance. Many NATO member states lack adequate expertise in sample collection, robust laboratory infrastructure, and the requisite instruments to conduct analysis, all of which impede attribution.

Some participants we spoke to, particularly on NATO’s eastern flank, reflected on a need to strengthen intelligence, monitoring, and detection capabilities to improve their overall deterrence and response posture. Investment in capabilities to investigate and attribute attacks could prevent Russian escalation. For attribution to be effective, the United States and European allies and partners must also possess a shared understanding of indicators and warning signals ahead of an attack.

Preparedness and resilience are essential

Participants described the need for the United States and its European allies and partners to limit the consequences of Russian chemical and biological attacks. The notion of “deterrence by resilience” or “deterrence by preparedness” (a subcategory of the broader notion of “deterrence by denial”) is one paradigm for thinking of how the United States could successfully prevent Russia from turning to chemical or biological weapons. The following considerations came up most frequently as areas for investment.

Capability development and deployment

Allied military representatives broadly agreed that CBRN-related equipment—either related to attribution (including detection and surveillance systems) or response (such as decontamination or personal protective equipment [PPE])—is often overlooked in favor of high-caliber defense systems. Counter-CBRN capabilities are frequently considered too niche for broader collective defense.

Investment in CBRN defense capabilities, discussed further in the response section of this report, provides a deterrent signal in addition to preparing allies to fight through a chemical or biological attack. However, nearly everyone we interviewed recognized that these capabilities are often siloed to specialist forces and not broadly integrated within general purpose forces. Ministries of defense across the Alliance should set baselines for CBRN defense-capability targets, including PPE, gas masks, and treatment, across the total force and resource these priorities accordingly.

Exercises and training

Regular and comprehensive exercises that incorporate a variety of US and European military forces would underpin an effective deterrence strategy toward Russia. Some participants described the importance of joint training among special operations forces (SOF) that might be equipped to respond to chemical and biological weapons use. Components of these exercises should be incorporated into broader training, which can enable preparedness in times of crisis. Participants pointed to several preexisting multinational exercises as examples to demonstrate readiness to deter CBRN escalation.³⁰

Other training—including tabletop exercises and war-games—can be deployed to help decision-makers design more effective standards to aid and inform how the United States and its European allies and partners can deter potential Russian use of CBRN threats. Tabletop exercises and war-games leveraged by the Pentagon and DTRA with their European counterparts can be used to strengthen strategic and operational thinking about how to deter Russian escalation by providing opportunities to try new approaches under the guidance of expert facilitators.

Whole-of-society resilience

To be effective, deterrence by resilience must incorporate all facets of society to respond to instances of crisis or threats.³¹ To deter potential CBRN threats through preparedness, European allies and partners must warn the public, without fear-mongering, of the risk of escalation. Several participants noted the importance of preparing populations to withstand and defy threats from Russia, which includes activating and sustaining civilian institutions such as hospitals that would treat those affected by a chemical or biological attack. As part of a whole-of-society approach, greater awareness of chemical and biological threats is needed; public health personnel, first responders, law enforcement, teachers, and others ought to understand the effects of chemical and biological agents and how to respond appropriately. Similar to the military, civilian agencies should procure and maintain CBRN defense capabilities to protect and treat civilian populations in the event of a chemical or biological attack.

One phrase that is often repeated in expert circles is “raising the IQ” on nuclear threats. This concept applies to chemical and biological threats as well so that more individuals are cognizant of their scale and severity. Mental and emotional preparedness would enable the public to resist Russian efforts and contain the potential consequences associated with a Russian attack. Demonstrating societal resilience, in which wider social and civil functions can withstand CBRN escalation, could deter Russia from employing CBRN weapons.

Wielding the information space

Russia consistently utilizes the information space to instill fear, distrust, and confusion.³² In addition to responding to these types of stories with clear, fact-based information that demonstrates why Russian claims are false, the United States and its European allies and partners can also pre-bunk and dispel any false or misleading claims that Russia produces about CBRN-related threats. Participants pointed to the importance of sharing proactive messages about resistance to such narratives through a variety of means—including traditional media, official government communications, and social media—to dissuade Russian perpetrators from deploying attacks. Eye-catching social media posts and multimedia tools can extend reach to nontraditional communities to help dispel Russian claims. As one participant noted, winning the information war must be combined with the requisite military power and civilian capability to deter Russia.

Be cautious of setting red lines

While US and European officials must be clear about the consequences of escalation, interviewees resisted establishing so-called red lines that are overly specific. Many interviewees pointed to the infamous case of the Obama administration’s supposed red lines regarding Syria’s use of chemical weapons during its civil war in the 2010s. Such thresholds, which may be politically sensitive to apply, would leave the international community in a difficult position with respect to enforcement or punishment, which could undermine the credibility of deterrence.

Participants called instead for political rhetoric to be vague externally, where Russia and its allies would have difficulty determining the threshold for response, while being precise internally about the consequences of Russia’s actions. This distinction would provide space for the United States and its European allies and partners to determine the requisite response to CBRN threats stemming from Russia.

Diplomacy as a deterrent

Russia finds itself somewhat isolated in the current geopolitical environment. However, the Kremlin frequently looks to several nations—including China, Iran, and North Korea—to bolster Russia’s defense. These relationships could provide options to engage non-European nations to deter Russia from CBRN escalation. For example, China reportedly engaged Russia to discourage the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and the deployment of nuclear weapons in space.³³ Given the degree to which Russia depends on China to prop up its wartime economy, there may be an opportunity to leverage China to dissuade Russia from turning to CBRN escalation, particularly if China upholds international regimes regarding CBRN use.³⁴ India may also be able to influence Russia given its role in supporting Russia’s economic stability amid Western sanctions and may have sway in discouraging CBRN escalation.

Part III: Response

The results of our workshops, interviews, and secondary research illuminated opportunities to enhance US and European responses to a CBRN attack should deterrence fail. Given its role in coordinating allied planning, NATO will be a critical actor in any response effort. Our discussions with NATO and European officials revealed consistent, close cooperation among military elements at NATO, while understanding that support required from civilian entities is a more nascent effort. However, the mandate for responding to a CBRN incident typically falls within the civilian sectors of many European governments, so political-military coordination is essential to ensuring all facets of government are aware of their roles in the event of a CBRN attack. Enhancing cooperation to promote coordinated responses includes the following best practices.

Ensure broad awareness of CBRN threats

Allies we interviewed broadly agreed that awareness of Russian CBRN threats cannot only reside within the specialist communities at NATO or in national militaries. At the political level, there is general agreement at NATO and within European capitals that Russia’s CBRN threats are an immediate concern. However, it is less clear how much allies are willing to invest to counter these threats, both now and in the five-to-ten-year time frame. Those geographically closest to Russia were most acutely aware of the threats and adamant about engaging with NATO allies via training, exercises, and exchanges to ensure active cooperation.

Variations in threat perception also appeared to be generational, according to our discussions. For example, officers who have served since the end of the Cold War described a lack of investment in CBRN defense in the absence of acute Soviet chemical, biological, and nuclear threats. The perception of such threats was lower in the post-Cold War era, which led the United States and Europe to deprioritize investment in preparedness. Given Russia’s continued flouting of international norms against the use of chemical weapons, and the primacy of nuclear warfare in its military doctrine, US, NATO, and European leaders need to uphold what they have recognized in recent strategic guidance as a critical threat emanating from Russia and invest in their forces accordingly.

Expand CBRN training to the total force

Training is an area that appears ripe for further investment. European military leaders we interviewed agreed that expertise cannot reside in the CBRN specialist communities alone. General purpose forces must also be trained on CBRN threats and equipped to fight through contaminated environments. To ensure broader awareness of CBRN threats, NATO and national military exercises should include elements of chemical, biological, or limited nuclear use scenarios. Military and civilian leaders we interviewed recognized the drawbacks of having personnel exercise in restrictive protective gear, given how it can slow maneuver, but it also puts troops at a disadvantage if they need to operate wearing the gear in a real-time scenario without much experience. NATO’s CBRN-focused exercises, described in the previous section, are an important step toward ensuring interoperability among NATO forces, but these lessons can be expanded beyond CBRN defense units to include NATO SOF and other elements of NATO’s deployable forces.

Better integrate military and civilian components

Apart from military preparedness, it is critical for national military and NATO elements to understand the capacity of civilian institutions, as first responders will have the authority for coordinating a response to incidents that occur outside of military operations. During the workshops and the interviews, participants expressed the need for greater integration of civilian and military personnel on topics such as decontamination and training, which necessitates the ability to share information between sectors.

Civilian institutions also play a critical role in responding to chemical and biological incidents, which could include attacks. Preparedness within national, subnational, and local institutions—including, for example, hospitals, research laboratories, public health institutions, law enforcement agencies, manufacturing facilities, and entities managing critical infrastructure—are essential to ensuring readiness for potential chemical and biological attacks. Civilian institutions could be underprepared for the crisis operations that would be required in the event of a chemical or biological attack. Better coordination with military counterparts can bridge these gaps to ensure a whole-of-society response to potential attacks, which also has an important deterrent effect when highlighted via strategic communications campaigns.

The European Union can play a role in fostering greater access to critical resources, such as PPE and laboratory equipment, particularly in times of crisis where traditional processes are too slow. The European External Action Service, which is the EU’s diplomatic service, has long partnered with NATO to ensure mutual understanding of threats and how to best prepare NATO allies and EU member states for possible CBRN attacks with information and tangible assets.³⁵ This relationship is vital to ensure stronger political-military coordination and should be expanded to account for greater CBRN-related cooperation.

Leverage NATO for coordination and capabilities

NATO’s 2022 CBRN defense policy represented a shift from the focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism of the early 2000s to a state-based threat actor that more closely aligns with the modern security environment.³⁶ NATO’s International Staff is overseeing the implementation of this policy, which is critical to ensure guidance flows to capitals so national authorities can promote a consistent approach. A response aligned with NATO demonstrates unity, which in turn demonstrates alliance cohesion in the face of continued Russian threats. Several NATO allies, including the United States, UK, and Finland, have their own national policies, but for those that do not, the NATO policy provides a roadmap for driving national prioritization of CBRN threats and response options for these threats aligned with NATO’s priorities.³⁷

As NATO allies consider greater thresholds for defense spending, more investment is needed in CBRN defense equipment and capabilities. An essential aspect of capability development is deploying and positioning of attribution, detection, and surveillance systems. NATO is well poised to lead collaborative efforts and ensure that states without adequate CBRN defenses learn from leaders in the field. NATO’s High Visibility Projects (HVP) includes three initiatives to improve cooperation around facilities, equipment, and detection.³⁸ CBRN defense projects have also been part of NATO’s Smart Defence Initiative since 2014.³⁹

Consider the information domain

As noted in the deterrence section, proactive communication about military and civilian activities to safeguard the entire population from a CBRN attack serves an important deterrent function while bolstering societal resilience. Effective use of the information domain is equally critical to reassuring the public regarding CBRN responses.

States can disseminate proactive messages to get ahead of any false or misleading information that Russia may seek to inject within open societies. This includes emphasis on strategic communications, fact-checking initiatives, media literacy, and education campaigns for adults and children alike.

The health sector can offer lessons in disseminating information about emotionally sensitive topics in a way that recognizes the severity of a threat without stoking fear. For example, the UK Health Service launched a public health campaign in 2025 to counter fears of taking antibiotics, which has become a top issue among UK residents.⁴⁰ Similar approaches can be taken to inform the public about chloropicrin or other agents Russia has used. Such communications should focus on facts, and in the realm of CBRN weapons, be clear about the rare and limited nature of exposure to such threats so as not to provoke undue stress or fear.

Integrating deterrence and response

Through the course of our research, we identified two activities that served both deterrent and response functions. First, being clear and unafraid of imposing massive costs to Russia (including economic, geopolitical, or military actions) for its use of chemical weapons could deter it from continuing to deploy chemical weapons or prevent escalation. Accountability is also an important part of response. Since 2014, Russia has acted with impunity in the absence of credible deterrent threats to its use of chemical weapons. Although many countries and international organizations have condemned Russia’s use of chemical weapons and imposed sanctions on Moscow, these actions have not stopped Russia from using chemical agents to achieve geopolitical goals. The consensus during our workshops and interviews is that Russia has a long history of incorporating CBRN weapons into its strategy and planning, which makes them both a near-term threat and a long-term strategic threat. Bringing treaty violations forward has had limited impact on Russia’s behavior, but increasing economic sanctions could reduce Russian access to funding, equipment, facilities, and technologies that could advance their chemical and biological weapons ambitions.

Second, the United States and its European allies and partners should clearly communicate potential consequences to deter future actions and inflict damage on the sectors on which Russia relies on for the development of its chemical and biological capabilities. The apparent threat of what a potential CBRN escalation would entail, including the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic implications, is essential for deterring Russia from turning to these threats, but following through on these actions also serves to punish Russia in response to its illicit activities.

Recommendations and key findings

Recommendation: Allies should continuously assess and evaluate Russia’s strategic objectives. To better coordinate threat perceptions across the Alliance, the United States and its European allies and partners should consider opportunities to expand collaboration on joint threat assessments related to Russia’s CBRN capabilities. As the Office of the Director of National Intelligence crafts the annual joint threat assessment report, insights from European allies and partners will be critical to assemble the most comprehensive picture of Russian CBRN threats; integrating perspectives from the Office of the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security will be paramount in this effort.

Recommendation: Instead of publicizing red lines, the United States should champion the achievement of internal consensus regarding acceptable thresholds of Russian activity based on treaty obligations, while externally preserving ambiguity as a component of deterrence. NATO, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the United Nations are valuable forums for such deliberations and can play roles in imposing costs on Russia for CBRN use. However, internal debates within national governments are required to achieve consensus, which can take time. International investigations, such as those previously led in Syria by the OPCW (an intergovernmental body), are also time-consuming, and Russia politicizes the results to undermine effectiveness. Therefore, this recommendation could take years of sustained effort to carry out.

Recommendation: Within the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD) should work with the relevant authorities within the Treasury and Commerce departments to inflict the requisite economic pain on Russia through, for example, sanctions and export controls, to undermine its ability to sustain its biological and chemical weapons programs. Unified public messaging campaigns from the United States and Europe that condemn Russian CBRN weapons deployment would reinforce activities conducted behind the scenes.

Recommendation: The United States and its European allies and partners should identify methods for cooperation with nontraditional partners to dissuade Russia from leveraging CBRN threats as part of their military doctrine. Through NATO or the UN, the United States should explore opportunities to engage China and India to dissuade Moscow from pursuing further CBRN weapons development and use.

Recommendation: As concerns about potential deployment of Russian CBRN weapons grow, the US DoD should emphasize and prioritize efforts to expand counter-CBRN capabilities. Specific needs include sufficient systems to detect, surveil, and attribute CBRN threats. The United States could leverage the OPCW (and vice versa) for its experience in investigations. As the United States and its European allies and partners update guidelines for defense spending, CBRN defense warrants renewed attention and investment. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) should advocate for European counterparts to place greater emphasis on CBRN defense. The DoD and the relevant subagencies should emphasize these systems when outlining US defense policy and national security strategies as they pertain to CBRN threats. Such systems will aid in deterring Russian CBRN threats while expanding readiness, preparedness, and resilience within the United States and across the transatlantic community. Ministries of defense and crisis response agencies should set baselines for CBRN defense capabilities and stockpile accordingly, including PPE, gas masks, antibiotics, and laboratory equipment.

Recommendation: DTRA and the broader US defense community should expand training on CBRN threats by incorporating elements of chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare scenarios in tabletop exercises and war-games. Inclusion of these scenarios can complement crisis situations posited in Europe to identify deterrence strategies and response options. CBRN considerations are often perceived to be too niche and left to specialist communities to design strategy and crisis responses. However, it is critical for decision-makers within the entire chain of command to possess a broad awareness of CBRN threats and simulate planning. The Joint Staff should ensure that service-level training incorporates these considerations into doctrine and training. Then, DTRA’s liaison officers could support training at US military commands and within multilateral institutions, such as NATO.

Recommendation: The United States and its NATO allies should incorporate the NATO SOF Command more directly into operational planning, particularly when thinking through the requisite deterrence and response implications of Russia deploying a CBRN weapon. NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) could help drive this coordination with support from the United States. Given the hybrid nature of many CBRN threats from Russia, within SHAPE and NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO), the United States and its NATO allies could consider a greater role for responding to hybrid threats alongside preexisting military structures. The US should expand CBRN defense cooperation, particularly on training, exercising, and information sharing. Elsewhere in Europe, allies recognized the leading role the United States plays (as well as the UK) in sharing intelligence with NATO; for allies with limited intelligence capabilities of their own, US information might be the only source of CBRN-related intelligence. Some allies expressed uncertainty over the prioritization of CBRN-related cooperation as a new administration begins its work in Washington, but at the individual level, cooperation remains close. NATO leaders should leverage productive working relationships to ensure sustained, coordinated prioritization for CBRN defense across all echelons of NATO planning.

Recommendation: As the need for additional CBRN defense capabilities and equipment grows, so too does the need to strengthen the private-sector capacity to supply the requisite functionalities. The US government should expand relationships with the defense industry and bolster production capacity to sustain supply chains and replenish depleted stockpiles of PPE. The DoD can also leverage lessons learned for production capacity and procurement protocols from the COVID-19 pandemic, when the Pentagon supported the production of PPE through the Defense Production Act to increase production of critical supplies and equipment. The DoD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Defense Logistics Agency can both play an important role in facilitating these relationships while removing unnecessary barriers to procurement processes within the DoD. Similar efforts should be undertaken with European counterparts of these agencies and at NATO, though the implementation of this recommendation could require years of investment.

Recommendation: Demonstrating close cooperation between civilian and military entities can have a deterrent effect if communicated properly, while also ensuring military entities are aware of the resources that reside in civilian institutions. Key areas for investment include interoperability of CBRN defense equipment; standards and procedures for treating exposure to chemical or biological agents; availability of civilian infrastructure for military use; and protocols for military members seeking care in civilian hospitals. NATO is well poised to encourage cooperation between military forces and critical civilian institutions that are often on the front lines of such responses, including public health agencies, local hospitals, and law enforcement. European nations can leverage the examples of their peers to their advantage. In the United States, the DoD is well positioned to support interagency coordination among European allies and partners with respect to emergency preparedness mechanisms, capability development, and training. OSD should consider embedding highly skilled personnel within US military commands, diplomatic missions, and other frameworks to facilitate the exchange of information and expertise.

Recommendation: A whole-of-society approach to resilience—to include health institutions, law enforcement, critical infrastructure, business community, and other sectors—can help strengthen attribution systems for identifying and attributing chemical and biological attacks. The United States should coordinate with its European allies and partners to encourage greater resilience and preparedness within civilian institutions and foster information sharing across national borders.

Recommendation: Preemptive and frequent intelligence sharing, in classified and open-source settings, is critical to deterring Russia from using CBRN weapons; this practice presents a unified approach among the United States and its European allies and partners. All allies should aim to more regularly share relevant information. The US national security apparatus should conduct a complete review of potential barriers to information and intelligence sharing to identify areas for streamlined sharing with NATO allies. The Defense Intelligence Agency could lead such an initiative on behalf of the DoD, with a focus on greater use of open-source intelligence to draw further public attention to Russia’s CBRN capabilities, facilities, and development. The United States should encourage similar reviews across NATO member states to improve Alliance-wide access to intelligence and information and ensure that this subject is a standing agenda item for the relevant NATO committees, including the Defense Policy and Planning Committee and the Civilian Intelligence Committee.

Recommendation: To support NATO’s 2022 CBRN Defense Strategy’s effort to improve shared understanding across the Alliance, more consistent and comprehensive messaging is needed within the capitals of NATO allies, particularly around the policy planning process and the integration of civilian entities within a coordinated military response in the event of a CBRN-related contingency. The US Mission to NATO can champion efforts to expand knowledge and understanding of Russian CBRN threats within NATO while sharing lessons learned from European allies and partners throughout the US government.

Recommendation: The US Defense, State, and Homeland Security departments have produced public messaging campaigns related to Russian CBRN threats and methods to improve media literacy. These efforts should expand to include greater emphasis on debunking false and misleading claims related to CBRN threats. Additionally, the US government should incorporate European allies and partners in messaging efforts to counter Russian malign influence operations around CBRN threats.

Recommendation: The United States should work with European allies to identify best practices in crafting public awareness-raising campaigns for how to respond to suspected CBRN attacks. Public messaging should focus on practical steps individuals can take in an emergency, without prompting undue alarm among the wider population.

Recommendation: US and European governments should explore opportunities to partner with civil society organizations to craft prebunking, media literacy, and fact-checking initiatives that can successfully communicate proactive messaging to broader publics in the Euro-Atlantic area, particularly given the scientific and technical nature of CBRN threats. Proactive messages about resistance to Russian narratives should be disseminated through a combination of means, including traditional media, official government communications, and social media. The United States could also explore joint research initiatives with European institutions. EU member states can leverage the European Defense Fund, which provides research into common defense and security priorities, including in CBRN-related issues. Partnerships between universities, scientific foundations, and think tanks can facilitate greater knowledge and information sharing related to CBRN threats.

Recommendation: Technologies such as synthetic biology and additive manufacturing continue to evolve, and their applications will remain difficult to foresee. The international community must remain vigilant to how technologies can be exploited. To that end, the United States must continue and expand its restrictions for known suppliers of potential dual-use technologies to Russia. The DoD should coordinate with the Department of Commerce to expand the use of export controls to address instances where Russia is able to obtain capabilities and equipment, such as pharmaceutical components, biotechnologies, and chemical precursors. Critical to the success of these controls, however, is including like-minded European allies and partners into conversations about technologies of concern. The Department of Defense should work with the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to strengthen and expand the list of sanctioned entities that aid and abet Russia’s biological and chemical weapons development programs.

Conclusion

This project demonstrates that Russian chemical and biological threats are a concern now and will continue to pose challenges to European security in the next five to ten years. To enable European allies and partners to counter these threats, the United States can leverage its strong security and defense relationships with European allies and partners to improve capabilities and raise the profile of chemical and biological weapons issues within governments and among populations. The existing chemical and biological defense infrastructure in the United States, NATO, and in some European countries provides lessons for the broader Euro-Atlantic community. With greater investment comes greater confidence that deterring Russia is feasible, but if deterrence fails, attention now can ensure that the United States and Europe are prepared to effectively respond.

Please note that the appendixes are not included in the online version of this publication, but they can be accessed in the attached PDF file. The appendixes contain the following information: Appendix A – Acronym List; Appendix B – Workshop Participants; Appendix C – Exercise Methodology; Appendix D – Interview Participants; Appendix E – Biographies. These appendixes provide additional details and insights on the research methods and findings.

The research team thanks the US Department of Defense for sponsoring this work and for the guidance and support provided throughout the course of the project. Special thanks go to the wide range of experts and stakeholders, inside and outside of the US and European governments, who took part in the scenario-building exercises, contributed their perspectives during the interview process, spoke during roundtable discussions, and participated in other contexts to enrich the analysis.

We would also like to acknowledge Hans Binnendijk and John Watts for their support in conceptualizing the methodology and structure of the scenario workshop exercises. Hans and Katarzyna Zysk provided useful peer reviews to improve the quality of the report. In addition, we would like to thank Torrey Taussig and Matthew Kroenig, who offered strategic direction, peer review, and key perspectives throughout the project. Within the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative team, we recognize our current and recent colleagues Inga Samoškaitė, Zak Schneider, Kristen Taylor, Kimberly Talley, and Luka Ignac for their project management and research support. We would also like to thank the Atlantic Council’s Gretchen Ehle, Nicholas O’Connell, and Caroline Simpson, whose support for this project was invaluable.

This report is intended to live up to General Brent Scowcroft’s standard for rigorous, relevant, and nonpartisan analysis on national security issues. The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to continue his nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Department of Defense or the United States Government.

Staff

Philippe Dickinson

Deputy Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Chinese East Asia

Fellow

Ryan Arick

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

Fellow

Natasha Lander Finch

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

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In the long run, a weakened Russia and a Ukraine that succeeds in reclaiming as much of its occupied territory as possible is in line with Turkey’s interests, as it would reinforce Ankara’s strategic role in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. This would encourage both the United States and the European Union (EU) to include Turkey in bilateral and multilateral defense projects, as well as to supply Turkey with the military equipment it needs.

But in the short term, Turkey’s close energy cooperation with Russia presents a challenge. Trump’s demand that Europe and NATO allies end their energy trade with Russia, which he repeated both in his United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) opening speech and in front of the press with Erdoğan, is actually something that Turkey has been taking precautions about for a long time. However, Trump’s call to stop importing Russian oil comes as Washington and Ankara are expanding their energy cooperation. In the same week as the White House meeting, the United States and Turkey signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Civil Nuclear Cooperation and Turkey’s state-owned BOTAŞ signed a major agreement to import US liquefied natural gas (LNG). In addition to its agreements with US companies, Turkey has signed LNG deals totaling 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) with several global firms.

From now through 2028, Turkey could source up to 36 percent of the gas it imported from Russia in 2024 from new suppliers. This diversification is significant, as Turkey’s twenty-five-year, 16 bcm annual gas agreement with Russia is set to expire in 2026. This step will substantially weaken Russia’s position as a natural gas exporter to Turkey and increase Ankara’s bargaining power. However, in the near term, it does not seem likely that Turkey will completely end its energy relationship with Russia. Thus, the increasing energy and trade cooperation between Turkey and the United States should be read as both a furthering of Turkish-US bilateral relations and an effort to curb Russian influence.  

With political leadership in Turkey and the United States doing the groundwork, companies from both countries can explore opportunities to cooperate in the South Caucasus, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, potentially contributing to prosperity and peace in these areas.

Turkey’s efforts to diversify its energy sources

Long before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Turkey realized that Russia wouldn’t hesitate to use energy as a weapon. It learned this lesson when Gazprom cut Turkey’s gas supply by 50 percent during the harsh winter of 2016 in retaliation for the downing of a Russian jet. In response, Turkey took steps to ensure its own energy security while contributing to that of Europe.

Turkey significantly diversified its energy sources and mix by increasing renewables and importing LNG, becoming the second-largest importer of US LNG in Europe in 2017. It also increased its gas storage capacity, ranking second in Europe in terms of LNG regasification capacity in 2024, with three floating storage regasification units and two LNG terminals.

Turkey has also diversified its pipelines, with the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) delivering Azerbaijani Shah Deniz gas to Turkey since 2018 and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), operational since 2020, carrying that gas to Europe. This solidified Turkey’s role as a key transit country, especially after European countries reduced their Russian gas imports following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Last year, Turkey increased its LNG purchases from the United States, both for domestic consumption and for trade with third countries. A major LNG import and trade deal was signed in 2024 between Turkey’s state-owned BOTAŞ and ExxonMobil, signaling a growing US share in the Turkish market over the next decade. In March of this year, Turkey also signed an agreement with US firms to develop its own shale fields.

During the UNGA meetings last week, the team led by Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar concluded additional energy deals. Turkish state-owned BOTAŞ and Mercuria signed an agreement for the import of approximately 70 billion cubic meters of US LNG over twenty years. This agreement also includes distributing US-sourced LNG to Europe and North Africa, contributing to a gradual shift in Europe from Russian to US gas. Similarly, the Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Civil Nuclear Cooperation, signed during Erdoğan’s Washington visit, will contribute to Turkey’s energy security and reduce its dependence on Russian energy through the transfer of US small modular reactors and nuclear technology.

Lingering dependence on Russia

Despite Turkey’s efforts to reduce dependence on Russian gas, imports from Russia increased after 2022. According to Turkey’s Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK), Russian gas accounted for 39.5 percent of total gas imports in 2022, 42.27 percent in 2023, and 41.3 percent in 2024.

After halting crude oil and petroleum product imports from Iran in 2019, Turkey has increasingly relied on Russia for oil. According to EPDK data, the shares of imports from the top two suppliers, Russia and Iraq, were respectively: 40.75 percent and 26.39 percent in 2022, 51 percent and 20 percent in 2023, and 66 percent and 9.8 percent in 2024. This increase is likely due to two reasons: First, European countries purchased Russian oil indirectly through Turkey. Second, the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) halted oil exports over the past two-and-a-half years due to a revenue-sharing dispute between the central Iraqi government and the KRG that resulted in an arbitration case in the International Criminal Court between Turkey and Iraq. Now that this issue has been resolved, oil exports through Turkey’s Ceyhan port have resumed. Combined with the EU’s commitment to halt imports of Russian fossil fuels by the end of 2027, this could lead to a significant decline in Turkey’s oil imports from Russia in a few years.

US-Turkey cooperation in challenging regions

The United States’ efforts to support US business interests in regions where US military presence has declined provide opportunities for energy cooperation with Turkey in third countries. Trump’s fossil fuel-friendly policies are encouraging US oil and gas companies to enter new markets, creating an opportunity to collaborate with Turkish firms.

Turkey played a key role in Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in 2020 and the return of Nagorno-Karabakh to rule from Baku in 2023, providing critical military and strategic support. Turkey advocated the opening of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor,” which it sees as part of the Middle Corridor, linking Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan and ultimately to Turkey—thereby connecting Europe to Central Asia and eventually to China. However, Armenia delayed implementation of the corridor provision from the 2020 deal, likely due to concerns from Russia and Iran, as well as due to Azerbaijan’s insistence that it get the control of the road without Armenian border or customs checks on Armenian territory. After US mediation, the corridor was rebranded the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, which could check Russian and Iranian influence in the region. If the project succeeds, the US and Turkish companies which have already played a significant role in regional infrastructure projects are expected to collaborate in building and operating the route.

Turkey also played a major role in the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Throughout the Syrian civil war, Turkey secured a key region near its border in cooperation with Syrian opposition forces and is expected to play a critical role in strengthening the new regime’s military and administrative capacities. If successful, a US-mediated agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syria’s interim government, as well as efforts to broker an agreement between Israel and Syria, would reduce tensions in the country. Turkey and Gulf countries are expected to contribute significantly to Syria’s reconstruction, including via energy projects. In May, Turkish, US, and Qatari companies signed a $7 billion agreement to build natural gas and solar power plants in Syria, aiming to meet much of the country’s energy needs with a combined 5,000 megawatts over the next three years.

In Iraq, with the mission of the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS nearing its end, US troops are shifting from Baghdad and western Iraq to Erbil. In 2024, Turkey deepened ties with Baghdad by providing military training and capacity-building, conducting joint exercises, and lending support in areas such as electronic warfare and cybersecurity. Given its long fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and its support for the KRG’s Peshmerga during ISIS’s occupation of Iraq from 2014 to 2017, Turkey has over one hundred military installations in the KRG as of 2024.

Both Turkey and the United States played a critical role in resolving the oil revenue dispute between Baghdad and the KRG, thus enabling the resumption of operations for US and Turkish companies in Iraq. In May, the KRG signed major oil and gas deals with two US companies during their visit to Washington.

Turkish and US companies are expected to work more closely with both the KRG and the Iraqi federal government on new energy and infrastructure projects. Given Turkey’s extensive military presence in the KRG and its recent diplomatic initiatives—including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s meeting with Iran-backed militias in Iraq last month—Turkey seems poised to play a leading role in ensuring security and stability in the region, in partnership with the United States.

Recent developments suggest that Libya is emerging as another area of potential energy cooperation between Turkish and US companies. Turkey has shifted from solely supporting the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity to also engaging with the Benghazi-based administration in eastern Libya led by Khalifa Haftar. The first sign of this shift came in April, when Haftar’s son Saddam visited Turkey and met with the Turkish defense minister and senior military officials. This engagement has made it more likely that Benghazi’s parliament will approve Turkey’s 2019 exclusive economic zone agreement with Tripoli. This would mark a milestone for Turkey’s sovereign rights and energy exploration efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean. Following Turkish intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın’s meeting with Haftar in Libya in early September, there are growing rumors that Haftar may soon visit Turkey.

Through its maritime and defense cooperation agreements with the Tripoli government, Turkey has established itself as a key political and military actor in Libya, operating from two military bases—a naval and land base at Misrata and an air base at Al-Watiya —since May 2020. It currently supports the Tripoli-based government’s forces, including by providing unmanned aerial vehicles, troops, military advisors, electronic warfare systems, air defense units, and tactical missiles. Turkey’s broader goal is to leverage this military footprint to support the reconstruction of Libyan state institutions, facilitate national reconciliation—a policy promoted by the Turkish Defense Ministry under the slogan “One Libya, one Army”—and ensure Turkey’s economic rights in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In August, Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) signed a memorandum of understanding with ExxonMobil. Given ExxonMobil’s prominent role in Eastern Mediterranean gas exploration, cooperation between the NOC, ExxonMobil, and Turkey’s BOTAŞ appears increasingly likely.

***

Looking across all these regions of cooperation, a clear pattern emerges: In areas of past or ongoing conflict where US companies are looking to establish or expand their presence, Turkey is playing a crucial role in ensuring the security and stability necessary for trade and investment. Moreover, Turkey is expected to collaborate with US firms in these regions. As Turkey increases energy collaboration with Washington, diversifies its energy imports away from Russia, and increases its military presence in regions where the United States is reducing its footprint, a new model of US–Turkey cooperation is emerging. This model is based on shared commercial interests, strategic regional presence, and burden-sharing that leverages the United States’ and Turkey’s complementary soft and hard power capabilities.

Pınar Dost is a nonresident fellow at Atlantic Council Turkey Program and a historian of international relations. She is also the former deputy director of Atlantic Council Turkey Program. She is an associated researcher with the French Institute for Anatolian Studies.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Anna Wieslander, Director for Northern Europe, featured in the Swedish TV program on Foreign Politics, “Utrikesbyrån”, on October 7.

Wieslander commented on the Russian threat to NATO and the cohesion and responsiveness of the alliance. Wieslander called for tougher measures against Russia and reiterated that Ukraine has a right to sovereignty and self-determination.

Click the button to watch it! The broadcast is in Swedish.

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Ukraine’s drone warfare prowess was a hot topic at this week’s European Political Community Summit in Copenhagen. “The only expert right now in the world when it comes to anti-drone capacities is Ukraine, because they are fighting the Russian drones almost every day,” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen commented. “We need to take all the experiences, all the new technology, all the innovation from Ukraine, and incorporate it into our own rearmament.”

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte agreed with the Danish leader’s assessment of Ukraine’s pivotal role. “Ukraine is a powerhouse when it comes to military innovation and anti-drone technology,” he noted, adding that Ukraine’s readiness to share its insights with the country’s NATO partners was “very important.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s rapid rise to drone superpower status confirms the old adage that necessity is the mother of invention. When Putin first launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it was clear that the Ukrainian military could not realistically hope to compete with Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower and conventional firepower. Instead, Kyiv would have to rely on a combination of raw courage and innovative technological solutions.

From the early stages of the war, Ukraine began pioneering the large-scale deployment of drones in combat roles. By 2023, this was enabling Ukrainian commanders to compensate for artillery shell shortages and blunt Russian advances. This emphasis on relatively cheap and highly effective drones has transformed the battlefield and created a kill zone along the front lines that Ukrainians have dubbed the “Drone Wall.”

With drones now ubiquitous above the battlefield, any soldier or vehicle that breaks cover in a zone stretching for many kilometers on either side of the zero line risks becoming an instant target. This has made it extremely challenging to concentrate large quantities of troops and armor, which helps explain the lack of major front line breakthroughs over the past three years.

Ukraine has also employed drone technologies to great effect far beyond the battlefield. Kyiv’s innovative use of marine drones has turned the tide in the Battle of the Black Sea, breaking the Russian blockade of Ukraine’s southern coastline and forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his warships from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports. More recently, Ukrainian marine drones have been modified to carry anti-aircraft missiles and have reportedly shot down Russian helicopters over the Black Sea. This unprecedented success has revolutionized naval warfare and led to growing global interest in Ukraine’s domestically developed marine drones.

Kyiv has dramatically expanded its long-range drone fleet in recent years as part of a strategy to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia. As a result, Ukraine has been able to mount a highly effective bombing campaign since August 2025 targeting oil refineries, logistics hubs, and military industrial sites deep inside the Russian Federation. This has led to a fuel crisis across Russia, with some regions forced to introduce gasoline rationing amid supply shortages and record price hikes. Ukraine’s long-range strikes have helped to reshape perceptions of the war and have demonstrated how Kyiv’s technological edge can offset its material disadvantages.

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Former Ukrainian Commander in Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi was one of the architects of Ukraine’s drone warfare doctrine until being relieved of his position in early 2024. In a recent commentary, he argued that innovation must remain the foundation of a sustainable Ukrainian resistance strategy against Russia. Zaluzhnyi stressed that Ukraine’s embrace of drone technologies has helped offset the imbalance between the two countries while inflicting disproportionate costs on the Kremlin. “Ukraine must compensate for its relative lack of resources by constantly introducing military innovations,” he commented.

Ukraine and Russia now find themselves locked in a relentless race to innovate, with the window between the appearance of new weapons systems and the development of effective countermeasures now sometimes reduced to a matter of weeks. The intensity of this competition has turbo-charged Ukraine’s domestic drone industry and propelled it far ahead of its Western counterparts.

If NATO members wish to close this gap, they must lean heavily on the technical and strategic lessons learned by the Ukrainian military over the past three and half years of full-scale drone warfare. Training initiatives are already underway, with President Zelenskyy expressing his readiness to share Ukraine’s experience with more of the country’s NATO partners.

A growing number of countries are also looking to establish joint drone production in order to benefit from Ukrainian defense tech know-how. In late September, Britain announced that it would soon launch the mass production of interceptor drones developed in collaboration with Ukraine. Romania has also recently unveiled ambitious plans to manufacture drones in partnership with Ukraine for domestic use and for potential export to NATO allies. Meanwhile, a Ukrainian delegation is reportedly in the United States this week to negotiate a landmark deal with the Trump administration that would see Kyiv sharing battle-tested drone technology with the US.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the world’s first fully fledged drone war and represents a watershed moment in military history. With drones now set to play a dominant role in the wars of the future, Ukraine’s unique experience in this technologically advanced form of warfare makes the country a key partner for NATO and an indispensable ally in the defense of Europe.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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The post Drone superpower Ukraine is teaching NATO how to defend against Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Denmark is not the only NATO country looking to learn from Ukraine’s experience. When Russian drones penetrated Polish airspace in early September, Poland’s response included plans to establish joint anti-drone training together with the Ukrainian military. Meanwhile, The Times reported earlier this year that Ukrainian military instructors had been dispatched to the UK to train British forces in the use of drones on the modern battlefield.

Ukraine is also increasingly recognized as a global leader in the development of drone technologies. The country boasts a rapidly expanding domestic drone industry that has been turbo-charged by more than three and a half years of full-scale war with Russia. This has created a fertile climate for relentless innovation and made it possible to test new drone designs in combat conditions on a daily basis.

The results speak for themselves. Ukrainian drones have excelled along the front lines of the conflict and have allowed Kyiv to turn the tide in the Battle of the Black Sea. Far beyond Ukraine’s borders, the country’s growing fleet of bomber drones now routinely strike targets deep inside the Russian Federation.

Many partner countries are understandably eager to incorporate Ukrainian drone technologies into their own defense doctrines. Britain recently confirmed that it will begin mass producing drones developed in collaboration with Ukraine as part of efforts to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank against the threat of Russian incursions. A Ukrainian delegation reportedly set off for the United States in late September to begin discussions on a potentially major drone production cooperation agreement.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is well aware of his country’s rising military profile and sees the current mission to Denmark as a potential model for a more comprehensive approach to Ukrainian drone warfare training initiatives with other European countries. “Our experience, our specialists, and our technologies can become a key element in Europe’s future Drone Wall initiative,” he commented on September 30.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s burgeoning reputation as a key player in the field of drone warfare reflects the dramatic shifts currently taking place in Europe’s security architecture. Until quite recently, Ukraine was treated as a military minnow struggling to adopt NATO standards. Strikingly, it is now NATO that is seeking to adopt Ukrainian standards.

The emergence of Ukraine as a drone superpower is only one aspect of the country’s remarkable recent transformation into a major military force. The Ukrainian army is also at the cutting edge of innovation in defense tech sectors including electronic warfare, robotic systems, and cyber security. It came as no surprise that the recent Defense Tech Valley industry showcase event in western Ukraine attracted at least 5000 participants from over 50 countries, with Western companies pledging more than $100 million in investments.

The technological progress made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2022 is certainly eye-catching, but the country’s human capital remains its greatest asset. Today’s Ukraine boasts Europe’s second-largest army, with almost one million men and women currently in uniform and a large reserve of battle-hardened combat veterans. This dwarfs anything else on the continent, even before Ukraine’s unrivaled experience of modern warfare is taken into account. With the United States seeking to reduce its role in European security, the Ukrainian military is now the biggest single barrier between an expansionist Russia and an unprepared Europe.

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Ukraine’s newfound status as one of Europe’s leading military powers is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s worst nightmare. It is nightmare entirely of his own making. Indeed, this military metamorphosis would have been inconceivable without the impetus of Russian imperial aggression.

When Putin began the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Kyiv had only a few thousand combat-ready troops at its disposal. At first, things went according to plan for Moscow, with minimal Ukrainian resistance to the seizure of Crimea. However, Russian efforts to push further into mainland Ukraine then sparked a wave of popular resistance, with thousands of ordinary Ukrainians forming improvised volunteer battalions to block the Kremlin advance. This epic grassroots response saved Ukraine and laid the foundations for the subsequent expansion and modernization of the Ukrainian army.

Despite this stunning setback, Putin refused to accept defeat. With his initial plans to extinguish Ukrainian statehood thwarted, the Kremlin dictator made the fateful decision to escalate further and began preparing to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

On the morning of the invasion, Putin identified the “demilitarization” of Ukraine as one of his two key war aims. This made perfect sense. After all, in order to effectively subjugate Ukraine, it would first be necessary to render the country defenseless. However, it is now abundantly clear that Putin’s plan to demilitarize Ukraine has backfired disastrously.

Russia’s invasion has spurred the creation of a formidable military machine in Ukraine that has quickly come to occupy a pivotal role in European security. In capitals across Europe, there is a growing sense of recognition that the Ukrainian army is indispensable for the defense of the continent and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Kyiv’s partners now have an obvious and urgent self-interest in supporting Ukraine’s defense industry and financing the Ukrainian war effort. Indeed, the choice currently facing European leaders is disarmingly simple: Support Ukraine today or face Russia tomorrow.

With Russian troops still advancing and Russian drones and missiles pummeling Ukrainian cities, it remains far too early to declare Putin’s invasion a failure. Nevertheless, it is already difficult to conceive of any outcome that would leave Ukraine undefended and at Moscow’s mercy. Instead, the Ukrainian army is likely to emerge from the war stronger than ever and fully capable of defending the country’s place within the European community of nations. Putin had hoped to disarm and decapitate the Ukrainian state, but his self-defeating demilitarization campaign has inadvertently created the strong and fiercely independent Ukraine he feared most of all.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Putin’s dream of demilitarizing Ukraine has turned into his worst nightmare appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Over the past year, the economic and security environment shared by the transatlantic partners has rapidly changed. With the return of the Trump administration, the United States launched a trade war—that led to a trade deal—with the European Union (EU). Meanwhile, Washington has continued to press NATO allies to increase their defense spending, as Russia’s war in Ukraine carries on and its incursions into European airspace accelerate. 

Amid such headwinds for the US-Europe relationship, our experts flew to Brussels for the Transatlantic Forum on GeoEconomics to hear from US and EU leaders on their visions for enhancing US-European cooperation on trade, security, technology, and other era-defining issues. Below are highlights from the forum, hosted by Atlantik-Brücke and the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and Europe Center. 

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Matthew Whitaker’s message to NATO allies: ‘Start spending money’ on defense ‘and stop buying Russian energy’

• As Europe continues to face increasing threats from Russia, the United States “remains committed to NATO and to defending every inch of NATO territory,” but “there are still issues to address,” said US Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker.
• In a conversation with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe, Whitaker said that “the ball is in the court of the European and Canadian allies” to address these issues: “Every single ally needs to start spending money on their defense and stop buying Russian energy.” 
• Whitaker said that if Europe’s purchases of Russian energy continue, then “sanctions”—including the package currently under consideration in the US Congress—“aren’t going to ultimately have as much bite.” 
• On defense spending, “The Hague defense commitment was a good start,” Whitaker said, referring to the agreement at this year’s NATO Summit by allies to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense and defense-related needs. “But, unfortunately, I think some of our allies are dragging their feet, and they need to pick up the pace.” 
• Whitaker pointed to Spain and Italy as examples of countries that still need “to get serious” on defense spending. At the same time, he said that Germany’s ability to meet the spending targets in the next four years is “good news.” Meanwhile, Whitaker argued that France and the United Kingdom have the “desire” to spend more, “but the economics are just not there,” and their “borrowing capacity is not really going to cover what they need to do.” 
• As Russia continues to violate the airspace of European countries, Whitaker argued that NATO’s response has proven that the Alliance is “serious and ready to move.” Still, he said, NATO can do better to maintain a “multilayered” air defense that ensures allies are “not firing two-million-dollar missiles to shoot down six-hundred-dollar Shaheds.” 
• “A lot of people think that somehow these challenges that Russia presents to us somehow demonstrate our weakness. It’s quite the opposite,” Whitaker said. “We’re all over every single one of these threats. 
• “In an uncertain world, we can only have peace through strength,” Whitaker said. “If the whole team is strong and there’s no weak link, then that strength is what’s going to ensure peace, and no one will challenge that strength.” 

Watch the conversation

EU trade chief Maroš Šefčovič: US-EU trade deal better than ‘full-scale trade war’ 

• “Global trade will not go back” to the era before US President Donald Trump unveiled a sweeping package of tariffs on April 2, Šefčovič said, in conversation with Atlantic Council Europe Center Senior Director Jörn Fleck. “So, all those who are longing for the world of the past, they’re losing time” to adjust to a new order. 
• The first way to adjust, he said, is to secure deals with the United States and continue to revisit the US-EU trade relationship, in what Šefčovič called “permanent relationship management.” 
• But, he added, he hopes that every time the $1.7 trillion per year US-EU trade relationship is revisited, it would not be a “huge political issue” and that disputes would be resolved swiftly. 
• Šefčovič argued that the US-EU trade agreement solidified in August, which set a maximum for US tariffs on EU goods at 15 percent, is the “best possible deal,” especially considering the alternative: “Would we be better off with a full-scale trade war?”  
• With questions arising about Trump’s recent announcement of 100 percent tariffs on foreign brand-name drugs, Šefčovič said that the EU “should be shielded from the incoming very high tariffs on pharmaceuticals” by the 15-percent ceiling. 
• While Trump has applied 50 percent tariffs to steel and aluminum, Šefčovič argued that “we are not each [other’s] problems” when it comes to steel, considering that US-EU steel trade is relatively low and the EU exports a specialized steel that the United States needs. His solution: “A tariff rate quota” with “very low or zero tariffs.” 
• Yet, at the same time, the EU is adjusting to the new trade order in two other ways, Šefčovič explained. The first is diversifying its trade relationships—pursuing tighter ties with countries such as Japan, Mexico, Australia, the United Arab Emirates, and India. “With all these partners, we can progress significantly this year,” he said. 
• The second is working to reform multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization so that they can best respond to today’s trade challenges, from overcapacities to illegal subsidies—”otherwise this rule-based global order would be under more and more pressure,” Šefčovič warned. 

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US Ambassador to the EU Andrew Puzder: ‘We need Europe strong’ as a partner for trade and defense 

• For years, Europe’s economy was “based on a three-legged stool,” made up of defense costs covered by the United States, “cheap Russian energy, and a retail market in China that seemed like it would never go away,” Andrew Puzder, US ambassador to the EU, told Kempe. Now, he said, “we’ve seen that three-legged stool collapse,” after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Washington’s defense priorities shifting to Asia, and China’s consumer market weakening.
• It is in the best interest of the United States “to have an economically strong Europe,” said Puzder. “We need Europe strong for trade purposes,” as well as for “defense purposes so they can cover their defense costs” and “can help us in other troubled parts of the world,” he said. 
• “Europe got a really good deal,” said Puzder of the recent US-EU trade agreement. “I know that’s not the popular opinion here” in Brussels, he acknowledged.  
• But he argued that Europe would benefit from increasing its purchases of energy from the United States and noted that the 15 percent tariffs and investment commitments were more favorable for Europe than the deals the United States struck this year with South Korea and Japan. “I’m hoping that gets ratified in the European Parliament,” he said. 
• Puzder described some remaining areas of disagreement between the United States and EU, including nontariff trade barriers and EU regulations under the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act, which the Trump administration views as discriminatory against US companies.  
• Washington needs to ensure that the Digital Markets Act is “not intended to penalize companies because they’re American and large,” Puzder said. “If that’s the intent, then that’s an issue we need to address. That’s not the way you treat allies.” 
• “If Europe’s going to enter the AI age,” its policymakers “need to start looking at the problem of energy in the future,” said Puzder, arguing for an approach to energy policy that emphasizes a US framing of “energy abundance” over a European emphasis on “energy efficiency” or “energy cleanliness.” With artificial intelligence (AI), he said, “you’ve got a whole new incredible energy demand going forward that you really need an all-of-the-above approach to energy to meet.”

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European Commission Executive Vice-President Teresa Ribera: The EU must stick to its climate goals to remain competitive 

• Teresa Ribera, European Commission executive vice-president for a clean, just and competitive transition, said that it “has not been particularly easy” to keep good relations between the EU and United States this year. 
• In a conversation with Bloomberg News Brussels Bureau Chief Suzanne Lynch, Ribera explained that the EU always regarded the United States as a “real partner” in building global governance, innovating, and ensuring that trade flows smoothly. “We have . . . learned that we need to develop and count on our own capacities,” she said. “It has been kind of a shock.” 
• After the EU placed an antitrust fine on Google earlier this month, Ribera said she does not believe that the EU’s regulatory oversight will damage US-EU relations, because such antitrust measures are in line with US principles around protecting against monopolies. The US and EU have the same goal, she said, “which is to ensure that things work well, that the level playing field is respected, that innovation is not being killed, and that consumers are protected.” 
• Ribera said that as AI competition ramps up, the EU will encounter “new challenges” related to its energy consumption and data privacy measures. She called for the EU to build the governance capacity needed to ensure that AI development “does not create additional distortions.” 
• She acknowledged that while the EU may not be known for its speed in crafting new regulations, it is “reliable, stable, predictable: Things that others may be missing.” 
• She added that with China moving at “high speed” in producing its own technological breakthroughs, it will be important for the EU to consider how it maintains a labor force, investment pool, and business capacity to provide its own tech solutions, such as in clean energy.  
• On these clean-energy solutions, “the United States seems to be backtracking,” Ribera said, and “it’s not helpful for the technology breakthroughs that still need to happen”—although the US private sector and state-level leaders are still showing up, she noted. “There may be lots of new things happening at smaller scale,” but they add up to “quite a big amount of modernization of the American economy,” she said. 
• As the EU looks to remain competitive, Ribera said that she will be focusing on “driving the single market,” which she highlighted as one of the EU’s unique strengths. She also stressed the importance of EU members continuing to keep to the union’s climate goals through innovation, as doing so “is the only way to become competitive and to keep on creating wealth.”

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EU Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis: A digital euro is likely six years away

• With the geopolitical situation “getting more complicated,” the European Union has had to “reassess” its role as an institution, especially on security and defense, said Valdis Dombrovskis, European commissioner for economy and productivity. 
• Dombrovskis told Atlantik-Brücke Chief Executive Officer Julia Friedlander that while the European Union began as a “peace project,” it has had to take on new “tasks” and “competencies” as war returned to the continent. He pointed to the ReArm Europe Plan, which aims to provide an additional 800 billion euros in defense spending over four years. 
• Yet, he argued, the European Commission still respects a “certain division of competencies” when it comes to defense, considering NATO’s prerogatives. 
• Regarding the US-EU relationship, Dombrovskis said that the two sides are “strategic allies” and that it is important that they work together in a more “conflictual geopolitical situation” in which “autocracies are trying to assert themselves.” 
• Dombrovskis, who is also the European commissioner for implementation and simplification, also spoke about the Commission’s effort to simplify EU laws and regulations, which he said would save billions of euros per year and would help the EU with its “competitiveness agenda.” 
• He said to expect new proposals over the next few months to simplify regulations related to digital matters, the environment, chemicals, and cars. Such simplifications are “equally important” for European companies and US companies working in Europe, he said. “Often they point to the same problems and issues to be resolved.” 
• Dombrovskis said that while the European Commission has made “slow and steady progress” on a digital euro, “it’s important now to accelerate” that work.  
• He explained that right now, the European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament are each finalizing their approaches to central bank digital currencies and should discuss them next year. After that, it will be “some five years before the actual introduction of the digital euro,” he said. 

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The post Highlights from the Transatlantic Forum on GeoEconomics, as US and European leaders reimagine transatlantic cooperation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Flagship Event Mon, September 29, 2025 • 6:30 am ET

2025 Transatlantic Forum on GeoEconomics

The Transatlantic Forum on GeoEconomics is an annual conference convening economic and financial leaders from both sides of the Atlantic.

Digital Policy Economy & Business Europe & Eurasia European Union

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

MATTHEW WHITAKER: Good morning, Fred.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Good morning, Ambassador. How are you?

MATTHEW WHITAKER: Well, they said a fireside chat. There’s no fire, so I’m a little disappointed.

FREDERICK KEMPE: I always take that out of my notes because a fireside chat is a—you know, it’s until we get to December, January, February I think we don’t need that.

But what a pleasure to start the day with you—Matthew Whitaker, the United States permanent representative to NATO. And you got off to what I would say is just a tremendous start with the summit in The Hague: A 5 percent defense commitment from all the allies. Nobody could have imagined that: 3.5 percent core, 1.5 percent beyond that. It’s great to have you here kicking us off.

As Julia said, we always put together the notion that you cannot separate security and you can’t separate prosperity. And so one of the questions behind this that we’ll talk about during the course of the day is Europe can’t afford not to pay for its own defense, but cannot afford to pay for its own defense. That’s one question.

But let’s start a little bit with a very brief introduction. We don’t have much time, so I don’t want to go through your entire CV. But Ambassador Whitaker has been President Trump’s envoy to NATO since April. As I said, he’s already made his mark in the summit in June. Most notably from that summit, the ambassador himself labeled it one of the most consequential moments in this alliance’s history. And it could be that if this could now be delivered on.

So maybe that’s where I’ll start. You’ve got threats to Europe’s security becoming frequent and dangerous. Just this month, Russia violated airspace—Poland, Romania, Estonia. This week’s Russian attacks on Ukraine are some of the fiercest we’ve had since the war began in February 2022. What are you looking at? In this context, with the decisions made in the NATO summit, how are you going to measure success? How are you going to see if everything that people have agreed to is actually producing real results?

MATTHEW WHITAKER: Yeah, great question. And thanks, Fred. I appreciate the invitation and, obviously, we could speak probably for all morning on the topics that right now we’re dealing with at NATO. And I want to appreciate, you know, your Atlantic Council, your Europe Center, and Atlantik-Brücke for hosting this important forum. The topics are very timely, and appropriate to be here in Brussels.

You know, the United States, as I say everywhere I go, remains committed to NATO and to defending every inch of NATO territory. But there are still issues to address, including the big one, defense spending, and obviously the resolution of the war in Ukraine. The United States expects European NATO allies to meet their defense commitments and the spending target of 5 percent, which you mentioned is 3.5 percent on NATO capability targets and another 1.5 percent on defense-related spending like enablement, dual-purpose infrastructure, and the like.

And these investments I think really get to the heart of the capabilities, security, stability, and quite frankly the credibility of NATO. When allies contribute their fair share towards the conventional defense of Europe, we strengthen deterrence and allow the United States to prioritize its own strategic resources while reinforcing regional and global security. And the Hague defense commitment was a good start, but unfortunately I think some of our allies are dragging their feet, and they need to pick up the pace. And you know, we need real year-over-year growth in every country’s defense spending, not just some defense spending in countries.

If every ally lives up to their Article 3 obligation, which says they will invest in their individual and therefore the collective defense, we’ll drive innovation and modernization across the alliance—two big things that I’m working on on a daily basis—and ensure that our forces are prepared for the evolving threats that we see changing every day, whether it’s in cyber, space, and really across all domains. And shared investment and collective defense investment in modern, interoperable forces—another keyword here in Europe, because there is still not 100 percent interoperability among all of our armed forces—will ensure that Europe and the United States can work seamlessly together. It strengthens our collective security, balances burden-sharing, and builds a credible deterrent that protects both European and American citizens, and Canadian citizens.

In an uncertain world, we can only have peace through strength. And this—I talk about this so much, Fred, how the strength of NATO, and if all thirty-two allies—if the whole team is strong and there’s no weak link, then that strength is what’s going to ensure peace and no one will challenge that strength.

And we all know that Russia is the greatest threat to peace in the transatlantic area. And if allies are serious about bringing peace to Ukraine, they need to starve the Russian war machine and stop purchasing Russian energy. Once they do that, obviously, there’s a clear path to additional US and European sanctions to impose even more costs and change the calculation for the Russians to come to the negotiating table and resolve this completely unnecessary and just meat-grinder of a war. And quite frankly, the ball is in the court of the European and Canadian allies. They need to start—every single ally needs to start spending money on their defense and stop buying Russian energy.

And you know, this conversation is something I’ve been looking forward to, Fred, for—since it got on my calendar, and I really appreciate the time. But I just want to emphasize that we are—everyone made the commitment in The Hague. Everyone knows 5 percent is our North Star. Everyone knows that every year we have to get year-over-year growth. And the challenge now is to make sure that everyone is moving at pace to the—at the speed of relevance to make sure that we can meet these commitments and, therefore, have that strength that’s going to guarantee the peace.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you, Ambassador.

So let me come back to the defense spending and sort of the challenge for Europe. But let me first hit on something in your—in your opening comment, which is a clear path to sanctions; stop purchasing Russian energy. There’s a NATO bill—sorry, sanctions bill in the Senate, I think eighty-four Senate sponsors, waiting to go through. Are you saying and is the president saying that until Europe does more in terms of stopping its gas purchases, oil purchases from Russia, that these sanctions—the US sanctions won’t move forward?

MATTHEW WHITAKER: Yeah, I think President Trump has looked at the entire horizon of this and has said, you know, what are we doing? If we’re—if we’re still giving European money to Russia to buy energy, you know, sanctions aren’t going to ultimately have as much bite. And so, you know, if you look at countries like Poland, Czech Republic, completely weaned themselves off of Russian oil and gas. We have other NATO alliance members that are buying almost a hundred percent of their oil and gas—specifically, Hungary, Slovakia—and not a hundred percent, but Turkey still is buying too much Russian energy. And these are conversations that we’re having as the United States with our allies and together through NATO as to how we also wean those folks off.

Now, obviously, this is not going to be easy. You know, two of those countries have direct pipelines from Russia—bringing them, you know, cheaper oil than they can buy on the—on the market, and so it’s not going to be easy. But it also—you know, as I go to these conferences, one of the things I hear are people on the stage say, oh, this is going to be hard; you know, this is a hard issue, or—but that’s—we have to do these hard things. This is—this is what’s actually going to bring this environment of peace and prosperity for all of our citizens, all one billion—approximately—citizens that, you know, are in NATO territories, in the thirty-two countries.

And so I keep working really hard. You know, I’ve had some very good conversations both with the United States government and people like Doug Burgum and Chris Wright, our energy secretary and our interior secretary, and then also with our allies to—like, we got—this is going to be hard, I know, but we have to do it. And that’s how NATO not only is relevant in things other than just the security of Europe and the transatlantic region, but also how it’s relevant to solving the war in Ukraine and—you know, and moving forward to a new moment in world history.

FREDERICK KEMPE: I’m so glad you said it that way, a new moment in world history. Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the Commission, gave a State of the European Union which was really powerful, and her quote was Europe is in a fight: “A fight for a continent that is whole and at peace. For a free and independent Europe.” Interesting, used that word. “A fight for our values and our democracies. A fight for our liberty and our ability to determine our destiny for ourselves. Make no mistake—this is a fight for our future.”

You know, I’ve been watching Europe for a long time, and it feels as though that’s true. And the two sides of this that we’re talking about at this conference are security and competitiveness. Can you talk about the interlinkages between that? Because one of my questions over time is whether Europe’s going to be able to afford—it can’t afford not to pay for its defense, but will it be able to afford to pay for its defense? Will it not have to take from the welfare state? Will it not have to innovate more and grow more to be able to do this? How do you look at those interlinkages between Europe’s economic health and ability to defend itself?

MATTHEW WHITAKER: Well, they’re directly related. I mean, it is—this is something you’re not going to be able to borrow your way to, you know, security, because at the end of the day you can buy tanks and you can buy artillery and you can buy planes—prefer you buy F-35s—but all of those need to be sustained and repaired and fixed. And you know, that oftentimes is as expensive in the long term as the initial purchase. And so we have to figure out how to get the European economy on better, more solid footing.

And a lot of it is the United States has a culture of innovation and entrepreneurship. I mean, we just—it’s built into our DNA. A lot of it was inherited from the immigrants that came from Europe originally, whether from—you know, whether Dutch or German or, you know, every other, you know, country and creed. But ultimately, for some reason Europe has taken a no approach and the United States has taken a yes approach when it comes to innovation and entrepreneurship. You know, we have—we have created a culture in the United States where somebody can take risk, and if they take risk and they—and they succeed then they’ll be rewarded for that. And I think oftentimes in Europe it’s backwards, where there is a—there’s a—the government is skeptical on new ideas and innovation and innovators. And that’s something that’s going to have to change.

And, obviously, the social safety net is—you know, instead of a hand up, it’s a hammock, where I think there is a very comfortable life for, you know, a lot of countries and their citizens. And I look at, you know—you know, I know the American work ethic is inconsistent. There are some of us that work very hard; there’s some that—you know, that don’t. But certainly, a work week for us is at least forty hours and oftentimes, you know, for a lot of people it’s fifty or sixty hours a week. And in places like, you know, Belgium, it’s thirty-six hours and with downward pressure on the number of hours. And I think that’s—you know, that whole culture is going to have to grow and develop because fundamentally you can’t pay 5 percent of your GDP on defense and defense-related items without economic growth—

FREDERICK KEMPE: Right.

MATTHEW WHITAKER: —because, you know, you can’t grow your government budget. And there’s only two ways. You can get it through economic growth, and therefore more revenue under your current tax system; or you can get it, you know, by raising taxes. And that certainly is not popular here in Europe or in North America either.

FREDERICK KEMPE: And as you’ve talked to your allies, how do they feel about—you were talking again in your opening comment about some dragging their feet. Do you feel the energy after the summit declarations is there toward meeting these goals, toward making the changes that are needed? Does Europe understand what a big moment it is for Europe?

MATTHEW WHITAKER: Yeah. The good news is that the biggest economy, Germany, has committed to get to the spending targets in the next four years. And that is very important. You know, what Germany does is going to be a lot more important—nothing against my friends from North Macedonia, but if North Macedonia gets there in four years it’s not going to make a huge difference because their economy’s not big and their population’s not big. But Germany will. And that’s going to—that’s probably going to, what I would say, paper over a little bit of some of the inconsistencies. But we’re going to need countries like Spain and Italy and several others to get serious.

But there—but there are countries that are sober/serious, especially those on the frontlines of Russia on the eastern flank. I mean, Poland is clear-eyed on what the threat is and, you know, they’re going to be at 5 percent here in the next year. All the Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania—they’re going to be at 5 percent spending on core defense. I mean, they are—they are investing. But again, you’re talking about countries that are smaller than my home state of Iowa; you know, that are less than two million citizens. And so, you know, it’s going to be the big countries like Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy that are going to really determine whether Europe steps up.

And so Germany is the good-news story, and we need to keep encouraging them to make those big spending jumps. I’m a little—you know, I’m going to continue to watch our friends in France and Great Britain. I think the desire is there, but the economics are just not there. I mean, the borrowing capacity is not really going to cover what they need to do, and their economic growth is equally slow. And they’re going to—they’re going to have to structurally rethink how they’re doing growth in their country and invest in ways to encourage businesses to grow, entrepreneurs to start new businesses, and create a culture where that is sustained.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that.

So in the past President Trump’s expressed frustration with the concept of collective defense for allies who are not paying where they ought to be paying. We’ve seen the Russian incursions now in the airspace over countries like Poland and Estonia, however, who are hitting their numbers and have been doing so for some time. Where do you—how serious do you see these new incursions over airspace? How serious is the United States looking at this? How can the alliance deter future such incidents?

MATTHEW WHITAKER: Yeah. Well, we—I mean, we’re going to defend every inch. And I think I’ll point to the good-news story. So the—so the drones that flew into Polish airspace were tracked, were shot down. Many of them were shot down by F-35s and F-16s. And you know, that shows a domain awareness and an air defense strategy that I think is—shows that NATO is serious and ready to move.

I think one of the things that I’m looking at is how we can do that better—how we’re not firing two-million-dollar missiles to shoot down six-hundred-dollar Shaheds. And that’s something that we’re working very closely with the military leadership within NATO and the US military leaders to make sure that we have multilayered at all altitudes air defense.

And then Estonia is another great example. I mean, from the moment those planes took off, they were tracked by our—by our radars. Ultimately, Sweden, Finland, and the Italian air force all were part of making—escorting those planes, let’s call it, and making sure that they were not a threat to the capital in Estonia.

And so each one of these examples, I think, demonstrates NATO capabilities.

The thing that I want to remind everybody is, you know, we’re in this—if you think about how Iran treated the United States and our allies, it was kind of this no war, no peace—N-O war and N-O peace. And I think we’re—I think that’s probably what Russia is trying to do to NATO right now, is to not cross a line that drags the United States and our allies into a war, but they also are trying to be disruptive and present kind of asymmetrical threats. And that’s, you know, another area where I’m working every single today together with our allies and our—and our military leaders, is to make sure that we have better options on the asymmetrical war and the hybrid war; and to make sure that we’re not just always reacting, that we are—that we are strategic, and that we have an ability to respond in kind, and at the same time to play the same game; you know, if we’re really in this sort of hybrid war, to make sure that the—that we have enough rungs on the escalation ladder that we can also play in that domain.

And I’m just ensuring that, again, we’re strong and go unchallenged, because I think a lot of people think that somehow these challenges that Russia presents to us are—somehow demonstrate our weakness. It’s quite the opposite. I mean, we’re all over every single one of these threats.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So very interesting last week in New York, after meeting with the Ukrainian president, President Trump said Ukraine can and should retake territory it has lost. That seemed to some in the media and some observers as a—as at least a change of rhetoric. He’s now considering providing Ukraine Tomahawk missiles, though as I understand it still through NATO purchases not direct support. Then, on Sunday, Vice President Vance attributed President Trump’s recent change in attitude to the continued loss of life, impact on Russia’s economy, and said, quote, “The Russian economy is in shambles. The Russians are not gaining much on the battlefield.”

Is there a shift going on in the—in the administration in the United States toward Russia right now? And, if so, what does it consist of?

MATTHEW WHITAKER: You know, I think, first of all, President Trump has been very clear that he’s frustrated with Vladimir Putin, that Putin could end this war if he wanted to and continues to fight—and in fact, not only continues to fight, but every time that President Trump makes an entreaty to Vladimir Putin, Putin then responds by sending massive amounts of drones and missiles at cities in Kyiv—cities in Ukraine. And so, ultimately, I think President Trump has determined that—of the two sides, that the Russians are less willing to negotiate and resolve this than the Ukrainians, who appear to be willing to give a lot for peace.

And at the same time, there’s just a battlefield reality that Russia continues to lose about, depending on the day, about a thousand soldiers every single day, which is just—it’s incomprehensible. In over four years, they’ve lost about a million soldiers on the battlefield for less than 20 percent of Ukrainian territory. And it’s just—ultimately, a snail could have left the border with Russia and Ukraine and been to Poland already, you know, in all seriousness.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Yeah.

MATTHEW WHITAKER: So they can’t even move as fast as a snail. It’s like this pace with which, you know, this—and then for a day they tried to—you know, Russia tried to convince us that they’re—that they’re—really, they’re a bear, not a paper tiger, you know?

FREDERICK KEMPE: Yeah.

MATTHEW WHITAKER: President Trump called them a paper tiger, and they spent a day trying to explain how, really, they were a bear. And you know, I mean, a bear could have probably made it from the border to Poland in a couple days, I’m guessing.

But you know, this is the situation we find ourselves in. There is a—there is a detachment from reality that the Russians currently have as to their military success on the battlefield, and most likely that is the generals and the military leaders that are not providing real information to Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin as to what’s happening on the battlefield.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Yeah.

MATTHEW WHITAKER: But this war needs to end. President Trump’s been so clear and clear-eyed about how this war needs to end. It is a completely senseless war, it makes no sense whatsoever to continue this on the battlefield, and it needs to end.

And you know, I think one of the things that I would point to, Fred, that I think is crucial is President Trump has made available the best weapons in the world—American armaments, munitions—to sell to our European NATO allies plus Canada and then provide to Ukraine. And that’s another area where, if we talk about Europe taking over the conventional defense of the continent, then that—those sales should continue to move at pace. And we’ve—you know, we’ve sold billions already and we have billions more available. Ukraine needs it, wants it, and we need to make sure that that continues to flow and that—and that our European allies are stepping up and buying that.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Yeah.

So let me end with a question, one of my—as you know, I always like to point to a part of your biography that appeals to me. You’ve got this amazing career in public service and private practice, but you were also a player on a Big Ten team in Iowa that went to the Rose Bowl. That’s not quite—

MATTHEW WHITAKER: At THE University of Iowa.

FREDERICK KEMPE: The University of Iowa. And that’s not quite the World Cup, which is going to be played in the United States next year, in 2026, but it comes pretty close. In football, if you see a strategy’s not working you change on the field. So on the field with Russia right now, since it’s not coming to the negotiating table, since it seems stuck but Russia also seems economically weak, isn’t it time to double down on sanctions? Isn’t it time to double down on the military efforts against Russia to bring—isn’t that going to be necessary to bring Putin to the table?

MATTHEW WHITAKER: Ultimately, that’s up to President Trump and the Congress. But I think he knows that there are multiple steps.

And so he put sanctions on India. Certainly, they have reacted. There’s a—there’s a lot of other things we can do on a sanctions front, on a shadow fleet front. There are a menu of items that we could do. But we can’t do it alone.

And this—I think this is one of President Trump’s frustrations with the EU especially, is they want the United States to bear the weight and the burden of sanctions, whether it’s against China, whether against Brazil, or India, or any other countries that are buying Russian oil and gas. And all he’s saying is that we need to move together. Like, we are more powerful as an alliance and as allies if we all work together instead of, you know. But the EU, obviously, has challenges in their membership and who’s willing to—you know, because Hungary, who’s buying a hundred percent of their oil and gas, you know, they would be voting to sanction themselves, ultimately. And you know, that’s—that would be foolhardy. Hungary has an election in the spring that I think they’re very keen on how that plays out over the coming months. And that’s something that we’re watching very carefully.

But that’s why, as an alliance, the EU and the United States need to bring alternatives. I mean, I point again, Poland/Czech Republic eliminated their dependency on Russian oil and gas, and they have more trade space now and more ability to—you know, to navigate this current situation where Russia has invaded Ukraine and continuing to fight the war. And I think we need to—for these landlocked countries, and together with Turkey, I think we need to provide them alternatives, whether that’s, you know, American LNG, whether that is oil, you know, and building pipelines and the things—again, the hard work that it’s going to take to actually change the calculation on these matters.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Mr. Ambassador, I wasn’t quite sure how I could bring American football together with Ukraine, but thank you for this—

MATTHEW WHITAKER: Just know it’s very hard to watch in Europe. Six hours ahead is—those night games are impossible.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, look, very much look forward to the rest of this conference. Thanks for kicking us off in such fine fashion.

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Much of Trump’s post focused on taunting Putin over his faltering invasion. In characteristically abrasive language, the US leader mocked the Russian army’s lack of progress in Ukraine and suggested Moscow was facing major economic problems due to the spiraling cost of the war. “Russia has been fighting aimlessly for three and a half years a war that should have taken a real military power less than a week to win,” Trump wrote. “This is not distinguishing Russia. In fact, it is very much making them look like a paper tiger.”

Many commentators chose to leap on Trump’s statement as proof of a major change in US policy toward Ukraine. In fact, the post contained nothing that suggested a new approach to relations between Washington and Kyiv. On the contrary, Trump stressed that it would now now be up to Europe to take the lead in supporting Ukraine.

While the US President repeatedly asserted that Ukraine could defeat Russia, there was no indication that America was ready to increase its support for the Ukrainian war effort or expand sanctions against Moscow. Instead, Trump limited himself to confirming that the US will continue to sell weapons to Ukraine via NATO partners. In other words, the Trump administration’s stance on the war is set to remain largely unchanged. However, instead of pressing Ukraine to accept a Kremlin-friendly peace deal, Trump is now openly talking about Ukrainian victory.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

What caused President Trump’s rather radical change in tone? Putin’s relentless stalling tactics and his shameless backtracking have no doubt played a role, exhausting the US leader’s patience and making him look foolish for touting their alleged personal friendship. Trump himself has suggested that his new assessment of the war is based on a detailed understanding of the current military and economic situation in Russia and Ukraine. This version has been endorsed by US Vice President JD Vance, who commented this week that Trump has “grown very confident this war is bad for Russia.”

It is not difficult to imagine how intelligence briefings on the current state of the war in Ukraine might have convinced Trump to revise his earlier assumptions regarding Russia’s economic and military might. Putin’s recent summer offensive was billed as a potential turning point in the war but has clearly failed to achieve its objectives. Russian troops were unable to secure any major breakthroughs during the summer months and have made little progress toward the establishment of a border buffer zone in northern Ukraine. This underwhelming outcome was entirely in line with broader battlefield trends that have seen Russia forces seize less than one percent of Ukrainian territory over the past three years.

Russia’s modest gains have come at a terrible price. While neither Moscow nor Kyiv release official casualty figures, independent research based on open source data and intelligence reports indicate that hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine, with even greater numbers wounded. This dwarfs the losses suffered in all the wars waged by the Kremlin since World War II.

In order to replenish the depleted ranks of his army, Putin has been forced to offer ever-larger bounties to new recruits. Nevertheless, the catastrophic casualty rate in Ukraine means that even the present steady flow of Russian volunteers may not be enough to sustain the invasion. In an indication of Moscow’s mounting manpower challenges, Putin brokered a deal with Pyongyang last year that saw more than ten thousand North Korean soldiers deployed to fight alongside the Russian army.

Putin is also visibly in struggling in the wider geopolitical arena. With the vast majority of Russia’s military resources already committed to the invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has found itself unable to project strength elsewhere. Russia could do nothing when the simmering war between Azerbaijan and Armenia flared up in 2023, and has since been largely excluded from the peace process between the two countries, leaving centuries of Russian imperial influence in doubt. Similarly, when the regime of Kremlin client Bashar al-Assad was under threat in late 2024, Moscow was unable to intervene to save the Syrian dictator. Iranian officials encountered the same toothless response more recently when they appealed to their Russian allies for help during Israel’s brief air war against the country.

As Russia’s international influence declines, Putin is facing growing economic woes on the home front. These problems are being compounded by an escalating Ukrainian bombing campaign targeting the Russian oil and gas industry. Since the beginning of August, Ukraine has launched dozens of airstrikes against Russian refineries, pipelines, pumping stations, and ports. This Ukrainian aerial offensive has dealt the biggest blow to the Russian economy since the start of the war, Reuters reports, with refining capacity significantly curtailed and energy exports down. Crucially, Ukrainian attacks have sparked a worsening fuel crisis in regions across Russia, with long queues forming at gas stations amid supply breakdowns and record price hikes.

Russia’s inability to defend its economically vital energy industry against Ukrainian long-range drones has highlighted just how overstretched the country’s military currently is. With the army’s limited supply of air defense systems deployed to the front lines in Ukraine or guarding major Russian cities along with the palaces of Putin and his cronies, there is simply not enough spare capacity to protect the vast oil and gas infrastructure that serves as the engine of Putin’s war machine.

This does not bode well for the Kremlin. Ukraine is clearly intent on methodically destroying Russia’s energy industry and is developing its own domestically produced cruise missiles to do so. If these weapons become more readily available in the coming months as anticipated, Kyiv’s capacity to strike targets deep inside Russia will be drastically enhanced.

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The unfavorable current military and economic outlook helps to explain why Trump chose to brand Russia a “paper tiger.” The jibe seems to have struck a nerve among Russians, many of whom are no doubt already beginning to feel uneasy about the worsening domestic situation and their army’s lack of progress in Ukraine. Pro-war bloggers and Kremlin pundits lined up to attack Trump and ridicule his “paper tiger” assertion, while Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov felt obliged to directly address the insult. “Russia is by no means a tiger. Russia is traditionally seen as a bear. There is no such thing as paper bears. Russia is a real bear,” he somewhat bizarrely insisted during a radio interview.

Putin has so far remained silent but is likely to be seething. The Kremlin dictator is well known for his gangster-like obsession with respect, and has made no secret of his bitter resentment over Russia’s humiliating loss of superpower status following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin was said to have been deeply offended when US President Barack Obama dismissed Russia as a mere “regional power” in 2014 during the initial stages of Moscow’s attack on Ukraine. He will now also be haunted by Trump’s “paper tiger” taunt, which strikes at the very heart of his imperial insecurities.

The invasion of Ukraine was conceived by Putin as a decisive step to reverse the injustice of the Soviet breakup and revive the Russian Empire. He had hoped for a rapid victory that would transform the wider geopolitical landscape and return Russia to its rightful place among the world’s great powers. Instead, the war has ruthlessly exposed the limitations of the Russian military.

Today, Putin’s armies remain bogged down in brutal fighting for control over villages that lie within walking distance of the original front lines when Russia’s invasion first began more than three and a half years ago. At sea, Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports has been broken, with the bulk of Putin’s fleet forced to retreat from Crimea. Despite possessing one of the world’s largest air forces, Russia has been unable to secure air superiority in Ukraine and cannot even prevent the Ukrainians from striking targets deep inside the Russian Federation itself.

In light of this poor performance, it is hardly surprising that Russia’s military reputation has taken such a battering since 2022. Putin still possesses a vast and powerful war machine that is capable of inflicting untold harm and misery, but few would now classify Russia as a global superpower. Trump’s “paper tiger” barb was meant as an insult, but it may be closer to the truth that Putin’s pretensions to great power status.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 2, 2025

Putin’s failed summer offensive shatters the myth of inevitable Russian victory

By Peter Dickinson

The failure of Putin’s summer offensive should help to debunk the persistent myth of inevitable Russian victory and persuade Western leaders to increase their support for the Ukrainian war effort, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Sep 22, 2025

Moldova accuses Russia of election interference ahead of key vote

By Aidan Stretch

Moldova is raising the alarm over Russian interference ahead of this weekend’s parliamentary election amid fears that a pro-Kremlin victory could derail Moldova’s EU ambitions and create a new front in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, writes Aidan Stretch.

Conflict Corruption

UkraineAlert Sep 18, 2025

Putin’s Polish probe demands decisive response to restore NATO deterrence

By Zahar Hryniv

Putin’s recent drone escalation in the skies over Poland is an unmistakable signal that NATO’s credibility is under threat. Western leaders must now respond decisively to deter further Russian aggression, writes Zahar Hryniv.

Conflict Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Trump called Russia a ‘paper tiger’ because he believes Putin is losing appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Although billed as defensive, the joint military exercises in Belarus sparked considerable alarm among the country’s European neighbors. The presence of Russian troops close to the Belarusian border with NATO and the European Union inevitably drew comparisons with the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which had been preceded by Russian military drills in Belarus. In an apparent bid to menace nearby NATO member states, this year’s exercises featured a simulated nuclear strike. Russian and Belarusian troops also trained with drones and robotic systems.

These military drills took place against a backdrop of mounting European disquiet over Russia’s apparent readiness to escalate its hybrid war against the West. Ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014, the Kremlin has faced accusations of engaging in a wide variety of hostile acts across Europe, ranging from cyberattacks and disinformation to sabotage and assassinations. This campaign gained further momentum following the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022. It may now be entering a dangerous new phase.

In recent weeks, the Kremlin has launched drones into Polish and Romanian airspace, while also sending warplanes into Estonian airspace above the Baltic Sea. On September 22, major airports in Norway and Denmark were forced to suspend operations due to suspicious drone activity. While the source of this sophisticated drone disruption has not yet been clarified, Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said Russian involvement cannot be ruled out.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia’s recent actions reflect the ongoing integration of drones into the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare playbook as Moscow looks to raise the stakes in its confrontation with the democratic world. Since US President Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, Moscow has been cheered by his efforts to reduce support for Ukraine and limit the US role in European security. Russia now appears intent on exploiting growing divides within the Western camp and intimidating Europe with thinly-veiled threats of possible drone bombardment.

European leaders must take the Russian drone threat seriously. Since 2022, the Kremlin has made drones one of the key components of Russia’s overall military strategy. Domestic production of bomber drones has increased dramatically over the past year in particular, making it possible for Russia to conduct mass bombing raids on Ukrainian cities featuring as many as 800 drones in a single night.

In addition to increased numbers, Russian drones are also undergoing significant upgrades. The most common form of kamikaze drone used by the Russian army is based on the Iranian Shahed model, but recent versions are significantly larger, faster, and more explosive. Russia has also implemented improved navigation and control systems, making the current generation of bomber drones far deadlier than their predecessors.

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At this stage, it appears that Russia is looking to assess NATO’s readiness to defend itself and is unlikely to be preparing any large-scale attacks. However, there is no time to waste. European countries cannot wait until Russia goes even further before addressing the urgent security concerns raised by the Kremlin’s drone diplomacy.

Crucially, this means learning from Ukraine’s unrivaled experience in defending against large-scale Russian drone attacks. Only Ukraine has the know-how to develop layered air defenses featuring ground-based missile systems, mobile gun crews, fighter jets, propeller planes, helicopters, and a rapidly expanding fleet of interceptor drones. Likewise, only Ukraine can offer practical tips on effective jamming and other electronic warfare strategies. These lessons make Ukraine an indispensable security partner for Europe.

NATO member states need to collectively establish realistic and unambiguous rules of engagement for cross-border drone and fighter jet incursions that provide maximum clarity for all countries, including Russia. The alliance’s somewhat improvised Eastern Sentry initiative along the NATO frontier with Russia should be expanded and given permanent status, with Ukraine fully integrated as a strategic partner. Europe should prioritize the production of cost-effective anti-drone technologies and invest in Ukrainian defense sector companies that are already producing key elements such as interceptor drones and electronic warfare tools.

Individual European countries also need to make sure civilian populations are protected against potential Russian drone attacks. This means checking existing bomb shelters. In many cases, it will no doubt be necessary to conduct comprehensive renovation works. By addressing this issue now rather than waiting for the next Russian escalation, governments can prevent panic and demonstrate that the security situation is under control.

Putin has clearly been encouraged by Trump’s efforts to downgrade America’s involvement in transatlantic security and feels emboldened to escalate his own hybrid war against Europe. For now, the Kremlin dictator appears to be focused on probing Europe’s responses and fueling insecurity across the continent. Looking ahead, his strategic objective is to split the Euro-Atlantic alliance and reduce support for Ukraine to minimal levels. If he succeeds, the threat to Europe will reach a new level entirely and the cost of stopping Russia will only rise.

Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategic policy specialist whose work focuses on Russia’s evolving military and hybrid strategy, EU-Ukraine cooperation, and Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 18, 2025

Putin’s Polish probe demands decisive response to restore NATO deterrence

By Zahar Hryniv

Putin’s recent drone escalation in the skies over Poland is an unmistakable signal that NATO’s credibility is under threat. Western leaders must now respond decisively to deter further Russian aggression, writes Zahar Hryniv.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Sep 16, 2025

Only Ukraine can teach NATO how to combat Putin’s growing drone fleet

By David Kirichenko

NATO must urgently learn from Ukraine’s unique experience of Russian drone warfare as the alliance seeks to address the growing threats posed by Putin’s drone swarms, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Sep 22, 2025

Moldova accuses Russia of election interference ahead of key vote

By Aidan Stretch

Moldova is raising the alarm over Russian interference ahead of this weekend’s parliamentary election amid fears that a pro-Kremlin victory could derail Moldova’s EU ambitions and create a new front in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, writes Aidan Stretch.

Conflict Corruption

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Putin is escalating Russia’s hybrid war against Europe. Is Europe ready? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Director for Northern Europe Anna Wieslander has featured on Swedish radio on September 22 following the Russian fighter jets intrusion on Estonian airspace.

Wieslander underlined that it was essential for NATO to react and discussed potential outcomes out of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council and stronger measures taken.

The post Wieslander on Swedish radio appeared first on Atlantic Council.

1. Why has Japan deployed these jets now?  

In recent years, Japan and NATO countries have worked to strengthen their defense relations. This has helped Tokyo and NATO members promote mutual understanding, coordination, and cooperation to deal with security issues in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. Against this backdrop, the “Atlantic Eagles” mission—which involves the deployment of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s F-15, C-2, KC-767, and KC-46A to the United States, Canada, Britain, and Germany, is essentially about demonstrating Japan’s commitment to working closely with its NATO partners, but it also demonstrates Tokyo’s efforts to play a greater role in global security. 

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also an associate professor at the Institute for International Strategy, Tokyo International University and an adjunct senior fellow at the Pacific Forum.

2. Are there other recent actions by Japan that point to a shift in how it views its security? 

Japan has been working to expand and deepen security cooperation via various channels, not only with the United States and its allies and likeminded states, but also with other vital partners in Southeast Asia, in South Asia, and among the Pacific Island states. These efforts are part of Japan’s One Cooperative Effort Among Nations (OCEAN) concept, which is aimed at achieving and sustaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. Of course, the efforts also allow the Japan Self-Defense Force and Japan Coast Guard to gain important operational experience. Japan’s cooperation and coordination with various partners reflects Tokyo’s recognition that a proactive international role is vital to stabilizing the region and ensuring its own national security.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

3. What does Japan’s deployment mean for NATO allies?

Amid heightened military and economic threats posed by the axis of aggressors (China, Russia, and North Korea), likeminded nations of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are bolstering their security cooperation. Japan, despite being a traditionally pacifist country with a “no war” clause in its constitution, has dramatically increased its defense spending every year following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. On the multilateral front, Japan has accomplished many firsts to bolster its European defense partnerships. In January, Tokyo established an independent mission to NATO to help develop a more efficient partnership between the two entities.  

The “Atlantic Eagles” deployment to NATO bases marks the first time in history that Japanese warplanes have been deployed to Canada and Europe. As the United States looks for ways to reduce its military presence abroad, it is vital for Indo-Pacific and European democracies to develop robust pathways for security cooperation without Washington at the helm. 

—Kyoko Imai is the associate director for the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

***

Japan’s recent deployment of fighter jets to NATO bases is a strategic move. It signals Tokyo’s growing intent to deepen ties with Europe, and it lays the groundwork for enhanced cooperation—particularly in the defense industrial and innovation domains.  

Confronted by growing China-Russia cooperation and an increasingly fickle US administration, Japan and Europe are moving past decades-long defense postures. Each is taking considerable steps to rebuild its defense industrial base and procure critical capabilities—wherever they can find them. Europe is already looking to Indo-Pacific partners to help fill these gaps.  

To this end, Tokyo and Brussels aim to launch a new European Union–Japan Defence Industry Dialogue in the near future. This follows several moves to align defense industrial ambitions, including a formal European Union–Japan security and defense agreement, Japan’s new mission to NATO, and growing bilateral defense industrial ties.   

Programs such as the Global Combat Air Programme and the development of a Japan-France-Germany electromagnetic railgun demonstrate Japan and Europe’s increased defense industrial cooperation. Tokyo brings to bear advanced research and development opportunities in robotics and additive manufacturing, while Europe can offer greater production capacity for more advanced systems.  

As Japan strengthens its military footprint alongside its NATO allies, expect this momentum to carry over into the industrial domain. Defense innovation and production will become a cornerstone of defense cooperation between Japan and Europe. 

—Kristen Taylor is an assistant director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative (TSI) at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

4. Where should Japan-NATO relations go from here?

This deployment of combat aircraft by Japan reflects an important development in the operationalization of the long-standing relationship between Tokyo and NATO. It should become a regular event, one eventually complemented by similar deployments and exercises by Japanese ground and naval forces, including their special operations elements. Japan could also host modest NATO exercises on its territory, leveraging the regular presence of US, Canadian, and European armed forces in the Indo-Pacific. 

Now is the time to reanimate proposals for a small institutional NATO presence in Tokyo. This would facilitate greater understanding about the Alliance in Japan and expand the Alliance’s awareness of the regional dynamics affecting the interests shared by NATO and Japan. 

—Ian Brzezinski is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and he is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Advisors Group.

***

Going forward, Japan and its NATO partners should go beyond ceremonial exchanges and enhance interoperability for coordinated defense readiness, particularly in information, surveillance, and reconnaissance. And there are many opportunities in defense technologies for next-generation platforms and know-how.  

Much will depend, however, on how much Japan and NATO can further exchange their visions and map out the partnership’s strategies and plans. Although the partnership is not about Japan and NATO fighting side by side, the coordination and exchanges will establish a network that will be critical for containing the instability caused by anti-status quo powers. 

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

The post Why has Japan deployed fighter jets to NATO bases in the US, Canada, and Europe? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The strategy is a wide-ranging document covering everything from developing the skills needed to build and maintain nuclear submarines to reforming the way government supports defense exports. Three elements should be of particular interest to the transatlantic defense industrial base.

Recognition of defense as a key industrial sector

The modern history of industrial strategy in the United Kingdom has seen active state intervention in the economy come in and out of political favor. In recent years, successive governments have been more comfortable with the need to nurture the domestic defense industrial base, including through the 2021 Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSIS). This strategy broke with several long-held principles of British defense procurement, most notably the commitment to “international competition by default,” which had stood for more than a decade. However, it is difficult to point to specific outcomes of the changes, perhaps in part because while DSIS recognized the defense industrial base as a critical enabler of defense and national security, it was much less clear about the value of the defense industrial base to the wider economy.

That is certainly not the case for the new Defence Industrial Strategy, which is effectively a sector-specific subcomponent of the broader national Industrial Strategy. Defense is now listed as a growth sector, and the national security strategy even talks of a “defense dividend.” By situating the defense industry firmly within the wider industrial base, the British government has elevated the profile of a sector that employs 272,000 people across the country. In practical terms, it will give access to—and, perhaps more importantly, influence over—whole-of-government initiatives such as skills development programs, infrastructure investment, and regulatory reform. Additionally, almost 70 percent of those 272,000 jobs are based outside of the relatively affluent areas of southeast England, making the industry an obvious candidate to benefit from programs to incentivize regional investment. For example, the Defence Growth Deals promised in the strategy, if implemented well, could allow the industry to leverage hundreds of millions of pounds of government funding, take advantage of favorable tax and customs duties in certain Freeport locations, and perhaps even reduce the burden of the United Kingdom’s famously unpredictable planning process. 

There are benefits too for those more interested in cold, hard cash, with promises that the National Wealth Fund will soon support capital-intensive projects (subject to the necessary legislation clearing Parliament) and that the British Business Bank will provide more support for defense companies looking to scale up. Finally, the British government is using its financial muscle to help the defense industry export. Unlike its American and Canadian cousins, the United Kingdom’s export credit agency (UKEF) can already support defense projects. Under new rules, UKEF will see its lending capacity increased to ten billion pounds, with three billion pounds of that specifically ring-fenced for defense, providing a significant new source of low-cost debt financing to help soften the overall cost of investment in the sector.

Focus on UK-based businesses

Naturally, any interventionist industrial strategy runs the risk of encouraging narrow, national protectionism. But, in this case, the repeated references in the Defence Industrial Strategy to “UK-based industry” rather than the simpler “UK industry” formulation is telling. Yes, there are clearly defense technology areas where the United Kingdom intends to compete on the global stage, but the strategy takes a pragmatic approach that recognizes the inherently global nature of the industry. 

This is especially important in the context of the long and mutually beneficial history of collaboration between British and US defense industries. Of the 272,000 jobs mentioned above, more than 20,000 are directly working for US-owned companies, with another 94,000 jobs indirectly supported in the supply chain. That constitutes a significant contribution to the UK economy by any standard, even before considering the technological advances achieved through collaborative research and development, the security benefits of increased supply chain resilience, and increased export opportunities through reciprocal market access. 

Despite this, some US-owned defense contractors have privately expressed concern that the strategy’s commitment to developing an offset policy could roll back that record of collaboration. Many countries require foreign companies to invest directly or indirectly in their economies as a necessary component of competing for government defense contracts. The United Kingdom currently has no formal offset policy or enforcement mechanism, but the geopolitical climate has driven increased concern about the reliability of its defense supply chains. Last year, for example, the British government even purchased a semiconductor factory, the first such direct purchase of a private company by the MOD since it acquired Sheffield Forgemasters in 2021. Therefore, it is not surprising that a formal offset policy is being considered. 

US-owned companies are right to be concerned that an overly prescriptive and inflexible offset strategy could be counterproductive. The US government regards offsets as market distorting, and critics of the approach argue that offsets encourage inflation and inefficiency. There is, however, little reason to believe that the United Kingdom will go down that road. By calling out Australia’s relatively flexible and pragmatic approach as the inspiration, and by openly acknowledging the risks involved, the United Kingdom has signaled that it intends to move carefully. Past evidence of previous UK offset-like policies also supports this conclusion, with some analysts suggesting that the current prevalence of US-owned defense companies in the UK market is, at least in part, a result of previous offset strategies.

Commitment to acquisition reform

Longtime followers of British defense acquisition reform will have good reason to be skeptical on this front, having seen multiple attempts try and fail in the past, but there is reason to believe this time will be different. 

First, the government has committed itself to a segmented approach with ambitious timelines, with the period from initiation to contracting as short as three months for commercially available products. In doing so, the government has made an easy metric by which outsiders can measure success.

Second, the newly empowered national armaments director will take responsibility for all non-nuclear procurement in an end-to-end acquisition system running from investments in scientific research all the way up to end of lifecycle disposals of capital assets like aircraft carriers and jets. This new system reduces eight separate procurement budgets down to one, and it streamlines decision making, which will be essential to meet those speedy timelines noted above.

Third, and perhaps most important, the British people will demand it. Critics of British defense spending have long pointed to a relative lack of funding compared to domestic priorities like the National Health Service and other social benefit programs. Making defense a truly national endeavor, as the Strategic Defense Review aspires to, requires a clear and public argument for reprioritizing government spending. More than three and a half years on, polling shows that the Russian invasion of Ukraine still sharpens the mind in the United Kingdom much more acutely than in the United States. Given the clear and present threat on the continent, the British people might be willing to accept a reduction in social benefit programs to redirect resources to defense, but not if those resources are wasted on overly complicated and underperforming procurements.

Deborah Cheverton is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is a senior trade and investment adviser with the UK embassy. Before working in trade, she worked for the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence for fifteen years, working across a range of policy and delivery areas with a particular focus on science and technology policy, industrial strategy, capability development, and international collaboration.

The post Three things to note in the UK’s new Defence Industrial Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Over the past week, numerous Western leaders have condemned Russia’s “reckless” incursion. Meanwhile, NATO has announced the launch of the Eastern Sentry deterrence initiative, with plans for more integrated air defense, intelligence sharing, and new assets. Despite these steps, some believe the response has so far been insufficient. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has criticized NATO’s “lack of action,” suggesting that European countries need to go further and work on a joint air defense system to create “an effective air shield over Europe.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

If the West fails to credibly deter further Kremlin escalations, this would have potentially disastrous consequences for international security. At stake is not only Ukraine’s survival as a sovereign state, but NATO’s continued existence as the main guarantor of peace and stability in Europe. A conventional Russian invasion of Poland or the Baltic states remains within the realm of possibilities if Moscow is successful in Ukraine. However, a far more likely scenario would be some kind of gray zone aggression on NATO’s eastern flank with the aim of discrediting the alliance’s core commitment to collective security.

This could take many forms. For example, Russia could launch a significantly larger drone attack against Poland. Alternatively, the Kremlin could stage a hybrid cross-border incursion into Estonia, utilizing the same kind of plausible deniability employed during the 2014 seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. Moscow’s goal would be to demonstrate that the NATO alliance lacks the resolve to act on its collective security commitments, while remaining below the threshold that could trigger a full-scale war.

Even prior to the recent appearance of Russian drones over Poland, there were already ample indications that the scale of the threat posed by the Putin regime was not fully understood in Western capitals. Recent diplomatic efforts to end the invasion of Ukraine via some form of compromise peace deal suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of Russia’s maximalist war aims. Putin’s ambitions extend far beyond limited territorial gains in Ukraine; any attempt to appease him with “land swaps” will merely whet his imperial appetite and encourage further aggression.

Members of the so-called Coalition of the Willing led by France and the UK have spoken recently of providing Ukraine with “robust” security guarantees, but only after a ceasefire is in place. This gives the Kremlin dictator no incentive to back down. While Putin’s recent summer offensive in Ukraine has failed strategically, Russia continues to make marginal gains on the battlefield while mercilessly striking Ukrainian cities and civilians with drones and missiles. It is therefore imperative to compel the Kremlin to agree to a ceasefire first, separating this from discussions over security guarantees while retaining a commitment to both.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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A far more united, assertive, and multi-pronged approach is required in order to deter Russia. Western governments must make full use of the extensive economic leverage at their disposal. Washington and Brussels should seize Russia’s frozen assets and implement tougher sanctions that drastically cut Russia’s income from oil exports, including measures targeting Moscow’s shadow fleet of tankers. Applying additional secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that facilitate the purchase of Russian oil will force buyers like India and China to comply with US sanctions or risk losing access to the global financial system.

At the same time, the US and Europe must ensure Ukraine becomes a “steel porcupine” capable of defending itself and deterring future Russian aggression on its own. This should involve guaranteed weapons deliveries, an end to all restrictions on Ukrainian long-range strikes inside Russia, increased intelligence sharing, and enhanced industrial cooperation between Western and Ukrainian defense companies, especially in terms of drone technologies and electronic warfare.

This combination of intensifying economic pressure on Russia and increased military support for Ukraine could set the stage for a ceasefire agreement. If this is achieved, the West must then unilaterally implement security guarantees and deploy troops from as many countries as possible to Ukraine to ensure maximum deterrence. Any deployments should take a layered approach. The initial step would be a monitoring mission on the line of contact, followed by the deployment of soldiers across Ukraine, along with air and naval patrols.

While American troops will almost certainly not be involved on the ground in Ukraine, it is vital that US President Donald Trump sticks to his commitment to back any reassurance force with continued intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support, along with a potential aviation component. The Trump administration has successfully encouraged NATO members to spend more on defense and support Kyiv, but Trump’s skepticism toward alliances and his often ambiguous position on Ukraine increase the likelihood of a Russian challenge to NATO’s Article 5 in the near future.

Putin’s latest escalation in the skies over Poland is an unmistakable signal that NATO’s credibility is under threat. In order to reduce the potential for a larger European war, a new approach to engagement with the Kremlin that projects strength and resolve is clearly required. Failure to act accordingly will place the entire international security architecture in question, including the foundational principle that borders cannot be changed by force.

Zahar Hryniv is a Young Global Professional at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 16, 2025

Ukraine’s skies are Europe’s first line of defense against Russian drones

By Alina Zubkovych

As NATO leaders respond to Russia’s recent drone incursion into Poland, they should recognize that Ukraine’s skies are now European first line of defense against Putin’s growing drone fleet, writes Alina Zubkovych.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Sep 16, 2025

Only Ukraine can teach NATO how to combat Putin’s growing drone fleet

By David Kirichenko

NATO must urgently learn from Ukraine’s unique experience of Russian drone warfare as the alliance seeks to address the growing threats posed by Putin’s drone swarms, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Aug 28, 2025

Putin wants to capture Ukraine’s crucial fortress belt without a fight

By Mykola Bielieskov

As US-led efforts to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine struggle to gain momentum, Vladimir Putin’s latest territorial demands include the surrender of strategically vital and heavily fortified Ukrainian land in the east of the country, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Putin’s Polish probe demands decisive response to restore NATO deterrence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For the Russians, gray zone acts of aggression such as the recent drone raid on Poland offer an opportunity to gauge how far they can go without provoking a major military response. Each new operation is a probe. If Russian drones can cross into Poland unchecked, the next stage may be for missiles to begin “accidentally” striking NATO territory.

As none of the drones launched at Poland last week appear to have been armed, it is reasonable to conclude that Putin does not currently seek to conduct a conventional attack on NATO. Instead, the operation served a number of other objectives. Crucially, it allowed the Kremlin to test NATO’s red lines and demonstrate that the alliance is hesitant to act, even when its borders are so clearly penetrated. This strikes at the credibility of NATO’s core commitment to collective security.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The appearance of Russian drones in the skies above Poland set off alarm bells in a number of European capitals. This trend toward greater insecurity can help drive the radicalization of European politics, which often means increased support for Kremlin-friendly parties on both the far-left and far-right of the political spectrum.

Fears over a mounting Russian threat could also divert attention and resources away from Ukraine, with Europeans growing less inclined to support the Ukrainian war effort and more concerned about their own security. In the aftermath of the recent drone incident, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned of growing anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland fueled by Moscow, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested that Russia may be seeking to prevent the delivery of additional air defenses to Ukraine ahead of the winter season.

With the Western response to Russia’s drone raid still taking shape, it remains too early to draw any definitive conclusions. However, the mixed initial reaction from Western leaders is unlikely to have deterred the Kremlin. Rather than projecting unity and purpose, US President Donald Trump appeared to contradict many of his NATO allies by claiming that the large-scale Russian incursion into Polish airspace could have been “a mistake.”

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Russia’s drone escalation has revived the long-running debate over the possibility of a NATO-backed no-fly zone of some kind in Ukraine. Following the Kremlin’s aerial attack, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski became the latest figure to publicly voice his support for allied efforts to close the skies over Ukraine. Poland’s top diplomat argued that protecting Ukrainian airspace from Russian drone and missile attacks would also serve as the first line of defense for the rest of Europe.

This concept has been under discussion since the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion but has so far failed to gain serious traction due to widespread Western fears of escalation. Skeptics have noted that any NATO jets deployed to Ukraine would immediately become targets for the Russians, creating the potential for a direct military confrontation between the alliance and the Kremlin. A single downed NATO aircraft over Ukraine or a destroyed anti-aircraft system on Russian territory could plunge Europe into a major crisis with unpredictable outcomes for international security.

Europe can minimize the risks associated with a no-fly zone by ruling out the deployment of fighter jet squadrons in Ukrainian airspace and focusing instead on boosting the number of ground-based air defense systems covering western Ukraine. Many systems could be positioned across the border and need not actually enter Ukraine at all.

Participating countries could also increase their support for Ukraine’s own layered air defenses, including Kyiv’s growing interceptor drone capabilities. This approach would strengthen the security of European airspace without the necessity of sending NATO pilots into combat.

Enhanced air defenses would not entirely neutralize the Russian threat but could succeed in creating significantly safer conditions for millions of Ukrainians along with citizens in neighboring EU states. While Moscow would inevitably protest over any increased European involvement, it would be hard for the Kremlin to argue convincingly that intercepting Russian drones and missiles constitutes an act of international aggression.

Recent events offer a clear precedent for a greater European role in Ukraine’s air defenses. Jets from multiple NATO countries shot down a number of the Russian drones that entered Polish airspace last week without sparking an escalation. There is therefore no reason to believe that expanding the no-fly zone into western Ukraine would suddenly spark World War III.

Ukraine also has an important role to play in efforts to strengthen Europe’s air shield. Following the recent Russian incursion into Polish airspace, European countries now recognize that they need to urgently study Ukraine’s unrivaled experience of defending against Russian missiles and drones. This process is already underway, with Poland looking to implement lessons learned by the Ukrainians over the past three and half years of regular Russian bombardment. Other countries will no doubt soon be joining the Poles in seeking the advice of Ukrainian air defense crews. Looking ahead, Ukraine’s unique air defense expertise must be fully integrated into NATO and EU security planning.

It should now be abundantly clear that Putin will continue to escalate until he is stopped. The Kremlin dictator’s imperial ambitions extend far beyond the conquest of Ukraine. To achieve his goals, he seeks to discredit NATO and divide Europe. Acting decisively through smart air defense, leveraging Ukrainian expertise, and deepening regional cooperation can help safeguard European security. If Western leaders continue to hesitate, Putin will grow bolder still and the cost of stopping Russia will only rise.

Alina Zubkovych is Head of the Nordic Ukraine Forum and Academic Director at the Kyiv School of Economics.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s skies are Europe’s first line of defense against Russian drones appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s unprecedented drone raid was widely interpreted as a test of NATO’s readiness and resolve. Former US Army Europe commander General Ben Hodges said the operation was a Kremlin rehearsal with the objective of checking NATO response times and capabilities. “Using F-35s and F-22s against drones shows we are not yet prepared,” he noted.

Many analysts joined Hodges in commenting on the inefficiency of employing NATO fighter jets and expensive missiles to counter relatively cheap Russian drones. The obvious shortcomings of this approach have underlined the need to radically rethink how NATO members address air defense amid the rapidly evolving threats posed by Russian drone warfare. Ukraine’s experience of combating Putin’s drone fleet will prove crucial in this process.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Like many other NATO members, Poland has invested heavily in recent years in high-end air defense systems such as Patriots and F-35 warplanes. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has revealed a new kind of war that requires alternative solutions. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three and a half years ago, unmanned systems have emerged as the decisive weapon above the battlefield and have also been used extensively for longer range attacks on land and at sea.

With Russia and Ukraine locked in a relentless race to innovate, the Kremlin has prioritized the mass production of deadly strike drones capable of hitting targets hundreds of kilometers away. The number of drones involved in Russian aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities has risen dramatically over the past year from dozens to hundreds, with record waves in recent months featuring as many as eight hundred drones. Europe remains dangerously unprepared to address the unprecedented challenges posed by these large-scale Russian drone swarms.

Ukrainians have been advising their European colleagues for some time of the need to reassess their air defense strategies in line with the growing dominance of drones. Ukrainian drone warfare specialist Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, who leads the country’s Unmanned Systems Forces, warned in July 2025 that NATO commanders must urgently review their air defense doctrines in order to focus on the dangers posed by swarms of Russian attack drones.

Brovdi’s call to Kyiv’s Western partners and his offer to share Ukraine’s unique experience of drone warfare did not initially provoke much of a response. However, following Russia’s recent escalation in the skies above Poland, that may now be changing. Within days of the Russian drone incursion, Polish and Ukrainian officials announced plans for Ukraine to provide anti-drone training in Poland. Other NATO members are now expected to follow suit, reflecting Ukraine’s status as a leading authority on drone warfare.

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Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski is one of numerous senior European politicians to acknowledge the need for NATO countries to learn from Ukraine. “The Ukrainians have better equipment for dealing with Russian drones and more up-to-date experience,” he commented during a visit to Kyiv last week. “This is something that the public and governments in the West need to urgently integrate into their thinking. It is the Ukrainians who will be training us on how to stand up to Russia, not the other way around.”

US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg echoed this sentiment, commenting on September 12 that Ukraine has emerged in recent years as a “world leader” in drone warfare. Noting that the evolution of drone technologies was changing the nature of modern war, Kellogg credited Ukraine with playing a leading role in this trend while acknowledging that other nations including the United States were now “well behind.”

In addition to offering air defense training to the country’s allies, Ukraine is also ready to help NATO partners identify and procure the necessary defensive tools to combat Russian drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently stressed that nobody in the world has enough missiles to shoot down the large volumes of drones currently being deployed by the Kremlin. Instead, a more eclectic approach is needed, featuring ground-based air defenses and jet fighters together with defensive drones, helicopter patrols, and propeller planes.

Ukraine has already developed and begun deploying a number of interceptor drones that serve as a cost-effective solution to Russia’s expanding swarms of strike drones. Work is now underway to increase production in order to keep pace with Russia’s growing output. Kyiv’s partners are engaged in these efforts. A new initiative was recently unveiled that will see Britain support Ukraine by mass producing interceptor drones based on existing Ukrainian technologies. This should make it possible to deliver thousands of drones to Ukraine every month.

Ukraine’s sophisticated anti-drone defenses will now set the standard for NATO as the alliance adjusts to the changing face of modern warfare and the mounting threat posed by Putin’s drones. At present, Putin is using drone incursions to test NATO and probe the alliance’s military and political responses, but his appetite for escalation has never been more apparent. European countries must therefore prepare to defend themselves against potential large-scale attacks involving hundreds of Russian drones. As they scramble to do so, Ukraine’s experience will prove absolutely indispensable.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Only Ukraine can teach NATO how to combat Putin’s growing drone fleet appeared first on Atlantic Council.

These commitments only matter when they are delivered. NATO’s strength is measured not by communiqués, but by visible capabilities that deter and defend.

The war in Ukraine drives urgency. Russia’s use of long-range fires, drone swarms, and advanced air defenses has reshaped the air domain. For NATO, Ukraine is not a distant conflict but a preview of its own eastern flank—and a test of whether the Alliance can adapt quickly. We saw this play out just recently, when NATO fighters shot down Russian drones that had entered Polish airspace, marking a rare engagement of allied air defenses. NATO also cannot assume US airborne enablers will always be available.

That reality exposes NATO’s most acute gap: its airborne command and control (C2) enterprise.

A stopgap, not a solution

The Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC) program is NATO’s blueprint to replace the E-3 AWACS fleet with a multi-domain “system of systems” for a resilient C2 architecture. The Concept Stage, running through December 2025, will define this architecture and procurement approach.

But that vision remains years away. To bridge the gap, NATO launched an initial Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (iAFSC) initiative with six E-7A aircraft—modern, proven, but too few to meet Alliance-wide demand. High costs, delivery delays, and shallow depth render this iAFSC at best a stopgap, not a solution. Without complementary systems, NATO risks overstretch and doubts about its adaptability. Airborne C2 is a visible symbol of credibility; shortfalls are quickly noticed by allies and adversaries.

Operational requirements and gaps

NATO’s shortfalls in its airborne C2 are immediate and growing:

• Survivability and distribution: Large, high-value platforms such as the E-7 are vulnerable to advanced surface-to-air missiles and long-range fires. As former Supreme Allied Commander Europe Philip M. Breedlove emphasized, quality and ready capacity matter now—not in the 2030s— because demand is global and persistent. Senior air leaders also cautioned there can be “no sanctuaries” in modern air warfare; adversaries can strike deep into theater, threatening operations. Distributed C2 nodes are essential to avoid a single point of failure.
• Coverage, persistence, and quantity: Six E-7s cannot cover simultaneous crises. As senior commanders note, quantity has a quality all its own. Exercises show demand outstrips availability, leaving gaps. Programs such as Alliance Ground Surveillance illustrate the risk: narrow scope and small fleets cannot meet Alliance needs. Complementary airborne platforms are required for layered, theater-wide persistence.
• Integration across domains: The E-7 is optimized for Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) but not designed to fuse tactical and strategic data across domains. Russia’s failures in Ukraine show that without effective AEW, wars devolve into attrition. NATO must link the F-35, Integrated Air & Missile Defense (IAMD), and the future space-based Airborne Moving Target Indicator into a layered C2 architecture. Modular, rapidly fieldable aircraft can accelerate this shift, while AFSC matures. 
• Timeliness: E-7 deliveries run into the mid-2030s, while the E-3 fleet rapidly ages out. Space-based solutions remain years away. Retiring E-3s also erode airborne battle manager training capacity—these specialists are indispensable, and expertise cannot be surged in a crisis. Without near-term solutions, NATO risks shrinking to a “minimum viable fleet” before replacements arrive and losing a generation of battle managers.
• Emerging threats: Adversaries employ drone swarms, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles to saturate defenses and strike command nodes. Managing hundreds of tracks demands a distributed C2 system able to survive forward. Without it, NATO risks ceding the initiative.

These gaps are increasingly visible to allies and adversaries. Failing to address them risks deterrence and credibility. NATO cannot wait for a perfect solution—it must begin layering survivable, proven capabilities now.

How a layered architecture changes the fight

NATO’s AFSC vision requires a layered C2 architecture. Space-based sensors provide wide-area surveillance, the E-7 delivers theater-level battle management, and smaller, survivable platforms operate closer to contested airspace—integrating data from fighters, IAMD, and ground sensors into actionable C2. This design would ensure resilience: if one node is lost, others remain in the fight. Just as important, it lets NATO operate inside threat rings where larger aircraft cannot safely go, denying adversaries sanctuaries.

NATO does not need next-decade technologies to close today’s gaps. Business jet–class Airborne Early Warning and Control systems; multi-mission intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft; and even unmanned concepts already operate in allied fleets today. These systems are combat-proven, globally supported, and available in multiple mission configurations. Most importantly, they can be scaled within RAAP’s two-year target—demonstrating that credible capability is achievable now, not just in the 2030s. When NATO fighters and Italian Conformal Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft intercepted Russian drones that violated Polish airspace last week, it highlighted the value of affordable, flexible platforms forward-based in Europe. They provide both persistence for day-to-day security tasks and resilience in high-end conflict.

Senior commanders warn against retiring legacy capacity before replacements are in place. With the retirement of E-3s accelerating and E-7 deliveries stretching into the 2030s, NATO cannot afford a gap. Fielding complementary, mid-sized platforms ensures depth now while buying time for AFSC to mature.

One advantage of mid-sized platforms is their resilience and agility. Smaller platforms have a reduced radar cross-section, can operate from short runways, and are compatible with NATO’s Agile Combat Employment concept. This makes them harder to target, easier to disperse, and better suited to survive inside contested environments compared to larger, high-value aircraft.

A second advantage is their cost and scale. Operating at less than half the cost of larger aircraft, these platforms allow NATO to field larger fleets and sustain persistent coverage across multiple theaters. Lower operating costs also mean they can be employed more flexibly—whether for exercises, day-to-day surveillance tasks, or during crisis surges—without exhausting limited budgets.

Finally, they offer integration and growth potential. These aircraft are already proven in allied service, interoperable with NATO datalinks and fifth-generation fighters like the F-35. Their modular design allows them to expand roles over time, shifting from airborne early warning to electronic attack, signals intelligence, or IAMD as operational demands evolve. This adaptability ensures that NATO is not locked into a single-use system but is investing in platforms that can grow with the threat environment.

Fielding such a visible, affordable, and survivable layer not only strengthens NATO’s C2 architecture, it demonstrates to allies, publics, and adversaries alike that RAAP’s promises are real and immediate.

The risk of delay

Ukraine shows how fast threats adapt—Russia is refining strike and air defense systems now, not in 2035. NATO cannot assume uninterrupted US support, nor afford gaps in its own airborne command and control.

The Alliance must act now: field modular, multi-mission platforms under AFSC, integrate them with E-7 and space assets, and deploy them rapidly in training and operations.

Doing so would close NATO’s most pressing C2 gaps. Delay risks a decade of dangerous vulnerability in the domain that decides modern wars—and a failure of NATO’s own promises.

Lieutenant General David J. Julazadeh is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, he was the deputy chief of staff for capability development at NATO Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia.

The post NATO has a gap in its airborne command and control. Here’s how to close it. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Anna Wieslander, Director for Northern Europe, appeared on Radio Sweden on September 12 to comment on the Russian drone incursion over Poland. Wieslander was not surprised over the Russian act, but underlines that NATO’s response was “absolutely necessary” and that it sends the right signals to Russia.

Wieslander features between minutes 9:30 to 13:30 and the broadcast is in English.

The post Wieslander in Radio Sweden appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Polish and other NATO jets reportedly shot down a number of Russian drones in the skies above Poland early on September 10. This was the first time in NATO history that alliance fighter pilots have engaged Russian targets in allied airspace, officials stated. Addressing members of the Polish parliament in Warsaw, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said the incident was “the closest we have been to open conflict since World War II.”

Moscow’s decision to target Poland with drones was the latest in a series of alarming escalations by the Kremlin following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s August summit meeting in Alaska with US President Donald Trump. This has served to significantly raise the stakes ahead of Russia’s military drills in Belarus. While the authorities in Minsk have sought to downplay the significance of the joint exercises, they are a timely reminder that Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka is a key accomplice in Russia’s war effort who poses a security threat to NATO’s eastern flank.

Even before this week’s unprecedented appearance of Russian drones over Poland, Belarus’s European neighbors were already stepping up security measures along the frontier. Lithuania and Poland are accelerating construction work on enhanced border defenses, while the Polish authorities have announced the closure of border crossings with Belarus during the military exercises, citing the risk of provocations tied to the drills.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The “Zapad” military exercises, meaning “West” in Russian, are large-scale drills that have been jointly organized for a number of years by Russia and Belarus. The planned 2023 iteration was canceled as Russian troops and equipment were needed for the ongoing invasion of Ukraine. This year’s war games are set to be significantly smaller in scale that the 2021 exercises, which were used as cover for preparations ahead of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Following Russia’s recent drone incursion, NATO forces across the border from Belarus will be on high alert for any further escalations during the drills.

This week’s Zapad 2025 military exercises will underline the transformation of Belarus into a forward base for the Russian army and will further normalize Moscow’s military footprint in the country. Infrastructure for hosting Russian troops is already in place including missile facilities, fortified munitions depots, and expanded rail links. Almost 300 Belarusian state enterprises are also reportedly involved in the production of weapons or munitions for the Russian military.

Lukashenka has been steadily trading Belarusian sovereignty for regime security ever since 2020, when he became dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival following the brutal suppression of anti-regime protests across Belarus. Hosting Russian troops, supplying Putin’s war machine, and supporting the invasion of Ukraine are all part of this bargain. Russian backing has made it possible for Lukashenka to transform Belarus into an increasingly repressive dictatorship, with regime opponents exiled and over a thousand political prisoners currently behind bars.

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While Lukashenka has little choice but to continue playing the role of junior partner in Putin’s anti-Western crusade, there are signs that he may not be entirely comfortable with his current predicament. In fact, the Belarusian response to this week’s Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace says much about how cornered the Lukashenka regime has become.

Early on Wednesday morning, officials in Minsk reportedly contacted their Warsaw counterparts to offer advance warning that drones were heading their way from the direction of Belarus. Poland said this information was unexpected but helpful. “It was surprising that Belarus, which is really trying to escalate the situation on our land border, decided to cooperate in this way,” commented Polish military officials. While the Belarusians were ready to help the Poles, they also avoided blaming Russia directly for the incident, highlighting just how carefully Lukashenka is treading.

The message from Minsk seems straightforward. Lukashenka is desperate to demonstrate to his EU neighbors and the wider international community that he is not fully tied to Moscow’s war machine and can still act independently of the Kremlin. He is probing for geopolitical space and signaling a cautious openness to dialogue with the West, while trying to avoid provoking a furious response from his Russian patrons.

This should not be interpreted as a sudden thaw. Moscow will certainly fight to keep Belarus as a key pressure point against NATO for many years to come, and is in a position to do so. Over the past five years, Russia has managed to establish extensive levers of influence throughout Belarus’s political, military, business, and cultural establishments in a process that some have characterized as a “creeping annexation.” Meanwhile, Lukashenka may have earned a reputation as a wily political operator, but he will almost certainly always gravitate back toward the Kremlin, regardless of any overtures from the West.

Lukashenka’s room for maneuver is clearly limited. But at the same time, his fear of being dragged directly into Putin’s war against the West creates a potential opening for pragmatic diplomacy. The September 11 visit by a US delegation to Minsk, which secured the release of dozens of political prisoners, shows that this diplomatic path is already producing tangible results. Western governments should now build on this momentum to press Lukashenka harder for the release of all political prisoners and an end to the repression of domestic opponents.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Belarus hosts Russian war games as Putin’s drones probe Poland appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Director for Northern Europe Anna Wieslander has featured on Swedish radio September 10 & 11 following the news of NATO forces shooting down Russian drones over Poland and commented on the NATO response and reactions from world leaders.

September 10, Wieslander says that “it was about time NATO reacted in such a way” and continues to say that Russia is testing the responses and resolve of the alliance. The NATO response was “absolutely necessary” deems Wieslander.

September 11, Wieslander also comments on the absent US response to the incident, saying that it is “curious” that neither the President nor any secretary in the administration has condemned Russia’s actions.

Listen to the features here:

The post Wieslander on Swedish radio appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Aaron Korewa: The Kremlin knew exactly what it was doing

Daniel Fried: Russia is trying to spread insecurity westward

Torrey Taussig: The risk of a NATO-Russia conflict will remain as long as Putin believes he can win in Ukraine 

Ian Brzezinski: Putin’s test requires a decisive NATO response

Marek Magierowski: For Poland, war is no longer “next door” in Ukraine 

Oksana Nechyporenko: Ukrainians know firsthand the devastation Russian drones cause

Shelby Magid: NATO should work with Ukraine to counter Russia’s increasingly sophisticated drones 

Piotr Arak: In response to the drones, Poland can flex its defense muscle 

Daniel Tannebaum: The incursions underscore the urgency of additional US economic pressure

The Kremlin knew exactly what it was doing 

WARSAW—When nearly twenty drones are sent into the airspace of a NATO member, that’s not an accident. Representatives of the Polish government were clear that they see this as a Russian provocation. The country’s main airport in Warsaw was closed for several hours and so was Jasionka in Rzeszów, which sits near the Poland-Ukraine border and serves as the hub for most of the Western aid to Kyiv. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk also said that Poland will invoke NATO’s Article 4. The usually very polarized Polish political scene once again showed unity in a time of crisis. Despite being fierce political rivals, President Karol Nawrocki and Tusk praised each other for the excellent cooperation. They also stressed the need be wary of Russian disinformation. On social media, one can see attempts to claim that this was a Ukrainian “false flag” operation, but as of now, those allegations are not sticking. 

Most Poles see clearly what this is about—not a declaration of war by Russia, but another attempt by the Kremlin to send a political signal that supporting Ukraine comes with a risk. Russia hopes that by doing so, it gives ammunition to the voices who advocate for a quick end to the war on Russia’s terms. Absent a firm response from NATO, it could raise doubts in Poland on what promises from allies are worth. Here, it has long been known that weakness provokes Russia—and firm resolve deters it.

—Aaron Korewa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office which is part of the Europe Center.

Russia is trying to spread insecurity westward 

The Russians may be seeking to intimidate NATO allies into accepting a de facto weakening of NATO security for Poland and for other NATO members, such as the Baltic states and Romania, that Russia still considers to be in its rightful zone of control. Russia wants to spread a “gray zone” of insecurity as far west as it can reach.  

By threatening to extend the conflict to Poland, Russia seeks Western acquiescence to its claims to dominate Ukraine now. But giving Putin dominance of Ukraine would be a mere prelude to a westward extension of that Russian domination.  

Russia may be overreaching. It is excellent news that Dutch F-35 fighter jets scrambled and other allied units engaged. Russia’s attack may have been a test of just that reaction. If Western allies act with determination, Putin may fail and, indeed, is likely to fail if the West puts forth its strength. 

NATO allies and members of the Coalition of the Willing, should determine what additional forces, if any, are needed to defend NATO members. They should also consider whether forward defense—air defense in and over Ukraine, for example—is needed to address this latest Russian attack. 

The West should push back and not just with words. Russia has been engaged in sabotage and assassination in Europe and against Europe. Now is not the time to try to settle things down, like those fifty years ago who tried to rescue detente with an aggressive Soviet Union, but rather to make “peace through strength” a reality. 

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

The risk of a NATO-Russia conflict will remain as long as Putin believes he can win in Ukraine 

Russia’s drone incursion into Polish airspace is a massive provocation that requires NATO to issue a decisive and unified response. Russia’s attack—regardless of its intention—presents NATO with an unprecedented situation, as it marks the first time in history that the Alliance has directly engaged Russia in allied airspace.   

Thus far, NATO has responded effectively both militarily and politically. Militarily, NATO employed multinational capabilities including Polish and Dutch fighters, a German Patriot air defense system, and an Italian surveillance aircraft to defend allied territory. Through its political leadership, NATO has held Article 4 consultations called for by Poland to assess the situation and discuss potential response options. Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that allies will consult whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the allies is threatened. Though called for rarely, NATO has held these consultations more regularly since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.   

NATO is not presently treating this as an attack that would trigger the Alliance’s Article 5 mutual defense clause. However, the United States and its NATO allies should immediately move to increase the costs on Russia for its continued aggression in Ukraine and bring Putin to the negotiating table. As we have seen over the past twenty-four hours, there remains considerable risk of a broader conflict between NATO and Russia as long as Putin believes he can emerge victorious from his war in Ukraine.   

—Torrey Taussig is the director of and a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, she was a director for European affairs on the National Security Council.

Putin’s test requires a decisive NATO response 

Nineteen drones—and it may have been more—is not a mistake. It is an intentional barrage intended to provoke Poland and test the solidarity of the NATO alliance. This is not the first incursion by Russian drones on NATO territory and airspace. It is a repeated offense, one of which previously killed two innocent Polish farmers. But this time Putin leveraged mass to ensure that there is no question that Russia is challenging the will of the Western community of democracies to defend its interests and itself. 

If the West doesn’t respond forcefully to this attack, Putin will have achieved a strategic double hit. He aims to create a crisis of confidence that could cripple NATO’s unity and the credibility of its deterrence posture. If successful, he will have profoundly weakened Ukraine’s security. 

It is critical for the Alliance to decisively respond to deny such a success through its own double hit—one that reinforces its own deterrent posture and the defense of Ukraine. NATO allies and its partners should impose a harsh set of sanctions designed to body slam the Russian economy.  

In the military realm, the United States and other leading allies should reinforce their military presence in NATO’s front-line states, including with both defensive and offensive capabilities. That coalition should extend its air defense operations into Ukrainian airspace—if only to defend NATO territory.  

Efforts should be made to increase the flow of military equipment to Ukraine, including the resumption of US-funded equipment transfers. And the United States should reconstitute and exercise information operations directed toward the Russian people to undermine the Putin regime and its violent hegemonic ambitions. 

Incremental responses to Putin’s aggression led him to conclude that he can demonstrate that the West lacks the will to defend itself. Decisive action is necessary to change that perception and convince Putin, a product of Soviet imperialism, that the “correlation of forces” have turned against him. Failure to do so will only lead to another escalation of Putin’s efforts to defeat not just Ukraine but also NATO. 

—Ian Brzezinski is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and former US deputy secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

For Poland, war is no longer “next door” in Ukraine 

WARSAW—Instilling fear in Western societies is one of the skills Russians truly excel at. In this respect last night’s incursion of nineteen drones in eastern Poland turned out to be a successful enterprise. There were no casualties, and damage on the ground was limited, as were disruptions in air traffic. However, the psychological impact was immense. War is no longer “next door.” It’s already on our driveway. 

Fear is tangible and understandable, but you can confront it with calm and competence. NATO forces stationing in Poland have proven their professionalism. Polish politicians, usually locking horns in petty domestic disputes, have been flawlessly coordinating their actions and public statements. 

Still, we need more. It’s not only about reinforcing the military capabilities of eastern flank countries, raising combat readiness of NATO units, and scrambling allied fighter jets. It’s also about vocabulary. Russians must understand that we don’t fear them, and in case of a major conflagration in this part of Europe, not only would their drones be intercepted and shot down, but we would also destroy the air bases they are launched from, target the factories they are assembled in, and eliminate their operators. This is the message we should send to Moscow now. 

The Kremlin ruler is already convinced the entire West wages war against Russia and him personally. Why not prove him right? 

—Marek Magierowski is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the director of strategy for the Poland program at the Freedom Institute in Warsaw. He previously served as Poland’s ambassador to the United States and to Israel.

Ukrainians know firsthand the devastation Russian drones cause 

Last night, Ukrainians could not sleep because of one of the largest drone attacks in our history. Every day, every night, brings a new record. When we learned that drones were actually flying into Poland, Ukrainians living there began asking questions. They couldn’t find any coverage in Polish media—only on Ukrainian Telegram channels. Now there are memes and jokes aimed at Poles, suggesting they should start learning Ukrainian to understand what’s really happening in their own country. 

But this is no joke. Ukrainians have been saying for years that Putin is not only waging war against Ukraine, but against the West—Europe in particular. He is simply testing tactics, always using the “salami strategy”: he tries something outrageous, waits for the world’s reaction, and if there is none, he pushes further. 

This latest attack targeted Rzeszów airport—the headquarters of the US base and the transport hub for everything Europe is buying from the United States for Ukraine. The choice of target was not a coincidence. It’s not just a stray drone crossing into Poland; it is Putin’s next test to see how Europe will respond. The softer the reaction, the harder the next blow will be. We Ukrainians can guarantee it—we have lived through this ourselves. 

—Oksana Nechyporenko is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

NATO should work with Ukraine to counter Russia’s increasingly sophisticated drones 

Poland did exactly what the Alliance needed in the face of bold Russian aggression: a quick, decisive, and multinational response to protect NATO’s territorial integrity. Warsaw deserves credit for its reaction, but Ukraine’s role must not be overlooked. 

Russian provocations are never accidental. Over the past three months, Moscow has made massive improvements in the maneuverability of its drones, likely with the help of Chinese technology. Russia’s drones are getting better at evading counter measures and air defenses, making them more deadly. 

It is a success that the drones that Poland determined were most dangerous were shot down. But the fact remains that most of the early warning of these threats came from Ukraine. This shows that NATO as a whole, including the United States, needs to be more proactive in working with Ukraine to develop sufficient electronic warfare, including early warning systems and other counter measures to defeat weapons that are increasingly an integral part of the modern battle space. 

The potential for lessons learned from Ukraine is enormous. Poland passed Russia’s latest test. But for Poland’ security—and NATO’s as a whole—the next step is clear: double down on learning from and working with Ukraine. 

—Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. 

In response to the drones, Poland can flex its defense muscle 

WARSAW—Poland’s efforts alongside NATO allies to shoot down the Russian drone swarm on Wednesday were a reminder of the historic transformation of its defense capabilities. In 2025, Warsaw plans to allocate $55 billion to defense, or 4.8 percent of gross domestic product, the highest figure in NATO. Combined with $51 billion in defense loans from the European Commission’s SAFE initiative, these resources create an unprecedented opportunity to modernize Poland’s military, strengthen its domestic defense industry, and assert its role as a central player in European security. 

Poland plans to invest this money into everything from drones to air defenses to, eventually, tank production. By 2030, Poland plans to operate around 1,100 tanks, which is more than Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy combined. 

Delivering on these ambitions will not be simple. Beyond financing, Poland must recruit thousands of new soldiers, engineers, and supply chain specialists to bring these systems into full operational readiness. Success will also depend on attracting foreign investment, building durable technology partnerships, and implementing recent legislation aimed at accelerating and simplifying defense and security projects.The payoff, however, extends far beyond national security. By building a resilient and technologically advanced defense infrastructure, Poland reinforces its role as a cornerstone of NATO and a leading force in European security. Warsaw now has an opportunity to shape not only its own defense future but also the broader strategic balance in the region—while advancing its bid to join the ranks of the Group of Twenty. 

Wednesday’s attack was a stark reminder that Poland stands on Europe’s threshold, where the continent’s future is being tested. And Poland is not just holding the line—it is pouring resources into the fight. 

—Piotr Arak is an assistant professor of economic sciences at the University of Warsaw and chief economist at VeloBank Poland.

The incursions underscore the urgency of additional US economic pressure

Last night’s incursion into NATO territory by Russian drones reinforces that the United States needs to take tangible action in applying further economic pressure on Russia.  

Yesterday it was reported that US President Donald Trump is looking for the European Union (EU) to impose a 100 percent tariff on China and India due to their continued trade with Russia; the United States would then follow suit. 

It should be made clear what these tariffs would be. These tariffs would have Chinese and Indian businesses pay taxes into the EU and the United States as a result of their trade with Russia, essentially having the EU and United States profit from Ukraine’s pain. 

The application of secondary sanctions, forcing China and India to choose between continuing their relationships with Russia or potentially losing access to the US market, would likely have a far more meaningful impact on Beijing’s and New Delhi’s decisionmaking than any tariff. 

—Daniel Tannebaum is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative in the GeoEconomics Center and a partner at Oliver Wyman, where he leads the firm’s Global Anti-Financial Crime Practice.

The post Experts react: Poland just shot down Russian drones over its territory. Is Putin ramping up his war on Europe? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Charles Lichfield: Bayrou’s failed plan to cut spending reveals a political division between the old and young

Jörn Fleck: France’s political instability will be felt in Brussels and Berlin, too

Lisa Homel: Facing constraints at home, Macron is likely to focus even more on foreign policy

Rama Yade: Macron’s best bet may be a prime minister from the opposition 

Bayrou’s failed plan to cut spending reveals a political division between the old and young 

Bayrou will resign after losing a vote of confidence that he himself had called. He knew he would lose but decided to preempt a parliamentary budget process that was also doomed to end in failure and probably end his premiership as well. After all, this is what happened to his predecessor Michel Barnier less than a year ago.   

Bayrou has not tried to obfuscate the fact that French deficit spending is unsustainable. His draft budget included forty billion euros of savings and other measures that were meant to set France on course to bring its annual deficit under 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)—the point at which, with growth and inflation, the debt-to-GDP ratio stops increasing—by 2029. The idea of eliminating two public holidays with no wage increases was particularly unpopular. 

Less deserving of praise has been Bayrou’s reluctance to build any kind of consensus with other parties over the summer. At the helm of a minority government, this was compulsory. Still, since Bayrou called the vote of confidence that would seal his fate two weeks ago, his frankness on the French social model has been very refreshing. Politicians like Bayrou who belong to France’s shrinking political center rely on the votes of the retired to stay in office. Along with demographics, this explains how ever more resources have been diverted to funding generous pensions—often to the direct detriment of vital public services like education, policing, and defense. 

At seventy-four years old, Bayrou has suddenly become an unlikely champion of younger voters who do not benefit from such largesse and will have to deal with the debt burden these policies leave behind. He has spent the past two weeks arguing that the system is too skewed toward “Boomers” and must be changed. For this alone, Bayrou deserves credit. 

France’s borrowing costs continue to creep up. They are above Greece’s and are closing in on Italy’s. Markets’ eyes are peeled for the next Fitch sovereign rating decision scheduled for September 12. For now, we shouldn’t expect volatility of the kind we experienced during the eurozone periphery crisis. Euro-denominated French debt is still desirable because there isn’t much German debt to go around. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that this is about to change. Berlin’s 2026 budget plans a tripling of borrowing compared to this year’s. 

—Charles Lichfield is the deputy director and C. Boyden Gray senior fellow, of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

France’s political instability will be felt in Brussels and Berlin, too 

Monday’s vote of no confidence and the impending resignation of Bayrou will not be welcome news in Brussels and the rest of Europe. The ensuing political instability in France risks distracting, if not detracting from Macron’s undoubted leadership in building meaningful European commitments to security guarantees and a reassurance force for Ukraine, which could help keep US President Donald Trump engaged in pressing Russia on a peace deal.  

When it comes to European defense, those in Brussels who favor more cooperation at the level of the European Union (EU) will have a weaker ally in Paris as the union seeks to translate its defense-industrial ambitions into actual budgetary commitments and industrial policies. Few, especially in Central and Northern Europe, share France’s concept of strategic autonomy and calls for EU sourcing requirements for the continent’s rearmament. But France has had an important political role in pushing EU-level coordination and cooperation against those who instead prefer the EU institutions to simply get out of the way of member states that want to prioritize short-term off-the-shelf solutions, primarily from US defense companies. Short-term Schadenfreude from the strategic autonomy critics may come at the expense of European industrial capacity in the medium to long term without French political initiatives at the EU level. All of this will be compounded by the likely fallout for French credibility from the likely delays in making its pledges for defense spending increases for the coming years a legislative reality, as happened when the Barnier government fell.          

Berlin especially will be concerned. With some success, Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his new government had invested significantly in bringing back the Franco-German relationship from some of its most difficult days under Chancellor Olaf Scholz. While parliamentary instability will not directly impact Macron’s primacy over foreign and defense policy, the political maneuvering ahead of the 2027 presidential elections in France is likely to get even more intense. That will reduce the policy space for the next French government when it comes to important decisions for the EU’s economic outlook: within France on unavoidable reforms to improve the fiscal position of the EU’s second-largest economy, and in Brussels when it comes to Europe’s trade, tech, and other policies critical to a much-needed push for regulatory simplification and economic diversification amid growing pressures from the United States and China. 

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Facing constraints at home, Macron is likely to focus even more on foreign policy 

With the French parliament voting to oust its second prime minister in a year, Macron is beset by chaos and ineffectiveness at home even as he has strived to be the figurehead for leadership and European unity abroad. Just last week, the French president co-hosted the Coalition of the Willing meeting in Paris, where twenty-six nations committed to providing postwar security guarantees to Ukraine. 

Bayrou is the third centrist leader out of a job since Macron called snap elections in June 2024 in a failed attempt to solidify his mandate after the far right’s surprising performance in European Parliament elections. However, the resulting hung parliament has no working majority and has only increased the political fragmentation in France. This latest political crisis stems from the government’s inability to pass a budget that would have seen a €44 billion cut in an effort to reduce France’s budget deficit (which stands at 5.8 percent of GDP, nearly double the EU standard of 3 percent). 

Still, despite Macron’s increasing unpopularity at home, with two years left in his last presidential term, he is unlikely to resign. Expect Macron to instead maintain his focus on the international arena where he can still drive his agenda forward: rallying dramatic international support for Ukraine through the Coalition of the Willing, using the 2025 United Nations General Assembly to recognize a state of Palestine, deepening ties with Southeast Asian partners, and joining the United Kingdom and Germany in reimposing snapback sanctions on Iran. 

But with France’s budget under the microscope, these efforts may be more about capabilities and building international consensus rather than increasing spending. 

—Lisa Homel is an associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center where she supports the center’s work on France, Germany, the Western Balkans, and Central and Eastern Europe.

Macron’s best bet may be a prime minister from the opposition 

Macron’s number one problem is not the choice of a prime minister. There will always be candidates from all parties for this position, no matter how precarious the job may be. The challenge for Macron lies in his difficulty in embracing the policy that the French people want, i.e., a different policy than the one he has led for the past eight years. As long as he chooses prime ministers from the right-wing opposition (Les Républicains), his party (Renaissance), or the center-left opposition (the Socialist Party), they will remain in the minority. Furthermore, as they are all from the same backgrounds and share the same ideas, nothing will fundamentally change in the eyes of the French people.  

With the fall of Bayrou’s government, Macron is now directly exposed to their anger: No prime minister, except a prime minister in a cohabitation government, can protect him. This has led to increased debate about his resignation as the only possible solution, paving the way for a democratic reset. Since he refuses to resign, only a prime minister from the opposition would allow him to respect the July 2024 vote and perhaps save himself, like former President François Mitterrand did in his first cohabitation in 1986. Mitterrand, with the help of the institutions and his subtle political Machiavellianism, managed to stay in the game against his prime minister at the time, Jacques Chirac.  

Even if pressure is high on Macron to choose a prime minister from the far right, French voters have consistently opposed the Republican Front to Marine Le Pen’s party, National Rally. Given the nature of the French institutions, it would make more sense to designate an opposition prime minister from the New Popular Front, the winner of the 2024 elections in the wake of the dissolution of the parliament. If Macron walks away from this option, it is uncertain whether France, tossed between dissolutions and prime ministerial resignations, will be able to endure for two years until the next presidential election in 2027.

The post Experts react: The French government has collapsed again. What does this mean for France, the EU, and Macron? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“Nous sommes prêts,” French President Emmanuel Macron said on Thursday. “We are ready.” Speaking after a meeting of the “Coalition of the Willing” in Paris, Macron announced that twenty-six European nations had agreed to participate in a postwar force by air, land, or sea to ensure Ukraine’s security and deter further Russian aggression after a peace agreement is reached between Kyiv and Moscow. What would fulfilling this commitment look like in practice? And how should the United States view this development amid its efforts to end the war? We asked our coalition of experts, who were willing to provide their responses below. 

• John E Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine 
• Léonie Allard (@AllardLeonie): Visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, currently in residence from the French Ministry of Armed Forces 
• Jörn Fleck (@JornFleck): Senior director of the Europe Center and former European Parliament staffer 

What will this commitment look like in practice? 

• John points to Macron’s announcement that a security force “will deploy once a cease-fire is reached,” with France “one of several countries that has declared its willingness to supply troops.”   
• “Macron has definitely been a leader on this effort,” says Léonie, both in organizing the coalition along with the United Kingdom and in talking about putting boots on the ground, which the French president first put forward in February 2024 by saying “nothing is ruled out.” Since then, more countries have come on board.   
• However, important specifics are still unclear, such as “in what capacity, in what numbers, and for what specific guarantees” each country would contribute to Ukraine’s postwar defense, says Jörn. It is likely, he adds, that “not all those who are part of the Coalition of the Willing are going to be willing to put troops in Ukraine,” noting that Germany has been “hedging” on its level of involvement in security guarantees for Kyiv.