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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Ukraine’s most immediate contribution to European security is likely to be in terms of helping countries defend against the mounting threat posed by Russian drones. The Kremlin’s current harassing activities around airports and other strategic sites across Europe are essentially an annoyance, but even such small-scale drone operations have exposed an alarming lack of readiness. At present, it seems safe to say that the continent as a whole is utterly unprepared for the kind of large-scale Russian drone attacks that have become a routine feature of the war in Ukraine.

Europe has responded to escalating Russian drone activity by developing plans to establish a “drone wall” along the continent’s exposed eastern flank. So far, however, this initiative remains somewhat fragmented with no unified concept or central coordination. While a collective response could eventually prove effective, pursuing this goal without learning from Ukraine’s unique experience makes little sense. Only Kyiv has the data and insights necessary to build layered defensive networks capable of combating waves of Russian drones.

In recent months, a growing number of European countries have taken the practical step of seeking to tap into Ukraine’s drone warfare prowess by working with Ukrainian trainers or establishing joint production initiatives. “Ukraine’s experience is the most relevant in Europe right now. Our specialists and technologies can become a key element of the future European drone wall, a large-scale project that will ensure safety in the skies,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy commented in September 2025.

In addition to drone tactics and technologies, Ukraine can also offer its European partners an unrivaled environment for drone operator training and weapons development. The whole of Ukraine is now a vast drone warfare laboratory where novel threats are identified and addressed on a daily basis. As a result, new drone models and upgraded designs can move from the drawing board to the battlefield at a pace that is unheard of in peacetime Europe.

Drone warfare is just one of the many areas where Europe can learn from Ukraine. As European leaders explore new security strategies in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment, it should be abundantly clear that Kyiv has a crucial role to play. No other European country has such a battle-hardened army or intimate knowledge of modern warfare. In an increasingly unpredictable world, that makes Ukraine a vital partner.

Lesia Orobets is the founder of the Price of Freedom air defense initiative and a former member of the Ukrainian parliament.

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There are currently concerns that Ukraine’s fast‑growing defense tech sector risks inheriting longstanding governance problems including opaque procedures, slow decision‑making, and uneven enforcement. Recent corruption scandals in Kyiv have already damaged trust, creating what some businesses have described as “negative expectations.”

From the Ukrainian government’s side, there is recognition that institutions are still adapting, with many of the available economic security tools still fragmented or not yet fully operational. This represents an opportunity for Ukraine if the country is able to build governance structures tailored to strategic sectors rather than retrofitting existing and outdated bureaucratic models. Creating a new generation of transparent institutions to address defense sector exports, investment screening, and procurement could become a competitive advantage for Ukraine if designed with private sector input from the outset.

Export licensing is one of the most acute potential bottlenecks. Ukraine’s defense tech businesses currently face a process requiring excessive approvals from multiple institutions, with little accountability or predictability. There is also a perception of unequal treatment, undermining confidence in the system. Ukrainian officials, meanwhile, tend to stress the necessity of strict controls to prevent leakage of sensitive technologies.

A risk‑based and tiered export control regime could address these concerns. By clearly defining a narrow list of highly sensitive technologies requiring strict oversight, the Ukrainian authorities could create faster and more predictable export pathways for less sensitive defense and dual‑use products. This would support economic growth while preserving core security interests.

Wartime currency controls and capital movement restrictions severely limit the ability of Ukrainian defense sector companies to expand internationally. Multiple investors have noted the paradox of profitable Ukrainian firms being unable to deploy their own capital abroad, forcing them to raise funds outside the country simply to operate globally.

From the perspective of Ukrainian policymakers, currency restrictions are viewed as necessary to preserve macro‑financial stability and to prevent capital flight. Targeted exemptions for vetted defense and dual‑use companies, particularly those pursuing foreign acquisitions or joint ventures aligned with national priorities, could unlock growth without undermining financial stability. Such a mechanism would signal trust in compliant firms and reward transparency.

Another key issue is intellectual property (IP). Standard IP processes are too slow for wartime innovation cycles. In the dynamic current environment, Ukrainian companies rely on trade secrets and know‑how rather than formal patents, but this increases risks when partnering internationally.

Ukrainian officials acknowledge the importance of innovation but have so far only been able to offer limited concrete solutions. Accelerated IP pathways for defense and dual‑use technologies, combined with support for joint research and development frameworks with trusted foreign partners, could help Ukrainian firms secure protection in allied jurisdictions while strengthening international integration.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

There is a degree of uncertainty in Ukraine’s expanding defense tech sector that can be seen in inconsistent terminology, unclear boundaries, and undefined red lines. A shared vocabulary and published strategic framework, co‑developed by the public and private sectors, could help reduce this uncertainty.

Different priorities lead to diverging visions. Defense tech industry executives and investors tend to view the issue of economic security primarily through the lens of scalability, competitiveness, and speed. Their key assumptions include the notion that innovation thrives in predictable, transparent environments.

Many also argue that Ukraine’s combat‑tested technologies represent a unique global opportunity, while cautioning that excessive controls risk pushing talent, capital, and IP abroad. With this in mind, industry representatives and investors generally support targeted security measures but fear blanket restrictions that treat all technologies and companies as equally sensitive.

Ukrainian officials tend to frame economic security primarily as a defensive necessity. They warn that adversaries actively use markets, investment, and technology transfer as weapons. Many are also concerned that under‑regulation could result in irreversible strategic losses. Naturally, their perspective prioritizes caution, monitoring, and alignment with allied security frameworks, even at the cost of slower growth.

The central tension here is time-based and risk‑based. Businesses operate on market timelines and accept calculated risk, while governments operate on security timelines and seek to minimize worst‑case scenarios. Without structured dialogue, these differences manifest as mistrust rather than complementary roles.

If managed effectively, wartime Ukraine’s approach to economic security in the defense tech and dual-use sectors could become a model for the country’s broader postwar reconstruction. Ukraine has the opportunity to redesign institutions in a strategic sector that already commands global attention. Success may depend on whether government policy is seen by businesses as a partnership or as an obstacle.

Constructive cooperation grounded in transparency, risk‑based policy, and continuous dialogue can transform economic security from a constraint into a catalyst for Ukraine’s long‑term strength and sovereignty, providing significant security benefits for allies and partners along the way. This is a realistic objective. After all, industry, investors, and government all ultimately seek the common goal of a resilient, innovative Ukrainian economy integrated with democratic allies and protected from adversarial exploitation.

Bridging the gap between perspectives is less a matter of ideology than of process, trust, and execution. Ukraine is currently in a period of transition that is marked by many significant challenges but no irreconcilable obstacles. Industry and investors are ready to scale globally while the government is racing to build safeguards against unprecedented threats. The task now is to synchronize these efforts.

Eric K. Hontz is director of the Accountable Investment Practice Area at the Center for International Private Enterprise.

On disinformation and influence operations, the deal is unlikely to be transformative. As we argued in a 2024 report examining TikTok’s national security implications, Beijing’s ability to conduct influence operations does not depend on ownership of a single platform. While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could theoretically attempt to shape content via TikTok’s recommendation algorithm, it already engages in influence campaigns across US-based social media platforms and will continue to do so even with TikTok’s structural reorganization. Restricting TikTok does not dismantle the broader information ecosystem in which foreign influence campaigns operate.

The data security case is even more revealing. The type of data generated by TikTok is not fundamentally different from that collected across the digital advertising ecosystem, which over the past decade has evolved into a system capable of extremely granular micro-targeting. Data brokers routinely aggregate information from mobile advertising identifiers, cookies, location data, and online activity to build detailed dossiers on individuals. Although these identifiers are often described as “anonymized,” it is widely understood that combining multiple datasets makes re-identification fairly straightforward.

This ecosystem enables the creation of highly specific audience segments—such as military personnel with financial vulnerabilities, politically active voters, or individuals likely to participate in protests—drawing on data that includes location histories, credit card transactions, employment records, social media activity, and government filings. Investigations by civil society organizations and journalists have repeatedly demonstrated how easy it is to access such data, often with minimal vetting, and how readily it could be exploited by foreign intelligence services or malign actors.

Importantly, this data is not confined to fringe actors. Major US technology platforms continue to earn significant revenue from foreign advertisers, including Chinese firms, even as they attempt to place guardrails on data flows. While companies such as Google have introduced measures to limit the sharing of certain identifiers with Chinese entities, advertising experts note that these restrictions are often porous. Once an ad is served, advertisers can still infer sensitive information—such as IP addresses and device characteristics—and real-time bidding systems offer no technical guarantee that data will not be misused after it is received.

Compared to this sprawling and still inadequately regulated market, TikTok’s data practices are not uniquely dangerous. Focusing narrowly on this one app risks obscuring the far more consequential vulnerabilities embedded in the broader data economy.

Finally, it is worth underscoring how little ByteDance has conceded in the deal. If ByteDance has in fact licensed the algorithm, as subsequent reporting has indicated, the company has preserved control over its most valuable intellectual property. The principal concession—that is, the loss of majority ownership in the entity overseeing data security—imposes limited strategic costs.

In addition, depending on how the actual licensing deal is laid out, this structure could still hypothetically leave room for PRC influence over the algorithm—though it will likely be more difficult than it would be if ByteDance retained full ownership. The licensed algorithm is a continuously trained system shaped by design choices, training data, model updates, and operational parameters. If ByteDance is retaining control over that core intellectual property, in theory, the PRC government could exert some influence over how the system evolves, even if day-to-day content moderation or data security oversight is localized. Once further details of the licensing agreement are released, this risk will be better understood.

At the same time, it is important not to overstate what that influence could look like in practice. Rather than eliminate the risk of manipulation, this structure redistributes it among a different set of actors. Algorithmic manipulation is unlikely to take the form of overt, platform-wide promotion of pro-CCP content. Should manipulation occur, it would likely take the form of more subtle interventions that would be difficult to attribute to PRC influence or parse out from how the recommender system is working on US user data. This is especially the case now as the handover gets under way and the algorithm is being trained on US user data from scratch; in the short term, the app could exhibit high variability in terms of the content it surfaces while the system learns what users want and curates their “For You” page accordingly.

In essence, this structure largely shifts visible forms of control from Beijing to other actors without eliminating the underlying vulnerabilities inherent in the US social media ecosystem. While the deal may reduce political pressure in Washington and be framed as a decisive step to protect the US information environment from PRC interference, it does little to resolve the systemic challenges of information manipulation, foreign influence, and data exploitation. Those risks are embedded in the architecture of the digital ecosystem itself, and mitigating them will require far more than rearranging the ownership of a single platform.

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Time matters: Why Europe needs Ukrainian defense innovation

Oleksiy Honcharuk — Mon, 26 Jan 2026 18:06:42 +0000

KYIV—In an age of global instability, the most important dimension is time. In Davos and throughout the continent in recent weeks, European leaders have spoken of the need for a common defense strategy. As European nations work to make this a reality, building joint investment processes in defense technology between Ukraine and the European Union (EU) is not merely desirable—it is strategically indispensable.

Europe is undergoing the deepest security reappraisal in the history of the EU. Since 2022, the continent has shed its illusions about a “stable order” and shifted into a phase of rapid rearmament. Over the past year alone, the EU has approved multiyear defense funds worth tens of billions of euros, launched new mechanisms for joint procurement and, for the first time, begun a serious conversation about defense autonomy.

This is hardly surprising: the United States continues to remind Europeans that they must be able to shoulder the burden of their own defense and rely on their own capabilities rather than await salvation from across the Atlantic. The question now is how Europeans can best accomplish this.

Europe is accelerating its defense industry but running into structural problems

Europe continues to be one of the key technological centers of the global defense industry and is actively investing in military innovation. The continent hosts both traditional defense giants and a new generation of defense-tech companies and start-ups. European states are investing in unmanned systems, cybersecurity, air and missile defense, space and sensor technologies, and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven military applications. The European Union also remains one of the world’s largest arms exporters—reaching sixty billion euros in 2024—underscoring the bloc’s industrial capacity and technological depth.

At the same time, several structural problems continue to hinder the development of Europe’s defense industry and its ability to meet new challenges. Three stand out in particular:

Spending gaps. Against the backdrop of constrained credit and fiscal rules, EU member states together spend roughly half as much on defense as the United States does. At the same time, moving toward spending 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense would represent a genuinely revolutionary shift for Europe. A series of statements by European leaders in 2025 have made it increasingly clear that such a change in approach is becoming politically unavoidable. Securing funding is, in effect, Europe’s primary political homework assignment.
Fragmentation of production, technologies, standards, and procurement. In his 2024 report on European competitiveness, former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi highlighted one of the EU’s core strategic weaknesses: fragmentation. By preserving the sovereignty and autonomy of member states, the EU has produced a kaleidoscope of defense approaches. Member states operate under different procurement policies and lack unified standards. This problem can’t be solved by simply increasing spending. Without common policies and standardization, Europe risks achieving lower levels of efficiency compared with other major military powers even with nominally comparable levels of expenditure.
Heavy dependence on foreign suppliers, especially the United States. As Draghi noted in his report, “The choice to procure from the US may be justified in some cases because the EU does not have some products in its catalogue, but in many other cases a European equivalent exists, or could be rapidly made available by the European defence industry.” This dependence constrains Europe’s strategic autonomy, and it slows the development of its own industrial and technological base.

Europe’s rearmament will cost hundreds of billions of euros. Yet the critical question is not only how much money is spent or what is bought today or tomorrow. What matters most is the speed of the defense-industrial system whose development these funds are intended to support.

What is missing? Speed.

Europe still lacks an adequate answer to Russia’s drone technologies, honed through years of war. In September 2025, the intrusion of nineteen Russian drones into NATO airspace forced the scrambling of F-35 fighter jets to shoot them down, an absurdly expensive response. When unidentified drones disrupt air traffic around European capitals, nobody is certain how to react. Inevitably, attention turns east—to Ukraine, which has learned to survive in a modern drone war, repel incursions of more than seven hundred airborne targets in a single night, and strike back. All this has been achieved through military innovation. As Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said in October 2025, “The only expert right now in the world when it comes to anti-drone capacities is Ukraine, because they are fighting the Russian drones almost every day.”

Many now argue that Ukrainian unmanned technologies are precisely what Europe needs—and could become the continent’s trump card in its hybrid confrontation with Russia. “Ukraine is already helping us and teaching us how to fight the wars of tomorrow. Ukrainian drones destroy 80 percent of targets on the ground,” said Andrius Kubilius, the EU’s defense commissioner, at the Conference on Ukraine’s European Future in November 2025.

Ukraine is often described as a drone superpower: It produces four million drones a year (the United States makes less than one hundred thousand a year), fields hundreds of systems and models, and has logged thousands of confirmed drone strikes on Russian targets. With drones, Ukraine has crippled Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, damaged its strategic aviation, and now threatens one of the foundations of Russia’s power: its oil infrastructure. The low cost of Ukrainian drone technology compared with conventional weaponry greatly impresses political leaders who must approve defense budgets. But the real issue runs deeper.

Defense technologies are constantly evolving: No matter what new weapons appear on the battlefield, none of them remains decisive for long. Within months, adversaries develop countermeasures—new tactics, new technologies. Wars are won not by those with the largest arsenals or the most soldiers but by those who win this race. Europe’s true strategic problem is slowness. The main thing Europe can learn from Ukraine’s defense sector is speed.

At the strategic level, Europe can win any war or technological race—if it buys itself a faster engine.

The Ukrainian precedent: Frontline research and development as a model

This is the first war in which dual-use products—such as agricultural drones and open-source software platforms—are often more lethal than conventional weapons. It has also made one thing clear: Preparation for war must involve not only professional armies, but the entire nation. During the war, millions of civilians joined in the defense of Ukraine, bringing their own approaches and fundamentally transforming the process of developing defense innovations.

Drone production in Ukraine resembles a vast open-source frontline research and development lab. Volunteers, private firms, military units and government agencies all test, iterate, and refine designs on a weekly basis. Strike videos circulate on social media; experts debate performance; thousands of chats buzz with feedback; ideas are exchanged in kitchens, workshops, and smoking areas. This may appear absurd from the perspective of traditional military rules and procedures, but it works.

There are almost no examples of drones built by defense giants remaining effective on the battlefield for long. The reason is the slow pace of adaptation and evolution. Ukrainian drones also do not last long on the battlefield—but the best of them evolve faster than the adversary can adapt to them.

No wonder NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte remarked in October 2025 that Ukraine is “a powerhouse when it comes to innovation, insights, for example, when it comes to anti-drone technology [and] anti-cyber threats.”

European militaries do not operate this way. Yet Europe possesses a strategic advantage of its own—one it can put to powerful use.

Europe’s slow money and Ukraine’s speed

Ukraine and Europe have opposite superpowers.

Europe is slow but has cheap, long-term capital. Slowness is, in fact, a form of trust: Investors know the rules will not change and their rights will be protected. This is precisely what Ukraine has long lacked.
Ukraine is fast and unpredictable, but its capital is always expensive. Speed means risk, which means a high cost of capital.

Combining Europe’s capital with Ukraine’s speed and innovation would create a unique dynamic.

Investment is not merely capital; it is a way to synchronize Europe’s pace with Ukraine’s school of fast-evolving combat systems.

Europe’s future hinges on integrating Ukraine into its defense ecosystem

Europe has entered an era of rapid military evolution. Ukraine is the country of the free world that best understands what modern war looks like. This is why European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen now speaks of a new drone alliance between Ukraine and Europe. “Before the war, Ukraine had no drones. Today, Ukrainian drones are responsible for over 23 percent of Russian equipment losses, highlighting the impact of human ingenuity in open societies,” she said in September 2025.

Europe is already entering a phase of practically implementing Ukrainian defense technologies and more closely cooperating with Ukrainian defense-tech companies. This is reflected both in joint manufacturing projects and in the integration of Ukrainian solutions into European rearmament programs—from cooperation on unmanned systems and counter-drone technologies to the creation of joint research and development teams. Notable examples include initiatives to establish joint ventures with Ukrainian manufacturers, as well as growing interest from European defense-tech players in Ukraine’s combat-tested experience with AI- and network-centric solutions.

The process has already begun. Many announcements have been made about joint investments and co-development of unmanned systems between European and Ukrainian firms. More will follow. It is part of a broader shared strategy.

If Europe and Ukraine carry this strategy through, the continent will at last acquire genuine defense autonomy, making it capable of withstanding any threat.

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To adapt to today’s security threats, NATO should prioritize the basics of defense innovation

jcookson — Wed, 21 Jan 2026 20:40:57 +0000

WASHINGTON—From the specter of US retrenchment to ongoing Russian revanchism, European NATO members must face up to a harsh reality: the Alliance lacks the industrial capabilities to meet today’s security challenges. Their recent promises to increase defense spending, while substantial and welcome, will not be enough alone to change this.

To adapt quickly enough to confront evolving threats, NATO allies must get the basics right. This means adopting functional and flexible financing mechanisms, streamlining regulatory frameworks, and building production foundations that prioritize scalable and sustainable innovation.

These challenges that NATO faces, as well as the need for the Alliance to get the basics right, are being actively discussed, including at the 2025 Netherlands-US Defense Industry Days conference in Washington, DC, this past October. At this event, organized by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Atlantic Council, policymakers, industry leaders, financiers, and experts discussed how transatlantic allies can accelerate defense innovation while strengthening their defense industrial bases. Below are a few of the authors’ major takeaways from this conference on how NATO can meet these challenges.

Don’t just spend more—spend smarter

Increasingly, the battlefields of the future will be won in the realm of innovation. Building ecosystems to support technology development will require allies to use newly unlocked defense dollars to fill immediate capability gaps and build flexible financing pathways to foster innovation. If done right, these defense ecosystems can allocate more resources directly to innovators, boosting returns on investment and generating cutting-edge capabilities in North America and Europe.

To do this, allies should take a two-pronged approach to financing innovation:

Accept risk to accelerate adoption. Many innovation initiatives—such as NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) organization—too often fall short because they prioritize immediate return on investment or quick-turn results over long-term innovation development. This places a strain on innovators, limiting their access to seed money and signaling to the private sector that the Alliance does not prioritize lasting defense technology innovation. Instead, NATO should give these initiatives greater latitude to prioritize experimentation and iteration rather than meeting often arbitrary metrics and quotas.

Protect research and development budgets. From the rise of the space domain to electromagnetic warfare, NATO allies must win not just a single innovation race; they need to win many at once. Research and development (R&D) budgets are critical to this effort. Yet, far too often, as participants at the conference noted, R&D budgets for defense technologies are cannibalized in favor of immediate operational needs, particularly during periods of heightened security pressure. By prioritizing R&D budgets, governments can send a clear signal to defense industries, investment bankers, and venture capitalists that NATO members see investment in defense technology as a long-term and sustainable demand. These signals can help spur greater private-sector investment in these technologies.

To produce at scale, regulate at scale

Current regulatory environments on both sides of the Atlantic are not designed for the speed of innovation or adoption needed in today’s rapidly evolving security environment. Instead, NATO allies must strike a careful balance: NATO countries should impose regulations that protect sensitive technologies and intellectual property while also encouraging cooperation among allies on innovation development. Two main principles should inform this approach:

Break down barriers to transatlantic defense industrial cooperation. In the United States, having to navigate dense bureaucracy can stifle innovation, hamper collaborative partnerships, and stretch lead times for critical defense technologies. However, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently made several announcements that show promise in this area—including loosening restrictions on defense contractors and emphasizing speed—indicating that the Pentagon will work to streamline defense cooperation for allies looking to buy US capabilities. Despite this positive momentum, meaningful changes to US foreign military sales and armaments cooperation will require sustained efforts to reform these overly burdensome bureaucratic processes.

Keep agile firms top of mind when writing regulations. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will make or break the next era of warfare. Yet defense industrial and innovation regulations often impose disproportionate costs on SMEs because they are designed only for the largest defense companies. For example, the US Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification rightly protects sensitive data through third-party audit and monitoring requirements. But as written, the cost of compliance with these regulations is prohibitively expensive for SMEs, risking pushing many smaller defense firms out of the market altogether. Therefore, policymakers and military planners must establish more frequent, institutionalized relationships with SMEs to better understand how regulations affect these new players. A good step in the right direction would be for policymakers to apply regulations on a sliding scale, setting thresholds for how large a defense company must grow before it has to comply with certain requirements.

Build integrated innovation ecosystems

NATO should adopt a holistic approach to capability development that marries research, design, and production to turn industrial development into more than just the sum of its structural parts. Three ways to build this holistic approach are:

Champion defense industrial cooperation. To innovate at the necessary pace, the Alliance must build defense industrial co-development, co-production, and co-assembly pathways. Working industry-to-industry or industry-to-partner, such collaborative efforts can help enable allied industries to scale up production and develop cutting-edge defense technologies. This approach defrays risk for industry, builds stronger transatlantic bonds, and shortens lead times for capability delivery.

Advance a model that combines expertise across sectors. To build more resilient and sustainable defense innovation ecosystems, allies should foster a defense innovation model that integrates government, industry, and academia. With these three sectors working together, allies can coordinate experimentation, testing, and manufacturing efforts to accelerate development and deployment timelines. Applied across the Atlantic, such a model could replace isolated national pilot projects with a coordinated framework for sustained, interoperable innovation.

Establish a NATO Defense Innovation Unit to spur development. Modeled after the United States’ own Defense Innovation Unit, a NATO version of the institution would help the Alliance coordinate funding, regulation, and capability development. A NATO Defense Innovation Unit would maintain shared test facilities, align technical standards, and guide the transition of prototypes into fielded systems. It would serve as a permanent platform connecting NATO’s innovation initiatives—such as DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund—with national and private-sector efforts.

Building transatlantic innovation ecosystems must begin with the basics: financing innovation wisely, regulating for speed and scalability, and building integrated defense innovation models across sectors and allied capitals. A roadmap grounded in smart investment, adaptive regulations, and collaborative production can transform innovation into readiness.

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Ukraine’s best security guarantee is the ability to strike back inside Russia

Serhii Kuzan — Tue, 20 Jan 2026 19:14:29 +0000

The issue of potential security guarantees for Ukraine has dominated US-led peace talks in recent months, but current proposals lack credibility. While everyone agrees that security guarantees are essential, is anybody actually prepared to risk war with Russia in order to enforce them? Based on the excessive caution displayed by Western leaders over the past four years, it is easy to see why many observers remain unconvinced.

With Ukraine’s Western partners unlikely to defend the country against a new Russian invasion, the most realistic option is to build up Kyiv’s own military capabilities. This process is already well underway. Since 2022, the Ukrainian army has expanded dramatically to become by far the largest fighting force in Europe and a world leader in drone warfare. Ukraine’s transformation into a major European military power has been supported by the country’s allies, who have provided large quantities of weapons and equipment along with the financial support needed to power the rapid expansion of the Ukrainian defense industry.

The growing strength of the Ukrainian military has been instrumental in stemming the tide of Russia’s invasion. Despite holding the battlefield initiative throughout 2025, Putin’s army was able to seize less than one percent of Ukrainian territory while suffering heavy losses. The priority now is to freeze the front lines further and reach a point where even minor Russian advances become increasingly unfeasible. However, effective defenses alone will not be enough to end the war or prevent a new Russian invasion. In order to deter Putin, Ukraine must also be able to strike back effectively at targets across Russia.

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Ukraine’s arsenal of long-range weapons has evolved significantly since 2022. Over the past four years, the country has managed to develop a variety of strike drones with the capacity to reach targets located well over a thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Ukraine also now boasts an expanding selection of domestically produced cruise missiles. This enhanced long-range firepower has made it possible for Ukraine to conduct an escalating bombing campaign inside Russia that has already changed the geography of the war.

Since summer 2025, long-range Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory have reached record highs. Ukraine has struck dozens of military facilities and defense industry enterprises, while also paying special attention to the oil and gas infrastructure that fuels the Russian war economy. Ukraine has hit refineries, pipelines, oil rigs, ports, and a number of tankers belonging to the Kremlin’s so-called shadow fleet. These strikes have complicated the logistics of the invasion while contributing to a significant decline in Russia’s energy export revenues.

In addition to hampering the Kremlin war machine and causing economic damage, Ukraine’s mounting campaign of long-range strikes has also had a major psychological impact that is helping to bring home the reality of the war to the Russian public. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin has worked hard to shield ordinary Russians and contain the conflict within the borders of Ukraine. However, with air raid sirens becoming an increasingly routine feature of daily life in Russian towns and cities, the Putin regime is no longer able to control the narrative.

A recent survey conducted by Russia’s only remaining independent pollster, the Levada Center, has highlighted the impact Ukrainian strikes are having on Russian public sentiment. Asked to name the most notable event of the past year, 28 percent of respondents cited Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian cities and industrial facilities, making this the third most popular answer. Clearly, Ukraine’s long-range bombing campaign has succeeded in breaking through the Kremlin propaganda bubble and has made a strong impression on the Russian population.

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For Ukraine’s partners, the objective now should be to boost Ukraine’s long-range capabilities to the maximum in order to equip the country with the kind of strike power that can deter Russia. Numerous Western leaders have shied away from providing Kyiv with long-range missiles from their own arsenals due to escalation fears. The solution is simple: Western partners should focus their efforts on helping Ukraine produce sufficient quantities of drones and missiles domestically.

Ukrainian officials are well aware that the ability to hit targets across the Russian Federation may be their country’s most effective security guarantee against further Kremlin aggression. They are now appealing to Kyiv’s international partners for increased support as they seek to exploit the country’s considerable spare defense industry production capacity and crank up output.

“The modern arms race is not about nukes. It is about millions of cheap drones. Those who can scale up production quicker will secure peace,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha in late 2025. “This requires quick and sufficient funding for Ukraine’s defense industry, which is now the greatest source of defense innovation in the world. We can produce up to twenty million drones next year if we get sufficient funding.”

Throughout the past year of faltering US-led peace efforts, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that he has no intention of ending the invasion. As long as the war is being fought predominantly inside Ukraine, he is unlikely to change his position, regardless of Russian combat losses. However, if Ukrainian drone and missile strikes inside Russia continue to expand during 2026, the economic and social impact may become too serious to ignore. This could force Putin to abandon his stalling tactics and finally enter into genuine negotiations. It would also oblige him to think carefully before restarting his invasion in the years ahead.

Serhii Kuzan is chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). He formerly served as an adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (2022-2023) and as an advisor to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (2014).

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Ukraine’s defensive strategy goes far beyond a reliance on traditional static barriers. Over the past year, there has also been a growing emphasis on dispersed, concealed, and flexible defensive networks. These small-scale fortified positions are often located underground or embedded in tree lines at strategic locations, and are supported by remote fires and decoys. Each individual node in these networks is designed to shape enemy movement rather than stop it outright, channeling attackers into deliberately prepared kill pockets without exposing defenders. By creating choke points for Russian troops, Ukraine aims to maximize Kremlin casualties and capitalize on its in-built advantages as the defending party in a war of attrition.

There are growing signs that this approach is working. Ukraine’s top military commander Oleksandr Syrskyi commented recently that the current strategy has proved particularly effective on the Pokrovsk front, which has witnessed some of the heaviest fighting of the entire war over the past year. According to Syrskyi, “timely and high-quality fortifications and engineering obstacles” enabled Ukrainian forces to inflict maximum losses on Russian units close to Pokrovsk and disrupt their plans, even when facing numerical superiority.

Where Ukrainian defenses have failed, the reasons are instructive. In areas such as Toretsk and parts of the Kharkiv front, troop rotations occurred without sufficient time or equipment to construct proper fortifications, leading to Russian gains. Constant Russian drone surveillance made the use of heavy engineering machinery dangerous, leaving units unprepared when assaults followed. These cases serve as confirmation that fortifications are not optional enhancements but foundational to battlefield survival under drone saturated conditions.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Drones are at the heart of Ukraine’s defensive strategy, serving as a ubiquitous presence over kill zones and preventing localized Russian advances from consolidating into more substantial breakthroughs. Meanwhile, in some sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk, ground robotic systems are now being used to deliver the vast majority of supplies to troops. With this in mind, Ukrainian commanders argue that all future defensive lines should be optimized for both aerial and ground drones.

These technological advances do not eliminate the need for manpower. Even the most sophisticated fortifications require soldiers to react to emerging threats. When Russian units manage to infiltrate defensive lines or push into urban areas, infantry forces remain essential in order to clear and secure ground. While Ukraine’s improved fortifications are an encouraging development for the war-weary nation, no physical barrier can realistically stop Russia unless it is supported by sufficient quantities of well-trained troops.

Strengthening Ukraine’s fortifications and addressing manpower shortages will be among the top priorities for incoming Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, who took up his post this week. Fedorov made his name in government as Minister of Digital Transformation. Since 2022, he has been one of the driving forces behind Ukraine’s rapidly expanding drone warfare capabilities.

Fedorov’s extensive defense tech background, along with his reputation as a modernizer who has countered institutional corruption through the digitalization of state services, has led to considerable optimism over his appointment. He is now faced with the twin challenges of improving Ukraine’s front line defenses while addressing the mobilization and desertion problems hindering the Ukrainian war effort. If he is able to make progress on these two fronts, Ukraine’s prospects for 2026 and beyond will begin to look a lot better.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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The current emphasis on UGVs is part of a broader technological transformation taking place on the battlefields of Ukraine. This generational shift in military tech is redefining how modern wars are fought.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, homegrown innovation has played a critical role in Ukraine’s defense. Early in the war, Ukrainian troops deployed cheap commercial drones to conduct reconnaissance. These platforms were soon being adapted to carry explosives, dramatically expanding their combat role. By the second year of the war, Ukraine had developed a powerful domestic drone industry capable of producing millions of units per year while rapidly adapting to the ever-changing requirements of the battlefield.

A similar process has also been underway at sea, with Ukraine deploying domestically produced naval drones to sink or damage more than a dozen Russian warships. This has forced Putin to withdraw the remainder of the Black Sea Fleet from occupied Crimea to Russia itself. Recent successes have included the downing of Russian helicopters over the Black Sea using naval drones armed with missiles, and an audacious strike on a Russian submarine by an underwater Ukrainian drone.

By late 2023, drones were dominating the skies over the Ukrainian battlefield, making it extremely dangerous to use vehicles or armor close to the front lines. In response to this changing dynamic, Ukrainian forces began experimenting with wheeled and tracked land drones to handle logistical tasks such as the delivery of food and ammunition to front line positions and the evacuation of wounded troops.

Over the past year, Russia’s expanding use of fiber-optic drones and tactical focus on disrupting Ukrainian supply lines has further underlined the importance of UGVs. Fiber-optic drones have expanded the kill zone deep into the Ukrainian rear, complicating the task of resupplying combat units and leading to shortages that weaken Ukraine’s defenses. Robotic systems help counter this threat.

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Remote controlled land drones offer a range of practical advantages. They are more difficult to jam electronically than aerial drones, and are far harder to spot than trucks or cars. These benefits are making them increasingly indispensable for the Ukrainian military. In November 2025, the BBC reported that up to 90 percent of all supplies to Ukrainian front line positions around Pokrovsk were being delivered by UGVs.

In addition to logistical functions, the Ukrainian military is also pioneering the use of land drones in combat roles. It is easy to see why this is appealing. After all, Ukrainian commanders are being asked to defend a front line stretching more than one thousand kilometers with limited numbers of troops against a far larger and better equipped enemy.

Experts caution that while UGVs can serve as a key element of Ukraine’s defenses, they are not a realistic alternative to boots on the ground. Former Ukrainian commander in chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi has acknowledged that robotic systems are already making it possible to remove personnel from the front lines and reduce casualties, but stressed that current technology remains insufficient to replace humans at scale.

Despite the advances of the past four years, Ukraine’s expanding robot army remains incapable of carrying out many military functions that require infantry. When small groups of Russian troops infiltrate Ukrainian positions and push into urban areas, for example, soldiers are needed to clear and hold terrain. Advocates of drone warfare need to recognize these limitations when making the case for greater reliance on unmanned systems.

UGVs will likely prove vital for Ukraine in 2026, but they are not wonder weapons and cannot serve as a miracle cure for Kyiv’s manpower challenges. Instead, Ukraine’s robot army should be viewed as an important part of the country’s constantly evolving defenses that can help save lives while raising the cost of Russia’s invasion.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Unmanned systems of all kinds have emerged since 2022 as a fundamental element of modern military doctrine. This is radically changing everything from the structure of armies to the role of the individual soldier. Remotely controlled equipment no longer needs a large crew to support it, while individual models are becoming more compact and maneuverable. As a result, the power of unmanned weapons systems is increasing exponentially, while production is expanding to industrial scale and becoming significantly cheaper.

More and more soldiers now serve as unmanned systems operators. Those who remain in more traditional roles perform tasks such as special operations, guard duties, or logistical functions. The war being waged by Ukraine has demonstrated that the modern battlefield features a kill zone up to 25 miles deep and spanning the entire front line. This zone is controlled by drones that destroy any infantry or equipment. Combat operations are increasingly conducted by drone operators located deep in the rear or in underground bunkers.

In these conditions of drone dominance over the battlefield, any attempts to stage major breakthroughs are doomed to failure. Instead of tank columns and artillery duels, offensive operations require maximum dispersal of forces and the greatest possible camouflage. The main task of troops is to gradually shift the kill zone deeper into the enemy’s rear.

Success depends upon the ability to rapidly produce large quantities of inexpensive combat drones and continually update their control systems. Initial tactics involving single drones and individual targets are already becoming a thing of a past. Instead, operators can now use artificial intelligence to control entire fleets featuring large numbers of drones deployed simultaneously. This approach allows a single soldier to manage kilometers of front line space rather than just a few hundred meters. The result is a reduction in the need for mass mobilization and an emphasis on the professionalism and technical skills of each operator manning the front.

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Combat operations now boil down to two main scenarios: Either the collapse of an enemy who is not prepared for the new intensity of combat, or a positional struggle in the style of World War I. In a protracted positional war, it is crucial to ensure control over the kill zone and maintain sufficient supplies while depriving the enemy of similar capabilities. The protection of logistics networks and the infliction of maximum damage on the enemy’s rear areas is of decisive importance.

First and foremost, this means cutting off ground supply routes. To protect logistics, armies must develop fleets of maneuverable transport drones that are not dependent on road quality and can navigate minefields. Meanwhile, to ensure the steady supply of ammunition and spare parts to underground storage points along the front lines, a mobile air defense system featuring interceptor drones is necessary.

At the strategic level, key targets are now weapons factories, logistics centers, and command posts, which are often hidden deep in the rear or located inside underground bunkers close to the front lines. Destroying these high-value targets requires guided missiles or other air strike capabilities. Military planners are therefore faced with the challenge of moving away from expensive manned aircraft toward reusable strategic drones.

Testing of fully-fledged unmanned aircraft is already underway. The transition toward unmanned aviation will open up the mass deployment of guided aerial bombs, which are significantly cheaper than missiles. In addition, strategic drones will themselves be able to act as “aircraft carriers” for kamikaze drones.

The same principles apply equally to the maritime theater of operations. Ukrainian Sea Baby naval drones have already proven themselves by destroying numerous warships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and carrying out attacks on Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers.

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To ensure their future national security, states must focus on the mass production of unmanned systems and their components. China currently accounts for the lion’s share of component parts. This is a challenge for any country that seeks to play a role in global affairs. China must be deprived of the strategic advantages it enjoys due to its status as the leading producer of components for unmanned systems.

Many NATO generals appear to think that recent technological advances are making war cheaper and creating a more level military playing field. This is a mistake. In reality, any reduction in the cost of weapons is more than offset by the need for increased quantities.

It is also important to stress that unmanned technologies alone are not enough. Another key factor is an army’s access to reliable digital communications similar to Starlink. Without this capability, it is impossible to coordinate combat operations, collect data, and maintain connections between individual units and command structures. It is no coincidence that China is already investing billions to address this issue.

The transformation currently underway in the military sphere also increases the role of cyber warfare. Disruption to logistics, power outages, and communications breakdowns can all provide the enemy with the opportunity to advance. A hacked cyber system can expose vital defenses or dramatically reduce the possibility of recovery.

Looking ahead, technological innovation in the military must be recognized as a national priority when allocating defense budgets. This applies to everything from unmanned systems to the development of artificial intelligence.

The most important revolution must take place within the minds of today’s military generals. A comprehensive rethink of existing military doctrines is currently needed. Armies must be completely re-equipped. It is time for the top brass to acknowledge that they should either change or give way to a new generation of military strategists.

Ukraine’s experience since 2022 has confirmed that in order to be successful in modern warfare, armies should model themselves on technological giants like Amazon and SpaceX. They must embrace flexible thinking and be capable of competing in terms of implementing new innovations.

In an era of accelerated military change, all countries face a simple choice of adapting or accepting the inevitability of defeat. The winners will be those who embrace the lessons from the technological revolution currently underway on the battlefields of Ukraine.

Oleg Dunda is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament from the Servant of the People party.

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As the bombardment of Kharkiv intensifies, events taking place one hundred kilometers to the east are reshaping the city’s broader security outlook. In recent months, advancing Russian troops have attempted to reoccupy Kupiansk. This strategically important city came under Russian occupation during the initial phase of the full-scale invasion before being liberated during Ukraine’s successful September 2022 counteroffensive. Renewed Russian gains in this direction would further strain Ukraine’s defenses and expand the aerial threat looming over Kharkiv.

As the front line creeps closer to Kharkiv, the main threat remains air strikes. Russian attacks focus on civilian targets including energy infrastructure, apartment blocks, schools, hospitals, and shopping malls. The overall intention is clear: Russia aims to degrade municipal infrastructure, disrupt essential services, and make the city unlivable for its inhabitants.

One of the most shocking attacks in recent months took place on October 22, when Russia carried out a targeted drone strike on a Kharkiv kindergarten. On that occasion, images of firefighters carrying young children from the burning building made global headlines. However, the vast majority of attacks targeting the Kharkiv population do not attract the attention of international audiences.

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Alongside drones, Kharkiv residents must also now contend with extended periods of darkness. In early November, a major Russian bombardment caused the city’s energy supply system to collapse, leaving entire districts without electricity, heating, and light. Local residents have had to adapt to the realities of life without power while navigating the city in the winter gloom. For the Kharkiv population, this has meant returning to familiar blackout routines developed during earlier Russian winter bombing campaigns.

Despite these pressures, Kharkiv continues to function and maintain an air of normality. Everyday life in the city is in many ways defined by a culture of resilience that is both practical and disciplined, reflecting years of adaptation under fire.

Utilities crews repair power lines within hours of each new Russian attack. Municipal workers immediately clear away debris from air strikes and make sure the city remains tidy, even in the most extreme of circumstances. Teachers hold classes in specially constructed underground schools or metro stations. Doctors treat patients behind boarded up windows. Each individual demonstration of resilience is a direct rejection of Russia’s efforts to depopulate Kharkiv.

In order to maintain this remarkable resilience, Kharkiv requires continued international support. Most of all, this means additional air defenses. Supporting Kharkiv is not just a matter of humanitarian assistance. It is a strategic investment in European security.

Today, Kharkiv serves as a vital bastion in eastern Ukraine. The city’s endurance makes it possible to reinforce Ukrainian front line units, bolster the country’s defenses, offer a safe haven to the region’s civilian population, and prevent the war from spreading further west. A secure Kharkiv means a stronger Ukraine and a safer Europe, but this will only be possible with help from the international community.

Maria Avdeeva is a Ukrainian security analyst. The views in this article are her own and are expressed in a personal capacity.

While the H200 far surpasses the capabilities of the H20, it’s still a generation behind Nvidia’s cutting-edge Blackwell chips and will soon be overshadowed by the forthcoming Rubin architecture. Prior to meeting with Xi in October, Trump floated the idea of allowing Blackwell exports. But following the meeting, Trump said that the topic did not come up. Notably, Monday’s announcement stops short of allowing the export of Blackwell chips.

The Trump administration’s rationale

The Trump administration’s calculus comes down primarily to economics and the belief that projecting US technology abroad strengthens national power. Allowing the export of H200s to China will provide Nvidia access to the world’s largest single market and likely ensures that the next generation of Chinese AI runs on US hardware.

Proponents of this approach claim this move could slow the development of China’s indigenous AI capabilities by cutting off revenue to companies such as Huawei as sales divert to Nvidia. Under Xi’s leadership, China has undertaken a concerted national strategy to build a domestic chip manufacturing capability and break free from dependence on Western technology.

The 25 percent cut from sales to the US government gives the administration another means to tout benefits to the taxpayer. Still, recent reports of a special security review that the chips will undergo before export raise questions about how processes will be structured to legally charge this fee. Expect more from the administration in the coming days on how it will navigate this novel approach.

By approving exports of H200 chips but not Blackwell chips, the administration is attempting to strike a compromise position between those who see the advantages of strengthening Nvidia’s global market share and those worried about eroding the United States’ AI advantage.

US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping talk as they leave after a bilateral meeting in Busan, South Korea, on October 30, 2025. (REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein)

The real implications

The United States and China are locked in an existential race for AI supremacy. Until now, the United States’ one true advantage has been access to cutting-edge compute.

In recent years, China has proven that it can build frontier models that rival the performance of the leading models in the United States. It produces top AI talent and has cultivated a vibrant AI start-up ecosystem. Chinese companies have access to the same data as their US counterparts while also benefiting from internal data, such as that stemming from China’s surveillance state and widespread AI deployment. China also has a leg up in terms of energy generation, producing more than twice the electricity that the United States did in 2024.

Where the United States maintains a definitive edge is on aggregate computing power. As of mid-2025, the US share of global AI computing power reached 74 percent, with China at only 14 percent. Aggregate computing power is critical for training new frontier models, supporting the widespread use of AI and new applications of the technology, and exploring new architectures and pathways toward more powerful systems. Recent reporting finds that much of the compute used by companies such as OpenAI is in service of research.

Allowing Chinese companies to purchase H200 chips will significantly degrade this advantage. Chinese companies will likely pursue a strategy of scale, networking H200 chips into clusters that could rival the performance of Blackwell chips, albeit with a higher price tag. This is a strategy already widely employed in China to maximize the performance of their domestically produced, lower-end chips. With access to H200 chips, Chinese firms will be positioned to train the next generation of models and provide cloud-computing services beyond their borders. This would put them into competition with US providers for international market share and fundamentally undermine the Trump administration’s goal of establishing the US AI tech stack as the global standard.

Estimates for how far China’s domestic chip manufacturing capability lags that of the United States range from five to fifteen years. Currently, China cannot produce at scale to meet domestic demand. The Trump administration has estimated, for example, that major Chinese tech giant Huawei can only produce 200,000 of its Ascent AI chips this year, which is only 1-2 percent of estimated US production. Access to H200s could bridge this gap, allowing Chinese AI companies to compete globally until domestic manufacturing capability has reached parity. At which point, they would almost certainly move away from Nvidia.

From a national security perspective, many fear that H200 chips will not only bolster Chinese industry but also the People’s Liberation Army’s defense capabilities. Given China’s civil-military fusion doctrine, restricting sales to approved corporate entities likely won’t prevent military use.

Finally, the question remains whether Nvidia has the capacity to serve the Chinese market without eroding its ability to meet demand from US companies. Already, surging demand from data center build-outs is putting stress on the supply chain, and research universities are struggling to procure chips to support crucial research and education efforts.

As China moves forward to aggressively integrate AI into every aspect of its economy and society, as outlined in its recent “AI plus” initiative, providing the computational fuel to realize this vision will supercharge the United States’ strongest AI competitor, significantly endangering the Trump administration’s own global AI ambitions.

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Ukraine’s wartime experience provides blueprint for infrastructure protection

Oleksandr Bakalinskyi, Maggie McDonough — Mon, 08 Dec 2025 15:36:56 +0000

When cyberattacks and missile strikes converge on the same targets, infrastructure resilience becomes more than a technical mandate; it becomes a matter of national survival. For Ukraine, this is not a hypothetical future scenario. On the contrary, it has been daily reality for more than a decade.

Since 2014, Ukraine’s power grid, banking system, telecommunications networks, and digital infrastructure have faced sustained and increasingly sophisticated attacks. Yet these systems continue to function, adapt, and evolve, offering the world one of the most comprehensive case studies for how national infrastructure can endure under unrelenting cyber-kinetic pressure.

Ukraine’s experience reveals clearly that defending critical infrastructure is no longer simply a matter of cybersecurity. It requires a fundamentally different approach grounded in cyber-physical resilience, decentralization, system redundancy, institutional autonomy, and the capacity to sustain essential services, even when networks fail.

Industrial control systems were not designed for modern cyber warfare. The systems that operate electrical substations, power distribution logistics, and grid balancing typically prioritize availability and uptime rather than cyber defense. Russia exploited this structural vulnerability in 2015 and 2016, when Ukraine became the first country in history to suffer a nationwide power outage triggered by a cyberattack.

The same attacks that exposed digital fragility also revealed Ukraine’s greatest source of strength: Analog resilience. Even as digital control systems were compromised, engineers were able to manually isolate impacted grid segments, reroute power, and restore transmission through mechanical overrides and localized network segmentation.

The lessons are clear. While digital modernization delivers efficiency, full digital dependency creates systemic brittleness. Meanwhile, resilience can be enhanced through layered systems that incorporate manual fallbacks, localized control, and the ability to physically outmaneuver a digital attack. And while the ability to manually connect electricity to an electrical substation was not by design, the lack of digitalization at the time of the attacks proved to be an advantage in terms of service restoration speed.

The global takeaway from Ukraine’s grid defense is not a rejection of modernization; it is a rejection of exclusively digital modernization. True resilience requires hybrid architectures in which digital innovation is paired with analog redundancy, segmented control, and last resort options when networks are taken down.

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If the Ukrainian power grid demonstrated the value of technical redundancy, Ukraine’s banking sector has shown the value of institutional autonomy. The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) has emerged since the onset of Russian aggression as one of the most effective national actors in defending and sustaining critical infrastructure under attack. This has not only been due to advanced cybersecurity measures, but also thanks to operational freedom to act in line with the pace of the threat environment. The NBU has rapidly introduced mandatory security protocols, created a dedicated incident response unit, synchronized directly with law enforcement, and deployed real-time regulatory updates to address emerging vulnerabilities.

This capacity for decisiveness has helped ensure continuity in one of the country’s most essential sectors. Even under sustained digital attack, Ukrainians could still access their bank accounts, make electronic payments, and rely on national financial infrastructure without systemic interruption.

The most innovative aspect of this resilience came in the form of the Power Banking Initiative, a nationwide network of bank branches retrofitted for operational continuity during extended outages. Equipped with alternative energy sources, satellite communications, secure cash storage, and offline transaction capacities, these branches ensured uninterrupted access to currency, transfers, and basic banking services during power blackouts and infrastructure disruptions.

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Ukraine’s experience confirms that the boundary between cyberattacks and conventional warfare is often blurred. In many cases, the two elements are sequenced, synchronized, and structurally interdependent. Cyber operations can blind infrastructure sensors, disrupt communications, compromise operational decision-making, and erode trust in essential systems, often in direct coordination with physical strikes.

Resilience does not depend on preventing breaches, but on the ability to sustain essential services when breaches succeed. This requires a hybrid framework that integrates digital security, infrastructure continuity planning, and decentralized operational responses.

Alignment with EU and NATO standards will accelerate interoperability with allied infrastructure defense systems and enable long-term investment security. Compliance must move beyond voluntary adoption to formal certification, standardized auditing, and enforceable resilience benchmarks for infrastructure operators.

Ukraine’s national bank has shown the importance of sector-specific response units. This model should expand to the energy, telecommunications, transportation, healthcare, and regional government systems. In order to be effective, response units require independent monitoring authority, 24/7 threat detection, digital forensics, and integration into NATO and EU cyber fusion hubs.

Infrastructure resilience also demands institutionalized public-private intelligence sharing. A legally protected, mandatory, real-time intelligence exchange will shorten detection timelines and prevent cascading failures. Critical infrastructure owners must integrate into national security information-sharing with liability protections, rapid alert systems, and reciprocal intelligence flows.

Looking ahead, a national resilience investment fund should pool Ukrainian government resources, EU support, World Bank guarantees, EBRD/EIB financing, and private capital to enable infrastructure segmentation, micro-grid deployment, backup power systems, secure cloud environments, and hardened data centers. However, none of these technical investments will succeed without sufficient human capital. Ukraine should aim to develop a minimum of 10,000 new security specialists through university partnerships, military-civilian pipelines, veteran reskilling programs, and national cyber reserves.

Today, Ukraine possesses infrastructure resilience tested continuously under real cyber-kinetic attack. This unique experience should form the basis of international efforts to enhance critical infrastructure resilience. Ukraine can lead an international training center, host multinational resilience exercises, publish attack anatomy case files, and shape new NATO and EU doctrine. This would allow Kyiv to position itself not only as a defender, but as an architect of resilient infrastructure strategy.

Dr. Oleksandr Bakalinskyi is a Senior Researcher at the G. E. Pukhov Institute for Modeling in Energy Engineering at the National Academy of Sciences in Ukraine. Maggie McDonough is the Senior Vice President and Chief Innovation Officer at the Baltimore Development Corporation. She was previously affiliated with the Purdue Applied Research Institute (PARI) and Purdue’s Center for Education & Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS), where she served as a technical advisor on global cyber security resilience programming.

At the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector represented an important asset that the authorities in Kyiv were quick to mobilize. This tech prowess helped cement the country’s strategic focus on drones, which could be designed and produced domestically to compensate for a lack of more conventional weapons.

Since 2022, the number of Ukrainian companies developing drones has skyrocketed, while annual output has risen to millions of units. This has allowed Ukraine to establish a “drone wall” along the front lines of the conflict, making any buildup of enemy forces extremely challenging. Over the past year, around three-quarters of all Russian casualties have been as a result of Ukrainian drones.

At sea, Ukraine has used drones to sink multiple warships and break the Russian navy’s Black Sea blockade, forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his remaining fleet from Russian-occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s growing drone capabilities have also made it possible to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia with an escalating campaign of deep strikes on military and industrial targets across the Russian Federation.

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Russia has responded to Kyiv’s groundbreaking use of drone warfare by studying Ukrainian tactics and technologies, while also dramatically expanding its own domestic drone manufacturing base. The Kremlin has been aided in this by allies including China and Iran, who have provided vital components along with the blueprints for key drone designs.

The Kremlin strategy has focused on mass producing a limited range of models for use on the battlefield and in the bombardment of Ukrainian cities. This methodical approach has paid dividends. By the end of 2024, it was already becoming clear that the drone war was turning in Russia’s favor. This trend has only intensified over the past year.

One of Russia’s most important innovations has been the widespread use of fiber-optic drones. These drones are controlled by a wire connected directly to the operator, making them immune to jamming technologies and extremely difficult to intercept.

Russian commanders first began using large quantities of fiber-optic drones during fighting in late 2024 to push Ukrainian troops out of Russia’s Kursk region. The drones proved highly effective at disrupting Ukrainian logistics by targeting supply vehicles. This was widely seen as a crucial factor behind the success of the operation.

Russia has now replicated and scaled up these tactics throughout southern and eastern Ukraine, creating a drone wall of its own while reaching deeper and deeper into Ukrainian-controlled territory. Fiber-optic drones are being used to ambush supply vehicles far behind the front lines, forcing Ukraine to become increasingly reliant on ground robotics to supply combat units and evacuate the wounded.

In addition to striking Ukrainian logistics, Russian drone forces are also prioritising attacks on their Ukrainian counterparts, forcing Ukrainian drone crews to pull further back from the line of contact to ensure safety. This distance gives Russian operators room to move their own teams forward, increasing their ability to dominate the battlefield.

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Russia’s Rubicon drone unit has emerged during 2025 as a prominent symbol of the Kremlin’s rapidly evolving and increasingly effective drone warfare strategy. Highly trained and well funded Rubicon teams are leading the campaign to cut Ukraine’s supply lines and widen the kill zone.

Crucially, Rubicon pilots pass their experience on to newcomers and provide extensive training that is helping to improve the effectiveness of other Russian army drone units. According to Ukrainian drone commander Yurii Fedorenko, Rubicon can rapidly scale up drone units using manpower and financial advantages that Ukraine cannot replicate.

In the drone war between Russia and Ukraine, the Kremlin is betting on mass and hoping that a combination of smart choices, specialised production, extensive training, and sheer numbers will eventually overwhelm Ukraine’s technological edge. In contrast, Kyiv continues to rely on a highly decentralised ecosystem of volunteer groups, startups, and military workshops producing a wide variety of different drone models. This diversity helps to drive innovation but also creates coordination challenges.

The current effectiveness of Russia’s drone units does not mean the drone war has shifted decisively in Moscow’s favor, but recent trends do expose a gap that Ukraine must urgently close. In order to counter Russia’s increasingly centralised and well-resourced drone formations, Kyiv needs to adopt key elements of the Rubicon model. This means scaling up training pipelines, sharing front line experience more systematically, and ensuring Ukrainian drone units have all the resources they need to hunt down Russian operators and regain the initiative.

Since 2022, the Russian military has been widely mocked for its primitive “human wave” tactics and generally poor performance in Ukraine. However, the progress made by Russia in drone warfare indicates an army that is fully capable of learning, adapting, and innovating. Moscow has not been able to achieve any major technological breakthroughs, but Russian military strategists have significantly strengthened their country’s position by concentrating on scale, training, and relentless battlefield experimentation.

This progress should be a major wake-up call for European leaders. Small numbers of suspected Russian drones are already causing chaos and disruption across Europe. The longer the war in Ukraine lasts, the more advanced Russia’s drone capabilities will become.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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Punaro quoted in Air & Space Forces magazine on acquisition reform

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Nov 2025 19:00:00 +0000

Original Source

On November 18, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow MajGen Arnold Punaro, USMC (ret.) was quoted in an Air & Space Forces Magazine article entitled “What Experts Will Watch as the Pentagon Implements Acquisition Reform.” Punaro argued that Golden Dome’s sweeping, multi-domain missile-defense ambitions make it an ideal test case for implementing Secretary Hegseth’s recently announced acquisition reforms.

Advisory Council member

Arnold Punaro

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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Building the digital front line: Understanding big tech decision-making in Ukraine

Emma Schroeder — Mon, 17 Nov 2025 15:35:11 +0000

Executive summary
Introduction
Pull factors
- Clarity of conflict
- Business alignment
Push factors
- Difficulty of coordination
- Risk of retaliation
Key takeaways and conclusion
Author and acknowledgements

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Executive summary

The war in Ukraine has seen Russia launch and sustain a full-scale invasion across the information and physical domains against a country that has embraced technological development and increased technological and geopolitical connections to the United States, Canada, and Europe. Private technology companies have provided essential and often irreplaceable support to Ukraine following Russia’s invasion in 2022 and—especially in the early months of the conflict—did so largely without a request from an allied state or payment from Ukraine.

However, more than three years on, although the private sector’s assistance in Ukraine has been well-documented, the policymaking community at large is still largely unaware of how companies decided whether and how to provide technological support to and in Ukraine. Through open research as well as interviews and roundtable discussions with various private sector and government representatives, this report posits that companies were primarily motivated by a complex combination of factors in tandem, which pulled them toward or pushed them away from support. The factors pulling companies toward cooperation were the moral clarity of the conflict, and alignment with existing business opportunities. At the same time however, among factors pushing companies away from involvement in Ukraine was the difficulty of coordinating assistance in-country, as well as the risk of Russian retaliation. Meanwhile, both sets of factors were either enhanced—or mitigated—due to various actions taken by Ukraine, allied states, and international bodies. This includes Ukrainian tech diplomacy; the development of Ukraine’s technical capabilities; aid facilitations and coordination efforts by both various groups and entities; and risk mitigation efforts undertaken by both states and private companies.

Dependency on the private sector in the cyber domain has become a somewhat frequent refrain in domestic cybersecurity conversations. However, prior to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, no one—not supranational bodies, states, or even companies themselves—was prepared for the role they would assume once the tanks rolled and the missiles fired. The Russia-Ukraine conflict’s cyber dimension has revealed an underlying dependency on products, services, and infrastructure owned and operated by private companies. This has proved to be both a source of opportunity to enhance Ukraine’s defenses, while at the same time revealing fundamental risks and vulnerabilities. Given the heft and impact of technology companies in today’s digital infrastructure, let alone in conflict, it is essential that policymakers grasp this complex interplay of factors that influenced companies‘ decision-making as they headed in Ukraine, to inform planning or preparedness for future conflicts where the private sector will inevitably play a key role.

Introduction

Amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the private sector was and is a crucial line of defense and source of cyber resilience to a greater extent than any conflict previously observed. As the first case study of this phenomenon in an overt, conventional war, the past three years in Ukraine have clearly demonstrated how crucial the cyber and informational domain, and the private companies at its forefront, will be in competition, conflict, and war to come.

More than three years following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in the early morning of February 24, 2022, the war—and the crucial role of the international community in it—continues, but not unchanged. The war that Putin expected to end in Russian victory within a handful of days is now well into the third year of the largest and deadliest war in Europe since World War II.

This study examines the characteristics of this conflict that influenced companies’ decision-making regarding the type and degree of their involvement in Ukraine. Which factors and actions taken by states shaped tech companies’ decisions throughout the conflict as to whether and how to lend their support to Ukraine? These include both pull factors, those that increased the likeliness and degree of technology company involvement in Ukraine, and push factors, those that decreased the likeliness or degree of the same. Additionally, a key element influencing this space was the response by the Ukrainian government, allied governments, and international bodies to either build on the effects of the pull factors or mitigate the effects of the push factors throughout the conflict.

These factors and reactions are explored through open research, individual interviews with executives from tech companies active in Ukraine,¹ and workshop discussions including private sector, civil society, and representatives from various governments. It puts forward the private sector’s perspective on its own involvement in Ukraine since the 2022 invasion, reflecting on opinions and actions as they stood at the time of initial decision but also on the lessons learned since. The intention is to contribute to a baseline of understanding of public-private cooperation in Ukraine so that future policy decisions, whether in the Ukraine context or beyond, are built upon a full evaluation of experience.

Pull factors

Clarity of conflict

Clarity of conflict refers to the perception of the “right” and “wrong” or “victim” and “perpetrator” in a conflict, among one or more set audiences, whose support has the potential to provide materiel aid. In examining the role of this factor in the provision of tech aid to Ukraine, these audiences are primarily state policymakers, general populations, and technology leaders in Europe and North America. Overwhelmingly, in both public reporting and private interviews, the central reason given by companies themselves for why private companies provide aid and services supporting Ukraine is the moral clarity that these companies, their employees, and a large portion of their customers saw in the conflict and its conduct. Many interviewed commented on how the Russo-Ukrainian War, distinct from most other conflicts, has a clear and binary “right” and “wrong” side in the perspective of at least most of the Western world, from governments to individuals.

Russia engaged in continuous overt and covert aggressive action through a wide variety of coercive, though largely nonescalatory, tools in an attempt to exert control on Ukraine and its population. On February 24, 2022, however, Russia unleashed coordinated missile strikes on Ukrainian cities, airborne deployments of soldiers to key locations beyond the border region, conventional advancement across the border, and coordinated cyber aggression.

In March 2022, Amnesty International released a statement saying, in part, that “In less than a week, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a massive human rights, humanitarian, and displacement crisis that has the makings of the worst such catastrophe in recent European history.”² Photos and videos poured out of Ukraine, documenting Russian violence and war crimes against the people of that country. Reports on Russian atrocities and Ukrainian resistance dominated the headlines and news discussions in the West for months. A Monmouth University survey conducted in March 2022 found that 89 percent of Americans believed that Russia’s actions in Ukraine were not justified.³ Similarly, a poll of public perceptions of responsibility for war, taken across ten European countries showed that a clear majority in all countries attribute the primary responsibility to Russia.⁴

During these early months of 2022 the private sector quickly became an essential pillar of support for the Ukrainian war effort. As one expert put it, “If you had ordered a generic villain, you would have gotten Putin. From a moral standpoint, it was really easy for companies to take a stand, you have a moral highpoint.”⁵ Russia’s long decade of slowly escalating violence toward Ukraine, culminating in a brutal conventional assault and now, yearslong war, created an unusually stark geopolitical environment in which both Western states and the majority of their populations not only supported the defense of Ukraine but did so enthusiastically.

Across interviews and roundtable discussions, industry experts demonstrated an appreciation of the clarity of the “right” and “wrong” in the case of Ukraine. Nearly every private sector individual interviewed highlighted the importance of this factor in determining whether and how their company decided to begin or deepen its involvement in Ukraine following the invasion. One expert from a leading tech company said that “This was the easiest of all scenarios I could imagine for the private sector to seek to help an entity like Ukraine. The clarity on the conflict made the decision to assist Ukraine clear.”⁶ As several experts attested, much of the cyber aid provided to Ukraine required technical expertise that was not only limited to a few companies but also limited to a relatively small population of skilled individuals. At this level of analysis, the degree of available assistance had to take into account the bandwidth and possible burnout risk for these individuals as well as a strong, prevalent reluctance to work with a government or, especially, a military. The perceived clarity of the war in Ukraine, however, was critical to overcoming these concerns—at least for a while.⁷

Reaction – Ukrainian tech diplomacy

Tech diplomacy is the engagement between state authorities and tech companies, civil society organizations, other states, and multilateral fora to influence the development of both technology itself and the policy that surrounds it.⁸ Within the early days of the conflict, members of the Ukrainian government and especially the Minister for Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov, rallied for aid across the technology sector. These calls, and the generally positive reception to them, built on arguments regarding the clarity of the conflict. Although this tech diplomacy has been the project of various Ukrainian officials and offices, both before the 2022 invasion and in the years since, a focus in on Fedorov is illustrative of the Ukrainian approach to cultivating and extracting mutual benefit from relationships with international technology companies.

In 2019, Fedorov was tapped as deputy prime minister and minister of digital transformation and was subsequently named deputy prime minister for innovation, education, science and technology and minister for digital transformation and most recently first deputy prime minister of Ukraine—minister of digital transformation of Ukraine.⁹ Fedorov and his team have been adept, according to government affairs executive from a US-based multinational technology corporation, at creating and using “carrots and sticks” to influence company leadership and employees to more favorably view Ukraine and to augment their willingness to contribute to its defense.¹⁰

Fedorov cultivated a strong social media presence with an audience both within Ukraine and across Europe and North America. He emphasized the importance of social media platforms—using primarily English to connect with an international audience—to bring awareness to the dire situation in Ukraine. He pointed to the social media platform X (formerly Twitter), saying it “has become an efficient tool that we are using to counter Russian military aggression.”¹¹ In efforts like United24, the Ukrainian government’s official fundraising platform, which began with Fedorov tweeting the government’s crypto wallet addresses with an ask for donations,¹² he saw it not just as a fundraising tool, but as a tool that is “keeping people around the world aware of what is going on in Ukraine.”¹³ Crowdfunding efforts, even if donations are small, make people feel that their contributions are making a difference and fosters a closer relationship between that person and the Ukraine regardless of the distance.

Fedorov leveraged this engaged global audience to incentivize company action, effectively mobilizing his audience’s attention. A look at Fedorov’s social media presence shows a clear pattern of this strategy in action. Between March 2022 and July 2024, Fedorov posted fifty-two requests for aid from specific companies, celebrated companies and individuals taking positive action, and called out companies engaging in business practices that he deemed detrimental to Ukrainian defense efforts. These posts served as additional public acknowledgement of the contributions of specific companies to Ukraine in a global public forum that other states were watching, as were individuals, aid organizations, and companies. One tech executive explained that not only did these callouts serve as thanks, they also leveraged the competitive nature of these companies that “one up” each other with aid as an additional driver.¹⁴

The Starlink case provides an interesting example of this strategy in action. Fedorov tagged Elon Musk in an X post and asked him directly to instruct SpaceX to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations, calling him out for trying to “colonize Mars” instead of helping civilians on Earth.¹⁵ Musk responded publicly on X less than twelve hours later that, “Starlink Service is now active in Ukraine. More terminals en route.” Two days later these stations, which would come to serve critical functions for civilians, government entities, and even military personnel, arrived. Fedorov again publicly responded on X with a photo of a truck full of terminals saying, “Starlink – here. Thanks, @elonmusk.”¹⁶

According to Fedorov’s deputy minister, Alex Bornyakov, in the months leading up to the Russian invasion, Fedorov’s office was unable to secure a meeting with Elon Musk. However, SpaceX President and COO Gwynne Shotwell indicated in March of 2022 that the company had been coordinating with Ukraine as part of its European expansion effort for several weeks before the invasion and were awaiting final approval from the Ukrainian government. According to Shotwell, “they tweeted at Elon and so we turned it on … that was our permission. That was the letter from the minister. It was a tweet.¹⁷ These early interactions show that at the very least, Fedorov’s social media engagement functioned as a nontraditional method to accelerate the provision and delivery of essential technical equipment that would enable connectivity for civilians, government entities, and even military units.¹⁸

Six months before the February 2022 invasion, Fedorov went on a tech diplomacy tour to Silicon Valley, intent on building stronger relationships with key technology companies with Ukraine’s digital transformation on the agenda. Fedorov‘s tech diplomacy work laid a solid foundation for coordination between the Ukrainian government and these technology companies by the time the war began. These relationships and Fedorov and his ministry’s direct approach with private companies meant that his office could seek solutions in the private sector directly and more swiftly than in traditional government acquisition. For example, in less than a month, a new and improved air raid alert system was implemented across the country as a result of a direct and informal conversation between Ajax Systems Chief Marketing Officer Valentine Hrytsenko, Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation Valeriya Ionan, and a team of digital transformation officers.¹⁹

Therefore, Ukraine’s approach to tech diplomacy represents a significant shift in how states, especially small or mid-power states, should conceptualize and shape their relationships with technology companies. Given that global technology companies’ (“big tech”) yearly revenue continually overshadows the gross domestic product (GDP) of many states,²⁰ this evolution in states’ relationships with big corporations suggests that corporate ties are sometimes more important than a state’s relationship with another state. This was echoed in a statement from the Danish government, recognizing the extent to which technological disruption affects societal and geopolitical change, nothing that the companies driving that innovation “have become extremely influential; to the extent that their economic and political power match—or even surpass—that of our traditional partners, the nation states.”²¹ Fedorov’s actions therefore proved the importance of tech diplomacy as a key government priority to secure the cooperation of the tech sector in a crisis, aided by the moral clarity that many companies saw in assisting Ukraine in a time of war.

Business alignment

For companies examining whether and how to provide tech-based support to Ukraine in its defense, business alignment can take a variety of forms, but typically refers to some combination of benefits that the company receives from these activities. Although the primary driver cited publicly for tech companies’ involvement has been the desire to aid Ukraine, their customers, and employees in Ukraine against blatant Russian aggression, another factor in companies’ decision-making was in fact how the provision of assistance to Ukraine fit into and supported the overall health and security of their organizations. This included the character of preexisting relationships with both Ukraine and Russia, direct financial profit, and indirect benefits such as instructive experience, field-testing products, and reputational benefits.

Preexisting relationships

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was not the start of the conflict between the two nations, nor was it the beginning of technology companies’ relationships with Ukraine and Russia. The nature and tone of these relationships provided a key foundation for these companies’ decisions throughout the post-2022 conflict. Ukraine and Russia, both as partners and as markets, had different starting points and were also on different active trajectories that informed the types and depth of engagement that tech companies wished to have with each country, both individually and comparatively.

One of the primary motivations cited for company involvement in Ukraine after the Russian invasion was the simple fact that many of these companies were already active in Ukraine to some extent and their leadership felt a responsibility to protect its employees and continue to serve its customers within Ukraine. For example, threat intelligence companies like Mandiant and CrowdStrike had been engaged in Ukraine since at least 2014, actively tracking cyber espionage, influence, and attack operations, while companies like Microsoft and Google were actively building capacity in the country despite Ukraine’s prohibitions on cloud services. In 2020, Google opened its second research and development center in Ukraine and Microsoft signed a memorandum of understanding with Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation to include a $500 million investment to build two data centers.²²

Several private sector and government representatives conveyed in private interviews that one of companies’ greatest concerns in the first few weeks of the conflict was the safety of their employees in Ukraine.²³ Many companies set up or contributed to programs intended to help employees leave the country, if they wished, or to provide protection measures for those who remained.²⁴ Additionally, companies with existing customers in Ukraine saw their mission as largely unchanged, seeking to serve their customers regardless of their location.²⁵ Companies with these preexisting relationships had more reason to continue or expand their work in the country due to these long-term connections.

By contrast, many of these companies also had preexisting, albeit weaker, ties with and in Russia. According to a 2024 report from the Center for Security and Emerging Technology, however, of the eighteen US tech companies that provided “direct assistance on the battlefield and/or services to maintain critical infrastructure or government functions,” none had “significant economic or financial linkages to Russia.”²⁶ While Ukraine had undertaken concerted steps to foster mutually beneficial relationships, Russia had been largely coercive. The Kremlin in the years before the 2022 reinvasion sought to tighten control over the Russian information space and exert influence over international tech companies’ activities in Russia. For example, in 2021 Russia passed a law requiring large technology companies with a presence in the Russian market to establish Russian offices registered with the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media, commonly known as Roskomnadzor, or risk severe punitive measures.²⁷ Some in the industry viewed the move as an attempt to blackmail tech companies into complying with Russian censorship.²⁸ Google was one such target of these coercive measures—in a push to force Google to censor the content available on its platforms within Russia, Russian authorities seized the company’s bank accounts. In response, Google’s Russian subsidiary declared bankruptcy and ceased all but its free services within Russia.²⁹

Amplified by the clarity of conflict discussed above, and Ukrainian tech diplomacy efforts for companies to sever financial ties with Russia and the Russian market, the decision calculus for these companies was less complex than it may have been otherwise.

Not all companies chose to leave the Russian market completely. Despite the coercion that Google faced, the company chose to keep YouTube available in Russia; however, without ads for users in Russia and without the ability to monetize content that would “exploit, dismiss, or condone Russia’s war in Ukraine.”^“³⁰ As discussed previously, many companies decided to continue services in Ukraine out of an obligation to existing customers. Depending on the company and the type of product sold or service provided, this same motivation was seen with respect to Russia as well. One tech executive explained that some of these products and services remained active because they provided a benefit to the Russian public, as opposed to the Russian government. For example, YouTube remained partially active, with restrictions, so that the platform could continue to serve as an alternate source of information for Russians.³¹

Direct profit

For companies, both those with an existing presence in Ukraine and those without, providing technical services in and to Ukraine could also serve more clear-cut business interests. Some were at least partially motivated by direct financial gain like new paid contracts and revenue potential such as additional value generated through the delivery of services and the possibility of positive publicity for the company or their products.

Although much of private companies’ work in Ukraine was (or started as) free of charge, many others were acquired in a more traditional contractual manner, with either Ukraine or an allied government footing the bill. Company representatives said in several interviews and roundtables that while they wish to continue their work in the country, as the war continues, they will require financial support to do so.³²

Indirect benefit

Some of the tech companies active in Ukraine derived value from the very act of providing a service itself, with indirect gains that included instructive experience with Russian cyber operations, the ability to field-test products, and reputational benefits.

For more than a decade, many multinational threat intelligence companies have been tracking Russian cyber aggression in Ukraine as part of their core function. These services helped to drive the development of Ukrainian cyber infrastructure, but it was not solely a charitable effort. It was in these companies own interests to gain the closest possible insights into areas like Ukraine that experience a high degree and sophistication of cyberattacks. As a result, these companies sowed valuable intelligence from their experience, and improved their business offerings across the board. As one executive in threat intelligence at a US cybersecurity nonprofit put it: “for threat intelligence companies, having this depth of access is a gold mine, the details delivered out of Ukraine on Russian tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are quite amazing.”³³

These benefits are not only limited to threat intelligence companies. Companies that run active platforms used by and in Ukraine, such as cloud platforms, also gained greater direct experience against Russian cyber operations. As one executive put it, “while acting as a shield, [these] companies are collecting vast intelligence that can be used to improve their products and protect all their customers.”³⁴ The experience of defending against Russian activity at that scale and volume served as training of sorts for companies’ cybersecurity teams.

Both representatives from private companies and the Ukrainian government cited an additional benefit to working in Ukraine during the current war: it served as a testing ground for technology. As Fedorov stated, Ukraine “is the best test ground for all the newest tech … because here you can test them in real-life conditions.”³⁵ Several company executives privately seconded this notion, saying that alongside their company’s desire to do the right thing, their work in Ukraine provided proof of concept for their capabilities.³⁶ Ukraine also offered a means to demonstrate to potential customers the effectiveness of their offerings. Founding partner of Green Flag Ventures Deborah Fairlamb said at a European defense conference that “no one would even look at a product unless it had ‘Tested in Ukraine’ stamped on it.”³⁷ During a roundtable conversation, a company executive said that governments were more likely, having seen a company’s work in Ukraine, to purchase their products and trust that they are secure.³⁸

Finally, companies working actively in Ukraine were also motivated by the benefits to public perception and reputation. Popular support of Ukraine meant that companies’ support may have improved their reputation by association. In a TIME article from early 2024, author Vera Bergengruen argued that this reputational concern was part of Palantir’s decision calculus for its work in Ukraine, by helping to dispel characterization of the company’s work as a tool to support intrusive government surveillance. This would situate Palantir’s work in Ukraine among its similar efforts to “shed its reputation as a shadowy data-mining spy contractor.”³⁹ Clearview AI’s reputational concerns also likely motivated its assistance to Ukraine. The company was sanctioned multiple times throughout Europe for privacy violations and was lambasted in a 2020 New York Times article for its controversial use by law enforcement and private companies to track people through AI-enabled facial recognition.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the company received an outpouring of positive press following public announcements that Ukraine was using this same AI-enabled facial recognition software to identify Russian soldiers, including deceased soldiers and those suspected of committing war crimes in Ukraine.⁴¹ Whether trying to capitalize on a positive reputation or counter negative perceptions, companies benefit from their association with a cause popular across their customer base.

Reaction – Ukrainian technical capability and posture

In both the buildup to war and the conduct of it, some companies with interest in setting up operations in or with Ukraine were reluctant to do so out of concern regarding Ukraine’s ability to act as a capable and trustworthy recipient of goods and services. Executives working in threat intelligence and information security at US-based multinational technology companies have pointed to corruption in Ukraine as a barrier to engagement prior to the invasion and a factor that was carefully considered when deciding how to provide aid in Ukraine.⁴² This challenge is openly acknowledged in Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2021-25, which states that “corruption prevalence and distrust in the judiciary are the key obstacles to attracting foreign investment to Ukraine.”⁴³

To mitigate these factors, Ukraine and its partners have invested heavily over the past decade to take on corruption and build out legal, economic, and technical frameworks to transform Ukraine so as to make it a more appealing target for assistance and cooperation from the public and private sectors. According to Alex Bornyakov, Ukraine’s deputy minister of digital transformation, Ukraine’s sought to develop “the largest IT hub in Eastern Europe with the fastest growing GDP, industrial parks, and its own security-focused ‘Silicon Valley.’”⁴⁴

Anti-corruption efforts

The Ukrainian government’s commitment to anti-corruption efforts has been an important factor for the success of the process, which began well before the buildup of Russian tanks on its border. According to the 2025 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Integrity and Anti-Corruption Review of Ukraine, since 2013 Ukraine “significantly reformed its anti-corruption framework to fight what were then historically high corruption levels in the country.”⁴⁵

Ukraine’s public and private IT sectors have long been a breeding ground for software acquisition-related fraud, a scheme in which an individual reports the purchase of a legitimate software license but actually buys a pirated or outdated version of that software and pockets the difference. Before 2014, approximately 80 percent of Ukrainian government and private entities were using network software that had either never been or was no longer supported by the associated software vendor,⁴⁶ making Ukraine a difficult and unappealing market for software vendors.

In 2014, anti-corruption activists started the ProZorro project, which over the past decade moved public sector procurement, including that of IT infrastructure, to a central platform built around the tenets of transparency, efficiency, and cross-sector collaboration and competition.⁴⁷ According to a report by Dr. Robert Peacock, through the use of ProZorro and other anti-corruption efforts, senior officials at Ukraine’s State Special Communications Service estimated that “the share of pirated and unsupported software on the country’s networks had dropped from more than 80 percent in 2014 to only 20 percent in 2020.”⁴⁸

As the conflict in Ukraine escalated into a full-scale war, Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts became even more urgent and essential. For example, UNITED24, the country’s official fundraising platform to fund the Ukrainian war effort that has raised approximately $350 million since the beginning of the war, sends money directly into transparent national accounting systems depending on the choice of the donor, with the leading global accounting firm Deloitte auditing platform.⁴⁹ In addition, in the first year of the war Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his government dismissed several high-ranking government officials based on allegations of corruption. This included two of the top Ukrainian cyber officials after they were accused of participated in corrupt procurement practices. According to the country’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the accused allegedly embezzled $1.7 million between 2020 and 2022 through fraudulent software acquisition.⁵⁰ The Ukrainian government’s efforts largely mitigated companies’ concerns regarding corruption, and those companies that cited corruption as a barrier to working with Ukraine have since commenced programming previously denied to Ukraine on those grounds.⁵¹

For a private company to make the decision to invest more heavily in Ukraine, the benefits—financial or otherwise—must outweigh the risks. By addressing corruption within the government, and especially tech-related corruption, the Ukrainian government effectively diminished the weight of this factor in companies’ overall decision calculus. Crucially, such efforts take time to implement and yet more time to create meaningful change. Had these anti-corruption programs not been well underway before 2022, the question of corruption may have significantly deterred companies from deeper involvement in Ukraine.

Ukraine turns toward tech

Instead of sowing distrust in the idea of cyberspace as a safe space for economic and even government services, the past decade of Russian aggression against Ukraine in cyberspace motivated Ukraine to invest heavily in that space and turn its former weakness into a newfound strength. It could even be said that the continuous Russian aggression against Ukraine, through cyberspace and otherwise, helped Ukraine to better defend itself against Russia. Before the 2022 Russian invasion and even more so since, the Ukrainian government sees a flourishing technology sector within Ukraine as a key component to the economic strength of the country.⁵² However, to foster such a flourishing tech environment, Ukraine needed to first invest in its legal and economic foundations.

As a response to escalating Russian aggression in 2014, Ukraine began what would be an intensive decade of government reform and policy advancement on cyber issues. The figure below highlights various investment and development programs aimed at enhancing Ukrainian technological capacity, including efforts of the Ukrainian government itself and in partnership with various international entities such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

These, among other efforts, were essential steps to creating and expanding a technologically capable and developed Ukraine. Especially important was the increased relative cybersecurity of the Ukrainian digital environment, the development of Ukraine’s cyber workforce and general cyber literacy, and an influx of capital enabling increased investment in private sector tools and services.

On the economic front, the Ukrainian government made strides to create an attractive environment for investment. The government’s mission has been to shift the conversation from purely one of donations and aid to a direct appeal to the companies’ more pecuniary concerns. According to Bornyakov, “The best way to help Ukraine is to invest in Ukraine.”⁵³ This call is both international and domestic. The Ukrainian government has implemented a number of projects and programs dedicated to fostering the local tech ecosystem. As of December 2024, the IT sector accounted for 4.4 percent of Ukraine’s GDP and 38 percent of the country’s total service exports. Much of this technological energy is being dedicated back to the war effort—according to a report compiled in cooperation with the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, 97 percent of Ukrainian IT companies are “actively supporting projects that contribute” to Ukrainian defense.⁵⁴

Diia City in particular, launched just two weeks before the invasion, is a tool intentionally designed to make it easier and more appealing for foreign companies to set up and run operations within Ukraine. Diia City is a “virtual free economic zone for tech companies in Ukraine” that offers a variety of legal and tax benefits.⁵⁵ The connected Brave1 initiative launched in early 2023 to “create a fast track for innovation in the defense and security sectors,” especially those projects of high importance to Ukrainian military leadership, such as “drones, robotic systems, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence tools, cybersecurity, communications, and information security management systems.”⁵⁶

These efforts, both domestic and international, bolstered the defense of Ukraine by building and demonstrating trustworthiness, capability, and economic value for the private sector. In other words, the political and economic engine driving technological development in Ukraine was composed of more than a decade of concentrated action from Ukraine and its international partners, and was in place well before tanks began rolling across the borders. This vital work ultimately helped to bring about conducive conditions for private sector investment or provision of services, as long-term structural factors indirectly shaping company decision-making to aid Ukraine.

Push factors

Difficulty of coordination

Difficulty of coordination refers to the friction that private companies experienced along the lifecycle of technical assistance to Ukraine—from understanding which products or services would be impactful, knowing who to coordinate with and how, or the logistics of providing that assistance. Friction, as in all domains of warfare, is the imposition of the constraints of reality upon one’s plans and impulses, and therefore each additional complexity that stands between a certain technology and its use in Ukraine increases the likelihood that that desired provision will not occur, will take longer, or will be provided in a less helpful form.

One of the most persistent hindrances to the provision of tech-related assistance from private companies in Ukraine was the difficulties that all parties involved faced, which was to effectively coordinate the assistance available with the assistance that Ukraine needed most in a fast-moving and high-pressure environment, particular as more Ukrainian organizations expressed a need for more threat intelligence, licenses, or training for tools. In almost every conversation with industry representatives about their experience in this space raised this coordination problem. The factors that most significantly impacted coordination effectiveness included whether a company had a preexisting presence in or relationship with Ukraine, the clarity with which Ukraine communicated its technical needs, and the ability to assess the effectiveness and impact of products or services provided.⁵⁷

Especially in the early months of the full-scale Russian war, much of the assistance that private tech companies provided was coordinated by companies themselves and in a largely ad hoc manner. In addition, Ukraine experienced communications challenges such as a lack of secure channels or limited visibility into networks and infrastructure on the ground.⁵⁸ Companies that did not have a strong relationship with the Ukrainian public sector prior to the conflict found that direct coordination was difficult to establish once the conflict had begun.⁵⁹ For some, not having a direct relationship with or in Ukraine had been an intentional choice, due to regulation complexity or corruption concerns.⁶⁰ Initially, companies without a preexisting presence often struggled to pinpoint the correct office or person with which to speak. They bridged this gap most often with some combination of brand recognition driving direct outreach from the Ukrainian government and facilitation by Ukrainian private companies that had established relationships with international tech companies and could act as middlemen.⁶¹

Even in cases of existing relationships within Ukraine, complexities abound for companies. A threat intel executive indicated that, for many, there is a tension between what companies thought they could provide and what the Ukrainian government knew about its own needs. While Ukraine was effective in communicating its technical needs at the tactical level, according to various company representatives, effective coordination was somewhat hampered by their ability to effectively communicate and coordinate technical assistance needs across government at a strategic level lagged behind.⁶²

An additional point of friction was the high degree of difficulty in deconflicting the assistance provided to Ukraine from different companies. Understandably, the Ukrainian government—and various individuals and agencies working within it—were responding to imminent threats and thus would send out the same or similar requests to various companies in the hope that one would respond.⁶³ This meant that at times various companies were devoting time and resources to developing an assistance measure that was not actually needed and would not be implemented, or if it was in part, had a lesser relative impact on Ukrainian defense because of duplicative measures. This inability to understand and plan around the impact of assistance was broader than just the duplication issue; dozens of company representatives reported difficulties in getting a clear view as to whether their assistance was actually effective once provided.⁶⁴

Without this data, future requests for and fulfillments of technical aid will continue to be based on theory rather than evidence from their growing experiences together. A 2024 paper from the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative (CDAC) and Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, made strides in its effort to collate and assess the effectiveness of those companies and organizations that provided cyber defense assistance to Ukraine through their program. The report identified both direct indicators, where effectiveness can be assessed via concrete measures, and proxy indicators, where possible contributing factors are assessed on a scale of perceived impact.⁶⁵

Reaction – Ukrainian coordination and adaptation

On top of domestic development efforts, Ukrainian government officials spent concerted time and effort to build relationships that would serve as the foundation for future cooperation. Fedorov‘s tech diplomacy work forged new connections with these companies, as well as their leadership and employee bases, that in many ways enabled the speed of company response following Russia’s February 2022 invasion. “When the invasion began, we had personal connections to these companies,” Fedorov said. “They knew who we are, what we look like, what our values are and our mission is.”⁶⁶

According to Fedorov, in the first month of the war he sent “more than4,000 requests to companies, governments, and other organizations, each one personally signed.”⁶⁷ Some of these connections built on existing relationships, but companies without preestablished links either initiated conversations directly with or received direct requests from the Ukrainian Government. Beyond the Ministry of Digital Transformation, various Ukrainian offices like the State Special Communications Service of Ukraine, Security Service of Ukraine, National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, and Ukrainian National Cybersecurity Coordination Center were engaging in relationship building and outreach efforts in order to coordinate the provision of tech assistance.⁶⁸ According to Bornyakov, the early days of coordination with the international private sector were chaos.⁶⁹ Various offices and employees sent out messages and requests without internal coordination, and products or services were provided without sufficient due diligence to ensure that they were truly useful to the Ukrainian war effort.

The Ukrainian government quickly updated its practices to facilitate more efficient cooperation. Among the first of these moves was a Ukrainian policy change to directly enable increased private sector participation. In February 2022, prior to the invasion, the Ukrainian parliament Verkhovna Rada amended the laws that had barred government use of Cloud services. This change meant that just days before the Russian invasion, companies including Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Cloudflare were able the aid the Ukrainian government and several critical sector entities in migrating their critical data to their cloud servers—a critical move, as Russia’s attacks during the first few weeks of the war specifically targeted physical data centers.⁷⁰ In addition, due to the imposition of martial law, Ukraine adopted two resolutions to streamline public procurement. Resolution 169, adopted on February 28, 2022, enabled government contracting authorities to ignore, when necessary, the procurement procedures required by the laws on public and defense procurement.⁷¹ Resolution 723, passed four months later, added new, more efficient requirements to the procurement process, amending both resolution 169 and resolution 822, most important of which was the introduction of the ProZorro platform as the mandatory electronic procurement system.⁷² As previously discussed, this platform was both a tool to facilitate procurement and to counter corruption in the procurement process at large.

Despite improvements to coordinate more effectively with private tech companies, and even as international coordination mechanisms emerged, a significant contingent of companies has maintained a preference for direct coordination. One government affairs executive noted that their company, like many others, preferred direct coordination with the Ukrainian government since it enabled more immediate and relevant support, and they were skeptical that third-party mechanisms would be as effective.⁷³

Reaction – International aid facilitation

Since the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and even before that, international entities—states, supranational bodies, and non-state groups— played an important role in coordinating technical-focused aid in support of Ukraine.

However, states’ coordination efforts were notably inconsistent. In the first year and a half after the Russian reinvasion, the United States allocated $113 billion in response to the war in Ukraine—largely allocated to the Department of Defense at 54.7 percent, USAID at 32.3 percent, and the Department of State at 8.8 percent.⁷⁴ This money should not be viewed like a check signed over to the Ukrainian government, but rather as money allocated to respond to the Russian invasion through a combination of forms and recipients, primarily the defense industrial base in the United States.⁷⁵ By contrast, private companies publicly announced and celebrated their digital and tech aid to Ukraine. In an interview, one leading tech executive observed a clear dearth of focus from the US government toward digital and tech aid, instead opting for significant humanitarian and more traditional military assistance.⁷⁶ This prioritization was likely an intentional choice—the US government’s perspective seems to have been that it was leading conventional aid by a significant margin and wanted others, like European governments and the private sector, to take the lead on digital and tech matters.⁷⁷Though not speaking specifically on cyber and tech elements, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in February 2025 called publicly for European states to provide the “overwhelming” majority of defense funding for Ukraine, bemoaning what he saw as an “imbalanced relationship.”⁷⁸ Hegseth specifically pushed for the expansion of existing Europe-led coalitions—discussed below—dedicated to coordinating technological aid.⁷⁹

By contrast, industry experts agreed that the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) was a very effective facilitator of private sector aid.⁸⁰ The UK’s efficiency on this issue was due in part to fewer restrictions on aid money between distinct civilian- and military-designated buckets.⁸¹ According to an assessment from the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, which scrutinizes UK aid spending, this flexibility enabled the FCDO to respond and adapt to the constant evolutions of the war and geopolitical environment—thereby acting as an effective channel for private sector assistance into Ukraine.⁸²

The ad hoc nature of many of the early digital assistance programs provided by private companies was in some ways a double-edged sword. In many cases they were present and able to move more quickly than government programs, and in some places they stepped into de facto political roles—shaping the conflict and public understanding of it. However, this efficiency and effectiveness became difficult to sustain in the long run as governments and government-sponsored mechanisms were slow or insufficient to step in to support these efforts.⁸³ US government entities were instrumental in facilitating support from private companies to Ukraine through purchase agreements, such as that of hundreds of Starlink devices and subscriptions in coordination with other governments⁸⁴ and partnerships. US government entities also participated in intelligence sharing and collaboration efforts regarding Russian cyber capabilities and activities⁸⁵ and even conducted hunt forward operations to assist in Ukrainian defense against Russian cyber aggression both before and after the February 2022 Russian invasion.⁸⁶

In various conversations, both industry and government representatives confirmed the lack of effective governmental and supranational coordination and its impact on the private sector, and on Ukrainian defense.⁸⁷ Company representatives across the United States and Europe shared the same refrain: “we can’t keep supporting Ukraine ourselves forever without government assistance.⁸⁸

In addition to bilateral assistance efforts, various entities emerged across the conflict focused on cooperation organization and facilitation of digital and tech aid. The first of these was the CDAC, not a government entity, but a nonprofit organization that brought together a number of cybersecurity and technology organizations to better coordinate assistance efforts. The organization was founded by Gregory Rattray and a coalition of cyber executives to address the impediments and complications that accompanied the early days of digital and tech assistance provision from the private sector. A CDAC representative said in May 2024 that the group had facilitated $20-30 million in tech-related assistance for Ukraine since its inception.⁸⁹ As Ukrainian and CDAC representatives noted, CDAC’s facilitation efforts have since slowed for a variety of reasons: decreased ability to act as an intermediary as requests have become more specific, a stabilization among companies that no longer require a coordinator after their relationships in Ukraine were established, and a lack of sufficient financial support for both CDAC and the companies willing to provide assistance.⁹⁰

The vacuum noted by industry representatives and CDAC founders in the shape of a true digital and tech aid coordination body with the resources and remit to execute that mission is the planned role of the IT Coalition and the Tallinn mechanism. The IT Coalition, part of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG; also known as the Ramstein Group), was established in September 2023 as “a dedicated group of donor nations led by Estonia and Luxembourg within the UDCG framework, focused on delivering support to Ukraine’s Defense Forces in the area of IT, communications, and cyber security.”⁹¹ The group consists of eighteen member countries, with the European Union, NATO, the United States, and France acting as observers.⁹² In 2024 and 2025, the coalition had raised “€1,1 billion in both financial and material assistance.”⁹³ The coalition aims to support Ukraine cyber defense capability and command and control integration while also delivering on more long-term goals such as fostering innovation and cloud adoption. The United States is currently an observing member of the IT Coalition and have thus far has declined taking a more active role. Those familiar with the inner workings of the mechanism have emphasized the clear benefit of a more active US role in the mechanism, as most of the tech companies with whom the organization would like to coordinate are headquartered out of the United States.⁹⁴

The Tallinn Mechanism was established in December 2023 with 11 states to “coordinate and facilitate civilian cyber capacity building” within Ukraine, and is intended to be complementary to military-focused cyber aid facilitation bodies like the IT Coalition.⁹⁵ The Tallinn Mechanism is focused on “amplifying the cyber support of donors to Ukraine in the civilian domain.”⁹⁶ The mechanism raised approximately $210 million by the end of 2024 and has focused on bolstering cyber defense capabilities, especially that of critical national infrastructure, through the public and private provision of hardware and software, incident response, satellite communication provision, and cybersecurity training for government officials.⁹⁷

The international community has certainly made strides to better facilitate technology aid to Ukraine, to counteract the pushing effect that complicates such coordination for technology companies. However, it is yet unclear whether these programs and practices will meet the demands of this conflict, or those of conflicts to come. The most effective element of the tech sector at large’s efforts in Ukraine has been its speed, both in its response to the invasion itself and to individual challenges that have arisen over the course of this war. Meanwhile, government and supranational coordination—aside from those programs already in place—were much slower to implement.

Risk of retaliation

A significant factor shaping the behavior of companies’ work in and with Ukraine is the heightened threat state created by active warfare. Various technology company officials cited their concern about potential backlash—whether financial, cyber, or physical violence—from Russia against their infrastructure, products, and people.⁹⁸ The real risk that these companies took on was informed by a number of factors, such as the application of their products or services by and for military ends, the required physical presence of personnel, products, or infrastructure, and also the degree to which increased Russian aggression against these companies might be a meaningful increase from prewar conditions.

Defense application

An undeniable yet complex risk that companies face as a result of providing support to Ukraine is the threat of Russian retaliatory action. Private sector behavior in Ukraine is shaped by the degree to which the goods and services provided are connected to the conduct of the conflict itself. Products and services provided to civilian groups for purely humanitarian purposes come with a different risk profile than goods that underpin government functions. Though not discrete or exhaustive, cyber and technical aid to Ukraine can be understood in four categories: humanitarian aid, critical infrastructure protection, government support, and military application. In practice, this division exists on a continuum, from purely humanitarian support to products or services that the state itself has come to rely on for the continued provision of government services, with particular importance placed on whether the good is for military use and whether that use is in direct support of combat operations.

By and large, companies have made their own determinations as to how to amend their work in Ukraine, looking not only at the direct military application of their product or service but also examining existing and potential products or services to determine potential applicability for offensive operations—and where to avoid their abuse. A clear example of this is Google’s cessation of the live traffic display functionality within Google Maps. A team of open source researchers at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, under the leadership of Professor Jeffrey Lewis, were allegedly able to infer the early movements of the February 2022 Russian invasion before official reporting by analyzing Google Maps traffic data in combination with radar imagery.⁹⁹ Following these reports, Google announced that it would temporarily disable live traffic data so that it would not be used to plan military operations.¹⁰⁰ An internal task force at Google largely coordinated these and similar decisions to coordinate aid to Ukraine and, most importantly, to examine their actions and decisions in order to identify and address programs that had a potential to cause harm.¹⁰¹ However, even after these amendments were made, Google Maps was again the subject of controversy. In November 2024, Ukrainian defense chiefs accused Google of revealing the location of key military positions following an earlier Google Maps update. According to Russian military bloggers, among these revelations was the position of new air defense systems, including US-made Patriot anti-aircraft missiles, surrounding an airport near Kyiv. According to the head of Ukraine’s counter-disinformation unit Andriy Kovalenko, Google representatives reached out to Ukrainian government officials to address the issue shortly thereafter.¹⁰²

Similar in many ways was the SpaceX effort to restrict use of the Starlink satellite network close to the active front of the war. Though controversial in the public eye, and significant for military operators and planners, the SpaceX decision to restrict the use of Starlink devices near the front was an intentional one—to limit escalation directly supported by their devices. SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell explained “our intent was never to have them use it for offensive purposes.”¹⁰³ The Starlink network, despite these imposed limitations, has undeniably been an extremely useful tool for the Ukrainian military,¹⁰⁴ but its network also supports a much wider geography of users, from individuals to government entities. The inherent dual-use nature of the Starlink network poses a much greater risk should its network be considered a military object. This risk framework is likely a significant part of the drive behind Space X’s creation of Starshield, announced in early December 2022. A partner project to Starlink, Starshield operates on a separate network and is specifically and exclusively for government—rather than consumer and commercial—use.¹⁰⁵ With this application in mind, reports still vary as to whether such a contract, like the $1.8 billion deal with the National Reconnaissance Office, would be operated by the contractee, in this case the NRO, or whether, like Starlink, the service would remain operated by SpaceX.¹⁰⁶ It is possible that this case will follow, in practice, the principle that the closer that the operation of a technology sits to strategic and sensitive national priorities, the higher the risk for both state and company of that technology being operated by said company, and the more likely that technology will come to be operated from within a government body.

Physicality

Products and services that require the physical presence of personnel, products, or infrastructure within Ukraine are the riskiest to undertake. Providing support in this way carries a level of risk that most companies did not have either the willingness or the infrastructure to take on.¹⁰⁷ While some companies, for certain products, chose to partner with government entities to deliver products or services where physical presence was necessary, as in the preceding example, others chose instead to eschew options with such a requirement. In an interview, one expert said, “there were some products that you wanted to go forward with, but you couldn’t. Your informational security can only be as good as your physical security, so projects requiring new physical infrastructure development, or new infrastructure dependencies, was a major stumbling block.”¹⁰⁸

Russia’s cyber-offensive impact

To some degree, most of the technology companies in question—especially those with a preexisting presence in Ukraine—were already a target of a significant volume of Russian cyber intrusion attempts as well as other coercive actions. As one industry executive put it when asked about the role of risk assessment in decisions to deepen their work in Ukraine following the invasion, “we knew the risk, we were already targeted on a daily basis.”¹⁰⁹ The risk of Russian aggression and retaliation remains, but for many large tech companies, their work already took them into spaces where they were in direct or indirect conflict with Russian or Russian-affiliated groups. However, the risk of Russian cyber intrusions against their networks was already a built-in calculation for their existing cybersecurity plans.

In addition to the experience and expectations of many of these private companies, Russian cyber operations accompanying and following its February 2022 invasion were less disruptive than previously anticipated. The most prominent case of coordinated disruption in the information space remains the ViaSat satellite communications system hack during the invasion. As cyber scholar Jon Bateman writes, this intrusion demonstrated clear “timing (one hour before Russian troops crossed the border), clear military purpose (to degrade Ukrainian communications), and international spillover (disrupting connectivity in several European countries).”¹¹⁰ However, the incident appeared to be limited in duration and unclear in impact—senior Ukrainian official Victor Zhora acknowledged the loss to communications during the early hours of the invasion, but later stated that the incident was less disruptive than it could have been because of redundancies in Ukrainian communication methods.¹¹¹

As nonresident senior fellow Justin Sherman explored in May 2025 Atlantic Council report, Unpacking Russia’s cyber nesting doll,¹¹² the comparably muted effectiveness of Russian cyber operations during the war is the result of a multitude of factors including:

Cross-domain coordination difficulties
Resource constraints
Interagency competition
Intentional strategic prioritization
Ukrainian defensive strength

Sherman goes on to explain that while cyber operations against Ukraine did not have that catastrophic impact expected by some—the promised cyber Pearl Harbor—Russian cyber capabilities should not be underestimated.¹¹³

In just the first year of the war, Russia and—importantly—non-state actors in Russia’s orbit, launched a multitude of cyberattacks and intrusions against the public and private sector in Ukraine—including those entities relying on products, platforms, or infrastructure owned and operated by Western tech companies.¹¹⁴ In May 2025, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency released a joint cybersecurity advisory highlighting this threat, and explicitly calling out Russian targeting of “those involved in the coordination, transport, and delivery of foreign assistance to Ukraine.”¹¹⁵ The question at hand, then, is not what level of risk is associated with these actions but how prepared the company is to encounter such risks.

Reaction – Risk definition and mitigation

In response to the risk of Russian retaliatory action, either through cyber or kinetic means, states and intranational bodies had a role to play in helping companies to navigate and mitigate these risks. The first method by which this was attempted was in an increased clarity on the types of actions that may be considered military or escalatory in nature. Additionally, in many cases states were necessary partners in securing any element of product delivery or operation required new physical presence in or movement into and across Ukraine.

Definition

Throughout the conflict, industry executives and civil society displayed a great deal of concern about where the line falls between civilian actors and military objectives, and how to ensure that their activities fall squarely on the civilian side of this line. Individuals and companies reiterated a desire for increased clarity on this question from Western governments and international legal bodies.¹¹⁶ Current humanitarian law requires the country at war to target only military objects, defined as objects “whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage” in a manner proportional to the military gain foreseen by the operation.¹¹⁷

In a 2023 report, the International Red Cross posited that, “tech companies that operate in situations of armed conflict should understand and monitor whether the services they provide may amount to a direct participation in hostilities by their employees and whether the company might qualify as a military objective.”¹¹⁸ Essentially, the line between civilian and military object is determined by Russia in its assessment of the battlespace, as well as the broader question of whether the Kremlin is concerned about staying within the bounds of international humanitarian law. The subjectivity of this divide allows for some range in interpretation.¹¹⁹ Indeed some, like Lindsay Freeman at UC Berkeley School of Law, argue that “civilian objects have been intentional, direct targets and not simply collateral damage.”¹²⁰ Ukraine and its allies cannot simply dictate where such a line exists. However, greater clarity from national and supranational entities would provide some measure of cover to these companies and help solidify their ability to make more accurate risk calculations.¹²¹

Mitigation

For products and services that require physical presence, either of people or products, many companies view some kind of partnership with government, local or otherwise, as a virtual necessity to bridge the risk imposed.¹²²

Cisco’s Project PowerUp, led by Senior Security Strategist Joe Marshall of Cisco Talos Intelligence Group,¹²³ is a clear demonstration of this. The project innovated and delivered a new industrial ethernet switch that could ensure continued effective power grid management even when Russian GPS jamming blocked Ukrenergo substation synchronization, and avoid the resulting forced outages across the Ukrainian power grid.¹²⁴ The delivery of these devices into Ukraine was coordinated via a phone call to a US government official who coordinated the first shipment on an upcoming cargo shipment to Poland and then onto a train into Ukraine to be installed by Ukrenergo engineers.¹²⁵ While this project was conceived of and executed by Cisco employees, those involved in the project emphasized the importance of Cisco’s partnership with the US government on this, as well as other private assistance programs.¹²⁶

Several governments and international organizations have established insurance programs, particularly political risk insurance to help shield companies from the financial risk of investment into Ukraine. In 2023, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank issued guarantees of $9.1 million to support the construction and operation in the M10 Industrial Park in Lviv.¹²⁷ Additionally, the US International Development Finance Corporation has established several financial packages guaranteeing millions in political risk insurance for a variety of projects.¹²⁸ Within Ukraine, war and political risk insurance is offered by the Export Credit Agency, which insure loans for qualifying Ukrainian businesses against such risks, as well as for direct investment from or into Ukraine.¹²⁹ The Ukrainian Ministry of Economy also drafted a law, in cooperation with the National Bank of Ukraine, which would create a unified framework for political or war risk insurance, with a focus on mitigating risks that may deter foreign investments.¹³⁰

The physical element of presence in Ukraine and especially near the battlefield remains a clear demarcation between activities that are the realm of the public sector and those that are the realm of the private sector. In this area, cooperation and coordination between companies and governments could largely follow established practices and procedures. But, for technology whose infrastructure does not touch the territory of Ukraine, the question of where the line is between civilian product and military object, and where bodies like NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations would define that line to be, resembles a gradual gradient rather than a stark line.

Key takeaways and conclusion

Behind much of the discussions and debates among various groups on the role of the private sector in in the war in Ukraine is a deeper anxiety about the evolving character of warfare as we reach the quarter marker of the twenty-first century. The integration and implementation of new technologies and its effect on the practice of war is familiar territory for theoreticians and practitioners alike, from Douhet’s theories on the supremacy of air power to the revolution of military affairs (RMA) school of thought, to those today that focus on the effect of evolving drone tactics on the operation and strategy of war. Less comfortable, however, is the analysis of what changes in technology may mean in practice not just for the conduct of war itself, but more fundamentally for the very nature of actors whose abilities and choices shape the conduct of war.

Over the past few years, private companies, especially technology companies based in North America and Western Europe have made decisions as to whether and how to contribute to the Ukrainian war effort in ways that have greatly impacted the ability of the Ukrainian government to direct and effectuate its own defense. In other words, they have moved beyond the status of resource providers in this conflict toward something more resembling actors in and of themselves, at times approaching the importance of states in their contributions.

Clarity of conflict

The war in Ukraine—especially in the first months and years of the war— was notably less divisive in the court of public opinion in the West than many other contemporary conflicts. The historical context of the Russia-Ukraine relationship, along with the sustained aggression launched against Ukraine for more than a decade prior to this invasion and the nature of the invasion itself, combined with myriad factors including those discussed throughout this report, created conditions conducive to widespread sympathy and support across much of Western Europe and North America. The efforts of the Ukrainian government proactively built on these conditions both before and after the invasion. Ukrainian leaders, Zelenskyy in particular, both publicly and in private conversations with government and private sector representatives, clearly communicated the effects of Russian aggression against Ukraine and the actions undertaken by the Ukrainian government and its people.

Clarity of conflict, as a motivating factor for tech companies’ decision-making over the course of this conflict, was important in creating favorable conditions for such choices, but is not determinative. Most important as a lesson applicable in potential future conflicts, is that the seeds that grew these conditions into place were planted well before Russian forces rolled across the Ukrainian borders in February 2022.

Business alignment

Many firms had preexisting operations, employees, or customers in Ukraine—generating both a sense of duty and a pragmatic incentive to safeguard assets and personnel. Firms that were already active in Ukraine, or whose services directly contributed to protecting their employees and customers, were the most proactive and consistent contributors. Additionally, companies could derive direct or indirect benefits from their engagement. Several firms leveraged their involvement as an opportunity for product testing, cybersecurity innovation, and real-world validation of technologies under extreme conditions. In doing so, companies not only supported Ukraine’s defense but also advanced their own technical capabilities and reputational standing.

Ukraine’s long-term digital transformation further enhanced this alignment. Over the past decade, the government has implemented legal and technical reforms aimed at combating corruption and promoting digital industry growth, positioning the country as a prospective regional tech hub and a credible, innovation-friendly partner. This proactive transformation reassured corporate partners that their investments and assistance could be practicable and impactful.

For future conflicts, states will need to account for business alignment factors as an important driving factor in private sector’s decision-making. This includes the uncomfortable, yet important finding that this includes companies’ ability to profit, or at a minimum, sustain their operations in a conflict in a way that maintains their organizational health, noting that companies’ motivations will not always align with that of the states in which they are headquartered. While moral conviction catalyzed early engagement, sustained corporate involvement in Ukraine depended on alignment between ethical action and business strategy.

Difficulty of coordination

Even amid broad goodwill, the initial months of the war revealed the challenge of coordination. Companies often struggled to identify appropriate Ukrainian counterparts, assess needs accurately, or ensure that their offerings were deployed effectively. Early efforts were marked by confusion—with multiple government offices issuing overlapping requests and little centralized control. As Bornyakov later acknowledged, the early days of outreach “were chaos.”

Many of the most significant factors that shaped company involvement were already in place and being acted upon before the February 2022 Russian invasion. Preexisting relationships were key, both as a motivating factor and a facilitating factor, effectively minimizing coordination friction. Additionally, the technological and policy developments well underway before the February 2022 invasion created the appealing Ukrainian tech landscape and improved coordination necessary once the conflict was underway.

While private companies excelled in speed and agility, governments brought scale, reliability, and regulatory legitimacy. The war illustrated how preparedness for potential future conflicts will depend on preestablished coordination frameworks that merge these strengths—enabling rapid mobilization of technological capabilities, matching private capabilities with public needs in real time.

Risk of retaliation

Providing assistance to Ukraine exposed technology companies to new security risks from cyberattacks, sanctions, or kinetic threats against personnel or infrastructure. The degree of perceived risk—and retaliation—varied depending on each company’s exposure, particularly for firms whose technologies had direct military applications or some kind of physical presence.

Ambiguity around international law, cyber norms, and export controls can delay or discourage private assistance. Companies must understand whether providing certain technologies or services could be construed as escalatory, illegal, or sanctionable. Private firms are increasingly targeted in state-level cyber operations. The possibility of retaliation, in any of a myriad of forms, was a serious risk for companies aiding Ukraine; managing and sharing that risk is essential to sustaining long-term cooperation.

To mitigate these risks, Ukraine and allied governments played an essential supportive role, clarifying the boundaries between civilian and military assistance, helping companies avoid escalatory missteps and, in some cases, underwrote contracts or insurance to shield firms from loss. Such measures demonstrate the emerging need for risk-sharing frameworks between states and corporations. In cases where physical operations within Ukraine were necessary, governments provided logistical and security coordination to protect personnel and assets. Such collaboration underscores an emerging model of public-private security cooperation, wherein states and corporations jointly navigate the blurred boundaries between national defense and digital resilience.

If private technology companies’ decisions and actions are so impactful to the conduct of war, as they have shown themselves to be, then the character of warfare has evolved in such a way as to require states to likewise evolve in the ways that they provide military assistance and plan for potential future conflicts. The foundation for this evolution needs to be a greater understanding of the factors in the case of Ukraine that most greatly impacted company decision-making regarding their participation, or not, in the conflict space, starting with the four factors identified in this report: those that pulled companies toward cooperation, and those that pushed companies away. By assessing the factors that drove companies’ decision-making in Ukraine, states can better plan and prepare for future crises and conflicts—and not leave such critical capabilities, once again, to chance.

About the author

Emma Schroeder is an associate director with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Tech Programs. Her focus in this role is on developing statecraft and strategy for cyberspace useful for both policymakers and practitioners. Her work focuses on the role of cyber and cyber-enabled technology in conflict and crime.

Originally from Massachusetts, Schroeder holds an MA in History of War from King’s College London’s War Studies Department. She also attained her BA in International Relations & History, with a concentration in Security Studies, from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

Acknowledgements

This report was made possible by the participation of dozens of scholars and practitioners who shared their expertise and experiences with the author.

Thank you to the Cyber Statecraft Initiative team for their support, particularly Nikita Shah and Trey Herr for their guidance. Particular thanks to Emerson Johnston, Grace Menna, and Zhenwei Gao for their research assistance, as well as to Nancy Messieh, Samia Yakub, and Donald Partyka for the creation and review of language and digital assets. All errors are the author’s own.

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The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs, works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

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1 All unattributed interviews were conducted in confidentiality with the author, and the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

2 “Russia/Ukraine: Invasion of Ukraine Is an Act of Aggression and Human Rights Catastrophe,” Amnesty International, March 1, 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/03/russia-ukraine-invasion-of-ukraine-is-an-act-of-aggression-and-human-rights-catastrophe/.

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25 Interview with threat intelligence executive at US cybersecurity nonprofit, April 2, 2024.

26 Sam Bresnick, Ngor Luong, and Kathleen Curlee, Which Ties Will Bind: Big Tech, Lessons from Ukraine, and Implications for Taiwan, Center for Security and Emerging Technology (Georgetown University), February 2024, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/which-ties-will-bind/.

27 “Putin signs law forcing foreign social media giants to open Russian offices,” Reuters, July 1, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/technology/putin-signs-law-forcing-foreign-it-firms-open-offices-russia-2021-07-01/; Human Rights Watch, Russia: Growing Internet Isolation, Control, Censorship, June 18, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/18/russia-growing-internet-isolation-control-censorship.

28 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, August 28, 2024.

29 “Google’s Russian Subsidiary Files Bankruptcy Document,” Reuters, May 18, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/googles-russian-subsidiary-files-bankruptcy-document-2022-05-18/; “Google’s Russian Subsidiary Recognised Bankrupt by Court—RIA,” Reuters, October 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/googles-russian-subsidiary-recognised-bankrupt-by-court-ria-2023-10-18/.

30 Google Wins UK Injunction over YouTube Block on Russian Broadcasters,” Reuters, January 22, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/technology/google-wins-uk-injunction-over-youtube-block-russian-broadcasters-2025-01-22/.

31 Interview with executive at US multinational technology corporation, date withheld.

32 Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2025.

33 Interview with threat intelligence executive at US cybersecurity nonprofit, May 2, 2024.

34 Interview with business development executive at US information and communications technology corporation, July 18, 2024.

35 Vera Bergengruen, “How Tech Giants Turned Ukraine into an AI War Lab,” TIME, February 8, 2024, https://time.com/6691662/ai-ukraine-war-palantir/.

36 Interview with information security executive at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation, May 8, 2024.

37 Bergengruen, “How Tech Giants Turned.”

38 Industry Executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

39 Bergengruen, “How Tech Giants Turned.”

40 Robert Hart, “Clearview AI: Controversial Facial-Recognition Firm Fined $33 Million for Illegal Database,” Forbes, September 3, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2024/09/03/clearview-ai-controversial-facial-recognition-firm-fined-33-million-for-illegal-database/; Kashmir Hill, “The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It,” New York Times, January 18, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html.

41 Paresh Dave and Jeffrey Dastin, “Exclusive: Ukraine Has Started Using Clearview AI’s Facial Recognition during War,” Reuters, March 13, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-ukraine-has-started-using-clearview-ais-facial-recognition-during-war-2022-03-13/; Kashmir Hill, “Facial Recognition Goes to War,” New York Times, April 7, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/07/technology/facial-recognition-ukraine-clearview.html; Vera Bergengruen, “Ukraine’s ‘Secret Weapon’ Against Russia Is a Controversial U.S. Tech Company,” TIME, November 14, 2023, https://time.com/6334176/ukraine-clearview-ai-russia/; Drew Harwell, “Ukraine is scanning faces of dead Russians, then contacting the mothers,” Washington Post, April 15, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/04/15/ukraine-facial-recognition-warfare/.

42 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, May 2, 2024; Interview with information security executives at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation, May 8, 2024.

43 “Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2021–2025,” National Agency on Corruption Prevention (Ukraine), 2021, https://nazk.gov.ua/en/anti-corruption-strategy/.

44 Oleksandr Bornyakov, “Why Ukraine is Going All In on Tech to Rebuild Economy,” Fortune, August 24, 2022, https://fortune.com/2022/08/24/ukraine-going-all-in-tech-rebuild-economy-international-oleksandr-bornyakov/.

45 Integrity and Anti-Corruption Review of Ukraine, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, May 2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/7dbe965b-en.

46 Robert Peacock, The Impact of Corruption on Cybersecurity: Rethinking National Strategies Across the Global South, Atlantic Council, July 1, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-impact-of-corruption-on-cybersecurity-rethinking-national-strategies-across-the-global-south/; Software Management: Security Imperative, Business Opportunity, Business Software Alliance, June 2018, https://www.bsa.org/files/2019-02/2018_BSA_GSS_Report_en_.pdf.

47 Alona Savishchenko, “How Open Source E-procurement System Prozorro Helps to Sustain Ukrainian Economy,” Open Source Observatory, European Commission, November 19, 2024, https://interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu/collection/open-source-observatory-osor/news/e-procurement-prozorro-support-ukrainian-economy; “EProcurement System ProZorro,” Observatory of Public Sector Innovation, https://oecd-opsi.org/innovations/eprocurement-system-prozorro/.

48 Robert Peacock, The Impact of corruption; Software Management, Business Software Alliance.

49 “About UNITED24,” UNITED24 – The Initiative of the President of Ukraine, accessed October 20, 2025, https://u24.gov.ua/about; Guest, “Mykhailo Fedorov is Running.”

50 Daryna Antoniuk, “Two Ukraine Cyber Officials Dismissed amid Embezzlement Probe,” The Record, November 20, 2023, https://therecord.media/two-ukraine-cyber-officials-dismissed-amid-embezzlement-probe; “Misappropriation of UAH 62 million during the purchase of software: the leadership of the State Special Communications Service is suspected,” National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, news release (in Ukrainian), November 20, 2023, https://nabu.gov.ua/news/zavolod-nnia-62-mln-grn-pri-zakup-vl-programnogo-zabezpechennia-p-dozriu-t-sia-ker-vnitctvo-derzhspetczviazku/.

51 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, May 2, 2024; Interview with information security executives at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation, May 8, 2024; Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2024.

52 Bergengruen, “How Tech Giants Turned.”

53 Bergengruen, “How Tech Giants Turned.”

54 “Ukrainian Tech Industry Shows Resilience in the Face of War — IT Research Ukraine 2024,” techukraine.org, December 5, 2024, https://techukraine.org/2024/12/05/ukrainian-tech-industry-shows-resilience-in-the-face-of-war-it-research-ukraine-2024/.

55 “Diia City,” Diia, accessed October 20, 2025, https://city.diia.gov.ua/en.

56 Mykhailo Fedorov, “Ukraine’s Vibrant Tech Ecosystem Is a Secret Weapon in the War with Russia,” UkraineAlert (Atlantic Council), August 17, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-vibrant-tech-ecosystem-is-a-secret-weapon-in-the-war-with-russia/.

57 Greg Rattray, Geoff Brown, and Robert Taj Moore, The Cyber Defense Assistance Imperative: Lessons from Ukraine, Aspen Digital, May 2025, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Aspen-Digital_The-Cyber-Defense-Assistance-Imperative-Lessons-from-Ukraine.pdf.

58 “CDAC: “The Scale of What We Can Do is Severely Hampered by not Having Funding for Dedicated Staff or to Fulfill Requirements Directly,” Common Good Cyber, May 29, 2025, https://commongoodcyber.org/news/interview-cdac-funding/.

59 Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2024.

60 Interview with business development executive at US information and communications technology corporation, July 18, 2024; Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, May 2, 2024; Interview with information security executives at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation, May 8, 2024.

61 Interview with business development executive at US information and communications technology corporation, July 18, 2024.

62 Interview with threat intelligence executive at US cybersecurity nonprofit, April 2, 2024; Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

63 Industry executive, “IT Coalition” Roundtable, Atlantic Council, February 21, 2024.

64 Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2024; Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

65 “Cyber Defense Assistance Evaluation Framework,” Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative, June 18, 2024, https://crdfglobal-cdac.org/cda-evaluation-framework/.

66 Peter Guest, “Mykhailo Fedorov is Running,” WIRED, July 25, 2023, https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-runs-war-startup/.

67 Cat Zakrzewski, “4,000 letters and four hours of sleep: Ukrainian leader wages digital war,” Washington Post, March 30, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/30/mykhailo-fedorov-ukraine-digital-front/.

68 Interview with tech assistance coordination executive, US nonprofit organization, July 17, 2025.

69 Bergengruen, “How Tech Giants Turned.”

70 Colin Demarest, “Data Centers Are Physical and Digital Targets, Says Pentagon’s Eoyang,” C4ISRNET, November 17, 2022, https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2022/11/17/data-centers-are-physical-and-digital-targets-says-pentagons-eoyang/.

71 Oleh Ivanov, “Procurement During the Full-Scale War,” Vox Ukraine, October 14, 2022, https://voxukraine.org/en/procurement-during-the-full-scale-war.

72 “On Amendments to the Resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 822 of September 14, 2020 and No.169 of February 28, 2022,” Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, June 24, 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/723-2022-%D0%BF#n2.

73 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, August 28, 2024.

74 Elizabeth Hoffman, Jaehyun Han, and Shivani Vakharia, Past, Present, and Future of US Assistance to Ukraine: A Deep Dive into the Data, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), September 26, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/past-present-and-future-us-assistance-ukraine-deep-dive-data.

75 The difficulty, for the purposes of this paper, is understanding the breakdown of this assistance as it applies to digital and tech-focused aid to Ukraine. The author found examples breaking down US government assistance by general category (i.e., humanitarian, military, financial) and breakdowns of weapons systems aid (e.g., tanks and air defense systems) but little enumeration of the kind and amount of digital and tech aid provided by the US government. See “Ukraine Support Tracker,” Kiel Institute for the World Economy, updated October 14, 2025, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker.

76 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, August 28, 2024.

77 Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024; Interview with information security executive at US multinational technology corporation, August 28, 2024; Interview with threat intelligence executive and government affairs executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, October 2, 2024.

78 Alex Therrien and Frank Gardner, “Hegseth Sets Out Hard Line on European Defense and NATO,” BBC News, February 12, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy0pz3er37jo.

79 Jon Harper,“Hegseth Puts Onus on Allies to Provide ‘Overwhelming Share’ of Weapons to Ukraine,” DefenseScoop, February 12, 2025, https://defensescoop.com/2025/02/12/hegseth-ukraine-defense-contact-group-allies-military-aid-trump/.

80 Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024; Interview with threat intelligence executive and government affairs executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, October 2, 2024.

81 Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

82 “UK aid to Ukraine,” Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), April 30, 2024, https://icai.independent.gov.uk/html-version/uk-aid-to-ukraine-2/.

83 Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2024.

84 “SpaceX, USAID Deliver 5,000 Satellite Internet Terminals to Ukraine,” Reuters, April 6, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/technology/spacex-usaid-deliver-5000-satellite-internet-terminals-ukraine-2022-04-06/; Alex Marquardt, “Exclusive: Musk’s SpaceX Says it Can No Longer Pay for Critical Satellite Services in Ukraine, Asks Pentagon to Pick Up the Tab,” CNN, October 13, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/13/politics/elon-musk-spacex-starlink-ukraine; Michael Sheetz, “Pentagon Awards SpaceX with Ukraine Contract for Starlink Satellite Internet,” CNBC, June 1, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/01/pentagon-awards-spacex-with-ukraine-contract-for-starlink-satellite-internet.html.

85 “United States and Ukraine Expand Cooperation on Cybersecurity,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, July 27, 2022, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/united-states-and-ukraine-expand-cooperation-cybersecurity; David Jones, “White House Warns of US of Possible Russian Cyberattack Linked to Ukraine Invasion,” Cybersecurity Dive, March 22, 2022, https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/white-house-warns-russian-cyberattack-ukraine/620755/; Egle Murauskaite, “U.S. Assistance to Ukraine in the Information Space: Intelligence, Cyber, and Signaling,” Asymmetric Threats Analysis Center (University of Maryland), February 2023, https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/us-assistance-ukraine-information-space-intelligence-cyber-and-signaling.

86 Maj. Sharon Rollins, “Defensive Cyber Warfare: Lessons from Inside Ukraine,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2023, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/june/defensive-cyber-warfare-lessons-inside-ukraine; “Before the Invasion: Hunt Forward Operations in Ukraine,” US Cyber Command (declassified briefing), November 28, 2022, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/rmsj3h-751×3/2022-11-28-CNMF-Before-the-Invasion-Hunt-Forward-Operations-in-Ukraine.pdf; Dina Temple-Raston, Sean Powers, and Daryna Antoniuk, “Ukraine Hunt Forward Teams,” The Record, October 18, 2023, https://therecord.media/ukraine-hunt-forward-teams-us-cyber-command.

87 Interview with tech assistance coordination executive at US nonprofit organization, July 17, 2025; Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, August 28, 2024.

88 “Interview with threat intelligence executive at US multinational technology corporation, April 22, 2024; Industry executive, “IT Coalition” Roundtable, Atlantic Council, February 21, 2024; Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2024; Interview with threat intelligence executive and government affairs executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, October 2, 2024.

89 Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2024.

90 Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2024.

91 “Luxembourg, Estonia, and Ukraine Have Launched the IT Coalition,” Government of Luxembourg, September 19, 2023, https://gouvernement.lu/en/actualites/toutes_actualites/communiques/2023/09-septembre/19-bausch-itcoalition.html.

92 “Ukraine Defence Contact Group: Estonia and Luxembourg Announce New Contributions to IT Coalition,” European Pravda, April 8, 2024, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/8/7183316/; “IT Coalition Established by Estonia and Luxembourg … Has Raised about 500 Million Euros in Its First Year,” Republic of Estonia Ministry of Defense, December 12, 2024, https://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/en/news/it-coalition-established-estonia-and-luxembourg-help-ukraine-has-raised-about-500-million-euros.

93 “IT Coalition Led by Estonia and Luxembourg Has Raised over One Billion Euros to Support Ukraine,” Republic of Estonia Ministry of Defense, May 28, 2025, https://kaitseministeerium.ee/en/news/it-coalition-led-estonia-and-luxembourg-has-raised-over-one-billion-euros-support-ukraine.

94 Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

95 “Formalization of the Tallinn Mechanism to Coordinate Civilian Cyber Assistance to Ukraine,” US Department of State (Office of the Spokesperson), December 20, 2023, https://2021-2025.state.gov/formalization-of-the-tallinn-mechanism-to-coordinate-civilian-cyber-assistance-to-ukraine/.

96 “Tallinn Mechanism Raises €200 Million to Support Ukraine’s Resilience in Cyberspace,” Republic of Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 20, 2024, https://www.vm.ee/en/news/tallinn-mechanism-raises-eu200-million-support-ukraines-resilience-cyberspace.

97 “Joint Statement Marking the First Anniversary of the Tallinn Mechanism,” US Department of State (Office of the Spokesperson), December 20, 2024, https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-marking-the-first-anniversary-of-the-tallinn-mechanism/.

98 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, August 28, 2024; Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

99 Rachel Lerman, “On Google Maps, Tracking the Invasion of Ukraine,” The Washington Post, February 25, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/02/25/google-maps-ukraine-invasion/.

100 Marc Cieslak and Tom Gerken, “Ukraine Crisis: Google Maps Live Traffic Data Turned Off in Country,” BBC News, February 28, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-60561089.

101 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, date withheld.

102 Seb Starcevic, “Ukraine Slams Google for Revealing Location of Military Sites,” Politico, November 4, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-google-reveal-location-military-site/; James Kilner, “Google Maps ‘reveals location’ of Ukrainian military positions,” The Telegraph, November 4, 2024, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/11/04/ukraine-angry-google-maps-reveal-location-military-position/.

103 Alex Marquardt and Kristin Fisher, “SpaceX Admits Blocking Ukrainian Troops from Using Satellite Technology,” CNN, February 9, https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/09/politics/spacex-ukrainian-troops-satellite-technology/index.html.

104 “Russia Using Thousands of SpaceX Starlink Terminals in Ukraine, WSJ says,” Reuters, February 15, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-using-thousands-spacex-starlink-terminals-ukraine-wsj-says-2024-02-15/.

105 “Starshield,” SpaceX, accessed October 20, 2025, https://www.spacex.com/starshield/; Joey Roulette and Marisa Taylor, “Exclusive: Musk’s SpaceX Is Building Spy Satellite Network for US Intelligence Agency, Sources Say,” Reuters, March 16, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/musks-spacex-is-building-spy-satellite-network-us-intelligence-agency-sources-2024-03-16/.

106 Tim Fernholz, “The Big Questions About Starshield: SpaceX’s Classified EO Project,” Payload, March 22, 2024, https://payloadspace.com/the-big-questions-about-starshield-spacexs-classified-eo-project/; Brian Everstine, “SpaceX: DoD Has Requested Taking Over Starship Individual Missions,” Aviation Week Network, January 30, 2024, https://aviationweek.com/space/spacex-dod-has-requested-taking-over-starship-individual-missions; Sandra Erwin, “Pentagon Embracing SpaceX’s Starshield for Future Military SATCOM,” SpaceNews, June 11, 2024, https://spacenews.com/pentagon-embracing-spacexs-starshield-for-future-military-satcom/.

107 Interview with information security executive at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation, May 8, 2024; Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, March 1, 2024; Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

108 Interview with information security executive at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation, May 8, 2024.

109 Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

110 Jon Bateman, Russia’s Wartime Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Influences, and Implications, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 16, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/12/russias-wartime-cyber-operations-in-ukraine-military-impacts-influences-and-implications?lang=en.

111 Rafael Satter, “Satellite Outage Caused ‘Huge Loss in Communications’ at War’s Outset—Ukrainian Official,” Reuters, March 15, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/satellite-outage-caused-huge-loss-communications-wars-outset-ukrainian-official-2022-03-15/; Kim Zetter, “ViaSat Hack ‘Did Not’ Have Huge Impact on Ukrainian Military Communications, Official Says,” Zero Day (Substack), September 26, 2022, https://www.zetter-zeroday.com/viasat-hack-did-not-have-huge-impact/; Emma Schroeder with Sean Dack, A Parallel Terrain: Public‑Private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment, Atlantic Council, February 27, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-parallel-terrain-public-private-defense-of-the-ukrainian-information-environment/.

112 Justin Sherman, Unpacking Russia’s Cyber Nesting Doll, Atlantic Council, May 20, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/russia-tomorrow/unpacking-russias-cyber-nesting-doll/.

113 Justin Sherman, Unpacking Russia’s Cyber.”

114 Shane Huntley, “Fog of War: How the Ukraine Conflict Transformed the Cyber Threat Landscape,” Threat Analysis Group blog (Google), February 16, 2023, https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/fog-of-war-how-the-ukraine-conflict-transformed-the-cyber-threat-landscape/.

115 “Russian GRU Targeting Western Logistics Entities and Technology Companies,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, May 21, 2025, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-141a.

116 Industry executive, “IT Coalition” Roundtable, Atlantic Council, February 21, 2024; Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, March 1, 2024; Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024; Interview with information security executive at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation; Interview with threat intelligence executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, July 26, 2024.

117 International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), (June 8, 1977), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36b4.html.

118 Protecting Civilians Against Digital Threats During Armed Conflict: Recommendations to States, Belligerents, Tech Companies, and Humanitarian Organizations, ICRC Global Advisory Board on Digital Threats during Armed Conflict, October 19, 2023, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/protecting-civilians-against-digital-threats-during-armed-conflict, 15.

119 Zhanna L. Malekos Smith, “No ‘Bright‑Line Rule’ Shines on Targeting Commercial Satellites,” The Hill, November 28, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/3747182-no-bright-line-rule-shines-on-targeting-commercial-satellites/; Emma Schroeder and Sean Dack, A Parallel Terrain: Public‑Private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment, Atlantic Council, February 27, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-parallel-terrain-public-private-defense-of-the-ukrainian-information-environment/.

120 Lindsay Freeman, “Evidence of Russian Cyber Operations Could Bolster New ICC Arrest Warrants,” Lawfare, March 13, 2024, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/evidence-of-russian-cyber-operations-could-bolster-new-icc-arrest-warrants.

121 Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

122 Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

123 Joe Marshall, “Project PowerUp – Helping to Keep the Lights on in Ukraine in the Face of Electronic Warfare,” Cisco Talos Intelligence blog, December 4, 2023, https://blog.talosintelligence.com/project-powerup-ukraine-grid/.

124 Joe Marshall, “Project PowerUp;” Interview with threat intelligence executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, July 26, 2024.

125 Sean Lyngass, “Exclusive: This Pizza Box-sized Equipment Could Be Key to Ukraine Keeping the Lights on This Winter,” CNN, November 21, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/21/politics/ukraine-power-grid-equipment-cisco/index.html; Industry executive, “Tales from Ukraine” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, November 20, 2024; Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

126 Industry executive, “Tales from Ukraine” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, November 20, 2024

127 World Bank Group, “MIGA Backs Industrial Park in Ukraine,” news release, September 28, 2023, https://www.miga.org/press-release/miga-backs-industrial-park-ukraine.

128 US International Development Finance Corporation, “DFC Announces $357 Million in New Political Risk Insurance for Ukraine,” news release, June 12, 2024, https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-announces-357-million-new-political-risk-insurance-ukraine-russias.

129 “Your Business in Ukraine 2025,” KPMG Ukraine, March 2025, https://kpmg.com/ua/en/home/insights/2025/03/your-business-in-ukraine.html.

130 “Developments in War‑Risk Insurance Products for Investments in Ukraine,” Dentons, December 5, 2024, https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2024/december/5/developments-in-war-risk-insurance-products-for-investments-in-ukraine.

The post Building the digital front line: Understanding big tech decision-making in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cole discusses the future of the Navy in National Defense magazine

ajohnson — Fri, 14 Nov 2025 16:42:28 +0000

On November 10, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow August Cole was featured in a compendium article in the National Defense magazine titled “The Navy and Marine Corps at 250: A Look to the Future as the Sea Services Celebrate Their Quarter Millennial Anniversary.” Cole’s contribution, “A Navy Driven by Both Software and Steel,” discusses how the Navy will continue to evolve with automation, artificial intelligence, and other emerging technologies.

Fellow

August Cole

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The post Cole discusses the future of the Navy in National Defense magazine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hammes publishes issue brief on containerized weapons with Stimson Center

ajohnson — Wed, 12 Nov 2025 19:24:23 +0000

On November 6, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Thomas X. Hammes published an issue brief with the Stimson Center titled “We Can’t Buy Our Way Out: It’s Time to Think Differently.” Hammes urges the Pentagon to focus on a new generation of containerized weapons that can be mass produced in order to field capabilities to deter or succeed in a conflict against China.

Fellow

Thomas X. Hammes

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Industry

The post Hammes publishes issue brief on containerized weapons with Stimson Center appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It’s time to reckon with the geopolitics of artificial intelligence

Frederick Kempe — Tue, 11 Nov 2025 12:57:47 +0000

The headlines from Donald Trump’s recent meeting with Xi Jinping were all about the US and Chinese presidents reaching a trade truce. But what was lost in the news is a far more significant matter that will shape the high-stakes competition unfolding between the world’s two most significant powers: the contest for the commanding heights of artificial intelligence (AI).

The world has entered the most consequential tech race since the dawn of the nuclear age, but this time the weapons are algorithms instead of atoms. Rather than a race to obtain a single superweapon, this is one to determine how societies think, work, and make decisions. AI is transforming not only the distribution of power around the globe but also the very nature of that power and how it will be exercised.

A race with generational consequences

The Chinese government sees AI as a crucial driver for what it calls “comprehensive national power.” That’s why it is so focused on the rapid integration of AI into surveillance, consumer products and services, advanced manufacturing, military modernization, and even scientific discovery under a unified state strategy. As Tess deBlanc-Knowles, senior director with Atlantic Council Technology Programs, tells me, “One of the notable aspects of China’s approach is the prioritization of application, or what is called ‘AI-plus.’ China has an advantage over the US in terms of providing direction and incentives for the integration of AI across all sectors of the economy.”

When it comes to AI development and deployment, China’s private sector must be subservient to the will of the Communist Party. The cycle of innovation that results is distinct from Western conceptions of more loosely connected relationships among policymakers, industry, and academia.

The United States, by contrast, relies much more heavily on the singular dynamism of its private sector, open research culture, and international alliances. The US government struggles to coordinate its private stakeholders and universities at any national scale. The country remains hamstrung by weakening legal protections for privacy and intellectual property that tend to introduce ambiguity rather than clear running lanes.

And run the United States must. Failure to maintain US leadership on AI could have generational consequences. The outcome of this contest will determine which values—authoritarian efficiency or democratic dynamism—set global norms on everything from digital commerce to autonomous warfare.

“The escalating AI race is drawing comparisons with the Cold War, and the great scientific and technological clashes that characterized it,” write Josh Chin and Raffaele Huang in the Wall Street Journal today. “It is likely to be at least as consequential.” They write that both China and the United States “are driven as much by fear as by hope of progress.”

Helping the US and its allies mobilize, iterate, and deliver

There’s little doubt that who wins this race will depend on who can produce the most advanced chips, the best models, the most potent computers, and the cheapest and most sustainable energy for a proliferation of purposes.

More significantly, the emerging AI contest is about defining the world’s future standards in areas such as freedom, privacy, and even human dignity. The design of the internet—its core protocols and standards—reflected a bias toward openness, self-organization, and free speech that have shaped two generations of lives online and trillions of dollars in consumer technology. This moment in the AI era offers the same pivotal opportunity for influence. If the United States and its allies lose this race, that could produce a world in which AI becomes more of an instrument for political and autocratic control than one for individual and democratic empowerment.

With so much at stake, the Atlantic Council last week launched its GeoTech Commission on Artificial Intelligence as our flagship initiative to address this historic moment. It will bring together congressional leaders, top industry executives, and innovators across the AI ecosystem to ensure that the United States maintains its technological preeminence in an AI-defined world. Our aim is to help the United States and its allies mobilize more stakeholders, iterate faster, and deliver actionable strategies to ensure US and allied leadership—and a more enlightened, prosperous, secure, and democratic future.

The GeoTech Commission, of which I’m a member, will focus on overall competitiveness across six critical realms: AI innovation, supply chains, energy sources, government adoption and oversight, talent development, and international alliances. Rather than prioritizing some of these realms over others, it will integrate these pieces to address what asserting US leadership and winning the AI race should look like. The race for AI doesn’t boil down to one single measure or factor.

Los Alamos this isn’t

I began by writing that the current tech race is the most consequential for humanity since the beginning of the nuclear era. Some have gone further, drawing a direct comparison between the race for AI preeminence and the Manhattan Project that produced the first nuclear weapon. What’s true is that the AI race, like the Manhattan Project before it, will be decided to some extent by scientific breakthroughs. Both also share the potential for great good and catastrophic harm.

Yet this is also a misleading analogy. The Manhattan Project was a clandestine, centralized, US government-led sprint at a time of world war. The US government did have an important role in enabling the AI revolution through the development of technical foundations for deep learning and other advancements. But it has been private industry, not the government, that has leveraged and innovated to get to today’s capabilities.

To win this race, governments know they must work effectively with private companies such as Anthropic, Google, Nvidia, Microsoft, and OpenAI in the United States and Alibaba, DJI, High-Flyer, and Huawei in China. Such companies wield budgets and global reach that would make most defense ministries blush.

‘China is going to win the AI race’

The American edge is in its democratic, free market, innovative ecosystem, which at its best is an unmatched magnet for talent and capital. Yet that ecosystem is also a vulnerability in that Washington can’t control or leverage its tech champions for any overriding national security purpose in the manner Beijing does routinely.

“China is going to win the AI race,” Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang told the Financial Times this past week, pointing to Beijing’s looser regulations, new energy subsidies, and direct intervention to assist its champions. Industry leaders worry that the Trump administration focuses more on restricting what US firms can sell to China than on energetically helping its companies win the race. “We need more optimism,” Huang said a week after Trump announced that he would stop China from gaining access to both Nvidia’s cutting-edge Blackwell chips and a less advanced chip designed explicitly for the Chinese market, and just a few days after the company reached an unprecedented market capitalization of five trillion dollars.

China’s system fuses state and private ambition in a manner that could be decisive, mobilizing government, private capital, and leading-edge science around common cause dictated by Xi and the Communist Party. The system intentionally aligns national goals with corporate incentives. While US companies focus on winning markets, competing with each other, and turning profits, Chinese companies that fail to serve the state and the party do so at their own peril.

In the United States, by contrast, the messiness of the free market could prove an enduring strength in directing capital, talent, and attention to cutting-edge technologies. Winning the race to adopt AI will require newly integrated thinking across the development, use, and consequences of the technology, rather than a narrow focus on how to build more chips or run faster models.

The Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Commission on Artificial Intelligence will grapple with this integrated question and identify how best to counter China’s capacity to leverage its entire society toward technological ends. The Manhattan Project changed history with an explosion. The demonstrations of success won’t be as dramatic with AI, but they will affect every person on the globe. And the outcome may be just as far-reaching in determining what group of countries and which set of values determine the future.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The GeoTech Commission on Artificial Intelligence

Enabling US and allied leadership in the age of AI

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Ukraine’s drone war lesson for Europe: Technology is nothing without training

David Kirichenko — Tue, 11 Nov 2025 00:47:02 +0000

As Europe races to strengthen its defenses against the mounting threat posed by Russian drones, more and more countries are looking to learn from Ukraine’s experience. Speaking in October, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen acknowledged that Ukraine is currently a world leader in drone warfare and called on her European colleagues to “take all the experiences, all the new technology, all the innovation from Ukraine, and put it into our own rearming.”

It is clear that Europe has much to learn. A spate of suspected Russian drone incursions during the second half of 2025 have highlighted the continent’s vulnerability to drone-based aggression and raised fundamental questions over whether European armies are currently preparing for the wrong kind of war. While Europe’s rearmament efforts continue to gain ground, even big spenders like Poland remain focused primarily on traditional weapons systems. This is fueling concerns that European defense policymakers may not fully appreciate the growing dominance of drones on the battlefields of Ukraine.

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Ukraine’s embrace of drone warfare since 2022 can provide Kyiv’s partners with a wide range of important insights. Following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost four years ago, Ukraine has turned to relatively cheap drone technologies in order to offset Moscow’s often overwhelming advantages in conventional firepower and reduce the country’s dependence on Western weapons supplies. As a result, the number of Ukrainian drone producers has skyrocketed from a handful of companies to hundreds, while overall drone output has shot up to millions of units per year.

Ukraine’s vibrant prewar tech sector has proved a major asset, serving as fertile ground for the dynamic expansion of the country’s defense sector. Meanwhile, Ukrainian initiatives like the government-backed Brave1 defense tech cluster have helped to empower innovators and optimize cooperation between the army, the state, and individual drone producers. In summer 2024, Ukraine became the first country to establish a separate branch of the military dedicated to drones with the launch of the Unmanned Systems Forces.

The results speak for themselves. Drones are now thought to be responsible for up to three-quarters of Russian battlefield casualties, with Ukrainian army units creating a “drone wall” around ten kilometers in depth along the front lines of the war. At sea, Ukraine has used naval drones to break the Russian blockade of the country’s ports and force Putin to withdraw the bulk of his fleet away from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea coast. Kyiv has also deployed an expanding arsenal of long-range drones to strike high-value targets with increasing frequency deep inside Russia.

In addition to these offensive roles, drones have become a vital element in Ukraine’s air defenses. Since 2024, Russia has dramatically increased the production of kamikaze bomber drones, making it possible to launch hundreds of drones at targets across Ukraine in a single night. The sheer scale of these attacks has meant that traditional missile-based air defenses are no longer practical due to the high cost and limited availability of interceptor missiles. Instead, Ukrainian defense companies have focused on developing and producing interceptor drones in large quantities.

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So far, European efforts to learn from Ukraine’s drone warfare experience have concentrated primarily on securing access to the latest Ukrainian drone innovations. This approach certainly makes sense. However, many Ukrainian specialists have stressed that as their European partners look to develop drone capabilities of their own, effective training programs will be just as important as advanced technologies.

Maria Berlinska, who heads Ukraine’s Victory Drones project, has argued that up to 90 percent of success in drone warfare depends on the training of the team behind the drone rather than the technology involved. “A drone on its own, without the coordinated work of the team, delivers nothing,” she commented in an October 2025 article addressing the need for skilled drone crews.

Training an effective drone pilot is a complex task that can take at least three months. Many categories of drone operators must also be able to act as engineers and mechanics with the ability to repair and reconfigure their systems in the field. To help meet this challenge, Ukraine has developed a strong network of volunteer organizations dedicated to training new drone pilots and preparing them for combat operations. By late 2024, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense had certified over thirty training centers for drone operators. Novel innovations include a mobile drone school located inside a converted bus.

Speaking to Euronews in October, Ukrainian drone warfare expert Fedir Serdiuk warned that Europe was currently focusing too much on drone technologies while overlooking the need to train operators and commanders in the effective battlefield use of drones. “I don’t see as many training centers being built as factories. It’s a major mistake. Not only for technical skills but also for tactical skills,” he commented.

Ukraine appears poised to play a central part in the training of Europe’s drone forces. Ukrainian trainers have already reportedly begun sharing their expertise with a number of countries including Britain, Denmark, and Poland. This trend reflects an important eastward shift in Europe’s defense landscape, with Ukraine emerging as a key contributor to the continent’s future security. This contribution will draw heavily on technological innovations developed during the war with Russia, but it will also emphasize the importance of effective training.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

The Eurofighter Typhoon is one of Europe’s three principal combat aircraft options alongside the French Dassault Rafale and Sweden’s Saab Gripen. US dominance in the continent’s weapons markets is becoming more pronounced, as evidenced by the F-35’s consecutive wins in European tactical combat aircraft tenders. Nevertheless, the Eurofighter forms the backbone of various countries’ airwings, where it operates as a bridge between legacy capabilities and future air warfare concepts. Telltale indicators suggest that the baseline will keep flying until the 2060s, though some nations will likely phase it out sooner. The four-nation program, involving the British, German, Italian, and Spanish defense industries, also supports the production of military aerial engines in Europe.

To provide the Turkish Air Force with the Eurofighter Typhoons, Britain’s BAE Systems will lead major airframe manufacturing and weapons integration, primarily in Lancashire and other production pipelines. The British government estimates that the deal will create twenty thousand new jobs throughout the United Kingdom. The Turkish order will likely involve a comprehensive weapons systems package, including Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles and Brimstone air-ground munitions. Unlike the AMRAAM missile’s solid-propellant power pack, the Meteor, with a range of some 124 miles, uses a rocket-ramjet combination that enables it to endure longer flight paths. As a major munitions producer in NATO, ranging from aero-ballistic missiles to cruise missiles and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles, Turkey will likely ask the Eurofighter Typhoon’s European consortium to certify its indigenous weapons systems to the Turkish Air Force’s forthcoming tactical airwing. Doing so will offer Ankara more freedom of movement in operational planning without being desperately reliant on the Eurofighter Typhoon’s European weapon systems configurations. As the war in Ukraine has demonstrated, a strong national munitions portfolio is essential when fighting prolonged showdowns via high-tempo combat operations.

From Britain to the Gulf: Scaling the Typhoon fleet to meet Turkish air-warfare demand

The British aircraft will be new, hailing from the latest Tranche-4 variant of the Eurofighter Typhoon baseline. However, the delivery timeline will extend to 2030. Turkey needs the Eurofighter Typhoons as a stopgap capability between its aging F-16 fleet and its forthcoming, fifth-generation airpower asset, KAAN. Recognizing this five-year gap, the Turkish government is eying Gulf Arab Eurofighter arsenals. Turkish defense outlets suggest that Ankara is looking to procure a twelve-platform Eurofighter Typhoon package from the Qatari Tranche-3A AESA radar-equipped pool. Oman’s small Typhoon arsenal could also be a modest source for the Turkish Air Force, though Turkey has closer ties to Qatar and more diplomatic capital in Doha than it does in Muscat. Buying immediately from Qatar or Oman would allow Turkey to develop its pilot pool’s and ground crews’ understandings of the Eurofighter Typhoon and achieve operational capability within a few years. Such a move would make the Turkish Air Force a Eurofighter-flying branch before the British Tranche-4 deliveries kick in. At this juncture, it is important to monitor if Ankara will pursue a parallel track to finalize F-16V modernization amid price disputes and negotiations with the US defense giant Lockheed Martin. Given the United States’ decades-long dominance in the Turkish tactical aircraft market, this dispute with Lockheed Martin, at a time when Turkish and European defense cooperation is expanding, could lead to further defense trade reshuffles.

A fourth-generation answer to a fifth-generation problem

Strategically, Turkey’s Eurofighter deal with Britain is far more than an off-the-shelf purchase. It anchors deeper Turkish-British defense ties and preserves a key European production line. For Ankara, the deal modernizes its fleet, improves allied interoperability, and positions Turkey in a stronger air warfare posture within NATO. The Eurofighter can also provide the industrial bridge that Turkey needs while facing shortfalls in fifth-generation capabilities caused by its exclusion from the United States’ F-35 program and the lengthy development runway of its indigenous KAAN multirole platform. If realized, shared maintenance, logistics, avionics, and weapons integration for the Eurofighter Typhoon can even lay some groundwork to help KAAN’s co-development, allowing Turkey to evolve from being merely a buyer to a defense partner, although there is little, if any, chance that Ankara will join the European consortium behind the Eurofighter baseline.

Turkey’s Eurofighter Typhoon procurement delivers an immediate NATO-standard boost to its airpower, offering credible air superiority and standoff strike capacity across the nation’s troubled neighborhood, which has been shaped by wars. High-end weapons, such as the Meteor and the Brimstone, will enhance the Turkish aerial deterrent’s firepower, while the Eurofighter’s agility, twin-engine reliability, and modern sensors will offer more advantages.

Still, the Eurofighter Typhoon is not the F-35. The combat aircraft lacks low observability. Thus, combat-deploying the Eurofighters in heavily defended airspace would require very careful planning, intensive electronic warfare support, and coalition enablers. It is not the legacy F-16, either: keeping highly combat-ready Eurofighter Typhoon squadrons will require allocating more resources and money. They are more demanding and expensive beasts to operate. Moreover, flying a dual tactical airwing, consisting of the F-16s and the Eurofighter Typhoons, would inevitably lead to swollen defense expenditures for Ankara and Turkish taxpayers: it will be sustainable but surely costlier.

Nonetheless, amid political fluctuations, this diversification of suppliers is an insurance policy for Turkey in a world that has been losing its once-predictable diplomatic patterns. The Eurofighter Typhoon deal does not mean that the Turkish Air Force would no longer need the F-16V modernization, nor would it end the nation’s quest for achieving the fifth-generation tactical combat aircraft capability. In practical terms, the twenty-piece Eurofighter Typhoon package for the Turkish Air Force, one of the largest operators of the F-16s around the globe, is like a good protein bar for an Olympic athlete. It would not compensate for a full meal, but would still offer a feasible, interim solution under time pressure.

Can Kasapoğlu is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a co-editor of the Atlantic Council Turkey Program’s Defense Journal.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Rich Outzen interview with i24 on UK assistance to Belgium’s counter-drone defenses

aozen — Sun, 09 Nov 2025 13:55:12 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

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Learning the lessons from Ukraine’s fight against Russian cyber warfare

Oleksandr Bakalynskyi, Maggie McDonough — Thu, 06 Nov 2025 19:36:30 +0000

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine is among the most technologically advanced wars the world has ever seen. But while the rapid developments taking place in drone warfare tend to attract most attention, the cyber front of the conflict also offers important lessons for international audiences.

The Russian state and affiliated groups have been refining their cyber warfare tactics in Ukraine ever since the initial onset of Russian aggression in 2014. In January 2022, Ukrainian government sites and other critical elements of the country’s digital infrastructure experienced a series of major cyber attacks in a precursor to the full-scale invasion, which began weeks later.

This escalating cyber war has made Ukraine both a critical source of intelligence on Russia’s evolving cyber capabilities and a front line arena for cyber defense strategies. Cyber operations have become integral to Russia’s campaign of aggression, with cyber attacks and kinetic strikes frequently coordinated. Today’s Russian cyber strategy involves continuous, adaptive, and multi-vector operations encompassing malware, phishing, and disinformation.

Ukraine’s cyber defense is critical to international security and the stability of the global digital environment. As a testing ground for Russian cyber tools, Ukraine faces attacks that, once refined, can be directed against allied governments, critical infrastructure, and private sector entities. The question is not whether such attacks will occur, but when this will happen, how costly these attacks will be, and how quickly recovery can be achieved.

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Unlike conventional warfare, cyberspace has no borders. A criminal or adversary can strike targets in Kyiv, Washington, or New York with equal ease. Sustained collaboration between Ukrainian, United States, and allied cyber specialists is therefore critical, especially given the escalating cyber threat posed by China, North Korea, Iran, Belarus, and their state-backed proxy groups.

Despite the growing threat, institutional capabilities for a coordinated response by Ukraine, Europe, the US, and other allies are still underdeveloped. The NIS2 Directive, the legal framework that sets minimum cyber security standards across the EU, was an important step toward increasing coordination around risk management, threat sharing, and supply chain security. However, the process of building a dynamic cyber defense coalition has been slow, given the large number of jurisdictions in Europe.

To compound these challenges, Western governments have often been hesitant to share sensitive information with Ukrainian counterparts, or even with each other. Thankfully, there are measures that can be adopted to offer more effective support to Ukraine while still safeguarding classified information. These include sharing tiered or sanitized intelligence reports, conducting joint cyber security operations, and expanding advisory access to expertise. Sustained knowledge exchange, international assistance, and cooperative engagement remain essential to countering the breadth and sophistication of Russian cyber operations.

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Ukraine’s experience highlights the importance of increased investment in critical infrastructure protection. Since 2014, Russia has repeatedly targeted Ukraine’s critical infrastructure with cyber offensives designed to disrupt vital services. The cyber defense of these assets is highly specialized and requires specific strategies.

Cooperation between the public and private sectors is crucial in the fight against Russian cyber warfare. Civilian engagement and private sector partnerships have played important roles in Ukraine’s cyber defense, with both groups filling gaps that government and military structures cannot fully cover, especially under conditions of relentless hybrid warfare. However, there are a number of problematic related issues that need to be resolved.

One of the most difficult topics in terms of legislation is the issue of cyber volunteers. Ukrainian initiatives such as the IT Army have shown that civilians are prepared to work long hours to protect their country. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s private sector and international companies have provided a multi-layered defense by combining technical expertise, rapid incident response, and coordination with state authorities and civilian volunteers.

These contributions have proved vital in the struggle to preserve Ukraine’s digital sovereignty, protect citizens, and support the broader war effort. But many questions remain. How can large numbers of volunteers be effectively vetted? How should they be organized, when in many cases they are not cyber security specialists? Who should lead? Do volunteer cyber defenders become legitimate military targets? One solution could be to formalize a framework for civil-military-tech collaboration integrating vetted civilian volunteers with appropriate oversight.

There is a strong case for strengthening sanctions against Russia’s IT sector. Sanctions already play a critical role in constraining the Kremlin’s offensive cyber capabilities, but additional measures could further limit access to advanced technologies and signal the risks of collaboration with sanctioned entities, thereby reducing opportunities for knowledge transfer.

Potential measures include technology export bans, targeted entity designations, secondary sanctions, restrictions on software and cloud services, limitations on talent pipelines, and the financial isolation of IT firms. Implemented multilaterally, these steps could weaken Russia’s ability to innovate in cyber warfare, increase the Kremlin’s reliance on less advanced domestic technologies, and raise the cost of sustaining long-term cyber operations against Ukraine and its allies.

Finally, it is important to underscore that people remain the central element of effective cyber defense. Even with regular training designed to strengthen the skills of cyber defenders, individuals remain vulnerable to cyber fraud and social engineering techniques. Addressing these risks requires not only technical safeguards but also robust organizational policies and a sustained commitment to individual vigilance. Continuous awareness, preparedness, and adaptability are therefore essential components of a comprehensive cyber security posture.

Dr. Oleksandr Bakalinskyi is a Senior Researcher at the G. E. Pukhov Institute for Modeling in Energy Engineering at the National Academy of Sciences in Ukraine. Maggie McDonough is currently affiliated with the Center for Education & Research in Information Assurance and Security at Purdue University, where she serves as a technical advisor on global cyber security resilience programming.

The UN investigation identified numerous instances on Russian attacks on first responders, including the bombing of ambulances and fire brigade crews attempting to provide emergency aid following earlier strikes. With sudden death from above now an everyday fact of life for the local population, residents of southern Ukraine say they feel hunted and refer to the relentless Russian drone attacks as a “human safari.”

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The drones deployed by the Russian military in this bombing campaign feature video cameras allowing operators to carefully select and track victims, confirming the deliberate and calculated nature of the killings. “All the types of short-range drones used in these attacks are equipped with live streaming cameras that focus on particular targets, leaving no doubt about the knowledge and intent of the perpetrators,” the UN report confirmed.

Russian intent it further underlined by the widespread practice of posting ghoulish video footage online celebrating drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians. These posts are often accompanied by menacing language and warnings for remaining Ukrainian residents to flee the area. “Russian military units often release videos of drone-eye views of civilians being killed, to be posted online by the units or groups affiliated with the Russian army, apparently as a means of amplifying the threat,” reports the New York Times.

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This new UN report underscores the industrial scale and systematic nature of Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Moscow’s efforts to displace the civilian population in the Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv provinces are only one part of a broader Kremlin campaign to render much of Ukraine unlivable. This depopulation strategy is designed to fuel anti-government sentiment within Ukrainian society and increase the pressure on the Kyiv authorities to capitulate, while also generating fresh waves of Ukrainian refugees and setting the stage for further Russian advances.

In addition to the human safari tactics employed in regions of southern Ukraine located close to the front lines, Russia is engaged in a nationwide bombing campaign of civilian infrastructure that aims to deny Ukrainians access to basic amenities such as heating, electricity, and running water. These attacks are part of a long-running airstrike offensive that escalates each year on the eve of the winter season as Russia seeks to weaponize subzero temperatures and freeze the Ukrainian population into submission.

Since the beginning of the current year, Moscow has also increased the terror bombing of residential districts and other civilian targets such as hospitals and kindergartens in cities across Ukraine. This is fueling a climate of fear and has resulted in a series of mass casualty attacks including a ballistic missile strike targeting Palm Sunday churchgoers in Sumy and the bombing of a park and children’s playground in Kryvyi Rih. Ukrainian civilian casualties surged by 31 percent year-on-year during the first nine months of 2025 due to this intensification of Russian drone and missile strikes.

In a separate probe conducted earlier this year, UN human rights investigators determined that Russia is also guilty of committing crimes against humanity targeting the civilian population in occupied regions of Ukraine. A report released in March 2025 found that Moscow’s large-scale program of illegal detentions and mass deportations throughout areas of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control was “perpetrated pursuant to a coordinated state policy and amounts to crimes against humanity.”

These United Nations findings make a complete mockery of Russia’s attempts to deny targeting Ukrainian civilians. While Kremlin officials frequently assert that the Russian army never deliberately conducts strikes on non-military objects and respects the human rights of noncombatants, overwhelming evidence identified by United Nations investigators demonstrates that Russia is in fact engaged in systematic and centrally coordinated efforts to attack Ukraine’s civilian population.

Russia’s use of drones to conduct a “human safari” in southern Ukraine marks a grim new milestone in the long history of Kremlin war crimes against civilians. UN investigators have now recognized this lethal drone campaign as a crime against humanity. Putin’s decision to target the Ukrainian civilian population in this coordinated manner is a reminder that the current Russian invasion is not only an attempt to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation; it is also an attack on the fundamental principles of international law.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Linda Lourie

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Artificial Intelligence Australia

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US voices concern over Chinese support for Russia’s Ukraine invasion

Katherine Spencer — Thu, 23 Oct 2025 14:20:49 +0000

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has raised concerns over Chinese components in Russian military drones amid fresh allegations of Beijing’s mounting support for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Speaking in mid-October, Bessent announced that the US would soon release photo evidence supplied by the Ukrainian government indicating China’s growing involvement in the war.

China has claimed neutrality throughout Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and denies providing lethal weapons to either party in the conflict. However, evidence including publicly available trade data, satellite activity, and indications of drone development between Russian and Chinese companies tell a different story.

A Washington Post report published on October 13 claimed that China has dramatically increased shipments to Russia of critical parts required to build fiber-optic drones used extensively by Putin’s army on the battlefields of Ukraine. In particular, the quantity of exported fiber-optic cables and lithium-ion batteries has skyrocketed in recent months. In August 2025, China exported a record 328,000 miles of fiber optic cable to Russia. In the same month, China supplied the Russians with approximately $47 million of lithium-ion batteries.

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Both Russia and Ukraine have been heavily reliant on Chinese drone components throughout the past three and a half years of full-scale war. However, export volumes to Russia now dwarf deliveries of key component categories to Ukraine. Many Ukrainians have come to view their dependence on Chinese suppliers as a strategic liability. This vulnerability has been highlighted by restrictions imposed by China on drone component exports to Ukraine including motors, navigation cameras, and flight controllers.

Beijing’s support for the Russian war effort allegedly goes far beyond the provision of drone components. At the end of September, Reuters reported that Chinese experts were traveling to Russia to develop military drones at a state-owned weapons manufacturer currently under Western sanctions. The Russian arms maker in question was accused of producing a new drone, the Garpiya-3, in collaboration with Chinese experts.

Garpiya-3 strike drones are said to feature Chinese technologies and have an operational range extending hundreds of kilometers. Kyiv claims around five hundred of these drones are now being launched at targets inside Ukraine every month. China has denied the reports. If confirmed, this and other instances of collaboration between Russian arms producers and Chinese companies would represent a flagrant violation of Beijing’s stated neutrality.

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Chinese support for the Russian military has also extended to assisting Moscow with the provision of satellite imagery in order to help Russian forces identify potential Ukrainian targets. In October, a senior Ukrainian intelligence official stated that China was supplying satellite intelligence to Russia to facilitate missile strikes inside Ukraine.

Such accusations are not new. In 2023, the US Treasury Department sanctioned seven Chinese firms for providing high-resolution satellite imagery to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. In 2024, a Financial Times report citing senior US officials asserted that China was assisting in the development of Russia’s satellite and space-based capabilities, while also sharing current satellite imagery in support of the Russian war effort.

Claims of deepening military collaboration between China and Russia are complicating efforts by the Trump administration to broker a peace deal and end the largest European invasion since World War II. Despite multiple rounds of sanctions on Russian and Chinese companies, the US and EU do not appear to have made any progress toward reducing the stream of dual use Chinese components heading to Russia.

In recent months, US State Department officials have estimated that China is now providing “nearly 80 percent” of the sanctioned dual use items Russia requires to continue the war in Ukraine. The significance of this Chinese contribution cannot be overstated. Without a steady supply of cheap Chinese drone components, for example, it is unlikely that Russia would be able to maintain the bombardment of Ukrainian cities and the country’s civilian infrastructure at anything like the current intensity.

Bessent’s recent remarks are an encouraging sign that the US authorities recognize China’s integral role in enabling Russia’s invasion. However, further steps are needed. Cooperation between Beijing and Moscow in areas including the development of new military technologies and the sharing of satellite information for bombing raids cannot be ignored. This problematic collaboration will continue to undercut efforts to end the war in Ukraine until it is addressed.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Elliot Ackerman

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Defense Policy

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Tomahawk missiles are Russia’s latest red line. Will Trump call Putin’s bluff?

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 14 Oct 2025 21:44:05 +0000

As the United States moves closer to a decision on supplying Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles, the Kremlin is cranking up the rhetoric in a bid to deter US President Donald Trump. Commenting on Sunday, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov acknowledged that the issue of Tomahawks was causing “extreme concern” in Moscow and said the war was now entering a “dramatic moment” with tensions escalating on all sides.

Others were even more outspoken. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev led the way with a thinly-veiled nuclear threat directed personally at Trump. “It’s been said a hundred times, in a manner understandable even to the star-spangled man, that it’s impossible to distinguish a nuclear Tomahawk missile from a conventional one in flight,” Medvedev noted. “The delivery of these missiles could end badly for everyone. And most of all, for Trump himself.”

Medvedev’s nuclear saber-rattling has been echoed by Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Long seen as Putin’s closest international ally and a junior partner in the Kremlin’s Ukraine invasion, Lukashenka warned this week that any decision to provide Kyiv with the US-made long-range missiles could have disastrous ramifications for international security. “Tomahawks will not solve the problem. They will escalate the situation to a nuclear war,” he told colleagues in Minsk.

It is easy to understand why Moscow so adamantly opposes the idea of sending Tomahawks to Ukraine. With a potential range of up to 2500 kilometers, these powerful missiles would make it possible for the Ukrainian army to radical expand their current campaign of long-range strikes against military and industrial targets deep inside Russia. Kyiv has already been able to significantly damage Putin’s war machine using domestically produced drones and missiles. There is now clearly a growing sense of alarm in Moscow that the additional firepower provided by American Tomahawks could tip the balance further in Ukraine’s favor.

The real question is whether Russia’s latest threats deserve to be taken seriously. After all, Kremlin officials have frequently used similarly apocalyptic language throughout the past three and a half years of full-scale war, but have consistently failed to back their words up with actions. Time and again, Moscow has declared a new red line while warning the West of potential Russian reprisals, only to then do nothing when these red lines are subsequently crossed.

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Russia’s attempts to impose red lines on Ukraine’s Western allies are a key part of the intimidation tactics employed by Putin since the start of the war. During his address announcing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin threatened the West with “such consequences that you have never faced in your history” if they dared to intervene. This rather obvious reference to nuclear war set the tone for the relentless nuclear blackmail that has followed. When it became apparent last year that Putin’s nuclear bluster was losing its potency, he ostentatiously revised Russia’s nuclear doctrine to lower the threshold for nuclear strikes and heighten the fear factor throughout the democratic world.

Russia’s nuclear threats have certainly not been subtle, but they have proved surprisingly effective against risk-averse Western leaders. From the eve of the invasion onward, every single debate over the delivery of new weapons to Ukraine has been dragged out and delayed by overblown fears of possible escalation and craven talk of the need to avoid provoking Putin.

The timidity of the West has only served to embolden the Kremlin dictator and prolong the war, enabling Russia to punch well above its geopolitical weight against far wealthier and better armed opponents. Indeed, while his armies have struggled to advance on the battlefields of Ukraine, Putin’s ability to intimidate the West has been arguably his single biggest success of the entire invasion.

This success is all the more remarkable given how many times Putin’s threats have been exposed as empty. Russia’s unilaterally declared red lines over the supply of everything from Javelin anti-tank weapons and Patriot air defense systems to F-16 fighter jets and Leopard tanks have all eventually been violated without consequence. Likewise, the Ukrainian army has repeatedly demonstrated its complete disregard for Putin’s red lines by liberating large swathes of the country from Russian occupation, chasing the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of Crimea, and invading Russia itself.

None of this has sparked World War III. On the contrary, Putin has responded to each fresh military setback by attempting to downplay the significance of his latest humiliation. Russian retreats have been rebranded in Orwellian fashion as “goodwill gestures,” while earlier protests over the planned delivery of new weapons systems have been replaced by expressions of defiant indifference.

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Based on the wartime experience of the past three and a half years, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that Russia’s red lines are credible. Instead, the only logical conclusion is that Putin has been bluffing all along. Trump must now decide whether he will call Putin’s bluff and arm Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles.

There are mounting indications that he may be inclined to do so. Since the end of summer, the US leader’s rhetoric toward Russia and Ukraine has changed markedly, with Trump mocking the Russian army as a “paper tiger” and stating that Ukraine is now in a position to win the war. Meanwhile, reports have emerged in recent days that the US is already providing vital intelligence support for Ukraine’s long-range strikes against Russia’s oil and gas industries.

Trump’s apparent change of heart can be partially explained by his loss of patience with Putin, who has rejected the US leader’s generous peace terms and has proven himself to be completely untrustworthy during the past eight months of faltering negotiations. The new US stance is also due to Trump’s evolving understanding of the war in Ukraine. Knowledge of Russia’s failed summer offensive and the country’s escalating economic woes appear to have helped persuade Trump that the time has come to rethink his earlier assumptions regarding the inevitability of Russian victory.

There is some speculation, based in part on Trump’s own comments, that the current US strategy is to raise the prospect of arming Ukraine with Tomahawks without actually supplying them in order to bring Putin to the negotiating table. Even if the missiles are delivered, they are not wonder weapons and will not win the war for Ukraine overnight. Nevertheless, the current debate over Tomahawks represents a potentially important turning point in the biggest European war since World War II.

From the onset of the invasion, Putin has managed to limit support for Ukraine by skillfully exploiting the West’s collective fear of escalation. Trump now has an opportunity to convince his Russian counterpart that he is not as easily intimidated as other Western leaders and is more than ready to increase the pressure on Moscow until Putin agrees to pursue peace. Many of Trump’s detractors will no doubt scoff at the idea of the US president adopting such a uncompromising stance toward Putin, but few objective observers would question that this approach is the only way to end the war.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Co-chairs: Deborah Lee James and Ryan McCarthy

Task force director: Stephen Rodriguez

Program director: Clementine G. Starling-Daniels*

Task force staff: Mark J. Massa and Jonathan Rosenstein

* Starling-Daniels’s contributions were completed prior to her departure from a fulltime role at the Atlantic Council in September 2025.

Task force members

Deborah Lee James, board director, Atlantic Council; twenty-third secretary of the Air Force; co-chair of the Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force, Atlantic Council

Ryan McCarthy, twenty-fourth secretary of the Army; co-chair of the Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force, Atlantic Council

Jim Cooper, former US representative (D-TN-05); former chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee

Madelyn Creedon, former assistant secretary of defense for global strategic affairs, US Department of Defense

Doug Lamborn, former US representative (R-CO-05); former chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee

James McConville, general (ret.), US Army; fortieth chief of staff, US Army

Whitney McNamara, senior vice president, Beacon Global Strategies; nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Industry task force members

Felipe Gomez del Campo, CEO, Specter Aerospace

Mick Maher, chief strategy and commercial officer, Amaero

Katrina “Kat” Hornstein, director, vehicle systems, Ursa Major

Michael Johns, senior vice president, Kratos

Mike Manazir, vice president, federal, Hadrian

Mark Rettig, vice president and general manager, Edison Works, GE Aerospace

Ralph Sandfry, director, advanced capabilities, Lockheed Martin

Zach Shore, chief revenue officer, Hermeus

Brian Zimmerman, senior vice president, global defense, Booz Allen Hamilton

Advisors

Reginald Brothers, former under secretary for science and technology, US Department of Homeland Security

Justin Johnson, former senior official performing the duties of the assistant secretary of defense for space policy

Lead author and methodology

Michael E. White was the inaugural principal director for hypersonics in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, serving from October 2018 to June 2023. In that capacity, White was responsible for leading the Pentagon’s vision and strategy for developing offensive and defensive warfighting capability enabled by hypersonic systems. White previously served as the head of the air and missile defense sector at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL). White is a board director of North Wind USA Inc., which provides research, development, test, and evaluation products and services in aerospace and defense, and of Textum, which produces advanced textiles and aerospace composites. As managing member of WhiteAero, LLC, he is a senior defense consultant for hypersonic, air, and missile defense systems and tactical and strategic strike systems. WhiteAero’s clients include Lockheed Martin and GE Aerospace, which are both supporters of the Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force and producers of hypersonic capabilities, as well as Stratolaunch, X-Bow Systems, Cerberus Capital Management, Karman Space and Defense, Textum, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, JHU/APL, ACMI, and Riverside Research, all of which are involved in hypersonic capabilities.

As part of the research process for this report, the lead author conducted several dozen interviews and consultations with members of the Atlantic Council’s Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force, current and former officials in the US Department of Defense, congressional staff members, and industry representatives. The full task force convened several times over the course of the project to develop the findings reflected in this report, but the report’s analysis and recommendations do not necessarily reflect the views of all individuals consulted. This effort was conducted under the leadership of task force director Stephen Rodriguez, former Forward Defense director Clementine G. Starling-Daniels, deputy director Mark J. Massa, and program assistant Jonathan Rosenstein.

This effort has been made possible through the support of Amaero, Booz Allen Hamilton, GE Aerospace, Hadrian, Hermeus, Kratos, Lockheed Martin, Nominal, RTX, Specter Aerospace, and Ursa Major.

The Atlantic Council maintains strict intellectual independence for all of its projects and publications. The Council requires all donors to agree to the Council maintaining independent control of the content and conclusions of any products resulting from sponsored projects.

Foreword

The United States stands at a critical juncture. The strategic environment is defined by the return of great power competition and the rapid proliferation of advanced military technologies that challenge long-held US advantages. China and Russia have invested heavily in systems designed to deny US forces access to key theaters and to strike their forward-deployed assets and allies with unprecedented speed.

The fielding of hundreds of hypersonic weapons by US adversaries represents a paradigm shift in modern warfare, creating a battlefield asymmetry that the United States cannot afford to ignore. This challenge demands more than incremental improvements to the existing force; it requires a fundamental rethinking of the US strategy for deterrence and defense. During our time leading the US Air Force and US Army, we saw good progress against these objectives, but there is much more to be done.

That is why we have served as co-chairs of the Atlantic Council’s Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force. In its final report, the task force puts forth a clear-eyed assessment of this challenge and offers a comprehensive road map for action. The concept of integrated comprehensive layered defeat provides the strategic framework, and the imperative to field offensive hypersonic capabilities provides the critical tool. The recommendations outlined herein are actionable, urgent, and essential to ensuring the United States can meet the demands of this new era. Now is the time to act decisively to close the hypersonic gap and defend the nation’s interests for the future.

The Hon. Deborah Lee James
Twenty-third secretary of the US Air Force;
Co-chair, Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force

The Hon. Ryan McCarthy
Twenty-fourth secretary of the US Army;
Co-chair, Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force

Executive summary

Potential US adversaries such as China and Russia are creating an increasingly contested anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environment, posing a severe challenge to US battlefield dominance on land, at sea, in the air, and in space. It is imperative that the United States develop and field hypersonic strike weapons, in substantial numbers, as part of an integrated comprehensive layered defeat strategy that delivers left- and right-of-launch defeat of each adversary A2/AD capability through integrated kinetic and nonkinetic effects to defeat vulnerable kill-chain elements of the adversary’s warfighting capability. Hypersonic strike systems enable delivery of timely, survivable, lethal effects from outside of an adversary’s defensive perimeter in a timescale of relevance and are essential to ensuring future US warfighting preeminence on a highly contested battlefield. It is also imperative that the United States aggressively pursue defense against adversary hypersonic strike systems to combat the growing number of such systems being fielded.

To address these hypersonic imperatives, it is essential that the US Department of Defense pursue and Congress fund: robust acquisition of the current generation of hypersonic weapons and counter-hypersonic interceptors; block upgrades to these systems to field advanced capability and significantly improve affordability; accelerated development of next-generation systems to achieve affordable capacity; technology maturation to increase capability and affordability for hypersonic strike weapons, hypersonic interceptors, and future reusable hypersonic aircraft; critical workforce initiatives; expansion of the nation’s test infrastructure and modeling and simulation capabilities to accelerate advanced concept development; robust long-range kill webs to allow for effective employment of hypersonic capabilities; and cooperation with allies and partners to coproduce these weapons and interceptors and integrate them into whole-of-alliance defense strategies and plans.

Beyond closing the immediate missile gap, this report also recommends a dedicated effort to mature reusable hypersonic aircraft. These systems offer a transformational capability for persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and responsive strike missions in highly contested environments, ensuring enduring US leadership in the next generation of warfare.

The hypersonic imperative

Any future US battle against a great power rival, and particularly against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Indo-Pacific theater and the Russian Federation in the European theater, will be fought in a highly contested environment where US battlefield dominance will be challenged in each of the warfighting domains: land, air, sea, and space. This challenge will come in the form of the A2/AD warfighting-capability areas described below:

Large numbers of high-speed strike systems, such as ballistic missiles, supersonic missiles, and hypersonic missiles, along with many more conventional subsonic uncrewed aerial vehicles and cruise missiles. These threats will place at risk US, allied, and partner forward land bases and carrier-based sea bases.
Increasingly sophisticated air and missile defense systems designed to prohibit penetration of US strike aircraft and defeat traditional strike weapons.
Terrestrial and spaced-based antisatellite systems that will challenge the space-based elements of US and allied ISR capabilities and the space portions of US kill chains.
Fifth-generation fighters armed with air-to-air missiles with very long ranges that will challenge US air superiority.
Land, maritime, and air-launched antiship and antisubmarine capabilities that will challenge US maritime dominance.
Nonkinetic disrupters, including laser and high-powered microwave systems, cyberattack capabilities, and electromagnetic (EM) spectrum jamming and spoofing, which will challenge all elements of the US offensive and defensive capability suite.¹

These systems create what is oftentimes referred to as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy that proliferates and integrates these high-end systems, at extended range, in a way that is designed to defeat traditional US warfighting capability, including traditional strike weapon systems. (See figures 1 and 2.)

Figure 1: Notional depiction of Russian A2/AD strategy in the European theater

Figure 2: Notional depiction of Chinese A2/AD strategy in the Pacific theater

Defining the challenge

The combination of adversary offensive and defensive capabilities described above create a highly contested environment that has the potential to severely degrade the US ability to maintain battlefield dominance. Addressing these challenges requires an integrated comprehensive layered defeat (ICLD) strategy. (See figure 3.)

Figure 3: Example system elements for ICLD capability to fight within a timescale of relevance

ICLD involves breaking the needed US capability space into four quadrants that include left- and right-of-launch defeat (i.e., before and after launch) of each adversary A2/AD capability, and aggressive use of kinetic and nonkinetic defeat mechanisms (in both phases) to attack and disable vulnerable elements of each respective kill chain. Effective integration of the ICLD warfighting capability requires a dedicated battle management system working to optimize employment across all four capability elements. High-priority targets should be identified based on the specific strategy and mission plan being employed. This strategy should be applied to each element of the adversary’s A2/AD environment.

Take, for example, the mission to defeat the adversary’s strike missile capability described in the A2/AD capability area above. The missile defense modality that gets the most attention is kinetic intercept of an incoming missile by a missile defense system, such as the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Patriot, and Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) for theater defense, or the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, with the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) or eventually the Next-Generation Interceptor (NGI), for defeating nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles.² These systems consist of an integrated network of sensors, command-and-control elements, and interceptors required to perform the detect, control, and engage functions necessary to defeat incoming missiles. While US kinetic, postlaunch missile defeat capability is significant and necessary, it is not sufficient, due to challenges associated with overwhelming numbers, sophisticated tactics, and advanced threats such as hypersonic missiles. These challenges can reduce the effectiveness of each element of the defensive fire-control loop and make defense against a capable adversary very challenging, at best. It therefore becomes essential that the other three elements of the ICLD construct, namely, right-of-launch nonkinetic defeat mechanisms and left-of-launch kinetic and nonkinetic defeat mechanisms, be brought to the fight and integrated to ensure maximum probability of an effective defense. This necessity applies across all six of the A2/AD target areas described above.

While integrated employment of kinetic and nonkinetic options will maximize the effectiveness of postlaunch missile defense systems, a capable and determined adversary can overwhelm a defensive system with numbers and tactics. Therefore, maximum effort must be applied to defeating adversary capability before launch. In other words, an effective defense requires a good offense to deny and degrade the adversary’s ability to employ its A2/AD-enabling systems.

For left-of-launch nonkinetic attack, the objectives are to degrade and/or disable foundational elements of the adversary’s prelaunch kill chain. These include degrading the adversary’s ability to detect and geolocate US targets and to communicate that targeting information to its respective launch assets to help prevent launch. Additionally, attacks on the adversary command-and-control infrastructure would also be an effective means of prelaunch nonkinetic attack.

Even with the other three elements of the ICLD construct, left-of-launch kinetic strike remains an essential component of an effective ICLD construct by enabling the prelaunch physical destruction of required system elements, thereby limiting the number of threats that must be defeated after launch. While the United States has traditionally used subsonic strike capabilities on a battlefield where the timescale of relevance is measured in hours and days, the effectiveness of these systems is severely degraded by today’s peer adversaries that can deploy both high-speed systems to dramatically compress the battlefield timescale and high-end defensive systems to create a highly contested airspace out to an increasingly long range. On such a battlefield, traditional US long-range strike capabilities are simply insufficient to adequately perform the kinetic strike element of ICLD to achieve left-of-launch defeat of time-critical elements of adversary A2/AD capabilities, due to insufficient speed of action at meaningful range and poor survivability. This deficiency greatly jeopardizes the US ability to achieve and maintain battlefield dominance, creating the imperative to field hypersonic strike weapons in meaningful numbers. Once fielded, hypersonic weapons will better enable and then complement more traditional strike capabilities, providing a significant force multiplier.

To fully appreciate the growing asymmetry and the imperative to accelerate the fielding of US hypersonic systems, it is important to understand some of the key challenges and assess the relative status of US hypersonic capability versus China and Russia.

Addressing the challenge

Hypersonic strike systems provide a unique combination of range, speed, survivability, and maneuverability to deliver lethal kinetic effects to defeat a wide range of critical targets in a highly contested environment and within a battlefield timescale of relevance. An aggressive transition to, and fielding of, hypersonic strike capabilities in meaningful numbers is essential to enable US forces to fight in the increasingly compressed timescale being dictated by adversaries’ fielding of high-speed strike systems. The importance of being able to eliminate such an asymmetry between the United States and China was highlighted by then-nominee for Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth when he stated that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces can launch a strike from the Chinese mainland on US carriers located in the Pacific theater within twenty minutes.³ This statement reflects the fact that China has fielded a large number of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic and hypersonic glide weapons designed to carry out high-speed attacks of US and allied forward land and sea bases in the first and second island chain. In both China and Russia, traditional intercontinental nuclear ballistic missiles are being augmented by hypersonic systems being developed, and in some cases fielded, that place the US homeland more at risk. The adversary’s fielding of these weapons dramatically compresses the timescale of any future battle and creates uncertainty that may affect US decision calculus. Without the US fielding of similarly capable systems, a dangerous asymmetry will persist that will dramatically affect the United States’ deterrence posture. This battlefield asymmetry must be addressed with a dedicated and accelerated effort to field US hypersonic strike capabilities to enable success on the tactical battlefield, enhance the effectiveness of the US nuclear deterrent, and provide another rung on the escalation ladder prior to the use of nuclear weapons.

The target sets that define the needed hypersonic strike capabilities for this essential capability include key terrestrial elements of the adversary A2/AD capability areas (described above) such as: the long-range, high-speed strike systems that threaten US forward land, sea, and air bases; integrated air and missile defense launch complexes; terrestrial sites that support adversary kill chains (specifically, command, control, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting [C4ISR&T] nodes); terrestrial components of adversary anti-space capabilities; and other high-value, time-critical, and heavily defended targets. The number of targets that will require hypersonic strike missile allocation early in a war is significant, making it imperative to not only develop survivable, long-range hypersonic strike capabilities, but also to field that capability in significant numbers. This translates into the need to create and fund a family of affordable hypersonic systems supported by a robust and properly incentivized industrial base to deliver affordable hypersonic capacity.

Adversary hypersonic strike capability

The current gap in high-speed and hypersonic capability is significant and growing rapidly. Russia and China have both aggressively developed and fielded hypersonic strike capabilities. Russia has fielded the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile that has been used against Ukraine. Moscow also has fielded the Tsirkon ship-launched hypersonic strike missile and a new intermediate-range, multiple independent reentry vehicle-equipped ballistic missile with a conventional warhead, also used in Ukraine. Perhaps most notably, Russia has fielded the Avangard intercontinental missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle carrying a nuclear warhead that threatens the US homeland.⁴

The 3M22 Tsirkon missile. (Russian Ministry of Defense)

The Avangard. (Russian Ministry of Defense)

The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal. (kremlin.ru)

China has fielded numerous short-, medium-, and intermediate-range high-speed strike systems including ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles with maneuvering reentry vehicles, and hypersonic glide vehicles that can target US and allied land bases in the first and second island chains as well as US aircraft carrier sea bases at extended range. These systems include, among others, the DF-17, the DF-21 family of missiles, and the DF-26 family of missiles. The recent PRC military parade displayed supersonic and hypersonic cruise missiles. Additionally, Beijing has demonstrated and is on the path to fielding global-range strike systems, as shown by the PRC’s nuclear modernization efforts coupled with a fractional orbital system that was flight tested in 2021.⁵

The DF-26. (Wikimedia)

The DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. (Wikimedia)

The DF-17 Intermediate Range Hypersonic Glide Weapon. (Wikimedia)

Russia and China have fielded many hundreds of high-speed strike systems that today pose a dramatic threat to forward land and sea bases as well as to the US homeland. Beyond Russia and China, there have also been numerous media reports that indicate the likely development and deployment of hypersonic systems in North Korea and Iran, among others.⁶ The asymmetry created by the tactical employment of these systems by nonpeer adversaries is likely not as much of a critical issue given their lack of other key capabilities across the battlefield landscape, but they still pose a clear and present threat to US forward presence and to US allies—and the potential for future nuclear versions could be catastrophic.

US hypersonic capability

The United States, which for years had a lead in research related to hypersonic technologies, has been late in recognizing and embracing the military significance of hypersonic systems, which coupled with rapid advancements by US adversaries has created an asymmetry that is growing and that has the potential to jeopardize future US and allied deterrence and battlefield dominance. With an eye toward addressing that asymmetry, there has been good progress in the United States over the past seven years or so relative to developing a family of first-generation hypersonic strike systems for air, land, and sea launch.⁷ However, it is important to note that these systems are just now getting to the point of being ready for fielding.

The AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon Instrumented Measurement Vehicle 2. (Giancarlo Casem for the US Air Force)

Long Range Hypersonic Weapon Transporter Erector Launchers. (Ryan DeBooy/David Kim for the US Army)

A Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile. (Lindsey Iniguez for the US Air Force)

The Army and Navy have worked to develop a common hypersonic missile that can deliver a hypersonic glide body with a conventional warhead that will be able to strike critical targets that are on the order of 1,700 miles downrange in a matter of minutes. That capability is now ready for fielding by the Army as the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), aka Dark Eagle. The plan is for that same missile to be fielded as the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) weapon on Zumwalt-class destroyers and then on Virginia-class submarines.⁸

The Air Force developed a long-range strike system called the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), based on the joint Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and Air Force Tactical Boost Glide program. The integrated ARRW weapon system capability was demonstrated in a successful flight demonstration program that culminated in 2024.⁹ That system delivers survivable, lethal effects many hundreds of miles downrange in minutes. The Air Force completed development of ARRW in 2024 but decided not to field ARRW when it was ready. The new administration has included funding for ARRW procurement and fielding in President Donald Trump’s Fiscal Year 2026 budget request.

The Air Force has continued to allocate funding to develop an air-launched Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) capability.¹⁰ Air-launched, lower-cost hypersonic cruise missiles are an important element of the hypersonic strike portfolio because they are more affordable, smaller, and can be fielded in significant numbers on a wide variety of aircraft.

In addition to the significant progress being made in US development efforts for this family of first-generation strike weapons, there are numerous other key efforts of note. There has been significant additional funding allocated to the Test Resources Management Center (TRMC) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to bolster and energize the nation’s hypersonic test and evaluation enterprise and enhance capability and throughput for ground and flight test.¹¹ There also has been additional OSD funding allocated to bolster the hypersonic industrial base, with presidential determinations signed for munitions, high-temperature materials, propulsion, and guidance and navigation.¹² The Joint Hypersonic Transition Office (JHTO) is making investments in the University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics to help prepare the next-generation workforce and is accelerating the transition of advanced technologies.¹³ There has also been significant private capital funding allocated to establish a cadre of small companies to augment the traditional defense industrial base addressing some of the key hypersonic challenges, such as enabling a much more rapid flight test cadence to accelerate learning and development.

With all that said, the United States continues to face a growing battlefield asymmetry in hypersonic and high-speed weapon systems that jeopardizes US deterrence effectiveness and threatens to degrade or eliminate US battlefield dominance in all warfighting domains. The United States must move more aggressively to close the gap in fielding hypersonic weapon capabilities to ensure that such an asymmetry does not stand.

Meeting the imperative

The gap in high-speed and hypersonic systems has resulted in major implications for the US ability to deter and, if necessary, prevail on the battlefield. The capability gap is magnified by the aggressive deployment of the broader A2/AD strategy discussed earlier and the highly contested warfighting environment being established by US adversaries across all warfighting domains. It is imperative that the gap between the hypersonic capability needed to defeat critical adversary A2/AD capability and the current US trajectory for fielding offensive and defensive systems be aggressively closed. Addressing this imperative is essential to ensuring that the United States can operate in a battlefield timescale of relevancewhile also addressing the highly contested environment that has been created across all battlefield domains. Fielding hypersonic strike systems in significant numbers is essential to enabling defeat of the rapidly increasing set of heavily defended, time-critical targets that simply cannot be addressed with the US military’s legacy set of subsonic strike weapons.

It is important to appreciate that the imperative to field hypersonic strike capability does not replace the need for more traditional US weapons. Quite to the contrary, hypersonic weapons are essential to enabling the United States and its allies to fully leverage their traditional capabilities by defeating high-end adversary systems early in a conflict and “decontesting” the battlefield environment. Therefore, the near-term gap that exists and continues to grow is in the ability to field the number and types of weapons necessary to defeat the heavily defended, time-critical target set that the adversary has employed to challenge US battlefield dominance on land, at sea, in the air, and in space. Looking beyond this immediate need, reusable hypersonic aircraft present an opportunity to achieve this decontesting effect with greater persistence and flexibility. A reusable platform can conduct ISR missions to locate and track mobile targets, a critical enabler for the entire strike complex, and then execute or coordinate a strike itself, providing a rapid sensor-to-shooter capability that expendable missiles alone cannot.

Remaining challenges

While there has been good progress on developing the first generation of US hypersonic systems, there are still significant challenges that remain to accelerate fielding of US capability in the numbers necessary to address adversary A2/AD capabilities. Most important among those challenges is affordability. Current systems being fielded by the United States are based on accelerated prototype designs transitioned to a production environment. The system designs were not optimized for affordability and high-rate production and, as such, initial units are more expensive than traditional strike weapons that have been in production for years or decades. The cost will come down as the production rate increases, but the services must prioritize production at cost-efficient rates and institute cost-reduction initiatives to ensure the United States can affordably field the necessary capacity in the near term.

The United States must ensure that the warfighter is equipped to fully leverage the fielding of the hypersonic strike capabilities. As they are fielded, there must also be a high-priority effort to integrate hypersonic strike capability into US deterrence strategies and war plans for future conflicts. In so doing, DOD planners must include a focus on diverse platform integration, production in meaningful numbers, war plan utilization strategies, and, perhaps most importantly, development and implementation of a robust and effective long-range kill web.¹⁴

A critical challenge that must be overcome to close the capability gap is the inherent bias by the services, and some in OSD, toward next-generation air, land, and sea platforms at the expense of weapon quantity and capability. Each service has historically prioritized funding for development of next-generation platforms that have grown increasingly more complex and expensive due to the need to operate in an ever more contested environment, and they are almost always years late and billions of dollars over budget. As a result, weapons programs have consistently been bill-payers for platform priorities and overruns.

Nothing will be possible without an energized and expanded industrial base that embraces speed of development, affordability, and innovation across the portfolio. The current industrial base is simply not equipped or incentivized to innovate, design, and build hypersonic weapons to achieve affordable capacity. There must be a dramatic shift in perspective to embrace a model that is much more like the automobile, commercial aerospace, and commercial space-access industries than the traditional defense contractor business model. New and innovative contracting incentives should be created through collaboration between the government and industry to motivate the industry behavior essential to national success (i.e., rapid, on-time delivery of highly capable systems at or below clearly defined cost objectives). Investments in the hypersonic industrial base necessary to address this deficiency can come in the form of Defense Production Act Title III investments, Innovation Capability and Modernization (ICAM) program and Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) program investments, and Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) program investments.¹⁵ However, these investments should be targeted to new and innovative ways of achieving affordable capacity for hypersonic systems and should not be used to simply build up traditional industry to do more of the same.

A call for action

The DOD and Congress can, and should, take numerous additional actions to rapidly and efficiently field warfighting capability based on hypersonic strike systems, and to bolster capabilities for defense against rapidly proliferating adversary hypersonic strike and, more broadly, growing A2/AD capabilities. Recommended actions include the following.

1. Create a munitions czar to oversee weapons development and procurement

Problem statement

The US military services are platform-centric, with weapon programs often having lower priority than development and procurement of current and next-generation platforms. These platforms are notoriously expensive, with delays measured in years and consistent cost overruns totaling billions of dollars. Services historically defund weapons programs to pay for these overruns, while also slow-rolling advanced weapons activities that might in any way compete politically with the advanced platform budget allocations.

Recommendation

The DOD should create a direct reporting program manager (DRPM) for weapons, a “weapons czar,” reporting directly to the deputy secretary of defense, and elevate the principal director for hypersonics to be a direct report to that DRPM, with responsibility and authority for defining the vision, strategy, and execution plans for all high-speed weapons programs, including defense against adversary high-speed weapons, in close coordination with the DRPM handling the proposed “Golden Dome” missile shield. The weapons czar should have authority over advanced weapon budget allocations and be held accountable for program execution.

2. Aggressively field and evolve first-generation hypersonic weapons

Problem statement

The United States has made good progress developing its first generation of hypersonic strike weapons. However, fielding has been delayed by technical challenges, budget battles, and shifting priorities, while adversaries continue to expand their arsenals. These initial systems, designed as accelerated prototypes, are also not yet optimized for affordability or high-rate production.

Recommendation

The DOD and Congress should ensure stable funding and priority to aggressively field first-generation hypersonic weapons across air, land, and sea launch platforms at the earliest possible dates, and fully equip units at levels consistent with the DOD’s analysis of warfighting needs. The DOD must work with industry to drive down costs as production rates increase. A block-upgrade strategy should be implemented for each system to rapidly insert advanced capabilities and enhance affordability, allowing them to service a broader set of targets and be procured and fielded in the necessary numbers.

3. Prioritize next-generation hypersonic systems designed for affordable capacity

Problem statement

While first-generation systems are critical for closing the immediate capability gap that adversaries have opened regarding expendable hypersonic missiles, the initial cost of first-generation US systems will limit the capacity that the United States can affordably field. To counter the sheer number of targets presented by the A2/AD strategies of peer adversaries, the United States requires a next-generation family of long-range, high-speed strike systems designed from the outset for affordable, high-rate production and broad launch-platform compatibility. The current industrial base is not structured or incentivized for this kind of rapid, cost-effective innovation.

At the same time, focusing solely on mirroring adversaries’ approach surrenders the strategic initiative. An opportunity remains to lead in the next transformational capability: reusable hypersonic aircraft for responsive ISR and strike missions. As space becomes increasingly contested, hypersonic aircraft could decisively counter adversary A2/AD strategies by enabling persistent, survivable operations from within contested zones.

Recommendation

The DOD should robustly fund two distinct but complementary lines of effort for affordable capacity:

(a) Next-generation expendable missiles: Pursue a family of lower-cost, high-capacity missiles for affordable capacity designed to service a broad set of A2/AD targets. This should be done through competitive programs that incentivize traditional companies to deliver affordable capacity, and inspire new and innovative companies, including nontraditional commercial firms, to compete against the traditional defense industrial base. These programs should set firm cost requirements and a trade space of performance objectives, with the goal of achieving optimal affordability. High-capacity designs must be integrated with air, land, and sea launch platforms that allow for delivery of high-capacity effects on a highly contested battlefield.
(b) Foundational reusable aircraft programs: Aggressively fund technology maturation and demonstrator programs for reusable hypersonic aircraft. While the initial investment is higher, these platforms offer the prospect of significantly lower cost per sortie for persistent ISR and strike missions over their lifecycle, representing the most viable path to truly affordable and sustainable capacity. Affordability must be a key driver to the design process at the earliest stages of this effort.

4. Mandate and resource an ICLD strategy

Problem statement

Fielding offensive hypersonic weapons is only one part of the solution to defeating complex A2/AD environments created by adversaries. Battlefield dominance will require both an architecture and approach that is holistic. Relying solely on postlaunch kinetic interceptors (like Patriot or THAAD) is insufficient due to challenges of overwhelming numbers, sophisticated tactics, and the unique flight characteristics of adversary cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missile threats.

Recommendation

The DOD must formally integrate the fielding of offensive and defensive hypersonic systems into an integrated comprehensive layered defeat architecture. This framework should be adopted and must be resourced to include robust pre- and post-launch kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities. It should be an underpinning of both homeland defense (such as the proposed “Golden Dome” missile shield) and theater warfighting strategies, leveraging hypersonic strike as a critical left-of-launch enabler to disrupt and destroy adversary systems before they can be used while defeating every other element of the adversary kill chain through the integration of kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities.

5. Accelerate learning through an integrated national test enterprise

Problem statement

The pace of developing and fielding hypersonic systems is directly tied to the ability to test them early and often in a development cycle. The nation’s once-robust hypersonic ground- and flight-test infrastructure, while improving, continues to be a bottleneck, slowing down the development cycle for next-generation hypersonic systems.

Recommendation

The United States must continue to enhance its hypersonic ground and flight tests and its modeling and simulation (M&S) capabilities to enable accelerated learning and development. This enterprise must be resourced to support both rapid iteration of expendable missile designs and the more complex, sustained flight test campaigns required for reusable air-breathing aircraft. The progress made by the TRMC in ground testing, flight testing, and enhanced test-range telemetry should be embraced and robustly funded. The HyperCorr program, emphasizing ground and flight test efforts tightly coupled to high-fidelity M&S, should be accelerated. Greater emphasis should be placed on tightly coupling these TRMC investments to the overarching objectives of the DOD hypersonics program portfolio, with emphasis on accelerated development of affordable capacity for future hypersonic capability.

6. Energize allied codevelopment and coproduction

Problem statement

The United States will likely not face an adversary alone in any future major conflict. Collaboration with allies on the development and deployment of advanced high-speed systems has been limited by information-sharing challenges, missing key opportunities to share costs, leverage innovation, and together build a more integrated and capable coalition force.

Recommendation

The United States must work diligently with allies to cooperatively develop, produce, and deploy advanced and affordable hypersonic strike capabilities. Cooperative programs, such as AUKUS Pillar 2, which focuses on developing and delivering emerging technology, should be nurtured and expanded to advance alliances, foster innovation, and field capabilities in more meaningful numbers.¹⁶ Collaboration should be enhanced with all allies pursuing advanced high-speed systems, and with the removal of barriers to information and technology sharing, wherever it is possible.

7. Modernize theater and strategic nuclear delivery options

Problem statement

Adversary integrated air defenses and nuclear-modernization efforts are challenging the survivability of legacy nuclear delivery systems. For example, the F-35A dual-capable aircraft, central to NATO’s nuclear mission, is not likely to remain sufficiently survivable in the 2030s against peer defenses in all relevant scenarios.¹⁷

Recommendation

The DOD should pursue hypersonic delivery options for future strategic and tactical nuclear weapons to ensure enduring deterrence. A high-speed, air-delivered standoff weapon should be considered to augment and then replace B61 gravity bombs for the NATO mission. The United States should consider new nuclear capabilities that would be delivered by highly responsive systems, like hypersonic weapons, capable of penetrating advanced defenses with high reliability.

8. Bolster layered defenses against hypersonic threats

Problem statement

Defending against adversary hypersonic strike weapons is exceptionally difficult. These threats challenge all aspects of the defensive fire-control loop, from detection to engagement, due to their speed, range, altitude, and highly maneuverable and unpredictable trajectories.

Recommendation

The DOD must pursue a defense-in-depth, layered strategy for counter-hypersonic defense. Crucially, this kinetic shield must be integrated with nonkinetic defensive layers, such as capabilities that degrade or deny satellite navigation, communication, and terminal missile seekers, to maximize the probability of defeat. This postlaunch capability is a necessary, but not sufficient, element of the ICLD architecture.

9. Develop robust long-range kill webs for hypersonic strike capability

Problem statement

Current kill webs for effective employment of long-range strike missiles require considerable time and effort and can be brittle. This vulnerability limits the ability to deliver meaningful warfighting capability in a highly contested A2/AD environment. Warfighting effectiveness for long-range strike systems can be significantly enhanced relative to traditional weapon employment by the integration of hypersonic strike weapons. Hypersonic weapons are inherently survivable due to their ability to maneuver unpredictably and fly high-altitude, high-speed trajectories. This characteristic dramatically reduces both mission planning time prior to weapon employment and target custody duration for relocatable and moving targets.

Recommendation

The DOD should significantly enhance the development and fielding of robust long-range strike kill-web capabilities, fully leveraging the advantages of hypersonic strike weapons. An integrated and specific initiative should be funded to enhance time-critical targeting capabilities that would leverage the full spectrum of US and allied ISR and targeting systems.

10. Rapidly transition advanced technology and enhance the workforce to support future hypersonic capability development and production

Problem statement

The JHTO has responsibility for this area of the national strategy. JHTO has, so far, done a good job in creating the University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics. However, JHTO budgets have been limited beyond that. Workforce challenges and resulting technology maturation timelines are bottlenecks to further scaling the development and production of hypersonic capabilities.

Recommendation

The DOD should champion a whole-of-nation effort to address workforce initiatives and science and technology advancements to quicken the pace for future development, production, and fielding. The department and Congress should robustly fund the JHTO to identify and aggressively develop new technology for rapid transition to next-generation systems and to accelerate upgrades for existing systems. Initiatives should include the maturation of concepts and technology driven by the need to deliver affordable capacity and advanced capabilities, including future reusable hypersonic aircraft. Finally, the JHTO should more tightly couple its workforce and technology development strategies to the needs of traditional and nontraditional industry to enable accelerated development of future affordable hypersonic systems.

Conclusion

Potential adversaries, particularly China and Russia, are creating an increasingly contested environment that severely challenges US battlefield dominance. A central element of this challenge is their fielding of a variety of high-speed and hypersonic strike systems designed to attack US and allied forces at long range and with overwhelming speed.

To ensure US battlefield preeminence, the Pentagon must develop and field capabilities to enable execution of an integrated comprehensive layered defeat strategy that leverages kinetic and nonkinetic means to defeat adversary capabilities. As part of this strategy, it is imperative for the United States to develop and field its own hypersonic strike weapons in substantial numbers to enable US forces to operate effectively and survive on the modern battlefield by defeating adversary high-end capabilities in a battlefield timescale of relevance.

To that end, the Department of Defense and Congress should aggressively move forward to field first-generation air-, land-, and sea-launched hypersonic strike weapons; develop and field a next-generation family of affordable hypersonic strike systems in meaningful numbers; mature and demonstrate future hypersonic aircraft technologies; and energize the foundational enablers of the industrial base, test infrastructure, technology, and workforce. Simultaneously, the United States must bolster its defenses against adversary air and missile threats through implementation of the full spectrum of ICLD capabilities. The time to act is now to close the growing gap in offensive and defensive hypersonic capability and ensure the United States’ ability to deter and, if necessary, win in any future conflict.

List of acronyms

Acronym	Definition
A2/AD	Anti-access/area-denial
ARRW	Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon system
BMD	Ballistic missile defense
C4ISR	Command, control, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CPS	Conventional Prompt Strike (weapon system)
DOD	US Department of Defense
DRPM	Direct reporting program manager
EM	Electromagnetic
GBI	Ground-Based Interceptor
HACM	Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile
IBAS	Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (program)
ICAM	Innovation Capability and Modernization (program)
ICLD	Integrated comprehensive layered defeat strategy
ISR	Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JHTO	Joint Hypersonic Transition Office
LRHW	Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, or the “Dark Eagle”
M&S	Modeling and simulation
ManTech	Manufacturing technology
NGI	Next-Generation Interceptor
OSD	Office of the US Secretary of Defense
PRC	People’s Republic of China
THAAD	Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
TRMC	Test Resources Management Center
UCAH	University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics

Biographies

Co-chairs

Deborah Lee James is an Atlantic Council board director and served as the twenty-third secretary of the US Air Force from 2013 to 2017. In this capacity, she was responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and providing for the welfare of the Department of the Air Force’s nearly 660,000 active-duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen and their families. She also oversaw the Air Force’s annual budget of more than $139 billion.

James has extensive homeland and national security experience in the federal government and the private sector. In the private sector, she served as president of Science Applications International Corporation’s Technical and Engineering Sector, as executive vice president and chief operating officer at Business Executives for National Security, and as vice president at United Technologies.

In earlier government positions, James served as assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, in the office of the assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs, and as a professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee.

James earned a bachelor of arts degree in comparative area studies from Duke University and a master’s degree in international affairs from Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs. She served as co-chair of the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption.

Ryan D. McCarthy served as the twenty-fourth secretary of the US Army from 2019 to 2021. In this capacity, he was responsible for the recruitment, organization, training, equipping, and care of 1.4 million active-duty, National Guard, and Reserve soldiers, Department of the Army civilians, and their families. Prior to this role, he served as the thirty-third under secretary of the Army from 2017 to 2019.

McCarthy has extensive national security experience in government and the private sector. Prior to his confirmation as the under secretary of the Army, McCarthy worked for Lockheed Martin Corporation in vice president roles responsible for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program and the company’s global security policy. Earlier in his career, he was a vice president for HSBC.

In earlier government positions, he served as special assistant to then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, as the special assistant to the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, and as a professional staff member of the US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations. McCarthy proudly served in the US Army from 1997 to 2002 and was involved in combat operations in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom with the 75th Ranger Regiment. He holds a bachelor of arts in history from Virginia Military Institute and a master of business administration from the University of Maryland’s School of Business.

Lead author

Michael E. White was the inaugural principal director for hypersonics in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, serving from October 2018 to June 2023. In that capacity, White was responsible for leading the Pentagon’s vision and strategy for developing offensive and defensive warfighting capability enabled by hypersonic systems. White previously served as the head of the air and missile defense sector at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL). White is a board director of North Wind USA Inc., which provides research, development, test, and evaluation products and services in aerospace and defense, and of Textum, which produces advanced textiles and aerospace composites. As managing member of WhiteAero, LLC, he is a senior defense consultant for hypersonic, air, and missile defense systems and tactical and strategic strike systems.WhiteAero’s clients include Lockheed Martin and GE Aerospace, which are both supporters of the Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force and producers of hypersonic capabilities, as well as Stratolaunch, X-Bow Systems, Cerberus Capital Management, Karman Space and Defense, Textum, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, JHU/APL, ACMI, and Riverside Research, all of which are involved in hypersonic capabilities.

Task force director

Stephen Rodriguez is the founder of One Defense, a technology-enabled consulting firm that identifies advanced commercial capabilities and accelerates their transition into the defense industrial base. He was a senior leader at an artificial intelligence growth-stage company and a global defense corporation. He has also been in and out of the US government throughout his career, including operational service in Colombia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan. Rodriguez serves on the boards of fourteen venture-backed companies, including Applied Intuition, Chariot Defense, Firestorm, Kela Systems, Smack Technologies, Ursa Major Technologies, and ZeroMark. He is also a commission director at the Atlantic Council, chairman of Blue Forge Alliance, and a life member at the Council on Foreign Relations. Rodriguez received a bachelor of business administration from Texas A&M University and a master’s degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He has been published in the Wall Street Journal, Foreign Policy, War on the Rocks, and National Review.

Program director

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels is the former director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program and is now a nonresident senior fellow with Forward Defense. Her contributions to this task force concluded before she departed her fulltime role at the Council in September 2025. In her role, she shaped the center’s US defense research agenda and produced thought leadership on US security strategies and the evolving character of warfare. Her research focuses on long-term US thinking on issues like China’s and Russia’s defense strategies, space security, defense industry, and emerging technology. Prior to launching Forward Defense, Starling-Daniels served as deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security team, specializing in US security policy toward Europe and NATO. During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling-Daniels authored numerous reports and commentaries on US space strategy, deterrence, operational concepts, coalition warfare, and US-Europe relations. Outlets that have featured her analysis include Bloomberg, Defense One, Defense News, RealClearDefense, the National Interest, SpaceNews, NATO’s Joint Air and Space Power Conference, the BBC, National Public Radio, and ABC News, among others. Starling-Daniels previously worked in the UK Parliament focusing on technology, defense, and Ukraine. She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a bachelor’s degree in international relations and history, and she received her master of arts in security studies from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Task force staff

Mark J. Massa is the deputy director of the Forward Defense program of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He leads Forward Defense’s work on strategic forces policy. He holds a master’s in security studies and a BSFS in science, technology, and international affairs from Georgetown University.

Jonathan Rosenstein is a program assistant in Forward Defense. He supports the program’s strategic forces body of work. He holds a master of security policy studies from The George Washington University and a bachelor’s degree from Tulane University.

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

1 For more on these and other military capabilities in the context of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, see: “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” US Department of Defense (DOD),2024, 80–100, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF.

2 Lockheed Martin, a sponsor of this task force and a client of the lead author’s consultancy, produces THAAD, the Aegis Combat System, and the NGI. RTX, a sponsor of this task force, produces the Patriot system.

3 Shawn Ryan, host, Shawn Ryan Show, podcast, episode 143, “Pete Hegseth-Secretary of Defense Nominee,” November 7, 2024, https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/143-pete-hegseth-secretary-of-defense-nominee/id1492492083?i=1000676048381.

4 “Nuclear Challenges: The Growing Capabilities of Strategic Competitors and Regional Rivals,” US Defense Intelligence Agency, Advanced Capabilities series, 2024, 10–16, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Nuclear_Challenges_2024.pdf.

5 “Military and Security Developments,” US DOD.

6 “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee and National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2020, 14–30, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/11/2002563190/-1/-1/1/2020%20BALLISTIC%20AND%20CRUISE%20MISSILE%20THREAT_FINAL_2OCT_REDUCEDFILE.PDF.

7 Michael E. White, “The Hypersonic Imperative,” Atlantic Council, March 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/strategic-insights-memos/the-hypersonic-imperative/.

8 Lockheed Martin, a sponsor of this task force and a client of the lead author’s consultancy, is the prime systems integrator for the LRHW and CPS. Andrew Feickert, “The US Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW): Dark Eagle,” Congressional Research Service, April 24, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11991/IF11991.33.pdf.

9 Lockheed Martin, a sponsor of this task force and a client of the lead author’s consultancy, is the prime contractor for the ARRW. “AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW),” Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation,2024, 295–297, https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2024/af/2024arrw.pdf?ver=3fXxXiEv-GcV0EYPvwE6qQ%3d%3d.

10 RTX, a sponsor of this task force, is the prime contractor for HACM.

11 “Department of Defense Demonstrates Reusability of Hypersonic Test Vehicle,” US Department of Defense Test Resource Management Center,May 5, 2025, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4174167/department-of-defense-demonstrates-reusability-of-hypersonic-test-vehicle/.

12 Presidential determinations “resolve that certain provisions of law are or are not in the national interest,” according to the law library research guide of The George Washington University’s Jacob Burns Law Library, accessed September 16, 2025. “DOD Strengthens Supply Chains for Hypersonic and Strategic Systems,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy,April 28, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3377605/DOD-strengthens-supply-chains-for-hypersonic-and-strategic-systems/.

13 The University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics has hundreds of universities, research centers, and industry partners as members, listed here: https://hypersonics.tamu.edu/affiliate-members/, including some sponsors of this task force and clients of the lead author’s consultancy. “Annual Hypersonics Consortium Offers University Partnerships and Student Networking Opportunities,” US Department of Defense Under Secretary of Research and Engineering, April 19, 2024, https://www.cto.mil/news/annual-hypersonics-consortium/.

14 While a “kill chain” refers to a linear progression of systems from sensing to effecting a target, the more contemporary “kill web” approach builds in redundancy by linking together many nodes to achieve the desired effect.

15 For recent Atlantic Council work on accelerating the adoption of defense innovation and software-defined capabilities, see: Whitney M. McNamara et al., Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption: Final Report,Atlantic Council, January 16, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/atlantic-council-commission-on-defense-innovation-adoption/; and Whitney M. McNamara, Peter Modigliani, and Tate Nurkin, Commission on Software-Defined Warfare: Final Report, Atlantic Council, March 27, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/atlantic-council-commission-on-software-defined-warfare/.

16 “Defense Official Statement on AUKUS Pillar 2 and Exercise Maritime Big Play,” news release, US Department of Defense, October 24, 2024.

17 Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor for the F-35A, is among the sponsors of this report and is a client of the lead author’s consultancy.

The post The imperative for hypersonic strike weapons and counterhypersonic defenses appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yevgeniya Gaber joins Defense News, on on Ukraine’s defense coop and knowledge transfer to European countries in developing counter-UAV capabilities

aozen — Thu, 09 Oct 2025 12:49:11 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

The post Yevgeniya Gaber joins Defense News, on on Ukraine’s defense coop and knowledge transfer to European countries in developing counter-UAV capabilities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s defense tech sector must guard against innovation drain

Andriy Dovbenko — Thu, 09 Oct 2025 00:01:12 +0000

On the outskirts of Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine, Ukrainian electronic warfare teams are deploying home-grown systems that automatically detect and suppress Russian drones. Along the southern front, domestically developed observation drones are giving Ukrainian troops real-time visibility in contested airspace. These are not prototypes; they’re battle-proven Ukrainian technologies saving lives on a daily basis and shaping the future of warfare.

Yet as Ukraine cements its reputation as a defense tech powerhouse, a strategic risk is emerging. Without robust intellectual property (IP) protections, Ukraine may lose control of the very breakthroughs that are currently helping to defend the country on the battlefield. Ukraine could potentially win the war itself and secure national survival, only to lose the innovation economy that should underpin its recovery.

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Wartime urgency creates pressure to sacrifice IP sovereignty. Startups under fire need capital, global market access, and production capacity which foreign investors and international partners can provide. But too often, these deals require handing over IP rights. What looks like a lifeline can, in fact, be a strategic loss.

This leaves Ukraine exposed to a quiet leakage of its designs. Meanwhile, the absence of a strong domestic IP framework risks pushing entrepreneurs to register patents and commercialize outside the country, where protections are stronger and funding is more accessible. The result could be both a brain drain and an innovation drain, hollowing out Ukraine’s defense tech sector just as it proves its global potential. Instead of becoming an international hub, Ukraine risks being relegated to the status of pipeline for foreign defense industries.

The case for IP sovereignty is not only about Ukraine’s economy and national security; it is also about the future resilience of Europe and NATO. For Ukraine, retained IP means royalties, licensing revenues, and a steady funding stream for reconstruction. It signals to investors that Ukraine is not just a wartime incubator but a serious innovation ecosystem. Most importantly, it preserves national sovereignty. Control over sensitive technologies ensures Ukraine is not permanently dependent on foreign suppliers for security.

For Kyiv’s allies, Ukrainian IP is also an important asset. The United States is currently exploring a multi-billion dollar joint drone production deal with Ukraine. But if Ukraine cannot retain ownership, partners risk relying on fragmented supply chains and losing access to innovation. Europe’s Defense Industrial Strategy, launched this year, calls for a resilient continental base. That goal will be undermined if Europe’s most battle-tested and innovative nation loses control of its own technologies.

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Protecting IP involves more than goodwill. It requires policy, legislation, and institutional design. Every foreign aid package and licensing deal should include explicit protections for Ukrainian IP ownership. Likewise, technological solutions co-developed with international partners must not result in the wholesale transfer of rights.

Ukraine’s current plan to relax restrictions on some categories of arms exports is good news. Export barriers force many firms into joint ventures (JVs) or licensing arrangements that often strip away their IP protections. Enabling direct exports would ease this dependency on JVs or licensing, reducing both complexity and IP risk, as well as the danger of leakage. Ukraine should encourage co-production and investment, but on terms that guarantee domestic equity and enforceable IP rights.

Currently, the Ukrainian government is closely monitoring its top innovators to prevent IP leaks abroad. Some companies have sought to incorporate outside of Ukraine in order to free themselves from these shackles, but have encountered problems related to unfair IP structuring. One solution could be greater intergovernmental cooperation. This could allow Ukraine to access external capital and expertise while keeping control over core technologies.

Tech parks and defense incubators should anchor talent domestically, providing access to funding, testing grounds, and mentorship. With 40,000 trained drone pilots and a new generation of AI engineers, Ukraine could benefit hugely if the country can create the right climate to build global companies at home. Speed is also important. Traditional patent offices often move too slowly for battlefield innovation. Ukraine needs a dedicated defense IP office to fast-track protection, address dual-use complexities, and guard against theft or predatory licensing.

The Israeli experience provides a potentially useful model for Ukraine. Decades of conflict have forced Israel to develop technologies with immediate battlefield relevance. Crucially, Israel has managed to retain IP sovereignty, even when foreign funding was involved, and has built an ecosystem where defense innovation feeds into global competitiveness.

Europe also offers lessons. Airbus shows how multinational collaboration can preserve shared IP while scaling production across borders. The overall objective is clear: Ukraine should be positioned as a central node in Europe’s defense industry and not just as a subcontractor.

Ukraine’s battlefield innovations are saving lives today, but they can also lay the foundations for tomorrow’s Ukrainian economy. Without IP sovereignty, Ukraine risks becoming a laboratory for others. With the right frameworks, Ukraine can transition from its current status as a war-driven exporter of ideas to become a global defense industry innovation leader. This can only happen if the country’s IP assets are protected.

Andriy Dovbenko is the founder and principal at UK-Ukraine TechExchange.

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Ukraine’s rapid rise to drone superpower status confirms the old adage that necessity is the mother of invention. When Putin first launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it was clear that the Ukrainian military could not realistically hope to compete with Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower and conventional firepower. Instead, Kyiv would have to rely on a combination of raw courage and innovative technological solutions.

From the early stages of the war, Ukraine began pioneering the large-scale deployment of drones in combat roles. By 2023, this was enabling Ukrainian commanders to compensate for artillery shell shortages and blunt Russian advances. This emphasis on relatively cheap and highly effective drones has transformed the battlefield and created a kill zone along the front lines that Ukrainians have dubbed the “Drone Wall.”

With drones now ubiquitous above the battlefield, any soldier or vehicle that breaks cover in a zone stretching for many kilometers on either side of the zero line risks becoming an instant target. This has made it extremely challenging to concentrate large quantities of troops and armor, which helps explain the lack of major front line breakthroughs over the past three years.

Ukraine has also employed drone technologies to great effect far beyond the battlefield. Kyiv’s innovative use of marine drones has turned the tide in the Battle of the Black Sea, breaking the Russian blockade of Ukraine’s southern coastline and forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his warships from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports. More recently, Ukrainian marine drones have been modified to carry anti-aircraft missiles and have reportedly shot down Russian helicopters over the Black Sea. This unprecedented success has revolutionized naval warfare and led to growing global interest in Ukraine’s domestically developed marine drones.

Kyiv has dramatically expanded its long-range drone fleet in recent years as part of a strategy to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia. As a result, Ukraine has been able to mount a highly effective bombing campaign since August 2025 targeting oil refineries, logistics hubs, and military industrial sites deep inside the Russian Federation. This has led to a fuel crisis across Russia, with some regions forced to introduce gasoline rationing amid supply shortages and record price hikes. Ukraine’s long-range strikes have helped to reshape perceptions of the war and have demonstrated how Kyiv’s technological edge can offset its material disadvantages.

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Former Ukrainian Commander in Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi was one of the architects of Ukraine’s drone warfare doctrine until being relieved of his position in early 2024. In a recent commentary, he argued that innovation must remain the foundation of a sustainable Ukrainian resistance strategy against Russia. Zaluzhnyi stressed that Ukraine’s embrace of drone technologies has helped offset the imbalance between the two countries while inflicting disproportionate costs on the Kremlin. “Ukraine must compensate for its relative lack of resources by constantly introducing military innovations,” he commented.

Ukraine and Russia now find themselves locked in a relentless race to innovate, with the window between the appearance of new weapons systems and the development of effective countermeasures now sometimes reduced to a matter of weeks. The intensity of this competition has turbo-charged Ukraine’s domestic drone industry and propelled it far ahead of its Western counterparts.

If NATO members wish to close this gap, they must lean heavily on the technical and strategic lessons learned by the Ukrainian military over the past three and half years of full-scale drone warfare. Training initiatives are already underway, with President Zelenskyy expressing his readiness to share Ukraine’s experience with more of the country’s NATO partners.

A growing number of countries are also looking to establish joint drone production in order to benefit from Ukrainian defense tech know-how. In late September, Britain announced that it would soon launch the mass production of interceptor drones developed in collaboration with Ukraine. Romania has also recently unveiled ambitious plans to manufacture drones in partnership with Ukraine for domestic use and for potential export to NATO allies. Meanwhile, a Ukrainian delegation is reportedly in the United States this week to negotiate a landmark deal with the Trump administration that would see Kyiv sharing battle-tested drone technology with the US.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the world’s first fully fledged drone war and represents a watershed moment in military history. With drones now set to play a dominant role in the wars of the future, Ukraine’s unique experience in this technologically advanced form of warfare makes the country a key partner for NATO and an indispensable ally in the defense of Europe.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

The results speak for themselves. Ukrainian drones have excelled along the front lines of the conflict and have allowed Kyiv to turn the tide in the Battle of the Black Sea. Far beyond Ukraine’s borders, the country’s growing fleet of bomber drones now routinely strike targets deep inside the Russian Federation.

Many partner countries are understandably eager to incorporate Ukrainian drone technologies into their own defense doctrines. Britain recently confirmed that it will begin mass producing drones developed in collaboration with Ukraine as part of efforts to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank against the threat of Russian incursions. A Ukrainian delegation reportedly set off for the United States in late September to begin discussions on a potentially major drone production cooperation agreement.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is well aware of his country’s rising military profile and sees the current mission to Denmark as a potential model for a more comprehensive approach to Ukrainian drone warfare training initiatives with other European countries. “Our experience, our specialists, and our technologies can become a key element in Europe’s future Drone Wall initiative,” he commented on September 30.

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Ukraine’s burgeoning reputation as a key player in the field of drone warfare reflects the dramatic shifts currently taking place in Europe’s security architecture. Until quite recently, Ukraine was treated as a military minnow struggling to adopt NATO standards. Strikingly, it is now NATO that is seeking to adopt Ukrainian standards.

The emergence of Ukraine as a drone superpower is only one aspect of the country’s remarkable recent transformation into a major military force. The Ukrainian army is also at the cutting edge of innovation in defense tech sectors including electronic warfare, robotic systems, and cyber security. It came as no surprise that the recent Defense Tech Valley industry showcase event in western Ukraine attracted at least 5000 participants from over 50 countries, with Western companies pledging more than $100 million in investments.

The technological progress made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2022 is certainly eye-catching, but the country’s human capital remains its greatest asset. Today’s Ukraine boasts Europe’s second-largest army, with almost one million men and women currently in uniform and a large reserve of battle-hardened combat veterans. This dwarfs anything else on the continent, even before Ukraine’s unrivaled experience of modern warfare is taken into account. With the United States seeking to reduce its role in European security, the Ukrainian military is now the biggest single barrier between an expansionist Russia and an unprepared Europe.

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Thomas Wright: The NSS must make the case for the president’s worldview

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Ukraine’s newfound status as one of Europe’s leading military powers is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s worst nightmare. It is nightmare entirely of his own making. Indeed, this military metamorphosis would have been inconceivable without the impetus of Russian imperial aggression.

When Putin began the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Kyiv had only a few thousand combat-ready troops at its disposal. At first, things went according to plan for Moscow, with minimal Ukrainian resistance to the seizure of Crimea. However, Russian efforts to push further into mainland Ukraine then sparked a wave of popular resistance, with thousands of ordinary Ukrainians forming improvised volunteer battalions to block the Kremlin advance. This epic grassroots response saved Ukraine and laid the foundations for the subsequent expansion and modernization of the Ukrainian army.

Despite this stunning setback, Putin refused to accept defeat. With his initial plans to extinguish Ukrainian statehood thwarted, the Kremlin dictator made the fateful decision to escalate further and began preparing to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

On the morning of the invasion, Putin identified the “demilitarization” of Ukraine as one of his two key war aims. This made perfect sense. After all, in order to effectively subjugate Ukraine, it would first be necessary to render the country defenseless. However, it is now abundantly clear that Putin’s plan to demilitarize Ukraine has backfired disastrously.

Russia’s invasion has spurred the creation of a formidable military machine in Ukraine that has quickly come to occupy a pivotal role in European security. In capitals across Europe, there is a growing sense of recognition that the Ukrainian army is indispensable for the defense of the continent and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Kyiv’s partners now have an obvious and urgent self-interest in supporting Ukraine’s defense industry and financing the Ukrainian war effort. Indeed, the choice currently facing European leaders is disarmingly simple: Support Ukraine today or face Russia tomorrow.

With Russian troops still advancing and Russian drones and missiles pummeling Ukrainian cities, it remains far too early to declare Putin’s invasion a failure. Nevertheless, it is already difficult to conceive of any outcome that would leave Ukraine undefended and at Moscow’s mercy. Instead, the Ukrainian army is likely to emerge from the war stronger than ever and fully capable of defending the country’s place within the European community of nations. Putin had hoped to disarm and decapitate the Ukrainian state, but his self-defeating demilitarization campaign has inadvertently created the strong and fiercely independent Ukraine he feared most of all.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

According to the French outlet Intelligence Online, Mexican and Ukrainian intelligence services are investigating reports that Mexican nationals joined Ukraine’s International Legion not to fight Russia’s invasion but to study FPV drone operations. These “volunteers” allegedly sought assignment to specialized units where FPV tactics were evolving most rapidly, acquiring knowledge and techniques that could accelerate the cartels’ learning curve by a matter of years.

Mexico’s National Intelligence Center reportedly sent a memo to Ukraine’s counterintelligence service, the SBU, warning that Spanish-speaking volunteers in the International Legion were deliberately targeting FPV training. The memo expressed concern that cartel-linked operatives were embedding within semi-clandestine International Legion units along the frontlines, such as Ethos, which has tested FPVs in large numbers. Some investigations have even extended to the possible involvement of non-Mexican actors, including individuals linked to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as FARC.

Ukraine’s International Legion was created as a noble effort to harness global solidarity against Russia’s invasion. Yet its open recruitment policy also created opportunities for malign actors to exploit the war as a proving ground. For Mexican cartels, whose drone programs have historically lagged global innovators by five to ten years, this represents a chance to leapfrog directly to the cutting edge.

FPV drones are rapidly evolving

The Ukrainian battlefield has become a laboratory for drone warfare. At the outset of the war, Kyiv received small batches of manufactured loitering munitions, such as the US-supplied Switchblade. But these systems proved expensive, limited in scale, and vulnerable to Russian electronic warfare. Ukrainian innovators quickly pivoted to commercially available FPVs, originally designed for high-speed drone racing.

The advantages of FPVs immediately became clear. They’re cheap—often under four hundred dollars per unit—highly maneuverable, and easily assembled from off-the-shelf parts. They can carry small explosive payloads with precision. And operating them only requires a level of dexterity that can be honed through widely available flight simulators. What began as improvisation soon evolved into industrial-scale production lines, backed by a global supply chain of parts and volunteer networks.

In the past three years, Ukrainian FPV tactics have advanced rapidly. Operators have integrated octocopters as airborne relays, extending control ranges by serving as signal repeaters. Artificial intelligence has been layered in, allowing FPVs to lock onto targets even when communications are jammed. More recently, Ukrainian units have deployed drones tethered with fiber optic spools, enabling secure, jam-resistant operations deep into contested environments.

This rapid cycle of innovation has created what military analysts call a “co-evolutionary dance” between Ukraine and Russia—new FPV tactics prompting new countermeasures, which in turn spur further adaptation. For outside observers, however, the key lesson is clear: These technologies are transferable, scalable, and relatively easy to learn. What takes years for militaries to institutionalize can be picked up in weeks by dedicated operators with access to training.

How cartels are using FPVs

For Mexican cartels, FPVs offer an ideal combination of affordability, lethality, and deniability. They can be assembled discreetly, launched from improvised sites, and targeted with extraordinary precision. In cartel-on-cartel warfare, FPVs might be capable of striking high-value targets inside fortified compounds, which previously required costly and high-risk raids. Cartels already have experience experimenting with drones. Roughly five years ago, some began dropping grenades and small improvised munitions from commercial quadcopters, many years after the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, pioneered the tactic in Syria. These systems were crude and limited. FPVs, by contrast, bring maneuverability and standoff capability that could tilt the balance of power in ongoing conflicts.

There are already signs that cartels are adapting their FPV tactics. In their long-running arms race, the Sinaloa cartel and the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación are reportedly testing FPVs in west-central Mexico. Videos have surfaced online of FPV attacks depicting targeted strikes. In anticipation, some cartel “narco-tanks” have been modified with protective cages to ward off drone strikes—eerily echoing the battlefield adaptations of Russian and Ukrainian forces.

The danger is not confined to cartel rivalries. Should US policy escalate to commonplace kinetic strikes against cartels—a possibility the Trump administration acted on recently—FPVs could quickly be redirected toward US personnel and infrastructure. Border patrols, forward operating bases, or even critical nodes in urban environments could become vulnerable to swarm attacks.

How the US can adapt to drone proliferation

Nonstate actors can now acquire capabilities once reserved for nation-states. Cartels are no longer merely criminal syndicates; they increasingly resemble hybrid entities blending organized crime, paramilitary force, and terrorist tactics.

The United States and its partners cannot afford to treat cartel drone experimentation as a distant curiosity. The risk trajectory is clear: What begins as opportunistic adoption can quickly harden into doctrine. In response, the United States should take several steps to combat this threat:

Enhance intelligence cooperation. Washington should strengthen trilateral intelligence sharing with Mexico and Ukraine, focusing on the movement of personnel and technology linked to FPVs. Early identification of operatives seeking training abroad is critical.
Invest in counter-drone defenses. US Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Homeland Security, and Mexican security forces need access to the latest counter-drone technologies. This includes directed-energy weapons, jamming tools, and radar systems scaled to detect small, low-flying craft.
Disrupt supply chains. While FPV parts are commercially available, targeted export controls and monitoring could slow bulk acquisition by malign actors. Cooperation with private manufacturers is essential.
Reframe cartels as hybrid threats. US strategy must continue to evolve beyond treating cartels as criminal and terrorist organizations, instead combating them as “narco-multinational corporations” (narco-MNC). Their adoption of military-grade tactics—combined with terrorist-style violence—demands a whole-of-government approach that blends law enforcement, defense, and intelligence tools.
Plan for FPV attacks on the US-Mexico border. Scenarios involving FPV swarm attacks on border facilities should be integrated into homeland security through Multi-National, and Multi-Agency exercises. Waiting until the first operational use against US targets would be too late.

***

This is a brave new world where a disposable drone can checkmate a $24 million tank. In Ukraine, FPVs have bought time against Russia’s advance. In Mexico, their adoption by cartels could accelerate violence, destabilize regions, and threaten US border security.

The question is not whether cartels, or narco-MNCs, will experiment with FPVs—they already are. The question is how quickly the United States and its partners can adapt, anticipate, and counter this emerging threat. The diffusion of FPV technology underscores a sobering reality: the democratization of military power is no longer hypothetical. It is unfolding now, with profound consequences for security from Kyiv to Mexico City to Washington.

Now is the time for the United States to defend against the growing threat that the democratization of drone warfare poses to its southern border.

Stephen Honan is a fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, a senior consultant for BVG and Company, and a former explosive ordnance disposal officer for the US Navy.

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In defense of the US maintaining a balanced nuclear triad

Paul Amato — Mon, 29 Sep 2025 17:52:29 +0000

The United States has long relied on a nuclear triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), strategic bombers, and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). This combination, which the past four US presidential administrations endorsed, is the best way to maintain effective deterrence at a reasonable cost. But new risks loom on the horizon, and defenders of the triad should take note that potentially expedient US government decisions made in the coming years could inadvertently undermine the triad’s continued viability.

The three legs of the triad are mutually supporting, making the whole greater than the sum of its parts. The SSBN force is widely seen as the most survivable leg in a conflict, as SSBNs have been virtually undetectable when at sea. ICBMs are often viewed as the most responsive leg, because they are on alert and ready to launch any time day or night. Strategic bombers are the most flexible and visible leg, because they can be alerted, dispersed, and forward-deployed in plain sight to provide both assurance to allies and deterrence against adversaries.

Together, the triad’s three legs provide many benefits. The triad offers enhanced survivability and, thus, assured retaliation. It offers strategic stability through redundancy of options, as well as flexibility in both crisis and conflict. It offers the ability to tailor deterrence to diverse adversaries, as well as the ability to mitigate risk related to technological breakthroughs or geopolitical realignments.

Changes in triad composition that significantly alter the proportion of US nuclear capabilities fielded among its three legs, combined with new, nonnuclear adversary attack vectors, could invite preemptive, nonnuclear attack in ways that could undermine deterrence and the United States’ ability to employ its nuclear capabilities in a conflict. The strength of the triad is a function not just of the existence of its three legs, but also of the balance in numbers and capabilities among the three legs. Any changes that disrupt this balance may introduce new vulnerabilities into one or more of its legs, thereby undermining deterrence.

Introducing vulnerability

The Trump administration is unlikely to abandon the triad outright, and its support for the existing nuclear modernization program seems solid. However, there are growing stressors that might lead to decisions that could undermine the triad’s continued effectiveness and credibility. This could manifest if the United States either reduces its commitment to one of the legs of the triad or improvidently increases its reliance on one leg at the expense of the others. The United States must not just maintain the triad. It must also maintain balance among its three legs to ensure it possesses the correct mix of attributes that US nuclear deterrence policy and posture have come to rely on to maintain stability and the capacity to achieve national objectives in the event of conflict.

Three examples of these stressors illustrate the risks if warhead imbalances are introduced into the triad in the coming years.

First, SSBNs have long been considered practically invulnerable to adversary attack and, as a result, the leg upon which the United States relies for its second-strike capability. With this in mind, some commentators have suggested an increased reliance on SSBNs or that Washington should purchase more of them. This could disproportionately increase the number of weapons in the SSBN leg relative to the other two.

Second, because of the growing cost of the Sentinel ICBM program* (estimated at 81 percent higher in 2024 than the 2020 estimate), the US Air Force has admitted that it must decide whether to stay with the current Sentinel ICBM acquisition strategy or significantly change it (a process that is ongoing). Congress has staunchly supported Sentinel, and the Pentagon has shown no signs that it will abandon the current plan to replace the Minuteman III ICBM with the Sentinel on a one-for-one basis. However, if costs continue to rise so sharply, then it could create pressure to pursue other avenues, potentially resulting in a smaller number of deployed Sentinels, a fielding approach with fewer key nodes for adversary attack, or, perhaps, a pivot to an entirely different system that results in fewer fielded missiles but a larger number of warheads. This could reduce the number of ICBMs in the land leg relative to the other two.

Third, because the B-21 Raider* program is proceeding apace, some are calling for the purchase of a greater number of B-21s. All else being equal, this could increase the bomber leg relative to the other two.

Emerging threats

Any one of these potential posture changes may be a logical response to factors such as how the security environment is changing, what funds are available, or what is feasible in the short term from an acquisition perspective. However, any such posture change should be approached cautiously for fear that it could introduce vulnerabilities into the triad. Such vulnerabilities could arise by US policymakers failing to account for evolving threats or by unintentionally providing adversaries perverse incentives for preemptive attacks in ways that US strategists and planners had not previously envisioned.

For example, emerging technology is heightening risks to the triad’s sea leg. Unmanned surface and subsurface drones threaten to make US submarines incrementally easier to find, fix, and track. Similarly, quantum sensing technologies hold the potential to render submarines more detectable by using advanced acoustics, magnetometry, and gravimetry. While the threat posed by these evolving capabilities in the near term may be limited by the vastness of the ocean and the tactics, techniques, and procedures adopted to mitigate risks, the Defense Intelligence Agency warned in May that quantum technologies are nearing battlefield relevance. Given the small number of SSBNs (especially when they are not on a heightened alert status), and the correspondingly large share of deployed warheads that these SSBNs carry, such developments may introduce new and destabilizing vulnerabilities to US nuclear posture if SSBNs and their missiles come to represent a disproportionately large share of the overall US nuclear arsenal.

A similar concern applies to US strategic bombers. The B-2 Spirit* and B-52 Stratofortress are based in the continental United States on open ramps or unhardened aircraft hangars. Publicly available information suggests that the B-21, when fielded, will be located in unhardened environmental protection shelters similar to the B-2. Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb, conducted in June 2025, should give US policymakers pause. Ukrainian special forces attacked and damaged or destroyed more than forty Russian strategic bombers from within Russian territory with unmanned aerial vehicles. This operation is a potential blueprint for how China or Russia could attack US strategic bombers with assets from within the United States.

US ICBM silos and launch infrastructure are not immune to these increasing risks either. In a crisis or conflict, drones carrying munitions or even shaped charges launched from US farmland or other locations near ICBM missile fields could conceivably interfere with the United States’ ability to launch ICBMs quickly by attacking launch control centers, critical command-and-control infrastructure, and/or the missile silos themselves.

In light of such increasing and emerging risks, the United States should continue to field a balanced proportion of capabilities among the three triad legs. Increased emphasis on one leg or a decreased emphasis on another could introduce vulnerability to the triad that Washington will later regret—especially as it takes years to field new or different capabilities due to challenges in the defense industrial base and nuclear enterprise. As US policymakers consider potential changes to the size, posture, or composition of US nuclear forces, they must account for these considerations—and recognize that the consequences of the choices they make today will play out over decades.

Paul Amato is the former director for nuclear deterrence policy in the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy. He is a retired Marine infantry officer with twenty-eight years of active and reserve service. Before his government service, he was a practicing lawyer in the private sector. The views expressed in this article are his own.

Note: The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security conducts work on nuclear and strategic forces that is supported by donors including Lockheed Martin Corporation, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Northrop Grumman Corporation (which is the prime contractor for the Sentinel ICBM, the B-21 Raider, and the B-2 Spirit), RTX Corporation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, the United States Department of Defense, and the United States Department of State, as well as through general support to the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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How to write a US National Security Strategy

Matthew Kroenig — Tue, 23 Sep 2025 15:28:40 +0000

The Trump administration is reportedly nearing completion of its national security strategy (NSS). Since the 1980s, the US Congress has required every presidential administration to produce an NSS that explains the threats facing the United States and the country’s strategy to address them.

To aid the administration in this task, we reached out to NSS authors from the George W. Bush administration through to the Biden administration to get their advice and recommendations for how President Donald Trump’s team should approach this important document. What should the Trump administration prioritize in its upcoming strategy? How can the United States best adapt to new and emerging threats? Find valuable insights from past NSS contributors below.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Rebecca Lissner: Drafters can benefit from outside input, but must not allow it to dilute strategic focus

Mara Rudman: The NSS should be maximally implementable

Peter Feaver: To be worth drafting and reading, an NSS must convey the logic guiding the administration

The NSS must make the case for the president’s worldview

My advice to anyone writing an NSS is that the document should make the best case possible for the president’s worldview, rather than reflecting the consensus view of the entire US government. It should be interesting to read and move the debate on the president’s foreign policy forward.

There are two mistakes to avoid. The first is what could be called the “Christmas ornament” problem, where everything is added in regardless of whether it really fits with the strategy. The second is the tendency to sand down anything interesting until it is fairly innocuous.

To avoid these mistakes, you need a small team of one or two people to do the drafting and run a tight process, and for the president or the national security advisor to be deeply engaged and have some ownership over the document. This enables you to write something coherent, and it means there is someone who can overrule recommendations from the interagency if needed.

In Trump’s first term, his National Security Council produced an excellent NSS that had a positive impact on the administration’s foreign policy. The problem, though, is that it did not reflect Trump’s own views. One need only read his remarks marking its publication.

On this occasion, the Trump administration seems poised to produce a document more reflective of the president’s worldview. From a process perspective, I think that’s the right approach. But substantively, it worries me because his worldview is very much at odds with traditional US strategy, particularly on alliances, China, and Russia. That’s his right. He won the election. The 2017 NSS obscured the differences between Trump and traditionalists on US foreign policy. This NSS is likely to reveal and clarify them.

—Thomas Wright is a senior fellow at the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Brookings Institution, and a former special assistant to the president and senior director for strategic planning at the National Security Council. In the latter role, he contributed to the 2022 NSS.

Drafters can benefit from outside input, but must not allow it to dilute strategic focus

While past presidents have produced updated NSS documents for their second terms in office, this one will have the unique task of adapting—or perhaps overhauling—Trump’s first-term vision after the passage of eight consequential years since his first NSS was released in December 2017. Initial leaks indicate that this NSS may depart significantly from his first one, shifting from an overriding focus on great power competition with China and Russia toward a Western hemispheric strategy that prioritizes threats closer to the US homeland.

I spent the first year of the Biden-Harris administration as lead author of then US President Joe Biden’s NSS, so I understand the challenge facing Trump’s team. Stakeholders inside and outside of the government are eager to see their priorities reflected in what is supposed to be the president’s most authoritative statement of strategic intent. Policy experts across the government lobby for their regions or issues—in my case, by sending thousands of track-change edits to drafts we circulated. Foreign embassies are calling to ensure their countries receive the requisite mentions. Interest groups and think tanks are suggesting language and hoping for early previews. This feedback is important. It helps ensure that the analysis and prescriptions are sound, that the national security bureaucracy will be invested in its implementation, and that the NSS is well received by outside groups. But it also risks diluting strategic focus and turning the NSS into a dreaded “Christmas tree,” covered in stakeholders’ parochial ornamentation.

As they triage input and finalize their drafts, Trump’s team would do well to remember that the NSS is, first and foremost, the president’s document. An NSS must achieve many objectives at once: guide US government policy, create a communications template for national security messaging, signal the direction of US policy to countries around the world, and indicate priorities to Congress and the American people. To be effective, audiences must perceive the document as truly reflective of the president’s priorities and preferences. For all the downsides of this administration’s centralized national security decision-making process, one benefit may be an NSS that speaks clearly and authoritatively on behalf of the president.

—Rebecca Lissner is a senior fellow for US foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Brady-Johnson distinguished practitioner in grand strategy at the Jackson School of Global Affairs at Yale University. She is a former deputy assistant to the president and principal deputy national security advisor to the vice president and a former acting senior director and director for strategic planning on the National Security Council. In the latter role she contributed to the 2022 NSS.

The NSS should be maximally implementable

My advice for those drafting the NSS: Focus on the why, what, who, and how, in the room where it happens, to deliver an effective, executable strategy. I base this on coordinating the 2009 NSS development and on assessing the 2022 NSS through service on the National Defense Strategy Commission.

1. Why: The NSS is mandated by Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The legislation, a bipartisan national security structural statute developed in concert with the Reagan administration, requires the president to submit this report to Congress to communicate their national security vision to the legislative branch.

2. What: This mission statement should guide policy execution. It must discuss the United States’ international interests, commitments, objectives, and policies, along with capabilities necessary to deter threats and implement US security plans.

3. Who: The president and their immediate circle of advisers benefit from soliciting input from senior officials across the broad swath of executive branch agencies and departments that carry national security responsibilities. An effective coordinating process should pressure test even the most determined of presidential views. Allowing debate leads to a stronger product. Providing space at the crafting table to consider wide-ranging positions makes those who were heard more committed to executing the strategy, regardless of whether their views prevail.

4. How: Strategy drafters should design the president’s national security mission statement to be maximally implementable. By statute, the strategy must discuss the “capabilities necessary” to “implement … security plans.” Strategies consistently fall short on the follow-through that is necessary to execute the vision. It is crucial to include parameters against which the executive branch can measure progress toward the strategy’s goals. This can set the frame for dialogue with Congress, which is charged with procuring funding and providing oversight.

—Mara Rudman is a professor of practice and director of the Ripples of Hope Project within the Miller Center at University of Virginia and a former deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs in the Clinton and Obama administrations. She coordinated the development of the 2009 NSS and assessed the 2022 NSS during her service on the National Defense Strategy Commission.

To be worth drafting and reading, an NSS must convey the logic guiding the administration

It is relatively easy to write a coherent NSS in one’s own voice. Countless scholars and analysts have done so over the years. The challenge is to write a version of the NSS that is in the president’s voice and thus an authentic account of how the president understands the United States’ role in the world, the challenges the country faces, and the way forward. And it is even more challenging to do all of that in a more rigorous way than your garden-variety presidential speech might do. Presidential speeches can be a good window into the president’s vision and voice. But they rarely if ever address the kind of tough, “yes, but what about this?” kind of pushback that an NSS worth reading will include.

Of course, there are many other desiderata, most of which are not possible to be included (which explains why you will not find them in any of the published NSS’s of the past four decades). It would be great if the NSS went granular on “means” in addition to covering “ends” and “ways.” However, it is just not practical to include such details in a vision-logic statement. But if the NSS is worthwhile, it will ultimately be reflected in the president’s budget.

Likewise, many critics ask for clear and unambiguous prioritization—as if they expected the document to rack and stack allies and adversaries in a best-of/worst-of list. Good NSS’s do reveal the president’s priorities by revealing what issues they dwell on and what they skip lightly over. But there are inevitable compromises that blur the text for understandable reasons. If we mention ally A without mentioning ally B, we buy ourselves lots of heartache with little gain; what is the harm in mentioning them both, even if everyone knows—and the president demonstrates through allocation of scarce resources like Oval Office access—that A matters more than B? Sometimes, calls for prioritization themselves indicate strategic incoherence, as when “prioritizers” pretend we can better confront China by abandoning Ukraine to the predations of China’s ally Russia.

An NSS is worth reading if it accurately conveys the logic that is actually guiding the administration. If that logic is wise, the NSS will be easy to praise; if that logic is unwise, the NSS will help illuminate the problem. Either way, it is a fruitful guide to understanding the administration’s national security ambitions.

—Peter Feaver is a professor of political science and public policy and director of the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy and co-principal investigator of the America in the World Consortium at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy. He is a former special advisor for strategic planning and institutional reform at the National Security Council, where his responsibilities included contributing to the drafting of the 2006 NSS.

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Cole discusses the role of fictional intelligence and technological prediction with War on the Rocks

ajohnson — Thu, 18 Sep 2025 19:19:12 +0000

On September 17, August Cole, a nonresident fellow at Forward Defense, and P.W. Singer were interviewed by War on the Rocks, reflecting on the technological predictions of their 2015 book Ghost Fleet. They highlighted the use of fictional writing for exploring future military and technological scenarios.

Fellow

August Cole

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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How AI with ‘nurtured consciousness’ could transform warfare

John James and Alia Brahimi — Thu, 18 Sep 2025 13:25:11 +0000

The rise of large language models (LLMs) and multimodal foundation models has already begun to reshape the character of warfare. For evidence, look no further than the battlefields of Russia’s war on Ukraine. During “Operation Spiderweb” in June, for example, Ukrainian quadcopters switched to autonomous navigation assisted by artificial intelligence (AI) to strike multiple Russian airfields. After standard GPS and communication links were disabled by Russian jammers, built-in sensors and pre-programmed decision-making meant that “backup AI targeting” took over. The strike, Ukraine’s longest-range assault of the conflict to date, resulted in the destruction of billions of dollars’ worth of Russian aircraft.

But automation and data-processing speed—image identification, logistics, and pattern detection—are only one part of the story. An arguably more significant transformation is underway, toward synthetic cognition within AI systems.

Adversary simulation

The US Army’s Mad Scientist Initiative and NATO’s Strategic Foresight Analysis program have both identified AI-based adversary simulation as critical for preparing joint forces for contested decision environments. This involves mapping adversary biases, illuminating internal cognitive blind spots, and forecasting narrative-driven escalations. The idea is to promote what has been called “strategic empathy”—the disciplined effort to understand how adversaries perceive their interests, threats, and opportunities—and to reduce inadvertent escalation risks.

Everyday AI chatbots such as GPTs are already spontaneously displaying the rudiments of theory of mind—that is, the ability to infer that others can hold beliefs different from one’s own. This capability has been demonstrated in LLMs through successful completion of false-belief tasks, such as recognizing that a person can search for an object where they mistakenly believe it to be, rather than where it actually is—a benchmark long associated with childhood cognitive development and a function regarded as unique to the species. In military contexts, if carefully constrained and validated, such capabilities are likely to soon allow for real-time simulation of adversarial logic, strategic ambiguity, and reputational calculus.

The capacity to accurately interpret and anticipate adversaries’ behaviors and strategic intent may prove to be the ultimate determinant of cognitive overmatch, understood here as the demonstrable ability to emulate, predict, and outpace adversary decision cycles. In practice, this is measured in reduced decision time, greater accuracy in escalation forecasting, and validated against observed behavior in falsifiable scenario outcomes. In an era defined by the contest of perceptions, safely and successfully integrating synthetic cognition into defense capabilities may well prove decisive. As such, embedding cultural, historical, and ideological nuance into cognitive-emulative systems will be important to ensure strategic superiority for the United States. After all, China is already reportedly investing in culturally informed AI frameworks for military use.

Taught versus nurtured consciousness

The crux of efforts to simulate adversarial reasoning emerges from a cognitive duality between taught consciousness and nurtured consciousness. This is not standard AI terminology, but a conceptual framework we have introduced to distinguish between two modes of reasoning. Taught consciousness refers to structured learning, facts, and procedural logic. Nurtured consciousness, by contrast, arises from culture, history, trauma, identity, and emotional reinforcement—the forces that shape how an actor interprets risk, legitimacy, and legacy.

To “think better,” AI must move beyond structured data alone; it must incorporate historical memory, cultural worldviews, symbolic interpretations, and ideological drivers of conflict. For example, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commander influenced by the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War may exhibit caution in mountainous terrain, a detail invisible to most automated models but accessible to LLMs trained on PLA memoirs, doctrine, and historiography.

As a recent report we both worked on details, military decisions are rarely made in isolation from personal or collective history. Strategy is often shaped by deep-seated narrative logic, encompassing national myths, identities, and ideology. Beyond procedural logic and battlefield geometry, war is fought through perception: how each actor experiences shame, fear, honor, legitimacy, and memory. These variables do not exist in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance feeds or probability tables. They are present in the minds of adversaries, shaped by decades, if not centuries, of history, trauma, and political indoctrination. This is the cognitive substrate of strategic action, and it cannot be approximated through taught knowledge alone.

Consider the threat from jihadist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, and Boko Haram, which do not adhere to classical strategic logic; their behaviors are shaped by religious eschatology, historical grievances, and narrative theater. They use spectacular violence and ritualized fear to sustain their ideological appeal, often engaging in an epistemic war against perceived Western influence and employing brutality as part of the construction of identity. A purely data-driven model might focus on the number of fighters, frequency of attacks, or intercepted chatter while missing the symbolic logic animating those patterns.

A system that incorporates cognitive elements layers in the importance of sacred geography, the modeling of theological escalation ladders where martyrdom is incentivized, and the role of online radicalization, where command structures are replaced by narrative contagion. Nurtured AI systems trained on religious texts, ideological manifestos, and martyr testimonials might be able to simulate the decision logic of these “nonrational” actors, providing predictive insights into, for example, when a symbolic event might trigger a suicide bombing, or when leadership decapitation may lead to fragmentation and the splintering toward more extreme offshoots.

Inhabiting the fog

Without nurtured consciousness, even the most advanced AI-driven systems risk failing to accurately interpret complex adversarial behaviors, symbolic intentions, and cultural thresholds, thereby undermining strategic effectiveness.

While taught consciousness enables a model to replicate tactical planning or doctrinal norms, nurtured consciousness simulates how a decision maker understands risk, perceives adversaries, and weighs personal legacy against national mythology. This is what allows an AI system to reason like a human in a real-world context, rather than merely replicating surface-level behavior. Combined, taught and nurtured consciousness deepen strategic empathy.

However, as AI systems with synthetic cognition begin to dynamically shape military operations, they will require accountability frameworks, multidisciplinary oversight, and governance protocols. Failure to establish clear guidelines risks strategic misalignment, ethical ambiguity, and unanticipated escalation, ultimately weakening their utility and credibility. Therefore, cognitive-emulative systems must remain auditable, strategically aligned with values, and guided by transparent governance structures involving regional experts and ethicists to ensure responsible deployment. Given rapid advances by the United States’ near-peer adversaries, Washington needs technical and doctrinal oversight of nurtured consciousness, as well as clearly defined international norms governing its use.

Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz observed that “war is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.” Conscious-model AI does not dispel the fog, it inhabits it. It reasons, reacts, and remembers within it. This capability is what turns an information advantage into a conscious advantage, and it has the potential to set the standard for strategic dominance in the twenty-first century.

John James is a technologist, deep-tech investor, and founding partner of BOKA Capital Ltd, which has investments in military AI companies.

Alia Brahimi, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow on the Atlantic Council Middle East Programs.

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Ukraine’s skies are Europe’s first line of defense against Russian drones

Alina Zubkovych — Tue, 16 Sep 2025 21:01:41 +0000

The recent launch of Russian drones into Polish airspace generated global headlines, but the incident was far from unprecedented. In reality, it was the latest escalation in a far larger Kremlin campaign that aims to test NATO’s resolve and intimidate European leaders. In addition to regular incursions into NATO airspace, Russia is also accused of disrupting thousands of European flights through the widespread use of GPS jamming. Unless the West responds decisively, Russia will continue to escalate.

For the Russians, gray zone acts of aggression such as the recent drone raid on Poland offer an opportunity to gauge how far they can go without provoking a major military response. Each new operation is a probe. If Russian drones can cross into Poland unchecked, the next stage may be for missiles to begin “accidentally” striking NATO territory.

As none of the drones launched at Poland last week appear to have been armed, it is reasonable to conclude that Putin does not currently seek to conduct a conventional attack on NATO. Instead, the operation served a number of other objectives. Crucially, it allowed the Kremlin to test NATO’s red lines and demonstrate that the alliance is hesitant to act, even when its borders are so clearly penetrated. This strikes at the credibility of NATO’s core commitment to collective security.

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The appearance of Russian drones in the skies above Poland set off alarm bells in a number of European capitals. This trend toward greater insecurity can help drive the radicalization of European politics, which often means increased support for Kremlin-friendly parties on both the far-left and far-right of the political spectrum.

Fears over a mounting Russian threat could also divert attention and resources away from Ukraine, with Europeans growing less inclined to support the Ukrainian war effort and more concerned about their own security. In the aftermath of the recent drone incident, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned of growing anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland fueled by Moscow, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested that Russia may be seeking to prevent the delivery of additional air defenses to Ukraine ahead of the winter season.

With the Western response to Russia’s drone raid still taking shape, it remains too early to draw any definitive conclusions. However, the mixed initial reaction from Western leaders is unlikely to have deterred the Kremlin. Rather than projecting unity and purpose, US President Donald Trump appeared to contradict many of his NATO allies by claiming that the large-scale Russian incursion into Polish airspace could have been “a mistake.”

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Russia’s drone escalation has revived the long-running debate over the possibility of a NATO-backed no-fly zone of some kind in Ukraine. Following the Kremlin’s aerial attack, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski became the latest figure to publicly voice his support for allied efforts to close the skies over Ukraine. Poland’s top diplomat argued that protecting Ukrainian airspace from Russian drone and missile attacks would also serve as the first line of defense for the rest of Europe.

This concept has been under discussion since the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion but has so far failed to gain serious traction due to widespread Western fears of escalation. Skeptics have noted that any NATO jets deployed to Ukraine would immediately become targets for the Russians, creating the potential for a direct military confrontation between the alliance and the Kremlin. A single downed NATO aircraft over Ukraine or a destroyed anti-aircraft system on Russian territory could plunge Europe into a major crisis with unpredictable outcomes for international security.

Europe can minimize the risks associated with a no-fly zone by ruling out the deployment of fighter jet squadrons in Ukrainian airspace and focusing instead on boosting the number of ground-based air defense systems covering western Ukraine. Many systems could be positioned across the border and need not actually enter Ukraine at all.

Participating countries could also increase their support for Ukraine’s own layered air defenses, including Kyiv’s growing interceptor drone capabilities. This approach would strengthen the security of European airspace without the necessity of sending NATO pilots into combat.

Enhanced air defenses would not entirely neutralize the Russian threat but could succeed in creating significantly safer conditions for millions of Ukrainians along with citizens in neighboring EU states. While Moscow would inevitably protest over any increased European involvement, it would be hard for the Kremlin to argue convincingly that intercepting Russian drones and missiles constitutes an act of international aggression.

Recent events offer a clear precedent for a greater European role in Ukraine’s air defenses. Jets from multiple NATO countries shot down a number of the Russian drones that entered Polish airspace last week without sparking an escalation. There is therefore no reason to believe that expanding the no-fly zone into western Ukraine would suddenly spark World War III.

Ukraine also has an important role to play in efforts to strengthen Europe’s air shield. Following the recent Russian incursion into Polish airspace, European countries now recognize that they need to urgently study Ukraine’s unrivaled experience of defending against Russian missiles and drones. This process is already underway, with Poland looking to implement lessons learned by the Ukrainians over the past three and half years of regular Russian bombardment. Other countries will no doubt soon be joining the Poles in seeking the advice of Ukrainian air defense crews. Looking ahead, Ukraine’s unique air defense expertise must be fully integrated into NATO and EU security planning.

It should now be abundantly clear that Putin will continue to escalate until he is stopped. The Kremlin dictator’s imperial ambitions extend far beyond the conquest of Ukraine. To achieve his goals, he seeks to discredit NATO and divide Europe. Acting decisively through smart air defense, leveraging Ukrainian expertise, and deepening regional cooperation can help safeguard European security. If Western leaders continue to hesitate, Putin will grow bolder still and the cost of stopping Russia will only rise.

Alina Zubkovych is Head of the Nordic Ukraine Forum and Academic Director at the Kyiv School of Economics.

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Like many other NATO members, Poland has invested heavily in recent years in high-end air defense systems such as Patriots and F-35 warplanes. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has revealed a new kind of war that requires alternative solutions. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three and a half years ago, unmanned systems have emerged as the decisive weapon above the battlefield and have also been used extensively for longer range attacks on land and at sea.

With Russia and Ukraine locked in a relentless race to innovate, the Kremlin has prioritized the mass production of deadly strike drones capable of hitting targets hundreds of kilometers away. The number of drones involved in Russian aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities has risen dramatically over the past year from dozens to hundreds, with record waves in recent months featuring as many as eight hundred drones. Europe remains dangerously unprepared to address the unprecedented challenges posed by these large-scale Russian drone swarms.

Ukrainians have been advising their European colleagues for some time of the need to reassess their air defense strategies in line with the growing dominance of drones. Ukrainian drone warfare specialist Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, who leads the country’s Unmanned Systems Forces, warned in July 2025 that NATO commanders must urgently review their air defense doctrines in order to focus on the dangers posed by swarms of Russian attack drones.

Brovdi’s call to Kyiv’s Western partners and his offer to share Ukraine’s unique experience of drone warfare did not initially provoke much of a response. However, following Russia’s recent escalation in the skies above Poland, that may now be changing. Within days of the Russian drone incursion, Polish and Ukrainian officials announced plans for Ukraine to provide anti-drone training in Poland. Other NATO members are now expected to follow suit, reflecting Ukraine’s status as a leading authority on drone warfare.

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Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski is one of numerous senior European politicians to acknowledge the need for NATO countries to learn from Ukraine. “The Ukrainians have better equipment for dealing with Russian drones and more up-to-date experience,” he commented during a visit to Kyiv last week. “This is something that the public and governments in the West need to urgently integrate into their thinking. It is the Ukrainians who will be training us on how to stand up to Russia, not the other way around.”

US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg echoed this sentiment, commenting on September 12 that Ukraine has emerged in recent years as a “world leader” in drone warfare. Noting that the evolution of drone technologies was changing the nature of modern war, Kellogg credited Ukraine with playing a leading role in this trend while acknowledging that other nations including the United States were now “well behind.”

In addition to offering air defense training to the country’s allies, Ukraine is also ready to help NATO partners identify and procure the necessary defensive tools to combat Russian drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently stressed that nobody in the world has enough missiles to shoot down the large volumes of drones currently being deployed by the Kremlin. Instead, a more eclectic approach is needed, featuring ground-based air defenses and jet fighters together with defensive drones, helicopter patrols, and propeller planes.

Ukraine has already developed and begun deploying a number of interceptor drones that serve as a cost-effective solution to Russia’s expanding swarms of strike drones. Work is now underway to increase production in order to keep pace with Russia’s growing output. Kyiv’s partners are engaged in these efforts. A new initiative was recently unveiled that will see Britain support Ukraine by mass producing interceptor drones based on existing Ukrainian technologies. This should make it possible to deliver thousands of drones to Ukraine every month.

Ukraine’s sophisticated anti-drone defenses will now set the standard for NATO as the alliance adjusts to the changing face of modern warfare and the mounting threat posed by Putin’s drones. At present, Putin is using drone incursions to test NATO and probe the alliance’s military and political responses, but his appetite for escalation has never been more apparent. European countries must therefore prepare to defend themselves against potential large-scale attacks involving hundreds of Russian drones. As they scramble to do so, Ukraine’s experience will prove absolutely indispensable.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Belarus hosts Russian war games as Putin’s drones probe Poland

Hanna Liubakova — Thu, 11 Sep 2025 11:42:47 +0000

On September 12, Belarus will play host to Russia as the two countries stage their largest joint military exercises since the start of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The war games are set to begin against a backdrop of dramatically heightened regional tensions, coming just two days after at least nineteen Russian drones penetrated Polish airspace. Some of these Russian drones entered Poland via neighboring Belarus.

Polish and other NATO jets reportedly shot down a number of Russian drones in the skies above Poland early on September 10. This was the first time in NATO history that alliance fighter pilots have engaged Russian targets in allied airspace, officials stated. Addressing members of the Polish parliament in Warsaw, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said the incident was “the closest we have been to open conflict since World War II.”

Moscow’s decision to target Poland with drones was the latest in a series of alarming escalations by the Kremlin following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s August summit meeting in Alaska with US President Donald Trump. This has served to significantly raise the stakes ahead of Russia’s military drills in Belarus. While the authorities in Minsk have sought to downplay the significance of the joint exercises, they are a timely reminder that Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka is a key accomplice in Russia’s war effort who poses a security threat to NATO’s eastern flank.

Even before this week’s unprecedented appearance of Russian drones over Poland, Belarus’s European neighbors were already stepping up security measures along the frontier. Lithuania and Poland are accelerating construction work on enhanced border defenses, while the Polish authorities have announced the closure of border crossings with Belarus during the military exercises, citing the risk of provocations tied to the drills.

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The “Zapad” military exercises, meaning “West” in Russian, are large-scale drills that have been jointly organized for a number of years by Russia and Belarus. The planned 2023 iteration was canceled as Russian troops and equipment were needed for the ongoing invasion of Ukraine. This year’s war games are set to be significantly smaller in scale that the 2021 exercises, which were used as cover for preparations ahead of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Following Russia’s recent drone incursion, NATO forces across the border from Belarus will be on high alert for any further escalations during the drills.

This week’s Zapad 2025 military exercises will underline the transformation of Belarus into a forward base for the Russian army and will further normalize Moscow’s military footprint in the country. Infrastructure for hosting Russian troops is already in place including missile facilities, fortified munitions depots, and expanded rail links. Almost 300 Belarusian state enterprises are also reportedly involved in the production of weapons or munitions for the Russian military.

Lukashenka has been steadily trading Belarusian sovereignty for regime security ever since 2020, when he became dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival following the brutal suppression of anti-regime protests across Belarus. Hosting Russian troops, supplying Putin’s war machine, and supporting the invasion of Ukraine are all part of this bargain. Russian backing has made it possible for Lukashenka to transform Belarus into an increasingly repressive dictatorship, with regime opponents exiled and over a thousand political prisoners currently behind bars.

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While Lukashenka has little choice but to continue playing the role of junior partner in Putin’s anti-Western crusade, there are signs that he may not be entirely comfortable with his current predicament. In fact, the Belarusian response to this week’s Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace says much about how cornered the Lukashenka regime has become.

Early on Wednesday morning, officials in Minsk reportedly contacted their Warsaw counterparts to offer advance warning that drones were heading their way from the direction of Belarus. Poland said this information was unexpected but helpful. “It was surprising that Belarus, which is really trying to escalate the situation on our land border, decided to cooperate in this way,” commented Polish military officials. While the Belarusians were ready to help the Poles, they also avoided blaming Russia directly for the incident, highlighting just how carefully Lukashenka is treading.

The message from Minsk seems straightforward. Lukashenka is desperate to demonstrate to his EU neighbors and the wider international community that he is not fully tied to Moscow’s war machine and can still act independently of the Kremlin. He is probing for geopolitical space and signaling a cautious openness to dialogue with the West, while trying to avoid provoking a furious response from his Russian patrons.

This should not be interpreted as a sudden thaw. Moscow will certainly fight to keep Belarus as a key pressure point against NATO for many years to come, and is in a position to do so. Over the past five years, Russia has managed to establish extensive levers of influence throughout Belarus’s political, military, business, and cultural establishments in a process that some have characterized as a “creeping annexation.” Meanwhile, Lukashenka may have earned a reputation as a wily political operator, but he will almost certainly always gravitate back toward the Kremlin, regardless of any overtures from the West.

Lukashenka’s room for maneuver is clearly limited. But at the same time, his fear of being dragged directly into Putin’s war against the West creates a potential opening for pragmatic diplomacy. The September 11 visit by a US delegation to Minsk, which secured the release of dozens of political prisoners, shows that this diplomatic path is already producing tangible results. Western governments should now build on this momentum to press Lukashenka harder for the release of all political prisoners and an end to the repression of domestic opponents.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Adam Hammer

Nonresident Fellow

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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Daniels discusses China’s AI strategy on the China Power Podcast

Atlantic Council — Fri, 22 Aug 2025 16:15:23 +0000

On August 19, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Owen Daniels was featured on Episode 108 of the German Marshal Fund’s China Power Podcast. In the episode, Owens discusses US-China competition in artificial intelligence, China’s AI strategy and ambitions, and how Beijing is leveraging AI to expand its global influence. Daniels also explores what the United States can do to maintain and bolster its technological leadership.

Fellow

Owen J. Daniels

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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Putin is facing a fuel crisis as Ukraine escalates attacks on Russian refineries

David Kirichenko — Thu, 21 Aug 2025 21:06:17 +0000

Gasoline prices soared to record highs in Russia this week amid growing reports of fuel shortages due to an escalating Ukrainian bombing campaign targeting Russia’s oil refineries. Social media has been flooded with videos showing long lines of cars and lorries queuing up at gas stations in regions across Russia and in occupied parts of Ukraine, highlighting the scale of the mounting crisis.

Ukrainian long-range drone strikes have knocked out around 13 percent of the Russia’s oil refining capacity since the beginning of August, the Moscow Times reports. The situation is proving particularly challenging as the supply disruption caused by Ukrainian airstrikes is coinciding with a period of peak seasonal demand due to summer travel and the upcoming harvest season.

News of Russia’s growing fuel shortages has been welcomed by many in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s influential chief of staff Andriy Yermak noted that Russia had earlier done everything it could to deprive Ukraine of fuel. “Now they suddenly face shortages themselves,” he commented. “That’s what happens when you attack Ukrainians.”

Ukraine’s unfolding bombing campaign is no mere act of righteous retribution, of course. The recent strikes against Russia’s oil industry infrastructure are designed to directly hit Putin’s war economy and undermine his ability to continue bankrolling the invasion of Ukraine. With Kyiv’s European and American allies seemingly reluctant to impose tougher sanctions measures against the Russian energy sector, Ukrainians see the current wave of drone attacks as a highly effective form of “direct sanctions.”

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The Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries since the beginning of August are part of a wider pattern. In recent weeks, Ukraine has also struck multiple military production sites inside Russia, along with a number of fuel trains and logistics hubs in areas close to the front lines of the war. On August 18, Ukrainian drones destroyed the pumping station for the Druzhba pipeline in Russia’s Tambov region, shutting down this strategically important element of the Kremlin’s energy infrastructure carrying Russian oil to European markets.

Ukraine’s leaders regard the country’s growing long-range strike potential as an important factor in efforts to force Russia to end its invasion and come to the negotiating table. During the early months of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine had only a very limited number of drones capable of reaching targets inside Russia. Over the past three and a half years, Kyiv’s long-range arsenal has expanded dramatically, making it possible to launch increasingly ambitious air offensives.

The latest addition to Ukraine’s arsenal is a domestically produced long-range cruise missile dubbed the “Flamingo.” This recently unveiled missile has a reported range of over 3000 kilometers and carries a massive warhead that dwarfs anything Ukraine’s long-range drones are currently capable of delivering. Zelenskyy recently confirmed that the missile has undergone successful testing and should enter mass production by the end of the current year.

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Ukraine’s ability to establish domestic cruise missile production should come as no surprise. The country had earlier played a central role in the Soviet missile program, with Ukrainian city Dnipro known informally throughout the Cold War as “Rocket City.”

The revival of this tradition now gives Kyiv a potential trump card in talks with Moscow. Even with the country’s current limited domestic drone and missile capabilities, Ukraine is already proving itself capable of inflicting serious damage on Russia’s economically vital energy sector. If Kyiv reaches its goal of mass produced long-range cruise missiles, the consequences for Russia’s refineries, ports, and pipelines could be catastrophic.

Ukraine’s accelerating deep strikes come at a time when the dominance of drones is making battlefield breakthroughs increasingly difficult to achieve. While the Russian army continues to grind forward in eastern Ukraine, it is advancing at glacial pace and has managed to capture less than one percent of Ukrainian territory in the past one thousand days while losing hundreds of thousands of soldiers.

The current technological realities of the war clearly favor the defenders. This leaves no obvious pathway toward a decisive Russian military victory in Ukraine. Kyiv policymakers are hoping that if Putin is confronted with a bloody stalemate in Ukraine and the prospect of mounting attacks inside Russia, he may be forced to rethink his current uncompromising stance and seek a settlement to end the invasion.

Historically, Russia’s sheer size has always been considered one of its main strengths. By launching waves of airstrikes across the country, Ukraine now intends to exploit this vastness and transform it into Russia’s greatest weakness. The Kremlin simply does not have enough air defense systems to protect thousands of potential military and energy targets spread across eleven time zones. The only question is whether Ukraine can produce drones and missiles in sufficient quantities to destroy Putin’s war machine. Based on the current trajectory, there is certainly cause for concern in the Kremlin.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Turkey and the United States have entered an era of renewed bilateral relations, with Ankara and Washington demonstrating increasing will at the highest level to enhance dialogue and cooperation. Both the Middle East’s ongoing conflicts and its emerging opportunities, such as the rise of the new government in Syria, have underscored Turkey’s strategic position as a crucial partner for the United States in this period of change. However, while there is positive momentum in the bilateral dialogue, certain points of disagreement persist, such as the US partnership with the People’s Defense Units (YPG) in Syria, sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), and diverging perspectives on Israel’s foreign policy.

Defense cooperation is a central pillar of the US-Turkey bilateral relationship. Turkey has NATO’s second-largest army and has recently shifted from being a major US defense tech importer to a domestic defense tech manufacturer and rising exporter. Turkish drones and unmanned aerial vehicle technology have proved successful on the battlefield from the South Caucasus to Libya to Ukraine.

Turkey and the United States see strong potential and shared interest in deepening their defense cooperation. A long-stalled deal for F-16 fighter jet sales to Turkey is progressing, with growing optimism in both capitals that it will soon be finalized. Both sides are signaling readiness to address and overcome the CAATSA sanctions the United States imposed on Turkey following its purchase of the Russian S-400 system, which have constrained US-Turkey defense cooperation for several years. Turkey’s readmission to the F-35 program has also been raised as a topic for discussion.

Below are highlights from the Turkey Program’s Defense Journal launch event, which addressed the importance of US-Turkey defense relations and US-Turkey strategic cooperation in the Middle East.

Defne Arslan, senior director of the Turkey Program and AC in Turkey at the Atlantic Council: “The region stands at an inflection point. This historic moment calls for increasing cooperation and alignment of mutual interests between NATO allies Turkey and the United States,” said Arslan in her welcoming remarks.

General James L. Jones, executive chairman emeritus at the Atlantic Council, former US national security advisor, and former supreme allied commander Europe: Jones noted: “Turkey’s defense capabilities and strategic location make it a critically important ally for the United States in tackling regional security challenges.”

Michael Goldman, chargé d’affaires at the US embassy in Turkey: Goldman spoke about the United States and Turkey’s ever-evolving partnership, arguing that their cooperation is important for addressing regional challenges. He also noted several qualities that provide Turkey’s strategic importance for NATO: “When we talk about the region in flux, Turkey is the center of it. . . This country and our relationship have three things: Turkey’s geography, its mass, and its innovative capacity.”

Rich Outzen, co-managing editor of the Defense Journal and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Program: Outzen said that there was an alignment in how Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and US President Donald Trump approach Russia, arguing that both leaders prioritize engaging Moscow through strength while keeping the door open to negotiations to end its war against Ukraine. Outzen highlighted that both Turkey and the United States have substantial battlefield experience, especially in evolving methods of war. Outzen also explained the intent behind the Defense Journal: “Both the US and Turkey suffer from information pollution about the relationship. There are some ideas that paint us as enemies of one another rather than allies of long standing. The Defense Journal is a response to that.”

Can Kasapoğlu, co-managing editor of the Defense Journal by the Atlantic Council Turkey Program: “With the Defense Journal, we want Turkish and American strategic communities to be able to communicate, agree and disagree, like two NATO allies,” Kasapoğlu said. He added that the Defense Journal project is important for keeping the momentum for further cooperation between the US and Turkish defense communities.

Ambassador Ömer Önhon, former Turkish ambassador to Syria: “Turkish-American cooperation is essential for lasting stability in Syria; but we have to have a common ground,” Önhon said. Önhon underlined that the US-Turkey partnership was indispensable for ensuring stability in Syria. However, while the main goals of the two allies are aligned, he said, there are a few ongoing issues such as US support to the YPG, which he said should be addressed to further improve joint efforts for Syria’s reconstruction. Önhon also shared his key takeaways from his recent trip to Syria, where he observed that unlike in the case of Iraq, the state structures from the era of Bashar al-Assad’s regime were not eradicated by the new government. He argued that this gives Syria’s new leadership a good foundation to slowly and deliberately reshape governance and develop better practices. While acknowledging that Syria’s reconstruction would be a slow process and a long-term challenge, Önhon argued that there is unexplored potential for increasing transatlantic engagement with the region while also addressing Turkey’s regional strategy and potential future role in Syria.

General Tod D. Wolters, distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and former supreme allied commander Europe: To conclude the event, Wolters reiterated the importance of the US-Turkey defense partnership for tackling regional security challenges. Wolters highlighted the qualities of the Turkish defense sector that make it strategically important for the United States. “One of the military and government attributes of Turkey is its tremendous degree of readiness,” said Wolters. “It has a lot to do with resilience and responsiveness,” he said, crediting Turkey’s readiness posture for its contribution to regional stability.

Photos from the event

Alp Ozen is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program.

Zeynep Egeli is project assistant at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program.

A vision for US hypersonic weapons

Edward Brady and Michael E. White — Tue, 19 Aug 2025 22:13:28 +0000

Bottom lines up front

Near term: Hypersonics are vital to “kick down the door” of enemy anti-access/area-denial systems to enable less-exquisite forces to attack in mass.
Long term: A high-low mix of hypersonic and traditional weapons will be key to asserting military advantage.
What’s at stake: Delaying the fielding of hypersonic weapons would increase strategic risk; expediting the fielding of hypersonic strike weapons would improve lethality and deterrence and reduce strategic risk.

Any future large-scale conflict in the Pacific will be in a highly contested environment where US capability will be aggressively challenged in the air, on land, at sea, and in space. The US military must have the ability to rapidly deliver lethal effects at range in a timescale of relevance. On their own, traditional strike weapons do not have sufficient speed or range to enable effective operation on what will be the highly contested battlefield of the future. Hypersonic weapons, if fielded in sufficient numbers to defeat critical targets necessary to degrade adversary capabilities, will enable effective use of traditional weapon systems and allow for future battlefield dominance. A layered defeat construct must be deployed to defend against ballistic and hypersonic missiles targeting US assets.

How do hypersonic weapons fit into weapons evolution?

For centuries, weapons have trended toward increasing speed, range, and accuracy. Hypersonic weapons build on these trends. Advanced engine technology and improved materials enable missiles to travel at hypersonic speeds (above Mach 5) while maintaining meaningful maneuverability. Because of their speed, hypersonic weapons, especially hypersonic cruise missiles, tend to have greater ranges than similarly sized weapons.

Faster weapons with longer ranges are more lethal than slower, shorter-range weapons. The faster speeds mean that targets have less time to evade or defend themselves. Hypersonic weapons are more likely to penetrate enemy defenses optimized for slower munitions, meaning missile salvos can comprise fewer missiles. Longer ranges mean that shooters can engage from farther away, potentially outside detection or engagement range of enemy defenses, depending on launch platform capabilities.

In the next decade, exquisite hypersonic weapons will be keys to “open the door” for forces equipped with more traditional weapons. This paradigm is like the United States’ 1991 employment of the new F-117 stealth fighters equipped with precision bombs to dramatically degrade Iraqi air defense command and control. This innovation made it possible for traditional airpower to attack other targets. In a similar vein, highly capable platforms like the B-21 stealth bombers or Virginia-class fast-attack submarines can employ hypersonic weapons against high-value targets in enemy defenses, reducing the overall effectiveness of the enemy defense system at much lower cost than a more traditional force package.

Hypersonic weapons are 5 to 20 times faster than traditional missiles

Reaction time is up to 6x shorter

75% fewer hypersonic missiles needed for a given mission

How can hypersonic weapons increase near-term lethality in the Indo-Pacific context?

Consider a large surface warship like China’s Type 055 (or Renhai-class) cruiser. These vessels are potent sea- and air-control platforms, able to detect and engage air and surface targets hundreds of miles away. They are key nodes within a broader anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) system, capable of extending the A2/AD bubble well into the Pacific Ocean in the event of war. They usually steam in a task group of several other warships, adding missiles and antisubmarine capabilities as well. Moreover, that group is also likely to be protected by fighter aircraft and possibly shore-based surface-to-air missiles. One can assume that the task group could engage incoming missiles at a range of at least one hundred nautical miles.¹

A traditional cruise missile launched from several hundred miles away from the ship traveling at about Mach 1 (or slower) would take up to an hour to reach the ship. In contrast, a hypersonic cruise missile closes that distance in just ten minutes or less. The ship defenses have one-fifth the time to detect, maneuver, and engage a hypersonic threat compared to a traditional missile.

Calculating how many missiles will “leak” through the enemy defenses is extremely challenging. Empirical studies of anti-ship missile attacks show that a good assumption for hits is 30 percent against older defenses, likely less against more modern defenses.² One can assume a need for one-quarter to one-third as many hypersonic weapons to achieve the same effects as traditional weapons based on this same analysis (i.e., an advanced weapon against older defenses not designed to counter it). Successful strikes (i.e., the ship was knocked out of action) against ships with less capable defenses were between 30 and 60 percent. When missiles were fired against ships with capable defenses, this rate fell to only 13 percent.³ Since existing missiles are well understood by most navies, one can assume that traditional missiles will likely have success rates of around 10 percent. In contrast, there are essentially no effective defenses (especially shipborne) against hypersonic weapons: It is therefore reasonable to assume a success rate closer to 30 percent. This change not only reduces the weapon cost per target but also places far fewer launch platforms at risk throughout a campaign. This example could be easily applied to other target sets, launch platforms, and so on, and does not take into account the enabling assets required for the strike force.

Fig. 1: Salvo-size comparison shows hypersonic advantage over subsonic weapons

How do hypersonics improve survivability?

The ability to deliver timely and survivable lethal effects from outside of an enemy’s defended perimeter means that hypersonic weapons significantly reduce the operational risk for the launching forces. Air and missile defense forces defend themselves, broadly speaking, by “shooting the arrows” (destroying incoming missiles), “shooting the archers” (neutralizing launch platforms before they fire their munitions), or both. Peer adversaries like China use both methods.

Continuing the cruiser example, the ship uses its defenses to engage incoming missiles (or launch platforms if they get too close). However, many current weapons outrange the cruiser’s defenses. As a result, a high-end adversary will likely ensure that shore-based surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, fighters, submarines, and so on, are complementing the cruiser to further extend the defensive perimeter. Incoming bombers or surface vessels will likely be engaged outside the range of US missiles by these defenses. A stealth bomber needs to be within several hundred nautical miles of the cruiser to engage with an extended-range antiship missile. Even if the cruiser is several hundred miles from the coastline, at least some other defensive assets will likely engage, whether a carrier- or land-based aircraft, possibly supported by tankers. In the near future, those fighters will likely have unmanned combat autonomous vehicles (UCAVs) with them. Therefore, the US bomber needs to be protected by fighters. This package will likely need electronic warfare (EW) platforms, targeting assets, tactical command and control, and, significantly, tankers, as the strike package likely requires several aerial refuelers to get it to and from the fight. A hypersonic-equipped surface force can achieve the same level of lethality with improved survivability: The ability to launch from twice the range or more puts the hypersonic-equipped force beyond the reach of many of the defenses, notably reducing the size of the enabling assets needed for the strike package while simultaneously reducing operational risk.

Hypersonic weapons—especially if they achieve precision accuracy—may trigger shock waves in the strategic balance.

—Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Origins of Victory

How do hypersonics generate improved campaign effectiveness?

In the near term, leveraging hypersonic weapons in a high-low weapons mix will allow critical targets to be struck with increased effectiveness and at lower risk. This means fewer weapons need to be used to break down the A2/AD system; fewer assets lost during that process; and overall, a more sustainable, effective, and affordable campaign.

Returning to the high-end cruiser example and using round numbers, one can assume that traditional subsonic antiship missiles cost approximately $3 million each and hypersonic antiship cruise missiles cost $6 million each (a reasonable assumption with larger purchase orders).⁴ One can also assume that it will take, on average, ten traditional subsonic missiles to disable the cruiser and it will take three hypersonic antiship missiles. The missile procurement cost to complete the mission is $30 million for the traditional missiles and $18 million for the hypersonic missiles.

Using a single hypersonic missile to first degrade the ship’s defenses followed by two traditional missiles brings the weapon cost down to $12 million. Now, to take it one step further, independent of type, each missile requires one weapon station, and each launch platform has a fixed number of weapon stations. If the number of weapon stations used is reduced by one-third for an individual target, then the number of targets any specific launch platform can attack increases by a factor of three, dramatically increasing the overall campaign effectiveness of a given force.

While this example is intended to be illustrative, it demonstrates that a mix of hypersonic and traditional strike weapons has the potential to significantly increase force effectiveness and reduce mission cost. This increase in mission effectiveness becomes dramatic when the number of high-value, heavily defended targets—as anticipated for any future conflict—is considered.

In addition to the difference in cost for this example, consider an array of related questions: How many launch platforms might be lost taking higher-risk shots with traditional weapons compared to hypersonic ones? How many fewer strike packages are needed each day in a campaign by a longer-ranged hypersonic-equipped force? How much easier is resupply if the number of missiles to be replenished is measured in tens to hundreds (in the hypersonic category) versus hundreds to thousands (of traditional ones)? While the optimal combination of capability and respective inventory should be determined with a more detailed and specific analysis by the joint force, the answers to these questions dictate that policymakers should use decision metrics that reflect the dramatic improvement in mission effectiveness enabled by hypersonic weapons and not simply weapon cost when making critical acquisition and weapon-mix decisions.

Finally, in any conflict in the Pacific, the United States will be faced with an adversary that has a large inventory of long-range ballistic, supersonic, and hypersonic strike missiles. These missiles will be able to deliver effects on US land and sea forces out to hundreds of miles in a matter of minutes. The US military must be able to strike at range within a similar timescale so as not to lose control of the battlespace. Traditional long-range, US strike missiles are subsonic, however, limiting the military’s ability to do so. That asymmetry in battlefield timescale reduces the United States’ warfighting effectiveness and overall tactical deterrence, highlighting an additional imperative to field hypersonic strike missiles in meaningful numbers.

What is a long-term vision of hypersonic weapons?

In the longer term, twenty to thirty years from now, the majority of missiles, fired from all platforms, may very likely be hypersonic weapons. Air combat weapons evolved from exclusively short-range weapons in the early 1980s to mostly medium-range weapons by the 2000s. In the same way, air-to-surface munitions evolved from predominantly unguided “dumb” bombs in 1990 to almost exclusively precision-guided munitions by 2015. It is reasonable to envision a future in which missile speeds evolve from the current norms (less than Mach 1 to Mach 3) to hypersonic (Mach 5+) speeds in the next twenty to thirty years.

But hypersonic weapons are so expensive—are they worth the cost? The short answer is yes. Hypersonic weapons are the future of weapons. Fielding accurate hypersonic weapons in moderate quantities will deliver notable military advantage to the United States. Not doing so might put the United States at a dangerous disadvantage to China and other competitors.

Moreover, these weapons are very expensive now (compared to traditional missiles) precisely because the systems are rapidly fielded, first-generation prototypes that are procured in small numbers. As weapons progress through typical upgrade plans, technology continues to mature, and production efficiencies are realized along with increased procurement numbers, economies of scale are likely to kick in and costs can be expected to begin to decline significantly.

One example of this process is the now-ubiquitous AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile. (RTX, a sponsor of the Scowcroft Center’s Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force, produces the AIM-120.) When its procurement began in 1987, each missile cost $997,000. When the peak efficiencies were reached in the late 1990s, the unit cost of the AIM-120 was $105,000.⁵ Policymakers should expect a similar decrease in unit cost of hypersonic weapons with sustained procurement.

Achieving this future vision rests on assumptions that policymakers can influence. Three stand out.

Promoting continued development of hypersonic weapons will result in them transitioning from bespoke weapons for specific platforms, usually large in size, to smaller sizes that can be integrated across multiple platforms.
Sustaining research and development will solve critical technical problems over time, notably those related to sensors and materials, among others.
Continuing and increasing acquisition will reduce unit cost over time as a demand signal causes industry to invest in appropriate resources and larger orders create economies of scale.

Hypersonic weapons are crucial for future battlefield success. As defenses increase in potency, hypersonic weapons are essential to give the military the lethality it needs to attack key targets and open the door for other forces. Failing to field these weapons, in sufficient quantities, creates strategic risk by making the US military less lethal and less survivable. A US force equipped with hypersonic weapons, on the other hand, is a potent conventional deterrent.

In future publications, the Atlantic Council’s Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force will cover offensive hypersonic capabilities and counter-hypersonic defenses. The Task Force will offer numerous specific policy recommendations to make this vision of expedited deployment a reality.

View the full issue brief

About the authors

Michael E. White is the lead author of the Atlantic Council’s Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force. He served as the first principal director for hypersonics in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. In that capacity, White was responsible for leading the nation’s vision and strategy for developing offensive and defensive warfighting capability enabled by hypersonic systems. Prior to his time in the Department of Defense, he was head of the Air and Missile Defense Sector at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

Edward Brady is a US Air Force officer and A-10 instructor pilot who served as a national defense fellow at the Atlantic Council. The views expressed in this brief represent the personal views of the author and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, the Air University, or any other US government agency.

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1 Eric Wertheim, “Type 055 Renhai-Class Cruiser: China’s Premier Surface Combatant,” US Naval Institute, March 2023, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/march/type-055-renhai-class-cruiser-chinas-premier-surface-combatant.

2 John Schulte, “An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1994), 15–18, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADB192139.pdf; and B. R. Prakash, “Analysis of Missile Effectiveness– A Historical Perspective,” Defense Research and Studies, August 2020, https://dras.in/analysis-of-missile-effectiveness-a-historical-perspective/.

3 Prakash, “Analysis of Missile Effectiveness.”

4 John Tirpak, “Air Force Ramps Up Multiyear Buy,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, Air & Space Force Association, April 2024, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/navy-shoots-four-lrasmair-force-multiyear-buy/. For cost of the hypersonic weapons, see below discussion of AIM-120 cost. While hypersonic weapons currently in development cost at least $18 million, none
of these weapons are in large-scale production. The AIM-120 example illustrates that, once a weapon is procured in larger numbers, the cost should drop significantly.

5 US Department of Defense, AMRAAM Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), December 2018, Report No. 19-F-1098 DOC 14, Department of Defense, 2018, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Selected_Acquisition_Reports/FY_2018_SARS/19-F-1098_DOC_14_AMRAAM_SAR_Dec_2018.pdf.

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A marketplace for mission-ready AI: Accelerating capability delivery to the Pentagon

Jack Long, Bharat C. Patel, and Jags Kandasamy — Thu, 14 Aug 2025 14:30:56 +0000

TO: The secretary of defense

FROM: Jack Long, Bharat C. Patel, and Jags Kandasamy

DATE: August 14, 2025

SUBJECT: Proposing a performance-based AI model marketplace for the Department of Defense

Jack Long, PhD, is a lieutenant colonel in the US Marine Corps Reserve and the Naval AI lead at the Office of Naval Research.
Bharat C. Patel is product lead, Project Linchpin, at the US Army Program Executive Office–Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors.
Jags Kandasamy is co-founder and chief executive officer of Latent AI, a start-up offering scalable, secure edge AI solutions for battlefield and industrial environments. He is also a distinguished fellow at the University of South Florida’s Global and National Security Institute.

The Department of Defense (DOD) should accelerate the deployment of operational artificial intelligence (AI) by establishing a performance-driven AI model marketplace. This strategic insights memo outlines a framework for one such marketplace. The approach incentivizes innovation through open competition, rapid iteration, and real-world performance validation—delivering mission-ready AI solutions at speed and scale. This proposal follows the principles outlined by the Atlantic Council’s Software-Defined Warfare Commission.

Currently, the government purchases AI models from a variety of industry partners. These models need regular retraining and optimization to be relevant in the deployed scenarios. There is a better way to meet the Defense Department’s need for AI.

In this proposal, the government would make a “data lake” available for industry partners to use to train models. This data lake could consist of imagery, radio frequency, sonar, and other mission-relevant datasets. Vendors could independently train models on this data lake and submit them to a centralized government model catalog—the Open Model Marketplace—where they would be made available for discovery and deployment by DOD components across services and commands.

Unlike the traditional procurement of AI through upfront contracts, this approach would compensate vendors based solely on model usage. The government would pay only for performance and the vendors would make money each time their models are deployed in operations. Models that demonstrate real-world utility, responsiveness to mission context, efficient compute utilization, and value to the user and value to the user would naturally rise to the top.

Step one: The Pentagon sets up a government-furnished data playground.

DOD will establish and operate a secure data playground in which industry partners can work with US government data at various classification levels.
DOD will provide vetted industry partners access to datasets and a data catalog.
The playground will provide secure infrastructure; vendors are expected to support the infrastructure by paying to use it.

Step two: Vendors develop models and DOD vets them.

DOD will provide known requirements, but vendors would be free to develop models for any use case they consider relevant.
Models will be assessed via common and standardized metrics.
Models will be vetted for relevance, performance, security, interoperability, and ethical considerations.
Models will undergo basic validation and be scored before gaining approval for inclusion in the catalog of the Open Model Marketplace.

Step three: DOD units use the Open Model Marketplace.

The Open Model Marketplace will be a centralized catalog containing all approved models categorized by mission, type, accuracy, and resource footprint.
Government customers could perform additional testing on models to assess relevance.
Any DOD unit could select and deploy models that meet its mission needs.
Users could run models on the compute infrastructure of their choice.
Models could be selected individually or as part of a “model pack” based on pricing offered by vendors.

Step four: Vendors are paid using a pay-for-performance model.

Vendors will be compensated based on model consumption—with no upfront funding or long-term exclusivity.
Model pricing will be independent of compute costs; models will run on government hardware.
The model can be used on a monthly basis, with the option to terminate at end of each month.
Vendors willing to assume risk could move quickly to build solutions.
By avoiding long-term contracts or vendor lock-in, DOD could maintain flexibility.
Innovation cycles would be shortened as vendors continuously iterate to remain competitive.

Step five: Users and customers score and give feedback.

DOD can concurrently run multiple models that address the same problem.
Government units will provide structured feedback and scoring on model performance.
Users will send feedback to both the vendor and a DOD Test, Evaluation, Validation and Verification oversight team.
Model performance statistics will be included in a model card and visible in a model catalog.
Poorly performing models will be flagged, while high performers will be rewarded with increased usage and visibility.

Step six: Contracting pathways for acquisition.

The DOD can leverage different contracting mechanisms to enable both rapid onboarding of new models and scalable deployment of proven ones.
For newer models, the Commercial Solutions Opening authority is the best option to quickly prototype and validate capabilities that are tied to specific operational needs.
For proven models, DOD should establish a multiple-award Blanket Purchase Agreement under Federal Acquisition Regulation 13.5 or 16.703 to pre-qualify and establish standardized terms (security, intellectual property, telemetry, runtime), enabling rapid call orders for repeat or scaled use.
This approach ensures the marketplace serves as both an on-ramp for emerging capabilities and a fast lane for repeat procurement.

An open-model marketplace would offer several benefits to servicemembers.

Innovation: Access to data would make it possible for the vendor base to iterate and develop faster.
Speed: DOD would have immediate access to cutting-edge models without procurement delays.
Performance: Only the most effective models would be likely to survive based on real-world success.
Flexibility: DOD operators could tailor model selection to their unique operating environments.
Cost-efficiency: DOD would only spend taxpayer dollars on solutions that deliver value, avoiding sunk costs.

To handle adoption and implementation, the Pentagon’s Chief Digital and AI Office (CDAO) should develop a franchise strategy in which it sets the standards but others (e.g., services, combatant commands, and others) can set up their own operations. CDAO should define onboarding policies, model-intake standards, test and evaluation criteria, and other high-level rules, but should let the franchisees execute. This approach would ensure department-wide interoperability while allowing fast movers to drive ahead.

Acknowledgments

Latent AI is a financial supporter of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Software-Defined Warfare Commission. Kandasamy is an industry member of the commission.

The views expressed are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of their employer, the US government, or any affiliated organization.

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Ukraine’s expanding robot army can help address manpower shortages

David Kirichenko — Thu, 07 Aug 2025 20:55:04 +0000

The Ukrainian military claims to have conducted a groundbreaking local offensive in early July 2025, using exclusively robotic systems to seize a front line position in the Kharkiv region and capture a number of surrendering Russian soldiers. Officials from the Ukrainian army’s Third Assault Brigade stressed that the operation was unprecedented in modern warfare and emphasized that Ukraine had suffered no casualties.

Meanwhile, another Ukrainian front line unit has recently showcased a new robotic platform that is reportedly capable of shooting down Russian warplanes and helicopters. The system features a Soviet-era anti-aircraft missile launcher mounted on a remote-controlled robot, providing Ukrainian troops with enhanced defense against aerial attack while reducing their exposure to Russian drones.

These two developments underline the growing importance of robotic systems for the Ukrainian war effort. The Commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Major Robert Brovdi, has identified the deployment of robots as a top priority for the embattled nation. “Drones are currently creating a kill zone extending 20 kilometers from the front lines,” he stated in July. “The next challenge is to replace Ukrainian infantry with ground-based robotic systems that can take over all the logistical tasks in the front line area.”

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The increased use of ground robots by the Ukrainian military reflects an emphasis on innovation that has enabled Ukraine to counter Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of conventional firepower and manpower. For example, since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, Ukraine has dramatically increased domestic drone production and earned a reputation as a global leader in drone warfare.

Similar trends are now evident in the development and deployment of Ukrainian robotic systems on the modern battlefield. Earlier this year, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense officials said the country intends to produce up to 15,000 ground robots by the end of 2025. If this target is reached, it would represent a massive expansion in the use of Unmanned Ground Vehicles or UGVs.

Robotic systems are in many ways an ideal solution for Ukraine as the country seeks ways to leverage its proven tech prowess in order to defend itself in a grueling war of attrition against a far larger enemy. With the Russian invasion now in its fourth year, mobilizing sufficient troops to maintain the war effort is becoming an increasingly acute problem for the Ukrainian authorities amid high casualty rates and an alarming rise in the number of desertions. This has led to questions over how much longer the Ukrainian military can hold the current front lines, and is believed to be fueling optimism in Moscow that a decisive breakthrough may soon be possible.

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While robots can never completely replace humans on the battlefield, there are a range of front line functions that robotic systems are suitable for. At present, Ukraine’s growing robot army is most commonly used in a logistical role to deliver supplies to troops in the trenches. With drones now a ubiquitous feature above the battlefield, any soldiers or vehicles moving around close to the front lines immediately become targets. Tracked or wheel-mounted robotic systems make it possible to resupply forces without risking casualties.

Crucially, robotic systems can be used to evacuate soldiers. Since 2022, the dominance of drones has made it more difficult to withdraw the wounded from the battlefield. This has led to increased Ukrainian losses, with injured troops often unable to receive medical attention in a timely fashion. While robotic transports are also vulnerable to drone attack and can face a range of other technical obstacles, the use of such platforms for emergency evacuations does increase the chances of survival.

Ukraine is also developing robotic systems capable of playing more direct defensive and offensive roles in the combat zone. While soldiers are still needed to guard trenches and consolidate any territorial gains, armed robots can potentially help maintain defensive positions and prevent Russian advances. This could reduce Ukraine’s reliance on dwindling manpower reserves and limit casualties.

Volunteers and private companies are playing an important part in efforts to develop new robotic models and integrate them into the Ukrainian military. They are faced with an array of practical challenges. In addition to securing the necessary funding and resources, it can also be difficult to provide training for military personnel who are desperately needed for combat duty.

While Ukraine’s senior military and political leadership are believed to appreciate the potential benefits of robotic systems, some field commanders reportedly remain reluctant to embrace new technologies. This legacy of the Soviet past has led to an uneven picture at different points along the line of contact, with many Ukrainian brigades able to invest time and money into developing and deploying robotic systems while others receive only limited access.

In order to fully capitalize on the promise of Ukraine’s robotic ground systems, more support must come from the Ukrainian government and the country’s international partners. Foreign investment is also needed to help Ukrainian developers boost output. Meanwhile, front line units must be given the resources and flexibility to train soldiers in the use of new unmanned systems, with commanders empowered to identify and prioritize the most effective robotic solutions.

Ukraine’s rapid wartime defense tech progress is driving the expansion of the country’s robot army. This is helping to address manpower shortages across the front and allowing the Ukrainian military to at least partially compensate for Russia’s greater resources and far larger population.

With the right investment and technical support, robotic systems could become a key element guaranteeing Ukraine’s national security and protecting the country against further Russian aggression. In order to reach that point, Kyiv and its partners must act quickly to scale up production and integrate new robotic technologies along the front lines of the war.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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Recent reports of growing Chinese support for the Russian war effort are fuelling renewed speculation over what Beijing is hoping to achieve in Ukraine. While Chinese officials reject accusations that their country is arming Russia as “groundless” and insist that their focus remains on promoting peace talks, comments attributed to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in early July offer a window into Beijing’s priorities. According to EU officials, China’s top diplomat told his European counterpart, Kaja Kallas, that Beijing is not willing to accept a Russian defeat in Ukraine as this could allow the United States to turn its full attention to China.

Wang Yi’s widely reported statement certainly fits with Beijing’s official stance toward the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although China claims to want peace, it has consistently demonstrated its diplomatic and economic support for Moscow amid deepening ties with the Kremlin. On the eve of the invasion, China and Russia declared a “no limits” partnership. China’s President Xi Jinping has since met with his Russian counterpart on multiple occasions to reaffirm this partnership. Chinese officials have also frequently echoed Russian justifications for the invasion.

Economic ties between the two countries have strengthened significantly since 2022 amid a rupture in Russian business links with the West. Bilateral trade has soared to record highs, with China serving as a key alternative destination for Russian energy exports while also allegedly proving instrumental in helping Moscow bypass Western sanctions. According to a May 2025 report by the German Foreign Ministry, China is believed to be responsible for around 80 percent of Russian sanctions avoidance.

This growing partnership makes perfect sense. China and Russia share a clear geopolitical alignment in opposition to the current US-led world order, with both Xi and Putin openly speaking about the need for a new multipolar era in international relations. Russia also appears to have had considerable success in convincing China that the invasion of Ukraine is a key step toward achieving this goal. Likewise, Beijing has good reason to fear a Russian defeat in Ukraine, which would significantly strengthen the West while freeing up the United States to turn its attention to Asia.

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It is clear that China is now Russia’s most important international partner, but there are some indications of distrust between the two authoritarian allies. Many in Moscow are wary of Russia’s growing dependence on Beijing amid suspicions regarding China’s long-term ambitions toward their country. According to a New York Times report published in June 2025, some elements within Russia’s extensive intelligence community openly refer to the Chinese as “the enemy” and believe efforts are already underway to lay the groundwork for future claims to Russian territory.

In China, meanwhile, there is likely to be a degree of uneasiness about the rapidly deepening military cooperation between Russia and North Korea. Since 2022, Pyongyang has emerged as a key supplier of artillery shells, ballistic missiles, and other munitions to the Russian army. More recently, North Korea has begun providing thousands of combat troops for Russia’s war against Ukraine, along with large numbers of workers for military-related construction and factory roles.

Growing cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang could undermine Beijing’s position by diluting China’s ability to influence the Kremlin. At the same time, the large amounts of money and increased access to advanced Russian military technologies that North Korea is receiving in return for its support could also transform the delicate geopolitical balance in East Asia.

There is little reason to doubt recent EU claims that China is committed to preventing a Russian defeat in Ukraine. However, the much-hyped partnership between Moscow and Beijing may be more marriage of convenience than ideological alliance. Both sides share a common interest in weakening the West, but they might not be as trusting of each other as their public statements would suggest.

Some in Russia are now openly alarmed by their country’s growing reliance on China and have little faith in Beijing’s good intentions. China almost certainly does not want Russia to lose the war in Ukraine, but Beijing is unlikely to welcome the idea of an historic Russian victory that would strengthen Moscow and weaken the current dominant Chinese position during future negotiations with the Kremlin. Instead, China’s preference may be for the indefinite continuation of a war that increases its leverage over Russia while keeping the West fully occupied and unable to turn its attention to Asia.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

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SAIC CEO Toni Townes-Whitley on the ‘ecosystem of capabilities’ needed to win today’s wars

Katherine Golden — Fri, 25 Jul 2025 17:27:06 +0000

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SAIC CEO Toni Townes-Whitley on mission integration in the defense ecosystem

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—SAIC CEO Toni Townes-Whitley discusses the role of mission integrators in today’s defense industrial base and the future of the US defense ecosystem.

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In SAIC Chief Executive Officer Toni Townes-Whitley’s view, it will take much more than top tech to win the wars of the future.

“You can win a battle with some phenomenal tech,” she said at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Thursday. “But if we’re talking about durable, long-term regional conflict, to win wars, you have to have an ecosystem of capabilities.”

For Townes-Whitley, having such an ecosystem—one that joins academics, investors, innovators, and government officials behind common national-security objectives—depends on mission integration. It requires an “open” architecture that accommodates innovation from this wider ecosystem, instead of maintaining exclusivity, or “vendor lock,” for the biggest competitors in the defense industrial base.

“Commercial technology, as important as it is, as critical as it is, is not the only answer,” she said. “For war fighting going forward, our national security needs . . . integration, and it has to drive toward interoperability.”

In short, as Townes-Whitley put it: The United States needs to “leverage all that this country creates in the war fight.”

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Atlantic Council President and Chief Executive Officer Frederick Kempe, which was held as part of the Captains of Industry series of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program.

Play the player

Townes-Whitley argued that adversaries such as China and Russia have already worked to assemble a wide ecosystem for both defense and warfare, with China leaning into asymmetric and hybrid warfare and Russia heightening its cyberwarfare activities.
“We have a change not only in who the players are, how they engage, where they show up, but quite frankly what they leverage,” she said.
Thus, when it comes to a US-led innovation ecosystem, “we have to know how to leverage all of it to protect this country and to protect this planet,” she said.
She added that Ukraine has similarly rallied a massive ecosystem for the sake of its defense, bringing together a “talented” and “tech-enabled citizenry” and gritty technologies—backed by policymakers who have “changed capital structures” to support the fight. “It’s been a phenomenal lesson for us,” she said.
As European countries commit to ramping up their defense spending, they have a “leapfrog opportunity,” Townes-Whitley said, to prioritize mission integration first, instead of following “the US pattern of buying things” and having to make their defense tech interoperable later. “There’s an opportunity for them to use the best of commercial technology if they have a framework and engagement around mission integration,” she said.

High speed, high tech

Townes-Whitley argued that an upfront investment in mission integration will help improve the United States’ speed on the battlefield as warfighting continues to change quickly.
One reason, she explained, is that the “open and interoperable” architectures she envisions would be “plug and play,” erasing the need to ensure in advance that certain defense technologies are compatible with others.
“The speed of compatibility is going to be . . . more of the pacing mechanism than just the commercial tech itself,” she said.
Townes-Whitley said that as artificial intelligence (AI) advances, she sees a future in which “digital agents” are deployed for the sake of defense, making capabilities cheaper.
But “there’s a big conversation about how much it gets regulated,” she argued. She said that the White House’s AI Action Plan reflected a “real openness to AI” and a “desire to not let a regulatory burden slow down the commercial AI.”
Townes-Whitley argued that national security threats have expanded beyond traditional borders to include defending cyberspace and critical infrastructure, fundamentally changing how the homeland must be defended. As a result of this evolving landscape, “data has become the new currency,” helping people on the frontlines make more informed decisions faster.
But still, Townes-Whitley said, the “stovepipe nature” of the military and structural issues between the Department of Defense and the intelligence community continue to serve as “blockers” to much-needed data integration and real-time analytics. “This is not a tech issue,” she said. “This is a policy issue. This is a structural issue.”

Sending a signal

Townes-Whitley’s open architecture vision for the defense ecosystem will depend on whether the government can “send the right signal of long-term investment” to the private sector—and it will require officials across the government to send a consistent message.
Townes-Whitley said that she is “thrilled” to see signals from the current administration that there is high demand for commercial technology.
“The time is ripe right now for the country to evolve in our thinking of how we look at commercial technology,” she said, “how we look at investments and private equity, and how we look to bring those together for orchestration in the current world order.”

Katherine Golden is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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Ukraine is now an indispensable security partner for the US and Europe

Oleksiy Goncharenko — Thu, 24 Jul 2025 21:15:16 +0000

The world is currently entering a new multipolar geopolitical era defined by declining Western dominance, growing Chinese influence, and resurgent Russian imperialism. As the United States adapts to these changing realities, the Trump administration is seeking to reduce its commitment to European security while boosting the continent’s ability to defend itself. Ukraine can play a vital role in this process, and is ideally placed to help US President Donald Trump realize his vision of a secure but more self-sufficient Europe.

Many European leaders were initially caught off-guard in early 2025 when new US Vice President JD Vance stated plainly that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security. Other White House officials have since reiterated this stance, while also underlining the continued US commitment to partnership with America’s NATO allies.

This new US security posture has sparked a major debate across Europe over the need to rearm. However, while the rhetoric in European capitals has changed markedly, there is still no consensus on exactly what this rearmament should involve. At the recent NATO summit, for example, Spain pushed back against the proposal to raise defense spending to 5 percent of GDP, calling it “unreasonable.”

The time for talk may soon be over. Numerous NATO member countries are already warning that Russia could be in a position to attack the alliance within the coming five years. By almost any measure, Europe is not currently ready to face this threat. With clock now ticking, the continent’s leaders must urgently expand defense sector production while also revising outdated defense doctrines.

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Ukraine is uniquely positioned to help Europe meet the mounting security challenges posed by a revisionist and expansionist Russia. After all, Ukraine has already been defending Europe’s eastern frontier for more than a decade following Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea and invasion of the Donbas region. Since February 2022, the country has been the scene of the largest European war since World War II.

The past eleven years of Russian aggression have transformed Ukraine into one of Europe’s leading military powers. Today, the Ukrainian army features around one million battle-hardened men and women, dwarfing the armed forces of its European neighbors. Kyiv’s EU and US partners need to recognize that this unrivaled experience of the twenty-first century battlefield makes Ukraine a key contributor to the future of European security.

Ukraine brings much more to the table than mere numbers. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian defense industry has expanded dramatically and is capable of further growth. The country has also emerged as a global innovator in a number of defense tech segments ranging from attack drones to cyber security.

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Ukraine currently serves as the ideal testing ground for the American and European weapons systems of tomorrow. Ukraine’s successful deployment of Western defense technologies such as the Patriot air defense system has led to a number of historic breakthroughs that have made significant operational upgrades possible. Growing numbers of cutting edge European and American defense sector companies are already present in Ukraine, developing partnerships and testing their products in combat conditions.

Meanwhile, US security support for Kyiv is keeping the country’s defense contractors busy, creating thousands of jobs and contributing billions of dollars in tax revenues to the United States budget. Similar processes are underway across Europe as the impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion helps to reverse decades of defense industry neglect.

Ukraine’s rapidly evolving drone industry deserves a special mention. Since 2022, Ukrainian drone production has increased dramatically to millions of drones per year. This progress has helped Ukraine counter Russia’s often overwhelming battlefield advantages in terms of firepower and manpower, while also transforming the Battle of the Black Sea in Kyiv’s favor and enabling long-range strikes against targets deep inside Russia.

In June 2025, Ukraine conducted an unprecedented attack involving simultaneous remotely coordinated drone strikes on a number of airbases across Russia. This landmark operation was carried out at a fraction of the cost of traditional missile systems, underlining how Ukraine is shaping the future of drone warfare. Indeed, Ukrainian innovation is now pushing the entire global defense industry to evolve and rethink future plans.

At a time when the rest of Europe is struggling to adjust to a rapidly changing security environment, Ukraine stands out. Over the past decade, Ukrainians have developed the mindset, resilience, and self-confidence to function effectively as a front line democracy in an increasingly insecure world. They know what it means to mobilize society in response to an existential threat, and understand the nature of modern war. These attributes make Ukraine a valuable partner for the United States and key contributor to the future defense of Europe.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Combined arms refers to an approach that, when implemented well, creates a decisive tactical advantage for one’s military. The essence of combined arms lies in striking an adversary in multiple ways so that responding to one kind of attack exposes vulnerabilities to another. Its modern form emerged in the early twentieth century, particularly during World War I, as militaries learned to synchronize infantry, artillery, armor, and aviation to overcome tactical challenges.

Since then, military capabilities have significantly evolved across four key variables: speed, range, sensing, and accuracy of fires. Today, another transformation is now underway—with two major implications for combined arms. First, dramatic improvements in computational power, epitomized by artificial intelligence (AI), greatly increase the amount of data that can be processed at headquarters at all levels. Second, autonomy and advanced missile technology—combined with this enhanced computational power—increase both the range and volume of accurate firepower and improve the protective capabilities of forces.

These changes in the character of warfare suggest different approaches to both platform design and overall force structure. In this new environment, combined arms demands tactical forces across all domains that can: fight for information and decision advantage, deny the enemy access to information; deliver (and absorb) large amounts of firepower; and maintain the ability to close “organic” kill chains to ensure that maneuver remains part of the tactical and operational playbook.

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Five pillars for deterring strategic attacks

Mark J. Massa, Alyxandra Marine — Thu, 24 Jul 2025 20:30:00 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Executive summary

To achieve the likely objectives of the National Defense Strategy—defending the US homeland and deterring China—the United States must address the risk of strategic attacks on the homeland. This imperative includes preventing such attacks and ensuring that the Department of Defense has both the strategy and capabilities to restore deterrence at the lowest possible level of damage if prevention fails.

This is essential because a strategic attack could coerce the United States into halting its support for allies and partners, or cause military disruption severe enough to prevent such support altogether—thus undermining the objective of deterring China. Moreover, adversaries could inflict damage on US society that far outweighs the benefits the United States seeks through its foreign policy, further weakening homeland defense.

An effective strategy to address the risk of strategic attack on the US homeland must rest on several overlapping pillars. These include deterring a large-scale nuclear attack on the United States; preventing nuclear escalation during conventional regional conflicts; fielding US and allied forces sufficient to deter the outbreak of major-power conventional war; maintaining a flexible declaratory policy and adaptable strategic forces; and enhancing the nation’s ability to sustain warfighting capacity—even while under strategic attack.

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Mark J. Massa

Deputy Director

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Alyxandra Marine

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Defense Policy

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Invest in space or lose the high ground

Edward Brady, Clementine G. Starling-Daniels — Wed, 23 Jul 2025 20:30:00 +0000

Military Fellowship Alumnus/Alumna

Executive summary

Space will be a decisive factor in shaping the direction—and possibly even the outcome—of the next major-power war. Ever since humanity first ventured beyond Earth, the ability of air forces—and now space forces—to affect military activity on the ground has only grown. Since World War II, achieving air superiority, or at least denying it to the enemy, has been essential for successful surface operations. Today, this same logic holds for space: control of the air enables dominance on the surface, but space superiority now underpins dominance in both air and surface domains (land and sea).

In future conflicts, militaries that achieve space superiority will be able to detect adversary activities across land, sea, and air; strike platforms and advanced long-range weapons will engage targets at unprecedented distances by leveraging space-based sensors, communications, and command and control systems; and space power will be essential for deterring strategic attacks on the US homeland and defending US territory if deterrence fails.

The Department of Defense’s (DoD) emphasis on Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control reflects this reality to a certain extent. Still, the current Space Force budget is insufficient to establish space superiority. In fact, a lack of investment is putting not only US space ambitions, but the effectiveness of the broader military, in jeopardy. Addressing this problem requires increasing the Space Force budget by billions of dollars. If Congress is unwilling to raise the defense topline to accommodate these investments, then the importance of space is so critical that the DoD should make the necessary divestments from other parts of the military to fund the Space Force. Deterring the next war—and winning it if deterrence fails—requires a powerful Space Force that is fully resourced to succeed.

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Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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The Sahel is pivoting toward Turkey. Here’s what that means for Washington.

Jordanna Yochai — Wed, 23 Jul 2025 12:31:51 +0000

Since 2022, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger have received at least a dozen total shipments of Turkish defense articles. This is just one of several signs of the Sahel’s growing engagement with Turkey. High-level diplomatic exchanges, along with the rumored operation of Turkish private military companies in the region, hint at a broader relationship. Washington may consider partnering with Turkey when it advances US interests—but it must approach any cooperation with clear eyes.

A broadening partnership

Turkey’s engagement in the Sahel predates the region’s security crisis, though it has grown in recent years. Trade between Turkey and Mali increased 32,000 percent over the previous two decades, from $5 million in 2003 to $165 million in 2022. Turkish firms have also played a key role in infrastructure development, constructing both an airport and a five-star hotel in Niamey, Niger. These relationships provide a strong base for defense cooperation.

Sahel-Turkey defense cooperation has steadily increased since 2018. What began as a five-million-dollar Turkish pledge to the now-defunct G5 Sahel Joint Force has matured into a broader, deeper partnership. Additionally, coups d’état in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger prompted the United States to halt its defense assistance, impeding these states’ ability to maintain and procure US equipment. Turkey became a more attractive partner as regional security deteriorated and Western assistance stagnated.

Military equipment sales are the cornerstone of Sahel-Turkey defense cooperation. They began in earnest in 2022, when Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger each took delivery of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. These drones rapidly proliferated across both the region and the continent, drawing comparisons to the AK-47 assault rifle because of their affordability, reliability, and ubiquity. These acquisitions heralded a shift in procurement, as Sahel states increasingly turned toward Ankara.

As time went on, drone sales continued apace. Chad obta ined Anka-S drones in 2023 and Aksungur drones in 2024, while Mali expanded its TB2 fleet. Burkina Faso and Mali both procured Akıncı drones in 2024, signaling a shift toward more advanced systems. “Our defense capacity consists of the famous Bayraktar TB2s. We now have a new [drone] called Akıncı,” boasted Burkina Faso’s president, underscoring the centrality of Turkish equipment in Burkina Faso’s arsenal.

But it’s not just drones: Burkina Faso and Chad each acq uired Turkish armored vehicles in 2022. Cooperation expanded further when Niger procured Turkish planes in late 2022, becoming the first export customer of an entirely Turkish-produced aircraft. Chad followed soon thereafter, acquiring the same aircraft in 2023.

Turkish equipment has addressed Sahel militaries’ acute security gaps and afforded them new capabilities. Turkish aircraft and drones offset ground mobility constraints by enabling militaries to surveil their territory and project force into contested areas. Turkish TB2 drones reportedly played a decisive role in Mali’s 2024 reconquest of Kidal, a rebel stronghold situated deep in the Sahara Desert.

Military equipment sales help grow Turkey’s relationships and influence. Partnering with Sahel states offers Turkey new avenues through which it can pursue its regional interests and bolster its image as a leader among Muslim-majority countries. A Turkish intelligence report from 2024 assessed that Niger was a “strategic partner,” capable of extending Ankara’s influence in Africa.

These relationships also enable Turkey to compete with rivals. Some analysts contend that Turkey’s outreach helps it outflank France and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, relations with Sahel states have helped Turkey constrain the Gülen movement, which the Turkish government labeled a terrorist organization and blames for the 2016 coup attempt. For example, Chad and Mali handed over control of Gülenist schools to a Turkish state-run organization in 2017.

Sahel states consider Ankara an important security partner. “We are taking a new course,” said the Malian minister of defense in November 2024. “[Turkish equipment] will help strengthen the territorial grid and neutralize threats wherever they are.” Burkina Faso awarded its highest state medal to the head of a Turkish defense company in 2023.

Defense cooperation may reach even further than equipment sales. In 2024, a report from Agence France-Presse indicated that SADAT International Defense Consultancy, a Turkish private military company, was deployed in the Sahel. It cited the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights as saying that one thousand Syrian personnel who had signed contracts with SADAT were deployed to Niger “to protect Turkish projects and interests.” (SADAT and the Turkish Ministry of National Defense denied these allegations). Africa Defense Forum, a magazine published by US Africa Command, reported that “Turkey said the fighters are in Niger to consult and guard Turkish interests, such as mines.” A deployment to Niger has not been confirmed.

Another report from Jeune Afrique suggested that SADAT had deployed to Mali and trained the country’s military in mid-2024. According to the report, SADAT personnel embedded with elite units loyal to the president and trained them to prevent coups d’état. This has not been verified, but, if accurate, would suggest that Turkey is employing new tools to deepen partnerships and address regimes’ desire for security.

There is also a small body of reporting indicating that Turkey is expanding its overt military presence. In February 2025, Military Africa reported that Chad granted Turkey control of a military base in the city of Abéché. If confirmed, this would be Turkey’s first base in the Sahel. It would also constitute a new element in defense partnerships that, to this point, have largely been driven by Turkish private industry and Sahel states’ demand for military hardware.

So what?

There are some conditions under which cooperating with Turkey could advance US regional objectives. Sahel states need defense assistance to fight a growing terrorist threat, which the United States often cannot provide. Turkish assistance does not face the same legal restrictions and thus fills urgent capability gaps. Turkish aircraft, armored vehicles, and drones improve force mobility and help militaries take the fight to terrorist strongholds. As terrorists expand operations, partnering with Turkey could help regional militaries manage the threat.

Turkey’s growing involvement in the region also presents opportunities to counter US adversaries. Turkish military equipment offers an affordable, high-quality alternative to Chinese or Russian products. In a similar fashion, SADAT could reduce states’ reliance on Russia’s Africa Corps, which has provided training and regime security to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. SADAT offers a suite of similar services, and its deployment to Mali, if confirmed, would suggest that Mali’s president may be looking to move beyond Russian assistance.

That said, there are also risks in working with Turkey, and Washington must approach any partnership with clear eyes. The United States requires recipients of advanced military equipment to submit to end-use monitoring, but Turkey does not enforce recipients’ compliance with the law of armed conflict in the same manner. Moreover, private military companies operate under different rules of engagement than conventional militaries, underscoring the risks associated with possible SADAT deployments in the Sahel. Turkish defense assistance often comes with fewer asks than US assistance, and the United States may incur reputational harm if it chooses to partner with Turkey.

Partnering with Turkey is not a panacea for declining Western influence either. Ankara oscillates between cooperation and competition with Russia, frustrating European leaders. Turkey has been accused of fueling anti-colonial sentiment in Africa; this once irritated the French president who, in late 2020, alleged that Ankara and Moscow had inflamed anti-French sentiment in Africa. The European Union has since expressed interest in partnering with Turkey to “generate a wide international coalition that can support [the Sahel].” Even so, Turkey’s foreign policy suggests that it may not share the West’s precise goals.

Any partnership with Turkey must be carefully calibrated and closely monitored. Partnership has the potential to advance some US objectives, but it alone cannot resolve the broader challenges posed by terrorism’s dramatic expansion and states’ pivot from the political West. The United States must be prepared to work with Turkey where objectives align, while preserving the capacity and flexibility to act independently in pursuit of its vital interests.

Jordanna Yochai is an analyst whose research examines West African security, with prior experience in the US Department of Defense.

The positions expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the US Department of Defense. The US Department of Defense does not endorse the views expressed in hyperlinked articles or websites, including any information, products, or services contained therein.

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Stephen Rodriguez in War on the Rocks on the defense industrial paradigm

mpaulhiac — Tue, 22 Jul 2025 19:53:20 +0000

Original Source

On July 22, Stephen Rodriguez, senior advisor at Forward Defense, published a piece in War on the Rocks entitled “Titans, Trailblazers, and Translators: Forging a Unified Defense Industrial Paradigm”. Rodriguez, working at the intersection of the defense industrial base and technologies, identifies a growing tension between the two. To address this challenge to enduring national security, he says, the strategic imperative is to “harness the industrial might of the titans, fuse it with the digital velocity of the trailblazers, and leverage the deep integration expertise of the translators.”

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NATO is unprepared for the growing threat posed by Putin’s Russia

Elena Davlikanova, Yevhenii Malik — Mon, 21 Jul 2025 22:02:13 +0000

Ever since Russia began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, debate has raged over whether Vladimir Putin’s ambitions extend further. Could the Kremlin dictator actually attack NATO? Initially, many were skeptical, but as Russia’s invasion has escalated into the largest European war since World War II, more and more security experts believe that some kind of Russian attack on the NATO alliance is now a realistic possibility.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte recently stated that Russia could mount a military operation against a NATO member state within the next five years. Numerous intelligence services and military officials within the alliance concur. This Russian threat to NATO is helping to spur the largest European rearmament drive since the end of the Cold War. However, increased defense spending alone will not solve Europe’s Putin problem. NATO members must also convince the Kremlin that they have the political will to defend themselves, while urgently updating their military doctrines to reflect the drone-dominated realities of modern warfare.

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Those who question Russia’s ability to attack NATO typically point to the underwhelming performance of the Russian army in Ukraine. They note that the current invasion has exposed the limitations of Putin’s war machine and argue that Russia would have no chance in any direct confrontation with the far more formidable forces of the NATO alliance. This is true enough, but it assumes that Russia’s only option is to launch a conventional war against NATO. In reality, a future Russian attack would be far more likely to employ hybrid warfare tactics or rely on the Kremlin’s rapidly evolving drone warfare capabilities.

One possible scenario would involve a limited Russian cross-border incursion into the Baltics under the pretext of protecting the ethnic Russian population in countries like Estonia or Latvia. The strategic calculation behind such a move would be to test NATO’s resolve, betting that the alliance might avoid a direct military confrontation and instead resort to diplomacy. If the alliance chose not to respond militarily, it would seriously undermine the credibility of NATO’s core commitment to collective defense.

This outcome looks all too plausible when considered in the context of Russia’s recent ability to intimidate NATO countries and limit Western military support for Ukraine. The West’s excessive caution since 2022 has already emboldened Putin, encouraging him to escalate the invasion of Ukraine and expand his territorial demands. Crucially, this Western weakness may also have convinced Putin that Russia’s enemies lack the requisite resolve for a direct military confrontation and will always ultimately back down.

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Russia’s overwhelming current advantage in drone manufacturing is another key factor that may persuade Putin to move against NATO sooner rather than later. Over the past three years, Russia has built up an extensive domestic drone industry that is now producing thousands of units each month. This is already evident in Ukraine, with nightly bombardments involving more than 500 drones becoming a routine feature of the war. Russian drones are also undergoing constant technological upgrades to become deadlier and more difficult to intercept.

In contrast, NATO nations lag far behind. Drone production across the alliance remains fragmented. Meanwhile, the drones that are available are often outdated and poorly integrated into broader military structures. Unlike Ukraine and Russia, no European army has established a dedicated unmanned aerial force component. Instead, major NATO exercises still tend to treat drones as tactical novelties rather than the decisive weapons of the modern battlefield. While the rapid rise of drone warfare is no secret, it would certainly seem that many NATO commanders have not yet fully digested the lessons of the Russia-Ukraine War.

The situation in terms of missile production is similar. While Western output is still extremely modest, Russia is now able to produce hundreds of ballistic and cruise missiles every month. Increasingly, Russian rockets feature new modifications that allow them to evade Western air defense technologies such as the Patriot system. These dramatic advances in Russia’s drone and missile arsenal give the Kremlin a significant edge over NATO that Moscow may wish to exploit before the gap closes.

Putin is also likely to view the current geopolitical climate as being exceptionally favorable for Russia. US President Donald Trump has raised serious questions over his readiness to defend America’s NATO allies. Other members of the alliance are cranking up defense spending, but the process still lacks a sense of urgency. While Baltic and Nordic countries are taking important steps like withdrawing from earlier treaties banning the use of anti-personnel mines and digging defensive trench networks close to the Russian border, these efforts are relatively isolated.

A conventional armed conflict between Russia and NATO remains unlikely, but the Kremlin can choose from a range of options that stop short of full-scale war while serving Russian interests. At present, Russia’s objective is not seizing NATO territory but causing the collapse of the alliance. This can be achieved by taking advantage of NATO’s reluctance to risk war with Russia, and by capitalizing on the alliance’s slow response to the growing dominance of drone warfare. The Kremlin can also easily escalate its existing hybrid war against the West including cyber attacks, information offensives, sabotage operations, and targeted assassinations.

By defending itself so effectively against Russia’s invasion, Ukraine has already bought NATO precious time. Looking ahead, the Ukrainian military can play a key role in bolstering European security thanks to the country’s unrivaled experience of modern drone warfare and other military innovations. However, Kyiv cannot instill the necessary political will in European capitals or convince Ukraine’s allies to treat the Russian threat with the seriousness it deserves. That must come from Western leaders themselves.

Elena Davlikanova is a senior fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis and Sahaidachny Security Center. Yevhenii Malik is a veteran of the Ukrainian Army’s 36th Marine Brigade.

Ukraine’s recovery cannot wait until Russia’s invasion is over

Anna Morgan — Thu, 17 Jul 2025 13:20:57 +0000

There was something slightly surreal about attending the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome on July 10-11 and talking about reconstruction while my hometown, Kyiv, and many other Ukrainian cities were under relentless Russian bombardment. This jarring reality has helped fuel a degree of scepticism toward the entire concept of staging a recovery conference in the midst of a full-scale war. Some of the criticism aimed at the URC is valid, but much of the negativity misses the bigger picture.

The 2025 URC event was the largest so far in terms of participants and featured solid high-level representation, with national leaders including Georgia Meloni, Friedrich Merz, Pedro Sanchez, Donald Tusk, Maia Sandu, and Petr Pavel among the speakers. All reiterated their backing for the Ukrainian war effort and their support for Ukraine’s EU membership bid. Dozens of agreements were signed pledging international aid and investment.

The size of this year’s conference was particularly significant. Over 6,000 delegates spent two days making connections, sharing experiences, finding new partners, or simply expanding the community of people interested in making Ukraine a success story.

In just two days, I met a wide range of people engaged in efforts to build a better Ukraine. This included Ukrainian veterans leading rehabilitation initiatives, charities expanding their operations in Ukraine, American business owners trying to bring green energy facilities to Ukraine, and Ukrainian architects designing underground shelters. Many law firms were present, offering advice to companies seeking to enter the Ukrainian market. New relationships established in Rome could end up bringing a wide range of benefits to Ukraine.

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The scale of destruction and trauma in today’s Ukraine is daunting. Dozens of towns and cities lie in ruins. Millions have been forced to flee their homes. Every fifth person is a veteran or has a family member who has served in the armed forces, while between 30 and 50 percent of the Ukrainian population require mental health support. Addressing these unprecedented challenges will require huge effort and bold solutions.

Clearly, the top priority is to defend Ukraine and prevent further destruction and loss of life. For the first time, this year’s conference featured a focus on military issues including defense tech innovation and investment in key areas such as drone production. Many participants reiterated that Europe as a whole cannot be truly secure without Ukrainian victory.

Europeans are also increasingly acknowledging the need to learn from Ukraine as they look to defend themselves against the mounting threat posed by Russia. Slowly but surely, the rhetoric is shifting away from humanitarian support for Ukraine as a country under attack, toward recognition of the need to invest in Ukraine as a country that will play a vital role in the future of European security. This change in tone was on full display in Rome.

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Not everything about this year’s conference was ideal. The event would benefit from an extended schedule lasting more than two days. It would also help to have fewer overlapping sessions. The current format meant impressive initiatives often only received a few minutes of attention. Meanwhile, lack of audience interaction felt like a missed opportunity given the thousands of well-informed and experienced professionals in attendance from a diverse range of sectors and different countries.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of this year’s conference was the human dimension. Key themes included the return of refugees, engagement with the Ukrainian diaspora, integration of internally displaced people, and the need for Ukrainian society to prepare for the eventual reintegration of hundreds of thousands of military veterans. Participants also discussed labor shortages and investment in Ukraine’s education system.

My overall conviction is that the Ukraine Recovery Conference has immense value in strengthening Ukraine today and shaping the country’s future. Russia is trying to destroy Ukraine by inflicting death by a thousand cuts. “We need to find 1000 partnerships that will allow Ukraine to persevere in this war of attrition, achieve technological and strategic breakthroughs, and ultimately win this war,” noted my Chatham House colleague Orysia Lutsevych. The URC format can help do just that.

Supporting Ukraine’s wartime recovery and reconstruction is a good way to boost resilience by giving Ukrainians a greater sense of confidence in the future. Crucially, this approach also helps provide urgently needed practical support in a timely fashion. Neither Ukraine nor the country’s partners can afford to wait until the war is over before addressing the many profound security, economic, and social issues arising from Russia’s invasion. The Ukraine Recovery Conference is the best tool to facilitate this process.

Anna Morgan is manager of the Ukraine Forum at Chatham House.

In the Indo-Pacific, US defense industrial partnerships go much deeper than AUKUS submarines

Adam Kozloski, Markus Garlauskas — Tue, 15 Jul 2025 19:15:18 +0000

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This week, Australian and US forces began Talisman Sabre, a major biennial military exercise that sends a powerful message of the two countries’ resolute bilateral ties and joint capabilities. This year’s iteration is being described as the “largest and most sophisticated war fighting exercise ever conducted in Australia,” involving some 35,000 personnel. The successful completion of this major, three-week exercise will hopefully alleviate some of the anxiety that has built up following the US Department of Defense’s recent decision to review the defense industry pact among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known as AUKUS.

Much of this anxiety was misplaced in the first place. The US review is not the alliance-busting event that some have portrayed it as. Far from it. It is reasonable and expected that a new US administration would review such an agreement, and it is something that new governments in both the United Kingdom and Australia have also completed. Moreover, the review of AUKUS should be understood as just one part of a larger US effort to accelerate and refine defense industry cooperation to meet shared security goals in the Indo-Pacific.

What else is included in this larger US effort? In a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in May, for example, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced the first tranche of Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) projects. It was a decisive move toward deepening US-led defense industrial base cooperation—within the administration’s “America first” framework—to counter China’s looming threat. PIPIR and AUKUS, if employed properly, will be powerful tools to achieve the Trump administration’s vision of ensuring US deterrence against aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

AUKUS: The submarines aren’t the only substance

The first problem is that the AUKUS pact is widely misunderstood. It is not a new trilateral “alliance.” AUKUS does not, for instance, involve new commitments on the use of military force. Nor is it a political coalition, like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue made up of Australia, India, Japan and the United States. Further, despite the focus of recent media coverage, AUKUS is not just about a new submarine sales deal that cut France out of selling diesel submarines to Australia. AUKUS has two “pillars,” both of which hold important benefits for the United States and particularly its Indo-Pacific Command.

Pillar I is about developing nuclear-powered, but nonnuclear armed, attack submarine capability operating out of Australia. This has already started, with Australians training on nuclear submarine technology with US and UK counterparts, and with US submarines making more port calls at Perth in Western Australia. The next major milestone will be in 2027, when Submarine Rotational Force-West will be established at Perth, initially with US and UK submarines. Then, in the early 2030s, the United States will sell Australia Virginia-class submarines as an interim measure while Australia develops its own nuclear submarine production capability. By the early 2040s, Australia will be building and operating its own subs of the new SSN-AUKUS class, an Australia-UK-US design.

However, concerns are rising that the US industrial base may not be able to produce enough Virginia-class submarines to provide for both Australian and US requirements for Pillar I. Since 2022, the United States has only been able to produce 1.2 Virginia-class submarines a year. It has not reached the targeted procurement rate of two new submarines per year, much less the 2.33 production rate required to provide submarines to Australia. While the US Congress and the Australian government have directed billions of dollars to defense industrial base investments, reaching this production rate in the next few years is a herculean task. However, in the interim, even if Pillar I only results in US and UK attack submarines operating out of Western Australia—much closer to the key flashpoints of the Taiwan Strait and the West Philippine Sea—then it has had a meaningful impact.

AUKUS Pillar II, meanwhile, is a much broader effort at defense industrial cooperation in a range of important areas. This includes long-range fires, quantum computing, unmanned underwater vehicles, electronic warfare capabilities, and artificial intelligence, pooling the advanced research efforts of all three countries to deliver new capabilities in the short term. These baskets of capability are not as simple and powerfully symbolic as new nuclear subs, but they are very important. In fact, there’s a strong argument that the focus and funds for AUKUS should shift away from the signature submarine programs to build out these new systems right away. Further, unlike Pillar I, Pillar II has a real prospect of including additional regional allies in specific Pillar II projects beyond the original three partners. Unlike AUKUS Pillar I, which has hard production limitations focused on a very expensive platform type with a long production timeline, Pillar II is bearing fruit quickly. One example of an AUKUS Pillar II capability is the imminent deployment of a “trilateral algorithm” to share classified information from P-8 sonobuoys across each country’s systems, increasing the range and maritime domain awareness of allied anti-submarine warfare efforts.

PIPIR: Leveraging regional US partnerships

PIPIR is less prominent than AUKUS, but it is more expansive and may prove to be even more important. Since its founding in May 2024, PIPIR has evolved from an agreed-upon concept to a plan of action in recent weeks. Announced in late May, the first set of marquee projects shows how the United States looks across the region at opportunities to save taxpayer money and improve US sustainment capability. For example, one new project aims to “establish repair capability and capacity for P-8 radar systems in Australia.” The P-8 is a critical aircraft for anti-submarine warfare and for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Currently, repair efforts on the radar system are limited to the continental United States. The ability to repair both US and partner P-8 radar systems out of range of most China’s missiles will enhance both deterrence and sustainment capabilities in the event of a conflict.

Another new project involves identifying standards for small unmanned aerial systems and secure supply chains for production. Currently, China controls nearly 90 percent of the commercial drone market, and the Department of Defense’s innovation unit claims that “China could shut [the drone industry] down globally for a year.” Efforts to build ally and partner supply chains are essential for deterrence and lethality. The commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Paparo, has continued to emphasize the importance of the “Hellscape” concept of massed unmanned systems to fight China. This new PIPIR project will help buttress the Department of Defense’s Replicator Initiative to ensure “Hellscape” is a credible option that is truly free of Chinese components.

Other PIPIR efforts include expanding in-theater ship repair, cooperation with Australia to produce artillery shells and guided missiles, and even coproduction with India on “equipment needed to deter aggression.” Hegseth’s public release of these projects indicates that partners and allies in the region are confident about PIPIR and the United States’ commitment to its success, with likely even more cooperation occurring behind closed doors.

The way forward

Together, PIPIR and AUKUS Pillar II could prove to be vital to deterrence and defense in the Indo-Pacific. While diplomatic messages and military exercises are immediate, visible, and necessary to shore up deterrence in the near term, aligning defense on industrial capabilities to match China’s massive armament program is the more important strategic move for the years ahead. The US Navy has acknowledged that China has 230 times more shipbuilding capacity than the United States. To provide both a qualitative and quantitative response to China’s push to become a “world class” military power, the need for the United States to integrate the industrial capacity and comparative technological advantages of allies and partners in the region has never been greater. Pitting the US defense industry against China’s without the help of Washington’s allies and partners, is a recipe for the failure of deterrence and, perhaps, catastrophic defeat. As US President Donald Trump has put it in the past, “America first does not mean America alone.”

Further defense industrial cooperation and integration can yield immense and local benefits for the US warfighter. However, these benefits must be carefully balanced with the need to ensure that the US government is not replacing US capacity and jobs with foreign ones to cut costs and speed up timelines. The Trump administration’s recently announced review of AUKUS, and its likely already completed review of PIPIR, under an “America first” framework, will be critical to mitigating this risk. A revitalized AUKUS and PIPIR model can create coproduction and cooperative models, allowing the United States to bring its strengths to the table. The better the United States can work with its regional partners on munitions and systems of mutual use, such as addressing the meager supply of 155mm artillery shells, the more effectively Washington can equip its warfighters to deter, and if necessary, win a prolonged war.

As the Trump administration prepares a national security strategy to help restore US greatness, regional defense industrial base partnerships must play a central role in restoring domestic manufacturing and increasing US lethality and deterrence. The early successes of AUKUS Pillar II and the announcement of marquee PIPIR projects have built a solid foundation for what should be an even more ambitious program of integration and cooperation.

Adam Kozloski is a nonresident senior fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and at the N7 Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He previously served as an aide in the United States Senate, supporting Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee members, including as Senator Joni Ernst’s foreign policy advisor.

Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leading the Council’s Tiger Project on War and Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. He is a former senior US government official with two decades of service as an intelligence officer and strategist, including twelve years stationed overseas in the region. He posts as @Mister_G_2 on X.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

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Russia’s bombing campaign is killing record numbers of Ukrainian civilians

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 14 Jul 2025 10:33:17 +0000

As Russia’s bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities continues to intensify, the civilian death toll is rapidly rising. June 2025 saw the highest monthly casualties among the Ukrainian civilian population in more than three years, according to new data from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. Losses included 232 deaths with a further 1343 Ukrainians injured, UN officials reported.

This sharp rise in Ukrainian civilian casualties is the result of a Russian air offensive that has expanded dramatically in scope since late 2024. During June, the number of drones and missiles launched at Ukrainian targets was ten times higher than the volume one year earlier.

“Civilians across Ukraine are facing levels of suffering we have not seen in over three years,” commented UN Monitoring Mission head Danielle Bell. “The surge in long-range missile and drone strikes across the country has brought even more death and destruction to civilians far away from the frontline.”

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The trend of increasingly deadly Russian bombardments continues to gain momentum at an alarming rate with a series of record-breaking aerial attacks in early July, each featuring more than 500 drones along with cruise and ballistic missiles. Based on the current trajectory, analysts warn that Russia will soon be able to conduct regular bombing raids involving in excess of 1000 drones.

Russia has managed to increase the scale of its bombing operations thanks to progress made since 2023 in the domestic production of drones. During the first year of the full-scale invasion, Iran supplied Russia with the long-range Shahed drones used to bomb Ukraine. Moscow has since reduced its reliance on the Iranians by securing the necessary Shahed drone blueprints from Tehran and establishing production lines inside the Russian Federation.

A growing number of dedicated Russian facilities are now manufacturing thousands of drones each month for the invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin has reportedly imported laborers from a number of Asian and African countries to bolster the workforce in these factories. China has also been accused of providing vital components in large quantities.

In addition to ongoing increases in output, Russia has also introduced a series of upgrades to Iran’s Shahed drones. The most recent models are faster and able to operate at higher altitudes, making them significantly more difficult to intercept. They are equipped with video cameras and in some cases utilize AI technologies, paving the way for autonomous flight operation and target selection. Crucially, the new generation of Russian bomber drones can also carry much larger warheads, leading to far greater destruction and loss of life.

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The escalation in Russia’s air war comes as Putin’s army struggles to make progress on the ground while suffering catastrophic losses. The Russian military has held the battlefield initiative since early 2024, but has managed to seize less than one percent of additional Ukrainian territory during this period, raising doubts over Putin’s ability to achieve his maximalist war aims. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently reported that the Russian army had lost over 100,000 soldiers during the first half of 2025 alone.

With no sign of an imminent breakthrough along the frontlines of the war, Putin’s bombardment strategy appears aimed at terrorizing the Ukrainian civilian population and undermining the country’s will to resist. The US-based Institute for the Study of War recently assessed that Russia’s ongoing large-scale air strikes seek to degrade Ukrainian and Western morale while underscoring Ukraine’s need for continued Western support.

Ukrainian officials have reached similar conclusions regarding the Kremlin’s intentions. “The Russians are intensifying terror against cities and communities to increasingly intimidate our people,” commented Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on July 13. “Russian terror against the rear is an attempt to break the nation,” stated Andriy Yermak, head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office. “Russia can’t achieve Putin’s goals on the frontline, so it keeps targeting civilians.”

The recent geographical expansion of Russia’s nightly bombing raids certainly seems to support these claims and appears designed to demoralize the entire Ukrainian population by sending a message that nowhere in Ukraine is now safe. Key targets in early July included cities in western Ukraine that had little previous experience of major bombardment such as Lutsk and Chernivtsi.

Ukraine is now seeking to address Russia’s terror bombing strategy with a combination of technological innovation, expanded military capabilities, and increased Western support. While additional air defense systems like US-made Patriots are a priority, Kyiv is developing and testing its own domestically produced interceptor drones as the most cost-effective way to combat Russia’s massive drone raids.

Long-range weapons are also vital as Ukraine seeks to strike back. Some commentators believe Ukraine can never have enough air defenses to neutralize the threat posed by Russia’s ever-expanding bombardments. They argue that the only way to stop Putin from bombing Ukrainian cities is by boosting Ukraine’s ability to hit targets deep inside Russia including production facilities and launch sites.

With Putin’s war machine cranking out missiles and drones in even greater quantities, larger Russian raids in the coming months are inevitable. The Ukrainian authorities must urgently come up with effective solutions before the civilian death toll rises further. Putin appears to believe he can bomb Ukraine into submission. While there is currently no indication that the civilian population is approaching breaking point, the horror of Russia’s increasingly deadly air raids is weighing heavy on the war-weary nation.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Aerial drones are only part of Ukraine’s expanding unmanned arsenal. The Ukrainian military uses ground drones to storm enemy trenches, deliver supplies to the front lines, and evacuate wounded soldiers from hot spots. At sea, Ukrainian marine drones have forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to abandon its home base in Russian-occupied Crimea. Remarkably, Ukrainian marine drones armed with missiles have also reportedly managed to destroy Russian helicopters and fighter jets. Together, these air, land, and sea drones are able to threaten every part of Putin’s war machine.

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So far, drones have helped Ukraine to hold the line against Russia’s invasion. But holding is not winning. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is catching up. Indeed, rapidly growing domestic production of Shaheds and unjammable fiber optic drones have recently allowed Russia to seize the initiative from Ukraine in the drone war. In order to reverse this trend and open up a pathway toward ending Russia’s invasion, Kyiv’s Western partners must help Ukraine dramatically scale up drone production.

This year, Ukraine aims to produce around four million drones of all types, more than double last year’s total. Partner countries also plan to expand deliveries. A twenty-nation Drone Coalition co-chaired by Latvia and the UK has pledged €2.75 billion to supply an additional one million drones in 2025. However, progress has been slow as members rely on their own limited drone production capabilities.

The so-called Danish model of military aid offers a faster and more cost-effective alternative. Under this approach, Copenhagen pools donor funds, including windfall interest from frozen Russian assets, to procure drones and other military equipment directly from Ukrainian manufacturers. Total disbursements via this streamlined pipeline are expected to reach €1.5 billion in 2025.

Even if Kyiv and Western partners meet their current targets, overall output of around five million drones is only half the annual total necessary to shift the battlefield balance in Ukraine’s favor. With ten million drones per year, Ukraine could maximize the power of drone swarms to overwhelm Russia’s air defenses and knock out supply lines faster than Moscow could patch them up. This could realistically alter the course of the war and force Putin to retreat.

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Ukraine’s drone industry has already demonstrated that it can scale up production quickly and cheaply. What started as garage tinkering using mostly Chinese-imported parts has evolved into a robust industry relying primarily on domestic and Western components. For several years, Ukraine has been mass-producing drones that rival Western models in effectiveness at a fraction of the cost.

Innovation cycles are equally impressive. Thanks to rapid battlefield feedback and streamlined procurement, Ukraine’s agile approach to innovation easily surpasses the far slower development cycles in the West. New drone variants roll off production lines in weeks rather than months. Airframes produced by industrial-grade 3D printers enable rapid prototyping and redesign without costly retooling.

Ukrainian officials have repeatedly stressed that the country has the spare capacity to produce drones in far greater numbers. They estimate that scaling up drone production from current levels to ten million units per year is realistic but would require an additional €10 billion over two years. To meet that goal, Ukraine’s allies should launch a dedicated drone initiative.

This initiative would draw on the Danish model, with funding for Ukrainian drone production coming from a variety of sources including bilateral grants, windfall interest from frozen Russian assets, and low-interest loans from the EU’s SAFE instrument, which aims to bolster Europe’s defense-related industrial capacity. Most orders would flow directly to Ukraine’s drone manufacturers, significantly reducing costs, cutting delivery times, and minimizing logistical risks.

In parallel, the EU should rapidly establish a unified defense market that includes Ukraine. This means integrating Kyiv into the European innovation ecosystem and fostering collaboration between Western industry and Ukraine’s vibrant defense tech ecosystem. Ukrainian drone producers would gain from European orders and investments, while the EU would benefit from Ukraine’s battle-tested technologies, production capacity, and agile innovation mindset. Strengthening Ukraine as an allied drone superpower is clearly a strategic investment in the continent’s long-term security.

History shows that transformative technologies define entire eras of warfare. Artillery was the decisive weapon during World War I, while tanks, combined with air power, ruled the battlefield a generation later in World War II. The 1991 Gulf War marked the next leap: The ascendancy of precision-guided air power.

Today, the dominance of drones is rewriting military doctrine and looks set to shape conflicts for years to come. Ukraine has the technology, talent, and industrial potential to prevail in the war with Russia, but currently lacks the funding to scale drone production to the necessary levels.

Failure to act now will prolong the war in Ukraine, erode Western security, and embolden autocrats worldwide. The stakes have never been higher; the solution has rarely been clearer. The young Ukrainian drone operators in that dimly lit command room understand this very well. Ukraine’s Western partners must now also grasp the new military realities. By funding a massive Ukrainian drone surge, they can thwart Russia’s invasion and safeguard Europe.

Mark Boris Andrijanič is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, a member of the Governing Board of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology, and a former Minister for Digital Transformation of Slovenia.

Ukraine can benefit from growing tech ties between Gulf states and the US

Anatoly Motkin — Sun, 13 Jul 2025 14:38:11 +0000

The recent conflict between Israel and Iran has shaken Middle Eastern security assumptions and set the stage for new strategic alignments across the region. Amid escalating threats and shifting power dynamics, the United States and Gulf nations have moved swiftly to fortify a different kind of alliance; one anchored not in oil prices or arms sales, but in cooperation to develop and implement cutting-edge technologies.

This emerging US-Gulf tech partnership is not only a response to regional instability, but also a platform for global influence. For Ukraine, it presents a strategically exciting opportunity to deepen engagement with both Washington and the Gulf nations, while also advancing the country’s own recovery and integration into established international innovation networks.

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The Gulf’s recalibration following the unprecedented recent escalation in hostilities between Israel and Iran has reinforced the urgency of technological self-sufficiency and digital resilience. From Riyadh to Abu Dhabi, national strategies such as Saudi Vision 2030 and the UAE’s AI agenda are gaining new importance.

The United States, meanwhile, is seeking reliable partners to counter the rise of authoritarian tech ecosystems led by China, Russia, and Iran. These converging interests are creating a new basis for cooperation that is focused on issues such as semiconductors, AI, cybersecurity, energy transition, and space innovation.

The current shift has potentially long-lasting geopolitical implications. In contrast to China’s closed and tightly state-controlled tech model, the US-Gulf partnership emphasizes transparency, interoperability, and market access.

The Gulf’s geographic position and capital resources make it an ideal hub for restructured supply chains and next-generation infrastructure. In this context, the recent Israel-Iran conflict has served as both catalyst and justification for deeper American-Gulf integration, particularly in terms of dual-use technologies with civilian and defense applications.

For Ukraine, the relevance of this rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape is immediate and multi-dimensional. Ukrainian battlefield-tested technologies in electronic warfare, counter-drone systems, and cyber defense all directly address the concerns of Gulf nations regarding growing regional threats.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s agritech innovation can support Gulf food security strategies in what are increasingly arid environments. The country’s globally respected software talent and cybersecurity expertize can also offer value to American firms operating in the Gulf.

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Looking ahead, the convergence of US innovation, Gulf investment, and Ukrainian resilience could become an attractive blueprint for Kyiv’s postwar recovery. Ukraine’s reconstruction is set to be one of the largest rebuilding efforts of the twenty-first century. This unprecedented rebuilding process can serve as a real-world testbed for smart infrastructure, digital services, and clean energy systems co-developed by Ukrainians together with partners in the US and the Gulf region.

To take full advantage of this moment, Ukraine must adopt a targeted strategy. First, the country should identify the most strategically attractive niche sectors including cybersecurity, agritech, and defense tech. These should be areas where Ukraine’s assets complement rather than compete with American and Gulf priorities.

Second, Ukraine must invest in human capital by expanding tech education and exchange programs that connect Ukrainian talent with innovation centers in the Gulf and the United States. Thirdly, Kyiv should position itself as a proactive contributor to this emerging innovation bloc, not just as a beneficiary of international aid but as a co-creator of strategic value.

Recent shifts in the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East have accelerated existing global divisions in terms of both technology and security. The US-Gulf alliance is emerging as a stabilizing force, grounded in shared values and mutual technological ambition. Through focused engagement and smart positioning, Ukraine can become an indispensable partner in this alliance, and can help shape a more secure and innovative global future.

Anatoly Motkin is president of StrategEast, a non-profit organization with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan dedicated to developing knowledge-driven economies in the Eurasian region.

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Dutch and German intelligence agencies claim to have evidence that Russia is increasingly using chemical weapons in a “widespread and standardized” way in Ukraine. Ukrainian military officials say that at least three Ukrainian soldiers have died in connection with Russian chemical weapon use, with more than 2,500 injured troops displaying symptoms consistent with exposure to chemical weapons.

According to Dutch Military Intelligence Agency chief Peter Resink, there have been thousands of instances of Russian chemical weapons use during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Ukrainian authorities have reported 9,000 separate incidents. Resink emphasized that the occurrences of chemical weapons use in Ukraine were not the result of “some ad-hoc tinkering” but rather “a large-scale program.”

Russia’s alleged deployment of chloropicrin, which is banned under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, has reportedly involved improvised munitions such as “filled light bulbs and empty bottles that are hung from a drone.” The chemical causes severe irritation to the skin, eyes, and respiratory tract, and is more toxic than regular riot control agents. Russia faces accusations of utilizing chloropicrin on the battlefield to force Ukrainian soldiers out of their trenches, leaving them vulnerable to enemy fire.

The European intelligence agencies also alleged in their joint statement that Russia has made “massive investments” into its chemical weapons program, with Moscow continuing to expand chemical weapons research and recruiting new scientists. This echoes earlier reports that Russia expanded a restricted military facility linked to biological weapons research following the onset of the full-scale Ukraine invasion in 2022.

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Russia’s alleged use of chemical weapons in Ukraine corrodes internationally recognized norms and rules of war established during the twentieth century. This includes the Chemical Weapons Convention, which Russia has signed and ratified.

Turning a blind eye to Russia’s alleged violations in Ukraine could set a concerning precedent and give the green light for other countries to develop their own chemical weapons arsenals. This would reverse the progress of the past century and set the stage for a dangerous new era of warfare.

During World War One, nearly 100,000 soldiers were killed in gas attacks and more than 1.3 million were exposed to chemical weapons. Although chemical weapons were not the deadliest force used on the battlefield, they brought “enormous psychological consequences,” and “should be classed not as a weapon of war, but as a weapon of mass terror.”

The issue of chemical weapons appeared to strike a chord with US President Donald Trump during his first term in office. When former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad was accused of carrying out a gas attack against Syrian civilians in 2017, Trump said it affected his attitude toward Assad. Trump later ordered a missile strike on the airfield where stocks of the sarin nerve agent were reportedly stored.

Dutch Minister of Defense Rubin Brekelmans has stated that Russia’s alleged use of chemical weapons must be met with pressure from the international community. “This calls for more sanctions, the isolation of Russia, and undiminished military support for Ukraine,” he commented. Addressing the allegations of Russian chemical weapons use, Trump has recently indicated that he will not permit such violations of international law to pass without a response.

Unless reports regarding the use of chemical weapons in Ukraine are addressed, other rogue regimes may be tempted to follow Moscow’s lead and deploy these weapons against civilians and soldiers alike. A safer future starts with holding Russia accountable for its alleged chemical weapons violations today.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

What’s in the plan

The big question in European defense is how Europe should address its spending and capability gaps. In its April 7 report, Bruegel laid out one possible solution in the form of the EDM. The mechanism would focus on joint procurement across a single European defense market. Notably, this proposal reflects a similar idea discussed among British officials earlier this year for the creation of a “supranational bank” for joint European defense purchases. The EDM would use funds from its members to finance the joint procurement of weaponry, including for the acquisition of strategic enablers, and make loans to member states. To fund these activities, the EDM would be empowered to borrow on capital markets.

The Bruegel plan represents a step forward in addressing well-documented challenges to European security. Currently, the European defense landscape is largely divided along national lines, creating high prices where markets are small. Weapons stockpiles are low, and countries too often do not coordinate purchases. The EDM would help create a single market for defense on the continent and allow Europe to take advantage of economies of scale. It would also shift the financial burden of borrowing away from member states, allowing the EDM to acquire costly defense materials and keep debt on its own books. While the EU has made recent attempts to add flexibility to its fiscal rules for defense spending, this arrangement may be an attractive alternative for heavily indebted countries seeking to avoid rising debt levels. On top of these advantages, the EDM would allow for the participation of countries outside the EU, such as the United Kingdom.

If the plan were adopted in its current form, the EDM would become the official embodiment of the “coalition of the willing.” It would allow European democracies, whether part of the EU or not, to voluntarily join a framework governed by rules that are better suited to addressing challenges facing the European security landscape. Nations would be prohibited from using national bias in defense procurement, thereby eliminating the exception in EU law that allows countries to prioritize their own national defense initiatives at the expense of consolidating the European single market for defense.

What it might mean for the United States

The potential downside for the United States remains the same issue that has plagued European defense plans for years: a single market for European defense procurement would likely lead officials across the continent to prioritize European defense contractors over US firms. The current proposal stipulates that in most cases, the EDM could only procure weapons from defense contractors located in EDM member countries.

Politicians in both parties in Washington have sharply criticized this potential exclusion. This concern has bubbled up before: during US President Donald Trump’s first administration, as the EU moved to establish its Permanent Structured Cooperation initiative, the White House objected to what this would mean for US firms. But times have changed: Washington cannot reasonably expect Europe to step up its capabilities and increase its reliance on a United States that has shown its priorities are elsewhere.

Furthermore, the EDM would not fully exclude US firms. Under the proposal in the Bruegel report, if the EDM board were to choose to do business with a defense contractor in the United States, then it could do so through a “majority” or potentially a qualified majority vote. To be sure, this would add an additional hurdle to clear, but it would not completely bar US companies from the market.

What’s more, the EDM project fits into Washington’s strategic thinking. By facilitating purchases on a larger scale, the EDM would give European countries the power to jointly procure capabilities operated by the United States. Currently, European countries largely depend on the US command in NATO to provide them with access to strategic enablers, including strategic air defense and lift systems, satellite communications, and command-and-control capabilities. These enablers are expensive to acquire, yet they are necessary to carry out any large-scale coordinated action. With its greater purchasing power, the EDM would potentially have the capacity to buy and own strategic enablers, build European capabilities, and free up US capabilities for other priorities. The EDM is not a tool for Europe to move beyond NATO; it’s one to fortify European security within the Alliance.

The plan for the EDM remains a blueprint for now, but it provides an invaluable insight into European defense planning amid the changing transatlantic relationship. The European Union and its member states need to take ideas such as these, which facilitate the strategic independence of the continent, and put them into action.

For its part, Washington should recognize the fresh ideas that are coming out of Europe and embrace them. A US endorsement of bold proposals for European defense such as the EDM can help Europe build momentum to adopt them and make real progress on taking more responsibility for its defense. Until then, rhetoric from Washington on its support for greater European self-reliance will be just that.

Katherine Johnson is a former young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Putin is winning the drone war as Russia overwhelms Ukraine’s defenses

Maksym Beznosiuk — Tue, 08 Jul 2025 13:51:28 +0000

Russia’s July 4 bombardment of Kyiv was reportedly the largest of the entire war. The attack came just hours after US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin had finished an unsatisfactory telephone conversation, leading many to suggest that the raid was a calculated act of defiance by the Kremlin.

Whether the intention was to personally embarrass Trump or not, the recent Russian airstrikes in the early hours of American Independence Day certainly served to underline the changing fortunes in the drone war between Ukraine and Russia.

For the first few years of the war following Putin’s 2022 invasion, Ukraine’s dynamic tech sector and vibrant startup culture helped keep the country a step ahead of Russia despite the Kremlin’s far greater resources. In recent months, however, it has become increasingly apparent that the initiative has passed to Moscow.

The recent shift in the drone war is a matter of both quantity and quality. Russia is now producing far more drones and has developed new models incorporating a range of technological upgrades. This is making it possible to launch massive bombardments of Ukrainian cities that overwhelm Ukraine’s limited air defenses and terrorize the civilian population.

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Since 2022, drones have emerged as the key weapon for both sides in the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin. Ukraine’s drone manufacturing ecosystem has mushroomed from a handful of businesses to more than two hundred companies. This expansion has helped fuel innovation and strengthened the country’s defenses, but the large number of market participants means scaling up successful innovations can be challenging.

In contrast, Russia has played to its traditional strengths by focusing on volume. Moscow was initially reliant on Iran for the delivery of Shahed drones, but soon established domestic manufacturing facilities in Tatarstan and elsewhere. These drone factories have reportedly imported workers from Africa and Asia, and are now producing more than 5000 drones per month.

Alongside increases in output, Russian strike drones have also undergone a series of upgrades. For example, some recently intercepted models incorporate AI technologies that allow them to operate autonomously, while most have larger warheads and are able to fly at far higher altitudes, making them much harder to intercept.

This is translating into Russian aerial attacks on an unprecedented scale. Throughout spring and early summer 2025, Ukrainian cities faced a succession of record-breaking bombardments. At present, Russia is able to launch more than 500 drones at Ukraine in a single night. Based on current trajectories, Ukrainian analysts warn that 1000-drone Russian aerial attacks may soon become a reality.

The tactics shaping Russia’s drone bombing campaign are also evolving. Overnight raids now routinely incorporate hundreds of upgraded Shahed drones converging on Ukrainian targets from different directions, followed by waves of ballistic and cruise missiles. Putin hopes this approach will exhaust Ukraine’s limited air defenses while inflicting severe physical and psychological damage on the Ukrainian civilian population.

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It is clear that Ukraine urgently requires innovative defense tech solutions to address the challenges posed by Russia’s dramatically escalating drone attacks. It will also be vital to address bureaucratic inefficiencies and streamline government procurement processes. Ukraine has the brains to defend itself as long as the authorities in Kyiv make the most of the country’s tech sector potential.

The top priority should be scalable and economically viable systems capable of intercepting large numbers of Russian attack drones. Sophisticated anti-missile weapons such as the US-produced Patriot system are too expensive and in too short supply for use against plentiful and cheaply produced Russian drones.

Many see interceptor drones as the most technologically suitable and cost-effective solution to Russia’s drone blitz. A number of models are currently in development and undergoing testing in combat conditions. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said interceptor drones proved effective during Russia’s July 4 attack and shot down “dozens of Shaheds.” He vowed to scale up production while expanding training for drone operators.

Ukraine is also increasing cooperation with international partners to develop and produce interceptor drones along with other models. There is an obvious mutual interest here. Putin’s rapidly growing drone arsenal poses a direct threat to European security and would likely play a leading role in any future war with Russia.

Interceptor drones are not the only focus of current efforts to counter Putin’s drone bomber fleet. Other options currently under consideration include laser-based weapons, autonomous gun turrets employing AI, and aerial interception involving helicopters or propeller planes. Ultimately, flexibility will be crucial against an enemy that is also constantly learning and innovating.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is rewriting the rules of modern warfare. In this war of innovation, the most important lesson so far has been the dominance of drones. Ukraine set the pace early on, but Russia has now seized the initiative. In the coming months, Kyiv’s allies must provide as much support as possible in order to close the gap on Moscow and prevent Putin’s current advantage in the drone war from becoming decisive.

Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategic policy specialist and director of UAinFocus, an independent platform connecting Ukrainian and international analysts around key Ukrainian issues.

Read the issue briefs

A US defense strategy to win the next conflict

By Clementine Starling-Daniels

Amid rising global tensions and rapid technological change, the forthcoming National Defense Strategy is set to reshape US military strategy. Its success hinges on five key priorities.

Homeland defense amid new strategic threats

By Clementine Starling-Daniels and Amy Cowley

From launching cyberattacks to targeting critical infrastructure, US rivals are bringing the fight closer to home. Defending against these threats will require not just military might, but smarter defense planning, greater resilience, and military modernization.

A pivot to China—not Asia

By Clementine Starling-Daniels, Edward Brady, and Theresa Luetkefend

The next National Defense Strategy must prioritize competition with China beyond the Indo-Pacific—and clearly define how to recalibrate the size, structure, and posture of US forces.

Rethinking combined arms for modern warfare

By Edward Brady

Invest in space or lose the high ground

By Edward Brady and Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Five pillars for deterring strategic attacks

By Mark J. Massa and Alyxandra Marine

Addressing China’s military expansion in West Africa and beyond

By Tressa Guenov

As China expands its military reach in West Africa, the United States risks losing strategic ground on the continent. The next National Defense Strategy must confront China’s ambitions beyond the Indo-Pacific, balancing defense diplomacy, bilateral military relationships, and counterterrorism.

Winning through people

By Beth Foster and Alex Wagner

To maintain military readiness, deter conflict, and preserve its technological edge, the United States must prioritize human capital by investing in resilient service members and a skilled civilian workforce.

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The post The National Defense Strategy Project appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A US defense strategy to win the next conflict

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels — Thu, 03 Jul 2025 13:00:00 +0000

Executive summary

The next National Defense Strategy (NDS) is set to reshape US military strategy in an era of evolving global threats—from the rise of China as a primary competitor to emerging challenges in homeland security. At the same time, it must correct the shortcomings of previous strategies, including the failure to clearly balance defense and power projection, as well as an overly narrow focus on nuclear missile and terrorist threats.

To sharpen its approach to national defense, the second Trump administration should center the forthcoming NDS around five critical priorities: defending the homeland, deterring strategic attacks on the United States through a resilient and modernized deterrent posture, recognizing China as the primary competitor globally, modernizing US forces for combined arms operations in the age of AI and autonomy, and securing US military dominance in space.

Together, these five priorities form a comprehensive framework to protect the lives of US citizens, interests, and values in an increasingly contested world. In this sense, the next NDS is more than a policy document—it is an opportunity. A bold strategic vision must be met with the necessary resources and capabilities to back it up. By embracing these priorities with clarity and commitment, the NDS can deliver a defense strategy that meets today’s threats and secures the United States’ future.

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About the author

Fellow

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

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Homeland defense in an era of new strategic threats

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels, Amy Cowley — Thu, 03 Jul 2025 13:00:00 +0000

Executive summary

Threats to the US homeland have fundamentally changed from two decades ago. In the years following 9/11, the most pressing dangers came from terrorist groups intent on carrying out attacks on US soil. Today’s threat landscape is broader, more complex, and more difficult to predict. Peer-state competitors, transnational criminal organizations, and non-state actors now possess the means to target the US homeland through a range of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities—including long-range missiles, cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation, and malign foreign influence.

Responding to these evolving threats—designed to disrupt critical infrastructure, weaken public trust, and undermine the ability of the United States to project power abroad— requires a comprehensive approach to homeland defense that extends beyond border security. But how should the United States chart this new course, and what must it entail? The forthcoming National Defense Strategy (NDS), published by the Department of Defense (DoD), offers a critical opportunity to lay the groundwork for the next step in strengthening homeland defense.

Meeting this challenge requires a focus not only on large-scale air and missile defense and border security but also on the protection of critical defense systems—such as space infrastructure—from cyberattacks and coercive economic activities. The success of these efforts may well determine whether the United States can stay one step ahead of those seeking to do it harm.

View the full report

About the authors

Fellow

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Staff

Amy Cowley

Assistant Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict North & West Africa

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A pivot to China—not Asia

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels, Edward Brady, Theresa Luetkefend — Thu, 03 Jul 2025 13:00:00 +0000

Executive summary

In the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the first Donald Trump administration and that of the Joe Biden administration, great-power competition played a central role. However, both administrations considered China and Russia—and therefore the Indo-Pacific and Europe—as twin focal points of risk and strategic interest. The current Trump administration is shifting gears. Rather than balancing China and Russia, the Department of Defense (DoD) will now organize around China as the principal threat and competitor.

This prioritization is welcome. After all, defense planners have long criticized that trying to manage too many threats to the United States without a corresponding increase in defense budget makes it difficult to address any of them effectively. The problem is not whether the United States should engage globally—it must—but whether considering too many issues means that none of them are effectively prioritized.

But how can the Trump administration—through its upcoming NDS—successfully position China as the primary threat, while rebalancing its engagement in other regions in a measured and responsible way? The answer lies in updating the US military’s force structure and rebalancing its force posture. Moreover, to deter China in the Indo-Pacific, the US military should focus on long-range fires, the ability to move forces, the protection of critical defense infrastructure, and additional basing options.

View the full report

About the author

Fellow

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Fellow

Edward Brady

Military Fellowship Alumnus/Alumna

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Middle East

Staff

Theresa Luetkefend

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy German

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Ukraine’s drone wall is Europe’s first line of defense against Russia

David Kirichenko — Wed, 02 Jul 2025 19:46:42 +0000

As Russia’s summer offensive continues to unfold along a front line measuring hundreds of miles, Ukraine’s overstretched military finds itself heavily reliant on drones to prevent any major breakthroughs. The Ukrainian military’s innovative and rapidly evolving use of unmanned aerial vehicles to create a layered defense is often referred to as a “drone wall.” If this Ukrainian drone wall can prove itself over the coming months and blunt Putin’s big offensive, this will likely shape future defensive doctrine in military academies across Europe and beyond.

The military use of unmanned aerial vehicles has evolved dramatically since the onset of Russia’s invasion more than three years ago, leading many to call the current conflict the world’s first ever full-scale drone war. As the invasion enters a fourth summer, drones are currently thought to account for around 70 percent of all Russian and Ukrainian battlefield casualties.

Ukraine’s drone wall tactics emerged out of military necessity and are part of this far broader shift toward the dominance of unmanned systems on the modern battlefield. Following Russia’s victory in the Battle of Avdiivka in early 2024, Ukraine found itself on the defensive and facing severe shortages of artillery amid delays in anticipated US aid. Kyiv responded by turning to drones as a cheap and effective substitute for more conventional munitions.

While drones lack the firepower to completely replace artillery, Ukraine’s deployment of drones to create defensive corridors many miles deep has proved remarkably effective. Drones are used both for surveillance purposes and to conduct airstrikes, making it extremely difficult for enemy forces to concentrate and launch large-scale offensive operations. The impact of this approach can be seen in the sheer scale of the damage being done to Putin’s invading army. Britain’s International Institute for Strategic Studies has estimated that Russian losses in 2024 included around 1400 tanks along with more than 3700 armored vehicles.

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As Ukraine’s drone wall has taken shape over the past eighteen months, Russian commanders have been forced to adapt their own tactics. Instead of depending on large armored columns to punch through Ukrainian defenses, Russia has becoming increasingly reliant on small infantry units working to achieve local advances. Rather than traveling in armored vehicles, soldiers now often use highly mobile forms of transport such as motorcycles and buggies in order to evade drones.

Russia is mirroring Ukraine’s progress in the field of drone warfare as the two nations compete in a daily race to innovate and gain a battlefield advantage. At present, the Russians have managed to achieve a significant edge through the large-scale manufacture and deployment of drones operated via fiber optic cables. This low-tech category of drone has been hailed by some as a game changer as such models cannot be jammed using existing electronic warfare tools.

Meanwhile, Russia is increasingly targeting Ukrainian drone operators and the radar stations they depend on. This is making it significantly more difficult for Ukraine to maintain comprehensive drone coverage in depth along the front lines of the war, while creating gaps for Russian infantry units to exploit.

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The strength of Ukraine’s drone wall depends on a number of factors including increased volumes, technological advances, and integration into existing military structures. Domestic Ukrainian drone production has skyrocketed since 2022, with hundreds of new companies entering the market. As a result, annual output is set to reach four million drones this year, according to Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov.

Despite this progress, Ukrainian drone manufacturing remains hampered by financial constraints. Speaking during the recent NATO summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine could potentially produce eight million drones annually but currently lacks the funding to do so. He argued that making up this shortfall was a priority, not only for Ukraine but for the future of European security.

In order to improve the integration of drone units into the Ukrainian army, the country has established a new branch of the military dedicated to drone warfare. Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces are at the forefront of efforts to enhance the drone wall and improve other aspects of the country’s drone operations. In spring 2025, Ukraine also launched the Drone Line initiative, which aims to build on the experience of the Ukrainian military’s most effective drone units and expand on the drone wall concept in order to establish a “kill zone” with a depth of up to fifteen kilometers.

Ukraine’s innovative use of drones to slow Russia’s advance is attracting plenty of attention among Kyiv’s European partners. In April 2025, Germany and six other NATO member states unveiled plans for a drone wall initiative of their own. This envisioned defensive formation will stretch along NATO’s eastern flank, from Norway in the far north down to Poland. The goal is to deter Russia with a combination of AI-powered reconnaissance and counter-drone systems.

Meanwhile, Britain and Ukraine recently announced a new agreement to jointly produce Ukrainian-designed drones, with financing coming from the UK government. This cooperation reflects growing recognition among Kyiv’s allies that Ukraine is no longer a mere recipient of military aid and has become a valuable security partner with unique experience of modern warfare. British troops are also reportedly receiving training from Ukrainian specialists in drone warfare.

Ukraine’s drone wall alone will not be enough to stop the invading Russian army. But with sufficient funding, effective coordination, and the right support from more conventional weapons systems, there are good reasons to believe that this approach can make it extremely difficult for the Russian army to achieve major battlefield breakthroughs. This will be put to the test during what promises to be an intense summer campaigning season as Putin pushes his commanders to deliver results, whatever the cost. If Ukraine’s drone wall can stand firm, it will likely be recognized as an essential element in Europe’s future defense against Russia.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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The biggest change during 2025 has been in the sheer scale of Russia’s aerial attacks. In late 2024, Moscow was launching around two thousand drones per month at Ukrainian cities. That figure has now risen to more than four thousand. While a typical attack may earlier have involved dozens of drones, it is now commonplace for Russia to launch hundreds of drones in a single night. Inevitably, this increase in volume means more and more drones are reaching their targets.

This has been made possible by massively expanded drone production inside Russia. During the first year of the full-scale invasion, the Russians initially relied on Iran to supply the bulk of the long-range drones used in attacks on Ukrainian cities. More recently, Moscow has acquired the relevant technology from Tehran and begun producing drones domestically.

With dependence on Iran now reduced to a minimum, Russia’s expanding drone production is in part thanks to backing from the Kremlin’s other authoritarian allies. Ukraine has accused China of supporting Russia’s efforts to ramp up domestic drone output and claims Beijing is providing Moscow with a wide range of vital technical components. Recent reports also indicate that North Korea is poised to send tens of thousands of workers to produce drones at industrial facilities in eastern Russia.

Russia’s increasingly deadly drone attacks are not only due to growing numbers. Russian drones are also evolving to become faster and more explosive, with some of the latest models featuring video cameras and incorporating AI technologies. The current generation of drones tend to attack from higher altitudes, making them significantly more difficult for Ukrainian air defense crews to intercept.

Meanwhile, Russian drone warfare specialists continue to develop more effective tactics. This includes coordinated attacks involving drones together with cruise missiles and ballistic missiles to overload Ukraine’s air defenses. Russia is also now incorporating so-called wolf pack tactics, with drones approaching a target from a range of different directions before striking virtually simultaneously. This has proved far more effective than launching wave after wave of drone attacks.

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Russia’s increasingly deadly drone campaign is having a demoralizing impact on the population throughout Ukraine. Addressing this challenge is now one of the most urgent and complex tasks facing the Ukrainian military.

The most obvious solution would be to destroy Russian drones before they can be launched, either at production sites or storage facilities. Russia is well aware of this and has moved production lines far away from Ukraine. As Russian drones do not require traditional airfields, attacks on launch sites are unlikely to have a significant impact.

At present, Ukraine’s anti-drone defenses include a combination of heavy machine guns and traditional anti-aircraft artillery. This approach proved fairly effective during the first few years of the war, but ground crews are now increasingly unable to cope with the scale of Russia’s attacks and the sophistication of Moscow’s most recent drone models. Missile defense systems and fighter jets have a better chance of intercepting Russia’s upgraded drone fleet, but this is a very expensive approach that risks exhausting Ukraine’s air defenses and leaving the country vulnerable to missile strikes.

As the destruction of residential districts across Ukraine reaches unprecedented levels, it is clear that the Ukrainian military needs to adopt new approaches to address the growing drone menace. The most cost-effective solution would be to produce interceptor drones capable of protecting Ukrainian cities. This process is already underway but must be urgently scaled up to reflect the size of the task ahead.

There is no time to waste. Ukraine’s dynamic defense tech sector is developing a range of potentially effective interceptor drone models, but large-scale production is crucial. This will require decisive measures from the Ukrainian authorities to identify the most effective solutions and provide the necessary backing in a timely fashion. Kyiv’s partners can also contribute to this process by supplying interceptor drones and financing the manufacture of domestic models.

In addition to interceptor drones, some analysts see promise in the expanded use of helicopters and perhaps even propeller planes to shoot down Russian drones. Propeller planes may be particularly well-suited to this task, offering an economically viable alternative to the use of jet fighters while operating at speeds closer to the drones they aim to intercept. A Ukrainian F-16 pilot and his plane were lost while trying to destroy incoming Russian drones and missiles on June 29, underlining the dangers of such operations.

Russia’s escalating drone war is the latest chapter in an invasion that has been shaped by rapid technological development. Ukraine can expect recent Russian trends to continue, with more massive aerial attacks featuring deadlier drones. If they wish to prevent a collapse in Ukrainian morale, officials in Kyiv must rapidly come up with their own tech solutions in quantities capable of blunting the threat posed by Putin’s expanding drone fleet.

Civil regulation of artificial intelligence (AI) is hugely complex and evolving quickly, with even otherwise well-aligned countries taking significantly different approaches. At first glance, little in the content of these regulations is directly applicable to the defense and national security community. The most wide-ranging and robust regulatory frameworks have specific carve-outs that exclude military and related use cases. And while governments are not blind to the need for regulations on AI used in national security and defense, these are largely detached from the wider civil AI regulation debate. However, when potential second-order or unintended consequences on defense from civil AI regulation are considered, it becomes clear that the defense and security community cannot afford to think itself special. Carve-out boundaries can, at best, be porous when the technology is inherently dual use in nature. This paper identifies three broad areas in which this porosity might have a negative impact, including

market-shaping civil regulation that could affect the tools available to the defense and national security community;

judicial interpretation of civil regulations that could impact the defense and national security community’s license to operate; and

regulations that could add additional cost or risk to developing and deploying AI systems for defense and national security.

This paper employs these areas as lenses through which to assess civil regulatory frameworks for AI to identify which initiatives should concern the defense and national security community. These areas are grouped by the level of resources and attention that should be applied while the civil regulatory landscape continues to develop. Private-sector AI firms with dual-use products, industry groups, government offices with national security responsibility for AI, and legislative staff should use this paper as a roadmap to understand the impact of civil AI regulation on their equities and plan to inject their perspectives into the debate.

Introduction

Whichever side of this argument—or the gray and murky middle ground—one tends toward, it is clear that artificial intelligence (AI) is an enormously consequential technology in at least two ways. First, the AI revolution will change the way people work, live, and play. Second, the development and adoption of AI will transform the way future wars are fought, particularly in the context of US strategic competition with China. These conclusions, brought to the fore by the seemingly revolutionary advances in generative AI—as typified by ChatGPT and other large multimodal models—are natural conclusions drawn from decades of incremental advances in basic science and digital technologies. As public interest in AI and fears of its misuse rise, governments have started to regulate it.

Much like AI itself, the global discussion on how best to regulate AI is complex and fast-changing, with big differences in approach seen even between otherwise well-aligned countries. Since the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published the first internationally agreed-upon set of principles for the responsible and trustworthy development of AI policies in 2019, the organization has identified more than 930 AI-related policy initiatives across 70 jurisdictions. The comparative analysis presented here reveals huge variation across these initiatives, which range from comprehensive legislation like the European Union (EU) AI Act to loosely managed voluntary codes of conduct, like that agreed to between the Biden administration and US technology companies. Most of the initiatives aim to improve the ability of their respective countries to thrive in the AI age; some aim to reduce the capacity of their competitors to do the same. Some take a horizontal approach focusing on specific sectors, use cases, or risk profiles, while others look vertically at specific kinds of AI systems, and some try to do bits of both. Issues around skills, supply chains, training data, and algorithm development feature varying degrees of emphasis. Almost all place some degree of responsibility on developers of AI systems, albeit voluntarily in the loosest arrangements, but knotty problems around accountability and enforcement remain.

The defense and national security community has largely kept itself separate from the ongoing debates around civil AI regulation, focusing instead on internally directed standards and processes. The unspoken assumption seems to be that regulatory carve-outs or special considerations will insulate the community, but that view fails to consider the potential second-order implications of civil regulation, which will be market shaping and will affect a whole swath of areas in which defense has significant equity. Furthermore, the race to develop AI tools is itself now an arena of geopolitical competition with strategic consequences for defense and security, with the ability to intensify rivalries, shift economic and technological advantage, and shape new global norms. Relying on regulatory carve-outs for the development and use of AI in defense is likely to prove ineffective at best, and could seriously limit the ability of the United States and its allies to reap the rewards that AI offers as an enhancement to military capabilities on and off the battlefield.

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the national and international regulatory initiatives that will likely be important for defense and national security, including initiatives in the United States, United Kingdom (UK), European Union, China, and Singapore, as well as the United Nations (UN), OECD, and the Group of Seven (G7). The paper assesses the potential implications of civil AI regulation on the defense and national security community by grouping them into three buckets.

Be supportive: Areas or initiatives that the community should get behind and support in the short term.

Be proactive: Areas that are still maturing but in which greater input is needed and the impact on the community could be significant in the medium term.

Be watchful: Areas that are still maturing but in which uncertain future impacts could require the community’s input.

Definitions

To properly survey the international landscape, this paper takes a relatively expansive view of regulation and what constitutes an AI system.

The former is usually understood by legal professionals to mean government intervention in the private domain or a legal rule that implements such intervention.¹ In this context, that definition would limit consideration to so-called “hard regulation,” largely comprising legislation and rules enforced by some kind of government organization, and would exclude softer forms of regulation such as voluntary codes of conduct and non-enforceable frameworks for risk assessment and classification. For this reason, this paper interprets regulation more loosely to mean the controlling of an activity or process, usually by means of rules, but not necessarily deriving from government action or subject to formal enforcement mechanisms. When in doubt, if a policy or regulation says it is aimed at controlling the development of AI, this paper takes it at its word.

To define AI, this paper follows the National Artificial Intelligence Act of 2020, as enacted via the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, which defines AI as “a machine-based system that can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations or decisions influencing real or virtual environments.”² This definition neatly encompasses the current cutting edge of narrow AI systems based on machine learning. At a later date, it might also be expected to include theorized, but not yet realized, artificial general intelligence or artificial superintelligence systems. This paper deliberately excludes efforts to control the production of advanced microchips as a precursor technology to AI, as there is already significant research and commentary on that issue.

National and supranational regulatory initiatives

United States

Thus far, the US approach to AI regulation can perhaps best be characterized as a patchwork attempting to balance public safety and civil rights concerns with a widespread assumption that US technology companies must be allowed to innovate for the country to succeed. There is consensus that government must play a regulatory role, but a wide range of opinions on what that role should look like.

Overview

Regulatory approach

Overall, the regulatory approach is technology agnostic and focused on specific use cases, especially those relating to civil liberties, data privacy, and consumer protection.

It should be supplemented in some jurisdictions by additional guidelines for models that are thought to present particularly severe or novel risks. The latter includes generative AI and dual-use foundation models.

Scope of regulation

Focus on outcomes generated by AI systems with limited consideration of individual models or algorithms, except dual-use foundation model elements that use a compute-power threshold definition.

At the federal level, heads of government agencies are individually responsible for the use of AI within their organizations, including third-party products and services. This includes training data, with particular focus on the use of data that are safety, rights, or privacy impacting as defined in existing regulation.

Type of regulation

At the federal level, regulation should entail voluntary arrangements with industry and incorporation of AI-specific issues into existing hard regulation through adapting standards, risk management, and governance frameworks.

Some states have put in place bespoke hard regulation of AI, including disclosure requirements, but this is generally focused on protecting existing consumer and civil rights regimes.

Target of regulation

At the federal level, voluntary arrangements are aimed at developers and deployers of AI-enabled systems and intended to protect the users of those systems, with particular focus on public services provided by or through federal agencies. Service providers might not be covered due to Section 230 of the Communications Act.

At the state level, some legislatures have placed more specific regulatory requirements on developers and deployers of AI-enabled systems to their populations, but the landscape is uneven and evolving.

Coverage of defense and national security

Defense and national security are covered by separate regulations at the federal level, with bespoke frameworks for different components of the community. State-level regulation does not yet incorporate sector-specific use cases, but domestic policing, counterterrorism, and the National Guard could fall under future initiatives.

Federal regulation

At the federal level, AI has been a rare area of bipartisan interest and relative agreement in recent years. The ideas raised in 2018 by then President Donald Trump in Executive Order (EO) 13845 can be traced through subsequent Biden-era initiatives, including voluntary commitments to manage the risks posed by AI, which were agreed upon with leading technology companies in mid-2023.³ However, other elements of the Biden approach to AI—such as the 2022 Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights, which focused on potential civil rights harms of AI, and the more recent EO14110 Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence—were unlikely to survive long, with the latter explicitly called out for reversal in the 2024 Republican platform.⁴ Trump was able to follow through on this easily because, while EO14110 was a sweeping document that gave elements of the federal government 110 specific tasks, it was not law and was swiftly overturned.⁵

While EO14110 was revoked, it is not clear what might replace it.⁶ It seems likely that the Biden administration’s focus on protecting civil rights as laid out by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will become less prominent, but the political calculus is complicated and revising Biden-era AI regulation is not likely to be at the top of the Trump administration’s to-do list.⁷ So, the change of administration does not necessarily mean that all initiatives set in motion by Biden will halt.⁸ Before EO14110 was issued, at least a dozen federal agencies had already issued guidance on the use of AI in their jurisdictions and more have since followed suit.⁹ These may well survive, especially the more technocratic elements like the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (NIST Framework), which is due to be expanded to cover risks that are novel to, or exacerbated by, the use of generative AI.¹⁰ The NIST Framework, along with guidance on secure software development practices related to training data for generative AI and dual-use foundation models, and a plan for global engagement on AI standards, are voluntary tools and generally politically uncontentious.¹¹

In Congress, then-Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) led the AI charge with a program of educational Insight Forums, which led to the Bipartisan Senate AI Working Group’s Roadmap for AI Policy.¹² Some areas of the roadmap support the Biden administration’s approach, most notably support for NIST, but overall it is more concerned with strengthening the US position vis-à-vis international competitors than it is with domestic regulation.¹³ No significant legislation on AI is on the horizon, and the roadmap’s level of ambition is likely constrained by dynamics in the House of Representatives, given that Speaker Mike Johnson is on the record arguing against overregulation of AI companies.¹⁴ A rolling set of smaller legislative changes is more likely than an omnibus AI bill, and the result will almost certainly be a regulatory regime more complex and distributed than that in the EU.¹⁵ This can already be seen in the defense sector, where the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) references AI 196 times and includes provisions on public procurement of AI, which were first introduced in the Advancing American AI Act.¹⁶ These provisions require the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop and implement processes to assess its ethical and responsible use of AI and a study analyzing vulnerabilities in AI-enabled military applications.¹⁷

Beyond the 2024 NDAA, the direction of travel in the national security space is less clear. The recently published National Security Memorandum (AI NSM) seemingly aligns with Trump’s worldview.¹⁸ Its stated aims are threefold: first, to maintain US leadership in the development of frontier AI systems; second, to facilitate adoption of those systems by the national security community; and third, to build stable and responsible frameworks for international AI governance.¹⁹ The AI NSM supplements self-imposed regulatory frameworks already published by the DoD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. But, unlike those existing frameworks, the AI NSM is almost exclusively concerned with frontier AI models.²⁰ The AI NSM mandates a whole range of what it calls “deliberate and meaningful changes” to the ways in which the US national security community deals with AI, including significant elevation in power and authority for chief AI officers across the community.²¹ However, the vast majority of restrictive provisions are found in the supplementary Framework to Advance AI Governance and Risk Management in National Security, which takes an EU-style, risk-based approach with a short list of prohibited uses (including the nuclear firing chain), a longer list of “high-impact” uses that are permitted with greater oversight, and robust minimum-risk management practices to include pre-deployment risk assessments.²² Comparability with EU regulation is unlikely to endear the AI NSM to Trump, but it is interesting to note that Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan argued that restrictive provisions for AI safety, security, and trustworthiness are key components of expediting delivering of AI capabilities, saying, “preventing misuse and ensuring high standards of accountability will not slow us down; it will actually do the opposite.”²³ An efficiency-based argument is likelier with a Trump administration focused on accelerating AI adoption.

State-level regulation

According to the National Conference of State Legislators, forty-five states introduced AI bills in 2024, and thirty-one adopted resolutions or enacted legislation.²⁴ These measures tend to focus on consumer rights and data privacy, but with significantly different approaches seen in the three states with the most advanced legislation: California, Utah, and Colorado.²⁵

Having previously been a leader in data privacy legislation, the California State Legislature in 2024 passed what would have been the most far-reaching AI bill in the country before it was vetoed by Governor Gavin Newsom.²⁶ The bill had drawn criticism for potentially imposing arduous, and damaging, barriers to technological development in exactly the place where most US AI is developed.²⁷ However, Newsom supported a host of other AI-related bills in 2024 that will place significant restrictions and safeguards around the use of AI in California, indicating that the country’s largest internal market will remain a significant force in the domestic regulation of AI.²⁸

Colorado and Utah both successfully enacted AI legislation in 2024. Though both are consumer rights protection measures at their core, they take very different approaches. The Utah bill is quite narrowly focused on transparency and consumer protection around the use of generative AI, primarily through disclosure requirements placed on developers and deployers of AI services.²⁹ The Colorado bill is more broadly aimed at developers and deployers of “high-risk” AI systems, which here means an AI system that is a substantial factor in making any decision that can significantly impact an individual’s legal or economic interests, such as decisions related to employment, housing, credit, and insurance.³⁰ This essentially gives Colorado a separate anti-discriminatory framework just for AI systems, which imposes reporting, disclosure, and testing obligations with civil penalties for violation.³¹ This puts Colorado, not California, at the leading edge of state-level AI regulation, but that does not necessarily mean that other states will take the Colorado approach as precedent. In signing the law, Governor Jared Polis made clear that he had reservations, and a similar law was vetoed in Connecticut.³² Some states might not progress restrictive AI regulation at all. For example, Virginia Governor Glenn Youngkin recently issued an executive order aiming to increase the use of AI in state government agencies, law enforcement, and education, but there is no indication that legislation will follow anytime soon.³³

However state-level legislation progresses, it is unlikely to have any direct impact on military or national security users. There is also a risk that public fears around AI could be stoked and lead to more stringent state-level regulation, especially if AI is seen to “go wrong,” leading to tangible examples of public harm. As discussed below in the context of the European Union, the use of AI in law enforcement is among the most controversial use cases. This can only be more relevant in the nation with some of the most militarized police forces in the world and a National Guard that can also serve a domestic law-enforcement role.³⁴

International efforts

The United States has been active in a number of international initiatives relating to AI regulation, including through the UN, NATO, and the G7 Hiroshima process, which are covered later in this paper. The final element of the Biden administration’s approach to AI regulation, and the one that might be the least likely to carry through into 2025, was the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy.³⁵ The declaration is a set of non-legally binding guidelines that aims to promote responsible behavior and demonstrate US leadership in the international arena. International norms are notoriously hard to agree upon and even harder to enforce. Unsurprisingly, the declaration makes no effort to restrict the kinds of AI systems that signatories can develop in their pursuit of national defense. According to the DoD, forty-seven nations have endorsed the declaration, though China, Russia, and Iran are notably not among that number.³⁶

China

The Chinese approach to AI regulation is relatively straightforward compared to that of the United States, with rules issued in a top-down, center-outward manner in keeping with the general mode of Chinese government.

Overview

Regulatory approach

China has a vertical, technology-driven approach with some horizontal, use-case, and sectoral elements.

It is focused on general-purpose AI, with some additional regulation for specific use cases.

Scope of regulation

The primary unit of regulation is AI algorithms, with specific restrictions on the use of training data in some cases.

Type of regulation

China uses hard regulation with a strong compliance regime and significant room for politically interested interpretation in enforcement.

Target of regulation

Regulation is narrowly targeted to privately owned service providers operating AI systems within China and those entities providing AI-enabled services to the Chinese population.

Coverage of defense and national security

These areas are not covered and unlikely to be covered in the future.

Domestic regulation

Since 2018, the Chinese government has issued four administrative provisions intended to regulate delivery of AI capabilities to the Chinese public, most notably the so-called Generative AI Regulation, which came into force in August 2023.³⁷ This, and preceding provisions on the use of algorithmic recommendations in service provision and the more general use of deep synthesis tools, is focused on regulating algorithms rather than specific use cases.³⁸ This vertical approach to regulation is also iterative, allowing Chinese regulators to build skills and toolsets that can adapt as the technology develops. A more comprehensive AI law is expected at some point but, at the time of writing, only a scholars’ draft released by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) gives outside observers insight into how the Chinese government is thinking about future AI regulation.³⁹

The draft proposes the formation of a new government agency to coordinate and oversee AI in public services. Importantly, and unlike in the United States, the use of AI by the Chinese government itself is not covered by any proposed or existing regulations, including for military and other national security purposes. This approach will likely not change, as it serves the Chinese government’s primary goal, which is to preserve its central control over the flow of information to maintain internal political and social stability.⁴⁰ The primary regulatory tool proposed by the scholars’ draft is a reporting and licensing regime in which items that appear on a negative list would require a government-approved permit for development and deployment. This approach is a way for the Chinese government to manage safety and other risks while still encouraging innovation.⁴¹ The draft is not clear about what items would be on the list, but foundational models are explicitly referenced. In addition to an emerging licensing regime and ideas about the role of a bespoke regulator, Chinese regulations have reached interim conclusions in areas in which the United States and others are still in debate. For example, the Generative AI Regulation explicitly places liability for AI systems on the service providers that make them available to the Chinese public.⁴²

Enforcement is another area in which the Chinese government is signaling a different approach. As one commentator notes, “Chinese regulation is stocked with provisions that are straight off the wish list for AI to support supposed democratic values [. . .] yet the regulation is clearly intended to strengthen China’s authoritarian system of government.”⁴³ Analysis from the East Asia Forum suggests that China is continuing to refine how it balances innovation and control in its approach to AI governance.⁴⁴ If this is true, then the vague language in Chinese AI regulations, which would give Chinese regulators huge freedom in where and how they make enforcement decisions, could be precisely the point.⁴⁵

International efforts

As noted above, China has not endorsed the United States’ Political Declaration on the Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, but China is active on the international AI stage in other ways. At a 2018 meeting relating to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Chinese representative presented a position paper proposing a ban on lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS).⁴⁶ But Western observers doubt the motives behind the proposal, with one commentator saying it included “such a bizarrely narrow definition of lethal autonomous weapons that such a ban would appear to be both unnecessary and useless.”⁴⁷ China has continued calling for a ban on LAWS in UN forums and other public spaces, but these calls are usually seen in the West as efforts to appear as a positive international actor while maintaining a position of strategic ambiguity—there is little faith that the Chinese government will practice what it preaches.⁴⁸ This is most clearly seen in reactions to the Global Security Initiative (GSI) concept paper published in February 2023.⁴⁹ Reacting to this proposal, which China presented as aspiring for a new and more inclusive global security architecture, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) responded with scorn, saying, “the GSI’s core objective appears to be the degradation of U.S.-led alliances and partnerships under the guise of a set of principles full of platitudes but empty on substantive steps for contributing to global peace.”⁵⁰

Outside of the military sphere, Chinese involvement in international forums attracts similar critique. In the lead-up to the United Kingdom’s AI Safety Summit, the question of whether China would be invited, and then whether Beijing’s representatives would attend, caused controversy and criticism.⁵¹ However, that Beijing is willing to collaborate internationally in areas where it sees benefit does not mean that Beijing will toe the Western line. In fact, Western-led international regulation might not even be a particular concern for China. Shortly after the AI Safety Summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a new Global AI Governance Initiative.⁵² As with the GSI, this effort has been met with skepticism in the United States, but there is a real risk that China’s approach could split international regulation into two spheres.⁵³ This risk is especially salient because of the initiative’s potential appeal to the Global South. More concerningly, there is some evidence that China is pursuing a so-called proliferation-first approach, which involves pushing its AI technology into developing countries. If China manages to embed itself in the global AI infrastructure in the way that it did with fifth-generation (5G) technology, then any attempt to regulate international standards might come too late—those standards will already be Chinese.⁵⁴

European Union

The European Union moved early into the AI regulation game. In August 2024, it became the first legislative body globally to issue legally binding rules around the development, deployment, and use of AI.⁵⁵ Originally envisaged as a consumer protection law, early drafts of the AI Act covered AI systems only as they are used in certain narrowly limited tasks—a horizontal approach.⁵⁶ However, the explosion of interest in foundational models following the release of ChatGPT in late 2022 led to an expansion in the law’s scope to include these kinds of models regardless of how and by whom they are used.

Overview

Regulatory approach

The approach is horizontal, with a vertical element for general-purpose AI systems.

Specific use cases are based on risk assessment.

Scope of regulation

The scope is widest for high-risk and general-purpose AI systems. This includes data, algorithms, applications, and content provenance.

Hardware is not covered, but general-purpose AI system elements use a compute-power threshold definition.

Type of regulation

The EU uses hard regulation with high financial penalties for noncompliance.

A full compliance and enforcement regime is still in development but will incorporate the EU AI Office and member states’s institutions.

Target of regulation

The regulation targets AI developers, with more limited responsibilities placed on deployers of high-risk systems.

Coverage of defense and national security

Defense is specifically excluded on institutional competence grounds, but domestic policing use cases are covered, with some falling into the unacceptable and high-risk groups.

Internal regulation

The AI Act is an EU regulation, the strongest form of legislation that the EU can produce, and is binding and directly applicable in all member states.⁵⁷ The AI Act takes a risk-based approach whereby AI systems are regulated by how they are used, based on the potential harm that use could cause to an EU citizen’s health, safety, and fundamental rights. There are four categories of risk: unacceptable, high, limited, and minimal/none. Systems in the limited and minimal categories are subject to obligations around attribution and informed consent, i.e., people must know they are talking to a chatbot or viewing an AI-generated image. At the other end of the scale, AI systems that fall within the unacceptable risk category are completely prohibited. This includes any AI system used for social scoring, unsupervised criminal profiling, or workplace monitoring; systems that exploit vulnerabilities or impair a person’s ability to make informed decisions via manipulation; biometric categorization of sensitive characteristics; untargeted use of facial recognition; and the use of real-time remote biometric identification systems in public spaces, except for narrowly defined police use cases.⁵⁸

High-risk systems are subject to the most significant regulation in the AI Act and are defined as such by two mechanisms. First, AI systems used as a safety component or within a kind of product already subject to EU safety standards are automatically high risk.⁵⁹ Second, AI systems are considered high risk if they are used in the following areas: biometrics; critical infrastructure; education and vocational training; employment, worker management, and access to self-employment; access to essential services; law enforcement; migration, asylum, and border-control management; and administration of justice and democratic processes.⁶⁰ The majority of obligations fall on developers of high-risk AI systems, with fewer obligations placed on deployers of those systems.⁶¹

As mentioned, so-called general-purpose AI (GPAI) is covered separately in the AI Act. This addition was a significant bone of contention in the trilogue negotiation, as some member states were concerned that vertical regulation of specific kinds of AI would stifle innovation in the EU.⁶² As a compromise, though all developers of GPAI must provide technical documentation and instructions for use, comply with the Copyright Directive, and publish a summary about the content used for training, the more stringent obligations akin to those imposed on developers of high-risk systems are reserved for GPAI models that pose “systemic risk.”⁶³ Open-license developers must comply with these restrictions only if their models fall into this last category.⁶⁴

It is not yet clear exactly how the new European AI Office will coordinate compliance, implementation, and enforcement. As with all new EU regulation, interpretation through national and EU courts will be critical.⁶⁵ One startling feature of the AI Act is the leeway it appears to give the technology industry by allowing developers to self-determine their AI system’s risk category, though the huge financial penalties those who violate the act face might serve as sufficient deterrent to bad actors.⁶⁶

The AI Act does not, and could never, apply directly to military or defense applications of AI because the European Union does not have authority in these areas. As expected, the text includes a general exemption for military, defense, and national security uses, but exemptions for law enforcement are far more complicated and were some of the most controversial sections in final negotiations.⁶⁷ Loopholes allowing police to use AI in criminal profiling, if it is part of a larger, human-led toolkit, and the use of AI facial recognition on previously recorded video footage have caused uproar and seem likely candidates for litigation, potentially placing increased costs and uncertainty on developers working in these areas.⁶⁸ This ambiguity could have knock-on effects, given the increasing overlap between military technologies and those used by police and other national security actors, especially in counterterrorism.

International efforts

The official purpose of the AI Act is to set consistent standards across member states in order to ensure that the single market can function effectively, but some believe that this will lead the EU to effectively become the world’s AI police.⁶⁹ Part of this is the simple fact that it will be a lot easier for other jurisdictions to copy and paste a regulatory model that has already been proven, but concern comes from the way that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has had huge influence outside of the territorial boundaries of the EU by placing a high cost of compliance on companies that want to do business in or with the world’s second-largest economic market.⁷⁰ Similarly, EU regulations on the kinds of charging ports that can be used for small electronic devices have resulted in changes well beyond its borders.⁷¹ However, more recently, Apple has decided to hold back on releasing AI features to users in the EU, indicating that cross-border influence can run both ways.⁷²

United Kingdom

Since 2022, the UK government has described its approach to AI regulation as innovation-friendly and flexible, designed to service the potentially contradictory goals of encouraging economic growth through innovation while also safeguarding fundamental values and the safety of the British public.⁷³ This approach was developed under successive Conservative governments but is yet to change radically under the Labour government as it attempts to balance tensions between business-friendly elements of the party and more traditional labor activists and trade unionists.⁷⁴

Overview

Regulatory approach

The approach is horizontal and sectoral for now, with some vertical elements possible for general-purpose AI systems.

Scope of regulation

The scope is unclear. Guidance to regulators refers primarily to AI systems with some consideration of supply chain components. It will likely vary by sector.

Type of regulation

There is hard regulation through existing sectoral regulators and their compliance and enforcement regimes, with the possibility of more comprehensive hard regulation in the future.

Target of regulation

The target varies by sector. Guidance to existing regulators generally focuses on AI developers and deployers.

Coverage of defense and national security

Bespoke military and national security frameworks sit alongside a broader government framework.

Domestic regulation

The UK’s approach to AI regulation was first laid out in June 2022, followed swiftly by a National AI Strategy that December and a subsequent policy paper in August 2023, which set out the mechanisms and structures of the regulatory approach in more detail.⁷⁵ However, this flurry of policy publications has not resulted in any new laws.⁷⁶ During the 2024 general election campaign, members of the new Labour government initially promised to toughen AI regulation, including by forcing AI companies to release test data and conduct safety tests with independent oversight, before taking a more conciliatory tone with the technology industry and promising to speed up the regulatory process to encourage innovation.⁷⁷ Though its legislative agenda initially included appropriate legislation for AI by the end of 2024, this has not been realized.⁷⁸ The prevailing view seems to be that, with some specific exceptions, existing regulators are best placed to understand the needs and peculiarities of their sectors.⁷⁹

Some regulators are already taking steps to incorporate AI into their frameworks. The Financial Conduct Authority’s Regulatory Sandbox allows companies to test AI-enabled products and services in a controlled environment and, by doing so, to identify consumer protection safeguards that might be necessary.⁸⁰ The Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum (DRCF) recently launched its AI and Digital Hub, a twelve-month pilot program to make it easier for companies to launch new AI products and services in a safe and compliant manner, and to reduce the time it takes to bring those products and services to market.⁸¹

Though the overall approach is sectoral, there is some central authority in the UK approach. The Office for AI has no regulatory role but is expected to provide certain central functions required to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the regulatory framework.⁸² Another centrally run AI authority, the AI Safety Institute (AISI), breaks from the sectoral approach and instead focuses on “advanced AI,” which includes GPAI systems as well as narrow AI models that have the potential to cause harm in specific use cases.⁸³ While AISI is not a regulator, several large technology companies, including OpenAI, Google, and Microsoft, have signed voluntary agreements to allow AISI to test these firms’ most advanced AI models and make changes to them if they find safety concerns.⁸⁴ However, now that AISI has found significant flaws in those same models, both AISI and the companies have stepped back from that position, demonstrating the inherent limitations of voluntary regimes. In recognition of this dilemma, the forthcoming legislation referenced above is expected to make existing voluntary agreements between companies and the government legally binding.⁸⁵

The most significant challenge to the current sector-based approach is likely to come from the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). Having previously taken the view that flexible guiding principles would be sufficient to preserve competition and consumer protection, the CMA is now concerned that a small number of technology companies increasingly have the ability and incentive to engage in market-distorting behavior in their own interests.⁸⁶ The CMA has also proposed prioritizing GPAI under new regulatory powers provided by the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (DMCC).⁸⁷ A decision to do so could have a huge impact on the AI industry, as the DMCC significantly sharpens the CMA’s teeth, giving it the power to impose fines for violation of up to 10 percent of global turnover without involvement of a judge, as well as smaller fines for senior individuals within corporate entities and consumer compensation.⁸⁸

As in the United States, it is expected that any UK legislative or statutory effort to expand the regulatory power of government over AI will have some kind of exemption for national security usage.⁸⁹ But, as in the United States, it does not follow that the national security community will be untouched by regulation. The UK Ministry of Defence (UK MOD) published its own AI strategy in June 2022, accompanied by a policy statement on the ethical principles that the UK armed forces will follow in developing and deploying AI-enabled capabilities.⁹⁰ Both documents recognize that the use of AI in the military sphere comes with a specific set of risks and concerns that are potentially more acute than those in other sectors. These documents also stress that the use of any technology by the armed forces and their supporting organizations is already subject to a robust regime of compliance for safety, where the Defence Safety Agency has enforcement authorities; and legality, where existing obligations under UK and international human rights law and the law of armed conflict form an irreducible baseline.

The UK’s intelligence community does not have a director of national intelligence to issue community-wide guidance on AI, but the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) offers some insight into how the relevant agencies are thinking about the issue.⁹¹ Published in 2021, GCHQ’s paper on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence predates the current regulatory discussion but slots neatly into the sectoral approach.⁹² In the paper, GCHQ points to existing legislative provisions that ensure its work complies with the law. Most relevant for discussion of AI is the role of the Technology Advisory Panel (TAP), which sits within the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office and advises on the impact of new technologies in covert investigations.⁹³ The implicit argument underpinning both the UK MOD and GCHQ approaches is that specific regulations or restrictions on the use of AI in national security are needed only insofar as AI presents risks that are not captured by existing processes and procedures. Ethical principles, like the five to which the UK MOD will hold itself, are intended to frame and guide those risk assessments at all stages of the capability development and deployment process, but they are not in themselves regulatory.⁹⁴ As civil regulation of AI develops, it will be necessary to continue testing the assumption that the existing national security frameworks are capable of addressing AI risks and to change them as needed, including to ensure that they are sufficient to satisfy a supply base, international community, and public audience that might expect different standards.

International efforts

In addition to active participation in multilateral discussions through the UN, OECD, and the G7, the United Kingdom has held itself out to be a global leader in AI safety. The inaugural Global AI Safety Summit held in late 2023 delivered the Bletchley Declaration, a statement signed by twenty-eight countries in which they agreed to work together to ensure “human-centric, trustworthy and responsible AI that is safe” and to “promote cooperation to address the broad range of risks posed by AI.”⁹⁵ The Bletchley Declaration has been criticized for its focus on the supposed existential risks of GPAI at the expense of more immediate safety concerns and for its lack of any specific rules or roadmap.⁹⁶ But it gives an indication of the areas of AI regulation in which it might be possible to find common ground, which, in turn, might limit the risk of entirely divergent regulatory regimes.⁹⁷

Singapore

With a strong digital economy and a global reputation as pro-business and pro-innovation, Singapore is unsurprisingly approaching AI regulation along the same middle path between encouraging growth and preventing harms as the United Kingdom.⁹⁸ Unlike the United Kingdom, Singapore has carefully maintained its position as a neutral player between the United States and China, and this positioning is reflected in its strategy documents and public statements.⁹⁹

Overview

Regulatory approach

The approach is horizontal and sectoral for now, with a future vertical element for general-purpose AI systems.

Scope of regulation

The proposed Model AI Governance Framework for Generative AI includes data, algorithms, applications, and content provenance.

In practice, it will vary by sector.

Type of regulation

It is hard regulation through existing sectoral regulators and their compliance and enforcement regimes.

Target of regulation

The targets include developers, application deployers, and service providers/hosting platforms.

Responsibility is allocated based on the level of control and differentiated by the stage in the development and deployment cycle.

Coverage of defense and national security

No publicly available framework.

Domestic regulation

Government activity in the area is driven by the second National AI Strategy (NAIS 2.0), which is partly a response to the increasing concern over the safety and security of AI, especially GPAI.¹⁰⁰ NAIS 2.0 clearly recognizes that there are security risks associated with AI, but it places relatively little emphasis on threats to national security. According to NAIS 2.0, the government of Singapore wants to retain agility in its approach to regulating AI, a position backed by public statements by senior government figures. Singapore’s approach to AI regulation is sectoral and based, at least for the time being, on existing regulatory frameworks. Singapore’s regulatory bodies have been actively incorporating AI into their toolkits, most notably through the Model AI Governance Framework jointly issued by the information communications and data-protection regulators in 2019 and updated in 2020.¹⁰¹ The framework is aimed at private-sector organizations developing or deploying AI in their businesses. It provides guidance on key ethical and governance issues and is supported by a practical Implementation and Self-Assessment Guide and Compendium of Use Cases to make it easier for companies to map the sector- and technology-agnostic framework onto their organizations.¹⁰² Singaporean regulators have begun to issue sector-specific guidelines for AI, including the advisory guideline on the use of personal data for AI systems that provide recommendations, predictions, and decisions.¹⁰³ Like the wider framework, these are non-binding and do not expand the enforcement powers of existing regulators.

Singapore has leaned heavily on technology industry partnerships in developing other elements of its regulatory toolkit, especially its flagship AI Verify product.¹⁰⁴ AI Verify is a voluntary governance testing framework and toolkit that aims to help companies objectively verify their systems against a set of global AI governance and ethical frameworks so that participating firms can demonstrate to users that the companies have implemented AI responsibly. AI Verify works within a company’s own digital enterprise environment and, as a self-testing and self-reporting toolkit, it has no enforcement power.¹⁰⁵ However, the government of Singapore hopes that, by helping to identify commonalities across various global AI governance frameworks and regulations, it can build a baseline for future international regulations.¹⁰⁶ One critical limitation of AI Verify is that it cannot test GPAI models.¹⁰⁷ The AI Verify Foundation, which oversees AI Verify, recognized this limitation and recently conducted a public consultation to expand the 2020 Model AI Governance Framework to explicitly cover generative AI.¹⁰⁸ The content of the final product is not yet known, and there is no indication that the government intends to translate this new framework into a bespoke AI law, but the consultation document gives important clues about how Singapore is thinking about issues such as accountability; data, including issues of copyright; testing and assurance; and content provenance.¹⁰⁹

As mentioned, the government of Singapore places relatively little emphasis on national security in its AI policy documents, but that does not mean it is not interested or investing in AI for military and wider national security purposes.¹¹⁰ In 2022, Singapore became the first country to establish a separate military service to address threats in the digital domain.¹¹¹ Unlike in the United States, where cyber and other digital specialties are spread across the traditional services, the Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) brings together the whole domain, from command, control, communications, and cyber operations to implementing strategies for cloud computing and AI.¹¹² The DIS also has specific authority to raise, train, and sustain digital forces.¹¹³ Within the DIS, the Digital Ops-Tech Centre is responsible for developing AI technologies, but publicly available information about it is sparse.¹¹⁴ Singapore has deployed AI-enabled technologies through the DIS on exercises, and the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) has previously stated that it wants to integrate AI into operational platforms, weapons, and back-office functions, but the Singaporean Armed Forces have not published any official position on the use of AI in military systems.¹¹⁵

International efforts

Singapore is increasingly taking on a regional leadership role on AI regulation. As chair of the 2024 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Digital Ministers’ Meeting, Singapore was instrumental in developing the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics.¹¹⁶ The guide aims to establish common principles and best practices for trustworthy AI in the region but does not attempt to force a common regulatory approach. In part, this is because the ASEAN region is so politically diverse that it would be almost impossible to reach agreement on hot-button issues like censorship, but also because member countries are at wildly different levels of digital maturity.¹¹⁷ At the headline level, the guide bears significant similarity to US, EU, and UK policies, in that it takes a risk-based approach to governance, but the guide makes concessions to national cultures in a way that those other approaches do not.¹¹⁸ It is possible that some ASEAN nations might move toward a more stringent EU-style regulatory framework in the future. But, as the most mature AI power in the region, Singapore and its pro-innovation approach will likely remain influential for now.

International regulatory initiatives

At the international level, four key organizations have taken steps into the AI regulation waters—the UN, OECD, the G7 through its Hiroshima Process, and NATO.

OECD

The OECD published its AI Principles in 2019, and they have since been agreed upon by forty-six countries, including all thirty-eight OECD member states.¹¹⁹ Though not legally binding, the OECD principles have been extremely influential, and it is possible to trace the five broad topic areas through all of the national and supranational approaches discussed previously.¹²⁰ The OECD also provides the secretariat for the Global Partnership on AI, an international initiative promoting responsible AI use through applied co-operation projects, pilots, and experiments.¹²¹ The partnership covers a huge range of activity through its four working groups, and, though defense and national security do not feature explicitly, there are initiatives that could be influential in other forums that consider those areas. For example, the Responsible AI working group is developing technical guidelines for implementation of high-level principles that will likely influence the UN and the G7, and the Data Governance working group is producing guidelines on co-generated data and intellectual-property considerations that could have an impact on the legal use of data for training algorithms.¹²² Beyond these specific areas of interest, the OECD will likely remain influential in the wider AI regulation debate, not least because it has built a wide network of technical and policy experts to draw from. This value was seen in practice when the G7 asked the Global Partnership on AI to assist in developing the International Guiding Principles on AI and a voluntary Code of Conduct for AI developers that came out of the Hiroshima Process.¹²³

Regulatory approach

The approach is horizontal and risk based.

Scope of regulation

Regulation applies to AI systems and associated knowledge. In theory, this scope covers the whole stack.

There is some specific consideration of algorithms and data through the Global Partnership on AI.

Type of regulation

Regulation is soft, with no compliance regime or enforcement mechanism.

Target of regulation

“AI actors” include anyone or any organization that plays an active role in the AI system life cycle.

Coverage of defense and national security

None.

G7

The G7 established the Hiroshima AI Process in 2023 to promote guardrails for GPAI systems at a global level. The Comprehensive Policy Framework agreed to by the G7 digital and technology ministers later that year includes a set of International Guiding Principles on Artificial Intelligence and a voluntary Code of Conduct for GPAI developers.¹²⁴ As with the OECD AI Principles on which they are largely based, neither of these documents is legally binding. However, by choosing to focus on practical tools to support development of trustworthy AI, the Hiroshima Process will act as a benchmark for countries developing their own regulatory frameworks.¹²⁵ There is some evidence that this is already happening and a suggestion that the EU might adopt a matured version of the Hiroshima Code of Conduct as part of its AI Act compliance regime.¹²⁶ That will require input from the technology sector, including current and future suppliers of AI for defense and national security.

The G7 is also taking a role in other areas that might impact AI regulation, most notably technical standards and international data flows. On the former, the G7 could theoretically play a coordination role in ensuring that disparate national standards do not lead to an incoherent regulatory landscape that is time consuming and expensive for the industry to navigate.¹²⁷ However, diverging positions even within the G7 might make that difficult.¹²⁸ The picture emerging in the international data flow space is only a little more optimistic. The G7 has established a new Institutional Arrangement for Partnership (IAP) to support its Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT) initiative, but it has not yet produced any tangible outcomes.¹²⁹ The EU-US Data Privacy Framework has made some progress in reducing the compliance burden associated with cross-border transfer of data through the EU-US Data Bridge and its UK-US extension, but there is still a large risk that the Court of Justice of the European Union will strike it down over concerns that it violates GDPR.¹³⁰

Regulatory approach

The approach is vertical. The Hiroshima Code of Conduct applies only to general-purpose AI.

Scope of regulation

The scope is GPAI systems, with significant focus on data, particularly data sharing and cross-border transfer.

Type of regulation

Regulation is soft, with no compliance regime or enforcement mechanism.

Target of regulation

Developers of GPAI are the only target.

Coverage of defense and national security

None.

United Nations

The UN has been cautious in its approach to AI regulation. The UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) issued its global standard of AI ethics in 2021 and established the AI Ethics and Governance Lab to produce tools to help member states asses their relative preparedness to implement AI ethically and responsibly, but these largely drew on existing frameworks rather than adding anything new.¹³¹ Interest in the area ballooned following the release of ChatGPT, such that Secretary-General António Guterres convened an AI Advisory Body in late 2023 to provide guidance on future steps for global AI governance. That report, published in late 2024 and titled “Governing AI for Humanity,” did not recommend a single governance model, but it proposed establishing a regular AI policy dialogue within the UN to be supported by an international scientific panel of AI experts.¹³² Specific areas of concern include the need for consistent global standards for AI and data, and mechanisms to facilitate inclusion of the Global South and other currently underrepresented groups in the international dialogue on AI.¹³³ A small AI office will be established within the UN Secretariat to coordinate these efforts.

At the political level, the General Assembly has adopted two resolutions on AI. The first, Resolution 78/L49 on the promotion of “safe, secure and trustworthy” artificial AI systems, was drafted by the United States but drew co-sponsorship support from a wide range of countries, including some in the Global South.¹³⁴ The second, Resolution 78/L86, drafted by China and supported by the United States, calls on developed countries to help developing countries strengthen their AI capacity building and enhance their representation and voice in global AI governance.¹³⁵ Adoption of both resolutions by consensus could indicate global support for Chinese and US leadership on AI regulation, but the depth of that support remains unclear.¹³⁶ Notably, following the adoption of Resolution 78/L86, two separate groups were established, one led by the United States and Morocco, and the other by China and Zambia.¹³⁷

There is also disagreement over the role of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in addressing AI-related threats. Resolution 78/L49 does not apply to the military domain but, when introducing the draft, the US permanent representative to the UN suggested that it might serve as a model for dialogue in that area, albeit not at the UNSC.¹³⁸ The UNSC held its first formal meeting focused on AI in July 2023.¹³⁹ In his remarks, the secretary-general noted that both military and non-military applications of AI could have implications for global security and welcomed the idea of a new UN body to govern AI, based on the model of the International Atomic Energy Agency.¹⁴⁰ The council has since expressed its commitment to consider the international security implications of scientific advances more systematically, but some members have raised concerns about framing the issue narrowly within a security context. At the time of writing, this remains a live issue.¹⁴¹

Regulatory approach

The approach is horizontal with a focus on the Sustainable Development Goals.

Scope of regulation

AI systems are broadly defined, with particular focus on data governance and avoiding biased data.

Type of regulation

Regulation is soft, with no compliance regime or enforcement mechanism.

Target of regulation

Resolutions refer to design, development, deployment, and use of AI systems.

Coverage of defense and national security

Resolutions exclude military use, but there have been some discussions in the UNSC.

NATO

NATO is not in the business of civil regulation, but it plays a major role in military standards and is included here for completeness.

The Alliance formally adopted its first AI strategy in 2021, well before the advent of ChatGPT and other forms of GPAI.¹⁴² At that time, it was not clear how NATO intended to overcome different approaches to governance and regulatory issues among allies, nor was it obvious which of the many varied NATO bodies with an interest in AI would take the lead.¹⁴³ The regulatory issue has, in some ways, become more settled with the advent of the EU’s AI Act, in that the gaps between European and non-European allies are clearer. Within NATO itself, the establishment of the Data and Artificial Intelligence Review Board (DARB) under the auspices of the assistant secretary-general for innovation, hybrid, and cyber places leadership of the AI agenda firmly within NATO Headquarters rather than NATO Allied Command Transformation.¹⁴⁴ One of the DARB’s first priorities is to develop a responsible AI certification standard to ensure that new AI projects meet the principles of responsible use set out in the 2021 AI Strategy.¹⁴⁵ Though this certification standard has not yet been made public, NATO is clearly making some progress in building consensus across allies. However, NATO is not a regulatory body and has no enforcement role, so it will require member states to self-police or transfer that enforcement role to a third-party organization.¹⁴⁶

NATO requires consensus to make decisions and, with thirty-two members, consensus building is not straightforward or quick, especially on contentious issues. Technical standards might be easier for members to agree on than complex, normative issues, and technical standards are an area in which NATO happens to have a lot of experience.¹⁴⁷ The NATO Standardization Office (NSO) is often overlooked in discussions of the Alliance’s successes, but its work to develop, agree to, and implement standards across all aspects of the Alliance’s operational and capability development has been critical.¹⁴⁸ As the largest military standardization body in the world, NSO is uniquely placed to determine which civilian AI standards apply to military and national security use cases and identify areas where niche standards are needed.

Regulatory approach

The approach is horizontal. AI principles apply to all types of AI.

Scope of regulation

AI systems are broadly defined.

Type of regulation

Regulation is soft. NATO has no enforcement mechanism, but interoperability is a key consideration for member states and might drive compliance.

Target of regulation

The target is NATO member states developing and deploying AI within their militaries.

Coverage of defense and national security

The regulation is exclusively about this arena.

Analysis

The regulatory landscape described above is complex and constantly evolving, with big differences in approach seen even between otherwise well-aligned countries. However, by breaking various approaches into their component parts, it is possible to see some common themes.

Common themes

Regulatory approach

The general preference seems to be for a sectoral or use-case-based approach, framed as a pragmatic attempt to balance competing requirements to promote innovation while protecting users. However, there is increasing concern that some kinds of AI, notably large language models and other forms of GPAI, should be regulated with a vertical, technology-based approach. China looks like an outlier here, in that its approach is vertical with horizontal elements rather than the other way around, but in practice the same regulatory ground could be covered.

Scope

There is little consensus around which elements of AI should be regulated. In cases where the framework refers simply to “AI systems” without saying explicitly whether that includes training data, specific algorithms, packaged applications, etc., it is possible to infer the intended scope through references in implementation guidance and other documentation. This approach makes sense in jurisdictions where the regulatory approach relies on existing sectoral regulators with varying focus. For example, a regulator concerned with the delivery of public utilities might be concerned with the applications deployed by the utilities providers, whereas a financial services regulator might need to look deeper into the stack to consider the underlying data and algorithms. China is again the outlier, as its regulation is specifically focused on the algorithmic level, with some coverage of training data in specific cases.

Type of regulation

The EU and China are, so far, the only jurisdictions to have put in place hard regulations specifically addressing AI. Most other frameworks rely on existing sectoral regulators incorporating AI into their work, voluntary guidelines and best practices, or a combination of both. It is possible that the EU’s AI Act will become a model as countries increasingly turn to a legislative approach, but practical concerns and lengthy timelines mean that most compliance and enforcement regimes will remain fragmented for now.

Target group

Almost all of the frameworks place some degree of responsibility on developers of AI systems, albeit voluntarily in the loosest arrangements. Deployers of AI systems and the service providers that make them available are less widely included. There is some suggestion that assignment of responsibility might vary across the AI life cycle, though what this means in practice is unclear, and only Singapore suggests differentiating between ex ante and ex post responsibility. Even in cases in which responsibility is clearly ascribed, it is likely that questions of legal liability for misuse or harm will take time to be worked out through the relevant judicial system. China is again an outlier here, but a more comprehensive AI law could include developers and deployers.

Impact on defense and national security

At first glance, little of the civil regulatory frameworks discussed above relates directly to the defense and national security community, but there are at least three broad areas in which the defense and national security community might be subject to second-order or unintended consequences.

Market-shaping civil regulations could affect the tools available to the defense and national security community. This area could include direct market interventions, such as modifications to antitrust law that might force incumbent suppliers to break up their companies, or second-order implications of interventions that affect the sorts of skills available in the market, the sorts of problems that skilled AI workers want to work on, and the data available to them.

Judicial interpretation of civil regulations could impact the defense and national security communities’ license to operate, either by placing direct limitations on the use of AI in specific use cases, such as domestic counterterrorism, or more indirectly through concerns around legal liability.

Regulations could add hidden cost or risk to the development and deployment of AI systems for defense and national security use. This area could include complex compliance regimes or fragmented technical standards that must be paid for somewhere in the value chain, or increased security risks associated with licensing or reporting of dual-use models.

By using these areas as lenses through which to assess the tools and approaches found within civil regulatory frameworks, it is possible to begin picking out specific areas and initiatives of concern to the defense and national security community. The tables below make an initial assessment of the potential implications of civil regulation of AI on the defense and national security community by grouping them into three buckets.

Be supportive: Areas or initiatives that the community should get behind and support in the short term.

Be proactive: Areas that are still maturing but in which greater input is needed and the impact on the community could be significant in the medium term.

Be watchful: Areas that are still maturing but in which uncertain future impacts could require the community’s input.

The content of these tables is by no means comprehensive, but it gives an indication of areas in which the defense and national security community might wish to focus its resources and attention while the civil regulatory landscape continues to develop.

Be supportive

Areas or initiatives that the community should get behind and support in the short term

Technical standards	Defense and national security technical standards should, as far as possible, align with civil-sector standards to minimize the cost of compliance, maximize interoperability, and allow efficient adoption of civil solutions to specialist problems. Action on: chief information officers, chief AI officers, standard-setting bodies, and AI developers in the public and private sectors.
Risk-assessment tools	Adopting tools and best practices developed in the civil sector could save time and money that could be better spent on advancing capability or readiness. Action on: chief information officers, chief AI officers, risk-management professionals including auditors, system integrators, and AI developers in the public and private sectors.
Safety and assurance tools	As above, adopting tools and best practices developed in the civil sector could be more efficient, but there could also be reputational and operational benefits to equivalency in some areas like aviation, in which military and civil users of AI systems might need to share airspace. Action on: chief information officers, chief AI officers, compliance officers, and domain safety specialists.

Be proactive

Areas that are still maturing but in which greater input is needed and the impact on the community could be significant in the medium term.

Regulation of adjacent sectors and use cases	Restrictions on the use of AI in domestic security and policing could limit development of capabilities of use to the defense and national security community or increase the cost of capabilities by limiting economies of scale. This is especially concerning in technically complex areas such as counterterrorism, covert surveillance and monitoring, and pattern detection for intelligence purposes. Action on: chief information officers, chief AI officers, legal and operational policy advisers, and AI developers in the public and private sectors.
Data sharing and transfer	Regulatory approaches that impact, in policy or practical terms, the ability of the defense and national security community to share data between allies across national borders could limit or impose additional costs on collaborative capability development and deployment. Action on: chief information officers, chief AI officers, data-management specialists, and export-control policymakers.
Specialty regulatory provisions for generative AI	Regulations placed on the general-purpose AI systems that underpin sector-specific applications could impact the capabilities available to defense and national security users, even if those use cases are themselves technically exempt from such restrictions. Action on: chief information officers, chief AI officers, standard-setting bodies, legal and operational policy advisers, and AI developers in the public and private sectors.

Be watchful

Areas that are still maturing but in which uncertain future impacts could require the community’s input

Licensing and registration databases	Such databases could easily exclude algorithms and models developed specifically for defense or national security purposes. However, registering the open-source or proprietary models on which those tools are based could still pose a security risk if malign actors accessed the registry. Action on: chief information officers, chief AI officers, risk-management professionals, and counterintelligence and security policymakers.
Data protection, privacy, and copyright regulations	AI systems do not work without data. Domestic regulation of privacy, security, and rights-impacting data, as well as interpretations of fair use in existing copyright law, could limit access to training data for future AI systems. Action on: chief information officers, chief AI officers, privacy and data-protection professionals, and AI developers in the public and private sectors.
Market-shaping regulation	The AI industry, especially at the cutting edge of general-purpose AI, is heavily dominated by a few incumbents, most of which operate internationally. Changes to the substance or interpretation of domestic antitrust regulations could impact the supply base available to the defense and national security community. Action on: chief information officers, chief AI officers, commercial policymakers, and legal advisers.
Legal liability	Like any other capability, AI systems used by the military and national security community in an operational context are covered by the law of armed conflict and broader international humanitarian law, not domestic legislation. However, in nonoperational contexts, judicial interpretation of civil laws could impact particularly questions of criminal, contractual, or other liability. Action on: chief information officers, chief AI officers, legal and operational policy advisers.

Conclusion

The AI regulatory landscape is complex and fast-changing, and likely to remain so for some time. While most of the civil regulatory approaches described here exclude defense and national security applications of AI, the intrinsic dual-use nature of AI systems means that the defense and national security community cannot afford to think of or view itself in isolation. This paper has attempted to look beyond the rules and regulations that the community chooses to place on itself to identify areas in which the boundary with civil-sector regulation is most porous. In doing so, this paper has demonstrated that regulatory carve-outs for defense and national security uses must be part of a broader solution ensuring the community’s needs and perspectives are incorporated into civil frameworks. The areas of concern identified are just a first cut of the potential second-order and unintended consequences that could limit the ability of the United States and its allies to reap the rewards that AI offers as an enhancement to military capability on and off the battlefield. Private-sector AI firms with dual-use products, industry groups, government offices with national security responsibility for AI, and legislative staff should use this paper as a roadmap to understand the impact of civil AI regulation on their equities and plan to inject their perspectives into the debate.

About the author

Fellow

Deborah Cheverton

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Defense Industry

Deborah Cheverton is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a senior trade and investment adviser with the UK embassy.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Primer AI for its generous support in sponsoring this paper. It would not have been possible without help and constructive challenge from the entire staff of the Forward Defense program, especially the steadfast support of Clementine Starling-Daniels, the editorial and grammatical expertise of Mark Massa, and the incredible patience of Abigail Rudolph.

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1 Barak Orbach, “What Is Regulation?” Yale Journal on Regulation, July 25, 2016, https://www.yalejreg.com/bulletin/what-is-regulation/.

2 William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, PubL. 116-283.PS, 134 STAT. 3388 (2021) https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ283/PLAW-116publ283.pdf.

3 The other EOs overridden by President Biden were: EO13859 Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence and EO13960 Promoting the Use of Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in the Federal Government. “Biden-Harris Administration Secures Voluntary Commitments from Leading Artificial Intelligence Companies to Manage the Risks Posed by AI,” White House, press release, July 21, 2023, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/07/21/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-secures-voluntary-commitments-from-leading-artificial-intelligence-companies-to-manage-the-risks-posed-by-ai/.

4 “AI Bill of Rights Making Automated Systems Work for the American People,” White House, October 2022, https://marketingstorageragrs.blob.core.windows.net/webfiles/Blueprint-for-an-AI-Bill-of-Rights.pdf; “RNC 2024 Platform,” Republican National Committee, July 8, 2024, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2024-republican-party-platform.

5 Ronnie Kinoshita, Luke Koslosky, and Tessa Baker, “The Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy AI: Decoding Biden’s AI Policy Roadmap,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, May 3, 2024, https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/eo-14410-on-safe-secure-and-trustworthy-ai-trackers.

6 Jeff Tollefson, et al., “What Trump’s Election Win Could Mean for AI, Climate and Health,” Nature, November 8, 2024, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-024-03667-w; Gyana Swain, “Trump Taps Sriram Krishnan for AI Advisor Role amid Strategic Shift in Tech Policy,” CIO, Demember 23, 2024, https://ramaonhealthcare.com/trump-taps-sriram-krishnan-for-ai-advisor-role-amid-strategic-shift-in-tech-policy/

7 Trump’s allies are divided on AI. While Trump himself is friendly to the AI industry, polling shows that many Americans are worried about the impact on their jobs. Julie Ray, “Americans Express Real Concerns about Artificial Intelligence,” Gallup, August 27, 2024, https://news.gallup.com/poll/648953/americans-express-real-concerns-artificial-intelligence.aspx.

8 “OMB Releases Final Guidance Memo on the Government’s Use of AI,” Crowell & Moring, April 9, 2024, https://www.crowell.com/en/insights/client-alerts/omb-releases-final-guidance-memo-on-the-governments-use-of-ai; Gabby Miller and Justin Hendrix, “Where US Tech Policy May Be Headed during a Second Trump Term,” Tech Policy Press, November 7, 2024, https://www.techpolicy.press/where-us-tech-policy-may-be-headed-during-a-second-trump-term/; Harry Booth and Tharin Pillay, “What Donald Trump’s Win Means for AI,” Time, November 8, 2024, https://time.com/7174210/what-donald-trump-win-means-for-ai.

9 Ellen Glover, “AI Bill of Rights: What You Should Know,” Built In, March 19, 2024, https://builtin.com/artificial-intelligence/ai-bill-of-rights.

10 “AI Risk Management Framework. Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0),” National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2023, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.100-1.pdf; “Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2024, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.600-1.pdf.

11 Harold Booth, et al., “Secure Software Development Practices for Generative AI and Dual-Use Foundation Models,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, April 2024, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218A.pdf; Jesse Dunietz, et al., “A Plan for Global Engagement on AI Standards,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2024, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.100-5.pdf.

12 The Insight Forums took input from experts in the field on subjects ranging from workforce implications and copyright concerns to doomsday scenarios and questions around legal liability. Gabby Miller, “US Senate AI ‘Insight Forum’ Tracker,” Tech Policy Press, December 8, 2023, https://www.techpolicy.press/us-senate-ai-insight-forum-tracker.

13 Chuck Schumer, et al., “Driving US Innovation in Artificial Intelligence,” US Senate, May 15, 2024, https://www.schumer.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Roadmap_Electronic1.32pm.pdf.

14 The House of Representatives AI Task Force Report was published too late for inclusion in this paper. Prithvi Iyer and Justin Hendrix, “Reactions to the Bipartisan
US House AI Task Force Report,” Tech Policy Press, December 20, 2024, https://www.techpolicy.press/reactions-to-the-bipartisan-us-house-ai-task-force-report/;
Maria Curi, “What We’re Hearing: Speaker Johnson on AI,” Axios, May 2, 2024, https://www.axios.com/pro/tech-policy/2024/05/02/speaker-johnson-on-ai; Gopal Ratnam, “Schumer’s AI Road Map Might Take GOP Detour,” Roll Call, November 13, 2024, https://rollcall.com/2024/11/13/schumers-ai-road-map-might-take-gop-detour/.

15 Amber C. Thompson, et al., “Senate AI Working Group Releases Roadmap for Artificial Intelligence Policy,” Mayer Brown, May 17, 2024, https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2024/05/senate-ai-working-group-releases-roadmap-for-artificial-intelligence-policy.

16 “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024,” US Congress, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/2670.

17 “Summary of the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act FY 2024,” US Senate Committee on Armed Services, 2023, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fy24_ndaa_conference_executive_summary1.pdf. It is possible that the 2025 NDAA could be used to progress new AI legislation.

18 “Memorandum on Advancing the United States’ Leadership in Artificial Intelligence; Harnessing Artificial Intelligence to Fulfill National Security Objectives; and Fostering the Safety, Security, and Trustworthiness of Artificial Intelligence,” White House, October 24, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/10/24/memorandum-on-advancing-the-united-states-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence-harnessing-artificial-intelligence-to-fulfill-national-security-objectives-and-fostering-the-safety-security/.

19 Provisions relating to especially sensitive national security issues, such as countermeasures for adversarial use of AI, are reserved to a classified annex.

20 Examples of self-imposed regulation include: “DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence,” US Department of Defense, February 24, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/; Joseph Clark, “DOD Releases AI Adoption Strategy,” US Department of Defense, November 2, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3578219/dod-releases-ai-adoption-strategy; “DOD Directive 3000 09 Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” US Department of Defense, January 25, 2023, https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf; “Artificial Intelligence Ethics Framework for the Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, June 2020, https://www.intelligence.gov/artificial-intelligence-ethics-framework-for-the-intelligence-community. For full analysis of the AI NSM, see: Gregory C. Allen and Isaac Goldston, “The Biden Administration’s National Security Memorandum on AI Explained,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 25, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/biden-administrations-national-security-memorandum-ai-explained.

21 Ibid.

22 “Framework to Advance AI Governance and Risk Management in National Security,” White House, October 24, 2024, https://ai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/NSM-Framework-to-Advance-AI-Governance-and-Risk-Management-in-National-Security.pdf.

23 “Remarks by APNSA Jake Sullivan on AI and National Security,” White House, October 25, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/10/24/remarks-by-apnsa-jake-sullivan-on-ai-and-national-security.

24 “Artificial Intelligence 2024 Legislation,” National Conference of State Legislators, June 3, 2024, https://www.ncsl.org/technology-and-communication/artificial-intelligence-2024-legislation.

25 Brian Joseph, “Common Themes Emerge in State AI Legislation,” Capitol Journal, April 16, 2024, https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/insights/legal/capitol-journal/b/state-net/posts/common-themes-emerge-in-state-ai-legislation; John J. Rolecki, “Emerging Trends in AI Governance: Insights from State-Level Regulations Enacted in 2024,” National Law Review, January 6, 2025, https://natlawreview.com/article/emerging-trends-ai-governance-insights-state-level-regulations-enacted-2024.

26 Safe and Secure Innovation for Frontier Artificial Intelligence Models Act, SB-1047 (2024), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB1047.

27 Hodan Omaar, “California’s Bill to Regulate Frontier AI Models Undercuts More Sensible Federal Efforts,” Center for Data Innovation, February 20, 2024, https://datainnovation.org/2024/02/californias-bill-to-regulate-frontier-ai-models-undercuts-more-sensible-federal-efforts; Bobby Allyn, “California Gov. Newsom Vetoes AI Safety Bill That Divided Silicon Valley,” NPR, September 29, 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/09/20/nx-s1-5119792/newsom-ai-bill-california-sb1047-tech.

28 Hope Anderson, Nick Reem, and Sara Tadayyon, “Raft of California AI Legislation Adds to Growing Patchwork of US Regulation,” White & Case, October 10, 2024, https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/raft-california-ai-legislation-adds-growing-patchwork-us-regulation; Myriah V. Jaworski and Ali Bloom, “A View from California: One Important Artificial Intelligence Bill Down, 17 Others Good to Go,” Clark Hill, November 5, 2024, https://www.clarkhill.com/news-events/news/a-view-from-california-one-important-artificial-intelligence-bill-down-17-others-good-to-go.

29 Scott Young and Jordan Hilton, “Utah Enacts AI-Focused Consumer Protection Bill,” Mayer Brown, May 13, 2024, https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2024/05/utah-enacts-ai-focused-consumer-protection-bill.

30 “Colorado Enacts Groundbreaking Artificial Intelligence Act,” Troutman Pepper Locke, May 29, 2024, https://www.regulatoryoversight.com/2024/05/colorado-enacts-groundbreaking-artificial-intelligence-act.

31 Jake Parker, “Misgivings Cloud First-In-Nation Colorado AI Law: Implications and Considerations for the Security Industry,” Security Industry Association, May 28, 2024, https://www.securityindustry.org/2024/05/28/misgivings-cloud-first-in-nation-colorado-ai-law-implications-and-considerations-for-the-security-industry.

32 Bente Birkeland, “In Writing the Country’s Most Sweeping AI Law, Colorado Focused on Fairness, Preventing Bias,” NPR, June 22, 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/06/22/nx-s1-4996582/artificial-intelligence-law-against-discrimination-hiring-colorado.

33 Daniel Castro, “Virginia’s New AI Executive Order Is a Model for Other States to Build On,” Center for Data Innovation, February 16, 2024, https://datainnovation.org/2024/02/virginias-new-ai-executive-order-is-a-model-for-other-states-to-build-on.

34 “War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Police,” American Civil Liberties Union, June 23, 2014, https://www.aclu.org/publications/war-comes-home-excessive-militarization-american-police; Anshu Siripurapu and Noah Berman, “What Does the U.S. National Guard Do?” Council on Foreign Relations, April 3, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-does-us-nationa-guard-do.

35 “Fact Sheet: The Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy,” US Department of State, November 27, 2024, https://www.state.gov/political-declaration-on-the-responsible-military-use-of-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomy.

36 Brandi Vincent, “US Eyes First Multinational Meeting to Implement New ‘Responsible AI’ Declaration,” DefenseScoop, January 9, 2024, https://defensescoop.com/2024/01/09/us-eyes-first-multinational-meeting-to-implement-new-responsible-ai-declaration.

37 “How Does China’s Approach to AI Regulation Differ from the US and EU?” Forbes, July 18, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbeseq/2023/07/18/how-does-chinas-approach-to-ai-regulation-differ-from-the-us-and-eu/?sh=47763973351c.

38 Matt Sheehan, “China’s AI Regulations and How They Get Made,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 10, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/07/chinas-ai-regulations-and-how-they-get-made?lang=en.

39 CASS is an official Chinese think tank operating under the State Council. “China’s New AI Regulations,” Latham & Watkins Privacy & Cyber Practice, August 16, 2023, https://www.lw.com/admin/upload/SiteAttachments/Chinas-New-AI-Regulations.pdf; Zac Haluza, “How Will China’s Generative AI Regulations Shape the Future?” DigiChina Forum, April 26, 2023, https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/how-will-chinas-generative-ai-regulations-shape-the-future-a-digichina-forum; Zeyi Yang, “Four Things to Know about China’s New AI Rules in 2024,” MIT Technology Review, January 17, 2024, https://www.technlogyreview.com/2024/01/17/1086704/china-ai-regulation-changes-2024.

40 Sheehan, “China’s AI Regulations and How They Get Made.”

41 Graham Webster, et al., “Analyzing an Expert Proposal for China’s Artificial Intelligence Law,” DigiChina, Stanford University, August 29, 2023, https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/forum-analyzing-an-expert-proposal-for-chinas-artificial-intelligence-law.

42 Mark MacCarthy, “The US and Its Allies Should Engage with China on AI Law and Policy,” Brookings, October 19, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-us-and-its-allies-should-engage-with-china-on-ai-law-and-policy.

43 Matt O’Shaughnessy, “What a Chinese Regulation Proposal Reveals about AI and Democratic Values,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 16, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2023/05/what-a-chinese-regulation-proposal-reveals-about-ai-and-democratic-values?lang=en.

44 Huw Roberts and Emmie Hine, “The Future of AI Policy in China,” East Asia Journal, September 27, 2023, https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/09/27/the-future-of-ai-policy-in-china/.

45 Will Henshall, “How China’s New AI Rules Could Affect U.S. Companies,” Time, September 19, 2023, https://time.com/6314790/china-ai-regulation-us.

46 “CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7 Position Paper: Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,” China in Delegation to UN-CCW, April 11, 2018, https://unoda-documents-library.s3.amazonaws.com/Convention_on_Certain_Conventional_Weapons_-_Group_of_Governmental_Experts_(2018)/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.7.pdf.

47 Gregory C. Allen, “Understanding China’s AI Strategy,” Center for a New American Security, February 6, 2019, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/understanding-chinas-ai-strategy.

48 Putu Shangrina Pramudia, “China’s Strategic Ambiguity on the Issue of Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional 24, 1 (2022), https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/global/vol24/iss1/1/; Gregory C. Allen, “One Key Challenge for Diplomacy on AI: China’s Military Does Not Want to Talk,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 20, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/one-key-challenge-diplomacy-ai-chinas-military-does-not-want-talk.

49 “Full Text: The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, 2023, http://cr.china-embassy.gov.cn/esp/ndle/202302/t20230222_11029046.htm.

50 Sierra Janik, et al., “China’s Paper on Ukraine and next Steps for Xi’s Global Security Initiative,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, July 17, 2024, https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-paper-ukraine-and-next-steps-xis-global-security-initiative.

51 Joyce Hakmeh, “Balancing China’s Role in the UK’s AI Agenda,” Chatham House, October 30, 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/10/balancing-chinas-role-uks-ai-agenda.

52 “Global AI Governance Initiative,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, 2023, http://gd.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zxhd_1/202310/t20231024_11167412.htm.

53 Shannon Tiezzi, “China Renews Its Pitch on AI Governance at World Internet Conference,” Diplomat, November 9, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/china-renews-its-pitch-on-ai-governance-at-world-internet-conference.

54 Bill Drexel and Hannah Kelley, “Behind China’s Plans to Build AI for the World,” Politico, November 30, 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/11/30/china-global-ai-plans-00129160.

55 “AI Act Enters into Force,” European Commission, August 1, 2024, https://commission.europa.eu/news/ai-act-enters-force-2024-08-01_en.

56 The AI Act is formally called the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence and Amending Certain Legislative Acts.

57 Hadrien Pouget, “Institutional Context: EU Artificial Intelligence Act,” EU Artificial Intelligence Act, 2019, https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/context.

58 “Chapter 2, Article 5—Prohibited AI Practices in Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of 13 June 2024 Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence and Amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (Text with EEA Relevance),” EUR-Lex, European Union, 2024, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng.

59 This covers a huge swath of consumer devices including toys, medical devices, motor vehicles, and gas-burning appliances.

60 “Chapter 3, Section 1, Article 5—Classification Rules for High-Risk AI Systems in Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of 13 June 2024 Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence and Amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (Text with EEA Relevance),” EUR-Lex, European Union, 2024, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng.

61 Developers of high-risk AI systems must implement comprehensive risk-management and data-governance practices throughout the life cycle of the system; meet standards for accuracy, robustness, and cybersecurity; and register the system in an EU-wide public database. Mia Hoffmann, “The EU AI Act: A Primer,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, September 26, 2023, https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/the-eu-ai-act-a-primer.

62 Jedidiah Bracy, “EU AI Act: Draft Consolidated Text Leaked Online,” International Association of Privacy Professionals, January 22, 2024, https://iapp.org/news/a/eu-ai-act-draft-consolidated-text-leaked-online.

63 “Chapter 5, Section 1, Article 51—Classification of General-Purpose AI Models as General-Purpose AI Models with Systemic Risk and Article 52—Procedure in Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of 13 June 2024 Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence and Amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (Text with EEA Relevance),” EUR-Lex, European Union, 2024, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng.

64 Lisa Peets, Marianna Drake, and Marty Hansen, “EU AI Act: Key Takeaways from the Compromise Text,” Inside Privacy, February 28, 2024, https://www.insideprivacy.com/artificial-intelligence/eu-ai-act-key-takeaways-from-the-compromise-text.

65 Hadrien Pouget and Johann Laux, “A Letter to the EU’s Future AI Office,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/10/03/letter-to-eu-s-future-ai-office-pub-90683.

66 Hoffman, “The EU AI Act: A Primer”; Osman Gazi Güçlütürk, Siddhant Chatterjee, and Airlie Hilliard, “Penalties of the EU AI Act: The High Cost of Non-Compliance,” Holistic AI, February 18, 2024, https://www.holisticai.com/blog/penalties-of-the-eu-ai-act.

67 Jedidah Bracy and Alex LaCasse, “EU Reaches Deal on World’s First Comprehensive AI Regulation,” International Association of Privacy Professionals, December 11, 2023, https://iapp.org/news/a/eu-reaches-deal-on-worlds-first-comprehensive-ai-regulation.

68 Gian Volpicelli, “EU Set to Allow Draconian Use of Facial Recognition Tech, Say Lawmakers,” Politico, January 16, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-ai-facial-recognition-tech-act-late-tweaks-attack-civil-rights-key-lawmaker-hahn-warns.

69 Melissa Heikkilä, “Five Things You Need to Know about the EU’s New AI Act,” MIT Technology Review, December 11, 2023, https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/12/11/1084942/five-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-eus-new-ai-act.

70 Jennifer Wu and Martin Hayward, “International Impact of the GDPR Felt Five Years On,” Pinsent Masons, June 6, 2023, https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/analysis/international-impact-of-the-gdpr-felt-five-years-on.

71 Kevin Purdy, “USB-C Is Now the Law of the Land in Europe,” Wired, January 3, 2025, https://www.wired.com/story/usb-c-is-now-a-legal-requirement-for-most-rechargeable-gadgets-in-europe.

72 Apple has said that this decision isn’t related to the AI Act, but rather the earlier Digital Markets Act (DMA), which aims to prevent large companies from abusing their market power with massive fines of up to 10 percent of the company’s total worldwide annual turnover, or up to 20 percent in the event of repeated infringements. “Apple’s AI Has Now Been Released but It’s Not Coming to Europe,” Euronews and Associated Press, October 29, 2024, https://www.euronews.com/next/2024/10/29/apples-ai-has-now-been-released-but-its-not-coming-to-europe-any-time-soon.

73 Paul Shepley and Matthew Gill, “Artificial Intelligence: How Is the Government Approaching Regulation?” Institute for Government, October 27, 2023, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainer/artificial-intelligence-regulation.

74 Vincent Manancourt, Tom Bristow, and Laurie Clarke, “Friend or Foe: Labour’s Looming Battle on AI,” Politico, October 12, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/friend-or-foe-labour-party-keir-starmer-looming-battle-ai-artificial-intelligence.

75 “Establishing a Pro-Innovation Approach to Regulating AI,” UK Government, July 18, 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/establishing-a-pro-innovation-approach-to-regulating-ai/establishing-a-pro-innovation-approach-to-regulating-ai-policy-statement; “National AI Strategy,” Government of the United Kingdom, September 22, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-ai-strategy; “A Pro-Innovation Approach to AI Regulation,” Government of the United Kingdom, March 22, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-regulation-a-pro-innovation-approach/white-paper#executive-summary.

76 This decision is likely, in part, a result of political pragmatism (legislation takes time and parliamentary time is limited) but it also reflects the nature of the United Kingdom’s parliamentary system, which allows the government of the day significant leeway in interpretation of primary legislation, including through secondary legislation and various kinds of subordinate regulatory instruments that may be delegated to public bodies. “Understanding Legislation,” Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2018, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/understanding-legislation.

77 Tom Bristow, “Labour Will Toughen up AI Regulation, Starmer Says,” Politico, June 13, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/starmer-labour-will-bring-in-stronger-ai-regulation; Dan Milmo, “Labour Would Force AI Firms to Share Their Technology’s Test Data,” Guardian, February 4, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/feb/04/labour-force-ai-firms-share-technology-test-data.

78 “King’s Speech,” Hansard, UK Parliament, July 17, 2024, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2024-07-17/debates/2D7D3E47-776E-4B81-8E2A-7854168D6FED/King%E2%80%99SSpeech; Anna Gross and George Parker, “UK’s AI Bill to Focus on ChatGPT-Style Models,” Financial Times, August 1, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/ce53d233-073e-4b95-8579-e80d960377a4.

79 “A Pro-Innovation Approach to AI Regulation.”

80 “Regulatory Sandbox,” Financial Conduct Authority, August 1, 2023, https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/innovation/regulatory-sandbox.

81 DRCF brings together the four UK regulators with responsibilities for digital regulation—the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), and Ofcom—to collaborate on digital regulatory matters. “The DRCF Launches Informal Advice Service to Support Innovation and Enable Economic Growth,” Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum, April 22, 2024, https://www.drcf.org.uk/publications/press-releases/the-drcf-launches-informal-advice-service-to-support-innovation-and-enable-economic-growth.

82 This includes through implementation guidelines, 10 million pounds of funding to boost regulators’ capabilities in AI, and ensuring interoperability with international regulatory frameworks. “Implementing the UK’s AI Regulatory Principles Initial Guidance for Regulators,” Government of the United Kingdom, February 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/implementing-the-uks-ai-regulatory-principles-initial-guidance-for-regulators.

83 “Introducing the AI Safety Institute,” Government of the United Kingdom, last updated January 17, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-institute-overview/introducing-the-ai-safety-institute; “AI Safety Institute Approach to Evaluations,” Government of the United Kingdom, February 9, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-institute-approach-to-evaluations/ai-safety-institute-approach-to-evaluations.

84 Madhumita Murgia, Anna Gross, and Cristina Criddle, “World’s Biggest AI Tech Companies Push UK over Safety Tests,” Financial Times, February 7, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/105ef217-9cb2-4bd2-b843-823f79256a0e.

85 Dan Milmo, “AI Safeguards Can Easily Be Broken, UK Safety Institute Finds,” Guardian, February 9, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/feb/09/ai-safeguards-can-easily-be-broken-uk-safety-institute-finds; Gross and Parker, “UK’s AI Bill to Focus on ChatGPT-Style Models.”

86 “AI Foundation Models Review: Short Version,” Competition and Markets Authority, September 18, 2023, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65045590dec5be000dc35f77/Short_Report_PDFA.pdf; Sarah Cardell, “Opening Remarks at the American Bar Association (ABA) Chair’s Showcase on AI Foundation Models,” Government of the United Kingdom, April 10, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/opening-remarks-at-the-american-bar-association-aba-chairs-showcase-on-ai-foundation-models. The CMA is known to be looking at Microsoft’s partnership with OpenAI and has recently opened a “Phase 1” investigation into Amazon’s recent $4-billion investment in Anthropic to assess whether the deal may harm competition. Ryan Browne, “Amazon’s $4 Billion Investment in AI Firm Anthropic Faces UK Merger Investigation,” CNBC, August 8, 2024, https://www.cnbc.com/2024/08/08/amazons-investment-in-ai-firm-anthropic-faces-uk-merger-investigation.html.

87 “AI Foundation Models Update Paper,” Competition and Markets Authority, 2024 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-foundation-models-update-paper.

88 Meredith Broadbent, “UK Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill: Extraterritorial Regulation Affecting the Tech Investment Climate,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 4, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/uk-digital-markets-competition-and-consumers-bill-extraterritorial-regulation-affecting.

89 “A Pro-Innovation Approach to AI Regulation.”

90 “Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” Government of the United Kingdom, June 15, 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-artificial-intelligence-strategy; “Ambitious, Safe, Responsible: Our Approach to the Delivery of AI-Enabled Capability in Defence,” Government of the United Kingdom, June 15, 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ambitious-safe-responsible-our-approach-to-the-delivery-of-ai-enabled-capability-in-defence/ambitious-safe-responsible-our-approach-to-the-delivery-of-ai-enabled-capability-in-defence.

91 GCHQ is the UK’s signal intelligence agency.

92 “Pioneering a New National Security: The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence at GCHQ,” Government of the United Kingdom, February 24, 2021, https://www.gchq.gov.uk/artificial-intelligence/index.html.

93 “Technology Advisory Panel—IPCO,” Investigatory Powers Commissioner, 2021, https://www.ipco.org.uk/who-we-are/technology-advisory-panel.

94 The five principles are: human centricity; responsibility; understanding; bias and harm mitigation; and reliability.

95 “The Bletchley Declaration by Countries Attending the AI Safety Summit, 1–2 November 2023,” Government of the United Kingdom, November 1, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-2023-the-bletchley-declaration/the-bletchley-declaration-by-countries-attending-the-ai-safety-summit-1-2-november-2023.

96 Thomas Macaulay, “World-First AI Safety Deal Exposes Agenda Set in Silicon Valley, Critics Say,” Next Web, November 2, 2023, https://thenextweb.com/news/ai-safety-summit-bletchley-declaration-concerns.

97 Sean Ó hÉigeartaigh, “Comment on the Bletchley Declaration,” Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge, November 1, 2024, https://www.cser.ac.uk/news/comment-bletchley-declaration/.

98 Yeong Zee Kin, “Singapore’s Model Framework Balances Innovation and Trust in AI,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, June 24, 2020, https://oecd.ai/en/wonk/singapores-model-framework-to-balance-innovation-and-trust-in-ai.

99 Kayla Goode, Heeu Millie Kim, and Melissa Deng, “Examining Singapore’s AI Progress,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, March 2023, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/examining-singapores-ai-progress.

100 “National AI Strategy,” Government of Singapore, 2019, https://www.smartnation.gov.sg/nais; Yin Ming Ho, “Singapore’s National Strategy in the Global Race for AI,” Regional Programme Political Dialogue Asia, February 26, 2024, https://www.kas.de/en/web/politikdialog-asien/digital-asia/detail/-/content/singapore-s-national-strategy-in-the-global-race-for-ai.

101 “Model AI Governance Framework Second Edition,” Personal Data Protection Commission of Singapore, January 21, 2020, https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/-/media/files/pdpc/pdf-files/resource-for-organisation/ai/sgmodelaigovframework2.pdf.

102 “Singapore’s Approach to AI Governance,” Personal Data Protection Commission, last visited January 11, 2025, https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/Help-and-Resources/2020/01/Model-AI-Governance-Framework.

103 “Advisory Guidelines on Use of Personal Data in AI Recommendation and Decision Systems,” Personal Data Protection Commission, last visited January 11, 2025, https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/guidelines-and-consultation/2024/02/advisory-guidelines-on-use-of-personal-data-in-ai-recommendation-and-decision-systems.

104 “AI Verify Foundation,” AI Verify Foundation, January 9, 2025, https://aiverifyfoundation.sg/ai-verify-foundation.

105 Marcus Evans, et al., “Singapore Contributes to the Development of Accessible AI Testing and Accountability Methodology with the Launch of the AI Verify Foundation and AI Verify Testing Tool,” Data Protection Report, June 15, 2023, https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2023/06/singapore-contributes-to-the-development-of-accessible-ai-testing-and-accountability-methodology-with-the-launch-of-the-ai-verify-foundation-and-ai-verify-testing-tool.

106 Yeong Zee Kin, “Singapore’s A.I.Verify Builds Trust through Transparency,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, August 16, 2022, https://oecd.ai/en/wonk/singapore-ai-verify.

107 “What Is AI Verify?” AI Verify Foundation, last visited January 11, 2025, https://aiverifyfoundation.sg/what-is-ai-verify.

108 “Model AI Governance Framework for Generative AI,” AI Verify Foundation, May 30, 2024, https://aiverifyfoundation.sg/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Model-AI-Governance-Framework-for-Generative-AI-May-2024-1-1.pdf.

109 Bryan Tan, “Singapore Proposes Framework for Generative AI,” Reed Smith, January 24, 2024, https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2024/01/singapore-proposes-framework-for-generative-ai.

110 The phrase “national security” appears only once in the Generative AI proposal and not at all in the NAIS 2.0.

111 Germany established its Cyber and Information Domain Service in 2016, but it was not upgraded to a separate military service until 2024. “Establishment of the Digital and Intelligence Service: A Significant Milestone for the Next Generation SAF,” Government of Singapore, October 28, 2022, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/28oct22_nr2.

112 Mike Yeo, “Singapore Unveils New Cyber-Focused Military Service,” C4ISRNet, November 2, 2022, https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2022/11/02/singapore-unveils-new-cyber-focused-military-service.

113 “Fact Sheet: The Digital and Intelligence Service,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, October 28, 2022, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/28oct22_fs.

114 “Fact Sheet: Updates to the Establishment of the Digital and Intelligence Service,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, June 30, 2022, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/30jun22_fs2.

115 “How Singapore’s Defence Tech Uses Artificial Intelligence and Digital Twins,” Singapore Defence Science and Technology Agency, November 19, 2021, https://www.dsta.gov.sg/whats-on/spotlight/how-singapore-s-defence-tech-uses-artificial-intelligence-and-digital-twins; Ridzwan Rahmat, “Singapore Validates Enhanced AI-Infused Combat System at US Wargames,” Janes, September 22, 2023, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/singapore-validates-enhanced-ai-infused-combat-system-at-us-wargames.

116 David Hutt, “AI Regulations: What Can the EU Learn from Asia?” Deutsche Welle, August 2, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/ai-regulations-what-can-the-eu-learn-from-asia/a-68203709.

117 Sheila Chiang, “ASEAN Launches Guide for Governing AI, but Experts Say There Are Challenges,” CNBC, February 2, 2024, https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/02/asean-launches-guide-for-governing-ai-but-experts-say-there-are-challenges.html.

118 Eunice Lim, “Global Steps to Build Trust: ASEAN’s New Guide to AI Governance and Ethics,” Workday Blog, February 9, 2024, https://blog.workday.com/en-hk/2024/global-steps-build-trust-aseans-new-guide-ai-governance-ethics.html.

119 “The OECD Artificial Intelligence (AI) Principles,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2019, https://oecd.ai/en/ai-principles.

120 The five topic areas are: inclusive growth and sustainable development; human-centered values and fairness; transparency and explainability; robustness, security, and safety; and, accountability.

121 “About GPAI,” Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, 2020, https://gpai.ai/about.

122 “Responsible AI Working Group Report,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, December 2023, https://gpai.ai/projects/responsible-ai/Responsible%20AI%20WG%20Report%202023.pdf; “Data Governance Working Group Report,” Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, December 2023, https://gpai.ai/projects/data-governance/Data%20Governance%20WG%20Report%202023.pdf.

123 “OECD Launches Pilot to Monitor Application of G7 Code of Conduct on Advanced AI Development,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, July 22, 2024, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/press-releases/2024/07/oecd-launches-pilot-to-monitor-application-of-g7-code-of-conduct-on-advanced-ai-development.html.

124 “G7 Leaders’ Statement on the Hiroshima AI Process,” European Commission, October 30, 2023, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/g7-leaders-statement-hiroshima-ai-process.

125 Hiroki Habuka, “The Path to Trustworthy AI: G7 Outcomes and Implications for Global AI Governance,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 6, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/path-trustworthy-ai-g7-outcomes-and-implications-global-ai-governance.

126 Gregory C. Allen and Georgia Adamson, “Advancing the Hiroshima AI Process Code of Conduct under the 2024 Italian G7 Presidency: Timeline and Recommendations,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 27, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/advancing-hiroshima-ai-process-code-conduct-under-2024-italian-g7-presidency-timeline-and.

127 Habuka, “The Path to Trustworthy AI: G7 Outcomes and Implications for Global AI Governance.”

128 Peter J. Schildkraut, “The Illusion of International Consensus—What the G7 Code of Conduct Means for Global AI Compliance Programs,” Arnold & Porter, January 18, 2024, https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2024/01/what-the-g7-code-of-conduct-means-for-global-ai-compliance.

129 “Ministerial Declaration—G7 Industry, Technology, and Digital Ministerial Meeting,” Group of Seven, 2024, https://www.g7italy.it/en/eventi/industry-tech-and-digital/.

130 Joe Jones, “UK-US Data Bridge Becomes Law, Takes Effect 12 Oct.,” International Association of Privacy Professionals, August 21, 2023, https://iapp.org/news/a/uk-u-s-data-bridge-becomes-law-takes-effect-12-october; Camille Ford, “The EU-US Data Privacy Framework Is a Sitting Duck. PETs Might Be the Solution,” Centre for European Policy Studies, February 23, 2024, https://www.ceps.eu/the-eu-us-data-privacy-framework-is-a-sitting-duck-pets-might-be-the-solution.

131 “Ethics of Artificial Intelligence,” UNESCO, 2024, https://www.unesco.org/en/artificial-intelligence/recommendation-ethics; “Global AI Ethics and Governance Observatory,” UNESCO, 2021, https://www.unesco.org/ethics-ai/en.

132 “Governing AI for Humanity,” United Nations, September 19, 2024, https://www.un.org/Sites/Un2.Un.org/Files/Governing_ai_for_humanity_final_report_en.pdf.

133 Tess Buckley, “Governing AI for Humanity: UN Report Proposes Global Framework for AI Oversight,” TechUK, September 20, 2024, https://www.techuk.org/resource/governing-ai-for-humanity-un-report-proposes-global-framework-for-ai-oversight.html; Alexander Amato-Cravero, “UN Releases Its Final Report on ‘Governing AI for Humanity,’” Herbert Smith Freehills, October 8, 2024, https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/notes/tmt/2024-posts/UN-releases-its-final-report-on–Governing-AI-for-Humanity-.

134 “General Assembly Adopts Landmark Resolution on Artificial Intelligence,” United Nations, March 21, 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147831.

135 “Enhancing International Cooperation on Capacity-Building of Artificial Intelligence,” United Nations, June 25, 2024, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/ltd/n24/183/80/pdf/n2418380.pdf.

136 Edith Lederer, “UN Adopts Chinese Resolution with US Support on Closing the Gap in Access to Artificial Intelligence,” Associated Press, July 2, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/un-china-us-artificial-intelligence-access-resolution-56c559be7011693390233a7bafb562d1.

137 “Artificial Intelligence: High-Level Briefing,” Security Council Report, December 18, 2024, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/12/artificial-intelligence-high-level-briefing.php.

138 Linda Thomas-Greenfield, “Remarks by Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield at the UN Security Council Stakeout Following the Adoption of a UNGA Resolution on Artificial Intelligence,” United States Mission to the United Nations, March 21, 2024, https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-by-ambassador-thomas-greenfield-at-the-un-security-council-stakeout-following-the-adoption-of-a-unga-resolution-on-artificial-intelligence.

139 “July 2023 Monthly Forecast: Security Council Report,” Security Council Report, July 2, 2023, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2023-07/artificial-intelligence.php.

140 Michelle Nichols, “UN Security Council Meets for First Time on AI Risks,” Reuters, July 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/technology/un-security-council-meets-first-time-ai-risks-2023-07-18.

141 “Statement by the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, September 21, 2024, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/307/20/pdf/n2430720.pdf; “July 2023 Monthly Forecast: Security Council Report.”

142 “Summary of the NATO Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” NATO, October 22, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_187617.htm.

143 Simona Soare, “Algorithmic Power, NATO and Artificial Intelligence,” Military Balance Blog, November 19, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/ja-JP/online-analysis/military-balance/2021/11/algorithmic-power-nato-and-artificial-intelligence.

144 “NATO Allies Take Further Steps Towards Responsible Use of AI, Data, Autonomy and Digital Transformation,” NATO, October 13, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_208342.htm.

145 “NATO Starts Work on Artificial Intelligence Certification Standard,” NATO, February 7, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_211498.htm.

146 Daniel Fata, “NATO’s Evolving Role in Developing AI Policy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 8, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/natos-evolving-role-developing-ai-policy.

147 Maggie Gray and Amy Ertan, “Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy in the Military: An Overview of NATO Member States’ Strategies and Deployment,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, NATO, January 2021, https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/artificial-intelligence-and-autonomy-in-the-military-an-overview-of-nato-member-states-strategies-and-deployment.

148 “Standardization,” NATO, October 14, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69269.htm.

The post Second-order impacts of civil artificial intelligence regulation on defense: Why the national security community must engage appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Crash (exploit) and burn: Securing the offensive cyber supply chain to counter China in cyberspace

Winnona DeSombre Bernsen — Wed, 25 Jun 2025 04:01:00 +0000

Executive summary
Background
Analysis
Key findings
Recommendations
Conclusion
Author and acknowledgements
Appendices

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Executive summary

If the United States wants to increasingly use offensive cyber operations internationally, does it have the supply chain and acquisition capabilities to back it up—especially if its adversary is the People’s Republic of China?  

Strategic competition between the United States and China has long played out in cyberspace, where offensive cyber capabilities, like zero-day vulnerabilities, are a strategic resource. Since 2016, China has been turning the zero-day marketplace in East Asia into a funnel of offensive cyber capabilities for its military and intelligence services, both to ensure it can break into the most secure Western technologies and to deny the United States from obtaining similar capabilities from the region. If the United States wishes to compete in cyberspace, it must compete against China to secure its offensive cyber supply chain.  

This report is the first to conduct a comparative study within the international offensive cyber supply chain, comparing the United States’ fragmented, risk-averse acquisition model with China’s outsourced and funnel-like approach.  

Key findings: 

Zero-day exploitation is becoming more difficult, opaque, and expensive, leading to “feast-or-famine” contract cycles.

Middlemen with prior government connections further drive up costs and create inefficiency in the US and Five Eyes (FVEYs) market, while eroding trust between buyers and sellers.

China’s domestic cyber pipeline dwarfs that of the United States. China is also increasingly moving to recruit from the Middle East and East Asia.

The United States relies on international talent for its zero-day capabilities, and its domestic talent investment is sparse – focused on defense rather than offense.

The US acquisition processes favor large prime contractors, and prioritize extremely high levels of accuracy, trust, and stealth, which can create market inefficiencies and overly index on high-cost, exquisite zero-day exploit procurements.

China’s acquisition processes use decentralized contracting methods. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) outsources operations, shortens contract cycles, and prolongs the life of an exploit through additional resourcing and “n-day” usage.

US cybersecurity goals, coupled with “Big Tech” market dominance, are strategic counterweights to the US offensive capability program, demonstrating a strategic trade-off between economic prosperity and national security.

China’s offensive cyber industry is already heavily integrated with artificial intelligence (AI) institutions, and China’s private sector has been proactively using AI for cyber operations.

Given the opaque international market for zero-day exploits, preference among government customers for full exploit chains leveraging multiple exploit primitives, and the increase in bug collisions, governments can almost never be sure they truly have a “unique capability.”

Recommendations: 

Strengthen the supply chain by creating Department of Defense (DOD) vulnerability research accelerators, funding domestic hacking clubs and competitions, expanding the National Security Agency’s (NSA) Centers of Academic Excellence in Cyber Operations (CAE-CO) program, and providing legal protections to security researchers.

Improve acquisition processes by establishing a government-sponsored vulnerability broker in a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) to decentralize and simplify exploit purchases while increasing cyber capability budgets and expanding research on automated exploit chain generation.

Adjust policy frameworks to consider counterintelligence strategies in the zero-day marketplace (burning capabilities of malicious actors while recruiting willing ‘responsible’ actors into a more formal pipeline), funding n-day research through US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) where appropriate and leveraging alliances like the Pall Mall process to counter China’s growing cyber dominance.

Without meaningful reforms, the United States risks ceding to China whatever strategic advantage it has left in cyberspace. By fostering a more deliberate offensive cyber supply chain and adjusting acquisition strategies, the US can retain a steady supply of offensive cyber capabilities to maintain its edge in the digital battlefield. 

Background

Securing the zero-day supply chain (and its private sector market) is crucial to US-China conflict in cyberspace

“America has incredible offensive cyber power. We need to stop being afraid to use it.”
– Alexei Bulazel, incumbent special assistant to the president and National Security Council senior director for Cyber.¹

“Geopolitical conflicts are increasingly shifting to cyberspace, including tensions between the U.S. and China. Technology is therefore no longer just an area for opportunity, but also a battleground for control, values and influence.”
– Jeremy Fleming, former GCHQ director.

China and the United States are engaged in strategic competition in cyberspace. While cyber operations are often an overlooked area of geopolitical power, both countries’ militaries, intelligence communities, and law enforcement agencies conduct cyber operations. They do so to obtain intelligence crucial to national security, assist conventional military operations, and even create kinetic effects to achieve strategic goals. To make a cyber operation possible, one must have the capacity to break into a particular system: offensive cyber capabilities (and particularly zero-day vulnerabilities) are the necessary strategic resources required to conduct such operations.

The United States clearly wishes to further leverage its cyber prowess in the international arena, particularly against the People’s Republic of China (PRC).² Doing so would help the United States protect its vital national security and economic interests, international partnerships, and norms. However, to operationalize a “cyber power” strategy, the United States must acquire enough high-end capabilities to ensure it can achieve such strategic goals. Moreover, the timeline for implementing these policies is urgent, given the increasing potential for conflict with China in the coming years. Thus, given the international privatized offensive cyber capability marketplace, how can the United States and its allies continue to ensure the availability of offensive cyber capabilities (focusing on zero-day vulnerabilities), while limiting China’s access to those same capabilities?

“China remains the most active and persistent cyber threat to US Government, private-sector, and critical infrastructure networks.”
– ODNI, 2024 Annual Threat Assessment.

“The era of network security has arrived, and vulnerabilities have become a national strategic resource.”
– Qihoo360 CEO Zhou Hongyi, Remarks at the 2017 China National Cyber Security Summit.

Cyber operations consist of a variety of offensive cyber capabilities — many of the most crucial cyber capabilities involve the exploitation of “zero-day” vulnerabilities (also known as zero-days or 0days). Zero-day vulnerabilities are issues or weaknesses (“bugs”) in software or hardware, typically unknown to the vendor and for which no fix is available— in other words, the vendor has had “zero days” to fix the issue. Some of these vulnerabilities are exploitable: an actor with knowledge of the vulnerability could write code that takes advantage of said vulnerability. This results in a “zero-day exploit”—code enabling a range of behaviors that could include establishing access into the computer system the software is installed on, escalating privileges on those systems, or remotely issuing commands.

The work of finding vulnerabilities and writing exploits, thanks to its strategic necessity to governments worldwide, has become a billion-dollar international services industry in the last 20 years. Private firms now often create cutting-edge offensive cyber capabilities for governments. Given the sensitivity around supporting government cyber operations, many of these firms do not openly advertise their services, shrouding the industry in secrecy. Between this secrecy and the variation in products offered (i.e., governments target different technology systems, and no two zero-days are identical), the supply chain for such capabilities is not only opaque to outsiders, but also to governments and even among players in the industry.

Within this highly fragmented and opaque market, large firms, like the United States’ L3Harris or ManTech, frequently hold multi-million dollar valuations.³ Notably, Israel’s NSO Group’s worth reached $1 billion at its peak.⁴ Meanwhile, individual US government agencies receive millions of dollars to procure offensive tools.⁵ Such companies’ tools have clearly been purchased by such government agencies and put to use in modern-day cyber operations. Notably, of all the zero-day vulnerabilities found exploited “in-the-wild” in 2023 and 2024 by Google, around 50 percent of them were attributed to commercial vendors that sell capabilities to government customers.⁶ While this statistic only encompasses detected zero-day exploits, this is still a significant set of capabilities being provided by private sector actors.

The offensive cyber capability industry itself is international and ranges in professionalization depending on the region; companies in Russia, Israel, Spain, Singapore, and the United States all have varying relationships with their home governments, other firms (including middlemen and brokers), international government customers, and even cyber-criminal groups. However, the study of offensive cyber capabilities has largely over-indexed on firms based in Israel and Europe rather than the United States’ greatest geopolitical rival: China.⁷ This is surprising, as the Chinese hacking and cybersecurity ecosystem is robust. Chinese companies have, on multiple occasions, are directly linked to Chinese government-sponsored cyber operations against the United States. Moreover, the development of offensive cyber capabilities in the United States remains largely unstudied or examined in a way that does a disservice to the domestic hacker community.⁸

Why is this question important?

At first glance, it can be difficult to see why the private sector zero-day exploit market—a series of obscure companies selling code that can enable governments to break into widely-used software—would be important in preserving national interests in cyberspace, particularly against China. A simple explanation of this relationship is as follows: the United States and its allies rely on an increasingly digital world, and China is both a savvy adversary and hardened target in cyberspace.⁹ When any country’s intelligence community wishes to infiltrate high-value, hard-to-access digital targets, it likely must use zero-day exploits or other bespoke (i.e., custom-made or tailored) offensive cyber capabilities. Intelligence organizations from both the United States and China, due to decreasing internal supply and rising demand for such capabilities,¹⁰ have increasingly relied on acquiring such exploits from the private sector zero-day exploit market.¹¹ However, the private sector zero-day market is murky and more international than policymakers expect; even if the United States and China are truly entering a “New Cold War,” both countries still source capabilities from an overwhelmingly opaque international market of offensive cyber capability firms, and do not know if they are being supplied with potentially overlapping capabilities. In short, any cyber operation that relies on an acquired capability, conducted by the United States, China, or anyone else, carries a counterintelligence and operational security risk, with no guarantee that they can source a similar capability in the future. Thus, securing the cyber supply chain (understanding the industry, constraining malicious actors, and ensuring availability from trusted parties) is important to address such risks.

While former President Joe Biden’s administration sought to constrain private sector actors with additional regulation and placing bad actors on the entities list,¹² these policies were framed around human rights concerns largely out of Europe and Israel. President Donald Trump’s administration is moving away from this approach, focusing on China as a geostrategic threat over transnational digital repression framings,¹³ as well as signaling willingness to engage with private sector actors in the space. The Trump administration, as of 2025, has accelerated plans for a US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) 2.0, focusing on working better with private industry partners.¹⁴ This is a continuation of the first Trump administration’s policies: Trump was the first president to delegate the authority for offensive cyber operations down to the secretary of defense (through National Security Presidential Memorandum–13) allowing USCYBERCOM more leeway to conduct operations without presidential approval, albeit still with a robust interagency review process.¹⁵

If the United States wishes to further leverage its cyber prowess in the international arena by leveraging private sector partners, does it have the supply chain and acquisition capabilities to back it up—especially if its adversary is the People’s Republic of China? Although the author does not condone general analogies between cyber and other domains, supply chain and acquisition analysis in the cyber domain can be similar to nuclear or other arms proliferation questions. For example, to answer whether a country has the capability to construct a nuclear weapon, one must understand how much enriched uranium the country can easily acquire. Similarly, to answer whether a country can become a cyber power that can access the hardest of digital targets, one must ask how easily it can source and acquire zero-days and other offensive cyber capabilities.

Methodology

This report combines quantitative data analysis and interviews of experts from across the offensive cyber capability ecosystem. The underlying research—conducted over ten months, from June 2024 to March 2025—occurred in three stages.¹⁶ It has since been revised and updated. The first was a comprehensive literature review of US-China cyber conflict, how the offensive cyber capabilities industry works, and recent policies on combating the proliferation of spyware from the Biden administration (which has impacted zero-day exploit acquisition and sales). The second then analyzed data scraped from the open internet, largely from the website “CTFTime” (well-known for tracking Capture the Flag (CTF) competitions internationally),¹⁷ as well as secondary sources containing anonymized and aggregated information on the cybersecurity ecosystem. This report includes statistics from this dataset—the full dataset is available upon request. The third stage involved interviewing experts from across the national security and offensive cybersecurity ecosystem. The interviews, which began in December 2024 and concluded in March 2025, comprise the most significant aspects of this research. The approximately thirty experts consulted, both virtually and in person, came from one or more of the following backgrounds:

Business leaders and senior employees of offensive hacking or vulnerability research companies in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada;

Senior defense acquisition and innovation officials in the US government;

Security researchers internationally who focus on China or wider Asia-Pacific cyber issues;

Current and/or former US and Five Eyes (FVEYs) intelligence officials; and

Current and/or former US national security policy officials.

To narrow the project’s scope, and given the foreign intelligence and military concerns China poses, this paper focuses primarily on acquiring zero-days for foreign intelligence and military customers, rather than for domestic law enforcement. Although some of the analysis and ultimate policy recommendations may be applicable to law enforcement, the analysis was conducted with intelligence and military end uses in mind. Because of the lack of publicly available reporting on this topic, the interviews are a major part of the paper’s findings. A list of interviewees can be found in Appendix B. For security reasons, many interviewees asked to remain unattributed. Anonymous interviewees are not individually cited in the text to avoid identifying them based on their aggregate comments.

The author’s background as a student, cybersecurity practitioner, think tank fellow, and founder of a Washington DC-based hacking conference¹⁸ heavily contributed to sourcing interviews with the hacking and cyber policy community. However, the author recognizes that, given the highly fragmented nature of the offensive cyber capability industry, the findings in this paper are likely only part of the wider truth, and reflect her biases and affiliations. Many sources are former and current industry colleagues. One of the interviewees is her husband, Derek Bernsen, whose DARPA program, Intelligent Generation of Tools for Security (INGOTS), is mentioned in the paper. Any omissions, errors, or factual inaccuracies are the author’s alone.

The majority of the paper consists of an analysis of the US supply and acquisition funnel of offensive cyber capabilities, followed by an analysis of China’s supply and acquisition funnel, from which the author makes conclusions and recommendations for US policy moving forward. There are plenty of risks to this approach, two of which are mirror imaging bias and “whataboutism” (justifying an approach because another party has conducted similar activity). The author has tried to, wherever possible, seek to remove such fallacies from her analysis. She justifies the overall approach through the following (somewhat obligatory) Sun Tzu quote:

知己知彼，百战不殆.”

(“Know yourself and your enemy, and you will not know defeat in battle”).

Analysis

This section addresses the relative supply chains for offensive cyberspace operations to the United States and China, building around a tripartite model to encompass a set of industry and government relationships characterized by significant degrees of internal complexity, opacity, and fragmentation. This model addresses (1) what the underlying international market of offensive cyber capabilities looks like, (2) what parts of this international market supply China and/or the United States with offensive cyber capabilities, and (3) how the United States and China acquire such capabilities.

A. The international offensive cyber supply chain

Source: Emma Schroeder. Adapted from photograph by Basma Alghali (Unsplash license) and image by Gordon Johnson (Pixabay content license).

All software is built by people, and there are three types of bespoke software often used in a cyber operation:¹⁹ (1) exploit code that takes advantage of a software vulnerability, (2) a malware payload, and (3) technical command and control.²⁰ All three are “offensive cyber capabilities.” While individual governments with the right expertise can build their respective capabilities in-house, many rely heavily on commercial vendors.²¹ In a 2024 report, the Atlantic Council identified forty-nine commercial vendors along with thirty-six subsidiaries, twenty-four partner firms, twenty suppliers, and a mix of thirty-two holding companies, ninety-five investors, and one hundred and seventy-nine individuals, including many named investors.²² Despite over-indexing on firms in Italy, Israel, and India, companies and individuals named in this dataset hailed from every major continent except for Antarctica, suggesting that each continent likely has hackers that provide offensive cyber capabilities to governments.²³ While only a small subset of these firms can and do sell zero-day exploits, these named vendors are likely just the tip of the iceberg. Top-tier vulnerability research talent exists worldwide, hailing not just from the FVEY countries (the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia)²⁴ and China but also from smaller nations like Egypt, Vietnam, and Cyprus (see Figure 1).²⁵

Figure 1: Heatmap of major known commercial vendors for offensive cyber capabilities, suppliers, and investors, 2024

Source: Jen Roberts et al., Mythical Beasts and Where to Find Them: Mapping the Global Spyware Market and Its Threats to National Security and Human Rights, Atlantic Council, September 4, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/mythical-beasts-and-where-to-find-them-mapping-the-global-spyware-market-and-its-threats-to-national-security-and-human-rights/.

Moreover, the above dataset excludes talent not yet plugged into the government cyber marketplace. CTF competitions (hacking contests in a simulated environment), Live hacking competitions (where hackers hack into systems live on stage), and bug bounty programs (usually company-run reward programs that encourage hackers to find and report system vulnerabilities) enable hackers to develop similar skill sets as those required for government-sponsored hacking. These programs and competitions are both common recruiting pipelines for defensive cybersecurity companies and offensive vendors alike.

The number of individuals that participate in such programs globally is staggering. In 2020, HackerOne, a well-respected bug bounty platform, reported around 600,000 users spanning 170 countries.²⁶ A 2024 survey by Bugcrowd, one of the largest bug bounty and vulnerability disclosure companies on the internet, revealed most of Bugcrowd’s over 200,000 hackers hailed from India, Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Nepal, Vietnam, Australia, and the United States;²⁷ 78 percent of them are self-taught, and 58 percent of them were under twenty-five years old.²⁸ While not all of these individuals possess the skills to find zero-day vulnerabilities and write code to exploit them, multiple security experts interviewed estimated that there are likely thousands of international individuals able to do so, with numbers in the low hundreds that can be trained to do so well.²⁹

What is required to create and sell a zero-day exploit?

Finding a vulnerability in a technology product or system is a highly manual, labor-intensive process that requires in-depth knowledge of how the target product works. Vulnerability researchers usually acquire such knowledge by reading through a target’s codebase and dependencies for small idiosyncrasies and mistakes.³⁰ Depending on the size of the codebase (ranging from hundreds to millions of lines of code),³¹ this can be a time-consuming process.

However, finding a vulnerability (or “bug”) is only the first step to creating a zero-day exploit. Once a bug is found, there are a series of follow-up questions that need answers. Is the bug exploitable (i.e., can it be used to do anything useful)? If so, can it be exploited reliably, or could it alert the target that something is wrong? Does the exploit work on only one version of the target or across multiple versions? These complex questions usually require additional quality assurance (QA) testing to produce a field-ready exploit, with the QA’s rigor depending on the risk aversion of the end customer.³² Any additional time spent conducting QA tests carries a risk that the technology firm producing the product finds the underlying vulnerability in the meantime and patches it, decreasing the value of the exploit.³³

Instead of selling a single exploit, it is usually more lucrative and impactful to link the individual exploit (known as an “exploit primitive”) with others to create an “exploit chain,” using multiple exploit primitives in conjunction with one another to achieve a particular effect, such as gaining full control over a system. As of 2025, exploit chains are no longer just an option for greater impact; now, they are often necessary to achieve any effect on a modern, enterprise-grade system. Many recent offensive security talks at major conferences,³⁴ alongside security advisories from dominant technology firms,³⁵ have moved away from analyzing primitives and toward analyzing exploit chains for this reason. However, not every exploit primitive can be used in the same chain. When trying to create a functioning full exploit chains (“full chains”), a company may work with middlemen (or “brokers”) to purchase primitives for the exploit chain they want to build.³⁶ This comes with additional risks. Since middlemen work with other middlemen, the original source of a zero-day exploit is often difficult to ascertain. This also raises the potential that multiple parties have access to the same exploit, which, in turn, leads to a higher likelihood of discovery.

Because only a small number of big technology firms create most of the products used globally today, bug collisions (i.e., the parallel independent discovery of a vulnerability by multiple researchers) are also growing increasingly common.³⁷ This dynamic increases the risk for buyers and sellers, as a bug collision means an exploit is more likely to be used by multiple parties, resulting in a higher risk of discovery or false attribution by the private sector. This also erodes trust between the buyers and sellers of a capability, as the buyer can only take the seller’s word that the bug was concurrently discovered rather than resold.

While selling offensive cyber capabilities (and particularly zero-day exploits) to governments is a lucrative profession, it is a risky industry. Creating a zero-day exploit to leverage against a widely used technology product may require between six and eighteen months of full-time engineering and research work.³⁸ Unless an offensive cyber capability firm has multiple engineers working on different products or uses different payment schemes, this timeline can lead to long downtimes between exploit sales. This “feast-or-famine” payout schedule carries risks for companies that rely on one or two windfalls a year to pay their overhead and engineering costs.³⁹

In addition, finding a customer to sell exploits to is more difficult than it first seems. In general, potential sellers must find an existing government contract through which to sell their exploits or know the right government individual to speak with.⁴⁰ Unless an offensive cyber capability firm has hired employees who have recently left a government interested in such capabilities, actual buyers may be extremely hard to find.⁴¹ Thus, international hackers without former government connections normally sell their products to middlemen, many of whom operate internationally.⁴² Even then, the exploit may go through multiple levels of middlemen to get to a government customer,⁴³ frustrating both buyers and sellers. Buyers know that exploits sold to them have extremely high mark-ups, given the number of middlemen involved, and often will not know who the original bug producers are. Meanwhile, sellers are likely aware of the extreme markups, but do not know whether their bugs were sold to multiple governments.⁴⁴

Throughout both the development and sale of an exploit, offensive cyber capability firms are also subject to counterintelligence risks by adversary governments. Since 2022, North Korea has consistently targeted vulnerability researchers globally to steal their tools and exploits.⁴⁵ Vulnerability researchers also frequently report being solicited by foreign intelligence at security conferences, falsely claiming to work for FVEYs governments.⁴⁶ On the U.S. side, government response to this counterintelligence threat has been half-hearted at best. While the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) reportedly announced initiatives to protect high-risk communities against cyber threat actors in 2024,⁴⁷ security researchers who have tried to contact CISA have not found the program helpful.⁴⁸ As a result, the offensive cyber capability industry does not perceive that the US government is interested in protecting this community, even from one of the world’s most unpopular and totalitarian nation-states.

As a result, most vulnerability researchers do not spend more than a decade in the profession, instead choosing to pivot into less risky segments of the cybersecurity industry.⁴⁹ The individuals who stay in the market tend to do so for some combination of three reasons. First, they firmly believe in the mission—this largely describes either likely former government employees who have moved out to the private sector or individuals who wish to have their work “used for good.”⁵⁰ Second, they are profit-motivated. The “feast” element of the feast-or-famine model provides an incredible windfall for certain highly skilled individuals. Third, they simply enjoy the challenge. A large portion of the vulnerability research community, and the hacker community writ large, exhibits a large amount of awe for their vocation (i.e., the only person who hacks textile looms, or the first person to “pop,” or exploit, the newest iPhone can feel like a superpower).⁵¹ This vocational awe creates camaraderie among the most passionate vulnerability researchers worldwide. For some researchers, exploitation is art, and they will often try to put the art above the artist. In that sense, some individuals in the global market, particularly those who interact more with the international community online or participate on international CTF teams, perceive geopolitics as an inconvenient truth.⁵² Chinese and Russian researchers can admire the work done by American researchers, and vice versa, while understanding that they will likely never work together.⁵³

B. The US acquisition pipeline

The DEFCON (DEF CON) hacking conference in Las Vegas, Nevada, in 2014. Source: Tony Webster, Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DEFCON_22_%2814704446530%29.jpg.

“An individual researcher who isn’t informed on what bugs are selling for may sell a good bug for 100k. By the time it makes it to a customer, an individual bug could go for 750k to 1 million dollars.”
– Former ONCD Official.

“The system by which zero day vulnerabilities are acquired is horrendously inefficient and broken.”
– Senior DOD official working on offensive cybersecurity research programs.

Given this international sphere of private sector hackers with the capability to find and exploit capabilities, how does the United States develop and leverage this community to supply its offensive cyber operations? The sections below—and those mirrored in the following section on China—focus on sources of supply (companies that provide capabilities and talent pools that support them) and acquisition methods (contracts, regulations, and informal roadblocks or enablers).

Supply—International, opaque, and loosely affiliated networks.

Companies—Prime and subcontractor ecosystem.

While the US government has highly sophisticated cyber capabilities developed in-house, it increasingly purchases offensive cyber capabilities from a wide network of prime and subcontractors. Many of the large firms that sell offensive cyber capabilities to the US government are the same defense contractors that sell it other forms of software or even weapons. Large, traditional prime contractors like Raytheon (rebranded RTX)⁵⁴ and L3Harris,⁵⁵ as well as more technology-focused firms like Peraton, compete for multi-million dollar government contracts to support cyber operations and provide capabilities to the government.⁵⁶ Many individuals who work for these firms are former DOD or Intelligence Community employees.⁵⁷

When large prime contractors cannot fulfill contract requirements, they often portion out the work to subcontractors. Some prime contractors are heavily reliant on small businesses, boutique research firms, and even individual researchers to satisfy contracts. Many of these subcontractors attract high-end vulnerability researchers and exploit developers worldwide, who are looking for flexible hours, high pay, and a company culture that better reflects the hacker community.⁵⁸ Some contractors, to boost available capital, are funded or partially owned by venture capital, private equity, or other investment firms, which can shape the company structure and strategy. For example, AE Industrial, a private investment firm, acquired Israeli firm Paragon in 2024, and sought to merge it with US subcontractor RedLattice, which it also owns.⁵⁹ The United States also likely sources its tooling through its intelligence-sharing relationship with the FVEYs.⁶⁰ Given its existing close cooperation between the five countries’ signals intelligence (SIGINT) agencies and emphasis on “cooperative security”, this cooperation likely translates to capability sharing as well.⁶¹

The services and products such firms provide (whether as the subcontractor or the prime contractor) differ based on their government contract vehicle. Internal research and development services contracts enable government research teams to break into harder targets by providing supplement staff.⁶² Procurement contracts for zero-day exploits exist in various forms, and subscription models for a company’s full catalog (i.e., a flat fee for year-long access to everything the company finds) are not uncommon.⁶³ For less sophisticated government clients, private sector firms may provide Access-as-a-Service models (i.e., black-box and end-to-end solutions) where the contractor guarantees product maintenance for a specified timeframe.⁶⁴ These Access-as-a-Service models combine zero-day exploits with other tooling into an all-in-one spyware solution, such as NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware.⁶⁵ Many prime contractors and subcontractors in the United States and FVEYs experience similar issues and risks listed in the previous section (i.e., feast-or-famine timeframes, middlemen, counterintelligence risks, and general difficulty of the field), which impacts recruitment.

Some companies that provide capabilities directly to the US government have been innovating in the nexus between artificial intelligence (AI) and cyber operations. However, while individual researchers use AI to assist with code auditing and fuzzing, many focused on this field affiliate with academic institutions or large US technology (“Big Tech”) firms rather than government contractors.⁶⁶ Open, unclassified offensive initiatives do exist. For example, the Intelligent Generation of Tools for Security (INGOTS) program, within the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), seeks to automate the creation, modification, modeling, and analysis of exploit chains.⁶⁷ However, INGOTS is an exception to the norm. Most of the US intelligence community experiments with AI in-house,⁶⁸ and US policymakers currently spend far more money to encourage companies to use AI for defensive applications (e.g., DARPA’s AIxCC partnership with Anthropic, Google, Microsoft, OpenAI, the Linux Foundation, and the Open Source Security Foundation to design, test, and improve novel AI systems to automatically find and fix vulnerabilities in code).⁶⁹

The DOD’s AI strategy (originating in 2018 with updates in 2020 and 2023) has revolved around “Responsible AI”—developing and using AI capabilities in accordance with the DoD AI Ethical Principles while delivering better, faster insights and improved mission outcomes.⁷⁰ While the Trump administration has been moving away from “Responsible AI” strategies, its new Project Stargate, an injection of $500 billion over the next four years building new AI infrastructure in the United States, is giving significant funding to OpenAI, whose investments in cybersecurity have been largely defensive in nature.⁷¹

Domestic talent—Decentralized, defense-forward.

Feeder systems into US and US-affiliated offensive security firms come from a loose conglomerate of internship programs, cybersecurity conferences, and hacking competitions. Technology companies sponsor many of these conferences and competitions to encourage talent to go into defensive cybersecurity careers (a worthwhile but orthogonal field for the purposes of this paper’s analysis). The bug bounty industry, as well as the defensive cybersecurity industry in the United States, hires plenty of hackers and former government cyber engineers (who might otherwise apply to work in offensive capability development) into defensive or more IT-focused roles.“SkillBridge and CSP Coordinators,” Microsoft: Military Affairs, accessed March 16, 20⁷² Some programs have formal relationships with the government, like the CyberCorps Scholarship for Service program, Hack the Pentagon, or University-based NSA Centers of Excellence.⁷³ However, many of these programs funnel students into defensive jobs. Notably, of the 461 NSA cyber centers of excellence, only twenty-one are certified to train students in cyber operations.⁷⁴

Few universities have applied (i.e., non-theoretical) offensive cyber programs that feed directly into the private vulnerability research industry.⁷⁵ Many students who learn how to hack in college do so through extra-curricular security clubs or CTF teams. In 2024, among all registrants, the United States had the most registered academic teams competing in CTFs on popular platforms.⁷⁶ Many CTFs that US teams compete in are at cybersecurity conferences,⁷⁷ hosted by academic institutions,⁷⁸ or sponsored by technology companies.⁷⁹ However, without consistent funding, alumni engagement, and professor buy-in, these clubs and teams often risk disappearing entirely due to lack of overt support from their home universities.⁸⁰

Moreover, few university programs produce engineers ready to write fully functioning exploits. Multiple vulnerability research firms interviewed referenced a “training valley of death,” where entry-level engineers out of university still require a year or more of talent development before they can produce a marketable product.⁸¹ While some intermediate-level trainings exist in companies or at conferences, they are currently insufficient—in either technical depth or timeframe.⁸²

The US government has created more support for hacking contests, but at a much smaller scale than in other countries. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a report on cyber competitions in 2016, suggesting that parts of the US government have historically understood the importance of such contests in developing offensive talent.⁸³ NIST currently supports the US Cyber Games to recruit, train, and develop the team representing the United States in international cybersecurity competitions, this program engages with 2,000 individuals in a single contest, the US Cyber Open, and annually trains approximately 150 students.⁸⁴ Unfortunately, it is far from the lofty, nationwide efforts pitched in NIST’s initial paper and is dwarfed by the sheer size of Chinese sponsored competitions (as shown in later sections).

Undermining all these efforts is the anti-government sentiment that remains strong within the US cybersecurity and hacking community, which likely contributes to difficulty in maintaining an offensive talent pipeline. Much of the original US hacking community emerged from countercultural activities like phone phreaking (i.e., bypassing Pacific Bell telephone lines to make long-distance phone calls without paying). Law enforcement responses from the 1960s to the early 2000s treated many hackers as criminals rather than innovators. In 1990, the Secret Service’s Operation Sundevil seized more than forty computers and 23,000 data disks from teenagers in fourteen American cities and charged individuals who managed hacker magazine “Phrack” with interstate transport of stolen property. The charge was based on information published by Phrack that later proved to have been already publicly available.⁸⁵ The arrests and subsequent court cases resulted in the creation of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.⁸⁶ While the US government has made significant strides toward repairing the relationship with domestic hackers in recent years, anti-government sentiment still persists.⁸⁷

Reliance on and integration with the wider international hacking community

The US hacking community relies on and interacts heavily with the international hacking community. Multiple FVEYs vulnerability research company employees and founders interviewed claimed to hire individuals from other FVEYs countries, Europe, and South America to provide services.⁸⁸ This international nature of US talent is most publicly apparent at the upper echelons of vulnerability research and exploitation competitions. Pwn2Own, sponsored by the American-Japanese cybersecurity software company Trend Micro, is the epitome of Western live-hacking competitions for vulnerability research companies. While initially starting at a security conference in Canada, the competition has expanded to events in the United States, Canada, Japan, Ireland, and Germany.⁸⁹ While the United States had the most participating teams by country at Pwn2Own Ireland in 2024, they numbered only four teams out of seventeen, which included countries like the Netherlands, France, Vietnam, Taiwan, and South Korea (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Number of teams participating in Pwn2Own Ireland 2024, by country

Source: Dustin Childs, “Pwn2Own Ireland 2024: Day Four and Master of Pwn,” Trend Micro, Zero Day Initiative, October 25, 2025, https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2024/10/25/pwn2own-ireland-2024-day-four-and-master-of-pwn.

The talent pipeline for offensive security in the United States also corroborates this claim, particularly when looking at CTF competitions. CTFs serve as talent development and recruitment for both vulnerability research firms and the wider cybersecurity industry. Data from the CTFTime website (used widely in the West for tracking CTF competitions) shows the United States, as a country, has the most registered teams (16,774 as of August 19, 2024).⁹⁰ However, there are just as many teams that are “international” in nature—over 16,000 either do not align with a single country, or have members competing and collaborating on the same team from multiple countries (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Teams on CTFtime by country, as of August 2024 (thousands)

Notes: Far left column represents “unaligned” or “international” teams.
Source: Winnona DeSombre Bernsen, data from CFTtime.com.

The most famous CTF competition in the world also corroborates this trend. DEF CON CTF, held annually in Las Vegas during DEF CON – the world’s largest hacker conference, attracts both university students and seasoned industry professionals alike. Of the top twelve scoring teams in 2024, none of them came solely from the United States. All the top teams with US players were either international teams who practiced remotely with each other to qualify as a team, or multiple single-country teams that merged with each other to compete (see Figure 4).⁹¹ For example, the 2024 winner was Maple Mallard Magistrates, a joint Canadian and US team formed by participants at Carnegie Mellon University, Korean-American Vulnerability Research Company Theori, Inc.,⁹² and the University of British Columbia. Notably, joint Chinese and Russian teams, as well as single-country teams out of China placed within DEF CON CTF 2024’s top twelve.

Figure 4: Top scoring teams at the 2024 DEF CON CTF, and their countries of origin

Source: Winnona DeSombre Bernsen from an initial CFTtime scoreboard for DEF CON CTF 2024, accessed April 5, 2025, https://ctftime. org/event/2462/.

US offensive cyber capability acquisition methods

Organizations that contract capabilities for cyber include federal intelligence agencies, military, and law enforcement—such as the NSA, USCYBERCOM,⁹³ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Contract requirements differ by agency. Some organizations can ingest single exploits, while others do not have the in-house talent to independently weaponize capabilities. Normally, the latter organizations require end-to-end, black-box solutions that necessitate additional engineering work and safeguards.⁹⁴

Government contracts for offensive cyber are compliance-heavy and favor large primes

The contracting ecosystem, with its many compliance requirements, inherently favors large prime contractors despite the earlier noted heavy reliance on small businesses, boutique research firms, and even individual researchers to fulfill contracts.⁹⁵

Put simply, small cyber businesses find it incredibly difficult to navigate DOD acquisition processes.⁹⁶ Little reporting on the specifics of US offensive cyber capability acquisitions is openly available. Yet, the general US software contracting requirements offer valuable insight. The feast-or-famine timelines of zero-day exploit contracts require a company to have existing capital to withstand long downtimes between sales (like a large prime contractor), in which smaller companies may be one faulty bug away from going bankrupt.⁹⁷ Any prime contractor on a government contract (i.e., a contractor bidding directly on a government contract) must also meet the incredibly stringent standards within the Federal Acquisition Regulations, including having cleared individuals for classified government contracts, meeting cybersecurity and other regulatory requirements,⁹⁸ and getting financial systems audited.⁹⁹

Clearance requirements are also a large pain point for small exploit businesses, as many exploit contracts are classified. Businesses must go through the complex and costly Facility Clearance process to bid or even perform on such contracts,¹⁰⁰ which is difficult for smaller vendors.¹⁰¹ Moreover, certain contracts have active clearance prerequisites, which requires a vulnerability research company to have the resources to obtain employee clearances (or find another vendor to sponsor the needed clearances). This can also exclude foreign companies from the bidding process (as foreigners, in general, cannot hold US security clearances).¹⁰²

Despite the hacker community’s international nature, some customers also informally restrict the nationalities of employees who may work on contracts, limiting the ability of companies who wish to hire hackers abroad.¹⁰³ Despite all these regulations, interviewees confirmed that many of these smaller firms and foreigners may, in effect, actually be working on such contracts anyway, via the sales of their services and products to added layers of contractors (or middlemen) at, of course, an additional expense to the government.¹⁰⁴

On the government side, additional focused regulations and policies trigger based on the product or agency’s risk aversion

Aside from the procurement process, additional regulations trigger (and place added burdens on the government buyer) depending on the type of offensive cyber capability acquired. If an exploit is sold to the government individually, the government organization must send the exploit through the Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP). All vulnerabilities sold to the United States government go through the VEP. Effectively, it is an interagency process that balances whether to disseminate vulnerability information to the vendor/supplier in the expectation that it will be patched or to use the vulnerability for national security and law enforcement purposes.¹⁰⁵ It is possible to get a waiver to circumvent the VEP, but only if the government agency can assert a deeply pressing national security need for immediate use.¹⁰⁶

If the exploit is sold as part of an end-to-end spyware solution (or via an Access-as-a-Service model), other regulations also trigger. The US government, under Executive Order 14093, must ensure that a solution does not pose “significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government or significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person.”¹⁰⁷ Biden signed the order in 2023 to prevent the US government from supporting businesses that also enable human rights abuses abroad while mitigating the risk of such businesses to US government interests. Because end-to-end spyware solutions enable less sophisticated clients to conduct cyber operations, vendors providing such solutions have been caught selling to authoritarian countries, many of whom had not yet built high-end cyber operations organizations in-house and did not have regulations to deter government spying on civil society organizations, political opposition groups, or journalists. The most famous example of a vendor engaging in such activity was the Israeli company NSO Group, whose sale of its Pegasus spyware to the Saudi government resulted in the spying on and subsequent assassination of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi.¹⁰⁸

The US military and intelligence communities also have additional internal requirements for procured zero-day vulnerabilities, particularly in the name of stealth and risk-aversion. Zero-day exploits provide the lowest risk of detection in a cyberspace operation (as they do not rely on previously known “n-day” vulnerabilities) and can offer initial access to a system by exploiting pre-existing weaknesses rather than having to somehow manufacture weaknesses in an adversary system. However, to further minimize the discovery risk of an operation, a government buyer may further require a seller to submit its product to QA testing for reliability to see whether and how often an exploit fails.¹⁰⁹ Failure means that the exploit does not succeed in triggering the desired activity and potentially leaves suspicious artifacts on the target device.¹¹⁰ The reliability requirement adds cost and time, and it can also create risk of intellectual property and trade secret theft if the third party conducting QA is a competitor of the original seller.¹¹¹

0-days v. n-days: What’s the difference?

The focus on zero-day exploits as capabilities in this paper may suggest that zero-day exploits are the dominant methods of exploiting systems. The opposite is true: zero-day exploits are not the dominant way to exploit systems and get information in the offensive ecosystem. Oftentimes, the simplest methods of obtaining access are the most effective, even if they may get attributed, or “burned.”¹¹² While simple methods can include phishing emails or social engineering, they can also include “n-day exploits”—exploit code that uses known vulnerabilities to achieve a certain goal, effectively relying on a target not regularly updating their systems.

A zero-day exploit, when compared to an n-day, or other more common capability, is similar to comparing an F-35 fighter jet to a commercially-made drone: one is an exquisite, highly tailored capability, while the other can be made cheaply and at scale—however, while there are incredibly important things an F-35 can do that drones cannot, both can fly from point A to point B and deliver a payload.

A government buyer’s interest in stealth can, at times, create market inefficiencies. Various vendors interviewed claimed that certain government customers may not tell a seller what type of target or exploit they want, leading to an inefficient process, where vendors might work on an exploit that a government customer has no intent to purchase.¹¹³ Alternatively, vendors said that other government customers purchase a company’s entire catalog of exploits to hide the specific exploit they are after. However, this is likely a decreasing practice given the increasing cost of zero-day exploits.¹¹⁴ Both of these practices likely seek to increase operational security and avoid the risk that anyone outside the government buyer learns of any intended targets in cyberspace, especially when dealing with a market of increasingly international firms.

Given the increasing costs of exploits and stagnating budgets, US government customers can also become territorial against others within the interagency. Some vendors interviewed noted that government customers can become possessive and completely unwilling for their vendors to share exploits with other customers.¹¹⁵ This can cause vendors to avoid selling even completely distinct products to other government agencies, for fear of damaging the relationship with a current buyer.¹¹⁶ While buying bugs jointly is a potential interagency option, it is rare. Coordinating the movement of funding between agencies is time-consuming, requiring forethought that is not consistent with the normal marketplace tempo.¹¹⁷ Throughout this relationship, trust between the supplier and end client is key. There is a risk that the government client will cut into the supplier’s bottom line by being too risk-averse and territorial.¹¹⁸ There is also the risk that the supplier has worked with untrustworthy parts of the international supply chain, resulting in an untrustworthy product for the government client. In this field, trust is currency.

International and regional policies around exploit sales affecting government purchasers are also on the horizon. In 2024, the United Kingdom and France initiated the Pall Mall Process as an international dialogue meant to establish guiding principles for the “development, facilitation, purchase, and use of commercially available cyber intrusion capabilities.”¹¹⁹ The process emerged from international outrage over NSO Group’s sales to numerous authoritarian countries worldwide, alongside additional revelations that the offensive cyber capabilities market was growing rapidly. This mission, in theory, is much broader than “end-to-end” spyware: it encompasses development, sales (from brokers or companies), and use of spyware– which includes the acquisition, development, and maintenance of zero-day exploits.¹²⁰ The consultation summary report initially included laudable proposals around zero-day exploitation, such as encouraging VEP programs internationally and creating clear guidelines for vendors in the space.¹²¹ However, several follow-on reports on Pall Mall have focused mainly on applying international law frameworks toward government use of such capabilities or state-by-state policies guides. This suggests not only a divergence in stakeholder interest for what topic Pall Mall should tackle first but also a divergence in understanding of how to translate international norms to an operational level across countries.¹²²

US Big Tech companies as a strategic counterweight

Because the use of zero-day exploits in cyber operations inherently takes advantage of weaknesses in private sector software products, US domestic technology companies’ cybersecurity measures are a strategic obstacle to US offensive cyber goals. In many ways, this is a strategic obstacle by design. The public outcry over US intelligence community’s efforts to influence the distribution of deliberately insecure products,¹²³ or mandating backdoors into existing technology products¹²⁴ has shifted US policy away from built-in eavesdropping tools and towards ensuring that US products are secure by design.¹²⁵ However, companies like Google, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, or Cisco are frequent targets for vulnerability research and exploitation because their products are so prevalent. Any private sector vendor, with or without insider knowledge, can easily assume that a zero-day exploit against a widely used application will likely be more attractive to a potential government customer, and thus are incentivized to exploit those applications. This is particularly obvious in the mobile market, where Android (developed by Google) is on 71 percent of all mobile phones globally, and iOS (developed by Apple) is on 28 percent—in other words, 99 percent of global mobile phones run US Big Tech software.¹²⁶ As a result, plenty of offensive cyber capability firms worldwide have been found selling products with iOS and Android exploits.¹²⁷

US Big Tech companies, to protect against exploitation and government operations against their users, have invested heavily into cybersecurity defenses, taken steps to make their products secure, and thwarted government attempts to make their products less secure through regulation.¹²⁸ The complexity and robustness of cybersecurity mitigations (such as sandboxing, logging crashes, and other exploit mitigations) have prolonged development cycles for exploits (from days or weeks in the early 2000s to 6 to 18 months or more)¹²⁹ and have also driven up prices.¹³⁰

The actions by US Big Tech companies have made zero-day exploitation incredibly difficult over the last decade for five reasons. First, security measures have resulted in hyper-specialization within the offensive cyber capabilities industry. As product codebases become ever more complex, learning how a product works to find vulnerabilities becomes more time consuming, and vulnerability researchers have fewer incentives to look at more than one product.¹³¹ Second, thanks to layered security measures, most vulnerability research shops now must not only find single exploits (i.e., exploit primitives), but also be able to chain them into exploit chains to successfully gain access to the newest iOS or Android phone.¹³² Third, the act of chaining exploits together and maintaining the chain for a government customer has also become increasingly complicated,¹³³ with large technology firms employing quick turnarounds to fix vulnerabilities (i.e., “quick-patch cycles”).¹³⁴ Fourth, some US Big Tech companies have created threat-hunting teams, like Google’s Project Zero, dedicated to researching zero-days found “in-the-wild” (i.e., being actively exploited by an attacker)¹³⁵ and conducting novel research¹³⁶ to directly thwart efforts made by offensive firms to exploit any devices.¹³⁷

Finally, Western Big Tech firms have begun suing offensive cyber capability firms in US federal courts. While the lawsuits do not yet involve US firms, the precedent set in these cases may open US contractors to risks of future lawsuits. In 2019, WhatsApp sued NSO Group for violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the primary US anti-hacking law, and the WhatsApp platform’s terms of service.¹³⁸ This case was widely regarded as a win for human rights. Namely, a large company with a wide history of providing products to human-rights-abusing governments, who primarily used the platform to spy on domestic civil society groups and even against US government personnel, was forced to cease their activities exploiting WhatsApp software and to pay significant fines.¹³⁹ However, because the argument laid out in the case relied on an explanation of how NSO’s exploits worked, both vendors and government officials alike have concerns about the ripple effects it may cause in the zero-day research community.¹⁴⁰ In particular, NSO Group was found in violation of the CFAA because their Pegasus spyware used a WhatsApp exploit to deliver Pegasus to WhatsApp users across all major operating systems, even despite the fact that they were likely doing so on behalf of a government customer.¹⁴¹ While, unlike with the Israel-based NSO Group, the national security carve-out in the CFAA could protect most US firms, this particular part of the anti-hacking law has not yet been tested in US courts.¹⁴²

C. China’s acquisition pipeline

Chinese offensive cyber capability firm No Sugar Tech’s website. Source: No Sugar Tech, accessed April 5, 2025, https://www.nosugartech.com.

“This market [for offensive cyber] is basically land reclamation. Look at the legion model of Huawei and Qi Anxin – they’ve got 10,000 people, and we have a team of 100.”
– Leaked discussion between co-founders of Chinese cyber mercenary company iSoon, January 14, 2022.

“Why would the PLA want to work with us? We are a non-Chinese party … they cannot control what we tell people. [But] the PLA could always go through a third party, or go through someone else … I [would] not have a problem selling something to the Chinese government.”
– Thomas Lim, former founder of Singaporean Exploit Firm COSEINC (Risky Business podcast, 2014).

Supply—Well established, comprehensive feeder systems

Companies—Prime and subcontractor ecosystem, with outsourcing of both capability and operations to the private sector.

China’s offensive cyber capabilities firms are also a mix of both large prime contractors and smaller bespoke companies. However, unlike US defense primes, prime contractors for China’s offensive cyber projects are often the same Chinese big tech firms that sell products in the global market. China’s major cybersecurity firms, such as QiAnXin, Huawei, Qihoo360, and NSFocus provide services directly to the Chinese military—Qihoo360, China’s leading antivirus company, assisted with China’s hack of the US health insurance company Anthem.¹⁴³ Many of the large technology firms also have internal bespoke teams that focus on offensive security work. However, unlike the Google Project Zero model, such internal teams directly provide research on exploitation to the government rather than making government-funded zero-day research hard. Chinese large technology firms also directly fund or subcontract work to small- and medium-sized offensive security start-ups.¹⁴⁴ Cofounders of such offensive security start-ups are usually serial entrepreneurs, who also encourage families to enter the industry.¹⁴⁵ For large tech firms that do not have embedded offensive security teams or bid for government contracts directly, China’s 2021 Vulnerability Disclosure Law forces engagement with the overall offensive pipeline regardless (as explained in the sections below).

Chinese offensive cyber capabilities firms (both prime and subcontractors), such as No Sugar Tech seen in the image above, provide multiple offensive-cyber services at once. These can include various offerings, selling targeting platforms, various hacking services, or even access to victims’ devices and data directly to the Chinese government—an outsourcing of both capability and operations to the private sector. This is a much broader remit than US firms, which often only provide the capabilities. When Chengdu-based offensive security company iSoon’s marketing materials and internal chat logs were leaked online in 2023, researchers discovered that iSoon sold all three services (hack-for-hire, selling victim data gained by directly hacking targets, and targeting platforms for such hacking) to a variety of Chinese government clients.¹⁴⁶ iSoon also subcontracted for the major Chinese cybersecurity company Qi An Xin, while sourcing vulnerabilities and other capabilities from other firms when they could not source services in-house.¹⁴⁷ For example, iSoon cooperated with Chengdu 404 on research regarding “software vulnerability of information systems”—Chengdu 404 was previously indicted by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) for conducting computer intrusion campaigns against more than 100 global victims.¹⁴⁸

Chinese researchers also experiment heavily with changing the underlying cyber landscape by using AI, with government support. As early as 2017, the Chinese government began to integrate “intelligentization” into its armed forces and contractors: the concept of incorporating numerous emerging technologies—including decentralized computing, data analytics, quantum computing, AI, and unmanned or robotic systems—into the PLA’s conceptual framework.¹⁴⁹ Chinese cyber actors have been using large language models since 2024 to create deepfakes for disinformation campaigns,¹⁵⁰ but this likely only scratches the surface. Researchers believe China already utilizes even more cutting-edge AI research in cyber operations. Since 2021, at least six Chinese universities with links to known Chinese state-sponsored cyber operations have been conducting cutting-edge AI research.¹⁵¹ Moreover, China’s AI industry has deep connections with its offensive cyber industry. Since 2021, an AI tool created by Huawei, a sanctioned Chinese company, has been a dominant contributor to the Linux kernel. A majority of contributions from Huawei’s AI tool, known as “HULK bot,” are fixing previously unknown vulnerabilities (the tool is a machine-learning enabled fuzzer).¹⁵² Despite Western-led efforts to prevent Chinese firms from obtaining semiconductors able to support the training of high-end large language models, this has not impacted Chinese AI firms as deeply as initially expected and suggests that Chinese cyber operators will increasingly be able to utilize AI research in the future.¹⁵³

Domestic talent—Large, centralized, state-sponsored

While the United States relies on an international talent pool to secure these capabilities, China largely relies on its domestic talent but is moving to capture more of the market in East Asia. China has an incredibly robust domestic talent pool of offensive hacking talent: the Chinese hacking ecosystem, as judged by their CTF competitions alone, is immense. Government sponsorship ensures large-scale funding, extensive participation, and stable career pipelines for top competitors—China’s top ten CTF national competitions attract over 11,000 participants on average.¹⁵⁴ This is in stark contrast to the 2,000 individuals participating in the US Cyber Open, the top contest within the US’s relative handful of government-sponsored contests. By sheer numbers alone, it is unsurprising that China each year has more graduates in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (or “STEM”) fields than the United States produces in total college graduates.¹⁵⁵

Of course, the Chinese CTF ecosystem is only part of a comprehensive and deliberate feeder system from universities, cybersecurity conferences, and hacking competitions into the Chinese offensive cyber apparatus. Chinese military universities and high-end science and engineering schools produce high-caliber graduates in deeply applied offensive cybersecurity research, some of whom are encouraged to develop final projects that involve hacking into US companies.¹⁵⁶ Many of them, upon graduating, either work on offensive teams of existing offensive security firms, found an offensive cyber start-up, or work directly for high-end teams in China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) or People’s Liberation Army (PLA).¹⁵⁷ Talent pools from China’s higher education are also supplemented by a wide array of government-sponsored hacking competitions and conferences. The Chinese government has hosted hundreds of official CTF and other industry standard hacking competitions, often in partnership with many of its ecosystem’s offensive security companies and with universities that provide financial incentives for students to participate.¹⁵⁸ Many other CTF competitions were directly founded by top Chinese teams that used to compete internationally,¹⁵⁹ while other competitions have involved breaking into real foreign technology products or even enterprise systems.¹⁶⁰ The Chinese government and its major offensive firms seek to recruit directly from these competitions.Interview with Dakota Cary, Fellow, Atlantic Council Global China Hub, January 8, 2025.

Unlike the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has the unique advantage of having a hacking community that originated in explicit, patriotic alignment with state interests, making such hackers easier to recruit. One of China’s first hacker groups was the Hongke Union who, in 2001, famously took down the White House website and defaced websites of US businesses in retaliation for the collision between a US spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet off of Hainan Island.¹⁶¹ In the early to mid-2000s, as China was experiencing unprecedented economic growth, China’s hackers either professionalized and created technology companies, were co-opted directly into China’s growing cyber forces, or both. For example, the head of the Green Army, Jiye Shen (a.k.a. “Goodwill” on hacker forums), created the internet security company NSFocus in 2000.¹⁶²

Meanwhile, the PLA, in 2005, directly recruited Tan Dailin (谭戴林, a.k.a. Wicked Rose), a student from the Sichuan University of Science and Engineering, to design hacking tools for the Chinese military.¹⁶³ Wicked Rose then formed a patriotic hacking group to break into DOD computer systems in 2006.¹⁶⁴ MSS, China’s foreign intelligence organization, also began recruiting talent both directly and indirectly during the early 2000s.¹⁶⁵ This organization has suited the many hackers less able to conform to physical fitness tests or other rigid requirements the PLA typically requires of its military recruits, with just as many benefits.¹⁶⁶

The Chinese government has spent the last decade effectively closing off its domestic talent pool from outside influence. From 2016 to 2021, China effectively began to prevent hackers from sharing research with the global hacking community. In July 2016, Wooyun, a vulnerability disclosure platform created by the Chinese “ethical hacking” community, which had engaged frequently with Taiwanese and other international hackers, was suddenly taken down, and its founding members were arrested by Chinese authorities without charges.¹⁶⁷ Some China researchers speculate that the takedown was an action taken at the behest of the MSS, China’s primary intelligence service, who wished to control the vulnerability marketplace.¹⁶⁸ In 2018, China announced a regulation (“Regulating the Promotion of Cybersecurity Competitions”) effectively banning hackers from travelling abroad to participate in hacking competitions, as well as requiring any vulnerabilities found through domestic competitions to be directly reported to the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), China’s law enforcement organization, and other relevant departments.¹⁶⁹ Chinese hacker participation at contests like Pwn2Own dropped to zero, and the number of presentations given by Chinese researchers at Taiwanese conferences fell precipitously.¹⁷⁰

More recently, China has expanded its reach into East and Southeast Asia through hacking competitions and partnerships with regional researchers, seeking to secure additional talent on its own terms. Academics from the Harbin Institute of Technology and Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications have advocated for actively engaging with hacking communities in East Asia seeking to influence future international standards for how vulnerabilities are discovered and managed.¹⁷¹ While Chinese hackers cannot participate in most Western hacking competitions, Chinese CTF events often attract or even outright invite talent in the wider East and South Asian regions to participate. The QiangWang Cup and RealWorldCTF (respectively, linked to the PLA and MSS) are two Chinese hacking contests that historically have had participants from Vietnam, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, and even the United States.¹⁷² Moreover, China prolifically sponsors and hosts international hacking conferences to draw in international talent. Chinese researchers, while unable to participate in most outside hacking competitions, still have a large presence at “Hack in the Box” Dubai and other conferences, which reflects the coordination and sharing that China and the United Arab Emirates have in cyberspace. Chinese conference “GeekCon” (active in China from 2014 to 2021) re-established itself in Singapore from 2021 onwards, soliciting international talks and insinuating that they still abided by China’s vulnerability disclosure laws.¹⁷³ Elite Chinese and South Korean offensive security research companies (Pangu Team and POCSecurity, respectively) consistently collaborate to recruit international talent to MOSEC, a conference on mobile security hosted in Shanghai every year.¹⁷⁴

It is clear that China, while limiting the activities of its domestic hackers, already sources some vulnerabilities from foreign hackers living abroad. COSEINC, a Singaporean vulnerability research company run by Thomas Lim (a Singaporean national with ties to China),¹⁷⁵ was put on the US entities list in 2021, likely for selling exploits to the Chinese government.¹⁷⁶ Lim, a known entity in East Asia’s vulnerability research circles, publicly stated that he was not against selling his products to the Chinese government.¹⁷⁷ China may also be tricking researchers into handing over bugs to the Chinese state. In 2021, Taiwanese vulnerability researcher Orange Tsai reported a vulnerability to Microsoft that impacted its exchange servers two days after a Chinese Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group began exploiting the same vulnerability in its operations. This suggests that either two separate individuals (one Chinese and one Taiwanese) independently discovered the vulnerability, or information about the vulnerability was somehow obtained from the researcher by a Chinese entity.¹⁷⁸

China’s offensive cyber capability acquisition methods.

Government contracts for offensive cyber care less about stealth than access and provide additional resources to firms.

The Chinese system accepts higher operational risk for the sake of speed and flexibility. China’s acquisition system has decentralized mechanisms, such that even provincial and municipal government entities contract directly with local cyber firms. iSoon’s former website listed over fifty-six different clients, ranging from the MPS to a wide variety of various provincial, city, and municipal public security bureaus—effectively the equivalent of FBI field offices.¹⁷⁹ Based on the leaks, iSoon held individual contracts for goods and services with several municipal and provincial level bureaus (similar in size to the Cincinnati or Pittsburgh police departments) purchasing hack-for-hire capabilities. Chinese legal scholars have also bemoaned China’s national intelligence apparatus’s lack of clear pre-, mid-, and post-supervision structures for intelligence operations more broadly.¹⁸⁰ This suggests that decentralization is a feature of the overall system rather than an exception.¹⁸¹

Unlike in the United States, where government acquisition is slow and risk-averse, Chinese firms can operate opportunistically, sometimes combining cybercrime with state-sponsored activity, with minimal fear of reprisal as long as they align with state interests. Internal discourse from within the Chinese hacker community suggests that, despite China’s cybersecurity laws and ancillary legislation on regulating vulnerabilities, there is a grey zone for what activity is permitted, versus what may get a patriotic Chinese hacker “invited to tea” at MPS or MSS offices.¹⁸²One famous example is Wicked Rose, who, after creating the NCPH hacker group and defacing multiple US websites, was arrested by the MPS in 2009 for engaging in domestic cybercrime.¹⁸³ He likely received a commuted sentence in exchange for an agreement to contract for the MSS just two years later (which resulted in Wicked Rose founding Chengdu 404, a company indicted by the DOJ in 2020), and was likely permitted to continue his criminal activities as long as they targeted victims outside China.¹⁸⁴ China researchers interviewed have also suggested that the Chinese government gives hackers significant leeway, while underpaying them for services and handling its most sensitive matters in-house.¹⁸⁵ While the Chinese government deliberately depresses prices and exercises monopsony power, its decentralized model and allowance of a “grey zone” enables a more flexible contracting environment that enables smaller players. Small and medium-sized companies like iSoon, Chengdu 404, and others have been shown to obtain contracts through a mix of “guanxi” (networking and relationship building) and formal contracting processes.¹⁸⁶

Most importantly, the PRC’s overall contracting process, including the loose leash on its corporate hackers-for–hire, largely does not penalize organizations when they are caught or attributed. In 2013, the security firm Mandiant published a report on APT1, the first publicly-outed Chinese threat group, and attributed it to the Chinese PLA Unit 61398.¹⁸⁷ While the report initially sent shockwaves through the Chinese state security apparatus, many quickly realized that naming and shaming did not result in strategic level or department level pain.¹⁸⁸ Rather, most US policies that resulted from “naming and shaming” threat groups fell into two groups: DOJ indictments of individual Chinese hackers (who likely were not planning on leaving China for a US-extradition friendly state anyway) or economic sanctions on Chinese offensive security companies that did not plan on doing much business with Western firms.¹⁸⁹ Thus, while middle managers of China’s security services likely must prioritize both operational tradecraft and obtaining intelligence of strategic value to the Chinese Communist Party, the goal of obtaining such intelligence significantly outweighs the requirement to adhere to tradecraft and professionalism, as there are few real costs of attribution on the managers of such operations.¹⁹⁰ Of course, like the grey zone, there are likely exceptions to this rule, such as if a single Chinese company causes the wider CCP intelligence apparatus to “lose face.”¹⁹¹

China’s apparent preference for results over attribution also enables Chinese organizations to utilize riskier capabilities (such as noisier, easier-to-detect n-day vulnerabilities) and to reuse infrastructure, even when it allows Western organizations to better detect them. In that sense, truly “burning” (or disposing of) a capability is much rarer in China.¹⁹² Moreover, this preference provides room for private-sector hackers to experiment. Some Chinese offensive cyber capability shops can also observe what other countries’ offensive teams are doing “in-the-wild” and attempt to echo the techniques of other countries’ APT groups.¹⁹³ For example, Chinese APTs were able to exploit a vulnerability linked to NSA hacking tools leaked online in 2017, prior to the leak itself, suggesting that either an elite Chinese team found the same bug as the NSA during a similar timeframe, or they were able to detect the NSA exploit, reverse engineer it, and then use it themselves.¹⁹⁴

Finally, CCP intelligence and law enforcement mechanisms clearly provide consistent resourcing to their offensive firms, likely to help shorten the feast-or-famine cycles. Experts following the Chinese cyber capabilities market largely agree that the Chinese government likely has a method of vulnerability sharing among both their private sector and government operators, with tiers of access and privileges.¹⁹⁵ The sources of vulnerabilities likely range from hacking competitions like the Tianfu Cup,¹⁹⁶ acquisitions from existing contractors (both foreign and domestic), and vulnerability reports into the MSS-operated China National Vulnerability Database (CNNVD), and other government vulnerability databases.

China’s combination of revealed results-forward preference over stealth, and commitment to resource sharing with its private sector, results in a unique vulnerability resourcing process, where small subsets of more elite hacking “A-teams” get early access to the zero-day vulnerabilities. However, once the vulnerability is discovered, the Chinese government opens the capability to other groups.¹⁹⁷ This was famously evidenced in the 2021 Microsoft Exchange attacks, where a Chinese APT group exploited a vulnerability targeting Microsoft Exchange two days before the vulnerability was reported to Microsoft on January 5th.¹⁹⁸ Before Microsoft could issue a patch for the vulnerability, multiple other Chinese APT groups began using the same exploit in their campaigns.¹⁹⁹ Microsoft released a patch for the vulnerability on March 2^nd – one day later, Chinese threat groups began exploiting the vulnerability en-masse.²⁰⁰ However, while the Microsoft Exchange vulnerability is the most notorious example, Chinese threat analysts have seen this pattern play out for even non-critical vulnerabilities in other public-facing services, such as web servers, virtual private networks (VPNs), and other edge devices.²⁰¹ This rapid weaponization of both 0day and n-day vulnerabilities also explains why certain campaigns use relatively new vulnerabilities or access points to gain entry into targets that are relatively low-hanging fruit—at this point, the “D-teams” have obtained access to the capabilities previously used by “A-teams.”²⁰² In some senses, this results in an enormous ability to efficiently weaponize offensive cyber capabilities—this system enables organs of the PRC government to efficiently build, acquire, and weaponize capabilities ranging from the mediocre to the exquisite.²⁰³ It also stands in stark contrast to the US model, effectively extending the shelf-life of a purchased capability.

Currently, China has yet to engage with the Pall Mall process or other international codes of practice to regulate the acquisition and use of offensive cyber capabilities.

China uses its CTF and regulatory ecosystem to solicit bugs informally from hackers for national security use; its major technology companies are strategic allies in sourcing exploits.

As stated previously, China effectively prevented its domestic vulnerability research talent pool from sharing research with the wider community between 2016 and 2021. During this time, China began ramping up hacking opportunities and vulnerability disclosure programs domestically: the CNNVD (the previously mentioned MSS-run vulnerability database) grew its partnerships from fifteen technical support units and partner companies in 2016 to 151 companies in 2023.²⁰⁴ This expansion drew in Chinese Big Tech firms like Tencent, Huawei, and Hikvision, which would report vulnerabilities in their own products. Other partners also included specialized offensive capability firms. Moreover, hackers who could no longer compete internationally were encouraged to compete in Chinese live-hacking competitions, like the famous Tianfu Cup, founded in 2018 as a “Chinese Pwn2Own.”²⁰⁵ However, both the Tianfu Cup and the CNNVD have ties to the Chinese intelligence and law enforcement apparatus. In 2017, researchers found that if a vulnerability was reported to the CNNVD that had value to MSS cyber operations, the CNNVD would delay publishing the vulnerability, write an exploit for the vulnerability, and use it in operations.²⁰⁶ Meanwhile, the Tianfu Cup was (and remains) a vulnerability feeder system for the MPS, China’s national police. Vulnerabilities submitted as part of the Tianfu Cup competition are sent straight to the MPS, which would be used in law enforcement operations against Uighurs and other minority groups.²⁰⁷ If the vulnerabilities were not already full exploit chains (i.e., ready-to-use), the MPS would disseminate the proof-of-concept code to private firms to further exploit.²⁰⁸

In addition to its domestic researchers, China has even integrated its respective heavyweight tech firms into its offensive cyber programs. Unlike US Big Tech companies, which act as a strategic blocker against the US vulnerability ecosystem, Chinese technology companies (and even foreign tech companies operating in China) are far more beholden to the Chinese government and have largely been co-opted into the CCP’s vulnerability acquisition funnel. This is unsurprising. While Chinese technology firms have similar market caps to their Western counterparts, their primary consumers are still domestic Chinese users. For example, Huawei, the leading smartphone company in China, only makes up 4 percent of the global smartphone market.²⁰⁹

China began integrating “civil-military fusion” concepts into its cybersecurity industry starting in 2017, embedding military units into its domestic cybersecurity companies.²¹⁰ Setting up a PLA military-civil fusion center in a company enables the Chinese military to connect with industry peers and resources almost seamlessly by embedding military members into companies to work side-by-side with internal staff.²¹¹ Various entities, including universities and private companies, use this model to collaborate with the Chinese government to submit zero-days, co-partner on defense research labs, and set up private IT infrastructure for state-sponsored hacking operations.²¹²

PRC’s integration of technology companies into its offensive pipeline does not end with staffing choices. State policies demand forced disclosures of vulnerabilities. Since 2021, the PRC has required all software companies operating in China to (reluctantly or otherwise) report vulnerabilities that impact any systems, regardless of source, directly to the PRC government. In 2021, China released new regulations on vulnerability management, the Regulations on the Management of Network Product Security Vulnerabilities (RMSV),²¹³ which mandates reporting all industry-wide discoveries of vulnerabilities to the Chinese government within 48 hours.²¹⁴ This affects all technology companies operating in China, including foreign software firms. In the disclosure, companies are encouraged to upload proof-of-concept code and instructions on how to replicate the vulnerability, which would undoubtedly be helpful to Chinese offensive missions.²¹⁵ It also has impacted US critical infrastructure firms: one of the companies found to comply with the Chinese law is Schneider Electric, a US industrial control systems and energy company, whose products (and subsequent vulnerabilities) are likely offered with minimal alteration in both the US and Chinese markets.²¹⁶

Companies that do not comply with the law are penalized. In 2021, an engineer in Chinese company Alibaba found and disclosed a critical zero-day vulnerability impacting Apache Log4j (a widely used software application) to the US Apache Foundation (maintainers of Log4j) instead of notifying Chinese regulators.²¹⁷ As a result, Chinese regulators suspended a cooperative partnership with Alibaba regarding cybersecurity threats and information-sharing platforms for six months.²¹⁸ It is important to note that this RMSV process is separate from and, in many ways, completely counterproductive to the internationally accepted bug bounty and coordinated vulnerability disclosure process.²¹⁹ Instead of interfacing directly with the manufacturer of a technology product and encouraging them to be more secure, China’s RMSV regulation circumvents this process by (1) mandating that the Chinese government be notified first instead of the company and (2) persuading the sharing of exploit code, but only with the government.

Despite this, Chinese technology firms still contribute to finding bugs in Western technology firms. Chinese researchers accounted for 27 percent of all vulnerabilities reported to the bug bounty programs of Apple, Google Android, and Microsoft from 2017 to 2023.²²⁰ Many of these contributions are also from security companies that have links to the Chinese intelligence apparatus.²²¹ These contributions are frequently linked to a small handful of individuals within these companies, and a company’s contributions to such bug bounty programs fall when one or more Chinese hackers transitions between security companies.²²² Given the strict chokehold the CCP holds on these firms and their vulnerability reporting pipelines, researchers in the US speculate that the CCP’s security services recognize that some slackening of restrictions is necessary to retain a truly robust talent pool, especially for hackers that are motivated by international recognition rather than mission or money.²²³ It is also likely beneficial to the PRC that its hackers and companies are seen as responsible stakeholders in the global cybersecurity market.

Key findings

During the literature review, data analysis, and expert interviews (as laid out in the above sections), nine key findings emerged:

Zero-day exploitation is becoming more difficult, opaque, and expensive. The global hacking ecosystem is highly international and fragmented. The amount of time and capital required to develop an impactful capability has escalated dramatically in the last decade, leading to riskier feast-or-famine contract cycles. The growing number of publicly discovered zero-day threats does not detract from this market trend, in fact, the increase suggests a concurrent rising number of players in the international market. Multiple sources interviewed estimate the number of individuals consistently producing zero-day exploits is in the low hundreds globally.

Middlemen create market inefficiency and erode trust in the market. Given the lack of transparency in the zero-day market, middlemen with prior government connections further drive up costs and create inefficiency in the US and FVEYs market, while eroding trust between buyers and sellers.

The United States relies on international talent, while China relies on domestic might. The US offensive cyber workforce relies heavily on international talent pools in South America, Europe, and other FVEYs countries. China’s domestic cyber pipeline dwarfs that of the United States, but China is also increasingly moving its supply network out to the Middle East and East Asia.

Talent investment in US offense is lacking. US government investment into the offensive talent pipeline, however sparse, has focused on defensive jobs, whereas China has well established and comprehensive feeder systems within its offensive apparatus. US talent in exploit development also experiences a “Training Valley of Death” between junior and intermediate levels.

US acquisition favors large prime contractors, slows acquisition in pursuit of stealth, and adds additional risk through opacity. US cyber capability acquisition favors large defense contractors, who take on heavy compliance burdens while shifting project requirements to smaller firms. The US government internally prioritizes extremely high levels of accuracy, trust, and stealth, which can create market inefficiencies and a reliance on high-cost, exquisite zero-day exploit procurements. Certain US government customers deliberately lengthen the contract cycle by refusing to share information about desired capabilities with firms, leading to an inefficient process where firms may work on an exploit that a customer has no intent to purchase.

China’s acquisition uses decentralized contracting methods, outsources operations, shortens contract cycles through additional resourcing, and prolongs the life of an exploit through “n-day usage.” While China also relies on large prime contractors, government ministries have decentralized government procurement processes, such that even provincial government offices issue contracts to firms. China’s regulatory environment actively encourages vulnerability reporting to the state, often integrates corporate research with government offensive strategies, and widely enables private sector hack-for-hire operations. China has also shortened the feast-or-famine contract cycle for exploits by providing additional resources to its private sector firms, and it continues to use exploits after their discovery.

US cybersecurity goals, coupled with Big Tech’s dominance, are strategic counterweights to the US offensive capability program. Because zero-day exploits in cyber operations take advantage of weaknesses in private sector software products, the global market dominance of the US Big Tech companies ensures that, as such, they act as a strategic obstacle to US offensive cyber goals. This demonstrates a strategic trade-off between economic prosperity (and global trust in US products), and national security. In contrast, China’s tech firms have a far less global market share, and they are a strategic enabler of China’s offensive cyber program.

International partnerships for unique offensive cyber capabilities attempt to leverage different circles, but the opaque market offers no guarantees. The United States leverages international alliances, particularly within the FVEYs intelligence-sharing network, to bolster its cyber capabilities. In contrast, China focuses on cultivating regional influence and integrating offensive cyber capabilities from East Asia and the Middle East. However, given the opaque international market, preference for full chains leveraging multiple exploit primitives, and the increase in bug collisions, there is no 100 percent guarantee of unique capability.

China leans forward on AI in cyber operations. China’s offensive cyber industry is already heavily integrated with AI institutions, and China’s private sector has been proactively using AI for cyber operations. The US government’s primary efforts with both AI and cyber have largely been defensive in nature, or within the intelligence community internally, although some DARPA programs have encouraged open offensive innovation.

Recommendations

“We are not going to deter the adversary with defenses only… I will work to strengthen our offensive cyber capabilities to ensure the President has the options. He needs to respond to this growing threat.”Katie Sutton, Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy (2025).²²⁴

It is impossible for the United States to match China’s supply of zero-day exploits by sheer numbers alone, and adopting the Chinese policies for acquisition and supply is the equivalent of stooping to the level of an authoritarian state. However, there are myriad ways to materially and quickly bridge this gap. Informed by analysis from over 30 expert interviews and open-source data gathering, this report concludes by offering ten recommendations across supply, acquisition, and operations to close this capability gap. Each of these recommendations must be filtered through a consideration of timeline (swift action is needed given the increasing potential for conflict with China in the coming years), feasibility (cyber is one of the last bipartisan domains but with implications for contentious national issues and cross-cutting networks of civil society, government, and industry stakeholders), buy-in from the hacker community (alienation or acceptance from this community will determine failure or success), and maintaining Western values (to learn from CCP cyber models without adopting them wholesale).

Supply

The United States government should create vulnerability research accelerators through existing investment vehicles.

The United States struggles to obtain capabilities from skilled smaller firms, relying on prime contractors with burdensome overhead costs. Creating Vulnerability Research Accelerators (VRAs) through the DOD’s Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO), In-Q-Tel, or the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) could significantly bolster the supply of zero-day exploits by fostering the growth of small, specialized research teams. This would circumvent the de facto requirement for a small business to go through a prime contractor to sell offensive capabilities to the government. These accelerators would focus on supporting small businesses (those with at least five dedicated vulnerability researchers), ensuring that funding and resources are directed toward those generating the original research rather than prime contractors with existing relationships with the government. The VRAs would help these companies navigate the complex federal contracting process, get Small Business Administration certifications, hold and pay for security clearances, and connect companies directly to government contracts. By doing so, the accelerator would significantly lower the barrier to entry and reduce administrative burdens that often deter small but highly skilled teams from engaging with government contracts directly.

The NSA should expand its CAE-CO program, provide grants to private organizations that support existing CTFs and offensive security conferences, and directly fund CTF teams at top universities.

Domestic CTF teams at universities die without adequate funding and support. The NSA should bolster the pipeline of skilled vulnerability researchers while demonstrating that the US government values and invests in offensive security talent. It could do so by providing grants to private organizations or academic institutions that support CTF competitions, offensive security conferences, and university-based CTF teams. Directly sponsoring CTFs and hacker clubs at leading universities would nurture talent at the source, as CTFs have long been a testing ground for some of the world’s best exploit developers and security researchers. Government funding, paired with resources and mentorship, would encourage students to view vulnerability research as a viable career path, ultimately fostering a new generation of skilled researchers. The NSA, through these grants, could also encourage additional academic institutions to create programs that comply with CAE-CO accreditations or postgraduate programs that solve the “Training Valley of Death,” taking apprentice vulnerability researchers to cyber “journeymen” status.

This program should also pair with grants among FVEYs and other allies to fund companies that conduct “cyber journeyman”-like training, host international CTFs and security conferences, or hire international researchers at higher rates than Chinese or other firms, expanding the pool of talent while strengthening partnerships abroad. This approach would help cultivate both domestic and international pipelines of vulnerability researchers, ensuring that the United States and its partners remain competitive in offensive security innovation. This is most important to do within international fora outside the US sphere of influence. For example, offensive conferences in South Korea, Thailand, and Singapore could provide ample networking opportunities with hackers who risk of getting pulled into China’s vulnerability acquisition orbit. The international hacker community tends to view the US government with skepticism, but it is notably more receptive to private companies that are perceived as supporting the community—even if those companies work closely with the government. By positioning itself as an enabler rather than a direct participant, the US government can build trust while supporting the development of offensive security skills.

DOD and Congress must expand programs on AI-enabled vulnerability research and consider n-day exploitation where possible.

Investing in technologies that reduce dependency on zero-days—such as automation, AI-driven vulnerability discovery, and novel exploitation techniques—would future-proof US cyber capabilities, effectively “intelligentizing” DOD’s cyber organizations. As software security continues to advance, traditional exploit chains are becoming harder to develop and maintain. While defense is important, the DOD must also prioritize research into next-generation exploitation methods that can help sustain offensive capabilities in the long term—particularly for other, harder targets in East Asia. Expanding government programs, like AIxCC and INGOTS,²²⁵ while encouraging offensive firms to create additional tools, like Google’s OSSFuzz,²²⁶ would enable firms already conducting vulnerability research to do so in a more scalable manner while also assisting defensive efforts. Alternatively, creating a section under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for “automated code auditing” or “exploit chain generation for both n-day and 0day” for the armed services could send a demand signal to the wider defense innovation ecosystem, encouraging venture capital and other investment firms to find ways to scale the labor-intensive process of vulnerability research.

To combat excess slowdowns due to risk aversion, as well as to extend the life of an acquired capability, USCYBERCOM should also consider additional policies around n-day exploitation and use. This could lengthen the lifecycle of an acquired capability, prevent excess waste and time in contract cycles, and also provide additional resourcing to junior-level talent in offensive cyber firms (who can likely exploit n-days but are not yet able to reliably conduct zero-day exploitation). USCYBERCOM is an ideal organization to try new policies around n-day acquisition as, while stealth is important in military operations, it is not required for all of them.

DOJ should provide legal guidance and counter-intelligence protection to vulnerability researchers.

Vulnerability researchers in the private sector, particularly those who participate in bug bounties, often rely on their companies or entities like the Security Research Legal Defense Fund²²⁷ to defend themselves from lawsuits that seek to chill their research. The legal challenges are only more numerous for individuals selling these capabilities for national security purposes, especially if the individual is selling capabilities for classified purposes, which cannot be disclosed in court without greymail concerns. While the US government has clear interests in protecting security research (e.g., through DOJ policies not criminally prosecute good faith security research and the CFAA’s subsection for a national security carve out to hacking),²²⁸ as well as protecting individuals from counterintelligence threats, there is no centralized task force actively looking to protect hackers (especially ones without clearances), and no policy priority to ensure that civil lawsuits are settled with an eye on how they impact private sector hacking supply chains.²²⁹

One potential solution is to empower the DOJ’s Civil Division to intervene in civil lawsuits through existing procedural mechanisms if an offensive capability firms’ researcher faces a lawsuit by a technology company (particularly if the researcher works for government interests).²³⁰ This would likely need pairing with a publication on transparent criteria for how to define “government interest” for CFAA purposes, and how firms can seek protection under those terms (similar to how the DOJ’s “good-faith security research” policy published in 2022 clarified what cases DOJ would or would not prosecute against hackers).²³¹ Another approach would be to establish a federally funded legal defense fund modeled after the Security Research Legal Defense Fund, providing independent legal support to security researchers working on US government contracts. Additionally, a task force could be created within the FBI or the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) National Counterintelligence and Security Center (paired with the first “demand” option below) to address counterintelligence concerns raised by hackers and provide a clear point of contact for researchers facing foreign threats or legal retaliation. These measures would help foster a safer and more reliable environment for the private sector supply chain supporting US cyber operations.

Demand

Create a government-sponsored vulnerability broker for the US intelligence community within a federally funded research and development center.

On the demand side, establishing a government-sponsored broker for vulnerability acquisition could streamline the fragmented and opaque market, particularly for companies without existing connections into the US federal contracting system and individual researchers who may reach out to private sector middlemen. The current landscape relies heavily on private brokers, who often inflate prices and obscure the true value of individual exploits. A government-backed intermediary could improve efficiency, offer more predictable payment structures, and reduce the risks associated with relying on third-party brokers. While this effort could be coordinated at a National Security Council (NSC) level, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) would likely be the best place to implement such a program. This is because, thanks to interagency equities and Title 10 / Title 50 concerns, there is likely no single agency within the Intelligence Community or DOD that a government-sponsored middleman could work without spawning duplicate structures across the ecosystem, causing a drain of government resources.²³²

Such a program would likely need an individual at the helm with experience in exploit acquisition, one who would understand the needs of the various agencies and also be able to interface directly with the hacker community. Any bug would still need to go through the VEP,²³³ and then funnel vulnerabilities to existing contracts based on need. This middleman program should also be able to solicit bugs regardless of origin, directly contracting with friendly international suppliers beyond even the FVEYs. This program could also offer additional insights into the zero-day supply chain for future coordination amongst the FVEYs and additional regional allies.

Decentralize, internationalize, and simplify the process for purchasing bugs.

Government acquisition moves at a glacial pace, even for cyber capabilities. The US government must find ways to decentralize purchasing authority away from prime-heavy government contracts. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, in March 2025, began moving towards more efficient software acquisition mechanisms. However, this effort is largely tailored to commercial software solutions (which zero-day exploits are not).²³⁴ The DOD could create an acquisition vehicle specifically for cyber capabilities used in support of SIGINT or defensive efforts, particularly for cheaper capabilities purchased directly from researchers or small firms. This could be in the form of creating a Software Acquisition and Practices (SWAP) for offensive cyber specifically, or by expanding programs for offensive cyber acquisitions under Other Transaction Authorities.²³⁵ Any acquisition mechanism, to succeed, cannot contain US person or clearance requirements, allowing companies the flexibility to hire international talent.

Congress could also alter the US government’s Simplified Acquisitions Program to enable the US government to purchase offensive cyber capabilities. All products that support overseas contingency operations²³⁶ or that facilitate defense against or recovery from a cyber-attack can already be purchased via the micro-purchase program (if the cost is less than $20,000) and can be acquired through the Simplified Acquisitions Program (if the cost is less than $800,000 domestically or $1.5 million abroad).²³⁷ It is far more likely that lower-tier vulnerabilities will fall under the Simplified Acquisitions program than the micro-purchase program, but the micro-purchase program could provide for one-off technical projects or additional resources given to offensive cyber capabilities firms, which could supplement government operations and lessen the burden of feast-or-famine cycles.²³⁸

Resource such processes accordingly.

Raising the budget for zero-day acquisition across the government is also essential to ensure companies do not go out of business when making exclusive sales to the government. Increased funding would allow the US government to secure higher-quality vulnerabilities and reduce concerns that a single purchase of a critical exploit does not ruin the acquisition budget for the rest of the fiscal year. Additionally, while big-ticket iOS and Chrome vulnerabilities garner widespread attention, real cyber operations often rely on lower-profile but highly specialized exploits tailored to niche devices and environments. These require not only technical sophistication but also partnerships, trust, and deep operational knowledge—especially when targeting software specific to a particular region or industry. Policymakers must recognize this complexity and resource the ecosystem accordingly, ensuring both intelligence-gathering and operational effectiveness while holding stakeholders accountable for outcomes. Expanding cyber-specific pathways of the Simplified Acquisitions Program (which already exist for “facilitating defense against or recovery from cyber [attacks]”) and raising the cap for cyber capabilities up to $3 million that fall under a simplified acquisitions program would further assist this effort to buy higher quality, harder target exploits.

Policy

Identify highly skilled foreign researchers and hire them wherever possible.

When zero-day exploits and bespoke cyber capabilities are created by a finite pool of international talent (and especially if the number of highly skilled vulnerability researchers globally is indeed in the low hundreds), talent recruitment becomes a zero-sum game. To maintain a competitive edge, the United States and its allies must focus not only on acquiring superior capabilities but also on attracting and retaining top talent—both foreign and domestic—while actively countering adversary advancements through a combination of acquisition, disruption, and strategic talent recruitment. Many top-tier vulnerability researchers might qualify for the “Gold Card” visa program by lowering the tier requirement (e.g., $500,000 instead of $5 million).²³⁹ Moreover, many private sector technology firms would also likely be interested in recruiting this talent for defensive purposes. US firms can hire vulnerability researchers to make the ecosystem safer.

US alliances also become particularly useful in this regard. As China attempts to expand its offensive hacking talent pool to researchers in East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, encouraging companies that provide cyber capabilities to the FVEYs to hire foreign talent, work with foreign firms, and invite foreign researchers to cybersecurity conferences will likely be a necessary counter strategy to prevent this from occurring. While recruiting hundreds of hackers through the FVEYs seems like a daunting task, this is far less than the over 1600 German nuclear and rocketry scientists brought over to the United States alone from the Cold War-era program, Operation Paperclip.²⁴⁰

Catch and burn capabilities.

Not every researcher will want to work for the US government or its allies. While some researchers prefer to focus on the work, many Chinese researchers enjoy the mission of working for their home governments. This likely comprises a significant pool of potential vulnerabilities in China every year. The MSS currently has 324 partner companies, who have disclosed almost 4,000 vulnerabilities to the CNNVD.²⁴¹ Thus, the US intelligence community should actively identify offensive capabilities not just leveraged by adversary states, but also offensive capabilities likely being sold to adversary states, to either disclose them to vendors who can fix them or use them in false flag operations. This will assist US companies in making their products more secure, while also imposing costs on an adversary.

Deepen offensive cyber collaboration among allies.

Replicating these policies among US partners and allies is crucial to shaping and maintaining the base of offensive talent and capability. Shielding up-and-coming talents from the Chinese sphere of influence will be vital to maintaining a long-term competitive advantage. If the FVEYs cannot convince individuals to come directly to FVEYs countries, getting them out of China’s sphere of influence would suffice. Creating diplomatic programs through the US State Department focusing on technical talent exchange and industry-wide collaboration (which would benefit both defensive and offensive vulnerability research talent) would be ideal to do so. While key countries in Europe and South America would likely be an important start beyond the FVEYs, deepening cyber relationships with South Korea and Thailand (two treaty allies) would likely be key countries to engage.

However, the more countries that the US partners with, the higher the risk that the United States funds a capability that may be used to commit human rights abuses or to spy on US persons. The Pall Mall initiative, which attempts to establish global norms around ethical hacking and responsible offensive cybersecurity practices, represents a step toward addressing this complexity, if the coalition focuses on actual acquisition of capabilities rather than use. Encouraging the Pall Mall process to create better guidance on hiring foreign and uncleared talent to address counterintelligence risks and creating a coalition of countries willing to sell exploits to one another with proper human rights safeguards (particularly with the goal of stepping away from China’s sphere of influence) would be crucial steps towards developing a coalition with proper guardrails in place.

Conclusion

Given the finite international zero-day marketplace, it is imperative that the United States and its allies continue to ensure the availability of such capabilities (understanding the industry, rooting out malicious actors, and developing trusted sources) while limiting China’s access to those same capabilities. If the United States fails to do so, it risks losing its competitive edge to adversaries—most notably China—who are investing heavily in cultivating their domestic cyber talent pipeline and enabling a more flexible, market-driven approach to acquisition. China’s permissive regulatory environment and government-backed support for private-sector hacking companies have allowed it to scale its capabilities rapidly. Without a corresponding investment in the US ecosystem—both in terms of talent development and acquisition reform—the United States could face long-term strategic disadvantages.

The current landscape is bleak. China has a larger supply of hackers than the United States, and its offensive pipeline has grown incredibly robust in the last decade. If, from an operational perspective, China is already a peer adversary in cyberspace,²⁴² China’s hacking capabilities will likely exceed those of the United States very soon, if it has not already.

However, this moment also presents an opportunity. The United States can strengthen its position by embracing policies that nurture a robust domestic talent pipeline, reduce barriers to entry for small vulnerability research businesses, and streamline the government’s acquisition process to work more effectively with the private sector. Investing in legal protections, expanding support for hacker communities, and fostering international partnerships can secure the supply chain while building trust between the government and researchers.

Ultimately, the United States must not only maintain parity with China but also ensure that it remains at the forefront of offensive cybersecurity capabilities. Choices made today will determine whether the United States can sustain its cyber advantage or whether, when called upon to do more, the US offensive cyber supply chain crashes and burns itself.

About the author

Fellow

Winnona DeSombre Bernsen

Nonresident Fellow

China Chinese

Winnona DeSombre Bernsen is nonresident fellow with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Tech Programs, and a Master of Public Policy/Juris Doctor candidate at Harvard Kennedy School and Georgetown Law.

She was formerly a security engineer at Google’s Threat Analysis Group, tracking targeted threats against Google users, and she is the founder of the offensive security conference DistrictCon, held in Washington DC. In recent years, Winnona has organized policy content at DEF CON and authored multiple pieces on offensive cyber capability proliferation.

Acknowledgements

This paper could not have been written without the assistance of my many mentors and colleagues in hacking and cyber policy. Thank you for fielding my tireless questions, vouching for me to potential interviewees, and reviewing my copious notes. A special thank you to the Atlantic Council, Trey Herr, and Nikita Shah for giving me the opportunity to pursue this project, to Margin Research for their partnership and assistance with data gathering, and to Mark Griffin and the local Washington DC hacker community for their interview corroboration assistance.

This paper is dedicated to my husband Derek (who has tirelessly supported my four-year odyssey through graduate and law school), Sophia d’Antoine, and all the members of our shared Book Club. While this thesis was produced over the last year, our discussions over the last half-decade have deeply influenced the final product.

Appendices

Appendix A: Abbreviations and key terms

Access-as-a-Service: a form of offensive cyber capabilities service that provides black-box technological solutions to customers looking to break into devices.

artificial intelligence (AI): the ability of computers or machines to perform tasks that traditionally require human intelligence, such as learning, reasoning, problem-solving, and perception

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT): a sophisticated, sustained cyber campaign in which an intruder establishes an undetected presence in a network to steal sensitive data over a prolonged period of time.

bespoke: This term refers to tailored or customized entities, services, or products within the information security environment.

bug bounty programs: Programs run by companies to encourage hackers to find and report security vulnerabilities in their software. Hackers receive monetary rewards (“bounties”) for valid reports, enabling companies to identify and fix issues before malicious actors exploit them.

bug collision: The parallel, independent discovery of a vulnerability by multiple researchers.

Capture the Flag (CTF): Hacking competition in a simulated environment where participants solve security challenges, like exploiting vulnerabilities, reverse engineering, or cryptography, to “capture flags” (hidden tokens representing successful completion).

China National Vulnerability Database (CNNVD): A national vulnerability database of the PRC, operated by the MSS, China’s foreign intelligence service.

Chinese Communist Party (CCP): China’s, or PRC’s, ruling political party. It holds ultimate authority over the state, military, and society.

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA): United States federal law that criminalizes and provides for civil penalties for various forms of computer-related fraud and abuse.

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): component of the United States Department of Homeland Security responsible for cybersecurity and infrastructure protection

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA): research and development agency of the United States Department of Defense responsible for the development of emerging technologies for use by the military.

Exploit Broker: An intermediary company or middleman that purchases vulnerabilities and exploits from researchers and sells them to government agencies or other clients.

exploit chain: A sequence of multiple exploit primitives used in conjunction with one another to achieve a particular effect, such as gaining full control over a system.

exploit primitive: a basic exploit that, on its own, may not be enough to compromise a system but can be leveraged in combination with other primitives to achieve a more significant effect.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): the domestic intelligence and security service of the United States and its principal federal law enforcement agency.

Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC): public-private partnerships that conduct research and development for the United States Government—famous examples include Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, and MITRE.

Five Eyes (FVEYs): An intelligence-sharing alliance comprising five countries: the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

live hacking: Live onstage demonstrations of hackers exposing system bugs or hacking into systems.

Ministry of Public Security (MPS): China’s national police agency, responsible for law enforcement, domestic security, and maintaining public order.

Ministry of State Security (MSS): China’s primary civilian intelligence and security agency, responsible for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security.

National Security Agency (NSA): The US intelligence agency under the DOD tasked with SIGINT collection and cybersecurity.

n-day exploit: A tool or piece of code that exploits an n-day vulnerability (a known security flaw), typically targeting systems that have not yet applied the vendor’s patch.

n-day vulnerability (n-day): A publicly disclosed software vulnerability that is known to the vendor, and a patch is likely available. Yet, it is still exploitable if systems remain unpatched.

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA): U.S. federal law that sets the annual budget and authorizes appropriations for the U.S. Department of Defense, nuclear weapons programs of the Department of Energy, and other defense-related activities.

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): agency of the United States Department of Commerce whose mission is to promote American innovation and industrial competitiveness.

People’s Liberation Army (PLA): The armed forces of the PRC, controlled by China’s ruling party, the CCP.

People’s Republic of China (PRC): The official name of mainland China, governed by the CCP.

Proof of Concept (PoC): Sample code showing that a particular vulnerability is exploitable. It proves an attack is feasible but may not be a fully reliable exploit.

quality assurance (QA): systematic efforts taken to assure that the product delivered to customer meet with the contractual and other agreed upon performance, design, reliability, and maintainability expectations of that customer.

Regulations on the Management of Network Product Security Vulnerabilities (RMSV): a set of regulations in China that mandate network product providers to promptly report any security vulnerabilities in their products to the CCP.

signals intelligence (SIGINT): intelligence derived from electronic signals and computer systems used by foreign targets.

Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO): rapid prototyping organization within the DOD to address high priority operational and strategic challenges.

US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM): The unified combatant command of the DOD responsible for conducting cyberspace operations.

US Department of Defense (DOD): United States Department in charge with coordinating and supervising the U.S. armed services.

US Department of Justice (DOJ): United States Department that oversees the domestic enforcement of federal laws and the administration of justice.

Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP): process used by the U.S. federal government to determine on a case-by-case basis how it should treat zero-day vulnerabilities.

zero-day vulnerability (0day / zero-day): A software vulnerability that is unknown to the software vendor and has not yet been patched.

zero-day exploit: A tool or piece of code that takes advantage of a zero-day vulnerability to compromise a system.

Appendix B: List of cited interviewees

JD Work, Professor at National Defense University.

Ian Roos, VP of Intelligence, Margin Research.

Mei Danowski, Natto Thoughts.

Dakota Cary, Fellow, Atlantic Council Global China Hub.

Adam Kozy, CEO of SinaCyber.

Derek Bernsen, DARPA Program Manager. Note, Mr. Bernsen’s comments do not reflect the opinions of DARPA, the DOD, or the US Government.

Chi-en (Ashley) Shen, Security Researcher.

Former US Intelligence Community Official (Background Interview)

Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 1 (Background Interview).

Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 2 (Background Interview).

Founder, Vulnerability Research Company 3 (Background Interview).

Founder, Former Vulnerability Research Vendor (Background Interview).

Former ONCD Official (Background Interview).

U.S. Government China Cyber Analyst (Background Interview).

Founding Member of Vulnerability Research Company (Background Interview).

Pwnie Award Organizer (Background Interview).

Member of Defense Science Board, Study on Cyber as a Strategic Capability (Background Interview).

China Area Specialist in the Vulnerability Research Space (Background Interview).

Security Researcher with Experience in Collection and Cyber Operations (Background Interview).

CTO of Defense Contractor in the DOD / IC space (Background Interview).

USG China Analyst (Background Interview).

DOD Cyber Official (Background Interview).

Senior DOD Cyber Official 1 (Background Interview).

Senior DOD Cyber Official 2 (Background Interview).

USG Cyber Official (Background Interview).

Independent Security Researcher (Background Interview).

Former Senior Intelligence Official (Background Interview).

Explore the program

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1 Alexei Bulazel (@0xAlexei), “That’s right. America has incredible offensive cyber power. We need to stop being afraid to use it,” X, December 24, 2024, 1:39 p.m., https://x.com/0xAlexei/status/1871626708488720565.

2 David DiMolfetta, “Contractors Could Hack Back against Adversaries, Top Cyber Democrat Says,”. NextGov, April 2, 2025, https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2025/04/contractors-could-hack-back-against-adversaries-top-cyber-democrat-says/404233/.

3 “L3harris Trenchant Ltd (Overview),” Pomanda, accessed April 3, 2025, https://pomanda.com/company/09068202/l3harris-trenchant-ltd.

4 Asaf Lubin, “Unpacking WhatsApp’s Legal Triumph Over NSO Group,” Lawfare, January 7, 2025, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/unpacking-whatsapp-s-legal-triumph-over-nso-group.

5 Sam Sabin, “Cyber’s Big Budget Week,” Politico, March 28, 2022, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/weekly-cybersecurity/2022/03/28/cybers-big-budget-week-00020739.

6 Maddie Stone and James Sadowski, “A Review of Zero-Day In-the-Wild Exploits in 2023,” Google, March 27, 2024, https://blog.google/technology/safety-security/a-review-of-zero-day-in-the-wild-exploits-in-2023/; Sergiu Gatlan, “Google: Spyware Vendors Behind 50% of Zero-Days Exploited in 2023,” BleepingComputer, March 27, 2024, https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/google-spyware-vendors-behind-50-percent-of-zero-days-exploited-in-2023/; Casey Charrier et al., “Hello 0-Days, My Old Friend: A 2024 Zero-Day Exploitation Analysis,” Google Cloud (blog), April 29, 2025, https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/2024-zero-day-trends.

7 Dave Aitel, “OffensiveCon23—Information Security Is an Ecology of Horrors and You Are the Solution,” YouTube video, accessed March 8, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BarJCn4yChA&ab_channel=OffensiveCon.

8 Halvar.flake, “Book Review: ‘This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends,’” ADD / XOR / ROL (blog), February 23, 2021, https://addxorrol.blogspot.com/2021/02/book-review-this-is-how-they-tell-me.html.

9 Jonah Victor, “China’s Thickening Information Fog: Overcoming New Challenges in Analysis,” Center for the Study of Intelligence 68, no. 23, September 2024, https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/studies-in-intelligence-68-no-3-extracts-september-2024/chinas-thickening-information-fog-overcoming-new-challenges-in-analysis/.

10 Evan Rosenfield, “The NSA’s Brain Drain Has a Silver Lining,” Defense One, April 12, 2023, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/04/nsas-brain-drain-has-silver-lining/385051/.

11 Winnona DeSombre Bernsen, “Same Same, but Different, Margin Research, February 29, 2024, https://margin.re/2024/02/same-same-but-different/.

12 Bureau of Industry and Security, “Commerce Removes Sandvine from Entity List Following Significant Corporate Reforms to Protect Human Rights,” US Department of Commerce, October 21, 2024 (release), https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-removes-sandvine-entity-list-following-significant-corporate-reforms-protect-human-rights.

13 Thomas Latschan, “Deep Rift between US and Europe Opens up in Munich,” Deutsche Welle, February 15, 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/deep-rift-between-us-and-eu-opens-up-in-munich/a-71624354.

14 Martin Matishak, Pentagon Fast-Tracks ‘Cyber Command 2.0’ Review, Requests Authorities Wish List,” The Record, February 21, 2025, https://therecord.media/hegseth-cyber-command-2-0-review-authorities-wish-list.

15 “NSPM-13 and the Future of Cyber Warfare,” Hudson Institute (virtual event), May 5, 2022, https://www.hudson.org/events/2109-virtual-event-nspm-13-and-the-future-of-cyber-warfare52022.

16 This project was originally developed as a Policy Analysis Exercise product for the Atlantic Council during the author’s time at Harvard Kennedy School.

17 “About CTF (Capture the Flag),” CTFTime, accessed March 16, 2025, https://ctftime.org/.

18 DistrictCon, accessed April 3, 2025, https://www.districtcon.org.

19 This assumes that the target for a cyber operation has been selected and that they do not respond to phishing emails or other forms of access.

20 Winnona DeSombre et al., A Primer on the Proliferation of Offensive Cyber Capabilities, Atlantic Council, March 1, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-primer-on-the-proliferation-of-offensive-cyber-capabilities/.

21 Gatlan, “Google: Spyware vendors behind 50% of zero-days.”

22 Jen Roberts et al., Mythical Beasts and Where to Find Them: Mapping the Global Spyware Market and Its Threats to National Security and Human Rights, Atlantic Council, September 4, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/mythical-beasts-and-where-to-find-them-mapping-the-global-spyware-market-and-its-threats-to-national-security-and-human-rights/.

23 Roberts et al., Mythical Beasts and Where to Find Them.

24 FVEYs is an intelligence alliance within the five governments rather than set by companies. However, because the five governments often share intelligence, a US company selling offensive cyber capabilities to the US government will often be able to sell to other FVYEs countries without much concern if they wish to expand into international markets.

25 Aitel, “OffensiveCon23—Information Security Is an Ecology of Horrors.”

26 Adam Bannister, “Bug Bounty Earnings Soar, but 63% of Ethical Hackers Have Withheld Security Flaws – Study,” The Daily Swig, February 24, 2020, https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/bug-bounty-earnings-soar-but-63-of-ethical-hackers-have-withheld-security-flaws-study.

27 Christopher Kissel and Mathew Marden, “The Business Value of Bugcrowd Security Solutions,” IDC Business Value, October 2021, https://www.bugcrowd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/business-value-bugcrowd-security-solutions.pdf.

28 “Inside the Mind of a Hacker,” Bugcrowd, 2024, https://www.bugcrowd.com/resources/report/inside-the-mind-of-a-hacker/.

29 Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 2, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Former US Intelligence Community Official, December 27, 2024.

30 Mark Dowd, “OffensiveCon22—Keynote—How Do You Actually Find Bugs?” YouTube video, April 21, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Ysy6iA2sqA.

31 Note: the Linux kernel has over 27 million lines of code as of 2024. See conversation: “How much code is in Linux? General Linux Question,” FOSS Community, August 2024, https://itsfoss.community/t/how-much-code-in-linux/12493.

32 Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 2, January 8, 2025.

33 Dowd, “OffensiveCon22—Keynote—How Do You Actually Find Bugs?”

34 “Huawei NetEngine AR617VW Authenticated Root RaCE,” Wr3nchsr, October 31, 2023, https://wr3nchsr.github.io/huawei-netengine-ar617vw-auth-root-rce/; Guang Gong, “TiYunZong: An Exploit Chain to Remotely Root Modern Android Devices,” Blackhat USA, n.d., https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Gong-TiYunZong-An-Exploit-Chain-To-Remotely-Root-Modern-Android-Devices.pdf.

35 Phil Muncaster, “Apple Patches Two Zero-Days Exploited in Pegasus Attacks,” Infosecurity Magazine, September 8, 2023, https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/apple-patches-two-zerodays-pegasus/.

36 “Zero-Day Marketplace Explained: How Zerodium, BugTraq, and Fear Contributed to the Rise of the Zero-Day Vulnerability Black Market – API Security,” Wallarm, June 18, 2024, https://lab.wallarm.com/zero-day-marketplace-explained-how-zerodium-bugtraq-and-fear-contributed-to-the-rise-of-the-zero-day-vulnerability-black-market/.

37 Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 2, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 1, January 15, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founding Member of a Vulnerability Research Company, January 11, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025.

38 Background Interview, Former ONCD Official, January 8, 2025; corroborated by interview with Derek Bernsen, DARPA Program Manager, January 5, 2025 (Note: Bernsen’s comments do not reflect the opinions of DARPA, the DOD, or the US Government); corroborated by Background Interview, Founding Member of a Vulnerability Research Company, January 11, 2025.

39 Background Interview, Former ONCD Official, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Bernsen interview, January 5, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founding Member of Vulnerability Research Company, January 11, 2025.

40 Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 2, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research company 3, January 9, 2025.

41 Bernsen interview, January 5, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Former ONCD Official, January 8, 2025.

42 Wallarm, “Zero-Day Marketplace Explained: How Zerodium, BugTraq, and Fear Contributed.”

43 Bernsen interview, January 5, 2025; corroborated by On Background Interview, USG Cyber Official, January 26, 2025.

44 This government contracting process may be a uniquely “Western” phenomenon. China analysts posit that the Chinese government has deliberately created avenues for foreigners to offer bugs to the Chinese government in a relatively frictionless way (Interview with Adam Kozy, CEO of SinaCyber, January 17, 2025).

45 Andy Greenberg, “North Korea Hacked Him. So He Took Down Its Internet,” Wired, February 2, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/north-korea-hacker-internet-outage/; Clement Lecigne and Maddie Stone, “Active North Korean campaign targeting security researchers,” Google: Threat Analysis Group (blog), September 7, 2023, https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/active-north-korean-campaign-targeting-security-researchers/.

46 Background Interview, Former US Intelligence Community Official, December 27, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founding Member of Vulnerability Research Company, January 11, 2025.

47 ”High-Risk Communities,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, accessed June 9, 2025, https://www.cisa.gov/audiences/high-risk-communities.

48 Background Interview, Founder, Former Vulnerability Research Vendor, January 8, 2025.

49 Background Interview, Founder, Former Vulnerability Research Vendor, January 8, 2025.

50 Background Interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025.

51 Halvar Flake, “OffensiveCon20—Keynote—Why I Love Offensive Work, Why I don’t Love Offensive Work,” YouTube video, April 17, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8QRnOpjmneo; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 2, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research company 3, January 9, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 1, January 15, 2025.

52 Background Interview, Founder, Former Vulnerability Research Vendor, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 1, January 15, 2025.

53 Background Interview, Pwnie Award Organizer, January 12, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, USG China Analyst, January 22, 2025.

54 Aaron Mehta, “Raytheon is Now RTX. Here’s What That Means for Its Defense Arm,” Breaking Defense, June 23, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/06/raytheon-is-now-rtx-heres-what-that-means-for-its-defense-arm/.

55 “L3Harris® Fast. Forward., Domain Cyber,” accessed March 16, 2025, https://www.l3harris.com/capabilities/cyber.

56 “Peraton Awarded $889M Contract to Support U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) and Cyber Mission Partners,” Peraton, January 9, 2024, https://www.peraton.com/news/peraton-awarded-889m-contract-to-support-arcyber-and-cyber-mission-partners/.

57 On Background Interview, Founding Member of Vulnerability Research Company, January 11, 2025.

58 Andy Greenberg, “Inside Endgame: A Second Act for the Blackwater of Hacking,” Forbes, February 14, 2014 [update], https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2014/02/12/inside-endgame-a-new-direction-for-the-blackwater-of-hacking/; On Background Interview, Founding Member of Vulnerability Research Company, January 11, 2025.

59 A.J. Vicens, “Israeli Spyware Firm Paragon Acquired by US Investment Group, Report Says,” Reuters, December 16, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/israeli-spyware-firm-paragon-acquired-by-us-investment-group-report-says-2024-12-16/.

60 Josh Gold, “The Five Eyes and Offensive Cyber Capabilities: Building a ‘Cyber Deterrence Initiative,’” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence,” October 30, 2020, https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/the-five-eyes-and-offensive-cyber-capabilities-building-a-cyber-deterrence-initiative/.

61 Gold, “The Five Eyes and Offensive Cyber Capabilities.”

62 On Background interview, Former US Intelligence Community Official, December 27, 2024; corroborated by Background Interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025.

63 Aitel, “OffensiveCon23—Information Security Is an Ecology of Horrors.”

64 Background Interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025.

65 Winnona Desombre et al., Countering Cyber Proliferation: Zeroing in on Access-as-a-Service, Atlantic Council: Scowcroft Center, March 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Offensive-Cyber-Capabilities-Proliferation-Report-1.pdf.

66 Yizheng Chen et al., “DiverseVul: A New Vulnerable Source Code Dataset for Deep Learning Based Vulnerability Detection,” Association for Computing Machinery: Proceedings of the 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (October 2023), 654-68, https://doi.org/10.1145/3607199.3607242; Ziyang Li, Saikat Dutta, and Mayor Naik, “LLM-Assisted Static Analysis for Detecting Security Vulnerabilities” (Version 2), Cornell University: arXiv, November 24, 2024, https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2405.17238.

67 System for Award Management, (2024, September 1). “Intelligent Generation of Tools for Security (INGOTS) Contract Opportunity,” US General Services Administration, accessed March 16, 2025, https://sam.gov/opp/98406eb5b34641468e25287249077c48/view.

68 “Research Overview,” National Security Agency: Central Security Service, accessed June 9, 2025, https://www.nsa.gov/Research/Overview/#:~:text=We%20bring%20increased%20depth%2C%20resilience,teaming%20with%20artificial%20intelligence%20agents.

69 “Overview – Interview with Dr. Kathleen Fisher,” AixCC: AI Cyber Challenge, accessed April 5, 2025, https://aicyberchallenge.com/overview/.

70 DOD Data, Analytics, and Artificial Intelligence Adoption Strategy, US Department of Defense, June 27, 2023 [publication clearance date], https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/02/2003333300/-1/-1/1/DOD_DATA_ANALYTICS_AI_ADOPTION_STRATEGY.PDF.

71 Executive Order No. 14179, “Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence,” 90 FR 8741 (January 23, 2025), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/31/2025-02172/removing-barriers-to-american-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence; “Security on the Path to AGI,” OpenAI, March 26, 2025, https://openai.com/index/security-on-the-path-to-agi/; Emil Sayegh, “Stargate AI Project: The $500 Billion Gamble to Dominate the Future,” Forbes, January 22, 2025, https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilsayegh/2025/01/22/stargate-ai-project-the-500-billion-gamble-to-dominate-the-future/.

72 25, https://military.microsoft.com/mssa/faqs/skillbridge-and-csp-coordinators/.

73 “CAE Institution Map,” CAE in Cybersecurity Community, June 9, 2025 [map update], https://www.caecommunity.org/cae-map; “CyberCorps: Scholarship for Service,” US Office of Personnel Management, accessed March 16, 2025, https://sfs.opm.gov/.

74 CAE in Cybersecurity Community, “CAE Institution Map.”

75 Background Interview, Former US Intelligence Community Official, December 27, 2024; corroborated by Background Interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025.

76 Data gathering by Winnona DeSombre—full data available upon request.

77 “DEF CON 24 Hacking Conference, Capture the Flag,” DEF CON Communications, Inc. accessed March 16, 2025, from https://defcon.org/html/defcon-24/dc-24-ctf.html.

78 “CSAW’25 Capture the Flag, US-Canada, Mena, Europe, India, Mexico,” New York University OSIRIS Lab, accessed March 16, 2025, from https://www.csaw.io/ctf.

79 Capture the Flag with Google,” Google CTF, accessed March 16, 2025, https://capturetheflag.withgoogle.com/.

80 Background Interview, Former US Intelligence Community Official, December 27, 2024; corroborated by Background Interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025.

81 Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 1, January 8, 2025, corroborated by Background Interview, Founder, Vulnerability Research Company 3, January 9, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025.

82 Advanced Cyber Training Program, accessed May 14, 2025, from https://www.mantech.com/focus-areas/cyber-training/.

83 Katzcy Consulting, “Cybersecurity Games: Building Tomorrow’s Workforce,” National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), 2016, https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2017/04/24/cyber_games-_building_future_workforce_final_1031a_lr.pdf.

84 National Cyber Workforce Strategy, June 25, 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20240816044309/https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/NCWES-Initial-Report-2024.06.25.pdf.

85 John Perry Barlow, “A Not Terribly Brief History of the Electronic Frontier Foundation,” November 8, 1990, Electronic Frontier Foundation. https://www.eff.org/pages/not-terribly-brief-history-electronic-frontier-foundation.

86 “A History of Protecting Freedom Where Law and Technology Collide,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, October 7, 2011, https://www.eff.org/about/history.

87 Aitel, “OffensiveCon23—Information Security Is an Ecology of Horrors.”

88 Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 1, January 8, 2025, corroborated by Background Interview, Founder, Vulnerability Research Company 3, January 9, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder, Former Vulnerability Research Vendor, January 8, 2025.

89 Zero Day Initiative Blog, Trend Micro, accessed March 16, 2025, https://www.thezdi.com/blog.

90 Data gathering by Winnona DeSombre—full data available upon request.

91 cts🌸 (@gf_256), “The real CTF skill is Mergers & Acquisitions,” X (then as Twitter: https://t.co/jpQClGf1KU), May 28, 2023, 6:03 p.m., https://x.com/gf_256/status/1662942688155451395.

92 Theori (Company Profile and Financial), Crunchbase, accessed March 16, 2025, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/theori.

93 Justin Doubleday, “CYBERCOM Embraces the Non-Traditional as Acquisition Program Grows,” Federal News Network, April 15, 2024, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/defense-news/2024/04/cybercom-embraces-the-non-traditional-as-acquisition-program-grows/.

94 Background Interview, Founding Member of Vulnerability Research Company, January 11, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Former ONCD Official, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Senior DOD Cyber Official 1, January 23, 2025.

95 Background Interview, Founding Member of vulnerability research company, January 11, 2025.

96 Interview with Ian Roos, VP of Intelligence, Margin Research, March 9, 2025.

97 On Background Interview, Former ONCD Official, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Bernsen Interview, January 5, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founding Member of Vulnerability Research Company, January 11, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder, Former Vulnerability Research Vendor, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Independent Security researcher, January 31, 2025.

98 “Government Contractor Requirements,” National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), August 2, 2024 [update], https://www.nist.gov/itl/smallbusinesscyber/guidance-topic/government-contractor-requirements.

99 Chelsea Meggitt, “Prime Contractors – Move from Sub to Prime Contracting,” Collaborative Compositions, September 13, 2022, https://collaborativecompositions.com/prime-contractors-move-from-sub-to-prime-contracting/.

100 “Facility Clearances,” Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, accessed March 16, 2025, https://www.dcsa.mil/Industrial-Security/Entity-Vetting-Facility-Clearances-FOCI/Facility-Clearances/.

101 Roos interview, March 9, 2025.

102 Background Interview, Former ONCD Official, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Bernsen interview, January 5, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founding Member of Vulnerability Research Company, January 11, 2025.

103 On Background Interview, Founder, Vulnerability Research Company 3, January 9, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 1, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background interview, Founder, Former Vulnerability Research Vendor, January 8, 2025.

104 Background Interview, Former ONCD Official, January 8, 2025.

105 “Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United States Government,” Trump White House Archives, November 15, 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/External%20-%20Unclassified%20VEP%20Charter%20FINAL.PDF.

106 Background Interview, CTO of Defense Contractor in the DOD / IC Space, January 22, 2025; corroborated by interview with JD Work, Professor at National Defense University, January 31, 2025.

107 Executive Order 14093, “Prohibition on Use by the United States Government of Commercial Spyware That Poses Risks to National Security,” 88 FR 18957 (2023, March 30), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/30/2023-06730/prohibition-on-use-by-the-united-states-government-of-commercial-spyware-that-poses-risks-to.

108 Stephanie Kirchgaessner, (2021, July 18). Saudis Behind NSO Spyware Attack on Jamal Khashoggi’s Family, Leak Suggests,” The Guardian, July 18, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/18/nso-spyware-used-to-target-family-of-jamal-khashoggi-leaked-data-shows-saudis-pegasus.

109 Background Interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 1, January 8, 2025; Background Interview, DOD Cyber Official, January 23, 2025; corroborated by Bernsen interview, January 5, 2025.

110 On Background Interview, CTO of Defense Contractor in the DOD / IC space, January 22, 2025.

111 On background interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 1, January 8, 2025.

112 Background Interview, Former ONCD Official, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder, Vulnerability Research Company 3, January 9, 2025.

113 Background Interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 2, January 8, 2025.

114 Background Interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder, Former Vulnerability Research Vendor, January 8, 2025.

115 Background Interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 1, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder, Former Vulnerability Research Vendor, January 8, 2025.

116 Background Interview, Independent Security Researcher, January 31, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 1, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder, Former Vulnerability Research Vendor, January 8, 2025.

117 Background Interview, Member of Defense Science Board, Study on Cyber as a Strategic Capability, January 15, 2025.

118 Background Interview, Founder, Former Vulnerability Research Vendor, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founding Member of Vulnerability Research Company, January 11, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Independent Security researcher, January 31, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Former U.S. Intelligence Community Official, December 27, 2025.

119 “Pall Mall Process: Consultation on Good Practices Summary Report,”. UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, January 8, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-pall-mall-process-consultation-on-good-practices-summary-report.

120 UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, “Pall Mall Process: Consultation On Good Practices Summary Report.”

121 UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, “Pall Mall Process: Consultation On Good Practices Summary Report.”

122 Louise Marie Hurel et al., “The Pall Mall Process on Cyber Intrusion Tools: Putting Words into Practice,” March 14, 2025, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/pall-mall-process-cyber-intrusion-tools-putting-words-practice.

123 “The Clipper Chip,” Electronic Privacy Center, accessed April 5, 2025,. https://archive.epic.org/crypto/clipper/.

124 “Amicus Briefs Apple v. FBI,” Electronic Privacy Information Center, accessed April 5, 2025, https://epic.org/documents/apple-v-fbi-2/.

125 “Secure by Design: It’s Time to Build Cybersecurity into the Design and Manufacture of Technology Products,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), accessed April 5, 2025, https://web.archive.org/web/20250102030020/https://www.cisa.gov/securebydesign.

126 “Mobile Operating System Market Share Worldwide May 2024 – May 2025,” chart, StatCounter GlobalStats, accessed April 4, 2025, https://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/worldwide.

127 Maddie Stone, “0-days exploited by commercial surveillance vendor in Egypt,” Google Threat Analysis Group, September 22, 2023,. https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/0-days-exploited-by-commercial-surveillance-vendor-in-egypt/; Bill Marczak et al., “Triple Threat: NSO Group’s Pegasus Spyware Returns in 2022 with a Trio of iOS 15 and iOS 16 Zero-Click Exploit Chains,” Munk School Citizen Lab, University of Toronto. April 18, 2023, https://citizenlab.ca/2023/04/nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-returns-in-2022/.

128 “Apple Can No Longer Offer Advanced Data Protection in the United Kingdom to New Users,” Apple Support (UK), February 24, 2025,. https://support.apple.com/en-gb/122234.

129 Background interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 1, January 15, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 2, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founding Member of Vulnerability Research Company, January 11, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research company 3, January 9, 2025.

130 Background interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 1, January 15, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founding Member of Vulnerability Research Company, January 11, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research company 3, January 9, 2025.

131 Work interview, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder, Former Vulnerability Research Vendor, January 8, 2025.

132 Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 2, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research company 3, January 9, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founder of Vulnerability Research Company 1, January 15, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, Founding Member of Vulnerability Research Company, January 11, 2025.

133 Flake, “OffensiveCon20—Keynote—Why I Love Offensive Work, Why I don’t Love Offensive Work.”

134 About Project Zero, Project Zero, accessed June 9, 2025, https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/about-project-zero.html.

135 Ben Hawkes, “0day ‘In the Wild,’” Project Zero, May 15, 2019, https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/0day.html.

136 Ravie Lakshmanan, “Google Project Zero Researcher Uncovers Zero-Click Exploit Targeting Samsung Devices,” The Hacker News, January 10, 2025,. https://thehackernews.com/2025/01/google-project-zero-researcher-uncovers.html.

137 All bugs found by Project Zero are disclosed to the affected company directly, and the company is given 90 days to fix the underlying issue before Google publishes technical details about the bug openly—encouraging rapid remediation of the vulnerability. However, Big Tech’s actions have not been without scrutiny. In 2020–21, Google’s Project Zero unilaterally and publicly shut down multiple Western-led counter-terrorism operations in cyberspace because they found the operations used vulnerabilities in Android and Chrome products. See: Patrick Howell O’Neill, “Google’s Top Security Teams Unilaterally Shut Down a Counterterrorism Operation,” MIT Technology Review, March 26, 2021, https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/03/26/1021318/google-security-shut-down-counter-terrorist-us-ally/; Michael Coppola, “Google: Stop Burning Counterterrorism Operations,” author blog, June 24, 2024, https://poppopret.org/2024/06/24/google-stop-burning-counterterrorism-operations/.

138 Suzanne Smalley, “NSO Ruling Is a Victory for WhatsApp, but Could Have a Small Impact on Spyware Industry,”. The Record, January 10, 2025, https://therecord.media/nso-whatsapp-ruling-may-have-limited-impact-on-spyware-ecosystem.

139 Asaf Lubin, “Unpacking WhatsApp’s Legal Triumph Over NSO Group,” Lawfare, January 7, 2025, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/unpacking-whatsapp-s-legal-triumph-over-nso-group.

140 Background Interview, Member of Defense Science Board, Study on Cyber as a Strategic Capability, January 15, 2025.

141 Lubin, Unpacking WhatsApp’s Legal Triumph Over NSO Group.”

142 Fraud and related activity in connection with computers, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(f).

143 “The Chinese Private Sector Cyber Landscape,” Margin Research, , April 25, 2022, https://margin.re/2022/04/the-chinese-private-sector-cyber-landscape/.

144 Margin Research, “The Chinese Private Sector Cyber Landscape.”

145 Background Interview, U.S. Government China Cyber Analyst, January 9, 2025.

146 Cyber Treat Research Team, “A comprehensive Analysis of I-Soon’s Commercial Offering,” HarfangLab, March 1, 2024, https://harfanglab.io/insidethelab/isoon-leak-analysis/.

147 DeSombre Bernsen, “Same Same, but Different.”

148 DOJ Office of Public Affairs, “Seven International Cyber Defendants, Including ‘Apt41’ Actors, Charged in Connection with Computer Intrusion Campaigns Against More Than 100 Victims Globally,” release [archives], US Department of Justice, September 16, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/seven-international-cyber-defendants-including-apt41-actors-charged-connection-computer; Natto Team, “i-SOON: Kicking off the Year of the Dragon with Good Luck … or Not,” Natto Thoughts [Substack newsletter], February 28, 2024, https://nattothoughts.substack.com/p/i-soon-kicking-off-the-year-of-the.

149 Elsa Kania, “AlphaGo and Beyond: The Chinese Military Looks to Future ‘Intelligentized’ Warfare,” Lawfare, June 5, 2017, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/alphago-and-beyond-chinese-military-looks-future-intelligentized-warfare.

150 Derek B. Johnson, “Chinese Hackers Turn to AI to Meddle in Elections, CyberScoop, April 5, 2024, https://cyberscoop.com/microsoft-ai-election-taiwan/.

151 Dakota Cary, “Academics, AI, and APTs. How Six Advanced Persistent Threat-Connected Chinese Universities are Advancing AI Research,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, March 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/academics-ai-and-apts/.

152 Dave Aitel et al., China’s Cyber Operations: The Rising Threat to American Security, Margin Research, August 20, 2022, https://margin.re/content/files/2024/02/China-s-Cyber-Operations-Full-Report-Updated.pdf.

153 Kelly Ng et al., “DeepSeek: The Chinese AI App that Has the World Talking,” BBC News, February 4, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yv5976z9po.

154 Dakota Cary and Eugenio Benincasa, Capture the (Red) Flag: An Inside Look into China’s Hacking Contest Ecosystem, Atlantic Council, October 18, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/capture-the-red-flag-an-inside-look-into-chinas-hacking-contest-ecosystem/.

155 Remco Zwetsloot et al., “China is Fast Outpacing U.S. STEM PhD Growth,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, August 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-is-fast-outpacing-u-s-stem-phd-growth/; Brendan Oliss, Cole McFaul, and Jaret C. Riddick, “The Global Distribution of STEM Graduates: Which Countries Lead the Way?” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, November 27, 2023, https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/the-global-distribution-of-stem-graduates-which-countries-lead-the-way/; Melanie Hanson, “College Graduation Statistics,” Education Data Initiative, March 15, 2024 [update], https://educationdata.org/number-of-college-graduates.

156 On background Interview, U.S. Government China Cyber Analyst, January 9, 2025. See also information on Real World CTF: Cary and Benincasa, Capture the (Red) Flag.

157 Background Interview, U.S. Government China Cyber Analyst, January 9, 2025. See also information on Real World CTF: Cary and Benincasa, Capture the (Red) Flag.

158 Cary and Benincasa, Capture the (Red) Flag.

159 Eugenio Benincasa, “From Vegas to Chengdu: Hacking Contests, Bug Bounties, and China’s Offensive Cyber Ecosystem,” ETH Zurich Center for security Studies, June 10, 2024, https://css.ethz.ch/en/center/CSS-news/2024/06/from-vegas-to-chengdu-hacking-contests-bug-bounties-and-chinas-offensive-cyber-ecosystem.html, https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000675181.

160 Cary and Benincasa, Capture the (Red) Flag.

161 Wun Nan, “From Hackers to Entrepreneurs: The Sino-U.S. Cyberwar Veterans Going Straight,” South China Morning Post, August 21, 2013, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1298200/hackers-entrepreneurs-sino-us-cyberwar-veterans-going-straight.

162 Scott J. Henderson, The Dark Visitor: Inside the World of Chinese Hackers, Lulu.com (2007),’ https://books.google.com/books?id=NYIiAQAAMAAJ.

163 Adam Kozy, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on ‘China’s Cyber Capabilities: Warfare, Espionage, and Implications for the United States,’” February 17, 2022, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/Adam_Kozy_Testimony.pdf.

164 Ken Dunham and Jim Melnick, “‘Wicked Rose’ and the NCPH Hacking Group,” Krebs on Security, November 2012, https://krebsonsecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/WickedRose_andNCPH.pdf.

165 Kozy interview, January 17, 2025.

166 Kozy interview, January 17, 2025.

167 Gene Lin, “Founder of China’s Largest ‘Ethical Hacking’ Community Arrested,” Hong Long Free Press, March 31, 2020, https://hongkongfp.com/2016/07/30/founder-chinas-largest-ethical-hacking-community-arrested/.

168 Kozy interview, January 17, 2025.

169 Translation: “Notice on Regulating the Promotion of Cybersecurity Competitions,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, May 13, 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/notice-on-regulating-the-promotion-of-cybersecurity-competitions/; Cary and Benincasa, Capture the (Red) Flag.

170 Interview with Security Researcher Chi-en (Ashley) Shen, January 9, 2025.

171 对漏洞治理体系革新发展的思考与建议, 哈尔滨工业大学 (张兆心, 孔珂) / 北京邮电大学 (刘欣然) [Thoughts and suggestions on the innovation and development of vulnerability management system, Harbin Institute of Technology (Zhang Zhaoxin, Kong Ke) / Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (Liu Xinran)], China Information Security Magazine, May 1, 2024. https://www.scribd.com/document/816402725/%E7%94%B5%E5%AD%90%E5%88%8A202405. Corroborated by Background Interview, China Area Specialist in the Vulnerability Research Space, January 16, 2025.

172 Cary and Benincasa, Capture the (Red) Flag.

173 Cary and Benincasa, Capture the (Red) Flag; corroborated by Interview with Security Researcher Chi-en (Ashley) Shen, January 9, 2025.

174 MOSEC 2023, accessed March 16, 2025, https://www.mosec.org/en/2023/.

175 “China, Singapore, United States: Blacklisted by the US, Zero Day Distributor COSEINC Works on for China’s Pwnzen,” Intelligence Online, August 11, 2021,. https://www.intelligenceonline.com/surveillance–interception/2021/11/08/blacklisted-by-the-us-zero-day-distributor-coseinc-works-on-for-china-s-pwnzen,109703349-art.

176 David Sun, “Singapore Cyber-Security Firm Blacklisted by the U.S. Along with Those Linked to Pegasus Spyware,” The Straits Times, November 4, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapore-cyber-security-firm-blacklisted-by-the-us-along-with-those-linked-to-pegasu.

177 Patrick Gray and Adam Boileau, “Risky Business #310—Export Exploits? Wassenaar Says No,” Risky Business Podcast, February 14, 2014, https://risky.biz/RB310/.

178 Matthieu Faou, Thomas Dupuy, and Mathieu Tartare, “Exchange Servers under Siege from at least 10 APT Groups,” ESET Research, March 10, 2021, https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/03/10/exchange-servers-under-siege-10-apt-groups/.

179 安洵信息-专业领先信誉卓著. [Anxun Information – Professional leadership and outstanding reputation.], accessed March 16, 2025, https://web.archive.org/web/20240219105947/http:/www.i-soon.net/pc_partner.html.

180 我国国家情报监督体系构建研究.[Research on the construction of my country’s national intelligence supervision system.] (2025). 情报杂志 [Intelligence Magazine], 44(2), 38–43.

181 Schwarck, E. (2024, November 15). The Power Vertical: Centralization in the PRC’s State Security System. Retrieved March 16, 2025, from https://jamestown.org/program/the-power-vertical-centralization-in-the-prcs-state-security-system/. Note: Operational decentralization should not be conflated with lack of oversight. Vertical leadership of local MSS units, where personnel authority rests with the internal party organs of a higher level unit within the central Ministry of State Security, has been in place since 2016–2017.

182 On Background Interview, China Area Specialist in the Vulnerability Research Space, January 16, 2025.

183 Kozy, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing,” February 17, 2022; DOJ Office of Public Affairs, “Seven International Cyber Defendants, Including ‘Apt41’ Actors, Charged.”

184 Kozy, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing,” February 17, 2022; DOJ Office of Public Affairs, “Seven International Cyber Defendants, Including “Apt41” Actors, Charged.”

185 Background Interview, China Area Specialist in the Vulnerability Research Space, January 16, 2025.

186 Dina Temple-Raston, “192. Return to the Leak that Unmasked China’s Hackers-for-Hire,” podcast transcript, Recorded Future News, December 17, 2024, https://pod.wave.co/podcast/click-here/192-return-to-the-leak-that-unmasked-chinas-hackers-for-hire-a648d800.

187 Dan McWhorter, “Mandiant Exposes APT1 – One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units – and Releases 3,000 Indicators,” Google Cloud Blog, February 19, 2013, https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/mandiant-exposes-apt1-chinas-cyber-espionage-units.

188 Kozy, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing,” February 17, 2022.

189 “Treasury Sanctions Company Associated with Salt Typhoon and Hacker Associated with Treasury Compromise,” release, US Department of the Treasury, February 8, 2025, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2792; DOJ Office of Public Affairs, “U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage,” release [archives], US Department of Justice, May 19, 2014, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor.

190 Background Interview, China Area Specialist in the Vulnerability Research Space, January 16, 2025.

191 Background Interview, China Area Specialist in the Vulnerability Research Space, January 16, 2025.

192 Background Interview, China Area Specialist in the Vulnerability Research Space, January 16, 2025; corroborated by Kozy interview, January 17, 2025; corroborated by Interview with Mei Danowski, Natto Thoughts, January 8, 2025.

193 Kozy interview, January 17, 2025.

194 Threat Hunter Team, “Buckeye: Espionage Outfit Used Equation Group Tools Prior to Shadow Brokers Leak,” Symantec and Carbon Black, May 6, 2019, https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/buckeye-windows-zero-day-exploit.

195 Cary interview, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, China Area Specialist in the Vulnerability Research Space, January 16, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, USG China Analyst, January 22, 2025.

196 Patrick Howell O’Neill, “How China Turned a Prize-Winning iPhone Hack against the Uyghurs,” MIT Technology Review, May 6, 2021, https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/05/06/1024621/china-apple-spy-uyghur-hacker-tianfu/.

197 Cary interview, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, China Area Specialist in the Vulnerability Research Space, January 16, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, USG China Analyst, January 22, 2025.

198 Faou, Dupuy, and Tartare, “Exchange Servers under Siege.”

199 Faou, Dupuy, and Tartare, “Exchange Servers under Siege.”

200 Faou, Dupuy, and Tartare, “Exchange servers under Siege.”

201 Cary interview, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, China Area Specialist in the Vulnerability Research Space, January 16, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, USG China Analyst, January 22, 2025.

202 Cary interview, January 8, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, China Area Specialist in the Vulnerability Research Space, January 16, 2025; corroborated by Background Interview, USG China Analyst, January 22, 2025.

203 On Background Interview, USG China Analyst, January 22, 2025.

204 Dakota Cary and Kristin Del Rosso, Sleight of Hand: How China Weaponizes Software Vulnerabilities, Atlantic Council, September 6, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/sleight-of-hand-how-china-weaponizes-software-vulnerability/.

205 Karen Chiu, “Chinese Hackers Break into Chrome, Microsoft Edge and Safari in Competition,” South China Morning Post, November 19, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/abacus/tech/article/3038326/chinese-hackers-break-chrome-microsoft-edge-and-safari-competition.

206 Priscilla Moriuchi and Bill Ladd, “China’s Ministry of State Security Likely Influences National Network Vulnerability Publications,” Recorded Future, November 16, 2017, https://www.recordedfuture.com/blog/chinese-mss-vulnerability-influence.

207 Howell O’Neill, “How China Turned a Prize-Winning iPhone Hack against the Uyghurs.”

208 DeSombre Bernsen, “Same Same, but Different.”

209 Monsoor Iqbal, “TikTok Revenue and Usage Statistics (2025),” Business of Apps, February 25, 2025 [update], https://www.businessofapps.com/data/tik-tok-statistics/; “WeChat Users by Country 2025,” World Population Review, accessed May 14, 2025, https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/wechat-users-by-country; Emmanuel Oyedeji, “Huawei Overtakes Apple to Become the Leading smartphone Brand in China,” Techloy, January 23, 2025, https://www.techloy.com/huawei-overtakes-apple-to-become-the-leading-smartphone-brand-in-china/.

210 Danowski interview, January 8, 2025.

211 Danowski interview, January 8, 2025.

212 Benincasa, “From Vegas to Chengdu.”

213 Stewart Scott et al., Dragon Tails: Preserving International Cybersecurity Research, Atlantic Council, September 14, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/preserving-international-cybersecurity-research/.

214 Andy Greenberg, “How China Demands Tech Firms Reveal Hackable Flaws in Their Products,” Wired, September 6, 2023, https://www.wired.com/story/china-vulnerability-disclosure-law/.

215 “Vulnerability laws create ‘bug bounties with Chinese characteristics.’” (2024, January 10). Retrieved March 16, 2025, from https://therecord.media/china-vulnerability-disclosure-military-government-dakota-cary.

216 Greenberg, “How China Demands Tech Firms Reveal Hackable Flaws.”

217 Scott et al., Dragon Tails.

218 “China Regulator Suspends Cyber Security Deal with Alibaba Cloud,” Reuters, December 22, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-regulator-suspends-cyber-security-deal-with-alibaba-cloud-2021-12-22/.

219 Scott et al., Dragon Tails.

220 Benincasa, “From Vegas to Chengdu.”

221 Benincasa, “From Vegas to Chengdu.”

222 Benincasa, “From Vegas to Chengdu.”

223 Background Interview, China Area Specialist in the Vulnerability Research Space, January 16, 2025.

224 Martin Matishak (@martinmatishak), “Sutton: ‘ … While We Need Strong Defenses We Are Not Going to Deter the Adversary with Defenses Only, and That, If Confirmed, I Will Work to Strengthen Our Offensive Cyber Capabilities to Ensure the President Has the Options, He Needs to Respond to This Growing Threat,’” X, May 6, 2025, 10:20 a.m., https://x.com/martinmatishak/status/1919759233978945681.

225 AixCC AI Cyber Challenge,” accessed March 16, 2025, https://aicyberchallenge.com/.

226 Abhishek Arya et al., “OSS-Fuzz: Continuous Fuzzing for Open Source Software,” Google / OSS-Fuzz, 2025 (beginning with original post 2016), https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz.

227 “Security Research Legal Defense Fund,” accessed March 16, 2025, https://www.securityresearchlegaldefensefund.org/.

228 18 U.S.C. 1030(f); Justice Manual, “9-48.000—Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,” US Department of Justice, February 19, 2015, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-48000-computer-fraud.

229 “Counterintelligence,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed March 16, 2025, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence.

230 “South Dakota High School Activities Ass’n—United States’ Motion To Intervene As Plaintiff-Intervenor,” US Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, August 6, 2015, https://www.justice.gov/crt/south-dakota-high-school-activities-assn-united-states-motion-intervene-plaintiff-intervenor.

231 DOJ Office of Public Affairs, “Department of Justice Announces New Policy for Charging Cases under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,” release [archives], US Department of Justice, May 19, 2022, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-new-policy-charging-cases-under-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act.

232 Also, the White House Office of Budget Management (OMB) is in charge of designating all IT-related government-wide acquisition contracts. See: Clinger Cohen Act of 1996 (40 U.S.C. 1401 et seq, 1996) in Department of Defense Chief Information Officer Desk Reference, Volume I Foundation Documents, August 2006, https://dodcio.defense.gov/portals/0/documents/ciodesrefvolone.pdf.

233 Trump White House Archives, “Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United States.”

234 Pete Hegseth, “Memorandum for Senior Pentagon Leadership, Commanders of Combatant Commands, Defense Agency, and DOD Field Activity Directors, Subject: Directing Modern Software Acquisition to Maximize Lethality, US Department of Defense,” March 6, 2025, https://media.defense.gov/2025/Mar/07/2003662943/-1/-1/1/DIRECTING-MODERN-SOFTWARE-ACQUISITION-TO-MAXIMIZE-LETHALITY.PDF.

235 Other Transaction Authority (OTA), Defense Acquisition Encyclopedia / AcqNotes, accessed April 7, 2025, https://acqnotes.com/acqnote/careerfields/other-transaction-authority-ota.

236 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13)(A) (2025): “[a ‘contingency operation’ is a military operation that] is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States…” This term has been used to describe Operation Enduring Freedom and other Global War on Terror operations, as well as US operations with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Operation Atlantic Resolve).

237 48 CFR § 2.101 – Definitions (2025).

238 Alternatively, if the secretary of defense simply designates USCYBERCOM’s hunt forward and other offensive cyber operations against adversaries as non-kinetic “contingency operations,” the entire US government could take advantage of its Simplified Acquisitions Program to purchase bugs in the name of contingency operations and cyber defense. However, this would likely be seen as deeply escalatory.

239 Agustina Vergara Cid, “Trump’s Immigration ‘Gold card’ Could Be a Win for America—With These Changes, The Hill, March 7. 2025 https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/5181185-trumps-immigration-gold-card-could-be-a-win-for-america-with-these-changes/.

240 “A10. Operation Paperclip: How German Scientists Were Brought to the US after World War II,” Worcester Institute for Senior Education, accessed May 14, 2025, https://assumptionwise.org/event-5375339.

241 Dakota (@dakotaindc.bsky.social), “New MSS ecosystem numbers from those 324 companies,” Bluesky, March 18, 2025, 9:05 p.m., https://bsky.app/profile/dakotaindc.bsky.social/post/3lkoyj7hstk2i.

242 Adam Segal, “China Has Raised the Cyber Stakes: The ‘Salt Typhoon’ Hack Revealed America’s Profound Vulnerability,” Foreign Affairs, January 21, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-has-raised-cyber-stakes.

The post Crash (exploit) and burn: Securing the offensive cyber supply chain to counter China in cyberspace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

North Korea is playing a key role in Russia’s war against Ukraine

Olivia Yanchik — Tue, 24 Jun 2025 20:33:46 +0000

North Korea has agreed to send thousands of additional construction workers and engineers to Russia in the latest indication of deepening military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang. The plans were announced on June 17 following a meeting between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Sergei Shoigu, the former Russian Defense Minister who now serves as secretary of the country’s Security Council.

According to Shoigu, North Korea will send two brigades of “military construction workers” totaling five thousand men, along with a further one thousand combat engineers. They will reportedly conduct demining operations and help repair war damage in Russia’s Kursk region, which borders Ukraine and witnessed months of heavy fighting following a Ukrainian incursion in August 2024.

This is the latest step in an ambitious defense sector partnership between the two countries that has taken shape over the past three years. Since the early months of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, North Korea has provided the Kremlin with extensive military supplies. More recently, this cooperation has expanded further with Pyongyang sending thousands of soldiers to participate directly in the war against Ukraine. Russia and North Korea signed a strategic partnership treaty in summer 2024.

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The deployment of North Korean troops to Russia was first reported in late 2024, with at least 10,000 North Korean soldiers believed to have taken part in combat operations in Russia’s Kursk region. According to a recent UK Ministry of Defense intelligence update, North Korean forces sustained more than 6,000 casualties during fighting against the Ukrainian military, representing around half of the original deployment. This is an indication of the prominent role played by the North Koreans in front line combat operations.

Russia initially denied the presence of North Korean soldiers. However, following significant battlefield progress in spring 2025, both Moscow and Pyongyang moved to publicly acknowledge the role played by North Korean troops in pushing the Ukrainians out of the Kursk region. Reports indicate that they served as assault units operating on the front lines of the Russian offensive, which would certainly tally with the high North Korean casualty rates claimed by the British.

This North Korean presence is having a significant impact on the battlefield. Ukrainian military officials who have encountered North Korean troops on the front lines of the war acknowledge their ability to learn quickly and incorporate new tactics based on their expanding combat experience in Russia. “They have adapted to modern combat conditions,” commented Ukrainian commander Oleh Shyriaiev. This has included significant progress in terms of drone warfare.

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The appearance of North Korean troops fighting alongside Russian forces came following more than two years of increasing military cooperation marked by expanding deliveries of North Korean ammunition and equipment to bolster the Russian war effort. This support has played a critical role in aiding Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. A Reuters investigation published in spring 2025 indicated that North Korea was providing more than half of all artillery shells being used by the Russian military in Ukraine.

North Korea is also supplying Russia with significant quantities of ballistic missiles, according to a May 2025 report produced by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team comprising eleven countries including the United States, Britain, Japan, and a number of EU member states. The report concluded that Russia is using North Korean weapons to escalate airstrikes on critical Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and to “terrorize” entire Ukrainian cities.

In exchange for providing the Kremlin with manpower and a steady flow of munitions, North Korea is receiving Russian assistance that is enabling the country to modernize its military. Reported upgrades in North Korean military capabilities through cooperation with the Kremlin include Russian funding for North Korean military programs along with the provision of air defense equipment and anti-aircraft missiles, advanced electronic warfare systems, and the further development of North Korea’s ballistic missiles.

By providing Russia with ballistic missiles for attacks on Ukraine, North Korea has gained unprecedented experience in modern warfare. This is making it possible to increase the accuracy of North Korea’s existing missile guidance systems. With Moscow’s help, North Korea is also developing attack drones similar to those used by Russia to strike Ukrainian cities, according to Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov.

The modernization of the North Korean army poses a range of potential security challenges for South Korea and the wider region. North Korea’s participation in Russia’s war against Ukraine is also seen by many as a dangerous escalation toward a more international confrontation.

So far, North Korean soldiers appear to have only participated in combat operations inside Russia. However, Kyiv officials have voiced concerns that the North Koreans could soon be redeployed to Ukraine itself to join Russia’s ongoing summer offensive. Given the lack of a forceful Western response to Pyongyang’s increasingly open involvement in the Russian war effort, such concerns seem more than justified.

Olivia Yanchik is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Ukraine is shaping the future of drone warfare at sea as well as on land

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 12 Jun 2025 21:16:01 +0000

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is redefining military doctrine in ways not witnessed since the advent of air power and nuclear weapons in the first half of the twentieth century. For more than three years, both countries have been locked in a daily race to innovate that is leading to the increasing dominance of unmanned systems. This unprecedented drone war is being fought on the battlefields of Ukraine, deep inside Russia, and at sea. While Russia’s far greater resources favor Moscow, Ukraine’s sophisticated tech scene and vibrant startup culture are helping Kyiv to punch well above its weight.

Ukraine’s spectacular June 1 drone attacks on Vladimir Putin’s strategic bomber fleet at airbases across Russia made global headlines and have led to widespread claims that Kyiv has managed to “rewrite the rules of war.” However, Ukraine’s most remarkable accomplishments in the field of drone warfare have arguably been achieved thousands of miles to the south in the Black Sea.

Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Chief Kyrylo Budanov recently showcased the latest addition to the country’s expanding naval drone fleet, the Magura V7 unmanned marine vehicle. This domestically produced naval drone is armed with a pair of anti-aircraft missiles and is reportedly capable of operating at sea for days at a time while hunting Russian warplanes. According to Ukrainian officials, the Magura V7 has already proven itself in combat by shooting down two Russian Su-30 fighter jets over the Black Sea in early May. Budanov described the operation as an “historic moment.” It is believed to be the first ever instance of military jets being downed by unmanned naval platforms.

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Last month’s destruction of two Russian warplanes was the latest in a series of remarkable maritime breakthroughs that have allowed Ukraine to gain the upper hand in the Battle of the Black Sea. When the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began more than three years ago, few would have believed such a turn of events was possible. At the time, the war at sea was widely viewed as a foregone conclusion. After all, Ukraine had no conventional navy to speak of, while Russia could call on the considerable might of the country’s aged but nonetheless formidable Black Sea Fleet.

This disparity was on display during a famous incident that took place on the very first day of the invasion. On the morning of February 24, 2022, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva missile cruiser, loomed up to Ukraine’s Snake Island and ordered the tiny Ukrainian garrison to surrender. “Russian warship, go f*** yourself,” came the iconic response. While this message of defiance captured the global imagination and became an unofficial slogan for the entire Ukrainian war effort, the incident also served to underline the apparent mismatch between the maritime capabilities of the two adversaries.

During the initial weeks of the war, Russian control of the Black Sea remained uncontested, with Ukrainian attention focused firmly on preventing amphibious landings along the country’s southern coastline. But even at this precarious point, Ukrainian commanders had their own offensive ambitions and would soon send a powerful signal that they were capable of fighting back at sea as well as on land. In April 2022, the Ukrainian Navy launched a bold missile attack on the Moskva, securing two direct hits and sinking the Russian flagship. The attack sent shock waves around the world and sparked fury among Kremlin officials. Little did they know that this was just the first of many stunning Russian naval defeats that would transform the military situation in the Black Sea.

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Since the sinking of the Moskva, Ukraine has used a combination of domestically developed naval drones and cruise missiles provided by Kyiv’s French and British partners to decimate Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian Navy officials claim they have managed to damage or destroy around one-third of Putin’s entire fleet, while forcing the remaining Russian warships to retreat from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of ports in Russia itself. This has severely limited the Russian Navy’s ability to operate in the Black Sea. By spring 2024, Britain’s Defense Ministry declared that the Russian Black Sea Fleet had become “functionally inactive.”

Ukraine’s stunning success in the Battle of the Black Sea has yet to receive the international attention it deserves. By breaking the Russian naval blockade of Ukraine’s seaports, it has allowed Kyiv to resume maritime exports and secure a vital economic lifeline.

Crucially, the Russian Navy’s humiliating retreat from Crimea has also made a complete mockery of the Kremlin’s so-called red lines and has demonstrated the emptiness of Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. The Russian dictator has long championed the seizure of Crimea as his crowning achievement, and has repeatedly hinted that he is willing to use nuclear weapons in defense of his conquests. But when confronted by the harsh military realities of Ukraine’s deadly naval drones, he withdraw the bulk of Russia’s fleet from Crimea with barely a murmur.

The Battle of the Black Sea is far from over, of course. While Ukraine develops groundbreaking new naval drones capable of hitting warplanes as well as warships, Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian seaports and targets merchant shipping carrying Ukrainian exports to global markets. The Russian Navy is also producing marine drones of its own, and is adopting defensive measures to protect the remainder of the Black Sea Fleet. Nevertheless, Kyiv’s Black Sea innovations are a reminder that Ukraine is an increasingly formidable military power in its own right and is shaping the future of drone warfare at sea as well as on land.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The primary role of drones in modern warfare is as weapons. Over the past three years, first person view (FPV) drones have become a ubiquitous feature of the contemporary battlefield and are believed to be responsible for the vast majority of Russian and Ukrainian casualties. This is changing the way the war is fought. Any vehicles operating close to the front lines must now rely on jamming devices, with many also favoring the additional protection of so-called “cope cage” coverings to shield against drone attacks. With larger groups of infantry deemed too vulnerable to drone strikes, attacks are typically carried out by small groups, often using highly mobile transport such as motorbikes or buggies.

Ukraine has also pioneered the use of drones and accompanying software to perform surveillance tasks mapping out the battlefield and providing real-time situational awareness of enemy deployments. This reconnaissance capability is not new in itself, but has undergone significant upgrades in recent years. Accurate and up-to-date information allows commanders to make informed decisions quickly, improving the effectiveness of military operations.

Beyond the battlefield, Ukraine has also transformed international understanding of drone warfare at sea. Since 2022, Ukrainian naval drones have succeeded in sinking or damaging around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet, forcing the remainder of Putin’s warships to retreat from Russian-occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russia’s own Black Sea ports. Most recently, Ukraine claimed to have used naval drones to shoot down two Russian warplanes over the Black Sea.

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