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The NDS’s emphasis on allies is reassuring for Japan, but questions over commitments remain

For Japan, the United States’ new NDS and its emphasis on working with Indo-Pacific allies to strengthen “collective defense” in the First Island Chain provided some assurance. But the NDS also further underlined long-standing questions about the Trump administration’s intentions and expectations toward allies. 

To some extent, the NDS brought a sigh of relief in Japan, given that there were concerns about how the Trump administration’s focus on the Western Hemisphere and the administration’s arguably somewhat softer posture toward China in recent months would impact Washington’s defense efforts and regional partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. In this light, the NDS was reassuring, as it did not completely de-prioritize the Indo-Pacific region.

Still, some concerns remain. Above all, while the NDS suggests that the United States will deter full-scale aggression by China, much remains unknown about Washington’s posture toward the gray-zone situations that persist in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the NDS makes clear its demand that allies and partners “take on a greater share of the burden,” adding pressure on states like Japan to increase defense expenditures and take on a more proactive defense role. Combined with the United States’ strategic ambiguity toward China and North Korea, Japan remains concerned about when and how Washington will respond if a contingency were to erupt. Such ambiguities and gaps undermine progress toward enhancing strategic, operational, and tactical readiness of the bilateral alliance US-Japan alliance, as well as US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation and other vital frameworks in the Indo-Pacific region.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

The NDS’s call for collective defense of the region is thin on details 

From Seoul’s vantage point, two phrases stood out most: “critical but limited support from U.S. forces” and “collective defense” along the First Island Chain.  

If the premise is that Seoul—and other regional allies—assume primary responsibility in the conventional domain, a central question is whether (and how far) that logic could bleed into the nuclear backstop. This would mark, not a “shift” in declaratory terms, perhaps, but a perceptible change in the visibility, tempo, and scope of the United States’ provision of extended deterrence.

At the same time, while the latest NDS and National Security Strategy both prescribe building “collective defense” in the region, both documents are notably thin on how Washington intends to operationalize it. The NDS states that the United States will seek to “make it as easy as possible for allies and partners to take on a greater share of the burden of our collective defense, including through close collaboration on force and operational planning and working closely to bolster their forces’ readiness for key missions.” Yet it avoids specifying the connective tissue—South Korea–US–Japan trilateral cooperation, or other mini- or multilateral pathways—that could be the key means to implement the concept.

None of this, however, makes me doubt that the South Korea–US alliance will keep adapting; if anything, Seoul’s description in the NDS as a “model ally” reinforces that expectation. But precisely because adversaries look for seams, the United States and South Korea need tighter communication, coordination, and signaling—so that capability shifts or posture adjustments do not create deterrence vacuums or generate unnecessary provocation in the region. 

—Bee Yun Jo, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and research fellow in the Security Strategy Division at the Sejong Institute. 

Manila has a ‘pragmatic’ response to the NDS amid tensions with China

The reaction in Metro Manila to the Pentagon’s 2026 NDS has been largely pragmatic and firmly Philippine-focused. The softer language on China has not generated public backlash among government officials, politicians, and policymakers. This is largely because Philippine policy debates are driven less by Washington’s terminology than by concrete security conditions in the West Philippine Sea, domestic development imperatives, and existing military cooperation with the United States anchored by the National Defense Authorization Act.

At the same time, there has been a subtle recalibration among some Philippine policymakers toward a more pragmatic approach to economic engagement with China. This shift has been hinted at by the Philippines’ ambassador to the United States, Jose Manuel “Babe” Romualdez, who has argued that persistent geopolitical frictions should not preclude selective economic cooperation with China. This recalibration reflects growing concern that the Philippines is falling behind regional peers, particularly Vietnam, whose manufacturing sector has expanded rapidly through export-oriented growth and deeper integration into global supply chains. Economic underperformance has also become increasingly visible in tourism vis-à-vis neighboring countries, prompting policy responses aimed at stimulating demand. One such measure has been the introduction of fourteen-day visa-free entry for Chinese citizens, a move widely interpreted in Manila as economically motivated rather than geopolitical signaling.

However, this pragmatism has not translated into accommodation toward Beijing on sovereignty issues or political influence. This week, Philippine senators across party lines signed a resolution condemning what they describe as verbal attacks and intimidation by Chinese officials against Philippine institutions defending the West Philippine Sea. In addition, the publicly disclosed meeting between the Chinese ambassador to the Philippines and Davao City Mayor Sebastian “Baste” Duterte drew scrutiny in Manila political circles. The meeting’s timing coincided with heightened tensions in the West Philippine Sea, reinforcing concerns about political signaling and elite influence pathways, anxieties that have been shaped by China’s prior patterns of elite engagement across Southeast Asia.

—Alvin Camba is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

Australia will welcome clear messaging on China and an emphasis on re-industrialization 

On the surface, the 2026 NDS is a radical departure from its predecessors. Its bombastic rhetoric, political focus, and sharp tone make it an unconventional document and in key areas it represents significant policy shifts, particularly as it relates to European allies and the threat Russia presents. Moreover, while it repeatedly states that it is not isolationist in nature, the document also heavily emphasizes a refocus to its own region through the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Beneath the surface, however, there is also a lot of continuity, and for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific there is a lot in the document to be reassured by.

For Australia, the clear articulation of the threat China poses, the need to deter rather than confront, along with a clear message to China on what the United States considers an acceptable balance of power in the region will be encouraging, particularly as China has often exploited the strategic ambiguity of previous policy documents. However, the lack of any mention of Taiwan or how the United States will view a potential crisis there will create uncertainty and anxiety.

But the acknowledgment of the speed and scope of the threat China poses, and reassurances that the United States will continue to support efforts to stand up to it will be well received in Canberra. The need for increased burden sharing and re-prioritization of effort have reverberated throughout the national security community for over a decade and will come as no surprise to Australian policymakers. Moreover, the emphasis on re-industrialization is a trend already under way there, and the NDS’s language will be viewed as a seriousness of intent on the part of the United States. While the document is simplistic and short on details, its strength is the clarity of messaging and pragmatic views on the reality of regional and global threats. For those in Australia, that statement will be well received.

—John T. Watts is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served as a senior policy advisor to the US Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy and a staff officer at the Australian Department of Defence.

The NDS leaves unanswered questions about what a ‘decent’ US-China peace would mean for Taiwan

Taiwan is concerned about being left out of US defense perimeters and becoming seen as primarily an economic issue, rather than a security one, for Washington.

The clearest sign is that the 2026 NDS does not mention Taiwan by name at all. There is also the softening in NDS language concerning China. The 2018 NDS from Trump’s first term referred to China and Russia as “revisionist powers”; the 2026 NDS no longer does. This raises the question of whether China’s repeated claim that it will annex Taiwan, by force if necessary, is no longer considered an act of revisionism.

The NDS does talk about the importance of deterrence by denial and pledges to “make clear that any attempt at aggression against U.S. interests will fail.” But is defense of the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait still a US interest?

The answer is unclear. The NDS mentions five areas where the United States will prioritize the provision of “critical but limited support from U.S. forces,” and the Taiwan Strait is not one of them.

Furthermore, while it may be reassuring for some to read the NDS’s promise “to prevent anyone, including China, from being able to dominate us or our allies,” Taiwan is not a US ally.

The NDS does say that all nations should “recognize that their interests are best served through peace and restraint.” Is “restraint,” then, what the United States expects from Taiwan?

The NDS also calls for reaching a “decent peace” with China, stating later that such an accord “on terms favorable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under is possible.” This language brings back the long-standing specter of a US-China “grand bargain” over Taiwan. Especially since Beijing has long seen Taiwan as nonnegotiable and a core interest, Washington seeking to strike a deal on “terms that China can accept” is not generating much optimism inside Taiwan.

Yet with crisis comes opportunity. Taiwan’s strategy should be threefold. First, Taiwan needs to reassure domestic audiences that Taiwan is not mentioned in the NDS because strong US-Taiwan relations are now a given. Second, increase Taiwan’s defense spending to show that Taipei is not a security free-rider and is doing its fair share. To this end, Taiwan’s defense spending is set to reach 3.32 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2026, and Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te has pledged to reach 5 percent of GDP on defense spending before 2030. Third, Taiwan needs to contribute to the Trump administration’s reindustrialization agenda. Taiwan has made progress in this area as well. This month, Taiwanese companies committed to investing at least $250 billion in the United States, especially in the semiconductor and technology sectors.

Taken together, Taiwan is seeking to signal that it is an understanding, responsible, and helpful partner to the United States, one that is too valuable to let fall into Beijing’s hands.

—Wen-Ti Sung is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

The post What the Indo-Pacific thinks of the new US National Defense Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Europe is rearming but at too slow of a pace, as countries encounter several structural challenges that hinder development.
• Ukraine offers what Europe lacks—speed. Kyiv has rapidly become a leader in unmanned technologies and other cutting-edge, battle-tested innovations.
• Combining Europe’s long-term capital with Ukraine’s high-speed innovation can help the continent achieve greater strategic autonomy and a military edge.

KYIV—In an age of global instability, the most important dimension is time. In Davos and throughout the continent in recent weeks, European leaders have spoken of the need for a common defense strategy. As European nations work to make this a reality, building joint investment processes in defense technology between Ukraine and the European Union (EU) is not merely desirable—it is strategically indispensable.

Europe is undergoing the deepest security reappraisal in the history of the EU. Since 2022, the continent has shed its illusions about a “stable order” and shifted into a phase of rapid rearmament. Over the past year alone, the EU has approved multiyear defense funds worth tens of billions of euros, launched new mechanisms for joint procurement and, for the first time, begun a serious conversation about defense autonomy.

This is hardly surprising: the United States continues to remind Europeans that they must be able to shoulder the burden of their own defense and rely on their own capabilities rather than await salvation from across the Atlantic. The question now is how Europeans can best accomplish this.

Europe is accelerating its defense industry but running into structural problems

Europe continues to be one of the key technological centers of the global defense industry and is actively investing in military innovation. The continent hosts both traditional defense giants and a new generation of defense-tech companies and start-ups. European states are investing in unmanned systems, cybersecurity, air and missile defense, space and sensor technologies, and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven military applications. The European Union also remains one of the world’s largest arms exporters—reaching sixty billion euros in 2024—underscoring the bloc’s industrial capacity and technological depth.

At the same time, several structural problems continue to hinder the development of Europe’s defense industry and its ability to meet new challenges. Three stand out in particular:

1. Spending gaps. Against the backdrop of constrained credit and fiscal rules, EU member states together spend roughly half as much on defense as the United States does. At the same time, moving toward spending 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense would represent a genuinely revolutionary shift for Europe. A series of statements by European leaders in 2025 have made it increasingly clear that such a change in approach is becoming politically unavoidable. Securing funding is, in effect, Europe’s primary political homework assignment.
2. Fragmentation of production, technologies, standards, and procurement. In his 2024 report on European competitiveness, former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi highlighted one of the EU’s core strategic weaknesses: fragmentation. By preserving the sovereignty and autonomy of member states, the EU has produced a kaleidoscope of defense approaches. Member states operate under different procurement policies and lack unified standards. This problem can’t be solved by simply increasing spending. Without common policies and standardization, Europe risks achieving lower levels of efficiency compared with other major military powers even with nominally comparable levels of expenditure.
3. Heavy dependence on foreign suppliers, especially the United States. As Draghi noted in his report, “The choice to procure from the US may be justified in some cases because the EU does not have some products in its catalogue, but in many other cases a European equivalent exists, or could be rapidly made available by the European defence industry.” This dependence constrains Europe’s strategic autonomy, and it slows the development of its own industrial and technological base.

Europe’s rearmament will cost hundreds of billions of euros. Yet the critical question is not only how much money is spent or what is bought today or tomorrow. What matters most is the speed of the defense-industrial system whose development these funds are intended to support.

What is missing? Speed.

Europe still lacks an adequate answer to Russia’s drone technologies, honed through years of war. In September 2025, the intrusion of nineteen Russian drones into NATO airspace forced the scrambling of F-35 fighter jets to shoot them down, an absurdly expensive response. When unidentified drones disrupt air traffic around European capitals, nobody is certain how to react. Inevitably, attention turns east—to Ukraine, which has learned to survive in a modern drone war, repel incursions of more than seven hundred airborne targets in a single night, and strike back. All this has been achieved through military innovation. As Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said in October 2025, “The only expert right now in the world when it comes to anti-drone capacities is Ukraine, because they are fighting the Russian drones almost every day.”

Many now argue that Ukrainian unmanned technologies are precisely what Europe needs—and could become the continent’s trump card in its hybrid confrontation with Russia. “Ukraine is already helping us and teaching us how to fight the wars of tomorrow. Ukrainian drones destroy 80 percent of targets on the ground,” said Andrius Kubilius, the EU’s defense commissioner, at the Conference on Ukraine’s European Future in November 2025.

Ukraine is often described as a drone superpower: It produces four million drones a year (the United States makes less than one hundred thousand a year), fields hundreds of systems and models, and has logged thousands of confirmed drone strikes on Russian targets. With drones, Ukraine has crippled Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, damaged its strategic aviation, and now threatens one of the foundations of Russia’s power: its oil infrastructure. The low cost of Ukrainian drone technology compared with conventional weaponry greatly impresses political leaders who must approve defense budgets. But the real issue runs deeper.

Defense technologies are constantly evolving: No matter what new weapons appear on the battlefield, none of them remains decisive for long. Within months, adversaries develop countermeasures—new tactics, new technologies. Wars are won not by those with the largest arsenals or the most soldiers but by those who win this race. Europe’s true strategic problem is slowness. The main thing Europe can learn from Ukraine’s defense sector is speed.

At the strategic level, Europe can win any war or technological race—if it buys itself a faster engine.

The Ukrainian precedent: Frontline research and development as a model

This is the first war in which dual-use products—such as agricultural drones and open-source software platforms—are often more lethal than conventional weapons. It has also made one thing clear: Preparation for war must involve not only professional armies, but the entire nation. During the war, millions of civilians joined in the defense of Ukraine, bringing their own approaches and fundamentally transforming the process of developing defense innovations.

Drone production in Ukraine resembles a vast open-source frontline research and development lab. Volunteers, private firms, military units and government agencies all test, iterate, and refine designs on a weekly basis. Strike videos circulate on social media; experts debate performance; thousands of chats buzz with feedback; ideas are exchanged in kitchens, workshops, and smoking areas. This may appear absurd from the perspective of traditional military rules and procedures, but it works.

There are almost no examples of drones built by defense giants remaining effective on the battlefield for long. The reason is the slow pace of adaptation and evolution. Ukrainian drones also do not last long on the battlefield—but the best of them evolve faster than the adversary can adapt to them.

No wonder NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte remarked in October 2025 that Ukraine is “a powerhouse when it comes to innovation, insights, for example, when it comes to anti-drone technology [and] anti-cyber threats.”

European militaries do not operate this way. Yet Europe possesses a strategic advantage of its own—one it can put to powerful use.

Europe’s slow money and Ukraine’s speed

Ukraine and Europe have opposite superpowers.

• Europe is slow but has cheap, long-term capital. Slowness is, in fact, a form of trust: Investors know the rules will not change and their rights will be protected. This is precisely what Ukraine has long lacked.
• Ukraine is fast and unpredictable, but its capital is always expensive. Speed means risk, which means a high cost of capital.

Combining Europe’s capital with Ukraine’s speed and innovation would create a unique dynamic.

Investment is not merely capital; it is a way to synchronize Europe’s pace with Ukraine’s school of fast-evolving combat systems.

Europe’s future hinges on integrating Ukraine into its defense ecosystem

Europe has entered an era of rapid military evolution. Ukraine is the country of the free world that best understands what modern war looks like. This is why European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen now speaks of a new drone alliance between Ukraine and Europe. “Before the war, Ukraine had no drones. Today, Ukrainian drones are responsible for over 23 percent of Russian equipment losses, highlighting the impact of human ingenuity in open societies,” she said in September 2025.

Europe is already entering a phase of practically implementing Ukrainian defense technologies and more closely cooperating with Ukrainian defense-tech companies. This is reflected both in joint manufacturing projects and in the integration of Ukrainian solutions into European rearmament programs—from cooperation on unmanned systems and counter-drone technologies to the creation of joint research and development teams. Notable examples include initiatives to establish joint ventures with Ukrainian manufacturers, as well as growing interest from European defense-tech players in Ukraine’s combat-tested experience with AI- and network-centric solutions. 

The process has already begun. Many announcements have been made about joint investments and co-development of unmanned systems between European and Ukrainian firms. More will follow. It is part of a broader shared strategy.

If Europe and Ukraine carry this strategy through, the continent will at last acquire genuine defense autonomy, making it capable of withstanding any threat.

The post Time matters: Why Europe needs Ukrainian defense innovation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 7, Forward Defense Senior Fellow Steven Grundman was featured in an article on CNN entitled “Trump threatens defense contractors with restrictions while promising sharp increase in spending,” arguing that Trump’s proposed limits on defense contractors’ buybacks, dividends, and executive pay would amount to an unprecedented form of state intervention. In his view, even if the intent is justified, the approach risks damaging incentives, investment, and the long-term health of the defense industrial base.

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

Learn more

The post Grundman in CNN reporting on defense contracting appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• To spend larger defense budgets wisely, European NATO allies will need to develop an ecosystem that fosters innovation.
• To increase innovation and the adoption of new technologies, NATO allies will need to address regulations that too often inhibit cooperation.
• Among other steps, NATO should establish a Defense Innovation Unit modeled after the US organization of the same name.

WASHINGTON—From the specter of US retrenchment to ongoing Russian revanchism, European NATO members must face up to a harsh reality: the Alliance lacks the industrial capabilities to meet today’s security challenges. Their recent promises to increase defense spending, while substantial and welcome, will not be enough alone to change this. 

To adapt quickly enough to confront evolving threats, NATO allies must get the basics right. This means adopting functional and flexible financing mechanisms, streamlining regulatory frameworks, and building production foundations that prioritize scalable and sustainable innovation.

These challenges that NATO faces, as well as the need for the Alliance to get the basics right, are being actively discussed, including at the 2025 Netherlands-US Defense Industry Days conference in Washington, DC, this past October. At this event, organized by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Atlantic Council, policymakers, industry leaders, financiers, and experts discussed how transatlantic allies can accelerate defense innovation while strengthening their defense industrial bases. Below are a few of the authors’ major takeaways from this conference on how NATO can meet these challenges.

Don’t just spend more—spend smarter

Increasingly, the battlefields of the future will be won in the realm of innovation. Building ecosystems to support technology development will require allies to use newly unlocked defense dollars to fill immediate capability gaps and build flexible financing pathways to foster innovation. If done right, these defense ecosystems can allocate more resources directly to innovators, boosting returns on investment and generating cutting-edge capabilities in North America and Europe. 

To do this, allies should take a two-pronged approach to financing innovation:

Accept risk to accelerate adoption. Many innovation initiatives—such as NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) organization—too often fall short because they prioritize immediate return on investment or quick-turn results over long-term innovation development. This places a strain on innovators, limiting their access to seed money and signaling to the private sector that the Alliance does not prioritize lasting defense technology innovation. Instead, NATO should give these initiatives greater latitude to prioritize experimentation and iteration rather than meeting often arbitrary metrics and quotas. 

Protect research and development budgets. From the rise of the space domain to electromagnetic warfare, NATO allies must win not just a single innovation race; they need to win many at once. Research and development (R&D) budgets are critical to this effort. Yet, far too often, as participants at the conference noted, R&D budgets for defense technologies are cannibalized in favor of immediate operational needs, particularly during periods of heightened security pressure. By prioritizing R&D budgets, governments can send a clear signal to defense industries, investment bankers, and venture capitalists that NATO members see investment in defense technology as a long-term and sustainable demand. These signals can help spur greater private-sector investment in these technologies.

To produce at scale, regulate at scale

Current regulatory environments on both sides of the Atlantic are not designed for the speed of innovation or adoption needed in today’s rapidly evolving security environment. Instead, NATO allies must strike a careful balance: NATO countries should impose regulations that protect sensitive technologies and intellectual property while also encouraging cooperation among allies on innovation development. Two main principles should inform this approach: 

Break down barriers to transatlantic defense industrial cooperation. In the United States, having to navigate dense bureaucracy can stifle innovation, hamper collaborative partnerships, and stretch lead times for critical defense technologies. However, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently made several announcements that show promise in this area—including loosening restrictions on defense contractors and emphasizing speed—indicating that the Pentagon will work to streamline defense cooperation for allies looking to buy US capabilities. Despite this positive momentum, meaningful changes to US foreign military sales and armaments cooperation will require sustained efforts to reform these overly burdensome bureaucratic processes. 

Keep agile firms top of mind when writing regulations. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will make or break the next era of warfare. Yet defense industrial and innovation regulations often impose disproportionate costs on SMEs because they are designed only for the largest defense companies. For example, the US Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification rightly protects sensitive data through third-party audit and monitoring requirements. But as written, the cost of compliance with these regulations is prohibitively expensive for SMEs, risking pushing many smaller defense firms out of the market altogether. Therefore, policymakers and military planners must establish more frequent, institutionalized relationships with SMEs to better understand how regulations affect these new players. A good step in the right direction would be for policymakers to apply regulations on a sliding scale, setting thresholds for how large a defense company must grow before it has to comply with certain requirements.

Build integrated innovation ecosystems

NATO should adopt a holistic approach to capability development that marries research, design, and production to turn industrial development into more than just the sum of its structural parts. Three ways to build this holistic approach are: 

Champion defense industrial cooperation. To innovate at the necessary pace, the Alliance must build defense industrial co-development, co-production, and co-assembly pathways. Working industry-to-industry or industry-to-partner, such collaborative efforts can help enable allied industries to scale up production and develop cutting-edge defense technologies. This approach defrays risk for industry, builds stronger transatlantic bonds, and shortens lead times for capability delivery. 

Advance a model that combines expertise across sectors. To build more resilient and sustainable defense innovation ecosystems, allies should foster a defense innovation model that integrates government, industry, and academia. With these three sectors working together, allies can coordinate experimentation, testing, and manufacturing efforts to accelerate development and deployment timelines. Applied across the Atlantic, such a model could replace isolated national pilot projects with a coordinated framework for sustained, interoperable innovation.

Establish a NATO Defense Innovation Unit to spur development. Modeled after the United States’ own Defense Innovation Unit, a NATO version of the institution would help the Alliance coordinate funding, regulation, and capability development. A NATO Defense Innovation Unit would maintain shared test facilities, align technical standards, and guide the transition of prototypes into fielded systems. It would serve as a permanent platform connecting NATO’s innovation initiatives—such as DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund—with national and private-sector efforts.

Building transatlantic innovation ecosystems must begin with the basics: financing innovation wisely, regulating for speed and scalability, and building integrated defense innovation models across sectors and allied capitals. A roadmap grounded in smart investment, adaptive regulations, and collaborative production can transform innovation into readiness.

The post To adapt to today’s security threats, NATO should prioritize the basics of defense innovation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With Ukraine’s Western partners unlikely to defend the country against a new Russian invasion, the most realistic option is to build up Kyiv’s own military capabilities. This process is already well underway. Since 2022, the Ukrainian army has expanded dramatically to become by far the largest fighting force in Europe and a world leader in drone warfare. Ukraine’s transformation into a major European military power has been supported by the country’s allies, who have provided large quantities of weapons and equipment along with the financial support needed to power the rapid expansion of the Ukrainian defense industry.

The growing strength of the Ukrainian military has been instrumental in stemming the tide of Russia’s invasion. Despite holding the battlefield initiative throughout 2025, Putin’s army was able to seize less than one percent of Ukrainian territory while suffering heavy losses. The priority now is to freeze the front lines further and reach a point where even minor Russian advances become increasingly unfeasible. However, effective defenses alone will not be enough to end the war or prevent a new Russian invasion. In order to deter Putin, Ukraine must also be able to strike back effectively at targets across Russia.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s arsenal of long-range weapons has evolved significantly since 2022. Over the past four years, the country has managed to develop a variety of strike drones with the capacity to reach targets located well over a thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Ukraine also now boasts an expanding selection of domestically produced cruise missiles. This enhanced long-range firepower has made it possible for Ukraine to conduct an escalating bombing campaign inside Russia that has already changed the geography of the war.

Since summer 2025, long-range Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory have reached record highs. Ukraine has struck dozens of military facilities and defense industry enterprises, while also paying special attention to the oil and gas infrastructure that fuels the Russian war economy. Ukraine has hit refineries, pipelines, oil rigs, ports, and a number of tankers belonging to the Kremlin’s so-called shadow fleet. These strikes have complicated the logistics of the invasion while contributing to a significant decline in Russia’s energy export revenues.

In addition to hampering the Kremlin war machine and causing economic damage, Ukraine’s mounting campaign of long-range strikes has also had a major psychological impact that is helping to bring home the reality of the war to the Russian public. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin has worked hard to shield ordinary Russians and contain the conflict within the borders of Ukraine. However, with air raid sirens becoming an increasingly routine feature of daily life in Russian towns and cities, the Putin regime is no longer able to control the narrative.

A recent survey conducted by Russia’s only remaining independent pollster, the Levada Center, has highlighted the impact Ukrainian strikes are having on Russian public sentiment. Asked to name the most notable event of the past year, 28 percent of respondents cited Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian cities and industrial facilities, making this the third most popular answer. Clearly, Ukraine’s long-range bombing campaign has succeeded in breaking through the Kremlin propaganda bubble and has made a strong impression on the Russian population.

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For Ukraine’s partners, the objective now should be to boost Ukraine’s long-range capabilities to the maximum in order to equip the country with the kind of strike power that can deter Russia. Numerous Western leaders have shied away from providing Kyiv with long-range missiles from their own arsenals due to escalation fears. The solution is simple: Western partners should focus their efforts on helping Ukraine produce sufficient quantities of drones and missiles domestically.

Ukrainian officials are well aware that the ability to hit targets across the Russian Federation may be their country’s most effective security guarantee against further Kremlin aggression. They are now appealing to Kyiv’s international partners for increased support as they seek to exploit the country’s considerable spare defense industry production capacity and crank up output.

“The modern arms race is not about nukes. It is about millions of cheap drones. Those who can scale up production quicker will secure peace,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha in late 2025. “This requires quick and sufficient funding for Ukraine’s defense industry, which is now the greatest source of defense innovation in the world. We can produce up to twenty million drones next year if we get sufficient funding.”

Throughout the past year of faltering US-led peace efforts, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that he has no intention of ending the invasion. As long as the war is being fought predominantly inside Ukraine, he is unlikely to change his position, regardless of Russian combat losses. However, if Ukrainian drone and missile strikes inside Russia continue to expand during 2026, the economic and social impact may become too serious to ignore. This could force Putin to abandon his stalling tactics and finally enter into genuine negotiations. It would also oblige him to think carefully before restarting his invasion in the years ahead.

Serhii Kuzan is chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). He formerly served as an adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (2022-2023) and as an advisor to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (2014).

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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News of this successful recent deployment highlights the potential of Ukraine’s robot army at a time when the country faces mounting manpower shortages as Russia’s full-scale invasion approaches the four-year mark. Robotic systems are clearly in demand. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has reported that it surpassed all UGV supply targets in 2025, with further increases planned for the current year. “The development and scaling of ground robotic systems form part of a systematic, human-centric approach focused on protecting personnel,” commented Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal.

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The current emphasis on UGVs is part of a broader technological transformation taking place on the battlefields of Ukraine. This generational shift in military tech is redefining how modern wars are fought.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, homegrown innovation has played a critical role in Ukraine’s defense. Early in the war, Ukrainian troops deployed cheap commercial drones to conduct reconnaissance. These platforms were soon being adapted to carry explosives, dramatically expanding their combat role. By the second year of the war, Ukraine had developed a powerful domestic drone industry capable of producing millions of units per year while rapidly adapting to the ever-changing requirements of the battlefield.

A similar process has also been underway at sea, with Ukraine deploying domestically produced naval drones to sink or damage more than a dozen Russian warships. This has forced Putin to withdraw the remainder of the Black Sea Fleet from occupied Crimea to Russia itself. Recent successes have included the downing of Russian helicopters over the Black Sea using naval drones armed with missiles, and an audacious strike on a Russian submarine by an underwater Ukrainian drone.

By late 2023, drones were dominating the skies over the Ukrainian battlefield, making it extremely dangerous to use vehicles or armor close to the front lines. In response to this changing dynamic, Ukrainian forces began experimenting with wheeled and tracked land drones to handle logistical tasks such as the delivery of food and ammunition to front line positions and the evacuation of wounded troops.

Over the past year, Russia’s expanding use of fiber-optic drones and tactical focus on disrupting Ukrainian supply lines has further underlined the importance of UGVs. Fiber-optic drones have expanded the kill zone deep into the Ukrainian rear, complicating the task of resupplying combat units and leading to shortages that weaken Ukraine’s defenses. Robotic systems help counter this threat.

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Remote controlled land drones offer a range of practical advantages. They are more difficult to jam electronically than aerial drones, and are far harder to spot than trucks or cars. These benefits are making them increasingly indispensable for the Ukrainian military. In November 2025, the BBC reported that up to 90 percent of all supplies to Ukrainian front line positions around Pokrovsk were being delivered by UGVs.

In addition to logistical functions, the Ukrainian military is also pioneering the use of land drones in combat roles. It is easy to see why this is appealing. After all, Ukrainian commanders are being asked to defend a front line stretching more than one thousand kilometers with limited numbers of troops against a far larger and better equipped enemy.

Experts caution that while UGVs can serve as a key element of Ukraine’s defenses, they are not a realistic alternative to boots on the ground. Former Ukrainian commander in chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi has acknowledged that robotic systems are already making it possible to remove personnel from the front lines and reduce casualties, but stressed that current technology remains insufficient to replace humans at scale.

Despite the advances of the past four years, Ukraine’s expanding robot army remains incapable of carrying out many military functions that require infantry. When small groups of Russian troops infiltrate Ukrainian positions and push into urban areas, for example, soldiers are needed to clear and hold terrain. Advocates of drone warfare need to recognize these limitations when making the case for greater reliance on unmanned systems.

UGVs will likely prove vital for Ukraine in 2026, but they are not wonder weapons and cannot serve as a miracle cure for Kyiv’s manpower challenges. Instead, Ukraine’s robot army should be viewed as an important part of the country’s constantly evolving defenses that can help save lives while raising the cost of Russia’s invasion.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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Ukraine’s battlefield experience since 2022 confirms that in order to be successful in modern warfare, armies should model themselves on technological giants like Amazon and SpaceX, writes Oleg Dunda.

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Western leaders have hailed progress toward “robust” security guarantees for Ukraine this week, but until Putin faces increased pressure to make peace, Russia will remain committed to continuing the war, writes Peter Dickinson.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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On January 4, GeoStrategy Initiative distinguished fellow Tobias Ellwood authored an opinion piece in Express titled “The UK is woefully underprepared for global war – we must bring back National Service.” He explains that the United Kingdom has grown complacent and argues that restoring mandatory national service is essential amid intensifying strategic competition.

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On January 4, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Wall Street Journal article titled “A New Trump Game Plan Takes Shape: Strike and Coerce.” He evokes the Maduro regime’s ties to US adversaries and affirms the US military’s ability to operate in multiple theatres.

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On January 3, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Politico article titled “The hawks are winning.” He argues that widespread support for military action in Venezuela was driven less by policy conviction than by an awareness of internal power dynamics, with officials mindful of where influence resides within the White House.

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• Executive summary
• Introduction
• A comprehensive approach to defense and resilience
• Key pillars of Latvian resilience
• Challenges and future imperatives for resilience
• Annex 1: Management structure
• Annex 2: Framework of concepts, plans, laws, and regulations

Executive summary

Latvia has significantly evolved its defense and security policy, focusing on national resilience as a cornerstone of its statehood, as analyzed in LVARes: The Evolution of Latvia’s Defense and Security Policy in Resilience Building, a project of the Centre for East European Policy Studies and the Atlantic Council. This transformation is anchored in Latvia’s Comprehensive National Defense (CND) framework, a whole-of-society strategy that integrates civilian, military, and private-sector efforts to deter aggression and manage crises. Key to this approach are legal underpinnings from evolving state defense concepts and amendments to foundational laws like the National Security Law.

Pillars of this resilience include ensuring the continuity of essential services and critical infrastructure, with a shift from mere asset protection to guaranteeing operational functionality through public-private partnerships and an enhanced role for municipalities. Regular exercises like Namejs and Pilskalns test these preparations.

To counter hybrid threats, Latvia formally recognizes the information space as a defense domain, implementing multilayered strategies that combine government-led strategic communications, support for independent media, civil-society engagement against disinformation, and international cooperation, notably through hosting the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence. Societal resilience is further boosted by public-preparedness campaigns like “72 Hours: What to do in case of a crisis,” media literacy programs, and integrating national defense education, including psychological defense and nonviolent civil resistance, into curricula.

Significant reforms are modernizing Latvia’s crisis management, with the planned National Crisis Management Center (CMC) under the prime minister, centralizing coordination and decision-making. Civil-protection measures are strengthening as well, with new legislation for public shelters and updates to the State Civil Protection Plan.

International cooperation is indispensable, with NATO providing collective defense, the EU offering funding and policy coordination, and robust bilateral ties with the United States and regional cooperation with Baltic and Nordic partners. The LVARes project itself exemplifies Latvia’s proactive international engagement in studying national capabilities, raising awareness, and sharing best practices.

Challenges persist, including resource constraints, interagency coordination complexities, evolving threats, and the need to bolster societal cohesion. Future imperatives involve fully operationalizing the CMC, implementing the shelter program, sustained investment in capabilities, and deeper public engagement in CND. Strategic recommendations for policymakers emphasize CMC effectiveness, civil-protection investments, public-private partnerships, psychological resilience, volunteer engagement, and integrating nonviolent resistance. For international partners, continued support for Latvian capability development, amplifying LVARes findings, facilitating resilience benchmarking, and supporting cross-border exercises are crucial. Through these efforts, Latvia fortifies its security and contributes valuable lessons to the Euro-Atlantic community.

Introduction

The contemporary security environment is characterized by an array of complex and interconnected threats. These range from the potential for conventional military aggression to the more pervasive and persistent challenges of hybrid warfare, sophisticated information operations, and malicious cyber activities. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy and its full-scale war against Ukraine have significantly amplified these threats, underscoring the vulnerability of states in the region and the urgent need for robust national preparedness. Latvia’s position as a frontline state of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), sharing a direct border with the Russian Federation, has inherently shaped its national security posture and necessitated a continuous adaptation of its defense strategies, pushing for an essential shift in Latvia’s defense thinking.

The traditional focus on military defense, while still fundamental, is increasingly understood as insufficient on its own. Consequently, Latvia has progressively embraced a broader concept of national resilience encompassing not only military strength but also the resilience of its society, the continuity of government and essential services during crises, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the cultivation of psychological defense among its populace. This evolution reflects a growing understanding that national security in the twenty-first century is a whole-of-society endeavor.

Latvia’s pursuit of national resilience is not confined to a single strategy but is realized through a multifaceted approach that addresses various dimensions of security. These include ensuring the operational continuity of essential services and the resilience of critical infrastructure, actively countering hybrid threats in the information and cyber domains, fostering broad societal resilience through public preparedness and education, and acknowledging the potential role of nonviolent civil resistance. The aim of this report is to systematically analyze the evolution in Latvia’s defense and security policy, particularly its implementation of a comprehensive national defense framework, and to share the insights and lessons learned with allies, partners, and the broader public to enhance collective security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

A comprehensive approach to defense and resilience

Latvia’s approach to national defense has undergone a significant evolution, moving from a primary focus on conventional military capabilities and professional military service orientation toward a more encompassing strategy known as Comprehensive National Defense (CND). Adopted in 2018, the CND system is designed to ensure security and crisis preparedness across all sectors of the state and society, thereby enhancing Latvia’s overall deterrence posture and its resilience against armed conflicts or a wide spectrum of potential crises. The overarching aims of CND are the following:

• Preparing the Latvian population to actively participate in the defense of their country. 
• Facilitating efficient and effective crisis management at the national level. 
• Ensuring the continuity and support of critical state functions, including government operations, energy supply, healthcare, and logistics, even under duress. 

A fundamental and defining characteristic of Latvia’s CND is its “whole-of-society” approach, which recognizes that national defense and resilience are not the sole responsibility of the armed forces or government ministries but require the active involvement and cooperation of every element of society. This comprehensive vision entails the systematic integration of municipalities, the owners and managers of both public and private critical infrastructure (spanning sectors such as energy, communications, finance, and healthcare), nongovernmental organizations, the broader business community, and individual citizens into national defense planning and preparedness efforts. 

A significant emphasis within this approach is placed on building and nurturing mutual trust and robust partnerships between public authorities at all levels and private-sector entities. These collaborative efforts are seen as essential for creating a networked civil and military defense system where each component is prepared and able to work in sync. The success of the CND model hinges on the ability to overcome traditional challenges and foster a shared sense of responsibility for national security.

The whole-of-society approach is further strengthened through the way the CND is managed and its legal basis, both of which are designed as a multitiered framework to ensure a whole-of-government and -societal approach to national resilience. The management structure (detailed in Annex 1) integrates political leadership, ministerial responsibilities, operational agencies, local governments, and societal actors to prepare for and respond effectively to a diverse spectrum of threats, ranging from military aggression to civil emergencies. Whereas the framework of strategic concepts, national plans, legal acts, and supporting regulations (a detailed list provided in Annex 2) ensure that CND is not merely a theoretical construct but a systematically planned and implemented national effort. Strategic concepts like the National Security Concept and the State Defense Concept, both approved by the parliament, articulate Latvia’s high-level strategic assessments, goals, and priorities in response to the evolving security environment, providing the overarching vision and direction for the development of the CND.

This approach also aligns with the direction set by NATO at its 2016 Warsaw Summit, where the Alliance adopted seven baseline requirements for national resilience. For the first time, NATO established clear conditions that member states’ civilian institutions must meet to support Article 4 and 5 military operations. These requirements include: continuity of government and critical services; resilient energy, food, and water supplies; the ability to manage uncontrolled population movements; resilient civil communication and transportation systems; and the capacity to handle mass casualties. In this regard, Latvia’s CND system goes beyond these NATO requirements by also incorporating societal resilience and the involvement of the private sector in defense operations and other aspects.

Alongside NATO’s framework, relevant EU-level initiatives provide significant complementary support for resilience. These include the EU’s crisis-management framework, particularly its Civil Protection Mechanism, and the Military Mobility initiative, which supports development of civilian infrastructure to facilitate the rapid movement of military forces across Europe. These efforts directly reinforce both NATO and national resilience objectives, providing practical tools and funding to enhance collective defense.

Beyond multilateral alliances, Latvia cultivates strong bilateral partnerships and engages actively in regional cooperation formats to enhance its security and resilience. The 2020 State Defense Concept emphasizes the strong military cooperation between Latvia and the United States, highlighting the long-standing and highly valued partnership between the Latvian National Armed Forces and the Michigan National Guard. The United States is widely regarded as a major strategic partner for Latvia’s security and independence.

The three Baltic states also work closely together to develop their collective security and defense capabilities. This cooperation includes joint efforts to strengthen their external borders, deepen collaboration in civil protection and crisis management, combat disinformation through shared intelligence and strategies, and enhance overall societal resilience. Joint military exercises are also a regular feature of this trilateral cooperation.

Nordic-Baltic cooperation provides another layer of security collaboration. Latvia’s comprehensive defense approach shares many similarities with the strategies adopted by Nordic countries, facilitating mutual learning and coordinated efforts. The Nordic and Baltic countries have also demonstrated solidarity through joint statements and coordinated actions, for example, in reaffirming their support for Ukraine.

Latvia’s multifaceted international engagement—spanning NATO, the EU, key bilateral relationships such as with the United States, and intensive regional cooperation—is not merely about receiving security assistance or aligning with external frameworks. It increasingly reflects a strategy of proactive contribution. As a frontline state that has rapidly developed its resilience concepts and capabilities in response to direct and evolving threats, Latvia is well-positioned to share valuable expertise and lessons learned.

Key pillars of Latvian resilience

Since the adoption of CND, Latvia has pursued a comprehensive approach to defense based on an understanding that every element of the government and population plays a part in creating a networked civil and military defense system—and recent lessons from Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression have further reinforced this understanding. This approach grew out of necessity: Latvia, a small country with limited strategic depth, neighbors Russia, a large, aggressive military power that has attacked countries in its so-called near abroad. Latvia’s approach, like those of its fellow Nordic-Baltic countries, is built on a straightforward idea that the country’s civil and military defense systems can achieve a greater deterrence and defense impact if they collaborate and if each part is prepared. Meanwhile, Latvia’s pursuit of national resilience is not confined to a single strategy but is realized through a multifaceted approach that addresses various dimensions of security. 

While the CND concept encompasses eight dimensions, ranging from military development to psychological resilience, our report examines it through four perspectives: military, civil, societal, and governmental resilience. This approach allows for a cohesive, strategic evaluation of the dimensions of readiness without sacrificing the scope of the original concept.

Military resilience

Latvia’s military resilience is a central aspect of its national defense, resting on the fundamental pillars of domestic responsibility for developing its own capabilities and a robust collective defense provided by its allies.

Lessons learned from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine since 2014 have driven initiatives to ensure that Latvian institutions and society can respond effectively to any unconventional or hybrid threat scenarios. Changes to the National Security Law have empowered the National Armed Forces (NAF), from the lowest level up, with the authority to respond to any military threat, conventional or unconventional, even without immediate orders from the political leadership. The law explicitly states that armed resistance may not be prohibited in times of war or occupation and affirms that every citizen has the right to take up arms to resist an aggressor. This legal framework solidifies the principle of total defense, ensuring that the entire nation is prepared and authorized to contribute to the defense of the country.

To maintain this posture, Latvia has steadily increased its defense budget. By 2018, Latvia had met the NATO defense spending goal of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), which has significantly contributed to the development of military capabilities, including within the National Guard. Military resolve is evident in the budget’s rapid growth, which is projected to reach approximately 3.65 percent of GDP in 2025, with announcements indicating a further increase to 5 percent by 2026. This funding is crucial for keeping military modernization on track through the strategic procurement of advanced weapon systems. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Latvia has significantly increased investment in conventional war-fighting capabilities to enhance its deterrence posture. The commitment to acquiring advanced systems—such as High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers, IRIS-T air defense systems, and coastal defense missiles—sends a vital message that the country is serious about bolstering its defense. National resilience also necessitates forging a cohesive fighting force from diverse sources of manpower. Latvia is proactively addressing manpower challenges, most notably through the reintroduction of mandatory conscription in the form of the State Defense Service (SDS). Introduced in 2023, the SDS aims to increase recruitment and build a larger, well-trained reserve force. This policy of eleven-month mandatory service has shown early signs of success. Latvia plans to enlist four thousand new recruits annually by 2028 and, notably, 40 percent of the 2024 intake opted for professional careers after their mandatory service. Current military plans envision 31,000 troops by 2029, complemented by an equally large reserve contingent thereafter. However, this rapid expansion presents significant challenges. The primary obstacles include a lack of sufficient modern training infrastructure to accommodate the larger number of recruits, a shortage of qualified instructors to lead the training, and the immense organizational task of building a functional reserve system that can effectively manage and retrain thousands of new reservists annually after their active service ends. Successfully overcoming these hurdles is critical to ensuring the SDS translates into a genuine increase in combat-ready forces.

Advanced capabilities and increased manpower are only effective if they are maintained at a high state of readiness. This is achieved through a rigorous schedule of military exercises designed to test plans and ensure interoperability. The flagship event is the annual Comprehensive Defense Exercise “Namejs,” which tests the armed forces in joint operations at every level.

These exercises are crucial for more than just military units, serving as the primary mechanism for implementing the whole-of-society defense concept in practice. During Namejs, the NAF systematically drills its cooperation with the civilian sector. This includes collaborating with municipalities and state-owned companies to support military mobility and countermobility efforts, and working with private-sector entrepreneurs on resource mobilization. Similarly, through this whole-of-society approach, Latvia has demonstrated both ingenuity and cooperation. It is exemplified by efforts to formalize the roles of civilian groups in national defense, such as the involvement of hunters in the national defense system—a patriotic and armed segment of society that can be integrated with the National Guard and tasked with support assignments. As comprehensive defense evolves into a societal reality, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia.

Civil resilience

Civil resilience in Latvia focuses on the comprehensive preparedness of its civilian structures and population, encompassing robust civil-defense planning across all government levels, from national ministries to local municipalities. This emphasis recognizes the critical role of municipalities in fostering a society-wide culture of preparedness and resilience.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine beginning in 2014 and 2022 deeply reverberated across Latvian society, creating significant momentum for action. The latter created public demand that pushed local governments beyond mere declaratory contingency plans to proactively explain preparedness strategies to their constituents. Latvia has adopted the necessary legislative basis that mandates that Latvian municipalities ensure the continuity of essential services during crises or war, therefore actively participating in developing a society-wide culture of preparedness and resilience.

Another key aspect of civil resilience involves ensuring the continuity of essential services and protecting critical infrastructure. Latvia has strategically shifted its crisis-management thinking from solely focusing on infrastructure protection to prioritizing the uninterrupted delivery of essential services and functions. While this shift presents additional planning challenges, it stems from the understanding that critical infrastructure cannot operate in isolation from broader national defense factors; it is rendered ineffective without skilled personnel, operational processes, and supporting services vital for its functioning. Businesses are consequently required to develop robust continuity plans.

The ability to ensure the flow of money for goods and services constitutes another critical service. Societal upheavals, crises, and wars often disrupt peacetime payment systems, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s experience. To address this, the Bank of Latvia (which is analogous to the US Federal Reserve) is developing crisis payment solutions, both cash and noncash, for a society with a high adoption rate for noncash transactions. For example, the Bank of Latvia is collaborating with major commercial banks to develop approved offline solutions, ensuring individuals can use their bank cards for basic necessities even if bank communications are down. Similarly, during a crisis or war, banks are required to maintain a predefined network of ATMs, with at least one ATM per municipal center, and have developed a map of critical ATMs that would operate in case of crisis.

Latvia also has proactively sought to improve the integrity of its communications systems. This involves ensuring that critical data—including sensitive healthcare, defense, security, and economic data—remains within Latvian territory and that critical information technology systems continue to function without interruption even if the connection to the global internet is disrupted. To achieve this, the government now mandates that national and municipal institutions, companies, and owners/managers of critical IT infrastructure prioritize using a single national internet exchange point, GLV-IX, a statewide and state-operated local internet ecosystem, for their data flows if the outer perimeter of electronic communications is compromised.

Finally, Latvia has actively addressed two common challenges in building preparedness: improving the communication of preparedness requirements and funding resilience efforts. Many national governments struggle with effectively communicating military crisis and war preparedness expectations to municipalities and private industries. While both disseminating information and issuing legislation are important, these efforts must be augmented by activities that encourage thoughtful planning, accurate understanding of requirements, and knowledge development. Indeed, Latvian municipalities have sometimes voiced concerns about insufficient resources for civil preparedness, arguing it should be a national responsibility. Similarly, even large, well-funded hospitals struggle to meet the three-month supply requirement for medicine and supplies, while smaller hospitals lack adequate funding altogether.

Latvia has sought to address these questions through legislative changes, clarifying responsibilities and tasks, and mandating regular exercises. Over time, continuous cooperation and the mandatory requirement of yearly exercises are expected to foster a better understanding of the overall defense system, individual roles within it, and mutual expectations among all parties involved. Regular exercise schedules significantly benefit Latvia’s preparedness across sectors by stress testing developed plans, building knowledge, and informing participants about potential organizational challenges during a military crisis or war. For example, the yearly state-wide comprehensive defense exercises Namejs involve municipalities, allied forces, and local companies playing out different scenarios alongside the National Armed Forces. On a local level, Pilskalns exercises, in use since 2020, test municipalities’ planning and practical response capabilities under wartime scenarios, involving national and local institutions, the NAF, and local companies. These exercises are crucial for stress testing plans, identifying gaps, and building practical experience among all involved parties. Ultimately, however, private enterprises are expected to fund their own preparedness planning and implementation activities.

Societal resilience

Societal resilience in Latvia is built on the principle that national security is a shared responsibility that extends to every citizen, empowering individuals with the practical knowledge and tools needed to withstand a crisis. The government has fostered a “culture of readiness” through regular information campaigns and hands-on materials that include tips to spot false information.

The most visible example of this is Latvia’s “72-hour preparedness guide,” a practical tool aimed at bolstering individual and, by extension, societal resilience. This campaign advises citizens on how to be self-sufficient for the first seventy-two hours of a crisis, a critical period before state emergency services may be able to provide widespread assistance. The booklet provides practical guidance on reliable information sources, identifying and countering disinformation, essential supplies to stock like water and food, preparing an emergency kit, and developing a family crisis action plan. This proactive approach is rooted in both general emergency-management principles and Latvia’s specific geopolitical and historical context. It not only promotes self-sufficiency that reduces the immediate burden on state resources, but also empowers citizens with concrete actions they can take, which reduces feelings of helplessness and fosters a sense of control and readiness. Public preparedness campaigns like this booklet encourage citizens to volunteer and self-organize, which are foundational elements for any form of collective resistance. The State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD) plays a vital role in this public preparedness effort by actively informing the population on safety measures. To significantly enhance these capabilities, Latvia fully implemented a national cell broadcast system in early 2025. This modern alert system allows the VUGD to instantly send critical warnings directly to all mobile phones within a specific geographic area during an emergency, functioning without requiring users to install an application. This technology provides an immediate and widespread communication layer, complementing existing tools like sirens and the “112 Latvija” mobile application, which is also promoted by the VUGD as a key resource for emergency information.

These practical and educational efforts are underpinned by a broader national defense strategy that formally acknowledges psychological defense and nonviolent civil resistance as crucial components of CND. A noteworthy aspect of Latvia’s posture is the formal integration of nonviolent civil

resistance, where the 2020 State Defense Concept explicitly includes “nonviolent civil resistance against occupation forces” as a component of the societal dimension of “total defense.” This signifies a preparedness to resist aggression through a wide spectrum of means, not limited to armed conflict. This is, in large part, a direct response to Russia’s information manipulation and its treatment of the information space as a critical front. Securing an open media space and bolstering psychological resilience against manipulation is now a paramount security goal, involving the cultivation of critical thinking skills to withstand attempts to sow discord.  

To defend this front, Latvia employs a multilayered approach. The state has bolstered strategic communication resources, with a dedicated unit under the State Chancellery that coordinates messaging and works to disarm foreign malign information activities. Quality journalism is supported by funding and policy, and authorities have banned most of the Russian propaganda channels. In 2021, Latvia became the first Baltic state to prosecute individuals for willfully spreading dangerous falsehoods as per the criminal law, though there have been few convictions due to legal ambiguity in Article 231 around the definition of “fake news.” This state-led approach is complemented by a vibrant ecosystem of nongovernmental organizations, academics, and volunteers—such as the “Baltic elves”—who actively debunk falsehoods. Investigative journalists, fact-checkers, and initiatives like the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence also work to expose disinformation and promote high standards in journalism.

At the community level, these principles are put into practice through societal and municipality-led initiatives. Continuing work started in the previous year, the Riga municipality has organized a cycle of seven practical civil-defense seminars across various city neighborhoods. During the workshops, residents learn about specific risks in their area, such as nearby high-risk objects and evacuation routes, as identified by the Riga city municipality. They also receive practical training on how to: adapt a basement into a safe shelter; properly assemble a seventy-two-hour emergency bag; and build mental resilience with psychological self-help techniques.

To address the wider Russian threat to Western society, Latvia is sharing what it is learning with its allies and partners. It hosts NATO’s Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, and it works with allies and partners to combat malign influence. Examples of this kind of cooperation are IREX (International Research and Exchanges Board), which conducts media training in the Baltic area, and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, which investigates disinformation and debunks narratives, educates media consumers, and has had staff based in Latvia since 2017.

Governmental resilience

Governmental resilience is the central pillar that ensures the state can continue to lead and function during a crisis, providing the necessary command, control, and coordination within the CND system. This is achieved through a robust legal framework, a clear institutional hierarchy, contingency and crisis-response planning, and a commitment to testing these plans through regular exercises to guarantee the continuity of government.

The crisis-management system of Latvia is multilayered. The State Civil Protection Plan clearly outlines the responsibilities and leading roles of all state institutions in case of state-level contingencies. The system is designed to be flexible; for example, the Ministry of Health has the leading role and responsibility for management of pandemics, as was the case with COVID-19, with all institutions (including the armed forces) supporting these efforts. Meanwhile, in the case of a military threat or war, civilian institutions have the role of supporting the armed forces and ensuring continuity of governance and essential services. At the practical level, the system envisions the establishment of the Civil Protection Operational Management Centre (abbreviated in Latvian as CAOVC), that is formed in case of state-level contingencies, including war. It would be led by the Ministry of the Interior and composed of delegated experts from across the government, tasking it with coordinating interinstitutional response, compiling a comprehensive situational picture, and providing support to the NAF.

This role is to be complemented by municipal-level responsibility through the establishment of municipal civil-protection commissions that are obliged to plan and execute response activities on a regional level, as well as coordinate with state-level efforts.

The “Kristaps” series involves the Cabinet of Ministers in simulating strategic decision-making, as well as NATO Crisis Management Exercises (CMX), while the operational comprehensive defense exercise Namejs includes tests of civil-military cooperation, the practical implementation of civil defense plans, and the coordination functions of the planned CAOVC.

Latvia’s current push to improve its crisis-management system and governmental resilience is a direct response to lessons learned from a series of major crises. The COVID-19 pandemic served as a stark, real-world test of cross-sectoral crisis management, exposing significant shortcomings in interministerial coordination, public communication, and the ability to manage state material reserves effectively. The 2021 hybrid attack and instrumentalization of migration organized by Belarus on the EU’s eastern border tested the state’s ability to coordinate a response between interior, defense, and foreign policy bodies under “gray zone” threat conditions that are, as another Atlantic Council report put it, diffuse and hard to attribute. Most significantly, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022 has provided an invaluable, albeit grim, case study in the requirements of modern national defense. It underscored the absolute necessity of a resilient government able to overcome the massive scale of civil-defense challenges and pervasive hybrid threats. These events collectively created a clear need for reevaluation and reform of the crisis-management system in Latvia, highlighting systemic challenges in achieving effective horizontal coordination across ministries.

To resolve these issues, Latvia is establishing a new centralized National Crisis Management Center (CMC). The concept for the CMC, approved by the government in early 2025, represents the keystone of the nation’s reformed resilience architecture. Its creation is a direct answer to the lessons learned from past crises, designed to provide the professional, permanent, and agile coordination that was previously lacking. Operating under the direct authority of the prime minister, the CMC is designed to provide a single, empowered hub for analysis, planning, and, crucially, to improve coordination in crisis management between key state institutions, especially in complex threat scenarios, and provide support to decision-makers and political leadership.

The core functions of the CMC will include: continuous monitoring of the situation and information gathering; identifying potential risks and threats; conducting analysis of information and data to assess these risks and threats; strategic planning and coordination of operational planning; coordinating the planning, logistics, and recovery of state-level civilian crisis-management resources, including state material reserves; and coordinating crisis-communication efforts. Meanwhile, in the specific context of a military crisis, the CMC will be responsible for coordinating the civilian sector’s response and ensuring seamless cooperation with the military sector.

In essence, this new structure, continuously validated through planning and exercises, aims to ensure the leadership and effective whole-of-government coordination deemed essential for navigating these complex security challenges.

Challenges and future imperatives for resilience

Latvia has been systematically working to integrate all societal elements into its national defense posture, particularly since 2014. This ongoing effort, while showing significant progress, presents a range of challenges and necessitates clear future developments to ensure sustained and enhanced security in a complex geopolitical landscape.

Latvia’s commendable strides in building a comprehensive national resilience model are met with several persistent and evolving challenges; therefore, for the continued evolution and strengthening of Latvian resilience it is crucial to address them in a timely manner:

1. Building and maintaining robust military defense capabilities. Maintaining momentum in military modernization programs and ensuring the capacity to sustain combat operations beyond an initial phase are crucial for credible deterrence and defense. This includes addressing the timeline for military buildup in relation to potential Russian force reconstitution. While Latvia’s defense spending is projected to reach 3.45 percent of GDP in 2025, with ambitions for 5 percent by 2026, efficient allocation across diverse needs—from military modernization to civil protection and societal programs—remains a complex undertaking. This financial strain also impacts critical infrastructure operators and municipalities tasked with new preparedness responsibilities. Therefore, continued investment in critical military capabilities, including air defense, coastal defense systems (like Naval Strike Missile systems), and long-range precision fires (HIMARS) should be pursued.
2. Expanding the National Armed Forces. Planned expansions of the NAF and the full implementation of the State Defense Service face manpower constraints, requiring substantial investment in training infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative recruitment policies. The current reserve system also requires significant overhaul. Latvia should continue the expansion of the NAF, overhaul the reserve system to effectively integrate SDS graduates, and implement both dedicated reservist training and early military education. Ensuring adequate infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative policies for recruitment and training is crucial.
3. Developing targeted strategies for critical areas. The development of industry-specific expertise for business and service continuity, particularly for critical infrastructure, can be a bottleneck. Cultivation of a deeper culture of shared responsibility with the private sector through targeted incentives, joint training programs, and secure information-sharing platforms should be continued. Additionally, mechanisms for improving intermunicipal coordination and resource sharing can alleviate the burden or strain associated with this issue. Latvia should also move beyond awareness campaigns to foster active participation, skill building, and a sense of ownership among the citizenry. Relatively low levels of public trust in certain state institutions can potentially hinder the full engagement of society in defense and resilience efforts. Actively integrating civilian agencies, businesses, and citizens into national resilience and defense planning through practical taskings and drills could help resolve this challenge. A primary challenge is also extending the intensity of preparedness from military threat scenarios to encompass nonmilitary crises across all civilian institutions. Intermunicipal coordination, particularly in resource sharing, needs strengthening. Consistent funding for new municipal responsibilities in civil defense is also a point of discussion, which the municipalities have on previous occasions cited as one of the reasons for their inability to build up civil defense capacities.
4. Interagency coordination and centralized leadership. Ensuring seamless collaboration and clear, consistent communication of preparedness requirements across all sectors and among numerous actors remains a continuous task. Latvia faces persistent interagency coordination complexities. While the spirit of comprehensive national defense promotes collaboration, the practicalities of aligning different ministries, agencies, and even different levels of government can be challenging. Each entity has its own priorities, budgets, and institutional cultures. The MoD, while a key actor, cannot guarantee or ensure the engagement and resource commitments of other ministries. Effective comprehensive national defense requires a process led by a centralized authority with the power to direct and synchronize efforts across government—ideally the prime minister’s office or a dedicated high-level body. This is especially true for distributing tasks effectively among ministries and bodies of equivalent hierarchical power. Therefore, the establishment of the new Crisis Management Center is a promising development that could further leadership in the implementation of comprehensive national defense and serve as a central actor for confronting crisis situations. However, its mandate, authority, and resourcing will be critical. It must be empowered to not just coordinate but also to direct and enforce; it also must avoid becoming yet another silo and instead act as a true hub for national crisis response and comprehensive national defense implementation. The assurance that the CMC is rapidly and effectively staffed, resourced, and empowered to coordinate across all government levels, municipalities, and the private sector is paramount. The CMC should also be tasked with leading institutionalized, regular, complex cross-sectoral crisis-management exercises. Engaging all nongovernmental organizations and local media more consistently in preparedness exercises and overcoming local political inertia are both ongoing efforts. Effective Comprehensive National Defense coordination across ministries, especially in horizontal tasking, presents difficulties. 
5. Countering evolving threats in the information landscape. Democratic countries like Latvia must counter influence within political, ethical, moral, and legal constraints, while adversaries often operate without such limits, giving them an advantage in proactive narrative projection. Latvia must continuously adapt its resilience strategies to counter new and evolving hybrid threats, sophisticated disinformation techniques, and novel cyberattack methods. Sustaining and enhancing programs to equip the population to withstand long-term information influence operations and maintain morale during crises is crucial. Further exploration and integration of nonviolent resistance concepts into national defense training and public guidance could promote the adaptability of resilience in this area. Latvia’s main approach to countering malign activities in the information space has been blocking narratives rather than proactively projecting its own strategic messages. A shift in policy is also needed from primarily blocking disinformation to more proactive narrative projection by developing and disseminating national strategic narratives that reinforce democratic values and societal cohesion. Expanding media literacy and critical thinking education is still an option; so, too, is allocating more support to independent and local media. Collaboration with allies on resilience benchmarking particularly for critical services, countering hybrid threats, and protecting critical infrastructure could bring about collective benefits in resilience building. 
6. Reviewing the conceptual framework of national defense. Latvia has made impressive progress in defining and implementing the CND concept. However, we believe that the evolution of its conceptual framework must continue to better adhere to the complexities of real-life challenges and diverse crisis situations. As time passes, a review of the initially laid out core principles is needed. A primary concern is preventing comprehensive national defense from becoming a catch-all concept. While its all-encompassing nature is a strength there is risk that its boundaries are too wide and therefore its core purpose can become diluted, leading to a diffusion of effort and resources. For instance, if every societal issue is framed as a comprehensive national defense matter, prioritization becomes difficult and the focus on core security and defense preparedness could be lost. Future work should aim to refine the operational scope of the comprehensive national defense, ensuring it remains a focused and effective framework while clearly delineating its relationship with broader societal well-being initiatives. We need to clearly define what falls within comprehensive national defense and what is supportive but distinct to maintain its strategic integrity. 
7. Deepening societal engagement and cohesion. Latvia should continue its efforts to make its comprehensive defense concept a nationwide reality not just a government policy on paper. As comprehensive defense evolves into a social reality, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia. Although we have seen great examples of civil engagement from businesses in actively pursuing their role in the defense system, challenges remain with broad-based individual and community-level engagement. Latvia, for various historical and societal reasons, doesn’t always exhibit the strong deeply embedded community culture seen in some other nations. This can make reaching individuals and fostering grassroots resilience initiatives more challenging. Simply put, many individuals may not yet fully internalize their role or feel connected to a local preparedness network. Achieving genuine societal cohesion and developing the resilience of individuals within their respective communities must become a more pronounced strategic goal. This requires more than just information campaigns. It means investing in local leadership development, supporting community-based organizations, designing exercises that actively involve ordinary citizens in practical ways, and perhaps leveraging existing structures like schools, cultural centers, or even hobby groups to build networks of mutual support and preparedness. The aim should be to empower individuals and communities to self-mobilize for constructive action in crisis rather than relying solely on top-down directives.
8. Continued advocacy for enhanced support from NATO, the EU, the United States, and regional allies for Latvia’s capability development, military modernization, joint exercises, and resilience projects is crucial, as is maximizing the prepositioning of allied military equipment and stocks. The current strategic window, while Russian forces are degraded by the war in Ukraine, should be used to rapidly build up defense capacity and societal resilience, secure continued US commitment, generate a greater NATO forward presence, deepen regional integration, and refine reinforcement mechanisms. Other regional resilience priorities include transitioning the Baltic defense line from a concept to a concrete reality with fortified positions, leveraging natural terrain, and ensuring forces train to fight effectively from these prepared positions.

Editors: Armands Astukevičs, Elīna Vrobļevska.

Contributors: Mārcis Balodis, Hans Binnendijk, Marta Kepe, Beniamino Irdi.

Annex 1: Management structure

A. Strategy and policy level

President of Latvia and National Security Council (NSC): The president, as NAF supreme commander, chairs the NSC. The NSC, comprising top state officials and security heads, advises and coordinates on national security and defense, and offers recommendations to the Saeima (see below) and Cabinet.

Saeima (Parliament): Enacts national security, defense, and civil-protection laws; approves key strategic concepts (National Security Concept, State Defense Concept); and provides parliamentary oversight.

Key committees:

• National Security Committee: Prepares national security policy documents for Saeima approval.
  • Defense, Internal Affairs and Corruption Prevention Committee: Oversees relevant ministries, legislation, and budgets.
  • Comprehensive National Defense Subcommittee: Monitors government implementation of Comprehensive National Defense (CND) elements within the National Security and State Defense Concepts.
  • Other committees: May address specific CND implementation aspects as needed.

Cabinet of Ministers (CoM): The highest executive body, implementing national CND policy, approving strategic plans and regulations, allocating resources, and directing ministries.

Key bodies:

• Crisis Management Centre (CMC): Concept approval in early 2025; planned to be fully operational when legislation has been passed. Envisioned as the central, national crisis-management coordinator (monitoring, analysis, strategic planning. Its potential role in leading overall CND coordination is under active discussion.
  • Ministerial-Level Working Group for CND: Chaired by prime minister or lead minister. Ensures political alignment and high-level interministerial CND strategy coordination.

B. Planning and coordination level

State Secretary-Level Working Group for Comprehensive Defense (CND): Chaired by MoD state secretary. Coordinates CND plan development, harmonization, and monitoring across ministries at the senior-civil-servant level, translating Cabinet decisions into actionable plans.

Ministry of Defense (MoD): Lead institution for the State Defense Concept/Plan and CND concept development; responsible for military defense, NAF development, and civil-military cooperation planning.

Ministry of Interior (MoI): Lead institution for public order, internal security, and the State Civil Protection Plan; oversees the State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD), State Police, and Border Guard; coordinates the Civil Defense Operational Management Centre.

Line ministries (e.g., health, transport, economy): Develop and implement sector-specific resilience plans and CND measures, ensuring continuity of essential services and participating in relevant working groups and exercises.

Bank of Latvia: Ensures financial-sector resilience, including payment systems and cash circulation, in cooperation with commercial banks.

C. Implementation and operations (state level):  

National Armed Forces Headquarters (NAF HQ): The NAF’s highest military headquarters and main operational command and control entity under the chief of defense; manages NAF operations, plans/executes joint operations (peacetime, crisis, war), and coordinates with civil authorities such as the Operational Control Centre of Civil Protection.

Operational Control Centre of Civil Protection: A state-level coordination body for major crises or military threats; integrates multiagency expert groups and works closely with NAF HQ to coordinate civil-military efforts.

State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD): Primary state agency for firefighting, rescue operations, and practical civil-protection measures; implements elements of the State Civil Protection Plan.

Other key state agencies and services (e.g., Emergency Medical Service, State Police, Border Guard): Implement crisis response and resilience measures according to their mandates and plans, participating in exercises and interagency coordination.

Municipal and private-sector actors:

Civil Defense Commissions (thirty-seven at municipal level): Develop and implement local civil defense plans; coordinate local resources and crisis response (including public notification, evacuation, basic services, shelters); cooperate with regional NAF units and state services.

Private sector/critical infrastructure operators: Develop and implement business continuity plans for essential service resilience; cooperate with state and municipal authorities; may be involved in resource mobilization.  

Annex 2: Framework of concepts, plans, laws, and regulations

Armands Astukevičs is a researcher at the Center for East European Policy Studies in Riga, Latvia. Currently, he is working on his doctoral dissertation on authoritarian regime resilience. He has a master’s degree in political science from University of Latvia. Astukevičs’ previous work experience includes policy analysis and planning in the Latvian Ministry of Defense, where he focused on crisis management and comprehensive national defense issues. His current research interests relate to topics on the defense and security policy of the Baltic states, national resilience and resistance to hybrid threats, and analysis of Russia’s foreign policy processes.

Elīna Vrobļevska is a researcher and deputy director at the Center for East European Policy Studies in Riga, Latvia. She has a doctoral degree in international relations from Rīga Stradiņš University, with her thesis on “Russia’s foreign policy identity ideas and their manifestation in foreign policy (2012–2022).” Vroblevska serves as a lecturer and researcher at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Rīga Stradiņš University. Her research interests include the analysis of Russia’s foreign policy narratives and their impact on political processes, the study of Russia’s foreign policy and the security challenges it poses, as well as the examination of Russia’s activities in the information space.

Mārcis Balodis is a researcher and a member of the board of the Center for East European Policy Studies. His primary research focuses on Russia’s foreing and security policy as well as Russia’s use of hybrid warfare.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Marta Kepe is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a senior defense analyst at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization.

Beniamino Irdi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also the head of strategic and international affairs at Deloitte Legal Italy and founder and CEO of HighGround, a political risk consulting firm.

New Atlanticist May 14, 2025

Inside Latvia’s race against time to build deterrence against Russia

By Armands Astukevičs and Hans Binnendijk

Latvia must convince its NATO allies to commit the necessary resources for its defense before Russia reconstitutes its forces.

Conflict Defense Industry

New Atlanticist May 7, 2025

Lessons from Latvia’s efforts to keep essential services running during a crisis

By Mārcis Balodis and Marta Kepe

Latvia has shifted its crisis-management thinking from a focus on infrastructure protection to an emphasis on continuity of essential services and functions.

Crisis Management Europe & Eurasia

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

Learn more

The post The evolution of Latvia’s defense and security policy in resilience building appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Israel has threatened escalated military action against Hezbollah if it doesn't withdraw further north by the end of the year.
• Hamas has rejected calls to disarm, and no other countries have agreed to forcibly disarm the group as part of a stabilization force in Gaza.
• The central risk facing the region is cascading escalation, from Gaza to Lebanon to Iran and beyond.

As a turbulent year comes to a close, the Middle East is entering another period of acute strategic tension. There is a complex web of players involved: Israel, Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, alongside armed nonstate actors including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and multiple factions within Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces. No one should confuse the patchwork of temporary cease-fire agreements in place throughout the region for sustainable deterrence and peace, as underlying issues remain unresolved and adversaries’ desired end states remain diametrically opposed.

There is an elevated risk of renewed multi-theater conflict over the coming months. This risk is driven by three converging dynamics: Iran’s effort to reconstitute strategic strike and deterrent capabilities, the continued refusal of Hezbollah and Hamas to disarm, and the increasing linkage between regional theaters from Gaza and southern Lebanon to Iraq and the Red Sea.

Israeli leaders have publicly stated that diplomatic arrangements to stabilize Israel’s northern border cannot remain open-ended. Israel has indicated that Lebanon has until the end of the calendar year to demonstrate meaningful compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, particularly regarding Hezbollah’s armed presence south of the Litani River. Absent such progress, Israeli officials have signaled that they may consider military action to be a matter of necessity rather than choice. Israel could also escalate to achieve its goals of disarming Hamas and ensuring Iran no longer possesses a ballistic missile or nuclear threat.

What distinguishes the current moment is not just the persistence of these conflicts, but the degree to which escalation in one theater is increasingly likely to trigger responses across others. With Washington focused on a military buildup in the Caribbean and negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, US policymakers should not take their eye off the prospect of a renewed crisis in the Middle East.

Iran, proxies, and the reconstitution of deterrence

Iran’s regional strategy has long relied on a layered deterrence model built around proxies, long-range fires, and ambiguity rather than direct state-to-state confrontation. This model seeks to impose cumulative costs on adversaries while insulating Iran from direct retaliation.

According to repeated assessments by the US Department of Defense and the United Nations, Iran maintains the largest and most diverse missile force in the Middle East and continues to invest in survivability, underground basing, and production capacity. These capabilities are complemented by Iran-aligned armed groups operating across Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

From Israel’s perspective, this proxy-based deterrence architecture is an existential threat. Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack fundamentally altered Israeli threat perception by demonstrating that Iran-aligned groups could inflict a strategic shock without triggering immediate regional war. Israeli officials have since made clear that they will not allow Iran to reestablish a deterrence environment that sets conditions for similar attacks in the future.

This dynamic significantly narrows Israel’s tolerance for Iranian rearmament and proxy consolidation, particularly when combined with explicit timelines it has set for Hezbollah on its northern border.

Hezbollah, Lebanon, and the limits of state authority

Among Iran-aligned groups, Hezbollah remains the most capable militarily. Independent assessments estimate that Hezbollah possesses tens of thousands of rockets and missiles, including increasingly accurate systems capable of striking deep into Israel.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended Israel’s 2006 war with Lebanon, requires the disarmament of nonstate armed groups in southern Lebanon and the extension of Lebanese state authority. Nearly two decades later, Hezbollah has explicitly refused to disarm, framing its arsenal as a necessary resistance force.

The Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces have acknowledged that they are unwilling or unable to forcibly disarm Hezbollah. Public statements by Lebanese officials and international reporting confirm that the state lacks the capacity and consensus to enforce Resolution 1701 without risking internal conflict.

This reality has increasingly shaped Israeli planning. Israeli officials have framed the issue not as Lebanon’s unwillingness to disarm Hezbollah but its inability to do so. They have also argued that continued Hezbollah entrenchment along the border is incompatible with long-term stability. Since the 2024 cease-fire was signed between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel has been sporadically striking targets in southern Lebanon, and Iran has attempted to resupply Hezbollah with funds and weapons, exacerbating tensions that could reach a tipping point.

Gaza, phase two, and the missing path to disarmament

In Gaza, Hamas remains an armed political actor despite sustained Israeli military operations and international mediation. Hamas has explicitly rejected disarmament as a condition for any cease-fire or post war arrangement.

The US proposal for phase two of the Gaza cease-fire envisions a transition from active combat to a sustainable security and governance arrangement. However, none of the regional or international actors that have expressed willingness to participate in a future international or Arab-led stabilization force in Gaza have committed to forcibly disarming Hamas.

Arab states have made clear in public and private statements that they will not assume responsibility for Gaza if it requires direct confrontation with Hamas. As a result, phase two currently lacks an enforcement mechanism capable of eliminating Hamas’s armed capacity, leaving Israel skeptical that any interim arrangement can prevent future attacks.

This gap reinforces Israeli concerns that de-escalation without disarmament merely postpones rather than resolves conflict.

Cascading triggers across theaters

The central risk facing the region is cascading escalation.

Israeli military action in Gaza could intensify pressure along the northern border with Lebanon. Escalation with Hezbollah could increase the likelihood of direct or indirect confrontation with Iran. Iranian or Israeli strikes could, in turn, prompt the Houthis to resume missile and drone attacks against Red Sea shipping or launch long-range systems toward Israel, as they have previously done in response to regional military action.

Simultaneously, escalation elsewhere has historically coincided with increased activity by Iran-aligned groups in Iraq, including rocket and drone attacks on US and coalition facilities.

These pathways are not theoretical. They reflect repeated patterns observed over the past decade, now compressed by explicit timelines, rearmament efforts, and eroding deterrence.

Policy and the challenge of a stable end state

US policy should help shape an end state in which Israel’s security is credibly guaranteed and regional actors believe that further escalation will not produce strategic gain.

This is an exceptionally difficult balance. Historically, Iran’s use of proxies to establish deterrence has rested on its ability to convince adversaries that attacks on Iranian interests will produce widespread retaliation throughout the region. Israel, particularly after October 7, is unwilling to accept that framework and is increasingly determined to dismantle it rather than manage it.

US policy should therefore focus on restoring deterrence rather than pursuing temporary de-escalation alone. This means reinforcing credible regional defense postures, protecting maritime commerce, and ensuring that Iran and its partners understand that further proxy escalation will impose direct and cumulative costs.

At the same time, policy should define enforceable security arrangements, not aspirational ones. Stabilization frameworks in Gaza or Lebanon that lack credible disarmament or enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to reassure Israel or deter future attacks.

Finally, the creation of escalation management mechanisms that preserve decision space during crises. These include crisis communication channels, regional military deconfliction, and diplomatic engagement designed to prevent miscalculation even when underlying conflicts remain unresolved.

The region is not yet in open war. But the convergence of unresolved conflicts, proxy-based deterrence, and explicit timelines for disarmament has sharply reduced the margin for error. Preventing escalation now requires addressing not only immediate triggers, but the deterrence structures that made them possible.

The post The Middle East is on the brink of a new crisis. Here’s where it could start. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At the June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, allies committed to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense, with 3.5 percent focused on core defense and 1.5 percent on related defense expenditures. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney says his country is committed to reaching NATO’s new defense spending target of 5 percent of GDP by 2035—and his government is also on track to meet the previous 2 percent target for the first time by spending an additional C$8.7 billion ($6.58 billion) this fiscal year (which ends in March 2026). Canada has struggled to meet NATO goals in the past. In 2023, it failed to meet both of NATO’s defense spending targets of 2 percent of GDP on defense and 20 percent of that spending allocated for research, development, and equipment. 

Although there is now support for increased defense expenditure at the highest levels of government, Canada has underinvested in its defense industrial base for decades and will need renewed focus, resources, and support to meet the country’s Hague commitments. How will Canada’s defense industrial base adapt to meet the current moment? Carney has put forward the bold claim that “Canada is meeting this moment with determination and resolve—modernising our defence capabilities, strengthening our industrial base, and reaffirming our role as a reliable partner in global security.” But what must its defense industrial base do to match this commitment?

In late 2025, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative hosted a workshop with government officials, academic experts, and participants from the public and private sectors of Canada, the United States, and Europe. The insights gathered from these conversations helped inform this issue brief, which assesses challenges, recommendations, and opportunities for Canada’s defense industrial base in an era defined by multiple conflicts and increased coordination by adversaries.

Canada’s defense industry at a crossroads

Canada has an extensive list of military equipment it needs to either produce domestically or purchase internationally, such as new warships, submarines, coastal defense vessels, fighter aircraft, and surveillance aircraft. This new equipment is needed for both national defense and to modernize Canada’s military to meet the current threat environment. In addition to renewing its leadership of the multinational NATO forces in Latvia, Canada has needed to strengthen its military capabilities along its three seas: in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans. This comes at a time when Canada is also juggling bilateral border security cooperation and engaging in a major renewal of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in close cooperation with the United States.

Central to Canada’s defense industry is its reliance on the US market and US companies, which supply much of Canada’s defense needs. Carney has often noted that one challenge facing Canada’s defense industry is that approximately 75 cents of every dollar in capital spending on defense winds up going to firms based in the United States. The relative size of the Canadian defense industrial base and its ability to compete internationally for contracts remain concerns as new funding flows to industry at an unprecedented rate. 

For the first time, Canada’s military is poised to receive additional funding through the new federal budget and facing “the uncomfortable position of having so much cash it will be hard to keep up.” This represents a dramatic mindset shift for the military, which has had to cope with deficits of people, equipment, training, and sustainment. Now, with more funding allocated for defense, the hard work begins as Canada tries to use that funding effectively to address gaps in equipment, personnel shortages, and better training opportunities for its military. 

With this increased available funding, the question matters of Canada’s procurement process and how to adapt it to meet the current moment. Canada’s procurement process, sometimes described as “glacial,” has received more attention lately and has a new agency focused on eliminating waste and accelerating the process. At the same time, Canada should recognize the constraints it faces regarding the size and scope of its defense industry; it should instead focus on niche areas in which it can excel, such as the maritime or Arctic domains. Many hurdles remain for Canada to meet the current moment, including personnel shortages in both the Canadian Armed Forces and industry roles. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), in its army modernization report, outlines the challenges facing the CAF to modernize, with at least another fourteen thousand recruits needed to meet the current security environment.

Recommendations for the Department of National Defence

1. Create consistent and predictable defense contracts for industry

A frequent refrain from industry is that the lack of consistency and predictably about defense contracts makes it challenging to scale and expand. A stable defense industrial base can foster innovation and address evolving challenges facing Euro-Atlantic security. The Canadian defense industry contributes about $10 billion annually to the economy and supports an estimated eighty-one thousand jobs. By investing in its domestic defense industry, niche capabilities, and evergreen infrastructure in the near term, the Canadian government can not only meet its NATO commitments but also expand job growth and economic performance. The long-term timeline for this investment in Canada’s defense industrial base will be key—Carney leads a minority government and this inevitably leads to a degree of uncertainty about long-term government commitment. Canada’s defense industrial base will not be able to meet the current moment with a one-off surge in available funding; it requires consistent and predictable funding over a longer-term horizon.

To get a sense of the importance of consistent and predictable defense contracts, look no further than the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) modernization process. Canada has been in the market for a new submarine fleet that is deployable in the Arctic with extended range and endurance. Two qualified suppliers—a German company and a South Korean company—will work with the Canadian maritime and defense sectors to deliver new submarines by 2035. So far, there is no project budget for this initiative, leading to uncertainty from an industry perspective. The Justin Trudeau government frequently made promises about defense spending that failed to materialize. The Parliamentary Budget Office recently quantified past underspending: between 2017 and 2023, efforts to buy new equipment fell short by C$18.3 billion. Ammunition producers claim they need at least C$800 million to open new production lines. Ultimately, for industry to respond to government decisions regarding its defense and security needs, a level of consistency and predictability must be provided, which has been a challenge for Canada’s defense industrial base in the past.

2. Streamline and strengthen the procurement process 

If defense spending is now a given, the question then turns to how the Canadian Armed Forces will acquire the materiel they need. On October 2, Carney announced the formation of a new agency, the Defence Investment Agency (DIA), to facilitate and accelerate the defense procurement process. The procurement process had previously been fragmented across multiple departments, resulting in significant slowdowns in obtaining critical equipment. The DIA removes some of the red tape and redundancies with a centralized review and approval process. The agency has a specific aim to bolster Canada’s domestic defense industry, to empower Canadian companies to compete globally while also investing in dual-use capabilities. This will specifically address a frequent criticism that by the time equipment is delivered it is either out of date or unfit for the current mission. Additionally, the agency hopes to bridge the divide between industry and government by bolstering awareness on both sides of the timelines, costs, and expectations for equipment deliveries.

The formation of the DIA is the first step in an overdue streamlining and strengthening exercise for procurement. As the Canadian government seeks to foster innovation and create national champions in the defense space, it needs to continue bridging the divide between industry and government. Additional work can be done to ensure a role for Canada’s many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in its industrial base, which is critical to ensure agility and flexibility. The current conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the significance of drones, but the next conflict might look very different and, in turn, might require industry to adapt to changing battlefield conditions. SMEs are better poised to adapt and pivot as technology evolves at a rapid pace and ensure Canada’s military is ready to respond to future conflicts. 

3. Balance “Buy Canadian” with buying the right equipment for the mission

Despite the improvements to the procurement process, the Canadian Armed Forces still needs to ensure they are buying the best possible equipment for the mission. As the CAF seeks more expeditionary and proactive capabilities, this modernization effort places a premium on not just buying domestically but buying the best possible equipment. The prime minister’s new goal of focusing investment on domestic manufacturers will naturally come into conflict with the army’s modernization efforts if Canada’s defense industrial base cannot produce equipment to meet its operational needs. In turn, this decision to “Buy Canadian” will impact Canada’s ability to export its materiel and potentially raise barriers to other markets. Canada exports about half of the defense materiel it produces, with 63 percent destined for the United States and a further 12 percent to the Middle East and Africa. Striking the right balance between investing in its domestic industrial base and strengthening ties to international markets will be key to the long-term sustainability of Canada’s defense industrial base.

4. Strengthen ties with Europe

The conversation around bolstering Canada’s defense industrial base mirrors those conversations taking place in Germany, France, and elsewhere across Europe. Indeed, a deepening of Canada-Europe relations has been on display in the last year in response to the growing complexity of international conflicts and crises. This includes a landmark security and defense partnership between the European Union (EU) and Canada, which was agreed to in June 2025. This defense pact paves the way for the two to cooperate on cyber, maritime, and space security, and also opens the door to joint weapon procurement. Additionally, Canada has been proposed as a potential participant in the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program, offering low-interest loans to accelerate procurement and investment in defense capabilities.

Diversifying and increasing the number of strategic partnerships globally, instead of over-relying on a single provider for its defense materiel, is a logical step to strengthen Canada’s defense industrial base—and also spurs innovation and supply chain resilience. Beyond the EU, Canada has sought to strengthen opportunities to collaborate with its fellow Five Eyes members, particularly the United Kingdom and Australia. The newly formed Canadian DIA aims to facilitate conversations with its counterparts in France, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Due to the similarity of their intentions to spend more on defense, Canada will have natural partners in European nations, as well as the EU more broadly. 

5. Focus on doing a few things well rather than trying to do everything all at once

A consistent theme across the various challenges facing Canada’s defense industry—its size, speed, and reliance on the US market—can all be partially solved by specializing in a few niche areas rather than doing too much all at once. Three specific areas in which Canada has both urgent needs for development and the opportunity to specialize are: unmanned autonomous systems (aerial and underwater vehicles in particular); Arctic-specific technologies, including icebreakers; and maritime capabilities leveraging Canada’s three-ocean geography. The Arctic region emerges repeatedly as a unique domain in which Canada should invest more, for both its own national security purposes and for enhancing wider Alliance capabilities. Canada has the most icebreakers of any NATO ally and is working through the trilateral ICE Pact (with Finland and the United States) to build even more of these highly specialized vessels. Capitalizing on the dearth of icebreakers within NATO would give Canada a unique opportunity to leverage its Arctic capabilities to support its shipbuilding industry while enhancing Alliance capabilities in the Arctic.

Conclusion

Carney’s government is taking unprecedented steps to strengthen Canada’s armed forces, invest in the country’s industrial base, and reaffirm Canada’s role as a reliable partner within NATO and the wider global security context. While his government’s approach and announcements so far are laudable, Canada now must turn to the task of how to support and expand its defense industrial base to meet these goals. Without this foundation, Carney’s pledges will fail to translate into improved capabilities and will hinder attempts to modernize the CAF. Time is short, the amount of work ahead is significant, and history will remember how Canada meets the current moment and security environment. 

Fellow

Jason C. Moyer

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Europe & Eurasia NATO

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Climate Change & Climate Action Defense Policy

Report Aug 1, 2025

Defining Canada’s threat landscape: Resetting for a new reality

By Peter Engelke, Ginger Matchett, Samantha Wong

In a changing strategic landscape, Canada must reinforce its national security and confront the threats of geopolitics, climate change, and emerging technology.

Climate Change & Climate Action Defense Policy

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

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The post How to equip Canada’s defense industrial base to meet NATO’s Hague summit commitments appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 19, Atlantic Council Vice President and Scowcroft Center Senior Director Matthew Kroenig published an opinion letter in the Wall Street Journal titled “What Trump’s Foreign-Policy Detractors Miss.” In the article, Kroenig argues that critics of the new NSS overlook the practical roadmap it lays out for addressing core strategic challenges.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in the Wall Street Journal on the US National Security Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

These tensions have resulted in a new geopolitical landscape in the region, one in which any crisis should be analyzed through the lens of possible Russian subversion or interference. This reality is already reordering regional dynamics. The Kremlin’s militarization of the Black Sea has highlighted littoral allies’ vulnerabilities, including energy availability, gaps in the defense and technological industrial base (DTIB), reinvigorated nationalist and secessionist movements, and challenges to maritime traffic and commercial activity. And the Black Sea’s insecurity has implications far beyond its regional boundaries. Most recently, Russia’s drone and fighter jet actions have violated the airspace of Romania, as well as that of Poland and Estonia, demonstrating that Moscow’s hybrid aggression in the region threatens to spill over into equally vulnerable neighboring states.

To help secure the region and deter further Russian aggression, littoral allies must enhance their energy security and bolster the DTIB, those enterprises and institutions that provide the materials, products, and services vital to national defense. The wider Black Sea region boasts vast oil and gas reserves, and new offshore discoveries link the region with the global economy, while pipelines and commercial maritime activity act as a conduit. As a high-value commodity, hydrocarbons are a prime target for an adversary willing to destabilize an enemy’s economy, military readiness, and civil society.

For example, hybrid threats to offshore energy infrastructure could cause considerable disruptions to countries’ entire energy sectors. Romania’s Neptun Deep and Turkey’s Sakarya gas fields are especially exposed to such risks, requiring new technologies, such as unmanned undersea systems, to counter these hybrid threats. The Black Sea littoral states are also vulnerable to Russian-sponsored lawfare and maritime coercion, including the use of floating mines and other threats to maritime traffic and naval operations. Russia has designated large sections of the Black Sea off limits to maritime traffic for the purpose of military exercises, which impede freedom of navigation and commercial activity. These exercises are often unannounced or conducted with little advance warning, reducing investor confidence, creating timetable delays, and eroding the Black Sea’s longstanding maritime legal regime.

Black Sea regional stability is key to deterring Russian expansion into Eastern Europe, where the Kremlin wishes to splinter NATO and widen its sphere of influence. China and Iran are also trying to gain regional influence, leading to greater tensions on NATO’s southeastern flank. As Russia’s long-term goals in the wider Black Sea region are diametrically opposed to those of the West, much remains to be done to advance a counterstrategy. The Black Sea region’s instability demands greater transatlantic engagement across all domains and economic sectors. The United States’ Black Sea strategy, which was proposed in 2023 under the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, has languished. On May 28, 2025, the European Commission submitted a Black Sea strategy, but it is too soon to evaluate its impact.

Over the long term, there is a need for more resilient civil-military infrastructure, as well as for increased military capability and interoperability in the region. While all the Black Sea littoral states will benefit from a continued transatlantic presence, three nations in particular stand out. Ukraine is bearing the brunt of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Romania’s size, strategic location, and strong transatlantic credentials have positioned it to become a military and economic hub, particularly as more NATO assets are deployed there. Turkey, with its burgeoning defense industry, has NATO’s second-largest military and serves a vital security role as the Alliance’s guardian of the straits, as codified under the Montreux Convention of 1936. NATO’s Black Sea states have taken the initiative in the face of growing regional threats from Russia. For instance, in January 2024, Romania, Turkey, and Bulgaria signed the Mine Counter Measures, which creates a framework for joint efforts to address naval mine threats and improve operational coordination among Black Sea NATO allies.

Countering Russian aggression in the wider Black Sea region will be expensive in both funds and political capital. It will also require greater collaboration among the Black Sea’s non-Russian littoral states. While not a NATO member, Ukraine has emerged as Europe’s most seasoned military power, capable of rapidly innovating and deploying new technologies. For example, Ukraine’s use of unmanned systems has inflicted considerable losses on the Russian Black Sea fleet, forcing it to disperse to safer ports and diminishing its effectiveness. In this regard, the Alliance has much to learn from Ukraine, particularly in twenty-first century multi-domain operations.

Whether or not a lasting cease-fire is implemented in Ukraine any time soon, Russian aggression has forever altered the Black Sea region’s security landscape. This escalation of the Black Sea’s militarization has heightened tensions, forcing regional governments to allocate increasing portions of their budgets to defense. All this portends greater destabilization, increased national debts, and the absence of a predictable commercial environment well into this century.

An effective response from NATO allies and partners requires novel and forceful policies that energize governments and private sectors to address key weaknesses in energy security and the DTIB. Indeed, a special emphasis should be placed on the private sector, which has demonstrated tremendous innovation and flexibility in the rapidly evolving battlespace.

While Kyiv’s role as a bulwark against Russian aggression deserves the greatest attention, Romania and Turkey have a major role to play in the Black Sea region’s security, as well. Both countries have increased their defense expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product, stepped up joint exercises, and enhanced cross-border collaboration. But further actions will be needed if Turkey, Romania, and their littoral allies and partners are to help defend the Black Sea from Russian aggression. While Turkey has a generally robust DTIB, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s are underfunded and in need of reform. Additionally, the region’s infrastructure is in need of rapid expansion and modernization, especially when it comes to trade routes running north-to-south and energy interconnectors. Admittedly, there have been positive steps on this front, including the launch of the Gas Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria, which became operational in October 2022, among other successful Black Sea infrastructure projects. Romania’s efforts to increase its energy interconnection with Moldova are laudable, as well. And in December, Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria announced a joint project to build three new bridges over the Danube. Even so, time is not on NATO’s side.

These states and their neighbors cannot secure the Black Sea alone; this will require greater support from the transatlantic community. Moreover, the Black Sea states will need to find solutions with limited US involvement; the new 2025 US National Security Strategy makes it clear that Washington’s attention will be on the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific.

As Russia continues to destabilize and militarize the wider Black Sea region, helping bolster its security will require a concerted focus on informed government policies supported by a robust private sector to advance resilience, capabilities, and interoperability in the face of these growing security threats.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Program.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The post How NATO and its partners should respond to Russia’s militarization of the wider Black Sea region appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This raised concerns among Western policymakers that Russia might shift its regional posture to Libya if its foothold in Syria unraveled, given Russia’s existing relationship with the Libyan National Army (LNA). Moscow has cultivated ties with LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar for nearly a decade to secure access to eastern Libyan territory and military infrastructure, turning Libya into a logistical hub for Russia to project power deep into Africa. 

One year later, Russia’s situation in Syria appears better than many expected in the early post-Assad days. Russia has preserved a reduced but durable presence in Syria. High-level engagements between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa reaffirmed Moscow’s role in the country, and al-Sharaa publicly committed to honoring preexisting military agreements. The result is a more constrained footprint, but not one that represents a strategic loss. 

While its plan B in Libya proved unnecessary, Russia nevertheless has spent the past year building up its logistical network in eastern and southern Libya. Serving as a transit hub, Libyan airbases give Russia the ability to reach deep into the African continent, where it seeds for instability with arms shipments and members of its Africa Corps—a Russian defense ministry-controlled paramilitary group and successor to the Wagner Group.

Why southern Libya became Russia’s new strategic platform

By late 2024, before its future in post-Assad Syria was determined, Russia was actively searching for alternatives for strategic relationships in the Middle East and North Africa. Flights from Syria to eastern Libya, movements of personnel and equipment, and diplomatic visits by Russian officials to eastern Libya were being reported, as concerns about Russia establishing a naval port in eastern Libya grew among Western leaders. A year later, Russia still has not secured a port in the southern Mediterranean, likely because Libya’s eastern authorities are unwilling to jeopardize improving ties with the United States, Turkey, and European partners by granting Moscow a major coastal facility. 

Instead, Russia expanded inland in Libya. The Maaten al-Sarra airbase provides a key example. This strategically located airbase near the borders with Chad and Sudan is a staging point for Russia’s destabilizing operations across the Sahel. It predates the Assad regime’s collapse and is reportedly financed by the United Arab Emirates. But beginning in December 2024, Russian equipment, personnel, and Syrian fighters tied to the Assad regime began arriving at the desert airbase 

Although Maaten al-Sarra is a key location in Russia’s southern Libya presence, Moscow uses multiple airfields as part of its transit corridor to the Sahel. These include the al-Khadim base in eastern Libya, the al-Jufra base in central Libya, the Brak al-Shati base near Sabha, and the al-Qardabiya base south of Sirte. Together, these dispersed locations form a resilient transit network connecting Russia’s foothold in Syria to its growing activities in the Sahel, increasing Russia’s ability to sustain Africa Corps deployments and arms supplies to its African partners. The inland network faces less international scrutiny, requires fewer political concessions from Libyan authorities, and gives Moscow access to remote corridors that support long-range logistical movements.

Countering Russia’s gains in Libya  

Russia’s increased presence in Libya over the past year hasn’t gone entirely unchecked. The United States and its key international partners have sought to counter Russian activities and influence. This has primarily been through a strategy to accelerate military unification between eastern and western Libya, with promises of security cooperation and training. LNA Deputy Commander Saddam Haftar has been the main focus of these efforts to untangle the LNA from Russia’s hold.  

In February, the United States sent two B-52H Stratofortress aircraft into Libyan airspace as part of a joint training with Libyan military tactical air controllers. In April, the US Navy conducted its first port call to Libya in over fifty years with stops in Tripoli and Benghazi. That same month, Ankara hosted a visit by LNA’s Saddam Hafter, and in August, the Turkish Navy conducted port calls to both Tripoli and Benghazi as well.

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly this September, the United States hosted a senior officials meeting on Libya. Participants included representatives from Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. The importance of Libyan east-west security integration was highlighted, as was the importance of modifying the UN arms embargo in January 2025, which enables joint training and technical assistance in support of east-west integration. 

In October, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. John Brennan announced that Libya will participate and co-host part of the US military’s annual Flintlock exercise in the spring of 2026. Brennan commented that “this exercise isn’t just about military training; it’s about overcoming divisions, building capacity, and supporting Libya’s sovereign right to determine its own future.” 

During the first week of December, AFRICOM Commander Gen. Dagvin Anderson met in Tripoli with Deputy Minister of Defense Abdulsalam Zubi and Chief of Staff Gen. Mohamed al-Haddad, as well as with Haftar and his son Deputy Commander Saddam Haftar in Benghazi. These discussions focused on maintaining regional stability, supporting Libyan efforts to unify military institutions, and US-Libya security cooperation, including Flintlock 26.

While these efforts by the United States and its partners have likely nudged along east-west military integration in Libya, it remains unclear if the strategy has done much to counter Russian activities or separate Russia and LNA leadership. Incentives, such as legitimacy and security cooperation, may be insufficient when used alone to try to pull the LNA away from Russia’s orbit. Economic sticks, such as targeted sanctions, may be required too.  

Eliminating or greatly diminishing Russia’s use of Libya as a transit hub for its arms shipments and for personnel to flow into the Sahel would be a significant step toward promoting stability and ending conflicts on the continent. This would advance US President Donald Trump’s peacebuilding priorities, pushed forward over the past year by Senior Advisor Massad Boulos. 

One year after the fall of Assad, Russia’s most important bases in the region may not be Khmeimim Air Base or the Tartus naval facility in Syria, but instead a handful of small air bases scattered across Libya. This represents a key front in Washington and its partners’ efforts to counter Russia. 

Frank Talbot is a nonresident senior fellow with the North Africa Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafid Hariri Center & Middle East programs. Previously, he served in the Department of State supporting stabilization initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa.

The post Russia’s most important Middle East base is not where you think appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The new US National Security Strategy presents a view of US foreign policy that is, at best, noncommittal to the transatlantic relationship.
• In response, European countries should work to develop a new security architecture that allows for bold and decisive European action.
• This effort should be aimed not at breaking with the United States, but to boost Europe’s ability to act alone while bolstering cooperation with Washington when practical.

WASHINGTON—US President Donald Trump’s new US National Security Strategy (NSS) makes clear that the United States does not maintain a shared perception of threats with its NATO allies. In an incredible reversal of priorities from the first Trump administration’s NSS, the latest document spends more time describing an internal threat to Europe from European Union (EU) overregulation, censorship, and “civilizational erasure” than it does the threat of Russian aggression, which is largely absent from the document. While calling for an end of the war in Ukraine, Trump’s NSS clarifies the United States’ position as a neutral arbiter. In response, the Russian government lauded the NSS for being “largely consistent” with its worldview, even as Russia’s own strategic documents consider Moscow to be in an existential conflict with the West.

Rather than lament the United States’ noncommittal approach to the transatlantic relationship, European leaders should instead lean into the NSS directive for greater “burden sharing and burden shifting.” Specifically, European countries should work to develop a new security architecture that allows for bold and decisive European action. This architecture should be based on coalition and consortium models for decision-making, action, and capability development. Europe must also continue to plan a central role for Ukraine in Europe’s long-term security architecture, irrespective of Kyiv’s near-term prospects for NATO or EU membership.  

Some Europeans may hesitate at this idea, fearing that too much political leadership and autonomy might push the United States to further decouple from the continent. But if anything, the new NSS reinforces the need for Europe to develop new models of decision-making to bolster cooperation with the United States when practical and boost European agency to act alone when necessary and where interests diverge. If carried out effectively, this reorganization will lead to a stronger European pillar in NATO, more capable European allies and partners, and a more resilient relationship with the United States.  

Momentum is building for Europe to take on a greater share of conventional deterrence

Even before the White House released its new NSS, elements of a new European security architecture had already begun to emerge. Since Russia launched its full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, European nations have made unprecedented investments in their militaries and have been preparing their armed forces for territorial defense. On the Alliance’s eastern flank, where deterrence and defense are most at stake, NATO’s posture has evolved from a tripwire force of four battlegroups first deployed in 2017 to nine Forward Land Forces, positioned from Finland to Romania, that are better equipped to defend allied territory. The investments made by the lead European Forward Land Forces nations represent burden-sharing in action. 

With Sweden and Finland’s integration into NATO, the Alliance can now operate as a united front from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The quick accession of both countries has put Russia in a more difficult position geographically along the eastern flank: the Black Sea is effectively neutralized and the Baltic Sea has become a NATO bastion. This consolidation allows for unprecedented European military activity and reinforces allied territory against air and missile threats, which have been compounded in recent years by the broken or expired arms control treaties that previously underwrote European security.

As NATO adapts its posture to new forms of pressure from Russia, many of its military activities and operations now rely on European initiatives and assets. This is the case with NATO’s Operation Baltic Sentry, which was launched in January after several allied undersea cables were damaged or severed in 2023 and 2024. NATO’s Operation Eastern Sentry, launched in September 2025 in response to Russian drone incursions into Poland, also relies extensively on European capabilities. Both operations show that European nations can operationalize NATO’s adapted posture.  

And even outside NATO frameworks, European countries and the United Kingdom are creating new dilemmas for Russia. Europeans have continued to push sanctions and are focusing on dismantling Russia’s “shadow fleet” of oil tankers. In October, for instance, French forces boarded a Russian shadow fleet tanker as part of a broader effort to hinder Russia’s ability to illegally acquire revenue.

New defense agreements between several European countries have reinforced a commitment to mutual defense that has, outside of US extended deterrence, primarily existed to date in NATO’s realm of crisis management. In just the past few months, the United Kingdom and France penned the Lancaster House 2.0 Agreement to modernize their defense and security relationship, Germany and France agreed to develop a defense and security council to better operationalize joint responses, and the United Kingdom and Germany signed a mutual defense agreement called the Kensington Treaty.

While these agreements and initiatives affirm the respective nations’ commitment to NATO’s collective defense and the EU’s mutual defense clause, they also highlight European countries’ push to work more closely with one another on security amid increasing uncertainty emanating from Washington. Importantly, these agreements also create complexities for Russia and China, both of which would prefer to deal with a less-intertwined continent.

Coalition and consortium approaches to security

Next, Europe needs to strengthen its ability to take bold and decisive action. The first step in doing so is for democratic European nations to follow through on their pledges to increase defense spending. NATO’s new target of 5 percent of gross domestic product for defense spending, coupled with the EU’s Readiness 2030 plan, gives leaders fiscal and political headway to drive up defense budgets. This will not be easy given anemic economic growth and the strength of populist opposition parties across Europe, but the threat of a revanchist Russia makes higher defense spending even more urgent. With defense industrial capacity nowhere near the scale and speed necessary to meet the strategic environment on both sides of the Atlantic, nations should also direct new defense spending toward effective and efficient defense industrial initiatives that will fill Europe’s urgent capability shortfalls. 

At the multilateral level, if Europe is to spearhead proposals for and by itself, European nations must prioritize decision-making formats that are smaller than NATO and the EU. This is true with Ukraine, as the future of Kyiv’s armed forces will be a cornerstone of the new European security architecture. The British and French-led “coalition of the willing” that supports Ukraine began as a summit. Today, twenty-six countries have made formal pledges, the coalition has established a permanent headquarters in Paris, and it plans to create a coordination cell in Kyiv.  

The coalition, though currently stalled amid frustrated cease-fire negotiations, at least allows Europeans to shape how Ukraine could integrate into Europe’s security architecture in the future. The coalition has announced that it would support Ukraine in a post-cease-fire environment by regenerating Ukraine’s land forces (possibly with boots on the ground), securing Ukraine’s skies, and ensuring safe and secure access for vessels transiting Ukraine’s ports. This structure remains the best model for supporting Ukraine in the future, given the United States’ lack of clarity around security guarantees for Ukraine or support for Kyiv’s future NATO membership.  

To build up the continent’s defense industrial base, European nations should adopt a consortium approach aimed at jointly developing and procuring military equipment and technologies that are complementary with NATO. This approach will be critical for rapidly resourcing and filling gaps that might be left by departing US capabilities in the coming years. For example, the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) shows promise, and it can be regarded as a blueprint for how European nations can work together to develop new capabilities together and decide when and how to use them. ELSA, which includes France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, aims to build a full-spectrum system for weapons with a range exceeding 500 kilometers. It complements the European Sky Shield Initiative, which although incomplete, aims to create a ground-based integrated air-defense system to protect European airspace that remains heavily dependent on US enablers.  

For these capability-centric consortiums to reach their potential, Europeans should pool financial resources through the EU and make better use of the intergovernmental European Defense Agency for funding and coordination. Several projects show promise such as the satellite programs for intelligence or observation as a future alternative to Starlink through Eutelsat. The uptick in Italian and French land-air missile SAMP/T co-production, which will in the future equip Denmark, the third European country to operate the system rather than Patriot. For smaller scale projects, the EDA should continue to support programs like the Belgian Dutch-led “replacement Mine Countermeasures” (rMCM), which aims at upgrading mine warfare capabilities.

A new way of working with the United States 

As Europe seeks to maintain US interest and commitment in the near term, it has a once-in-a-generation opportunity to rethink its security architecture and rebalance the transatlantic relationship. In this new strategic landscape, the future of transatlantic relations will rest on Europe working toward being able to defend itself while carving out room to advance proposals with the United States where advantageous for both sides of the Atlantic. Europe has strengths of its own in the balance of power against Russia, despite the latter’s perceived escalation advantage, and a major one is its high level of cooperation and interoperability.

Only a few years ago, building European coalitions and capabilities independent of the United States would have seemed a potential threat to transatlantic and European unity. Now it is the opposite. As the United States repositions and reprioritizes, more European action does not have to equal less cooperation with Washington. This new security architecture would also allow the United States to better identify points of dialogue on specific issues, helping answer the Cold War–era dilemma of who to dial when the United States wants to call Europe. Especially as the new NSS calls for the United States to “organize a burden-sharing network.”

Trump’s new NSS has outlined US goals, and neither Europe nor Ukraine should wait any longer for Washington to reinforce its commitment to transatlantic security. US priorities lie outside the European theater regardless of the security threats Russia or China may pose. Moreover, Europe will not receive such strategic clarity from an administration that pursues a situation-based and transactional approach to security dilemmas. Instead, Europe must be bold in advancing a new security architecture that has the potential to strengthen European defense and reset the transatlantic relationship for the better.

The post How Europe can strengthen its own defenses and rebalance transatlantic relations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 11, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig published an article in Foreign Policy titled “Two Cheers for the National Security Strategy.” In the article, Kroenig lays out the strengths and weaknesses of the NSS and places it in a broader strategic context.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in Foreign Policy on the National Security Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Director for Northern Europe, Anna Wieslander, featured in the New York Times on Wednesday December 10 on the challenges to Europe’s security.

Wieslander underlines that Ukraine is Europe’s first line of defense against Russia but explains that “we don’t follow through on what that means and what it costs”. The frozen Russian assets are essential for Ukraine to stay in the fight, says Wieslander adding that Europe must “take higher risks or pay a higher price later”.

The post Wieslander in New York Times appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Director for Northern Europe, Anna Wieslander was interviewed in the Swedish Radio podcast “USApodden” (The USA podcast) on the European reactions to the new US NSS and its implications for European security and policy.

While Europe remains important for the US Administration, it is perceived to have several challenges that Europe needs to deal with, says Wieslander. Wieslander argues that we are in a new era of European security and that the current Administration’s take on European security appears to be a longterm policy. “Europe must react and not remain passive”, Wieslander says.

It is “completely unrealistic”, argues Wieslander, that Europe would take over all US NATO responsibilities on European soil by 2027, as has been circulating over the weekend, adding that this may be a tactic from the US Administration to get European countries to do more on defense and quicker.

Listen to the whole episode to know more. It is recorded in Swedish.

The post Wieslander in Swedish Radio podcast appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 10, Alexander B. Gray, a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Scowcroft Center, published an opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal titled “The Logic of Trump’s Foreign-Policy Doctrine”. He argues that the new National Security Strategy’s greatest strength is its clear prioritization of core national interests within a larger strategic context.

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The post Gray in The Wall Street Journal on the National Security Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 6, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed on “PBS News Weekend” about the Trump administration’s national security strategy. He discusses key takeaways and areas where the NSS marks a departure from past policy.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig on PBS News Weekend on the National Security Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

However, the administration should consider the consequences of agreeing to a deal that favors the clear aggressor instead of fighting for a more balanced and just peace. The effects of the former would be felt far beyond Ukraine, Russia, and Europe: the very terms that would be agreeable to Russian President Vladimir Putin are exactly the ones that could embolden China to take military action of its own. The United States cannot isolate its actions in one part of the world from its goals in another. China will learn from any peace in Ukraine made under the current situation. The United States will reap the consequences.

Unacceptable terms

The most contentious issue in any peace deal is that of territory. Russia occupies large portions of eastern and southern Ukraine. Putin thinks he can lay claim to what his forces already occupy (and potentially more) in any negotiated settlement, especially because Ukraine has not demonstrated the ability to reclaim that territory. Also concerning are the implications of a potential near-term peace deal on the issues of Ukrainian sovereignty and a renewal of international economic cooperation with Russia. Putin wants limits on Ukraine’s military and its ability to join NATO. He also wants a cessation of sanctions against Russia, Moscow’s readmittance to the Group of Eight (G8), and the restoration of frozen Russian assets. Instead of a pariah, Putin wants Russia to be a respected member of the international community—the status quo ante but better.

China will learn from the outcome of Putin’s bid to secure these terms, just as Beijing has learned from the rest of the war. If Putin can secure vast amounts of territory through military force, then so can China. If Putin can restrict Ukrainian sovereignty via an invasion, then China can secure similar limitations on Taiwan. Given that Beijing’s greatest concerns vis-à-vis Taiwan revolve around questions of the island’s sovereignty, such peace terms for Russia would be a veritable coup for China.

Similarly, if Putin can forestall any permanent economic consequences for his invasion, China will learn it can do the same. The economic consequences China would face as a result of an invasion of Taiwan are some of the most important deterrents to a possible conflict. If China is led to believe it can return to its place in the global economic community—or even improve on it—after the short-term pain of a conflict, the deterrent value of these tools will be reduced.

Questions of resolve

The Trump administration seems prepared to give Russia what it wants because it assesses that Russia is winning, and winners dictate the terms. Underlying the urgency to actually end the conflict, however, is a desire by some in the Trump administration to shift resources away from Europe and to the Indo-Pacific to better deter conflict there. However, the actual amount of blood and treasure the United States has spent on Ukraine, while significant for the Ukrainians, is relatively small for the United States. The United States has no direct military involvement in the war in Ukraine, has not lost a single service member, and has deeply degraded the Russian military with relatively little cost to itself, all while spurring increased competition and growth in the US defense industrial base.

Therefore, ending the war in Ukraine under these conditions will not strengthen the United States’ hand in the Indo-Pacific. It will do the opposite. Peace under these terms will teach China what it stands to gain from military action and demonstrate the limits of US resolve. Deterring a conflict over Taiwan or elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific is as much about having the proper capabilities to fight a war as it is about having the will to see it through. If Beijing’s leaders are led to believe that US resolve over the Taiwan issue will dissipate before their own, deterrence will fail regardless of how many US ships, missiles, and aircraft are in the theater.

Changing the calculus

Given his current calculus, any peace that Putin will sign will send the wrong messages to Beijing. Thus, the United States must change Putin’s calculus. To do so, and thereby strengthen the Washington’s hand vis-à-vis Beijing, the United States and its allies and partners should make Putin question the idea that a Russian victory is assured. They must demonstrate the will and resolve to outlast him in Ukraine. Only then will Putin sign a peace that does not teach the wrong lessons to China. Anything less, and the administration may find the peace it has brokered to be fleeting.

Lieutenant Phillip M. Ramirez is a military SkillBridge fellow for Forward Defense in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

The post The cost of an unjust peace in Ukraine? An emboldened China. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, our experts dig into what the strategy includes and leaves out—and emerge with their biggest takeaways. This post will be updated as more contributions come in.

Click to jump to an expert analysis: 

Matthew Kroenig: Where the NSS succeeds—and falls short 

Jason Marczak: The NSS gives new insight into Trump’s Venezuela goals 

Alexander B. Gray: The Western Hemisphere “Trump Corollary” is a logical focus on strategic geography 

Tressa Guenov: The NSS avoids taking on US adversaries’ goals

Daniel Fried: The NSS offers an inconsistent but workable set of elements 

James Mazzarella and Kimberly Donovan: The NSS is as much about economic statecraft as national security

Torrey Taussig: The administration’s treatment of Europe undermines its own interests

Rama Yade: On Africa, the NSS emphasizes trade and a more interventionist security policy 

Markus Garlauskas: The NSS sends clear signals to friends and adversaries in the Indo-Pacific

Thomas S. Warrick: An emphasis on national sovereignty and business interests

Jorge Gastelumendi: Trump’s energy- and technology-dominance goals will need more of a focus on resilience

Caroline Costello: A major evolution in how Washington frames its competition with Beijing

Alex Serban: NATO’s eastern flank must respond to shifting US priorities with greater self-reliance and European cooperation 

Dexter Tiff Roberts: Trade and tariff policy is jeopardizing the strategy’s worthy goals

Tess deBlanc-Knowles: To reach the NSS’s tech leadership goals, the administration needs to invest in research

Where the NSS succeeds—and falls short 

While they might not have conceived of it this way, the true challenge facing the authors of the United States’ new national security was how to update the country’s mostly successful eighty-year, post-World War II grand strategy for a new era. The new National Security Strategy’s greatest strengths, therefore, come when it doubles down on past principles that still work and identifies creative solutions to new problems. 

The strategy is traditional in its strong support for nuclear deterrence and preventing hostile powers from dominating important regions. It calls for strong alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific—to be achieved in part by allies stepping up to do more for their own defense and greater coordination on economic security. The document prioritizes achieving freer and fairer terms for global trade and deeper economic engagement in most world regions. 

It provides creative solutions for new challenges with a suite of policies to address the downsides of globalization (on border security, revitalizing domestic manufacturing, and so on) and by laying out a vision for US victory in the new tech arms race. 

The document falls short where it rejects principles that have worked in the past (e.g., the pragmatic promotion of democracy and human rights) and where it fails to clearly identify and address new challenges before the country (the threat from revisionist autocracies and their interlinkages should have received much more attention). 

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies. 

The NSS gives new insight into Trump’s Venezuela goals 

The new NSS is clear: The Western Hemisphere is now the United States’ top priority. This is a long overdue and welcome shift, as US interests should begin close to home. The strategy captures on paper what we have seen from the Trump administration in action thus far, including the twin goals laid out of “Enlist and Expand.” This approach underpins efforts to control migration, stop the proliferation of drug cartels, reduce nonfriendly foreign influence, and secure critical supply chains. But also, and importantly, it includes incentivizing new waves of US investment, since strong domestic economies serve US interests.  

The priorities laid out in the NSS—from a holistic perspective—dovetail with many of the interests of countries across the Western Hemisphere, such as security and economic growth, which have been the top concerns of voters in recent elections. There’s also a regional yearning for greater US investment, especially in infrastructure such as telecommunications, technology, and ports, all of which simply has not come at the desired scale. The NSS provides a blueprint for the broader US government to elevate its role in these critical sectors, and it underscores the need for a whole-of-government approach. 

The strategy gives insight into the Trump administration’s ultimate goal in Venezuela. A country where Maduro and his cronies currently provide safe haven for criminal groups, profit from trafficking, and welcome the influence of foreign adversaries is a direct threat to US national security. Success in Venezuela, therefore, means ushering in a democratic government that’s a genuine US partner as part of the goal to “expand” US partnerships. And a US shift to the Western Hemisphere as part of the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine also signals that the redeployment of US forces to the Caribbean is not time-bound. 

The NSS further details a multi-pronged hemispheric effort to counter the influence of external powers, including Russia and, especially, China. For China, this means addressing Beijing’s growing footprint across commerce, investment, soft diplomacy, military training, and more. What should we look at next? How will implementation be prioritized, and how will this strategy translate at the country level across the hemisphere? 

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The Western Hemisphere “Trump Corollary” is a logical focus on strategic geography 

Trump’s NSS is a much-needed corrective to decades of “strategies” that, through their failure to force difficult choices about priorities and resource allocation, commit the United States to an overstretched conception of national strategy. This NSS is remarkably and refreshingly frank about the essential objectives of the United States: securing the homeland, which requires a secure Western Hemisphere, and preventing outside great power adversaries from exerting malign influence in the hemisphere. The “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, which seeks to guarantee US access to key hemispheric locations (think the Panama Canal, Greenland, and much of the Caribbean) will likely stand as an overt, twenty-first century statement of a logical and previously unexceptional focus on strategic geography. The Trump Corollary carries real security and economic implications for American interests and security in the homeland. This strategic focus is likely to encourage new resources dedicated to intelligence, military, law enforcement, and economic statecraft programs focused on the hemisphere. 

The administration’s statement of intent for the Indo-Pacific is a consistent throughline from its 2017 NSS, but it also reflects evolving geopolitical realities. The NSS reiterates US commitment to preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific and strengthening regional partners and allies against China’s malign activity. It defines the region as the essential non-hemispheric theater for geopolitical competition. Importantly, the NSS seeks to draw a line between security in our hemisphere and deterrence of Beijing more broadly. This makes explicit a long-running reality of the US competition with China: Beijing seeks to distract the United States from maintaining the status quo in the Indo-Pacific by pursuing adversarial activities in the Western Hemisphere. 

Finally, the NSS is a useful thematic reminder that US national strength stems from more than simply the military balance. The strategy is explicit on the need for a strong defense-industrial and manufacturing base to sustain that military balance, alongside dominance in technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, and supercomputing. The NSS should be understood as a limiting document that seeks to more narrowly define US objectives globally, while also expanding the definition of US national power in a more comprehensive direction, building upon Trump’s long-stated belief that economic security is national security.  

Taken together, these lines of effort reflect a coordinated, holistic approach to preserving US national power in the decades to come. 

—Alexander B. Gray is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Gray most recently served as deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff of the White House National Security Council (NSC).

The NSS avoids taking on US adversaries’ goals

This NSS articulates key policy patterns into a declarative set of priorities for the administration. But it also leaves several strategic holes on how and whether the United States will address the effect that adversaries will continue to have on realizing the NSS’s goals. 

On Russia, the strategy notes that Europe sees Moscow as an existential threat, but it does not contain any meaningful treatment about the threat Russia poses to the United States in terms of realizing its economic, soft power, or military projection—not just in Europe but around the world. The United States is cast more as an arbiter between Russia and Europe rather than the object of an almost singular focus by Russia on counteracting US influence and power projection. The strategy’s focus on Africa is welcome, but there is no acknowledgement that Russia and China continue to actively thwart nearly every US objective on the continent.  

The strategy acknowledges Iran’s role as a major regional destabilizer, but the Tehran problem is largely set aside as bygone. Let’s hope that is the case. Still, the Middle East has continuously demonstrated to every successive US administration that the United States must always remain vigilant in the region. Iran’s influence in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Gaza, and beyond must be closely monitored even as the administration pursues its investment-focused regional agenda. Similarly, North Korea is not explicitly named in the strategy, yet Pyongyang surely will have designs on global attention over the next three years.   

The strategy’s muted treatment of adversary goals is likely intentional, a bid to signal a new chapter for the United States where it is less encumbered by the strategic irritants of the post-Cold War era and is free to pursue a bolder interest-based agenda. The reality remains that US adversaries do not want to see this NSS realized whether the United States names them or not. US strategy must continue to take those factors into account.  

—Tressa Guenov is the director for programs and operations and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, she was the US principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the US Department of Defense. 

The NSS offers an inconsistent but workable set of elements 

The newly released NSS seems to combine: 

• an overlay of post-Iraq/Afghanistan weariness and reaction, a sort of right-wing version of the post-Vietnam “come home, America” thinking of the Democrats in the early 1970s; 
• ideological posturing, particularly directed against Europe with a sharp partisan element of support for “patriotic” (presumably meaning nationalist and nativist) parties; 
• a call for fortress America (the document refers to the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” which seems to mean a desire to prevent outside powers such as China from establishing economic leverage in the hemisphere);
• a strong assertion of US interests in pushing back on Chinese economic coercion and distortion of global trade as well as Chinese expansionism. The section on Asia has good language about no change to the Taiwan “status quo” and lots about protecting the Western Pacific island chains;
• possibly workable language on economic policy, with emphasis on preventing foreign domination of critical resources and technologies and foreign exploitation of international trade, and; 
• inconsistent, occasionally odd, and probably compromise language on Europe that combines partisan hostility to Europe’s mainstream politics with grudging but welcome recognition that the United States needs to work with Europe.

The NSS is weak on Russia, which is mentioned only in a European context. But it does call for a “cession of hostilities” in Ukraine that leaves Ukraine a “viable state” and terms this a “core interest” of the United States. That’s not sufficient, given Russian President Vladimir Putin’s refusal to engage in US efforts to end the war, but it is good enough to support a good-enough policy, if the Trump team decides to push Russia to achieve this core interest. 

The strategy’s ideological hostility toward Europe combines with its implied bitterness over perceived US overextension and general disdain for “values” to drive US withdrawal from leadership of the free world—and even the concept of the free world itself. At the same time, the NSS elsewhere recognizes that the United States will need its friends, Europe included, to contend with its adversaries, especially China. This gives the NSS an internal incoherence. To a policy practitioner, the incoherence could provide an opportunity to build on the NSS’s better elements. 

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He formerly served as special assistant and National Security Council senior director for presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, ambassador to Poland, and assistant secretary of state for Europe.

The NSS is as much about economic statecraft as national security

The second Trump administration’s NSS is as much an economic statecraft strategy as it is a national security strategy, justifying US internationalism primarily based on economic interests, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, and, perhaps surprisingly for those concerned about the merger of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) into the Department of State, reinforcing the importance of soft power.  

It frames foreign policy around traditional economic statecraft objectives such as preserving secure supply chains, access to raw materials, protecting US export markets, and ensuring dominance of US technology and industrial capacity. International assistance is not dismissed, but it is also not presented as a tool of humanitarian obligation or for providing global public goods. Rather, assistance is considered meaningful when it helps protect or advance US interests.  

While this may seem cold-hearted, it actually reflects what many in the Global South already assume to be the reality of all foreign assistance and is how this funding has been justified to the American people for decades. Even as the United States provides food aid, for instance, US leaders talk about it as helping US farmers or creating global stability to ensure Americans’ own safety and prosperity. The NSS also notes plans to scale up the use of two of the most important US government development tools, the Development Finance Corporation and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, reversing a Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)-era assault on development in general.  

—James Mazzarella is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. From 2017 to 2019, he served at the White House’s National Security Council (NSC) and National Economic Council, first serving as director of international development and then senior director for global economics and development. 

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served as acting associate director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) Intelligence Division, in the US Treasury Department.

The administration’s treatment of Europe undermines its own interests

Throughout 2025, the Trump administration’s purported aim in Europe has been to shift the burden of conventional defense onto the shoulders of European allies. The administration scored a win at the Hague Summit by pushing NATO allies to agree to an ambitious defense spending pledge of 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense by 2035. Unfortunately, the NSS does nothing to help further US national security interests, by the administration’s own definition, on the European continent.  

By underplaying—and refraining from even referencing—the conventional threat Russia poses to transatlantic security, the NSS does not empower those nations that are working to take on greater defense responsibilities. Instead, the NSS seeks to embolden those nationalist and populist parties (such as the AfD in Germany) that would be the most likely to cut defense budgets and downplay the conventional threats that have traditionally fallen to a reliance on the United States. In this regard, the NSS is an own goal that undermines the administration’s stated objectives for what it seeks to achieve with European allies. 

—Torrey Taussig is the director of and a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, she was a director for European affairs on the National Security Council.   

On Africa, the NSS emphasizes trade and a more interventionist security policy 

On the Africa front, the paper is thin—a half page at the bottom of the strategy—and is not surprising. It repeats the key angles of the Trump administration’s approach to Africa as already outlined before Trump’s election by Project 2025 (with a clear refutation of “liberal ideology”) and after Trump’s election by Troy Fitrell, the State Department’s senior bureau official for African Affairs, in Abidjan and in Luanda. 

Following the shutdown of the US Agency for International Development in July, the strategy shifts US–Africa relations from aid to trade and investment: the United States signals a stronger focus on commerce, mining (especially critical minerals), and energy investments in African countries. The United States plans to support private-sector growth and expand market access. 

It is on security that the Trump administration has perhaps evolved the most, with a more interventionist policy. The administration started this shift in February with large strikes on Somalia against a leader from the local branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The strategy emphasizes that combating the “resurgent Islamist terrorist activity in parts of Africa” remains a priority. Because security is not far from commerce, the landmark peace agreemen signed yesterday at the US Institute of Peace between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo , with the goal of ending a three-decade war that has taken millions of lives, will also serve as a platform to advance US business interests. It seems the administration will next turn to Sudan and the ongoing genocide in Darfur. 

The strategy does not say anything, though, about the two most remarkable developments this year with respect to US-Africa relations—the rising tensions with the two largest African economies, South Africa and Nigeria. These disputes seem more motivated by domestic considerations (protection of Christians, Afrikaners, and Israel) than the competition with China on African soil, reminding us that any Trump foreign activity is guided by the principle of “America first.” 

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. 

The NSS sends clear signals to friends and adversaries in the Indo-Pacific

Public US government strategic documents are more meaningful for what they signal to friends and adversaries than for driving change in US actions. This NSS’s writing suggests a domestic audience, but its words are being parsed closely in the Indo-Pacific—where the time zone differences enabled publishing local first takes while Washington slept.

Language on China and Taiwan garnered the most attention. For example, some commentators are already opining that shifting from the last NSS’s wording of “oppose any unilateral changes”  to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, to “does not support any unilateral change” is a softening, despite the new NSS calling this a “longstanding declaratory policy.” Any worried readers should instead direct their attention to the NSS’s blunt imperative on “reinforcing U.S. and allies’ capacity to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan or achieve a balance of forces so unfavorable to us as to make defending that island impossible.” This is stronger language than any previous NSS on Taiwan’s defense. Even more important is the recent context: the president’s signing of the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act and the announced $330 million package of advanced US arms sales to Taiwan.

Similarly, South Korean concerns that North Korea was mentioned seventeen times in the first Trump administration’s NSS, but not once this time, are misplaced. Pyongyang has obviously not been a high priority for Washington since the inconclusive Hanoi summit of 2019, but the United States is doubling down on its alliance with South Korea and remains steadfast in deterring threats from the North. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un might take solace that boilerplate language on denuclearization was absent, but Kim would be foolish to see this as a concession.

At least for the Indo-Pacific, friends and adversaries alike should read the clear signals in the NSS—the United States is committed to strengthening extended deterrence in the region, even as it reminds its Indo-Pacific friends that Washington expects them to increase their military contributions to such deterrence.

—Markus Garlauskas is director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He served for two decades in the US government as an intelligence officer and strategist.

An emphasis on national sovereignty and business interests 

As expected, the new National Security Strategy is a combination of traditional views of the importance of American power, but with an emphasis on national sovereignty and business interests as a driver of international engagement. For the first time in decades, the Western Hemisphere is given precedence, with the strategic goal of reducing mass migration. Border security is seen as a key element of national security―a proposition that most Americans would agree with, even if they disagree on how to handle immigration enforcement domestically. More paragraphs in the NSS are devoted to Asia (25) than Europe, the Middle East, and Africa combined (13, 7, and 3).  

Counterterrorism, soon to be the subject of its own national strategy, is barely mentioned, but previews of the counterterrorism strategy show a vision of global terrorism reduced to a problem that governments can deal with on their own, with limited outside support needed. This would represent important progress and is a goal that would benefit the United States and its counterterrorism partners around the world. 

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

Trump’s energy- and technology-dominance goals will need more of a focus on resilience 

The 2025 NSS clearly outlines ambitions for US energy, industrial, and technological dominance. However, to secure long-term success in those aims, I believe the document should place even greater emphasis on building resilience—both in infrastructure and in financial systems. 

Resilient, modern infrastructure is the foundation of reliable energy and technological networks. Without robust power grids, supply chains, and communications systems, ambitions for advanced nuclear reactors, AI-driven innovation, and export leadership remain fragile. Supporting that infrastructure—and embedding redundant, disaster-resistant systems—gives real durability to the energy- and technology-dominance goals. 

Likewise, broadening access to financial opportunities and capital—especially for infrastructure, clean energy, and emerging tech—would strengthen economic inclusion and mobilize domestic innovation at scale. A strategy anchored in resilience and financial empowerment would therefore bolster not just short-term gains, but enduring strength, capacity, and stability for decades. 

—Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center.

A major evolution in how Washington frames its competition with Beijing

It is striking that this NSS frames China as more of a potential economic partner than an adversary, pledging to pursue “a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.” The previous NSS described China as a values-based adversary seeking to “create more permissive conditions for its own authoritarian model.”  

Why is China an adversary? There are, broadly speaking, two answers to this question: because China’s rise challenges US economic and security interests, and because Beijing is replacing the rules-based international system with one that favors its authoritarian model. This NSS makes it clear that the Trump administration views the US-China rivalry as an interest-based competition, not a clash of values.  

The NSS neither denounces nor even mentions China’s authoritarianism. It also prioritizes deterring conflict over Taiwan for strategic and economic reasons, not to preserve its democracy. This represents a major evolution in how Washington frames its competition with Beijing. This is the first time since the 1988 NSS—published during a period of optimism toward China’s reform and opening to the world—that the NSS has neither condemned China’s governance system nor expressed an intent to promote democratic reform in China. 

—Caroline Costello is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. 

NATO’s eastern flank must respond to shifting US priorities with greater self-reliance and European cooperation 

The new NSS signals a major reordering of US global priorities. This will have important implications for all of Europe, including countries in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, a region that was named in one of the administration’s seven priorities for the continent. One clear message: Washington is urging European allies to take over conventional defense responsibilities while the United States retains a more limited role in the continent’s security, mostly as a nuclear backstop.  

For states on NATO’s eastern flank, this recalibration raises legitimate concerns. Given the ongoing war in Ukraine and continued pressure from Russia, diminished US engagement could weaken the sense of reliability that underpins collective defense guarantees and NATO’s Article 5.   

At the same time, the shift pushes Europe—including eastern flank nations—to reassess strategic autonomy. That means investing more in defense capabilities, strengthening regional cooperation, and possibly speeding up modernization and institutional reforms. For Romania, this aligns with the objectives laid out in its new national security strategy, which was presented by President Nicușor Dan and approved by Parliament last month. 

But this transition comes with difficulty. Diverging threat perceptions between the United States and Europe regarding issues including Russia, China, migration, and climate change could strain alliance cohesion and reduce predictability.   

This strategic pivot by the United States may force Romania and its neighbors into a period of heightened responsibility and adaptation. This will require greater self-reliance, deeper cooperation among European countries, and a reassessment of regional security dynamics—all while navigating uncertainty over long-term transatlantic security guarantees.  

—Alex Serban is the Director for the Atlantic Council’s Romania Office and formerly a senior fellow in the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Trade and tariff policy is jeopardizing the strategy’s worthy goals

The Trump administration’s decision to frame the China challenge as one centered around economics is welcome. Indeed, successive US administrations have had a blind spot in recognizing how Beijing’s mercantilist practices have often hurt US industries and workers and allowed China to quickly narrow the technological gap with the United States. The focus on finding ways to better combat China’s state-directed subsidies and unfair trade practices, secure global supply chains, and trade more with the Global South, which the NSS correctly calls “among the greatest economic battlegrounds of the coming decades,” is also welcome. The fact that China doubled its exports to low-income countries between 2020 and 2024, which the NSS highlights, is indeed a challenge the United States should address. And the NSS’s declaration that the United States “must work with our treaty allies and partners,” whose economies, when combined with the United States’, account for half of global output, to “counteract predatory economic practices” (clearly referring to China), is on the mark, as well. 

But the challenge, in large part of the White House’s own making, is that many US allies and partners are feeling less confident about economic and trade policy making in Washington than ever before. Much of that is due to the chaotic and possibly illegal tariff policy of the US president, which the Supreme Court is about to weigh in on in a case with potentially massive economic and diplomatic consequences. A Pew Research Center survey from earlier this year shows that most countries view China rather than the United States as the world’s leading economic power, with 41 percent choosing Beijing compared to 39 percent for Washington. This is a striking reversal from just two years earlier. What’s more, that survey was conducted before Trump’s “Liberation Day” announcement of sweeping, unprecedented global tariffs on April 2; since then, this sentiment is likely to have shifted even more in China’s favor. And this shift in perceptions is convincing some countries to strengthen economic partnerships with US rivals. 

Take the example of India (mentioned only four times in the NSS, compared to twenty-one references to China). While for much of the past decade-plus it has been seen as a key counterweight to China and successive US administrations have worked to improve relations with New Delhi, that relationship is now at risk. The imposition of 50 percent tariffs on India, in part for purchasing Russian oil and gas while China was largely given a pass for purchasing even larger quantities of Russian energy products, has upset New Delhi and seems to be driving its recent efforts to improve relations with Beijing. 

A high-profile leaders’ meeting in August between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during Modi’s first trip to China in seven years, is one sign of this shift. A closer relationship between China and India could also challenge Washington’s desire to see New Delhi contribute more to “Indo-Pacific security,” including through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (a grouping comprised of the United States, Australia, Japan, and India), another worthy goal the NSS highlights. And Modi’s warm welcome of Russian President Vladimir Putin in New Delhi this week is another warning sign of how a US national security strategy aimed at leaning on allies and partners to confront global threats is being undermined by US trade and tariff policy. 

—Dexter Tiff Roberts is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, which is part of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served for more than two decades as China bureau chief and Asia News Editor at Bloomberg Businessweek, based in Beijing. 

To reach the NSS’s tech leadership goals, the administration needs to invest in research  

The NSS rightly emphasizes that leadership on emerging technologies is central to US national security. It recognizes that national security depends not only on military might, but on a robust economic foundation. As such, the strategy places due emphasis on essential investments in the US economy, workforce, and research enterprise to enable US leadership in critical technologies and to sustain the country’s military advantage.  

The strategy also acknowledges technology as an instrument for cooperation and influence, a strategy that China has skillfully employed across the globe. However, it falls short in articulating a clear framework for pursuing the level of technology export and capacity-building needed to counter Chinese influence at scale.  

As the administration moves to implement the strategy, its proposed $44 billion cut to federal research and development spending threatens to undermine its own vision and erode the very foundations upon which technological leadership depends. 

—Tess deBlanc-Knowles is the senior director of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs. She previously served as senior policy advisor on artificial intelligence at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. 

The post Experts react: What Trump’s National Security Strategy means for US foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 5, Alexander B. Gray, a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Scowcroft Center, was quoted in the Politico newsletter on the newly released US National Security Strategy. He called it “a fundamental break from 35 years of how America views the world.”

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The post Gray quoted in Politico on the National Security Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 4, Forward Defense Senior Fellow Steven Grundman authored an article in Aviation Week entitled “Can Hegseth Transform U.S. Defense Acquisition?,” highlighting the importance of speed and agility in acquisition reform. Grundman argues that without funding to pay the upfront costs of reform and sustained engagement from the military departments that execute acquisition, the Pentagon’s much-needed efforts to streamline acquisition risk stalling.

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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The post Grundman in Aviation Week on Pentagon acquisition reform appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The most important innovation of the past four years has been the expanding use of drones on the battlefield. While drones have featured in a range of different conflicts since the turn of the millennium, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is widely recognised as the world’s first drone war. Initially, the smaller and more innovative Ukrainian military held the initiative in the deployment of drones, but the Russians have learned important lessons from early setbacks and are now steadily eroding Ukraine’s advantage. 

Ukraine’s emphasis on drone warfare reflects the country’s underlying strengths and weaknesses. In terms on manpower, firepower, and funding, the Ukrainians simply cannot hope to compete with Russia. This has made cheap and potentially plentiful drones a particularly attractive option for Ukrainian military planners as they look to compensate for Russia’s far greater resources while also reducing their country’s dependence on military support from Western partners.

At the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector represented an important asset that the authorities in Kyiv were quick to mobilize. This tech prowess helped cement the country’s strategic focus on drones, which could be designed and produced domestically to compensate for a lack of more conventional weapons. 

Since 2022, the number of Ukrainian companies developing drones has skyrocketed, while annual output has risen to millions of units. This has allowed Ukraine to establish a “drone wall” along the front lines of the conflict, making any buildup of enemy forces extremely challenging. Over the past year, around three-quarters of all Russian casualties have been as a result of Ukrainian drones. 

At sea, Ukraine has used drones to sink multiple warships and break the Russian navy’s Black Sea blockade, forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his remaining fleet from Russian-occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s growing drone capabilities have also made it possible to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia with an escalating campaign of deep strikes on military and industrial targets across the Russian Federation.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia has responded to Kyiv’s groundbreaking use of drone warfare by studying Ukrainian tactics and technologies, while also dramatically expanding its own domestic drone manufacturing base. The Kremlin has been aided in this by allies including China and Iran, who have provided vital components along with the blueprints for key drone designs.

The Kremlin strategy has focused on mass producing a limited range of models for use on the battlefield and in the bombardment of Ukrainian cities. This methodical approach has paid dividends. By the end of 2024, it was already becoming clear that the drone war was turning in Russia’s favor. This trend has only intensified over the past year. 

One of Russia’s most important innovations has been the widespread use of fiber-optic drones. These drones are controlled by a wire connected directly to the operator, making them immune to jamming technologies and extremely difficult to intercept. 

Russian commanders first began using large quantities of fiber-optic drones during fighting in late 2024 to push Ukrainian troops out of Russia’s Kursk region. The drones proved highly effective at disrupting Ukrainian logistics by targeting supply vehicles. This was widely seen as a crucial factor behind the success of the operation. 

Russia has now replicated and scaled up these tactics throughout southern and eastern Ukraine, creating a drone wall of its own while reaching deeper and deeper into Ukrainian-controlled territory. Fiber-optic drones are being used to ambush supply vehicles far behind the front lines, forcing Ukraine to become increasingly reliant on ground robotics to supply combat units and evacuate the wounded. 

In addition to striking Ukrainian logistics, Russian drone forces are also prioritising attacks on their Ukrainian counterparts, forcing Ukrainian drone crews to pull further back from the line of contact to ensure safety. This distance gives Russian operators room to move their own teams forward, increasing their ability to dominate the battlefield. 

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Russia’s Rubicon drone unit has emerged during 2025 as a prominent symbol of the Kremlin’s rapidly evolving and increasingly effective drone warfare strategy. Highly trained and well funded Rubicon teams are leading the campaign to cut Ukraine’s supply lines and widen the kill zone.

Crucially, Rubicon pilots pass their experience on to newcomers and provide extensive training that is helping to improve the effectiveness of other Russian army drone units. According to Ukrainian drone commander Yurii Fedorenko, Rubicon can rapidly scale up drone units using manpower and financial advantages that Ukraine cannot replicate.

In the drone war between Russia and Ukraine, the Kremlin is betting on mass and hoping that a combination of smart choices, specialised production, extensive training, and sheer numbers will eventually overwhelm Ukraine’s technological edge. In contrast, Kyiv continues to rely on a highly decentralised ecosystem of volunteer groups, startups, and military workshops producing a wide variety of different drone models. This diversity helps to drive innovation but also creates coordination challenges.

The current effectiveness of Russia’s drone units does not mean the drone war has shifted decisively in Moscow’s favor, but recent trends do expose a gap that Ukraine must urgently close. In order to counter Russia’s increasingly centralised and well-resourced drone formations, Kyiv needs to adopt key elements of the Rubicon model. This means scaling up training pipelines, sharing front line experience more systematically, and ensuring Ukrainian drone units have all the resources they need to hunt down Russian operators and regain the initiative.

Since 2022, the Russian military has been widely mocked for its primitive “human wave” tactics and generally poor performance in Ukraine. However, the progress made by Russia in drone warfare indicates an army that is fully capable of learning, adapting, and innovating. Moscow has not been able to achieve any major technological breakthroughs, but Russian military strategists have significantly strengthened their country’s position by concentrating on scale, training, and relentless battlefield experimentation.

This progress should be a major wake-up call for European leaders. Small numbers of suspected Russian drones are already causing chaos and disruption across Europe. The longer the war in Ukraine lasts, the more advanced Russia’s drone capabilities will become. 

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 2, 2025

Ukraine peace plan must not include amnesty for Russian war crimes

By Ivan Horodyskyy

US President Donald Trump’s 28-point peace plan for Ukraine includes an amnesty for war crimes that critics say will only strengthen Putin’s sense of impunity and set the stage for more Russian aggression, writes Ivan Horodyskyy.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert Nov 27, 2025

While Trump talks peace, Putin is escalating efforts to erase Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Russian President Vladimir Putin has issued a decree this week calling for an escalation in efforts to erase all traces of Ukrainian identity from the approximately 20 percent of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Human Rights

UkraineAlert Dec 3, 2025

Returning Ukraine’s abducted children should be central to any peace plan

By Kristina Hook

The United States should lead efforts to secure the release and return of Ukrainian children abducted by Russia. This could help build confidence in the peace process and boost efforts to end the war, writes Kristina Hook.

Conflict European Union

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Russia has learned from Ukraine and is now winning the drone war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 2, Defense News published an op-ed by ReForge Commission Co-Chairs Kathleen Hicks and Mac Thornberry outlining why the United States must urgently rebuild an industrial base capable of outproducing and outlasting its adversaries. The piece highlights the strategic risks posed by today’s manufacturing shortfalls and the reforms needed to ensure the nation can deter, surge, and win in a prolonged conflict

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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The post Hicks and Thornberry published in Defense News appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This opt-out has made Spain an outlier within the Alliance. In October, US President Donald Trump even suggested that NATO should consider Spain’s expulsion over its unwillingness to contribute more, calling the country a “very low payer” and hinting at potential trade retaliation.

Spain’s persistent spending shortfall

Spain’s defense spending has long fallen short of NATO’s benchmarks. Under the previous NATO benchmark of reaching 2 percent of GDP in military spending by 2024, Spain consistently underperformed, spending only about 1.2 percent in recent years. In 2024, its military budget stood at approximately €17.2 billion, or 1.24 percent of the country’s GDP, the lowest among NATO members as a percentage of economic output.

Meanwhile, most allies have increased spending to levels closer to or above 2 percent in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. As Atlantic Council Fellow Andrew Bernard noted, Spain’s promise to reach 2 percent, which it only committed to in April of this year, has yet to translate into the modern military capabilities the Alliance needs. Although Spain contributes approximately three thousand troops to NATO missions from the Baltics to the Sahel, deployment alone does not substitute for investment in equipment, readiness, and modernization.

Few within the Alliance believe Spain can meet NATO capability requirements by spending just over 2 percent of its GDP. This gap only deepens the impression that Spain is benefiting from NATO without fully contributing to it.

Domestic politics: The main barrier to higher spending

Why does Spain lag so far behind in defense spending when it is one of the fastest-growing economies in the eurozone? The answer lies mainly in domestic politics and public opinion.

Sánchez leads a fragile minority coalition dependent on left-wing and regional nationalist parties that are skeptical of increased military spending. His Socialist Party governs in partnership with the far-left parties Unidas Podemos and Sumar, and it relies on small Basque and Catalan nationalist parties to maintain a parliamentary majority. These partners view military investment with suspicion, fearing that higher defense budgets would come at the expense of social spending programs.

As Ione Belarra, one of the leaders of Podemos, bluntly put it, these parties refuse to help the government “continue licking the boots of the United States.” Pro-independence Catalan and Basque parties are equally unwilling to strengthen the Spanish army, which they historically distrust.

Public opinion reinforces these pressures. The legacy of Francisco Franco’s dictatorship left Spaniards skeptical of the military for decades, and while the armed forces have gradually gained trust through peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, there remains limited enthusiasm for large budget increases. In a recent poll by the national polling institute CIS, only around 14 percent of Spaniards supported significantly increasing the military budget, as most prioritize healthcare and education.

Spain’s official neutrality during both world wars and its largely peripheral role during the Cold War helped shape a political culture that views defense as secondary to social welfare.

A weaker ally means weaker influence

Spain’s unwillingness to spend on defense comes at a cost, particularly to its image abroad. Eastern European NATO members such as Poland and the Baltic states, which are investing heavily in defense, may interpret Spain’s stance as a troubling lack of solidarity at a critical time. Burden-sharing in NATO is ultimately about sharing risk. Spain’s refusal to invest in new capabilities raises concerns over its willingness to do so. And that reluctance carries risks of its own, given the security challenges it faces at home, including tensions with Morocco over the bordering Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla, migration pressures, and instability across the Mediterranean, which could require NATO support in the near future.

The practical implications of this credibility gap are already visible. Diplomatically, Spain has found itself sidelined in some high-profile discussions on European security. In August, for instance, Sánchez did not take part in a White House meeting of key European leaders on Ukraine, a signal of its second-tier status among allies. If Madrid is perceived in Washington or Brussels as an unreliable partner on defense, it risks further losing influence, not just on defense and security issues, but in crucial areas such as trade, as well.

The spectacle of being publicly singled out by the US president only deepens the damage. Trump’s sharp criticism of Spain and his threat of tariffs have reinforced the country’s image as an underperforming and unreliable ally. The idea that Sánchez leads “an anti-Trump coalition” may play well domestically, but it has done little to strengthen Spain’s standing abroad. In reality, no such coalition exists, and the Spanish government has failed to find allies or present any credible alternative approach, leaving Spain isolated and exposed. Consequently, Spain’s internal vulnerability is translating into external weakness.

Spain needs to make hard choices

Spain now faces a strategic choice. On the one hand, the Sánchez government can continue trying to appease its domestic political partners, delaying or limiting defense investments to maintain the support of far-left and regional factions. This path may ensure short-term governmental stability, but it will likely further erode Spain’s standing within NATO and Europe.

On the other hand, it could make the hard political choices needed to shift course, accepting that Spain’s internal fragility is already damaging its international credibility. Until then, Spain will continue to be seen as NATO’s easy target.

The Sánchez government cannot have it both ways. A country cannot expect to benefit from NATO membership with deterrence, geopolitical influence, and allied solidarity, while not meeting the targets that almost all allies, even poorer ones, are striving to meet. If Spain wants to become a reliable ally, it will need to demonstrate, not just declare, a stronger commitment. That means real budgetary increases that translate into modern jets, ships, and infrastructure.

Ultimately, the more Spain appears divided and hesitant on defense, the more it invites actors such as Russia to exploit those divisions within NATO. With Europe’s security environment the most dangerous it has been in decades, the margin for underperformance is thin. The country’s friends and even some of its critics would welcome a Spain that robustly funds its defense and contributes its full weight to transatlantic security, in accordance with its status as the European Union’s fourth-largest economy. But getting there requires the political courage to prioritize long-term national and allied security interests over short-term parliamentary survival. Until that shift occurs, Spain’s own political choices will continue to undermine its international credibility and Europe’s collective defense.

Jacobo Ramos Folch is an international policy consultant, Contributor at Newsline, and a visiting professor at Universidad de Navarra and IE University. He is part of the Atlantic Council’s European Leadership Accelerator program.

The post Why Spain is not meeting NATO spending targets appeared first on Atlantic Council.

That cloud of doubt hung heavily over members of the Czech defense establishment who spoke with our Atlantic Council delegation in Prague last week. A range of defense, industry, and academic representatives shared their concerns about a possible reversal of defense commitments by the incoming government led by Andrej Babiš. The question about the long-term sustainability of high levels of defense spending has even been raised in Poland, despite that nation’s Alliance-leading defense expenditures (currently 4.12 percent) and the very real threat posed by Russia. 

The latest act of apparent Russian sabotage—this month’s disruption of an eastern rail line in Poland that is critical for shipments to Ukraine—offered a sobering reminder of Poland’s urgent need to demonstrate military readiness and reestablish deterrence. We were on the ground in Warsaw when news of the railway incident broke and gripped a nervous nation. Poles understand the implications of sustained Russian aggression, but the dramatic scenes of sabotage were not enough to temper the concerns that government officials repeatedly expressed to us regarding the country’s fiscal woes and unsustainable defense spending.

Joined by Atlantic Council colleagues, we met last week with more than a dozen defense companies, venture capitalists, and senior national security professionals. In these meetings, we heard a consistent refrain: Polish defense-tech talent is real, but government structures are misaligned to the moment and impede innovation and economic growth. In particular, the government-owned giant Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ) lumbers as a slow-moving behemoth. 

Tenders for government-funded defense support are now technically open to the private sector. But those involved in these processes told us that, in reality, few can compete because acquisitions continue to include a range of security requirements that result in incumbents (PGZ and a limited number of larger firms) running the table. 

PGZ argues that the required capabilities are needed immediately, which it cites as the principal reason for purchasing US or European technologies that have been combat-proven in Ukraine, rather than investing in Polish systems that are still maturing through research and development (R&D) processes. This stands in contrast to the approach both Germany’s Bundeswehr and the British armed forces have taken toward Europe’s emerging defense startups—such as Stark, Alpine Eagle, or until recently Helsing—which have been contracted at earlier stages of development.

In most of PGZ’s public communications, however, it is primarily the subsidiaries that dominate these procurements, as was the case with the recent launch of testing of the American MEROPS drone-interception system. PGZ consistently emphasizes that it contracts such capabilities with the explicit assumption that they serve as bridging solutions, to be used only until national systems are developed. The technologies themselves are not lacking in Poland; yet under the current framework—where no R&D phase can be formally contracted—domestic solutions are effectively prevented from reaching product maturity, making it impossible for them to compete with fully developed foreign systems.

As a result, defense companies that make products such as cutting-edge satellites, attack drones, and command-and-control systems must look beyond Poland’s borders to grow. They often seek capital outside of Poland and then sell abroad to markets in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe, limiting Poland’s ability to reap the benefits of these advanced technologies for its own purposes while also forfeiting the economic growth Warsaw says it desires.

Defense industry leaders told us that PGZ’s demise is already unfolding as it fails to fulfill orders on the timeline needed to provide the readiness and technological innovation that military planners are demanding. But this approach of allowing gradual atrophy in order to lessen political friction—a tactic deployed repeatedly in the early aftermath of Poland’s post-communist economic rebirth—is unsuited to addressing the country’s current and future challenges. If PGZ is left to decay gradually, Poland risks slowing its ability to re-establish deterrence with Russia, thereby compromising readiness for a true wartime footing and denying itself the potential economic dividends generated by spending 5 percent of GDP on defense.

In addition to PGZ reforms and broadening the competitive landscape, Poland must enable the capitalization of its defense companies through the inflow of foreign investment—especially US private equity and venture capital, which has become an increasingly active player in European defense and dual-use technologies. Creating clear pathways for such capital to enter the Polish market would unlock scale that domestic financing alone cannot provide. Likewise, Poland’s major defense enterprises should have the ability to structure and finance acquisitions in the form of joint ventures, allowing them to access advanced technologies, share risk, and accelerate export capacity.

Yet even robust capital flows will not deliver meaningful outcomes without changes to how Poland develops and procures military technology. Critically—and this would represent the single most consequential reform—Poland must begin contracting the R&D phase of defense products in close cooperation with the armed forces, ensuring that military users participate in shaping, testing, and iterating emerging technologies from the earliest stages. This stands in stark contrast to the current system, in which the Polish armed forces contract only fully mature products. In practice, testing is treated as the very first phase of procurement, meaning that a product must already be validated in the field before acquisition can begin. Earlier-stage technologies—those requiring prototyping, experimentation, or iterative refinement—cannot be procured under the existing framework.

This approach is reinforced by military regulations that prohibit meetings between commanders, senior leadership, and industry, as well as by a cultural posture that discourages early-stage collaboration and tolerates no errors during development. Overcoming these constraints and fostering a mindset in which iterative testing, controlled failure, and rapid learning are accepted as essential elements of technological maturation is crucial if Poland is to build a competitive defense innovation ecosystem capable of absorbing investment, scaling joint ventures, and ultimately delivering the capabilities needed for national security.

Taken together, such reforms would generate support for Polish firms, thereby obviating the need for Poland to look outside the country to meet its own defense needs and creating an opportunity to deliver the economic growth any government would desire. These efforts would deliver clear benefits to frustrated US companies eager to do business in a nation brimming with talent.

The potential for defense expenditures to serve as an engine of economic growth in Poland is real. But unlocking that potential requires reforms that align structures with needed outcomes. That’s an opportunity that both the US and Polish governments should seize.

Jenna Ben-Yehuda is the executive vice president of the Atlantic Council. She previously served as a military advisor, among other intelligence and policy roles, at the US State Department.

Jacek Siewiera is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a former national security advisor to the president of Poland.

The post Poland doesn’t have to choose between defense spending and growth—if it makes the right reforms appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While the question of whether the ISF would get a mandate is no longer the blocker, ISF composition and troop contributions remain unsettled, and Israel has sought to veto the participation of several countries, most notably Turkey. Turkey seems ready to participate, but it is uncertain whether the United States will put pressure on Israel to bring Turkish forces into the ISF or whether Washington will find another role for Turkey in implementing the peace plan.

The Middle East Eye reported that Turkey is drafting a brigade—roughly two thousand personnel, including land forces but also specialists on engineering, logistics, and explosive ordnance disposal—for potential participation in the Gaza stabilization mission. Ankara has also set its own condition: that the creation of the ISF must guarantee a lasting cease-fire.

Turkey’s readiness to participate, Israel’s rejection of Turkey’s role, and conditions that both countries have placed on the ISF mission reflect a deeper divide. Turkey has been a constant critic of Israel, ramping up its condemnations during the war in Gaza. For its part, Israel points to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s close relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Excluding Turkey would be problematic, however, as Ankara is among the guarantors of the cease-fire plan and Erdoğan had a prominent role in the Sharm el-Sheikh Peace Summit in October.

The question, then, isn’t simply whether Turkey becomes part of the ISF; it’s where Ankara can—or cannot—add value without breaking the fragile political math.

Israel’s objection comes down to politics, not capabilities

Turkey has substantial peacekeeping credentials (including maritime and Balkans missions). Its reported preparations for a Gaza brigade underscore its capacity. But Israel, in demanding “no Turkish boots on the ground,” is more focused on its distrust of Ankara’s ties with Hamas and Turkey’s past hostile relations with Israel.  

Turkey is seen by many countries as a credible security actor in the region, but its policies are not without critics and opponents. Egypt’s relations with Turkey, for example, pass through periods of strain, and thus Egypt will likely insist on having a say in what kind of role will be assigned to Turkish troops. The United Arab Emirates might also raise questions about Turkish involvement—although, perhaps not, seeing as it appears to have ruled out a troop commitment role for itself and thus may not have a strong preference about Turkey’s role. Thus, it’s a toss-up whether excluding Turkey would impact regional buy-in for whatever force emerges.

The immediate needs in Gaza are engineering-heavy: the clearance of unexploded ordnance, the removal of debris, power and water restoration, bridging, and the improvement of medevac services. Those are areas where Turkish units have proven experience, but the Egyptian military has as well. Turkey can make a case for participation owing to its military’s competencies, but that will not necessarily assure its role.

Perhaps Turkey’s most important political asset in this discussion is its ties to Hamas, which helped bring about the cease-fire and which could prove instrumental in ensuring the cease-fire holds, as well as moving toward Hamas disarmament. For example, recent reporting indicated Turkey was involved in sensitive talks over holdout Hamas fighters in tunnels—precisely the kind of quiet Turkish action that can reduce violence.

Where Turkey fits in

The US-led Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC), established in southern Israel in October, has become the coordination spine for “day-after” mechanics—aid flows, deconfliction, and scaffolding for any future ISF. Multiple accounts over the past month report that the CMCC is increasingly shaping logistics and compliance under the cease-fire plan. Ankara understands this and appears ready to fit in seamlessly with the operation, which is headed by US Central Command. This points to a realistic possibility for Ankara’s involvement in which Turkey is adjacent to (rather than inside) the ISF’s core formation; and it could allay some of Israel’s concerns. Turkey’s work, alongside the CMCC and otherwise, could include the following:

• Off-shore training and vetting of Palestinian police. Turkish (and Jordanian) facilities could host accelerated cycles for a reconstituted, internationally vetted police service—politically tolerable to Israel and operationally essential for Gaza. Coordination would run through CMCC and relevant UN channels. This would be feasible even if Turkish infantry never sets foot in Gaza.
• Engineering, explosive ordnance disposal, and medevac under UN umbrellas. Technical detachments working under UN humanitarian cluster systems—rather than frontline “peacekeeper” formations—could address the most life-saving tasks with the least political friction. The reported emphasis on engineering/explosive ordnance disposal in Turkish planning aligns with this.
• Quiet diplomacy on sensitive files, such as tunnels/holdouts, remains recovery, or border deconfliction. This is where Ankara’s channels can move needles without personnel on Gaza’s streets.

While the resolution authorizes an ISF and envisages demilitarization support and civilian protection, it leaves rules of engagement and the precise disarmament mechanics to follow-on arrangements under the transitional bodies. Reporting also indicates that Turkey and Egypt prefer a mandate that prioritizes border control, de-escalation, and reconstruction over coercive disarmament during a fragile truce. Given that, the most probable outcome for Ankara’s involvement remains not hosting Turkish infantry in Gaza, but allowing Turkish assets that plug into CMCC-coordinated humanitarian and policing pipelines.

In view of Trump’s warm relations with Erdoğan, it is likely that the US administration will try to find a way to overcome Israeli objections and to assign a role for Turkey in the ISF. Even if Turkish soldiers don’t patrol Gaza’s streets, Ankara can play a role, which it clearly desires to do, that helps shape policy and rebuild Gaza. Thus, Turkey and Israel should spend their time not issuing demands to each other but instead working with the United States in developing a role for Ankara that helps advance the ISF mission.

Daniel C. Kurtzer is a former US ambassador to Egypt and former US ambassador to Israel, as well as the S. Daniel Abraham professor of Middle East policy studies at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs.

Kayra Sener is a program assistant of the Atlantic Council’s Realign For Palestine project.

The post Whether it puts boots on the ground or not, Turkey matters for Gaza’s stabilization appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 20, Alexander B. Gray, a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Scowcroft Center, published an article in The National Interest, arguing in favor of strengthening the branch’s ability to carry out its missions by establishing a Secretary of the Coast Guard. 

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The post Gray in National Interest on establishing a Secretary of the Coast Guard appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“We’ve always been on the same side of every issue.” That’s how US President Donald Trump described Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) during a chummy Oval Office meeting on Tuesday, part of a day of pageantry and dealmaking at the White House. The United States and Saudi Arabia struck a series of agreements on defense, semiconductors, nuclear power, and more. While the world awaits the fine print of these deals, our experts took stock of what the leaders have announced so far and what to expect next. 

• Daniel B. Shapiro (@DanielBShapiro): Distinguished fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and US ambassador to Israel
• Tressa Guenov: Director for programs and operations and senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and former US principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs 
• Jennifer Gordon: Director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative and the Daniel B. Poneman chair for nuclear energy policy at the Global Energy Center
• Tess deBlanc-Knowles: Senior director with the Atlantic Council Technology Programs and former senior policy advisor on artificial intelligence at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

Jet setters

• On defense, Trump approved the sale of fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, which Dan interprets as an indication that the US president “is going all-in on the US-Saudi relationship.” 
• But “China remains an issue in the backdrop of US-Saudi defense relations,” Tressa tells us. She notes that US intelligence agencies have reportedly raised concerns about Chinese access to the F-35 if a US-Saudi sale were to proceed, and “similar efforts to sell F-35s to the UAE were not realized across the previous Trump and Biden administrations, in part due to concerns of technology transfer to China.” 
• There’s also the US legal requirement to ensure Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) in the region. Dan points out that although the 2020 F-35 deal with the United Arab Emirates was later scuttled, it did pass a QME review, and the Saudi deal is likely to do so as well, in part because “Israel will have been flying the F-35 for a decade and a half before the first Saudi plane is delivered, and Israel will have nearly seventy-five F-35s by then.” 
• But the UAE deal was linked to its normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel, and “it appears there is no link to Saudi normalization” with Israel in this deal, Dan points out. In the Oval Office, MBS conditioned his joining the Abraham Accords on “a clear path” to a Palestinian state, which does signal a potential disparity from Saudi Arabia’s previous stance requiring the “establishment” of a Palestinian state.
• The Biden administration held talks with Saudi Arabia about a treaty that “would have included restrictions on Saudi military cooperation with China and ensured access for US forces to Saudi territory when needed to defend the United States,” Dan tells us. But “Trump has not announced whether he is giving the Saudis a one-way security guarantee, or whether there are mutual-security commitments.” 
• So what about Trump’s announcement during MBS’s visit that Saudi Arabia has become the United States’ twentieth Major Non-NATO Ally? Tressa tells us the designation “is a favorite tool of US presidents to cap off major visits with a symbolic flourish to indicate elevated relations.” But Saudi Arabia already enjoys many of the benefits of the designation, Tressa notes, such as privileged access to US arms sales, and the designation “does not provide any special or enforceable security guarantees, nor is it a binding treaty.” 

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Nuclear option

• The White House also announced a Joint Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation. Jennifer tells us it’s “likely a precursor to an official Section 123 agreement” on peaceful nuclear cooperation, which must also be reviewed by Congress. 
• “Saudi Arabia has indicated keen interest for years in pursuing civil nuclear technologies,” Jennifer notes, both to add to its power grid and for water desalinization. If the United States provides that nuclear technology, she adds, then “it can exert influence on security matters and help prevent the development of nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia and beyond.”  
• “Although there had long been speculation that a civil nuclear agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia might cover broader geopolitical issues,” Jennifer adds, “this week’s announcement reflects a more pragmatic approach with a focus on technologies that have strong national security implications.” 

Chipping in

• The two leaders also announced an AI Memorandum of Understanding but did not release many details. “Likely this means the approval of the sale of a package of advanced AI chips to Saudi Arabia,” Tess says. In the Oval Office, she points out, “MBS shared his vision (and strategic bet) on computing to compensate for the country’s workforce shortfalls and ensure continued economic growth.” 
• While the Trump administration has lifted the Biden administration’s “AI Diffusion Rule” that limited the sale of chips to many countries, it still has the final say on exports of the most advanced chips to Saudi Arabia, Tess notes, “likely due to fears related to ties with China.” 
• Now, Tess adds, US national security officials will keep their eyes on “the provisions of the new AI agreement focused on technology protection and what measures will be put in place to keep America’s most advanced AI chips out of reach of Chinese adversaries.” 

The post Digging into the details of the US-Saudi deals appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Colleagues from the Atlantic Council and I spent two intense days in Warsaw this week, meeting with senior officials, former officials, entrepreneurs, executives, and experts from across Poland’s divided and contentious political spectrum. We also met with the newly arrived US Ambassador Tom Rose. This came after four days in Prague and meetings with Czech senior civilian and military officials, and with the new US Ambassador Nicholas Merrick.

News of the rail line sabotage broke the last day of our Warsaw visit. Russian sabotage and aggression against Europe—drone and fighter jet overflights; attacks against Baltic Sea cables; and various incidents in Germany, Czechia, Poland, and other countries—are not new. Everywhere we went, Poles spoke, quietly and earnestly, of the possibility of war returning to their country. Poland, like its neighbors in Central Europe, has enjoyed more than a generation of peace, democracy, and rapidly increasing prosperity. To many of the Poles we spoke with, these times may soon seem like the “before times” of wistful memory.

The Poles are neither alone nor “Russophobic” or alarmist. Senior German officials, burned and now wiser after their long and futile search for accommodation with Putin’s Russia, now speak in similar terms. The head of Germany’s intelligence service, Bruno Kahl, testified in October to the Bundestag about the possibility of a Russian attack on Europe. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has spoken of the possibility of open conflict with Russia as early as 2026.

What then should Europe and the United States do about this trend of actual and suspected Russian aggression? This was the question that formed the basis of many of our discussions in Warsaw and Prague.

First, Europe and the United States need to face the music. Putin is not interested in doing business with the United States or Europe except on his terms, terms that include a demand for tacit recognition of his empire acquired through war. He will not break with China; he will not do a “deal” for peace in Ukraine, except when faced with insurmountable strength. His aggression against Europe is intended to intimidate the West into stunned acquiescence while he seeks to reverse the fall of the Soviet and Russian empires.

The Trump administration has spent a lot of energy pushing for a sustainable settlement of the war in Ukraine. And rightly so. The core of the administration’s outline of a settlement could work: a cease-fire in place and security for Ukraine, with Europe in the lead but with strong US backup. But the US administration still sends mixed messages, seemingly reflecting different schools of thought within it. That won’t do. The Trump team needs to be as steady and internally united in its pushback against Putin’s aggression as it has been against Iran and other adversaries.

Second, Europe needs to get real, and fast, about doing more for its own defense. The Trump administration has often, and rightly, put that in terms of a push for greater European spending on its military. That push has met with success in the form of NATO’s agreement at its 2025 Hague summit to a target of 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense, broken down into 3.5 percent on “hard” military expenditures and 1.5 percent on associated defense spending.

But spending is an input, and the output in military capability is what matters. We spent much of our time meeting with business executives from the Czech and Polish defense sectors, talking about the rapidly changing technological challenge of new weapons such as drones and the need to move fast from a sluggish peacetime procurement cycle to rapid turnaround. That’s no abstract challenge but an immediate necessity.

Fortunately, there is good news coming from Central Europe. High-tech start-ups that move fast, working with Ukrainians to apply battlefield lessons to production, are springing up all over both countries. Some are small. Others are mid-sized and growing fast. Still others, such as one Czech company we met with, are already investing in large-scale military production, including in the United States. A Polish firm is building state-of-the art reconnaissance satellites and launching them on SpaceX rockets.

One big task for these companies is to scale up and work with their US and European counterparts to turn topline defense spending into frontline military capacity. The United States can help. The United States and Europe have been sparring over trade and risk looking at their respective defense industries on what sometimes seem like zero-sum terms. That won’t do, especially in the face of the near-term danger of Russian aggression. To use the vocabulary of the Trump administration, there are a lot of good deals to be done in the defense sector. By helping remove barriers to technology transfer, defense trade, and investment, the United States can do the right thing for common security and make good money along the way.

Third, the United States and Europe can tighten the screws on Russia’s economy. The Trump administration has finally introduced its first new Russia sanctions, on the energy giants Rosneft and Lukoil. Now the administration must enforce them. And if it turns out that Russia is behind the latest attack on Polish rail lines, the United States and Europe should scale up sanctions. A full financial embargo, with limited and defined exceptions, might be a good place to start.

Fourth, the United States and Europe should speed up provision to Ukraine of weapons to target Russian infrastructure. And they can consider asymmetrical measures to counter Russian physical sabotage. These can be covert, but Russia should not have the luxury of taking action against the West without fear of countermeasures.

Even a brief visit to Warsaw, with its history of wartime destruction, communist oppression, and present prosperity and vulnerable peace, can concentrate the mind. Poles, whatever their politics, look to the United States, whatever its politics. And the Poles are pulling their weight on defense, with other Europeans starting to do the same. Putin represents the latest incarnation of the old adversary of the twentieth century—an aggressive tyranny. He’s on the march. But countries of the free world have good options if they will take them.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

The post Dispatch from Warsaw: How to respond as Putin ratchets up the pressure appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 18,  Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow MajGen Arnold Punaro, USMC (ret.) was quoted in an Air & Space Forces Magazine article entitled “What Experts Will Watch as the Pentagon Implements Acquisition Reform.” Punaro argued that Golden Dome’s sweeping, multi-domain missile-defense ambitions make it an ideal test case for implementing Secretary Hegseth’s recently announced acquisition reforms.

Advisory Council member

Arnold Punaro

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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The post Punaro quoted in Air & Space Forces magazine on acquisition reform appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 10,  Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Thomas X. Hammes was featured in a compendium article in the National Defense magazine titled “The Navy and Marine Corps at 250: A Look to the Future as the Sea Services Celebrate Their Quarter Millennial Anniversary.” Hammes’s contribution, “Modernization Going in Right Direction,” argues that the Marine Corps Force Design modernization plan moves the service in the right direction for modern combat.

Fellow

Thomas X. Hammes

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Industry

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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The post Hammes discusses Force Design in National Defense magazine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• Sovereignty eroded: How Belarus became a Russian satellite
• Military merger: From troublesome ally to armed outpost
• From fence-sitter to foot soldier: How Belarus lost its foreign policy
• Hostile takeover: Russia’s control of Belarus’s economy
• Cultural hegemony: The appropriation of media and education
• What Belarusians really want
• Conclusion
• About the author

For about five years, from 2015 to 2020, Belarus created an illusion that it was changing: a deceptive glimmer that suggested its leader, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, might steer his country away from Russia’s orbit and toward greater independence. In hindsight, this false dawn only masked the tightening grip of Moscow.

Two myths fueled misplaced optimism. First, there was a belief that Belarus could balance between the East and West through a multivector foreign policy. Second, there was a hope that Minsk’s limited reforms, release of some political prisoners, and especially its refusal to unconditionally back Moscow in the 2014 annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas signaled a liberalizing turn. Both illusions ultimately frayed during this period.

At first, Lukashenka positioned Belarus as a neutral host for peace talks on the Ukraine conflict—not a participant. The Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 fed Western hopes: Belarus as mediator, not accomplice. Lukashenka even rejected Russian demands for a new Russian airbase in Belarusian territory, wary of appearing too dependent.

A partial thaw followed. Some Belarusian political prisoners were released. The European Union (EU) lifted sanctions. Western officials applauded Lukashenka’s apparent pragmatism. Engagement resumed.

But beneath the surface, nothing fundamentally changed. The regime remained authoritarian and Soviet in ethos. The security apparatus stayed intact. Dissent was managed, not tolerated. And Moscow remained the indispensable lifeline—providing cheap energy, market access, and strategic cover.

By the end of the decade, the signs were unmistakable. Crackdowns against dissent intensified. Economic dependence on Moscow deepened. Russia’s regional aggression hardened. The scaffolding of sovereignty remained, but the core was hollow.

When mass protests erupted in 2020 and the West recoiled at the regime’s violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrators in 2020, Lukashenka had only one direction to turn. The illusion of neutrality collapsed. So did the myth of a buffer state. What had once looked like strategic balance was instead a drift toward absorption into Russia.

A rapid unraveling ensued. After the extreme crackdown on protesters came the forced landing of a Ryanair flight to detain a dissident journalist and the weaponization of migration at EU borders, both in 2021. Clearly, Lukashenka was no longer playing both sides. He had chosen one—and it was Moscow’s.

This report examines how Belarus moved close relations with Russia to full-scale integration under the Kremlin. From political alignment to economic subjugation. From linguistic erasure to cultural annexation. What looked like independence was dependency in disguise.

Yet beneath this transformation lies a deeper truth: Belarusians themselves have not chosen this path. Public opinion surveys consistently show opposition to war and to nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil. They reject the loss of sovereignty and the transformation of Belarus into a Russian-controlled satellite. The regime has chosen absorption. The people have not.

The following chapters trace Belarus’s evolution into a de facto Russian outpost: militarily, politically, diplomatically, economically, and culturally. They also outline strategic options for ensuring that Belarus’s future is not decided solely in Moscow.

Sovereignty eroded: How Belarus became a Russian satellite

Lukashenka’s proclaimed neutrality during Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine was always a fiction. Belarus remained a loyal authoritarian ally, making no meaningful reforms. Still, until 2020, Minsk maintained a degree of strategic flexibility, balancing deep ties with Moscow against limited outreach to the West and to China. Now, however, the question is no longer whether Belarus is drifting into Russia’s orbit but how much autonomy Lukashenka still retains.

From the start of his presidency in 1994, Lukashenka aligned himself with Moscow, consolidating domestic power by dismantling democratic institutions and suppressing dissent. He courted Russian elites and even positioned himself in the 1990s as a possible successor to President Boris Yeltsin, garnering the support of some nationalists in Russia. His ambition culminated in the 1999 Union State Treaty, a blueprint for deep integration: shared currency, joint institutions, and equal rights for citizens. But when Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, Lukashenka’s dreams of entering the Kremlin were dashed. Putin used that treaty to attempt to end Belarusian sovereignty. 

As a result, for over two decades, Lukashenka stalled implementation of the Union State Treaty, using the illusion of progress to extract economic concessions from the Kremlin—especially cheap energy—while avoiding genuine integration.

That strategy started to unravel in the late 2010s. Frustrated by Minsk’s endless demands for cheaper energy prices, Moscow began tying economic support to political concessions. In 2019, the two sides drafted thirty-one road maps for integration. Lukashenka sought better economic terms; Moscow wanted alignment. When Belarusians protested, he let the demonstrations proceed: a signal to Putin that public backlash might limit his flexibility.

Everything changed after the fraudulent 2020 presidential election, in which Lukashenka claimed victory over popular opposition forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Mass protests left Lukashenka isolated and unrecognized by the West. Desperate, he turned fully to Moscow, and Putin seized the opportunity. In November 2021, Belarus and Russia formally endorsed twenty-eight Union State programs, reviving integration plans that aimed to harmonize legal systems, unify markets, and align policies in energy, finance, customs, and taxation. Though framed as cooperation, these measures eroded Belarusian sovereignty.

Implementation continues today with minimal transparency. Lukashenka maintains vague, noncommittal rhetoric, but the direction is clear: Moscow is embedding itself deeper into the Belarusian state. If enacted in full, these reforms would strip Belarus of real independence in key areas of governance.

The most sensitive areas—oil, gas, taxation, and customs—expose the imbalance. While the creation of a joint energy market remains stalled and more controversial steps like a single currency or union parliament have been deferred, integration is advancing quietly. A unified tax system is particularly telling. It includes a common policy, a supranational committee, and a Russian-designed digital platform with access to centralized taxpayer data. Lukashenka insists Belarus still makes its own decisions, but Moscow now has unprecedented access to its economic infrastructure.

The same dynamic plays out in customs. Lukashenka’s proposed joint customs group, framed as merely advisory, opens the door to deeper dependency. The more Russia shapes Belarus’s regulatory and administrative frameworks, the less independent Minsk becomes as bureaucracies are built to serve Moscow’s interests.

Technically, Belarus retains sovereignty—just as other members of Russia-led blocs do, including the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). These alliances offer the illusion of multilateralism, but are structured to preserve Russian dominance. 

Russia’s intentions are not subtle. In a 2021 essay, Putin asserted that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians form a “triune Russian nation,” denying Belarus a distinct identity. Lukashenka has echoed this logic, repeatedly affirming Belarus’s eternal closeness to Russia. Yet he continues to resist full annexation. Maintaining the appearance of sovereignty helps him contain domestic resistance and preserve what limited international engagement remains. For now, Russia seems content with this arrangement: decisive control without the complications of formal annexation.

Most Belarusians support independence. But every concession, every road map, chips away at the country’s ability to determine its future. Lukashenka has traded that future to retain power. Belarus remains a state in name—but, increasingly, a satellite in function.

Military merger: From troublesome ally to armed outpost

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO’s eastern flank faced a new reality. Belarus opened its skies, railways, and military infrastructure to support Moscow’s assault.

What began as logistical support has since evolved into something far more permanent: the transformation of Belarus into a de facto military outpost of the Russian state. Behind the facade of sovereignty, Lukashenka’s regime has traded independence for protection, welcoming Russian troops, hardware, and even nuclear weapons onto Belarusian soil.

Before 2022, Russia’s permanent military presence in Belarus was limited to two Soviet-era facilities: the Hantsavichy missile warning station and the Vileyka naval communication center. Moscow sought to expand its footprint as early as 2013, aiming for permanent bases and deploying fighter jets. But Lukashenka resisted. Particularly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and armed intervention in the Donbas in early 2014, he avoided the optics of occupation, maintaining the appearance of a balancing act between the East and West. He hosted the Minsk peace talks, freed some political prisoners, courted Western engagement, and even refrained from recognizing Crimea’s annexation, while publicly mocking the Kremlin’s “Russian World” ideology.

That balancing act ended after the August 2020 fraudulent election and the mass protests that followed, when Lukashenka relied heavily on Moscow’s political and security support to stay in power. In early February 2022 Belarus held a constitutional referendum—under conditions of repression and with no genuine debate—that ended the country’s nuclear-free status. The timing was no coincidence: Within days, Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine. And Belarus was complicit from day one.

Since then, Belarus has allowed its territory and infrastructure to be used by Russian forces. Military and civilian airfields—including Homiel airport—have served as operational hubs for launching missile and drone attacks, conducting maintenance, and supporting logistics for Russian military operations against Ukraine.

But Belarus provided more than runways. Its integrated air defense systems, navigation networks, and flight control infrastructure supported Russian operations. The Mazyr Oil Refinery fueled the war machine. Belarusian railways became arteries of invasion, shuttling tanks, troops, and ammunition across the Ukrainian border. Belarusian roads, depots, and logistics hubs sustained the assault on Kyiv.

​​By December 2022, the depth of this integration became unmistakable. Putin announced that Belarusian SU-25 aircraft would be modified to carry nuclear weapons and that Russia’s Iskander-M missile systems—capable of carrying nuclear payloads—had been delivered to Belarus. Because the operational control remained with Russia, the symbolic shift was profound.

Meanwhile, Belarus’s defense industry quietly joined the war effort: repairing Russian tanks, modernizing aircraft, and supplying optical systems for missiles. Trains loaded with weapons and parts began moving in both directions, solidifying a more profound military-industrial interdependence.

Between February 2022 and March 2023, more than seven hundred missiles were launched from Belarus into Ukraine. However, as the front lines stabilized, Belarus’s role shifted from an active launchpad to a strategic rear base.

In October 2022, as Ukrainian counteroffensives gained ground, Minsk and Moscow activated the Regional Grouping of Forces (RGF), a bilateral military formation that provided legal cover for new Russian deployments. Around nine thousand Russian troops, along with hundreds of tanks and artillery systems, arrived in Belarus under a joint command. The RGF marked a turning point: ad hoc cooperation became institutionalized military integration.

By mid-2023, most Russian troops deployed under the RGF had withdrawn, likely due to manpower constraints elsewhere. But the infrastructure remained—ready for rapid reactivation.

In March 2023, Putin announced that Russia had reached an agreement with Belarus to station tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory, with the construction of a special storage facility to be completed by July. The establishment of a Russian military base complete with nuclear weapons would significantly increase Moscow’s leverage over Belarus and cement Putin’s grip on the country.

By early 2023, Belarusian crews had completed training on using the Iskander tactical missile system for potential nuclear strikes. However, independent monitors have found no visual evidence of actual nuclear weapon deployments in Belarus, casting doubt on whether Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric reflects the reality on the ground.

Throughout 2024, Belarus adopted a new military doctrine that codified deeper integration with Russia’s armed forces. For the first time, it explicitly allowed the deployment and potential use of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory—framed as a deterrent against external threats. In practice, the doctrine handed Moscow strategic leverage near NATO’s borders, while letting Lukashenka claim a protective nuclear umbrella at home. The price was a further erosion of Belarusian autonomy.

Even as Russian MiG-31K fighters armed with hypersonic Kinzhal missiles maintained their presence on Belarusian territory, keeping Ukraine’s air defenses on constant alert, the relationship was becoming institutionalized rather than episodic.

In December 2024, Russia and Belarus signed the Treaty on Security Guarantees under the Union State framework. The agreement enabled permanent Russian bases and deployments in Belarus and committed both sides to mutual defense—including in response to threats against “sovereignty” or “constitutional order.” It further folded Belarus into Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy.

As of mid-2025, roughly two thousand Russian military personnel remain in Belarus, including air defense units and aerospace forces. Russian operations continue from key locations, such as the Mazyr (Bokau) and Ziabrauka airfields.

New satellite imagery from May 2025 revealed expanded infrastructure at the Asipovichy base: new fencing, loading platforms, and air defenses—all consistent with preparations for storing and potentially deploying tactical nuclear weapons.

While Belarus has gestured toward de-escalation, suggesting it might scale back the Zapad-2025 joint exercises with Russia, these moves are largely symbolic and likely reflect Russia’s shifting priorities on the battlefield rather than a genuine reduction in military activity. In September, separate large-scale drills took place—both the Zapad-2025 exercises and joint CSTO operations—keeping the region on edge. 

Meanwhile, Minsk confirmed plans to host the Oreshnik missile system; Russia has already used this system in strikes against Ukraine. For Lukashenka, this is both a pledge of loyalty to Putin and a way to remain strategically indispensable.

In less than three years, Belarus has transitioned from a reluctant ally to a satellite state. Lukashenka has surrendered control over the country’s military and security policy in exchange for Kremlin backing. The result: Belarus is now a forward base for Russian aggression—potentially with nuclear weapons.

This development reshapes NATO’s eastern frontier, attempts to legitimize the forward deployment of Russian nuclear assets, and dismantles the boundaries between sovereign ally and subjugated proxy. The implications are stark. A former buffer state has become a Russian military outpost. Belarus is on the front line of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the West. 

From fence-sitter to foot soldier: How Belarus lost its foreign policy

After Lukashenka spent decades creating the illusion of maneuvering between the East and West to preserve regime autonomy, poof—it’s gone. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Belarus’s foreign policy has collapsed into a one-way street leading straight to Moscow.

Facing sweeping Western sanctions and mounting isolation, the Belarusian regime claims to be pivoting toward Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Officials describe this reorientation as a strategic reset, aimed at offsetting annual losses estimated at $16 billion to $18 billion due to sanctions. But the pivot is largely rhetorical. Minsk’s global engagement has narrowed to improvised alliances, symbolic gestures, and tactical outreach.

Lukashenka’s facade of neutrality—avoiding recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and refraining from endorsement of Kremlin claims over Abkhazia and South Ossetia—crumbled in 2021 when he acknowledged Crimea as Russian territory. By 2024, he was hosting bilateral meetings with Denis Pushilin, the Moscow-backed head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic.

At the United Nations, Belarus has become one of Moscow’s most reliable allies. On March 2, 2022, it was one of just five countries to vote against a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—alongside North Korea, Eritrea, Syria, and Russia itself. Diplomatic independence has all but evaporated.

Western sanctions have gutted Belarus’s traditional export markets. In 2019, Belarus exported goods valued at $8.5 billion to the EU. By 2024, that figure had dropped to just over $1 billion. Potash, oil products, and timber—key sources of revenue—have been hard-hit.

In response, Lukashenka launched an outreach campaign focused on the Global South. He visited Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, promising closer ties and “anti-colonial solidarity.” Yet these trips have produced little beyond vague memoranda and photo ops. The case of Zimbabwe is telling: Lukashenka offered tractors and equipment, and trade reached $25 million in 2021. More significant, however, are Belarusian elite links to Zimbabwe’s gold and lithium sectors, and growing military ties between the two regimes. These are not signs of diversification, but transactions rooted in authoritarian clientelism.

Nowhere is the asymmetry of Belarus’s foreign policy more visible than in its relationship with China. While Minsk promotes Beijing as a key partner, the reality is marked by caution, imbalance, and diminishing returns. Lukashenka’s fifteenth visit to Beijing, delayed until June 2025, was described in state media as “family style,” which sounds like a cozy familiarity but produced no major agreements. 

Belarus remains a logistical node in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, but its value has declined amid the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions. In 2024, Lukashenka announced fifteen new “strategic” Chinese investment projects totaling three billion dollars, but much of this support is conditional and geared toward Chinese interests. The China-Belarus Industrial Park Great Stone lacks fresh momentum. With Western investors gone, it increasingly targets Russian and domestic firms.

Belarus’s 2024 accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was meant to signal a turn from the West. In practice, trade with China is lopsided. Belarus exports potash and foodstuffs, while importing higher-value Chinese machinery and electronics. Belarusian defense firms are incorporating Chinese components into optics used by Russian tanks. In July 2024, Chinese and Belarusian troops held joint drills near NATO’s borders. The two countries have also codeveloped the Polonez multiple-launch rocket system.

Even as formal economic cooperation stalls, Lukashenka remains politically useful to Beijing. His public support for China on the status of Taiwan and Hong Kong reinforces shared authoritarian alignment. As China expands its global reach, Belarus’s transit infrastructure may retain some relevance. But the broader partnership remains shallow. China is watching carefully, but is not investing heavily. Not yet.

With traditional diplomacy in ruins, Minsk has embraced a model of “shadow diplomacy,” a murky blend of military deals, sanctions evasion, and autocratic alignment. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as a key enabler. A UAE-based company acquired the Belarusian arm of Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank after it came under pressure to exit. Investigative journalists from the Belarusian Investigative Center and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project network have alleged Dubai’s involvement in laundering Belarusian assets through shell companies.

Ties with Iran have deepened. Since 2023, Minsk and Tehran have signed a string of defense agreements. A 2023 Kyiv Post article, citing unconfirmed reports and Western analysts, suggested Belarus may begin producing Iranian Shahed drones. During the 2024 military parade in Minsk, Belarus showcased its domestically produced “Geran” strike drones—closely resembling the Iranian Shahed-136 model widely used by Russia in Ukraine—marking their first public appearance. Defense ministers have met repeatedly, underscoring the growing military dimension of the partnership.

Meanwhile, Belarus is bypassing Western restrictions via new trade corridors. In 2024, the port of Makhachkala in Dagestan began handling Belarusian potash as part of the North-South Transport Corridor linking Russia and Iran.

Despite occasional overtures, such as Lukashenka’s claimed willingness to mediate peace or restore dialogue with Washington, the regime shows no signs of meaningful reform. Recent prisoner releases have been tokenistic, used as bargaining chips rather than a shift in policy.

Belarus’s foreign messaging now mirrors the Kremlin’s almost entirely. From Ukraine to NATO to US policy, Minsk speaks with Moscow’s voice. The country that once sought to straddle the East-West divide has become, decisively, a satellite of its eastern neighbor.

Hostile takeover: Russia’s control of Belarus’s economy

Since 2020, Belarus has undergone a profound economic shift: not toward growth or innovation, but into near-total dependence on Russia. What may look to some like recovery is, in fact, economic subjugation. Following a 4.7 percent decline in gross domestic product (GDP) in 2022 due to Western sanctions, the Belarusian economy rebounded by 4 percent in 2024, according to the World Bank. But this growth was driven to a large extent by Russian demand. Today, nearly every major Belarusian export, investment, and banking channel runs through Moscow. Belarusian factories feed Putin’s war machine, the Russian ruble dominates the Belarusian ruble, and tens of thousands of skilled workers have fled to EU countries. This is not a partnership—it’s an economic takeover. Russia no longer needs troops in Belarus to control it; it already controls the country through trade, credit, and industry.

State-owned enterprises have been systematically repurposed to support the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine. Electronics firms like Integral and JSC Planar, once producers of civilian components, now supply Russian weapons manufacturers. Backed by nearly $120 million in Russian investment, Integral produces microchips found in Russian cruise missiles. Legmash in Orsha, which once manufactured textile machinery, now produces components for the Grad multiple rocket launchers. StankoGomel builds machine tools for the Russian arms industry. Textile giant Mogotex signed a contract with Chechnya’s Erzu to produce military uniforms.

Even before the full-scale invasion, Belarus played a significant role in Russia’s military supply chains, but recent disclosures reveal a dramatic escalation. By early 2025, according to BelPol, a group of anti-regime former security officers, at least 287 Belarusian state enterprises have become involved in producing weapons, components, or munitions for Russia, with the real figure potentially approaching 500 when private firms are included. Belarusian factories now manufacture or supply everything from artillery shells and rocket parts to drones and electronics components, making the country a crucial node in the Russian military-industrial complex.

Belarus’s economy has long mirrored its authoritarian politics: centralized, state-controlled, and resistant to market reforms. Under Lukashenka, state-owned enterprises still account for more than half of GDP. This Soviet-style model prioritizes loyalty over innovation—a vulnerability Putin has exploited. 

Today, up to 70 percent of Belarus’s exports flow to Russia. When including transit through Russian-controlled ports and railways, Moscow effectively controls more than 90 percent of Belarus’s outbound trade.

This near-total dependence extends beyond simple trade flows. With traditional European export routes blocked, Belarus has become locked into Russian transit corridors. In 2023, Belarusian exporters utilized twenty Russian ports, double the number from the previous year. Even goods destined for third countries must pass through Russia, inflating costs and shrinking profit margins. Key exports, such as potash and oil products, are especially vulnerable, with state-owned producer Belaruskali facing costly delays at Russian-controlled ports.

Moreover, Belarus’s fiscal survival depends almost entirely on Russian support. The country owes roughly eight billion dollars in intergovernmental loans to Russia, making it Moscow’s largest debtor. Last year, Russia granted a seven-year deferral on debt repayments—effectively writing a blank check to preserve Lukashenka’s loyalty.

The Belarusian ruble is informally pegged to a currency basket, half of which is the Russian ruble, meaning it rises and falls with Moscow’s economic fortunes, limiting Minsk’s ability to pursue an independent monetary policy.

Russian banks now handle an increasing share of Belarusian exports, while local financial institutions have been integrated into Russia’s payment and messaging systems. Western sanctions have forced Belarus to adopt Russian digital infrastructure—from tax administration tools to consumer payment platforms—further eroding what remains of its economic sovereignty.

In 2024, more than half of foreign direct investment in Belarus came from Russia. Under the banner of “import substitution” and joint ventures, Russian firms aren’t merely filling gaps left by departing Western companies, they’re systematically displacing Belarusian competitors in a quiet economic conquest.

For Belarusian manufacturers, access to the Russian market represents both a lifeline and a trap. The more dependent they become on Russian demand, the more vulnerable they are to Moscow’s political whims. In critical sectors, Russia has evolved from the largest customer to the sole customer, giving Putin effective veto power over Belarus’s industrial base.

This process is hollowing out Belarus’s economy from within. Domestic policies—such as price freezes and retaliatory sanctions—have only added strain. Prices are rising, and consumer choice is shrinking. When Lukashenka occasionally pushes back, such as blocking McDonald’s rebranding to Russia’s “Vkusno i Tochka” (which means “Tasty, Period”) and instead insisting on a Belarusian brand, these gestures prove meaningless against the broader trajectory of economic surrender.

Nowhere is Belarus’s decline more visible than in its once-thriving information technology (IT) sector, formerly a symbol of innovation and Western integration. The transformation has been devastating: IT exports plummeted 45 percent from $3.2 billion in 2021 to $1.8 billion in 2023, while the sector shed over 19,000 workers.

Russian investors, who previously comprised just 10 percent of foreign IT involvement, now account for nearly a third of the market. While these contracts offer short-term stability, they represent a strategic dead end: constraining growth potential, limiting global market access, and tying Belarus’s technological future to Russia’s isolated digital ecosystem.

The brain drain extends beyond IT. As Belarus’s most talented professionals flee westward, the country loses not just individual expertise but entire innovation networks that took decades to build. This hemorrhaging of human capital ensures Belarus’s long-term economic stagnation regardless of short-term Russian subsidies.

Cultural hegemony: The appropriation of media and education 

Moscow is attempting to methodically redefine what it means to be Belarusian. Since the mass protests following the flawed election of August 2020, the Kremlin has fused its propaganda machine with Minsk’s state media, rewritten school curricula, and flooded the cultural sphere with programming promoting “brotherly unity.” The objective is unmistakable: erase the idea that Belarus can stand apart from Russia.

Russian cash and consultants now dictate prime-time narratives across Belarusian television. A joint history textbook portrays Belarus as a junior branch of Russian civilization, while concert stages and museums celebrate Kremlin-approved myths, silencing dissenting voices. This soft-power offensive, reinforced by Lukashenka’s brutal repression, amounts to a slow-motion annexation of memory and identity.

The transformation began in August 2020, when Belarusian state media workers walked off the job to protest the regime’s violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrators. Almost immediately, rumors spread that Russian journalists—particularly from Kremlin-backed outlets like RT—had replaced them. Lukashenka fueled the speculation by publicly thanking Russian media, while RT admitted only to “advising” local teams.

Soon after, state channels began parroting Moscow’s talking points. Anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric surged. When Russia launched its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Lukashenka was framed as a bystander, even as Belarusian territory was used as a launchpad for missile strikes and military operations. 

Russia isn’t just influencing Belarusian media—it’s bankrolling it. In 2025, a new Union State joint media holding is set to launch with a budget of one billion Russian rubles (approximately eleven million dollars), headquartered in Moscow with a representative office in Minsk. The venture will encompass television, radio, and print outlets, marking a significant step toward media integration under Kremlin direction. In February, RT hosted a two-day “media school” at the Russian House in Minsk, an unmistakable effort to cultivate a new generation of regime-aligned Belarusian journalists.

Independent outlets, by contrast, are suffocating. Since 2020, the Information Ministry has blocked about eighteen thousand websites, branding nearly seven thousand as “extremist.” Dozens of newsrooms have fled abroad; those that remain work under constant threat. For most Belarusians, uncensored news is becoming increasingly scarce.

After the 2020 protests, the regime also sharply curtailed academic freedom. Student activism is met with expulsions, imprisonment, forced “repentance” videos, and mobile court trials held at universities. The government has intensified its ideological campaign, blaming “internet technologies” and foreign influence for corrupting students and responding with stricter controls on campus life.

This campaign extends into all areas of student life. In 2023, Belarus’s largest university banned Valentine’s Day, citing it as “too Western,” following a previous ban on Halloween for similar reasons. Since 2024, military training has been introduced into curricula, and even kindergartens now host military-themed events.

The state is also strangling educational choice. Licensing rules adopted in 2022 shut dozens of private schools and those that have survived face intrusive oversight. Belarusian-language teaching is in decline: Fewer than one in ten pupils study it, and no university offers a full Belarusian curriculum. In 1999, 86 percent of citizens identified Belarusian as their native language; by 2019, that figure had dropped to 61 percent and continued to fall.

At the same time, Belarusians are being steered toward Russian universities. State‑funded places for Belarusians at Russian universities jumped from 72 in 2019 to 1,300 in 2023—plus an unprecedented 30,000‑seat quota through the Rossotrudnichestvo exchange program. The Kremlin is grooming a generation whose professional networks and intellectual loyalties lie in the East, not the West.

Russia’s cultural dominance in Belarus has grown in parallel with its political and media influence. Joint exhibitions, concerts, and museum partnerships—especially those highlighting shared military history—further embed Belarus within Russia’s ideological orbit.

Events like the Slavianski Bazaar celebrate “Slavic unity,” but the content increasingly serves pro-Kremlin narratives. Russian artists who openly support Moscow’s foreign policy are welcomed, while Belarusian and Western performers and authors critical of the war in Ukraine or Lukashenka’s regime are banned.

Since 2020, independent Belarusian culture has been gutted. State funding has shifted toward Russian-backed projects, leaving little room for local voices. The result is a cultural landscape where Belarus’s distinct identity is increasingly blurred and, in many cases, erased.

What Belarusians really want

Most Belarusians aren’t choosing Russia’s path—they’re being dragged down it.

While the Kremlin tightens its grip on Belarus’s military, economy, and foreign policy, public opinion tells a very different story. Independent polling consistently shows that the Belarusian people reject war, oppose Russian nuclear deployments, and are uneasy about their country’s deepening dependence on Moscow.

Over 85 percent of Belarusians oppose sending troops to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and more than half disapprove of missile attacks launched from Belarusian soil. These numbers have remained remarkably stable over time, signaling deep and consistent anti-war sentiment that transcends political divisions. Belarusians want stability, but not if it means becoming a launchpad for Russian aggression.

Russian nuclear weapons represent another red line. Two-thirds of Belarusians oppose their deployment on Belarusian territory, though support has ticked up slightly since Moscow reportedly moved tactical nuclear weapons into the country in 2023. This resistance to militarization extends to broader security arrangements. Support for remaining in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization dropped from 63 percent in 2020 to 54 percent in 2023. When Russia invaded Ukraine, more Belarusians briefly preferred remaining outside any military bloc than staying in the CSTO—showing growing distrust of Russian-led alliances. These trends suggest Belarusians are not deeply attached to such alliances and may be open to neutrality or alternative security options.

Geopolitical preferences reveal a more complex picture. While half of Belarusians still back an alliance with Russia, 16 percent favor alignment with the EU, and 30 percent support neutrality. More telling, 57 percent believe Belarus should improve ties with the EU, with 37 percent specifically wanting stronger trade relationships.

Support for NATO remains low, between 6 percent and 11 percent, typically, but this reflects mistrust on all sides, limited access to open debate, and years of regime-driven anti-Western messaging rather than wholehearted embrace of Russia. Importantly, even among those who back integration with Russia, few envision a single state. Belarusians may accept cooperation, but not annexation.

Media access explains much of this complexity. Among those who rely on state-controlled media, 63 percent support closer ties with Russia and only 2 percent support EU integration. However, among consumers of independent media, the numbers flip: 44 percent support moving toward Europe, while just 11 percent back greater integration with Russia.

This data point carries profound implications for Western strategy. Propaganda works, but only when it monopolizes the conversation. Where independent journalism survives, even underground or in exile, it shapes opinions and maintains space for alternative futures. Belarusians who access independent information are more likely to oppose war, support Ukraine, and envision a sovereign development path.

The regime may have crushed street protests, but resistance persists through underground sabotage, cyber leaks, and digital dissent. These aren’t isolated acts of defiance; they signal a society that refuses to surrender its agency.

Belarusians are not ideologues. They are pragmatic. While geopolitical views are fragmented, public support for economic reforms is strong. Nearly 80 percent support fair competition between the public and private sectors. Most also want stock market development, tax cuts for small businesses, and less state interference.

That said, there are anxieties. Inflation, shrinking social safety nets, and the risk of economic shock are real concerns. Attitudes are nuanced: people support market mechanisms but fear short-term pain. Trust in the business elite is limited, but support for entrepreneurship is high.

The regime’s choices do not reflect the will of the Belarusian people. Most Belarusians oppose the war, reject nuclear deployments, and favor neutrality over dependence on Moscow. Despite repression and propaganda, quiet resistance persists: in attitudes, media habits, and daily acts of dissent. This gap between state and society is strategic. The regime is brittle; the people are not. Western policy must begin here: Belarus is not lost, and its future is still in play.

Conclusion

Belarus has not been formally annexed, but it has been absorbed. Militarily, politically, economically, and culturally, it has become a Russian outpost: a launchpad for aggression and repression alike. Yet this transformation is not complete, and it is not irreversible. The Belarusian regime survives through coercion and dependence, not legitimacy. Beneath the surface lies a society that still aspires to sovereignty, stability, and connection to the democratic world.

This report has shown how absorption happened, sector by sector—but also why it matters. A captive Belarus threatens NATO’s flank, enables Kremlin aggression, and offers a template for authoritarian consolidation elsewhere. For the United States and its allies, the time to act is now. Containing Russia, defending Europe, and supporting democracy all run through Minsk. The path to long-term regional security runs not only through Kyiv but also through a free and sovereign Belarus.

Belarus in the balance: Strategic recommendations for US and allied policy

The West can no longer afford to treat Belarus as a sideshow. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Belarus has become a critical platform for Kremlin aggression: militarily, economically, and ideologically. Restoring Belarusian sovereignty is now a strategic imperative for NATO’s eastern security and the broader defense of democratic values.

To counter Belarus’s deepening alignment with Russia, Western policymakers must adopt a four-part strategy: reframe Belarus as a frontline issue, enforce synchronized pressure, build democratic resilience, and prepare for regime rupture.

First, the United States must elevate Belarus as a national security priority. It should be fully integrated into NATO and EU threat assessments, treated alongside Ukraine and the Baltic states in strategic planning. Russian bases, nuclear deployments, and hybrid threats from Belarus are not theoretical: They are already altering Europe’s security landscape.

Second, sanctions must be expanded, enforced, and fully aligned with allies. Belarus is a central hub for sanctions evasion and war logistics, leveraging smuggling networks, trade rerouting, and Russian support. The United States, the EU, and the Group of Seven should synchronize measures against Belarus’s military-industrial complex, financial institutions, and dual-use sectors, extend secondary sanctions to enablers in China, Iran, and elsewhere, and close loopholes to raise the cost of Minsk’s subjugation to Moscow and deter further aggression.

Third, pressure must be matched by investment in Belarusian democratic infrastructure. This includes independent media, secure digital tools, exile education, and cultural preservation. These aren’t symbolic; they sustain the capacity for democratic self-rule and offer a credible alternative to Kremlin domination.

American leadership is vital. Appointing a US special envoy for the Belarusian democratic forces would centralize policy coordination and ensure Belarus stays on the transatlantic agenda. Belarusian democratic leaders must also be present in any future diplomatic process on postwar regional security. No high-level engagement with Lukashenka should resume until more than one thousand political prisoners are freed. 

Thanks to US mediation, a number of Belarusian political prisoners and foreign nationals have been freed this year. This humanitarian track should continue. However, it is crucial not to legitimize Lukashenka or ease pressure prematurely. The United States must adopt long-term strategic thinking on Belarus. Ultimately, Western policy should be guided by the understanding that only a democratic Belarus can ensure lasting stability for the entire region.

Finally, contingency planning is essential. Lukashenka’s regime is fragile. The West must be prepared for scenarios ranging from internal collapse to Russian destabilization. Planning should cover political transition, humanitarian assistance, and infrastructure security. Clear public guarantees of post-Lukashenka support—from economic aid to security cooperation—could hasten regime erosion and incentivize elite defections.

Belarus’s future must be embedded in the broader strategy to end the war in Ukraine and roll back authoritarian influence. A free Belarus would deny Moscow a key launchpad, reduce NATO’s exposure, and weaken Russian and Chinese leverage in the region.

The window for action is narrowing. A coherent Western strategy that combines pressure with preparation can still tip the balance.

Hanna Liubakova is a Belarusian journalist and political analyst. She is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and has reported on developments in Belarus for international outlets including the Washington Post, the Economist, and others.

Liubakova began her career at Belsat TV, the only independent Belarusian television channel, which has been banned by the regime in Minsk. She later worked for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) in Prague, Czechia, and is currently writing a book about Belarus.

Her reporting has earned multiple honors, including the Freedom of the Media Award from the Transatlantic Leadership Network and the One Young World Journalist of the Year Award. She was also a finalist for the European Press Prize. In retaliation for her work, the Lukashenka regime sentenced her in absentia to ten years in prison. She is wanted by authorities in Russia and across all Commonwealth of Independent States countries.

Russia Tomorrow Feb 2, 2024

Russia Tomorrow: Five scenarios for Russia’s future

By Casey Michel

A new Atlantic Council report explores five paths that Russia future might take in its future. What forces will shape Russia’s future?

Europe & Eurasia Political Reform

Russia Tomorrow Oct 1, 2024

Russia’s war on Ukraine: Moscow’s pressure points and US strategic opportunities

By Ariel Cohen

A new Atlantic Council report explores Russia’s modern day domestic and international vulnerabilities.

Defense Industry Europe & Eurasia

New Atlanticist Jul 24, 2024

Lukashenka’s rhetoric toward Ukraine and the West has softened. His repression of Belarusians has not.

By Hanna Liubakova

Lukashenka is continuing his campaign of domestic repression and targeting Belarusians in exile—including the author of this article.

Belarus Conflict

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Minsk in Moscow’s grip: How Russia subjugated Belarus without annexation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 6, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Thomas X. Hammes published an issue brief with the Stimson Center titled “We Can’t Buy Our Way Out: It’s Time to Think Differently.” Hammes urges the Pentagon to focus on a new generation of containerized weapons that can be mass produced in order to field capabilities to deter or succeed in a conflict against China.

Fellow

Thomas X. Hammes

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Industry

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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The post Hammes publishes issue brief on containerized weapons with Stimson Center appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 11, Forward Defense senior fellow Steven Grundman was featured in a Defense & Aerospace Report podcast episode entitled “Deep Dive in to Sec Hegseth’s Acquisition Reforms.” Grundman underscored the importance of the Pentagon’s push to streamline acquisition and argued that current conditions make this a pivotal moment for the United States to embrace industrial policy and invest in rebuilding domestic capacity.

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Steven Grundman

Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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The post Grundman featured in Defense & Aerospace Report on defense acquisition reform appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 11, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Arnold Punaro was quoted in an Air & Space Forces Magazine article entitled “The Pentagon Wants to Buy Weapons Faster. What Will It Cost?” where he discussed acquisition reform. Punaro noted that while expanding competition in weapons procurement will require substantial upfront investment, it will ultimately drive down costs and strengthen long-term competitiveness. 

Advisory Council member

Arnold Punaro

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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It is clear that Europe has much to learn. A spate of suspected Russian drone incursions during the second half of 2025 have highlighted the continent’s vulnerability to drone-based aggression and raised fundamental questions over whether European armies are currently preparing for the wrong kind of war. While Europe’s rearmament efforts continue to gain ground, even big spenders like Poland remain focused primarily on traditional weapons systems. This is fueling concerns that European defense policymakers may not fully appreciate the growing dominance of drones on the battlefields of Ukraine.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s embrace of drone warfare since 2022 can provide Kyiv’s partners with a wide range of important insights. Following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost four years ago, Ukraine has turned to relatively cheap drone technologies in order to offset Moscow’s often overwhelming advantages in conventional firepower and reduce the country’s dependence on Western weapons supplies. As a result, the number of Ukrainian drone producers has skyrocketed from a handful of companies to hundreds, while overall drone output has shot up to millions of units per year.

Ukraine’s vibrant prewar tech sector has proved a major asset, serving as fertile ground for the dynamic expansion of the country’s defense sector. Meanwhile, Ukrainian initiatives like the government-backed Brave1 defense tech cluster have helped to empower innovators and optimize cooperation between the army, the state, and individual drone producers. In summer 2024, Ukraine became the first country to establish a separate branch of the military dedicated to drones with the launch of the Unmanned Systems Forces.

The results speak for themselves. Drones are now thought to be responsible for up to three-quarters of Russian battlefield casualties, with Ukrainian army units creating a “drone wall” around ten kilometers in depth along the front lines of the war. At sea, Ukraine has used naval drones to break the Russian blockade of the country’s ports and force Putin to withdraw the bulk of his fleet away from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea coast. Kyiv has also deployed an expanding arsenal of long-range drones to strike high-value targets with increasing frequency deep inside Russia.

In addition to these offensive roles, drones have become a vital element in Ukraine’s air defenses. Since 2024, Russia has dramatically increased the production of kamikaze bomber drones, making it possible to launch hundreds of drones at targets across Ukraine in a single night. The sheer scale of these attacks has meant that traditional missile-based air defenses are no longer practical due to the high cost and limited availability of interceptor missiles. Instead, Ukrainian defense companies have focused on developing and producing interceptor drones in large quantities.

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So far, European efforts to learn from Ukraine’s drone warfare experience have concentrated primarily on securing access to the latest Ukrainian drone innovations. This approach certainly makes sense. However, many Ukrainian specialists have stressed that as their European partners look to develop drone capabilities of their own, effective training programs will be just as important as advanced technologies.

Maria Berlinska, who heads Ukraine’s Victory Drones project, has argued that up to 90 percent of success in drone warfare depends on the training of the team behind the drone rather than the technology involved. “A drone on its own, without the coordinated work of the team, delivers nothing,” she commented in an October 2025 article addressing the need for skilled drone crews.

Training an effective drone pilot is a complex task that can take at least three months. Many categories of drone operators must also be able to act as engineers and mechanics with the ability to repair and reconfigure their systems in the field. To help meet this challenge, Ukraine has developed a strong network of volunteer organizations dedicated to training new drone pilots and preparing them for combat operations. By late 2024, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense had certified over thirty training centers for drone operators. Novel innovations include a mobile drone school located inside a converted bus.

Speaking to Euronews in October, Ukrainian drone warfare expert Fedir Serdiuk warned that Europe was currently focusing too much on drone technologies while overlooking the need to train operators and commanders in the effective battlefield use of drones. “I don’t see as many training centers being built as factories. It’s a major mistake. Not only for technical skills but also for tactical skills,” he commented.

Ukraine appears poised to play a central part in the training of Europe’s drone forces. Ukrainian trainers have already reportedly begun sharing their expertise with a number of countries including Britain, Denmark, and Poland. This trend reflects an important eastward shift in Europe’s defense landscape, with Ukraine emerging as a key contributor to the continent’s future security. This contribution will draw heavily on technological innovations developed during the war with Russia, but it will also emphasize the importance of effective training.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 10, 2025

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Hollywood star Angelina Jolie paid a surprise visit to Ukraine in early November to help raise international awareness about Russia’s ‘human safari’ campaign of drone killings targeting Ukrainian civilians, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

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Ukraine’s long-range drone strike campaign has brought Putin’s invasion home to Russia but mounting domestic problems are unlikely to spark a rebellion against the Kremlin dictatorship, writes Christopher Isajiw.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Oct 31, 2025

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By Aura Sabadus

The EU has recently moved to impose a full ban on Russian gas imports by 2028. After years of using energy exports to blackmail Europe and fund the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow is finally facing the loss of its last European costumers, writes Aura Sabadus.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Ukraine’s drone war lesson for Europe: Technology is nothing without training appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Rich Outzen interview with i24 on UK assistance to Belgium’s counter-drone defenses appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Public Event Wed, November 5, 2025 • 3:00 pm ET

Representative Adam Smith on how Congress will shape US defense policy

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Representative Adam Smith (D-WA), ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, shares his priorities for the upcoming National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and discusses how Congress can ensure the Pentagon meets today’s security challenges.

Security & Defense United States and Canada

“I don’t think simply committing this large number of assets—hundreds of millions, probably billions of dollars by the time it’s done—to blow up some drug boats in international waters in Latin America is going to make an appreciable difference” in the fight against drug trafficking, said Representative Adam Smith (D-WA), the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Thursday. 

The event, part of the Atlantic Council’s Commanders Series, came amid uncertainty over whether the Trump administration’s campaign of attacks on boats that it claims are trafficking drugs will escalate into an effort to overthrow Venezuelan autocrat Nicolás Maduro.

Based on a briefing he received from the State Department and Department of Defense on Wednesday, Smith said he thinks that “the administration does not want to go to war with Venezuela.” But, Smith added, US President Donald Trump sometimes “very quickly” changes his mind. “So who knows?”

Thursday’s event also came amid the longest US government shutdown in history, with the House out of session even as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the next fiscal year has yet to be passed, a situation Smith called “unbelievably disruptive.”

Read below for more highlights from this conversation with Smith, which was moderated by Fox News Chief National Security Correspondent Jennifer Griffin. 

The NDAA

• “The NDAA itself is moving forward,” Smith said of the annual bill, noting that different versions have been passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and now the two versions need to be reconciled.
• One of Smith’s priorities for the bill is acquisition reform: “My position is we’ve had the risk wrong for a long time” on defense acquisition policy, said Smith. “We’ve been only focused” on the risk of corruption in the procurement process “as opposed to the risk of not moving fast enough,” he said. One way to speed up acquisition, he said, is “consolidating the decision makers” in the process “instead of having to go through nine or ten different layers.”
• Smith also said he wants to “have procurement people stay in their job longer.” Constant turnover in procurement roles, he said, “doesn’t really help with corruption. It just means that the person doesn’t know the system as well when they’re working on it.”

US strikes on boats in the Caribbean and Pacific

• Transnational drug-trafficking gangs in the Western Hemisphere are “a problem for our national security” and “a problem for Latin America,” Smith said. “You’ve got budding narco-states down there. They’re having a harder and harder time dealing with that. We need to be engaged and involved in that.”
• However, Smith was critical of the Trump administration’s campaign of attacks on alleged drug-trafficking boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific. “It seems very problematic to me that we have decided that drug dealing will now have the death penalty attached to it,” with “no process whatsoever.”
• “They’re certainly bad policy in my view,” Smith said of the strikes.

US military presence abroad

• “I think one of the mistakes that we have made is to assume that our global presence is just a cost that isn’t benefiting us,” Smith said of US troop deployments abroad. 
• Citing threats posed by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorist organizations, Smith said that to pull US troops back from allied countries now and “ignore” these dangers “places us at risk.”
• Smith took issue with the Trump administration’s decision to draw down its forces in Romania and noted that there is “bipartisan, bicameral support” in the House and Senate armed services committees “to maintain our presence in Europe and defend them.”
• “If any of you have been to Romania, the Baltics, Poland,” said Smith, addressing the crowd, “they want a lot of things, but the one thing they want more than anything is us,” meaning a US military presence. “They don’t believe Russia wants to come in and kill a bunch of US troops. So a little bit of presence can give us a maximum amount of deterrence, and we’re going to fight that out in the defense bill.”

Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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Ukraine’s mobilization challenges are no secret and have been steadily mounting for much of the war. During the initial days of the full-scale invasion in early 2022, an unprecedented flood of volunteers made it possible to dramatically expand the size of the Ukrainian armed forces to around one million troops. However, as the conflict has dragged on into a fourth year amid consistently high casualty rates and escalating problems with desertion, this initial flow has slowed to a relative trickle. Individual units have responded by launching their own slick advertising campaigns to attract fresh recruits, while military mobilization officials have become notorious for dragging eligible men off the streets straight to military bases.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The mobilization issue has been exacerbated by President Zelenskyy’s reluctance to lower the age for compulsory military service from twenty-five to eighteen. This has led to criticism from Ukraine’s Western partners, who have argued that it is unrealistic to wage a major war while exempting so many young Ukrainians from mobilization. Rather than take the politically dangerous decision to reduce the conscription age, Zelenskyy has backed an incentive scheme to attract volunteers in the eighteen to twenty-five age bracket. However, the initiative has so far failed to fill the gaps in Ukraine’s decimated front line units.

The recent decision to lift international travel restrictions on young Ukrainian men aged eighteen to twenty-two has further complicated Ukraine’s manpower problems. Around 100,000 Ukrainian males have left the country since restrictions were eased around two months ago, Britain’s Daily Telegraph reports. This exodus deprives the country of potential future army recruits and has created a range of more immediate personnel issues that are already reverberating throughout the Ukrainian economy. While some of these men may plan on returning to Ukraine, experience since 2022 suggests that many will seek to settle elsewhere in the European Union.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Moscow is also facing difficulties replenishing its invasion force amid catastrophic losses in Ukraine that dwarf the death toll from every other Kremlin war since 1945. Putin initially sought to address this problem by launching a partial mobilization in September 2022, but the move proved hugely unpopular and led to around one million young Russians fleeing the country. Instead, the Kremlin has introduced a system a lavish financial incentives including huge enlistment bounties and generous monthly salaries in order to attract volunteers willing to join the invasion of Ukraine. While it has proved necessary to repeatedly increase the sums on offer, this approach has made it possible to secure around thirty thousand new recruits per month.

Based on the current trajectory of the war, Russia’s manpower advantage over Ukraine will only grow wider during the coming year. This is already making itself on the battlefield, with Russian forces exploiting gaps in Ukraine’s defenses along the more than one thousand kilometers of front line and edging forward at multiple points. While Putin’s troops have so far been unable to achieve any major breakthroughs, Russia’s territorial gains are slowly but surely adding up.

The most intensive fighting is currently taking place in the Donetsk region as Russia seeks to complete the capture of Pokrovsk. If Putin’s commanders succeed in taking the city, it will be seen by many as vindication of the Kremlin strategy to grind out victory by relying on the sheer size of the Russian army. Putin has long believed that he can win the war by outlasting the West and overwhelming Ukraine. He will view Kyiv’s increasingly evident infantry shortage as a strong indication that time is on his side.

For Zelenskyy, there are no easy options. Lowering the mobilization age would generate a new wave of recruits but could also pose a significant threat to Ukrainian national morale. Reforming the terms of military service to provide greater rotation guarantees while also adopting a more meritocratic approach to the appointment of army commanders may help restore flagging public confidence and attract more volunteers, but this would take time that Ukraine quite frankly no longer possesses.

For now, the battle-hardened but exhausted and outnumbered Ukrainian army has little choice but to remain in a defensive posture. Ukraine’s commanders must be prepared to cede ground when necessary in order to preserve precious fighting strength, while looking for opportunities to maximize enemy casualties. The goal should be to withstand the Russian onslaught until a combination of punishing front line losses, escalating long-range strikes inside Russia, and deepening economic woes finally forces Putin to the negotiating table.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 28, 2025

UN report: Russia targets civilians in systematic bid to depopulate Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Russia is deliberately targeting Ukrainian civilians in a deadly drone strike campaign that aims to depopulate large parts of the country and constitutes a crime against humanity, according to a new United Nations report, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Oct 16, 2025

Putin seeks more foreign fighters amid mounting Russian losses in Ukraine

By David Kirichenko

With fewer and fewer Russians ready to volunteer for the war in Ukraine, Putin is seeking to recruit more foreign fighters from across Africa, Asia, and beyond, writes David Kirichenko.

Africa Americas

UkraineAlert Oct 6, 2025

Putin rejected Trump’s generous deal. Time to try peace through strength.

By Sergiy Solodkyy

President Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine by offering Putin Kremlin-friendly peace terms have failed to convince the Russian dictator. It is now time to speak to Putin in the language of strength, the only language he truly understands, writes Sergiy Solodkyy.

Conflict Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Russia’s advance on Pokrovsk exposes Ukraine’s growing manpower crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Alex Serban: A transition from reassurance to co-ownership of defense 

Philippe Dickinson: This is far from the worst outcome for Europe 

A transition from reassurance to co-ownership of defense

BUCHAREST—The big question across NATO’s eastern flank today is: Should this development be understood as a retreat by the United States or a strategic reconfiguration? 

Romanian authorities confirmed that approximately one thousand US troops will remain stationed in the country. Key allied strategic assets will remain untouched, such as the Deveselu missile-defense site and the Mihail Kogălniceanu (MK) Air Base, which is undergoing a two-billion-dollar expansion to become one of NATO’s largest and most capable bases in Europe. Reuters reported that a NATO official also underscored on Wednesday that the overall US military presence in Europe “remains larger than it has been in many years,” framing the decision as part of a regular adjustment in posture rather than a withdrawal. 

Indeed, Romanian President Nicușor Dan had already informed Parliament in August about approving the pre-positioning of military equipment and new US contingents at MK Air Base, describing it as “a strategic reconfiguration, not a withdrawal,” in the context of rising instability in the Middle East and NATO’s ongoing consolidation. 

But Washington’s decision may bring unintended consequences. This regional brigade was a reminder that in the face of populist politics and Russian interference—via drones, sabotage, and disinformation—weakened democracies such as Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary still had a Western commitment and troops to rely on. Instead of reflecting confidence that allies like Romania can host, integrate, and operate advanced assets within a broader NATO command structure, populist politicians and extremist voices may use this pullback as a signal that Moscow is once again setting the region’s clock.  

For Bucharest, it is a call to maintain momentum in modernizing its armed forces, investing in logistics and surveillance systems, and aligning its defense planning with both NATO and the European Union’s (EU’s) emerging defense initiatives, including within the Bucharest Nine format of NATO’s eastern flank countries.  

From Moscow’s perspective, the move will be applauded and seen as a weakening of US resolve. In reality, however, if the United States and Europe make strong commitments, a more agile and networked posture—anchored in Romania—strengthens deterrence by enhancing mobility, intelligence, and rapid reaction capacity across the Black Sea. 

Ultimately, this decision could mark a transition from reassurance to co-ownership of defense. The transatlantic partnership is not retracting; it is evolving and transforming, requiring Europe, and Romania in particular, to turn political reliability into operational capability. Romania is looking to its US ally to send clear messages and commit firmly to continue its presence across the region as a deterrent to Russian aggression. 

That’s why Pentagon and NATO leaders should go the extra mile and further underscore that no future retrenchment will take place in the next three years. US military investments in Romania should remain steadfast and continue to expand, particularly at MK Air Base. 

Meanwhile, Europe should step in and backfill for the departing brigade. Romania and the EU must deepen their own defense investment, financially, industrially, and in troop commitments, to ensure that NATO’s forward presence is matched by credible European capabilities. 

—Alex Serban is the senior advisor for the Atlantic Council’s Romania Office and a nonresident senior fellow in the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

This is far from the worst outcome for Europe

WASHINGTON—This is a day that many in Europe have feared for some time. But it shouldn’t come as a surprise—this is a clearly stated policy direction that the Trump administration has communicated for several months. 

It also shouldn’t be a time to panic. The administration has been trying to reassure European allies that the planned reconfiguration of the US presence on the ground in Europe will be gradual and moderate, returning US troop numbers over time to levels similar to those before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This move in Romania is broadly in line with that direction. In the range of potential force posture moves the administration could take, this is far from the worst outcome for Europe. The suggestion today from the Estonian defense minister that US troops will remain in the Baltic nation should provide more reassurance. 

The administration has generally been pleasantly surprised by the broader European response to the Trump administration’s demands that Europe take on greater responsibility for its own security, with the NATO 5 percent spending target being the standout success. Europe’s cooperation should strengthen the hand of those within the administration arguing for a phased and moderate reorientation done in coordination with NATO and European allies. 

The lesson for European leaders should be that showing progress on their own defense spending and capabilities is the best way to keep the Americans on board and engaged in the project of European security. And it helps them frame as more reasonable their critical asks of Washington: US enablers that are not easily replaced (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; long-range strike capabilities; command and control; logistics and transport; and the US nuclear umbrella) and the maintenance of a thin but broad US physical presence along the eastern flank that can be scaled at speed in a crisis. 

With that said, Moscow will inevitably interpret this move as a message that, while the United States is most certainly not abandoning Europe, it is serious about its efforts to reconfigure its European force posture. To neutralize any potential emboldening of Moscow, the United States should find other ways to signal clear, long-term resolve to deter further Russian aggression. The recent sanctions package is an excellent start. Providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles and committing critical enablers to Ukraine after a cease-fire would be even better. 

—Philippe Dickinson is a deputy director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative. Prior to joining the Council, he was a career diplomat with the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 

The post What does the US drawdown in Romania mean for European defense?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On October 16, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig published an article in Foreign Policy titled, “It’s Time to Stop New START.” He argues that the Trump administration should not extend the nuclear arms control treaty with Russia and should instead expand its nuclear arsenal to deter China.

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The post Yevgeniya Gaber interviewed and quoted by Clingendael Institute on Turkey’s role in the Black Sea and opportunities to cooperate with the EU within the EU Black Sea hub framework appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On October 24, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Linda Lourie was quoted in an article from the Jerusalem Post titled “CET Sandbox bridging battlefield tested Israeli defense tech with Washington.” Lourie highlighted the importance of connecting Israel’s combat-proven innovation ecosystem with US efforts to strengthen defense supply chains and accelerate technology integration.

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Linda Lourie

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Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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The post Lourie quoted in the Jerusalem Post on US-Israel defense technology cooperation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On October 21, Imran Bayoumi, associate director of the GeoStrategy Initiative, published an article for the Irregular Warfare Initiative titled “Policing the Pacific: How China Expands Influence Where the US Looks for Allies.” In the article, Bayoumi examines China’s use of police partnerships in the Pacific Islands and how Washington can adapt this strategy to counter Beijing’s influence.

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Imran Bayoumi

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The post Bayoumi for the Irregular Warfare Initiative on countering Chinese influence in the Pacific Islands appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Director for Northern Europe, Anna Wieslander, was interviewed October 17 in an Al Jazeera article on Russia’s economy, sanctions against it and how it impacts the war in Ukraine.

Wieslander argues that US leadership has changed when it comes to addressing Russia as a threat to European security and warns that Europe will pay a higher price in the future if they don’t take tougher measures right now.

The EU proposal to use a large part of the seized Russian central bank reserves held in European institutions to back huge loans for Ukraine’s defense and reconstruction is the most powerful political message in the 19th sanctions package, says Wieslander.

The post Wieslander in Al Jazeera appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A number of recent media reports have highlighted the growing role of foreign nationals in the Russian military. In early October, an Indian citizen was captured by Ukrainian forces while fighting for Russia. The 22 year old claimed to have been arrested in Russia while studying and pressured into signing a contract with the Russian army in order to secure his release from prison. After just two weeks of basic training, he was sent to the front lines of the war in Ukraine.

Also in early October, the Los Angeles Times reported that Russia may have recruited tens of thousands of foreign fighters via social media, with many coming from disadvantaged countries across the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia. The article detailed how many of these recruits are allegedly enticed with offers of generous benefits including large salaries and Russian citizenship in exchange for military service in non-combat roles. In practice, however, most are soon sent straight into battle.

Meanwhile, a group of more than twenty Kenyan men were rescued from a suspected human trafficking ring in September following a raid on a residential complex in Nairobi. The men had reportedly been promised jobs in Russia but were set to be sent to fight in Ukraine. The multi-agency operation highlighted growing concerns that Moscow is stepping up efforts to lure African men to Russia and forcing them to join the Russian army.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The single largest contingent of foreigners currently fighting for Russia may be Cubans. An October 2 cable from the US State Department sent to dozens of US diplomatic missions claimed that up to 5000 Cuban nationals are currently serving in the ranks of Putin’s army. Ukrainian officials say the total number could actually be far higher and estimate that as many as 20,000 Cubans may have been recruited by Russia.

While Russian officials have typically been tight-lipped about the presence of foreigners in the country’s military, some have recently acknowledged the growing presence of Cuban troops. Andrey Kartapolov, who heads the Russian Parliament’s Defense Committee, defended the practice of recruiting Cubans and indicated that many more may soon be joining the invasion of Ukraine. “If young people from Cuba want to help our country, there is nothing strange about that,” he commented.

This increasing openness has also been evident in relation to the participation North Korean soldiers in Russia’s war. When reports first emerged of North Korean troops being deployed to Russia in late 2024, the Kremlin responded with a series of denials. Months later, Putin himself officially confirmed the presence of a North Korean contingent. “We will always honor the Korean heroes who gave their lives for Russia, for our common freedom, on an equal basis with their Russian brothers in arms,” he commented in April 2025.

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It is easy to understand why Moscow is so interested in enlisting foreigners to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to Britain’s Ministry of Defense, more than one million Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded since the start of the full-scale invasion, making the current war by far the costliest undertaken by the Kremlin since World War II.

The human wave tactics favored by Russian commanders require a steady supply of fresh troops, but Moscow is reluctant to conscript large numbers of Russian civilians into the army. A partial mobilization in September 2022 sparked a major backlash, with hundreds of thousands of Russians fleeing the country to avoid wartime service. Instead, the Kremlin has focused on sourcing manpower from Russia’s prison population and attracting volunteers by offering increasingly large financial incentives. CNN reports that numerous Russian regions have dramatically increased the amounts they offer to new recruits in recent months amid a decline in volunteers.

There are growing indications that the current approach may no longer be enough to compensate for Russia’s heavy losses on the front lines in Ukraine. The number of new recruits receiving signing-on bonuses during the second quarter of 2025 was the lowest in two years, according to research by independent Russian investigative outlet iStories based on Russian federal budget data. The outlet’s findings indicated that around 38,000 people volunteered for military service between April and June 2025, two and a half times lower than the figure for the same period one year earlier.

The Kremlin’s appetite for foreign fighters is not merely an attempt to make up the numbers. Crucially, Moscow also regards the recruitment of non-Russian troops as significantly cheaper and less politically risky. Since 2022, the Kremlin has established an extensive system of compensation payments for Russian soldiers killed or wounded in Ukraine. None of this applies to foreigners. Likewise, every Russian military death on the Ukrainian front lines risks fueling anti-war sentiment at home, while casualties from faraway lands have virtually no impact on Russian public sentiment.

These factors have encouraged Putin and other Kremlin leaders to view foreign fighters as an expendable alternative to dwindling numbers of Russian recruits. “If a foreigner dies, there are no social payouts and no responsibility. There are no relatives inside Russia who are unhappy with the war, and of course there are fewer dead Russians,” Ukrainian Military Intelligence spokesman Andriy Yusov told US Congress officials in September.

Moscow’s efforts to secure more foreign troops are an indication of the mounting manpower challenges confronting the Kremlin. Russia is still a very long way from running out of soldiers, but Putin has no more easy options as he seeks to replenish his decimated invasion force and continue the war into a fifth year. With declining numbers of Russians prepared to risk their lives in exchange for financial incentives, Putin may have to choose between a deeply unpopular mobilization or a further expansion of Russia’s international recruitment campaign. Neither option is likely to produce the kind of skilled and motivated fighting force capable of defeating Ukraine.

The presence of assorted Cubans, North Koreans, Indians, Africans, and other foreign troops within Putin’s military directly undermines widespread but misleading notions of Russia’s limitless resources. In reality, the Russian army in Ukraine is increasingly overstretched and may be far more vulnerable than Moscow would like us to believe. This should motivate Kyiv’s partners to expand their support for the Ukrainian war effort. Putin currently has no interest in ending his invasion, but the prospect of military defeat could force him to accept the necessity of a negotiated peace deal.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 14, 2025

Tomahawk missiles are Russia’s latest red line. Will Trump call Putin’s bluff?

By Peter Dickinson

Time and again since 2022, Moscow has declared a new red line while warning of the West of nuclear escalation, only to then do nothing when their red lines are crossed. Trump can now call Putin’s bluff over Russia’s latest red line by providing Ukraine with Tomahawks, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Sep 16, 2025

Only Ukraine can teach NATO how to combat Putin’s growing drone fleet

By David Kirichenko

NATO must urgently learn from Ukraine’s unique experience of Russian drone warfare as the alliance seeks to address the growing threats posed by Putin’s drone swarms, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Oct 8, 2025

Ukraine’s defense tech sector must guard against innovation drain

By Andriy Dovbenko

Without robust intellectual property (IP) protections, Ukraine may lose control of the defense tech innovations that are currently helping to defend the country on the battlefield, writes Andriy Dovbenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Putin seeks more foreign fighters amid mounting Russian losses in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On October 3, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Elliot Ackerman was featured in an episode of Open Debate entitled “Wartime Kill Switch: Human or AI?” in which he defended human control over lethal battlefield decisions.  

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Elliot Ackerman

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Afghanistan Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

Learn more

The post Ackerman defends human oversight of battlefield decisions on Open Debate appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• Key findings summary
• Methodology
• Part I: Russian intent
• Part II: Deterrence
• Part III: Response
• Recommendations and key findings
• Conclusion

Introduction

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the Atlantic Council project, Sustaining Allied Responses to the Threat of Russian Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Escalation. The objective of the project was to analyze the prospects for Russian use of chemical or biological weapons specifically in Europe over the next five to ten years; identify how the United States and its European allies and partners could deter and prevent Russian use of these weapons in Europe; and, should deterrence fail, assess response options.

Background

Russia has a well-established and clearly demonstrated strategic objective of undermining stability in the Euro-Atlantic region to reverse its loss of status following the end of the Cold War.¹ This strategy is characterized by hostility toward the United States and its allies and partners in Europe.²

Over recent years, Russia has demonstrated its intent to provoke instability in Europe by acting with malign aggression that is both overt and hybrid in nature. The starkest example of Russia’s revanchist aggression is its full-scale illegal invasion of Ukraine, launched in 2022. Russia has also been conducting hybrid attacks—hostile activities using tools of statecraft below the threshold of conventional warfare to shift the balance of power in its favor—against the United States and its allies in Europe.³

A willingness to use chemical weapons has long been a feature of Russian aggression, both on the battlefield in Ukraine (specifically chloropicrin), and on the streets of Europe.⁴ As a result, Russia was described as “the most acute nuclear, biological, and chemical threat in the near-term” in the United States’ 2023 Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction.⁵ This parallels the same terminology used in the 2022 National Defense Strategy and 2022 National Security Strategy.⁶ Undermining the cohesion of the United States and its NATO allies is a core goal of Russia’s political and military strategy. The Kremlin has shown that it is willing to use, or threaten to use, whatever capabilities it possesses, including CBRN weapons, to achieve this goal.

Research question

Our primary research question was, “What are the prospects for Russian use of chemical or biological weapons in Europe over the next five to ten years, and how can the United States and its European allies and partners counter such threats?” To address this question, the project team examined the following:

• In what scenarios might Russia use its arsenal of chemical and biological capabilities to achieve its geopolitical goals in the five-to-ten-year time frame? What developments in European security more broadly over the same period would increase or decrease the risk of Russian use of chemical or biological weapons?
• How might the United States and its European allies and partners enhance their overall defense and deterrence posture to reduce the risk of potential chemical or biological weapons use in the next five to ten years?
• How can the United States work with European allies and partners to coordinate and standardize comprehensive responses to the potential deployment of Russian chemical and biological weapons?
• To what extent could Russian use of chemical or biological weapons in Europe escalate further to the use of nuclear weapons, and how can the United States work with its European allies and partners to reduce the risk of escalation?

Key findings summary

Our project illuminated several findings for US and European decision-makers:

• Russia will likely continue using chemical weapons in Europe in a range of scenarios over the next five to ten years, particularly if doing so undermines Alliance unity and disrupts Ukraine’s integration into the West. Based on its recent behavior, however, Russia appears less likely to use biological weapons. Furthermore, while Russia has threatened nuclear use, a large-scale nuclear attack appears unlikely.
• To credibly deter Russia from nuclear escalation, the United States and its European allies and partners must ensure that Russia understands that using—or threatening to use—chemical and biological weapons would both fail to achieve its intended outcome and incur intolerable costs.
• Since the end of the Cold War, CBRN defense has been deprioritized among NATO allies, including the United States. Amid calls for increased defense spending, CBRN defense capability development is an area primed for greater investment.
• The United States should leverage NATO to facilitate greater coordination between civilian and military entities to enhance whole-of-society resilience to CBRN threats.
• Information and intelligence sharing is critical to achieving a common threat perception among NATO allies and partners. Expanded information sharing and effective strategic communications can deter Russian use of chemical or biological weapons and ensure a coordinated response if deterrence fails.
• The United States and its European allies and partners should take steps to raise the public IQ related to CBRN threats, particularly as it pertains to chemical and biological threats.
• The governance of emerging and applied technologies is difficult within the bounds of existing treaty regimes. Sanctions and export controls can complement treaty organizations to monitor and contain potential CBRN threats from such technologies, including dual-use systems and components.

Methodology

The project team adopted two principal research methods for this project: a series of scenario-based workshops and interviews with subject matter experts and officials from the United States, Europe, and NATO. The team also conducted secondary research to develop the workshop methodology and to corroborate information and insights gleaned during the workshops and interviews.

Scenario-based workshops

In January 2025, the project team convened experts and officials to take part in two scenario-based exercises. The first group, which was convened virtually, consisted of subject matter experts and researchers from the United States and Europe, while the second group (convened in hybrid format) consisted of officials from the United States, NATO, and European governments. See Appendixes B and C for more information about the participants and the methodology, respectively.

The project team created a plausible exploratory scenario in which tensions between Russia and the United States and its European allies and partners (primarily Ukraine) had grown over a five-year time frame. The scenario provided a framework for participants to consider the key questions of Russian strategic intent, and implications for allied deterrence and responses to Russian aggression.

The workshops presented two scenarios in the year 2030: one in which Russia carried out a chemical attack against NATO allies based in Ukraine, and one in which Russia carried out targeted biological attacks against allied officials in Europe. These attacks concerned low-level use of chemical and biological agents, rather than major battlefield use of such weapons. Thus, the focus was on how Russia might use these capabilities to test escalatory dynamics, rather than to achieve major military objectives. The workshops divided participants into two groups; each group focused on either the chemical or biological scenario. The workshops primarily asked participants to analyze why Russia might consider the use of chemical or biological weapons strategically advantageous in these scenarios; propose how to deter Russia from further use of chemical and biological weapons; and recommend how the United States and Europe should respond to Russia’s use of such weapons. The two groups reconvened after the exercise to share key findings from their discussions.

Interviews with officials and experts

Informed by the insights from the workshops, the project team conducted interviews with US, European, and NATO officials and experts. The interviews provided direct perspectives on the potential for Russian CBRN escalation over the next five to ten years and how the alliance can deter and respond to possible Russian chemical and biological escalation. The interview stage also enabled the project team to explore the additional question of nuclear escalation following Russia’s potential use of chemical or biological weapons.

The following report presents our analysis of Russia’s intent to use CBRN weapons, possible deterrence considerations to be employed by the United States and its European allies and partners, and response options for the United States and Europe to respond should deterrence fail. The report concludes with our overall findings and recommendations.

Part I: Russian intent

Vladimir Putin described the breakup of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”⁷ NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept makes clear that Putin’s ambition to reverse the outcome of the Cold War is at the heart of Russia’s efforts to reestablish spheres of influence and direct control over its former Soviet empire, including NATO allies.⁸ Russia’s hostile actions seek to undermine the rules-based international order that defines the worldview of NATO and its members.⁹

At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin signaled clearly to the world that he believed undermining the international rules-based system was necessary to carry out his revanchist ambitions.¹⁰ Russia has since demonstrated repeatedly that it is willing to use violent and aggressive means to further this ambition. This includes conventional military aggression, as demonstrated by Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, 2014 annexation of Crimea, and 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.¹¹

Russia’s hybrid campaign of aggression

In addition to conventional military aggression, Russia’s campaign has included a well-documented and long-running “shadow war” of hybrid tactics against NATO and its allies.¹² This hybrid campaign has included critical infrastructure attacks, acts of violence, weaponized migration, election interference, and information campaigns, which have intensified in volume since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.¹³

The threat and the use of Russia’s CBRN capabilities has been a feature of Moscow’s hybrid campaign. In spite of the long-standing norms against using CBRN weapons, enshrined in international treaties and conventions, Russia has demonstrated that it is able and willing to deploy these weapons,¹⁴ including in NATO territory.¹⁵ Russia has also demonstrated a willingness to use chemical weapons during its illegal invasion of Ukraine and long supported the former Assad regime in Syria that used chemical weapons against civilians.¹⁶

The psychological value of chemical and biological weapons

For Russia, chemical and biological weapons have many potential uses and bring many advantages. At their most basic level, chemical and biological weapons, either in a battlefield scenario or a civilian context, are agents of terror. Several interviewees noted the Russian state employs these weapons—or threatens to—to instill fear in European populations and among Russian dissidents in exile.¹⁷ Russian willingness to use chemical weapons in this manner also sends a clear signal to the domestic Russian population about the Putin regime’s tolerance for any potential threats and challenges. A clear demonstration of this tactic was the 2020 Novichok poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, which took place in Russia.¹⁸ While untested, it can be safely assumed that Putin would resort to extreme measures, including using CBRN weapons as necessary, to ensure the survival of his regime.

Some participants described public awareness in much of Europe about how chemical or biological weapons are used and the effects they can have as generally low. Those participants suggested that Russian use of CBRN weapons would be a means of causing widespread panic and manipulating emotions and public actions. The confusion they could potentially sow could create fertile ground for disinformation campaigns designed to undermine public trust in their governments.¹⁹ Such an attack could also expose frailties in broader social resilience in the target community.

Challenging norms–and NATO

Many participants in both the workshops and interviews reflected that a significant incentive for the use of chemical or biological weapons is to further degrade the broadly accepted international norms and standards in place since World War II. Russia’s documented use of chemical weapons sends a signal that it does not consider itself to be constrained by rules, norms, or obligations like other countries. It is an assertion that, as a supposed great power with an extensive and sophisticated CBRN toolbox (a legacy maintained from the Soviet era), and a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, Russia can act with relative impunity to flout and degrade the rules-based system that it opposes. Allies should continue to acknowledge and challenge this behavior, but more public reporting on Russian chemical and biological weapons and how they compare to restrictions outlined in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) could improve awareness of Russia’s possible intent.

In more general terms, the actions of the Russian regime demonstrate that Russia places lower value on human life than the United States and its allies, whether that is of Ukrainian civilians, unwitting bystanders to Russian crimes, or its own military personnel.²⁰ This cultural disregard for the suffering of even its own people affords Russia the space to conduct more reckless attacks and bear the subsequent consequences that the United States and its European allies and partners would not.

By their nature, different chemical and biological weapons have a broad range of properties, methods of delivery, rates of contagion, and lethality.²¹ While the CWC includes verification measures, the BWC does not. Participants noted that Russia could calibrate the nature, scale, and target of any chemical or biological weapon attack to create maximum uncertainty, exploit potential differences in threat perceptions and willingness to stand up against Russian aggression, and degrade international conventions. In many senses, the greater utility of chemical or biological weapons is not their lethality, but their impact on the adversary’s thinking. As one participant put it, “the intention isn’t to kill, but to complicate.”

This coercive element confers chemical and biological weapons and the range of effects they can create, with significant strategic value for Russia. Through the use (or threatened use) of different chemical or biological weapons in a range of scenarios, Russia might hope to influence allied decision-making and actions, such as potential Ukrainian integration into Western-oriented institutions. Participants observed that Russian use of chemical and biological weapons in these scenarios could be a means of Russia signaling that it considers the West has crossed its political red lines.

In a hypothetical battlefield context, the threat of chemical weapons use could limit the efficiency of allied military operations by imposing extra precautionary measures and influencing battlefield planning. In Iraq, the fear that Saddam Hussein could use chemical weapons degraded efficiency on the battlefield.²² After decades of underinvestment and neglect in the principles of operating in CBRN contaminated environments, Russia may be tempted to expose shortfalls in allied CBRN readiness on the battlefield.

For Russia, chemical and biological weapons serve an additional military function of making up for potential conventional military shortcomings. Where the Russians might be outmatched by NATO in conventional terms, unencumbered by moral or legal constraints, they might consider it a legitimate part of their doctrine to use asymmetric capabilities that can tilt the scales in their favor.²³ Participants in our exercises speculated that the likelihood of Russia resorting to chemical or biological weapons would increase should Russia face imminent conventional defeat on the battlefield, either against Ukraine or NATO. This assumption is supported by the 2024 change in Russian nuclear doctrine, which lowered the threshold for first use of nuclear weapons to a new, lower standard.²⁴

The escalatory dilemma

Russia’s recent changes to its military doctrine, and the potential use of chemical and biological weapons either in civilian or battlefield contexts, must be considered within the framework of political and military escalation.²⁵ Several interviewees noted that, because these are weapons that NATO allies do not and would not use, Russia’s previous use of chemical weapons and potential willingness to turn to biological weapons give the Kremlin an extra rung on the escalatory ladder.

Unlike nuclear escalation—which is well-studied, more clearly defined, and more widely considered taboo in the case of first-use of nuclear weapons—the escalatory dynamics of chemical and biological weapons use are more ambiguous and less certain. The scale and severity of chemical or biological weapon use could be calibrated to avoid crossing an obvious threshold that demands a military response, while at the same time clearly crossing a normative line that NATO allies would not cross, all the while posing a difficult conundrum about the appropriate and proportionate response.

Additionally, the dual-use nature of many of these chemical or biological agents (which may have legitimate and peaceful origins and uses) makes attribution challenging and presents sufficient deniability. This makes it difficult to establish clear lines of acceptable use and potentially hampers efforts to cohere a forceful and united response. At the same time, it allows Russia to simultaneously send a message of intent to allies and sow further confusion and distrust, while mostly avoiding (or limiting) punishment. In short, per one workshop participant, “it helps Russia to establish escalation dominance without committing to war.”

However, in many discussions throughout the project, there was considerable uncertainty over whether and how escalation to chemical and biological weapons use would increase the subsequent prospects of nuclear escalation. While many participants recognized that Russia’s willingness to disregard norms when it comes to chemical weapons in particular could logically lead to nuclear escalation and that Russia had invoked rhetoric around nuclear weapons use in recent years, participants agreed that taboos around nuclear weapons use exert more of a constraining force on Russia. Several participants noted the reported influence that China and India were able to wield against Russia in October 2022 to help de-escalate Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric at the time.²⁶

Participants noted that where chemical or biological weapons can be deployed in such a way as to sow confusion and inject escalatory ambiguity, the line that nuclear weapons use would cross is much more definitive. No participants envisaged these scenarios escalating to the use of nuclear weapons unless Putin felt it was the last and only option for his personal survival.

Part II: Deterrence

As outlined above, Russia has and could continue to use chemical or biological weapons depending on the state of its conventional capabilities. The United States and its European allies and partners play a crucial role in deterring Russia from using any CBRN weapon. It is therefore critical to consider the scenarios in which Russia might turn to such weapons. Russia might even assume that previous responses to chemical attacks give them scope to escalate to larger-scale strategic weapons.²⁷

For deterrence to be effective, like-minded nations must make clear that they are prepared to impose intolerable costs (economic, geopolitical, or military) on Russia should it use chemical or biological weapons, while also maintaining some ambiguity as to the exact nature of a response. Demonstrations of intelligence sharing among allies to present a unified threat assessment may clarify how the United States observes the Russian threat in the CBRN domain. Given how critical it is for civilian institutions to be integrated in the response to a potential CBRN attack, particularly related to chemical and biological threats, a whole-of-government approach to deterrence is essential for how the United States and its European allies and partners should position themselves vis-à-vis Russia. Outside-the-box thinking around potential partners and nontraditional allies may also aid in strengthening deterrence. The following takeaways emerged from our analysis, including discussions with key stakeholders in the United States and Europe.

Deterrence can yield powerful results

Deterrence by punishment would be harder to inflict if Russia were to use a chemical or biological weapon, given that there would not be a proportional response.²⁸ However, the United States and Europe still have options for precise, measured, and consequential actions. Workshop participants agreed that specific actions or escalation using CBRN threats from Russia would have severe consequences warranting a response, including stringent economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure campaigns, and, in some instances, retaliatory military strikes. With the nuclear deterrent as the foundation for any response from the United States (alongside that of the United Kingdom and France), any threat of retaliation against Russia will be stronger.²⁹ In addition, the United States and European countries could implement measures such as export controls, sanctions, international condemnation, or stationing NATO troops closer to Russia’s borders to deter Russian CBRN use.

Participants reflected that the most likely scenario in which Russia would turn to CBRN threats would include hybrid attacks on the United States and Europe. Deterrence of such threats remains a “riddle” as one interviewee put it, where more degrees of ambiguity are present that do not apply to conventional (or nuclear) escalation. When approaching the more tactical use of chemical or biological weapons, there is more opaqueness given the dual-purpose nature of substances, technologies, and delivery systems. Workshop participants did not come to consensus on how the United States and its European allies should view (or respond to) such threats within the hybrid domain or at the tactical applications of chemical or biological weapons.

The role of attribution in deterring CBRN use

During the workshops and interviews, participants continuously reiterated that attribution is critical to deterring Russian chemical and biological threats and holding Russia accountable for past use of chemical weapons. Intelligence and information sharing play an important role in attribution. One interviewee remarked that Russia may think twice about staging chemical and biological attacks if there is more publicly available information about their chemical and biological capabilities, facilities, and deployment means.

However, timely technical collection and forensic analysis capabilities are lacking among NATO allies, leading to questions about the accuracy and reliability of attributing attacks. Several existing capabilities—including detection, intelligence, and surveillance systems—could prevent escalation with chemical and biological weapons, but these systems are not well resourced across the Alliance. Many NATO member states lack adequate expertise in sample collection, robust laboratory infrastructure, and the requisite instruments to conduct analysis, all of which impede attribution.

Some participants we spoke to, particularly on NATO’s eastern flank, reflected on a need to strengthen intelligence, monitoring, and detection capabilities to improve their overall deterrence and response posture. Investment in capabilities to investigate and attribute attacks could prevent Russian escalation. For attribution to be effective, the United States and European allies and partners must also possess a shared understanding of indicators and warning signals ahead of an attack.

Preparedness and resilience are essential

Participants described the need for the United States and its European allies and partners to limit the consequences of Russian chemical and biological attacks. The notion of “deterrence by resilience” or “deterrence by preparedness” (a subcategory of the broader notion of “deterrence by denial”) is one paradigm for thinking of how the United States could successfully prevent Russia from turning to chemical or biological weapons. The following considerations came up most frequently as areas for investment.

Capability development and deployment

Allied military representatives broadly agreed that CBRN-related equipment—either related to attribution (including detection and surveillance systems) or response (such as decontamination or personal protective equipment [PPE])—is often overlooked in favor of high-caliber defense systems. Counter-CBRN capabilities are frequently considered too niche for broader collective defense.

Investment in CBRN defense capabilities, discussed further in the response section of this report, provides a deterrent signal in addition to preparing allies to fight through a chemical or biological attack. However, nearly everyone we interviewed recognized that these capabilities are often siloed to specialist forces and not broadly integrated within general purpose forces. Ministries of defense across the Alliance should set baselines for CBRN defense-capability targets, including PPE, gas masks, and treatment, across the total force and resource these priorities accordingly.

Exercises and training

Regular and comprehensive exercises that incorporate a variety of US and European military forces would underpin an effective deterrence strategy toward Russia. Some participants described the importance of joint training among special operations forces (SOF) that might be equipped to respond to chemical and biological weapons use. Components of these exercises should be incorporated into broader training, which can enable preparedness in times of crisis. Participants pointed to several preexisting multinational exercises as examples to demonstrate readiness to deter CBRN escalation.³⁰

Other training—including tabletop exercises and war-games—can be deployed to help decision-makers design more effective standards to aid and inform how the United States and its European allies and partners can deter potential Russian use of CBRN threats. Tabletop exercises and war-games leveraged by the Pentagon and DTRA with their European counterparts can be used to strengthen strategic and operational thinking about how to deter Russian escalation by providing opportunities to try new approaches under the guidance of expert facilitators.

Whole-of-society resilience

To be effective, deterrence by resilience must incorporate all facets of society to respond to instances of crisis or threats.³¹ To deter potential CBRN threats through preparedness, European allies and partners must warn the public, without fear-mongering, of the risk of escalation. Several participants noted the importance of preparing populations to withstand and defy threats from Russia, which includes activating and sustaining civilian institutions such as hospitals that would treat those affected by a chemical or biological attack. As part of a whole-of-society approach, greater awareness of chemical and biological threats is needed; public health personnel, first responders, law enforcement, teachers, and others ought to understand the effects of chemical and biological agents and how to respond appropriately. Similar to the military, civilian agencies should procure and maintain CBRN defense capabilities to protect and treat civilian populations in the event of a chemical or biological attack.

One phrase that is often repeated in expert circles is “raising the IQ” on nuclear threats. This concept applies to chemical and biological threats as well so that more individuals are cognizant of their scale and severity. Mental and emotional preparedness would enable the public to resist Russian efforts and contain the potential consequences associated with a Russian attack. Demonstrating societal resilience, in which wider social and civil functions can withstand CBRN escalation, could deter Russia from employing CBRN weapons.

Wielding the information space

Russia consistently utilizes the information space to instill fear, distrust, and confusion.³² In addition to responding to these types of stories with clear, fact-based information that demonstrates why Russian claims are false, the United States and its European allies and partners can also pre-bunk and dispel any false or misleading claims that Russia produces about CBRN-related threats. Participants pointed to the importance of sharing proactive messages about resistance to such narratives through a variety of means—including traditional media, official government communications, and social media—to dissuade Russian perpetrators from deploying attacks. Eye-catching social media posts and multimedia tools can extend reach to nontraditional communities to help dispel Russian claims. As one participant noted, winning the information war must be combined with the requisite military power and civilian capability to deter Russia.

Be cautious of setting red lines

While US and European officials must be clear about the consequences of escalation, interviewees resisted establishing so-called red lines that are overly specific. Many interviewees pointed to the infamous case of the Obama administration’s supposed red lines regarding Syria’s use of chemical weapons during its civil war in the 2010s. Such thresholds, which may be politically sensitive to apply, would leave the international community in a difficult position with respect to enforcement or punishment, which could undermine the credibility of deterrence.

Participants called instead for political rhetoric to be vague externally, where Russia and its allies would have difficulty determining the threshold for response, while being precise internally about the consequences of Russia’s actions. This distinction would provide space for the United States and its European allies and partners to determine the requisite response to CBRN threats stemming from Russia.

Diplomacy as a deterrent

Russia finds itself somewhat isolated in the current geopolitical environment. However, the Kremlin frequently looks to several nations—including China, Iran, and North Korea—to bolster Russia’s defense. These relationships could provide options to engage non-European nations to deter Russia from CBRN escalation. For example, China reportedly engaged Russia to discourage the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and the deployment of nuclear weapons in space.³³ Given the degree to which Russia depends on China to prop up its wartime economy, there may be an opportunity to leverage China to dissuade Russia from turning to CBRN escalation, particularly if China upholds international regimes regarding CBRN use.³⁴ India may also be able to influence Russia given its role in supporting Russia’s economic stability amid Western sanctions and may have sway in discouraging CBRN escalation.

Part III: Response

The results of our workshops, interviews, and secondary research illuminated opportunities to enhance US and European responses to a CBRN attack should deterrence fail. Given its role in coordinating allied planning, NATO will be a critical actor in any response effort. Our discussions with NATO and European officials revealed consistent, close cooperation among military elements at NATO, while understanding that support required from civilian entities is a more nascent effort. However, the mandate for responding to a CBRN incident typically falls within the civilian sectors of many European governments, so political-military coordination is essential to ensuring all facets of government are aware of their roles in the event of a CBRN attack. Enhancing cooperation to promote coordinated responses includes the following best practices.

Ensure broad awareness of CBRN threats

Allies we interviewed broadly agreed that awareness of Russian CBRN threats cannot only reside within the specialist communities at NATO or in national militaries. At the political level, there is general agreement at NATO and within European capitals that Russia’s CBRN threats are an immediate concern. However, it is less clear how much allies are willing to invest to counter these threats, both now and in the five-to-ten-year time frame. Those geographically closest to Russia were most acutely aware of the threats and adamant about engaging with NATO allies via training, exercises, and exchanges to ensure active cooperation.

Variations in threat perception also appeared to be generational, according to our discussions. For example, officers who have served since the end of the Cold War described a lack of investment in CBRN defense in the absence of acute Soviet chemical, biological, and nuclear threats. The perception of such threats was lower in the post-Cold War era, which led the United States and Europe to deprioritize investment in preparedness. Given Russia’s continued flouting of international norms against the use of chemical weapons, and the primacy of nuclear warfare in its military doctrine, US, NATO, and European leaders need to uphold what they have recognized in recent strategic guidance as a critical threat emanating from Russia and invest in their forces accordingly.

Expand CBRN training to the total force

Training is an area that appears ripe for further investment. European military leaders we interviewed agreed that expertise cannot reside in the CBRN specialist communities alone. General purpose forces must also be trained on CBRN threats and equipped to fight through contaminated environments. To ensure broader awareness of CBRN threats, NATO and national military exercises should include elements of chemical, biological, or limited nuclear use scenarios. Military and civilian leaders we interviewed recognized the drawbacks of having personnel exercise in restrictive protective gear, given how it can slow maneuver, but it also puts troops at a disadvantage if they need to operate wearing the gear in a real-time scenario without much experience. NATO’s CBRN-focused exercises, described in the previous section, are an important step toward ensuring interoperability among NATO forces, but these lessons can be expanded beyond CBRN defense units to include NATO SOF and other elements of NATO’s deployable forces.

Better integrate military and civilian components

Apart from military preparedness, it is critical for national military and NATO elements to understand the capacity of civilian institutions, as first responders will have the authority for coordinating a response to incidents that occur outside of military operations. During the workshops and the interviews, participants expressed the need for greater integration of civilian and military personnel on topics such as decontamination and training, which necessitates the ability to share information between sectors.

Civilian institutions also play a critical role in responding to chemical and biological incidents, which could include attacks. Preparedness within national, subnational, and local institutions—including, for example, hospitals, research laboratories, public health institutions, law enforcement agencies, manufacturing facilities, and entities managing critical infrastructure—are essential to ensuring readiness for potential chemical and biological attacks. Civilian institutions could be underprepared for the crisis operations that would be required in the event of a chemical or biological attack. Better coordination with military counterparts can bridge these gaps to ensure a whole-of-society response to potential attacks, which also has an important deterrent effect when highlighted via strategic communications campaigns.

The European Union can play a role in fostering greater access to critical resources, such as PPE and laboratory equipment, particularly in times of crisis where traditional processes are too slow. The European External Action Service, which is the EU’s diplomatic service, has long partnered with NATO to ensure mutual understanding of threats and how to best prepare NATO allies and EU member states for possible CBRN attacks with information and tangible assets.³⁵ This relationship is vital to ensure stronger political-military coordination and should be expanded to account for greater CBRN-related cooperation.

Leverage NATO for coordination and capabilities

NATO’s 2022 CBRN defense policy represented a shift from the focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism of the early 2000s to a state-based threat actor that more closely aligns with the modern security environment.³⁶ NATO’s International Staff is overseeing the implementation of this policy, which is critical to ensure guidance flows to capitals so national authorities can promote a consistent approach. A response aligned with NATO demonstrates unity, which in turn demonstrates alliance cohesion in the face of continued Russian threats. Several NATO allies, including the United States, UK, and Finland, have their own national policies, but for those that do not, the NATO policy provides a roadmap for driving national prioritization of CBRN threats and response options for these threats aligned with NATO’s priorities.³⁷

As NATO allies consider greater thresholds for defense spending, more investment is needed in CBRN defense equipment and capabilities. An essential aspect of capability development is deploying and positioning of attribution, detection, and surveillance systems. NATO is well poised to lead collaborative efforts and ensure that states without adequate CBRN defenses learn from leaders in the field. NATO’s High Visibility Projects (HVP) includes three initiatives to improve cooperation around facilities, equipment, and detection.³⁸ CBRN defense projects have also been part of NATO’s Smart Defence Initiative since 2014.³⁹

Consider the information domain

As noted in the deterrence section, proactive communication about military and civilian activities to safeguard the entire population from a CBRN attack serves an important deterrent function while bolstering societal resilience. Effective use of the information domain is equally critical to reassuring the public regarding CBRN responses.

States can disseminate proactive messages to get ahead of any false or misleading information that Russia may seek to inject within open societies. This includes emphasis on strategic communications, fact-checking initiatives, media literacy, and education campaigns for adults and children alike.

The health sector can offer lessons in disseminating information about emotionally sensitive topics in a way that recognizes the severity of a threat without stoking fear. For example, the UK Health Service launched a public health campaign in 2025 to counter fears of taking antibiotics, which has become a top issue among UK residents.⁴⁰ Similar approaches can be taken to inform the public about chloropicrin or other agents Russia has used. Such communications should focus on facts, and in the realm of CBRN weapons, be clear about the rare and limited nature of exposure to such threats so as not to provoke undue stress or fear.

Integrating deterrence and response

Through the course of our research, we identified two activities that served both deterrent and response functions. First, being clear and unafraid of imposing massive costs to Russia (including economic, geopolitical, or military actions) for its use of chemical weapons could deter it from continuing to deploy chemical weapons or prevent escalation. Accountability is also an important part of response. Since 2014, Russia has acted with impunity in the absence of credible deterrent threats to its use of chemical weapons. Although many countries and international organizations have condemned Russia’s use of chemical weapons and imposed sanctions on Moscow, these actions have not stopped Russia from using chemical agents to achieve geopolitical goals. The consensus during our workshops and interviews is that Russia has a long history of incorporating CBRN weapons into its strategy and planning, which makes them both a near-term threat and a long-term strategic threat. Bringing treaty violations forward has had limited impact on Russia’s behavior, but increasing economic sanctions could reduce Russian access to funding, equipment, facilities, and technologies that could advance their chemical and biological weapons ambitions.

Second, the United States and its European allies and partners should clearly communicate potential consequences to deter future actions and inflict damage on the sectors on which Russia relies on for the development of its chemical and biological capabilities. The apparent threat of what a potential CBRN escalation would entail, including the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic implications, is essential for deterring Russia from turning to these threats, but following through on these actions also serves to punish Russia in response to its illicit activities.

Recommendations and key findings

Recommendation: Allies should continuously assess and evaluate Russia’s strategic objectives. To better coordinate threat perceptions across the Alliance, the United States and its European allies and partners should consider opportunities to expand collaboration on joint threat assessments related to Russia’s CBRN capabilities. As the Office of the Director of National Intelligence crafts the annual joint threat assessment report, insights from European allies and partners will be critical to assemble the most comprehensive picture of Russian CBRN threats; integrating perspectives from the Office of the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security will be paramount in this effort.

Recommendation: Instead of publicizing red lines, the United States should champion the achievement of internal consensus regarding acceptable thresholds of Russian activity based on treaty obligations, while externally preserving ambiguity as a component of deterrence. NATO, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the United Nations are valuable forums for such deliberations and can play roles in imposing costs on Russia for CBRN use. However, internal debates within national governments are required to achieve consensus, which can take time. International investigations, such as those previously led in Syria by the OPCW (an intergovernmental body), are also time-consuming, and Russia politicizes the results to undermine effectiveness. Therefore, this recommendation could take years of sustained effort to carry out.

Recommendation: Within the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD) should work with the relevant authorities within the Treasury and Commerce departments to inflict the requisite economic pain on Russia through, for example, sanctions and export controls, to undermine its ability to sustain its biological and chemical weapons programs. Unified public messaging campaigns from the United States and Europe that condemn Russian CBRN weapons deployment would reinforce activities conducted behind the scenes.

Recommendation: The United States and its European allies and partners should identify methods for cooperation with nontraditional partners to dissuade Russia from leveraging CBRN threats as part of their military doctrine. Through NATO or the UN, the United States should explore opportunities to engage China and India to dissuade Moscow from pursuing further CBRN weapons development and use.

Recommendation: As concerns about potential deployment of Russian CBRN weapons grow, the US DoD should emphasize and prioritize efforts to expand counter-CBRN capabilities. Specific needs include sufficient systems to detect, surveil, and attribute CBRN threats. The United States could leverage the OPCW (and vice versa) for its experience in investigations. As the United States and its European allies and partners update guidelines for defense spending, CBRN defense warrants renewed attention and investment. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) should advocate for European counterparts to place greater emphasis on CBRN defense. The DoD and the relevant subagencies should emphasize these systems when outlining US defense policy and national security strategies as they pertain to CBRN threats. Such systems will aid in deterring Russian CBRN threats while expanding readiness, preparedness, and resilience within the United States and across the transatlantic community. Ministries of defense and crisis response agencies should set baselines for CBRN defense capabilities and stockpile accordingly, including PPE, gas masks, antibiotics, and laboratory equipment.

Recommendation: DTRA and the broader US defense community should expand training on CBRN threats by incorporating elements of chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare scenarios in tabletop exercises and war-games. Inclusion of these scenarios can complement crisis situations posited in Europe to identify deterrence strategies and response options. CBRN considerations are often perceived to be too niche and left to specialist communities to design strategy and crisis responses. However, it is critical for decision-makers within the entire chain of command to possess a broad awareness of CBRN threats and simulate planning. The Joint Staff should ensure that service-level training incorporates these considerations into doctrine and training. Then, DTRA’s liaison officers could support training at US military commands and within multilateral institutions, such as NATO.

Recommendation: The United States and its NATO allies should incorporate the NATO SOF Command more directly into operational planning, particularly when thinking through the requisite deterrence and response implications of Russia deploying a CBRN weapon. NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) could help drive this coordination with support from the United States. Given the hybrid nature of many CBRN threats from Russia, within SHAPE and NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO), the United States and its NATO allies could consider a greater role for responding to hybrid threats alongside preexisting military structures. The US should expand CBRN defense cooperation, particularly on training, exercising, and information sharing. Elsewhere in Europe, allies recognized the leading role the United States plays (as well as the UK) in sharing intelligence with NATO; for allies with limited intelligence capabilities of their own, US information might be the only source of CBRN-related intelligence. Some allies expressed uncertainty over the prioritization of CBRN-related cooperation as a new administration begins its work in Washington, but at the individual level, cooperation remains close. NATO leaders should leverage productive working relationships to ensure sustained, coordinated prioritization for CBRN defense across all echelons of NATO planning.

Recommendation: As the need for additional CBRN defense capabilities and equipment grows, so too does the need to strengthen the private-sector capacity to supply the requisite functionalities. The US government should expand relationships with the defense industry and bolster production capacity to sustain supply chains and replenish depleted stockpiles of PPE. The DoD can also leverage lessons learned for production capacity and procurement protocols from the COVID-19 pandemic, when the Pentagon supported the production of PPE through the Defense Production Act to increase production of critical supplies and equipment. The DoD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Defense Logistics Agency can both play an important role in facilitating these relationships while removing unnecessary barriers to procurement processes within the DoD. Similar efforts should be undertaken with European counterparts of these agencies and at NATO, though the implementation of this recommendation could require years of investment.

Recommendation: Demonstrating close cooperation between civilian and military entities can have a deterrent effect if communicated properly, while also ensuring military entities are aware of the resources that reside in civilian institutions. Key areas for investment include interoperability of CBRN defense equipment; standards and procedures for treating exposure to chemical or biological agents; availability of civilian infrastructure for military use; and protocols for military members seeking care in civilian hospitals. NATO is well poised to encourage cooperation between military forces and critical civilian institutions that are often on the front lines of such responses, including public health agencies, local hospitals, and law enforcement. European nations can leverage the examples of their peers to their advantage. In the United States, the DoD is well positioned to support interagency coordination among European allies and partners with respect to emergency preparedness mechanisms, capability development, and training. OSD should consider embedding highly skilled personnel within US military commands, diplomatic missions, and other frameworks to facilitate the exchange of information and expertise.

Recommendation: A whole-of-society approach to resilience—to include health institutions, law enforcement, critical infrastructure, business community, and other sectors—can help strengthen attribution systems for identifying and attributing chemical and biological attacks. The United States should coordinate with its European allies and partners to encourage greater resilience and preparedness within civilian institutions and foster information sharing across national borders.

Recommendation: Preemptive and frequent intelligence sharing, in classified and open-source settings, is critical to deterring Russia from using CBRN weapons; this practice presents a unified approach among the United States and its European allies and partners. All allies should aim to more regularly share relevant information. The US national security apparatus should conduct a complete review of potential barriers to information and intelligence sharing to identify areas for streamlined sharing with NATO allies. The Defense Intelligence Agency could lead such an initiative on behalf of the DoD, with a focus on greater use of open-source intelligence to draw further public attention to Russia’s CBRN capabilities, facilities, and development. The United States should encourage similar reviews across NATO member states to improve Alliance-wide access to intelligence and information and ensure that this subject is a standing agenda item for the relevant NATO committees, including the Defense Policy and Planning Committee and the Civilian Intelligence Committee.

Recommendation: To support NATO’s 2022 CBRN Defense Strategy’s effort to improve shared understanding across the Alliance, more consistent and comprehensive messaging is needed within the capitals of NATO allies, particularly around the policy planning process and the integration of civilian entities within a coordinated military response in the event of a CBRN-related contingency. The US Mission to NATO can champion efforts to expand knowledge and understanding of Russian CBRN threats within NATO while sharing lessons learned from European allies and partners throughout the US government.

Recommendation: The US Defense, State, and Homeland Security departments have produced public messaging campaigns related to Russian CBRN threats and methods to improve media literacy. These efforts should expand to include greater emphasis on debunking false and misleading claims related to CBRN threats. Additionally, the US government should incorporate European allies and partners in messaging efforts to counter Russian malign influence operations around CBRN threats.

Recommendation: The United States should work with European allies to identify best practices in crafting public awareness-raising campaigns for how to respond to suspected CBRN attacks. Public messaging should focus on practical steps individuals can take in an emergency, without prompting undue alarm among the wider population.

Recommendation: US and European governments should explore opportunities to partner with civil society organizations to craft prebunking, media literacy, and fact-checking initiatives that can successfully communicate proactive messaging to broader publics in the Euro-Atlantic area, particularly given the scientific and technical nature of CBRN threats. Proactive messages about resistance to Russian narratives should be disseminated through a combination of means, including traditional media, official government communications, and social media. The United States could also explore joint research initiatives with European institutions. EU member states can leverage the European Defense Fund, which provides research into common defense and security priorities, including in CBRN-related issues. Partnerships between universities, scientific foundations, and think tanks can facilitate greater knowledge and information sharing related to CBRN threats.

Recommendation: Technologies such as synthetic biology and additive manufacturing continue to evolve, and their applications will remain difficult to foresee. The international community must remain vigilant to how technologies can be exploited. To that end, the United States must continue and expand its restrictions for known suppliers of potential dual-use technologies to Russia. The DoD should coordinate with the Department of Commerce to expand the use of export controls to address instances where Russia is able to obtain capabilities and equipment, such as pharmaceutical components, biotechnologies, and chemical precursors. Critical to the success of these controls, however, is including like-minded European allies and partners into conversations about technologies of concern. The Department of Defense should work with the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to strengthen and expand the list of sanctioned entities that aid and abet Russia’s biological and chemical weapons development programs.

Conclusion

This project demonstrates that Russian chemical and biological threats are a concern now and will continue to pose challenges to European security in the next five to ten years. To enable European allies and partners to counter these threats, the United States can leverage its strong security and defense relationships with European allies and partners to improve capabilities and raise the profile of chemical and biological weapons issues within governments and among populations. The existing chemical and biological defense infrastructure in the United States, NATO, and in some European countries provides lessons for the broader Euro-Atlantic community. With greater investment comes greater confidence that deterring Russia is feasible, but if deterrence fails, attention now can ensure that the United States and Europe are prepared to effectively respond.

Please note that the appendixes are not included in the online version of this publication, but they can be accessed in the attached PDF file. The appendixes contain the following information: Appendix A – Acronym List; Appendix B – Workshop Participants; Appendix C – Exercise Methodology; Appendix D – Interview Participants; Appendix E – Biographies. These appendixes provide additional details and insights on the research methods and findings.

The research team thanks the US Department of Defense for sponsoring this work and for the guidance and support provided throughout the course of the project. Special thanks go to the wide range of experts and stakeholders, inside and outside of the US and European governments, who took part in the scenario-building exercises, contributed their perspectives during the interview process, spoke during roundtable discussions, and participated in other contexts to enrich the analysis.

We would also like to acknowledge Hans Binnendijk and John Watts for their support in conceptualizing the methodology and structure of the scenario workshop exercises. Hans and Katarzyna Zysk provided useful peer reviews to improve the quality of the report. In addition, we would like to thank Torrey Taussig and Matthew Kroenig, who offered strategic direction, peer review, and key perspectives throughout the project. Within the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative team, we recognize our current and recent colleagues Inga Samoškaitė, Zak Schneider, Kristen Taylor, Kimberly Talley, and Luka Ignac for their project management and research support. We would also like to thank the Atlantic Council’s Gretchen Ehle, Nicholas O’Connell, and Caroline Simpson, whose support for this project was invaluable.

This report is intended to live up to General Brent Scowcroft’s standard for rigorous, relevant, and nonpartisan analysis on national security issues. The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to continue his nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Department of Defense or the United States Government.

Staff

Philippe Dickinson

Deputy Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Chinese East Asia

Fellow

Ryan Arick

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

Fellow

Natasha Lander Finch

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Arms Control Europe & Eurasia

Report Jan 4, 2025

‘First, we will defend the homeland’: The case for homeland missile defense

By Robert Soofer with contributions from Kari Anderson, James McCue, Tom Karako, Mark J. Massa, Alyxandra Marine, and Jonathan Rosenstein

A comprehensive analysis of U.S. homeland missile defense, addressing policies, security challenges, and strategies to counter threats from North Korea, China, and Russia.

China Defense Technologies

Issue Brief Oct 4, 2024

How the US and Europe can counter Russian information manipulation about nonproliferation

By Natasha Lander Finch, Ryan Arick

This strategic framework presents the findings and recommendations of the Atlantic Council project to develop and strengthen comprehensive responses to counter Russian foreign malign influence that undermine nonproliferation norms and regimes in Eastern Europe.

Disinformation Europe & Eurasia

Report Oct 26, 2023

Continued US and allied integration is essential to deter Russian CBRN use

By Natasha Lander Finch, Ryan Arick, Christopher Skaluba

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the Atlantic Council project Conceptualizing Integrated Deterrence to Address Russian Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Escalation. The objective of this project was to develop an approach for incorporating European allies and partners into the US model of integrated deterrence against Russian CBRN use.

Arms Control Defense Policy

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

Learn more

The post How the US and Europe can deter and respond to Russia’s chemical, biological, and nuclear threats appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Yevgeniya Gaber joins Defense News to discuss Ukraine’s defense cooperation and knowledge transfer to European countries in developing counter-UAV capabilities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 30,  Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Elliot Ackerman authored an article in The Free Press entitled “Pete Hegseth Wants a ‘Warrior Culture.’ Does He Know What That Means?,” in which he discusses Secretary Hegseth’s changes to service member culture.

Fellow

Elliot Ackerman

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

Learn more

The post Ackerman discusses service member culture in The Free Press appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Rich Outzen joins TRT to discuss Trump Administration foreign and national security policies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Was progress made on any of these issues? And how might the Trump-Erdoğan meeting impact broader US-Turkish cooperation on trade, energy, and policy toward the Middle East? Find our experts’ takeaways from Erdoğan’s visit below. 

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Rich Outzen: Three reasons the Trump-Erdoğan meeting was a success 

Yevgeniya Gaber: Cooperation on Ukraine could help bolster US-Turkish ties 

Grady Wilson: Trump gives the nod to Erdoğan’s regional influence

Pınar Dost: Washington and Ankara are unlocking their vast energy trade potential

Ömer Özkizilcik: Turkey is the kingmaker Trump wants to work with in Syria 

Three reasons the Trump-Erdoğan meeting was a success

The meeting between Trump and Erdoğan was a success on three levels. First, the fact that the trip occurred at all is significant, as it ended a six-year period of arms-length distance between the countries’ leaders, despite their shared interests and strategic matters requiring top-level coordination. This marks a positive if partial shift of tone in the bilateral relationship. That should play out in tighter cooperation on defense, energy, trade, and regional matters for the rest of the current US administration’s term.  

Second, the optics of the joint press conference were overwhelmingly positive. The two men praised one another, avoided embarrassment, and ticked off a list of areas of shared concern and general policy overlap: Syria, Ukraine, ending the war in Gaza, and resolving the F-35 and US sanctions issues to resume broader defense industrial cooperation.  

Third, after the closed-door session, we have hints that solid progress was achieved in several areas. US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack expressed optimism that the reintegration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into the Syrian state security structure was moving forward and could be substantially achieved by the end of the year. And an announcement is expected after the meeting that could provide a roadmap for resolving the disputes over F-35s and US sanctions. In terms of concrete agreements, it appears that two major energy agreements—one for twenty-year liquefied natural gas (LNG) purchases valued at $43 billion and a civilian nuclear deal involving small modular reactors—were formalized during the meeting. Other commercial deals may be announced in formal readouts of the meeting. 

The United States’ asks of Erdoğan likely included the reopening of the Orthodox monastery at Heybeli Island—not a very heavy lift and one that Erdoğan has signaled receptivity to—and a suspension of Turkish purchases of Russian oil, which is a much bigger ask.  

Perhaps the broadest takeaway from the meeting is the reflection at all three levels—the occurrence of the meeting itself, optics and atmospherics, and discussion of regional issues—of growing convergence between the two presidents’ foreign policies. If the F-35 and sanctions issue gets a concrete resolution rather than a roadmap, that may become the bigger story. But for now, the feel-good nature of the visit benefits both leaders and both countries’ diplomatic positioning. Not all observers in Ankara or Washington will be pleased with this closer alignment, but the decision makers have weighed the merits and are moving forward. 

—Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. 

Cooperation on Ukraine could help bolster US-Turkish ties

The White House meeting between Trump and Erdoğan opens a rare window of opportunity for US-Turkish relations—with Ukraine at the center. With peace talks stalled and Moscow refusing to constructively engage with US or Turkish mediation efforts, Washington and Ankara share overlapping interests in deterring further Russian aggression in the Black Sea and preventing Russia from consolidating additional gains in Ukraine. 

This common agenda requires joint effort. A breakthrough would be possible if Ankara decides to resolve the lingering issue over Turkey’s purchases of the Russian S-400 missile system, paving the way for Turkey’s return to the US F-35 program. Such a step would be a win-win: It would reinforce NATO’s deterrence and defense posture in the region while restoring Turkey’s access to advanced allied capabilities. If paired with a (partial) lifting of the US Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions, the move could also unlock deeper defense-industrial cooperation between Ankara and Washington, boosting NATO’s European pillar. 

Energy is another crucial front. Trump made clear that Turkey should reduce its purchases of Russian oil and gas. Even a gradual shift would lessen Ankara’s dependence on Moscow while cutting into the Kremlin’s main source of wartime revenue. This, combined with the newly signed US-Turkey agreement on nuclear cooperation—including potential deployment of small modular reactors—signals an alternative to Russia’s dominant role in Turkey’s energy sector through the Akkuyu nuclear plant and future projects. 

Taken together, these developments point to a rare win-win-win: for the United States, for Turkey, and for Ukraine. If Ankara seizes this moment, it can help Ukraine push back against Russia, reinforce Black Sea stability, and reinvigorate its strategic partnership with Washington and NATO allies. The window is open—and this opportunity should not be wasted. 

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program. 

Trump gives the nod to Erdoğan’s regional influence

In the joint press conference between the two leaders, Trump did most of the talking. In responses to questions from reporters, Trump was light on details and noncommittal regarding the tricky issues Turkey and the United States have been working on for years, from defense systems to Syria to Gaza. But Trump was effusive in his respect for the Turkish leader, and he recognized Turkey’s increasing regional influence. Trump’s remarks underscore those made by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff in New York earlier this week. Witkoff noted that he regularly consults with key Turkish policymakers, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin, on issues such as Caspian Sea and Black Sea security.  

Given the current geopolitical landscape, there is good reason to believe this is more than just talk. Turkey has strengthened its influence and position in all the regions that it has intervened in directly in recent years, most dramatically in Syria, but also in Libya and the South Caucasus. And as Trump noted in the press conference, few other heads of state can claim the respect of both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.  

The details of where and how Turkey and the United States will work together going forward, as well as what US defense technology will make its way to Turkey, still need to be hashed out behind closed doors and executed over months and years. Nevertheless, today’s meeting should generate optimism for the future of US-Turkey relations, as Trump and Erdoğan demonstrated a common understanding that acting in coordination is to the benefit of both NATO allies. 

—Grady Wilson is a deputy director at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program, where he manages digital communications, coordinates events, and supports the program’s programming on US-Turkey bilateral relations. 

Washington and Ankara are unlocking their vast energy trade potential  

Thanks to business-oriented presidents on both sides of the Atlantic, a new working model of cooperation between the United States and Turkey is emerging. A significant aspect of this relationship is the growing potential for trade and energy cooperation, both bilaterally and in regions that have long been battlegrounds for military and political struggles. 

Yesterday, BOTAŞ, Mercuria, and Woodside Energy signed a major deal to import US LNG—approximately 70 billion cubic meters of natural gas over twenty years. This is significant, as it will help Turkey further diversify its natural gas sources at a time when Trump is taking a firmer stance on supporting Ukraine against Russia and the need to halt energy trade with Moscow. 

It is important to view these agreements in parallel with other deals signed a few months ago between leading Turkish, US, and Qatari companies to invest in the construction of natural gas and solar power plants in Syria. Additionally, these countries’ agreement to remove obstacles to oil exports from the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq to Turkey’s Ceyhan port after a two-year hiatus are about to bear fruit. The resumption of oil exports will benefit Iraq, Turkey, and US companies. There may also be further cooperation in Libya, where both Turkish and US companies signed deals with the country’s National Oil Company this summer. This growing cooperation will contribute to the welfare and stability of these regions, where Turkey is also present militarily and contributes to state and military capacity-building. 

—Pınar Dost is a nonresident fellow at Atlantic Council Turkey Program and a historian of international relations. She is also the former deputy director of Atlantic Council Turkey Program. She is an associated researcher with the French Institute for Anatolian Studies. 

Turkey is the kingmaker Trump wants to work with in Syria 

The meeting in the White House was dominated by the positive personal relationship between Erdoğan and Trump. But even beyond their personal rapport, Erdoğan and Trump share a convergence of interests in the Middle East. Turkey’s vision of regional responsibility aligns with the Trump administration’s strategy of delegating burdens to local allies. This is most evident in Syria, where Trump lifted sanctions to allow regional partners to contribute to reconstruction. For Trump, Turkey is the kingmaker he wants to work with in Syria. As a result of this thinking, large-scale Turkish-American-Qatari investment projects in Syria are already underway. 

Erdoğan and Trump are both leaders known for bypassing diplomatic conventions in favor of personal dealmaking. In this manner, Erdoğan’s visit to the White House has not only improved US-Turkish relations but also apparently produced positive momentum in Syria. 

In Syria, Erdoğan seeks US backing for a security mechanism between Israel and Syria to mitigate the destabilizing impact of Israeli strikes. From Ankara’s perspective, Israeli actions not only undermine Syrian stability but also weaken Damascus in its negotiations with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF is dominated by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist group that poses a direct threat to Turkey’s national security. Building on the recent call by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan for the group to lay down arms, Ankara favors a political settlement in northeastern Syria that would integrate the SDF into the Syrian state. 

Judging by the statement by Barrack—who also serves as the special envoy for Syria— Erdoğan and Trump agree on the need for the SDF to implement the March 10 agreement with Damascus incorporating its forces into the government. In some way, today’s meeting between Erdoğan and Trump empowered Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s hand in negotiations with the SDF. 

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based analyst of Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs.  

The post Experts react: What’s next for US-Turkey ties after Erdoğan’s White House visit?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To aid the administration in this task, we reached out to NSS authors from the George W. Bush administration through to the Biden administration to get their advice and recommendations for how President Donald Trump’s team should approach this important document. What should the Trump administration prioritize in its upcoming strategy? How can the United States best adapt to new and emerging threats? Find valuable insights from past NSS contributors below.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Thomas Wright: The NSS must make the case for the president’s worldview

Rebecca Lissner: Drafters can benefit from outside input, but must not allow it to dilute strategic focus

Mara Rudman: The NSS should be maximally implementable

Peter Feaver: To be worth drafting and reading, an NSS must convey the logic guiding the administration

The NSS must make the case for the president’s worldview

My advice to anyone writing an NSS is that the document should make the best case possible for the president’s worldview, rather than reflecting the consensus view of the entire US government. It should be interesting to read and move the debate on the president’s foreign policy forward.

There are two mistakes to avoid. The first is what could be called the “Christmas ornament” problem, where everything is added in regardless of whether it really fits with the strategy. The second is the tendency to sand down anything interesting until it is fairly innocuous.

To avoid these mistakes, you need a small team of one or two people to do the drafting and run a tight process, and for the president or the national security advisor to be deeply engaged and have some ownership over the document. This enables you to write something coherent, and it means there is someone who can overrule recommendations from the interagency if needed.

In Trump’s first term, his National Security Council produced an excellent NSS that had a positive impact on the administration’s foreign policy. The problem, though, is that it did not reflect Trump’s own views. One need only read his remarks marking its publication.

On this occasion, the Trump administration seems poised to produce a document more reflective of the president’s worldview. From a process perspective, I think that’s the right approach. But substantively, it worries me because his worldview is very much at odds with traditional US strategy, particularly on alliances, China, and Russia. That’s his right. He won the election. The 2017 NSS obscured the differences between Trump and traditionalists on US foreign policy. This NSS is likely to reveal and clarify them.

—Thomas Wright is a senior fellow at the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Brookings Institution, and a former special assistant to the president and senior director for strategic planning at the National Security Council. In the latter role, he contributed to the 2022 NSS.

Drafters can benefit from outside input, but must not allow it to dilute strategic focus

While past presidents have produced updated NSS documents for their second terms in office, this one will have the unique task of adapting—or perhaps overhauling—Trump’s first-term vision after the passage of eight consequential years since his first NSS was released in December 2017. Initial leaks indicate that this NSS may depart significantly from his first one, shifting from an overriding focus on great power competition with China and Russia toward a Western hemispheric strategy that prioritizes threats closer to the US homeland.

I spent the first year of the Biden-Harris administration as lead author of then US President Joe Biden’s NSS, so I understand the challenge facing Trump’s team. Stakeholders inside and outside of the government are eager to see their priorities reflected in what is supposed to be the president’s most authoritative statement of strategic intent. Policy experts across the government lobby for their regions or issues—in my case, by sending thousands of track-change edits to drafts we circulated. Foreign embassies are calling to ensure their countries receive the requisite mentions. Interest groups and think tanks are suggesting language and hoping for early previews. This feedback is important. It helps ensure that the analysis and prescriptions are sound, that the national security bureaucracy will be invested in its implementation, and that the NSS is well received by outside groups. But it also risks diluting strategic focus and turning the NSS into a dreaded “Christmas tree,” covered in stakeholders’ parochial ornamentation.

As they triage input and finalize their drafts, Trump’s team would do well to remember that the NSS is, first and foremost, the president’s document. An NSS must achieve many objectives at once: guide US government policy, create a communications template for national security messaging, signal the direction of US policy to countries around the world, and indicate priorities to Congress and the American people. To be effective, audiences must perceive the document as truly reflective of the president’s priorities and preferences. For all the downsides of this administration’s centralized national security decision-making process, one benefit may be an NSS that speaks clearly and authoritatively on behalf of the president.

—Rebecca Lissner is a senior fellow for US foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Brady-Johnson distinguished practitioner in grand strategy at the Jackson School of Global Affairs at Yale University. She is a former deputy assistant to the president and principal deputy national security advisor to the vice president and a former acting senior director and director for strategic planning on the National Security Council. In the latter role she contributed to the 2022 NSS.

The NSS should be maximally implementable

My advice for those drafting the NSS: Focus on the why, what, who, and how, in the room where it happens, to deliver an effective, executable strategy. I base this on coordinating the 2009 NSS development and on assessing the 2022 NSS through service on the National Defense Strategy Commission.

1. Why: The NSS is mandated by Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The legislation, a bipartisan national security structural statute developed in concert with the Reagan administration, requires the president to submit this report to Congress to communicate their national security vision to the legislative branch.

2. What: This mission statement should guide policy execution. It must discuss the United States’ international interests, commitments, objectives, and policies, along with capabilities necessary to deter threats and implement US security plans.

3. Who: The president and their immediate circle of advisers benefit from soliciting input from senior officials across the broad swath of executive branch agencies and departments that carry national security responsibilities. An effective coordinating process should pressure test even the most determined of presidential views. Allowing debate leads to a stronger product. Providing space at the crafting table to consider wide-ranging positions makes those who were heard more committed to executing the strategy, regardless of whether their views prevail.

4. How: Strategy drafters should design the president’s national security mission statement to be maximally implementable. By statute, the strategy must discuss the “capabilities necessary” to “implement … security plans.” Strategies consistently fall short on the follow-through that is necessary to execute the vision. It is crucial to include parameters against which the executive branch can measure progress toward the strategy’s goals. This can set the frame for dialogue with Congress, which is charged with procuring funding and providing oversight.

—Mara Rudman is a professor of practice and director of the Ripples of Hope Project within the Miller Center at University of Virginia and a former deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs in the Clinton and Obama administrations. She coordinated the development of the 2009 NSS and assessed the 2022 NSS during her service on the National Defense Strategy Commission.

To be worth drafting and reading, an NSS must convey the logic guiding the administration

It is relatively easy to write a coherent NSS in one’s own voice.  Countless scholars and analysts have done so over the years. The challenge is to write a version of the NSS that is in the president’s voice and thus an authentic account of how the president understands the United States’ role in the world, the challenges the country faces, and the way forward.  And it is even more challenging to do all of that in a more rigorous way than your garden-variety presidential speech might do. Presidential speeches can be a good window into the president’s vision and voice. But they rarely if ever address the kind of tough, “yes, but what about this?” kind of pushback that an NSS worth reading will include. 

Of course, there are many other desiderata, most of which are not possible to be included (which explains why you will not find them in any of the published NSS’s of the past four decades). It would be great if the NSS went granular on “means” in addition to covering “ends” and “ways.” However, it is just not practical to include such details in a vision-logic statement. But if the NSS is worthwhile, it will ultimately be reflected in the president’s budget. 

Likewise, many critics ask for clear and unambiguous prioritization—as if they expected the document to rack and stack allies and adversaries in a best-of/worst-of list. Good NSS’s do reveal the president’s priorities by revealing what issues they dwell on and what they skip lightly over. But there are inevitable compromises that blur the text for understandable reasons. If we mention ally A without mentioning ally B, we buy ourselves lots of heartache with little gain; what is the harm in mentioning them both, even if everyone knows—and the president demonstrates through allocation of scarce resources like Oval Office access—that A matters more than B?  Sometimes, calls for prioritization themselves indicate strategic incoherence, as when “prioritizers” pretend we can better confront China by abandoning Ukraine to the predations of China’s ally Russia.

An NSS is worth reading if it accurately conveys the logic that is actually guiding the administration. If that logic is wise, the NSS will be easy to praise; if that logic is unwise, the NSS will help illuminate the problem. Either way, it is a fruitful guide to understanding the administration’s national security ambitions.

—Peter Feaver is a professor of political science and public policy and director of the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy and co-principal investigator of the America in the World Consortium at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy. He is a former special advisor for strategic planning and institutional reform at the National Security Council, where his responsibilities included contributing to the drafting of the 2006 NSS.

The post How to write a US National Security Strategy  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 22, 2025, Andrew Michta, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, was published in RealClearDefense. He argues that the next U.S. National Security Strategy risks misreading history again.

Fellow

Andrew A. Michta

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta published in RealClearDefense on the next U.S. National Security Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The strategy is a wide-ranging document covering everything from developing the skills needed to build and maintain nuclear submarines to reforming the way government supports defense exports. Three elements should be of particular interest to the transatlantic defense industrial base.

Recognition of defense as a key industrial sector

The modern history of industrial strategy in the United Kingdom has seen active state intervention in the economy come in and out of political favor. In recent years, successive governments have been more comfortable with the need to nurture the domestic defense industrial base, including through the 2021 Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSIS). This strategy broke with several long-held principles of British defense procurement, most notably the commitment to “international competition by default,” which had stood for more than a decade. However, it is difficult to point to specific outcomes of the changes, perhaps in part because while DSIS recognized the defense industrial base as a critical enabler of defense and national security, it was much less clear about the value of the defense industrial base to the wider economy.

That is certainly not the case for the new Defence Industrial Strategy, which is effectively a sector-specific subcomponent of the broader national Industrial Strategy. Defense is now listed as a growth sector, and the national security strategy even talks of a “defense dividend.” By situating the defense industry firmly within the wider industrial base, the British government has elevated the profile of a sector that employs 272,000 people across the country. In practical terms, it will give access to—and, perhaps more importantly, influence over—whole-of-government initiatives such as skills development programs, infrastructure investment, and regulatory reform. Additionally, almost 70 percent of those 272,000 jobs are based outside of the relatively affluent areas of southeast England, making the industry an obvious candidate to benefit from programs to incentivize regional investment. For example, the Defence Growth Deals promised in the strategy, if implemented well, could allow the industry to leverage hundreds of millions of pounds of government funding, take advantage of favorable tax and customs duties in certain Freeport locations, and perhaps even reduce the burden of the United Kingdom’s famously unpredictable planning process. 

There are benefits too for those more interested in cold, hard cash, with promises that the National Wealth Fund will soon support capital-intensive projects (subject to the necessary legislation clearing Parliament) and that the British Business Bank will provide more support for defense companies looking to scale up. Finally, the British government is using its financial muscle to help the defense industry export. Unlike its American and Canadian cousins, the United Kingdom’s export credit agency (UKEF) can already support defense projects. Under new rules, UKEF will see its lending capacity increased to ten billion pounds, with three billion pounds of that specifically ring-fenced for defense, providing a significant new source of low-cost debt financing to help soften the overall cost of investment in the sector.

Focus on UK-based businesses

Naturally, any interventionist industrial strategy runs the risk of encouraging narrow, national protectionism. But, in this case, the repeated references in the Defence Industrial Strategy to “UK-based industry” rather than the simpler “UK industry” formulation is telling. Yes, there are clearly defense technology areas where the United Kingdom intends to compete on the global stage, but the strategy takes a pragmatic approach that recognizes the inherently global nature of the industry. 

This is especially important in the context of the long and mutually beneficial history of collaboration between British and US defense industries. Of the 272,000 jobs mentioned above, more than 20,000 are directly working for US-owned companies, with another 94,000 jobs indirectly supported in the supply chain. That constitutes a significant contribution to the UK economy by any standard, even before considering the technological advances achieved through collaborative research and development, the security benefits of increased supply chain resilience, and increased export opportunities through reciprocal market access. 

Despite this, some US-owned defense contractors have privately expressed concern that the strategy’s commitment to developing an offset policy could roll back that record of collaboration. Many countries require foreign companies to invest directly or indirectly in their economies as a necessary component of competing for government defense contracts. The United Kingdom currently has no formal offset policy or enforcement mechanism, but the geopolitical climate has driven increased concern about the reliability of its defense supply chains. Last year, for example, the British government even purchased a semiconductor factory, the first such direct purchase of a private company by the MOD since it acquired Sheffield Forgemasters in 2021. Therefore, it is not surprising that a formal offset policy is being considered. 

US-owned companies are right to be concerned that an overly prescriptive and inflexible offset strategy could be counterproductive. The US government regards offsets as market distorting, and critics of the approach argue that offsets encourage inflation and inefficiency. There is, however, little reason to believe that the United Kingdom will go down that road. By calling out Australia’s relatively flexible and pragmatic approach as the inspiration, and by openly acknowledging the risks involved, the United Kingdom has signaled that it intends to move carefully. Past evidence of previous UK offset-like policies also supports this conclusion, with some analysts suggesting that the current prevalence of US-owned defense companies in the UK market is, at least in part, a result of previous offset strategies.

Commitment to acquisition reform

Longtime followers of British defense acquisition reform will have good reason to be skeptical on this front, having seen multiple attempts try and fail in the past, but there is reason to believe this time will be different. 

First, the government has committed itself to a segmented approach with ambitious timelines, with the period from initiation to contracting as short as three months for commercially available products. In doing so, the government has made an easy metric by which outsiders can measure success.

Second, the newly empowered national armaments director will take responsibility for all non-nuclear procurement in an end-to-end acquisition system running from investments in scientific research all the way up to end of lifecycle disposals of capital assets like aircraft carriers and jets. This new system reduces eight separate procurement budgets down to one, and it streamlines decision making, which will be essential to meet those speedy timelines noted above.

Third, and perhaps most important, the British people will demand it. Critics of British defense spending have long pointed to a relative lack of funding compared to domestic priorities like the National Health Service and other social benefit programs. Making defense a truly national endeavor, as the Strategic Defense Review aspires to, requires a clear and public argument for reprioritizing government spending. More than three and a half years on, polling shows that the Russian invasion of Ukraine still sharpens the mind in the United Kingdom much more acutely than in the United States. Given the clear and present threat on the continent, the British people might be willing to accept a reduction in social benefit programs to redirect resources to defense, but not if those resources are wasted on overly complicated and underperforming procurements.

Deborah Cheverton is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is a senior trade and investment adviser with the UK embassy. Before working in trade, she worked for the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence for fifteen years, working across a range of policy and delivery areas with a particular focus on science and technology policy, industrial strategy, capability development, and international collaboration.

The post Three things to note in the UK’s new Defence Industrial Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s unprecedented drone raid was widely interpreted as a test of NATO’s readiness and resolve. Former US Army Europe commander General Ben Hodges said the operation was a Kremlin rehearsal with the objective of checking NATO response times and capabilities. “Using F-35s and F-22s against drones shows we are not yet prepared,” he noted.

Many analysts joined Hodges in commenting on the inefficiency of employing NATO fighter jets and expensive missiles to counter relatively cheap Russian drones. The obvious shortcomings of this approach have underlined the need to radically rethink how NATO members address air defense amid the rapidly evolving threats posed by Russian drone warfare. Ukraine’s experience of combating Putin’s drone fleet will prove crucial in this process.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Like many other NATO members, Poland has invested heavily in recent years in high-end air defense systems such as Patriots and F-35 warplanes. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has revealed a new kind of war that requires alternative solutions. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three and a half years ago, unmanned systems have emerged as the decisive weapon above the battlefield and have also been used extensively for longer range attacks on land and at sea.

With Russia and Ukraine locked in a relentless race to innovate, the Kremlin has prioritized the mass production of deadly strike drones capable of hitting targets hundreds of kilometers away. The number of drones involved in Russian aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities has risen dramatically over the past year from dozens to hundreds, with record waves in recent months featuring as many as eight hundred drones. Europe remains dangerously unprepared to address the unprecedented challenges posed by these large-scale Russian drone swarms.

Ukrainians have been advising their European colleagues for some time of the need to reassess their air defense strategies in line with the growing dominance of drones. Ukrainian drone warfare specialist Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, who leads the country’s Unmanned Systems Forces, warned in July 2025 that NATO commanders must urgently review their air defense doctrines in order to focus on the dangers posed by swarms of Russian attack drones.

Brovdi’s call to Kyiv’s Western partners and his offer to share Ukraine’s unique experience of drone warfare did not initially provoke much of a response. However, following Russia’s recent escalation in the skies above Poland, that may now be changing. Within days of the Russian drone incursion, Polish and Ukrainian officials announced plans for Ukraine to provide anti-drone training in Poland. Other NATO members are now expected to follow suit, reflecting Ukraine’s status as a leading authority on drone warfare.

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Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski is one of numerous senior European politicians to acknowledge the need for NATO countries to learn from Ukraine. “The Ukrainians have better equipment for dealing with Russian drones and more up-to-date experience,” he commented during a visit to Kyiv last week. “This is something that the public and governments in the West need to urgently integrate into their thinking. It is the Ukrainians who will be training us on how to stand up to Russia, not the other way around.”

US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg echoed this sentiment, commenting on September 12 that Ukraine has emerged in recent years as a “world leader” in drone warfare. Noting that the evolution of drone technologies was changing the nature of modern war, Kellogg credited Ukraine with playing a leading role in this trend while acknowledging that other nations including the United States were now “well behind.”

In addition to offering air defense training to the country’s allies, Ukraine is also ready to help NATO partners identify and procure the necessary defensive tools to combat Russian drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently stressed that nobody in the world has enough missiles to shoot down the large volumes of drones currently being deployed by the Kremlin. Instead, a more eclectic approach is needed, featuring ground-based air defenses and jet fighters together with defensive drones, helicopter patrols, and propeller planes.

Ukraine has already developed and begun deploying a number of interceptor drones that serve as a cost-effective solution to Russia’s expanding swarms of strike drones. Work is now underway to increase production in order to keep pace with Russia’s growing output. Kyiv’s partners are engaged in these efforts. A new initiative was recently unveiled that will see Britain support Ukraine by mass producing interceptor drones based on existing Ukrainian technologies. This should make it possible to deliver thousands of drones to Ukraine every month.

Ukraine’s sophisticated anti-drone defenses will now set the standard for NATO as the alliance adjusts to the changing face of modern warfare and the mounting threat posed by Putin’s drones. At present, Putin is using drone incursions to test NATO and probe the alliance’s military and political responses, but his appetite for escalation has never been more apparent. European countries must therefore prepare to defend themselves against potential large-scale attacks involving hundreds of Russian drones. As they scramble to do so, Ukraine’s experience will prove absolutely indispensable.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Announced last year by former US President Joe Biden’s administration and the Iraqi government, the agreed timeline to end Operation Inherent Resolve’s (OIR) Iraq mission stipulates that coalition operations in neighboring Syria—where partners agree ISIS remains a serious threat—will continue, based out of Iraq.

This new frontier in the US-Iraq relationship presents numerous opportunities, challenges, and uncertainties. Read on for expert responses to ten pressing questions on this moment of change—and reflection—for Washington’s posture in the Middle East.

1. What does OIR’s end mean for the future of the US-Iraq security cooperation?

The shift to a peacetime, bilateral security framework—at Baghdad’s request—will be an important test for both the United States and Iraq. The greatest risk is a repeat of Washington’s neglect and Baghdad’s politicization of the security forces after 2011, which paved the way for the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS) rise. A further disadvantage is that the end of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) will leave US–Iraq relations at their lowest level of security engagement since 2014, just as a new administration takes office in Baghdad after the upcoming November elections. To avoid squandering both the hard-earned defeat of ISIS and Iraq’s fragile stability, Washington and Baghdad must commit to a durable partnership in important areas, such as intelligence sharing, procurement, training, and leadership development—rather than treating the end of OIR as a pretext for a security “divorce.”

—Omar Al-Nidawi is a Middle East analyst focusing on Iraqi political, security, and energy affairs. He is currently the Director of Programs at Enabling Peace in Iraq Center (EPIC).

In the agreement between the United States and Iraq announced last year, the end of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) included a commitment to transition security cooperation under OIR to a bilateral security relationship with Iraq. This transition allows for deepening security and defense cooperation between the two countries based on mutual areas of interest, including counterterrorism, cybersecurity, border security, exercises, and information sharing, to name a few. Through more focused bilateral cooperation and collaboration, the United States will have the opportunity to bring Iraq into some aspects of US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) broader theater engagement strategy, strengthening multilateral security cooperation with some of Iraq’s neighbors against regional threats, including the continuing defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A deepening of the US-Iraqi security partnership will also contribute to better cooperation and integration between Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. ISIS remains a regional and global threat, so building a long-term partnership with Iraqi and Kurdish security forces to take on an even greater role in the continuing defeat of ISIS should remain a key focus for the foreseeable future. Finally, a deeper security partnership opens the door to even greater engagement and influence over the Iraqi government’s security sector reform process and efforts to make the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) more accountable to the state. As US troops redeploy, it should be less about how many US troops remain in the country or where they are located. Instead, the future of the partnership should be based on what areas will be its focus and how bilateral security cooperation will be conducted under the work of the Iraq-US Higher Military Commission and a more formal annual Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue.

—Alina L. Romanowski is a distinguished fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. She most recently served as the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (2022-2024) and Kuwait (2020-2022).

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2. How will the end of the OIR mission impact the US-Iraq relationship?

The end of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) is eight years overdue. The defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in 2017 accomplished two objectives: the elimination of the existential threat of the post-2000 Iraqi transition to democracy and the political system undertaking this transition, and the reconfiguration of Iraq’s military into a more confident security force that can protect the Iraqi people from a similar threat. Once these two main objectives were met, there remained no logic to keeping the wartime security infrastructure in place. From this point, the mission sent the wrong message to the Iraqis that the US military was in Iraq to stay indefinitely.

The successful negotiations and their implementation are positive steps forward. As they proceed with a new bilateral security arrangement, Iraq and the United States can maintain a credible level of deterrence to any possible domestic and external security threats to Iraq and the wider region. This simultaneously clears the way for more conducive cooperation on the bilateral relationship across a diverse range of sectors, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the US-Iraqi Strategic Framework Agreement.

The US invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, along with the nature of US foreign policy toward Iraq and the Middle East region at large, made the concept of a mutually beneficial US-Iraqi partnership very hard to present to the Iraqi people. Faithful implementation of this agreement will be very helpful in accomplishing this objective.

—Abbas Kadhim is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Previously, Kadhim led the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs until July 2025. He also previously held a senior government affairs position at the Iraqi Embassy in Washington, DC.

The end of the US-led mission against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is a significant turning point for US engagement in Iraq, providing an opportunity to reshape not only the US-Iraq security partnership but also the overall relationship with Iraq. For Iraq, the departure of US troops from federal Iraq is a reassertion of Iraqi sovereignty after more than two decades of foreign troop presence. The US military presence remains a domestic political flashpoint there, and normalizing this security partnership could reduce a source of friction. For the United States, it’s the conclusion of the first “forever war,” a military intervention that ultimately cost billions of dollars and thousands of Iraqi and American lives. This relationship remained anchored by the ongoing US military presence even as Iraq has continued to recede from the consciousness of the American public, and increasingly from American policymakers. Even as Iraq will remain important to advancing US national security interests in the Middle East, this is also a moment to create a more balanced partnership. US engagement should focus on broadening the bilateral relationship by promoting strengthened economic ties, including by promoting investment in Iraq’s still untapped energy sector. Promoting Iraq’s energy independence and prosperity will also ultimately contribute to a more stable and secure Iraq.

—Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East program. She served most recently as deputy assistant secretary for Iraq and Iran in the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, where she advised senior State Department leaders on Iraq and Iran in the aftermath of the Gaza conflict. 

3. What is the legacy of the US military mission in Iraq?

The legacy of the US military mission in Iraq is one of profound paradox. While it dismantled Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, set the foundation of a new political order, and enabled the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), it also produced enduring instability, sectarian fragmentation, and a dramatic shift in regional power dynamics. For Iraqis, the consequences diverged sharply. For many Sunnis, the fall of Hussein marked the collapse of their historic political dominance, ushering in marginalization, violence, and the rise of insurgency. For the Kurds, it was closer to a liberation narrative: the US mission enabled the consolidation of the Kurdistan Regional Government, fostering relative security, political autonomy, and economic growth. Among the Shia majority, initial optimism, rooted in newfound political representation, gradually gave way to disillusionment as governance faltered, corruption spread, and sectarian violence intensified.

From a geopolitical perspective, the US mission generated outcomes often described as counterproductive. The removal of the former Iraqi dictator paved the way for Tehran to expand its influence through political, economic, and paramilitary channels across Iraq and the wider Middle East.

The intervention’s human cost has been staggering. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians were killed, millions were displaced, and the country’s infrastructure sustained catastrophic damage. Beyond physical destruction, the war disrupted social cohesion, eroded trust in state institutions, and produced a generation scarred by conflict. For many observers, these humanitarian and developmental consequences represent the most enduring and tragic dimensions of the US mission.

This ending is widely regarded as a strategic setback for US interests and its regional allies, as it shifted the regional balance of power in ways that bolstered Iran’s position while straining Washington’s alliances. Analysts frequently point to Iraq as a cautionary tale of “geostrategic overreach,” where short-term military success undermined long-term strategic stability.

—Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Saeed is the Barzani scholar-in-residence in the Department of Politics, Governance & Economics at American University’s School of International Service, where he also serves as director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace.

The second US mission in Iraq, launched in 2014, played an indispensable role in liberating Iraq from the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and helping defeat the group in Syria. Without US intervention—and given the severe limitations of Iraqi forces—the war could have dragged on for years, with the potential to further intensify and spread sectarian violence. But while the mission’s military achievements are undeniable, it also illustrates the risks of alliances of necessity: they can sow the seeds of future conflict. The irony is stark—the same factions that desperately relied on US support against ISIS now celebrate Washington’s exit as a triumph over “the occupier.” Yet with no US troops left as “hostages” inside Iraq, what these groups spin as victory could in fact free Israel’s and the United States’ hands to target them—and Iraq more broadly—in a future confrontation with Iran.

—Omar Al-Nidawi

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Sep 4, 2025

Dispatch from Basra: Glimpses of hope in Iraq’s forgotten south

By Jon Wilks

Basra is proving to be part of a broader trend: improved security and visible reconstruction, despite persistent corruption and dysfunction.

Iraq Middle East

The legacy of the US mission in Iraq is complicated and fraught with different perspectives among both Americans and Iraqis. Bottom line, for our own strategic interests, the United States has stood by the Iraqis more than any other country and worked to bring stability to Iraq on multiple occasions. We share the tragic loss of life, the hardship of defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and the challenges of bringing good governance, rule of law, and functioning institutions after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Not all Iraqis share a positive view of the United States, but a majority understand that a strong US-Iraqi partnership, not just in security areas, is critical to Iraq’s future development and sovereignty and the region’s stability.

—Alina L. Romanowski

4. Is this a withdrawal, or a transition?

Whether this is a withdrawal or a transition will depend on the details. US President Donald Trump’s administration has yet to announce how Washington’s troop presence will change, including whether US troops will remain in federal Iraq, how many, and where they will be located.

The answers to these questions have direct bearing on the future of US-Iraqi security cooperation and whether the United States will continue to be a strategic military partner for the Iraqi Security Forces. Even with a reduction in the US troop presence, the United States could manage an effective transition from the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or D-ISIS Coalition, to a bilateral military relationship that retains core operational capabilities for counterterrorism cooperation. However, a more complete withdrawal of US troops and a narrowly scoped program of security cooperation would dramatically reduce US influence in Iraq and provide an opening for Iran to exploit.
—Victoria J. Taylor

5. How will the end of the OIR mission impact US security interests with respect to Iran and extremism?

While US participation in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) was critical to fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), it was provocative to Iran, which would prefer that Washington not be stationed, or play any role, in Iraq (or anywhere else in the Middle East). So, we find ourselves at an interesting moment. Both ISIS and Iran are down, but not out.

While ISIS’s operational capabilities in Iraq continue to decrease, its global presence will make its defeat difficult. Should a future Iraqi government adopt policies that alienate Sunni Iraqis, then you will again have conditions for the same kind of resurgence we saw in 2014. Thus, it will be in our interests to have a close enough relationship with Baghdad to encourage more inclusive policies, while also enabling cooperation to monitor and contain ISIS.

For Iran’s part, Israeli and US strikes against it have made it less attractive as a partner, which has likely played a role in its Iraqi proxy’s seeming unwillingness to engage Israel, despite their rhetoric. At the same time, it has increased Tehran’s sense of urgency regarding limiting US-Iraq relations and any US military presence. Therefore, we can expect any improvement in relations to be met with a response intended to constrain the US presence and prevent the expansion of economic and other relations critical for Iraq’s continued trajectory toward stability. Ultimately, Iraq has an interest in maintaining relations with both the United States and Iran. Doing is and will continue to be a tricky balancing act, where neither partner is likely to be happy with the outcome. But ultimately, I don’t think its interests change: defeat terrorism, avoid regional conflict, and play a stabilizing role in the region.

—C. Anthony Pfaff is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the research professor for the Military Profession and Ethic at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College in Carlisle, PA.

Much will depend on whether the United States’ and Iraq’s next government treat the post-Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) relationship with the seriousness it requires. If, as expected, the November elections produce a government more thoroughly dominated by Coordination Framework factions—with moderates like Haider al-Abadi absent—then ties will likely be tenuous at best. In that case, the loss of US “eyes and ears” in Iraq will create a more permissive environment for Iran to expand its influence and rebuild regional power projection, compensating for setbacks to Hezbollah and the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Such moves would heighten the risk of Iraq being drawn into the next regional conflagration, with major implications for Middle East stability, global energy security, and the threat of terrorism.

—Omar Al-Nidawi

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Jun 30, 2025

Balancing acts and breaking points: Iraq’s US-Iran dilemma

By C. Anthony Pfaff

The future of US–Iraq relations is neither as dim as it may first appear, nor as promising as one might hope.

Geopolitics & Energy Security Iran

6. How will the end of the OIR mission impact US security interests in Syria?

The end of the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission would significantly weaken US security interests in Syria. OIR has been the backbone of intelligence sharing and coordinated strikes that have kept the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) contained. If the mission concludes without an alternative framework, ISIS cells in the Badia and along porous borders could regenerate, threatening regional stability and US partners.

Strategically, losing Erbil as the platform for Syrian operations after 2026 would force a shift to Kuwait, reducing proximity, agility, and credibility. The legal basis for US operations, currently tied to Iraq’s 2014 United Nations letter, is also fragile—if Baghdad revokes it, Washington would lack a clear international mandate. A Syrian request to join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS could provide a new legal foundation, sustain coalition presence, and even broaden European participation.

Beyond counterterrorism, OIR’s end would erode US leverage vis-à-vis Russia and Iran inside Syria. For the United States, maintaining a credible counter-ISIS mission is not just about defeating ISIS; it’s about preserving influence, ensuring allies’ security, and preventing a vacuum that adversaries could exploit to undermine both regional stability and Syria’s fragile transition.

—Ibrahim Al-Assil is the Syria Project lead for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Al-Assil is also a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Harvard’s Middle East Initiative at the Belfer Center.

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Jun 4, 2025

Why Iraq should build bridges with its ‘new’ neighbor, Syria

By Shermine Serbest

Iraq’s position on the Syria transition is split between two camps: the official government, and that of the powerful non-state actors.

Iraq Middle East

The end of the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission in Iraq occurs against the backdrop of the political transition in Syria, with the potential for instability in Syria to create an opening for an Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) resurgence. The US military presence in Iraq remains the core logistical platform not only for ISIS operations in Iraq, but also in Syria. While a reduction in the US military presence in federal Iraq is likely to diminish counter-ISIS capabilities there, the September 2026 deadline to end the logistical platform in Iraq for OIR’s Syria operations will create a starker security challenge should the United States choose to continue its military presence in Syria. More broadly, the US security partnership with Iraq continues to be a counterweight to Iranian influence in Iraq. The scale and scope of the future US security relationship with Iraq is also of concern to other regional partners who would like to see a stable Iraq, with the Gulf, Jordan, and Israel all closely watching the next steps.

—Victoria J. Taylor

The continuation of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq to support the counter-Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) operations in Syria until the end of 2026 will provide a key area for US-Iraq bilateral security cooperation and involvement in the regional dialogue about the direction of the new Syrian government. What happens in Syria can affect Iraq and the region’s stability. Iraq’s Prime Minister and its security forces are concerned about the security situation in Syria, including the movement of non-state actors, terrorists, and drug trafficking across the Syrian-Iraqi border. As OIR winds down, security issues across that border and in Syria will offer another critical area to strengthen bilateral cooperation.

—Alina L. Romanowski

7. How can the United States ensure that the end of the OIR mission does not result in diminished US influence?

The United States will need to stay closely engaged in building a security partnership that supports US interests in the region and shapes Iraqi decision-making. While Washington and Baghdad would like to see increased economic investments in Iraq, many issues remain contentious, including the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces’ (PMF) institutionalization, corruption, oil smuggling, Iranian influence, armed non-state actors, and terrorist groups undermining Iraq’s sovereignty. These and other issues will complicate continued US military cooperation. Without a US security partnership, prospects for additional US economic investment in Iraq will diminish considerably. The recent visit of the new Central Command Commander, Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, shortly after taking up his new position, sends a signal to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and his military leadership—as well as to the region—that an active US-Iraq security partnership and engagement remains important to the United States. Now, it’s up to the Iraqis to make that happen.

—Alina L. Romanowski

8. How have Sunni attitudes shifted on the US military presence and how does the Sunni community view the departure of US forces?

Sunni Arab attitudes toward the United States began shifting positively well before Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)—during the mission’s Surge and Awakening, when many realized that working with the United States was the best way to defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq and to check the power of Shia hardliners in Baghdad. That pragmatic view persisted through the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Today, with ISIS defeated and Iraqi politics increasingly transactional, Sunni leaders may feel less dependent on the United States as a buffer. Still, Sunni communities remain vulnerable: whether the threat is an ISIS resurgence from Syria, a regional war, or renewed sectarian conflict, they often bear very heavy costs when Iraq enters another crisis.

—Omar Al-Nidawi

9. How do the Shia political elite view the end of the OIR mission and the future of the US-Iraq partnership?

Iraqi Shia leaders view this moment with mixed feelings. On the one hand, the end of the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission serves their pro-Iran inclinations and interests. Tehran is increasingly becoming their strategic partner and protector, and their top priority is to remain in power. Iran already has clear deliverables in helping them to maintain that hold—during the post-2021 election saga, Tehran helped Shia leaders defeat the Sadrist challenge. On the other hand, they worry about losing the United States because of their reliance on Iran. It is very difficult for them to find a comfortable balance between Washington and Tehran, particularly given the shrinking room for maneuver they face as a result of the current US–Iran confrontation.

—Akeel Abbas is a DC-based academic and journalist. His research and publications deal with national and religious identities, as well as modernity and democratization in the Middle East.

10. What impact does OIR’s end have on Kurdish interests, and how will this reshape dynamics between Erbil and Baghdad?

The first real test of Iraq’s federal structure and the acceptance of the Kurdistan Region as a federal autonomous region will come after September 2026, when the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission will conclude. If Washington opts for a complete pullout after 2026, Kurdish interests will undoubtedly face significant setbacks. No doubt that for Iraqi Kurds, the US military presence has long served as a security umbrella against Baghdad, and a strategic guarantor of Kurdish autonomy. The absence of US forces would tilt the balance of power decisively toward Baghdad, eroding Kurdish leverage. Historically, this imbalance has had destabilizing consequences. The 2011 US withdrawal created a political vacuum in which the Shia-led government marginalized Sunni politicians, fueling grievances that culminated in the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Kurdish leaders fear a similar trajectory today, in which Baghdad could take harsher measures to curtail Kurdish autonomy and consolidate centralized authority.

The departure of OIR will therefore reshape Erbil-Baghdad dynamics by removing a key external stabilizer. For the Kurds, US forces have been more than a military presence; they have been an anchor of security, stability, and leverage. Whether the post-OIR era mirrors the post-2011 instability or instead ushers in a more pragmatic Baghdad will depend on the central government’s willingness to avoid repeating past mistakes. Will Baghdad return to authoritarian centralization that could exacerbate ethnic and sectarian divisions? Or will it enact constitutional accommodations and acknowledge that durable stability requires a respect for constitutional frameworks? The stakes extend well beyond Kurdish autonomy: the outcome will influence Iraq’s internal cohesion and the broader balance of power in the Middle East.

— Yerevan Saeed

The post Ten questions (and expert answers) on Operation Inherent Resolve’s end in Iraq appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“Israel initiated it, Israel conducted it, and Israel takes full responsibility.” That’s what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Tuesday after launching strikes targeting senior members of Hamas’s political leadership in Doha, Qatar. The unprecedented Israeli attack in Qatari territory comes as Israel is preparing to launch a full-scale invasion of Gaza City and the Trump administration is pressing Hamas to accept US terms for a cease-fire and hostage-release deal. US President Donald Trump criticized the Doha strike as not helpful to US or Israeli goals, as Hamas indicated that its top leadership survived the attack. So what’s next for Israel’s campaign against Hamas? And how will Qatar, a key mediator between Israel and Hamas, respond to the attack? Our experts share their insights below.

• Daniel B. Shapiro (@DanielBShapiro): Distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former US ambassador to Israel
• Ahmed F. Alkhatib (@afalkhatib): Director of the Council’s Realign For Palestine project and native of Gaza City
• Thomas S. Warrick (@TomWarrickAC): Nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security
• Jennifer Gavito: Nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former US acting principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs

Israel’s thinking

• Ever since the Hamas-led attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, members of the group’s external leadership have been “dead men walking,” notes Dan, given Israel’s ability to find and target them. “What kept them alive for this long was their role in negotiations to free Israeli hostages,” Dan tells us. “And on that front,” he adds, “they proved to be limited in their utility” after multiple rounds of failed negotiations.
• The decision to target Hamas’s political leadership, which followed Monday’s Hamas terrorist attack at a bus stop in Jerusalem, “may signal that Israel no longer believes there will ever be a viable cease-fire and hostage deal in Gaza,” says Ahmed.
• In Tom’s assessment, the strike “will probably not bring the end of the war in Gaza any closer, but it won’t push it further away either.” That’s because any plans for the postwar reconstruction of Gaza “will not start until Hamas is disarmed, and that depends on decisions by Hamas’s military leaders in Gaza, not its political leaders in Doha.”

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Regional reaction

• As Jen notes, the strikes “upended Qatar’s role as a critical mediator” in the Israel-Hamas war, with Doha announcing that it is suspending its role in the talks in the aftermath of the attack.
• Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman also took Qatar’s side following the attack, which Jen says is noteworthy considering that only two years ago, Riyadh was “on the precipice of a normalization agreement” with Israel.
• “Only negotiations and greater normalization [with Arab neighbors] can bring about the long-term peace and security that Israel seeks,” Jen writes. “Each strike in contravention of international law diminishes Israel’s credibility as a negotiating partner.”
• Ahmed points out that the strikes took place not far from Al Udeid Air Base, which is home to US Central Command, placing the United States in a “delicate position vis-à-vis its strong Gulf ally.”  

What’s next?

• Following this strike, “Hamas no longer will feel safe anywhere it operates, even on the soil of a major non-NATO ally like Qatar,” Ahmed observes.
• And with the attack coinciding with an imminent invasion of Gaza City, Ahmed adds, this could mark “the beginning of the end of Hamas’s existence as a cohesive entity with territory and external leadership that could operate freely without repercussions.”
• According to Dan, the strike on Hamas negotiators and forthcoming Gaza City invasion “bode poorly” for the remaining hostages in Gaza. “We are closer than we have been at any point in the war to an Israeli reoccupation of Gaza, with all that likely means for hostages, Palestinian civilians, Israeli soldiers, and the challenge of shifting to any kind of sustainable day-after arrangement.”
• Jen warns that any “short-term success” by Israel in targeting Hamas officials, “if that is what today was, may yet bring more long-term pain.”

The post Israel just struck Hamas leadership in Qatar. What’s next?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the drama swirled, Rubio’s visit was an opportunity to consolidate long-term trust, cooperation, and collaboration with the United States’ partners in Mexico City and Quito. This and earlier trips to the region by the US secretary of state are part of a larger effort by Trump administration, which seeks to tie shared security together with enhanced prosperity for the Western Hemisphere. While progress is being made, the months and years to come will reveal whether this approach can overcome the region’s entrenched challenges.

A new implementation group in Mexico

In Mexico, President Claudia Sheinbaum and her cabinet welcomed deeper security cooperation with the United States while her secretary for foreign affairs, Juan Ramón de la Fuente, emphasized Mexican sovereignty and respect for territorial integrity during the joint press conference. Mexican officials stated clearly that each country must act against targets within their own borders. This emphasis on sovereignty should be seen in part as an attempt to shut down speculation by some that the United States might take unilateral action, including strikes against US-listed foreign terrorist organizations or other groups in Mexico.

Perhaps the biggest, most tangible announcement that came out of Palacio Nacional was the creation of a high-level implementation group to follow up on security commitments between the United States and Mexico. These commitments include coordinating joint operations against drug, arms, and human trafficking; overseeing efforts to dismantle cross-border tunnels and illicit financial networks; and designing rapid-response protocols for emerging threats. The new group is designed to give structure and permanence to bilateral security cooperation, and it will bring together senior US and Mexican officials from security, foreign affairs, and intelligence agencies. With the ability to spin off specialized subcommittees on issues such as fentanyl, firearms, and border infrastructure, the group will in effect act as a secretariat for security cooperation, with clear accountability built in through periodic progress reports to both governments. This marks an important step forward for cooperation between the United States and Mexico.

New security funding for Ecuador

Ecuador was once touted as one of the safest countries the region, but violence has increased in recent years. With five thousand murders this year as of July, the country’s homicide rate has increased by 40 percent in 2025 compared to the previous year. Much of this violence stems from criminal organizations and cartels. Reflecting this, the United States on Thursday designated Los Choneros and Los Lobos as foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated global terrorists.

While US-Ecuador cooperation is not new, the rise in violence, despite President Daniel Noboa’s efforts to tackle crime, underscores the urgency of providing increased US muscle to back his administration’s mano dura, or firm hand, policies. During his visit, Rubio announced nearly twenty million dollars in support for Ecuador, including six million dollars for naval drones. Rubio also mentioned the possibility of US troops on Ecuadorian soil, and, with an invitation from the Ecuadorians, potentially reopening a US base that was closed in 2009 under former President Rafael Correa.

The geopolitical significance of these announcements should not go unnoticed. These positive developments represent a major shift for US relations with Ecuador, a strategic ally that was once estranged and now in many ways sees eye-to-eye with the Trump administration, despite how heavily indebted it is to China. This stands in sharp contrast to US relations with long-time allies in the region, such as Colombia, whose ties with Washington have recently become more strained.

Also during the visit, US and Ecuadorian officials sketched the outlines of a potential migrant deportation agreement, though the details are pending. Last but not least, Rubio mentioned progress toward a bilateral trade deal.

From security cooperation to economic prosperity

Rubio’s focus both on enhancing security cooperation and on deepening economic ties is important, and his trip points the way toward a broader strategic vision for the region.

The Atlantic Council’s February 2024 Redefining US Strategy with Latin America and the Caribbean for a New Era report argues that the future of US engagement with the region must center on mutual, inclusive growth rooted in secure ties rather than transactional outreach. Specifically, the report envisions a revamped partnership built on shared values and country-specific strategies.

In effect, Rubio’s trip is a step toward turning that blueprint into a reality. The US secretary of state’s visit presented security cooperation as the entry point, but prosperity as the true test of success. Security cooperation should be conceived as a means to an end—in Latin America, that end should be economic security.

As Rubio said in Ecuador: “You cannot have economic prosperity without stability, and you cannot have stability without security. For example, it’s nearly impossible to attract foreign investment into a country unless you have security.”

With so much discussion surrounding the US counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean, it’s worth remembering that those shows of force are only one piece of the puzzle, and they should not distract from broader US efforts to build trust and enhance security cooperation in the region.

María Fernanda Bozmoski is director, impact and operations, and lead for Central America at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Rubio’s visit to Mexico and Ecuador shows the need for US security cooperation runs deeper than warships in the Caribbean appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“Nous sommes prêts,” French President Emmanuel Macron said on Thursday. “We are ready.” Speaking after a meeting of the “Coalition of the Willing” in Paris, Macron announced that twenty-six European nations had agreed to participate in a postwar force by air, land, or sea to ensure Ukraine’s security and deter further Russian aggression after a peace agreement is reached between Kyiv and Moscow. What would fulfilling this commitment look like in practice? And how should the United States view this development amid its efforts to end the war? We asked our coalition of experts, who were willing to provide their responses below. 

• John E Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine 
• Léonie Allard (@AllardLeonie): Visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, currently in residence from the French Ministry of Armed Forces 
• Jörn Fleck (@JornFleck): Senior director of the Europe Center and former European Parliament staffer 

What will this commitment look like in practice? 

• John points to Macron’s announcement that a security force “will deploy once a cease-fire is reached,” with France “one of several countries that has declared its willingness to supply troops.”   
• “Macron has definitely been a leader on this effort,” says Léonie, both in organizing the coalition along with the United Kingdom and in talking about putting boots on the ground, which the French president first put forward in February 2024 by saying “nothing is ruled out.” Since then, more countries have come on board.   
• However, important specifics are still unclear, such as “in what capacity, in what numbers, and for what specific guarantees” each country would contribute to Ukraine’s postwar defense, says Jörn. It is likely, he adds, that “not all those who are part of the Coalition of the Willing are going to be willing to put troops in Ukraine,” noting that Germany has been “hedging” on its level of involvement in security guarantees for Kyiv.

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What does this mean for Ukraine? 

• “That over two dozen countries are willing to contribute to security guarantees in some capacity is a good sign” for Ukraine, says Jörn. But the war is still ongoing. 
• Until a cease-fire is established, Jörn tells us, Europe must focus on “providing Ukraine with the adequate capabilities to defend itself” and “sending a message” to Russian President Vladimir Putin “that Europe is united and ready to act for Ukraine.” 
• European leaders’ “end goal,” adds Léonie, “is a strategic victory for a Ukraine integrated in the Western security order.”

What should the United States do next? 

• “Today’s meeting is an achievement for US President Donald Trump,” John argues, as Trump has long viewed European troops as “key to keeping the peace in Ukraine.” Now, he says, European leaders “have taken this idea and are making it a working proposition.” 
• Today’s announcement was “arguably as much about convincing Putin of Europe’s seriousness as it is about convincing the White House,” says Jörn. Now, he adds, “Europe’s leaders must keep up the level of effort, agency, and ambition they displayed at the White House on August 18” when they joined Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. 
• Next, says John, the Trump administration should “actively assist” European efforts. While Trump has said he will not deploy US troops in Ukraine, other options for US assistance remain on the table, including using US contract soldiers and supporting European troops with US airpower. “A visible, robust US role is essential to the deterrent power of the force and therefore to achieve the administration’s goal of a stable peace.” 

The post Twenty-six European countries have committed to help defend Ukraine after the war. What’s next?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At present, the emerging picture of future security guarantees appears to have four key components. These include a sustained allied military presence in or near Ukraine, robust air defense support, long-term weapons supplies, and mechanisms to monitor any potential ceasefire.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said he wants NATO-style commitments that would bind guarantor states to defend Ukraine, and insists any guarantees should be ratified by participating governments. European nations are expected to take the lead in providing security guarantees, with the United States playing a crucial but as yet undefined supporting role.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Much of the discussion over security guarantees has focused on the deployment of a military contingent to Ukraine in order to help enforce and monitor any ceasefire agreement. However, the potential composition and exact role of such a force remain unclear. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently told the Financial Times that Europe has a “pretty precise” plan in place to send troops to Ukraine, but other senior European officials have since suggested that her comments were premature.

Europe appears to be divided over the issue of sending troops to Ukraine. France and Britain have committed to leading what is being called a reassurance force, with others including Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and Lithuania signalling their readiness to also contribute soldiers. In contrast, Poland, Italy, Spain, and the Czech Republic have rejected the idea of deploying troops to Ukraine, while Germany has so far adopted a skeptical stance.

Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump has ruled out the presence of American soldiers in Ukraine. Instead, discussions are reportedly underway over the possible participation of private US military companies as part of a long-term peace plan for Ukraine. American contractors could potentially perform a number of functions including the strengthening of Ukraine’s air defenses.

The key question regarding the presence of foreign troops on Ukrainian soil is whether they would be given a mandate to engage in combat operations. In other words, would European soldiers be allowed to fight back if attacked by Russia? Critics have noted that this is unlikely. Instead, they argue, any foreign troop contingent deployed to Ukraine would be largely symbolic with no meaningful military role.

International military involvement of some kind in the air and maritime domains may be more realistic. Ukrainian officials are hopeful that the country’s European partners will participate in air patrols to defend Ukraine against Russian drone and missile attacks. Allied countries may also contribute to the strengthening of Ukraine’s existing network of air defense systems. This could lead to significantly enhanced security over at least a portion of Ukraine’s skies, creating opportunities for the resumption of commercial flights and providing a safer environment for the civilian population.

Similar support in the Black Sea is also under discussion, with the Turkish navy expected to play a prominent role. With Russia’s Black Sea Fleet already weakened by Ukrainian drone and missile strikes, allied involvement could help safeguard maritime supply corridors and secure uninterrupted trade flows from Ukrainian ports. This would provide the country with an important economic boost and help ease the pressure on congested land routes via Poland and Romania.

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While Ukrainian officials will certainly welcome further talk of troops on the ground, air shields, and naval missions, any serious discussion of security guarantees must acknowledge that Western leaders are deeply reluctant to risk direct military confrontation with the Kremlin. With this in mind, Ukraine’s most realistic security strategy lies not in empty promises or symbolic deployments of foreign soldiers, but in strengthening the country’s own defense capabilities.

Kyiv’s top priorities in this context include securing the continued supply of US and European weapons, ongoing intelligence support, and increased international investment in the rapidly expanding Ukrainian defense industry. Integration into existing European security structures will be crucial, including full coordination of the Ukrainian military with foreign partners providing the aviation and naval components of any future security guarantees.

Greater cooperation between Ukrainian defense tech companies and their Western counterparts can also contribute to the process of strengthening security ties between Ukraine and the rest of Europe. Today’s Ukraine has unrivalled experience in drone warfare and numerous other aspects of the contemporary battlefield. This makes the country a strategic partner with much to offer its European neighbors.

At present, a strong Ukraine looks to be by far the most realistic deterrent against further Russian aggression. This will require extensive material support and binding long-term political commitments from Kyiv’s allies, but is unlikely to involve a major foreign military presence in Ukraine.

The benefits of backing Ukraine will be potentially far-reaching for Europe as a whole. A strengthened and integrated Ukrainian military can serve as a bastion of European security for years to come as the continent seeks to modernize its military and adapt to the new geopolitical realities of an isolationist United States and an expansionist Russia.

Elena Davlikanova is a senior fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis and Sahaidachny Security Center. Yevhen Malik is a veteran of the Ukrainian Army’s 36th Marine Brigade.

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Europe’s best security guarantee against Russia is the Ukrainian army appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As August gives way to September, it is now abundantly clear that Putin’s big summer offensive has failed. The Russian army has been unable to secure any front line breakthroughs or capture a single major city, with overall Russian advances during the three summer months limited to an estimated 0.3 percent of Ukrainian territory. Crucially, key strategic objectives like Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine remain in Ukrainian hands.

The Kremlin’s ambitious plans to expand the war into northern Ukraine’s Sumy and Kharkiv regions have also fallen flat. During the initial weeks of the summer offensive in June, a swaggering Putin confidently declared that “all Ukraine is ours” and threatened to seize regional capital Sumy as part of efforts to establish a so-called “security buffer zone” stretching deep inside Ukraine. With the summer season now over, his invading troops find themselves pinned down in a handful of border villages, having been forced to retreat after a series of battlefield reverses.

Russia’s extremely modest recent gains have come at a terrible price. While the Kremlin does not release information about its war dead, conservative estimates of Russian casualties based on open source data suggest catastrophic losses during the summer months numbering tens of thousands. As German journalist and BILD correspondent Julian Röpcke has noted, any sober assessment of Russia’s summer offensive must conclude that it has been a “debacle.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The failure of Putin’s summer offensive should now help to debunk the persistent myth of inevitable Russian victory. For far too long, international perceptions of the war in Ukraine have been distorted by exaggerated notions of Russia’s military might. Perhaps most notoriously, this has led US President Donald Trump to criticize Ukraine for daring to defend itself against a far larger aggressor, while suggesting that Russia is somehow uniquely accustomed to waging and winning wars.

In reality, Russian history has been shaped to a significant degree by military defeats, including a long list of lost wars in the past few centuries alone. Russia suffered a comprehensive defeat against an Anglo-French coalition in the Crimean War of the 1850s. This was followed by a humiliating loss to Japan in 1905, which sparked a revolution. Russia then contrived to lose World War I, despite starting the war on what would eventually be the winning side. This led to the downfall of the Czarist Russian Empire.

In the immediate aftermath of the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks lost the 1920 Polish-Soviet War. The Soviet era would also end in defeat, with Russia retreating from Afghanistan in 1988 before losing the Cold War itself. Following the collapse of the USSR, post-Soviet Russia went on to lose the First Chechen War in the mid 1990s.