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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Ukraine’s most immediate contribution to European security is likely to be in terms of helping countries defend against the mounting threat posed by Russian drones. The Kremlin’s current harassing activities around airports and other strategic sites across Europe are essentially an annoyance, but even such small-scale drone operations have exposed an alarming lack of readiness. At present, it seems safe to say that the continent as a whole is utterly unprepared for the kind of large-scale Russian drone attacks that have become a routine feature of the war in Ukraine.

Europe has responded to escalating Russian drone activity by developing plans to establish a “drone wall” along the continent’s exposed eastern flank. So far, however, this initiative remains somewhat fragmented with no unified concept or central coordination. While a collective response could eventually prove effective, pursuing this goal without learning from Ukraine’s unique experience makes little sense. Only Kyiv has the data and insights necessary to build layered defensive networks capable of combating waves of Russian drones.

In recent months, a growing number of European countries have taken the practical step of seeking to tap into Ukraine’s drone warfare prowess by working with Ukrainian trainers or establishing joint production initiatives. “Ukraine’s experience is the most relevant in Europe right now. Our specialists and technologies can become a key element of the future European drone wall, a large-scale project that will ensure safety in the skies,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy commented in September 2025.

In addition to drone tactics and technologies, Ukraine can also offer its European partners an unrivaled environment for drone operator training and weapons development. The whole of Ukraine is now a vast drone warfare laboratory where novel threats are identified and addressed on a daily basis. As a result, new drone models and upgraded designs can move from the drawing board to the battlefield at a pace that is unheard of in peacetime Europe.

Drone warfare is just one of the many areas where Europe can learn from Ukraine. As European leaders explore new security strategies in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment, it should be abundantly clear that Kyiv has a crucial role to play. No other European country has such a battle-hardened army or intimate knowledge of modern warfare. In an increasingly unpredictable world, that makes Ukraine a vital partner.

Lesia Orobets is the founder of the Price of Freedom air defense initiative and a former member of the Ukrainian parliament.

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There are currently concerns that Ukraine’s fast‑growing defense tech sector risks inheriting longstanding governance problems including opaque procedures, slow decision‑making, and uneven enforcement. Recent corruption scandals in Kyiv have already damaged trust, creating what some businesses have described as “negative expectations.”

From the Ukrainian government’s side, there is recognition that institutions are still adapting, with many of the available economic security tools still fragmented or not yet fully operational. This represents an opportunity for Ukraine if the country is able to build governance structures tailored to strategic sectors rather than retrofitting existing and outdated bureaucratic models. Creating a new generation of transparent institutions to address defense sector exports, investment screening, and procurement could become a competitive advantage for Ukraine if designed with private sector input from the outset.

Export licensing is one of the most acute potential bottlenecks. Ukraine’s defense tech businesses currently face a process requiring excessive approvals from multiple institutions, with little accountability or predictability. There is also a perception of unequal treatment, undermining confidence in the system. Ukrainian officials, meanwhile, tend to stress the necessity of strict controls to prevent leakage of sensitive technologies.

A risk‑based and tiered export control regime could address these concerns. By clearly defining a narrow list of highly sensitive technologies requiring strict oversight, the Ukrainian authorities could create faster and more predictable export pathways for less sensitive defense and dual‑use products. This would support economic growth while preserving core security interests.

Wartime currency controls and capital movement restrictions severely limit the ability of Ukrainian defense sector companies to expand internationally. Multiple investors have noted the paradox of profitable Ukrainian firms being unable to deploy their own capital abroad, forcing them to raise funds outside the country simply to operate globally.

From the perspective of Ukrainian policymakers, currency restrictions are viewed as necessary to preserve macro‑financial stability and to prevent capital flight. Targeted exemptions for vetted defense and dual‑use companies, particularly those pursuing foreign acquisitions or joint ventures aligned with national priorities, could unlock growth without undermining financial stability. Such a mechanism would signal trust in compliant firms and reward transparency.

Another key issue is intellectual property (IP). Standard IP processes are too slow for wartime innovation cycles. In the dynamic current environment, Ukrainian companies rely on trade secrets and know‑how rather than formal patents, but this increases risks when partnering internationally.

Ukrainian officials acknowledge the importance of innovation but have so far only been able to offer limited concrete solutions. Accelerated IP pathways for defense and dual‑use technologies, combined with support for joint research and development frameworks with trusted foreign partners, could help Ukrainian firms secure protection in allied jurisdictions while strengthening international integration.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

There is a degree of uncertainty in Ukraine’s expanding defense tech sector that can be seen in inconsistent terminology, unclear boundaries, and undefined red lines. A shared vocabulary and published strategic framework, co‑developed by the public and private sectors, could help reduce this uncertainty.

Different priorities lead to diverging visions. Defense tech industry executives and investors tend to view the issue of economic security primarily through the lens of scalability, competitiveness, and speed. Their key assumptions include the notion that innovation thrives in predictable, transparent environments.

Many also argue that Ukraine’s combat‑tested technologies represent a unique global opportunity, while cautioning that excessive controls risk pushing talent, capital, and IP abroad. With this in mind, industry representatives and investors generally support targeted security measures but fear blanket restrictions that treat all technologies and companies as equally sensitive.

Ukrainian officials tend to frame economic security primarily as a defensive necessity. They warn that adversaries actively use markets, investment, and technology transfer as weapons. Many are also concerned that under‑regulation could result in irreversible strategic losses. Naturally, their perspective prioritizes caution, monitoring, and alignment with allied security frameworks, even at the cost of slower growth.

The central tension here is time-based and risk‑based. Businesses operate on market timelines and accept calculated risk, while governments operate on security timelines and seek to minimize worst‑case scenarios. Without structured dialogue, these differences manifest as mistrust rather than complementary roles.

If managed effectively, wartime Ukraine’s approach to economic security in the defense tech and dual-use sectors could become a model for the country’s broader postwar reconstruction. Ukraine has the opportunity to redesign institutions in a strategic sector that already commands global attention. Success may depend on whether government policy is seen by businesses as a partnership or as an obstacle.

Constructive cooperation grounded in transparency, risk‑based policy, and continuous dialogue can transform economic security from a constraint into a catalyst for Ukraine’s long‑term strength and sovereignty, providing significant security benefits for allies and partners along the way. This is a realistic objective. After all, industry, investors, and government all ultimately seek the common goal of a resilient, innovative Ukrainian economy integrated with democratic allies and protected from adversarial exploitation.

Bridging the gap between perspectives is less a matter of ideology than of process, trust, and execution. Ukraine is currently in a period of transition that is marked by many significant challenges but no irreconcilable obstacles. Industry and investors are ready to scale globally while the government is racing to build safeguards against unprecedented threats. The task now is to synchronize these efforts.

Eric K. Hontz is director of the Accountable Investment Practice Area at the Center for International Private Enterprise.

Europe is accelerating its defense industry but running into structural problems

Europe continues to be one of the key technological centers of the global defense industry and is actively investing in military innovation. The continent hosts both traditional defense giants and a new generation of defense-tech companies and start-ups. European states are investing in unmanned systems, cybersecurity, air and missile defense, space and sensor technologies, and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven military applications. The European Union also remains one of the world’s largest arms exporters—reaching sixty billion euros in 2024—underscoring the bloc’s industrial capacity and technological depth.

At the same time, several structural problems continue to hinder the development of Europe’s defense industry and its ability to meet new challenges. Three stand out in particular:

Spending gaps. Against the backdrop of constrained credit and fiscal rules, EU member states together spend roughly half as much on defense as the United States does. At the same time, moving toward spending 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense would represent a genuinely revolutionary shift for Europe. A series of statements by European leaders in 2025 have made it increasingly clear that such a change in approach is becoming politically unavoidable. Securing funding is, in effect, Europe’s primary political homework assignment.
Fragmentation of production, technologies, standards, and procurement. In his 2024 report on European competitiveness, former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi highlighted one of the EU’s core strategic weaknesses: fragmentation. By preserving the sovereignty and autonomy of member states, the EU has produced a kaleidoscope of defense approaches. Member states operate under different procurement policies and lack unified standards. This problem can’t be solved by simply increasing spending. Without common policies and standardization, Europe risks achieving lower levels of efficiency compared with other major military powers even with nominally comparable levels of expenditure.
Heavy dependence on foreign suppliers, especially the United States. As Draghi noted in his report, “The choice to procure from the US may be justified in some cases because the EU does not have some products in its catalogue, but in many other cases a European equivalent exists, or could be rapidly made available by the European defence industry.” This dependence constrains Europe’s strategic autonomy, and it slows the development of its own industrial and technological base.

Europe’s rearmament will cost hundreds of billions of euros. Yet the critical question is not only how much money is spent or what is bought today or tomorrow. What matters most is the speed of the defense-industrial system whose development these funds are intended to support.

What is missing? Speed.

Europe still lacks an adequate answer to Russia’s drone technologies, honed through years of war. In September 2025, the intrusion of nineteen Russian drones into NATO airspace forced the scrambling of F-35 fighter jets to shoot them down, an absurdly expensive response. When unidentified drones disrupt air traffic around European capitals, nobody is certain how to react. Inevitably, attention turns east—to Ukraine, which has learned to survive in a modern drone war, repel incursions of more than seven hundred airborne targets in a single night, and strike back. All this has been achieved through military innovation. As Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said in October 2025, “The only expert right now in the world when it comes to anti-drone capacities is Ukraine, because they are fighting the Russian drones almost every day.”

Many now argue that Ukrainian unmanned technologies are precisely what Europe needs—and could become the continent’s trump card in its hybrid confrontation with Russia. “Ukraine is already helping us and teaching us how to fight the wars of tomorrow. Ukrainian drones destroy 80 percent of targets on the ground,” said Andrius Kubilius, the EU’s defense commissioner, at the Conference on Ukraine’s European Future in November 2025.

Ukraine is often described as a drone superpower: It produces four million drones a year (the United States makes less than one hundred thousand a year), fields hundreds of systems and models, and has logged thousands of confirmed drone strikes on Russian targets. With drones, Ukraine has crippled Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, damaged its strategic aviation, and now threatens one of the foundations of Russia’s power: its oil infrastructure. The low cost of Ukrainian drone technology compared with conventional weaponry greatly impresses political leaders who must approve defense budgets. But the real issue runs deeper.

Defense technologies are constantly evolving: No matter what new weapons appear on the battlefield, none of them remains decisive for long. Within months, adversaries develop countermeasures—new tactics, new technologies. Wars are won not by those with the largest arsenals or the most soldiers but by those who win this race. Europe’s true strategic problem is slowness. The main thing Europe can learn from Ukraine’s defense sector is speed.

At the strategic level, Europe can win any war or technological race—if it buys itself a faster engine.

The Ukrainian precedent: Frontline research and development as a model

This is the first war in which dual-use products—such as agricultural drones and open-source software platforms—are often more lethal than conventional weapons. It has also made one thing clear: Preparation for war must involve not only professional armies, but the entire nation. During the war, millions of civilians joined in the defense of Ukraine, bringing their own approaches and fundamentally transforming the process of developing defense innovations.

Drone production in Ukraine resembles a vast open-source frontline research and development lab. Volunteers, private firms, military units and government agencies all test, iterate, and refine designs on a weekly basis. Strike videos circulate on social media; experts debate performance; thousands of chats buzz with feedback; ideas are exchanged in kitchens, workshops, and smoking areas. This may appear absurd from the perspective of traditional military rules and procedures, but it works.

There are almost no examples of drones built by defense giants remaining effective on the battlefield for long. The reason is the slow pace of adaptation and evolution. Ukrainian drones also do not last long on the battlefield—but the best of them evolve faster than the adversary can adapt to them.

No wonder NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte remarked in October 2025 that Ukraine is “a powerhouse when it comes to innovation, insights, for example, when it comes to anti-drone technology [and] anti-cyber threats.”

European militaries do not operate this way. Yet Europe possesses a strategic advantage of its own—one it can put to powerful use.

Europe’s slow money and Ukraine’s speed

Ukraine and Europe have opposite superpowers.

Europe is slow but has cheap, long-term capital. Slowness is, in fact, a form of trust: Investors know the rules will not change and their rights will be protected. This is precisely what Ukraine has long lacked.
Ukraine is fast and unpredictable, but its capital is always expensive. Speed means risk, which means a high cost of capital.

Combining Europe’s capital with Ukraine’s speed and innovation would create a unique dynamic.

Investment is not merely capital; it is a way to synchronize Europe’s pace with Ukraine’s school of fast-evolving combat systems.

Europe’s future hinges on integrating Ukraine into its defense ecosystem

Europe has entered an era of rapid military evolution. Ukraine is the country of the free world that best understands what modern war looks like. This is why European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen now speaks of a new drone alliance between Ukraine and Europe. “Before the war, Ukraine had no drones. Today, Ukrainian drones are responsible for over 23 percent of Russian equipment losses, highlighting the impact of human ingenuity in open societies,” she said in September 2025.

Europe is already entering a phase of practically implementing Ukrainian defense technologies and more closely cooperating with Ukrainian defense-tech companies. This is reflected both in joint manufacturing projects and in the integration of Ukrainian solutions into European rearmament programs—from cooperation on unmanned systems and counter-drone technologies to the creation of joint research and development teams. Notable examples include initiatives to establish joint ventures with Ukrainian manufacturers, as well as growing interest from European defense-tech players in Ukraine’s combat-tested experience with AI- and network-centric solutions.

The process has already begun. Many announcements have been made about joint investments and co-development of unmanned systems between European and Ukrainian firms. More will follow. It is part of a broader shared strategy.

If Europe and Ukraine carry this strategy through, the continent will at last acquire genuine defense autonomy, making it capable of withstanding any threat.

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Grundman in CNN reporting on defense contracting

clee — Thu, 22 Jan 2026 18:37:18 +0000

On January 7, Forward Defense Senior Fellow Steven Grundman was featured in an article on CNN entitled “Trump threatens defense contractors with restrictions while promising sharp increase in spending,” arguing that Trump’s proposed limits on defense contractors’ buybacks, dividends, and executive pay would amount to an unprecedented form of state intervention. In his view, even if the intent is justified, the approach risks damaging incentives, investment, and the long-term health of the defense industrial base.

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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To adapt to today’s security threats, NATO should prioritize the basics of defense innovation

jcookson — Wed, 21 Jan 2026 20:40:57 +0000

WASHINGTON—From the specter of US retrenchment to ongoing Russian revanchism, European NATO members must face up to a harsh reality: the Alliance lacks the industrial capabilities to meet today’s security challenges. Their recent promises to increase defense spending, while substantial and welcome, will not be enough alone to change this.

To adapt quickly enough to confront evolving threats, NATO allies must get the basics right. This means adopting functional and flexible financing mechanisms, streamlining regulatory frameworks, and building production foundations that prioritize scalable and sustainable innovation.

These challenges that NATO faces, as well as the need for the Alliance to get the basics right, are being actively discussed, including at the 2025 Netherlands-US Defense Industry Days conference in Washington, DC, this past October. At this event, organized by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Atlantic Council, policymakers, industry leaders, financiers, and experts discussed how transatlantic allies can accelerate defense innovation while strengthening their defense industrial bases. Below are a few of the authors’ major takeaways from this conference on how NATO can meet these challenges.

Don’t just spend more—spend smarter

Increasingly, the battlefields of the future will be won in the realm of innovation. Building ecosystems to support technology development will require allies to use newly unlocked defense dollars to fill immediate capability gaps and build flexible financing pathways to foster innovation. If done right, these defense ecosystems can allocate more resources directly to innovators, boosting returns on investment and generating cutting-edge capabilities in North America and Europe.

To do this, allies should take a two-pronged approach to financing innovation:

Accept risk to accelerate adoption. Many innovation initiatives—such as NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) organization—too often fall short because they prioritize immediate return on investment or quick-turn results over long-term innovation development. This places a strain on innovators, limiting their access to seed money and signaling to the private sector that the Alliance does not prioritize lasting defense technology innovation. Instead, NATO should give these initiatives greater latitude to prioritize experimentation and iteration rather than meeting often arbitrary metrics and quotas.

Protect research and development budgets. From the rise of the space domain to electromagnetic warfare, NATO allies must win not just a single innovation race; they need to win many at once. Research and development (R&D) budgets are critical to this effort. Yet, far too often, as participants at the conference noted, R&D budgets for defense technologies are cannibalized in favor of immediate operational needs, particularly during periods of heightened security pressure. By prioritizing R&D budgets, governments can send a clear signal to defense industries, investment bankers, and venture capitalists that NATO members see investment in defense technology as a long-term and sustainable demand. These signals can help spur greater private-sector investment in these technologies.

To produce at scale, regulate at scale

Current regulatory environments on both sides of the Atlantic are not designed for the speed of innovation or adoption needed in today’s rapidly evolving security environment. Instead, NATO allies must strike a careful balance: NATO countries should impose regulations that protect sensitive technologies and intellectual property while also encouraging cooperation among allies on innovation development. Two main principles should inform this approach:

Break down barriers to transatlantic defense industrial cooperation. In the United States, having to navigate dense bureaucracy can stifle innovation, hamper collaborative partnerships, and stretch lead times for critical defense technologies. However, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently made several announcements that show promise in this area—including loosening restrictions on defense contractors and emphasizing speed—indicating that the Pentagon will work to streamline defense cooperation for allies looking to buy US capabilities. Despite this positive momentum, meaningful changes to US foreign military sales and armaments cooperation will require sustained efforts to reform these overly burdensome bureaucratic processes.

Keep agile firms top of mind when writing regulations. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will make or break the next era of warfare. Yet defense industrial and innovation regulations often impose disproportionate costs on SMEs because they are designed only for the largest defense companies. For example, the US Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification rightly protects sensitive data through third-party audit and monitoring requirements. But as written, the cost of compliance with these regulations is prohibitively expensive for SMEs, risking pushing many smaller defense firms out of the market altogether. Therefore, policymakers and military planners must establish more frequent, institutionalized relationships with SMEs to better understand how regulations affect these new players. A good step in the right direction would be for policymakers to apply regulations on a sliding scale, setting thresholds for how large a defense company must grow before it has to comply with certain requirements.

Build integrated innovation ecosystems

NATO should adopt a holistic approach to capability development that marries research, design, and production to turn industrial development into more than just the sum of its structural parts. Three ways to build this holistic approach are:

Champion defense industrial cooperation. To innovate at the necessary pace, the Alliance must build defense industrial co-development, co-production, and co-assembly pathways. Working industry-to-industry or industry-to-partner, such collaborative efforts can help enable allied industries to scale up production and develop cutting-edge defense technologies. This approach defrays risk for industry, builds stronger transatlantic bonds, and shortens lead times for capability delivery.

Advance a model that combines expertise across sectors. To build more resilient and sustainable defense innovation ecosystems, allies should foster a defense innovation model that integrates government, industry, and academia. With these three sectors working together, allies can coordinate experimentation, testing, and manufacturing efforts to accelerate development and deployment timelines. Applied across the Atlantic, such a model could replace isolated national pilot projects with a coordinated framework for sustained, interoperable innovation.

Establish a NATO Defense Innovation Unit to spur development. Modeled after the United States’ own Defense Innovation Unit, a NATO version of the institution would help the Alliance coordinate funding, regulation, and capability development. A NATO Defense Innovation Unit would maintain shared test facilities, align technical standards, and guide the transition of prototypes into fielded systems. It would serve as a permanent platform connecting NATO’s innovation initiatives—such as DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund—with national and private-sector efforts.

Building transatlantic innovation ecosystems must begin with the basics: financing innovation wisely, regulating for speed and scalability, and building integrated defense innovation models across sectors and allied capitals. A roadmap grounded in smart investment, adaptive regulations, and collaborative production can transform innovation into readiness.

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Ukraine’s robot army will be crucial in 2026 but drones can’t replace infantry

David Kirichenko — Thu, 08 Jan 2026 21:33:37 +0000

Ukrainian army officials claim to have made military history in late 2025 by deploying a single land drone armed with a mounted machine gun to hold a front line position for almost six weeks. The remote-controlled unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) reportedly completed a 45-day combat mission in eastern Ukraine while undergoing maintenance and reloading every 48 hours. “Only the UGV system was present at the position,” commented Mykola Zinkevych of Ukraine’s Third Army Corps. “This was the core concept. Robots do not bleed.”

News of this successful recent deployment highlights the potential of Ukraine’s robot army at a time when the country faces mounting manpower shortages as Russia’s full-scale invasion approaches the four-year mark. Robotic systems are clearly in demand. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has reported that it surpassed all UGV supply targets in 2025, with further increases planned for the current year. “The development and scaling of ground robotic systems form part of a systematic, human-centric approach focused on protecting personnel,” commented Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal.

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The current emphasis on UGVs is part of a broader technological transformation taking place on the battlefields of Ukraine. This generational shift in military tech is redefining how modern wars are fought.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, homegrown innovation has played a critical role in Ukraine’s defense. Early in the war, Ukrainian troops deployed cheap commercial drones to conduct reconnaissance. These platforms were soon being adapted to carry explosives, dramatically expanding their combat role. By the second year of the war, Ukraine had developed a powerful domestic drone industry capable of producing millions of units per year while rapidly adapting to the ever-changing requirements of the battlefield.

A similar process has also been underway at sea, with Ukraine deploying domestically produced naval drones to sink or damage more than a dozen Russian warships. This has forced Putin to withdraw the remainder of the Black Sea Fleet from occupied Crimea to Russia itself. Recent successes have included the downing of Russian helicopters over the Black Sea using naval drones armed with missiles, and an audacious strike on a Russian submarine by an underwater Ukrainian drone.

By late 2023, drones were dominating the skies over the Ukrainian battlefield, making it extremely dangerous to use vehicles or armor close to the front lines. In response to this changing dynamic, Ukrainian forces began experimenting with wheeled and tracked land drones to handle logistical tasks such as the delivery of food and ammunition to front line positions and the evacuation of wounded troops.

Over the past year, Russia’s expanding use of fiber-optic drones and tactical focus on disrupting Ukrainian supply lines has further underlined the importance of UGVs. Fiber-optic drones have expanded the kill zone deep into the Ukrainian rear, complicating the task of resupplying combat units and leading to shortages that weaken Ukraine’s defenses. Robotic systems help counter this threat.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Remote controlled land drones offer a range of practical advantages. They are more difficult to jam electronically than aerial drones, and are far harder to spot than trucks or cars. These benefits are making them increasingly indispensable for the Ukrainian military. In November 2025, the BBC reported that up to 90 percent of all supplies to Ukrainian front line positions around Pokrovsk were being delivered by UGVs.

In addition to logistical functions, the Ukrainian military is also pioneering the use of land drones in combat roles. It is easy to see why this is appealing. After all, Ukrainian commanders are being asked to defend a front line stretching more than one thousand kilometers with limited numbers of troops against a far larger and better equipped enemy.

Experts caution that while UGVs can serve as a key element of Ukraine’s defenses, they are not a realistic alternative to boots on the ground. Former Ukrainian commander in chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi has acknowledged that robotic systems are already making it possible to remove personnel from the front lines and reduce casualties, but stressed that current technology remains insufficient to replace humans at scale.

Despite the advances of the past four years, Ukraine’s expanding robot army remains incapable of carrying out many military functions that require infantry. When small groups of Russian troops infiltrate Ukrainian positions and push into urban areas, for example, soldiers are needed to clear and hold terrain. Advocates of drone warfare need to recognize these limitations when making the case for greater reliance on unmanned systems.

UGVs will likely prove vital for Ukraine in 2026, but they are not wonder weapons and cannot serve as a miracle cure for Kyiv’s manpower challenges. Instead, Ukraine’s robot army should be viewed as an important part of the country’s constantly evolving defenses that can help save lives while raising the cost of Russia’s invasion.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

The art of war is undergoing a technological revolution in Ukraine

Oleg Dunda — Wed, 24 Dec 2025 23:52:17 +0000

Ukraine is currently at the epicenter of radical changes taking place in the way modern wars are fought. However, much of the world is still busy preparing for the wars of yesterday. European armies are only combat-ready on paper, while the invincibility of the United States military is based largely on past victories.

The current state of affairs is far from unprecedented. In early 1940, Polish officers tried to warn their French counterparts about Nazi Germany’s new blitzkrieg tactics but were ignored. France surrendered soon after. There is still time to adapt to the transformations that are now underway, but the clock is ticking.

One of the key lessons from the war in Ukraine is the evolving role of soldiers. People are now the most expensive, vulnerable, and difficult resource to replace on the battlefield. Meanwhile, many of the core weapons systems that dominated military doctrines in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are becoming less relevant. Tanks, artillery, and other traditional systems are simply too expensive and are unsuited to the challenges created by newer technologies.

Unmanned systems of all kinds have emerged since 2022 as a fundamental element of modern military doctrine. This is radically changing everything from the structure of armies to the role of the individual soldier. Remotely controlled equipment no longer needs a large crew to support it, while individual models are becoming more compact and maneuverable. As a result, the power of unmanned weapons systems is increasing exponentially, while production is expanding to industrial scale and becoming significantly cheaper.

More and more soldiers now serve as unmanned systems operators. Those who remain in more traditional roles perform tasks such as special operations, guard duties, or logistical functions. The war being waged by Ukraine has demonstrated that the modern battlefield features a kill zone up to 25 miles deep and spanning the entire front line. This zone is controlled by drones that destroy any infantry or equipment. Combat operations are increasingly conducted by drone operators located deep in the rear or in underground bunkers.

In these conditions of drone dominance over the battlefield, any attempts to stage major breakthroughs are doomed to failure. Instead of tank columns and artillery duels, offensive operations require maximum dispersal of forces and the greatest possible camouflage. The main task of troops is to gradually shift the kill zone deeper into the enemy’s rear.

Success depends upon the ability to rapidly produce large quantities of inexpensive combat drones and continually update their control systems. Initial tactics involving single drones and individual targets are already becoming a thing of a past. Instead, operators can now use artificial intelligence to control entire fleets featuring large numbers of drones deployed simultaneously. This approach allows a single soldier to manage kilometers of front line space rather than just a few hundred meters. The result is a reduction in the need for mass mobilization and an emphasis on the professionalism and technical skills of each operator manning the front.

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Combat operations now boil down to two main scenarios: Either the collapse of an enemy who is not prepared for the new intensity of combat, or a positional struggle in the style of World War I. In a protracted positional war, it is crucial to ensure control over the kill zone and maintain sufficient supplies while depriving the enemy of similar capabilities. The protection of logistics networks and the infliction of maximum damage on the enemy’s rear areas is of decisive importance.

First and foremost, this means cutting off ground supply routes. To protect logistics, armies must develop fleets of maneuverable transport drones that are not dependent on road quality and can navigate minefields. Meanwhile, to ensure the steady supply of ammunition and spare parts to underground storage points along the front lines, a mobile air defense system featuring interceptor drones is necessary.

At the strategic level, key targets are now weapons factories, logistics centers, and command posts, which are often hidden deep in the rear or located inside underground bunkers close to the front lines. Destroying these high-value targets requires guided missiles or other air strike capabilities. Military planners are therefore faced with the challenge of moving away from expensive manned aircraft toward reusable strategic drones.

Testing of fully-fledged unmanned aircraft is already underway. The transition toward unmanned aviation will open up the mass deployment of guided aerial bombs, which are significantly cheaper than missiles. In addition, strategic drones will themselves be able to act as “aircraft carriers” for kamikaze drones.

The same principles apply equally to the maritime theater of operations. Ukrainian Sea Baby naval drones have already proven themselves by destroying numerous warships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and carrying out attacks on Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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To ensure their future national security, states must focus on the mass production of unmanned systems and their components. China currently accounts for the lion’s share of component parts. This is a challenge for any country that seeks to play a role in global affairs. China must be deprived of the strategic advantages it enjoys due to its status as the leading producer of components for unmanned systems.

Many NATO generals appear to think that recent technological advances are making war cheaper and creating a more level military playing field. This is a mistake. In reality, any reduction in the cost of weapons is more than offset by the need for increased quantities.

It is also important to stress that unmanned technologies alone are not enough. Another key factor is an army’s access to reliable digital communications similar to Starlink. Without this capability, it is impossible to coordinate combat operations, collect data, and maintain connections between individual units and command structures. It is no coincidence that China is already investing billions to address this issue.

The transformation currently underway in the military sphere also increases the role of cyber warfare. Disruption to logistics, power outages, and communications breakdowns can all provide the enemy with the opportunity to advance. A hacked cyber system can expose vital defenses or dramatically reduce the possibility of recovery.

Looking ahead, technological innovation in the military must be recognized as a national priority when allocating defense budgets. This applies to everything from unmanned systems to the development of artificial intelligence.

The most important revolution must take place within the minds of today’s military generals. A comprehensive rethink of existing military doctrines is currently needed. Armies must be completely re-equipped. It is time for the top brass to acknowledge that they should either change or give way to a new generation of military strategists.

Ukraine’s experience since 2022 has confirmed that in order to be successful in modern warfare, armies should model themselves on technological giants like Amazon and SpaceX. They must embrace flexible thinking and be capable of competing in terms of implementing new innovations.

In an era of accelerated military change, all countries face a simple choice of adapting or accepting the inevitability of defeat. The winners will be those who embrace the lessons from the technological revolution currently underway on the battlefields of Ukraine.

Oleg Dunda is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament from the Servant of the People party.

Although there is now support for increased defense expenditure at the highest levels of government, Canada has underinvested in its defense industrial base for decades and will need renewed focus, resources, and support to meet the country’s Hague commitments. How will Canada’s defense industrial base adapt to meet the current moment? Carney has put forward the bold claim that “Canada is meeting this moment with determination and resolve—modernising our defence capabilities, strengthening our industrial base, and reaffirming our role as a reliable partner in global security.” But what must its defense industrial base do to match this commitment?

In late 2025, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative hosted a workshop with government officials, academic experts, and participants from the public and private sectors of Canada, the United States, and Europe. The insights gathered from these conversations helped inform this issue brief, which assesses challenges, recommendations, and opportunities for Canada’s defense industrial base in an era defined by multiple conflicts and increased coordination by adversaries.

Canada’s defense industry at a crossroads

Canada has an extensive list of military equipment it needs to either produce domestically or purchase internationally, such as new warships, submarines, coastal defense vessels, fighter aircraft, and surveillance aircraft. This new equipment is needed for both national defense and to modernize Canada’s military to meet the current threat environment. In addition to renewing its leadership of the multinational NATO forces in Latvia, Canada has needed to strengthen its military capabilities along its three seas: in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans. This comes at a time when Canada is also juggling bilateral border security cooperation and engaging in a major renewal of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in close cooperation with the United States.

Central to Canada’s defense industry is its reliance on the US market and US companies, which supply much of Canada’s defense needs. Carney has often noted that one challenge facing Canada’s defense industry is that approximately 75 cents of every dollar in capital spending on defense winds up going to firms based in the United States. The relative size of the Canadian defense industrial base and its ability to compete internationally for contracts remain concerns as new funding flows to industry at an unprecedented rate.

For the first time, Canada’s military is poised to receive additional funding through the new federal budget and facing “the uncomfortable position of having so much cash it will be hard to keep up.” This represents a dramatic mindset shift for the military, which has had to cope with deficits of people, equipment, training, and sustainment. Now, with more funding allocated for defense, the hard work begins as Canada tries to use that funding effectively to address gaps in equipment, personnel shortages, and better training opportunities for its military.

With this increased available funding, the question matters of Canada’s procurement process and how to adapt it to meet the current moment. Canada’s procurement process, sometimes described as “glacial,” has received more attention lately and has a new agency focused on eliminating waste and accelerating the process. At the same time, Canada should recognize the constraints it faces regarding the size and scope of its defense industry; it should instead focus on niche areas in which it can excel, such as the maritime or Arctic domains. Many hurdles remain for Canada to meet the current moment, including personnel shortages in both the Canadian Armed Forces and industry roles. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), in its army modernization report, outlines the challenges facing the CAF to modernize, with at least another fourteen thousand recruits needed to meet the current security environment.

Recommendations for the Department of National Defence

1. Create consistent and predictable defense contracts for industry

A frequent refrain from industry is that the lack of consistency and predictably about defense contracts makes it challenging to scale and expand. A stable defense industrial base can foster innovation and address evolving challenges facing Euro-Atlantic security. The Canadian defense industry contributes about $10 billion annually to the economy and supports an estimated eighty-one thousand jobs. By investing in its domestic defense industry, niche capabilities, and evergreen infrastructure in the near term, the Canadian government can not only meet its NATO commitments but also expand job growth and economic performance. The long-term timeline for this investment in Canada’s defense industrial base will be key—Carney leads a minority government and this inevitably leads to a degree of uncertainty about long-term government commitment. Canada’s defense industrial base will not be able to meet the current moment with a one-off surge in available funding; it requires consistent and predictable funding over a longer-term horizon.

To get a sense of the importance of consistent and predictable defense contracts, look no further than the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) modernization process. Canada has been in the market for a new submarine fleet that is deployable in the Arctic with extended range and endurance. Two qualified suppliers—a German company and a South Korean company—will work with the Canadian maritime and defense sectors to deliver new submarines by 2035. So far, there is no project budget for this initiative, leading to uncertainty from an industry perspective. The Justin Trudeau government frequently made promises about defense spending that failed to materialize. The Parliamentary Budget Office recently quantified past underspending: between 2017 and 2023, efforts to buy new equipment fell short by C$18.3 billion. Ammunition producers claim they need at least C$800 million to open new production lines. Ultimately, for industry to respond to government decisions regarding its defense and security needs, a level of consistency and predictability must be provided, which has been a challenge for Canada’s defense industrial base in the past.

2. Streamline and strengthen the procurement process

If defense spending is now a given, the question then turns to how the Canadian Armed Forces will acquire the materiel they need. On October 2, Carney announced the formation of a new agency, the Defence Investment Agency (DIA), to facilitate and accelerate the defense procurement process. The procurement process had previously been fragmented across multiple departments, resulting in significant slowdowns in obtaining critical equipment. The DIA removes some of the red tape and redundancies with a centralized review and approval process. The agency has a specific aim to bolster Canada’s domestic defense industry, to empower Canadian companies to compete globally while also investing in dual-use capabilities. This will specifically address a frequent criticism that by the time equipment is delivered it is either out of date or unfit for the current mission. Additionally, the agency hopes to bridge the divide between industry and government by bolstering awareness on both sides of the timelines, costs, and expectations for equipment deliveries.

The formation of the DIA is the first step in an overdue streamlining and strengthening exercise for procurement. As the Canadian government seeks to foster innovation and create national champions in the defense space, it needs to continue bridging the divide between industry and government. Additional work can be done to ensure a role for Canada’s many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in its industrial base, which is critical to ensure agility and flexibility. The current conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the significance of drones, but the next conflict might look very different and, in turn, might require industry to adapt to changing battlefield conditions. SMEs are better poised to adapt and pivot as technology evolves at a rapid pace and ensure Canada’s military is ready to respond to future conflicts.

3. Balance “Buy Canadian” with buying the right equipment for the mission

Despite the improvements to the procurement process, the Canadian Armed Forces still needs to ensure they are buying the best possible equipment for the mission. As the CAF seeks more expeditionary and proactive capabilities, this modernization effort places a premium on not just buying domestically but buying the best possible equipment. The prime minister’s new goal of focusing investment on domestic manufacturers will naturally come into conflict with the army’s modernization efforts if Canada’s defense industrial base cannot produce equipment to meet its operational needs. In turn, this decision to “Buy Canadian” will impact Canada’s ability to export its materiel and potentially raise barriers to other markets. Canada exports about half of the defense materiel it produces, with 63 percent destined for the United States and a further 12 percent to the Middle East and Africa. Striking the right balance between investing in its domestic industrial base and strengthening ties to international markets will be key to the long-term sustainability of Canada’s defense industrial base.

4. Strengthen ties with Europe

The conversation around bolstering Canada’s defense industrial base mirrors those conversations taking place in Germany, France, and elsewhere across Europe. Indeed, a deepening of Canada-Europe relations has been on display in the last year in response to the growing complexity of international conflicts and crises. This includes a landmark security and defense partnership between the European Union (EU) and Canada, which was agreed to in June 2025. This defense pact paves the way for the two to cooperate on cyber, maritime, and space security, and also opens the door to joint weapon procurement. Additionally, Canada has been proposed as a potential participant in the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program, offering low-interest loans to accelerate procurement and investment in defense capabilities.

Diversifying and increasing the number of strategic partnerships globally, instead of over-relying on a single provider for its defense materiel, is a logical step to strengthen Canada’s defense industrial base—and also spurs innovation and supply chain resilience. Beyond the EU, Canada has sought to strengthen opportunities to collaborate with its fellow Five Eyes members, particularly the United Kingdom and Australia. The newly formed Canadian DIA aims to facilitate conversations with its counterparts in France, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Due to the similarity of their intentions to spend more on defense, Canada will have natural partners in European nations, as well as the EU more broadly.

5. Focus on doing a few things well rather than trying to do everything all at once

A consistent theme across the various challenges facing Canada’s defense industry—its size, speed, and reliance on the US market—can all be partially solved by specializing in a few niche areas rather than doing too much all at once. Three specific areas in which Canada has both urgent needs for development and the opportunity to specialize are: unmanned autonomous systems (aerial and underwater vehicles in particular); Arctic-specific technologies, including icebreakers; and maritime capabilities leveraging Canada’s three-ocean geography. The Arctic region emerges repeatedly as a unique domain in which Canada should invest more, for both its own national security purposes and for enhancing wider Alliance capabilities. Canada has the most icebreakers of any NATO ally and is working through the trilateral ICE Pact (with Finland and the United States) to build even more of these highly specialized vessels. Capitalizing on the dearth of icebreakers within NATO would give Canada a unique opportunity to leverage its Arctic capabilities to support its shipbuilding industry while enhancing Alliance capabilities in the Arctic.

Conclusion

Carney’s government is taking unprecedented steps to strengthen Canada’s armed forces, invest in the country’s industrial base, and reaffirm Canada’s role as a reliable partner within NATO and the wider global security context. While his government’s approach and announcements so far are laudable, Canada now must turn to the task of how to support and expand its defense industrial base to meet these goals. Without this foundation, Carney’s pledges will fail to translate into improved capabilities and will hinder attempts to modernize the CAF. Time is short, the amount of work ahead is significant, and history will remember how Canada meets the current moment and security environment.

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

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South Korea and Europe are stepping up on security cooperation. Here’s why.

David F. Helvey — Thu, 18 Dec 2025 14:53:14 +0000

Over the past two decades, South Korea has transformed from a regional security partner into a global security provider. This evolution has significant implications for both the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic, where challenges are increasingly interlinked. As Russia’s aggression against Ukraine continues—bolstered by material support from China and North Korea—the dividing lines between these theaters have disappeared. What happens in Europe now reverberates across the Indo-Pacific.

One positive outcome of this new security reality has been to underscore for South Koreans and Europeans what they have in common: They share many core values, including democracy, respect for human rights, free and fair trade, and the rule of law. They also share an interest in preserving sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the right of nations to determine their own foreign and security policies.

These shared values and interests form a strong foundation for security cooperation. But to build on this foundation, Seoul and its European partners should focus on three areas in particular: increasing intelligence sharing, building on existing programs for cooperation, and expanding defense industrial collaboration.

North Korea’s shipments of artillery shells and ballistic missiles to Russia, beginning in the fall of 2022, have sustained Moscow’s assault on Ukraine—including strikes on cities, hospitals, and preschools—with consequences that extend far beyond the battlefield. These actions underscore the need for deeper cooperation between European intelligence services and their counterparts in Seoul. Collaboratively tracking North Korea’s military transfers, proliferation networks, and technology supply chains will be critical to disrupting these flows and exposing the actors who enable them.

Intelligence sharing should also extend beyond illicit arms transfers. Both regions can benefit from exchanging lessons learned about battlefield performance, military innovation, and technology adaptation under combat conditions. Such cooperation can inform joint efforts in cyber defense, hybrid warfare, strategic communications, and resilience, strengthening preparedness in both Europe and Asia.

Building on existing programs for collaboration

In recent years, South Korea has made major strides to institutionalize mutually beneficial cooperation with NATO and European partners. Seoul’s Individually Tailored Partnership Program with NATO provides a structured framework for collaboration in cyber defense, emerging technologies, interoperability, and resilience.

Equally important, South Korea’s participation in NATO’s dialogue with the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4)—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—positions Seoul as a vital connector between the two regions. Having managed Alliance relationships for much of my career, I see this as a turning point. South Korea is no longer simply a regional security partner—it has become a global security provider.

A logical next step would be a US–South Korea–NATO ballistic missile defense command-and-control or tabletop exercise. Such an event could test interoperability between allied systems, improve shared situational awareness of North Korean missile threats, and lay the groundwork for expanding participation to partners such as Japan and Australia. This initiative would complement NATO’s ongoing IP4 flagship projects on cyber, emerging technologies, and supply-chain resilience—areas in which South Korea’s innovation ecosystem and advanced defense industrial base bring distinct added value to Euro-Atlantic security.

Expanding defense industrial cooperation

Perhaps the most visible—and encouraging—evidence of South Korea’s security engagement with Europe is the rapid expansion of Seoul’s defense industrial partnerships with NATO members.

In Poland, major contracts—including for roughly 180 K2 main battle tanks, more than 200 K9 self-propelled howitzers, and 48 FA-50 fighter jets valued at over twelve billion dollars—have made South Korea one of Warsaw’s key defense suppliers, second only to the United States. The agreements include technology transfer and localized production, marking a shift from one-way export sales to genuine industrial cooperation.

In September 2025, Norway signed a contract for twenty-four additional K9 self-propelled howitzers and associated equipment, further strengthening South Korea–Nordic defense industrial ties.

These are not isolated transactions. They reflect a broader convergence between Europe’s urgent need to regenerate capabilities and South Korea’s proven ability to deliver modern, affordable, interoperable systems at speed and scale.

Looking ahead, further opportunities for cooperation include:

1. Munitions and artillery replenishment to rebuild NATO stockpiles and support Ukraine indirectly

Russia’s ongoing assault on Ukraine has placed extraordinary pressure on NATO members’ inventories of artillery, rockets, and air-defense munitions. Many allies are struggling to replenish stockpiles fast enough to meet both operational requirements and readiness standards. South Korea’s defense industry has demonstrated the ability to produce high-quality, NATO-interoperable munitions at scale and on accelerated timelines. Coordinated arrangements between South Korean producers and European governments—whether through direct procurement, licensed production, or joint ventures—could help meet near-term battlefield needs while laying the groundwork for longer-term industrial resilience across the Alliance.

2. Air and missile defense collaboration, especially as NATO member states invest in an integrated air and missile defense architecture across the Euro-Atlantic

As European nations strengthen integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) networks in response to Russian missile and drone attacks, there is growing interest in systems that are both effective and interoperable with NATO command-and-control frameworks. South Korea has relevant operational experience from defending against North Korean missile threats, as well as a mature, export-ready portfolio of layered air defense systems. Joint testing, shared training, command-and-control exercises, and eventual co-development could improve interoperability and accelerate the fielding of robust IAMD capabilities across Europe.

3. Co-development of advanced technologies in robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), and command-and-control systems

Both Europe and South Korea are investing in emerging defense technologies that leverage autonomy, AI-enabled decision support, and resilient command-and-control architectures. These technologies are rapidly shaping modern warfare, as demonstrated in Ukraine. Partnerships that bring together European research institutions, NATO centers of excellence, and Korean defense technology firms could accelerate innovation and focus efforts on systems that enhance allied operational advantage. Such collaboration also allows partners to share risk, scale production, and ensure interoperability from the outset rather than retrofitting it later.

4. Joint efforts to strengthen defense supply chains for semiconductors, propulsion, and energetics—the backbone of allied defense production

The past few years have demonstrated how vulnerable global supply chains are—especially in strategically critical sectors such as semiconductors and energetics. South Korea is a global leader in advanced chip manufacturing and materials engineering, while European nations possess high-end propulsion, composites, and specialty chemicals production. Structured cooperation across these sectors would reduce dependence on single-source suppliers—including adversarial or at-risk supply chains—while building a more resilient and distributed industrial base among trusted partners. This is not only about efficiency; it is about strategic endurance.

These initiatives can strengthen deterrence and promote strategic diversification, reducing dependence on single suppliers and reinforcing resilience across the Alliance network.

Importantly, this approach does not privilege foreign producers over US industry. There is ample demand across the allied system. No single defense industrial base—US or otherwise—can meet the scale of global rearmament now underway. Expanding cooperation among trusted partners accelerates production timelines, encourages innovation, and ensures interoperability across allied forces.

Turning momentum into structure

The emerging South Korean security partnership with NATO and Europe is one of the most promising developments in today’s alliance landscape. It reflects a shared understanding that deterrence in the twenty-first century is global—and that technology, information, and industrial capacity are as decisive as troop deployments or forward basing.

The task now is to convert this momentum into structure. This means:

Institutionalizing practical cooperative activities and exercises, such as cyber and ballistic missile defense;
Coordinating defense industrial planning across trusted partners; and
Sustaining political and policy engagement to align objectives, harvest lessons learned, and strengthen interoperability.

By doing so, South Korea’s partnership with NATO and Europe can serve as a model for cross-regional alignment—demonstrating how like-minded democracies can combine their technological, industrial, and military strengths to preserve stability and deter aggression.

In the long run, connecting the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security communities through shared intelligence, innovation, and industrial collaboration will be essential to maintaining global stability. South Korea’s growing role in Europe is not just an opportunity—it is a strategic necessity for both regions.

David F. Helvey is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served as a senior official in the US Department of Defense, with responsibilities for both Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security, alliance management, and defense policy.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Department of Defense.

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How Europe can strengthen its own defenses and rebalance transatlantic relations

jcookson — Mon, 15 Dec 2025 19:24:22 +0000

WASHINGTON—US President Donald Trump’s new US National Security Strategy (NSS) makes clear that the United States does not maintain a shared perception of threats with its NATO allies. In an incredible reversal of priorities from the first Trump administration’s NSS, the latest document spends more time describing an internal threat to Europe from European Union (EU) overregulation, censorship, and “civilizational erasure” than it does the threat of Russian aggression, which is largely absent from the document. While calling for an end of the war in Ukraine, Trump’s NSS clarifies the United States’ position as a neutral arbiter. In response, the Russian government lauded the NSS for being “largely consistent” with its worldview, even as Russia’s own strategic documents consider Moscow to be in an existential conflict with the West.

Rather than lament the United States’ noncommittal approach to the transatlantic relationship, European leaders should instead lean into the NSS directive for greater “burden sharing and burden shifting.” Specifically, European countries should work to develop a new security architecture that allows for bold and decisive European action. This architecture should be based on coalition and consortium models for decision-making, action, and capability development. Europe must also continue to plan a central role for Ukraine in Europe’s long-term security architecture, irrespective of Kyiv’s near-term prospects for NATO or EU membership.

Some Europeans may hesitate at this idea, fearing that too much political leadership and autonomy might push the United States to further decouple from the continent. But if anything, the new NSS reinforces the need for Europe to develop new models of decision-making to bolster cooperation with the United States when practical and boost European agency to act alone when necessary and where interests diverge. If carried out effectively, this reorganization will lead to a stronger European pillar in NATO, more capable European allies and partners, and a more resilient relationship with the United States.

Even before the White House released its new NSS, elements of a new European security architecture had already begun to emerge. Since Russia launched its full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, European nations have made unprecedented investments in their militaries and have been preparing their armed forces for territorial defense. On the Alliance’s eastern flank, where deterrence and defense are most at stake, NATO’s posture has evolved from a tripwire force of four battlegroups first deployed in 2017 to nine Forward Land Forces, positioned from Finland to Romania, that are better equipped to defend allied territory. The investments made by the lead European Forward Land Forces nations represent burden-sharing in action.

With Sweden and Finland’s integration into NATO, the Alliance can now operate as a united front from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The quick accession of both countries has put Russia in a more difficult position geographically along the eastern flank: the Black Sea is effectively neutralized and the Baltic Sea has become a NATO bastion. This consolidation allows for unprecedented European military activity and reinforces allied territory against air and missile threats, which have been compounded in recent years by the broken or expired arms control treaties that previously underwrote European security.

As NATO adapts its posture to new forms of pressure from Russia, many of its military activities and operations now rely on European initiatives and assets. This is the case with NATO’s Operation Baltic Sentry, which was launched in January after several allied undersea cables were damaged or severed in 2023 and 2024. NATO’s Operation Eastern Sentry, launched in September 2025 in response to Russian drone incursions into Poland, also relies extensively on European capabilities. Both operations show that European nations can operationalize NATO’s adapted posture.

And even outside NATO frameworks, European countries and the United Kingdom are creating new dilemmas for Russia. Europeans have continued to push sanctions and are focusing on dismantling Russia’s “shadow fleet” of oil tankers. In October, for instance, French forces boarded a Russian shadow fleet tanker as part of a broader effort to hinder Russia’s ability to illegally acquire revenue.

New defense agreements between several European countries have reinforced a commitment to mutual defense that has, outside of US extended deterrence, primarily existed to date in NATO’s realm of crisis management. In just the past few months, the United Kingdom and France penned the Lancaster House 2.0 Agreement to modernize their defense and security relationship, Germany and France agreed to develop a defense and security council to better operationalize joint responses, and the United Kingdom and Germany signed a mutual defense agreement called the Kensington Treaty.

While these agreements and initiatives affirm the respective nations’ commitment to NATO’s collective defense and the EU’s mutual defense clause, they also highlight European countries’ push to work more closely with one another on security amid increasing uncertainty emanating from Washington. Importantly, these agreements also create complexities for Russia and China, both of which would prefer to deal with a less-intertwined continent.

Coalition and consortium approaches to security

Next, Europe needs to strengthen its ability to take bold and decisive action. The first step in doing so is for democratic European nations to follow through on their pledges to increase defense spending. NATO’s new target of 5 percent of gross domestic product for defense spending, coupled with the EU’s Readiness 2030 plan, gives leaders fiscal and political headway to drive up defense budgets. This will not be easy given anemic economic growth and the strength of populist opposition parties across Europe, but the threat of a revanchist Russia makes higher defense spending even more urgent. With defense industrial capacity nowhere near the scale and speed necessary to meet the strategic environment on both sides of the Atlantic, nations should also direct new defense spending toward effective and efficient defense industrial initiatives that will fill Europe’s urgent capability shortfalls.

At the multilateral level, if Europe is to spearhead proposals for and by itself, European nations must prioritize decision-making formats that are smaller than NATO and the EU. This is true with Ukraine, as the future of Kyiv’s armed forces will be a cornerstone of the new European security architecture. The British and French-led “coalition of the willing” that supports Ukraine began as a summit. Today, twenty-six countries have made formal pledges, the coalition has established a permanent headquarters in Paris, and it plans to create a coordination cell in Kyiv.

The coalition, though currently stalled amid frustrated cease-fire negotiations, at least allows Europeans to shape how Ukraine could integrate into Europe’s security architecture in the future. The coalition has announced that it would support Ukraine in a post-cease-fire environment by regenerating Ukraine’s land forces (possibly with boots on the ground), securing Ukraine’s skies, and ensuring safe and secure access for vessels transiting Ukraine’s ports. This structure remains the best model for supporting Ukraine in the future, given the United States’ lack of clarity around security guarantees for Ukraine or support for Kyiv’s future NATO membership.

To build up the continent’s defense industrial base, European nations should adopt a consortium approach aimed at jointly developing and procuring military equipment and technologies that are complementary with NATO. This approach will be critical for rapidly resourcing and filling gaps that might be left by departing US capabilities in the coming years. For example, the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) shows promise, and it can be regarded as a blueprint for how European nations can work together to develop new capabilities together and decide when and how to use them. ELSA, which includes France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, aims to build a full-spectrum system for weapons with a range exceeding 500 kilometers. It complements the European Sky Shield Initiative, which although incomplete, aims to create a ground-based integrated air-defense system to protect European airspace that remains heavily dependent on US enablers.

For these capability-centric consortiums to reach their potential, Europeans should pool financial resources through the EU and make better use of the intergovernmental European Defense Agency for funding and coordination. Several projects show promise such as the satellite programs for intelligence or observation as a future alternative to Starlink through Eutelsat. The uptick in Italian and French land-air missile SAMP/T co-production, which will in the future equip Denmark, the third European country to operate the system rather than Patriot. For smaller scale projects, the EDA should continue to support programs like the Belgian Dutch-led “replacement Mine Countermeasures” (rMCM), which aims at upgrading mine warfare capabilities.

A new way of working with the United States

As Europe seeks to maintain US interest and commitment in the near term, it has a once-in-a-generation opportunity to rethink its security architecture and rebalance the transatlantic relationship. In this new strategic landscape, the future of transatlantic relations will rest on Europe working toward being able to defend itself while carving out room to advance proposals with the United States where advantageous for both sides of the Atlantic. Europe has strengths of its own in the balance of power against Russia, despite the latter’s perceived escalation advantage, and a major one is its high level of cooperation and interoperability.

Only a few years ago, building European coalitions and capabilities independent of the United States would have seemed a potential threat to transatlantic and European unity. Now it is the opposite. As the United States repositions and reprioritizes, more European action does not have to equal less cooperation with Washington. This new security architecture would also allow the United States to better identify points of dialogue on specific issues, helping answer the Cold War–era dilemma of who to dial when the United States wants to call Europe. Especially as the new NSS calls for the United States to “organize a burden-sharing network.”

Trump’s new NSS has outlined US goals, and neither Europe nor Ukraine should wait any longer for Washington to reinforce its commitment to transatlantic security. US priorities lie outside the European theater regardless of the security threats Russia or China may pose. Moreover, Europe will not receive such strategic clarity from an administration that pursues a situation-based and transactional approach to security dilemmas. Instead, Europe must be bold in advancing a new security architecture that has the potential to strengthen European defense and reset the transatlantic relationship for the better.

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Grundman in Aviation Week on Pentagon acquisition reform

Atlantic Council — Thu, 04 Dec 2025 21:00:00 +0000

On December 4, Forward Defense Senior Fellow Steven Grundman authored an article in Aviation Week entitled “Can Hegseth Transform U.S. Defense Acquisition?,” highlighting the importance of speed and agility in acquisition reform. Grundman argues that without funding to pay the upfront costs of reform and sustained engagement from the military departments that execute acquisition, the Pentagon’s much-needed efforts to streamline acquisition risk stalling.

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Russia has learned from Ukraine and is now winning the drone war

David Kirichenko — Thu, 04 Dec 2025 20:45:24 +0000

With its vast columns of tanks and attempts to seize key airbases, the initial Russian blitzkrieg invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 looked very similar to military operations conducted by Soviet forces throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Almost four years on, the invasion has evolved into something strikingly different, with military realities now being shaped by new technologies that are redefining the way wars are fought.

The most important innovation of the past four years has been the expanding use of drones on the battlefield. While drones have featured in a range of different conflicts since the turn of the millennium, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is widely recognised as the world’s first drone war. Initially, the smaller and more innovative Ukrainian military held the initiative in the deployment of drones, but the Russians have learned important lessons from early setbacks and are now steadily eroding Ukraine’s advantage.

Ukraine’s emphasis on drone warfare reflects the country’s underlying strengths and weaknesses. In terms on manpower, firepower, and funding, the Ukrainians simply cannot hope to compete with Russia. This has made cheap and potentially plentiful drones a particularly attractive option for Ukrainian military planners as they look to compensate for Russia’s far greater resources while also reducing their country’s dependence on military support from Western partners.

At the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector represented an important asset that the authorities in Kyiv were quick to mobilize. This tech prowess helped cement the country’s strategic focus on drones, which could be designed and produced domestically to compensate for a lack of more conventional weapons.

Since 2022, the number of Ukrainian companies developing drones has skyrocketed, while annual output has risen to millions of units. This has allowed Ukraine to establish a “drone wall” along the front lines of the conflict, making any buildup of enemy forces extremely challenging. Over the past year, around three-quarters of all Russian casualties have been as a result of Ukrainian drones.

At sea, Ukraine has used drones to sink multiple warships and break the Russian navy’s Black Sea blockade, forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his remaining fleet from Russian-occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s growing drone capabilities have also made it possible to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia with an escalating campaign of deep strikes on military and industrial targets across the Russian Federation.

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Russia has responded to Kyiv’s groundbreaking use of drone warfare by studying Ukrainian tactics and technologies, while also dramatically expanding its own domestic drone manufacturing base. The Kremlin has been aided in this by allies including China and Iran, who have provided vital components along with the blueprints for key drone designs.

The Kremlin strategy has focused on mass producing a limited range of models for use on the battlefield and in the bombardment of Ukrainian cities. This methodical approach has paid dividends. By the end of 2024, it was already becoming clear that the drone war was turning in Russia’s favor. This trend has only intensified over the past year.

One of Russia’s most important innovations has been the widespread use of fiber-optic drones. These drones are controlled by a wire connected directly to the operator, making them immune to jamming technologies and extremely difficult to intercept.

Russian commanders first began using large quantities of fiber-optic drones during fighting in late 2024 to push Ukrainian troops out of Russia’s Kursk region. The drones proved highly effective at disrupting Ukrainian logistics by targeting supply vehicles. This was widely seen as a crucial factor behind the success of the operation.

Russia has now replicated and scaled up these tactics throughout southern and eastern Ukraine, creating a drone wall of its own while reaching deeper and deeper into Ukrainian-controlled territory. Fiber-optic drones are being used to ambush supply vehicles far behind the front lines, forcing Ukraine to become increasingly reliant on ground robotics to supply combat units and evacuate the wounded.

In addition to striking Ukrainian logistics, Russian drone forces are also prioritising attacks on their Ukrainian counterparts, forcing Ukrainian drone crews to pull further back from the line of contact to ensure safety. This distance gives Russian operators room to move their own teams forward, increasing their ability to dominate the battlefield.

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Russia’s Rubicon drone unit has emerged during 2025 as a prominent symbol of the Kremlin’s rapidly evolving and increasingly effective drone warfare strategy. Highly trained and well funded Rubicon teams are leading the campaign to cut Ukraine’s supply lines and widen the kill zone.

Crucially, Rubicon pilots pass their experience on to newcomers and provide extensive training that is helping to improve the effectiveness of other Russian army drone units. According to Ukrainian drone commander Yurii Fedorenko, Rubicon can rapidly scale up drone units using manpower and financial advantages that Ukraine cannot replicate.

In the drone war between Russia and Ukraine, the Kremlin is betting on mass and hoping that a combination of smart choices, specialised production, extensive training, and sheer numbers will eventually overwhelm Ukraine’s technological edge. In contrast, Kyiv continues to rely on a highly decentralised ecosystem of volunteer groups, startups, and military workshops producing a wide variety of different drone models. This diversity helps to drive innovation but also creates coordination challenges.

The current effectiveness of Russia’s drone units does not mean the drone war has shifted decisively in Moscow’s favor, but recent trends do expose a gap that Ukraine must urgently close. In order to counter Russia’s increasingly centralised and well-resourced drone formations, Kyiv needs to adopt key elements of the Rubicon model. This means scaling up training pipelines, sharing front line experience more systematically, and ensuring Ukrainian drone units have all the resources they need to hunt down Russian operators and regain the initiative.

Since 2022, the Russian military has been widely mocked for its primitive “human wave” tactics and generally poor performance in Ukraine. However, the progress made by Russia in drone warfare indicates an army that is fully capable of learning, adapting, and innovating. Moscow has not been able to achieve any major technological breakthroughs, but Russian military strategists have significantly strengthened their country’s position by concentrating on scale, training, and relentless battlefield experimentation.

This progress should be a major wake-up call for European leaders. Small numbers of suspected Russian drones are already causing chaos and disruption across Europe. The longer the war in Ukraine lasts, the more advanced Russia’s drone capabilities will become.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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Poland doesn’t have to choose between defense spending and growth—if it makes the right reforms

Jenna Ben-Yehuda and Jacek Siewiera — Wed, 26 Nov 2025 18:30:55 +0000

WARSAW—In our recent travels in Eastern Europe, one important theme emerged: The honeymoon that followed this summer’s historic pledge by all thirty-two NATO member states to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense is now over. Slow growth rates and uneasy markets rattled by the tariff rollercoaster of 2025 have produced growing concerns in Europe about whether countries there can afford these commitments.

That cloud of doubt hung heavily over members of the Czech defense establishment who spoke with our Atlantic Council delegation in Prague last week. A range of defense, industry, and academic representatives shared their concerns about a possible reversal of defense commitments by the incoming government led by Andrej Babiš. The question about the long-term sustainability of high levels of defense spending has even been raised in Poland, despite that nation’s Alliance-leading defense expenditures (currently 4.12 percent) and the very real threat posed by Russia.

The latest act of apparent Russian sabotage—this month’s disruption of an eastern rail line in Poland that is critical for shipments to Ukraine—offered a sobering reminder of Poland’s urgent need to demonstrate military readiness and reestablish deterrence. We were on the ground in Warsaw when news of the railway incident broke and gripped a nervous nation. Poles understand the implications of sustained Russian aggression, but the dramatic scenes of sabotage were not enough to temper the concerns that government officials repeatedly expressed to us regarding the country’s fiscal woes and unsustainable defense spending.

Joined by Atlantic Council colleagues, we met last week with more than a dozen defense companies, venture capitalists, and senior national security professionals. In these meetings, we heard a consistent refrain: Polish defense-tech talent is real, but government structures are misaligned to the moment and impede innovation and economic growth. In particular, the government-owned giant Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ) lumbers as a slow-moving behemoth.

Tenders for government-funded defense support are now technically open to the private sector. But those involved in these processes told us that, in reality, few can compete because acquisitions continue to include a range of security requirements that result in incumbents (PGZ and a limited number of larger firms) running the table.

PGZ argues that the required capabilities are needed immediately, which it cites as the principal reason for purchasing US or European technologies that have been combat-proven in Ukraine, rather than investing in Polish systems that are still maturing through research and development (R&D) processes. This stands in contrast to the approach both Germany’s Bundeswehr and the British armed forces have taken toward Europe’s emerging defense startups—such as Stark, Alpine Eagle, or until recently Helsing—which have been contracted at earlier stages of development.

In most of PGZ’s public communications, however, it is primarily the subsidiaries that dominate these procurements, as was the case with the recent launch of testing of the American MEROPS drone-interception system. PGZ consistently emphasizes that it contracts such capabilities with the explicit assumption that they serve as bridging solutions, to be used only until national systems are developed. The technologies themselves are not lacking in Poland; yet under the current framework—where no R&D phase can be formally contracted—domestic solutions are effectively prevented from reaching product maturity, making it impossible for them to compete with fully developed foreign systems.

As a result, defense companies that make products such as cutting-edge satellites, attack drones, and command-and-control systems must look beyond Poland’s borders to grow. They often seek capital outside of Poland and then sell abroad to markets in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe, limiting Poland’s ability to reap the benefits of these advanced technologies for its own purposes while also forfeiting the economic growth Warsaw says it desires.

Defense industry leaders told us that PGZ’s demise is already unfolding as it fails to fulfill orders on the timeline needed to provide the readiness and technological innovation that military planners are demanding. But this approach of allowing gradual atrophy in order to lessen political friction—a tactic deployed repeatedly in the early aftermath of Poland’s post-communist economic rebirth—is unsuited to addressing the country’s current and future challenges. If PGZ is left to decay gradually, Poland risks slowing its ability to re-establish deterrence with Russia, thereby compromising readiness for a true wartime footing and denying itself the potential economic dividends generated by spending 5 percent of GDP on defense.

In addition to PGZ reforms and broadening the competitive landscape, Poland must enable the capitalization of its defense companies through the inflow of foreign investment—especially US private equity and venture capital, which has become an increasingly active player in European defense and dual-use technologies. Creating clear pathways for such capital to enter the Polish market would unlock scale that domestic financing alone cannot provide. Likewise, Poland’s major defense enterprises should have the ability to structure and finance acquisitions in the form of joint ventures, allowing them to access advanced technologies, share risk, and accelerate export capacity.

Yet even robust capital flows will not deliver meaningful outcomes without changes to how Poland develops and procures military technology. Critically—and this would represent the single most consequential reform—Poland must begin contracting the R&D phase of defense products in close cooperation with the armed forces, ensuring that military users participate in shaping, testing, and iterating emerging technologies from the earliest stages. This stands in stark contrast to the current system, in which the Polish armed forces contract only fully mature products. In practice, testing is treated as the very first phase of procurement, meaning that a product must already be validated in the field before acquisition can begin. Earlier-stage technologies—those requiring prototyping, experimentation, or iterative refinement—cannot be procured under the existing framework.

This approach is reinforced by military regulations that prohibit meetings between commanders, senior leadership, and industry, as well as by a cultural posture that discourages early-stage collaboration and tolerates no errors during development. Overcoming these constraints and fostering a mindset in which iterative testing, controlled failure, and rapid learning are accepted as essential elements of technological maturation is crucial if Poland is to build a competitive defense innovation ecosystem capable of absorbing investment, scaling joint ventures, and ultimately delivering the capabilities needed for national security.

Taken together, such reforms would generate support for Polish firms, thereby obviating the need for Poland to look outside the country to meet its own defense needs and creating an opportunity to deliver the economic growth any government would desire. These efforts would deliver clear benefits to frustrated US companies eager to do business in a nation brimming with talent.

The potential for defense expenditures to serve as an engine of economic growth in Poland is real. But unlocking that potential requires reforms that align structures with needed outcomes. That’s an opportunity that both the US and Polish governments should seize.

Jenna Ben-Yehuda is the executive vice president of the Atlantic Council. She previously served as a military advisor, among other intelligence and policy roles, at the US State Department.

Jacek Siewiera is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a former national security advisor to the president of Poland.

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Digging into the details of the US-Saudi deals

Atlantic Council — Wed, 19 Nov 2025 18:14:53 +0000

GET UP TO SPEED

“We’ve always been on the same side of every issue.” That’s how US President Donald Trump described Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) during a chummy Oval Office meeting on Tuesday, part of a day of pageantry and dealmaking at the White House. The United States and Saudi Arabia struck a series of agreements on defense, semiconductors, nuclear power, and more. While the world awaits the fine print of these deals, our experts took stock of what the leaders have announced so far and what to expect next.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Daniel B. Shapiro (@DanielBShapiro): Distinguished fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and US ambassador to Israel
Tressa Guenov: Director for programs and operations and senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and former US principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs
Jennifer Gordon: Director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative and the Daniel B. Poneman chair for nuclear energy policy at the Global Energy Center
Tess deBlanc-Knowles: Senior director with the Atlantic Council Technology Programs and former senior policy advisor on artificial intelligence at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

Jet setters

On defense, Trump approved the sale of fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, which Dan interprets as an indication that the US president “is going all-in on the US-Saudi relationship.”
But “China remains an issue in the backdrop of US-Saudi defense relations,” Tressa tells us. She notes that US intelligence agencies have reportedly raised concerns about Chinese access to the F-35 if a US-Saudi sale were to proceed, and “similar efforts to sell F-35s to the UAE were not realized across the previous Trump and Biden administrations, in part due to concerns of technology transfer to China.”
There’s also the US legal requirement to ensure Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) in the region. Dan points out that although the 2020 F-35 deal with the United Arab Emirates was later scuttled, it did pass a QME review, and the Saudi deal is likely to do so as well, in part because “Israel will have been flying the F-35 for a decade and a half before the first Saudi plane is delivered, and Israel will have nearly seventy-five F-35s by then.”
But the UAE deal was linked to its normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel, and “it appears there is no link to Saudi normalization” with Israel in this deal, Dan points out. In the Oval Office, MBS conditioned his joining the Abraham Accords on “a clear path” to a Palestinian state, which does signal a potential disparity from Saudi Arabia’s previous stance requiring the “establishment” of a Palestinian state.
The Biden administration held talks with Saudi Arabia about a treaty that “would have included restrictions on Saudi military cooperation with China and ensured access for US forces to Saudi territory when needed to defend the United States,” Dan tells us. But “Trump has not announced whether he is giving the Saudis a one-way security guarantee, or whether there are mutual-security commitments.”
So what about Trump’s announcement during MBS’s visit that Saudi Arabia has become the United States’ twentieth Major Non-NATO Ally? Tressa tells us the designation “is a favorite tool of US presidents to cap off major visits with a symbolic flourish to indicate elevated relations.” But Saudi Arabia already enjoys many of the benefits of the designation, Tressa notes, such as privileged access to US arms sales, and the designation “does not provide any special or enforceable security guarantees, nor is it a binding treaty.”

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Nuclear option

The White House also announced a Joint Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation. Jennifer tells us it’s “likely a precursor to an official Section 123 agreement” on peaceful nuclear cooperation, which must also be reviewed by Congress.
“Saudi Arabia has indicated keen interest for years in pursuing civil nuclear technologies,” Jennifer notes, both to add to its power grid and for water desalinization. If the United States provides that nuclear technology, she adds, then “it can exert influence on security matters and help prevent the development of nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia and beyond.”
“Although there had long been speculation that a civil nuclear agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia might cover broader geopolitical issues,” Jennifer adds, “this week’s announcement reflects a more pragmatic approach with a focus on technologies that have strong national security implications.”

Chipping in

The two leaders also announced an AI Memorandum of Understanding but did not release many details. “Likely this means the approval of the sale of a package of advanced AI chips to Saudi Arabia,” Tess says. In the Oval Office, she points out, “MBS shared his vision (and strategic bet) on computing to compensate for the country’s workforce shortfalls and ensure continued economic growth.”
While the Trump administration has lifted the Biden administration’s “AI Diffusion Rule” that limited the sale of chips to many countries, it still has the final say on exports of the most advanced chips to Saudi Arabia, Tess notes, “likely due to fears related to ties with China.”
Now, Tess adds, US national security officials will keep their eyes on “the provisions of the new AI agreement focused on technology protection and what measures will be put in place to keep America’s most advanced AI chips out of reach of Chinese adversaries.”

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Punaro quoted in Air & Space Forces magazine on acquisition reform

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Nov 2025 19:00:00 +0000

On November 18, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow MajGen Arnold Punaro, USMC (ret.) was quoted in an Air & Space Forces Magazine article entitled “What Experts Will Watch as the Pentagon Implements Acquisition Reform.” Punaro argued that Golden Dome’s sweeping, multi-domain missile-defense ambitions make it an ideal test case for implementing Secretary Hegseth’s recently announced acquisition reforms.

Advisory Council member

Arnold Punaro

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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Building the digital front line: Understanding big tech decision-making in Ukraine

Emma Schroeder — Mon, 17 Nov 2025 15:35:11 +0000

Executive summary
Introduction
Pull factors
- Clarity of conflict
- Business alignment
Push factors
- Difficulty of coordination
- Risk of retaliation
Key takeaways and conclusion
Author and acknowledgements

dOWNLOAD PDF

Executive summary

The war in Ukraine has seen Russia launch and sustain a full-scale invasion across the information and physical domains against a country that has embraced technological development and increased technological and geopolitical connections to the United States, Canada, and Europe. Private technology companies have provided essential and often irreplaceable support to Ukraine following Russia’s invasion in 2022 and—especially in the early months of the conflict—did so largely without a request from an allied state or payment from Ukraine.

However, more than three years on, although the private sector’s assistance in Ukraine has been well-documented, the policymaking community at large is still largely unaware of how companies decided whether and how to provide technological support to and in Ukraine. Through open research as well as interviews and roundtable discussions with various private sector and government representatives, this report posits that companies were primarily motivated by a complex combination of factors in tandem, which pulled them toward or pushed them away from support. The factors pulling companies toward cooperation were the moral clarity of the conflict, and alignment with existing business opportunities. At the same time however, among factors pushing companies away from involvement in Ukraine was the difficulty of coordinating assistance in-country, as well as the risk of Russian retaliation. Meanwhile, both sets of factors were either enhanced—or mitigated—due to various actions taken by Ukraine, allied states, and international bodies. This includes Ukrainian tech diplomacy; the development of Ukraine’s technical capabilities; aid facilitations and coordination efforts by both various groups and entities; and risk mitigation efforts undertaken by both states and private companies.

Dependency on the private sector in the cyber domain has become a somewhat frequent refrain in domestic cybersecurity conversations. However, prior to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, no one—not supranational bodies, states, or even companies themselves—was prepared for the role they would assume once the tanks rolled and the missiles fired. The Russia-Ukraine conflict’s cyber dimension has revealed an underlying dependency on products, services, and infrastructure owned and operated by private companies. This has proved to be both a source of opportunity to enhance Ukraine’s defenses, while at the same time revealing fundamental risks and vulnerabilities. Given the heft and impact of technology companies in today’s digital infrastructure, let alone in conflict, it is essential that policymakers grasp this complex interplay of factors that influenced companies‘ decision-making as they headed in Ukraine, to inform planning or preparedness for future conflicts where the private sector will inevitably play a key role.

Introduction

Amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the private sector was and is a crucial line of defense and source of cyber resilience to a greater extent than any conflict previously observed. As the first case study of this phenomenon in an overt, conventional war, the past three years in Ukraine have clearly demonstrated how crucial the cyber and informational domain, and the private companies at its forefront, will be in competition, conflict, and war to come.

More than three years following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in the early morning of February 24, 2022, the war—and the crucial role of the international community in it—continues, but not unchanged. The war that Putin expected to end in Russian victory within a handful of days is now well into the third year of the largest and deadliest war in Europe since World War II.

This study examines the characteristics of this conflict that influenced companies’ decision-making regarding the type and degree of their involvement in Ukraine. Which factors and actions taken by states shaped tech companies’ decisions throughout the conflict as to whether and how to lend their support to Ukraine? These include both pull factors, those that increased the likeliness and degree of technology company involvement in Ukraine, and push factors, those that decreased the likeliness or degree of the same. Additionally, a key element influencing this space was the response by the Ukrainian government, allied governments, and international bodies to either build on the effects of the pull factors or mitigate the effects of the push factors throughout the conflict.

These factors and reactions are explored through open research, individual interviews with executives from tech companies active in Ukraine,¹ and workshop discussions including private sector, civil society, and representatives from various governments. It puts forward the private sector’s perspective on its own involvement in Ukraine since the 2022 invasion, reflecting on opinions and actions as they stood at the time of initial decision but also on the lessons learned since. The intention is to contribute to a baseline of understanding of public-private cooperation in Ukraine so that future policy decisions, whether in the Ukraine context or beyond, are built upon a full evaluation of experience.

Pull factors

Clarity of conflict

Clarity of conflict refers to the perception of the “right” and “wrong” or “victim” and “perpetrator” in a conflict, among one or more set audiences, whose support has the potential to provide materiel aid. In examining the role of this factor in the provision of tech aid to Ukraine, these audiences are primarily state policymakers, general populations, and technology leaders in Europe and North America. Overwhelmingly, in both public reporting and private interviews, the central reason given by companies themselves for why private companies provide aid and services supporting Ukraine is the moral clarity that these companies, their employees, and a large portion of their customers saw in the conflict and its conduct. Many interviewed commented on how the Russo-Ukrainian War, distinct from most other conflicts, has a clear and binary “right” and “wrong” side in the perspective of at least most of the Western world, from governments to individuals.

Russia engaged in continuous overt and covert aggressive action through a wide variety of coercive, though largely nonescalatory, tools in an attempt to exert control on Ukraine and its population. On February 24, 2022, however, Russia unleashed coordinated missile strikes on Ukrainian cities, airborne deployments of soldiers to key locations beyond the border region, conventional advancement across the border, and coordinated cyber aggression.

In March 2022, Amnesty International released a statement saying, in part, that “In less than a week, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a massive human rights, humanitarian, and displacement crisis that has the makings of the worst such catastrophe in recent European history.”² Photos and videos poured out of Ukraine, documenting Russian violence and war crimes against the people of that country. Reports on Russian atrocities and Ukrainian resistance dominated the headlines and news discussions in the West for months. A Monmouth University survey conducted in March 2022 found that 89 percent of Americans believed that Russia’s actions in Ukraine were not justified.³ Similarly, a poll of public perceptions of responsibility for war, taken across ten European countries showed that a clear majority in all countries attribute the primary responsibility to Russia.⁴

During these early months of 2022 the private sector quickly became an essential pillar of support for the Ukrainian war effort. As one expert put it, “If you had ordered a generic villain, you would have gotten Putin. From a moral standpoint, it was really easy for companies to take a stand, you have a moral highpoint.”⁵ Russia’s long decade of slowly escalating violence toward Ukraine, culminating in a brutal conventional assault and now, yearslong war, created an unusually stark geopolitical environment in which both Western states and the majority of their populations not only supported the defense of Ukraine but did so enthusiastically.

Across interviews and roundtable discussions, industry experts demonstrated an appreciation of the clarity of the “right” and “wrong” in the case of Ukraine. Nearly every private sector individual interviewed highlighted the importance of this factor in determining whether and how their company decided to begin or deepen its involvement in Ukraine following the invasion. One expert from a leading tech company said that “This was the easiest of all scenarios I could imagine for the private sector to seek to help an entity like Ukraine. The clarity on the conflict made the decision to assist Ukraine clear.”⁶ As several experts attested, much of the cyber aid provided to Ukraine required technical expertise that was not only limited to a few companies but also limited to a relatively small population of skilled individuals. At this level of analysis, the degree of available assistance had to take into account the bandwidth and possible burnout risk for these individuals as well as a strong, prevalent reluctance to work with a government or, especially, a military. The perceived clarity of the war in Ukraine, however, was critical to overcoming these concerns—at least for a while.⁷

Reaction – Ukrainian tech diplomacy

Tech diplomacy is the engagement between state authorities and tech companies, civil society organizations, other states, and multilateral fora to influence the development of both technology itself and the policy that surrounds it.⁸ Within the early days of the conflict, members of the Ukrainian government and especially the Minister for Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov, rallied for aid across the technology sector. These calls, and the generally positive reception to them, built on arguments regarding the clarity of the conflict. Although this tech diplomacy has been the project of various Ukrainian officials and offices, both before the 2022 invasion and in the years since, a focus in on Fedorov is illustrative of the Ukrainian approach to cultivating and extracting mutual benefit from relationships with international technology companies.

In 2019, Fedorov was tapped as deputy prime minister and minister of digital transformation and was subsequently named deputy prime minister for innovation, education, science and technology and minister for digital transformation and most recently first deputy prime minister of Ukraine—minister of digital transformation of Ukraine.⁹ Fedorov and his team have been adept, according to government affairs executive from a US-based multinational technology corporation, at creating and using “carrots and sticks” to influence company leadership and employees to more favorably view Ukraine and to augment their willingness to contribute to its defense.¹⁰

Fedorov cultivated a strong social media presence with an audience both within Ukraine and across Europe and North America. He emphasized the importance of social media platforms—using primarily English to connect with an international audience—to bring awareness to the dire situation in Ukraine. He pointed to the social media platform X (formerly Twitter), saying it “has become an efficient tool that we are using to counter Russian military aggression.”¹¹ In efforts like United24, the Ukrainian government’s official fundraising platform, which began with Fedorov tweeting the government’s crypto wallet addresses with an ask for donations,¹² he saw it not just as a fundraising tool, but as a tool that is “keeping people around the world aware of what is going on in Ukraine.”¹³ Crowdfunding efforts, even if donations are small, make people feel that their contributions are making a difference and fosters a closer relationship between that person and the Ukraine regardless of the distance.

Fedorov leveraged this engaged global audience to incentivize company action, effectively mobilizing his audience’s attention. A look at Fedorov’s social media presence shows a clear pattern of this strategy in action. Between March 2022 and July 2024, Fedorov posted fifty-two requests for aid from specific companies, celebrated companies and individuals taking positive action, and called out companies engaging in business practices that he deemed detrimental to Ukrainian defense efforts. These posts served as additional public acknowledgement of the contributions of specific companies to Ukraine in a global public forum that other states were watching, as were individuals, aid organizations, and companies. One tech executive explained that not only did these callouts serve as thanks, they also leveraged the competitive nature of these companies that “one up” each other with aid as an additional driver.¹⁴

The Starlink case provides an interesting example of this strategy in action. Fedorov tagged Elon Musk in an X post and asked him directly to instruct SpaceX to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations, calling him out for trying to “colonize Mars” instead of helping civilians on Earth.¹⁵ Musk responded publicly on X less than twelve hours later that, “Starlink Service is now active in Ukraine. More terminals en route.” Two days later these stations, which would come to serve critical functions for civilians, government entities, and even military personnel, arrived. Fedorov again publicly responded on X with a photo of a truck full of terminals saying, “Starlink – here. Thanks, @elonmusk.”¹⁶

According to Fedorov’s deputy minister, Alex Bornyakov, in the months leading up to the Russian invasion, Fedorov’s office was unable to secure a meeting with Elon Musk. However, SpaceX President and COO Gwynne Shotwell indicated in March of 2022 that the company had been coordinating with Ukraine as part of its European expansion effort for several weeks before the invasion and were awaiting final approval from the Ukrainian government. According to Shotwell, “they tweeted at Elon and so we turned it on … that was our permission. That was the letter from the minister. It was a tweet.¹⁷ These early interactions show that at the very least, Fedorov’s social media engagement functioned as a nontraditional method to accelerate the provision and delivery of essential technical equipment that would enable connectivity for civilians, government entities, and even military units.¹⁸

Six months before the February 2022 invasion, Fedorov went on a tech diplomacy tour to Silicon Valley, intent on building stronger relationships with key technology companies with Ukraine’s digital transformation on the agenda. Fedorov‘s tech diplomacy work laid a solid foundation for coordination between the Ukrainian government and these technology companies by the time the war began. These relationships and Fedorov and his ministry’s direct approach with private companies meant that his office could seek solutions in the private sector directly and more swiftly than in traditional government acquisition. For example, in less than a month, a new and improved air raid alert system was implemented across the country as a result of a direct and informal conversation between Ajax Systems Chief Marketing Officer Valentine Hrytsenko, Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation Valeriya Ionan, and a team of digital transformation officers.¹⁹

Therefore, Ukraine’s approach to tech diplomacy represents a significant shift in how states, especially small or mid-power states, should conceptualize and shape their relationships with technology companies. Given that global technology companies’ (“big tech”) yearly revenue continually overshadows the gross domestic product (GDP) of many states,²⁰ this evolution in states’ relationships with big corporations suggests that corporate ties are sometimes more important than a state’s relationship with another state. This was echoed in a statement from the Danish government, recognizing the extent to which technological disruption affects societal and geopolitical change, nothing that the companies driving that innovation “have become extremely influential; to the extent that their economic and political power match—or even surpass—that of our traditional partners, the nation states.”²¹ Fedorov’s actions therefore proved the importance of tech diplomacy as a key government priority to secure the cooperation of the tech sector in a crisis, aided by the moral clarity that many companies saw in assisting Ukraine in a time of war.

Business alignment

For companies examining whether and how to provide tech-based support to Ukraine in its defense, business alignment can take a variety of forms, but typically refers to some combination of benefits that the company receives from these activities. Although the primary driver cited publicly for tech companies’ involvement has been the desire to aid Ukraine, their customers, and employees in Ukraine against blatant Russian aggression, another factor in companies’ decision-making was in fact how the provision of assistance to Ukraine fit into and supported the overall health and security of their organizations. This included the character of preexisting relationships with both Ukraine and Russia, direct financial profit, and indirect benefits such as instructive experience, field-testing products, and reputational benefits.

Preexisting relationships

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was not the start of the conflict between the two nations, nor was it the beginning of technology companies’ relationships with Ukraine and Russia. The nature and tone of these relationships provided a key foundation for these companies’ decisions throughout the post-2022 conflict. Ukraine and Russia, both as partners and as markets, had different starting points and were also on different active trajectories that informed the types and depth of engagement that tech companies wished to have with each country, both individually and comparatively.

One of the primary motivations cited for company involvement in Ukraine after the Russian invasion was the simple fact that many of these companies were already active in Ukraine to some extent and their leadership felt a responsibility to protect its employees and continue to serve its customers within Ukraine. For example, threat intelligence companies like Mandiant and CrowdStrike had been engaged in Ukraine since at least 2014, actively tracking cyber espionage, influence, and attack operations, while companies like Microsoft and Google were actively building capacity in the country despite Ukraine’s prohibitions on cloud services. In 2020, Google opened its second research and development center in Ukraine and Microsoft signed a memorandum of understanding with Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation to include a $500 million investment to build two data centers.²²

Several private sector and government representatives conveyed in private interviews that one of companies’ greatest concerns in the first few weeks of the conflict was the safety of their employees in Ukraine.²³ Many companies set up or contributed to programs intended to help employees leave the country, if they wished, or to provide protection measures for those who remained.²⁴ Additionally, companies with existing customers in Ukraine saw their mission as largely unchanged, seeking to serve their customers regardless of their location.²⁵ Companies with these preexisting relationships had more reason to continue or expand their work in the country due to these long-term connections.

By contrast, many of these companies also had preexisting, albeit weaker, ties with and in Russia. According to a 2024 report from the Center for Security and Emerging Technology, however, of the eighteen US tech companies that provided “direct assistance on the battlefield and/or services to maintain critical infrastructure or government functions,” none had “significant economic or financial linkages to Russia.”²⁶ While Ukraine had undertaken concerted steps to foster mutually beneficial relationships, Russia had been largely coercive. The Kremlin in the years before the 2022 reinvasion sought to tighten control over the Russian information space and exert influence over international tech companies’ activities in Russia. For example, in 2021 Russia passed a law requiring large technology companies with a presence in the Russian market to establish Russian offices registered with the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media, commonly known as Roskomnadzor, or risk severe punitive measures.²⁷ Some in the industry viewed the move as an attempt to blackmail tech companies into complying with Russian censorship.²⁸ Google was one such target of these coercive measures—in a push to force Google to censor the content available on its platforms within Russia, Russian authorities seized the company’s bank accounts. In response, Google’s Russian subsidiary declared bankruptcy and ceased all but its free services within Russia.²⁹

Amplified by the clarity of conflict discussed above, and Ukrainian tech diplomacy efforts for companies to sever financial ties with Russia and the Russian market, the decision calculus for these companies was less complex than it may have been otherwise.

Not all companies chose to leave the Russian market completely. Despite the coercion that Google faced, the company chose to keep YouTube available in Russia; however, without ads for users in Russia and without the ability to monetize content that would “exploit, dismiss, or condone Russia’s war in Ukraine.”^“³⁰ As discussed previously, many companies decided to continue services in Ukraine out of an obligation to existing customers. Depending on the company and the type of product sold or service provided, this same motivation was seen with respect to Russia as well. One tech executive explained that some of these products and services remained active because they provided a benefit to the Russian public, as opposed to the Russian government. For example, YouTube remained partially active, with restrictions, so that the platform could continue to serve as an alternate source of information for Russians.³¹

Direct profit

For companies, both those with an existing presence in Ukraine and those without, providing technical services in and to Ukraine could also serve more clear-cut business interests. Some were at least partially motivated by direct financial gain like new paid contracts and revenue potential such as additional value generated through the delivery of services and the possibility of positive publicity for the company or their products.

Although much of private companies’ work in Ukraine was (or started as) free of charge, many others were acquired in a more traditional contractual manner, with either Ukraine or an allied government footing the bill. Company representatives said in several interviews and roundtables that while they wish to continue their work in the country, as the war continues, they will require financial support to do so.³²

Indirect benefit

Some of the tech companies active in Ukraine derived value from the very act of providing a service itself, with indirect gains that included instructive experience with Russian cyber operations, the ability to field-test products, and reputational benefits.

For more than a decade, many multinational threat intelligence companies have been tracking Russian cyber aggression in Ukraine as part of their core function. These services helped to drive the development of Ukrainian cyber infrastructure, but it was not solely a charitable effort. It was in these companies own interests to gain the closest possible insights into areas like Ukraine that experience a high degree and sophistication of cyberattacks. As a result, these companies sowed valuable intelligence from their experience, and improved their business offerings across the board. As one executive in threat intelligence at a US cybersecurity nonprofit put it: “for threat intelligence companies, having this depth of access is a gold mine, the details delivered out of Ukraine on Russian tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are quite amazing.”³³

These benefits are not only limited to threat intelligence companies. Companies that run active platforms used by and in Ukraine, such as cloud platforms, also gained greater direct experience against Russian cyber operations. As one executive put it, “while acting as a shield, [these] companies are collecting vast intelligence that can be used to improve their products and protect all their customers.”³⁴ The experience of defending against Russian activity at that scale and volume served as training of sorts for companies’ cybersecurity teams.

Both representatives from private companies and the Ukrainian government cited an additional benefit to working in Ukraine during the current war: it served as a testing ground for technology. As Fedorov stated, Ukraine “is the best test ground for all the newest tech … because here you can test them in real-life conditions.”³⁵ Several company executives privately seconded this notion, saying that alongside their company’s desire to do the right thing, their work in Ukraine provided proof of concept for their capabilities.³⁶ Ukraine also offered a means to demonstrate to potential customers the effectiveness of their offerings. Founding partner of Green Flag Ventures Deborah Fairlamb said at a European defense conference that “no one would even look at a product unless it had ‘Tested in Ukraine’ stamped on it.”³⁷ During a roundtable conversation, a company executive said that governments were more likely, having seen a company’s work in Ukraine, to purchase their products and trust that they are secure.³⁸

Finally, companies working actively in Ukraine were also motivated by the benefits to public perception and reputation. Popular support of Ukraine meant that companies’ support may have improved their reputation by association. In a TIME article from early 2024, author Vera Bergengruen argued that this reputational concern was part of Palantir’s decision calculus for its work in Ukraine, by helping to dispel characterization of the company’s work as a tool to support intrusive government surveillance. This would situate Palantir’s work in Ukraine among its similar efforts to “shed its reputation as a shadowy data-mining spy contractor.”³⁹ Clearview AI’s reputational concerns also likely motivated its assistance to Ukraine. The company was sanctioned multiple times throughout Europe for privacy violations and was lambasted in a 2020 New York Times article for its controversial use by law enforcement and private companies to track people through AI-enabled facial recognition.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the company received an outpouring of positive press following public announcements that Ukraine was using this same AI-enabled facial recognition software to identify Russian soldiers, including deceased soldiers and those suspected of committing war crimes in Ukraine.⁴¹ Whether trying to capitalize on a positive reputation or counter negative perceptions, companies benefit from their association with a cause popular across their customer base.

Reaction – Ukrainian technical capability and posture

In both the buildup to war and the conduct of it, some companies with interest in setting up operations in or with Ukraine were reluctant to do so out of concern regarding Ukraine’s ability to act as a capable and trustworthy recipient of goods and services. Executives working in threat intelligence and information security at US-based multinational technology companies have pointed to corruption in Ukraine as a barrier to engagement prior to the invasion and a factor that was carefully considered when deciding how to provide aid in Ukraine.⁴² This challenge is openly acknowledged in Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2021-25, which states that “corruption prevalence and distrust in the judiciary are the key obstacles to attracting foreign investment to Ukraine.”⁴³

To mitigate these factors, Ukraine and its partners have invested heavily over the past decade to take on corruption and build out legal, economic, and technical frameworks to transform Ukraine so as to make it a more appealing target for assistance and cooperation from the public and private sectors. According to Alex Bornyakov, Ukraine’s deputy minister of digital transformation, Ukraine’s sought to develop “the largest IT hub in Eastern Europe with the fastest growing GDP, industrial parks, and its own security-focused ‘Silicon Valley.’”⁴⁴

Anti-corruption efforts

The Ukrainian government’s commitment to anti-corruption efforts has been an important factor for the success of the process, which began well before the buildup of Russian tanks on its border. According to the 2025 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Integrity and Anti-Corruption Review of Ukraine, since 2013 Ukraine “significantly reformed its anti-corruption framework to fight what were then historically high corruption levels in the country.”⁴⁵

Ukraine’s public and private IT sectors have long been a breeding ground for software acquisition-related fraud, a scheme in which an individual reports the purchase of a legitimate software license but actually buys a pirated or outdated version of that software and pockets the difference. Before 2014, approximately 80 percent of Ukrainian government and private entities were using network software that had either never been or was no longer supported by the associated software vendor,⁴⁶ making Ukraine a difficult and unappealing market for software vendors.

In 2014, anti-corruption activists started the ProZorro project, which over the past decade moved public sector procurement, including that of IT infrastructure, to a central platform built around the tenets of transparency, efficiency, and cross-sector collaboration and competition.⁴⁷ According to a report by Dr. Robert Peacock, through the use of ProZorro and other anti-corruption efforts, senior officials at Ukraine’s State Special Communications Service estimated that “the share of pirated and unsupported software on the country’s networks had dropped from more than 80 percent in 2014 to only 20 percent in 2020.”⁴⁸

As the conflict in Ukraine escalated into a full-scale war, Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts became even more urgent and essential. For example, UNITED24, the country’s official fundraising platform to fund the Ukrainian war effort that has raised approximately $350 million since the beginning of the war, sends money directly into transparent national accounting systems depending on the choice of the donor, with the leading global accounting firm Deloitte auditing platform.⁴⁹ In addition, in the first year of the war Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his government dismissed several high-ranking government officials based on allegations of corruption. This included two of the top Ukrainian cyber officials after they were accused of participated in corrupt procurement practices. According to the country’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the accused allegedly embezzled $1.7 million between 2020 and 2022 through fraudulent software acquisition.⁵⁰ The Ukrainian government’s efforts largely mitigated companies’ concerns regarding corruption, and those companies that cited corruption as a barrier to working with Ukraine have since commenced programming previously denied to Ukraine on those grounds.⁵¹

For a private company to make the decision to invest more heavily in Ukraine, the benefits—financial or otherwise—must outweigh the risks. By addressing corruption within the government, and especially tech-related corruption, the Ukrainian government effectively diminished the weight of this factor in companies’ overall decision calculus. Crucially, such efforts take time to implement and yet more time to create meaningful change. Had these anti-corruption programs not been well underway before 2022, the question of corruption may have significantly deterred companies from deeper involvement in Ukraine.

Ukraine turns toward tech

Instead of sowing distrust in the idea of cyberspace as a safe space for economic and even government services, the past decade of Russian aggression against Ukraine in cyberspace motivated Ukraine to invest heavily in that space and turn its former weakness into a newfound strength. It could even be said that the continuous Russian aggression against Ukraine, through cyberspace and otherwise, helped Ukraine to better defend itself against Russia. Before the 2022 Russian invasion and even more so since, the Ukrainian government sees a flourishing technology sector within Ukraine as a key component to the economic strength of the country.⁵² However, to foster such a flourishing tech environment, Ukraine needed to first invest in its legal and economic foundations.

As a response to escalating Russian aggression in 2014, Ukraine began what would be an intensive decade of government reform and policy advancement on cyber issues. The figure below highlights various investment and development programs aimed at enhancing Ukrainian technological capacity, including efforts of the Ukrainian government itself and in partnership with various international entities such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

These, among other efforts, were essential steps to creating and expanding a technologically capable and developed Ukraine. Especially important was the increased relative cybersecurity of the Ukrainian digital environment, the development of Ukraine’s cyber workforce and general cyber literacy, and an influx of capital enabling increased investment in private sector tools and services.

On the economic front, the Ukrainian government made strides to create an attractive environment for investment. The government’s mission has been to shift the conversation from purely one of donations and aid to a direct appeal to the companies’ more pecuniary concerns. According to Bornyakov, “The best way to help Ukraine is to invest in Ukraine.”⁵³ This call is both international and domestic. The Ukrainian government has implemented a number of projects and programs dedicated to fostering the local tech ecosystem. As of December 2024, the IT sector accounted for 4.4 percent of Ukraine’s GDP and 38 percent of the country’s total service exports. Much of this technological energy is being dedicated back to the war effort—according to a report compiled in cooperation with the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, 97 percent of Ukrainian IT companies are “actively supporting projects that contribute” to Ukrainian defense.⁵⁴

Diia City in particular, launched just two weeks before the invasion, is a tool intentionally designed to make it easier and more appealing for foreign companies to set up and run operations within Ukraine. Diia City is a “virtual free economic zone for tech companies in Ukraine” that offers a variety of legal and tax benefits.⁵⁵ The connected Brave1 initiative launched in early 2023 to “create a fast track for innovation in the defense and security sectors,” especially those projects of high importance to Ukrainian military leadership, such as “drones, robotic systems, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence tools, cybersecurity, communications, and information security management systems.”⁵⁶

These efforts, both domestic and international, bolstered the defense of Ukraine by building and demonstrating trustworthiness, capability, and economic value for the private sector. In other words, the political and economic engine driving technological development in Ukraine was composed of more than a decade of concentrated action from Ukraine and its international partners, and was in place well before tanks began rolling across the borders. This vital work ultimately helped to bring about conducive conditions for private sector investment or provision of services, as long-term structural factors indirectly shaping company decision-making to aid Ukraine.

Push factors

Difficulty of coordination

Difficulty of coordination refers to the friction that private companies experienced along the lifecycle of technical assistance to Ukraine—from understanding which products or services would be impactful, knowing who to coordinate with and how, or the logistics of providing that assistance. Friction, as in all domains of warfare, is the imposition of the constraints of reality upon one’s plans and impulses, and therefore each additional complexity that stands between a certain technology and its use in Ukraine increases the likelihood that that desired provision will not occur, will take longer, or will be provided in a less helpful form.

One of the most persistent hindrances to the provision of tech-related assistance from private companies in Ukraine was the difficulties that all parties involved faced, which was to effectively coordinate the assistance available with the assistance that Ukraine needed most in a fast-moving and high-pressure environment, particular as more Ukrainian organizations expressed a need for more threat intelligence, licenses, or training for tools. In almost every conversation with industry representatives about their experience in this space raised this coordination problem. The factors that most significantly impacted coordination effectiveness included whether a company had a preexisting presence in or relationship with Ukraine, the clarity with which Ukraine communicated its technical needs, and the ability to assess the effectiveness and impact of products or services provided.⁵⁷

Especially in the early months of the full-scale Russian war, much of the assistance that private tech companies provided was coordinated by companies themselves and in a largely ad hoc manner. In addition, Ukraine experienced communications challenges such as a lack of secure channels or limited visibility into networks and infrastructure on the ground.⁵⁸ Companies that did not have a strong relationship with the Ukrainian public sector prior to the conflict found that direct coordination was difficult to establish once the conflict had begun.⁵⁹ For some, not having a direct relationship with or in Ukraine had been an intentional choice, due to regulation complexity or corruption concerns.⁶⁰ Initially, companies without a preexisting presence often struggled to pinpoint the correct office or person with which to speak. They bridged this gap most often with some combination of brand recognition driving direct outreach from the Ukrainian government and facilitation by Ukrainian private companies that had established relationships with international tech companies and could act as middlemen.⁶¹

Even in cases of existing relationships within Ukraine, complexities abound for companies. A threat intel executive indicated that, for many, there is a tension between what companies thought they could provide and what the Ukrainian government knew about its own needs. While Ukraine was effective in communicating its technical needs at the tactical level, according to various company representatives, effective coordination was somewhat hampered by their ability to effectively communicate and coordinate technical assistance needs across government at a strategic level lagged behind.⁶²

An additional point of friction was the high degree of difficulty in deconflicting the assistance provided to Ukraine from different companies. Understandably, the Ukrainian government—and various individuals and agencies working within it—were responding to imminent threats and thus would send out the same or similar requests to various companies in the hope that one would respond.⁶³ This meant that at times various companies were devoting time and resources to developing an assistance measure that was not actually needed and would not be implemented, or if it was in part, had a lesser relative impact on Ukrainian defense because of duplicative measures. This inability to understand and plan around the impact of assistance was broader than just the duplication issue; dozens of company representatives reported difficulties in getting a clear view as to whether their assistance was actually effective once provided.⁶⁴

Without this data, future requests for and fulfillments of technical aid will continue to be based on theory rather than evidence from their growing experiences together. A 2024 paper from the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative (CDAC) and Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, made strides in its effort to collate and assess the effectiveness of those companies and organizations that provided cyber defense assistance to Ukraine through their program. The report identified both direct indicators, where effectiveness can be assessed via concrete measures, and proxy indicators, where possible contributing factors are assessed on a scale of perceived impact.⁶⁵

Reaction – Ukrainian coordination and adaptation

On top of domestic development efforts, Ukrainian government officials spent concerted time and effort to build relationships that would serve as the foundation for future cooperation. Fedorov‘s tech diplomacy work forged new connections with these companies, as well as their leadership and employee bases, that in many ways enabled the speed of company response following Russia’s February 2022 invasion. “When the invasion began, we had personal connections to these companies,” Fedorov said. “They knew who we are, what we look like, what our values are and our mission is.”⁶⁶

According to Fedorov, in the first month of the war he sent “more than4,000 requests to companies, governments, and other organizations, each one personally signed.”⁶⁷ Some of these connections built on existing relationships, but companies without preestablished links either initiated conversations directly with or received direct requests from the Ukrainian Government. Beyond the Ministry of Digital Transformation, various Ukrainian offices like the State Special Communications Service of Ukraine, Security Service of Ukraine, National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, and Ukrainian National Cybersecurity Coordination Center were engaging in relationship building and outreach efforts in order to coordinate the provision of tech assistance.⁶⁸ According to Bornyakov, the early days of coordination with the international private sector were chaos.⁶⁹ Various offices and employees sent out messages and requests without internal coordination, and products or services were provided without sufficient due diligence to ensure that they were truly useful to the Ukrainian war effort.

The Ukrainian government quickly updated its practices to facilitate more efficient cooperation. Among the first of these moves was a Ukrainian policy change to directly enable increased private sector participation. In February 2022, prior to the invasion, the Ukrainian parliament Verkhovna Rada amended the laws that had barred government use of Cloud services. This change meant that just days before the Russian invasion, companies including Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Cloudflare were able the aid the Ukrainian government and several critical sector entities in migrating their critical data to their cloud servers—a critical move, as Russia’s attacks during the first few weeks of the war specifically targeted physical data centers.⁷⁰ In addition, due to the imposition of martial law, Ukraine adopted two resolutions to streamline public procurement. Resolution 169, adopted on February 28, 2022, enabled government contracting authorities to ignore, when necessary, the procurement procedures required by the laws on public and defense procurement.⁷¹ Resolution 723, passed four months later, added new, more efficient requirements to the procurement process, amending both resolution 169 and resolution 822, most important of which was the introduction of the ProZorro platform as the mandatory electronic procurement system.⁷² As previously discussed, this platform was both a tool to facilitate procurement and to counter corruption in the procurement process at large.

Despite improvements to coordinate more effectively with private tech companies, and even as international coordination mechanisms emerged, a significant contingent of companies has maintained a preference for direct coordination. One government affairs executive noted that their company, like many others, preferred direct coordination with the Ukrainian government since it enabled more immediate and relevant support, and they were skeptical that third-party mechanisms would be as effective.⁷³

Reaction – International aid facilitation

Since the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and even before that, international entities—states, supranational bodies, and non-state groups— played an important role in coordinating technical-focused aid in support of Ukraine.

However, states’ coordination efforts were notably inconsistent. In the first year and a half after the Russian reinvasion, the United States allocated $113 billion in response to the war in Ukraine—largely allocated to the Department of Defense at 54.7 percent, USAID at 32.3 percent, and the Department of State at 8.8 percent.⁷⁴ This money should not be viewed like a check signed over to the Ukrainian government, but rather as money allocated to respond to the Russian invasion through a combination of forms and recipients, primarily the defense industrial base in the United States.⁷⁵ By contrast, private companies publicly announced and celebrated their digital and tech aid to Ukraine. In an interview, one leading tech executive observed a clear dearth of focus from the US government toward digital and tech aid, instead opting for significant humanitarian and more traditional military assistance.⁷⁶ This prioritization was likely an intentional choice—the US government’s perspective seems to have been that it was leading conventional aid by a significant margin and wanted others, like European governments and the private sector, to take the lead on digital and tech matters.⁷⁷Though not speaking specifically on cyber and tech elements, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in February 2025 called publicly for European states to provide the “overwhelming” majority of defense funding for Ukraine, bemoaning what he saw as an “imbalanced relationship.”⁷⁸ Hegseth specifically pushed for the expansion of existing Europe-led coalitions—discussed below—dedicated to coordinating technological aid.⁷⁹

By contrast, industry experts agreed that the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) was a very effective facilitator of private sector aid.⁸⁰ The UK’s efficiency on this issue was due in part to fewer restrictions on aid money between distinct civilian- and military-designated buckets.⁸¹ According to an assessment from the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, which scrutinizes UK aid spending, this flexibility enabled the FCDO to respond and adapt to the constant evolutions of the war and geopolitical environment—thereby acting as an effective channel for private sector assistance into Ukraine.⁸²

The ad hoc nature of many of the early digital assistance programs provided by private companies was in some ways a double-edged sword. In many cases they were present and able to move more quickly than government programs, and in some places they stepped into de facto political roles—shaping the conflict and public understanding of it. However, this efficiency and effectiveness became difficult to sustain in the long run as governments and government-sponsored mechanisms were slow or insufficient to step in to support these efforts.⁸³ US government entities were instrumental in facilitating support from private companies to Ukraine through purchase agreements, such as that of hundreds of Starlink devices and subscriptions in coordination with other governments⁸⁴ and partnerships. US government entities also participated in intelligence sharing and collaboration efforts regarding Russian cyber capabilities and activities⁸⁵ and even conducted hunt forward operations to assist in Ukrainian defense against Russian cyber aggression both before and after the February 2022 Russian invasion.⁸⁶

In various conversations, both industry and government representatives confirmed the lack of effective governmental and supranational coordination and its impact on the private sector, and on Ukrainian defense.⁸⁷ Company representatives across the United States and Europe shared the same refrain: “we can’t keep supporting Ukraine ourselves forever without government assistance.⁸⁸

In addition to bilateral assistance efforts, various entities emerged across the conflict focused on cooperation organization and facilitation of digital and tech aid. The first of these was the CDAC, not a government entity, but a nonprofit organization that brought together a number of cybersecurity and technology organizations to better coordinate assistance efforts. The organization was founded by Gregory Rattray and a coalition of cyber executives to address the impediments and complications that accompanied the early days of digital and tech assistance provision from the private sector. A CDAC representative said in May 2024 that the group had facilitated $20-30 million in tech-related assistance for Ukraine since its inception.⁸⁹ As Ukrainian and CDAC representatives noted, CDAC’s facilitation efforts have since slowed for a variety of reasons: decreased ability to act as an intermediary as requests have become more specific, a stabilization among companies that no longer require a coordinator after their relationships in Ukraine were established, and a lack of sufficient financial support for both CDAC and the companies willing to provide assistance.⁹⁰

The vacuum noted by industry representatives and CDAC founders in the shape of a true digital and tech aid coordination body with the resources and remit to execute that mission is the planned role of the IT Coalition and the Tallinn mechanism. The IT Coalition, part of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG; also known as the Ramstein Group), was established in September 2023 as “a dedicated group of donor nations led by Estonia and Luxembourg within the UDCG framework, focused on delivering support to Ukraine’s Defense Forces in the area of IT, communications, and cyber security.”⁹¹ The group consists of eighteen member countries, with the European Union, NATO, the United States, and France acting as observers.⁹² In 2024 and 2025, the coalition had raised “€1,1 billion in both financial and material assistance.”⁹³ The coalition aims to support Ukraine cyber defense capability and command and control integration while also delivering on more long-term goals such as fostering innovation and cloud adoption. The United States is currently an observing member of the IT Coalition and have thus far has declined taking a more active role. Those familiar with the inner workings of the mechanism have emphasized the clear benefit of a more active US role in the mechanism, as most of the tech companies with whom the organization would like to coordinate are headquartered out of the United States.⁹⁴

The Tallinn Mechanism was established in December 2023 with 11 states to “coordinate and facilitate civilian cyber capacity building” within Ukraine, and is intended to be complementary to military-focused cyber aid facilitation bodies like the IT Coalition.⁹⁵ The Tallinn Mechanism is focused on “amplifying the cyber support of donors to Ukraine in the civilian domain.”⁹⁶ The mechanism raised approximately $210 million by the end of 2024 and has focused on bolstering cyber defense capabilities, especially that of critical national infrastructure, through the public and private provision of hardware and software, incident response, satellite communication provision, and cybersecurity training for government officials.⁹⁷

The international community has certainly made strides to better facilitate technology aid to Ukraine, to counteract the pushing effect that complicates such coordination for technology companies. However, it is yet unclear whether these programs and practices will meet the demands of this conflict, or those of conflicts to come. The most effective element of the tech sector at large’s efforts in Ukraine has been its speed, both in its response to the invasion itself and to individual challenges that have arisen over the course of this war. Meanwhile, government and supranational coordination—aside from those programs already in place—were much slower to implement.

Risk of retaliation

A significant factor shaping the behavior of companies’ work in and with Ukraine is the heightened threat state created by active warfare. Various technology company officials cited their concern about potential backlash—whether financial, cyber, or physical violence—from Russia against their infrastructure, products, and people.⁹⁸ The real risk that these companies took on was informed by a number of factors, such as the application of their products or services by and for military ends, the required physical presence of personnel, products, or infrastructure, and also the degree to which increased Russian aggression against these companies might be a meaningful increase from prewar conditions.

Defense application

An undeniable yet complex risk that companies face as a result of providing support to Ukraine is the threat of Russian retaliatory action. Private sector behavior in Ukraine is shaped by the degree to which the goods and services provided are connected to the conduct of the conflict itself. Products and services provided to civilian groups for purely humanitarian purposes come with a different risk profile than goods that underpin government functions. Though not discrete or exhaustive, cyber and technical aid to Ukraine can be understood in four categories: humanitarian aid, critical infrastructure protection, government support, and military application. In practice, this division exists on a continuum, from purely humanitarian support to products or services that the state itself has come to rely on for the continued provision of government services, with particular importance placed on whether the good is for military use and whether that use is in direct support of combat operations.

By and large, companies have made their own determinations as to how to amend their work in Ukraine, looking not only at the direct military application of their product or service but also examining existing and potential products or services to determine potential applicability for offensive operations—and where to avoid their abuse. A clear example of this is Google’s cessation of the live traffic display functionality within Google Maps. A team of open source researchers at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, under the leadership of Professor Jeffrey Lewis, were allegedly able to infer the early movements of the February 2022 Russian invasion before official reporting by analyzing Google Maps traffic data in combination with radar imagery.⁹⁹ Following these reports, Google announced that it would temporarily disable live traffic data so that it would not be used to plan military operations.¹⁰⁰ An internal task force at Google largely coordinated these and similar decisions to coordinate aid to Ukraine and, most importantly, to examine their actions and decisions in order to identify and address programs that had a potential to cause harm.¹⁰¹ However, even after these amendments were made, Google Maps was again the subject of controversy. In November 2024, Ukrainian defense chiefs accused Google of revealing the location of key military positions following an earlier Google Maps update. According to Russian military bloggers, among these revelations was the position of new air defense systems, including US-made Patriot anti-aircraft missiles, surrounding an airport near Kyiv. According to the head of Ukraine’s counter-disinformation unit Andriy Kovalenko, Google representatives reached out to Ukrainian government officials to address the issue shortly thereafter.¹⁰²

Similar in many ways was the SpaceX effort to restrict use of the Starlink satellite network close to the active front of the war. Though controversial in the public eye, and significant for military operators and planners, the SpaceX decision to restrict the use of Starlink devices near the front was an intentional one—to limit escalation directly supported by their devices. SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell explained “our intent was never to have them use it for offensive purposes.”¹⁰³ The Starlink network, despite these imposed limitations, has undeniably been an extremely useful tool for the Ukrainian military,¹⁰⁴ but its network also supports a much wider geography of users, from individuals to government entities. The inherent dual-use nature of the Starlink network poses a much greater risk should its network be considered a military object. This risk framework is likely a significant part of the drive behind Space X’s creation of Starshield, announced in early December 2022. A partner project to Starlink, Starshield operates on a separate network and is specifically and exclusively for government—rather than consumer and commercial—use.¹⁰⁵ With this application in mind, reports still vary as to whether such a contract, like the $1.8 billion deal with the National Reconnaissance Office, would be operated by the contractee, in this case the NRO, or whether, like Starlink, the service would remain operated by SpaceX.¹⁰⁶ It is possible that this case will follow, in practice, the principle that the closer that the operation of a technology sits to strategic and sensitive national priorities, the higher the risk for both state and company of that technology being operated by said company, and the more likely that technology will come to be operated from within a government body.

Physicality

Products and services that require the physical presence of personnel, products, or infrastructure within Ukraine are the riskiest to undertake. Providing support in this way carries a level of risk that most companies did not have either the willingness or the infrastructure to take on.¹⁰⁷ While some companies, for certain products, chose to partner with government entities to deliver products or services where physical presence was necessary, as in the preceding example, others chose instead to eschew options with such a requirement. In an interview, one expert said, “there were some products that you wanted to go forward with, but you couldn’t. Your informational security can only be as good as your physical security, so projects requiring new physical infrastructure development, or new infrastructure dependencies, was a major stumbling block.”¹⁰⁸

Russia’s cyber-offensive impact

To some degree, most of the technology companies in question—especially those with a preexisting presence in Ukraine—were already a target of a significant volume of Russian cyber intrusion attempts as well as other coercive actions. As one industry executive put it when asked about the role of risk assessment in decisions to deepen their work in Ukraine following the invasion, “we knew the risk, we were already targeted on a daily basis.”¹⁰⁹ The risk of Russian aggression and retaliation remains, but for many large tech companies, their work already took them into spaces where they were in direct or indirect conflict with Russian or Russian-affiliated groups. However, the risk of Russian cyber intrusions against their networks was already a built-in calculation for their existing cybersecurity plans.

In addition to the experience and expectations of many of these private companies, Russian cyber operations accompanying and following its February 2022 invasion were less disruptive than previously anticipated. The most prominent case of coordinated disruption in the information space remains the ViaSat satellite communications system hack during the invasion. As cyber scholar Jon Bateman writes, this intrusion demonstrated clear “timing (one hour before Russian troops crossed the border), clear military purpose (to degrade Ukrainian communications), and international spillover (disrupting connectivity in several European countries).”¹¹⁰ However, the incident appeared to be limited in duration and unclear in impact—senior Ukrainian official Victor Zhora acknowledged the loss to communications during the early hours of the invasion, but later stated that the incident was less disruptive than it could have been because of redundancies in Ukrainian communication methods.¹¹¹

As nonresident senior fellow Justin Sherman explored in May 2025 Atlantic Council report, Unpacking Russia’s cyber nesting doll,¹¹² the comparably muted effectiveness of Russian cyber operations during the war is the result of a multitude of factors including:

Cross-domain coordination difficulties
Resource constraints
Interagency competition
Intentional strategic prioritization
Ukrainian defensive strength

Sherman goes on to explain that while cyber operations against Ukraine did not have that catastrophic impact expected by some—the promised cyber Pearl Harbor—Russian cyber capabilities should not be underestimated.¹¹³

In just the first year of the war, Russia and—importantly—non-state actors in Russia’s orbit, launched a multitude of cyberattacks and intrusions against the public and private sector in Ukraine—including those entities relying on products, platforms, or infrastructure owned and operated by Western tech companies.¹¹⁴ In May 2025, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency released a joint cybersecurity advisory highlighting this threat, and explicitly calling out Russian targeting of “those involved in the coordination, transport, and delivery of foreign assistance to Ukraine.”¹¹⁵ The question at hand, then, is not what level of risk is associated with these actions but how prepared the company is to encounter such risks.

Reaction – Risk definition and mitigation

In response to the risk of Russian retaliatory action, either through cyber or kinetic means, states and intranational bodies had a role to play in helping companies to navigate and mitigate these risks. The first method by which this was attempted was in an increased clarity on the types of actions that may be considered military or escalatory in nature. Additionally, in many cases states were necessary partners in securing any element of product delivery or operation required new physical presence in or movement into and across Ukraine.

Definition

Throughout the conflict, industry executives and civil society displayed a great deal of concern about where the line falls between civilian actors and military objectives, and how to ensure that their activities fall squarely on the civilian side of this line. Individuals and companies reiterated a desire for increased clarity on this question from Western governments and international legal bodies.¹¹⁶ Current humanitarian law requires the country at war to target only military objects, defined as objects “whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage” in a manner proportional to the military gain foreseen by the operation.¹¹⁷

In a 2023 report, the International Red Cross posited that, “tech companies that operate in situations of armed conflict should understand and monitor whether the services they provide may amount to a direct participation in hostilities by their employees and whether the company might qualify as a military objective.”¹¹⁸ Essentially, the line between civilian and military object is determined by Russia in its assessment of the battlespace, as well as the broader question of whether the Kremlin is concerned about staying within the bounds of international humanitarian law. The subjectivity of this divide allows for some range in interpretation.¹¹⁹ Indeed some, like Lindsay Freeman at UC Berkeley School of Law, argue that “civilian objects have been intentional, direct targets and not simply collateral damage.”¹²⁰ Ukraine and its allies cannot simply dictate where such a line exists. However, greater clarity from national and supranational entities would provide some measure of cover to these companies and help solidify their ability to make more accurate risk calculations.¹²¹

Mitigation

For products and services that require physical presence, either of people or products, many companies view some kind of partnership with government, local or otherwise, as a virtual necessity to bridge the risk imposed.¹²²

Cisco’s Project PowerUp, led by Senior Security Strategist Joe Marshall of Cisco Talos Intelligence Group,¹²³ is a clear demonstration of this. The project innovated and delivered a new industrial ethernet switch that could ensure continued effective power grid management even when Russian GPS jamming blocked Ukrenergo substation synchronization, and avoid the resulting forced outages across the Ukrainian power grid.¹²⁴ The delivery of these devices into Ukraine was coordinated via a phone call to a US government official who coordinated the first shipment on an upcoming cargo shipment to Poland and then onto a train into Ukraine to be installed by Ukrenergo engineers.¹²⁵ While this project was conceived of and executed by Cisco employees, those involved in the project emphasized the importance of Cisco’s partnership with the US government on this, as well as other private assistance programs.¹²⁶

Several governments and international organizations have established insurance programs, particularly political risk insurance to help shield companies from the financial risk of investment into Ukraine. In 2023, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank issued guarantees of $9.1 million to support the construction and operation in the M10 Industrial Park in Lviv.¹²⁷ Additionally, the US International Development Finance Corporation has established several financial packages guaranteeing millions in political risk insurance for a variety of projects.¹²⁸ Within Ukraine, war and political risk insurance is offered by the Export Credit Agency, which insure loans for qualifying Ukrainian businesses against such risks, as well as for direct investment from or into Ukraine.¹²⁹ The Ukrainian Ministry of Economy also drafted a law, in cooperation with the National Bank of Ukraine, which would create a unified framework for political or war risk insurance, with a focus on mitigating risks that may deter foreign investments.¹³⁰

The physical element of presence in Ukraine and especially near the battlefield remains a clear demarcation between activities that are the realm of the public sector and those that are the realm of the private sector. In this area, cooperation and coordination between companies and governments could largely follow established practices and procedures. But, for technology whose infrastructure does not touch the territory of Ukraine, the question of where the line is between civilian product and military object, and where bodies like NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations would define that line to be, resembles a gradual gradient rather than a stark line.

Key takeaways and conclusion

Behind much of the discussions and debates among various groups on the role of the private sector in in the war in Ukraine is a deeper anxiety about the evolving character of warfare as we reach the quarter marker of the twenty-first century. The integration and implementation of new technologies and its effect on the practice of war is familiar territory for theoreticians and practitioners alike, from Douhet’s theories on the supremacy of air power to the revolution of military affairs (RMA) school of thought, to those today that focus on the effect of evolving drone tactics on the operation and strategy of war. Less comfortable, however, is the analysis of what changes in technology may mean in practice not just for the conduct of war itself, but more fundamentally for the very nature of actors whose abilities and choices shape the conduct of war.

Over the past few years, private companies, especially technology companies based in North America and Western Europe have made decisions as to whether and how to contribute to the Ukrainian war effort in ways that have greatly impacted the ability of the Ukrainian government to direct and effectuate its own defense. In other words, they have moved beyond the status of resource providers in this conflict toward something more resembling actors in and of themselves, at times approaching the importance of states in their contributions.

Clarity of conflict

The war in Ukraine—especially in the first months and years of the war— was notably less divisive in the court of public opinion in the West than many other contemporary conflicts. The historical context of the Russia-Ukraine relationship, along with the sustained aggression launched against Ukraine for more than a decade prior to this invasion and the nature of the invasion itself, combined with myriad factors including those discussed throughout this report, created conditions conducive to widespread sympathy and support across much of Western Europe and North America. The efforts of the Ukrainian government proactively built on these conditions both before and after the invasion. Ukrainian leaders, Zelenskyy in particular, both publicly and in private conversations with government and private sector representatives, clearly communicated the effects of Russian aggression against Ukraine and the actions undertaken by the Ukrainian government and its people.

Clarity of conflict, as a motivating factor for tech companies’ decision-making over the course of this conflict, was important in creating favorable conditions for such choices, but is not determinative. Most important as a lesson applicable in potential future conflicts, is that the seeds that grew these conditions into place were planted well before Russian forces rolled across the Ukrainian borders in February 2022.

Business alignment

Many firms had preexisting operations, employees, or customers in Ukraine—generating both a sense of duty and a pragmatic incentive to safeguard assets and personnel. Firms that were already active in Ukraine, or whose services directly contributed to protecting their employees and customers, were the most proactive and consistent contributors. Additionally, companies could derive direct or indirect benefits from their engagement. Several firms leveraged their involvement as an opportunity for product testing, cybersecurity innovation, and real-world validation of technologies under extreme conditions. In doing so, companies not only supported Ukraine’s defense but also advanced their own technical capabilities and reputational standing.

Ukraine’s long-term digital transformation further enhanced this alignment. Over the past decade, the government has implemented legal and technical reforms aimed at combating corruption and promoting digital industry growth, positioning the country as a prospective regional tech hub and a credible, innovation-friendly partner. This proactive transformation reassured corporate partners that their investments and assistance could be practicable and impactful.

For future conflicts, states will need to account for business alignment factors as an important driving factor in private sector’s decision-making. This includes the uncomfortable, yet important finding that this includes companies’ ability to profit, or at a minimum, sustain their operations in a conflict in a way that maintains their organizational health, noting that companies’ motivations will not always align with that of the states in which they are headquartered. While moral conviction catalyzed early engagement, sustained corporate involvement in Ukraine depended on alignment between ethical action and business strategy.

Difficulty of coordination

Even amid broad goodwill, the initial months of the war revealed the challenge of coordination. Companies often struggled to identify appropriate Ukrainian counterparts, assess needs accurately, or ensure that their offerings were deployed effectively. Early efforts were marked by confusion—with multiple government offices issuing overlapping requests and little centralized control. As Bornyakov later acknowledged, the early days of outreach “were chaos.”

Many of the most significant factors that shaped company involvement were already in place and being acted upon before the February 2022 Russian invasion. Preexisting relationships were key, both as a motivating factor and a facilitating factor, effectively minimizing coordination friction. Additionally, the technological and policy developments well underway before the February 2022 invasion created the appealing Ukrainian tech landscape and improved coordination necessary once the conflict was underway.

While private companies excelled in speed and agility, governments brought scale, reliability, and regulatory legitimacy. The war illustrated how preparedness for potential future conflicts will depend on preestablished coordination frameworks that merge these strengths—enabling rapid mobilization of technological capabilities, matching private capabilities with public needs in real time.

Risk of retaliation

Providing assistance to Ukraine exposed technology companies to new security risks from cyberattacks, sanctions, or kinetic threats against personnel or infrastructure. The degree of perceived risk—and retaliation—varied depending on each company’s exposure, particularly for firms whose technologies had direct military applications or some kind of physical presence.

Ambiguity around international law, cyber norms, and export controls can delay or discourage private assistance. Companies must understand whether providing certain technologies or services could be construed as escalatory, illegal, or sanctionable. Private firms are increasingly targeted in state-level cyber operations. The possibility of retaliation, in any of a myriad of forms, was a serious risk for companies aiding Ukraine; managing and sharing that risk is essential to sustaining long-term cooperation.

To mitigate these risks, Ukraine and allied governments played an essential supportive role, clarifying the boundaries between civilian and military assistance, helping companies avoid escalatory missteps and, in some cases, underwrote contracts or insurance to shield firms from loss. Such measures demonstrate the emerging need for risk-sharing frameworks between states and corporations. In cases where physical operations within Ukraine were necessary, governments provided logistical and security coordination to protect personnel and assets. Such collaboration underscores an emerging model of public-private security cooperation, wherein states and corporations jointly navigate the blurred boundaries between national defense and digital resilience.

If private technology companies’ decisions and actions are so impactful to the conduct of war, as they have shown themselves to be, then the character of warfare has evolved in such a way as to require states to likewise evolve in the ways that they provide military assistance and plan for potential future conflicts. The foundation for this evolution needs to be a greater understanding of the factors in the case of Ukraine that most greatly impacted company decision-making regarding their participation, or not, in the conflict space, starting with the four factors identified in this report: those that pulled companies toward cooperation, and those that pushed companies away. By assessing the factors that drove companies’ decision-making in Ukraine, states can better plan and prepare for future crises and conflicts—and not leave such critical capabilities, once again, to chance.

About the author

Emma Schroeder is an associate director with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Tech Programs. Her focus in this role is on developing statecraft and strategy for cyberspace useful for both policymakers and practitioners. Her work focuses on the role of cyber and cyber-enabled technology in conflict and crime.

Originally from Massachusetts, Schroeder holds an MA in History of War from King’s College London’s War Studies Department. She also attained her BA in International Relations & History, with a concentration in Security Studies, from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

Acknowledgements

This report was made possible by the participation of dozens of scholars and practitioners who shared their expertise and experiences with the author.

Thank you to the Cyber Statecraft Initiative team for their support, particularly Nikita Shah and Trey Herr for their guidance. Particular thanks to Emerson Johnston, Grace Menna, and Zhenwei Gao for their research assistance, as well as to Nancy Messieh, Samia Yakub, and Donald Partyka for the creation and review of language and digital assets. All errors are the author’s own.

Explore the program

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs, works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

1 All unattributed interviews were conducted in confidentiality with the author, and the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

2 “Russia/Ukraine: Invasion of Ukraine Is an Act of Aggression and Human Rights Catastrophe,” Amnesty International, March 1, 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/03/russia-ukraine-invasion-of-ukraine-is-an-act-of-aggression-and-human-rights-catastrophe/.

3 “Majority back U.S. troop presence in Europe, but not in Ukraine itself,” Monmouth University Polling Institute, March 16, 2022, https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/reports/monmouthpoll_us_031622/.

4 Catarina Thomson et al., “European public opinion: united in supporting Ukraine, divided on the future of NATO,” International Affairs 99, no. 6 (2023): 2485–2500, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad241.

5 Interview with threat intelligence executive at US cybersecurity nonprofit, April 2, 2024.

6 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, March 26, 2024.

7 Industry executive, IT coalition roundtable, Atlantic Council, February 21, 2024.

8 “The TechPlomacy Approach,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, accessed October 20, 2025, https://techamb.um.dk/the-techplomacy-approach.

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12 Peter Guest, “Mykhailo Fedorov Is Running Ukraine’s War Like a Startup,” WIRED, July 25, 2023, https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-runs-war-startup/?_sp=f5dd85ca-06aa-46ec-b716-b7cda17ce4f4.1721243250176. Tom Wilson, “Ukraine raises $13 million in crypto after crowdfunding appeal,” Reuters, February 28, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/ukraines-government-raises-crypto-worth-8-million-crowdfunding-appeal-2022-02-27/.

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16 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), “Starlink service is now active in Ukraine. More terminals en route,” X, February 26, 2022, 5:33 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1497701484003213317; Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Starlink — here. Thanks, @elonmusk,” X, February 28, 2022, 3:19 p.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1498392515262746630?s=20&t=vtCM9UqgWRkfxfrEHzYTGg.

17 Jeff Foust, “SpaceX Worked for Weeks to Begin Starlink Service in Ukraine,” SpaceNews, March 3, 2022, https://spacenews.com/spacex-worked-for-weeks-to-begin-starlink-service-in-ukraine/.

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19 Guest, “Mykhailo Fedorov is Running.”

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21 “The TechPlomacy Approach.”

22 Alexander Query, “Google opens research and development center in Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, January 15, 2020 https://www.kyivpost.com/post/7682; “Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine and Microsoft to Collaborate in Digital Transformation,” Microsoft, October 2, 2020, https://news.microsoft.com/en-cee/2020/10/02/ministry-of-digital-transformation-of-ukraine-and-microsoft-to-collaborate-in-digital-transformation/.

23 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, March 1, 2024; Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, March 26, 2024; Interview with threat intelligence executive at US multinational technology corporation, April 22, 2024, Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation; Interview with information security executives at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation, May 8, 2024; Interview with subject matter expert on government cyber aid coordination, June, 17, 2024; Interview with threat intelligence executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, July 26, 2024; Interview with information security executive at US multinational technology corporation, August 28, 2024; Industry executive, IT coalition roundtable, Atlantic Council, February 21, 2024.

24 Interview with threat intelligence executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, July 26, 2024; Iain Martin, “US and Israeli Tech Companies Evacuate Ukrainian Staff From Possible Frontline,” Forbes, February 17, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/iainmartin/2022/02/17/usand-israeli-tech-companies-evacuate-ukrainian-staff-from-possible-frontline/; Supantha Mukherjee and Paul Sandle, “Cisco CEO Says Quarter of Staff in Ukraine Have Left,” Reuters, March 1, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/cisco-ceo-says-quarter-staff-ukraine-have-left-2022-03-01/; “A Message to Team Members on the Conflict in Ukraine,” FedEx, March 4, 2022, https://newsroom.fedex.com/newsroom/global-english/a-message-to-team-members-on-the-conflict-in-ukraine.

25 Interview with threat intelligence executive at US cybersecurity nonprofit, April 2, 2024.

26 Sam Bresnick, Ngor Luong, and Kathleen Curlee, Which Ties Will Bind: Big Tech, Lessons from Ukraine, and Implications for Taiwan, Center for Security and Emerging Technology (Georgetown University), February 2024, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/which-ties-will-bind/.

27 “Putin signs law forcing foreign social media giants to open Russian offices,” Reuters, July 1, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/technology/putin-signs-law-forcing-foreign-it-firms-open-offices-russia-2021-07-01/; Human Rights Watch, Russia: Growing Internet Isolation, Control, Censorship, June 18, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/18/russia-growing-internet-isolation-control-censorship.

28 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, August 28, 2024.

29 “Google’s Russian Subsidiary Files Bankruptcy Document,” Reuters, May 18, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/googles-russian-subsidiary-files-bankruptcy-document-2022-05-18/; “Google’s Russian Subsidiary Recognised Bankrupt by Court—RIA,” Reuters, October 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/googles-russian-subsidiary-recognised-bankrupt-by-court-ria-2023-10-18/.

30 Google Wins UK Injunction over YouTube Block on Russian Broadcasters,” Reuters, January 22, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/technology/google-wins-uk-injunction-over-youtube-block-russian-broadcasters-2025-01-22/.

31 Interview with executive at US multinational technology corporation, date withheld.

32 Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2025.

33 Interview with threat intelligence executive at US cybersecurity nonprofit, May 2, 2024.

34 Interview with business development executive at US information and communications technology corporation, July 18, 2024.

35 Vera Bergengruen, “How Tech Giants Turned Ukraine into an AI War Lab,” TIME, February 8, 2024, https://time.com/6691662/ai-ukraine-war-palantir/.

36 Interview with information security executive at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation, May 8, 2024.

37 Bergengruen, “How Tech Giants Turned.”

38 Industry Executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

39 Bergengruen, “How Tech Giants Turned.”

40 Robert Hart, “Clearview AI: Controversial Facial-Recognition Firm Fined $33 Million for Illegal Database,” Forbes, September 3, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2024/09/03/clearview-ai-controversial-facial-recognition-firm-fined-33-million-for-illegal-database/; Kashmir Hill, “The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It,” New York Times, January 18, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html.

41 Paresh Dave and Jeffrey Dastin, “Exclusive: Ukraine Has Started Using Clearview AI’s Facial Recognition during War,” Reuters, March 13, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-ukraine-has-started-using-clearview-ais-facial-recognition-during-war-2022-03-13/; Kashmir Hill, “Facial Recognition Goes to War,” New York Times, April 7, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/07/technology/facial-recognition-ukraine-clearview.html; Vera Bergengruen, “Ukraine’s ‘Secret Weapon’ Against Russia Is a Controversial U.S. Tech Company,” TIME, November 14, 2023, https://time.com/6334176/ukraine-clearview-ai-russia/; Drew Harwell, “Ukraine is scanning faces of dead Russians, then contacting the mothers,” Washington Post, April 15, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/04/15/ukraine-facial-recognition-warfare/.

42 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, May 2, 2024; Interview with information security executives at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation, May 8, 2024.

43 “Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2021–2025,” National Agency on Corruption Prevention (Ukraine), 2021, https://nazk.gov.ua/en/anti-corruption-strategy/.

44 Oleksandr Bornyakov, “Why Ukraine is Going All In on Tech to Rebuild Economy,” Fortune, August 24, 2022, https://fortune.com/2022/08/24/ukraine-going-all-in-tech-rebuild-economy-international-oleksandr-bornyakov/.

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46 Robert Peacock, The Impact of Corruption on Cybersecurity: Rethinking National Strategies Across the Global South, Atlantic Council, July 1, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-impact-of-corruption-on-cybersecurity-rethinking-national-strategies-across-the-global-south/; Software Management: Security Imperative, Business Opportunity, Business Software Alliance, June 2018, https://www.bsa.org/files/2019-02/2018_BSA_GSS_Report_en_.pdf.

47 Alona Savishchenko, “How Open Source E-procurement System Prozorro Helps to Sustain Ukrainian Economy,” Open Source Observatory, European Commission, November 19, 2024, https://interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu/collection/open-source-observatory-osor/news/e-procurement-prozorro-support-ukrainian-economy; “EProcurement System ProZorro,” Observatory of Public Sector Innovation, https://oecd-opsi.org/innovations/eprocurement-system-prozorro/.

48 Robert Peacock, The Impact of corruption; Software Management, Business Software Alliance.

49 “About UNITED24,” UNITED24 – The Initiative of the President of Ukraine, accessed October 20, 2025, https://u24.gov.ua/about; Guest, “Mykhailo Fedorov is Running.”

50 Daryna Antoniuk, “Two Ukraine Cyber Officials Dismissed amid Embezzlement Probe,” The Record, November 20, 2023, https://therecord.media/two-ukraine-cyber-officials-dismissed-amid-embezzlement-probe; “Misappropriation of UAH 62 million during the purchase of software: the leadership of the State Special Communications Service is suspected,” National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, news release (in Ukrainian), November 20, 2023, https://nabu.gov.ua/news/zavolod-nnia-62-mln-grn-pri-zakup-vl-programnogo-zabezpechennia-p-dozriu-t-sia-ker-vnitctvo-derzhspetczviazku/.

51 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, May 2, 2024; Interview with information security executives at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation, May 8, 2024; Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2024.

52 Bergengruen, “How Tech Giants Turned.”

53 Bergengruen, “How Tech Giants Turned.”

54 “Ukrainian Tech Industry Shows Resilience in the Face of War — IT Research Ukraine 2024,” techukraine.org, December 5, 2024, https://techukraine.org/2024/12/05/ukrainian-tech-industry-shows-resilience-in-the-face-of-war-it-research-ukraine-2024/.

55 “Diia City,” Diia, accessed October 20, 2025, https://city.diia.gov.ua/en.

56 Mykhailo Fedorov, “Ukraine’s Vibrant Tech Ecosystem Is a Secret Weapon in the War with Russia,” UkraineAlert (Atlantic Council), August 17, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-vibrant-tech-ecosystem-is-a-secret-weapon-in-the-war-with-russia/.

57 Greg Rattray, Geoff Brown, and Robert Taj Moore, The Cyber Defense Assistance Imperative: Lessons from Ukraine, Aspen Digital, May 2025, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Aspen-Digital_The-Cyber-Defense-Assistance-Imperative-Lessons-from-Ukraine.pdf.

58 “CDAC: “The Scale of What We Can Do is Severely Hampered by not Having Funding for Dedicated Staff or to Fulfill Requirements Directly,” Common Good Cyber, May 29, 2025, https://commongoodcyber.org/news/interview-cdac-funding/.

59 Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2024.

60 Interview with business development executive at US information and communications technology corporation, July 18, 2024; Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, May 2, 2024; Interview with information security executives at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation, May 8, 2024.

61 Interview with business development executive at US information and communications technology corporation, July 18, 2024.

62 Interview with threat intelligence executive at US cybersecurity nonprofit, April 2, 2024; Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

63 Industry executive, “IT Coalition” Roundtable, Atlantic Council, February 21, 2024.

64 Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2024; Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

65 “Cyber Defense Assistance Evaluation Framework,” Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative, June 18, 2024, https://crdfglobal-cdac.org/cda-evaluation-framework/.

66 Peter Guest, “Mykhailo Fedorov is Running,” WIRED, July 25, 2023, https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-runs-war-startup/.

67 Cat Zakrzewski, “4,000 letters and four hours of sleep: Ukrainian leader wages digital war,” Washington Post, March 30, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/30/mykhailo-fedorov-ukraine-digital-front/.

68 Interview with tech assistance coordination executive, US nonprofit organization, July 17, 2025.

69 Bergengruen, “How Tech Giants Turned.”

70 Colin Demarest, “Data Centers Are Physical and Digital Targets, Says Pentagon’s Eoyang,” C4ISRNET, November 17, 2022, https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2022/11/17/data-centers-are-physical-and-digital-targets-says-pentagons-eoyang/.

71 Oleh Ivanov, “Procurement During the Full-Scale War,” Vox Ukraine, October 14, 2022, https://voxukraine.org/en/procurement-during-the-full-scale-war.

72 “On Amendments to the Resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 822 of September 14, 2020 and No.169 of February 28, 2022,” Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, June 24, 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/723-2022-%D0%BF#n2.

73 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, August 28, 2024.

74 Elizabeth Hoffman, Jaehyun Han, and Shivani Vakharia, Past, Present, and Future of US Assistance to Ukraine: A Deep Dive into the Data, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), September 26, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/past-present-and-future-us-assistance-ukraine-deep-dive-data.

75 The difficulty, for the purposes of this paper, is understanding the breakdown of this assistance as it applies to digital and tech-focused aid to Ukraine. The author found examples breaking down US government assistance by general category (i.e., humanitarian, military, financial) and breakdowns of weapons systems aid (e.g., tanks and air defense systems) but little enumeration of the kind and amount of digital and tech aid provided by the US government. See “Ukraine Support Tracker,” Kiel Institute for the World Economy, updated October 14, 2025, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker.

76 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, August 28, 2024.

77 Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024; Interview with information security executive at US multinational technology corporation, August 28, 2024; Interview with threat intelligence executive and government affairs executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, October 2, 2024.

78 Alex Therrien and Frank Gardner, “Hegseth Sets Out Hard Line on European Defense and NATO,” BBC News, February 12, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy0pz3er37jo.

79 Jon Harper,“Hegseth Puts Onus on Allies to Provide ‘Overwhelming Share’ of Weapons to Ukraine,” DefenseScoop, February 12, 2025, https://defensescoop.com/2025/02/12/hegseth-ukraine-defense-contact-group-allies-military-aid-trump/.

80 Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024; Interview with threat intelligence executive and government affairs executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, October 2, 2024.

81 Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

82 “UK aid to Ukraine,” Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), April 30, 2024, https://icai.independent.gov.uk/html-version/uk-aid-to-ukraine-2/.

83 Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2024.

84 “SpaceX, USAID Deliver 5,000 Satellite Internet Terminals to Ukraine,” Reuters, April 6, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/technology/spacex-usaid-deliver-5000-satellite-internet-terminals-ukraine-2022-04-06/; Alex Marquardt, “Exclusive: Musk’s SpaceX Says it Can No Longer Pay for Critical Satellite Services in Ukraine, Asks Pentagon to Pick Up the Tab,” CNN, October 13, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/13/politics/elon-musk-spacex-starlink-ukraine; Michael Sheetz, “Pentagon Awards SpaceX with Ukraine Contract for Starlink Satellite Internet,” CNBC, June 1, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/01/pentagon-awards-spacex-with-ukraine-contract-for-starlink-satellite-internet.html.

85 “United States and Ukraine Expand Cooperation on Cybersecurity,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, July 27, 2022, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/united-states-and-ukraine-expand-cooperation-cybersecurity; David Jones, “White House Warns of US of Possible Russian Cyberattack Linked to Ukraine Invasion,” Cybersecurity Dive, March 22, 2022, https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/white-house-warns-russian-cyberattack-ukraine/620755/; Egle Murauskaite, “U.S. Assistance to Ukraine in the Information Space: Intelligence, Cyber, and Signaling,” Asymmetric Threats Analysis Center (University of Maryland), February 2023, https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/us-assistance-ukraine-information-space-intelligence-cyber-and-signaling.

86 Maj. Sharon Rollins, “Defensive Cyber Warfare: Lessons from Inside Ukraine,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2023, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/june/defensive-cyber-warfare-lessons-inside-ukraine; “Before the Invasion: Hunt Forward Operations in Ukraine,” US Cyber Command (declassified briefing), November 28, 2022, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/rmsj3h-751×3/2022-11-28-CNMF-Before-the-Invasion-Hunt-Forward-Operations-in-Ukraine.pdf; Dina Temple-Raston, Sean Powers, and Daryna Antoniuk, “Ukraine Hunt Forward Teams,” The Record, October 18, 2023, https://therecord.media/ukraine-hunt-forward-teams-us-cyber-command.

87 Interview with tech assistance coordination executive at US nonprofit organization, July 17, 2025; Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, August 28, 2024.

88 “Interview with threat intelligence executive at US multinational technology corporation, April 22, 2024; Industry executive, “IT Coalition” Roundtable, Atlantic Council, February 21, 2024; Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2024; Interview with threat intelligence executive and government affairs executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, October 2, 2024.

89 Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2024.

90 Industry executive, “Public-Private Cyber Support” Workshop, Royal United Services Institute, May 29, 2024.

91 “Luxembourg, Estonia, and Ukraine Have Launched the IT Coalition,” Government of Luxembourg, September 19, 2023, https://gouvernement.lu/en/actualites/toutes_actualites/communiques/2023/09-septembre/19-bausch-itcoalition.html.

92 “Ukraine Defence Contact Group: Estonia and Luxembourg Announce New Contributions to IT Coalition,” European Pravda, April 8, 2024, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/8/7183316/; “IT Coalition Established by Estonia and Luxembourg … Has Raised about 500 Million Euros in Its First Year,” Republic of Estonia Ministry of Defense, December 12, 2024, https://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/en/news/it-coalition-established-estonia-and-luxembourg-help-ukraine-has-raised-about-500-million-euros.

93 “IT Coalition Led by Estonia and Luxembourg Has Raised over One Billion Euros to Support Ukraine,” Republic of Estonia Ministry of Defense, May 28, 2025, https://kaitseministeerium.ee/en/news/it-coalition-led-estonia-and-luxembourg-has-raised-over-one-billion-euros-support-ukraine.

94 Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

95 “Formalization of the Tallinn Mechanism to Coordinate Civilian Cyber Assistance to Ukraine,” US Department of State (Office of the Spokesperson), December 20, 2023, https://2021-2025.state.gov/formalization-of-the-tallinn-mechanism-to-coordinate-civilian-cyber-assistance-to-ukraine/.

96 “Tallinn Mechanism Raises €200 Million to Support Ukraine’s Resilience in Cyberspace,” Republic of Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 20, 2024, https://www.vm.ee/en/news/tallinn-mechanism-raises-eu200-million-support-ukraines-resilience-cyberspace.

97 “Joint Statement Marking the First Anniversary of the Tallinn Mechanism,” US Department of State (Office of the Spokesperson), December 20, 2024, https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-marking-the-first-anniversary-of-the-tallinn-mechanism/.

98 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, August 28, 2024; Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

99 Rachel Lerman, “On Google Maps, Tracking the Invasion of Ukraine,” The Washington Post, February 25, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/02/25/google-maps-ukraine-invasion/.

100 Marc Cieslak and Tom Gerken, “Ukraine Crisis: Google Maps Live Traffic Data Turned Off in Country,” BBC News, February 28, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-60561089.

101 Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, date withheld.

102 Seb Starcevic, “Ukraine Slams Google for Revealing Location of Military Sites,” Politico, November 4, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-google-reveal-location-military-site/; James Kilner, “Google Maps ‘reveals location’ of Ukrainian military positions,” The Telegraph, November 4, 2024, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/11/04/ukraine-angry-google-maps-reveal-location-military-position/.

103 Alex Marquardt and Kristin Fisher, “SpaceX Admits Blocking Ukrainian Troops from Using Satellite Technology,” CNN, February 9, https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/09/politics/spacex-ukrainian-troops-satellite-technology/index.html.

104 “Russia Using Thousands of SpaceX Starlink Terminals in Ukraine, WSJ says,” Reuters, February 15, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-using-thousands-spacex-starlink-terminals-ukraine-wsj-says-2024-02-15/.

105 “Starshield,” SpaceX, accessed October 20, 2025, https://www.spacex.com/starshield/; Joey Roulette and Marisa Taylor, “Exclusive: Musk’s SpaceX Is Building Spy Satellite Network for US Intelligence Agency, Sources Say,” Reuters, March 16, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/musks-spacex-is-building-spy-satellite-network-us-intelligence-agency-sources-2024-03-16/.

106 Tim Fernholz, “The Big Questions About Starshield: SpaceX’s Classified EO Project,” Payload, March 22, 2024, https://payloadspace.com/the-big-questions-about-starshield-spacexs-classified-eo-project/; Brian Everstine, “SpaceX: DoD Has Requested Taking Over Starship Individual Missions,” Aviation Week Network, January 30, 2024, https://aviationweek.com/space/spacex-dod-has-requested-taking-over-starship-individual-missions; Sandra Erwin, “Pentagon Embracing SpaceX’s Starshield for Future Military SATCOM,” SpaceNews, June 11, 2024, https://spacenews.com/pentagon-embracing-spacexs-starshield-for-future-military-satcom/.

107 Interview with information security executive at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation, May 8, 2024; Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, March 1, 2024; Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

108 Interview with information security executive at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation, May 8, 2024.

109 Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

110 Jon Bateman, Russia’s Wartime Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Influences, and Implications, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 16, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/12/russias-wartime-cyber-operations-in-ukraine-military-impacts-influences-and-implications?lang=en.

111 Rafael Satter, “Satellite Outage Caused ‘Huge Loss in Communications’ at War’s Outset—Ukrainian Official,” Reuters, March 15, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/satellite-outage-caused-huge-loss-communications-wars-outset-ukrainian-official-2022-03-15/; Kim Zetter, “ViaSat Hack ‘Did Not’ Have Huge Impact on Ukrainian Military Communications, Official Says,” Zero Day (Substack), September 26, 2022, https://www.zetter-zeroday.com/viasat-hack-did-not-have-huge-impact/; Emma Schroeder with Sean Dack, A Parallel Terrain: Public‑Private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment, Atlantic Council, February 27, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-parallel-terrain-public-private-defense-of-the-ukrainian-information-environment/.

112 Justin Sherman, Unpacking Russia’s Cyber Nesting Doll, Atlantic Council, May 20, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/russia-tomorrow/unpacking-russias-cyber-nesting-doll/.

113 Justin Sherman, Unpacking Russia’s Cyber.”

114 Shane Huntley, “Fog of War: How the Ukraine Conflict Transformed the Cyber Threat Landscape,” Threat Analysis Group blog (Google), February 16, 2023, https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/fog-of-war-how-the-ukraine-conflict-transformed-the-cyber-threat-landscape/.

115 “Russian GRU Targeting Western Logistics Entities and Technology Companies,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, May 21, 2025, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-141a.

116 Industry executive, “IT Coalition” Roundtable, Atlantic Council, February 21, 2024; Interview with government affairs executive at US multinational technology corporation, March 1, 2024; Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024; Interview with information security executive at US intelligence and data analysis software technology corporation; Interview with threat intelligence executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, July 26, 2024.

117 International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), (June 8, 1977), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36b4.html.

118 Protecting Civilians Against Digital Threats During Armed Conflict: Recommendations to States, Belligerents, Tech Companies, and Humanitarian Organizations, ICRC Global Advisory Board on Digital Threats during Armed Conflict, October 19, 2023, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/protecting-civilians-against-digital-threats-during-armed-conflict, 15.

119 Zhanna L. Malekos Smith, “No ‘Bright‑Line Rule’ Shines on Targeting Commercial Satellites,” The Hill, November 28, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/3747182-no-bright-line-rule-shines-on-targeting-commercial-satellites/; Emma Schroeder and Sean Dack, A Parallel Terrain: Public‑Private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment, Atlantic Council, February 27, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-parallel-terrain-public-private-defense-of-the-ukrainian-information-environment/.

120 Lindsay Freeman, “Evidence of Russian Cyber Operations Could Bolster New ICC Arrest Warrants,” Lawfare, March 13, 2024, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/evidence-of-russian-cyber-operations-could-bolster-new-icc-arrest-warrants.

121 Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

122 Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

123 Joe Marshall, “Project PowerUp – Helping to Keep the Lights on in Ukraine in the Face of Electronic Warfare,” Cisco Talos Intelligence blog, December 4, 2023, https://blog.talosintelligence.com/project-powerup-ukraine-grid/.

124 Joe Marshall, “Project PowerUp;” Interview with threat intelligence executive at US multinational digital communications technology corporation, July 26, 2024.

125 Sean Lyngass, “Exclusive: This Pizza Box-sized Equipment Could Be Key to Ukraine Keeping the Lights on This Winter,” CNN, November 21, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/21/politics/ukraine-power-grid-equipment-cisco/index.html; Industry executive, “Tales from Ukraine” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, November 20, 2024; Industry executive, “Supporting Ukraine’s Warfighting Efforts with Digital Capabilities” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2024.

126 Industry executive, “Tales from Ukraine” Roundtable, Embassy of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Defense, November 20, 2024

127 World Bank Group, “MIGA Backs Industrial Park in Ukraine,” news release, September 28, 2023, https://www.miga.org/press-release/miga-backs-industrial-park-ukraine.

128 US International Development Finance Corporation, “DFC Announces $357 Million in New Political Risk Insurance for Ukraine,” news release, June 12, 2024, https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-announces-357-million-new-political-risk-insurance-ukraine-russias.

129 “Your Business in Ukraine 2025,” KPMG Ukraine, March 2025, https://kpmg.com/ua/en/home/insights/2025/03/your-business-in-ukraine.html.

130 “Developments in War‑Risk Insurance Products for Investments in Ukraine,” Dentons, December 5, 2024, https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2024/december/5/developments-in-war-risk-insurance-products-for-investments-in-ukraine.

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Hammes publishes issue brief on containerized weapons with Stimson Center

ajohnson — Wed, 12 Nov 2025 19:24:23 +0000

original source

On November 6, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Thomas X. Hammes published an issue brief with the Stimson Center titled “We Can’t Buy Our Way Out: It’s Time to Think Differently.” Hammes urges the Pentagon to focus on a new generation of containerized weapons that can be mass produced in order to field capabilities to deter or succeed in a conflict against China.

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Thomas X. Hammes

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Industry

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Grundman featured in Defense & Aerospace Report on defense acquisition reform

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Nov 2025 21:00:00 +0000

On November 11, Forward Defense senior fellow Steven Grundman was featured in a Defense & Aerospace Report podcast episode entitled “Deep Dive in to Sec Hegseth’s Acquisition Reforms.” Grundman underscored the importance of the Pentagon’s push to streamline acquisition and argued that current conditions make this a pivotal moment for the United States to embrace industrial policy and invest in rebuilding domestic capacity.

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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Punaro quoted in Air & Space Forces Magazine on defense acquisition policy

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Nov 2025 15:36:25 +0000

On November 11, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Arnold Punaro was quoted in an Air & Space Forces Magazine article entitled “The Pentagon Wants to Buy Weapons Faster. What Will It Cost?” where he discussed acquisition reform. Punaro noted that while expanding competition in weapons procurement will require substantial upfront investment, it will ultimately drive down costs and strengthen long-term competitiveness.

Advisory Council member

Arnold Punaro

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Public Event Wed, November 5, 2025 • 3:00 pm ET

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Rich Outzen interview with i24 on UK assistance to Belgium’s counter-drone defenses

aozen — Sun, 09 Nov 2025 13:55:12 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

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Representative Adam Smith on the NDAA, Venezuela, and the United States’ role in the world

Daniel Hojnacki — Fri, 07 Nov 2025 17:08:42 +0000

Watch the event

Representative Adam Smith on how Congress will shape US defense policy

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Representative Adam Smith (D-WA), ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, shares his priorities for the upcoming National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and discusses how Congress can ensure the Pentagon meets today’s security challenges.

Security & Defense United States and Canada

“I don’t think simply committing this large number of assets—hundreds of millions, probably billions of dollars by the time it’s done—to blow up some drug boats in international waters in Latin America is going to make an appreciable difference” in the fight against drug trafficking, said Representative Adam Smith (D-WA), the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Thursday.

The event, part of the Atlantic Council’s Commanders Series, came amid uncertainty over whether the Trump administration’s campaign of attacks on boats that it claims are trafficking drugs will escalate into an effort to overthrow Venezuelan autocrat Nicolás Maduro.

Based on a briefing he received from the State Department and Department of Defense on Wednesday, Smith said he thinks that “the administration does not want to go to war with Venezuela.” But, Smith added, US President Donald Trump sometimes “very quickly” changes his mind. “So who knows?”

Thursday’s event also came amid the longest US government shutdown in history, with the House out of session even as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the next fiscal year has yet to be passed, a situation Smith called “unbelievably disruptive.”

Read below for more highlights from this conversation with Smith, which was moderated by Fox News Chief National Security Correspondent Jennifer Griffin.

The NDAA

“The NDAA itself is moving forward,” Smith said of the annual bill, noting that different versions have been passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and now the two versions need to be reconciled.
One of Smith’s priorities for the bill is acquisition reform: “My position is we’ve had the risk wrong for a long time” on defense acquisition policy, said Smith. “We’ve been only focused” on the risk of corruption in the procurement process “as opposed to the risk of not moving fast enough,” he said. One way to speed up acquisition, he said, is “consolidating the decision makers” in the process “instead of having to go through nine or ten different layers.”
Smith also said he wants to “have procurement people stay in their job longer.” Constant turnover in procurement roles, he said, “doesn’t really help with corruption. It just means that the person doesn’t know the system as well when they’re working on it.”

US strikes on boats in the Caribbean and Pacific

Transnational drug-trafficking gangs in the Western Hemisphere are “a problem for our national security” and “a problem for Latin America,” Smith said. “You’ve got budding narco-states down there. They’re having a harder and harder time dealing with that. We need to be engaged and involved in that.”
However, Smith was critical of the Trump administration’s campaign of attacks on alleged drug-trafficking boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific. “It seems very problematic to me that we have decided that drug dealing will now have the death penalty attached to it,” with “no process whatsoever.”
“They’re certainly bad policy in my view,” Smith said of the strikes.

US military presence abroad

“I think one of the mistakes that we have made is to assume that our global presence is just a cost that isn’t benefiting us,” Smith said of US troop deployments abroad.
Citing threats posed by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorist organizations, Smith said that to pull US troops back from allied countries now and “ignore” these dangers “places us at risk.”
Smith took issue with the Trump administration’s decision to draw down its forces in Romania and noted that there is “bipartisan, bicameral support” in the House and Senate armed services committees “to maintain our presence in Europe and defend them.”
“If any of you have been to Romania, the Baltics, Poland,” said Smith, addressing the crowd, “they want a lot of things, but the one thing they want more than anything is us,” meaning a US military presence. “They don’t believe Russia wants to come in and kill a bunch of US troops. So a little bit of presence can give us a maximum amount of deterrence, and we’re going to fight that out in the defense bill.”

Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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A next-generation agenda: South Korea-US-Australia security cooperation

Lauren D. Gilbert, Kester Abbott, Hannah Heewon Seo — Tue, 04 Nov 2025 13:00:00 +0000

Bottom lines up front

There is great potential for expanded trilateral cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Australia, but they will need to overcome the “tyranny of distance” and the resulting diverging threat perceptions.
The three partners should do more to take advantage of the varied applications of critical and emerging technologies, as well as engage further with other partners in the region on these topics.
The partners can focus their efforts on concretely developing cooperation through public-private collaboration through avenues such as defense industry cooperation, research and development (R&D), and infrastructure projects.

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South Korea and Australia have consistently built upon cooperation as two “middle powers” in a region of ever-growing global importance and dynamism. At the same time, the two countries have bolstered their respective alliances with the United States, building regional bilateral and multilateral collaboration. Ultimately, capitalizing on the potential for growing collaboration and cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Australia could be key to maintaining security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. However, when it comes to bringing several countries together in a collaborative environment, there are inherent challenges to reaching a consensus.

To meet that challenge, the Atlantic Council and the Korea Foundation gathered mid-career and junior experts from the United States, South Korea, and Australia in two private workshops. The group identified several obstacles to cooperation—namely, differing geostrategic circumstances, diverging threat perceptions, different strategies for engaging with China, and a lack of consistent engagement between the countries. Despite this, there are several key opportunities to bolster cooperation—namely, defense industrial cooperation, joint endeavors in science and technology, developing maritime security, and collaborating on engaging additional partner countries and multilaterals.

The rising generation of policymakers we spoke with zeroed in on four ways to improve the trilateral relationship:

cultivate defense industry collaboration and public-private cooperation;
institutionalize relationships and expand joint exercises;
foster expanded R&D of critical technologies; and
develop disaster-resilient infrastructure projects and early warning systems.

view the full issue brief

about the authors

Lauren D. Gilbert is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In this role, she oversees research and programming focused on engaging with US, allied, and partner governments and other key stakeholders to shape strategies and policies to mitigate the most important rising security challenges facing the region.

Kester Abbott is a research associate at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and a non-resident James A. Kelly Korea fellow at the Pacific Forum. He works on US Indo-Pacific strategy, defense industry issues, and Northeast Asian security dynamics, with a focus on South Korean foreign relations.

Hannah Heewon Seo is the events administrator at The Australia Institute, with a background in international affairs organizations in Australia and South Korea. Her focus centers on foreign relations and diplomacy, particularly engagement with the Asia-Pacific, and the opinions expressed do not represent those of The Australia Institute.

explore the program

The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.

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Lourie quoted in the Jerusalem Post on US-Israel defense technology cooperation

Atlantic Council — Fri, 24 Oct 2025 15:00:00 +0000

On October 24, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Linda Lourie was quoted in an article from the Jerusalem Post titled “CET Sandbox bridging battlefield tested Israeli defense tech with Washington.” Lourie highlighted the importance of connecting Israel’s combat-proven innovation ecosystem with US efforts to strengthen defense supply chains and accelerate technology integration.

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Linda Lourie

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Artificial Intelligence Australia

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Russia’s ‘human safari’ in southern Ukraine is a warning to the world

Oleksandr Tolokonnikov — Thu, 23 Oct 2025 20:57:59 +0000

On October 20, pensioner Larisa Vakulyuk was killed by a Russian drone while tending to her goats in the Ukrainian city of Kherson. The murder of the 84 year old Ukrainian grandmother was a deliberate act carried out by a Russian drone operator using a video camera to hunt his victim. There can be no realistic doubt that he knew exactly what he was doing. One week earlier, Russian drones attacked a United Nations convoy traveling in the nearby area, damaging two clearly marked lorries carrying humanitarian aid. “This is a reminder of the incredible dangers Ukrainians face every day to feed themselves,” commented UN World Food Program Country Director for Ukraine Richard Ragan.

These two incidents are part of a comprehensive Russian bombing campaign targeting the civilian population in the Kherson region of southern Ukraine. Kherson lies on the right bank of the Dnipro River, directly across the river from territory currently under Russian occupation, placing it well within range of Russian drone operators. Since summer 2024, Russia has been conducting an unprecedented drone offensive designed to terrorize local residents and render the entire region unlivable. The indiscriminate nature of these attacks and the scale of the killings have led some to label the campaign a human safari.

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Anyone approaching Kherson is immediately made aware of the threat from above. The entrance to the city is marked by signs reading “Warning! Danger! Enemy Drones.” Meanwhile, major roads leading into the heart of Kherson and the Dnipro River are covered in improvised netting in a bid to offer some basic protection against the ever-present threat of Russian drones.

For local residents, Russia’s human safari has made sudden death from above an everyday fact of life. During the first nine months of 2025, more than a hundred people were killed and over one thousand were wounded in drone attacks. Those who remain say they feel hunted whenever they dare to leave their homes and venture out into the open air. A United Nations report released in May 2025 concluded that the Russian drone attacks were part of a systematic, coordinated state policy and constituted a crime against humanity.

The Russian side does not appear to have any serious reservations about the routine targeting of Ukrainian civilians in this manner. On the contrary, video footage of drone attacks on the Kherson population are posted online on an almost daily basis and are typically met with overwhelming approval. Nowhere is deemed off-limits by Russian drone teams. Targets have included private homes and residential buildings, cars, buses, and pedestrians. On numerous occasions, ambulances have been targeted as they have attempted to provide emergency care for victims of earlier attacks.

The hardest hit communities are those located along the banks of the Dnipro River and therefore closest to the Russians. In these riverside districts, Russian drones are a more or less constant feature circling in the sky and waiting to attack anything that moves. This makes it extremely difficult to repair damaged infrastructure or deliver essential supplies such as food and medicine. Instead, life has ground to a halt.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Combating the Russian drone menace is a relentless technological struggle as each side races to innovate and evade the latest countermeasures. In practical terms, it is often difficult for the Ukrainians to cope with the very large numbers of drones deployed by the Russians. The present interception rate in late October of around 80 percent may sound impressive, but this means that 20 percent of drones are still getting through.

Kherson’s current predicament should set alarm bells ringing across Europe and beyond. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is widely recognized as the world’s first drone war. Moscow’s human safari tactics in Kherson offer a chilling window into what this could mean when military drone technologies are unleashed against civilian populations.

Based on what is known about the Russian human safari campaign in the Kherson region, it should now be abundantly clear that drones can potentially paralyze the life of any modern city. They can be used to leave the population without access to electricity, water, and heating, while also disrupting core supply chains and even preventing people from setting foot outside.

Few countries are currently ready to address this threat. Indeed, the recent appearance of small numbers of Russian drones in Polish airspace and above strategic sites such as airports across Europe has highlighted how unprepared many NATO members are to face the rapidly evolving challenges of drone warfare.

These challenges are nowhere more immediately apparent than in Kherson, which has been living with the horrors of Russia’s human safari for more than a year. The fate of Kherson should serve as a warning to the wider world about the threat posed to civilians by military drone technologies. As countries seek to protest their populations, Ukraine’s unrivaled experience will prove priceless.

Oleksandr Tolokonnikov is Deputy Head of the Kherson Regional Military Administration.

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Both Russia and Ukraine have been heavily reliant on Chinese drone components throughout the past three and a half years of full-scale war. However, export volumes to Russia now dwarf deliveries of key component categories to Ukraine. Many Ukrainians have come to view their dependence on Chinese suppliers as a strategic liability. This vulnerability has been highlighted by restrictions imposed by China on drone component exports to Ukraine including motors, navigation cameras, and flight controllers.

Beijing’s support for the Russian war effort allegedly goes far beyond the provision of drone components. At the end of September, Reuters reported that Chinese experts were traveling to Russia to develop military drones at a state-owned weapons manufacturer currently under Western sanctions. The Russian arms maker in question was accused of producing a new drone, the Garpiya-3, in collaboration with Chinese experts.

Garpiya-3 strike drones are said to feature Chinese technologies and have an operational range extending hundreds of kilometers. Kyiv claims around five hundred of these drones are now being launched at targets inside Ukraine every month. China has denied the reports. If confirmed, this and other instances of collaboration between Russian arms producers and Chinese companies would represent a flagrant violation of Beijing’s stated neutrality.

Eurasia Center events

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Chinese support for the Russian military has also extended to assisting Moscow with the provision of satellite imagery in order to help Russian forces identify potential Ukrainian targets. In October, a senior Ukrainian intelligence official stated that China was supplying satellite intelligence to Russia to facilitate missile strikes inside Ukraine.

Such accusations are not new. In 2023, the US Treasury Department sanctioned seven Chinese firms for providing high-resolution satellite imagery to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. In 2024, a Financial Times report citing senior US officials asserted that China was assisting in the development of Russia’s satellite and space-based capabilities, while also sharing current satellite imagery in support of the Russian war effort.

Claims of deepening military collaboration between China and Russia are complicating efforts by the Trump administration to broker a peace deal and end the largest European invasion since World War II. Despite multiple rounds of sanctions on Russian and Chinese companies, the US and EU do not appear to have made any progress toward reducing the stream of dual use Chinese components heading to Russia.

In recent months, US State Department officials have estimated that China is now providing “nearly 80 percent” of the sanctioned dual use items Russia requires to continue the war in Ukraine. The significance of this Chinese contribution cannot be overstated. Without a steady supply of cheap Chinese drone components, for example, it is unlikely that Russia would be able to maintain the bombardment of Ukrainian cities and the country’s civilian infrastructure at anything like the current intensity.

Bessent’s recent remarks are an encouraging sign that the US authorities recognize China’s integral role in enabling Russia’s invasion. However, further steps are needed. Cooperation between Beijing and Moscow in areas including the development of new military technologies and the sharing of satellite information for bombing raids cannot be ignored. This problematic collaboration will continue to undercut efforts to end the war in Ukraine until it is addressed.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Abigail Rudolph

Assistant Director

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The post Rudolph argues for shipbuilding in the Great Lakes Region in the National Interest appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yevgeniya Gaber joins Defense News to discuss Ukraine’s defense cooperation and knowledge transfer to European countries in developing counter-UAV capabilities

aozen — Fri, 10 Oct 2025 07:22:39 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

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The imperative for hypersonic strike weapons and counterhypersonic defenses

Michael E. White — Thu, 09 Oct 2025 18:15:00 +0000

Foreword
Executive summary
The hypersonic imperative
Recommendations
Conclusion
Acronyms
Biographies

Final report of the Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force

Lead author: Michael E. White

Co-chairs: Deborah Lee James and Ryan McCarthy

Task force director: Stephen Rodriguez

Program director: Clementine G. Starling-Daniels*

Task force staff: Mark J. Massa and Jonathan Rosenstein

* Starling-Daniels’s contributions were completed prior to her departure from a fulltime role at the Atlantic Council in September 2025.

Task force members

Deborah Lee James, board director, Atlantic Council; twenty-third secretary of the Air Force; co-chair of the Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force, Atlantic Council

Ryan McCarthy, twenty-fourth secretary of the Army; co-chair of the Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force, Atlantic Council

Jim Cooper, former US representative (D-TN-05); former chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee

Madelyn Creedon, former assistant secretary of defense for global strategic affairs, US Department of Defense

Doug Lamborn, former US representative (R-CO-05); former chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee

James McConville, general (ret.), US Army; fortieth chief of staff, US Army

Whitney McNamara, senior vice president, Beacon Global Strategies; nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Industry task force members

Felipe Gomez del Campo, CEO, Specter Aerospace

Mick Maher, chief strategy and commercial officer, Amaero

Katrina “Kat” Hornstein, director, vehicle systems, Ursa Major

Michael Johns, senior vice president, Kratos

Mike Manazir, vice president, federal, Hadrian

Mark Rettig, vice president and general manager, Edison Works, GE Aerospace

Ralph Sandfry, director, advanced capabilities, Lockheed Martin

Zach Shore, chief revenue officer, Hermeus

Brian Zimmerman, senior vice president, global defense, Booz Allen Hamilton

Advisors

Reginald Brothers, former under secretary for science and technology, US Department of Homeland Security

Justin Johnson, former senior official performing the duties of the assistant secretary of defense for space policy

Lead author and methodology

Michael E. White was the inaugural principal director for hypersonics in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, serving from October 2018 to June 2023. In that capacity, White was responsible for leading the Pentagon’s vision and strategy for developing offensive and defensive warfighting capability enabled by hypersonic systems. White previously served as the head of the air and missile defense sector at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL). White is a board director of North Wind USA Inc., which provides research, development, test, and evaluation products and services in aerospace and defense, and of Textum, which produces advanced textiles and aerospace composites. As managing member of WhiteAero, LLC, he is a senior defense consultant for hypersonic, air, and missile defense systems and tactical and strategic strike systems. WhiteAero’s clients include Lockheed Martin and GE Aerospace, which are both supporters of the Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force and producers of hypersonic capabilities, as well as Stratolaunch, X-Bow Systems, Cerberus Capital Management, Karman Space and Defense, Textum, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, JHU/APL, ACMI, and Riverside Research, all of which are involved in hypersonic capabilities.

As part of the research process for this report, the lead author conducted several dozen interviews and consultations with members of the Atlantic Council’s Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force, current and former officials in the US Department of Defense, congressional staff members, and industry representatives. The full task force convened several times over the course of the project to develop the findings reflected in this report, but the report’s analysis and recommendations do not necessarily reflect the views of all individuals consulted. This effort was conducted under the leadership of task force director Stephen Rodriguez, former Forward Defense director Clementine G. Starling-Daniels, deputy director Mark J. Massa, and program assistant Jonathan Rosenstein.

This effort has been made possible through the support of Amaero, Booz Allen Hamilton, GE Aerospace, Hadrian, Hermeus, Kratos, Lockheed Martin, Nominal, RTX, Specter Aerospace, and Ursa Major.

The Atlantic Council maintains strict intellectual independence for all of its projects and publications. The Council requires all donors to agree to the Council maintaining independent control of the content and conclusions of any products resulting from sponsored projects.

Foreword

The United States stands at a critical juncture. The strategic environment is defined by the return of great power competition and the rapid proliferation of advanced military technologies that challenge long-held US advantages. China and Russia have invested heavily in systems designed to deny US forces access to key theaters and to strike their forward-deployed assets and allies with unprecedented speed.

The fielding of hundreds of hypersonic weapons by US adversaries represents a paradigm shift in modern warfare, creating a battlefield asymmetry that the United States cannot afford to ignore. This challenge demands more than incremental improvements to the existing force; it requires a fundamental rethinking of the US strategy for deterrence and defense. During our time leading the US Air Force and US Army, we saw good progress against these objectives, but there is much more to be done.

That is why we have served as co-chairs of the Atlantic Council’s Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force. In its final report, the task force puts forth a clear-eyed assessment of this challenge and offers a comprehensive road map for action. The concept of integrated comprehensive layered defeat provides the strategic framework, and the imperative to field offensive hypersonic capabilities provides the critical tool. The recommendations outlined herein are actionable, urgent, and essential to ensuring the United States can meet the demands of this new era. Now is the time to act decisively to close the hypersonic gap and defend the nation’s interests for the future.

The Hon. Deborah Lee James
Twenty-third secretary of the US Air Force;
Co-chair, Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force

The Hon. Ryan McCarthy
Twenty-fourth secretary of the US Army;
Co-chair, Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force

Executive summary

Potential US adversaries such as China and Russia are creating an increasingly contested anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environment, posing a severe challenge to US battlefield dominance on land, at sea, in the air, and in space. It is imperative that the United States develop and field hypersonic strike weapons, in substantial numbers, as part of an integrated comprehensive layered defeat strategy that delivers left- and right-of-launch defeat of each adversary A2/AD capability through integrated kinetic and nonkinetic effects to defeat vulnerable kill-chain elements of the adversary’s warfighting capability. Hypersonic strike systems enable delivery of timely, survivable, lethal effects from outside of an adversary’s defensive perimeter in a timescale of relevance and are essential to ensuring future US warfighting preeminence on a highly contested battlefield. It is also imperative that the United States aggressively pursue defense against adversary hypersonic strike systems to combat the growing number of such systems being fielded.

To address these hypersonic imperatives, it is essential that the US Department of Defense pursue and Congress fund: robust acquisition of the current generation of hypersonic weapons and counter-hypersonic interceptors; block upgrades to these systems to field advanced capability and significantly improve affordability; accelerated development of next-generation systems to achieve affordable capacity; technology maturation to increase capability and affordability for hypersonic strike weapons, hypersonic interceptors, and future reusable hypersonic aircraft; critical workforce initiatives; expansion of the nation’s test infrastructure and modeling and simulation capabilities to accelerate advanced concept development; robust long-range kill webs to allow for effective employment of hypersonic capabilities; and cooperation with allies and partners to coproduce these weapons and interceptors and integrate them into whole-of-alliance defense strategies and plans.

Beyond closing the immediate missile gap, this report also recommends a dedicated effort to mature reusable hypersonic aircraft. These systems offer a transformational capability for persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and responsive strike missions in highly contested environments, ensuring enduring US leadership in the next generation of warfare.

The hypersonic imperative

Any future US battle against a great power rival, and particularly against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Indo-Pacific theater and the Russian Federation in the European theater, will be fought in a highly contested environment where US battlefield dominance will be challenged in each of the warfighting domains: land, air, sea, and space. This challenge will come in the form of the A2/AD warfighting-capability areas described below:

Large numbers of high-speed strike systems, such as ballistic missiles, supersonic missiles, and hypersonic missiles, along with many more conventional subsonic uncrewed aerial vehicles and cruise missiles. These threats will place at risk US, allied, and partner forward land bases and carrier-based sea bases.
Increasingly sophisticated air and missile defense systems designed to prohibit penetration of US strike aircraft and defeat traditional strike weapons.
Terrestrial and spaced-based antisatellite systems that will challenge the space-based elements of US and allied ISR capabilities and the space portions of US kill chains.
Fifth-generation fighters armed with air-to-air missiles with very long ranges that will challenge US air superiority.
Land, maritime, and air-launched antiship and antisubmarine capabilities that will challenge US maritime dominance.
Nonkinetic disrupters, including laser and high-powered microwave systems, cyberattack capabilities, and electromagnetic (EM) spectrum jamming and spoofing, which will challenge all elements of the US offensive and defensive capability suite.¹

These systems create what is oftentimes referred to as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy that proliferates and integrates these high-end systems, at extended range, in a way that is designed to defeat traditional US warfighting capability, including traditional strike weapon systems. (See figures 1 and 2.)

Figure 1: Notional depiction of Russian A2/AD strategy in the European theater

Figure 2: Notional depiction of Chinese A2/AD strategy in the Pacific theater

Defining the challenge

The combination of adversary offensive and defensive capabilities described above create a highly contested environment that has the potential to severely degrade the US ability to maintain battlefield dominance. Addressing these challenges requires an integrated comprehensive layered defeat (ICLD) strategy. (See figure 3.)

Figure 3: Example system elements for ICLD capability to fight within a timescale of relevance

ICLD involves breaking the needed US capability space into four quadrants that include left- and right-of-launch defeat (i.e., before and after launch) of each adversary A2/AD capability, and aggressive use of kinetic and nonkinetic defeat mechanisms (in both phases) to attack and disable vulnerable elements of each respective kill chain. Effective integration of the ICLD warfighting capability requires a dedicated battle management system working to optimize employment across all four capability elements. High-priority targets should be identified based on the specific strategy and mission plan being employed. This strategy should be applied to each element of the adversary’s A2/AD environment.

Take, for example, the mission to defeat the adversary’s strike missile capability described in the A2/AD capability area above. The missile defense modality that gets the most attention is kinetic intercept of an incoming missile by a missile defense system, such as the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Patriot, and Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) for theater defense, or the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, with the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) or eventually the Next-Generation Interceptor (NGI), for defeating nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles.² These systems consist of an integrated network of sensors, command-and-control elements, and interceptors required to perform the detect, control, and engage functions necessary to defeat incoming missiles. While US kinetic, postlaunch missile defeat capability is significant and necessary, it is not sufficient, due to challenges associated with overwhelming numbers, sophisticated tactics, and advanced threats such as hypersonic missiles. These challenges can reduce the effectiveness of each element of the defensive fire-control loop and make defense against a capable adversary very challenging, at best. It therefore becomes essential that the other three elements of the ICLD construct, namely, right-of-launch nonkinetic defeat mechanisms and left-of-launch kinetic and nonkinetic defeat mechanisms, be brought to the fight and integrated to ensure maximum probability of an effective defense. This necessity applies across all six of the A2/AD target areas described above.

While integrated employment of kinetic and nonkinetic options will maximize the effectiveness of postlaunch missile defense systems, a capable and determined adversary can overwhelm a defensive system with numbers and tactics. Therefore, maximum effort must be applied to defeating adversary capability before launch. In other words, an effective defense requires a good offense to deny and degrade the adversary’s ability to employ its A2/AD-enabling systems.

For left-of-launch nonkinetic attack, the objectives are to degrade and/or disable foundational elements of the adversary’s prelaunch kill chain. These include degrading the adversary’s ability to detect and geolocate US targets and to communicate that targeting information to its respective launch assets to help prevent launch. Additionally, attacks on the adversary command-and-control infrastructure would also be an effective means of prelaunch nonkinetic attack.

Even with the other three elements of the ICLD construct, left-of-launch kinetic strike remains an essential component of an effective ICLD construct by enabling the prelaunch physical destruction of required system elements, thereby limiting the number of threats that must be defeated after launch. While the United States has traditionally used subsonic strike capabilities on a battlefield where the timescale of relevance is measured in hours and days, the effectiveness of these systems is severely degraded by today’s peer adversaries that can deploy both high-speed systems to dramatically compress the battlefield timescale and high-end defensive systems to create a highly contested airspace out to an increasingly long range. On such a battlefield, traditional US long-range strike capabilities are simply insufficient to adequately perform the kinetic strike element of ICLD to achieve left-of-launch defeat of time-critical elements of adversary A2/AD capabilities, due to insufficient speed of action at meaningful range and poor survivability. This deficiency greatly jeopardizes the US ability to achieve and maintain battlefield dominance, creating the imperative to field hypersonic strike weapons in meaningful numbers. Once fielded, hypersonic weapons will better enable and then complement more traditional strike capabilities, providing a significant force multiplier.

To fully appreciate the growing asymmetry and the imperative to accelerate the fielding of US hypersonic systems, it is important to understand some of the key challenges and assess the relative status of US hypersonic capability versus China and Russia.

Addressing the challenge

Hypersonic strike systems provide a unique combination of range, speed, survivability, and maneuverability to deliver lethal kinetic effects to defeat a wide range of critical targets in a highly contested environment and within a battlefield timescale of relevance. An aggressive transition to, and fielding of, hypersonic strike capabilities in meaningful numbers is essential to enable US forces to fight in the increasingly compressed timescale being dictated by adversaries’ fielding of high-speed strike systems. The importance of being able to eliminate such an asymmetry between the United States and China was highlighted by then-nominee for Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth when he stated that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces can launch a strike from the Chinese mainland on US carriers located in the Pacific theater within twenty minutes.³ This statement reflects the fact that China has fielded a large number of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic and hypersonic glide weapons designed to carry out high-speed attacks of US and allied forward land and sea bases in the first and second island chain. In both China and Russia, traditional intercontinental nuclear ballistic missiles are being augmented by hypersonic systems being developed, and in some cases fielded, that place the US homeland more at risk. The adversary’s fielding of these weapons dramatically compresses the timescale of any future battle and creates uncertainty that may affect US decision calculus. Without the US fielding of similarly capable systems, a dangerous asymmetry will persist that will dramatically affect the United States’ deterrence posture. This battlefield asymmetry must be addressed with a dedicated and accelerated effort to field US hypersonic strike capabilities to enable success on the tactical battlefield, enhance the effectiveness of the US nuclear deterrent, and provide another rung on the escalation ladder prior to the use of nuclear weapons.

The target sets that define the needed hypersonic strike capabilities for this essential capability include key terrestrial elements of the adversary A2/AD capability areas (described above) such as: the long-range, high-speed strike systems that threaten US forward land, sea, and air bases; integrated air and missile defense launch complexes; terrestrial sites that support adversary kill chains (specifically, command, control, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting [C4ISR&T] nodes); terrestrial components of adversary anti-space capabilities; and other high-value, time-critical, and heavily defended targets. The number of targets that will require hypersonic strike missile allocation early in a war is significant, making it imperative to not only develop survivable, long-range hypersonic strike capabilities, but also to field that capability in significant numbers. This translates into the need to create and fund a family of affordable hypersonic systems supported by a robust and properly incentivized industrial base to deliver affordable hypersonic capacity.

Adversary hypersonic strike capability

The current gap in high-speed and hypersonic capability is significant and growing rapidly. Russia and China have both aggressively developed and fielded hypersonic strike capabilities. Russia has fielded the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile that has been used against Ukraine. Moscow also has fielded the Tsirkon ship-launched hypersonic strike missile and a new intermediate-range, multiple independent reentry vehicle-equipped ballistic missile with a conventional warhead, also used in Ukraine. Perhaps most notably, Russia has fielded the Avangard intercontinental missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle carrying a nuclear warhead that threatens the US homeland.⁴

The 3M22 Tsirkon missile. (Russian Ministry of Defense)

The Avangard. (Russian Ministry of Defense)

The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal. (kremlin.ru)

China has fielded numerous short-, medium-, and intermediate-range high-speed strike systems including ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles with maneuvering reentry vehicles, and hypersonic glide vehicles that can target US and allied land bases in the first and second island chains as well as US aircraft carrier sea bases at extended range. These systems include, among others, the DF-17, the DF-21 family of missiles, and the DF-26 family of missiles. The recent PRC military parade displayed supersonic and hypersonic cruise missiles. Additionally, Beijing has demonstrated and is on the path to fielding global-range strike systems, as shown by the PRC’s nuclear modernization efforts coupled with a fractional orbital system that was flight tested in 2021.⁵

The DF-26. (Wikimedia)

The DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. (Wikimedia)

The DF-17 Intermediate Range Hypersonic Glide Weapon. (Wikimedia)

Russia and China have fielded many hundreds of high-speed strike systems that today pose a dramatic threat to forward land and sea bases as well as to the US homeland. Beyond Russia and China, there have also been numerous media reports that indicate the likely development and deployment of hypersonic systems in North Korea and Iran, among others.⁶ The asymmetry created by the tactical employment of these systems by nonpeer adversaries is likely not as much of a critical issue given their lack of other key capabilities across the battlefield landscape, but they still pose a clear and present threat to US forward presence and to US allies—and the potential for future nuclear versions could be catastrophic.

US hypersonic capability

The United States, which for years had a lead in research related to hypersonic technologies, has been late in recognizing and embracing the military significance of hypersonic systems, which coupled with rapid advancements by US adversaries has created an asymmetry that is growing and that has the potential to jeopardize future US and allied deterrence and battlefield dominance. With an eye toward addressing that asymmetry, there has been good progress in the United States over the past seven years or so relative to developing a family of first-generation hypersonic strike systems for air, land, and sea launch.⁷ However, it is important to note that these systems are just now getting to the point of being ready for fielding.

The AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon Instrumented Measurement Vehicle 2. (Giancarlo Casem for the US Air Force)

Long Range Hypersonic Weapon Transporter Erector Launchers. (Ryan DeBooy/David Kim for the US Army)

A Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile. (Lindsey Iniguez for the US Air Force)

The Army and Navy have worked to develop a common hypersonic missile that can deliver a hypersonic glide body with a conventional warhead that will be able to strike critical targets that are on the order of 1,700 miles downrange in a matter of minutes. That capability is now ready for fielding by the Army as the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), aka Dark Eagle. The plan is for that same missile to be fielded as the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) weapon on Zumwalt-class destroyers and then on Virginia-class submarines.⁸

The Air Force developed a long-range strike system called the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), based on the joint Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and Air Force Tactical Boost Glide program. The integrated ARRW weapon system capability was demonstrated in a successful flight demonstration program that culminated in 2024.⁹ That system delivers survivable, lethal effects many hundreds of miles downrange in minutes. The Air Force completed development of ARRW in 2024 but decided not to field ARRW when it was ready. The new administration has included funding for ARRW procurement and fielding in President Donald Trump’s Fiscal Year 2026 budget request.

The Air Force has continued to allocate funding to develop an air-launched Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) capability.¹⁰ Air-launched, lower-cost hypersonic cruise missiles are an important element of the hypersonic strike portfolio because they are more affordable, smaller, and can be fielded in significant numbers on a wide variety of aircraft.

In addition to the significant progress being made in US development efforts for this family of first-generation strike weapons, there are numerous other key efforts of note. There has been significant additional funding allocated to the Test Resources Management Center (TRMC) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to bolster and energize the nation’s hypersonic test and evaluation enterprise and enhance capability and throughput for ground and flight test.¹¹ There also has been additional OSD funding allocated to bolster the hypersonic industrial base, with presidential determinations signed for munitions, high-temperature materials, propulsion, and guidance and navigation.¹² The Joint Hypersonic Transition Office (JHTO) is making investments in the University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics to help prepare the next-generation workforce and is accelerating the transition of advanced technologies.¹³ There has also been significant private capital funding allocated to establish a cadre of small companies to augment the traditional defense industrial base addressing some of the key hypersonic challenges, such as enabling a much more rapid flight test cadence to accelerate learning and development.

With all that said, the United States continues to face a growing battlefield asymmetry in hypersonic and high-speed weapon systems that jeopardizes US deterrence effectiveness and threatens to degrade or eliminate US battlefield dominance in all warfighting domains. The United States must move more aggressively to close the gap in fielding hypersonic weapon capabilities to ensure that such an asymmetry does not stand.

Meeting the imperative

The gap in high-speed and hypersonic systems has resulted in major implications for the US ability to deter and, if necessary, prevail on the battlefield. The capability gap is magnified by the aggressive deployment of the broader A2/AD strategy discussed earlier and the highly contested warfighting environment being established by US adversaries across all warfighting domains. It is imperative that the gap between the hypersonic capability needed to defeat critical adversary A2/AD capability and the current US trajectory for fielding offensive and defensive systems be aggressively closed. Addressing this imperative is essential to ensuring that the United States can operate in a battlefield timescale of relevancewhile also addressing the highly contested environment that has been created across all battlefield domains. Fielding hypersonic strike systems in significant numbers is essential to enabling defeat of the rapidly increasing set of heavily defended, time-critical targets that simply cannot be addressed with the US military’s legacy set of subsonic strike weapons.

It is important to appreciate that the imperative to field hypersonic strike capability does not replace the need for more traditional US weapons. Quite to the contrary, hypersonic weapons are essential to enabling the United States and its allies to fully leverage their traditional capabilities by defeating high-end adversary systems early in a conflict and “decontesting” the battlefield environment. Therefore, the near-term gap that exists and continues to grow is in the ability to field the number and types of weapons necessary to defeat the heavily defended, time-critical target set that the adversary has employed to challenge US battlefield dominance on land, at sea, in the air, and in space. Looking beyond this immediate need, reusable hypersonic aircraft present an opportunity to achieve this decontesting effect with greater persistence and flexibility. A reusable platform can conduct ISR missions to locate and track mobile targets, a critical enabler for the entire strike complex, and then execute or coordinate a strike itself, providing a rapid sensor-to-shooter capability that expendable missiles alone cannot.

Remaining challenges

While there has been good progress on developing the first generation of US hypersonic systems, there are still significant challenges that remain to accelerate fielding of US capability in the numbers necessary to address adversary A2/AD capabilities. Most important among those challenges is affordability. Current systems being fielded by the United States are based on accelerated prototype designs transitioned to a production environment. The system designs were not optimized for affordability and high-rate production and, as such, initial units are more expensive than traditional strike weapons that have been in production for years or decades. The cost will come down as the production rate increases, but the services must prioritize production at cost-efficient rates and institute cost-reduction initiatives to ensure the United States can affordably field the necessary capacity in the near term.

The United States must ensure that the warfighter is equipped to fully leverage the fielding of the hypersonic strike capabilities. As they are fielded, there must also be a high-priority effort to integrate hypersonic strike capability into US deterrence strategies and war plans for future conflicts. In so doing, DOD planners must include a focus on diverse platform integration, production in meaningful numbers, war plan utilization strategies, and, perhaps most importantly, development and implementation of a robust and effective long-range kill web.¹⁴

A critical challenge that must be overcome to close the capability gap is the inherent bias by the services, and some in OSD, toward next-generation air, land, and sea platforms at the expense of weapon quantity and capability. Each service has historically prioritized funding for development of next-generation platforms that have grown increasingly more complex and expensive due to the need to operate in an ever more contested environment, and they are almost always years late and billions of dollars over budget. As a result, weapons programs have consistently been bill-payers for platform priorities and overruns.

Nothing will be possible without an energized and expanded industrial base that embraces speed of development, affordability, and innovation across the portfolio. The current industrial base is simply not equipped or incentivized to innovate, design, and build hypersonic weapons to achieve affordable capacity. There must be a dramatic shift in perspective to embrace a model that is much more like the automobile, commercial aerospace, and commercial space-access industries than the traditional defense contractor business model. New and innovative contracting incentives should be created through collaboration between the government and industry to motivate the industry behavior essential to national success (i.e., rapid, on-time delivery of highly capable systems at or below clearly defined cost objectives). Investments in the hypersonic industrial base necessary to address this deficiency can come in the form of Defense Production Act Title III investments, Innovation Capability and Modernization (ICAM) program and Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) program investments, and Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) program investments.¹⁵ However, these investments should be targeted to new and innovative ways of achieving affordable capacity for hypersonic systems and should not be used to simply build up traditional industry to do more of the same.

A call for action

The DOD and Congress can, and should, take numerous additional actions to rapidly and efficiently field warfighting capability based on hypersonic strike systems, and to bolster capabilities for defense against rapidly proliferating adversary hypersonic strike and, more broadly, growing A2/AD capabilities. Recommended actions include the following.

1. Create a munitions czar to oversee weapons development and procurement

Problem statement

The US military services are platform-centric, with weapon programs often having lower priority than development and procurement of current and next-generation platforms. These platforms are notoriously expensive, with delays measured in years and consistent cost overruns totaling billions of dollars. Services historically defund weapons programs to pay for these overruns, while also slow-rolling advanced weapons activities that might in any way compete politically with the advanced platform budget allocations.

Recommendation

The DOD should create a direct reporting program manager (DRPM) for weapons, a “weapons czar,” reporting directly to the deputy secretary of defense, and elevate the principal director for hypersonics to be a direct report to that DRPM, with responsibility and authority for defining the vision, strategy, and execution plans for all high-speed weapons programs, including defense against adversary high-speed weapons, in close coordination with the DRPM handling the proposed “Golden Dome” missile shield. The weapons czar should have authority over advanced weapon budget allocations and be held accountable for program execution.

2. Aggressively field and evolve first-generation hypersonic weapons

Problem statement

The United States has made good progress developing its first generation of hypersonic strike weapons. However, fielding has been delayed by technical challenges, budget battles, and shifting priorities, while adversaries continue to expand their arsenals. These initial systems, designed as accelerated prototypes, are also not yet optimized for affordability or high-rate production.

Recommendation

The DOD and Congress should ensure stable funding and priority to aggressively field first-generation hypersonic weapons across air, land, and sea launch platforms at the earliest possible dates, and fully equip units at levels consistent with the DOD’s analysis of warfighting needs. The DOD must work with industry to drive down costs as production rates increase. A block-upgrade strategy should be implemented for each system to rapidly insert advanced capabilities and enhance affordability, allowing them to service a broader set of targets and be procured and fielded in the necessary numbers.

3. Prioritize next-generation hypersonic systems designed for affordable capacity

Problem statement

While first-generation systems are critical for closing the immediate capability gap that adversaries have opened regarding expendable hypersonic missiles, the initial cost of first-generation US systems will limit the capacity that the United States can affordably field. To counter the sheer number of targets presented by the A2/AD strategies of peer adversaries, the United States requires a next-generation family of long-range, high-speed strike systems designed from the outset for affordable, high-rate production and broad launch-platform compatibility. The current industrial base is not structured or incentivized for this kind of rapid, cost-effective innovation.

At the same time, focusing solely on mirroring adversaries’ approach surrenders the strategic initiative. An opportunity remains to lead in the next transformational capability: reusable hypersonic aircraft for responsive ISR and strike missions. As space becomes increasingly contested, hypersonic aircraft could decisively counter adversary A2/AD strategies by enabling persistent, survivable operations from within contested zones.

Recommendation

The DOD should robustly fund two distinct but complementary lines of effort for affordable capacity:

(a) Next-generation expendable missiles: Pursue a family of lower-cost, high-capacity missiles for affordable capacity designed to service a broad set of A2/AD targets. This should be done through competitive programs that incentivize traditional companies to deliver affordable capacity, and inspire new and innovative companies, including nontraditional commercial firms, to compete against the traditional defense industrial base. These programs should set firm cost requirements and a trade space of performance objectives, with the goal of achieving optimal affordability. High-capacity designs must be integrated with air, land, and sea launch platforms that allow for delivery of high-capacity effects on a highly contested battlefield.
(b) Foundational reusable aircraft programs: Aggressively fund technology maturation and demonstrator programs for reusable hypersonic aircraft. While the initial investment is higher, these platforms offer the prospect of significantly lower cost per sortie for persistent ISR and strike missions over their lifecycle, representing the most viable path to truly affordable and sustainable capacity. Affordability must be a key driver to the design process at the earliest stages of this effort.

4. Mandate and resource an ICLD strategy

Problem statement

Fielding offensive hypersonic weapons is only one part of the solution to defeating complex A2/AD environments created by adversaries. Battlefield dominance will require both an architecture and approach that is holistic. Relying solely on postlaunch kinetic interceptors (like Patriot or THAAD) is insufficient due to challenges of overwhelming numbers, sophisticated tactics, and the unique flight characteristics of adversary cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missile threats.

Recommendation

The DOD must formally integrate the fielding of offensive and defensive hypersonic systems into an integrated comprehensive layered defeat architecture. This framework should be adopted and must be resourced to include robust pre- and post-launch kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities. It should be an underpinning of both homeland defense (such as the proposed “Golden Dome” missile shield) and theater warfighting strategies, leveraging hypersonic strike as a critical left-of-launch enabler to disrupt and destroy adversary systems before they can be used while defeating every other element of the adversary kill chain through the integration of kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities.

5. Accelerate learning through an integrated national test enterprise

Problem statement

The pace of developing and fielding hypersonic systems is directly tied to the ability to test them early and often in a development cycle. The nation’s once-robust hypersonic ground- and flight-test infrastructure, while improving, continues to be a bottleneck, slowing down the development cycle for next-generation hypersonic systems.

Recommendation

The United States must continue to enhance its hypersonic ground and flight tests and its modeling and simulation (M&S) capabilities to enable accelerated learning and development. This enterprise must be resourced to support both rapid iteration of expendable missile designs and the more complex, sustained flight test campaigns required for reusable air-breathing aircraft. The progress made by the TRMC in ground testing, flight testing, and enhanced test-range telemetry should be embraced and robustly funded. The HyperCorr program, emphasizing ground and flight test efforts tightly coupled to high-fidelity M&S, should be accelerated. Greater emphasis should be placed on tightly coupling these TRMC investments to the overarching objectives of the DOD hypersonics program portfolio, with emphasis on accelerated development of affordable capacity for future hypersonic capability.

6. Energize allied codevelopment and coproduction

Problem statement

The United States will likely not face an adversary alone in any future major conflict. Collaboration with allies on the development and deployment of advanced high-speed systems has been limited by information-sharing challenges, missing key opportunities to share costs, leverage innovation, and together build a more integrated and capable coalition force.

Recommendation

The United States must work diligently with allies to cooperatively develop, produce, and deploy advanced and affordable hypersonic strike capabilities. Cooperative programs, such as AUKUS Pillar 2, which focuses on developing and delivering emerging technology, should be nurtured and expanded to advance alliances, foster innovation, and field capabilities in more meaningful numbers.¹⁶ Collaboration should be enhanced with all allies pursuing advanced high-speed systems, and with the removal of barriers to information and technology sharing, wherever it is possible.

7. Modernize theater and strategic nuclear delivery options

Problem statement

Adversary integrated air defenses and nuclear-modernization efforts are challenging the survivability of legacy nuclear delivery systems. For example, the F-35A dual-capable aircraft, central to NATO’s nuclear mission, is not likely to remain sufficiently survivable in the 2030s against peer defenses in all relevant scenarios.¹⁷

Recommendation

The DOD should pursue hypersonic delivery options for future strategic and tactical nuclear weapons to ensure enduring deterrence. A high-speed, air-delivered standoff weapon should be considered to augment and then replace B61 gravity bombs for the NATO mission. The United States should consider new nuclear capabilities that would be delivered by highly responsive systems, like hypersonic weapons, capable of penetrating advanced defenses with high reliability.

8. Bolster layered defenses against hypersonic threats

Problem statement

Defending against adversary hypersonic strike weapons is exceptionally difficult. These threats challenge all aspects of the defensive fire-control loop, from detection to engagement, due to their speed, range, altitude, and highly maneuverable and unpredictable trajectories.

Recommendation

The DOD must pursue a defense-in-depth, layered strategy for counter-hypersonic defense. Crucially, this kinetic shield must be integrated with nonkinetic defensive layers, such as capabilities that degrade or deny satellite navigation, communication, and terminal missile seekers, to maximize the probability of defeat. This postlaunch capability is a necessary, but not sufficient, element of the ICLD architecture.

9. Develop robust long-range kill webs for hypersonic strike capability

Problem statement

Current kill webs for effective employment of long-range strike missiles require considerable time and effort and can be brittle. This vulnerability limits the ability to deliver meaningful warfighting capability in a highly contested A2/AD environment. Warfighting effectiveness for long-range strike systems can be significantly enhanced relative to traditional weapon employment by the integration of hypersonic strike weapons. Hypersonic weapons are inherently survivable due to their ability to maneuver unpredictably and fly high-altitude, high-speed trajectories. This characteristic dramatically reduces both mission planning time prior to weapon employment and target custody duration for relocatable and moving targets.

Recommendation

The DOD should significantly enhance the development and fielding of robust long-range strike kill-web capabilities, fully leveraging the advantages of hypersonic strike weapons. An integrated and specific initiative should be funded to enhance time-critical targeting capabilities that would leverage the full spectrum of US and allied ISR and targeting systems.

10. Rapidly transition advanced technology and enhance the workforce to support future hypersonic capability development and production

Problem statement

The JHTO has responsibility for this area of the national strategy. JHTO has, so far, done a good job in creating the University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics. However, JHTO budgets have been limited beyond that. Workforce challenges and resulting technology maturation timelines are bottlenecks to further scaling the development and production of hypersonic capabilities.

Recommendation

The DOD should champion a whole-of-nation effort to address workforce initiatives and science and technology advancements to quicken the pace for future development, production, and fielding. The department and Congress should robustly fund the JHTO to identify and aggressively develop new technology for rapid transition to next-generation systems and to accelerate upgrades for existing systems. Initiatives should include the maturation of concepts and technology driven by the need to deliver affordable capacity and advanced capabilities, including future reusable hypersonic aircraft. Finally, the JHTO should more tightly couple its workforce and technology development strategies to the needs of traditional and nontraditional industry to enable accelerated development of future affordable hypersonic systems.

Conclusion

Potential adversaries, particularly China and Russia, are creating an increasingly contested environment that severely challenges US battlefield dominance. A central element of this challenge is their fielding of a variety of high-speed and hypersonic strike systems designed to attack US and allied forces at long range and with overwhelming speed.

To ensure US battlefield preeminence, the Pentagon must develop and field capabilities to enable execution of an integrated comprehensive layered defeat strategy that leverages kinetic and nonkinetic means to defeat adversary capabilities. As part of this strategy, it is imperative for the United States to develop and field its own hypersonic strike weapons in substantial numbers to enable US forces to operate effectively and survive on the modern battlefield by defeating adversary high-end capabilities in a battlefield timescale of relevance.

To that end, the Department of Defense and Congress should aggressively move forward to field first-generation air-, land-, and sea-launched hypersonic strike weapons; develop and field a next-generation family of affordable hypersonic strike systems in meaningful numbers; mature and demonstrate future hypersonic aircraft technologies; and energize the foundational enablers of the industrial base, test infrastructure, technology, and workforce. Simultaneously, the United States must bolster its defenses against adversary air and missile threats through implementation of the full spectrum of ICLD capabilities. The time to act is now to close the growing gap in offensive and defensive hypersonic capability and ensure the United States’ ability to deter and, if necessary, win in any future conflict.

List of acronyms

Acronym	Definition
A2/AD	Anti-access/area-denial
ARRW	Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon system
BMD	Ballistic missile defense
C4ISR	Command, control, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CPS	Conventional Prompt Strike (weapon system)
DOD	US Department of Defense
DRPM	Direct reporting program manager
EM	Electromagnetic
GBI	Ground-Based Interceptor
HACM	Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile
IBAS	Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (program)
ICAM	Innovation Capability and Modernization (program)
ICLD	Integrated comprehensive layered defeat strategy
ISR	Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JHTO	Joint Hypersonic Transition Office
LRHW	Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, or the “Dark Eagle”
M&S	Modeling and simulation
ManTech	Manufacturing technology
NGI	Next-Generation Interceptor
OSD	Office of the US Secretary of Defense
PRC	People’s Republic of China
THAAD	Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
TRMC	Test Resources Management Center
UCAH	University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics

Biographies

Co-chairs

Deborah Lee James is an Atlantic Council board director and served as the twenty-third secretary of the US Air Force from 2013 to 2017. In this capacity, she was responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and providing for the welfare of the Department of the Air Force’s nearly 660,000 active-duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen and their families. She also oversaw the Air Force’s annual budget of more than $139 billion.

James has extensive homeland and national security experience in the federal government and the private sector. In the private sector, she served as president of Science Applications International Corporation’s Technical and Engineering Sector, as executive vice president and chief operating officer at Business Executives for National Security, and as vice president at United Technologies.

In earlier government positions, James served as assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, in the office of the assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs, and as a professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee.

James earned a bachelor of arts degree in comparative area studies from Duke University and a master’s degree in international affairs from Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs. She served as co-chair of the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption.

Ryan D. McCarthy served as the twenty-fourth secretary of the US Army from 2019 to 2021. In this capacity, he was responsible for the recruitment, organization, training, equipping, and care of 1.4 million active-duty, National Guard, and Reserve soldiers, Department of the Army civilians, and their families. Prior to this role, he served as the thirty-third under secretary of the Army from 2017 to 2019.

McCarthy has extensive national security experience in government and the private sector. Prior to his confirmation as the under secretary of the Army, McCarthy worked for Lockheed Martin Corporation in vice president roles responsible for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program and the company’s global security policy. Earlier in his career, he was a vice president for HSBC.

In earlier government positions, he served as special assistant to then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, as the special assistant to the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, and as a professional staff member of the US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations. McCarthy proudly served in the US Army from 1997 to 2002 and was involved in combat operations in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom with the 75th Ranger Regiment. He holds a bachelor of arts in history from Virginia Military Institute and a master of business administration from the University of Maryland’s School of Business.

Lead author

Michael E. White was the inaugural principal director for hypersonics in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, serving from October 2018 to June 2023. In that capacity, White was responsible for leading the Pentagon’s vision and strategy for developing offensive and defensive warfighting capability enabled by hypersonic systems. White previously served as the head of the air and missile defense sector at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL). White is a board director of North Wind USA Inc., which provides research, development, test, and evaluation products and services in aerospace and defense, and of Textum, which produces advanced textiles and aerospace composites. As managing member of WhiteAero, LLC, he is a senior defense consultant for hypersonic, air, and missile defense systems and tactical and strategic strike systems.WhiteAero’s clients include Lockheed Martin and GE Aerospace, which are both supporters of the Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force and producers of hypersonic capabilities, as well as Stratolaunch, X-Bow Systems, Cerberus Capital Management, Karman Space and Defense, Textum, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, JHU/APL, ACMI, and Riverside Research, all of which are involved in hypersonic capabilities.

Task force director

Stephen Rodriguez is the founder of One Defense, a technology-enabled consulting firm that identifies advanced commercial capabilities and accelerates their transition into the defense industrial base. He was a senior leader at an artificial intelligence growth-stage company and a global defense corporation. He has also been in and out of the US government throughout his career, including operational service in Colombia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan. Rodriguez serves on the boards of fourteen venture-backed companies, including Applied Intuition, Chariot Defense, Firestorm, Kela Systems, Smack Technologies, Ursa Major Technologies, and ZeroMark. He is also a commission director at the Atlantic Council, chairman of Blue Forge Alliance, and a life member at the Council on Foreign Relations. Rodriguez received a bachelor of business administration from Texas A&M University and a master’s degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He has been published in the Wall Street Journal, Foreign Policy, War on the Rocks, and National Review.

Program director

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels is the former director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program and is now a nonresident senior fellow with Forward Defense. Her contributions to this task force concluded before she departed her fulltime role at the Council in September 2025. In her role, she shaped the center’s US defense research agenda and produced thought leadership on US security strategies and the evolving character of warfare. Her research focuses on long-term US thinking on issues like China’s and Russia’s defense strategies, space security, defense industry, and emerging technology. Prior to launching Forward Defense, Starling-Daniels served as deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security team, specializing in US security policy toward Europe and NATO. During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling-Daniels authored numerous reports and commentaries on US space strategy, deterrence, operational concepts, coalition warfare, and US-Europe relations. Outlets that have featured her analysis include Bloomberg, Defense One, Defense News, RealClearDefense, the National Interest, SpaceNews, NATO’s Joint Air and Space Power Conference, the BBC, National Public Radio, and ABC News, among others. Starling-Daniels previously worked in the UK Parliament focusing on technology, defense, and Ukraine. She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a bachelor’s degree in international relations and history, and she received her master of arts in security studies from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Task force staff

Mark J. Massa is the deputy director of the Forward Defense program of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He leads Forward Defense’s work on strategic forces policy. He holds a master’s in security studies and a BSFS in science, technology, and international affairs from Georgetown University.

Jonathan Rosenstein is a program assistant in Forward Defense. He supports the program’s strategic forces body of work. He holds a master of security policy studies from The George Washington University and a bachelor’s degree from Tulane University.

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

1 For more on these and other military capabilities in the context of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, see: “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” US Department of Defense (DOD),2024, 80–100, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF.

2 Lockheed Martin, a sponsor of this task force and a client of the lead author’s consultancy, produces THAAD, the Aegis Combat System, and the NGI. RTX, a sponsor of this task force, produces the Patriot system.

3 Shawn Ryan, host, Shawn Ryan Show, podcast, episode 143, “Pete Hegseth-Secretary of Defense Nominee,” November 7, 2024, https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/143-pete-hegseth-secretary-of-defense-nominee/id1492492083?i=1000676048381.

4 “Nuclear Challenges: The Growing Capabilities of Strategic Competitors and Regional Rivals,” US Defense Intelligence Agency, Advanced Capabilities series, 2024, 10–16, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Nuclear_Challenges_2024.pdf.

5 “Military and Security Developments,” US DOD.

6 “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee and National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2020, 14–30, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/11/2002563190/-1/-1/1/2020%20BALLISTIC%20AND%20CRUISE%20MISSILE%20THREAT_FINAL_2OCT_REDUCEDFILE.PDF.

7 Michael E. White, “The Hypersonic Imperative,” Atlantic Council, March 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/strategic-insights-memos/the-hypersonic-imperative/.

8 Lockheed Martin, a sponsor of this task force and a client of the lead author’s consultancy, is the prime systems integrator for the LRHW and CPS. Andrew Feickert, “The US Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW): Dark Eagle,” Congressional Research Service, April 24, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11991/IF11991.33.pdf.

9 Lockheed Martin, a sponsor of this task force and a client of the lead author’s consultancy, is the prime contractor for the ARRW. “AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW),” Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation,2024, 295–297, https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2024/af/2024arrw.pdf?ver=3fXxXiEv-GcV0EYPvwE6qQ%3d%3d.

10 RTX, a sponsor of this task force, is the prime contractor for HACM.

11 “Department of Defense Demonstrates Reusability of Hypersonic Test Vehicle,” US Department of Defense Test Resource Management Center,May 5, 2025, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4174167/department-of-defense-demonstrates-reusability-of-hypersonic-test-vehicle/.

12 Presidential determinations “resolve that certain provisions of law are or are not in the national interest,” according to the law library research guide of The George Washington University’s Jacob Burns Law Library, accessed September 16, 2025. “DOD Strengthens Supply Chains for Hypersonic and Strategic Systems,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy,April 28, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3377605/DOD-strengthens-supply-chains-for-hypersonic-and-strategic-systems/.

13 The University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics has hundreds of universities, research centers, and industry partners as members, listed here: https://hypersonics.tamu.edu/affiliate-members/, including some sponsors of this task force and clients of the lead author’s consultancy. “Annual Hypersonics Consortium Offers University Partnerships and Student Networking Opportunities,” US Department of Defense Under Secretary of Research and Engineering, April 19, 2024, https://www.cto.mil/news/annual-hypersonics-consortium/.

14 While a “kill chain” refers to a linear progression of systems from sensing to effecting a target, the more contemporary “kill web” approach builds in redundancy by linking together many nodes to achieve the desired effect.

15 For recent Atlantic Council work on accelerating the adoption of defense innovation and software-defined capabilities, see: Whitney M. McNamara et al., Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption: Final Report,Atlantic Council, January 16, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/atlantic-council-commission-on-defense-innovation-adoption/; and Whitney M. McNamara, Peter Modigliani, and Tate Nurkin, Commission on Software-Defined Warfare: Final Report, Atlantic Council, March 27, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/atlantic-council-commission-on-software-defined-warfare/.

16 “Defense Official Statement on AUKUS Pillar 2 and Exercise Maritime Big Play,” news release, US Department of Defense, October 24, 2024.

17 Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor for the F-35A, is among the sponsors of this report and is a client of the lead author’s consultancy.

The post The imperative for hypersonic strike weapons and counterhypersonic defenses appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s defense tech sector must guard against innovation drain

Andriy Dovbenko — Thu, 09 Oct 2025 00:01:12 +0000

On the outskirts of Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine, Ukrainian electronic warfare teams are deploying home-grown systems that automatically detect and suppress Russian drones. Along the southern front, domestically developed observation drones are giving Ukrainian troops real-time visibility in contested airspace. These are not prototypes; they’re battle-proven Ukrainian technologies saving lives on a daily basis and shaping the future of warfare.

Yet as Ukraine cements its reputation as a defense tech powerhouse, a strategic risk is emerging. Without robust intellectual property (IP) protections, Ukraine may lose control of the very breakthroughs that are currently helping to defend the country on the battlefield. Ukraine could potentially win the war itself and secure national survival, only to lose the innovation economy that should underpin its recovery.

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Wartime urgency creates pressure to sacrifice IP sovereignty. Startups under fire need capital, global market access, and production capacity which foreign investors and international partners can provide. But too often, these deals require handing over IP rights. What looks like a lifeline can, in fact, be a strategic loss.

This leaves Ukraine exposed to a quiet leakage of its designs. Meanwhile, the absence of a strong domestic IP framework risks pushing entrepreneurs to register patents and commercialize outside the country, where protections are stronger and funding is more accessible. The result could be both a brain drain and an innovation drain, hollowing out Ukraine’s defense tech sector just as it proves its global potential. Instead of becoming an international hub, Ukraine risks being relegated to the status of pipeline for foreign defense industries.

The case for IP sovereignty is not only about Ukraine’s economy and national security; it is also about the future resilience of Europe and NATO. For Ukraine, retained IP means royalties, licensing revenues, and a steady funding stream for reconstruction. It signals to investors that Ukraine is not just a wartime incubator but a serious innovation ecosystem. Most importantly, it preserves national sovereignty. Control over sensitive technologies ensures Ukraine is not permanently dependent on foreign suppliers for security.

For Kyiv’s allies, Ukrainian IP is also an important asset. The United States is currently exploring a multi-billion dollar joint drone production deal with Ukraine. But if Ukraine cannot retain ownership, partners risk relying on fragmented supply chains and losing access to innovation. Europe’s Defense Industrial Strategy, launched this year, calls for a resilient continental base. That goal will be undermined if Europe’s most battle-tested and innovative nation loses control of its own technologies.

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Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Protecting IP involves more than goodwill. It requires policy, legislation, and institutional design. Every foreign aid package and licensing deal should include explicit protections for Ukrainian IP ownership. Likewise, technological solutions co-developed with international partners must not result in the wholesale transfer of rights.

Ukraine’s current plan to relax restrictions on some categories of arms exports is good news. Export barriers force many firms into joint ventures (JVs) or licensing arrangements that often strip away their IP protections. Enabling direct exports would ease this dependency on JVs or licensing, reducing both complexity and IP risk, as well as the danger of leakage. Ukraine should encourage co-production and investment, but on terms that guarantee domestic equity and enforceable IP rights.

Currently, the Ukrainian government is closely monitoring its top innovators to prevent IP leaks abroad. Some companies have sought to incorporate outside of Ukraine in order to free themselves from these shackles, but have encountered problems related to unfair IP structuring. One solution could be greater intergovernmental cooperation. This could allow Ukraine to access external capital and expertise while keeping control over core technologies.

Tech parks and defense incubators should anchor talent domestically, providing access to funding, testing grounds, and mentorship. With 40,000 trained drone pilots and a new generation of AI engineers, Ukraine could benefit hugely if the country can create the right climate to build global companies at home. Speed is also important. Traditional patent offices often move too slowly for battlefield innovation. Ukraine needs a dedicated defense IP office to fast-track protection, address dual-use complexities, and guard against theft or predatory licensing.

The Israeli experience provides a potentially useful model for Ukraine. Decades of conflict have forced Israel to develop technologies with immediate battlefield relevance. Crucially, Israel has managed to retain IP sovereignty, even when foreign funding was involved, and has built an ecosystem where defense innovation feeds into global competitiveness.

Europe also offers lessons. Airbus shows how multinational collaboration can preserve shared IP while scaling production across borders. The overall objective is clear: Ukraine should be positioned as a central node in Europe’s defense industry and not just as a subcontractor.

Ukraine’s battlefield innovations are saving lives today, but they can also lay the foundations for tomorrow’s Ukrainian economy. Without IP sovereignty, Ukraine risks becoming a laboratory for others. With the right frameworks, Ukraine can transition from its current status as a war-driven exporter of ideas to become a global defense industry innovation leader. This can only happen if the country’s IP assets are protected.

Andriy Dovbenko is the founder and principal at UK-Ukraine TechExchange.

Rebecca Lissner: Drafters can benefit from outside input, but must not allow it to dilute strategic focus

Mara Rudman: The NSS should be maximally implementable

Peter Feaver: To be worth drafting and reading, an NSS must convey the logic guiding the administration

The NSS must make the case for the president’s worldview

My advice to anyone writing an NSS is that the document should make the best case possible for the president’s worldview, rather than reflecting the consensus view of the entire US government. It should be interesting to read and move the debate on the president’s foreign policy forward.

There are two mistakes to avoid. The first is what could be called the “Christmas ornament” problem, where everything is added in regardless of whether it really fits with the strategy. The second is the tendency to sand down anything interesting until it is fairly innocuous.

To avoid these mistakes, you need a small team of one or two people to do the drafting and run a tight process, and for the president or the national security advisor to be deeply engaged and have some ownership over the document. This enables you to write something coherent, and it means there is someone who can overrule recommendations from the interagency if needed.

In Trump’s first term, his National Security Council produced an excellent NSS that had a positive impact on the administration’s foreign policy. The problem, though, is that it did not reflect Trump’s own views. One need only read his remarks marking its publication.

On this occasion, the Trump administration seems poised to produce a document more reflective of the president’s worldview. From a process perspective, I think that’s the right approach. But substantively, it worries me because his worldview is very much at odds with traditional US strategy, particularly on alliances, China, and Russia. That’s his right. He won the election. The 2017 NSS obscured the differences between Trump and traditionalists on US foreign policy. This NSS is likely to reveal and clarify them.

—Thomas Wright is a senior fellow at the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Brookings Institution, and a former special assistant to the president and senior director for strategic planning at the National Security Council. In the latter role, he contributed to the 2022 NSS.

Drafters can benefit from outside input, but must not allow it to dilute strategic focus

While past presidents have produced updated NSS documents for their second terms in office, this one will have the unique task of adapting—or perhaps overhauling—Trump’s first-term vision after the passage of eight consequential years since his first NSS was released in December 2017. Initial leaks indicate that this NSS may depart significantly from his first one, shifting from an overriding focus on great power competition with China and Russia toward a Western hemispheric strategy that prioritizes threats closer to the US homeland.

I spent the first year of the Biden-Harris administration as lead author of then US President Joe Biden’s NSS, so I understand the challenge facing Trump’s team. Stakeholders inside and outside of the government are eager to see their priorities reflected in what is supposed to be the president’s most authoritative statement of strategic intent. Policy experts across the government lobby for their regions or issues—in my case, by sending thousands of track-change edits to drafts we circulated. Foreign embassies are calling to ensure their countries receive the requisite mentions. Interest groups and think tanks are suggesting language and hoping for early previews. This feedback is important. It helps ensure that the analysis and prescriptions are sound, that the national security bureaucracy will be invested in its implementation, and that the NSS is well received by outside groups. But it also risks diluting strategic focus and turning the NSS into a dreaded “Christmas tree,” covered in stakeholders’ parochial ornamentation.

As they triage input and finalize their drafts, Trump’s team would do well to remember that the NSS is, first and foremost, the president’s document. An NSS must achieve many objectives at once: guide US government policy, create a communications template for national security messaging, signal the direction of US policy to countries around the world, and indicate priorities to Congress and the American people. To be effective, audiences must perceive the document as truly reflective of the president’s priorities and preferences. For all the downsides of this administration’s centralized national security decision-making process, one benefit may be an NSS that speaks clearly and authoritatively on behalf of the president.

—Rebecca Lissner is a senior fellow for US foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Brady-Johnson distinguished practitioner in grand strategy at the Jackson School of Global Affairs at Yale University. She is a former deputy assistant to the president and principal deputy national security advisor to the vice president and a former acting senior director and director for strategic planning on the National Security Council. In the latter role she contributed to the 2022 NSS.

The NSS should be maximally implementable

My advice for those drafting the NSS: Focus on the why, what, who, and how, in the room where it happens, to deliver an effective, executable strategy. I base this on coordinating the 2009 NSS development and on assessing the 2022 NSS through service on the National Defense Strategy Commission.

1. Why: The NSS is mandated by Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The legislation, a bipartisan national security structural statute developed in concert with the Reagan administration, requires the president to submit this report to Congress to communicate their national security vision to the legislative branch.

2. What: This mission statement should guide policy execution. It must discuss the United States’ international interests, commitments, objectives, and policies, along with capabilities necessary to deter threats and implement US security plans.

3. Who: The president and their immediate circle of advisers benefit from soliciting input from senior officials across the broad swath of executive branch agencies and departments that carry national security responsibilities. An effective coordinating process should pressure test even the most determined of presidential views. Allowing debate leads to a stronger product. Providing space at the crafting table to consider wide-ranging positions makes those who were heard more committed to executing the strategy, regardless of whether their views prevail.

4. How: Strategy drafters should design the president’s national security mission statement to be maximally implementable. By statute, the strategy must discuss the “capabilities necessary” to “implement … security plans.” Strategies consistently fall short on the follow-through that is necessary to execute the vision. It is crucial to include parameters against which the executive branch can measure progress toward the strategy’s goals. This can set the frame for dialogue with Congress, which is charged with procuring funding and providing oversight.

—Mara Rudman is a professor of practice and director of the Ripples of Hope Project within the Miller Center at University of Virginia and a former deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs in the Clinton and Obama administrations. She coordinated the development of the 2009 NSS and assessed the 2022 NSS during her service on the National Defense Strategy Commission.

To be worth drafting and reading, an NSS must convey the logic guiding the administration

It is relatively easy to write a coherent NSS in one’s own voice. Countless scholars and analysts have done so over the years. The challenge is to write a version of the NSS that is in the president’s voice and thus an authentic account of how the president understands the United States’ role in the world, the challenges the country faces, and the way forward. And it is even more challenging to do all of that in a more rigorous way than your garden-variety presidential speech might do. Presidential speeches can be a good window into the president’s vision and voice. But they rarely if ever address the kind of tough, “yes, but what about this?” kind of pushback that an NSS worth reading will include.

Of course, there are many other desiderata, most of which are not possible to be included (which explains why you will not find them in any of the published NSS’s of the past four decades). It would be great if the NSS went granular on “means” in addition to covering “ends” and “ways.” However, it is just not practical to include such details in a vision-logic statement. But if the NSS is worthwhile, it will ultimately be reflected in the president’s budget.

Likewise, many critics ask for clear and unambiguous prioritization—as if they expected the document to rack and stack allies and adversaries in a best-of/worst-of list. Good NSS’s do reveal the president’s priorities by revealing what issues they dwell on and what they skip lightly over. But there are inevitable compromises that blur the text for understandable reasons. If we mention ally A without mentioning ally B, we buy ourselves lots of heartache with little gain; what is the harm in mentioning them both, even if everyone knows—and the president demonstrates through allocation of scarce resources like Oval Office access—that A matters more than B? Sometimes, calls for prioritization themselves indicate strategic incoherence, as when “prioritizers” pretend we can better confront China by abandoning Ukraine to the predations of China’s ally Russia.

An NSS is worth reading if it accurately conveys the logic that is actually guiding the administration. If that logic is wise, the NSS will be easy to praise; if that logic is unwise, the NSS will help illuminate the problem. Either way, it is a fruitful guide to understanding the administration’s national security ambitions.

—Peter Feaver is a professor of political science and public policy and director of the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy and co-principal investigator of the America in the World Consortium at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy. He is a former special advisor for strategic planning and institutional reform at the National Security Council, where his responsibilities included contributing to the drafting of the 2006 NSS.

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Three things to note in the UK’s new Defence Industrial Strategy

Deborah Cheverton — Fri, 19 Sep 2025 17:27:39 +0000

Summer is usually quiet for members of the United Kingdom’s defense and national security community, but it is clear that no one has been relaxing this year, with one bumper policy announcement followed by another. In May, the British government secured a partnership with the European Union that creates a framework for a new era of security cooperation, filling a gap left by Brexit. Then the long-awaited Strategic Defence Review was published in early June, followed by a new National Security Strategy, which pulled together other big pieces of work including a Strategic Security Review, AUKUS Review, and Resilience Action Plan—to name a few. While all this has been going on, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) quietly undertook its biggest structural reform program in at least two decades. Earlier this month, the United Kingdom published its new Defence Industrial Strategy subtitled “Defence is an Engine for Growth.”

The strategy is a wide-ranging document covering everything from developing the skills needed to build and maintain nuclear submarines to reforming the way government supports defense exports. Three elements should be of particular interest to the transatlantic defense industrial base.

Recognition of defense as a key industrial sector

The modern history of industrial strategy in the United Kingdom has seen active state intervention in the economy come in and out of political favor. In recent years, successive governments have been more comfortable with the need to nurture the domestic defense industrial base, including through the 2021 Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSIS). This strategy broke with several long-held principles of British defense procurement, most notably the commitment to “international competition by default,” which had stood for more than a decade. However, it is difficult to point to specific outcomes of the changes, perhaps in part because while DSIS recognized the defense industrial base as a critical enabler of defense and national security, it was much less clear about the value of the defense industrial base to the wider economy.

That is certainly not the case for the new Defence Industrial Strategy, which is effectively a sector-specific subcomponent of the broader national Industrial Strategy. Defense is now listed as a growth sector, and the national security strategy even talks of a “defense dividend.” By situating the defense industry firmly within the wider industrial base, the British government has elevated the profile of a sector that employs 272,000 people across the country. In practical terms, it will give access to—and, perhaps more importantly, influence over—whole-of-government initiatives such as skills development programs, infrastructure investment, and regulatory reform. Additionally, almost 70 percent of those 272,000 jobs are based outside of the relatively affluent areas of southeast England, making the industry an obvious candidate to benefit from programs to incentivize regional investment. For example, the Defence Growth Deals promised in the strategy, if implemented well, could allow the industry to leverage hundreds of millions of pounds of government funding, take advantage of favorable tax and customs duties in certain Freeport locations, and perhaps even reduce the burden of the United Kingdom’s famously unpredictable planning process.

There are benefits too for those more interested in cold, hard cash, with promises that the National Wealth Fund will soon support capital-intensive projects (subject to the necessary legislation clearing Parliament) and that the British Business Bank will provide more support for defense companies looking to scale up. Finally, the British government is using its financial muscle to help the defense industry export. Unlike its American and Canadian cousins, the United Kingdom’s export credit agency (UKEF) can already support defense projects. Under new rules, UKEF will see its lending capacity increased to ten billion pounds, with three billion pounds of that specifically ring-fenced for defense, providing a significant new source of low-cost debt financing to help soften the overall cost of investment in the sector.

Focus on UK-based businesses

Naturally, any interventionist industrial strategy runs the risk of encouraging narrow, national protectionism. But, in this case, the repeated references in the Defence Industrial Strategy to “UK-based industry” rather than the simpler “UK industry” formulation is telling. Yes, there are clearly defense technology areas where the United Kingdom intends to compete on the global stage, but the strategy takes a pragmatic approach that recognizes the inherently global nature of the industry.

This is especially important in the context of the long and mutually beneficial history of collaboration between British and US defense industries. Of the 272,000 jobs mentioned above, more than 20,000 are directly working for US-owned companies, with another 94,000 jobs indirectly supported in the supply chain. That constitutes a significant contribution to the UK economy by any standard, even before considering the technological advances achieved through collaborative research and development, the security benefits of increased supply chain resilience, and increased export opportunities through reciprocal market access.

Despite this, some US-owned defense contractors have privately expressed concern that the strategy’s commitment to developing an offset policy could roll back that record of collaboration. Many countries require foreign companies to invest directly or indirectly in their economies as a necessary component of competing for government defense contracts. The United Kingdom currently has no formal offset policy or enforcement mechanism, but the geopolitical climate has driven increased concern about the reliability of its defense supply chains. Last year, for example, the British government even purchased a semiconductor factory, the first such direct purchase of a private company by the MOD since it acquired Sheffield Forgemasters in 2021. Therefore, it is not surprising that a formal offset policy is being considered.

US-owned companies are right to be concerned that an overly prescriptive and inflexible offset strategy could be counterproductive. The US government regards offsets as market distorting, and critics of the approach argue that offsets encourage inflation and inefficiency. There is, however, little reason to believe that the United Kingdom will go down that road. By calling out Australia’s relatively flexible and pragmatic approach as the inspiration, and by openly acknowledging the risks involved, the United Kingdom has signaled that it intends to move carefully. Past evidence of previous UK offset-like policies also supports this conclusion, with some analysts suggesting that the current prevalence of US-owned defense companies in the UK market is, at least in part, a result of previous offset strategies.

Commitment to acquisition reform

Longtime followers of British defense acquisition reform will have good reason to be skeptical on this front, having seen multiple attempts try and fail in the past, but there is reason to believe this time will be different.

First, the government has committed itself to a segmented approach with ambitious timelines, with the period from initiation to contracting as short as three months for commercially available products. In doing so, the government has made an easy metric by which outsiders can measure success.

Second, the newly empowered national armaments director will take responsibility for all non-nuclear procurement in an end-to-end acquisition system running from investments in scientific research all the way up to end of lifecycle disposals of capital assets like aircraft carriers and jets. This new system reduces eight separate procurement budgets down to one, and it streamlines decision making, which will be essential to meet those speedy timelines noted above.

Third, and perhaps most important, the British people will demand it. Critics of British defense spending have long pointed to a relative lack of funding compared to domestic priorities like the National Health Service and other social benefit programs. Making defense a truly national endeavor, as the Strategic Defense Review aspires to, requires a clear and public argument for reprioritizing government spending. More than three and a half years on, polling shows that the Russian invasion of Ukraine still sharpens the mind in the United Kingdom much more acutely than in the United States. Given the clear and present threat on the continent, the British people might be willing to accept a reduction in social benefit programs to redirect resources to defense, but not if those resources are wasted on overly complicated and underperforming procurements.

Deborah Cheverton is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is a senior trade and investment adviser with the UK embassy. Before working in trade, she worked for the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence for fifteen years, working across a range of policy and delivery areas with a particular focus on science and technology policy, industrial strategy, capability development, and international collaboration.

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Only Ukraine can teach NATO how to combat Putin’s growing drone fleet

David Kirichenko — Tue, 16 Sep 2025 20:15:16 +0000

The recent appearance of nineteen Russian drones over Poland set off alarm bells across Europe and marked a dangerous new escalation in the Kremlin’s hybrid war against the West. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said it was “the largest concentration of violations of NATO airspace that we have seen,” while Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk called the incident “the closest we have been to open conflict since World War II.”

Russia’s unprecedented drone raid was widely interpreted as a test of NATO’s readiness and resolve. Former US Army Europe commander General Ben Hodges said the operation was a Kremlin rehearsal with the objective of checking NATO response times and capabilities. “Using F-35s and F-22s against drones shows we are not yet prepared,” he noted.

Many analysts joined Hodges in commenting on the inefficiency of employing NATO fighter jets and expensive missiles to counter relatively cheap Russian drones. The obvious shortcomings of this approach have underlined the need to radically rethink how NATO members address air defense amid the rapidly evolving threats posed by Russian drone warfare. Ukraine’s experience of combating Putin’s drone fleet will prove crucial in this process.

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Like many other NATO members, Poland has invested heavily in recent years in high-end air defense systems such as Patriots and F-35 warplanes. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has revealed a new kind of war that requires alternative solutions. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three and a half years ago, unmanned systems have emerged as the decisive weapon above the battlefield and have also been used extensively for longer range attacks on land and at sea.

With Russia and Ukraine locked in a relentless race to innovate, the Kremlin has prioritized the mass production of deadly strike drones capable of hitting targets hundreds of kilometers away. The number of drones involved in Russian aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities has risen dramatically over the past year from dozens to hundreds, with record waves in recent months featuring as many as eight hundred drones. Europe remains dangerously unprepared to address the unprecedented challenges posed by these large-scale Russian drone swarms.

Ukrainians have been advising their European colleagues for some time of the need to reassess their air defense strategies in line with the growing dominance of drones. Ukrainian drone warfare specialist Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, who leads the country’s Unmanned Systems Forces, warned in July 2025 that NATO commanders must urgently review their air defense doctrines in order to focus on the dangers posed by swarms of Russian attack drones.

Brovdi’s call to Kyiv’s Western partners and his offer to share Ukraine’s unique experience of drone warfare did not initially provoke much of a response. However, following Russia’s recent escalation in the skies above Poland, that may now be changing. Within days of the Russian drone incursion, Polish and Ukrainian officials announced plans for Ukraine to provide anti-drone training in Poland. Other NATO members are now expected to follow suit, reflecting Ukraine’s status as a leading authority on drone warfare.

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Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski is one of numerous senior European politicians to acknowledge the need for NATO countries to learn from Ukraine. “The Ukrainians have better equipment for dealing with Russian drones and more up-to-date experience,” he commented during a visit to Kyiv last week. “This is something that the public and governments in the West need to urgently integrate into their thinking. It is the Ukrainians who will be training us on how to stand up to Russia, not the other way around.”

US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg echoed this sentiment, commenting on September 12 that Ukraine has emerged in recent years as a “world leader” in drone warfare. Noting that the evolution of drone technologies was changing the nature of modern war, Kellogg credited Ukraine with playing a leading role in this trend while acknowledging that other nations including the United States were now “well behind.”

In addition to offering air defense training to the country’s allies, Ukraine is also ready to help NATO partners identify and procure the necessary defensive tools to combat Russian drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently stressed that nobody in the world has enough missiles to shoot down the large volumes of drones currently being deployed by the Kremlin. Instead, a more eclectic approach is needed, featuring ground-based air defenses and jet fighters together with defensive drones, helicopter patrols, and propeller planes.

Ukraine has already developed and begun deploying a number of interceptor drones that serve as a cost-effective solution to Russia’s expanding swarms of strike drones. Work is now underway to increase production in order to keep pace with Russia’s growing output. Kyiv’s partners are engaged in these efforts. A new initiative was recently unveiled that will see Britain support Ukraine by mass producing interceptor drones based on existing Ukrainian technologies. This should make it possible to deliver thousands of drones to Ukraine every month.

Ukraine’s sophisticated anti-drone defenses will now set the standard for NATO as the alliance adjusts to the changing face of modern warfare and the mounting threat posed by Putin’s drones. At present, Putin is using drone incursions to test NATO and probe the alliance’s military and political responses, but his appetite for escalation has never been more apparent. European countries must therefore prepare to defend themselves against potential large-scale attacks involving hundreds of Russian drones. As they scramble to do so, Ukraine’s experience will prove absolutely indispensable.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Oman has also been a steadfast member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, played an important role as host in US nuclear negotiations with Iran, and successfully negotiated a ceasefire between the United States and the Houthis in May of 2025. Notably, the 2019 Framework Agreement allowed for expanded US access to the ports of Duqm and Salalah, providing the United States Navy with facilities to refit and repair warships in a strategically important part of the world and underscores Oman’s role as a prime logistics hub for its allies and partners.

In addition to serving as a critical naval facility for the United States, the Port of Duqm is playing an increasingly important role in Oman’s growing economic heft and efforts surrounding Oman Vision 2040. The recent investment announcement of $550 million into the Port of Duqm by Bahrain-based Investcorp, which will focus on port expansion and the addition of maritime infrastructure, highlights the increasing importance of the port not just for military partnerships but also for economic development opportunities.

The investment also enables the construction of an industrial plant that will produce low-carbon iron metallics and hydrogen-powered steel, aligning with Oman Vision 2040 to produce green steel and sustainable infrastructure development. This investment announcement is in addition to the World Bank’s support, which, since 2019, has mobilized $1.2 billion through the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency into the Port of Duqm Special Economic Zone. Additionally, Oman is advancing its pursuit of green hydrogen as part of Oman Vision 2040, with five of the ten largest upcoming low-carbon hydrogen plants in the Middle East planned to be operational by 2030, providing additional energy solutions for potential increases in economic activity.

Given these significant investments, Oman’s push to diversify its economy, its strategic location, and the free trade agreement with the United States, the small Gulf country is fortuitously positioned to greatly increase its economic and diplomatic role in the region. The investment climate for foreign firms in Oman continues to improve as well, with the recent passage of the Foreign Capital Investment Law, which allows 100 percent foreign ownership in most sectors and removes previously mandated minimum capital requirements. This change provides similar opportunities as the US free trade agreement which already allows US firms to establish and fully own a business in Oman without a local partner, giving maximum flexibility to companies and investors seeking to take advantage of Oman’s growing market, especially firms in the energy and minerals space, in line with the goals of Oman Vision 2040 these opportunities also come as US venture investment into frontier tech firms is up 47 percent year over year. The Trump administration is moving to promote deregulation and US leadership across the defense, energy, and technology sectors.

This alignment of incentives creates significant opportunities for Oman, which finds itself at a historic crossroad of trade, economic, tech, and geopolitical importance, given massive investments in artificial intelligence and renewable energy by sovereign wealth funds, in a region that remains integral to global markets and stability, and for US companies who wish to do business there.

Moreover, Oman’s continuing market reforms will drive additional economic interest from firms around the globe, such as those already investing in Saudi Arabia or the UAE, given market-friendly reforms and deepening capital markets. Private equity giants, such as BlackRock, have established a presence in the UAE, underscoring the interest in the region, particularly in countries where market access is favorable. US companies would do well to build on existing economic relationships, trust built over decades of security and diplomatic cooperation, and an increasingly favorable business environment to take advantage of Oman’s rising stature in the region. Additionally, US climate tech firms that may find a less favorable investment landscape in the United States might do well to realize investment and growth opportunities in Oman, given the focus on renewable energy, while advanced manufacturing, energy, or logistics companies seeking a way into the markets of the Arabian Gulf may find that the Duqm Port expansion provides fertile ground for investment.

Finally, defense co-production agreements with Oman, similar to Lockheed Martin’s collaboration with the General Authority for Military Industries in Saudi Arabia, could spur both economic windfalls for US defense tech companies while providing both the United States and Oman with defense articles closer to the point of need in what remains a complicated security environment.

While economic uncertainty is gripping many countries around the world, Oman has remained a steadfast defense and economic partner of the United States. Through an increasingly favorable business environment, strategic location, and desire to court additional international investment, Oman is positioned to become a key player in shaping the future of the Arabian Gulf. For American firms and policymakers, the question is no longer whether Oman will play a bigger role—it’s whether the United States will seize the opportunity before others do.

Nic Adams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Punaro discusses the Russia-Ukraine conflict on Bloomberg Radio

Atlantic Council — Wed, 27 Aug 2025 18:34:15 +0000

original Source

On August 5, MajGen Arnold Punaro (ret.), a Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow, discussed developments in the Russia-Ukraine conflict on Bloomberg Radio. In his interview, he applauded efforts to bolster the US defense production, advocated for increased sanctions on Russia, and expressed deep distrust in President Putin. Punaro emphasized that rewarding Russian aggression would only enable malign state actors.

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Arnold Punaro

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Hammer featured in the Albuquerque Journal on quantum technology

Atlantic Council — Wed, 27 Aug 2025 14:34:15 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On August 25, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Adam Hammer authored an article in the Albuquerque Journal, titled “A New Day for Quantum in New Mexico,” celebrating recent momentum in the state’s quantum sector. In the article, Hammer highlights how state funding, industry investments, and a leading quantum university program signal a pivotal shift toward establishing New Mexico as a global quantum technology hub.

Fellow

Adam Hammer

Nonresident Fellow

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Transatlantic experts highlight the importance of growing US-Turkish defense ties

Alp Ozen, Zeynep Egeli — Wed, 20 Aug 2025 13:30:00 +0000

From Russia’s war on Ukraine to the Israel-Hamas conflict and heightened tensions across the Middle East, Turkey’s strategic role in promoting regional stability and security has become especially salient. As crises persist across the region, now is the time to increase cooperation and alignment of mutual interests between NATO allies Turkey and the United States.

On July 23 in Istanbul, on the sidelines of the International Defense Industry Fair, the Atlantic Council Turkey Program organized an event to discuss transatlantic defense relations and strategic cooperation in a region in flux, gathering business leaders, diplomats, and experts.

The event also launched the fifth issue of the Defense Journal by the Atlantic Council Turkey Program, a publication covering the latest developments in the bilateral defense relationship and the defense sector, featuring analysis on the full spectrum of defense and security issues affecting the United States, Turkey, and the Middle East.

Turkey and the United States have entered an era of renewed bilateral relations, with Ankara and Washington demonstrating increasing will at the highest level to enhance dialogue and cooperation. Both the Middle East’s ongoing conflicts and its emerging opportunities, such as the rise of the new government in Syria, have underscored Turkey’s strategic position as a crucial partner for the United States in this period of change. However, while there is positive momentum in the bilateral dialogue, certain points of disagreement persist, such as the US partnership with the People’s Defense Units (YPG) in Syria, sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), and diverging perspectives on Israel’s foreign policy.

Defense cooperation is a central pillar of the US-Turkey bilateral relationship. Turkey has NATO’s second-largest army and has recently shifted from being a major US defense tech importer to a domestic defense tech manufacturer and rising exporter. Turkish drones and unmanned aerial vehicle technology have proved successful on the battlefield from the South Caucasus to Libya to Ukraine.

Turkey and the United States see strong potential and shared interest in deepening their defense cooperation. A long-stalled deal for F-16 fighter jet sales to Turkey is progressing, with growing optimism in both capitals that it will soon be finalized. Both sides are signaling readiness to address and overcome the CAATSA sanctions the United States imposed on Turkey following its purchase of the Russian S-400 system, which have constrained US-Turkey defense cooperation for several years. Turkey’s readmission to the F-35 program has also been raised as a topic for discussion.

Below are highlights from the Turkey Program’s Defense Journal launch event, which addressed the importance of US-Turkey defense relations and US-Turkey strategic cooperation in the Middle East.

Defne Arslan, senior director of the Turkey Program and AC in Turkey at the Atlantic Council: “The region stands at an inflection point. This historic moment calls for increasing cooperation and alignment of mutual interests between NATO allies Turkey and the United States,” said Arslan in her welcoming remarks.

General James L. Jones, executive chairman emeritus at the Atlantic Council, former US national security advisor, and former supreme allied commander Europe: Jones noted: “Turkey’s defense capabilities and strategic location make it a critically important ally for the United States in tackling regional security challenges.”

Michael Goldman, chargé d’affaires at the US embassy in Turkey: Goldman spoke about the United States and Turkey’s ever-evolving partnership, arguing that their cooperation is important for addressing regional challenges. He also noted several qualities that provide Turkey’s strategic importance for NATO: “When we talk about the region in flux, Turkey is the center of it. . . This country and our relationship have three things: Turkey’s geography, its mass, and its innovative capacity.”

Rich Outzen, co-managing editor of the Defense Journal and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Program: Outzen said that there was an alignment in how Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and US President Donald Trump approach Russia, arguing that both leaders prioritize engaging Moscow through strength while keeping the door open to negotiations to end its war against Ukraine. Outzen highlighted that both Turkey and the United States have substantial battlefield experience, especially in evolving methods of war. Outzen also explained the intent behind the Defense Journal: “Both the US and Turkey suffer from information pollution about the relationship. There are some ideas that paint us as enemies of one another rather than allies of long standing. The Defense Journal is a response to that.”

Can Kasapoğlu, co-managing editor of the Defense Journal by the Atlantic Council Turkey Program: “With the Defense Journal, we want Turkish and American strategic communities to be able to communicate, agree and disagree, like two NATO allies,” Kasapoğlu said. He added that the Defense Journal project is important for keeping the momentum for further cooperation between the US and Turkish defense communities.

Ambassador Ömer Önhon, former Turkish ambassador to Syria: “Turkish-American cooperation is essential for lasting stability in Syria; but we have to have a common ground,” Önhon said. Önhon underlined that the US-Turkey partnership was indispensable for ensuring stability in Syria. However, while the main goals of the two allies are aligned, he said, there are a few ongoing issues such as US support to the YPG, which he said should be addressed to further improve joint efforts for Syria’s reconstruction. Önhon also shared his key takeaways from his recent trip to Syria, where he observed that unlike in the case of Iraq, the state structures from the era of Bashar al-Assad’s regime were not eradicated by the new government. He argued that this gives Syria’s new leadership a good foundation to slowly and deliberately reshape governance and develop better practices. While acknowledging that Syria’s reconstruction would be a slow process and a long-term challenge, Önhon argued that there is unexplored potential for increasing transatlantic engagement with the region while also addressing Turkey’s regional strategy and potential future role in Syria.

General Tod D. Wolters, distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and former supreme allied commander Europe: To conclude the event, Wolters reiterated the importance of the US-Turkey defense partnership for tackling regional security challenges. Wolters highlighted the qualities of the Turkish defense sector that make it strategically important for the United States. “One of the military and government attributes of Turkey is its tremendous degree of readiness,” said Wolters. “It has a lot to do with resilience and responsiveness,” he said, crediting Turkey’s readiness posture for its contribution to regional stability.

Photos from the event

Alp Ozen is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program.

Zeynep Egeli is project assistant at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program.

A vision for US hypersonic weapons

Edward Brady and Michael E. White — Tue, 19 Aug 2025 22:13:28 +0000

Bottom lines up front

Near term: Hypersonics are vital to “kick down the door” of enemy anti-access/area-denial systems to enable less-exquisite forces to attack in mass.
Long term: A high-low mix of hypersonic and traditional weapons will be key to asserting military advantage.
What’s at stake: Delaying the fielding of hypersonic weapons would increase strategic risk; expediting the fielding of hypersonic strike weapons would improve lethality and deterrence and reduce strategic risk.

Any future large-scale conflict in the Pacific will be in a highly contested environment where US capability will be aggressively challenged in the air, on land, at sea, and in space. The US military must have the ability to rapidly deliver lethal effects at range in a timescale of relevance. On their own, traditional strike weapons do not have sufficient speed or range to enable effective operation on what will be the highly contested battlefield of the future. Hypersonic weapons, if fielded in sufficient numbers to defeat critical targets necessary to degrade adversary capabilities, will enable effective use of traditional weapon systems and allow for future battlefield dominance. A layered defeat construct must be deployed to defend against ballistic and hypersonic missiles targeting US assets.

How do hypersonic weapons fit into weapons evolution?

For centuries, weapons have trended toward increasing speed, range, and accuracy. Hypersonic weapons build on these trends. Advanced engine technology and improved materials enable missiles to travel at hypersonic speeds (above Mach 5) while maintaining meaningful maneuverability. Because of their speed, hypersonic weapons, especially hypersonic cruise missiles, tend to have greater ranges than similarly sized weapons.

Faster weapons with longer ranges are more lethal than slower, shorter-range weapons. The faster speeds mean that targets have less time to evade or defend themselves. Hypersonic weapons are more likely to penetrate enemy defenses optimized for slower munitions, meaning missile salvos can comprise fewer missiles. Longer ranges mean that shooters can engage from farther away, potentially outside detection or engagement range of enemy defenses, depending on launch platform capabilities.

In the next decade, exquisite hypersonic weapons will be keys to “open the door” for forces equipped with more traditional weapons. This paradigm is like the United States’ 1991 employment of the new F-117 stealth fighters equipped with precision bombs to dramatically degrade Iraqi air defense command and control. This innovation made it possible for traditional airpower to attack other targets. In a similar vein, highly capable platforms like the B-21 stealth bombers or Virginia-class fast-attack submarines can employ hypersonic weapons against high-value targets in enemy defenses, reducing the overall effectiveness of the enemy defense system at much lower cost than a more traditional force package.

Hypersonic weapons are 5 to 20 times faster than traditional missiles

Reaction time is up to 6x shorter

75% fewer hypersonic missiles needed for a given mission

How can hypersonic weapons increase near-term lethality in the Indo-Pacific context?

Consider a large surface warship like China’s Type 055 (or Renhai-class) cruiser. These vessels are potent sea- and air-control platforms, able to detect and engage air and surface targets hundreds of miles away. They are key nodes within a broader anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) system, capable of extending the A2/AD bubble well into the Pacific Ocean in the event of war. They usually steam in a task group of several other warships, adding missiles and antisubmarine capabilities as well. Moreover, that group is also likely to be protected by fighter aircraft and possibly shore-based surface-to-air missiles. One can assume that the task group could engage incoming missiles at a range of at least one hundred nautical miles.¹

A traditional cruise missile launched from several hundred miles away from the ship traveling at about Mach 1 (or slower) would take up to an hour to reach the ship. In contrast, a hypersonic cruise missile closes that distance in just ten minutes or less. The ship defenses have one-fifth the time to detect, maneuver, and engage a hypersonic threat compared to a traditional missile.

Calculating how many missiles will “leak” through the enemy defenses is extremely challenging. Empirical studies of anti-ship missile attacks show that a good assumption for hits is 30 percent against older defenses, likely less against more modern defenses.² One can assume a need for one-quarter to one-third as many hypersonic weapons to achieve the same effects as traditional weapons based on this same analysis (i.e., an advanced weapon against older defenses not designed to counter it). Successful strikes (i.e., the ship was knocked out of action) against ships with less capable defenses were between 30 and 60 percent. When missiles were fired against ships with capable defenses, this rate fell to only 13 percent.³ Since existing missiles are well understood by most navies, one can assume that traditional missiles will likely have success rates of around 10 percent. In contrast, there are essentially no effective defenses (especially shipborne) against hypersonic weapons: It is therefore reasonable to assume a success rate closer to 30 percent. This change not only reduces the weapon cost per target but also places far fewer launch platforms at risk throughout a campaign. This example could be easily applied to other target sets, launch platforms, and so on, and does not take into account the enabling assets required for the strike force.

Fig. 1: Salvo-size comparison shows hypersonic advantage over subsonic weapons

How do hypersonics improve survivability?

The ability to deliver timely and survivable lethal effects from outside of an enemy’s defended perimeter means that hypersonic weapons significantly reduce the operational risk for the launching forces. Air and missile defense forces defend themselves, broadly speaking, by “shooting the arrows” (destroying incoming missiles), “shooting the archers” (neutralizing launch platforms before they fire their munitions), or both. Peer adversaries like China use both methods.

Continuing the cruiser example, the ship uses its defenses to engage incoming missiles (or launch platforms if they get too close). However, many current weapons outrange the cruiser’s defenses. As a result, a high-end adversary will likely ensure that shore-based surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, fighters, submarines, and so on, are complementing the cruiser to further extend the defensive perimeter. Incoming bombers or surface vessels will likely be engaged outside the range of US missiles by these defenses. A stealth bomber needs to be within several hundred nautical miles of the cruiser to engage with an extended-range antiship missile. Even if the cruiser is several hundred miles from the coastline, at least some other defensive assets will likely engage, whether a carrier- or land-based aircraft, possibly supported by tankers. In the near future, those fighters will likely have unmanned combat autonomous vehicles (UCAVs) with them. Therefore, the US bomber needs to be protected by fighters. This package will likely need electronic warfare (EW) platforms, targeting assets, tactical command and control, and, significantly, tankers, as the strike package likely requires several aerial refuelers to get it to and from the fight. A hypersonic-equipped surface force can achieve the same level of lethality with improved survivability: The ability to launch from twice the range or more puts the hypersonic-equipped force beyond the reach of many of the defenses, notably reducing the size of the enabling assets needed for the strike package while simultaneously reducing operational risk.

Hypersonic weapons—especially if they achieve precision accuracy—may trigger shock waves in the strategic balance.

—Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Origins of Victory

How do hypersonics generate improved campaign effectiveness?

In the near term, leveraging hypersonic weapons in a high-low weapons mix will allow critical targets to be struck with increased effectiveness and at lower risk. This means fewer weapons need to be used to break down the A2/AD system; fewer assets lost during that process; and overall, a more sustainable, effective, and affordable campaign.

Returning to the high-end cruiser example and using round numbers, one can assume that traditional subsonic antiship missiles cost approximately $3 million each and hypersonic antiship cruise missiles cost $6 million each (a reasonable assumption with larger purchase orders).⁴ One can also assume that it will take, on average, ten traditional subsonic missiles to disable the cruiser and it will take three hypersonic antiship missiles. The missile procurement cost to complete the mission is $30 million for the traditional missiles and $18 million for the hypersonic missiles.

Using a single hypersonic missile to first degrade the ship’s defenses followed by two traditional missiles brings the weapon cost down to $12 million. Now, to take it one step further, independent of type, each missile requires one weapon station, and each launch platform has a fixed number of weapon stations. If the number of weapon stations used is reduced by one-third for an individual target, then the number of targets any specific launch platform can attack increases by a factor of three, dramatically increasing the overall campaign effectiveness of a given force.

While this example is intended to be illustrative, it demonstrates that a mix of hypersonic and traditional strike weapons has the potential to significantly increase force effectiveness and reduce mission cost. This increase in mission effectiveness becomes dramatic when the number of high-value, heavily defended targets—as anticipated for any future conflict—is considered.

In addition to the difference in cost for this example, consider an array of related questions: How many launch platforms might be lost taking higher-risk shots with traditional weapons compared to hypersonic ones? How many fewer strike packages are needed each day in a campaign by a longer-ranged hypersonic-equipped force? How much easier is resupply if the number of missiles to be replenished is measured in tens to hundreds (in the hypersonic category) versus hundreds to thousands (of traditional ones)? While the optimal combination of capability and respective inventory should be determined with a more detailed and specific analysis by the joint force, the answers to these questions dictate that policymakers should use decision metrics that reflect the dramatic improvement in mission effectiveness enabled by hypersonic weapons and not simply weapon cost when making critical acquisition and weapon-mix decisions.

Finally, in any conflict in the Pacific, the United States will be faced with an adversary that has a large inventory of long-range ballistic, supersonic, and hypersonic strike missiles. These missiles will be able to deliver effects on US land and sea forces out to hundreds of miles in a matter of minutes. The US military must be able to strike at range within a similar timescale so as not to lose control of the battlespace. Traditional long-range, US strike missiles are subsonic, however, limiting the military’s ability to do so. That asymmetry in battlefield timescale reduces the United States’ warfighting effectiveness and overall tactical deterrence, highlighting an additional imperative to field hypersonic strike missiles in meaningful numbers.

What is a long-term vision of hypersonic weapons?

In the longer term, twenty to thirty years from now, the majority of missiles, fired from all platforms, may very likely be hypersonic weapons. Air combat weapons evolved from exclusively short-range weapons in the early 1980s to mostly medium-range weapons by the 2000s. In the same way, air-to-surface munitions evolved from predominantly unguided “dumb” bombs in 1990 to almost exclusively precision-guided munitions by 2015. It is reasonable to envision a future in which missile speeds evolve from the current norms (less than Mach 1 to Mach 3) to hypersonic (Mach 5+) speeds in the next twenty to thirty years.

But hypersonic weapons are so expensive—are they worth the cost? The short answer is yes. Hypersonic weapons are the future of weapons. Fielding accurate hypersonic weapons in moderate quantities will deliver notable military advantage to the United States. Not doing so might put the United States at a dangerous disadvantage to China and other competitors.

Moreover, these weapons are very expensive now (compared to traditional missiles) precisely because the systems are rapidly fielded, first-generation prototypes that are procured in small numbers. As weapons progress through typical upgrade plans, technology continues to mature, and production efficiencies are realized along with increased procurement numbers, economies of scale are likely to kick in and costs can be expected to begin to decline significantly.

One example of this process is the now-ubiquitous AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile. (RTX, a sponsor of the Scowcroft Center’s Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force, produces the AIM-120.) When its procurement began in 1987, each missile cost $997,000. When the peak efficiencies were reached in the late 1990s, the unit cost of the AIM-120 was $105,000.⁵ Policymakers should expect a similar decrease in unit cost of hypersonic weapons with sustained procurement.

Achieving this future vision rests on assumptions that policymakers can influence. Three stand out.

Promoting continued development of hypersonic weapons will result in them transitioning from bespoke weapons for specific platforms, usually large in size, to smaller sizes that can be integrated across multiple platforms.
Sustaining research and development will solve critical technical problems over time, notably those related to sensors and materials, among others.
Continuing and increasing acquisition will reduce unit cost over time as a demand signal causes industry to invest in appropriate resources and larger orders create economies of scale.

Hypersonic weapons are crucial for future battlefield success. As defenses increase in potency, hypersonic weapons are essential to give the military the lethality it needs to attack key targets and open the door for other forces. Failing to field these weapons, in sufficient quantities, creates strategic risk by making the US military less lethal and less survivable. A US force equipped with hypersonic weapons, on the other hand, is a potent conventional deterrent.

In future publications, the Atlantic Council’s Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force will cover offensive hypersonic capabilities and counter-hypersonic defenses. The Task Force will offer numerous specific policy recommendations to make this vision of expedited deployment a reality.

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About the authors

Michael E. White is the lead author of the Atlantic Council’s Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force. He served as the first principal director for hypersonics in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. In that capacity, White was responsible for leading the nation’s vision and strategy for developing offensive and defensive warfighting capability enabled by hypersonic systems. Prior to his time in the Department of Defense, he was head of the Air and Missile Defense Sector at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

Edward Brady is a US Air Force officer and A-10 instructor pilot who served as a national defense fellow at the Atlantic Council. The views expressed in this brief represent the personal views of the author and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, the Air University, or any other US government agency.

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1 Eric Wertheim, “Type 055 Renhai-Class Cruiser: China’s Premier Surface Combatant,” US Naval Institute, March 2023, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/march/type-055-renhai-class-cruiser-chinas-premier-surface-combatant.

2 John Schulte, “An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1994), 15–18, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADB192139.pdf; and B. R. Prakash, “Analysis of Missile Effectiveness– A Historical Perspective,” Defense Research and Studies, August 2020, https://dras.in/analysis-of-missile-effectiveness-a-historical-perspective/.

3 Prakash, “Analysis of Missile Effectiveness.”

4 John Tirpak, “Air Force Ramps Up Multiyear Buy,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, Air & Space Force Association, April 2024, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/navy-shoots-four-lrasmair-force-multiyear-buy/. For cost of the hypersonic weapons, see below discussion of AIM-120 cost. While hypersonic weapons currently in development cost at least $18 million, none
of these weapons are in large-scale production. The AIM-120 example illustrates that, once a weapon is procured in larger numbers, the cost should drop significantly.

5 US Department of Defense, AMRAAM Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), December 2018, Report No. 19-F-1098 DOC 14, Department of Defense, 2018, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Selected_Acquisition_Reports/FY_2018_SARS/19-F-1098_DOC_14_AMRAAM_SAR_Dec_2018.pdf.

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A marketplace for mission-ready AI: Accelerating capability delivery to the Pentagon

Jack Long, Bharat C. Patel, and Jags Kandasamy — Thu, 14 Aug 2025 14:30:56 +0000

TO: The secretary of defense

FROM: Jack Long, Bharat C. Patel, and Jags Kandasamy

DATE: August 14, 2025

SUBJECT: Proposing a performance-based AI model marketplace for the Department of Defense

Jack Long, PhD, is a lieutenant colonel in the US Marine Corps Reserve and the Naval AI lead at the Office of Naval Research.
Bharat C. Patel is product lead, Project Linchpin, at the US Army Program Executive Office–Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors.
Jags Kandasamy is co-founder and chief executive officer of Latent AI, a start-up offering scalable, secure edge AI solutions for battlefield and industrial environments. He is also a distinguished fellow at the University of South Florida’s Global and National Security Institute.

The Department of Defense (DOD) should accelerate the deployment of operational artificial intelligence (AI) by establishing a performance-driven AI model marketplace. This strategic insights memo outlines a framework for one such marketplace. The approach incentivizes innovation through open competition, rapid iteration, and real-world performance validation—delivering mission-ready AI solutions at speed and scale. This proposal follows the principles outlined by the Atlantic Council’s Software-Defined Warfare Commission.

Currently, the government purchases AI models from a variety of industry partners. These models need regular retraining and optimization to be relevant in the deployed scenarios. There is a better way to meet the Defense Department’s need for AI.

In this proposal, the government would make a “data lake” available for industry partners to use to train models. This data lake could consist of imagery, radio frequency, sonar, and other mission-relevant datasets. Vendors could independently train models on this data lake and submit them to a centralized government model catalog—the Open Model Marketplace—where they would be made available for discovery and deployment by DOD components across services and commands.

Unlike the traditional procurement of AI through upfront contracts, this approach would compensate vendors based solely on model usage. The government would pay only for performance and the vendors would make money each time their models are deployed in operations. Models that demonstrate real-world utility, responsiveness to mission context, efficient compute utilization, and value to the user and value to the user would naturally rise to the top.

Step one: The Pentagon sets up a government-furnished data playground.

DOD will establish and operate a secure data playground in which industry partners can work with US government data at various classification levels.
DOD will provide vetted industry partners access to datasets and a data catalog.
The playground will provide secure infrastructure; vendors are expected to support the infrastructure by paying to use it.

Step two: Vendors develop models and DOD vets them.

DOD will provide known requirements, but vendors would be free to develop models for any use case they consider relevant.
Models will be assessed via common and standardized metrics.
Models will be vetted for relevance, performance, security, interoperability, and ethical considerations.
Models will undergo basic validation and be scored before gaining approval for inclusion in the catalog of the Open Model Marketplace.

Step three: DOD units use the Open Model Marketplace.

The Open Model Marketplace will be a centralized catalog containing all approved models categorized by mission, type, accuracy, and resource footprint.
Government customers could perform additional testing on models to assess relevance.
Any DOD unit could select and deploy models that meet its mission needs.
Users could run models on the compute infrastructure of their choice.
Models could be selected individually or as part of a “model pack” based on pricing offered by vendors.

Step four: Vendors are paid using a pay-for-performance model.

Vendors will be compensated based on model consumption—with no upfront funding or long-term exclusivity.
Model pricing will be independent of compute costs; models will run on government hardware.
The model can be used on a monthly basis, with the option to terminate at end of each month.
Vendors willing to assume risk could move quickly to build solutions.
By avoiding long-term contracts or vendor lock-in, DOD could maintain flexibility.
Innovation cycles would be shortened as vendors continuously iterate to remain competitive.

Step five: Users and customers score and give feedback.

DOD can concurrently run multiple models that address the same problem.
Government units will provide structured feedback and scoring on model performance.
Users will send feedback to both the vendor and a DOD Test, Evaluation, Validation and Verification oversight team.
Model performance statistics will be included in a model card and visible in a model catalog.
Poorly performing models will be flagged, while high performers will be rewarded with increased usage and visibility.

Step six: Contracting pathways for acquisition.

The DOD can leverage different contracting mechanisms to enable both rapid onboarding of new models and scalable deployment of proven ones.
For newer models, the Commercial Solutions Opening authority is the best option to quickly prototype and validate capabilities that are tied to specific operational needs.
For proven models, DOD should establish a multiple-award Blanket Purchase Agreement under Federal Acquisition Regulation 13.5 or 16.703 to pre-qualify and establish standardized terms (security, intellectual property, telemetry, runtime), enabling rapid call orders for repeat or scaled use.
This approach ensures the marketplace serves as both an on-ramp for emerging capabilities and a fast lane for repeat procurement.

An open-model marketplace would offer several benefits to servicemembers.

Innovation: Access to data would make it possible for the vendor base to iterate and develop faster.
Speed: DOD would have immediate access to cutting-edge models without procurement delays.
Performance: Only the most effective models would be likely to survive based on real-world success.
Flexibility: DOD operators could tailor model selection to their unique operating environments.
Cost-efficiency: DOD would only spend taxpayer dollars on solutions that deliver value, avoiding sunk costs.

To handle adoption and implementation, the Pentagon’s Chief Digital and AI Office (CDAO) should develop a franchise strategy in which it sets the standards but others (e.g., services, combatant commands, and others) can set up their own operations. CDAO should define onboarding policies, model-intake standards, test and evaluation criteria, and other high-level rules, but should let the franchisees execute. This approach would ensure department-wide interoperability while allowing fast movers to drive ahead.

Acknowledgments

Latent AI is a financial supporter of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Software-Defined Warfare Commission. Kandasamy is an industry member of the commission.

The views expressed are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of their employer, the US government, or any affiliated organization.

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Ukraine’s expanding robot army can help address manpower shortages

David Kirichenko — Thu, 07 Aug 2025 20:55:04 +0000

The Ukrainian military claims to have conducted a groundbreaking local offensive in early July 2025, using exclusively robotic systems to seize a front line position in the Kharkiv region and capture a number of surrendering Russian soldiers. Officials from the Ukrainian army’s Third Assault Brigade stressed that the operation was unprecedented in modern warfare and emphasized that Ukraine had suffered no casualties.

Meanwhile, another Ukrainian front line unit has recently showcased a new robotic platform that is reportedly capable of shooting down Russian warplanes and helicopters. The system features a Soviet-era anti-aircraft missile launcher mounted on a remote-controlled robot, providing Ukrainian troops with enhanced defense against aerial attack while reducing their exposure to Russian drones.

These two developments underline the growing importance of robotic systems for the Ukrainian war effort. The Commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Major Robert Brovdi, has identified the deployment of robots as a top priority for the embattled nation. “Drones are currently creating a kill zone extending 20 kilometers from the front lines,” he stated in July. “The next challenge is to replace Ukrainian infantry with ground-based robotic systems that can take over all the logistical tasks in the front line area.”

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The increased use of ground robots by the Ukrainian military reflects an emphasis on innovation that has enabled Ukraine to counter Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of conventional firepower and manpower. For example, since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, Ukraine has dramatically increased domestic drone production and earned a reputation as a global leader in drone warfare.

Similar trends are now evident in the development and deployment of Ukrainian robotic systems on the modern battlefield. Earlier this year, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense officials said the country intends to produce up to 15,000 ground robots by the end of 2025. If this target is reached, it would represent a massive expansion in the use of Unmanned Ground Vehicles or UGVs.

Robotic systems are in many ways an ideal solution for Ukraine as the country seeks ways to leverage its proven tech prowess in order to defend itself in a grueling war of attrition against a far larger enemy. With the Russian invasion now in its fourth year, mobilizing sufficient troops to maintain the war effort is becoming an increasingly acute problem for the Ukrainian authorities amid high casualty rates and an alarming rise in the number of desertions. This has led to questions over how much longer the Ukrainian military can hold the current front lines, and is believed to be fueling optimism in Moscow that a decisive breakthrough may soon be possible.

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While robots can never completely replace humans on the battlefield, there are a range of front line functions that robotic systems are suitable for. At present, Ukraine’s growing robot army is most commonly used in a logistical role to deliver supplies to troops in the trenches. With drones now a ubiquitous feature above the battlefield, any soldiers or vehicles moving around close to the front lines immediately become targets. Tracked or wheel-mounted robotic systems make it possible to resupply forces without risking casualties.

Crucially, robotic systems can be used to evacuate soldiers. Since 2022, the dominance of drones has made it more difficult to withdraw the wounded from the battlefield. This has led to increased Ukrainian losses, with injured troops often unable to receive medical attention in a timely fashion. While robotic transports are also vulnerable to drone attack and can face a range of other technical obstacles, the use of such platforms for emergency evacuations does increase the chances of survival.

Ukraine is also developing robotic systems capable of playing more direct defensive and offensive roles in the combat zone. While soldiers are still needed to guard trenches and consolidate any territorial gains, armed robots can potentially help maintain defensive positions and prevent Russian advances. This could reduce Ukraine’s reliance on dwindling manpower reserves and limit casualties.

Volunteers and private companies are playing an important part in efforts to develop new robotic models and integrate them into the Ukrainian military. They are faced with an array of practical challenges. In addition to securing the necessary funding and resources, it can also be difficult to provide training for military personnel who are desperately needed for combat duty.

While Ukraine’s senior military and political leadership are believed to appreciate the potential benefits of robotic systems, some field commanders reportedly remain reluctant to embrace new technologies. This legacy of the Soviet past has led to an uneven picture at different points along the line of contact, with many Ukrainian brigades able to invest time and money into developing and deploying robotic systems while others receive only limited access.

In order to fully capitalize on the promise of Ukraine’s robotic ground systems, more support must come from the Ukrainian government and the country’s international partners. Foreign investment is also needed to help Ukrainian developers boost output. Meanwhile, front line units must be given the resources and flexibility to train soldiers in the use of new unmanned systems, with commanders empowered to identify and prioritize the most effective robotic solutions.

Ukraine’s rapid wartime defense tech progress is driving the expansion of the country’s robot army. This is helping to address manpower shortages across the front and allowing the Ukrainian military to at least partially compensate for Russia’s greater resources and far larger population.

With the right investment and technical support, robotic systems could become a key element guaranteeing Ukraine’s national security and protecting the country against further Russian aggression. In order to reach that point, Kyiv and its partners must act quickly to scale up production and integrate new robotic technologies along the front lines of the war.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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SAIC CEO Toni Townes-Whitley on the ‘ecosystem of capabilities’ needed to win today’s wars

Katherine Golden — Fri, 25 Jul 2025 17:27:06 +0000

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SAIC CEO Toni Townes-Whitley on mission integration in the defense ecosystem

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—SAIC CEO Toni Townes-Whitley discusses the role of mission integrators in today’s defense industrial base and the future of the US defense ecosystem.

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In SAIC Chief Executive Officer Toni Townes-Whitley’s view, it will take much more than top tech to win the wars of the future.

“You can win a battle with some phenomenal tech,” she said at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Thursday. “But if we’re talking about durable, long-term regional conflict, to win wars, you have to have an ecosystem of capabilities.”

For Townes-Whitley, having such an ecosystem—one that joins academics, investors, innovators, and government officials behind common national-security objectives—depends on mission integration. It requires an “open” architecture that accommodates innovation from this wider ecosystem, instead of maintaining exclusivity, or “vendor lock,” for the biggest competitors in the defense industrial base.

“Commercial technology, as important as it is, as critical as it is, is not the only answer,” she said. “For war fighting going forward, our national security needs . . . integration, and it has to drive toward interoperability.”

In short, as Townes-Whitley put it: The United States needs to “leverage all that this country creates in the war fight.”

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Atlantic Council President and Chief Executive Officer Frederick Kempe, which was held as part of the Captains of Industry series of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program.

Play the player

Townes-Whitley argued that adversaries such as China and Russia have already worked to assemble a wide ecosystem for both defense and warfare, with China leaning into asymmetric and hybrid warfare and Russia heightening its cyberwarfare activities.
“We have a change not only in who the players are, how they engage, where they show up, but quite frankly what they leverage,” she said.
Thus, when it comes to a US-led innovation ecosystem, “we have to know how to leverage all of it to protect this country and to protect this planet,” she said.
She added that Ukraine has similarly rallied a massive ecosystem for the sake of its defense, bringing together a “talented” and “tech-enabled citizenry” and gritty technologies—backed by policymakers who have “changed capital structures” to support the fight. “It’s been a phenomenal lesson for us,” she said.
As European countries commit to ramping up their defense spending, they have a “leapfrog opportunity,” Townes-Whitley said, to prioritize mission integration first, instead of following “the US pattern of buying things” and having to make their defense tech interoperable later. “There’s an opportunity for them to use the best of commercial technology if they have a framework and engagement around mission integration,” she said.

High speed, high tech

Townes-Whitley argued that an upfront investment in mission integration will help improve the United States’ speed on the battlefield as warfighting continues to change quickly.
One reason, she explained, is that the “open and interoperable” architectures she envisions would be “plug and play,” erasing the need to ensure in advance that certain defense technologies are compatible with others.
“The speed of compatibility is going to be . . . more of the pacing mechanism than just the commercial tech itself,” she said.
Townes-Whitley said that as artificial intelligence (AI) advances, she sees a future in which “digital agents” are deployed for the sake of defense, making capabilities cheaper.
But “there’s a big conversation about how much it gets regulated,” she argued. She said that the White House’s AI Action Plan reflected a “real openness to AI” and a “desire to not let a regulatory burden slow down the commercial AI.”
Townes-Whitley argued that national security threats have expanded beyond traditional borders to include defending cyberspace and critical infrastructure, fundamentally changing how the homeland must be defended. As a result of this evolving landscape, “data has become the new currency,” helping people on the frontlines make more informed decisions faster.
But still, Townes-Whitley said, the “stovepipe nature” of the military and structural issues between the Department of Defense and the intelligence community continue to serve as “blockers” to much-needed data integration and real-time analytics. “This is not a tech issue,” she said. “This is a policy issue. This is a structural issue.”

Sending a signal

Townes-Whitley’s open architecture vision for the defense ecosystem will depend on whether the government can “send the right signal of long-term investment” to the private sector—and it will require officials across the government to send a consistent message.
Townes-Whitley said that she is “thrilled” to see signals from the current administration that there is high demand for commercial technology.
“The time is ripe right now for the country to evolve in our thinking of how we look at commercial technology,” she said, “how we look at investments and private equity, and how we look to bring those together for orchestration in the current world order.”

Katherine Golden is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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Ukraine is now an indispensable security partner for the US and Europe

Oleksiy Goncharenko — Thu, 24 Jul 2025 21:15:16 +0000

The world is currently entering a new multipolar geopolitical era defined by declining Western dominance, growing Chinese influence, and resurgent Russian imperialism. As the United States adapts to these changing realities, the Trump administration is seeking to reduce its commitment to European security while boosting the continent’s ability to defend itself. Ukraine can play a vital role in this process, and is ideally placed to help US President Donald Trump realize his vision of a secure but more self-sufficient Europe.

Many European leaders were initially caught off-guard in early 2025 when new US Vice President JD Vance stated plainly that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security. Other White House officials have since reiterated this stance, while also underlining the continued US commitment to partnership with America’s NATO allies.

This new US security posture has sparked a major debate across Europe over the need to rearm. However, while the rhetoric in European capitals has changed markedly, there is still no consensus on exactly what this rearmament should involve. At the recent NATO summit, for example, Spain pushed back against the proposal to raise defense spending to 5 percent of GDP, calling it “unreasonable.”

The time for talk may soon be over. Numerous NATO member countries are already warning that Russia could be in a position to attack the alliance within the coming five years. By almost any measure, Europe is not currently ready to face this threat. With clock now ticking, the continent’s leaders must urgently expand defense sector production while also revising outdated defense doctrines.

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Ukraine is uniquely positioned to help Europe meet the mounting security challenges posed by a revisionist and expansionist Russia. After all, Ukraine has already been defending Europe’s eastern frontier for more than a decade following Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea and invasion of the Donbas region. Since February 2022, the country has been the scene of the largest European war since World War II.

The past eleven years of Russian aggression have transformed Ukraine into one of Europe’s leading military powers. Today, the Ukrainian army features around one million battle-hardened men and women, dwarfing the armed forces of its European neighbors. Kyiv’s EU and US partners need to recognize that this unrivaled experience of the twenty-first century battlefield makes Ukraine a key contributor to the future of European security.

Ukraine brings much more to the table than mere numbers. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian defense industry has expanded dramatically and is capable of further growth. The country has also emerged as a global innovator in a number of defense tech segments ranging from attack drones to cyber security.

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Ukraine currently serves as the ideal testing ground for the American and European weapons systems of tomorrow. Ukraine’s successful deployment of Western defense technologies such as the Patriot air defense system has led to a number of historic breakthroughs that have made significant operational upgrades possible. Growing numbers of cutting edge European and American defense sector companies are already present in Ukraine, developing partnerships and testing their products in combat conditions.

Meanwhile, US security support for Kyiv is keeping the country’s defense contractors busy, creating thousands of jobs and contributing billions of dollars in tax revenues to the United States budget. Similar processes are underway across Europe as the impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion helps to reverse decades of defense industry neglect.

Ukraine’s rapidly evolving drone industry deserves a special mention. Since 2022, Ukrainian drone production has increased dramatically to millions of drones per year. This progress has helped Ukraine counter Russia’s often overwhelming battlefield advantages in terms of firepower and manpower, while also transforming the Battle of the Black Sea in Kyiv’s favor and enabling long-range strikes against targets deep inside Russia.

In June 2025, Ukraine conducted an unprecedented attack involving simultaneous remotely coordinated drone strikes on a number of airbases across Russia. This landmark operation was carried out at a fraction of the cost of traditional missile systems, underlining how Ukraine is shaping the future of drone warfare. Indeed, Ukrainian innovation is now pushing the entire global defense industry to evolve and rethink future plans.

At a time when the rest of Europe is struggling to adjust to a rapidly changing security environment, Ukraine stands out. Over the past decade, Ukrainians have developed the mindset, resilience, and self-confidence to function effectively as a front line democracy in an increasingly insecure world. They know what it means to mobilize society in response to an existential threat, and understand the nature of modern war. These attributes make Ukraine a valuable partner for the United States and key contributor to the future defense of Europe.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Combined arms refers to an approach that, when implemented well, creates a decisive tactical advantage for one’s military. The essence of combined arms lies in striking an adversary in multiple ways so that responding to one kind of attack exposes vulnerabilities to another. Its modern form emerged in the early twentieth century, particularly during World War I, as militaries learned to synchronize infantry, artillery, armor, and aviation to overcome tactical challenges.

Since then, military capabilities have significantly evolved across four key variables: speed, range, sensing, and accuracy of fires. Today, another transformation is now underway—with two major implications for combined arms. First, dramatic improvements in computational power, epitomized by artificial intelligence (AI), greatly increase the amount of data that can be processed at headquarters at all levels. Second, autonomy and advanced missile technology—combined with this enhanced computational power—increase both the range and volume of accurate firepower and improve the protective capabilities of forces.

These changes in the character of warfare suggest different approaches to both platform design and overall force structure. In this new environment, combined arms demands tactical forces across all domains that can: fight for information and decision advantage, deny the enemy access to information; deliver (and absorb) large amounts of firepower; and maintain the ability to close “organic” kill chains to ensure that maneuver remains part of the tactical and operational playbook.

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Invest in space or lose the high ground

Edward Brady, Clementine G. Starling-Daniels — Wed, 23 Jul 2025 20:30:00 +0000

Military Fellowship Alumnus/Alumna

Executive summary

Space will be a decisive factor in shaping the direction—and possibly even the outcome—of the next major-power war. Ever since humanity first ventured beyond Earth, the ability of air forces—and now space forces—to affect military activity on the ground has only grown. Since World War II, achieving air superiority, or at least denying it to the enemy, has been essential for successful surface operations. Today, this same logic holds for space: control of the air enables dominance on the surface, but space superiority now underpins dominance in both air and surface domains (land and sea).

In future conflicts, militaries that achieve space superiority will be able to detect adversary activities across land, sea, and air; strike platforms and advanced long-range weapons will engage targets at unprecedented distances by leveraging space-based sensors, communications, and command and control systems; and space power will be essential for deterring strategic attacks on the US homeland and defending US territory if deterrence fails.

The Department of Defense’s (DoD) emphasis on Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control reflects this reality to a certain extent. Still, the current Space Force budget is insufficient to establish space superiority. In fact, a lack of investment is putting not only US space ambitions, but the effectiveness of the broader military, in jeopardy. Addressing this problem requires increasing the Space Force budget by billions of dollars. If Congress is unwilling to raise the defense topline to accommodate these investments, then the importance of space is so critical that the DoD should make the necessary divestments from other parts of the military to fund the Space Force. Deterring the next war—and winning it if deterrence fails—requires a powerful Space Force that is fully resourced to succeed.

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Edward Brady

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Middle East

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Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

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To meet NATO’s 5 percent benchmark, allies need more industrial capacity. Here’s how they can build it.

James Hursch, Kristen Taylor — Wed, 23 Jul 2025 19:56:05 +0000

At last month’s NATO Summit in The Hague, allies agreed to a new defense spending target: 5 percent of gross domestic product, made up of 3.5 percent for core defense requirements and 1.5 percent for defense enablers. This follows the Alliance approving new capability targets at the Defense Ministerial earlier in June—targets that will allow the Alliance to better resource NATO’s suite of defense plans. Together, these bold steps can breathe new life into NATO’s crucial capability gaps and incentivize allies to invest more in transatlantic innovation efforts. In effect, the Alliance now has both the shopping list and—if states follow through with their spending commitments—the budget to match allied ambition with action.

Yet, the Alliance still faces a crucial disconnect: Without the industrial muscle to increase production and meet rising demand, this positive momentum could grind to a halt.

Industrial capacity is a vulnerability on both sides of the Atlantic. Current allied defense industrial bases are not sized to meet an era of great-power competition. The United States and Europe may face different challenges to their defense industrial landscapes, but the result is the same: As a whole, the Alliance risks losing its war-fighting edge because of its industrial challenges.

A new reality

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the defense industry in the United States consolidated, from more than fifty individual companies to the far fewer “defense primes” of today. In many ways, this consolidation better matched the United States’ strategic outlook immediately after the Cold War. However, even after signals that the world was reentering an era of great-power competition and more intense warfare, Washington did little to rethink these moves.

Only Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 laid bare the acuteness of the US defense industrial challenge. The United States found that it could no longer meet Ukraine’s requirements, replenish its newly depleted stock levels, and meet increased demand from allies and partners looking to fill and modernize their own forces. Production lead times began to exceed five years for major munitions. As Washington came to terms with this new reality, it also watched how its military equipment was performing in Ukraine—and it found that conditions on the battlefield were rapidly changing. Russia’s electronic warfare advantages and other tactics threatened to make current equipment obsolete before it was even delivered to the battlefield.

Despite this wake-up call, the US defense industry remains hesitant to adapt to this new reality. Prime contractors added additional shifts to existing production lines, but many have so far been unwilling to invest meaningfully in new plants. Industries tend to be risk-averse, fearing that demand will cool before larger investments can be recouped. This aversion to taking financial risks was further reinforced by concerns that supply chain disruptions and lower levels of workforce availability would make it more difficult to increase production.

A fractured landscape

The other side of the Atlantic faces a different industrial landscape: one that is too fractured. Europe is made up of thirty NATO allies with their own national defense industrial interests that are often unable to produce enough capacity and lack economies of scale. The European Union (EU) is now working to provide funding as a shot in the arm to joint production efforts. But even when European nations and companies agree to cooperate across boundaries, programs tend to get mired in workshare disputes, leading to considerable delays and inefficiencies. This was the case with the A-400M transport and appears to be becoming the case with European sixth-generation fighter programs.

Whether European defense equipment can compete with US systems remains a question—but the promise of US support is invaluable to some allies. Despite, for example, France’s best attempts to institute “buy European” mandates in new EU funding efforts, many NATO allies remain hesitant to remove the United States from the equation.

Breaking down barriers

While the United States and Europe have different industrial landscapes, transatlantic defense industrial cooperation remains an important part of the solution to the issues both sides face. The Hague summit communiqué offered a glimmer of promise in this regard. NATO allies included language on eliminating defense trade barriers, highlighting a shared priority on transatlantic defense industrial cooperation even amid a turbulent period for transatlantic trade.

An important balance is needed. Transatlantic defense industrial bases need to be robust enough to compete with one another, but also resilient enough to cooperate. Fortunately, allies have built much of the groundwork for this. European defense companies already operate facilities in the United States—with companies such as Kongsberg actively expanding their US presence. On the other side of the Atlantic, US counterparts, keen to get a cut of resurgent European defense spending, are exploring opportunities to broaden their already-established presence on the continent.

Since defense industries are risk-averse, allies should consider several additional policy initiatives. To begin with, the United States should increase its use of multiyear procurement. It should also increase the use of its Defense Production Act authority, including by investing in new plants for the most vital munitions, in addition to trying to solve supply chain issues. And Washington should look for more opportunities to use startup companies that are willing to assume risk to rapidly ramp up the production of innovative products.

At the same time, European governments can offset some of the risk that defense companies face by providing investments in defense primes that will in turn allow those companies to invest in expanding the production base for US products overseas. Current examples of this include Javelin production in Poland, NATO Support and Procurement Agency efforts to bring allies together to coproduce Patriot missiles in Germany, and Canberra investing in the production of US munitions in Australia.

Sharpening the war-fighting edge

Importantly, as the United States and Europe expand their industrial bases, they must not sacrifice interoperability. Coproduction and co-development, alongside co-innovation opportunities in research and development, will help keep a focus on this necessary requirement.

To ensure interoperability, the United States should increase exportability investments earlier in the development of defense articles. Washington should also ensure that technology, security, and foreign disclosure processes are transparent and predictable. And where possible, the United States should explore opportunities to coordinate export control processes with its allies, along the lines of the export control terms of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States security partnership known as AUKUS.

For their part, European governments should seek to integrate US defense industry capital, technical expertise, and capacity into their industrial base by ensuring that US industries partnering with local firms and producing in Europe are able to reap economic benefits from increased defense spending.

Neither the United States nor Europe can afford to go it alone in the current geopolitical climate. Instead, transatlantic allies must think more strategically about efforts to share risk, produce jointly, and cooperate on new and innovative capabilities that will sharpen the Alliance’s war-fighting edge.

James A. Hursch is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as the director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and as deputy defense advisor at the US Mission to NATO.

Kristen Taylor is an assistant director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

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Stephen Rodriguez in War on the Rocks on the defense industrial paradigm

mpaulhiac — Tue, 22 Jul 2025 19:53:20 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On July 22, Stephen Rodriguez, senior advisor at Forward Defense, published a piece in War on the Rocks entitled “Titans, Trailblazers, and Translators: Forging a Unified Defense Industrial Paradigm”. Rodriguez, working at the intersection of the defense industrial base and technologies, identifies a growing tension between the two. To address this challenge to enduring national security, he says, the strategic imperative is to “harness the industrial might of the titans, fuse it with the digital velocity of the trailblazers, and leverage the deep integration expertise of the translators.”

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Macron and Starmer have a plan to reset Anglo-French relations. What’s in this ‘Entente Industrielle’?

Philippe Dickinson — Thu, 17 Jul 2025 17:06:01 +0000

In September 2022, Liz Truss, at that moment running to become UK Conservative Party leader and prime minister, was asked whether French President Emmanuel Macron was a friend or foe to the United Kingdom. “The jury’s out,” Truss said.

Since the 2016 Brexit referendum, UK-France relations had been in the doldrums. One of the most stubborn sticking points in the yearslong Brexit negotiations was a dispute between London and Paris over fishing rights. And in 2021, the defense partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known as AUKUS, overturned a deal signed between France and Australia on industrial cooperation on submarines. What’s more, British politicians had long accused France of not doing enough to address the scourge of people smugglers sending desperate migrants in flimsy dinghies across the Channel to the English shore.

But less than three years after Truss’s comment about Macron, the mood in London has changed substantially. The Labour Party, elected back to power in 2024 after fourteen years in opposition and led by Prime Minister Keir Starmer, set out to reset the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union and the continent as a whole.

Last week, Macron concluded a three-day state visit to the United Kingdom, the first by any European leader since Brexit. For two countries with such a long, complicated, and intertwined bilateral history, symbolism and ceremony matter. And last week, Britain put its best ceremonial foot forward to show that Macron is not a foe, but the best of amis. There were toasts at white-tie banquets and speeches to Parliament. But the real test of this new UK-France bonhomie will be if the progress made during Macron’s visit moves forward now that the trip is over.

What was announced

On defense, there were significant new agreements on two fronts. First, Starmer and Macron agreed to new deals to ramp up defense industrial production, which, in the tradition of UK-French naming conventions, is being dubbed the “Entente Industrielle.” This new entente includes additional orders of the UK-French Storm Shadow—which Ukraine uses in its defense against Russia—while the two sides progress on a joint project for next-generation deep strike and anti-ship missiles as a part of the ultimate replacement system for Storm Shadow. Also agreed during Macron’s visit were new plans to strengthen collaboration on cutting-edge technologies in support of collective defense, including supercomputers, artificial intelligence, and satellite connectivity.

Next, London and Paris adopted a new and significant agreement to “coordinate” the two countries’ respective nuclear deterrents. Importantly, this does not mean that they will relinquish sovereignty of their nuclear decision-making. But the agreement will allow both sides to find new avenues for cooperation and coordination to maximize their nuclear forces’ strategic effects. The United States, which has long called for greater European burden-sharing on defense, should welcome the steps the United Kingdom and France are taking to strengthen European and NATO defense and deterrence capabilities.

But the agreements went beyond bilateral defense measures. In March of this year, Macron and Starmer stepped up on leading Western support for Ukraine, creating a “Coalition of the Willing.” Led by the United Kingdom and France, this group is intended to support and enforce an eventual peace deal between Moscow and Kyiv. During Macron’s visit, the two leaders convened a meeting of the Coalition of the Willing, announcing that its new permanent headquarters would be established in Paris and London with a coordination cell in Kyiv. For the first time, the United States was represented at such a meeting, with Keith Kellogg, the US special envoy for Ukraine, joined by Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT).

But perhaps the most sought-after prize that Starmer achieved during Macron’s stay in London was an agreement with France on migration. Britain and France committed to piloting a “one in, one out” scheme to return asylum seekers arriving in boats in the United Kingdom to France in exchange for accepting France-based migrants with family connections to Britain. And in keeping with the historical symbolism that defines Anglo-French relations, Macron agreed to loan the Bayeux tapestry—a medieval embroidered depiction of the Norman conquest of England in 1066—to the British Museum, the tapestry’s first return to English shores in nine hundred years.

What comes next

While Starmer has faced domestic political difficulties, the scorecard for his first year as a global statesman has been positive. He has astutely navigated a potentially difficult relationship with the Trump administration, reset the United Kingdom’s relationship with Europe, reinvested in defense, and demonstrated leadership by rallying support for Ukraine. In the post-Brexit years, the United Kingdom was seen by Europeans as a dysfunctional laughingstock. Not anymore.

This matters, especially at a time when Europe is looking for leadership to navigate a geopolitically uncertain period. Europe works better when its two nuclear-armed permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are in sync and working together effectively. And NATO is strengthened when two of its leading militaries interact with a constructive mix of collaboration and competition.

But the lofty goals for Anglo-French cooperation coming out of Macron’s UK visit are far from assured. Europe is only beginning what will be a generation-long journey to rearm. The defense investments announced last week will need to balloon in the coming years or their symbolism will ring hollow. The Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine could fizzle into irrelevance if Starmer and Macron can’t enlist a critical mass of allies to make commitments and provide capabilities. And, as the last decade has shown, domestic politics in either country can blow well-intentioned plans off course. Both leaders are wary of threats from domestic challengers on the right. The migration deal in particular reflects this political reality. Many doubt that it will be effective, and it could also prompt second-order complications with southern European governments.

So, will the Entente Industrielle endure as a landmark agreement between France and the United Kingdom, as Macron, Starmer, and many in the transatlantic community hope it will? Until the hard work begins, the jury is out.

Philippe Dickinson is a deputy director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Prior to joining the Council, he was a career diplomat with the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.

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In the Indo-Pacific, US defense industrial partnerships go much deeper than AUKUS submarines

Adam Kozloski, Markus Garlauskas — Tue, 15 Jul 2025 19:15:18 +0000

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This week, Australian and US forces began Talisman Sabre, a major biennial military exercise that sends a powerful message of the two countries’ resolute bilateral ties and joint capabilities. This year’s iteration is being described as the “largest and most sophisticated war fighting exercise ever conducted in Australia,” involving some 35,000 personnel. The successful completion of this major, three-week exercise will hopefully alleviate some of the anxiety that has built up following the US Department of Defense’s recent decision to review the defense industry pact among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known as AUKUS.

Much of this anxiety was misplaced in the first place. The US review is not the alliance-busting event that some have portrayed it as. Far from it. It is reasonable and expected that a new US administration would review such an agreement, and it is something that new governments in both the United Kingdom and Australia have also completed. Moreover, the review of AUKUS should be understood as just one part of a larger US effort to accelerate and refine defense industry cooperation to meet shared security goals in the Indo-Pacific.

What else is included in this larger US effort? In a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in May, for example, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced the first tranche of Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) projects. It was a decisive move toward deepening US-led defense industrial base cooperation—within the administration’s “America first” framework—to counter China’s looming threat. PIPIR and AUKUS, if employed properly, will be powerful tools to achieve the Trump administration’s vision of ensuring US deterrence against aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

AUKUS: The submarines aren’t the only substance

The first problem is that the AUKUS pact is widely misunderstood. It is not a new trilateral “alliance.” AUKUS does not, for instance, involve new commitments on the use of military force. Nor is it a political coalition, like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue made up of Australia, India, Japan and the United States. Further, despite the focus of recent media coverage, AUKUS is not just about a new submarine sales deal that cut France out of selling diesel submarines to Australia. AUKUS has two “pillars,” both of which hold important benefits for the United States and particularly its Indo-Pacific Command.

Pillar I is about developing nuclear-powered, but nonnuclear armed, attack submarine capability operating out of Australia. This has already started, with Australians training on nuclear submarine technology with US and UK counterparts, and with US submarines making more port calls at Perth in Western Australia. The next major milestone will be in 2027, when Submarine Rotational Force-West will be established at Perth, initially with US and UK submarines. Then, in the early 2030s, the United States will sell Australia Virginia-class submarines as an interim measure while Australia develops its own nuclear submarine production capability. By the early 2040s, Australia will be building and operating its own subs of the new SSN-AUKUS class, an Australia-UK-US design.

However, concerns are rising that the US industrial base may not be able to produce enough Virginia-class submarines to provide for both Australian and US requirements for Pillar I. Since 2022, the United States has only been able to produce 1.2 Virginia-class submarines a year. It has not reached the targeted procurement rate of two new submarines per year, much less the 2.33 production rate required to provide submarines to Australia. While the US Congress and the Australian government have directed billions of dollars to defense industrial base investments, reaching this production rate in the next few years is a herculean task. However, in the interim, even if Pillar I only results in US and UK attack submarines operating out of Western Australia—much closer to the key flashpoints of the Taiwan Strait and the West Philippine Sea—then it has had a meaningful impact.

AUKUS Pillar II, meanwhile, is a much broader effort at defense industrial cooperation in a range of important areas. This includes long-range fires, quantum computing, unmanned underwater vehicles, electronic warfare capabilities, and artificial intelligence, pooling the advanced research efforts of all three countries to deliver new capabilities in the short term. These baskets of capability are not as simple and powerfully symbolic as new nuclear subs, but they are very important. In fact, there’s a strong argument that the focus and funds for AUKUS should shift away from the signature submarine programs to build out these new systems right away. Further, unlike Pillar I, Pillar II has a real prospect of including additional regional allies in specific Pillar II projects beyond the original three partners. Unlike AUKUS Pillar I, which has hard production limitations focused on a very expensive platform type with a long production timeline, Pillar II is bearing fruit quickly. One example of an AUKUS Pillar II capability is the imminent deployment of a “trilateral algorithm” to share classified information from P-8 sonobuoys across each country’s systems, increasing the range and maritime domain awareness of allied anti-submarine warfare efforts.

PIPIR: Leveraging regional US partnerships

PIPIR is less prominent than AUKUS, but it is more expansive and may prove to be even more important. Since its founding in May 2024, PIPIR has evolved from an agreed-upon concept to a plan of action in recent weeks. Announced in late May, the first set of marquee projects shows how the United States looks across the region at opportunities to save taxpayer money and improve US sustainment capability. For example, one new project aims to “establish repair capability and capacity for P-8 radar systems in Australia.” The P-8 is a critical aircraft for anti-submarine warfare and for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Currently, repair efforts on the radar system are limited to the continental United States. The ability to repair both US and partner P-8 radar systems out of range of most China’s missiles will enhance both deterrence and sustainment capabilities in the event of a conflict.

Another new project involves identifying standards for small unmanned aerial systems and secure supply chains for production. Currently, China controls nearly 90 percent of the commercial drone market, and the Department of Defense’s innovation unit claims that “China could shut [the drone industry] down globally for a year.” Efforts to build ally and partner supply chains are essential for deterrence and lethality. The commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Paparo, has continued to emphasize the importance of the “Hellscape” concept of massed unmanned systems to fight China. This new PIPIR project will help buttress the Department of Defense’s Replicator Initiative to ensure “Hellscape” is a credible option that is truly free of Chinese components.

Other PIPIR efforts include expanding in-theater ship repair, cooperation with Australia to produce artillery shells and guided missiles, and even coproduction with India on “equipment needed to deter aggression.” Hegseth’s public release of these projects indicates that partners and allies in the region are confident about PIPIR and the United States’ commitment to its success, with likely even more cooperation occurring behind closed doors.

The way forward

Together, PIPIR and AUKUS Pillar II could prove to be vital to deterrence and defense in the Indo-Pacific. While diplomatic messages and military exercises are immediate, visible, and necessary to shore up deterrence in the near term, aligning defense on industrial capabilities to match China’s massive armament program is the more important strategic move for the years ahead. The US Navy has acknowledged that China has 230 times more shipbuilding capacity than the United States. To provide both a qualitative and quantitative response to China’s push to become a “world class” military power, the need for the United States to integrate the industrial capacity and comparative technological advantages of allies and partners in the region has never been greater. Pitting the US defense industry against China’s without the help of Washington’s allies and partners, is a recipe for the failure of deterrence and, perhaps, catastrophic defeat. As US President Donald Trump has put it in the past, “America first does not mean America alone.”

Further defense industrial cooperation and integration can yield immense and local benefits for the US warfighter. However, these benefits must be carefully balanced with the need to ensure that the US government is not replacing US capacity and jobs with foreign ones to cut costs and speed up timelines. The Trump administration’s recently announced review of AUKUS, and its likely already completed review of PIPIR, under an “America first” framework, will be critical to mitigating this risk. A revitalized AUKUS and PIPIR model can create coproduction and cooperative models, allowing the United States to bring its strengths to the table. The better the United States can work with its regional partners on munitions and systems of mutual use, such as addressing the meager supply of 155mm artillery shells, the more effectively Washington can equip its warfighters to deter, and if necessary, win a prolonged war.

As the Trump administration prepares a national security strategy to help restore US greatness, regional defense industrial base partnerships must play a central role in restoring domestic manufacturing and increasing US lethality and deterrence. The early successes of AUKUS Pillar II and the announcement of marquee PIPIR projects have built a solid foundation for what should be an even more ambitious program of integration and cooperation.

Adam Kozloski is a nonresident senior fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and at the N7 Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He previously served as an aide in the United States Senate, supporting Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee members, including as Senator Joni Ernst’s foreign policy advisor.

Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leading the Council’s Tiger Project on War and Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. He is a former senior US government official with two decades of service as an intelligence officer and strategist, including twelve years stationed overseas in the region. He posts as @Mister_G_2 on X.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

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Russia’s bombing campaign is killing record numbers of Ukrainian civilians

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 14 Jul 2025 10:33:17 +0000

As Russia’s bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities continues to intensify, the civilian death toll is rapidly rising. June 2025 saw the highest monthly casualties among the Ukrainian civilian population in more than three years, according to new data from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. Losses included 232 deaths with a further 1343 Ukrainians injured, UN officials reported.

This sharp rise in Ukrainian civilian casualties is the result of a Russian air offensive that has expanded dramatically in scope since late 2024. During June, the number of drones and missiles launched at Ukrainian targets was ten times higher than the volume one year earlier.

“Civilians across Ukraine are facing levels of suffering we have not seen in over three years,” commented UN Monitoring Mission head Danielle Bell. “The surge in long-range missile and drone strikes across the country has brought even more death and destruction to civilians far away from the frontline.”

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The trend of increasingly deadly Russian bombardments continues to gain momentum at an alarming rate with a series of record-breaking aerial attacks in early July, each featuring more than 500 drones along with cruise and ballistic missiles. Based on the current trajectory, analysts warn that Russia will soon be able to conduct regular bombing raids involving in excess of 1000 drones.

Russia has managed to increase the scale of its bombing operations thanks to progress made since 2023 in the domestic production of drones. During the first year of the full-scale invasion, Iran supplied Russia with the long-range Shahed drones used to bomb Ukraine. Moscow has since reduced its reliance on the Iranians by securing the necessary Shahed drone blueprints from Tehran and establishing production lines inside the Russian Federation.

A growing number of dedicated Russian facilities are now manufacturing thousands of drones each month for the invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin has reportedly imported laborers from a number of Asian and African countries to bolster the workforce in these factories. China has also been accused of providing vital components in large quantities.

In addition to ongoing increases in output, Russia has also introduced a series of upgrades to Iran’s Shahed drones. The most recent models are faster and able to operate at higher altitudes, making them significantly more difficult to intercept. They are equipped with video cameras and in some cases utilize AI technologies, paving the way for autonomous flight operation and target selection. Crucially, the new generation of Russian bomber drones can also carry much larger warheads, leading to far greater destruction and loss of life.

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The escalation in Russia’s air war comes as Putin’s army struggles to make progress on the ground while suffering catastrophic losses. The Russian military has held the battlefield initiative since early 2024, but has managed to seize less than one percent of additional Ukrainian territory during this period, raising doubts over Putin’s ability to achieve his maximalist war aims. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently reported that the Russian army had lost over 100,000 soldiers during the first half of 2025 alone.

With no sign of an imminent breakthrough along the frontlines of the war, Putin’s bombardment strategy appears aimed at terrorizing the Ukrainian civilian population and undermining the country’s will to resist. The US-based Institute for the Study of War recently assessed that Russia’s ongoing large-scale air strikes seek to degrade Ukrainian and Western morale while underscoring Ukraine’s need for continued Western support.

Ukrainian officials have reached similar conclusions regarding the Kremlin’s intentions. “The Russians are intensifying terror against cities and communities to increasingly intimidate our people,” commented Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on July 13. “Russian terror against the rear is an attempt to break the nation,” stated Andriy Yermak, head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office. “Russia can’t achieve Putin’s goals on the frontline, so it keeps targeting civilians.”

The recent geographical expansion of Russia’s nightly bombing raids certainly seems to support these claims and appears designed to demoralize the entire Ukrainian population by sending a message that nowhere in Ukraine is now safe. Key targets in early July included cities in western Ukraine that had little previous experience of major bombardment such as Lutsk and Chernivtsi.

Ukraine is now seeking to address Russia’s terror bombing strategy with a combination of technological innovation, expanded military capabilities, and increased Western support. While additional air defense systems like US-made Patriots are a priority, Kyiv is developing and testing its own domestically produced interceptor drones as the most cost-effective way to combat Russia’s massive drone raids.

Long-range weapons are also vital as Ukraine seeks to strike back. Some commentators believe Ukraine can never have enough air defenses to neutralize the threat posed by Russia’s ever-expanding bombardments. They argue that the only way to stop Putin from bombing Ukrainian cities is by boosting Ukraine’s ability to hit targets deep inside Russia including production facilities and launch sites.

With Putin’s war machine cranking out missiles and drones in even greater quantities, larger Russian raids in the coming months are inevitable. The Ukrainian authorities must urgently come up with effective solutions before the civilian death toll rises further. Putin appears to believe he can bomb Ukraine into submission. While there is currently no indication that the civilian population is approaching breaking point, the horror of Russia’s increasingly deadly air raids is weighing heavy on the war-weary nation.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

There’s no question: Increased defense spending is essential for NATO to remain fit for purpose. But without industrial output to match, scaled investments will fall short.

Russia and China continue to outpace the West across important production metrics. Western surge capability is limited. Supply chains remain fragile. And differences in national defense planning and procurement cycles continue to pose challenges for NATO’s long-term interoperability.

It will not be easy to close these gaps. Political friction, economic nationalism, and eroding trust among allies remain headwinds. Collective resolve and sustained follow-through will be critical to ensuring that NATO achieves progress.

From rhetoric to readiness

To put new defense dollars to work, NATO must treat defense industrial capacity not merely as a marketplace function, but as a core pillar of deterrence and combat power. This effort must reinforce transatlantic unity while recognizing different allies’ evolving roles, as European allies step up on the continent’s defense and the United States and Canada focus more on global strategic deterrence. Here’s how:

1. Move beyond promises to production

Momentum is building. Poland, Estonia, and other allies are boosting defense spending and industrial capacity. But industries still need more than political commitments—they need predictability. Multiyear procurement contracts, shared stockpile targets, and collaborative delivery plans are needed to send credible signals to industry. Yet many governments remain cautious about long-term contracts that could lock in funding amid shifting national priorities. Endorsed by allies at The Hague summit, NATO’s Rapid Adoption Action Plan (RAAP) is a vital step to ensure that the Alliance can match the speed of innovation and adopt technologies into its military posture in quick order. But this must be linked to specific demand signals, synchronized planning cycles, and the ability to rapidly field new technologies. The Hague summit should serve as a springboard for NATO’s Industrial Forum in the fall and related venues to solidify these mechanisms. Equally important is leveraging the strengths of small and medium-sized firms, whose innovative, cost-effective solutions can provide the scalable and attritable tech-enabled capabilities critical for modern defense. This would signal a needed shift, showing that the Alliance is committed not just to sustaining legacy platforms but investing in the future of defense production.

2. Use Ukraine as a pathfinder for innovation

Ukraine’s experience demonstrates what’s possible when necessity drives innovation. Under intense pressure, Ukrainian forces have iterated new battlefield solutions—drones, electronic warfare, counter-drone measures—in weeks rather than years. While Ukraine’s tactical gains have not always translated into strategic breakthroughs, its speed of adaptation remains instructive. NATO must capture this spirit of urgency. That means overhauling acquisition processes, streamlining contracting and approval timelines, and embracing iterative development. This isn’t just acquisition reform—it’s industrial transformation. Industry partners working in Ukraine have shown how quickly capability gaps can be addressed when missions are clear and resources are available. NATO’s innovation engines—the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic, known as DIANA, and the NATO Innovation Fund—must become more accepting of risk and help projects evolve from pilot programs to scalable solutions directly tied to operational needs. Language in the communiqué mirroring RAAP was a crucial first step and an implicit endorsement of the Alliance’s efforts to scale innovation. Embedding RAAP into Alliance guidance and national plans will demonstrate that NATO is serious about delivering innovation at operational speed.

3. Strengthen public-private partnerships

Governments cannot achieve this transformation alone. Industry buy-in is critical to the defense reforms envisioned under the 5 percent of GDP benchmark—split between 3.5 percent for military capabilities and 1.5 percent for innovation, security, and defense-related investments. While this structure offers flexibility, it also demands clarity. Industries must ramp up production by expanding shifts, modernizing facilities, and planning for higher volumes. Governments, meanwhile, must reduce regulatory obstacles, simplify export controls, and eliminate financial barriers that stifle smaller innovators. NATO should bring industry to the table earlier through forums such as the National Industrial Advisory Group. Trust must be earned through transparency, shared risk, and joint planning. RAAP provides a framework to accelerate technology adoption, but it must evolve into a practical mechanism for integrating private-sector partners into NATO’s strategic planning. This isn’t just about fielding new capabilities—it’s about building resilience, agility, and innovation across the transatlantic industrial base.

The cost of falling behind

NATO’s deterrence rests on more than unity—it depends on speed, readiness, and industrial credibility. The Alliance cannot afford to build an industrial base that delivers capabilities only after a crisis erupts. It must act now to ensure it can deter threats before they materialize.

Closing this gap demands urgency, pragmatism, and robust transatlantic cooperation. Investment must align with innovation. Friction must give way to flexibility. Risk must be shared. Demand signals must be clear—but remain adaptable as the security environment evolves. A system that takes a decade to deliver ground-based missiles risks irrelevance when threats emerge from space in half the time.

The Hague summit made significant progress, particularly through RAAP. But the Alliance cannot afford to let new plans become another line item in the communiqué. The test now is implementation.

If NATO can align its industrial capacity with its strategic ambition, it will remain the world’s most capable and credible military alliance. If it cannot, it risks ceding the advantage to competitors who are moving faster, scaling smarter, and shaping the future on their terms.

Let The Hague summit be remembered not just for promises—but for NATO’s tangible pivot from rhetoric to readiness.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) David J. Julazadeh is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He most recently served at NATO’s Allied Command Transformation as the deputy chief of staff, capability development.

Kristen Taylor is an assistant director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Europe has ideas for how to provide for its own security. The US should take notice.

Katherine Johnson — Tue, 08 Jul 2025 14:31:41 +0000

Since taking office, US President Donald Trump has upended transatlantic relations. Perhaps most significantly, he has called into question the United States’ role as the “guarantor” of peace on the European continent. Yet, at the same time, US actions and rhetoric calling for Europe to do more to defend itself have sparked genuine action on the continent. European leaders now appear determined to reimagine the continent’s agency and reduce its reliance on Washington for defense.

The US-Europe relationship may be somewhat tense at the moment, but Washington should pay attention and applaud the proposals coming out of Europe to take more ownership of European defense. This includes the idea for a new intergovernmental organization called the European Defence Mechanism (EDM) to help finance the continent’s rearmament.

The proposal originated from a report written by the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel, following a commission by the Polish presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU). It was reportedly a topic of intense debate at an April meeting of EU finance ministers—signaling European leaders’ increased willingness to take on more responsibility for Europe’s rearmament. While some ministers were hesitant to consider a new defense tool, many showed interest.

What’s in the plan

The big question in European defense is how Europe should address its spending and capability gaps. In its April 7 report, Bruegel laid out one possible solution in the form of the EDM. The mechanism would focus on joint procurement across a single European defense market. Notably, this proposal reflects a similar idea discussed among British officials earlier this year for the creation of a “supranational bank” for joint European defense purchases. The EDM would use funds from its members to finance the joint procurement of weaponry, including for the acquisition of strategic enablers, and make loans to member states. To fund these activities, the EDM would be empowered to borrow on capital markets.

The Bruegel plan represents a step forward in addressing well-documented challenges to European security. Currently, the European defense landscape is largely divided along national lines, creating high prices where markets are small. Weapons stockpiles are low, and countries too often do not coordinate purchases. The EDM would help create a single market for defense on the continent and allow Europe to take advantage of economies of scale. It would also shift the financial burden of borrowing away from member states, allowing the EDM to acquire costly defense materials and keep debt on its own books. While the EU has made recent attempts to add flexibility to its fiscal rules for defense spending, this arrangement may be an attractive alternative for heavily indebted countries seeking to avoid rising debt levels. On top of these advantages, the EDM would allow for the participation of countries outside the EU, such as the United Kingdom.

If the plan were adopted in its current form, the EDM would become the official embodiment of the “coalition of the willing.” It would allow European democracies, whether part of the EU or not, to voluntarily join a framework governed by rules that are better suited to addressing challenges facing the European security landscape. Nations would be prohibited from using national bias in defense procurement, thereby eliminating the exception in EU law that allows countries to prioritize their own national defense initiatives at the expense of consolidating the European single market for defense.

What it might mean for the United States

The potential downside for the United States remains the same issue that has plagued European defense plans for years: a single market for European defense procurement would likely lead officials across the continent to prioritize European defense contractors over US firms. The current proposal stipulates that in most cases, the EDM could only procure weapons from defense contractors located in EDM member countries.

Politicians in both parties in Washington have sharply criticized this potential exclusion. This concern has bubbled up before: during US President Donald Trump’s first administration, as the EU moved to establish its Permanent Structured Cooperation initiative, the White House objected to what this would mean for US firms. But times have changed: Washington cannot reasonably expect Europe to step up its capabilities and increase its reliance on a United States that has shown its priorities are elsewhere.

Furthermore, the EDM would not fully exclude US firms. Under the proposal in the Bruegel report, if the EDM board were to choose to do business with a defense contractor in the United States, then it could do so through a “majority” or potentially a qualified majority vote. To be sure, this would add an additional hurdle to clear, but it would not completely bar US companies from the market.

What’s more, the EDM project fits into Washington’s strategic thinking. By facilitating purchases on a larger scale, the EDM would give European countries the power to jointly procure capabilities operated by the United States. Currently, European countries largely depend on the US command in NATO to provide them with access to strategic enablers, including strategic air defense and lift systems, satellite communications, and command-and-control capabilities. These enablers are expensive to acquire, yet they are necessary to carry out any large-scale coordinated action. With its greater purchasing power, the EDM would potentially have the capacity to buy and own strategic enablers, build European capabilities, and free up US capabilities for other priorities. The EDM is not a tool for Europe to move beyond NATO; it’s one to fortify European security within the Alliance.

The plan for the EDM remains a blueprint for now, but it provides an invaluable insight into European defense planning amid the changing transatlantic relationship. The European Union and its member states need to take ideas such as these, which facilitate the strategic independence of the continent, and put them into action.

For its part, Washington should recognize the fresh ideas that are coming out of Europe and embrace them. A US endorsement of bold proposals for European defense such as the EDM can help Europe build momentum to adopt them and make real progress on taking more responsibility for its defense. Until then, rhetoric from Washington on its support for greater European self-reliance will be just that.

Katherine Johnson is a former young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Putin is winning the drone war as Russia overwhelms Ukraine’s defenses

Maksym Beznosiuk — Tue, 08 Jul 2025 13:51:28 +0000

Russia’s July 4 bombardment of Kyiv was reportedly the largest of the entire war. The attack came just hours after US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin had finished an unsatisfactory telephone conversation, leading many to suggest that the raid was a calculated act of defiance by the Kremlin.

Whether the intention was to personally embarrass Trump or not, the recent Russian airstrikes in the early hours of American Independence Day certainly served to underline the changing fortunes in the drone war between Ukraine and Russia.

For the first few years of the war following Putin’s 2022 invasion, Ukraine’s dynamic tech sector and vibrant startup culture helped keep the country a step ahead of Russia despite the Kremlin’s far greater resources. In recent months, however, it has become increasingly apparent that the initiative has passed to Moscow.

The recent shift in the drone war is a matter of both quantity and quality. Russia is now producing far more drones and has developed new models incorporating a range of technological upgrades. This is making it possible to launch massive bombardments of Ukrainian cities that overwhelm Ukraine’s limited air defenses and terrorize the civilian population.

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Since 2022, drones have emerged as the key weapon for both sides in the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin. Ukraine’s drone manufacturing ecosystem has mushroomed from a handful of businesses to more than two hundred companies. This expansion has helped fuel innovation and strengthened the country’s defenses, but the large number of market participants means scaling up successful innovations can be challenging.

In contrast, Russia has played to its traditional strengths by focusing on volume. Moscow was initially reliant on Iran for the delivery of Shahed drones, but soon established domestic manufacturing facilities in Tatarstan and elsewhere. These drone factories have reportedly imported workers from Africa and Asia, and are now producing more than 5000 drones per month.

Alongside increases in output, Russian strike drones have also undergone a series of upgrades. For example, some recently intercepted models incorporate AI technologies that allow them to operate autonomously, while most have larger warheads and are able to fly at far higher altitudes, making them much harder to intercept.

This is translating into Russian aerial attacks on an unprecedented scale. Throughout spring and early summer 2025, Ukrainian cities faced a succession of record-breaking bombardments. At present, Russia is able to launch more than 500 drones at Ukraine in a single night. Based on current trajectories, Ukrainian analysts warn that 1000-drone Russian aerial attacks may soon become a reality.

The tactics shaping Russia’s drone bombing campaign are also evolving. Overnight raids now routinely incorporate hundreds of upgraded Shahed drones converging on Ukrainian targets from different directions, followed by waves of ballistic and cruise missiles. Putin hopes this approach will exhaust Ukraine’s limited air defenses while inflicting severe physical and psychological damage on the Ukrainian civilian population.

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It is clear that Ukraine urgently requires innovative defense tech solutions to address the challenges posed by Russia’s dramatically escalating drone attacks. It will also be vital to address bureaucratic inefficiencies and streamline government procurement processes. Ukraine has the brains to defend itself as long as the authorities in Kyiv make the most of the country’s tech sector potential.

The top priority should be scalable and economically viable systems capable of intercepting large numbers of Russian attack drones. Sophisticated anti-missile weapons such as the US-produced Patriot system are too expensive and in too short supply for use against plentiful and cheaply produced Russian drones.

Many see interceptor drones as the most technologically suitable and cost-effective solution to Russia’s drone blitz. A number of models are currently in development and undergoing testing in combat conditions. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said interceptor drones proved effective during Russia’s July 4 attack and shot down “dozens of Shaheds.” He vowed to scale up production while expanding training for drone operators.

Ukraine is also increasing cooperation with international partners to develop and produce interceptor drones along with other models. There is an obvious mutual interest here. Putin’s rapidly growing drone arsenal poses a direct threat to European security and would likely play a leading role in any future war with Russia.

Interceptor drones are not the only focus of current efforts to counter Putin’s drone bomber fleet. Other options currently under consideration include laser-based weapons, autonomous gun turrets employing AI, and aerial interception involving helicopters or propeller planes. Ultimately, flexibility will be crucial against an enemy that is also constantly learning and innovating.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is rewriting the rules of modern warfare. In this war of innovation, the most important lesson so far has been the dominance of drones. Ukraine set the pace early on, but Russia has now seized the initiative. In the coming months, Kyiv’s allies must provide as much support as possible in order to close the gap on Moscow and prevent Putin’s current advantage in the drone war from becoming decisive.

Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategic policy specialist and director of UAinFocus, an independent platform connecting Ukrainian and international analysts around key Ukrainian issues.

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Finnish President Alexander Stubb shares his conclusions from the NATO Summit in The Hague and how Europe must adapt its approach to security.

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With the United States halting weapons shipments to Ukraine, “Europeans have to understand that they have to take more of the burden” of supporting Ukraine, Finnish President Alexander Stubb said.

“We need to find the right balance where Europeans can help the Ukrainians where perhaps the Americans are leaving a few gaps,” he added.

Stubb spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Thursday, where he outlined two ways Europe will need to support Ukraine.

“One is to continue to provide Ukraine with the weapons that it needs to win this war on the battlefield,” he said. “Two is to increase the pressure on Russia, which really at this particular time means more sanctions.”

Amid stalling Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations, Stubb outlined his vision for the future of the talks, which he said should happen in two phases: the installation of a cease-fire and the “actual peace negotiations,” which should include discussions about territorial settlements, compensation, and reconstruction.

“We have to do this in two phases. You can’t sort of lump everything in together. You’ll get nowhere,” he said.

Below are more highlights from the event, moderated by Atlantic Council President and Chief Executive Officer Frederick Kempe, where the Finnish president also spoke about his takeaways from the 2025 NATO Summit and about US-Finland relations.

A summit for the books

Stubb said that the summit “will go down in history as the birth of new NATO” for three reasons: 1) the Alliance went “back to its roots” as a “deterrent to a bigger imperial power in Europe”; 2) the allies agreed to spend 5 percent of their gross domestic product on defense and defense-related projects; and 3) NATO began “a bit of a shift” in its balance toward Europe.
“We’re probably witnessing the birth of a more European NATO,” he said, noting that such a shift fulfills the demands of several consecutive US administrations.
Stubb said that warnings about the United States possibly withdrawing from NATO are “more hype than anything else” based on his conversations with US President Donald Trump and his administration. “Not once did I hear anyone saying that the US is withdrawing from NATO,” he said.
But there is significant “burden shifting” underway, which is “a good thing for Europe and for the Alliance right now,” he said. “We’re not going to see a major shift away of the United States towards the Indo-Pacific, but there will be a rebalancing.”

The EU’s new era

Reflecting on the European Union’s (EU’s) history—during which it has set up a single market, introduced the euro, and addressed global crises such as the war in Ukraine—Stubb said that “the European Union always works on one big project at a time.”
He added that he believes “the next big project for Europe is going to be in defense,” with EU members navigating how to “pool our sovereignty.” “We have one big problem in Europe, and that is that we buy things separately,” he said, which drives up the price and results in incompatible systems. “We need to rationalize a lot of this stuff.”
“This is not about replacing the Alliance,” he said, but it is instead about strengthening the military and defense industry.

Breaking the ice

Stubb recounted his game of golf with Trump in March. “I’m happy that state to state, we have the same values . . . On a personal level, at least I can say that I get along with the president of the United States,” he said.
During the game, the two leaders reportedly talked about security matters ranging from the war in Ukraine to the procurement of Finnish icebreaker ships. “Trump has stated correctly that the Alliance, including, of course, the United States, needs icebreakers,” Stubb said. “Russia has over forty; and the battle of the Arctic, of course, is really about Russian and Chinese dominance.”
“We would be very happy to provide a few icebreakers to the US administration before the end of Trump’s term,” he said, adding that one way to do that is to “sell a used icebreaker and then combine that perhaps with building a few new ones.”
Amid offers from Putin to mediate between Israel and Iran—and to organize an ice hockey series with players from US and Russian leagues—Stubb warned that the United States and its allies cannot decouple diplomacy with Russia from the war in Ukraine. “Remember that Russian soft power is linked to things such as ice hockey,” he said. “Let’s not tarnish and make the game dirty by bringing the Russian league into it in any which way.”

Katherine Golden is an associate director on the Atlantic Council’s editorial team.

Watch the full event

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A US defense strategy to win the next conflict

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels — Thu, 03 Jul 2025 13:00:00 +0000

Executive summary

The next National Defense Strategy (NDS) is set to reshape US military strategy in an era of evolving global threats—from the rise of China as a primary competitor to emerging challenges in homeland security. At the same time, it must correct the shortcomings of previous strategies, including the failure to clearly balance defense and power projection, as well as an overly narrow focus on nuclear missile and terrorist threats.

To sharpen its approach to national defense, the second Trump administration should center the forthcoming NDS around five critical priorities: defending the homeland, deterring strategic attacks on the United States through a resilient and modernized deterrent posture, recognizing China as the primary competitor globally, modernizing US forces for combined arms operations in the age of AI and autonomy, and securing US military dominance in space.

Together, these five priorities form a comprehensive framework to protect the lives of US citizens, interests, and values in an increasingly contested world. In this sense, the next NDS is more than a policy document—it is an opportunity. A bold strategic vision must be met with the necessary resources and capabilities to back it up. By embracing these priorities with clarity and commitment, the NDS can deliver a defense strategy that meets today’s threats and secures the United States’ future.

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About the author

Fellow

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

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Homeland defense in an era of new strategic threats

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels, Amy Cowley — Thu, 03 Jul 2025 13:00:00 +0000

Executive summary

Threats to the US homeland have fundamentally changed from two decades ago. In the years following 9/11, the most pressing dangers came from terrorist groups intent on carrying out attacks on US soil. Today’s threat landscape is broader, more complex, and more difficult to predict. Peer-state competitors, transnational criminal organizations, and non-state actors now possess the means to target the US homeland through a range of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities—including long-range missiles, cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation, and malign foreign influence.

Responding to these evolving threats—designed to disrupt critical infrastructure, weaken public trust, and undermine the ability of the United States to project power abroad— requires a comprehensive approach to homeland defense that extends beyond border security. But how should the United States chart this new course, and what must it entail? The forthcoming National Defense Strategy (NDS), published by the Department of Defense (DoD), offers a critical opportunity to lay the groundwork for the next step in strengthening homeland defense.

Meeting this challenge requires a focus not only on large-scale air and missile defense and border security but also on the protection of critical defense systems—such as space infrastructure—from cyberattacks and coercive economic activities. The success of these efforts may well determine whether the United States can stay one step ahead of those seeking to do it harm.

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About the authors

Fellow

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Staff

Amy Cowley

Assistant Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict North & West Africa

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A pivot to China—not Asia

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels, Edward Brady, Theresa Luetkefend — Thu, 03 Jul 2025 13:00:00 +0000

Executive summary

In the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the first Donald Trump administration and that of the Joe Biden administration, great-power competition played a central role. However, both administrations considered China and Russia—and therefore the Indo-Pacific and Europe—as twin focal points of risk and strategic interest. The current Trump administration is shifting gears. Rather than balancing China and Russia, the Department of Defense (DoD) will now organize around China as the principal threat and competitor.

This prioritization is welcome. After all, defense planners have long criticized that trying to manage too many threats to the United States without a corresponding increase in defense budget makes it difficult to address any of them effectively. The problem is not whether the United States should engage globally—it must—but whether considering too many issues means that none of them are effectively prioritized.

But how can the Trump administration—through its upcoming NDS—successfully position China as the primary threat, while rebalancing its engagement in other regions in a measured and responsible way? The answer lies in updating the US military’s force structure and rebalancing its force posture. Moreover, to deter China in the Indo-Pacific, the US military should focus on long-range fires, the ability to move forces, the protection of critical defense infrastructure, and additional basing options.

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About the author

Fellow

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Fellow

Edward Brady

Military Fellowship Alumnus/Alumna

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Middle East

Staff

Theresa Luetkefend

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy German

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Ukraine’s drone wall is Europe’s first line of defense against Russia

David Kirichenko — Wed, 02 Jul 2025 19:46:42 +0000

As Russia’s summer offensive continues to unfold along a front line measuring hundreds of miles, Ukraine’s overstretched military finds itself heavily reliant on drones to prevent any major breakthroughs. The Ukrainian military’s innovative and rapidly evolving use of unmanned aerial vehicles to create a layered defense is often referred to as a “drone wall.” If this Ukrainian drone wall can prove itself over the coming months and blunt Putin’s big offensive, this will likely shape future defensive doctrine in military academies across Europe and beyond.

The military use of unmanned aerial vehicles has evolved dramatically since the onset of Russia’s invasion more than three years ago, leading many to call the current conflict the world’s first ever full-scale drone war. As the invasion enters a fourth summer, drones are currently thought to account for around 70 percent of all Russian and Ukrainian battlefield casualties.

Ukraine’s drone wall tactics emerged out of military necessity and are part of this far broader shift toward the dominance of unmanned systems on the modern battlefield. Following Russia’s victory in the Battle of Avdiivka in early 2024, Ukraine found itself on the defensive and facing severe shortages of artillery amid delays in anticipated US aid. Kyiv responded by turning to drones as a cheap and effective substitute for more conventional munitions.

While drones lack the firepower to completely replace artillery, Ukraine’s deployment of drones to create defensive corridors many miles deep has proved remarkably effective. Drones are used both for surveillance purposes and to conduct airstrikes, making it extremely difficult for enemy forces to concentrate and launch large-scale offensive operations. The impact of this approach can be seen in the sheer scale of the damage being done to Putin’s invading army. Britain’s International Institute for Strategic Studies has estimated that Russian losses in 2024 included around 1400 tanks along with more than 3700 armored vehicles.

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As Ukraine’s drone wall has taken shape over the past eighteen months, Russian commanders have been forced to adapt their own tactics. Instead of depending on large armored columns to punch through Ukrainian defenses, Russia has becoming increasingly reliant on small infantry units working to achieve local advances. Rather than traveling in armored vehicles, soldiers now often use highly mobile forms of transport such as motorcycles and buggies in order to evade drones.

Russia is mirroring Ukraine’s progress in the field of drone warfare as the two nations compete in a daily race to innovate and gain a battlefield advantage. At present, the Russians have managed to achieve a significant edge through the large-scale manufacture and deployment of drones operated via fiber optic cables. This low-tech category of drone has been hailed by some as a game changer as such models cannot be jammed using existing electronic warfare tools.

Meanwhile, Russia is increasingly targeting Ukrainian drone operators and the radar stations they depend on. This is making it significantly more difficult for Ukraine to maintain comprehensive drone coverage in depth along the front lines of the war, while creating gaps for Russian infantry units to exploit.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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The strength of Ukraine’s drone wall depends on a number of factors including increased volumes, technological advances, and integration into existing military structures. Domestic Ukrainian drone production has skyrocketed since 2022, with hundreds of new companies entering the market. As a result, annual output is set to reach four million drones this year, according to Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov.

Despite this progress, Ukrainian drone manufacturing remains hampered by financial constraints. Speaking during the recent NATO summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine could potentially produce eight million drones annually but currently lacks the funding to do so. He argued that making up this shortfall was a priority, not only for Ukraine but for the future of European security.

In order to improve the integration of drone units into the Ukrainian army, the country has established a new branch of the military dedicated to drone warfare. Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces are at the forefront of efforts to enhance the drone wall and improve other aspects of the country’s drone operations. In spring 2025, Ukraine also launched the Drone Line initiative, which aims to build on the experience of the Ukrainian military’s most effective drone units and expand on the drone wall concept in order to establish a “kill zone” with a depth of up to fifteen kilometers.

Ukraine’s innovative use of drones to slow Russia’s advance is attracting plenty of attention among Kyiv’s European partners. In April 2025, Germany and six other NATO member states unveiled plans for a drone wall initiative of their own. This envisioned defensive formation will stretch along NATO’s eastern flank, from Norway in the far north down to Poland. The goal is to deter Russia with a combination of AI-powered reconnaissance and counter-drone systems.

Meanwhile, Britain and Ukraine recently announced a new agreement to jointly produce Ukrainian-designed drones, with financing coming from the UK government. This cooperation reflects growing recognition among Kyiv’s allies that Ukraine is no longer a mere recipient of military aid and has become a valuable security partner with unique experience of modern warfare. British troops are also reportedly receiving training from Ukrainian specialists in drone warfare.

Ukraine’s drone wall alone will not be enough to stop the invading Russian army. But with sufficient funding, effective coordination, and the right support from more conventional weapons systems, there are good reasons to believe that this approach can make it extremely difficult for the Russian army to achieve major battlefield breakthroughs. This will be put to the test during what promises to be an intense summer campaigning season as Putin pushes his commanders to deliver results, whatever the cost. If Ukraine’s drone wall can stand firm, it will likely be recognized as an essential element in Europe’s future defense against Russia.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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The biggest change during 2025 has been in the sheer scale of Russia’s aerial attacks. In late 2024, Moscow was launching around two thousand drones per month at Ukrainian cities. That figure has now risen to more than four thousand. While a typical attack may earlier have involved dozens of drones, it is now commonplace for Russia to launch hundreds of drones in a single night. Inevitably, this increase in volume means more and more drones are reaching their targets.

This has been made possible by massively expanded drone production inside Russia. During the first year of the full-scale invasion, the Russians initially relied on Iran to supply the bulk of the long-range drones used in attacks on Ukrainian cities. More recently, Moscow has acquired the relevant technology from Tehran and begun producing drones domestically.

With dependence on Iran now reduced to a minimum, Russia’s expanding drone production is in part thanks to backing from the Kremlin’s other authoritarian allies. Ukraine has accused China of supporting Russia’s efforts to ramp up domestic drone output and claims Beijing is providing Moscow with a wide range of vital technical components. Recent reports also indicate that North Korea is poised to send tens of thousands of workers to produce drones at industrial facilities in eastern Russia.

Russia’s increasingly deadly drone attacks are not only due to growing numbers. Russian drones are also evolving to become faster and more explosive, with some of the latest models featuring video cameras and incorporating AI technologies. The current generation of drones tend to attack from higher altitudes, making them significantly more difficult for Ukrainian air defense crews to intercept.

Meanwhile, Russian drone warfare specialists continue to develop more effective tactics. This includes coordinated attacks involving drones together with cruise missiles and ballistic missiles to overload Ukraine’s air defenses. Russia is also now incorporating so-called wolf pack tactics, with drones approaching a target from a range of different directions before striking virtually simultaneously. This has proved far more effective than launching wave after wave of drone attacks.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Russia’s increasingly deadly drone campaign is having a demoralizing impact on the population throughout Ukraine. Addressing this challenge is now one of the most urgent and complex tasks facing the Ukrainian military.

The most obvious solution would be to destroy Russian drones before they can be launched, either at production sites or storage facilities. Russia is well aware of this and has moved production lines far away from Ukraine. As Russian drones do not require traditional airfields, attacks on launch sites are unlikely to have a significant impact.

At present, Ukraine’s anti-drone defenses include a combination of heavy machine guns and traditional anti-aircraft artillery. This approach proved fairly effective during the first few years of the war, but ground crews are now increasingly unable to cope with the scale of Russia’s attacks and the sophistication of Moscow’s most recent drone models. Missile defense systems and fighter jets have a better chance of intercepting Russia’s upgraded drone fleet, but this is a very expensive approach that risks exhausting Ukraine’s air defenses and leaving the country vulnerable to missile strikes.

As the destruction of residential districts across Ukraine reaches unprecedented levels, it is clear that the Ukrainian military needs to adopt new approaches to address the growing drone menace. The most cost-effective solution would be to produce interceptor drones capable of protecting Ukrainian cities. This process is already underway but must be urgently scaled up to reflect the size of the task ahead.

There is no time to waste. Ukraine’s dynamic defense tech sector is developing a range of potentially effective interceptor drone models, but large-scale production is crucial. This will require decisive measures from the Ukrainian authorities to identify the most effective solutions and provide the necessary backing in a timely fashion. Kyiv’s partners can also contribute to this process by supplying interceptor drones and financing the manufacture of domestic models.

In addition to interceptor drones, some analysts see promise in the expanded use of helicopters and perhaps even propeller planes to shoot down Russian drones. Propeller planes may be particularly well-suited to this task, offering an economically viable alternative to the use of jet fighters while operating at speeds closer to the drones they aim to intercept. A Ukrainian F-16 pilot and his plane were lost while trying to destroy incoming Russian drones and missiles on June 29, underlining the dangers of such operations.

Russia’s escalating drone war is the latest chapter in an invasion that has been shaped by rapid technological development. Ukraine can expect recent Russian trends to continue, with more massive aerial attacks featuring deadlier drones. If they wish to prevent a collapse in Ukrainian morale, officials in Kyiv must rapidly come up with their own tech solutions in quantities capable of blunting the threat posed by Putin’s expanding drone fleet.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Mercifully short at just five paragraphs, the summit declaration does not highlight the immediate threat Moscow’s military reconstitution poses to the Alliance, noting instead the “long-term threat” Russia poses to Euro-Atlantic security, alongside the threat of terrorism. It does not mention how Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—the largest land war in Europe since World War II—has shattered peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic. It does not address China’s stated ambitions or policies that challenge transatlantic security and values. Nor does it note the importance of strengthening NATO’s relationship with its Indo-Pacific partners. The declaration solidifies that this was a “hear nothing, see nothing, say nothing” summit meant to project a sense of calm amid an increasingly volatile and violent security landscape.

Opting not to address the toughest challenges facing the Alliance will come at a high price. Instead of agreeing to a robust set of deliverables that will strengthen NATO’s deterrence and resolve, allies will be left to their own national devices at a time when the full weight of the Alliance is needed to address threats and challenges to their security. NATO leaders are now left to confront four major uncertainties when they return to their capitals. Taken together, they present an immense task for the Alliance in the months and years ahead.

How committed is the United States to European security?

The first unknown is the United States’ political and military commitment to the transatlantic relationship. Despite reassuring comments from Trump at the close of the summit, several instances have highlighted this administration’s deep antipathy toward its European allies and partners. Trump has a long track record of skepticism toward multilateral institutions, including NATO. He has also said that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia should “do whatever the hell they want” to those allies that do not pay enough for their defense. And he has repeatedly questioned whether the United States should live up to its Article 5 collective defense commitments.

More recent examples include Trump’s pause of US military assistance and intelligence sharing to Ukraine, Vice President JD Vance’s scathing speech at the Munich Security Conference in February, and the infamous “Signalgate” text exchange, in which Vance and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth called Europeans “free-loaders” and “pathetic.” As a result, it’s no surprise that European leaders have indicated that Trump’s second arrival in the White House has ushered in a new era for the transatlantic relationship, in which Europeans cannot fully trust or rely on the United States.

The United States’ conventional military commitment to Europe is also in question. At this year’s summit, allies agreed to new capability targets to meet requirements outlined in NATO’s defense plans. However, these decisions were taken before the United States Department of Defense has completed its Global Posture Review, which is expected later this year. This review will assess and then recommend where the United States should locate its troops and capabilities around the world.

Early indications are that the United States will look to shift a significant number of troops and capabilities out of Europe and into theaters the administration deems more critical to US national security, including the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. While any changes to the United States’ conventional force posture in Europe won’t change the overall capabilities that NATO needs to deter and defend, a large-scale shift could overwhelm European allies that have not planned for an abrupt and significant drawdown.

Will Trump apply more pressure on Russia?

Another unknown is whether the United States will increase costs on Russia for its continued aggression in Ukraine. Despite Trump’s frustration with Putin, he has yet to say if he will penalize the Kremlin for pulling the United States along through futile negotiations meant to distract from Russia’s ongoing bombardment of Ukrainian civilians and critical infrastructure. Congress is deliberating on a new sanctions bill to target Russian energy exports (with eighty-four senators as cosponsors), but the White House has not indicated that it will support these measures. As the European Union assesses whether to renew its economic and energy sanctions on Moscow, a return to business as usual between United States and Russia would render Europe’s efforts meaningless.

Will the United States continue to support Ukraine?

Third, it remains unclear whether Trump will wash his hands of the conflict in Ukraine—now in its fourth year—and forego any future rounds of much-needed security assistance to Kyiv. The United States’ shift away from supporting Ukraine is already happening. In addition to the administration’s earlier pause of assistance and intelligence sharing to Ukraine, the United States has abdicated its leadership of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group—the very forum the United States launched and led for over three years to coordinate security assistance from more than fifty countries to Ukraine. Not knowing whether the United States will remain by Ukraine’s side puts another potential strain on European resources, which already may be squeezed by a retreating US force posture in Europe.

Can allies find a common approach to China?

Lastly, the Trump administration is sending mixed signals to European allies and partners about its interest in pursuing a common approach toward China. This uncertainty led allies to forego an important opportunity in The Hague to address the complex and growing challenges that China poses to Euro-Atlantic security. Moreover, the leaders of three of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners—Japan, South Korea, and Australia—decided to forego attending the summit. This signals a setback in the momentum the first Trump administration and Biden administration made in strengthening coordination between Europeans and other democratic allies to address Chinese military assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, economic coercion, and technological influence in Europe. This wavering could not come at a worse time, as Beijing continues its support of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and attempts to exert influence over democratic states in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

None of these pressing questions was adequately answered by allied leaders at this year’s NATO Summit. Yet how these challenges play out in the coming months and years will fundamentally shape NATO’s ability to address existing and emerging threats to Alliance territory. Allied leaders may have secured a new spending pledge and a nice photo op in The Hague, but a lot of hard work and harsh realities are waiting for them as they return home.

Torrey Taussig is a director and senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She was previously a director for European affairs on the National Security Council and the Department of Defense coordinator for the 2024 NATO Summit.

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Trump’s approach to Russia and its war on Ukraine is evolving, not in one big leap, but in several smaller steps

John E. Herbst — Fri, 27 Jun 2025 18:44:54 +0000

This is part of a series of regular assessments of the efforts, spearheaded by the Trump administration, to achieve a negotiated end to Russia’s war on Ukraine. Read the previous edition here.

US President Donald Trump’s policy toward Russia’s war on Ukraine continues to evolve in a rush of small and large steps as he reacts to events in Europe and beyond. The two large recent occasions for this were, first, the Israeli-US strikes against Iran’s nuclear program and, second, the NATO Summit at The Hague. While there were contradictory signs, Trump’s reaction to both major events signaled an evolution toward a tougher line on Moscow.

Since he won the election last November, Trump promised that he would end the Russian war on Ukraine by asking for concessions from both sides and putting pressure on the side obstructing progress toward a durable peace. Since March, Ukraine has accepted without quibble several of Trump’s proposals while Russia has first deflected, then rejected them. Despite this, the Trump administration has been reluctant to put pressure on Moscow. Washington underscored this at the June 16-17 Group of Seven (G7) summit, when Trump blocked an initiative to lower the price cap for a barrel of Russian oil from sixty dollars to forty-five dollars, which would have put more pressure on the Russian oil revenues enabling its aggression in Ukraine. Trump provided a second gift to Russian President Vladimir Putin at that summit by criticizing his G7 colleagues for expelling Russia from the Group of Eight (G8) after Moscow seized and “annexed” Crimea in 2014.

The Middle East dimension

On June 13, a few days before the G7 summit started, Israel began its remarkably successful operation against Iran’s nuclear program and military capabilities. Trump used the Middle East conflict as a reason to leave the G7 summit early, expressed his long-held view that Iran must never obtain nuclear weapons, stressed support for Israel’s operation and, with US allies, provided additional air defense for Israel. Trump then ordered the June 22 strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz.

An immediate, albeit inadvertent, impact of the Middle East escalation on the war in Ukraine was a shift of Western political and media attention away from the Kremlin’s rejection of Trump’s peace proposals and its savage bombing of Ukraine. More tangibly, it also resulted in the movement of scarce air defense systems to Israel and US military positions in the Middle East. Further, the war in the Middle East likewise persuaded US Senator Lindsey Graham not to introduce a revised version of a tough Russia sanctions bill. The current draft, with eighty-four Senate cosponsors, would place 500 percent tariffs on all nations purchasing Russian oil. Graham said last week that “Iran is center stage,” leading to the Russia bill’s delay, but he added that the Senate would move on sanctions “sooner rather than later.”

Work on that bill began more than two months ago as a response to the reluctance of the White House to put additional pressure on the Kremlin. It is striking that even as the administration continued to make friendly gestures to the Kremlin—blocking the G7 price cap on Russian oil and trying to minimize the references to Ukraine in the final statements at the G7 and NATO summits—Senate Republicans put on hold the bill that would have exerted pressure on Moscow.

But perhaps the more important development concerns the national security divisions among some of Trump’s core supporters as a result of his policy toward Iran. “Make America Great Again” stalwarts such as right-wing political commentator Tucker Carlson, US Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, and former Trump adviser Steve Bannon claimed that Trump’s strike on Iran was not consistent with an “America first” foreign policy. Trump dealt quite sharply with Carlson’s criticism, noting that he, Trump, determines what “America first” means. There are also reports that even some senior national security officials, specifically Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who are not believed to be in favor of the US military entering the Middle East fray, have been sidelined in administration deliberations.

Whether Trump’s decisive action in the Middle East will extend to the war in Europe is an open question. But the weakened position of the most cautious foreign policy voices in Trump world makes it easier for the president to deliver on his promise of taking the steps necessary to achieve a durable peace in Ukraine. More immediately, that means putting more pressure on Putin. (The most timid faction in Trump world has been partly mollified by Trump’s quick movement toward a cease-fire between Israel and Iran, but it understands that his commitment to a nonnuclear Iran keeps open the possibility of future US military engagement.)

Movement in both directions at The Hague

In the run-up to the summit, the administration’s unwillingness to increase pressure on—or even to criticize—Russia was visible. At the summit last year in Washington, NATO decided it needed a new strategic policy to address the dangers Moscow’s revisionist policy poses. Many NATO leaders believe, along with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, that a Putin win in Ukraine could be followed by severe provocations and worse against NATO members. But to avoid setting off the US president, NATO decided months ago to shelve the effort to write a new approach. For the same reason, the Alliance also decided to limit the role of the Ukrainian president to side events.

But the outcome of the summit was quite different, and that would not have been possible without Trump’s leadership and approval. Critics of the administration have pointed to numerous statements by the president questioning the need for US leadership in NATO. But these same critics often overlook the broader implications of Trump’s long-running insistence that US NATO allies up their defense spending, which has been a US objective since at least the Reagan administration. At the NATO Summit, nearly all member states agreed to increase allies’ defense and defense-related spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product by 2035—a signature triumph for Trump and for the Alliance. Dmitri Peskov, Putin’s press spokesman, slammed this as dangerous and claimed that it required the West to “conjure up a demonic threat.” It is important, too, that the summit communiqué linked this increase to the Russian threat to NATO. In effect, this achieved a similar result to what the scuttled strategic review of policy toward Russia would have. Moscow was also not pleased by the communiqué’s clear reaffirmation of Article 5—the commitment of each NATO member to the defense of its allies.

Regarding Ukraine, the NATO communiqué stipulated that the allies’ defense contributions to Kyiv count toward their defense spending requirements. That was a tangible sign of support for Ukraine. Trump also made clear both at The Hague and before the summit that Putin was the obstacle to peace in Ukraine. In a recent phone call with the US president, Putin offered to help negotiate an end to the conflict between Israel and Iran. Three times Trump noted publicly that he declined the offer and suggested that Putin pay more attention to ending the war in Ukraine. Trump also said during his visit to The Hague that he would see if he could find additional air defense systems for Ukraine and that he had a good meeting with Zelenskyy.

All these developments over the past two weeks position the administration in the right direction to block Russian designs on Ukraine and, beyond that, US NATO allies. But they do not guarantee the future steps needed to achieve a durable peace and to persuade Moscow to abandon its dreams of empire. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio provided a reminder of this in an interview from The Hague just before the NATO Summit began. He claimed that now was not the time to put down new sanctions because it would persuade the Kremlin not to engage in peace talks. That analysis is simply wrong. Moreover, it is out of step with the numerous statements from Trump that he would put pressure on the party obstructing peace. Even so, Rubio’s comments must be taken as a marker that the administration remains reluctant to press the Kremlin.

What does this all mean? It was a good week for US foreign policy, but still not a decisive one.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

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North Korea is playing a key role in Russia’s war against Ukraine

Olivia Yanchik — Tue, 24 Jun 2025 20:33:46 +0000

North Korea has agreed to send thousands of additional construction workers and engineers to Russia in the latest indication of deepening military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang. The plans were announced on June 17 following a meeting between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Sergei Shoigu, the former Russian Defense Minister who now serves as secretary of the country’s Security Council.

According to Shoigu, North Korea will send two brigades of “military construction workers” totaling five thousand men, along with a further one thousand combat engineers. They will reportedly conduct demining operations and help repair war damage in Russia’s Kursk region, which borders Ukraine and witnessed months of heavy fighting following a Ukrainian incursion in August 2024.

This is the latest step in an ambitious defense sector partnership between the two countries that has taken shape over the past three years. Since the early months of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, North Korea has provided the Kremlin with extensive military supplies. More recently, this cooperation has expanded further with Pyongyang sending thousands of soldiers to participate directly in the war against Ukraine. Russia and North Korea signed a strategic partnership treaty in summer 2024.

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The deployment of North Korean troops to Russia was first reported in late 2024, with at least 10,000 North Korean soldiers believed to have taken part in combat operations in Russia’s Kursk region. According to a recent UK Ministry of Defense intelligence update, North Korean forces sustained more than 6,000 casualties during fighting against the Ukrainian military, representing around half of the original deployment. This is an indication of the prominent role played by the North Koreans in front line combat operations.

Russia initially denied the presence of North Korean soldiers. However, following significant battlefield progress in spring 2025, both Moscow and Pyongyang moved to publicly acknowledge the role played by North Korean troops in pushing the Ukrainians out of the Kursk region. Reports indicate that they served as assault units operating on the front lines of the Russian offensive, which would certainly tally with the high North Korean casualty rates claimed by the British.

This North Korean presence is having a significant impact on the battlefield. Ukrainian military officials who have encountered North Korean troops on the front lines of the war acknowledge their ability to learn quickly and incorporate new tactics based on their expanding combat experience in Russia. “They have adapted to modern combat conditions,” commented Ukrainian commander Oleh Shyriaiev. This has included significant progress in terms of drone warfare.

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The appearance of North Korean troops fighting alongside Russian forces came following more than two years of increasing military cooperation marked by expanding deliveries of North Korean ammunition and equipment to bolster the Russian war effort. This support has played a critical role in aiding Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. A Reuters investigation published in spring 2025 indicated that North Korea was providing more than half of all artillery shells being used by the Russian military in Ukraine.

North Korea is also supplying Russia with significant quantities of ballistic missiles, according to a May 2025 report produced by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team comprising eleven countries including the United States, Britain, Japan, and a number of EU member states. The report concluded that Russia is using North Korean weapons to escalate airstrikes on critical Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and to “terrorize” entire Ukrainian cities.

In exchange for providing the Kremlin with manpower and a steady flow of munitions, North Korea is receiving Russian assistance that is enabling the country to modernize its military. Reported upgrades in North Korean military capabilities through cooperation with the Kremlin include Russian funding for North Korean military programs along with the provision of air defense equipment and anti-aircraft missiles, advanced electronic warfare systems, and the further development of North Korea’s ballistic missiles.

By providing Russia with ballistic missiles for attacks on Ukraine, North Korea has gained unprecedented experience in modern warfare. This is making it possible to increase the accuracy of North Korea’s existing missile guidance systems. With Moscow’s help, North Korea is also developing attack drones similar to those used by Russia to strike Ukrainian cities, according to Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov.

The modernization of the North Korean army poses a range of potential security challenges for South Korea and the wider region. North Korea’s participation in Russia’s war against Ukraine is also seen by many as a dangerous escalation toward a more international confrontation.

So far, North Korean soldiers appear to have only participated in combat operations inside Russia. However, Kyiv officials have voiced concerns that the North Koreans could soon be redeployed to Ukraine itself to join Russia’s ongoing summer offensive. Given the lack of a forceful Western response to Pyongyang’s increasingly open involvement in the Russian war effort, such concerns seem more than justified.

Olivia Yanchik is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Russia and Ukraine are locked in an economic war of attrition

Anders Åslund — Tue, 17 Jun 2025 19:29:50 +0000

A little noticed fact is that the Ukrainian economy is actually doing relatively well in the context of the current war. The Russian onslaught in 2022 reduced Ukraine’s GDP by 29 percent, but in 2023 it recovered by an impressive 5.5 percent. Last year, Ukrainian GDP rose by a further 3 percent, though growth is likely to slow to 1.5 percent this year.

Any visitor to Ukraine can take out cash from an ATM or pay in shops using an international credit card. Countries embroiled in major wars typically experience price controls, shortages of goods, and rationing, but Ukraine has none of these. Instead, stores are fully stocked and restaurants are crowded. Everything works as usual.

How has this been possible? The main answer is that Ukraine’s state institutions are far stronger than anybody anticipated. This is particularly true of the ministry of finance, the National Bank of Ukraine, and the state fiscal service. After 2022, Ukraine’s state revenues have risen sharply.

In parallel, wartime Ukraine has continued to make progress in combating corruption. When Russia’s invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014, Ukraine was ranked 142 of 180 countries in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index. In the most recent edition, Ukraine had climbed to the 105 position.

Rising Ukrainian patriotism has helped fuel this progress in the fight against corruption. EU accession demands and IMF conditions have been equally important. Ukraine has gone through eight quarterly reviews of its four-year IMF program. It has done so on time and with flying colors. The same has been true of each EU assessment.

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Looking ahead, three critical factors are necessary for wartime Ukraine’s future economic progress. First of all, Ukraine needs about $42 billion a year in external budget financing, or just over 20 percent of annual GDP, to finance its budget deficit. The country did not receive sufficient financing in 2022 because EU partners failed to deliver promised sums. This drove up Ukraine’s inflation rate to 27 percent at the end of 2022. The Ukrainian budget was fully financed in 2023 and 2024, driving down inflation to 5 percent. The budget will be fully financed this year.

The second factor is maritime trade via Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Shipping from Odesa and neighboring Ukrainian ports to global markets has been almost unimpeded since September 2023 after Ukraine took out much of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The vast majority of Ukraine’s exports are commodities such as agricultural goods, steel, and iron ore, which are only profitable with cheap naval transportation, so keeping sea lanes open is vital.

The third crucial factor for wartime Ukraine’s economic prospects is a steady supply of electricity. Russian bombing of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure disrupted the power supply significantly in 2024, which was one of the main reasons for the country’s deteriorating economic performance.

Ukraine’s economic position looks set to worsen this year. In the first four months of 2025, economic growth was only 1.1 percent, while inflation had risen to 15.9 percent by May. The main cause of rising inflation is a shortage of labor. The national bank will presumably need to hike its current interest rate of 15.5 percent, which will further depress growth. After three years of war, Ukraine’s economy is showing increasing signs of exhaustion. The country has entered stagflation, which is to be expected.

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Russia’s current economic situation is surprisingly similar to Ukraine’s, although almost all trade between Russia and Ukraine has ceased. After two years of around 4 percent economic growth in 2023 and 2024, Russia is expecting growth of merely 1.5 percent this year, while official inflation is 10 percent. Since October 2024, the Central Bank of Russia has maintained an interest rate of 21 percent while complaining about stagflation.

The Russian and Ukrainian economies are both suffering from their extreme focus on the military sector. Including Western support, Ukraine’s military expenditure amounts to about $100 billion a year, which is no less than 50 percent of Ukraine’s GDP, with 30 percent coming from the Ukrainian budget in 2024. Meanwhile, Russia’s 2025 military expenditure is supposed to be $170 billion or 8 percent of GDP. Unlike the Ukrainians, the Russians complain about the scale of military spending. This makes sense. The Ukrainians are fighting an existential war, while Russia’s war is only existential for Putin.

Contrary to common perceptions, Russia does not have an overwhelming advantage over Ukraine in terms of military expenditure or supplies. Russia does spend significantly more than Ukraine, but much of this is in reality stolen by politicians, generals, and Putin’s friends. Furthermore, Western sanctions impede the Russian military’s ability to innovate. In contrast, Ukraine benefits from innovation because its economy is so much freer, with hundreds of startups thriving in areas such as drone production.

Russia is now entering a fiscal crunch. Its federal expenditures in 2024 amounted to 20 percent of GDP and are likely to stay at that level in 2025, of which 41 percent goes to military and security. However, the Kremlin has financed its budget deficit of about 2 percent of GDP with its national welfare fund, which is expected to run out by the end of the current year. As a result, Russia will likely be forced to reduce its public expenditures by one-tenth.

Low oil prices could add considerably to Russia’s mounting economic woes and force a further reduction in the country’s public expenditures. However, Israel’s attack on Iran may now help Putin to stay financially afloat by driving the price of oil higher.

Economically, this is a balanced war of attrition at present. Ukraine’s Western partners have the potential to turn the tables on Russia if they choose to do so. Ukraine has successfully built up a major innovative arms industry. What is missing is not arms but funds. The West needs to double Ukraine’s military budget from today’s annual total of $100 billion to $200 billion. They can do this without using their own funds if they agree to seize approximately $200 billion in frozen Russian assets currently held in Euroclear Bank in Belgium. This could enable Ukraine to outspend Russia and achieve victory through a combination of more firepower, greater technology, and superior morale.

Anders Åslund is the author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

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Last month’s destruction of two Russian warplanes was the latest in a series of remarkable maritime breakthroughs that have allowed Ukraine to gain the upper hand in the Battle of the Black Sea. When the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began more than three years ago, few would have believed such a turn of events was possible. At the time, the war at sea was widely viewed as a foregone conclusion. After all, Ukraine had no conventional navy to speak of, while Russia could call on the considerable might of the country’s aged but nonetheless formidable Black Sea Fleet.

This disparity was on display during a famous incident that took place on the very first day of the invasion. On the morning of February 24, 2022, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva missile cruiser, loomed up to Ukraine’s Snake Island and ordered the tiny Ukrainian garrison to surrender. “Russian warship, go f*** yourself,” came the iconic response. While this message of defiance captured the global imagination and became an unofficial slogan for the entire Ukrainian war effort, the incident also served to underline the apparent mismatch between the maritime capabilities of the two adversaries.

During the initial weeks of the war, Russian control of the Black Sea remained uncontested, with Ukrainian attention focused firmly on preventing amphibious landings along the country’s southern coastline. But even at this precarious point, Ukrainian commanders had their own offensive ambitions and would soon send a powerful signal that they were capable of fighting back at sea as well as on land. In April 2022, the Ukrainian Navy launched a bold missile attack on the Moskva, securing two direct hits and sinking the Russian flagship. The attack sent shock waves around the world and sparked fury among Kremlin officials. Little did they know that this was just the first of many stunning Russian naval defeats that would transform the military situation in the Black Sea.

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Since the sinking of the Moskva, Ukraine has used a combination of domestically developed naval drones and cruise missiles provided by Kyiv’s French and British partners to decimate Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian Navy officials claim they have managed to damage or destroy around one-third of Putin’s entire fleet, while forcing the remaining Russian warships to retreat from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of ports in Russia itself. This has severely limited the Russian Navy’s ability to operate in the Black Sea. By spring 2024, Britain’s Defense Ministry declared that the Russian Black Sea Fleet had become “functionally inactive.”

Ukraine’s stunning success in the Battle of the Black Sea has yet to receive the international attention it deserves. By breaking the Russian naval blockade of Ukraine’s seaports, it has allowed Kyiv to resume maritime exports and secure a vital economic lifeline.

Crucially, the Russian Navy’s humiliating retreat from Crimea has also made a complete mockery of the Kremlin’s so-called red lines and has demonstrated the emptiness of Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. The Russian dictator has long championed the seizure of Crimea as his crowning achievement, and has repeatedly hinted that he is willing to use nuclear weapons in defense of his conquests. But when confronted by the harsh military realities of Ukraine’s deadly naval drones, he withdraw the bulk of Russia’s fleet from Crimea with barely a murmur.

The Battle of the Black Sea is far from over, of course. While Ukraine develops groundbreaking new naval drones capable of hitting warplanes as well as warships, Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian seaports and targets merchant shipping carrying Ukrainian exports to global markets. The Russian Navy is also producing marine drones of its own, and is adopting defensive measures to protect the remainder of the Black Sea Fleet. Nevertheless, Kyiv’s Black Sea innovations are a reminder that Ukraine is an increasingly formidable military power in its own right and is shaping the future of drone warfare at sea as well as on land.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The primary role of drones in modern warfare is as weapons. Over the past three years, first person view (FPV) drones have become a ubiquitous feature of the contemporary battlefield and are believed to be responsible for the vast majority of Russian and Ukrainian casualties. This is changing the way the war is fought. Any vehicles operating close to the front lines must now rely on jamming devices, with many also favoring the additional protection of so-called “cope cage” coverings to shield against drone attacks. With larger groups of infantry deemed too vulnerable to drone strikes, attacks are typically carried out by small groups, often using highly mobile transport such as motorbikes or buggies.

Ukraine has also pioneered the use of drones and accompanying software to perform surveillance tasks mapping out the battlefield and providing real-time situational awareness of enemy deployments. This reconnaissance capability is not new in itself, but has undergone significant upgrades in recent years. Accurate and up-to-date information allows commanders to make informed decisions quickly, improving the effectiveness of military operations.

Beyond the battlefield, Ukraine has also transformed international understanding of drone warfare at sea. Since 2022, Ukrainian naval drones have succeeded in sinking or damaging around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet, forcing the remainder of Putin’s warships to retreat from Russian-occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russia’s own Black Sea ports. Most recently, Ukraine claimed to have used naval drones to shoot down two Russian warplanes over the Black Sea.

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In addition to strike and surveillance functions, Ukraine has also employed drones in logistical roles. The Ukrainian army uses both aerial and ground-based unmanned systems to deliver ammunition, food, medicine, and other supplies to troops operating in dangerous or inaccessible areas, thereby reducing the need to expose personnel to hostile environments. Drone-based solutions can also potentially facilitate the evacuation of the wounded when manned rescue is deemed to be too risky.

One of the most creative Ukrainian uses of drones on the battlefield has been to help take surrendering Russian soldiers prisoner. This method reduces the need for physical engagement with enemy troops and therefore limits the risks to the Ukrainian side. Drones are used to give instructions using printed messages or via loudspeakers to guide enemy soldiers and indicate safe directions that will allow them to surrender without coming under fire.

Ukrainian unmanned systems are also playing an important role in efforts to document Russian war crimes. Drones are able to record the time, location, and nature of potential crimes, along with the identity of the perpetrators in some cases. Over the past three years, Ukrainian drones have captured evidence of potential war crimes including the execution of unarmed POWs and attacks on civilians. This footage can be used in future prosecutions and increases the chances that those responsible for war crimes in Ukraine will be held accountable.

The growing role of drones in warfare creates a range of challenges in terms of the accepted norms governing military operations. With this in mind, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence has drawn up and issued internal guidelines for drone operators and legal teams to ensure adherence to the laws of armed conflict. These guidelines incorporate real-world combat scenarios to help drone operators understand how to treat categories such as medical personnel, retreating enemy troops, and those engaged in the evacuation of the wounded. This initiative is a step toward establishing broader global standards for responsible drone warfare.

Ukraine’s unique experience of drone warfare offers valuable insights that will shape military doctrines for many years to come, while also helping to define international standards for the use of drones in a military context. It is already clear that drones are transforming the battlefield in ways the evoke the twentieth century rise of air power. As drone technologies continue to advance, Ukraine is likely to remain a key player in this new wave of military innovation.

Vitaliy Nabukhotny is a human rights lawyer and external legal advisor to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence’s Legal Department.

What explains this contrast? Leading NATO allies (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) diverge from one another because they face different threats and levels of threat perception. These differences explain each ally’s major defense decisions (defense spending, military structure, and military posture) as well as the ally’s role in and relationship to NATO. I explore this issue more deeply in my forthcoming book on NATO, drawing from ninety-eight interviews with current and former policymakers.

NATO allies’ different threat perceptions can explain much of the current crisis within the Alliance, and they provide the backdrop for what could be a contentious summit.

The United States: China trumps Europe

The Trump administration sees China as the most significant state security threat to US interests. The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment says that “China stands out as the actor most capable of threatening US interests globally.” The administration’s Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance reportedly focuses on the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as one of two priorities for the Pentagon, along with combating drug cartels.

The Trump administration has cited the threat from China to explain its European security policy. Hegseth said in February that the United States could not remain the primary guarantor of European security, telling allied military leaders in Brussels: “The US is prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific, recognizing the reality of scarcity, and making the resourcing tradeoffs to ensure deterrence does not fail.” The Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance reportedly concludes that because of the focus on China, European allies must do more for their own defense.

This view of China can also explain the Trump administration’s policy toward Greenland, an autonomous territory of NATO ally Denmark. Melting sea ice means that Greenland’s location will be critical for those seeking to control Artic sea lanes and it is home to large quantities of rare-earth minerals. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stressed that the United States would not use force to seize Greenland but only to protect it from encroachment by China.

This can also explain Trump’s significant, though inconsistent, turn toward Russia. Some have argued that the Trump administration is attempting a “reverse Kissinger,” aligning with Russia to weaken its ties to China. The Trump administration may even be turning toward Russia to pressure NATO allies into taking more responsibility for their own defense, as Victoria Coates, a former deputy national security advisor in Trump’s first term, has argued. Even though Trump has criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin, it is reasonable for European leaders to fear that a grand bargain between Washington and Moscow remains a distinct possibility.

Europe: Divided by diverse levels of threat

Europe is unable to defend itself without the United States. Europe lacks integrated air and missile defense, long-range precision strike, transport aircraft, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. European allies are struggling to recruit, train, and equip sufficient troops for NATO’s new force model—doing so in the next decade without the United States would most likely be a bridge too far.

But even faced with these challenges, not every European NATO ally has shown the same level of urgency when it comes to increasing defense spending. The reason is that leading European allies face different threats and levels of threat, limiting the incentives of some allies to act.

The overwhelming consensus among Italian officials, for example, is that instability in the wider Mediterranean is the most important security threat facing the country. Because addressing this threat does not primarily entail military means, Italy has not felt an urgent need to increase defense spending in response to Trump’s policies. While Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni announced in April that Italy would spend 2 percent of its GDP on defense this year (up from 1.5 percent in 2024), no new funding has been allocated for this yet. What’s more, reporting suggests that the government could reach the 2 percent benchmark largely through accounting changes, such as including its Coast Guard in defense spending.

Meanwhile, from strategy documents and official statements, it is clear that Poland, Germany, France, and Britain all view Russia as their greatest security threat. However, they each have different levels of threat perception, which informs the differing approaches they have taken toward military spending.

Poland provides the starkest contrast with Italy. Warsaw plans to spend 4.7 percent of GDP on defense this year, up from 4.1 percent last year. Poland’s level of defense spending makes sense given the intensity of the threat it faces from Moscow and its proximity to Russia. Poland’s view is that only a US-led NATO can provide collective defense against the threat from Russia, so it is focused on pushing allies to comply with US demands to keep Washington committed to European security.

Concern that the United States could shift away has also led Germany to spend more on defense. Following Germany’s February election, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz led a successful effort to revise Germany’s constitution to allow borrowing above 1 percent of GDP for defense spending. On April 9, Merz announced a coalition agreement with the Social Democrats, which included a pledge to ramp up defense spending “significantly” to fulfill Germany’s NATO commitments. Germany views any US moves to withdraw from Europe with alarm, and Merz continues to insist that Germany and Europe do more to keep the United States engaged in NATO. Last month, Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul said Germany will “follow” Trump’s demand that allies spend at least 5 percent of GDP on defense.

France’s independent nuclear arsenal gives it an added degree of security against the threat from Russia. While France has used the Trump administration’s statements to push for European defense independence, Paris has not reacted with urgency in terms of its own defense spending. French President Emmanuel Macron has called for a new NATO spending target of 3 percent of GDP on defense but has not proposed a new figure for French defense spending (currently at 2.1 percent of GDP).

While Britain’s nuclear arsenal would normally provide it with an extra measure of security against Russia, the United Kingdom relies on the United States for its nuclear submarines. As such, the British government has doubled down on its relationship with the United States. British officials have embraced Trump’s criticism of allies who underspend on defense, and Foreign Secretary David Lammy has called for a NATO that is “stronger, fairer, and more lethal.” Just prior to Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit to the United States in February, the British government announced that Britain will spend 2.6 percent of GDP on defense by 2028, up from 2.3 percent this year.

Preserving a mutually beneficial relationship

The United States’ greater focus on China and push for Europeans to take more responsibility for their defense are likely irreversible trends. But the NATO Summit in The Hague later this month provides an opportunity for the United States and its European allies to reaffirm their commitments to the Alliance amid these shifting dynamics.

First, the Trump administration should use the summit to work with its European allies on a phased and structured exchange of responsibility for European security over the next decade. Under such a plan, the United States would work with European allies to develop defense capabilities they do not currently have while maintaining the commitment of the US nuclear deterrent.

Second, Trump should take the opportunity to reassure European allies. He should affirm that the United States would come to the aid of any NATO ally that is attacked. Trump should also state plainly that his administration will work with Denmark to bolster the defense of Greenland and that it does not intend to acquire the island by force.

Third, European countries should use the summit to announce further commitments on defense spending. Following through on such commitments will entail costly domestic tradeoffs. The present moment requires courage: European leaders must make the case that significantly more defense spending is necessary because of the threat Russia poses and the United States’ turn toward the Indo-Pacific. Italy’s government in particular will have a challenging task. Because Italians are focused on threats from the Mediterranean, officials in Rome will have to make the case that Russia’s threat to European security matters for Italy. European governments like Italy’s can also make a compelling case that spending more on defense may boost overall economic growth.

If NATO allies take these steps at this year’s summit, they can help build a future Europe more capable of defending itself and an Alliance that better serves both US and European interests.

Jason Davidson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also a professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Security and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

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Stephen Rodriguez Joins AI+Expo Panel on Government Procurement Reform

clee — Wed, 04 Jun 2025 16:23:08 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On June 3, Stephen Rodriguez, Senior Advisor at Forward Defense and Director of the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, joined a panel at the AI+Expo to discuss “Reindustrializing America via Government Procurement Reform.”

He was joined by Eric Lofgren, Staff Member, U.S. House Armed Services Committee; Scott Friedman, Vice President of Government Affairs at Altana Technologies; and Mike Manazir, Vice President, Federal at Hadrian.

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

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The UK Strategic Defence Review lays out an ambitious roadmap for reform. Will the government deliver?

AM Sir Christopher Harper, KBE, RAF (Ret.) — Wed, 04 Jun 2025 15:06:10 +0000

By publishing its long-awaited Strategic Defence Review (SDR) on Monday, the United Kingdom has taken a positive step toward the reinvigoration and reform of its defense posture. Recognizing the perilous nature of the geostrategic scene, drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine, and seeking to enhance its leading role in NATO, the review is rigorous, thoughtful, and compelling; it offers one of the more realistic assessments of the United Kingdom’s security posture in recent memory. Its success, however, will hinge on funding and follow-through.

The SDR was written independently by Lord George Robertson, a former UK defense secretary and NATO secretary general; General Sir Richard Barrons, a former commander of the UK Joint Forces Command; and Fiona Hill, a foreign policy expert and former senior director for Europe and Russia at the US National Security Council. It benefits from the authors’ deep expertise and freedom to speak frankly.

In my assessment as a former Royal Air Force senior officer and director general of the NATO headquarters International Military Staff, I find the review blunt and refreshingly free of political gloss while still being infused with strategic depth. It offers a sobering analysis of the threats Britain faces and a coherent and comprehensive plan to deal with them.

If the UK media coverage of the review is anything to go by, then it has already been successful in promoting a national debate on the severity of the strategic risks the United Kingdom and its allies face. One of the review’s core aims is to foster a “total defence” culture, an understanding that security is not the sole preserve of the armed forces but a collective national responsibility.

No more “hollowing out”

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer echoed this whole-of-society message in a speech he delivered in Glasgow on Monday to launch the SDR. In the speech, he warned that the United Kingdom must prepare for a dangerous decade ahead. The United Kingdom would become, he said, “a battle-ready, armor-clad nation, with the strongest alliances and the most advanced capabilities, equipped for the decades to come.” Indeed, the review is laced throughout with the concept of “NATO first” and the United Kingdom’s aspiration to play a leading role in the Alliance.

On capabilities, the review outlines a serious agenda for restoring UK military strength after years of “hollowing out.” Among the most significant commitments is the acceleration of the United Kingdom’s sovereign nuclear warhead program (at a cost of £15 billion) to ensure that the country maintains an independent and credible deterrent. This is paired with equally serious investment in conventional capabilities, including the commitments to produce seven thousand long-range and cruise missiles and to construct six new munitions factories.

The SDR further calls for the United Kingdom to become a leading technology-enabled defense power, with an integrated force that deters, fights, and wins through constant innovation at wartime pace. To achieve that, it proposes a “three Is” model: integrated (rather than joint) forces, which are innovation-led and backed by industry. It emphasizes that greater attention must be given to the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains. It also proposes making the army ten times more lethal by 2035 by exploiting autonomous systems and a “digital targeting web,” all informed by lessons learned from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

The government has also pledged £1.5 billion for the modernization and refurbishment of military living accommodations. This, together with a move to take a whole-force, skills-based approach to workforce planning, would constitute long-overdue investments that could begin to address the current crisis surrounding the recruitment and retention of personnel.

None of the review’s recommendations reflect a marginal upgrade. Striking the appropriate balance between mass, speed, and resilience has returned to relevance alongside the need to reinvigorate stockpiles, munitions manufacturing, autonomous systems, and the United Kingdom’s technological edge. As demonstrated by the war in Ukraine, all these factors will increasingly define combat effectiveness. The SDR further recognizes the need to radically transform defense procurement processes and practice. For Britain to remain a serious military power, addressing these issues is both overdue and essential.

Finding the funding

Crucially, all sixty-two of the SDR’s recommendations have been accepted by the UK government—an indication, at least on paper, of genuine resolve.

And yet, despite the soundness of the review and the seriousness of its ambitions, an inevitable question mark remains over how these recommendations will be funded.

The government’s pledge to raise defense spending to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2027 is a step in the right direction. This review is unique in recent British history for being accompanied by increases rather than cuts in the budget. But this is still only a step. The longer-term ambition to reach 3 percent of GDP is not backed by binding Treasury policy or formal financial commitment. Moreover, it seems to hinge on a “defence dividend” of economic growth from a revitalized defense industrial base. Such an aspiration is not enough. In the face of a deteriorating strategic environment, Alliance members are likely to demand a minimum of 3.5 percent of GDP expenditure on defense at the upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague, which could lead to the United Kingdom falling behind the level of spending expected of a leading NATO power. Effective deterrence depends on credibility—and credibility hinges not on promises but on funded and delivered capabilities.

This financial dimension is especially critical in light of shifting US priorities. While the United States is unlikely to totally withdraw from NATO, there is a looming sense that Washington’s focus is inexorably moving away from Europe and toward the Indo-Pacific. Successive US administrations—regardless of party—have made clear that they expect European allies to carry more of the burden for their own defense. This has been brought into stark relief by the current US administration. A more self-reliant and militarily capable Europe is, therefore, no longer a theoretical objective—it is a strategic necessity.

For Britain, this means more than incremental increases in spending. It means making hard political choices and long-term industrial commitments now. The SDR lays out what needs to be done. The government has signaled its agreement. The next step—the most important one—will be putting money behind this critical endeavor.

Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served in the Royal Air Force, including as the UK military representative to NATO and the EU in Brussels and as director general of the NATO headquarters International Military Staff.

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2024 in the rear view

Rich Outzen — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

2024 brought a host of developments and changes in the security and defense environment facing the United States, Turkey, and their NATO partners. Some of these dynamics were political and geopolitical in nature, some operational, others military and technical. As the Defense Journal assesses and describes the state of the Alliance in 2025 for its readers, a brief retrospective on the year just passed and its impact provides a part of the necessary context.

Geopolitical shaping events

Momentous geopolitical events since our winter issue have included the advent of Donald Trump’s second term as US president, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and the apparent revelation in Europe that conventional military defense is a sovereign responsibility that cannot be outsourced in perpetuity. These events have had significant implications for the security of NATO, Turkey, and the United States.

Trump’s return has had several immediate effects on the United States (and thus the global) security environment. His approach narrows the US global mission from maintaining a liberal world order to pursuing US national interests, while adopting a tone of strategic ambiguity toward both rivals and allies. He has simultaneously directed reform of the US military to reemphasize combat readiness and lethality while minimizing social or ideological programs. As commander in chief, Trump has directed US soldiers to conduct counterterror strikes in places like Somalia and Yemen even as his negotiators seek to defuse conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and elsewhere.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad after an eleven-day rebel offensive reshaped the strategic map of the Middle East. Iran lost a valuable strategic position in its multidimensional “resistance” against Israel and Western influence. Russia lost its sunk investment in Assad and a degree of its influence in the Middle East. Turkey has gained greater stability on its southern border, close defense and intelligence ties with the new Syrian authorities, and prospects for expanded regional trade and a leading role in Syrian reconstruction. The challenges of stabilizing Syria, and tensions between Israel and Turkey stemming from their respective threat perceptions, have no immediate or apparent solution, and will require deft diplomacy to manage.

Shifts that might have attracted more attention in other times were easy to miss, but still noteworthy in terms of global security. China and Russia took steps to bolster the military junta in Myanmar that is teetering on the edge of collapse against a rebel coalition. Battles between the Sudanese army (backed by Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) and the antigovernment Rapid Support Forces (supported by Russia and the United Arab Emirates) have shifted decisively in favor of the army, though not yet presaging an end to the civil war. The war in Ukraine grinds on amid serious attempts by Trump to forge a ceasefire. Early 2025 continues to be an era of persistent conflict and great power competition, but one with dramatic developments that will echo throughout this and future years.

Strategic alliance development

International patterns of alliance and armament over the past half-year have reflected the weight of geopolitical changes noted above. Deep and effective US support to Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression has led to a tighter convergence of what has been referred to as the axis of upheaval, with China, Iran, and North Korea sending weapons, supplies, and even soldiers to aid the Russian war effort. A dozen or more other countries have provided diplomatic support to Moscow, but these three have become critical suppliers of weapons and cash for the Kremlin. This is a trend that began before 2024, but has only accelerated in recent months.

The global arms market continues to shift in other significant ways. The United States in 2024 cemented its leading position in arms exports, accounting for 43 percent of global exports. Russian exports have sharply decreased as domestic production has been consumed by the ongoing war in Ukraine. Italy and Turkey have more than doubled their national shares of global exports over the past several years (2 percent to 4.8 percent for Italy and 0.8 percent to 1.7 percent for Turkey). Five Turkish defense firms rank among the one hundred largest in the world—and a sixth, Baykar, would almost certainly be high on the list if all of its sales data were publicly released. Only the United States, China, Germany, and the United Kingdom match or exceed this number. Of particular note has been the continued rise in demand for Turkish armaments from Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.

Europe, for its part, has shown signs of finally getting serious about developing its own conventional military deterrent vis-à-vis Russia—or at least talking about doing so. Shocked by Trump’s heavy-handed conditionality on future aid to Ukraine, Brussels and its member states have drawn up plans for massive new defense spending and other deterrent steps—if taxpayers and military-age youth prove willing. Yet the European Union’s initial formulation of deterrence against Russia independent of Washington and without integrating Turkish geography, military capabilities, and strategic resources does not inspire confidence, especially given the long years needed to restore defense industrial capacity even assuming consistent commitment. European firms and national leaders would do well to welcome Turkish contributions to European defense planning and resourcing both in NATO and in EU planning by following through on plans to sell Ankara Eurofighters and encouraging more collaboration like that between Italy’s Leonardo and Turkey’s Baykar.

While the past half year has demonstrated volatility at the geopolitical and political levels, it has brought multipolarity and diffusion of power at the strategic level. This has played out in the evolution of alliances and the flow of arms and trade more broadly. In mid-2024 dualistic constructs (autocracy versus democracy, the US-led Alliance against an axis of evil) retained some utility. The current environment is messier, with issue-specific coalitions and transactional diplomacy creating a kaleidoscope of rivals, partners, and targets that, for now at least, deny predictable patterns and lead some to question the credibility of the international system’s most potent actor.

Operational trends

As geopolitics and alliances continue to evolve, so, too, does war in operational terms. In a world with ongoing “hot wars” in Ukraine, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere, several discernible trends can be identified. These include diminishing returns for artillery as seen in Ukraine, failure to achieve military victory through ground maneuver forces for Russia and Israel, and the fragility of lightly armed proxy forces in various theaters.

Russia since 2022 has compensated for shortcomings in its infantry, armor, and air forces through reliance on superior tube and rocket artillery, exacting a heavy toll on Ukrainian defenders in the process. Yet in late 2024, losses among Russian artillery units rose as Ukrainian drone tactics and counterbattery fire became more effective. While Russia still outproduces NATO in artillery ammunition and continues to fire it at prodigious rates, its advantage is decreasing in relative terms.

Russia has continued to advance at high cost to try and consolidate control over the nearly 20 percent of Ukrainian territory it occupies, but has failed to end the war via ground maneuver after three years. The difficulty of ending wars through ground maneuver even against inferior opponents can also be seen in Gaza, where operations which have continued for eighteen months are not yet meeting the stated war goals of military and political leaders. Both the Russian and Israeli campaigns reflect the historical difficulty of reconciling the political nature of conflict termination with the operational conduct of wars, and a resultant tendency for destructive wars to yield stalemate when that task remains incomplete.

The recent period produced impressive operational results in other cases, notably Israel’s campaign against Iran’s regional proxy network and the Sudanese army’s efforts to regain control of the national capital region from the insurgent Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. In late 2024 Israel crippled Lebanese Hezbollah and struck Iranian-supported militia targets in Syria and Iraq during an audacious campaign involving air strikes, ground maneuver, and exploding cellphones. Between November 2024 and March 2025 the Sudanese Army routed the RSF from Khartoum and other areas in central Sudan. The RSF had been supported by a number of foreign sponsors, including the United Arab Emirates and several other regional countries, but ultimately failed to achieve local or regional legitimacy—as had the Iranian proxy groups in Lebanon and Syria, and arguably in Iraq and Yemen as well. The past several months have badly undermined the notion popular over the past decade that proxy wars can effectively “enable intervention on the cheap.”

Military technical developments on the horizon

Over the past several months sixth-generation fighter aircraft have moved from concept to reality. China flew two prototypes in December 2024, one produced by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group and the other by AVIC Shenyang Aircraft. US prototypes for a Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft have been under evaluation since 2020, but in March 2025 the Boeing F-47 was officially selected as the program’s platform. A half-dozen other countries have done some sixth-generation work—integrating advanced stealth, artificial intelligence, manned-unmanned teaming, and other advanced technologies—though even for those with the deepest pockets, fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft will be mainstays for the foreseeable future.

Artificial intelligence is a growing element in military planning and readiness. While the United States and many of its allies have endorsed the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, many potential adversaries and rivals have not. Military applications for AI focus at present on information processing, threat identification, and decision-making, areas in which the United States has relative advantage. The Department of Defense’s Defense Innovation Unit is implementing a project, Thunderforge, to deploy such capabilities to headquarters in Asia and Europe. The military services each have designated units to test concepts and systems related to AI in the field. The drive to develop effective defenses against small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has gained urgency with the continued broad proliferation of cheap, easy-to-use, lethal UAS around the world. The December 2024 Department of Defense adoption of a classified strategy to accelerate counter-UAS development signals the rising criticality of the need for cost-effective and combat-effective counters to the cheap and plentiful threat. This is an area ripe for technical development and fielding in the near future.

Adaptive Alliance

The shifting dynamics at all these levels—geopolitical, strategic, operational, and technical—shape the contours of defense and security challenges for the United States and its NATO allies. These are certainly challenging times, yet the Alliance has endured for over seven decades through other chaotic and difficult periods because the basic value proposition of mutual defense among the members remains sound. Secretary General Mark Rutte strikes the right tone with his assessment that “there is no alternative to NATO” for either the United States or its partners, and that despite frictions related to burden sharing, domestic politics, and sometimes divergent national interest, NATO’s summit in The Hague in late June will show the Alliance evolving rather than dissolving.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.

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The Atlantic Council Turkey Program aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

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Q&A with Haluk Bayraktar

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Haluk Bayraktar is the CEO of Baykar, an autonomous technology company based in Turkey. He began his tenure at Baykar in 2004 as an engineering manager, when Baykar’s autonomous technology efforts were still nascent, and has been involved in every aspect of the business’s growth into a leading firm in the Turkish defense sector: project management, logistics, and business development. Baykar’s pioneering role in the rise of the Turkish drone industry makes Bayraktar a fascinating and well-informed observer on security and alliance dynamics affecting Turkey, NATO, and the region.

This interview has been lightly edited for style.

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY (DJ): Thanks for taking the time to talk with us. Let’s start with developments of common interest to readers in Turkey, the United States, and Europe. Following the industrial and technology cooperation deal with Italian defense and aerospace group Leonardo, what’s next for Baykar in the Western market?

Bayraktar: Baykar has become the world’s biggest drone maker, with thirty-eight international partners now—from Europe and NATO to the Turkic countries, Africa, and the Middle East. Among NATO allies, we have partnered with Poland, Romania, Kosovo, Croatia, and of course, Turkey’s military, law enforcement, and disaster relief agencies. Turkey is a NATO ally, so all our products and technologies follow the technical standards and military specifications of the West and are entirely compatible with Western systems. The Western market is critical for us.

As for Leonardo, we are on the path to establishing a joint venture (JV). They are a major player in Europe, and their work areas are highly compatible with ours—a lot of synergies and complementarity. We were already working with them, integrating payloads and systems with our products: This has become a very strong bond or marriage. A JV is a great opportunity/potential to bring robust, field-proven systems to a broader market. Baykar has drones all around the world, including tactical and strategic platforms. Leonardo produces critical subsystems with great potential for Europe and broader markets where they have a presence, including South America and elsewhere, but Europe is our main focus. In Europe, there is no other mature alternative to what we have.

DJ: What differentiates your approach to manned technology? What is the key to your value proposition?

Bayraktar: We are a tech developer but not just tech. It’s about tech but also about ways to use that technology—about operational employment. Our approach centers on reliability, safety, and robustness. Our experience brings lots of feedback from various areas, which makes our products even more robust. So, we combine technology with real-world experience. Our fleet now exceeds 300,000 flight hours per year, so there is a lot to analyze. Our systems offer the highest performance-to-cost across the market. They are the most adaptable with continuous innovation, and they are equipped with the most advanced technology. In the defense sector, there are huge manufacturing capacity challenges everywhere, whereas there has been a great buildup in Turkey in the last twenty-five years. Over just twenty years, we’ve gone from roughly seventy to over 3,000 companies in the sector, with thousands of products. It’s a great ecosystem with important internal synergies. Baykar has established mass production capacity for unmanned systems. Our Istanbul base is the biggest facility of its kind in the world. So, potential customers know we can deliver quickly. We produce 250 Bayraktar TB2 [unmanned combat aerial vehicles] per year, fifty Akinci [high-altitude, long-endurance] UCAVs per year, and we’re ramping up to support larger capacity as the Bayraktar TB3 UCAV and the Kizilelma unmanned fighter jet move from development to production.

DJ: What is your conceptual and defense technological approach to Kizilelma? Do you see it as a loyal wingman to the fifth-generation Kaan fighter or a pathway to replace Kaan in the future?

Bayraktar: Kaan is a national manned fighter program, funded by the government. Kizilelma is Baykar’s own design and project. It is our final target on the unmanned family of products—a fighter with both subsonic and supersonic capabilities. We do not envision it as a loyal wingman, though it can work as an integrated adjunct in theory, if one were to couple it and use it with manned fighters in risky environments. US President Donald Trump recently introduced the American F-47 as a mothership controlling other fighters, and the consortium developing [the Global Combat Air Program involving Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan] conceived it in similar fashion. But we envision Kizilelma as operating on its own with a fleet control system. As a company, we don’t develop manned systems. We exclusively invest in drones. That is our focus. Kizilelma is an aircraft with aggressive maneuvering, autonomous operation, and controls that can be flown by few operators. It completed its first flight in 2022, and we see that as a revolution. Bayraktar TB3 has the capability to take off and land on short-runway aircraft carriers. Kizilelma will have this feature too.

Fighter pilots stationed at aircraft carriers have to fly every single day and complete a certain number of sorties annually to stay current. That’s perhaps fifty training flights per day. By contrast, unmanned platforms do not require as much effort or so many daily landings to be certified for carriers. Moreover, Kizilelma will integrate artificial intelligence to assist with delegation of command and other operational aspects.

DJ: How do you view the F-35 debate in the United States, especially Elon Musk’s view that manned aircraft are not the best path forward?

Bayraktar: There are about 13,000 manned fighters worldwide right now–Russian, Chinese, US, and other systems combined. We believe that all those platforms will eventually be converted to unmanned systems, even though one cannot prove that point just yet. But when you look at the field, it’s clearly headed in that direction. To be clear, they may not be replaced one for one. It may be more like three to five unmanned platforms to replace each manned fighter. Unmanned systems will be everywhere, and it will be a crowded airspace—not just unmanned fighters but smaller first-person view drones and loitering munitions. They will be everywhere, and every country will need the ability to build and use these things. For nations to defend themselves in this century, this is a necessary capability—much like the ability to produce bullets.

DJ: Turkey has shown great agility in what has been termed “drone diplomacy,” or complementing regional policy initiatives with defense sales. What is the nature of public/private partnership in Turkish drone diplomacy?

Bayraktar: Overall, the major players in the Turkish defense ecosystem are still government-owned institutional firms. The private sector is smaller but dynamic and growing. Of course, I think that the private sector’s dynamism is preferable. SAHA is the industry group representing the smaller and midsize firms that comprise most of our private sector, and I am currently serving as the chairman.

Still, the system operates similarly for public and private firms. Anyone wishing to export applies to the Ministry of National Defense, which in turn coordinates with the Foreign Ministry and the intelligence community to issue an export license. It is the government’s decision at the end of the day. The government doesn’t promote private-sector firms per se. The Defense Industry Agency (SSB) has foreign relationships and partnerships, and they generally favor government-affiliated companies. One of the objectives of SAHA has been to help small and medium-sized companies become more visible. Our annual exhibition helps smaller players. Baykar is an example of successful growth: We’ve gone from five employees in 2004 to over 6,000 today. We know how important it is to become more visible, and we support other firms doing that. We try to make it easier for the newcomers. That is my responsibility as SAHA chairman.

My view is that European countries are better at using governmental influence to promote national commercial products. Baykar’s products promote themselves through their unique utility as well as aggressive marketing and social media presence. The Turkish government doesn’t subsidize sales, although other countries may. But we don’t rely on public credit or government grants. This is unique to Baykar: We’ve developed an unmanned fighter with the company’s own money. At the end of the day, since companies are required to receive a permit to export, the government plays an important role. The higher levels [of government officials] do talk about it and the firms need approval. The government spending environment matters greatly for domestic firms, too. And while Turkey spent 4.5 percent of its [gross domestic product] on defense before 2000, that number has remained close to 2 percent for two decades now. It was just in the last two years that it approached 3 percent.

The bottom line is that drone diplomacy is a reality and the Bayraktar TB2, in particular, has proven that. But the government doesn’t lead: market demand leads, the company follows, and the government supports.

DJ: Can you talk a little bit about the price/performance balance for Baykar systems?

Bayraktar: The Bayraktar TB2 is a very good example for price/performance balance. The initial purchase price or acquisition cost is one factor, but the life cycle, including maintenance and durability, has to be considered as well because reliability affects long-term costs. Let’s say you procure an alternative to Bayraktar TB2 for half the price. In reality, this is not an advantage if this “alternative” has double the crash rate. So, Bayraktar TB2 has a reliability advantage because you don’t face as many crashes and the cost consideration changes.

Unmanned systems represent a new niche in the defense ecosystem. Aerospace is conservative, especially for manned systems: extensive certifications and regulations serve to protect human life. But unmanned [aerial] vehicles are a different paradigm—you can add new sensors, new technology, and new operational approaches rapidly. An example is the fact that manned systems still use mechanical gyros, whereas the technologically advanced UAVs are currently using even cheaper MEMS [i.e., microelectromechanical system) sensors, fiber-optic alternatives with high-end software systems. You can easily innovate in the unmanned realm with the latest technology, whereas you need to be conservative in the manned domain because you need to make sure that each new step complies with the certification and safety standards of manned aviation. You can qualify unmanned systems with very high-end software—even AI software—and hardware much more quickly.

Baykar has a price advantage because we are vertically integrated. We have strong in-house avionics, power systems, and ground element design. This allows us to tailor critical subsystems and enable attractive pricing with high-end capability. The TB2, with a six-unit ground system and everything, still costs less than a manned platform. Our TB2 fleet recently passed the one-million-hour milestone, so our operating cost is just several hundred dollars per hour—compared to a minimum of $20,000 per hour for a single manned F-16. When you can mass produce, availability and reliability turn into a potent combination. Additionally, customers benefit from the rapid in-service schedule compared to a manned system. A country can field a full UAV system with trained people within a year, providing a very quick and affordable defense capability compared to a manned system, which is a multiyear exercise.

DJ: You mentioned thirty-eight international partners earlier. Ukraine was one of your earliest: Have you been able to apply lessons from that partnership with newer programs, such as those with the Gulf countries?

Bayraktar: Ukraine was Baykar’s first export customer. Our cooperation with Ukraine opened up the strategic level of cooperation for us. We had been working with them since 2011, but things moved rapidly after 2014. In 2014, no one else would sell them armed drones. We didn’t yet have a mature system, but we agreed to help. They were in need, huge need, and searching. That was more than ten years ago. They couldn’t get what they wanted elsewhere either, so they came to Turkey. President Erdoğan’s leadership mattered at that point, as he considered Ukraine a neighbor and friend in need. With the government’s support, we supplied armed drones starting in 2019—the order was placed in 2018. They were very happy and this was very important. President Zelensky visited in August 2019 after taking office. At his request, we agreed to build a factory in Ukraine. He acquired more systems, and we discussed an offset-type obligation. I told them: “You have very good engines. Maybe we can figure out a way to use your engines on our platforms.” So, we created effective cooperation with Motor Sich and others. In a sense, Turkey and Ukraine are complementary countries. When the war escalated in 2022, we did our best to support Ukraine. You may remember the European crowd-sourcing campaigns for Europeans to buy TB2s on Ukraine’s behalf, but we never accepted the money. We donated the platforms, giving up over $110 million in income that we chose not to generate. We are not war profiteers. We delivered all Bayraktar TB2s free of charge as part of those campaigns and the campaign funds were used for humanitarian aid and other pressing needs to support Ukraine.

Haluk Bayraktar is the CEO of Baykar, an autonomous technology company based in Turkey. Follow him on X at @haluk.

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Murray in Sky News on UK’s Strategic Defence Review

Atlantic Council — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

On June 2, Rob Murray, non-resident senior fellow at Forward Defense and the Transatlantic Security Initiative, appeared on Sky News to offer his insights on the UK’s Strategic Defence Review. Murray emphasized the importance of re-drawing financial architectures and increasing credit flow into supply chains to effectively finance the Review’s ambitious armament procurement goals.

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How NATO’s eastern flank is setting the standard for collective defense

Justina Budginaite-Froehly — Fri, 30 May 2025 16:04:21 +0000

“I am glad to be in Vilnius today,” said German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on May 22. “Because it is right here, in Lithuania, where we are taking the defense of NATO’s eastern flank into our own hands.”

Merz was in Vilnius to formally inaugurate the 45^th Armored Brigade in Lithuania, which will embed German combat power at the heart of Baltic defense. Germany will implement a phased deployment—it sent advanced elements in early 2024 and formally activated the brigade on April 1. The brigade is expected to reach full combat readiness by 2027. Once complete, this will offer Lithuania and its neighbors a sustained, high-end deterrent anchored in the NATO framework.

But it’s not just Germany that is helping bolster the defenses of NATO’s strategically exposed eastern flank. The eastern flank countries themselves are implementing concrete measures to overcome Europe’s entrenched defense fragmentation. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—all located along the eastern border of both NATO and the European Union (EU) with mainland Russia, its Kaliningrad exclave, and Belarus—are emerging as leaders in bolstering regional defense integration, the benefits of which could extend throughout Europe. This shift is especially significant amid growing transatlantic tensions and renewed calls from the United States for Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security and conventional defense.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, these countries have aligned their border protection efforts by integrating their counter-mobility measures. They have initiated the process of cooperatively developing deep-strike capabilities. They have also started the procurement process for German weapon systems, introduced the German defense industry to the region, and will soon host the first-ever permanently deployed German brigade. All these initiatives show that Europe’s defense efforts are well-positioned to grow together and consolidate from the epicenter in the northeast of the continent. By anchoring their defense planning in regional realities, the eastern flank countries are demonstrating that regional coordination, backed by political determination, can transform exposed vulnerabilities into strategic assets that enhance deterrence and operational readiness.

Integrating counter-mobility systems

Faced with growing geostrategic pressure along their borders with Russia and Belarus, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have taken decisive, coordinated steps to reinforce border protection and defense. Increasingly aligned in their strategic approach, these countries are developing integrated fortification systems that form a continuous defensive line along the eastern border of NATO and the EU.

Two major initiatives launched in 2024—the Baltic Defense Line covering Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and Poland’s East Shield—share the common goal of strengthening deterrence and denying adversaries access to NATO and EU territory. These efforts include expanding existing forested areas, deepening drainage ditches, building engineering depots to store physical barriers such as “dragons’ teeth,” “hedgehogs,” “Spanish horse,” and solid concrete road barriers, as well as installing anti-tank landmines and mine-laying equipment. There are also plans for developing reinforcements with drone and anti-drone technologies. The overall goal is to ensure the two defense initiatives’ integrity, especially as they converge at the Suwałki Gap, a security chokepoint and the primary axis for NATO’s land reinforcement to the Baltic states.

Finland’s accession to NATO added 1,340 kilometers to the Alliance’s border with Russia. Unlike the more exposed terrain of the Baltic states and Poland, Finland’s border region is naturally defensive, dominated by forests, lakes, and wetlands, which would complicate a large-scale Russian ground incursion. Accordingly, Finland has chosen not to build physical fortifications along the border.

However, to reinforce deterrence and secure vulnerable segments, Finland aligned itself with the regional consensus by withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention banning the use of anti-personnel landmines. This means the eastern flank countries can jointly deploy and stockpile anti-personnel landmines as a shared border defense tool against Russia. Both Russia and Ukraine have used anti-personnel landmines in Ukraine.

The regional integration of border defense has triggered broader EU interest. Following Baltic and Polish calls for a collective response, the European Council’s conclusions on European defense, released on March 6, recognized the importance of EU border defense. The EU’s White Paper on Defense, published in late March, endorsed the idea of creating an “Eastern Border Shield” and in April, the European Parliament passed a resolution recognizing the East Shield and the Baltic Defense Line as flagship projects for common security. This momentum must now translate into concrete EU support—and funding—for transforming the eastern flank countries’ national efforts into a unified, layered European border defense architecture.

Coordinated development of deep strike capabilities

The Baltic states, Poland, and Finland are also integrating their long-range firepower into a regional deep-strike architecture, which significantly raises the threshold for aggression along the eastern flank of NATO and the EU.

Since Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have each contracted High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) launchers and committed to trilateral cooperation with the United States on HIMARS integration, personnel training, system maintenance, and service. Embedding HIMARS into a joint operational concept will allow the Baltic states to conduct combined live-fire exercises and harmonize sustainment through shared maintenance, training, and logistics chains. Estonia’s six launchers, delivered in April, now reach well beyond four hundred kilometers. Lithuania’s eight launchers, due to arrive by 2026, will achieve a similar reach. Latvia is set to receive six launchers in 2027, which will complete the Baltic deep-strike firewall.

This Baltic cluster is dovetailing with Poland’s even larger “Homar-A” deep-strike program, under which some 486 additional HIMARS variants will be mounted on Polish Jelcz trucks and integrated into Poland’s Topaz command system. Together, Poland and the Baltic states are planning a joint logistics hub to manage munitions stockpiles, spare parts, and forward displacement. They are also planning to exercise joint targeting and coordinate fire support across borders.

Finland has opted to upgrade its M270 multiple-launch rocket systems rather than buy HIMARS. The upgrade, approved in 2023, allows Finnish M270s to fire the same munitions as their Baltic neighbors. This technical alignment transforms Finland’s forces into a seamless fourth pillar of the regional deep-strike ensemble, enabling integrated planning, data‐sharing, and cross-border reinforcement exercises.

By integrating US-provided launchers, coordinated doctrine, shared logistics, and interoperable fire-control standards, the five eastern flank nations are establishing a continuous, multi-tiered long-range fire network that spans from Finland to Poland. This network helps project deterrence and complicate adversary planning, solidifying a new level of collective defense integration on the eastern flank.

Regional consolidation with German weapon systems

The eastern flank countries have also deepened their partnerships with German weapon manufacturers. Lithuania is aligning its force modernization with the German brigade’s forward posture in the Baltics. In December, Lithuania’s defense ministry signed a €950 million contract with for forty-four Leopard 2 A8 main battle tanks—its first indigenous tank battalion—which will arrive through 2030, alongside an expanded fleet of twenty-seven additional Boxer “Vilkas” infantry fighting vehicles, which will arrive by 2029. Finland and Poland likewise use Leopard 2 variants, creating a shared main battle tank backbone across the eastern flank.

In the air defense domain, Estonia and Latvia will each field three IRIS-T surface-launched missile batteries this year, while Lithuania has bolstered its two national advanced surface-to-air missile systems (NASAMS) batteries (initially deployed in 2020) with additional systems due to arrive in 2026. To underpin sustained operations, German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall’s new NATO-standard 155 mm ammunition plant in Lithuania, scheduled to be online by mid-2026, will produce tens of thousands of shells annually, significantly enhancing regional munitions resilience.

In the defense innovation field, Lithuanian laser technology firm Aktyvus Photonics has partnered with German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems, having signed a memorandum of understanding on strategic collaboration in unmanned systems this month. Together, they will codevelop and field-test unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with laser capabilities, aiming to expedite deployment timelines and establish a standard for next-generation, networked unmanned systems in NATO’s eastern defenses.

Beyond procurement, production, and innovation, Lithuania has also positioned itself as a regional arms maintenance hub: Through the establishment of Lithuania Defense Services—a joint venture between Rheinmetall Landsysteme and French-German defense manufacturer KNDS—it provides repair, overhaul, and upgrade services for German vehicle platforms, including Boxer Vilkas IFVs, PzH 2000 howitzers, the Leopard main battle tank family, and tactical logistics vehicles.

Collectively, these deployments, procurements, and industrial partnerships do more than fill capability gaps: They forge a contiguous eastern flank defense ecosystem. By standardizing on German platforms, harmonizing training and logistics, co-locating production and repair facilities, and co-training under unified command structures, Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland, together with Germany, can achieve unprecedented interoperability and strategic depth. These initiatives are transforming NATO’s eastern flank into a seamless, multi-domain bulwark.

Strategic depth through regional alignment

The eastern flank’s transformation from a collection of fragmented national postures into a cohesive, multi-domain defense network exemplifies how sustained regional integration can overcome long-standing capability gaps. By aligning border defense, harmonizing long-range fires, and embedding German heavy armor and sustainment infrastructure, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are creating a continuous belt of deterrence that leverages shared doctrine, logistics, and industry. This holistic approach raises the cost of aggression and sets a new standard for European collective defense: one where interoperability and joint capacity-building replace duplication and dependency, anchoring strategic depth at NATO’s most exposed frontier.

Justina Budginaite-Froehly, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Fiber optic drones could play decisive role in Russia’s summer offensive

David Kirichenko — Thu, 29 May 2025 18:48:59 +0000

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, the war in Ukraine has been shaped by a technological arms race as both countries have struggled to achieve an innovative edge on the battlefield. While Ukraine’s dynamic tech sector and less cumbersome bureaucracy initially gave it the advantage, Russia may now be gaining the upper hand.

The weapon that is turning the tide in Russia’s favor is the rather humble-looking fiber optic drone. This variation on the first-person view (FPV) drones that have dominated the skies above the battlefield since 2022 may appear inconspicuous at first glance, but it is having a major impact on the front lines of the war and is expected to play a crucial role in Russia’s unfolding summer offensive.

As the name suggests, fiber optic drones are controlled by wire-thin cables linked to operators. Crucially, this makes them immune to the jamming systems that have become near-ubiquitous in the Russian and Ukrainian armies due to the rapid evolution of drone warfare. Thanks to their data-transporting cables, fiber optic drones benefit from improved video quality and can also operate at lower altitudes than their wireless counterparts, but it is their invulnerability to electronic jamming that makes them such a potentially game-changing weapon.

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There are some drawbacks to this kind of drone. Key problems include limited range and a tendency to become entangled in obstacles such as trees and pylons. Nevertheless, there is mounting recognition on both sides of the front lines and among international military observers that fiber optic drones are now indispensable. In a recent report, the BBC called these drones “the terrifying new weapon changing the war in Ukraine.” Meanwhile, the Washington Post noted that Moscow’s focus on fiber optic drones represents “the first time Russia has surpassed Ukraine in front-line drone technology since the full-scale invasion in 2022.”

The combat effectiveness of fiber optic drones became increasingly apparent amid heavy fighting in Russia’s Kursk region during the early months of 2025. Russia’s campaign to push Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region used large numbers of fiber optic drones to attack Ukraine’s flanks, cut supply lines, and cripple Ukrainian logistics. This eventually forced Ukrainian troops to retreat, ending an extended incursion into Russian territory that had been hugely embarrassing for Vladimir Putin. Ukrainian troops who fought in Kursk later reported that the only thing capable of stopping fiber optic drones was bad weather.

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The technology behind fiber optic drones is no secret and is available to Ukraine as well as Russia. However, as is so often the case, Moscow benefits from weight of numbers and is looking to exploit its strengths. While Ukraine has experimented with a wide variety of drones produced by hundreds of different startup-style defense companies, Russia has concentrated its vast resources on the mass production of a relatively small number of specific weapons categories including fiber optic drones and shahed kamikaze drones. Moscow’s strategy is to focus on volume with the goal of overwhelming Ukraine’s defenses. Russia has also benefited from close ties with China, which is a key drone producer and ranks among the world’s leading suppliers of fiber optic cables.

Ukraine’s front line military commanders and the country’s tech sector developers recognize the growing importance of fiber optic drones and are now rapidly increasing production. However, they are currently lagging far behind Russia and have much work to do before they can catch up. It is a race Ukraine cannot afford to lose. One of the country’s largest drone manufacturers recently warned that if the current trajectory continues, Kyiv will soon be unable to defend against the sheer scale of Russia’s mass production.

Increased foreign investment in Ukraine’s defense industry could help close the gap. By financing the development and production of fiber optic drones, Ukraine’s international partners can put the country’s defenses on a firmer footing and enable the Ukrainian military to address the threat posed by Russia’s cable-connected drones. This trend has already been underway for some time, with more and more partner countries allocating funds for Ukrainian defense sector production. The challenge now is to channel this financing specifically toward fiber optic drones.

Time may not be on Ukraine’s side. The Russian army is currently in the early stages of a summer offensive that promises to be one of the largest and most ambitious of the entire war, with fighting already intensifying at various points along the front lines. If Putin’s commanders can implement the fiber optic drone tactics that proved so successful in the Kursk region, they may be able to finally overcome Ukraine’s dogged defenses and achieve a long-awaited breakthrough. In a war defined by attrition and innovation, Ukraine must now come up with urgent solutions to counter Russia’s fiber optic drone fleet.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

The Rt Hon Lord Mandelson on Britain in an enduring transatlantic relationship

British Ambassador to the United States The Rt Hon Lord Mandelson speaks at the 2025 Christopher J. Makins lecture to discuss the significance of the transatlantic relationship during this unprecedented geopolitical period.

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Eighty years ago this month, the streets of Britain, America, and allied nations erupted in celebration at the fall of fascism in Europe.

For me personally, it’s a source of enormous pride that my grandfather, Herbert Morrison, served as home secretary in Winston Churchill’s wartime coalition.

He also served as deputy prime minister in Clement Attlee’s transformative postwar government in Britain. That government didn’t just support the formation of NATO to counter Soviet expansionism—they were the co-architects of it.

Amidst Cold War tensions and economic upheaval, Britain and America advanced from allies to integrated strategic partners at the dawn of the nuclear age, our scientists having joined forces in the Manhattan Project to create the advantage we had at the beginning of this age.

It was Western unity which ultimately ended the Cold War peacefully and demonstrated resilience to new threats, including the 9/11 attacks, where NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time.

Over eight decades, the foundations of collective defense have remained steadfast whilst the transatlantic relationship has continuously evolved and adapted to counter new challenges.

Today, I want to talk about the profound challenge we face in a new age of great power rivalry, a period characterized by political volatility, by economic mercantilism, and geopolitical competition.

We are witnessing the end of an era of hyper-globalization where we assumed that economic integration had made wars almost obsolete.

The logic seemed compelling: Mutual interests, integrated global supply chains, and shared economic stakes created too much to lose from warfare. History seemed to point only in one direction.

And those comfortable assumptions have been shattered.

We now see the rise of modern mercantilism, where nations prefer to prioritize national economic strength and autonomy in many respects.

States are intervening and playing a more protectionist role in managing trade and directing industrial policy to become ever more self-sufficient and localized.

I’m not declaring globalization dead, but it is being radically reconfigured around us.

China’s export-driven growth strategy flooded the global market with state-subsidized products, undercut Western manufacturing, and hollowed out industry.

The social disruption of rapid technological change, where, if you take media as an example, we have moved suddenly from decades of information flowing to people through established news organizations to a future where you only see “news” online that is curated to what you want to know, or what the algorithm—and those behind it—decides you want to know. And then there’s the backlash against globalization’s uneven distribution of benefits.

You can produce many different numbers to show the widening wealth disparities in the West over the past thirty years, but I would choose a simple one: GDP per capita in the United States has grown about 60 percent to 70 percent in real terms, but real median household income growth has been about 20 percent to 25 percent. The typical American household has not done as well as the booming US economy would suggest. A similar story holds true across all our countries in the West.

This has posed profound challenges to culture, place, and society—which too many of us over the past decades, frankly, have ignored. From the American Midwest to the coastal towns of England, a hands-off approach left many places adrift from the success stories of global cities such as London and New York.

And in a world which has often felt dominated by the exponential rise of social media, a sense of grievance—and of difference between us and them—has been amplified.

So yes, I credit President Trump’s acute political instincts in identifying the anxieties gripping not only millions of Americans, but also far more pervasive global trends: Economic stagnation, a sense of irreversible decline, the lost promise of meaningful work for so many people. These are the giants now that we must confront head-on.

So, where do we go next?

It is in no one’s interest—certainly not those of close allies—that each country pursues a wholly individualized path, which leads to accelerated economic fragmentation.

But if we are serious about rebuilding confidence in the international system, if we wish to maintain a set of common rules and standards—a shared economic and security commons in between us—we need to devote an enormous amount of energy and goodwill to preserve, sustain, and deepen the alliances which exist between like-minded countries.

For the UK and the rest of Europe, we must reboot the transatlantic alliance—indeed, a boot up the proverbial backside is needed now—to deliver peace through strength across three interconnected domains: military, economic, and technological.

For my generation, the twentieth-century gains in peace and prosperity were thought of as a European peace dividend.

I now recognize it as an urgent bill, that peace dividend: An urgent bill for decades of defense underinvestment—a payment that is long overdue.

We have lived in a fantasy created by the US security guarantee, complacent that a friendly heavyweight across the water would be always there when the going gets tough.

We meet in the shadow of Russia’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine, now in its fourth year.

The UK strongly supports President Trump’s initiative to bring this terrible war to an end. And we are working together with partners to secure a just and lasting peace.

The Ukraine conflict has served as a brutal wake-up call. State-on-state war has returned to Europe. Adversaries are using nuclear rhetoric to influence decision-making, and we are seeing regular attacks on European infrastructure beneath the threshold of warfare.

It is crystal clear that European defense must step up and rebalance for our collective security. Actually, I think President Trump is doing Europe a favor by confronting us with this reality.

The United States is the UK’s closest defense and security ally. We must become less dependent on America, while remaining inseparably linked to America—a distinction that I underline of critical importance. Yes, less dependent, but still inseparably linked.

Ukraine is just one flashpoint of many amid growing global instability. Even the US does not have limitless resources.

This is precisely why Britain must step up in providing for European security and why we have committed to the biggest sustained increase in defense spending since the Cold War.

We will become NATO’s fastest-innovating nation, ensuring our military forces have the technological and military capabilities to secure long-term strategic advantage, not just spending more, but spending better.

Of course, this all needs to be grounded in intelligent and effective strategic choices, not merely increased expenditure. Efficiency and innovation to renew our defense manufacturing bases must drive every pound, every dollar, and every euro that we invest.

And we will double down on our alliances. In defense, we will always be NATO first but not NATO only—and this is particularly true of the UK’s focus on the Indo-Pacific, as well as our new security partnership with Europe.

One good example is AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership with Australia and America, which will deliver advanced nuclear-powered submarines and catalyze technology sharing on other advanced capabilities.

Turning to the theme of economic strength, Britain now enjoys something that has eluded us for far too long: a government with both unity of purpose and longevity.

This government’s mandate and President Trump’s will both last for the next four years—providing huge opportunities for collaboration between us.

We are both pro-business and pro-trade in Britain, and committed to innovation, not as empty slogans but as practical imperatives.

This UK government is committed to creating the best investment environment with a regulatory reset that makes us the most competitive in Europe—that’s our aim.

One of the reasons we were able to close the first trade deal of the Trump administration is that our strong economic relationship between our countries is fair, balanced, and reciprocal. But also because, frankly, we are a businesslike nation with pragmatic instincts.

One of the great backhanded insults in British history was when Napoleon Bonaparte dismissed us as a mere “nation of shopkeepers.” He was right: Commerce is the lifeblood which flows through our veins, and that is one reason why we British and American cousins remain so close.

And that is also one reason why I see the current deal as the beginning of a new chapter as well as an end, in a sense, in itself. There is scope for an even more transformative stage in our long partnership. And I believe that centers on technology.

So let me address technological strength as the third. We face a clear, shared threat. There is nothing in this world I fear more than China winning the race for technological dominance in the coming decades.

China represents a far more dynamic and formidable strategic rival than the Soviet Union ever was: economically sophisticated, highly innovative, and strategically patient.

The United Kingdom and United States are the only two Western nations with trillion-dollar technology ecosystems combined with unparalleled talent and research capabilities in our universities and corporations.

We must combine forces, in my view, to drive the scientific breakthroughs that will define this century, and AI should be the spearpoint of that collaboration.

Artificial intelligence stands as the next great foundational technology. Through its power, we can rapidly make progress across so many frontiers of science: quantum, synthetic biology, medicine, nuclear fusion.

Rather than stifling these transformative technologies through excessive regulation, our two governments must unleash their immense potential for human benefit and Western advantage.

Let me say this in conclusion. In his immortal Iron Curtain speech, delivered in Missouri, Churchill spoke eloquently about the primacy of American power and its awesome responsibility to future generations.

Today, we face our own historical inflection point.

No one should doubt that we face accelerating global competition in which it is strongly in our interests to expand the perimeter of our alliances while deepening the transatlantic partnership at its core.

So our diplomacy must be more urgent, more agile, and more creative. We must deepen the political and military alliances which defined our past successes but also create new partnerships—borne in and of technology—which will redefine our future. The stakes could not be higher. The opportunities, actually, could not be greater. And I am confident that our two countries will indeed rise together to meet those challenges.

Peter Mandelson is the British ambassador to the United States.

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How to prevent Ukraine’s booming defense sector from fueling global insecurity

Vitaliy Goncharuk — Tue, 20 May 2025 20:18:47 +0000

Following the 1991 Soviet collapse, newly independent Ukraine inherited the second-largest defense arsenal in Europe from the USSR. As a result, the country soon emerged as one of the biggest arms exporters to Africa and the Middle East, significantly influencing conflicts in those regions. With the Ukrainian defense sector now experiencing years of unprecedented growth in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion, it is important to prevent Ukraine’s innovative military technologies from fueling a new wave of international instability.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, hundreds of companies have sprung up in Ukraine producing defense tech equipment for the country’s war effort. Growth has been largely driven by private initiatives led by civilians with no prior experience in the defense industry. This has led to a startup culture that does not require much investment capital, with most of the products developed since 2022 based on existing open source software and hardware platforms. Data leaks are a significant issue, as the vast majority of the people involved in this improvised defense sector have not undergone the kind of security checks typical of the defense industry elsewhere.

While there is currently no end in sight to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is already apparent that in the postwar period, the large number of Ukrainian defense sector companies that have appeared since 2022 will face a significant drop in demand. Indeed, even in today’s wartime conditions, many companies are already lobbying for the relaxation of export restrictions while arguing that the Ukrainian state is unable to place sufficient orders.

If these companies are forced to close, skilled professionals will seek employment abroad. This could lead to the leakage of knowledge and technologies. Meanwhile, with NATO countries likely to be focused on their own defense industries and strategic priorities, it is reasonable to assume that many Ukrainian defense sector companies will concentrate on exporting to more volatile regions. The potentially destabilizing impact of these trends is obvious. It is therefore vital to adopt effective measures to limit the spread of Ukrainian defense sector technologies, data, and finished products along with skilled developers, engineers, and operators to potential conflict zones around the world.

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Ukraine’s defense sector innovations fall into two categories. The first includes innovations that are easily replicated using readily available technologies. The second category features more complex systems requiring skilled professionals. It makes little sense to focus regulatory efforts on the first category. Instead, preventing proliferation is more effectively managed through intelligence operations and security measures. Preventative efforts should focus on those innovations that are more complex in both development and deployment.

Efforts to prevent Ukrainian defense technologies from fueling conflicts around the world will depend to a significant degree on enforcement. While Ukraine has made some progress in combating corruption over the past decade, this remains a major issue, particularly in the country’s dramatically expanded defense sector. A successful approach to limiting the spread of Ukrainian defense tech know-how should therefore incorporate a combination of positive and negative incentives.

Positive incentives can include opening up NATO markets to Ukrainian companies and supporting their efforts to comply with NATO standards. This would likely encourage a broader culture of compliance throughout the Ukrainian defense tech sector as companies sought to access the world’s most lucrative client base.

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Creating the conditions for the acquisition of Ukrainian companies by major international defense industry players could help to encourage a responsible corporate culture among Ukrainian companies while bolstering the country’s position globally. Likewise, enhanced access to funding and a simplified route to work visas and citizenship in the EU and US would help attract and retain talent. This would further strengthen Ukraine’s defense sector and encourage corporate compliance.

Professional organizations also have a potential role to play. Promoting the development of robust industry and professional associations for Ukrainians in the defense sector would encourage collaboration, knowledge sharing, and the establishment of industry standards, which could further propel innovation and growth within Ukraine’s defense industry, while creating a climate more conducive to regulation. Regulatory measures could include enhanced access to Western defense markets, with strict penalties for non-compliance.

Targeted export controls are another important measure. By establishing robust controls over critical components such as processors and specialized equipment, Ukraine can limit the availability of these technologies in regions with high conflict potential. Enhanced monitoring mechanisms should be implemented to track the transfer of technologies and the movement of skilled personnel. International cooperation is also crucial. Ukraine should look to work closely with global partners to synchronize regulatory standards and enforcement strategies, thereby reducing the challenges presented by regions with weak legal mechanisms.

Ukraine is now recognized internationally as a leading defense tech innovator in areas including AI solutions, cyber security, and drone warfare. There is huge global appetite for such technologies, but unregulated distribution could have disastrous consequences for international security. By combining enforceable regulatory measures with strategic incentives, it is possible to reduce the risks associated with the spread of Ukraine’s wartime innovations, while simultaneously maintaining an environment that supports ongoing innovation and growth in a controlled and secure manner.

Vitaliy Goncharuk is a US-based tech entrepreneur with Ukrainian roots who previously served as Chairman of the Artificial Intelligence Committee of Ukraine from 2019 to 2022.

For all the political difficulties, this is a time for both the EU and the United Kingdom to be bold.

The second, and most urgent, prospective agreement is a security and defense pact, which would open the way to the United Kingdom’s participation in EU-backed military spending. This agreement would allow Britain to take part in joint procurement for military capabilities alongside the bloc’s member states and to enable EU countries to purchase British-made military equipment as part of the new €150 billion European instrument to ramp up defense spending.

As one of Europe’s leading miliary powers, Britain is essential to achieving the continent’s aim of taking the primary role of defending itself in the wake of the Trump administration’s stated desire to reduce the United States’ commitment to defending Europe. In February, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer pledged that Britain would increase its defense spending to 2.5 percent of its gross domestic product by 2027 and to 3 percent during the next parliament.

European fears about Russian aggression and US withdrawal from the continent have increased the pressure for decisive action on defense and security, and the EU-UK pact would represent a welcome step toward developing the continent’s defense industrial base and enhancing effective military cooperation.

The third item on the summit’s agenda is to agree to a “common understanding” on a range of issues concerning the trade and economic relationship between Britain and the EU. Current UK-EU trade arrangements are governed by the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed by the two sides in late 2020.

For all the fanfare associated with the economic deal the United Kingdom signed with the United States on May 8, the EU remains Britain’s single largest trading partner by far. Boosting economic ties weakened by Brexit could bring desperately needed dividends for both sides, even if it doesn’t produce the growth that would come from Britain rejoining the European single market, a policy Starmer promised not to pursue on the campaign trail.

The TCA is subject to a joint review next year, and both the United Kingdom and EU have bilateral issues they want to amend. The United Kingdom is keen to negotiate an agreement to reduce border checks on agricultural products and secure a mutual recognition agreement for professional qualifications to help open up markets for UK service exporters.

On the EU side, there are calls from France and others to support EU fishing rights in UK waters and a European Commission proposal to create a youth mobility scheme, which would allow young people from across Europe to work and travel freely between the United Kingdom and the EU.

Some of these issues will require political risks and trade-offs from both sides. Starmer’s popularity has slumped since he was elected last summer, and Brexiteers in the United Kingdom will be ready to accuse him of compromising on the outcome of Britian’s referendum to leave the European Union.

This domestic pressure has become more intense after local elections in England earlier this month that represented a heavy defeat for the governing Labour Party and a significant victory for the populist right-wing party, Reform UK, led by the arch Brexit champion Nigel Farage.

There will be pressure on European governments, too, not to compromise the principles of the EU single market for a deal on defense and security. And there remain concerns in European capitals about Britain’s long-term commitment to closer ties with a club it chose to leave nine years ago.

Yet, for all the political difficulties, this is a time for both the EU and the United Kingdom to be bold. Squabbles about fishing or veterinary checks cannot be allowed to undermine the vital steps that must be taken to confront the economic and security threats facing Britain and the EU today.

Europe has always been stronger when the United Kingdom and its continental neighbors are united. Next week’s summit can mark a modest but important step forward for UK-EU relations and demonstrate that the friction and pain of the last decade can be replaced by a new partnership with mutual benefits.

Ed Owen is a nonresident fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a former UK government adviser.

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Inside Latvia’s race against time to build deterrence against Russia

Armands Astukevičs and Hans Binnendijk — Wed, 14 May 2025 14:51:29 +0000

This project, a collaboration between the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and the Latvia-based Centre for East European Policy Studies, aims to advance understanding of Latvia’s defense and security policies, with an emphasis on resilience-building strategies. Latvia’s measures offer lessons for other frontline states, and demonstrate an increasing willingness to prioritize defense in an uncertain geopolitical environment. Read the other articles in this series here and here.

Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has laid bare Moscow’s neo-imperial ambitions and the direct threat it poses to its so-called near-abroad. For NATO frontline states such as Latvia, the security landscape has fundamentally changed over the past three years. While Russian forces are currently taking staggering losses in Ukraine, necessitating a period of force reconstitution, Russia’s military could be rebuilt and ready to invade a Baltic state in as few as three years, according to estimates from some Western intelligence agencies.

Other factors complicate the picture further. On the positive side, the accession of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance, growing defense capabilities in neighboring Estonia and Lithuania, and Poland’s significant defense investments, all provide Latvia with a strengthened collective defense posture in the Baltic Sea region. However, this has occurred amid growing uncertainty regarding the United States’ long-term commitment to European security. Critical US enablers and rapid reinforcements cannot be taken for granted to the same degree as in the past. While the US nuclear umbrella remains extended so far, the erosion of trust is noticeable, creating potential vulnerabilities that the Kremlin might seek to test.

The stakes could not be higher. For Latvia and its Baltic neighbors, Russian aggression represents an existential threat. At the same time, a Russian attack on NATO’s eastern flank would quickly reverberate across the entire Alliance.

In response to these threats and changing security dynamics, Latvia should pursue three fundamental and interconnected strategic goals:

First, demonstrate political will: Latvia must demonstrate to allies in Washington and across Europe that it is maximizing its own defense capabilities and resilience, shouldering its share of the burden, and signaling unwavering commitment. It must then use that demonstration to harness the power of the Alliance for its national defense. Latvia’s defense budget hovered around 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 when Russia first invaded Crimea. Its defense budget this year is set at about 3.65 percent, with announced plans to push it to 5 percent of GDP soon. Latvia needs to make up for lost time.
Second, generate sufficient capabilities: Riga needs to generate sufficient domestic defensive capabilities, integrated with NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup, to realistically hold a defensive line against aggression long enough for decisive allied reinforcements to arrive. It needs to achieve a degree of deterrence by denial. This will require a significant Latvian military buildup.
Third, enhance societal resilience: Latvia must also project an undeniable national will, making it clear to Moscow that any aggression would face fierce, protracted, whole-of-society, and costly resistance. There can be no perception of Latvia as an easy target.

Achieving these goals demands immediate, focused action in Latvia, as well as a rallying of Riga’s NATO allies.

National defense priorities

Latvia should begin by making its comprehensive defense concept a nationwide reality. The 2018 adoption of this framework, which called for integrating civilian elements into national security, is its vital strength. Through this whole-of-society approach, Latvia has demonstrated ingenuity and cooperation. For example, Latvia’s municipalities and state companies collaborate to support armed forces mobility and counter-mobility efforts. Another example is the involvement of hunters in the national defense system—as a patriotic and armed part of society that can be integrated with the National Guard and tasked with support assignments. While these efforts are commendable, more must be done to ensure that civilian agencies, businesses, and citizens are actively integrated into national resilience and defense planning through practical taskings and drills. As comprehensive defense evolves into the reality of society, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia.

Latvia must also maintain momentum and keep military modernization on track. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Latvia has significantly increased investment in conventional war-fighting capabilities. Riga’s commitment to acquiring advanced systems such as HIMARS rocket launchers, IRIS-T air-to-air missiles, and coastal defense missiles sends a vital message: the country is serious about bolstering deterrence by denial. However, acquiring advanced hardware is only part of the equation; Latvia must also ensure that these systems can be effectively commanded, supplied, and maintained during high-intensity conflict. This necessitates trained personnel and critical support elements, including robust command-and-control, resilient logistics, sufficient ammunition stockpiles, and effective maintenance infrastructure. Not all equipment needs to be expensive or high-tech. Land mines along the border that would channel an attack and swarms of low-cost drones can have dramatic results on the battlefield. Perhaps most important, Latvia must ensure that it can sustain combat operations beyond the initial phase, proving it possesses the national endurance required to hold the line until allied reinforcements arrive.

National resilience also requires forging a cohesive fighting force from diverse sources of manpower. In 2023, Latvia introduced a mandatory conscription policy called State Defense Service (SDS) to bolster recruitment. This policy of mandatory eleven-month service has shown early signs of success. Latvia is planning to enlist four thousand new recruits annually by 2028, and 40 percent of the 2024 intake opted for professional careers after their mandatory service. However, given Latvia’s demographics, active service alone cannot generate sufficient manpower; it must be complemented by a ready and responsive reserve system—one that currently requires significant overhaul. With SDS providing a new input stream, the reserve system must be adapted to effectively integrate these personnel and grow combat power over the long term. Latvia could add significantly to its manpower mobilization by combining professionals, the Home Guard, and SDS graduates, as well as by implementing dedicated reservist training and early military education. Current military plans envision 31,000 troops by 2029, plus an equally large reserve contingent thereafter. While this objective is sound, the current timeline appears misaligned with the potential speed of Russian force reconstitution. Latvia must confront substantial constraints, including the need for adequate infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative policies to drive recruitment and conduct training at the required scale and speed.

Furthermore, physical defenses require turning the Baltic Defense Line from a concept to a concrete plan. A fortified line across the Baltics, leveraging naturally difficult terrain, is a clear-headed and necessary response to the Russian threat. Correctly executed, it could effectively impede a potential incursion, buying time for national counteractions and allied mobilization. Fast-tracking construction, funding, and policy decisions will be crucial for realizing this critical barrier. Critically, forces must train to fight effectively from these prepared positions, integrating them fully into national and regional operational plans.

Finally, Latvia must ensure that it has the infrastructure to support military mobility and to provide host nation support. Latvia’s defense fundamentally relies on NATO allies arriving quickly and in force, requiring substantial investment in mobility infrastructure and support elements. Latvia must therefore proactively invest in and expand the critical infrastructure needed to receive, stage, and sustain large-scale allied forces. Short-term priorities include accelerating projects like the Liepāja military port and enhancing airfield capacity at Lielvārde airbase and Riga International Airport. Accelerating Rail Baltica’s military utility is also crucial, as it could fundamentally alter the capacity and speed of NATO reinforcements into the region.

Rallying allied support

While Latvia shoulders these critical domestic responsibilities, its security ultimately rests on robust collective defense and the tangible commitment of its allies. Latvia must advocate for specific actions from its NATO partners, recognizing that the window before Russia potentially reconstitutes its offensive capabilities is short. This diplomatic push requires urgency and clarity.

The place to begin is in Washington. All three Baltic states and Poland have essentially accepted US President Donald Trump’s challenge for allies to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense. This should be presented in a high-profile fashion to Trump during the NATO Summit in June. As part of this presentation, Latvia should urge Trump to continue hosting US forces in the Baltic region on a rotational basis and to augment those rotations with high-impact capabilities such as air and missile defense assets.

To deter Russia, NATO must strengthen its forward defense posture on the ground. Latvia should continue advocating for transforming the Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup on its territory into a combat-credible forward defense force that expands on the full-time brigade and integrates it with national defense structures that match adversary military capabilities. Enhancing this forward defense by securing broader participation, particularly from a nuclear-armed European ally, would send a strong deterrent signal to Moscow.

This enhanced forward presence must be embedded within deeper, more integrated regional defense planning. Latvia, working closely with its neighbors, should champion the development of genuinely interlocking, all-domain defense plans within an enhanced Nordic-Baltic-Poland framework. This necessitates moving beyond interoperability exercises toward shared operational concepts and assigned responsibilities. This will help forge a more cohesive and resilient defense architecture in NATO’s northeast as part of the Alliance’s broader reinforcement strategy. Consequently, Latvia must be a vocal proponent of the regular, rigorous exercising and continuous streamlining of the supreme allied commander Europe’s reinforcement plans for the Baltic region. Identifying and resolving friction points, especially cross-border military mobility bottlenecks and logistical hurdles, requires sustained, collaborative effort with those allies designated to reinforce the region in a crisis.

Minimizing the time required for those reinforcements to arrive necessitates a concerted push to maximize the pre-positioning of allied military equipment and essential stocks within Latvia and the region. Reducing the lift requirement during a crisis by having equipment already in theater dramatically shortens response timelines, directly bolstering deterrence by showcasing NATO’s capacity for rapid, large-scale reaction.

Lastly, building on a deep-seated relationship, the Baltic states must treat strengthening security cooperation with Ukraine as a long-term strategic imperative. Currently, Kyiv’s resolute defense delivers immediate dividends by tying down significant Russian forces and offering invaluable, hard-earned combat lessons. For the Baltic states, a battle-hardened ally such as Ukraine can be a substantial security and defense contributor to the region. If Russia were to test NATO’s defense capabilities on its eastern flank, the prospect of Ukraine joining the fight would dramatically expand Moscow’s theater of operations.

Latvia has a brief respite as Russian troops are worn down in Ukraine, but it will take little time for Russia to reconstitute its conventional forces. Latvia must use this window to create a more favorable defense environment. At home, it must rapidly build up its defense capacity and resilience. Abroad, it needs to assure a continued US commitment to its defense, generate a greater NATO forward presence on its soil, and deepen regional integration. It also needs to refine reinforcement mechanisms and maximize pre-positioning. Convincing allies to commit the necessary political will and resources before Russia regains its strength is the most critical security task facing Riga and its regional partners.

Armands Astukevičs is a researcher at the Centre for East European Policy Studies. His primary research focuses on the Baltic states’ defense and security, as well as the foreign and security policies of Russia and Belarus. Previously, he worked on policy analysis and planning at the Latvian Ministry of Defence, focusing on crisis management and comprehensive national defence issues.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served in several senior US government positions, including special assistant to the president for defense policy, principal deputy director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and director of the Institute for National Security Studies.

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Drone superpower: Ukrainian wartime innovation offers lessons for NATO

David Kirichenko — Tue, 13 May 2025 21:10:46 +0000

Ever since the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine eleven years ago, military training has been a core element of Western support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As Moscow’s invasion has escalated into the largest European war since World War II, the relationship between Ukraine and the country’s partners has become much more of a two-way street. While Ukrainian troops continue to train with Western instructors, it is now increasingly apparent that NATO also has a lot to learn from Ukraine.

The Ukrainian military has evolved dramatically during the past three years of full-scale war against Russia to become the largest and most effective fighting force in Europe. Innovation has played a key role in this process, with Ukraine relying on the country’s vibrant tech sector and traditionally strong defense industry to counter Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of both manpower and firepower. This has resulted in an army capable of developing and implementing the latest military technologies at speeds that are unmatched by any Western countries with their far more bureaucratic procurement cycles.

Ukraine’s innovative approach to defense is most immediately obvious in the country’s ability to produce and deploy a wide variety of drones. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the experience of the Ukrainian army has underlined the growing dominance of drones on the modern battlefield, and has redefined our understanding of drone warfare in ways that will shape military doctrines around the world for many years to come.

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The most important tools in Ukraine’s unmanned arsenal are the country’s growing fleet of First Person View (FPV) drones. These drones in many ways function as the infantry of drone warfare. They have become a central pillar of Ukraine’s war effort, inflicting up to 80 percent of Russian battlefield casualties and making it possible to hold the line even when Ukrainian troops have found themselves starved of artillery shells.

Ukrainian production of FPV drones has mushroomed in recent years, with domestic companies also gradually moving away from an initial reliance on imported components. By early 2025, Ukraine was reportedly producing 200,000 FPV drones per month. Cheap to manufacture, they are capable of destroying tanks and other military equipment worth millions of dollars.

Russia is also relentlessly adapting to technological changes on the battlefield, creating a daily race to innovate that runs in parallel to the actual fighting on the front lines of the war. The dominance of FPV drones has led to a variety of countermeasures, ranging from the widespread use of netting and so-called “cope cages,” to increasingly sophisticated electronic blocking and the jamming of signals. In response, both Russia and Ukraine are turning to fiber optic drones that are not susceptible to jamming technologies.

As the full-scale war approaches a fourth summer, the evolution of drone tactics continues. Over the past year, Ukraine has sought to establish a 15-kilometer kill zone patrolled by drones along the front lines of the conflict, making it extremely challenging to concentrate troops for major offensive operations. The strength of Ukraine’s so-called “drone wall” defenses will be severely tested in the coming few months by Russia’s ongoing offensive. Building on Ukraine’s experience, NATO is reportedly exploring the idea of creating a “drone wall” of its own on the alliance’s eastern flank.

Beyond the front lines, Ukraine has developed an expanding fleet of long-range drones capable of striking targets deep inside Russia. This has made it possible to carry out a wide range of attacks on Russian military bases, ammunition storage facilities, air defenses, and Putin’s economically vital but vulnerable oil and gas industry. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called the country’s growing long range capabilities “a clear and effective guarantee of Ukraine’s security.”

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Ukrainian drone innovations are also transforming naval warfare. During the first two years of the war, Ukraine used marine drones to target Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, sinking or damaging multiple warships and forcing the remainder to retreat from Russian-occupied Crimea. This remarkable success made it possible to lift the naval blockade on Ukrainian ports and reopen commercial maritime routes, providing Kyiv with a vital economic lifeline.

More recently, Ukraine has begun using naval drones as launch platforms for missiles and smaller unmanned systems. The results have been spectacular. In January 2025, missile-armed Ukrainian naval drones reportedly destroyed several Russian helicopters over the Black Sea. In another world first, Ukrainian officials announced in early May that they had shot down two Russian fighter jets using marine drones equipped with anti-aircraft missile systems.

Ukrainian military planners are now working on a range of unmanned ground systems as they look to take drone warfare to the next level. With support from the country’s government-backed defense tech cluster Brave1, work is underway to develop dozens of robotic models capable of performing a variety of combat and logistical tasks. In December 2024, Ukrainian forces claimed to have made history by conducting the world’s first fully unmanned assault on Russian positions using ground-based robotic systems and FPV drones.

Speaking in April 2025, Ukraine’s former commander in chief Valeriy Zaluzhniy underlined how his country’s use of new technologies was transforming the battlefield. “The Russian-Ukrainian War has completely changed the nature of warfare,” he commented. Zaluzhniy predicted that the wars of the future would be won by countries that focus their resources on the development of drones, electronic warfare, and artificial intelligence. “It is obvious that victory on the battlefield now depends entirely on the ability to outpace the enemy in technological development,” he noted.

Western leaders and military commanders are clearly taking note of the remarkable progress made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2022. Many are now incorporating Ukraine’s unique battlefield experience into their own programs, while NATO members including Britain and Denmark are reportedly already receiving training in drone warfare from Ukrainian military instructors. This is likely to be just the beginning, as more countries seek to benefit from Ukrainian expertise.

For many years, it has been customary to view Ukraine as being almost entirely dependent on Western aid and know-how for its survival. This was always an oversimplification; it is now hopelessly outdated. In reality, today’s Ukraine is a drone superpower with an innovative domestic defense industry that can provide its NATO allies with important lessons in the realities of twenty-first century warfare.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare aims to digitally transform the armed forces for success in future battlefields. Comprised of a distinguished group of subject-matter and industry commissioners, the Commission has developed a framework to enhance US and allied forces through emergent digital capabilities.

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Hinote and Parker in Breaking Defense on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare

Atlantic Council — Fri, 02 May 2025 16:00:00 +0000

original source

On May 2, Breaking Defense published an article by retired Lt Gen Clinton Hinote and Nathan Parker, Commissioners on Forward Defense‘s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, emphasizing the urgent need for the Department of Defense to prioritize agile, testable software development practices. Drawing on findings from the Commission’s final report, the authors argue that software is now a decisive element in military advantage and call for immediate cultural and institutional shifts within the Pentagon to meet this strategic imperative.

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To fund US military modernization, Congress needs to pass on-time annual defense budgets

Jongsun Kim — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 20:26:53 +0000

On April 7, US President Donald Trump and US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made clear their ambitions: a one-trillion-dollar budget by fiscal year (FY) 2026 to fund a modern, agile, and globally competitive military. This is an ambitious goal, but if current funding trends hold, that future is far from guaranteed. Despite ongoing threats and bold declarations from the White House and the Pentagon, defense modernization is being squeezed by flat budgets, rising personnel costs, and a Congress that for more than a quarter century has failed to deliver predictable, on-time annual appropriations, which are essential for sustained military investment.

Look at what happened as recently as last month. In early March, Congress passed the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, a stopgap measure that locks the Pentagon into last year’s funding levels with only a modest $6.1 billion—or 0.7 percent—increase in defense funding, bringing the total to $892.5 billion. However, after accounting for inflation and rising personnel costs, this amounts to a cut in real terms. The total also falls more than $2.5 billion short of the Biden administration’s earlier $895.2 billion request for FY 2025.

Trump and Hegseth have floated a one-trillion-dollar topline for FY 2026, with congressional Republicans backing projections that hit that mark by 2031. But projections alone won’t modernize the force. The longer Congress relies on continuing resolutions, the further the Pentagon is likely to drift from the trillion-dollar goal.

Talk big, fund small

The biggest casualty of flat budgets is modernization. Of the $6.1 billion increase under the FY 2025 continuing resolution, more than $5.6 billion is consumed by rising personnel costs—including a 4.5 percent military pay raise and a 10 percent bump for junior enlisted. While these expenses are core to sustaining force readiness and quality of life for junior enlisted military personnel, they leave scant room for investment in next-generation weapon systems, shipbuilding, and advanced technology—all of which are needed to counter and deter future global threats.

Moreover, modernization and procurement budgets took hits in the latest continuing resolution—down $7.1 billion and $4.6 billion, respectively, compared to FY 2024. This isn’t a future-proofing strategy. It’s triage. And it reinforces a hard truth: the Pentagon is being forced to choose between readiness now and capabilities tomorrow.

As a result of this approach by Congress, a chasm has emerged between what the Pentagon says it needs and what Congress has been able to fund. Even with increased flexibilities granted under this continuing resolution, including fewer restrictions on program-level spending, the Pentagon cannot modernize on cruise control without deliberate and sustained investment. Without real growth in the defense topline, any flexibility becomes a license to reshuffle limited dollars, not expand capabilities.

Strategic signals, budget headwinds

Additionally, the Trump administration’s early moves—deployments to the southern border and near the Panama Canal, counter-narcotics operations, and a reorientation of posture toward homeland defense and regional security initiatives—highlight a shift in defense priorities. But these actions are being underwritten by a budget that isn’t built for strategic transformation.

This spring, the Trump administration’s FY 2026 request is expected to better reflect the new administration’s priorities, since the current budget was mostly shaped by the previous administration and major changes take time to fully appear. One key area to watch is its proposed $50 billion reallocation plan, redirecting funds from “noncritical” areas toward defense programs such as nuclear modernization, missile defense, drone technology, autonomous weapons, and cybersecurity. The Trump administration likely considers these activities necessary to bolster border security and strengthen US military capabilities in response to perceived threats to the homeland.

Regardless of the merits of using defense dollars and personnel for homeland security efforts, without a significant increase in overall funding, the administration will face tough choices between delivering on these priorities and meeting modernization and readiness goals.

The path forward: Congress holds the key

None of this is sustainable without a timely and predictable appropriations process. Even after making tough trade-offs, the Department of Defense cannot sustain modernization, support military pay raises, and reinvigorate domestic policy initiatives without meaningful real-term growth in its overall budget topline.

While continuing resolutions offer short-term stability, they erode long-term planning and procurement. They lock in outdated funding priorities, stall new projects and procurement efforts before they begin, and limit the Defense Department’s capacity to invest in multi-year efforts that benefit from future financial predictability. When the Department of Defense has to begin the fiscal year without an annual appropriations bill in place, it can lead to training disruptions due to uncertainty over available resources, as well as deferred equipment and facility maintenance, which can cause backlogs and increase long-term costs. It can also cause delays in awarding new contracts, affecting industrial base stability and workforce planning. Continuing resolutions also lead to cost inefficiencies from operating under constrained funding and require higher costs to “catch up” later. These stopgap measures also risk a gradual degradation of military readiness from the inability to execute planned operations, training, and maintenance. Even omnibus bills, often seen as a compromise, fall short of the predictability and purchasing power that full-year appropriations—enacted before the start of a fiscal year—offer. Relying on omnibus bills creates uncertainty for long-term modernization efforts and reduces the Defense Department’s ability to plan, start contracts, and invest early in the fiscal year.

The Pentagon needs more than authority and increased flexibility—it needs actual dollars. Timely appropriations passed by Congress are essential to making that possible. Yet persistent delays have become the norm rather than the exception. Without consistent, meaningful, and sustained funding, modernization will remain an ambition rather than a battlefield reality. The one-trillion-dollar vision for the defense budget may serve short-term political goals, but absent decisive and urgent action by Congress, the numbers won’t add up.

One important step Congress can take each year is to pass the annual defense appropriations bill on time, fulfilling its constitutional duty to fund essential government programs and defense functions that serve the national interest. A timely and focused appropriations bill would restore predictability to the budget process and enhance the capacity of the defense industrial base. It would also give military leaders the certainty they need to plan, build, and make more effective long-term investments across administrations.

Congress holds the keys. The question is whether it has the political will to turn them.

Jongsun A. Kim is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former deputy comptroller for budget and appropriations affairs at the Department of Defense.

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The United States needs a victory plan for the Indo-Pacific

Brian Kerg — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 13:00:00 +0000

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The United States desperately needs to plan for a long war in the Indo-Pacific region.

A troubling gap exists between US industrial capacity and the production requirements to sustain and win a war with China. While such assessments generally focus on shipbuilding due to the maritime focus of conflict scenarios, the same disparity exists in military platforms across all domains of warfare, such as aircraft, armor, ground-based air defense systems, and others. Defense analysis on these myriad gaps is abundant, but most evaluations are piecemeal in nature, focusing only on a single platform or domain, rather than taking a holistic approach to the problem.

This disjointed assessment is compounded by the lack of a rigorous analysis of the wartime manpower requirements to operate new platforms. Producing the ships, aircraft, and fighting vehicles to sustain a war against China—which would almost certainly be protracted—isn’t enough. The platforms must also be manned and supported. A guided missile destroyer, for example, requires a crew of more than three hundred sailors. A single squadron of F-35B Joint Strike Fighters requires hundreds of maintainers, air controllers, fuelers, and other support personnel to remain operational. And while opening phases of a war with China would predominantly be an air and maritime fight involving ships, aircraft, and precision munitions, a long conflict fought for years would likely require nearly one hundred divisions of ground and amphibious forces from the US Army and Marine Corps.

Generating the personnel to man such a force would almost certainly require a draft—and getting the numbers right is itself a complex challenge that demands a delicate touch. The skill sets required for the force must be balanced against the domestic workforce’s nonmilitary needs. Skilled laborers and trained knowledge workers will be needed in abundance to sustain the production of a US war machine. In short, properly planning a national mobilization for a long war with China is a daunting task that has not yet been engaged in detail by the national security community. Developing even a “plan to plan” for mobilization can be overwhelming. Where should analysts start? Thankfully, history provides a road map.

Lessons forged in war

In the final months leading up to the United States’ involvement in World War II, senior US policymakers noted a similar disparity between military-industrial capacity and the requirements to mobilize the nation for a war with Germany. After identifying US objectives in such a war and the combat power of the enemy, planners calculated the number of US combat divisions required to fight and win. This, in turn, enabled estimates of matériel production and the skilled laborers needed for military manufacturing. Comparing this to existing, peacetime US industry, its labor force, and its draftable population, a program was written for scaling up production while executing a military draft. The result was the Victory Program, which forecasted the military forces, their missions, and matériel requirements the United States would need to defeat Germany with uncanny precision.

Quite simply, the United States needs a modern victory plan for a war against China in the Indo-Pacific. Like its predecessor, this plan must account for all requirements to win a protracted war and tap into all forms of power available to the United States. For this plan to serve as an effective deterrent, the plan and its rigor should be clearly communicated to key leaders within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While the scope of such a document would be wide and deep, the following considerations are essential.

Good strategy starts with clear objectives

With the WWII Victory Program, lead planners first took care to determine the nature of the problem they were trying to solve. This enabled the identification of a national policy objective, facilitating the development of an appropriate military strategy. It was only then that planners were postured to estimate the military forces needed to pursue that strategy and reach the determined objective. The Victory Program took as its core assumption that US policy, should it be pulled into the war, would be to eliminate totalitarianism from Europe and deny imperial Japan control of the western Pacific. All other planning flowed to support this core objective and anticipated US participation in a long, global conflict.

In planning for a long war with China, US planners must frame the problem appropriately. Too often, national security practitioners frame war-games and exercises as short, decisive conflicts focused primarily around Taiwan and in the “first island chain.” But wars between great powers are rarely short affairs and instead tend to expand horizontally while grinding on for years. The hot wars raging today in Ukraine and the Middle East bear testament to this brutal reality.

As such, a victory plan for a war against China demands framing the problem in terms of a global war, with several theaters and multiple adversaries, focused on destroying the military capabilities of the CCP and its cobelligerents wherever they may be encountered. The Victory Program was careful to consider the “potential enemies” of the United States in its calculations, and a modern victory plan must similarly consider horizontal escalation and simultaneous fights against forces from Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Sea power is essential—but not sufficient

The Victory Program was focused on building the army that the United States would need, and it consequently assessed the number and types of US Army divisions needed to fight per the plan’s strategy. This task was also scoped in terms of three key missions, described as hemispheric defense, defending outlying possessions, and overseas task forces. An Indo-Pacific victory plan would similarly need to identify the right forces for the right missions.

While defeating the CCP’s island-landing campaign against Taiwan will be one mission, hemispheric defense, regional air defense, theater sustainment, and other global missions will also inform US force structure. Premier naval and amphibious forces will certainly be required as more regionally focused war-games suggest, but the military will also need forces capable of achieving dominance in all domains and against other probable enemies of the United States.

At the same time, the types of forces and platforms needed will shift depending on the phase of the war, enemy action, and the level of support from allies and partners. For example, missile defense will see more demand so long as the enemy maintains robust long-range strike capabilities, but this may change if the enemy’s precision munitions begin to dwindle and its ability to replenish its magazines is denied. Similarly, naval forces might be the nation’s priority at the beginning of the war, but ground forces that can seize, hold, and defend terrain may become a greater requirement later in the war.

Achieving economic and industrial balance

Generating such forces doesn’t just happen. In preparation for World War II, a balance had to be sought to avoid undercutting the industrial and farming base to keep the nation in the fight and on its feet, while also conducting a draft of unprecedented scale to fill out the formations needed to win. Notably, the first round of this draft occurred well before the United States was itself involved in the hostilities raging in Europe and the Pacific.

Similarly, the formations required for an Indo-Pacific victory plan could only be filled by a large draft. Additionally, the warfighting platforms, munitions, and other matériel needed for a protracted struggle can only be produced by an informational and industrial base manned by a critical mass of skilled workers. This poses the risk that indiscriminate drafting could strip the work force of the skilled workers essential to matérial production.

Planners must identify the key industrial bases the government needs to mobilize and in turn determine which skilled workers should be retained to support these bases, to avoid impairing US war-making potential. Deliberate thought must be put into determining whether an individual is more valuable to the war effort with a rifle in hand or on the production line for munitions, ships, aircraft, and other essential matérial.

Open discourse as a deterrent

While such a planning effort is critical should a war occur, it offers its greatest deterrent value if the CCP is aware of its existence.

The gaps in US readiness for a protracted war are many, known, and widely discussed within US policy circles. While such open discourse is a key strength of the US system and enables more honest assessments of gaps and in turn a path for improvement, it could also exaggerate CCP assessments of its own capability and will vis-à-vis the United States. Put another way, the frequent and grim assessments by the United States of its warfighting shortfalls could feed into China’s own campaign of public opinion warfare, and inflate China’s confidence in its ability to win.

The deterrent effect of any capability or redline is muted if the adversary is ignorant of its existence. The rigor and utility of a new US victory plan for the Indo-Pacific region should not be a hand of cards held close to the vest, but laid out on the table to demonstrate US resolve and long-term commitment to such a struggle should it break out. In this way, the plan could help tip the scales of deterrence and prevent such a war from breaking out at all.

Writing the victory plan

The US national security establishment remains focused on planning for a short, sharp war with China conducted around Taiwan in the first island chain. But such a war between two great powers, like so many before, will almost certainly become a long war of attrition. In planning for such a conflict, the United States needs a new victory plan. In writing this, planners should look to the Victory Program of World War II as a model. This process began with problem framing at the global scale, enabled estimates of the forces needed to win, and maintained the industrial base and work force needed for matériel production. In following this process, the United States could develop a credible plan to win a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific region. And in strategically communicating this plan to China, the United States may prevent such a catastrophic war from occurring in the first place.

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Kerg is an active-duty US Marine Corps operational planner and a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also a 2025 nonresident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a 501(c)3 partnered with Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the positions or opinions of the US Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the US government.

Ukraine’s innovative army can help Europe defend itself against Russia

David Kirichenko — Thu, 24 Apr 2025 21:39:48 +0000

When Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he cited Ukraine’s “demilitarization” as one of his two key war aims. He has not yet succeeded in achieving this goal, to put it mildly. Rather than disarming Ukraine, Putin’s invasion has actually transformed the country into one of Europe’s most formidable military powers.

The emergence of the Ukrainian army as a serious international fighting force can be traced back to the beginning of Russia’s invasion in 2014. At the time, decades of neglect and corruption had left Ukraine virtually defenseless. With the country’s existence under threat, a program of military modernization was rapidly adopted. During the following years, the Ukrainian Armed Forces expanded dramatically and implemented a series of far-reaching reforms in line with NATO standards.

Following the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022, the transformation of the Ukrainian military entered a new phase. The number of men and women in uniform swelled to around one million, making the Ukrainian army by far the largest in Europe. They have been backed by a domestic defense industry that has grown by orders of magnitude over the past three years and now accounts for around 40 percent of Ukraine’s military needs.

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For today’s Ukraine, a strong domestic defense sector is now a matter of national survival. During the initial stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian authorities relied heavily on military aid from the country’s partners. This support helped enable Ukraine’s early victories but was also often subject to prolonged delays that left Kyiv vulnerable to changing political priorities in various Western capitals.

The need for greater military self-sufficiency has been underlined in recent months by the return of US President Donald Trump to the White House. The new US leader has made clear that he does not intend to maintain United States military support for Ukraine, and plans instead to downgrade the overall American commitment to European security. This shift in US policy has confirmed the wisdom of Ukraine’s earlier decision to prioritize the expansion of the country’s domestic defense industry.

Ukraine’s growing military capabilities owe much to a defense tech revolution that has been underway in the country since 2022. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, hundreds of Ukrainian companies have begun producing innovative new technologies for the military ranging from software to combat drones. By focusing on relatively simple and affordable defense tech solutions, Ukraine has been able to close the gap on Russia despite Moscow’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, and resources.

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More than three years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it is now clear that wartime necessity has transformed Ukraine into perhaps the most agile and experimental military ecosystem in the world. Whereas Western arms procurement cycles typically span several years, Ukraine can translate ideas into operational weapons within the space of just a few months. This has helped establish Ukraine as a global leader in drone warfare. The country’s use of inexpensive FPV drones is increasingly defining the modern battlefield and now accounts for approximately 80 percent of all Russian casualties.

Ukraine’s domestic drone production capacity is growing at a remarkable rate. According to the country’s Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Havryliuk, Ukrainian forces are currently receiving approximately 200,000 drones per month, a tenfold increase on the figure from just one year ago. Kyiv is also making rapid progress in the development of numerous other cutting edge military technologies including robotic systems, marine drones, and cruise missiles.

Ukraine’s dramatically expanded armed forces and groundbreaking defense tech sector make the country an indispensable partner for Europe. After decades of reliance on US security support, European leaders currently find themselves confronted with the new political realities of an isolationist United States and an expansionist Russia. In this uncertain environment, it makes good sense for Europe to upgrade its support for the Ukrainian army while deepening collaboration with Ukrainian defense tech companies.

European investment in the Ukrainian defense industry is already on the rise, both in terms of government donor funds and private sector investment. This trend looks set to intensify in the coming months as Ukrainians and their European partners increasingly acknowledge that their collective future security depends on closer cooperation. Russia’s invasion has forced Ukraine to become a major military power and a leading defense tech innovator. This status looks set to guarantee the country a position at the heart of Europe’s security architecture for many years to come.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

In July 2024, the Atlantic Council Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security published “Toward resilience: An action plan for Taiwan in the face of PRC aggression.” The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) followed with its “Strengthening Resilience in Taiwan” report in December 2024. These two reports provide an accurate assessment of the challenges of creating societal resilience and share policy recommendations for the Taiwan Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee. However, additional perspectives—especially across social, technological, and economic dimensions—can help expand Taiwan’s approach to societal resilience.

Preparing for crisis—without spreading fear

Organizing the necessary stakeholders around a shared framework with a clearly defined and understood vision was the easy part. However, as with all large bureaucracies, Taiwan’s resilience committee faces significant challenges in getting both the government and other actors to accept and implement difficult trade-offs. These trade-offs require people, departments, and various parts of Taiwanese society to give up money, power, or influence in order to achieve the necessary reforms and make them sustainable for the long term.

A key pitfall for Taiwan was failing to persuade its people, in plain language, why it needed to create the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee in the first place. Taiwan’s resilience ultimately hinges on the public understanding that the PRC can, and might, use its full suite of tools and capabilities against the island, should Xi Jinping conclude that a takeover is otherwise unattainable. The government needs to explain how everyday citizens can prepare in the event of that type of crisis. As demonstrated by Taiwan’s response to multiple natural disasters, its government is a global leader in terms of orienting local and national efforts to recover and quickly return to a pre-disaster state. However, the resilience committee has the challenging task of learning how to balance preparing Taiwan for manmade emergencies, such as a maritime blockade or military invasion, without unnecessarily creating a sense of panic.

This May, a television miniseries titled Zero Day is set to air in Taiwan, depicting a “fictional” scenario of a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invasion of the island. The entertainment industry has always been most effective in helping people visualize a possibility that resonates with them in a way that the most well-written and brilliant policy papers cannot. As the old saying goes, a picture is worth a thousand words; a more modern version could say a viral video is worth a thousand tweets and re-tweets. The Zero Day trailer has already increased awareness and captured people’s imaginations in a way that official government messaging efforts are unlikely to achieve. The goal is not for people to conclude there’s no point in resistance, but to spur action toward resilience efforts now.

Taiwan should capitalize on the moment and create communications channels for local and provincial townships, facilitated by a fireside chat-style format, to have a greater voice on what is effective and resonates. The national government must be prepared to provide tailored support across the five key areas, even when such support is redundant and expensive at first. It must create an environment for any local government to communicate, improve infrastructure, increase civil preparedness, and support its constituents across a range of emergencies and disasters. Some will use whole-of-society resilience as another means to get funding, but the reality is that there will be improvements that meet resilience goals. This will gain long-term support for resilience efforts if everyday people understand what could happen and see their feedback result in tangible benefits.

From technological edge to strategic advantage

On a recent Bloomberg Odd Lots podcast, Shyam Sankar, the chief technology officer (CTO) of US software giant Palantir, described what his company’s product is and what it delivers to customers. In plain, non-technical language, Sankar said the product is an artificial intelligence (AI) decision-making platform to inform better and faster decisions.

Few countries already possess the technology foundation and expertise to rapidly create and scale the types of advanced technology cited by Sankar. Whether Taiwan develops its own version of Palantir or adopts existing technology, the Taiwan resilience committee should consider taking the calculated risk of trusting AI-driven platforms. Doing so could significantly enhance its decision-making processes, thereby maximizing the efficient use of its limited people, assets, and resources in countering the full spectrum of China’s coercive tools.

It is difficult to truly replicate quality in-person training or support for social welfare and medical care. But imagine being able to wear a headset or set up another interface for increasingly sophisticated virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) systems to provide civilians, first responders, and military personnel with more effective training programs and with more realistic scenarios. These systems could also help people stay connected to the government during a crisis and provide immediate medical information in potentially demanding situations in which physical care might not be possible. VR and AR systems offer an additional benefit in their ability to connect anyone around the world and to leverage the latest training and information without the limitations of budget, policy, and travel restrictions.

Three-dimensional (3D) printing could be equally important in supporting Taiwan’s resilience efforts. The ability to print critical parts and components could alleviate the need for large storage locations, which must be maintained and can become easy targets for sabotage or kinetic attacks. Because Taiwan has a unique and harsh climate that makes food production and storage difficult even in normal conditions, it should consider developing food stockpiles that are resilient to humidity and heat and can sustain the population for longer periods. Other critical areas for advanced technology development are portable and modular water-purification systems, which could provide water security in the event that critical infrastructure is damaged or disrupted. Lastly, Taiwan is already making progress toward redundant and resilient off-island communications. Still, much more needs to be developed to survive sophisticated jamming of all communications.

How Taiwan’s tech giants could help deter China

Most economists and financial analysts would agree that the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is the flagship company driving the global technology sector. Building on this foundation, Taiwan should leverage its world-class strengths in manufacturing, supply chain management, and technological innovation to directly support the efforts of the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee.

The idea of commercial companies supporting governmental demands and requirements is not new. In the same podcast mentioned earlier, Sankar shared that well-known commercial US companies such as Chrysler and General Mills used to be dual-purpose companies that produced military hardware. Due to its expertise in production-line milling equipment, General Mills manufactured torpedoes. Sankar further noted that Chinese prime contractors today derive only 27 percent of their revenue from the PLA, with the remainder coming from commercial sales. To strengthen its resilience, the Taiwanese government should consider additional tax incentives and subsidies to encourage tech giants like Foxconn to manufacture advanced technologies—supporting both national security efforts and positioning these companies for dual commercial and government purposes.

On June 13, 2024, New York Times (NYT) columnist Ross Douthat interviewed Vice President J. D. Vance for an opinion piece titled “What J. D. Vance Believes.” In the interview, Vance referred to “the most important lesson of World War II, that we seem to have forgotten: that military power is downstream of industrial power. We are still, right now, the world’s military superpower, largely because of our industrial might from the ’80s and ’90s. But China is a more powerful country industrially than we are, which means they will have a more powerful military in 20 years.” Against this background, Taiwanese technology companies—working in concert with Korean and Japanese companies—could provide a trusted partner network for global supply chain demands and facilitate decoupling from China, especially for highly specialized components such as drone camera lenses, batteries, and control boards. Taiwan should aim to replicate the strategic dominance achieved by TSMC in semiconductors—this time by becoming indispensable for global supply chain demands. Such an effort would unlock the full potential of Taiwan’s economic power and directly contribute to the deterrence it hopes to achieve with its resilience and defense reforms.

A Herculean feat

Tsai and Lai should be commended for their whole-of-government efforts to bolster Taiwan’s societal resilience against the onslaught of Chinese coercion. Creating new government structures, managing internal power and budgetary struggles, balancing responsibilities across various branches of government, and navigating opposition politics is a Herculean feat—and those are only the domestic challenges. None of these efforts will be effective or sustainable if everyday Taiwanese citizens do not believe they are necessary or that the scenarios being prepared for are a real possibility. Adopting a bottom-up approach—not the preferred method in Asia—may be the key to building momentum for Taiwan’s resilience effort. Asking any government bureaucracy to trust advanced technology such as AI is a significant leap of faith, but the potential benefits of integrating these systems could give Taiwan the elusive asymmetric edge needed to deter and delay China’s party-driven decision-making. Lastly, Taiwan is extremely proud of its world-class technology industries that drive the global economy today—but that success was built on decades of government support. Now, Taiwan’s industries must help support their government’s resilience efforts by expanding beyond commercial purposes. They should evolve into dual-purpose companies, serving both civilian and defense needs, and become trusted partners in securing global supply chains, especially for the US defense and technology sector. A renewed focus on its people, advanced technology, and economic strategy could help Taiwan deter Chinese coercion—something that military and defense reforms alone have been unable to achieve.

About the author

Marvin J. Park is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is a national security professional with experience in national-level policymaking, intelligence matters, and military operations throughout the Asia Pacific, especially Taiwan, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Park served on the National Security Council as the director for Taiwan affairs from 2023 to 2024. He retired in 2025 as a US Navy captain with over twenty-five years of experience.

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Dispatch from Vilnius: A NATO ally in Russia’s shadow won’t let history repeat itself

James Hursch — Thu, 24 Apr 2025 15:54:38 +0000

VILNIUS—“Never again!” We heard these words often from Lithuanians of all ages on a recent one-week Atlantic Council study trip to Lithuania. We heard them from people early in their careers, military officers, and the most senior officials in the government, all of whom recounted stories of what living in the Soviet Union had been like for their parents or grandparents from the annexation of Lithuania at the end of World War II until independence was regained in the early 1990s. They were stories of imprisonment, torture, and exile to Siberia.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Lithuania, a small NATO ally of about three million people, has taken seriously the threat of a more aggressive and revanchist Moscow led by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Russian leader has called the dissolution of the Soviet Union one of the greatest tragedies of history and has dedicated his regime to reasserting Russia’s dominance in the former Soviet space.

Amid US calls for Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense, Lithuania has been investing in its military.

We visited the borders with both Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. At the former, Lithuanian border guards told us of many cases of so-called “hybrid warfare” by the oppressive Belarusian regime, including pushing South and Central Asian migrants across the border and using drones and balloons to smuggle cheap Belarusian cigarettes into Lithuania. In Kaliningrad, Russia has built a heavily militarized province. Looking across the border bridge, which is now only open to pedestrian traffic, we saw a dark and foreboding city very different from the modern and free Lithuanian side.

Amid US calls for Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense, Lithuania has been investing in its military. Vilnius will increase its defense spending to 5 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) in 2026, competing with Poland for the highest percentage of GDP spent on defense by a NATO country and far above the current level of US defense spending as a proportion of GDP.

In the past few years, Lithuania has spent billions of dollars on new weapons systems, including from the United States. It has also built modern infrastructure for its own forces, for a German brigade expected to deploy in the next few years, and for a relatively small US rotational force in the country. It has taken the lead in constructing a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal at the port city of Klaipėda that has allowed the Baltic states and new NATO ally Finland to end their dependence on Russian natural gas and import LNG from elsewhere. Last year, half of the gas imported at this terminal came from the United States. Lithuania has also provided more assistance for Ukraine’s fight for freedom than one might expect. On our trip to the far corners of the country, we saw many signs that Lithuanians support Ukraine’s own “never again” fight.

But Lithuania is a small country with a relatively flat landscape, which does not lend itself to fighting a potentially reconstituted Russian military in a few years. Lithuanians need a strong NATO to deter the threat and make it clear to Putin that the country is not low-hanging fruit, ripe for the Kremlin to pick off. Lithuanians welcome the Germans and others who are eager to help with deterrence, but they know that only the United States and a physical US presence in the country can truly deter Russia. The Lithuanians are trying to show they deserve that support.

When then NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg spoke to a joint session of Congress in 2019, he said that the point of NATO is that “it’s good to have friends.” It’s good for the United States as it faces the challenges of the twenty-first century, he explained, and it’s good for US allies. “We are stronger and safer when we stand together,” he said. Stoltenberg received a bipartisan standing ovation.

Six years later, the stakes are considerably higher, as Russia’s aggression has only become bolder. The United States is urging its friends to do more for themselves and strengthen their defenses. Lithuania, in its resolve to “never again” be dominated by Moscow, is seeking to do just that.

Note: The Atlantic Council delegation’s visit to Lithuania was sponsored by the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense.

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Axios on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Wed, 23 Apr 2025 16:00:00 +0000

On April 23, Colin Demarest of Axios published an article mentioning Forward Defense‘s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare report, highlighting how the report reflects growing pressure, both within and outside the Pentagon, to smartly adopt software. The piece suggests that Domino Data Lab’s recent $16.5 million dollar AI contract may be evidence that this pressure is beginning to yield results.

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National Defense reports on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Tue, 22 Apr 2025 20:00:00 +0000

On April 22, Joanna Ye of National Defense published an article highlighting the key recommendations from Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare report. Entitled “Reforming Pentagon Software Practices Key to Countering Threats, Report Finds,” the article emphasizes the Commission’s hope that, by adopting its recommendations, the Department of Defense can enhance its capabilities and preserve the United States’ strategic advantage.

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Putin is attempting to intimidate Merz with yet more Russian red lines

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 17 Apr 2025 21:58:03 +0000

As Germany’s next chancellor Friedrich Merz prepares to boost support for Ukraine, the Kremlin is already seeking to deter him with intimidation tactics. Merz’s response to Moscow’s threats will reveal much about his ability to lead Europe at a time when the continent is attempting to confront the challenging new geopolitical realities of an expansionist Russia and an isolationist United States.

When Merz takes up his post in the coming weeks, his first big foreign policy decision will be whether to provide Ukraine with long-range Taurus missiles. Current German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has consistently refused to do so, but Merz has indicated that he will be prepared to give the green light for deliveries. This would potentially enable Ukraine to launch precision strikes against targets deep inside Russia.

The Kremlin is clearly anxious to prevent this from happening. Speaking in Moscow on April 17, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova warned that any decision to supply Ukraine with Taurus missiles would have serious consequences for Berlin, and would be viewed by Russia as direct German involvement in the war.

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It is no surprise to see Russia engaged in yet more saber-rattling. After all, this approach has served the Kremlin well throughout the full-scale war in Ukraine. From the very first days of Russia’s invasion, Putin has attempted to exploit Western fears of escalation by threatening to retaliate if Kyiv’s partners dare to cross arbitrary red lines set by Moscow limiting the scale of international support for Ukraine.

Russia’s threats have proved remarkably effective. They have helped fuel prolonged debates in Western capitals over each and every aspect of military aid for Ukraine, and have made many of Kyiv’s partners reluctant to provide the kinds of weapons that could lead to a decisive Ukrainian victory. Indeed, while the Russian army has struggled to advance on the battlefield, Putin’s ability to intimidate the West has been arguably his most important achievement of the entire war.

This success is all the more remarkable given how many times Putin’s bluff has been called. He began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 by issuing thinly-veiled threats indicating that any Western attempts to interfere would be met by a nuclear response. When Western leaders ignored this and proceeded to arm Kyiv, Putin did nothing.

In September 2022, as he prepared to illegally annex four partially occupied regions of Ukraine, Putin famously announced his readiness to use nuclear weapons to defend his Ukrainian conquests. “I’m not bluffing,” he declared. When Ukraine completely disregarded this bluster and proceeded to liberate the strategically vital southern city of Kherson days later, Putin did not reach for his nuclear button. On the contrary, he ordered his defeated army to quietly retreat across the Dnipro river.

The Kremlin’s many bloodcurdling threats regarding the sanctity of Russian-occupied Crimea have proved similarly hollow. Since 2022, Moscow has sought to position the occupied Ukrainian peninsula as being beyond the boundaries of the current war. This has not prevented Ukraine from sinking or damaging around one-third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, which has traditionally been based in Crimea. Putin has responded to this very personal humiliation in typically understated fashion by withdrawing the rest of his warships to the safety of Russia.

Remarkably, Putin even failed to react when Ukraine crossed the reddest of all red lines and invaded Russia itself in August 2024. Rather than declaring World War III or attempting to rally his compatriots against the foreign invader, Putin actively sought to downplay the significance of Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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The Russian Foreign Ministry’s recent warnings regarding the potential delivery of German missiles to Ukraine are eerily similar to the empty threats made by Putin last September as the US weighed up the possibility of allowing Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes inside Russia using American weapons. At the time, Putin stated that any lifting of restrictions would mean that Russia was “at war” with NATO. However, when the US then duly granted Ukraine permission to begin attacking Russian targets, there was no discernible change in Putin’s stance.

Russia’s saber-rattling over Taurus missiles represents an important early test for Germany’s next leader. As Chancellor, Merz will inherit a major war on Europe’s eastern frontier that is now in its fourth year and could potentially expand further into the heart of the continent. He is also well aware that Europeans can no longer rely on US military support, as they have done for generations.

Germany is the obvious candidate to lead Europe’s rearmament, but Merz must first demonstrate that he has the political will to match his country’s undoubted industrial capabilities. US President Joe Biden consistently sought to avoid escalation with Russia, while his successor Donald Trump seems more interested in building bridges with Vladimir Putin than containing the Kremlin. If Merz wants to lead the Western resistance to Putin’s imperial agenda, he can begin by rejecting Russia’s threats and delivering Taurus missiles to Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The Ukrainian army is now Europe’s most credible security guarantee

Pavlo Verkhniatskyi — Thu, 17 Apr 2025 21:22:52 +0000

Ever since the first months of Russia’s full-scale invasion in spring 2022, Kyiv has played host to a steady stream of visiting European officials eager to demonstrate their support for Ukraine. With the war now in its fourth year, there are growing signs that this relationship is evolving and becoming more balanced. While Kyiv continues to rely on European aid, it is increasingly clear that Ukraine also has much to offer and can play a major part in the future security of Europe.

Following his return to the White House in January, US President Donald Trump has initiated a dramatic shift in United States foreign policy that has left many in Europe unsure of the transatlantic alliance and keen to ramp up their own defense capabilities. This geopolitical instability is also encouraging European policymakers to rethink Ukraine’s role in the defense of the continent. With unparalleled combat experience and proven ability to scale up arms production at relatively low cost, Ukraine is in many ways the ideal partner for European countries as they confront the twin challenges of an expansionist Russia and an isolationist US.

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Ukraine’s defense industry has grown at a remarkably rapid rate since 2022 and is now capable of meeting approximately 40 percent of the country’s military needs. The segment that has attracted the most international attention so far is drone production, with Ukraine widely recognized as a global leader in drone warfare. It requires a careful approach in order to identify the few true gems from among the hundreds of Ukrainian companies currently producing over a million of drones per year, but the potential for groundbreaking advances in drone technologies is obvious.

In order to make the most of this potential, Ukraine must first safeguard its survival as an independent nation. Looking ahead, a key challenge for the Ukrainian authorities will be creating the kind of business climate that can enable the country’s emerging defense industry to prosper in a postwar environment that is likely to feature declining defense budgets.

At present, many Ukrainian defense sector companies are moving production to locations outside Ukraine due to a combination of factors including export bans and a lack of financing options inside the country. The most elegant solution to this problem is to promote more defense sector partnerships with Ukraine’s European allies.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

During the first few years of Russia’s full-scale invasion, security cooperation between Ukraine and the country’s partners was generally a one-way street, with weapons and ammunition flowing to Kyiv. More recently, a new model has emerged involving Western countries funding production at Ukrainian defense companies. This approach is efficient and strategically sound. It boosts Ukraine militarily and economically, while also taking advantage of the country’s strengths as a cost-effective and innovative arms producer. However, it lacks long-term appeal for Ukraine’s partners.

Establishing joint ventures between Ukrainian and European defense companies may be a more attractive and sustainable format. This would be a financially attractive way of fueling Europe’s rearmament, and would allow participating companies to build on a wide range of potential research and development synergies. Setting up production facilities in wartime Ukraine would clearly involve an element of risk, but this need not necessarily be a deal breaker if sensible security measures are implemented.

The scope for such joint ventures is huge. Indeed, it would make good sense to invest in specialized business and science parks providing the full range of related services and industry expertise. Initially, jointly produced equipment could be fast-tracked to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Further down the line, output could also be exported to partner countries and global markets. The growth of joint ventures would significantly improve Ukraine’s defensive potential and enhance the country’s ability to shield Europe from the Russian threat.

An ambitious European rearmament plan is currently taking shape that could significantly accelerate the integration of Ukraine’s defense industry. For this to happen, a number of regulatory and operational issues must first be resolved in Kyiv, Brussels, and various European capitals. While Ukraine can undoubtedly make a meaningful contribution to European security, the continent’s political complexities are particularly pronounced when it comes to defense budgets and procurement policies. It will require a degree of pragmatism to dismantle bureaucratic hurdles and overcome narrow national interests.

As European leaders adapt to radical shifts in the geopolitical landscape, Kyiv is ideally positioned to help the continent address its most pressing security needs. Ukraine’s army is by far the largest in Europe and has unique experience of modern warfare. It is backed by a domestic arms industry that is growing at a phenomenal rate while benefiting from an innovative startup culture that is transforming the twenty-first century battlefield. With sufficient international funding and technological cooperation, the Ukrainian defense sector can serve as a cornerstone of Europe’s security architecture for decades to come.

Pavlo Verkhniatskyi is managing partner of COSA, co-founder of Fincord-Polytech Science Park, and advisor to the Defense Group at the Ukraine Facility Platform.

Defense Acquisition University on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 19:00:00 +0000

On April 11, Defense Acquisition University (DAU) published an article entitled “Finding the Way on Software-Defined Warfare,” highlighting the enterprise-level challenges identified in Forward Defense‘s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare report, along with the report’s nine key recommendations. The article also explores how DAU supports the Commission’s proposals, particularly by providing training programs to cultivate software talent and by providing entry points for the acquisition workforce to stay informed on emerging developments.

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Industrial integration for global defense resilience: Pathways for action

Abigail Rudolph, Steven Grundman — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 15:00:00 +0000

TO: The president of the United States and US policymakers

FROM: Abigail Rudolph and Steven Grundman

DATE: April 2025

SUBJECT: Industrial integration for global defense resilience: Pathways for action

In October 2024, the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program, in partnership with Beretta USA, convened defense industry representatives, government leaders, and subject-matter experts for a not-for-attribution workshop on implementing section 2.1.2.6 of the US National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS), “Engage Allies and Partners to Expand Global Defense Production and Increase Supply Chain Resilience.” The participants focused on the biggest barriers to achieving a more integrated defense-industrial ecosystem and wrestled with how the next administration in Washington could take fast action to overcome these obstacles. Informed by the deliberations of the workshop, this Atlantic Council Strategic Insights Memorandum identifies six priority actions the current administration can undertake to fulfill the ambitions of the NDIS in respect to section 2.1.2.6.

Introduction

The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have exposed significant vulnerabilities in the industrial capacity and capabilities of the United States and its allies. A lack of speed, scale, and resilience in industrial production hampers the ability to sustain operations in these campaigns. Addressing these challenges is integral to achieving deterrence in today’s volatile security environment. The NDIS aims to correct these shortcomings by fostering a more resilient and agile defense-industrial ecosystem. Central to that strategy is the imperative of better integrating the defense industries of the United States and its allies and partners. This memorandum captures deliberations on the workshop’s four objectives, including

identify the key features of industrial readiness and capability;
explore the promise of better integrating the industries of the United States with those of its allies and partners;
characterize the most pressing challenges to integrating these nations’ defense-industrial resources; and
specify a small number of actions the next administration in Washington can quickly undertake to gain leverage on these challenges.

Strategic context

The NDIS “calls for sustained collaboration and cooperation between the entire U.S. government, private industry, and our Allies and partners abroad . . . [I]nternational allies and partners, each with their own robust defense industries, will continue to be a cornerstone of the DoD’s concept of Integrated Deterrence.”¹ A modern defense industrial base (DIB) that can keep pace with today’s volatile security environment is essential for the United States to deter and, if necessary, prevail in great-power conflict. However, the defense-industrial resources of the United States and its allies are significantly smaller than they were at the end of the Cold War, which provided the impetus for a great reduction of industrial capacity and a consolidation of companies. As a result, today’s defense industry has adopted a peacetime operating tempo that is ill-equipped to support more dynamic and competitive international-security and military-operating environments.

The preponderance of the US defense industry is optimized to address its customers’ acquisition practices, which have prioritized the development and production of small numbers of exquisite systems rather than weapons delivered at the scale and pace that current conflicts compel governments to require. The transition from an industrial structure optimized for post-Cold War buying preferences to the new imperatives of the age of digital technologies and great-power competition will involve substantial and wide-ranging changes, both to how governments acquire weapons and how industry is organized to deliver them. To accomplish this goal, the NDIS prioritized enhanced international cooperation among the United States, its allies and partners, and their respective defense-industrial resources.

The success of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) in harnessing the weapons stockpiles and industrial arsenals of Kyiv’s partners suggests the great promise of integrating allies’ industrial capabilities. When Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States spearheaded the formation of the UDCG to manifest “the arsenal of Ukrainian democracy.”² Working together, the armaments directors of more than forty countries cooperating to support Ukraine have expanded global production of critical munitions; developed a common sustainment framework to enhance Ukraine’s capabilities in spares, maintenance, training, and industrial support; and facilitated partnerships with Ukrainian industry for co-production and co-sustainment activities. Although further efforts to strengthen and integrate the international defense-industrial base are needed, the UDCG offers valuable insights into what a major conflict requires from an industrial readiness standpoint.

Challenges

The work of better integrating US and allied defense-industrial capabilities faces a wide range of significant challenges, which the workshop bucketed into three categories.

Because defense-industrial resources are, sensibly enough, primarily organized by national priorities and prerogatives, they do not lend themselves easily to cross-border opportunities.
The business and regulatory systems for managing cross-border defense trade are inapt and inefficient.
Substantial deficits of talent and knowledge management impair the integration of different nations’ industrial resources.

The long tradition of governments organizing their defense-industrial resources with respect to the sovereign obligation of national security continues. While most Western companies, which occupy the advanced industries of the twenty-first century, operate by the global imperatives of commerce, defense companies do not. Instead, they operate primarily in response to the program plans and buying practices of their home markets, and export sales are regulated for compliance with foreign policy, national security, and national economic considerations. These considerations notwithstanding, billions of dollars of arms exports proceed. However, these same considerations confound integration upstream from the points of sale, largely foregoing the industrial efficiencies that would be afforded by co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment of systems between and among companies from more than one nation. This tradition operates at odds with national strategies, which, at their core, rely on coordination of defense policies and militaries among allies and partners.

Therefore, to fulfill these strategies, the business and regulatory systems that effect cross-border defense trade need to be optimized for integration. In practice, however, they are optimized to minimize risk in respect to the foreign policy, security, and political prerogatives of each national government. Most notably, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which regulates the export of defense goods and services from the United States, is unsuited to the aims of the NDIS with respect to integrating allies’ industrial capabilities. The export of arms needs to remain a discretionary instrument of US foreign and defense policy, but the administration of these controls too often fails to facilitate licenses that will better integrate industrial capabilities to effectively meet the needs of the warfighter and improve industrial integration efforts. For example, “buy America” preferences, which are expressed in law and regulation—and, more importantly, the culture of the Pentagon’s acquisition workforce—continue to impair integration.

Moreover, defense ministries and industries face vast knowledge and talent-management deficits, which impair cross-border industrial integration. In the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields most relevant to the defense industry, there is a significant gap between workforce needs and the availability of qualified professionals. This gap is compounded by high attrition rates in management, resulting in a breakdown of knowledge transfer from industry veterans to new arrivals.³The deficits within the US government are at least as great. Defense civil servants require better education in both market research and procurement strategies to effectively evaluate when allied or partner capabilities might offer advantages or simple complementarity compared with domestic performers.⁴ Until these gaps are filled, the transmission belt from policy prescriptions encouraging cross-border integration to practical action enacting these reforms will continue to fail.

These three challenges—the lack of a common economic market among allies and partners, the inapt regulation of cross-border trade, and the weak preparedness of those involved in procurement processes—framed the workshop’s discussions and provided impetus for the priorities this memorandum identifies. By tackling these key challenges, the United States and its allies and partners can enhance their collective defense efforts, align more effectively with strategic objectives, and ensure a more robust and integrated deterrence posture in an increasingly complex security environment.

Recommendations

Achieving the speed, scale, and resilience that the NDIS calls for will require a concerted effort of initiatives in Washington and coordination with the governments of its allies and partners. For a fast start toward achieving this ambition, the new administration should undertake the following actions.

Designate a focal point at the White House. The initiatives this office should lead include
1. reform of the Foreign Military Sales processes;
2. reauthorization of the Defense Production Act (see b) below); and
3. establishment of consultative bodies to formalize government-to-government coordination of industrial capabilities (see c) below).
Leverage the reauthorization of the Defense Production Act. Most provisions of the Defense Production Act (DPA) will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The need to reauthorize the DPA in 2025 presents a significant opportunity to leverage and expand its authorities to enhance international industrial cooperation. Congress and the new administration should consider provisions including
1. expanding the recipients of Title III financial assistance to companies in allied nations beyond the National Technology Industrial Base (e.g., the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia);
2. expanding the purposes of Title III financial assistance beyond end items to encompass critical infrastructure, industrial capacity, and training and education; and
3. giving standing and utility in Title I to the security of supply agreements between the United States and the more than two dozen governments that have committed to mutually assured security of supply for defense needs.⁵
Establish formal institutions to facilitate international industrial cooperation. Operationalize consultative bodies with European and Asian partners to facilitate the coordination of industrial capabilities among the United States and its allies.
1. In Europe, NATO presents itself as the obvious platform on which to build a consultative forum for coordination with that region’s allies and partners.
2. In Asia, the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) is the platform through which to coordinate with Asian partners.
Identify specific defense system needs to comprise an initial agenda of industrial capacity and capabilities that would benefit from international coordination and industrial integration. To focus attention while, at the same time, indicating the broad scope and application of such initiatives, we recommend choosing just three systems on which to focus this year—one system in development, another in production, and a sustainment program.
Establish career paths and educational curriculums for acquisition managers who focus on international cooperation and industrial integration.

Conclusion

Implementation of the NDIS is well under way, including with respect to Section 2.1.2.6. However, a clear sense remains of the high leverage provided to the overall strategy by integrating allies’ industrial capabilities, together with a focused agenda of executive office actions required to achieve that ambition. The purpose of this memorandum is to give a tailwind to the new administration’s attention to these opportunities.

About the authors

Staff

Abigail Rudolph

Assistant Director

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to the government officials, industry representatives, and think tank experts who lent their time and expertise to the workshop in support of this strategic insights memorandum. The Atlantic Council would like to thank its partner, Beretta USA, for supporting its work on this publication.

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2 Lloyd J. Austin III, “’The Commons Defence’: Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at the Reagan National Defense Forum,” US Department of Defense, December 7, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3989588/the-common-defence-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-at-the-re/.

1 “National Defense Industrial Strategy,” US Department of Defense, November 16, 2023, i, 24, https://www.dau.edu/sites/default/files/2024-02/2023%20NDIS_FINAL%20FOR%20PUBLICATION%201_0.pdf.

3 Brooke Weddle, et al., “The Talent Gap: The Value at Stake for Global Aerospace and Defense,” McKinsey & Company, July 17, 2024, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/aerospace-and-defense/our-insights/the-talent-gap-the-value-at-stake-for-global-aerospace-and-defense.

4 James Hasik, “Friend-Sourcing Military Procurement: Technology Acquisition as Security Cooperation,” Atlantic Council, June 11, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/friend-sourcing-military-procurement/.

5 James Hasik, “The Security of Defense Trade with Allies: Enhancing Contact, Contracts, and Control in Supply Chains,” Atlantic Council, July 28, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-security-of-defense-trade-with-allies/.

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Europeans are responding to Trump by rallying around the EU flag

Anna Wieslander and Louise Blomqvist — Tue, 08 Apr 2025 13:48:30 +0000

A subtle but powerful shift is taking place across Europe. Support for the European Union (EU) is surging, with the latest Eurobarometer survey, published on March 25, showing that 74 percent of citizens of EU member states believe their country has benefited from EU membership. This is the highest level of support for that belief since the question was first asked in 1983.

The “rally ‘round the flag” effect—a surge in public support for a government in times of international crisis—is a well-documented phenomenon in politics. In an increasingly unpredictable world, Europeans are now rallying around the EU flag in Brussels. This growing confidence in the EU as a political and economic actor matters—not just for Europeans, but also for Americans, who should recognize that Europeans have started to prepare for a world in which the United States is no longer a central part of the continent’s security.

The message from Europeans is clear: They still want allies. But at the same time, they are getting ready to stand on their own feet in an uncertain world.

Sweden offers a striking example. Historically, Sweden is a transatlantic-leaning country with deep cultural and political ties to the United States. And it has often maintained a cautious stance toward EU integration. Yet in this latest poll, 79 percent of Swedes say that EU membership has been good for the country. At the same time, a separate survey conducted the same month by Sweden’s largest newspaper, Dagens Nyheter, shows a dramatic shift in Swedish public opinion toward the United States. Only 10 percent of Swedes hold a positive view of the United States, down from 23 percent just two years ago. The shift correlates with US President Donald Trump’s return to office in January. A full 86 percent of Swedes express a negative opinion of him. This dislike is not just personal; Trump is seen as a symbol of a declining US commitment to democratic norms and multilateralism, which many Swedes value highly. A striking two-thirds of Swedes surveyed in the Dagens Nyheter poll say that the United States has lost its role as leader of the free world. This sentiment had already taken root before Trump’s April 2 announcement of major global tariffs, which included a 20 percent tariff on the EU.

Across Europe, 66 percent of respondents in the Eurobarometer poll say that the EU should play a stronger role in protecting citizens from global crises and security threats. Three out of four respondents want the EU to be equipped with more tools, financial or institutional, to tackle these challenges. That said, this surge in pro-EU sentiment is not uniform. In countries led by more Trump-friendly or Euroskeptic governments, such as Hungary and Slovakia, support for deeper EU integration remains more tempered. Yet even in these contexts, the broader shift is visible. In Hungary, where Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has long been critical of Brussels, an April 2024 Eurobarometer survey found that more than two thirds of Hungarians view EU membership as beneficial, marking an increase from previous years. In Slovakia, public frustration with Prime Minister Robert Fico’s pro-Russian stance has sparked mass demonstrations in the past few months, with tens of thousands protesting under the slogan “Slovakia is Europe” expressing their support for democratic values and closer ties to the EU and NATO. These developments suggest that even where political leadership leans Euroskeptic, citizens are increasingly looking to the EU to safeguard their security and sovereignty.

Europeans have started to prepare for a world in which the United States is no longer a central part of the continent’s security.

The EU has responded in unprecedented ways to the call from its citizens to step up on defense and security. In January, European Commissioner for Defense and Space Andrius Kubilius called for a “Big Bang” in European defense spending and policy changes to face the Russian threat. This was an uphill task, with frugal nations such as Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands opposing initiatives to take out loans and raise debt ceilings, while other nations refused to make commitments to increase defense spending.

But with the push provided by the Trump administration’s clear signaling in recent weeks that Europe will become less of a US security priority, Kubilius got his wish. The ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 program, presented by the European Commission on March 18, outlines a new era in European security. It should not be understood merely as a short-term reaction to the Trump administration, but a necessary response to a changing global order—one in which the United States pivots to the Indo-Pacific while Europeans can no longer fully rely on US protection to counter the existential threat posed by Russia. As Kubilius put it in a speech on March 20: “450 million Europeans should not ask 340 million Americans to defend us from 140 million Russians who can’t even defeat 38 million Ukrainians.”

The ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 program marks a historic shift in EU defense policy, mobilizing up to €800 billion through a mix of new and adapted financial instruments. What sets this initiative apart is not just its ambition but how the funding is being unlocked. For the first time, the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact has been loosened to allow member states to undertake defense-related borrowing beyond national debt limits via the escape clause. The initiative also launched a new €150 billion joint-borrowing mechanism, comparable in scale to the EU’s COVID-19 pandemic recovery fund, to support collective procurement and help ramp up the defense industry, including cooperation with Ukraine.

In another radical departure from past practice, the European Investment Bank, which was previously prohibited from military financing, can now fund defense industries. These steps would have been politically impossible just a short while ago. Even Sweden, which has long been resistant to debt-financed EU initiatives, and other traditionally frugal countries are now prepared to take on loans to fund defense modernization. For example, Germany’s recent €100 billion national rearmament plan reflects a sea change in Berlin’s approach to military spending. These developments underscore that Europe is not merely responding to US disengagement but is building real capacity to act.

The tendency for the EU to integrate during crises is not new. For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the pan-European procurement of vaccines and the first issuance of an EU eurobond. Still, it is remarkable that no EU government outright blocked the path toward greater defense integration, as far-right parties that are sympathetic to Trump hold power in Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and the Netherlands. To be sure, European unity on defense is neither unanimous nor uncontested. Some governments remain wary of surrendering sovereignty over defense policy, and debates over funding mechanisms and the scope of joint procurement highlight enduring divisions among member states. These reservations underscore that while the trend is significant, it remains fragile and a range of questions on the implementation of further defense integration remain unsolved. Even so, this is a moment the United States should watch closely. The renewed push for a European Defense Union is a strategic counterweight to the uncertainty coming from Washington. Rather than retreating into nationalism or disengagement, Europeans are choosing to strengthen the EU as a geopolitical actor.

Anna Wieslander, PhD, is director for Northern Europe and head of the Atlantic Council Northern Europe Office in Stockholm.

Louise Blomqvist is a project assistant at the Northern Europe Office.

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Gen Kevin P. Chilton, USAF (ret.), featured on the Mitchell Institute’s Commander panel

Atlantic Council — Wed, 02 Apr 2025 19:17:19 +0000

original source

On March 31, Forward Defense distinguished fellow Kevin P. Chilton was featured on the Mitchell Institute’s panel, “Setting the Nuclear Deterrence Record Straight: Commanders’ Perspectives.” On the panel, he joined former US Strategic Command commanders Gen. Robert Kehler, USAF (Ret.), and Adm. Charles A. Richard, USN (Ret.), to discuss the realities of nuclear deterrence today. Additionally, the Mitchell Institute highlighted two of Chilton’s policy papers, “On U.S. Nuclear Deterrence” and “Defending the Record on U.S. Nuclear Deterrence.”

Fellow

Kevin P. Chilton

Distinguished Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Cybersecurity Defense Industry

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Russian advance slows in March as Putin’s invasion loses momentum

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 01 Apr 2025 21:16:38 +0000

Russia’s Ukraine invasion continued to lose momentum in March 2025, with the Kremlin’s territorial gains reportedly falling for a fourth consecutive month. According to new data from the Institute for the Study of War, Russian forces captured 240 square kilometers of Ukrainian land throughout March, representing the smallest monthly total since the current wave of offensive operations began in summer 2024.

News of Russia’s slowing advance comes as Russian President Vladimir Putin claims that his invading army currently holds the “strategic initiative” along the entire front line of the war in Ukraine. “There are now reasons to believe we can finish off” the Ukrainian military, he told submarine crews last week during a visit to the north Russian port city of Murmansk.

While Putin predicts impending Russian victory, the evidence on the ground in Ukraine would seem to suggest otherwise. Far from being on the verge of crumbling, Ukraine’s defensive lines have strengthened significantly in recent months. As a result, advancing Russian forces continue to suffer heavy losses without achieving any meaningful breakthroughs.

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Ukrainian commanders are well aware that the recent lull in Russian battlefield gains may only be a temporary phenomenon as Putin’s army regroups following months of intense fighting. Officials and analysts in Kyiv are now warning that preparations are likely well underway for a major new Russian offensive that is expected to begin in the coming weeks and last until late in 2025.

Putin hopes this new campaign can help strengthen his position as negotiations intensify over a possible compromise settlement to end the war. Speaking last week in Paris, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused the Kremlin dictator of “dragging out talks and trying to get the United States stuck in endless and pointless discussions about fake conditions just to buy time and then try to grab more land.”

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Russia’s modest battlefield gains since the start of the current year provide important perspective at a time when international media coverage and Western commentaries often create the misleading impression that Ukraine’s position is hopeless. In reality, the Ukrainian army has stood up to the full might of the Russian military for more than three years and represents a formidable obstacle to Putin’s plans for the complete subjugation of the country.

Today’s Ukrainian army is by far the largest and most experienced force in Europe, and is backed by a rapidly expanding domestic defense industry that already accounts for around forty percent of Ukraine’s military needs. Since early 2022, Ukrainian troops have succeeded in liberating around half of all the territory occupied by Russia, and have won a string of famous victories in the Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions.

Over the past three years, Ukraine has also emerged as a technologically advanced drone warfare superpower. Ukrainian drone manufacturers now produce millions of drones each year and continue to innovate on a daily basis. This is having a huge impact on the battlefield, where drones now account for well over half of all Russian casualties.

At sea, marine drones have enabled Ukraine to sink or damage around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet. This has transformed the Battle of the Black Sea and forced the remainder of Russia’s warships to retreat from Crimea. Meanwhile, Ukrainian commanders are using the country’s expanding arsenal of long-range drones and domestically produced cruise missiles to bring Putin’s invasion home by striking military and energy industry infrastructure deep inside Russia.

The remarkable evolution of the Ukrainian Armed Forces since February 2022 should give pause to all those who insist that Ukraine “has no cards” to play in future negotiations. While Kyiv cannot realistically hope to match Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, funding, and industrial capacity, Ukraine is now a major military power in its own right and will not agree to any peace deal that leaves the continued existence of the country in doubt.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Adding to the problem is the slow feedback loop. It can take as long as 180 days to request and receive user feedback through formal exercises, or “touch points”—an eternity when it comes to the fast-paced, ever-changing landscape of military operations. Even after receiving feedback, the Project Management Offices often don’t prioritize updates or changes. They often seem to focus more on meeting cost and schedule metrics than on ensuring the system works well for its intended users. This leads to a software-development cycle in which changes and adjustments are often delayed, resulting in systems that miss the mark.

In response to these issues, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth further codified the value of the Software Acquisition Pathway (SWP) as the gold standard for software-intensive system procurement. While this may sound like a new initiative, organizations such as the Air Force’s Kessel Run have been championing this approach for more than three years. The SWP introduces a shift toward more agile and user-centered development practices. The pathway mandates regular engagement with the end-user community, emphasizes the integration of user metrics to gauge the system’s value, and ensures that the system aligns with mission needs.

However, despite its potential, the implementation of the SWP is still mired in bureaucracy, often stalling progress before it reaches the users who need it most, with only eighty-two out of more than two thousand programs currently leveraging the pathway.

To truly address the user experience challenge, Department of Defense programs should ingrain user-centered design practices into the culture of software acquisition and bring it into the development process from the very beginning. This requires a shift in how the Department of Defense develops software: Instead of making assumptions about what users need—or leveraging “user representatives,” who may not have the latest operational context—development processes should incorporate regular user interviews, ad hoc reviews, and feedback loops. Weekly user interviews and the ability to present mockups and prototypes allow developers to adjust features based on real-time feedback. It does not require a full two-week User Acceptance Testing or a full-scale exercise; rather, it takes a couple hours a week of a warfighter’s time to provide input to critical software. This is ultimately a more cost-effective and streamlined investment of time to make sure the “right” thing is built. This data-driven approach helps to ensure that the system evolves according to the needs of the end-users, rather than being locked into rigid design specifications that may no longer be relevant by the time the system is fielded.

One critical aspect of improving the software development process is the creation of balanced product teams and acquisition teams. When teams are aligned in their objectives and share a focus on the user, the development process becomes more streamlined, efficient, and effective. This alignment reduces the need for rework, saving time and resources, while also creating happier, more satisfied users, and ultimately increasing readiness and lethality. By ensuring that acquisition professionals understand the importance of delivering a product that works well for the end-user, the Pentagon can create systems that not only meet cost and schedule metrics but also provide real value to those who need them the most.

Iteration is key in any software development process, and the Department of Defense must embrace this reality. Agile practices—such as continuous testing, rapid prototyping, and user feedback—should be integrated at scale into the development lifecycle as often as possible. Instead, developers too often fall into what is called an “agile-scrum-fall” approach, in which the process may appear to be agile and may even have agile-like instances but is in fact largely sequential, rigid, and linear.

The more frequently software is updated and improved based on real-user input, the more likely it is to meet the mission requirements and provide the right tools for success. This process ensures that software is not a one-and-done development effort but an ongoing evolution that aligns with the dynamic nature of military operations.

Ultimately, the Department of Defense must make user experience a priority in its software-development efforts. Only by focusing on the real needs of the people who will use these systems every day can the US military build software that enhances mission readiness and improves the overall lethality of US forces.

As it moves forward, the Department of Defense should follow four principles to bring warfighter user experience to the forefront of its development efforts.

Implement continuous user engagement: Introduce regular, structured user interviews, prototype testing, and feedback loops throughout the development process. Investing in enterprise design software, such as Figma, enables the ability to quickly generate mock-ups and gain feedback without investing engineering hours in coding a solution. This ensures that user needs are consistently addressed and prioritized at every stage of development.

Reduce the bureaucratic bottleneck: Streamline the JCIDS requirements process to ensure that feedback from junior enlisted servicemembers and officers is taken into account early in the planning stages. This will help align system development with real-world operational needs.

Adopt agile and iterative development practices: Embrace continuous iteration, rapid prototyping, and real-time user feedback to ensure that software evolves to meet user needs and mission requirements over time. This will reduce the need for costly rework and improve the overall user experience.

Align product and acquisition teams: Ensure that product teams and acquisition teams are closely aligned, with a shared focus on delivering software that meets both mission requirements and user needs. This alignment will drive efficiency, reduce rework, and lead to happier, more satisfied end users.

Some may be tempted to view a focus on UX as a luxury at odds with the tough, make-do image the US military is famous for. But on the twenty-first-century battlefield, where tech is woven into all parts of fighting, nothing could be further from the truth. It can be the difference between life and death.

Hannah Hunt is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a distinguished technical fellow at MetroStar Systems. She was previously the chief of product at the Army Software Factory under Army Futures Command and chief of staff at the US Air Force’s Kessel Run.

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The EU just released a roadmap to defend Europe. Will member states follow it?

Petr Tůma — Tue, 01 Apr 2025 15:23:34 +0000

The US-led talks aiming to end the war in Ukraine and efforts by France and Britain to stand up a “reassurance force” to provide a security guarantee to Kyiv have dominated headlines in the past few weeks. So it would have been easy to overlook the March 19 publication of the European Commission’s Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030. But this White Paper bears attention, as it marks a significant milestone in the European Union’s (EU’s) ongoing efforts to strengthen its security.

In December, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen assigned Kaja Kallas, the EU’s top diplomat, and Andrius Kubilius, the first-ever commissioner for defense and space, to produce this document. The resulting text presents a roadmap for Europe to build up its defense capabilities in response to growing external security threats, including the possibility of Russian military aggression against EU territory. The White Paper also represents a direct reaction and message to the ongoing changes in Washington’s approach to European security under US President Donald Trump.

The White Paper adopts a five-year outlook, which is also the timeframe in which several European intelligence agencies have estimated Moscow would require to reconstitute its military capabilities such that it could conduct a large-scale attack on a NATO country. In the event of a cease-fire or peace agreement with Ukraine, Russia would almost certainly seek to accelerate its rearmament. Meanwhile, Europe faces uncertainty regarding the extent of continued US security assistance given Washington’s rapidly shifting foreign policy stances and priorities.

The White Paper calls for addressing critical capability gaps, fostering a competitive defense industry, strengthening military support for Ukraine, and securing relevant financial instruments and resources for defense. But whether the EU will be able to address these challenges in the five-year window the report outlines will depend on member states’ willingness to make the necessary financial commitments and their ability to navigate political divisions within the bloc.

Filling capability gaps

The document begins by diagnosing Europe’s severe defense shortcomings. It explicitly states that Europe is currently ill-equipped to respond adequately to contemporary security challenges.

Major capability gaps are identified in the following areas:

Air and missile defense
Artillery systems
Ammunition and missile production
Drones and counter-drone systems
Military mobility
Artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, cyber, and electronic warfare
Strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection

It’s a big list, and to close these gaps the White Paper advocates for deeper collaboration among European nations on defense projects of common interest. It builds on EU reports from 2024 by former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö on civilian and military preparedness and by former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi on competitiveness, both of which highlighted inefficiencies and excessive costs resulting from a lack of coordination within the European defense industry.

So, what does this mean in practice? The White Paper specifically recommends harnessing “European economies of scale” and collaborative procurement to reduce costs, shorten delivery times, make demand more predictable for producers, and enhance interoperability.

A major question going forward, however, is how the EU’s efforts fit in with NATO. Importantly, capability building is an area in which EU collaboration can benefit the Alliance. EU countries share a single set of capabilities. If these capabilities are primarily defined by NATO, then the twenty-three EU member states that are also part of the Alliance would contribute to fulfilling them, including through EU instruments. For example, one of the major capacity building areas is military mobility, which particularly important for the EU countries that provide NATO host-nation support.

Strengthening the defense industry

In addition to capability gaps, the White Paper addresses structural weaknesses within the European defense industry, pinpointing fragmentation and underinvestment as major obstacles to achieving credible deterrence. Three years into the war in Ukraine, Europe remains unable to produce sufficient weapons and ammunition quickly. To remedy this, the document proposes creating a common European defense market, aggregating demand to increase predictability.

Another main focus is ensuring supply-chain security and reducing external dependencies. The commitment to collaboration is further reinforced by plans to simplify regulations. The European Commission pledged to launch a strategic dialogue with the defense industry and introduce the Defence Omnibus Simplification Proposal by June 2025. This act is intended to simplify the legal and administrative framework for procurements and industry cooperation. Excessive regulation has been a long-standing obstacle in this field, and streamlining administrative processes is overdue.

Prioritizing Ukraine

The White Paper states that Ukraine remains on the front line of European security and enhancing the EU’s defense requires continued military support to Kyiv. The report outlines what it calls a “Porcupine Strategy,” which is aimed at deterring further Russian aggression by equipping Ukraine with the necessary capabilities. This is the strongest security guarantee that Europe can provide to Kyiv.

The document highlights the following defense priorities for enhancing Europe’s military support for Ukraine:

Provision of large-caliber artillery ammunition (with a target of two million rounds in 2025)
Deployment of air defense systems
Enhanced drone capabilities
Continued military training

Despite Kallas’s initial ambition for a twenty billion euro military support package in 2025, her initiative has reportedly faced resistance from several member states, resulting in a more limited focus on ammunition supplies. This highlights the potential limitations that will complicate efforts to implement the plans outlined in the White Paper.

The document also calls for supporting Ukraine’s defense industry through direct contracts and closer integration with the European defense sector, including joint ventures. This effort should be further outlined in the forthcoming European Defence Industry Plan, expected within the next few months. Close cooperation with Ukraine in this domain is in Europe’s interest, as the bloc will benefit from Kyiv’s wartime experience and innovations. Such defense industry collaboration could also indirectly strengthen Ukraine’s EU membership prospects.

Securing new financial sources

Perhaps the most transformative element of the White Paper concerns defense financing. It builds upon the ReArm Europe Plan, unveiled by von der Leyen in early March.

The financial framework includes:

Joint EU loans backed by the EU budget, branded as SAFE (Security and Action for Europe), with an initial ceiling of €150 billion
An “escape clause” from the Stability and Growth Pact, allowing member states to exclude up to 1.5 percent of defense spending from national debt assessments
Relaxation of existing EU funding rules, mobilization of private capital, and adjustments to European Investment Bank regulations

The overarching ambition is to generate up to €800 billion in defense funding.

Success will depend on how seriously member states approach the offer. Some may take advantage of the relaxation of the escape clause to finance projects that are only superficially linked to military objectives. There is also some uncertainty surrounding the SAFE instrument, which aims to increase member states’ investments in defense via loans. Some capitals may secure better interest rates in domestic markets than those offered by the EU. Others may prefer different cooperation frameworks. Fiscally cautious governments might even exclude loans as an option on principle. A true embarrassment for the EU would arise if a substantial number of capitals considering SAFE were to withdraw due to the instrument’s byzantine rules.

From paper to practice

Since the White Paper is a European Commission initiative, it does not require formal approval from member states. However, its implementation will hinge on their willingness to support concrete instruments that will be built on the White Paper’s findings.

The first high-level discussions will take place at the upcoming EU Defense Ministers’ meeting on April 2-3, followed by the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on April 14. The goal is to secure agreement on key measures—such as SAFE and the Defence Omnibus Simplification Proposal—by June’s EU leaders’ summit.

A white paper, not a silver bullet

EU financial tools and incentives—aiming to generate €800 billion—certainly have the potential to move things forward, but they are not a silver bullet. A comprehensive response to the defense and security challenges Europe faces requires a multipronged approach to funding, with a majority of resources coming from member states. This will require significant increases in member states’ defense spending, likely beyond the currently discussed figure of 3 percent of each country’s gross domestic product. The mobilization of private capital should also be considered as part of this mix.

The success of the White Paper’s recommendations will also depend on the unity of the EU. Hungary, which has repeatedly blocked proposals for further military support to Ukraine, will not be the only obstacle to consensus on these initiatives. Take, for example, the prolonged discussions surrounding the upcoming European Defence Industry Plan, with the question of non-EU country participation emerging as a significant stumbling block. If increasing obstacles put EU security at greater risk, then one could expect a growing willingness to move forward instead in a “coalition of the willing,” which would further diminish the Commission’s coordination and support work.

Five years—the period in which a potential Russian threat to the EU could materialize—is a brief timeframe for Europe’s rearmament. For the sake of the EU and, in the more immediate term, of Ukraine, Europeans need to move from identifying the problems to acting on them. The White Paper is a good beginning, indicating a positive change in the mindset of EU policymakers, but the bloc must now translate this spirit into swift implementation.

Petr Tůma is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a Czech career diplomat with expertise on Europe, the Middle East, and transatlantic relations. His views are his own.

The post The EU just released a roadmap to defend Europe. Will member states follow it? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Air & Space Forces Magazine on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Sat, 29 Mar 2025 03:30:00 +0000

On March 28, Air & Space Forces Magazine published an article by Shaun Waterman titled, “Experts: US Military Needs ‘Software Literate’ Workforce, Not Just Coders.” The piece highlights key recommendations from the final report of Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare and discussions from its public launch event on March 27.

The report emphasizes the need for a software-literate workforce—not coders, but individuals who can ask the right questions, understand software limitations, and interpret inputs and outputs. This workforce will be essential to truly adopting the Software Acquisition Pathway, which the report recommends modernizing and implementing to achieving both short-term and long-term success in the Pentagon.

The post Air & Space Forces Magazine on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Chiang, Esper, and Fox published in DefenseNews and C4ISRNET on software-defined warfare

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Mar 2025 16:00:00 +0000

On March 28, Mung Chiang, Mark Esper, and Christine Fox published an op-ed highlighting key ideas from the final report of Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. Entitled, “America’s arsenal of democracy needs a software renaissance,” the piece published in DefenseNews and C4ISRNET underscores the critical role of software in future conflicts, “the ability to collect, process and act on data faster than the adversary is critical in prevailing in future conflicts.”

The authors emphasize the Commission’s recommendations, including investing in artificial intelligence enablers, mandating the creation of enterprise data repositories, and shifting toward commercial software acquisition. They argue that by prioritizing data management and commercial software acquisition, the Department of Defense can achieve immediate improvements while laying the groundwork for long-term strategic success.

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ExecutiveGov reports on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Mar 2025 15:00:00 +0000

Original source

On March 28, Jane Edwards of ExecutiveGov published an article highlighting the key recommendations from the final report of Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. Entitled, “Atlantic Council Calls for DOD to Advance Software-Defined Warfare,” the piece discusses the Commission’s suggestions that advanced software capabilities could elevate the Pentagon’s efficiency, effectiveness, and capacity.