Conflict - Atlantic Council

Drone superpower Ukraine can teach Europe how to defend itself

Lesia Orobets — Fri, 30 Jan 2026 22:54:12 +0000

Ever since US President Donald Trump returned to the White House just over a year ago, it has become increasingly apparent that the world is now entering a new and unpredictable era of international relations. For Europe, this has meant coming to terms with the idea that continued US military support can no longer be taken for granted. After decades of outsourcing their security to the Americans, Europeans must once again learn to defend themselves.

Throughout the past twelve months, there has been much talk in European capitals of wake-up calls but relatively little actual action. While many European countries have vowed to dramatically increase defense spending, the debate over a new European security architecture still lacks a sense of urgency and remains hampered by competing national interests.

One of the few things that a majority of European policymakers appear to agree on is the importance of Ukraine in the continent’s emerging security strategy. This recognition of Ukraine’s role underlines the scale of the changes that have taken place over the past four years.

When Russia’s full-scale invasion first began in February 2022, Ukraine was heavily reliant on Western military aid as the country fought for survival. Since those early days, the Ukrainian army has expanded dramatically and evolved into the largest and most experienced fighting force in Europe. As a result of this transformation, a country that many had previously dismissed as a minor military player is now widely regarded as indispensable for the future defense of Europe.

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Ukraine’s potential to shape Europe’s new security architecture is most immediately obvious in the field of drone warfare. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is widely acknowledged as the world’s first full-scale drone war, with huge quantities of drones dominating the battlefield and operating deep inside enemy territory. Over the past four years, Ukraine has established itself as a “drone superpower” with an annual output of around four million drones, Bloomberg reported in November 2025.

Western security experts are no doubt acutely aware that alongside Ukraine, the two other nations currently driving the international development of drone warfare are Russia and China. This underlines Kyiv’s strategic importance as the democratic world adjusts to the challenges posed by an emerging alliance of authoritarian powers centered on Moscow and Beijing.

A growing number of US and EU defense companies have already sought to establish a presence in Ukraine in order to capitalize on the country’s technological expertize. This approach is understandable but may be shortsighted. In reality, Ukraine’s value extends far beyond access to existing military drone technologies.

Since 2022, Ukrainian drone developers and military units specializing in unmanned operations have learned to solve problems and adapt to new battlefield realities at lightning speed. Out of necessity, they have become accustomed to upgrading individual drone models and counter-drone systems within ever-decreasing innovation cycles that can now be measured in weeks.

Ukrainian forces have pioneered the use of combat drones on the front lines of the war. The country has also led the way at sea, with Ukrainian naval drones sinking multiple Russian warships and forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his remaining fleet from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russia itself. Meanwhile, long-range Ukrainian drones now routinely strike targets deep inside Russia. This Ukrainian success can serve as the foundation for a wider European security strategy as the world moves into a new era of drone-based warfare.

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Ukraine’s most immediate contribution to European security is likely to be in terms of helping countries defend against the mounting threat posed by Russian drones. The Kremlin’s current harassing activities around airports and other strategic sites across Europe are essentially an annoyance, but even such small-scale drone operations have exposed an alarming lack of readiness. At present, it seems safe to say that the continent as a whole is utterly unprepared for the kind of large-scale Russian drone attacks that have become a routine feature of the war in Ukraine.

Europe has responded to escalating Russian drone activity by developing plans to establish a “drone wall” along the continent’s exposed eastern flank. So far, however, this initiative remains somewhat fragmented with no unified concept or central coordination. While a collective response could eventually prove effective, pursuing this goal without learning from Ukraine’s unique experience makes little sense. Only Kyiv has the data and insights necessary to build layered defensive networks capable of combating waves of Russian drones.

In recent months, a growing number of European countries have taken the practical step of seeking to tap into Ukraine’s drone warfare prowess by working with Ukrainian trainers or establishing joint production initiatives. “Ukraine’s experience is the most relevant in Europe right now. Our specialists and technologies can become a key element of the future European drone wall, a large-scale project that will ensure safety in the skies,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy commented in September 2025.

In addition to drone tactics and technologies, Ukraine can also offer its European partners an unrivaled environment for drone operator training and weapons development. The whole of Ukraine is now a vast drone warfare laboratory where novel threats are identified and addressed on a daily basis. As a result, new drone models and upgraded designs can move from the drawing board to the battlefield at a pace that is unheard of in peacetime Europe.

Drone warfare is just one of the many areas where Europe can learn from Ukraine. As European leaders explore new security strategies in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment, it should be abundantly clear that Kyiv has a crucial role to play. No other European country has such a battle-hardened army or intimate knowledge of modern warfare. In an increasingly unpredictable world, that makes Ukraine a vital partner.

Lesia Orobets is the founder of the Price of Freedom air defense initiative and a former member of the Ukrainian parliament.

The primary US policy tool—and the more immediate deadline—is TPS, a bipartisan humanitarian protection program that allows migrants from countries deemed unsafe to live and work in the United States for a temporary but extendable period. Haiti was first designated for TPS just days after a catastrophic earthquake struck the country in January 2010, and it has since remained eligible amid worsening political and security crises. As of March 2025, 330,735 Haitian nationals living in the United States had TPS, according to US Citizenship and Immigration Services. The US-based diaspora sends billions of dollars home each year in remittances, an economic lifeline for Haitians facing economic deprivation.

Barring further extensions, which are not expected at this point, TPS for Haiti is set to expire on February 3. After that date, Haitians in the United States will need to have another lawful status to remain in the country or risk deportation, even though crisis conditions persist in Haiti.

. . . and so does the TPC’s mandate

Just days after TPS ends, Haiti faces an internal deadline that reveals another layer of dysfunction: governance.

This year marks the country’s fifth without a president, its tenth without holding presidential elections, and its third without a single democratically elected official in power. On February 7, the TPC—the nine-member interim body currently running the Haitian government—will reach the end of its mandate.

Since 2024, the TPC’s principal duty has been to create the conditions needed to hold free and fair elections by the time their term expired. Despite undertaking several notable efforts, the TPC stated that the country’s unfettered security situation rendered elections “materially impossible” by the February deadline. The first round of elections is now set for August 2026, though experts warn the timeline will be difficult to meet absent meaningful security gains.

As the clock winds down on the TPC’s mandate, some members have launched a last-ditch effort to remove the sitting prime minister, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé. Appointed by the TPC and viewed as Washington’s preferred pick to run the government after February 7, Fils-Aimé has become the target of members’ efforts to maintain influence beyond the transition window. In response, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Fils-Aimé to offer support and restricted the visas of multiple members of the TPC.

There is little consensus on what will replace the TPC when its term inevitably ends. Will there be a power vacuum, and if so, will gangs fill it? Fils-Aimé has ruled out negotiations with powerful gangs regarding Haiti’s political future. This lack of clarity risks undermining legitimacy and further weakening the state’s capacity to combat the security crisis.

Consequences of these looming deadlines

While the expiration of both TPS and Haiti’s interim government in the same week is coincidental, the possible consequences of each could exacerbate Haiti’s internal crisis and expand the risks it poses to regional security.

In this context, the Trump administration’s decision not to renew TPS for Haiti risks accelerating the country’s decline and backfiring by fueling additional migration. In the absence of a stable government in place to manage returns, large-scale deportations to an already fragile country—even though the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has deemed it “safe” enough for return—could deepen internal displacement and drive more irregular migration, including to the Dominican Republic and the United States.

Early signs of this strain are already visible on the ground. With Toussaint Louverture Airport in Port-au-Prince closed for more than a year due to gang violence, US deportation flights have arrived in Cap-Haitien, a comparatively stable northern city already strained by internal displacement and limited municipal services. Cap-Haitien is also home to Haiti’s vital textile sector, which the US Congress recently voted to continue supporting through reauthorization of the HOPE and HELP Acts. Any large-scale increase in deportations could further overwhelm local capacity, risking the destabilization of one of the country’s most stable regions.

And the repercussions of these deadlines would extend beyond increased migration. According to the Organized Crime Index, Haiti’s porous borders and weak enforcement mechanisms have enabled transnational criminal networks to thrive, engaging in drug and weapons smuggling that is likely to continue. As of May 2025, two Haitian gangs—the powerful Viv Ansanm coalition and the Gran Grif gang—have been designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the US government, underscoring the security threat that they pose.

What Washington can do

Haiti’s overlapping crises are multi-pronged and deeply rooted, and no single policy measure will remedy years of state collapse. Amid renewed discussions of the Monroe Doctrine, past US involvement in Haiti—from the 1915 occupation to later interventions in the 1990s and 2000s—can rightly be critiqued for contributing to the erosion of Haitian institutions. Despite these challenges, it remains in the United States’ best interest to help restore a measure of stability in Haiti.

Redesignating Haiti for TPS would help advance the administration’s broader goal of ensuring the Western Hemisphere “remains reasonably stable and well-governed enough” to prevent mass migration to US borders. Extending TPS would provide humanitarian protection and create economic opportunity for Haitians while also giving Haitian authorities time to rebuild governing capacity after the TPC’s mandate expires. However, the Trump administration is unlikely to pursue this option.

But the administration has options to improve state capacity beyond immigration policy.

One is the UN-authorized Gang Suppression Force (GSF), which has received US support in its aim to both suppress violence and pave the path for eventual elections. Although intended to improve previous models, critics warn that the GSF, which is expected to reach full strength by summer, is still unlikely to produce meaningful results.

The GSF illustrates a long-recurring pattern in Haiti policy, in which external actors construct parallel structures separate from Haitian institutions to address short-term challenges, only to leave little to no state capacity once funding or political support inevitably dissipates. Rather than repeating this pattern, a comprehensive vision for US-backed security policy should explicitly prioritize training and supporting Haitian forces—whether that be the Haitian National Police or a revitalized national military—so that security gains can endure long after international forces depart.

The same logic should guide US thinking on a democratic transition. While holding elections is politically necessary and could help re-establish the rule of law, conditions on the ground mean a vote is currently infeasible and could result in a worse outcome than the status quo.

To ensure elections are the result of stability rather than a substitute for it, the United States should prioritize institution-building approaches such as the Global Fragility Act (GFA), which was signed into law by US President Donald Trump in 2019 and implemented under the Biden administration. Although the GFA has since lapsed (and Haiti is no longer listed as a target country), a similar whole-of-government approach would align US diplomatic, security, and development tools around bolstering Haiti’s resilient civil society and the preliminary work done by the TPC. The framework for this involvement already provides a clear roadmap—now it is up to lawmakers and policymakers to follow it.

Critics of US involvement in Haiti often argue that the country is beyond repair. Yet, if the United States wants to send Haitian temporary residents home and build a more prosperous Western Hemisphere, it should support positive change rather than compound Haiti’s crises.

The United States may not be able to deliver immediate prosperity in Haiti, but promoting stability through coordinated action that strengthens Haitian state capacity is firmly in the US strategic interest.

The post Haiti’s week ahead is the next test for Trump’s Western Hemisphere focus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine changes tone on Belarus and engages exiled opposition

Hanna Liubakova — Thu, 29 Jan 2026 22:05:12 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held his first official meeting with exiled Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya last weekend during a visit to Vilnius. Their meeting was the latest indication of a significant policy shift underway in Ukraine toward the country’s northern neighbor that could have implications for the wider region.

For years, Zelenskyy had kept the Belarusian democratic opposition at arm’s length as part of Ukrainian efforts to avoid angering Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka and pushing him further toward the Kremlin. That approach has brought few benefits. Ukraine now appears to have recognized that a new strategy to bilateral relations may be more appropriate.

Sunday’s meeting did not come as a complete surprise. Days earlier in Davos, Zelenskyy had identified Belarus’s 2020 pro-democracy protests as a turning point for the region and a missed opportunity for Europe. The Ukrainian leader argued that the democratic world made a mistake by failing to support nationwide protests in Belarus. As a result, the country now poses a threat to all Europe and serves as a forward base for Russia’s hybrid war against the West.

During his recent visit to Lithuania, Zelenskyy addressed the Belarusian population directly and expressed his support for their European future. He also met with recently released Belarusian political prisoners and paid tribute to Belarusian volunteers serving alongside Ukrainian forces in the fight against Russia’s invasion.

Ukrainian officials have recently made clear that Lukashenka and his regime must be held accountable for complicity in Russia’s aggression. Meanwhile, in a further indication that Ukraine is moving toward more systemic engagement with the Belarusian democratic opposition, plans have emerged to potentially appoint a special envoy and host Tsikhanouskaya in Kyiv.

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Some analysts believe this recent change in tone toward Belarus may reflect the growing influence of former Ukrainian spymaster Kyrylo Budanov, who was recently appointed as President Zelenskyy’s new chief of staff. Budanov has long been involved in contacts with the Belarusian side and helped facilitate the transfer of released political prisoners to Ukraine in December 2025.

Kyiv’s apparent pivot may also reflect the fact that Russia’s military footprint in Belarus continues to grow. Ukrainian officials claim Russia uses Belarus to conduct drone attacks on Ukraine and evade air defenses. Lukashenka recently announced the deployment of nuclear-capable Russian Oreshnik missiles to Belarus, which Zelenskyy described as a threat to both Ukraine and the European Union.

Meanwhile, Russia’s integration of the Belarusian military industrial complex continues, with up to 80 percent of Belarusian enterprises reportedly now engaged in production for Russia’s military needs. Belarus is accused of supplying ammunition, providing repair services for Russian equipment, and channeling sanctioned technology to Russian defense companies.

Lukashenka is understandably eager to distance himself from any direct ties to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the available evidence indicates that his regime is becoming more deeply embedded in the Kremlin war effort. This is the reality confronting the Ukrainian authorities. As long as Belarus remains firmly under Kremlin control, it will continue to pose a serious security threat along Ukraine’s northern border.

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Europe should be paying particular attention to indications of a new Ukrainian approach to Belarus. As US foreign policy priorities shift, responsibility for managing relations between Belarus and the West will increasingly fall on the European Union. EU officials must decide between freezing the Belarus issue or recognizing the country as a strategic challenge that requires European leadership.

Belarus has most recently made headlines due to a series of prisoner releases tied to partial US sanctions relief. The humanitarian impact of these deals should not be underestimated, but it is also important to underline that more than one thousand Belarusian political prisoners remain incarcerated. Some skeptics have argued that without a broader strategy, reducing sanctions pressure on Minsk in exchange for prisoner releases risks strengthening the current regime and reinforcing an oppressive system that imprisons political opponents.

This presents opportunities for Europe to demonstrate its ability to take the lead on the international stage. While the US seeks practical short-term results such as the release of political prisoners, Europe can push for more systemic change and democratic transition in Belarus. In this context, sanctions should be seen as a tool to undermine authoritarian rule rather than locking in the current status quo. This can be achieved by closing existing loopholes while targeting the revenue streams and logistical networks that sustain the Lukashenka regime and support the Russian war machine.

In the current geopolitical climate, any talk of a neutral Belarus is delusional. Lukashenka will not turn away from his patrons in the Kremlin voluntarily. If European policymakers wish to see genuine change in Belarus, they will need to demonstrate a readiness to increase the pressure on Minsk. The enticing prospect of future European integration can play a crucial role in these efforts.

Belarus now occupies a strategic position in Europe’s rapidly shifting security landscape. The country remains deeply involved in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and also represents a key challenge for European leaders as they seek to prove that the continent is capable of defending itself in an era when US support can no longer be taken for granted. The Ukrainian authorities clearly feel the time is right for a more proactive approach to Belarus. The question now is whether Europe will follow suit.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The core question now is not whether the state should intervene, but how to design intervention that protects national interests without suffocating private initiative or driving away international investors. This means finding the middle ground between security and economic freedom. Democratic Ukraine must seek to strike a better balance than its authoritarian adversary in order to enable the kind of continued defense tech innovation necessary to prevail on the battlefield and increase deterrence.

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There are currently concerns that Ukraine’s fast‑growing defense tech sector risks inheriting longstanding governance problems including opaque procedures, slow decision‑making, and uneven enforcement. Recent corruption scandals in Kyiv have already damaged trust, creating what some businesses have described as “negative expectations.”

From the Ukrainian government’s side, there is recognition that institutions are still adapting, with many of the available economic security tools still fragmented or not yet fully operational. This represents an opportunity for Ukraine if the country is able to build governance structures tailored to strategic sectors rather than retrofitting existing and outdated bureaucratic models. Creating a new generation of transparent institutions to address defense sector exports, investment screening, and procurement could become a competitive advantage for Ukraine if designed with private sector input from the outset.

Export licensing is one of the most acute potential bottlenecks. Ukraine’s defense tech businesses currently face a process requiring excessive approvals from multiple institutions, with little accountability or predictability. There is also a perception of unequal treatment, undermining confidence in the system. Ukrainian officials, meanwhile, tend to stress the necessity of strict controls to prevent leakage of sensitive technologies.

A risk‑based and tiered export control regime could address these concerns. By clearly defining a narrow list of highly sensitive technologies requiring strict oversight, the Ukrainian authorities could create faster and more predictable export pathways for less sensitive defense and dual‑use products. This would support economic growth while preserving core security interests.

Wartime currency controls and capital movement restrictions severely limit the ability of Ukrainian defense sector companies to expand internationally. Multiple investors have noted the paradox of profitable Ukrainian firms being unable to deploy their own capital abroad, forcing them to raise funds outside the country simply to operate globally.

From the perspective of Ukrainian policymakers, currency restrictions are viewed as necessary to preserve macro‑financial stability and to prevent capital flight. Targeted exemptions for vetted defense and dual‑use companies, particularly those pursuing foreign acquisitions or joint ventures aligned with national priorities, could unlock growth without undermining financial stability. Such a mechanism would signal trust in compliant firms and reward transparency.

Another key issue is intellectual property (IP). Standard IP processes are too slow for wartime innovation cycles. In the dynamic current environment, Ukrainian companies rely on trade secrets and know‑how rather than formal patents, but this increases risks when partnering internationally.

Ukrainian officials acknowledge the importance of innovation but have so far only been able to offer limited concrete solutions. Accelerated IP pathways for defense and dual‑use technologies, combined with support for joint research and development frameworks with trusted foreign partners, could help Ukrainian firms secure protection in allied jurisdictions while strengthening international integration.

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There is a degree of uncertainty in Ukraine’s expanding defense tech sector that can be seen in inconsistent terminology, unclear boundaries, and undefined red lines. A shared vocabulary and published strategic framework, co‑developed by the public and private sectors, could help reduce this uncertainty.

Different priorities lead to diverging visions. Defense tech industry executives and investors tend to view the issue of economic security primarily through the lens of scalability, competitiveness, and speed. Their key assumptions include the notion that innovation thrives in predictable, transparent environments.

Many also argue that Ukraine’s combat‑tested technologies represent a unique global opportunity, while cautioning that excessive controls risk pushing talent, capital, and IP abroad. With this in mind, industry representatives and investors generally support targeted security measures but fear blanket restrictions that treat all technologies and companies as equally sensitive.

Ukrainian officials tend to frame economic security primarily as a defensive necessity. They warn that adversaries actively use markets, investment, and technology transfer as weapons. Many are also concerned that under‑regulation could result in irreversible strategic losses. Naturally, their perspective prioritizes caution, monitoring, and alignment with allied security frameworks, even at the cost of slower growth.

The central tension here is time-based and risk‑based. Businesses operate on market timelines and accept calculated risk, while governments operate on security timelines and seek to minimize worst‑case scenarios. Without structured dialogue, these differences manifest as mistrust rather than complementary roles.

If managed effectively, wartime Ukraine’s approach to economic security in the defense tech and dual-use sectors could become a model for the country’s broader postwar reconstruction. Ukraine has the opportunity to redesign institutions in a strategic sector that already commands global attention. Success may depend on whether government policy is seen by businesses as a partnership or as an obstacle.

Constructive cooperation grounded in transparency, risk‑based policy, and continuous dialogue can transform economic security from a constraint into a catalyst for Ukraine’s long‑term strength and sovereignty, providing significant security benefits for allies and partners along the way. This is a realistic objective. After all, industry, investors, and government all ultimately seek the common goal of a resilient, innovative Ukrainian economy integrated with democratic allies and protected from adversarial exploitation.

Bridging the gap between perspectives is less a matter of ideology than of process, trust, and execution. Ukraine is currently in a period of transition that is marked by many significant challenges but no irreconcilable obstacles. Industry and investors are ready to scale globally while the government is racing to build safeguards against unprecedented threats. The task now is to synchronize these efforts.

Eric K. Hontz is director of the Accountable Investment Practice Area at the Center for International Private Enterprise.

South Korea

The Philippines

Australia

Taiwan

The NDS’s emphasis on allies is reassuring for Japan, but questions over commitments remain

For Japan, the United States’ new NDS and its emphasis on working with Indo-Pacific allies to strengthen “collective defense” in the First Island Chain provided some assurance. But the NDS also further underlined long-standing questions about the Trump administration’s intentions and expectations toward allies.

To some extent, the NDS brought a sigh of relief in Japan, given that there were concerns about how the Trump administration’s focus on the Western Hemisphere and the administration’s arguably somewhat softer posture toward China in recent months would impact Washington’s defense efforts and regional partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. In this light, the NDS was reassuring, as it did not completely de-prioritize the Indo-Pacific region.

Still, some concerns remain. Above all, while the NDS suggests that the United States will deter full-scale aggression by China, much remains unknown about Washington’s posture toward the gray-zone situations that persist in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the NDS makes clear its demand that allies and partners “take on a greater share of the burden,” adding pressure on states like Japan to increase defense expenditures and take on a more proactive defense role. Combined with the United States’ strategic ambiguity toward China and North Korea, Japan remains concerned about when and how Washington will respond if a contingency were to erupt. Such ambiguities and gaps undermine progress toward enhancing strategic, operational, and tactical readiness of the bilateral alliance US-Japan alliance, as well as US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation and other vital frameworks in the Indo-Pacific region.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

The NDS’s call for collective defense of the region is thin on details

From Seoul’s vantage point, two phrases stood out most: “critical but limited support from U.S. forces” and “collective defense” along the First Island Chain.

If the premise is that Seoul—and other regional allies—assume primary responsibility in the conventional domain, a central question is whether (and how far) that logic could bleed into the nuclear backstop. This would mark, not a “shift” in declaratory terms, perhaps, but a perceptible change in the visibility, tempo, and scope of the United States’ provision of extended deterrence.

At the same time, while the latest NDS and National Security Strategy both prescribe building “collective defense” in the region, both documents are notably thin on how Washington intends to operationalize it. The NDS states that the United States will seek to “make it as easy as possible for allies and partners to take on a greater share of the burden of our collective defense, including through close collaboration on force and operational planning and working closely to bolster their forces’ readiness for key missions.” Yet it avoids specifying the connective tissue—South Korea–US–Japan trilateral cooperation, or other mini- or multilateral pathways—that could be the key means to implement the concept.

None of this, however, makes me doubt that the South Korea–US alliance will keep adapting; if anything, Seoul’s description in the NDS as a “model ally” reinforces that expectation. But precisely because adversaries look for seams, the United States and South Korea need tighter communication, coordination, and signaling—so that capability shifts or posture adjustments do not create deterrence vacuums or generate unnecessary provocation in the region.

—Bee Yun Jo, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and research fellow in the Security Strategy Division at the Sejong Institute.

Manila has a ‘pragmatic’ response to the NDS amid tensions with China

The reaction in Metro Manila to the Pentagon’s 2026 NDS has been largely pragmatic and firmly Philippine-focused. The softer language on China has not generated public backlash among government officials, politicians, and policymakers. This is largely because Philippine policy debates are driven less by Washington’s terminology than by concrete security conditions in the West Philippine Sea, domestic development imperatives, and existing military cooperation with the United States anchored by the National Defense Authorization Act.

At the same time, there has been a subtle recalibration among some Philippine policymakers toward a more pragmatic approach to economic engagement with China. This shift has been hinted at by the Philippines’ ambassador to the United States, Jose Manuel “Babe” Romualdez, who has argued that persistent geopolitical frictions should not preclude selective economic cooperation with China. This recalibration reflects growing concern that the Philippines is falling behind regional peers, particularly Vietnam, whose manufacturing sector has expanded rapidly through export-oriented growth and deeper integration into global supply chains. Economic underperformance has also become increasingly visible in tourism vis-à-vis neighboring countries, prompting policy responses aimed at stimulating demand. One such measure has been the introduction of fourteen-day visa-free entry for Chinese citizens, a move widely interpreted in Manila as economically motivated rather than geopolitical signaling.

However, this pragmatism has not translated into accommodation toward Beijing on sovereignty issues or political influence. This week, Philippine senators across party lines signed a resolution condemning what they describe as verbal attacks and intimidation by Chinese officials against Philippine institutions defending the West Philippine Sea. In addition, the publicly disclosed meeting between the Chinese ambassador to the Philippines and Davao City Mayor Sebastian “Baste” Duterte drew scrutiny in Manila political circles. The meeting’s timing coincided with heightened tensions in the West Philippine Sea, reinforcing concerns about political signaling and elite influence pathways, anxieties that have been shaped by China’s prior patterns of elite engagement across Southeast Asia.

—Alvin Camba is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Australia will welcome clear messaging on China and an emphasis on re-industrialization

On the surface, the 2026 NDS is a radical departure from its predecessors. Its bombastic rhetoric, political focus, and sharp tone make it an unconventional document and in key areas it represents significant policy shifts, particularly as it relates to European allies and the threat Russia presents. Moreover, while it repeatedly states that it is not isolationist in nature, the document also heavily emphasizes a refocus to its own region through the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Beneath the surface, however, there is also a lot of continuity, and for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific there is a lot in the document to be reassured by.

For Australia, the clear articulation of the threat China poses, the need to deter rather than confront, along with a clear message to China on what the United States considers an acceptable balance of power in the region will be encouraging, particularly as China has often exploited the strategic ambiguity of previous policy documents. However, the lack of any mention of Taiwan or how the United States will view a potential crisis there will create uncertainty and anxiety.

But the acknowledgment of the speed and scope of the threat China poses, and reassurances that the United States will continue to support efforts to stand up to it will be well received in Canberra. The need for increased burden sharing and re-prioritization of effort have reverberated throughout the national security community for over a decade and will come as no surprise to Australian policymakers. Moreover, the emphasis on re-industrialization is a trend already under way there, and the NDS’s language will be viewed as a seriousness of intent on the part of the United States. While the document is simplistic and short on details, its strength is the clarity of messaging and pragmatic views on the reality of regional and global threats. For those in Australia, that statement will be well received.

—John T. Watts is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served as a senior policy advisor to the US Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy and a staff officer at the Australian Department of Defence.

The NDS leaves unanswered questions about what a ‘decent’ US-China peace would mean for Taiwan

Taiwan is concerned about being left out of US defense perimeters and becoming seen as primarily an economic issue, rather than a security one, for Washington.

The clearest sign is that the 2026 NDS does not mention Taiwan by name at all. There is also the softening in NDS language concerning China. The 2018 NDS from Trump’s first term referred to China and Russia as “revisionist powers”; the 2026 NDS no longer does. This raises the question of whether China’s repeated claim that it will annex Taiwan, by force if necessary, is no longer considered an act of revisionism.

The NDS does talk about the importance of deterrence by denial and pledges to “make clear that any attempt at aggression against U.S. interests will fail.” But is defense of the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait still a US interest?

The answer is unclear. The NDS mentions five areas where the United States will prioritize the provision of “critical but limited support from U.S. forces,” and the Taiwan Strait is not one of them.

Furthermore, while it may be reassuring for some to read the NDS’s promise “to prevent anyone, including China, from being able to dominate us or our allies,” Taiwan is not a US ally.

The NDS does say that all nations should “recognize that their interests are best served through peace and restraint.” Is “restraint,” then, what the United States expects from Taiwan?

The NDS also calls for reaching a “decent peace” with China, stating later that such an accord “on terms favorable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under is possible.” This language brings back the long-standing specter of a US-China “grand bargain” over Taiwan. Especially since Beijing has long seen Taiwan as nonnegotiable and a core interest, Washington seeking to strike a deal on “terms that China can accept” is not generating much optimism inside Taiwan.

Yet with crisis comes opportunity. Taiwan’s strategy should be threefold. First, Taiwan needs to reassure domestic audiences that Taiwan is not mentioned in the NDS because strong US-Taiwan relations are now a given. Second, increase Taiwan’s defense spending to show that Taipei is not a security free-rider and is doing its fair share. To this end, Taiwan’s defense spending is set to reach 3.32 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2026, and Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te has pledged to reach 5 percent of GDP on defense spending before 2030. Third, Taiwan needs to contribute to the Trump administration’s reindustrialization agenda. Taiwan has made progress in this area as well. This month, Taiwanese companies committed to investing at least $250 billion in the United States, especially in the semiconductor and technology sectors.

Taken together, Taiwan is seeking to signal that it is an understanding, responsible, and helpful partner to the United States, one that is too valuable to let fall into Beijing’s hands.

—Wen-Ti Sung is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

The post What the Indo-Pacific thinks of the new US National Defense Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Unable to win on the battlefield, Putin escalates war on Ukrainian civilians

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 27 Jan 2026 22:05:41 +0000

Russian strikes against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure are nothing new, of course. On the contrary, such attacks have been a routine feature since the onset of the full-scale invasion nearly four years ago. However, the current bombing campaign is by far the most comprehensive of the war. In recent months, Russia’s attacks on civilian targets have expanded dramatically in scope as the Kremlin seeks to inflict maximum harm on Ukraine’s population by denying them access to heating, electricity, gas, and water during the coldest period of the winter season.

The impact has been devastating, particularly as most residential districts in Ukrainian cities continue to rely on Soviet-era central heating systems powered by huge plants that are almost impossible to defend. The Kremlin has ruthlessly exploited this weakness with repeated bombardments of the same facilities to disrupt repair efforts. While teams of Ukrainian engineers continue to work miracles, each successive attack makes their task more difficult.

Ukrainians have responded to plummeting temperatures and freezing apartments with a range of improvised solutions such as erecting tents indoors and heating bricks on gas stoves to generate some precious warmth. There has also been plenty of trademark Ukrainian wartime defiance on display, with local communities rallying in support of one another, posting lighthearted videos on social media, and holding street parties in the snow.

At the same time, many have expressed frustration over the continued media emphasis on Ukrainian resilience amid a mounting humanitarian crisis that has left much of the country in desperate need of help. “Resilience doesn’t mean immunity. Ukraine cannot withstand everything indefinitely,” wrote Ukrainian commentator Iryna Voichuk on January 16. “Framing this as only a story of strength risks dulling the urgency of what’s happening.”

Others have echoed this sentiment, including some of Ukraine’s most prominent international supporters. “Mythologizing endurance is a quiet form of abandonment. Resilience does not mean invulnerability,” cautioned R.T. Weatherman Foundation president Meaghan Mobbs in a recent post. “When we speak as if Ukrainians can simply ‘take it,’ we absolve ourselves of responsibility.”

With the present arctic weather conditions expected to continue well into February, the situation in Ukraine is critical. In the high-rise apartment blocks that dominate Ukraine’s cities, many less mobile residents have already been housebound for weeks and will likely remain trapped in frigid darkness throughout the coming month. The outlook is particularly grave for the elderly, those with young families, and people in need of medical care. In other words, Russia’s present bombing strategy appears to have been specifically tailored to target the most vulnerable members of Ukrainian society.

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As the potential for large-scale loss of life becomes increasingly apparent, international audiences are waking up to the true extent of Russia’s criminal intentions. Wall Street Journal chief foreign affairs correspondent Yaroslav Trofimov recently referred to Russia’s winter bombing campaign as “Putin’s genocidal effort to make Kyiv unlivable.” It is easy to see why such terms are now being employed. The 1948 UN Genocide Convention identifies “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,” as one of five recognized acts of genocide. At the very least, Russia’s current actions closely resemble this definition.

The current winter bombing campaign reflects a broader trend of mounting Russian attacks against Ukraine’s civilian population. According to UN data, 2025 was the deadliest year of the war for Ukrainian civilians since 2022, with more than 2,500 people killed and over twelve thousand injured. This was 31 percent higher than the figure for the previous year and 70 percent more than in 2023. Many of these deaths were due to a spike in Russian missile and drone strikes on civilian targets including residential buildings, hospitals, and a children’s playground.

Russia also stands accused of conducting a systematic campaign of drone strikes targeting members of the public in the front line regions of southern Ukraine. These attacks have been dubbed a “human safari” by terrified locals. They involve the use of drones with video camera guidance systems to hunt individual victims, underlining the deliberate nature of the killings. An October 2025 United Nations investigation into this drone terror found that Russia was guilty of “systematically coordinated actions designed to drive Ukrainians out of their homes,” and concluded that the Kremlin’s actions in southern Ukraine qualified as the crimes against humanity of murder and of forcible transfer of civilians.

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Putin is dramatically escalating attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population because he cannot win the war on the battlefield. When he first launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Putin was expecting a quick and complete victory. Instead, his army has become bogged down in a brutal war of attrition that will soon enter a fifth year.

Despite pouring vast resources into the invasion and placing his entire country on a war footing, the Kremlin dictator has been unable to secure a decisive breakthrough. Many in Moscow had hoped the return of Donald Trump to the White House would transform the military situation, but even a dramatic decline in US aid for Ukraine over the past year has failed to turn the tide in Russia’s favor. Putin’s army captured less than one percent of Ukrainian territory during 2025, while suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties. At the present glacial pace, it would take Russia decades and millions of men to fully subjugate Ukraine.

In his official statements, Putin continues to project confidence and boast of his invading army’s success. However, with so few genuine victories to toast, this has often meant inventing imaginary advances. Putin’s habit of exaggerating Russian gains came back to haunt him in late 2025 when he repeatedly claimed to have captured the Ukrainian city of Kupyansk, only for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to personally visit the city and record a selfie video exposing the Russian ruler’s lies. This embarrassing episode underlined the growing credibility gap between Putin’s bold talk of inevitable Russian victory and the far more sobering battlefield reality of minimal Russian gains and disastrous losses.

With no obvious route to military victory, Putin is now openly embracing a strategy of terror tactics against Ukraine’s civilian population. He hopes that by weaponizing winter and putting millions of lives at risk, he can finally break Ukrainian resistance and force Kyiv to capitulate. Europe has not witnessed criminality on such a grand and terrible scale since the days of Hitler and Stalin.

So far, the international response to Russia’s winter bombing campaign has been utterly inadequate. While many of Kyiv’s partners have rushed to provide humanitarian aid, no additional costs whatsoever have been imposed on the Kremlin. Instead, it is Ukraine and not Russia that is reportedly being asked to make concessions. Unless this changes, the normalization of Russian war crimes will continue and Putin’s sense of impunity will become even more deeply entrenched. It will then only be a matter of time before other civilian populations experience the horrors currently taking place in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

With every diplomatic initiative over the past thirty-three months failing to halt the violence, US President Donald Trump’s administration has recently focused more on Sudan. This month, a US-Saudi cease-fire initiative has been under review by the Security and Defence Council, a body that includes members of the SAF. Whether this initiative can move forward and help reverse the country’s descent into catastrophe remains to be seen.

Nonetheless, the Trump administration’s efforts to play a productive role in winding down the conflict will depend, in no small part, on how Washington chooses to engage—and with whom.

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Trump, MBS, and the personal diplomacy factor

The landmark visit by Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) to the White House in November helped direct Trump’s attention toward Sudan, which he described as the “most violent place on Earth” and the “single biggest humanitarian crisis.” As Trump acknowledged during his meeting with MBS, Sudan was “not on my charts to be involved in that,” adding that he viewed the conflict as “just something that was crazy and out of control.”

US President Donald Trump greets Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, during a dinner at the White House in Washington, DC, November 18, 2025. REUTERS/Tom Brenner

That MBS played a decisive role in bringing Sudan onto Trump’s radar underscores the depth of the US president’s personal ties with key Gulf leaders. In contrast to previous US administrations that relied heavily on institutional channels such as the State Department for Middle East engagement, Trump has consistently favored leader-to-leader relationships as the foundation of his administration’s foreign policy decision-making.

Challenges before the Quad

Trump is determined to work with the so-called Quad—the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—to bring Sudan’s war to an end. However, this effort will face stiff resistance from both belligerents: the SAF, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF, commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (popularly known as Hemedti).

Deputy head of Sudan’s sovereign council General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo speaks during a press conference at Rapid Support Forces headquarters in Khartoum, Sudan, February 19, 2023. REUTERS/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah

Each side remains unwilling to make painful compromises, instead pursuing maximalist objectives. Their intransigence will complicate efforts by Trump, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Special Envoy Massad Boulos to secure a cease-fire, deliver humanitarian assistance, and launch negotiations under the auspices of a civilian-led government in Khartoum. Within the Quad, however, each regional partner brings distinct priorities shaped by geography, security concerns, and geopolitical pressures.

Egypt has firmly backed the SAF, positioning itself as Burhan’s principal regional supporter while viewing the RSF as a destabilizing force and an immediate security threat. Cairo sees the SAF as possessing the legitimacy of a national institution and the capacity to restore stability. With a shared 793-mile border with Sudan and the arrival of at least 1.5 million Sudanese refugees since April 2023, Egypt has a strong interest in preventing further displacement. This imperative underscores Cairo’s desire to see the conflict end.

Earlier on in this conflict, Saudi Arabia took care to present itself as a relatively neutral mediator between the two sides, yet its posture tilted toward the SAF. Following Saudi Arabia’s reversal of Emirati gains in Yemen in late 2025 and early 2026, Riyadh has grown increasingly determined to leverage its enhanced regional credibility to counter Abu Dhabi’s influence in the Sudanese conflict through multiple channels.

Riyadh’s ambitious Vision 2030 agenda depends on stability along the Red Sea, where major investments, particularly in tourism, are underway. Prolonged fighting in Sudan, and the risk of its escalation into a broader regional crisis, therefore deeply concerns the Saudi leadership. In this context, Saudi officials view a state army such as the SAF as far preferable to a militia such as the RSF, which they regard as unpredictable, institutionally weak, and lacking legitimacy. Ultimately, Riyadh seeks a coherent authority in Sudan capable of effective governance and control over Red Sea ports, which is not a role that Saudi Arabia sees the RSF fulfilling.

The UAE has charted a markedly different course than Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Though Abu Dhabi officially denies it, United Nations experts, human rights organizations, and many media outlets have concluded that the UAE has been arming the RSF, bearing significant responsibility for Hemedti’s rise. However, Abu Dhabi sees the force as a vehicle for projecting Emirati influence in Sudan and, by extension, across parts of Africa. Dependent on external financing and logistics, the RSF has become deeply reliant on financial networks in the UAE, particularly in Dubai. This reliance has substantially expanded Abu Dhabi’s leverage in Sudan. It is notable how Ethiopia, which is under much Emirati influence, has aligned closely with Abu Dhabi in terms of backing the RSF.

Ideologically, the UAE casts Burhan and the SAF as Muslim Brotherhood-aligned, while perceiving the RSF as a dependable anti-Islamist force capable of shaping a post-conflict order consistent with Abu Dhabi’s campaign to marginalize Brotherhood-linked movements across the Arab world.

Emirati support for the RSF reflects a desire to safeguard Abu Dhabi’s interests and preserve the UAE’s autonomy of action in a volatile environment. This approach is occurring within a broader context of intensifying economic and political competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi across the Arab world and parts of Africa, amid heavy involvement by multiple regional and extra-regional actors.

Although Saudi Arabia followed the UAE in designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization back in 2014, Riyadh adopts a notably less rigid stance toward the Islamist movement than Abu Dhabi. Collaborating closely with Turkey and Qatar—both known for their Muslim Brotherhood–friendly foreign policies—on a host of regional issues, Saudi Arabia increasingly prioritizes regional stability and the prevention of state collapse in countries such as Sudan and Syria.

In practice, the Quad’s internal contradictions risk undermining its diplomatic effectiveness, while Washington’s engagement risks being somewhat empty and reactive unless the Trump administration develops a comprehensive strategy that applies sustained pressure on both Sudanese and external actors. Yet, given Trump’s close ties to Abu Dhabi’s leadership, there is reason to doubt whether the White House would press the UAE to curtail its support for the RSF. Despite such challenges, there are good reasons to believe that Trump will see it in Washington’s interests to become more involved in Sudan’s civil war, which brings us to Iran.

The Iranian factor in Sudan’s civil war

While Arab states dominate coverage of regional involvement in Sudan, Iran has also intervened in the civil war. Tehran has supplied the SAF with military support, chiefly Mohajer-6 drones, since late 2023. After the setbacks suffered by the “Axis of Resistance” in 2024, Iran’s foreign policy has increasingly focused on exerting influence near two strategic global chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab. Its leverage over the latter is reinforced by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, now the strongest faction in the Iran-led axis. Sudan, for its part, offers Tehran an opportunity to expand influence along the Red Sea through state-level engagement, rather than warfare via surrogates.

With Burhan dependent on external backing, the Sudanese civil war has given Iran a chance to reclaim influence in Khartoum. Iran lost that foothold in the 2010s when Saudi Arabia and the UAE drew Omar al-Bashir’s regime away from Tehran, culminating in Khartoum joining Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in severing diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic in early 2016.

In this context, the Trump administration is likely concerned that a prolonged conflict in Sudan could advance Iranian interests and undermine the White House’s “maximum pressure 2.0” campaign. Alongside Israel, the Trump team seeks to prevent Sudan from reverting to its former role as an Iran-friendly state along the Red Sea, at the strategic crossroads of the Arab and African worlds.

Navigating Sudan’s geopolitical crossroads

In sum, Sudan’s civil war illustrates how local conflict can become a crucible for regional rivalries. The Trump administration’s new focus on Sudan, spurred by MBS’s November visit to Washington, may place the United States at the center of a complex interplay among competing Arab ambitions, Iranian strategic calculations, and the entrenched divisions between Sudanese actors.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia favor the SAF as the guarantor of stability and state legitimacy, while the UAE’s support for the RSF reflects a broader strategy of influence projection and counterweighting Riyadh. Iran’s involvement further complicates the calculus, presenting both a challenge to the US-Israeli alliance’s desire to counter Iran’s influence near the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, and an opportunity for Tehran to regain lost ground in Khartoum.

Actors within Sudan’s rich, complicated, and layered civil society—from established organizations to grassroots resistance committees—have been delivering humanitarian aid, organizing communities, and articulating credible visions for a democratic transition. No sustainable peace process can succeed without the inclusion of these civil society groups, which retain local legitimacy and organizing capacity. As the White House seeks to restore peace, the Trump administration cannot afford to sideline these actors again, because ignoring Sudanese civil society would mean repeating strategies that have already proven ineffective and unstable.

Additionally, there is the African Union (AU), which has sought to serve as the central diplomatic convener on Sudan, advancing a roadmap focused on a cease-fire, civilian protection, humanitarian access, and a Sudanese-led political transition. Through the Peace and Security Council, coordination with the United Nations and regional bodies, and public condemnation of atrocities such as those in el-Fasher, the AU has worked to align international efforts around an African-led approach, even as its limited enforcement capacity has constrained outcomes. Nonetheless, the AU remains the only actor with continent-wide legitimacy, sustained engagement with Sudanese stakeholders, and an existing framework for coordination.

For US policymakers, the path forward demands more than reactive diplomacy. Sustained pressure on Sudanese factions and regional patrons, careful balancing of rival interests, and an emphasis on humanitarian relief and durable governance are all necessary. Ultimately, the outcome in Sudan will not only determine the future of its people, but also serve as a test of how effectively external powers can navigate the overlapping ambitions, alliances, and rivalries that define Sudan’s position in a complicated geopolitical order.

Giorgio Cafiero is the chief executive officer of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He is also an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.

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Trump may move on from Greenland. Europe won’t.

Jörn Fleck, James Batchik — Thu, 22 Jan 2026 23:23:14 +0000

WASHINGTON—Relief and exasperation may have been the initial reactions across European capitals as US President Donald Trump folded the cards on his Greenland gamble from Davos on Wednesday. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte excelled once again as the unrivaled Trump whisperer, helped by a combination of financial market jitters and an unexpectedly united Europe holding its ground. Rutte’s framework deal with Trump, however scarce the details, seemed to vindicate those arguing for Europe to “engage, not escalate” with the US president.

But a day after the news of the Arctic deal from the Alps, the mood among European policymakers is shifting away from mere relief. It was Trump who threatened to remember if he didn’t get his way on Greenland, but it is the Europeans who will remember this dispute even as Trump moves on. Few are celebrating the de-escalation because of how pointless and reckless they view this latest test of the Alliance’s credibility and cohesion. And because they know it’s likely only a temporary reprieve and hardly the last transatlantic crisis they can expect from this US administration. As a result, a quiet yet dogged determination is emerging to strengthen Europe’s ability to withstand US pressure in any future scenarios brought on by a US president who is seen as unpredictable, if not erratic. In a sign of the impression the last few days and weeks have left, European Union (EU) leaders still met at a special summit in Brussels on Thursday despite the immediate issue having been defused.

Trump’s speech in Davos made an impression on European decision makers. The US president appeared to be setting the terms for negotiations, forcing Europe to choose between acquiescing on his acquisition of Greenland and maintaining US support for NATO. While doing away with any potential military action, Trump outlined a nebulous rationale of US control of Greenland: No one else could supposedly defend it, and the United States needed it to protect against adversaries. He reminded Europeans of their dependencies on the United States from energy and trade to security and Ukraine. It all looked like an attempt to boost his leverage in any of these areas. But by the evening Davos time, Trump had struck a preliminary deal with Rutte.

Europeans will want to better understand the details of that agreement and what it means for Greenland, Denmark, and Europe. As long as military options and tariffs are off the table, Nuuk’s and Copenhagen’s sovereignty are respected, and the White House’s sharp rhetoric and threats subside, then NATO and EU capitals will hold back on their criticism for now. Some may even be going back to the pretense of transatlantic dialogue, cooperation, and partnership.

But beyond the diplomatic protocol and time bought, Trump’s ready willingness to engage in brinkmanship with the alliance, Europe’s economy, and personal relationships with key leaders will have a lasting impact. Trump’s approach toward Greenland has destroyed much of the domestic political space for those arguing that Europe has a weak hand and therefore few options but to engage, assuage, and accommodate Trump. That same argument, which led the EU to accept a lopsided trade deal with the United States this past summer in pursuit of “stability and predictability” in the relationship, has taken a major hit, even if few European leaders say this out loud for now.

There are clear lessons here for Europe. Over the past few days, European resolve had been building to stand tall and stay united. Markets took note of the potential costs of that cohesion, including retaliatory tariffs and a “Sell America” turn away from US assets. Europe fared better than many expected in raising the complexity for Trump in Greenland, including by swiftly deploying even just small numbers of troops to prepare joint exercises. Denmark proved resilient and built more effective rapport with Greenlanders over historically difficult relations and, together with Europe, it made important commitments to the territory and Arctic security.

Whatever time the de-escalation over this latest rift has bought Europe, it better use that reprieve effectively. It likely won’t be the last such episode under this president. Europe will have to swiftly translate the lessons from the past few weeks into building greater resilience and sovereignty, if not strategic autonomy. Efforts to strengthen defense capabilities, defense industrial capacity, and long-term support for Ukraine are well underway. But much like Europe’s initiatives at boosting its competitiveness, intensifying trade diversification, and deepening its capital markets, these efforts require greater speed, ambition, and follow-through.

Europeans will be well advised to do even more contingency planning on how to resist economic coercion, even from partners, and make unwieldy tools such as the Anti-Coercion Instrument more effective politically. Other areas to watch in the coming months are progress on new trade and critical raw materials deals or breakthroughs on long-standing initiatives such as the savings and investment union. Front and center for European decision makers’ thinking will be the problem described in Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Davos speech of a “rupture, not a transition” in the world order. Whether they can act on his remedies of “strength at home [and] diversifying abroad” remains to be seen.

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The future of Greenland and NATO after Trump’s Davos deal

Atlantic Council — Thu, 22 Jan 2026 00:51:42 +0000

GET UP TO SPEED

Today started with ice and ended with a thaw. Shortly after a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland—in which he made his case for why the United States should own the “big, beautiful piece of ice” that is Greenland—Donald Trump announced that he had reached a “framework of a future deal” on the issue. The breakthrough came after Trump met with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, and led to the US president dropping his tariff threats against European nations that had opposed the US acquisition of the semiautonomous Danish territory. According to Trump, the deal will concern potential US rights over Greenland’s minerals, as well as the island’s involvement in his administration’s proposed “Golden Dome” missile defense system. Below, our experts shed light on all the transatlantic tumult.

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Josh Lipsky (@joshualipsky): Chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council, senior director of the GeoEconomics Center, and former International Monetary Fund advisor
Matthew Kroenig (@MatthewKroenig): Vice president and senior director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Tressa Guenov: Director for programs and operations and senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and former US principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs
Jörn Fleck (@JornFleck): Senior director of the Europe Center and former European Parliament staffer

Tariff troubles

Now that Trump appears to have backed down from both his military and economic threats, “Europe is breathing a sigh of relief,” Josh reports from the World Economic Forum, but it’s one that “will be short-lived.”
Don’t expect Europe to jump back in to last year’s US-EU trade deal, which Brussels paused in recent days. European leaders “feel like they’ve been burned by the volatility, paid a political price at home, and want commitments that next weekend they don’t wake up to new tariff threats,” Josh tells us. “Businesses, many of which said as much privately to the Trump administration this week in Davos, want the same” sort of commitments.
“Markets had their say” as well, Josh writes, noting that fears of a US-EU trade war drove up bond yields in recent days. That’s “the exact kind of pressure point that made Trump relent” in April 2025 when he paused his “Liberation Day” tariffs. “With mortgage rates shooting up” in response to the volatility, says Josh, “Trump showed that he can be especially sensitive to the bond markets.”

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NATO’s next steps

“The idea that Trump would attack a NATO ally was always hard to imagine,” says Matt, who argues that “Trump’s threats were clearly part of his now-trademark style of building leverage to force a negotiation.”
Matt now expects a future deal to include “increased military presence in Greenland from Denmark and other NATO allies and increased access and basing for the United States.”
The “hard work” ahead for negotiators, he explains, will be “hammering out an agreement that addresses Trump’s legitimate security concerns while also respecting the sovereignty of NATO allies.”
Matt identifies several cases that could provide “creative solutions,” including “the United Kingdom’s ‘sovereign base area’ in Cyprus, the bishop of Urgell and the president of France’s ‘shared sovereignty’ over Andorra, and the United States’ possession of a perpetual lease in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”

The bigger picture

But even if a deal gets done, says Tressa, Trump’s pressure campaign against Europe over Greenland could have consequences for security issues that must be solved on both sides of the Atlantic: “A sustained atmosphere of crisis has the potential to detract from Trump’s own success in getting NATO countries to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense and, he hopes, buy American products.” She points out that “many of the countries that he threatened with tariffs are the ones who have stepped up defense spending the most.”
Jörn agrees on the lasting impact of “Trump’s willingness to engage in brinkmanship with the Alliance, Europe’s economy, and personal relationships with key leaders.” The approach “has destroyed much of the domestic political space in Europe for those arguing that Europe has a weak hand and therefore few options but to engage, assuage, and accommodate” the US president, “even if few European leaders will say this out loud for now.”
Still, while “Davos is sometimes criticized for a lot of talk but little action, this year no one can doubt the forum mattered,” Josh adds. “Having Trump meet in person with leaders—privately—is where the US-European alliance was, at least temporarily, put back on track.”

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Surrender or freeze: Putin’s winter blitz targets Ukrainian civilians

Yuliya Kazdobina — Tue, 20 Jan 2026 21:16:26 +0000

Millions of Ukrainians have spent much of January without electricity and heating amid subzero winter temperatures, sparking fears that the country is on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe. This desperate situation has been deliberately provoked by a sustained Russian bombing campaign against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, as Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin targets the civilian population in order to pressure Kyiv into capitulation.

Russia’s attacks have led to dramatically deteriorating living conditions across Ukraine. Thousands of high-rise apartment buildings in large cities as well as smaller rural homes have been cut off from power, heating, and water for days at a time. As a result, indoor temperatures have dropped to dangerous levels. For the elderly, those with young children, and people suffering from health issues, the risks are particularly grave.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has declared a state of emergency in the country’s energy sector, while other Ukrainian officials have appealed to partners for urgent support. While international aid has begun arriving, the sheer scale of the crisis means that much may depend on weather conditions in the coming weeks.

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Attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure have been a routine feature of the war ever since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. According to Ukrainian Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal, every single energy-generating facility in the country has been bombed. “There is not a single power plant in Ukraine that has not been hit by the enemy since the beginning of the war,” he commented last week. “Thousands of megawatts of generation capacity have been knocked out. Nobody else in the world has ever faced a challenge like this.”

Russia’s current aerial offensive began to escalate noticeably during the final months of 2025 ahead of the cold season. As temperatures plummeted in early January, there was a further intensification of attacks on Ukraine’s power and heating infrastructure, with large numbers of drones and missiles concentrated on specific cities to overwhelm air defenses. The timing of Russia’s bombing campaign leaves no room for reasonable doubt; this was a premeditated attempt to target the Ukrainian population by weaponizing the winter weather.

The Kremlin’s goal is easy enough to decipher. By making Ukrainian cities unlivable and threatening to freeze millions of civilians, Moscow aims to break Ukraine’s resistance and force the Kyiv authorities to accept peace on Russian terms. In other words, the present bombing offensive is Putin’s response to US President Donald Trump’s peace efforts. Rather than agree to a ceasefire or offer concessions, Putin uses terror as a negotiating tool to secure Ukraine’s surrender.

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The targeting of Ukrainian civilians is not limited to attacks on critical infrastructure. According to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, 2025 was the deadliest year of the invasion for Ukrainian civilians since 2022. In a report released in early January, United Nations officials confirmed that more than 2500 Ukrainian civilians were killed in 2025. This was 31 percent higher than the figure for the previous year and 70 percent more than in 2023. A separate assessment by European governments reached similar conclusions and found that the scale of Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians increased whenever the Trump administration attempted to advance peace negotiations.

The rising civilian death toll in Ukraine is largely due to increased Russian bombing of Ukrainian cities. Moscow’s mounting air offensive owed much to a spike in domestic drone production, which has made it possible to launch hundreds of drones at Ukraine in a single night. Russia has also been accused of conducting a large-scale campaign of individual drone strikes against civilians in southern Ukraine that terrified locals have branded a “human safari.” UN investigators reported in October 2025 that Russia’s targeted drone strikes on civilians were a crime against humanity.

Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians have increased amid mounting frustration in Moscow over the slow pace of the invasion. Despite holding the battlefield initiative throughout 2025, Putin’s army failed to achieve any significant breakthroughs and gained less than one percent of Ukrainian territory while suffering heavy losses. With little immediate prospect of military success, Putin seems to have decided that his best chance of victory lies in terrorizing the civilian population.

So far, Russia’s terror tactics do not appear to be working. A nationwide poll conducted in mid-January by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that a majority of Ukrainians continue to reject the Kremlin’s territorial demands in eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, more than two-thirds of Ukrainians do not believe the present round of US-led negotiations will result in a lasting peace. Instead, most Ukrainians remain convinced that Russia aims to continue the war.

Today’s arctic conditions will eventually give way to milder weather, but the damage done to Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure in recent weeks will take months to repair. Nor is there any reason to believe that Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians will abate. On the contrary, the Kremlin is likely to escalate further in a bid to demoralize, destabilize, and depopulate the country. By seeking to freeze millions of Ukrainians, Putin has underlined his readiness to target civilians as he seeks to impose an imperialistic vision of peace through submission.

Yuliya Kazdobina is a senior fellow at the “Ukrainian Prism” nongovernmental analytical center.

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Ukraine’s arsenal of long-range weapons has evolved significantly since 2022. Over the past four years, the country has managed to develop a variety of strike drones with the capacity to reach targets located well over a thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Ukraine also now boasts an expanding selection of domestically produced cruise missiles. This enhanced long-range firepower has made it possible for Ukraine to conduct an escalating bombing campaign inside Russia that has already changed the geography of the war.

Since summer 2025, long-range Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory have reached record highs. Ukraine has struck dozens of military facilities and defense industry enterprises, while also paying special attention to the oil and gas infrastructure that fuels the Russian war economy. Ukraine has hit refineries, pipelines, oil rigs, ports, and a number of tankers belonging to the Kremlin’s so-called shadow fleet. These strikes have complicated the logistics of the invasion while contributing to a significant decline in Russia’s energy export revenues.

In addition to hampering the Kremlin war machine and causing economic damage, Ukraine’s mounting campaign of long-range strikes has also had a major psychological impact that is helping to bring home the reality of the war to the Russian public. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin has worked hard to shield ordinary Russians and contain the conflict within the borders of Ukraine. However, with air raid sirens becoming an increasingly routine feature of daily life in Russian towns and cities, the Putin regime is no longer able to control the narrative.

A recent survey conducted by Russia’s only remaining independent pollster, the Levada Center, has highlighted the impact Ukrainian strikes are having on Russian public sentiment. Asked to name the most notable event of the past year, 28 percent of respondents cited Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian cities and industrial facilities, making this the third most popular answer. Clearly, Ukraine’s long-range bombing campaign has succeeded in breaking through the Kremlin propaganda bubble and has made a strong impression on the Russian population.

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For Ukraine’s partners, the objective now should be to boost Ukraine’s long-range capabilities to the maximum in order to equip the country with the kind of strike power that can deter Russia. Numerous Western leaders have shied away from providing Kyiv with long-range missiles from their own arsenals due to escalation fears. The solution is simple: Western partners should focus their efforts on helping Ukraine produce sufficient quantities of drones and missiles domestically.

Ukrainian officials are well aware that the ability to hit targets across the Russian Federation may be their country’s most effective security guarantee against further Kremlin aggression. They are now appealing to Kyiv’s international partners for increased support as they seek to exploit the country’s considerable spare defense industry production capacity and crank up output.

“The modern arms race is not about nukes. It is about millions of cheap drones. Those who can scale up production quicker will secure peace,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha in late 2025. “This requires quick and sufficient funding for Ukraine’s defense industry, which is now the greatest source of defense innovation in the world. We can produce up to twenty million drones next year if we get sufficient funding.”

Throughout the past year of faltering US-led peace efforts, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that he has no intention of ending the invasion. As long as the war is being fought predominantly inside Ukraine, he is unlikely to change his position, regardless of Russian combat losses. However, if Ukrainian drone and missile strikes inside Russia continue to expand during 2026, the economic and social impact may become too serious to ignore. This could force Putin to abandon his stalling tactics and finally enter into genuine negotiations. It would also oblige him to think carefully before restarting his invasion in the years ahead.

Serhii Kuzan is chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). He formerly served as an adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (2022-2023) and as an advisor to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (2014).

At Davos, Trump’s 19th-century instincts will collide with 21st-century uncertainty

Frederick Kempe — Tue, 20 Jan 2026 05:00:00 +0000

It’s hard to imagine a more discordant way for Donald Trump to mark the first anniversary of his second inauguration than by attending the World Economic Forum’s annual gathering of global leaders in Davos. When he speaks in the Swiss Alps on Wednesday, the US president will be contesting—whether intentionally or not—the very notions of global common cause Davos was designed to advance.

Klaus Schwab founded the World Economic Forum in 1971, a decade after the Atlantic Council’s own birth, with a post-World War II premise that held until recently: that greater security cooperation, economic interdependence, institutional cooperation, and shared rules could prevent another global catastrophe and advance more lasting peace and prosperity in a manner that also served US interests.

Trump travels to Switzerland this week as perhaps the most forceful skeptic of that internationalist assumption ever to occupy the Oval Office. He set the stage on Saturday by threatening new 10 percent tariffs on European nations that stood in the way of his heightened efforts to acquire the Danish territory of Greenland.

Trump has pledged to slap those tariffs on NATO allies Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Finland on February 1. If those countries don’t yield, Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform, he will jack up the tariffs to 25 percent—presumably atop the tariffs he has already put on Europe—on June 1 “until such time as a Deal is reached for the Complete and Total purchase of Greenland.”

For their part, European leaders are considering a number of possible economic counterstrikes. The Financial Times reports that the European Union (EU) is considering €93 billion of new tariffs, while the French are reportedly pushing for the first-ever use of Brussels’s “Anti-Coercion Instrument.” Known as ACI, it is regarded as the nuclear option in that it could put limits on foreign direct investment, restrict US suppliers’ access to the EU market (excluding them from public tenders), and place export and import restrictions on goods and services.

That turns Davos, whose theme this year is “A Spirit of Dialogue,” into the epicenter of the worst transatlantic economic conflict in memory. European leaders hope they can still reach yet another deal with Trump. That said, one senior allied official told me it is hard to imagine common ground given Trump’s “absolutist” position that the only outcome he will accept is Greenland becoming US property. Another European official described Trump to me as an aberrational bully willing to risk eighty years of accumulated transatlantic trust to achieve territorial ambitions.

A nineteenth-century president in a twenty-first-century world

To better understand who they’re dealing with, a long-time friend of Trump’s suggested to me that European leaders should look less to the past eighty years and more to the time before the world wars. He calls Trump a nineteenth-century US president governing in a twenty-first-century world—a leader who combines the expansionism of US President James Polk, pushing to enlarge the United States’ territorial realm as part of a “Modern Manifest Destiny,” with the twenty-first-century nationalism of current counterparts like Russian President Vladimir Putin (whom the Kremlin claims has just been asked to join Trump’s Gaza peace board), China’s Xi Jinping, India’s Narendra Modi, and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

While it was journalist John L. O’Sullivan who coined the term “Manifest Destiny,” it was Polk who popularized and implemented the notion that the United States was divinely ordained to expand its realm and spread democracy, capitalism, and American values across the entire North American continent.

To refresh your history: Polk, the eleventh US president, presided over Texas’s formal entry into the United States on December 29, 1845, though President John Tyler and Congress had initiated the process before Polk took office. That helped trigger the Mexican-American war that resulted in Mexico’s ceding of the entire American southwest to the United States. After a negotiation fraught with the risk of war, Polk acquired the Oregon Territory from Great Britain in 1846, giving the United States land for the future states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, along with parts of Montana and Wyoming, while Britain kept Vancouver Island.

That history lesson won’t hearten the leaders of Denmark or its Europeans allies, who presumably believed the nineteenth century was, well, history. Polk’s era was an age not of global governance but of sovereign states, great power competition, mercantilism, and jealously guarded spheres of influence, followed by two world wars. Diplomacy was personal and transactional—just as Trump likes it. Leaders wielded commitments as conditional and trade as an instrument of power, as was the case this week when Trump upended trade deals he had negotiated with European states to open a new fight over Greenland.

What’s further capturing conversation in Davos is Trump’s military-judicial operation that brought Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro to New York to face criminal charges, part of a heightened focus on the Western Hemisphere through his “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine; his on-again, off-again threats to strike Iranian targets in response to Tehran’s killing of protesters; the US Department of Justice’s criminal investigation into Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell; and a series of domestic events that have made global headlines, most significantly the death of Renee Good in Minneapolis at the hands of an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent.

A world-historic figure—but in what sense?

Many in Trump’s electoral base charge that he’s paying far too much attention to global affairs at the expense of their own economic struggles. However, don’t expect Trump’s focus to shift—not even in a mid-term electoral year when the Republican hold on Congress is in doubt. Trump’s eye is on history, not congressional seats.

“The world, he thinks, is where a political figure makes his mark,” writes Wall Street Journal columnist Peggy Noonan. “He desires a big legacy, still wants to show Manhattan (not to be too reductive, but there’s still something in it) that the outer-borough kid you patronized became a world-historic figure.” If that’s true regarding Manhattan, it is even more so for Davos, given that it symbolizes for Trump the club of first-tier global business leaders to which he never previously belonged.

If Trump’s aim is to be a world-historic figure—and that’s increasingly beyond dispute early in his second term—then what’s most important to ask is: world-historic in what sense? For that reason alone, it will be worth listening closely to how Trump describes himself this week in Davos and comparing that to his previous three appearances.

In 2018, early in his first administration, he declared in Davos, “America first doesn’t mean America alone. When the United States grows, so does the world.” In 2020, ten months before his electoral defeat, he highlighted two trade deals he had just closed, one with China and the other with Mexico and Canada. “These agreements represent a new model of trade for the twenty-first century—agreements that are fair, reciprocal, and that prioritize the needs of workers and families.”

Then in 2025, three days after his second inauguration, he set a far feistier tone. Appearing remotely via video, Trump declared the beginning of “a golden age of America,” speaking of the most significant US election in 129 years, lambasting his predecessor President Joe Biden, and announcing a storm of executive orders to address a “calamity,” particularly regarding immigration, crime, and inflation. He said little about the tariffs that would follow. “They say that there’s a light shining all over the world since the election,” Trump told the Davos crowd.

The big question chasing Trump this week, as I asked earlier this year in this space, is: “What sticks?”

It’s still uncertain whether Trumpism will usher in a new and enduring ideology of some sort. US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt brought the world New Deal liberalism, an ideology that has remained until this day; US President Ronald Reagan ushered in an era of internationalist conservatism that won the Cold War alongside allies, and it still lingers. When American presidents break with the past and usher in new eras, those trends tend to stick.

Many argue that Trump’s emergence underscores and advances a new nationalist era, one of nineteenth-century tenets laced with twenty-first-century technologies and geographies, even though those who know him best say Trump is not a student of history himself.

If it’s a new nationalism that’s emerging, what brand of nationalism might that be? Autocratic or democratic? Isolationist or internationalist? Realist or imperialist? The range of possibilities is immense.

A new vocabulary

What has stuck over the past year—a shift that’s palpable in Davos—is the erosion of old certainties. Trump’s emphasis on tariffs, industrial policy, and economic security has redrawn global trade rules and attitudes. His skepticism about multilateral arrangements has forced allies and partners to question systems they’ve depended upon since World War II. Trump’s blunt focus on borders, energy dominance, and the Western Hemisphere has global partners rethinking their own concepts of geography and leverage.

Davos matters this week not in terms of whether Trump will convert his listeners to his worldview, but rather because the world has already begun to change around those gathering there. The Davos vocabulary of cooperation and convergence coexists now with the new language of fragmentation, national interest, and strategic autonomy.

When he appears at Davos this week, Trump arrives with the ambitions of a nineteenth-century president confronting leaders with a twentieth-century mindset inadequate to the uncertainties of a twenty-first-century world. At this inflection point, all three eras are colliding. There’s no settled script for what comes next.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Why Israel is responding to protests in Iran with caution

Danny Citrinowicz — Fri, 16 Jan 2026 22:17:27 +0000

JERUSALEM—Since the outbreak of mass protests in Iran, Israel’s public response has been unusually muted.

Cabinet ministers were instructed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to refrain from commenting on the unfolding events, while Netanyahu himself limited his remarks to a brief statement expressing support for the Iranian protesters.

At first glance, this restraint appears puzzling. Iran is facing its most serious internal unrest since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. For Netanyahu, who has long argued that the Iranian regime is inherently unstable and illegitimate, this moment would seem to bring his strategic vision closer to realization. Yet it is precisely this possibility that explains Israel’s caution.

Iranian protesters demonstrate against the regime in Tehran on January 10, 2026. (Social Media via ZUMA Press Wire)

Netanyahu understands that overt Israeli involvement in encouraging the protests would be counterproductive. Public Israeli support would hand Tehran a ready-made justification for violent repression, reinforce the regime’s narrative of foreign interference, and provide Iran with diplomatic pretext to act against Israel. More importantly, Israel has little real capacity to influence Iran’s internal balance of power. Symbolic gestures by Israel would carry high costs and minimal benefits.

There is also a broader strategic consideration. If regime change in Iran were to materialize, then it would almost certainly be driven by US actions and decisions, not Israeli ones. For years, Netanyahu has pressed Washington to confront Iran more forcefully. He is acutely aware that visible Israeli activism now could be perceived in the United States as an attempt to push the administration toward military action, echoing the controversies surrounding his past interventions in American domestic debates, most notably in the run-up to the Iraq War.

Another important factor behind Israel’s silence is the fear of premature escalation. Jerusalem is concerned about being drawn into a direct confrontation with Tehran before completing its own military and civilian preparations. In this context, Israel has reportedly conveyed calming messages to Iran, some via Russian intermediaries, signaling that it is not seeking an immediate confrontation. The objective is to reduce the risk of miscalculation that could lead Iran to conclude, mistakenly, that an Israeli strike is imminent.

Behind the scenes, however, Israel remains deeply engaged. It is maintaining close military and diplomatic coordination with the US administration and quietly preparing for scenarios in which US action against Iran could trigger Iranian retaliation, possibly against Israel itself. Such retaliation could, in turn, provide Israel with both the justification and the strategic opening for a broader campaign against Iran.

It is worth recalling that shortly before the unrest erupted, Netanyahu met with US President Donald Trump and sought a green light for military action against Iran, citing Tehran’s accelerated missile buildup. From Israel’s perspective, regime change would be the optimal outcome—one that could spare Jerusalem from another major conflict driven by Iran’s growing strategic capabilities, which Israel is unwilling to tolerate indefinitely.

Yet even if Netanyahu’s long-standing goal were achieved and the Iranian regime were fundamentally transformed, Israel could still find itself facing a more complex and potentially dangerous reality.

One possibility is that Trump might seek to capitalize on the regime’s weakness by pursuing a new nuclear agreement with Tehran. Even if such a deal were to include significant Iranian concessions—such as limits on enrichment—Israel would likely oppose it, arguing that it would stabilize and legitimize the existing regime while constraining Israel’s ability to sustain international pressure on Iran.

Other scenarios are even more troubling. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could consolidate power, accelerate a dash toward a nuclear weapon, or preside over a fragmented state in which control over Iran’s strategic weapons becomes uncertain. There is no guarantee that moderate, pro-Western forces would emerge victorious from a period of instability.

In Israel, there is sometimes a romanticized vision of a return to pre-1979 relations with Iran, harking back to the era of the shah. In reality, the likelihood of such a scenario is extremely low. Some Israelis’ quiet support for Reza Pahlavi, the eldest son of the last shah, carries significant risks and may end in disappointment, given his limited domestic legitimacy and organizational capacity inside Iran.

Ultimately, Netanyahu appears closer than ever—at least in his own assessment—to seeing the collapse of the Iranian regime. This explains Israel’s current strategy: public silence combined with intense behind-the-scenes coordination with Washington. Yet, as in other strategic arenas, Israel lacks a coherent, well-developed plan for “the day after” in Iran beyond hopeful assumptions about regime change.

Absent such plans, perhaps it is best for Israel to focus on what it wants most to avoid. The most serious risk is that Israel could be drawn into a large-scale conflict under unfavorable conditions, at a time when the United States—focused primarily on protecting its own forces and regional assets, and increasingly focused on its own hemisphere—may have limited bandwidth or willingness to come to Israel’s aid.

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Ukraine’s enhanced fortifications are increasing the cost of Putin’s invasion

David Kirichenko — Thu, 15 Jan 2026 22:01:39 +0000

Russian forces continued to gradually advance in Ukraine during 2025, but suffered huge losses in exchange for minimal gains. This unfavorable ratio reflects the increasing effectiveness of Ukraine’s defensive lines, which now feature a combination of layered fortifications backed by deadly drone coverage. Together, these elements have turned much of the front line into a controlled kill zone that makes large-scale offensive operations extremely challenging while dramatically raising the cost of each new assault.

As Ukraine focuses on preventing further Russian advances and solidifying the front lines of the war, Kyiv has invested consideration resources in a major upgrade of the country’s defenses. This has resulted in what Britain’s The Economist recently described as a “massive fortification system” up to two hundred meters in depth covering much of the Ukrainian battlefield. “Ukraine now has the fortress belt it wishes it had in 2022,” the publication reported in early January.

Physical obstacles play an important role in this approach. Anti-tank ditches, razor wire, and concrete obstacles are layered to slow Russian advances. Defensive lines are often spaced within mortar range of one another, allowing Ukrainian units to trade space for time and counterattack against exposed enemy assault groups before they have had an opportunity to consolidate. The emphasis is on attrition and disruption rather than rigid territorial defense.

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Ukraine’s defensive strategy goes far beyond a reliance on traditional static barriers. Over the past year, there has also been a growing emphasis on dispersed, concealed, and flexible defensive networks. These small-scale fortified positions are often located underground or embedded in tree lines at strategic locations, and are supported by remote fires and decoys. Each individual node in these networks is designed to shape enemy movement rather than stop it outright, channeling attackers into deliberately prepared kill pockets without exposing defenders. By creating choke points for Russian troops, Ukraine aims to maximize Kremlin casualties and capitalize on its in-built advantages as the defending party in a war of attrition.

There are growing signs that this approach is working. Ukraine’s top military commander Oleksandr Syrskyi commented recently that the current strategy has proved particularly effective on the Pokrovsk front, which has witnessed some of the heaviest fighting of the entire war over the past year. According to Syrskyi, “timely and high-quality fortifications and engineering obstacles” enabled Ukrainian forces to inflict maximum losses on Russian units close to Pokrovsk and disrupt their plans, even when facing numerical superiority.

Where Ukrainian defenses have failed, the reasons are instructive. In areas such as Toretsk and parts of the Kharkiv front, troop rotations occurred without sufficient time or equipment to construct proper fortifications, leading to Russian gains. Constant Russian drone surveillance made the use of heavy engineering machinery dangerous, leaving units unprepared when assaults followed. These cases serve as confirmation that fortifications are not optional enhancements but foundational to battlefield survival under drone saturated conditions.

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Drones are at the heart of Ukraine’s defensive strategy, serving as a ubiquitous presence over kill zones and preventing localized Russian advances from consolidating into more substantial breakthroughs. Meanwhile, in some sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk, ground robotic systems are now being used to deliver the vast majority of supplies to troops. With this in mind, Ukrainian commanders argue that all future defensive lines should be optimized for both aerial and ground drones.

These technological advances do not eliminate the need for manpower. Even the most sophisticated fortifications require soldiers to react to emerging threats. When Russian units manage to infiltrate defensive lines or push into urban areas, infantry forces remain essential in order to clear and secure ground. While Ukraine’s improved fortifications are an encouraging development for the war-weary nation, no physical barrier can realistically stop Russia unless it is supported by sufficient quantities of well-trained troops.

Strengthening Ukraine’s fortifications and addressing manpower shortages will be among the top priorities for incoming Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, who took up his post this week. Fedorov made his name in government as Minister of Digital Transformation. Since 2022, he has been one of the driving forces behind Ukraine’s rapidly expanding drone warfare capabilities.

Fedorov’s extensive defense tech background, along with his reputation as a modernizer who has countered institutional corruption through the digitalization of state services, has led to considerable optimism over his appointment. He is now faced with the twin challenges of improving Ukraine’s front line defenses while addressing the mobilization and desertion problems hindering the Ukrainian war effort. If he is able to make progress on these two fronts, Ukraine’s prospects for 2026 and beyond will begin to look a lot better.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

When conditions allow for free and fair Ukrainian elections to take place, a key issue will be the inclusion of those who are currently defending the country. According to a preliminary forecast by the Ministry of Veterans Affairs, after the war ends, the number of war veterans and their family members will reach five to six million people, or one in six Ukrainians.

Opinion polls indicate strong public trust in the Ukrainian military along with widespread support for the participation of veterans in Ukrainian politics. In contrast, Ukraine’s existing democratic and political institutions are among the least trusted entities in society. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that veteran involvement in politics could help counter this trust deficit and strengthen Ukrainian democracy.

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It is important to note that most Ukrainian veterans are not career military personnel. The vast majority of today’s Ukrainian soldiers joined the military voluntarily or were mobilized and expect to return to civilian life in peacetime. Veterans are also not a homogeneous group and do not represent a specific political agenda. They differ in views, values, and priorities, and should be understood as individuals seeking meaningful participation within legitimate democratic institutions.

Electing military personnel to public office is not without risk. Military experience does not automatically translate into political skill. Veterans transitioning from the battlefield to politics may face challenges in terms of essential political know-how such as policy coherence, negotiation tactics, coalition-building, and working within institutions. Without targeted support and a clear civilian framework, veterans risk being marginalized within political parties or exploited as symbolic figures without real influence.

Ukraine has previous practical experience of veterans entering politics, notably during the country’s 2014 parliamentary elections. One of the former military personnel elected on that occasion was Oksana Korchynska, who recalled at a recent Kyiv event how she “came from the front line, from Mariupol, two days before taking the oath of MP.”

Korchynska noted that in 2014, veterans were frequently included on electoral lists without being integrated into decision-making structures. While veterans enjoyed high public trust, their actual influence within parties and parliament has so far often been limited. This experience underscores a critical lesson: Political inclusion must be substantive, not symbolic. Veterans need pathways to real influence within parties and institutions, not mere visibility.

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Members of Ukraine’s veteran community do not need to wait for elections to take up a role in public life. Many are already serving in local government or building civic organizations and veteran associations. Kateryna Yamshchykova is a veteran who became acting mayor of Poltava in 2023. “Opportunities already exist for everyone,” she reflected. “Did I really want the position of acting mayor? It was the last thing I wanted in my life, but I understood that this responsibility had to be taken on in order to build the country we are fighting for.”

This kind of local engagement can help veterans develop the skills they need to run as candidates in national elections after the war ends. Democratic participation, civic habits, and political responsibility cannot be developed overnight. Instead, early engagement can help bring about a stable postwar transition.

For established Ukrainian political parties, engagement with the country’s veteran community is already becoming increasingly necessary to maintain public support. This will likely lead to intensified internal competition as veterans seek leadership roles alongside longstanding party members.

Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK and former commander of the Ukrainian army, has warned that established political elites might see veterans as a threat to their position. If this happens, everyone in Ukraine stands to lose. Public trust in politicians would erode further, undermining the legitimacy of decisions that will be essential for European integration and postwar recovery.

A critical step toward the meaningful political participation of veterans is the development of a clear legal framework for Ukraine’s first postwar elections. This should ensure inclusive participation, clarify registration requirements for new political parties, and potentially impose stricter campaigning rules to protect electoral integrity.

Ukraine’s democracy is not on pause; it is being reshaped under fire. The emergence of veterans as political actors represents a profound structural change in Ukrainian society. In and of itself, this change is neither a threat to democracy nor a guarantee of positive change. Instead, it requires a deliberate and inclusive approach. If Ukraine succeeds in integrating veterans into civilian political life while preserving pluralism, accountability, and fair competition, it may emerge from the war with a more resilient democracy capable of sustaining inclusive recovery, reforms, and European integration.

Vasyl Sehin is the WFD Country Director in Ukraine.

Putin is weaponizing winter as Russia tries to freeze Ukraine into submission

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 13 Jan 2026 22:39:41 +0000

Russia is “going all in” to destroy Ukraine’s power system, Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister Mykola Kolisnyk said on January 13 following the latest in a series of major bombardments targeting civilian energy infrastructure in cities across the country. “Today, Russia launched an attack just five days after the previous bombardment, using drones and ballistic missiles. We see that the enemy is going all in, deploying its forces to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure,” he commented.

The current wave of attacks have hit the Ukrainian capital Kyiv particularly hard. “The Russians are trying to disconnect the city and force people to move outside Kyiv,” Ukrenergo CEO Vitaliy Zaichenko told the Kyiv Independent. According to Zaichenko, around 70 percent of the Ukrainian capital’s approximately 3.5 million residents were left without electricity on Tuesday. Meanwhile, large numbers of apartments also had no heating amid subzero winter conditions.

Kyiv is one of multiple Ukrainian population centers currently facing rolling blackouts that in many cases can last for over 24 hours. Russia’s air offensive has also struck energy infrastructure supplying Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Chernihiv, and many other major cities.

Teams of engineers are working around the clock to repair damaged facilities, fix power lines, and reconnect Ukrainian homes and businesses to the electricity grid. However, repeated Russian attacks are making it increasingly difficult to patch up battered equipment and find the necessary replacement component parts.

The bombing campaign appears to have been timed to coincide with the coldest period in over a year, with temperatures plummeting to minus fifteen Celsius (five degrees Fahrenheit) for extended periods of time. “ They deliberately waited for freezing weather to make things worse for our people. This is cynical Russian terror specifically against civilians,” stated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

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This is not the first time Russian President Vladimir Putin has attempted to weaponize winter in his war against Ukraine. Russia launched a major air offensive against Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in October 2022, establishing a pattern that would be repeated each year as the cold season approached. While this tactic is not new, the present destruction of the Ukrainian power grid is widely recognized as the most severe of the entire war.

In Kyiv and other cities, the Ukrainian authorities have established so-called Points of Invincibility in heavily populated areas featuring heating and internet access along with electricity sources that can be used to charge up personal devices and power banks. Visitors can also expect hot drinks and a warm welcome.

Throughout Ukraine the buzz of generators has become the background noise of the winter season. Many Ukrainians have installed backup power sources in their homes, which are typically able to provide electricity for a limited period of time. Portable gas stoves are also a common feature as people adapt and improvise in the extreme conditions caused by Russia’s bombardment.

With millions of Ukrainian civilians at risk of being trapped in freezing darkness for days at a time, the potential for a humanitarian catastrophe is obvious. Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko has already urged residents of the Ukrainian capital to temporarily leave the city if they are able to and move to less affected areas where power and heating are more readily available. With the present cold snap set to last for at least another week and further Russian attacks widely expected, fears are now mounting over a possible winter exodus to neighboring EU countries.

That may be exactly what Putin has in mind. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia has repeatedly targeted Ukrainian civilians in a bid to break Ukraine’s resistance and depopulate large parts of the country. In addition to attacks on energy, heating, and other critical infrastructure, Russia has also launched large-scale drone strike campaigns designed to make entire towns and cities unlivable. A recent United Nations probe into Russia’s campaign of drone attacks throughout southern Ukraine’s front line regions concluded that Moscow’s actions amounted to the crimes against humanity of “murder and forcible transfer of population.”

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As Russia attempts to freeze Ukrainians into submission, Kyiv desperately needs a wide range of international support. This includes alternative energy supplies to replace domestic gas production damaged in Russia’s attacks, along with spare parts to mend the country’s power stations and associated infrastructure.

Ukraine also urgently requires additional air defense systems and interceptor missiles. At present, Ukraine’s existing air defenses are struggling to cope with the dramatically increased intensity of Russia’s aerial attacks, which now routinely feature hundreds of drones along with dozens of cruise and ballistic missiles.

Most of all, Ukraine needs to be able to strike back. However much Ukraine’s network of air defenses improves, the sheer scale of the Russian bombardment means that a percentage of missiles and drones will inevitably reach their targets. The only truly effective defense is deterrence. In other words, Russia’s attacks will continue until Putin is restrained by the knowledge that Ukraine has the capacity to reply in kind.

The next few weeks will be among the most challenging of the war for Ukraine’s civilian population that will test the country’s famed resilience to the limit. “I think the Russians want to break us. They want to make Ukrainians angry and unhappy. They think this will make us go out on the streets and protest but that won’t happen,” Kyiv resident Valentina Verteletska told Britain’s Guardian newspaper. “This makes us tougher and more determined. War doesn’t make people bad or good but it amplifies who you are. It allows people to show who they are inside and we have seen a lot of people volunteering to help their neighbors.”

Many believe Russia’s wintertime bombardment of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure now represents Putin’s best chance to achieve some kind of breakthrough at a time when his army is struggling to advance on the battlefield. Russia gained less than one percent of Ukrainian territory in 2025 despite suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties, and is still fighting over villages located within walking distance of the front lines at the start of the invasion in February 2022.

Despite this lack of progress, Putin remains committed to his original invasion objective of extinguishing Ukrainian independence and forcing the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. He clearly has no qualms about targeting millions of Ukrainian civilians in pursuit of this criminal goal. “You can see with your own eyes what is going on,” commented Kyiv building manager Oleksandr Matienko. “They are trying to kill us. They can’t win any other way. So they are willing to do anything to destroy Ukraine.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

There are no signs that this trend will change anytime soon. Despite mounting economic challenges on the home front amid falling energy export revenues, Russia’s defense budget for 2026 remains close to record highs. Moscow will continue to prioritize domestic drone production this year, while also allocating large sums to finance the system of generous bonus payments and salaries for army recruits who volunteer to serve in Ukraine.

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Russia’s refusal to embrace the idea of a compromise peace should come as no surprise. After all, Putin has built his entire reign around the promise of restoring Russian greatness and reversing the perceived humiliations of the Soviet collapse. After nearly four years of full-scale war, a negotiated settlement that secured Ukraine’s status as an independent country would represent a major political failure.

Since 2022, Kremlin officials and Russian state media have consistently portrayed the invasion of Ukraine as an existential struggle against Western aggression with the aim of establishing a new world order and returning Russia to its rightful place as a great power. However, a peace deal based on the current line of contact would leave approximately 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and firmly anchored in the West. Such an outcome would be viewed in Moscow as an historic Russian defeat.

This framing creates a political trap of Moscow’s own making. Putin knows he would face a potentially disastrous domestic backlash if he accepted anything less than a clear Russian victory in Ukraine. Peace terms that failed to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit would raise difficult questions about the enormous costs of the invasion. Russians would want to know why the country had spent vast sums of money and sacrificed so many men in order to achieve so little. Putin would risk entering Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine.

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Putin has begun 2026 in a challenging position. He remains reluctant to upset Trump, but he dare not accept the compromise peace the US leader is proposing. Instead, Putin needs either total victory in Ukraine or indefinite conflict. Any attempt to end the war without establishing complete political control over Ukraine would threaten the stability of Putin’s own regime. His interests are therefore best served by seeking to prolong negotiations while working toward a military solution.

If Western leaders wish to change the current political calculus in Moscow, they must first acknowledge that there is no alternative to increasing the pressure on Putin. At present, the Kremlin dictator views escalation as necessary for regime survival and has no plans to end the war.

Two scenarios could disrupt this trajectory. A collapse in global oil prices combined with successful secondary sanctions enforcement could create an economic crisis that would force Putin to revise his priorities. Alternatively, mass casualties during a failed spring 2026 Russian offensive could trigger domestic instability, while also highlighting the fading prospects of a military breakthrough.

Both these outcomes are realistic but would require significant additional action from Ukraine’s partners. If the West is unable to muster the requisite political will, escalation remains Moscow’s most rational path in 2026. Putin has little choice but to continue his invasion. Even if Russian victory remains out of reach in the coming year, he knows he cannot accept any peace deal that secures Ukrainian statehood.

William Dixon is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Service Institute specialising in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security.

Our experts unpack why violence erupted, what it means for Kurdish and wider minority safety and integration under the new Syrian government, and how Washington is engaging.

1. What is the political and military background of this conflict?

On April 1, Damascus and the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG)-dominated SDF agreed on a localized integration arrangement covering the two SDF-held neighborhoods of Aleppo city. Despite the initial atmosphere of goodwill, SDF-affiliated Asayish forces that remained in these neighborhoods obstructed the implementation phase and refused to subordinate themselves to Aleppo’s Internal Security Forces, as stipulated in the agreement.

On multiple occasions, Asayish units attacked civilians and civilian infrastructure, triggering violent clashes. Throughout this period, Damascus repeatedly agreed to cease-fires in an effort to preserve negotiations over the broader March 10 integration agreement with the SDF. However, after the deadline of the integration deal expired, final US-mediated talks in Damascus failed, and Asayish forces again targeted civilian infrastructure, and the Syrian army opted to launch a limited military operation.

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

For the last fourteen years, the Kurds enjoyed de facto autonomy, and they currently control a large chunk of eastern and northeastern Syria. An agreement inked in March last year, which the Kurds reluctantly agreed to under immense external pressure, was meant to see the SDF and the Kurdish civilian institutions integrated into the Syrian state. It has effectively gone nowhere, with both sides blaming each other.

The fighting in Aleppo broke out just days after negotiations stalled again and came to an end after external forces, notably the United States, intervened, preventing a potentially greater bloodbath. Turkey stated it would take action—if needed—on behalf of the Syrian government, and Israel threw its weight in behind the Kurds.

—Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA).

2. What does the withdrawal of SDF-affiliated units mean for stability in Aleppo?

The withdrawal does bring with it a sigh of relief for the residents of Aleppo. But taking stock of the destruction, for those who lost loved ones, it’s hardly a win. The days-long fighting further ripped open one of the many fissures that the Syrian government says it has been trying to repair as it attempts to consolidate power under Damascus. The Kurdish population—who largely remain wary of President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government—might just prove to be the toughest to win over.

While an even worse scenario has been avoided for the time being, if anything, the fighting is evidence of how much more work lies ahead for Syria and how its path to “stability” will not necessarily be free of suffering.

—Arwa Damon

3. What does the dismantling of the Kurdish military presence in Aleppo mean for SDF status in Syria?

Civilians carry their bags and belongings as they flee following renewed clashes between the Syrian army and the Syrian Democratic Forces in Aleppo, Syria on January 8, 2026. Photo via REUTERS/Mahmoud Hassano.

Losing Aleppo weakens the SDF’s negotiating position significantly. Damascus will never support the SDF in retaining an autonomous military or administrative structure in the northeast, but al-Sharaa has repeatedly said that Kurdish language and cultural rights will be enshrined in the future constitution. The current government is already highly localized, and we will likely see the same model applied to the northeast with or without a peaceful integration of the SDF.

—Gregory Waters is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and writes about Syria’s security institutions and social dynamics.

4. How credible are government assurances of inclusion and rights protections to Kurdish communities?

The components of the new Syrian government have a mixed track record of treatment towards Kurds. The factions that came from Idlib, most notably Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, have no serious history of ethnic targeting of Kurds, while several Syrian National Army (SNA) factions, which now serve in parts of the new army, have been sanctioned for years for systematic abuses against Kurds in northern Aleppo. It is now up to Damascus to ensure these ex-SNA factions no longer abuse or exploit Kurdish communities.

—Gregory Waters

There were no reports of large-scale violations by government security forces during the fighting in the Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiye neighborhoods, unlike the abuses that occurred in coastal areas or in Swaida last year. This demonstrates progress in managing security operations in areas where diverse communities live. Another episode of violence and killings would be too costly politically for Damascus. In Aleppo, security forces have been overall mindful to show that they are able to protect the Kurdish community.

—Marie Forestier is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. She is also currently a consultant for the European Institute of Peace.

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5. What does the Aleppo violence imply for future negotiations with other armed groups?

The issue in Aleppo is distinct from more general political or ideological dissent in Syria because it involved an armed group that controls territory. However, the government’s slower, methodical approach to the dispute this week, mixing continued diplomatic outreach with military pressure, shows a more mature leadership in Damascus compared to how it approached similar dissent in Swaida in July.

—Gregory Waters

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US officials described the events as “a rivalry” between Syria’s Druze and Bedouins. But this framing strips the crisis of its historical and political context.

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The operation in Aleppo was not a response to dissent, but rather a consequence of the deadlock of negotiations. A significant part of the Syrian population would like to see Kurds and the northeastern region fully integrated into the new Syria. The positive outcome of the military operation in Aleppo—at least from the government’s perspective—and the way security forces managed it raise the question of a possible replication of a similar operation in other areas in the northeast.

—Marie Forestier

6. How does the confrontation fit into the broader Turkish-Israeli rivalry over Syria?

Israel and Turkey hold fundamentally opposing views on Syria. Ankara sees the evolving situation as an opportunity to promote stability through a strong and centralized Syrian state, while Israel views such an outcome as a strategic threat and prefers a weak and fragmented Syria.

During the clashes in Aleppo city, both countries once again positioned themselves on opposite sides. The intensity and limited duration of the fighting did not allow for direct or indirect intervention by either actor. Nevertheless, Turkey publicly signaled its readiness to support the Syrian army if requested, while Israel called on the international community to protect the Kurds. This contrast underscores Turkey’s greater capacity to intervene in northern Syria, as well as the constraints on Israel’s options.

In light of the outcome in Aleppo city, Turkey’s vision of a unified Syria appears to have scored a tactical victory. At the same time, the episode served as a reminder that Turkish-Israeli competition over Syria—rooted in irreconcilable strategic perspectives—will persist.

—Ömer Özkizilcik

7. Where does the United States stand in all of this?

The escalation highlights two key realities for US policy in Syria. First, US mediation efforts aimed at facilitating integration and supporting a unified Syrian state have failed. Washington repeatedly brought Damascus and the SDF to the negotiating table and attempted to steer the process in a constructive direction, yet no breakthrough was achieved.

Second, the crisis has created a new opportunity for the United States. The exposure of the SDF’s fragility in Aleppo city may increase its willingness to make concessions and accept Damascus’s terms. If Washington seeks to prevent a broader military escalation in northeastern Syria, it can once again convene talks and press the SDF to adopt a more pragmatic stance. Should the SDF demonstrate genuine willingness, the United States could play a constructive role in facilitating integration and rebuilding trust between the parties.

—Ömer Özkizilcik

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The decision is a shift in the country’s alignment—from Russian and Iranian spheres of influence to one in NATO and GCC regional orbits.

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8. Did disagreements among SDF factions contribute to the violence?

The exact degree of internal disagreement within the SDF—and the extent of central command control over Asayish forces in Aleppo—remains contested. Nonetheless, it is evident that multiple decision-making centers are involved. Following the escalation, Damascus and the SDF agreed, under international mediation, to evacuate all Asayish forces from the contested neighborhoods. Some Asayish units, however, refused to comply and instead chose to fight.

According to Turkish intelligence sources cited in the media, this decision followed orders issued by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) cadres in Qandil, reportedly led by Bahoz Erdal. This suggests a rift between the Syrian branch of the PKK, which dominates the SDF, and the PKK’s central leadership in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq.

A second layer of fragmentation became visible on the battlefield itself. While the Syrian army initially pursued a limited operation, cohesion within the Asayish ranks collapsed, with many fighters deserting or laying down their weapons.

—Ömer Özkizilcik

The post Eight questions (and expert answers) on the SDF’s withdrawal from Syria’s Aleppo appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Belarus hosts nuclear-capable Russian missiles despite talk of US thaw

Mercedes Sapuppo — Sun, 11 Jan 2026 23:50:18 +0000

Russian nuclear-capable Oreshnik missiles are now in Belarus, Kremlin officials have confirmed. A video released by Russia’s Defense Ministry on December 30 showed multiple Russian Oreshnik mobile missile systems deployed in the forests of Belarus, a move designed to enhance the Kremlin’s ability to strike targets throughout Europe. This very deliberate act of nuclear saber-rattling has underlined the continued role of Belarus in Vladimir Putin’s war machine at a time when Minsk is also seeking to improve ties with the Trump administration.

In addition to hosting Oreshnik missiles, Belarus has also recently been accused of aiding Russian drone attacks on Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed on December 26 that Russian drone units are using Belarusian territory to penetrate Ukraine’s air defense network and strike targets across the country. “We note that the Russians are trying to bypass our defensive interceptor positions through Belarus. This is risky for Belarus,” Zelenskyy commented. “It ⁠is unfortunate that Belarus is ‌surrendering its sovereignty in favor of Russia’s aggressive ambitions.”

Meanwhile, Russia is reportedly building a major ammunition plant in Belarus to help supply the ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Construction is said to be underway close to Belarusian capital Minsk, according to opposition group BELPOL, comprised of former members of the Belarusian security services. Responding to news of the plant, exiled Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya accused Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka of “dragging Belarus deeper into Russia’s war.”

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Evidence of Belarusian involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine is not new, of course. On the eve of the invasion, Lukashenka allowed Putin to station tens of thousands of Russian troops in Belarus. The country then served as the main gateway and logistics hub for Russia’s blitzkrieg offensive to seize Kyiv in spring 2022. The Lukashenka regime is also implicated in the Kremlin campaign to abduct and indoctrinate thousands of Ukrainian children.

Reports of Lukashenka’s ongoing involvement in the Russian war effort come amid speculation of a potential thaw in diplomatic relations between Belarus and the United States. In December, 123 political prisoners were freed by the Belarusian authorities, with the US easing sanctions measures in exchange. This followed two smaller scale trade-offs earlier in 2025 as the Trump administration seeks to increase diplomatic dialogue with Minsk as part of ongoing efforts to broker a negotiated settlement to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Despite these headline-grabbing humanitarian steps, there is little sign of a more comprehensive shift in Minsk away from domestic repression or any reduction in support for Russia’s aggressive foreign policy agenda. On the contrary, the available evidence indicates that while Lukashenka may seek increased engagement with the West, he has no intention of turning away from Moscow or ending human rights abuses inside Belarus.

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By continuing to provide Moscow with its full backing, Belarus enhances Russia’s ability to wage war in Ukraine. This is undermining the Trump administration’s efforts to end the Russian invasion and secure a lasting peace settlement. Belarus also remains deeply implicated in Putin’s hybrid war against Europe and stands accused of weaponizing everything from migrants to balloons against its EU neighbors.

US outreach to Minsk over the past year has secured the release of many prominent prisoners, but continued arrests mean that the overall number of political detainees in the country remains high. Naturally, Lukashenka is happy to reengage with American officials in order to secure a relaxation of sanctions pressure, but there are also concerns that the current approach risks incentivizing hostage-taking.

Yes, a less isolated and more neighborly Belarus remains a worthwhile goal, but in the current circumstances, Lukashenka has little motivation to compromise. He is looking at possible gains without actually reducing the current level of repression in Belarus.

Sanctions relief would be a significant gain for Lukashenka. In exchange for that, the US should be able to achieve some limits on Belarusian facilitation of Kremlin aggression in Ukraine or, at a minimum, a notable decrease in the number of political prisoners in Belarus.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The organizations’ concerns are valid. Myanmar’s vote is being conducted amid ongoing civil war, mass displacement, and widespread violations of political freedoms. Major opposition parties are blocked from meaningful participation. For example, the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party is contesting widely, but the National League for Democracy (NLD)—the party of imprisoned opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi—remains banned from meaningful competition, with most of its leadership detained or barred from standing. Reports indicate that civilians feel coerced into voting out of fear rather than choice. Testimonies describe pressure to vote from local authorities, military-linked administrators, and security actors, creating a climate in which participation is seen less as civic exercise and more as fearful compliance.

The geographic scope of the vote itself reflects the imbalance at the heart of this process. Rather than a nationwide election, only a portion of Myanmar’s townships are included in the polling, with the rest excluded on the grounds of conflict, insecurity, or administrative decisions that conveniently remove opposition strongholds from participation. Out of the country’s 330 townships, polling is scheduled in just 274; in other words, 56 townships—and in some assessments, even more—will not vote at all because authorities have designated them too unstable. Almost entire regions—particularly in the states of Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Sagaing, and Karenni—remain cut out of the process, highlighting how the vote is structured less as a democratic exercise and more as a managed performance of legitimacy.

Bangladesh: Caught between crisis and containment

For Bangladesh—already host to more than a million Rohingya refugees and undergoing its own fraught political transition—the outcome offers little hope of resolution. The Rohingya crisis dates back several decades, with the biggest influx happening in 2017 because of mass expulsions from Rakhine State, which occurred under the NLD-led government that many Western observers once hailed as Myanmar’s democratic success story. Successive crises since then have exposed Dhaka’s limited leverage over Naypyidaw’s rulers, whether in military uniform or in civilian dress, and these elections are unlikely to change that calculus. The forced return of refugees without guarantees of safety and citizenship remains unrealistic under a Myanmar regime seeking legitimacy rather than reconciliation.

Continued violence in western Myanmar risks further displacement toward Cox’s Bazar, in southeastern Bangladesh. The border region has also seen shifts in control by armed groups, complicating trade and security cooperation and heightening anxiety in Dhaka about criminal networks and militant spillover. Prospects for stable, collaborative border governance remain dim.

Analysts characterize the current moment as a Rohingya stalemate, warning that the junta-driven polls offer “no meaningful pathway” for resolving the crisis and that any hope of voluntary, safe return remains illusory while the junta remains in place. Bangladesh already hosts more than a million Rohingya, while fresh fighting in Rakhine since 2024 has generated another surge of displacement, estimated at 150,000 people. Dhaka has rejected requests to send election observers, interpreting them as a bid to manufacture legitimacy. The interim Bangladeshi government, under pressure from domestic rights advocates, refuses to negotiate with Myanmar authorities who have no intention of allowing a safe and dignified return.

Security concerns compound this stalemate. The northern frontier is contested by the Arakan Army, Rohingya armed groups, and splinter factions, driving militarization. Bangladesh’s fence-building and patrol deployments respond to periodic cross‑border raids and trafficking networks, while nongovernmental organizations document camp‑level violence and extortion. In this context, even small escalations could trigger humanitarian emergencies and force Dhaka into defensive postures rather than constructive diplomacy.

India: Strategic ambivalence in the face of uncertainty

India’s stance reflects a tension between strategic interests and democratic principles. New Delhi shares a long, porous border with Myanmar’s restive northwest—an area where insurgent groups have long operated across boundaries and where any new wave of refugees, fighters, or illicit flows can inflame fears about the demographic balance in sensitive frontier states such as Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland. India’s priority is to prevent these pressures from spilling deeper into its territory, a task historically underpinned by security cooperation with the Myanmar military. Yet such cooperation is now a political liability given international condemnation of the junta.

At the same time, India has clear interests in counterbalancing China in Myanmar. Connectivity and energy projects under the Act East Policy—including highways and ports—depend on at least a minimal degree of order in Myanmar. The ongoing elections, marred by conflict and exclusion, do not provide that. New Delhi faces tough choices as it seeks to balance pragmatic ties with the junta even as doing so could enable Myanmar’s authoritarian consolidation, all while Chinese-backed infrastructure and security influence deepens along India’s eastern flank. India’s recent willingness to engage a wide spectrum of actors in the region—from Myanmar’s military to the Taliban government in Kabul, which New Delhi hosted for talks in October 2025—underscores how far it is prepared to stretch diplomatic orthodoxy to protect its strategic and connectivity interests.

This pragmatism reflects security pressures as well. Since the 2021 coup in Myanmar, New Delhi has documented increased flows of arms, refugees, and insurgents into India’s northeast, with groups such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang exploiting Myanmar’s political vacuum. Analysts warn that if the junta’s authority erodes further, Indian factions could seek sanctuary across the border or develop support channels through Bangladesh, threatening to upset the demographic balance in sensitive border states. Meanwhile, India’s signature projects—the Kaladan multi‑modal transit route and the India–Myanmar–Thailand highway—remain stalled by conflict, allowing China‑aligned infrastructure to gain relative momentum. Even as India dispatches observers and calls for an “inclusive poll,” critics argue that if India aligns too closely with the junta, it would cause a future resistance‑led government to tilt more toward Beijing. The dilemma is clear: Stability is indispensable for India’s Act East calculus, but stability anchored in repression could prove strategically self‑defeating.

The regional stakes

Myanmar’s electoral theater unfolds against a backdrop of great‑power competition. China sees the process as a means to safeguard strategic corridors linking Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. For China, it is a dual‑track strategy—formal engagement with the junta, informal management of militias—ensuring continued influence regardless of electoral credibility. Beijing wants elections above all for the promise of order: Even a tightly controlled, unfair vote is preferable, from its perspective, to open-ended civil war that threatens pipelines, ports, and overland trade routes. Chinese officials have leaned on some ethnic armed organizations to enter talks with the junta, with activists alleging that elements of this pressure campaign have veered into coercive tactics. These actions underscore the lengths to which Beijing is prepared to go to secure border stability, energy corridors, and uninterrupted trade.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has sent inconsistent messages on Myanmar’s election. Publicly, the bloc signals unease and maintains a measure of diplomatic distance, showing little appetite for a strong multilateral stance. Privately, however, several member states have opened bilateral channels with Naypyidaw—through security cooperation, commercial agreements, and selective political engagement—effectively diluting ASEAN’s collective leverage. Malaysia has taken a more critical line, warning that partial elections “achieve nothing without peace,” while Vietnam has broken with the broader consensus by sending observers and portraying the polls as a possible starting point for stability.

In sum, the election functions less as a transition than as a diplomatic sorting mechanism, clarifying who will tolerate the junta for strategic gain and who will condition engagement on democratic legitimacy.

False dawn, real dangers

Myanmar’s ongoing elections do not mark a step toward democratic recovery; they mark the consolidation of an authoritarian holding pattern whose shockwaves extend far beyond Myanmar’s borders. What is unfolding is not a transition but a recalibration of power, engineered through selective participation, territorial exclusion, and coerced consent. If anything is clear for South Asia, it is that Myanmar’s unraveling is no longer contained within its borders. Elections may freeze formal politics, but the conflict itself continues to move—across borders, through refugee flows, supply routes, insurgent networks, and competing infrastructure projects.

In the absence of a coordinated regional response that prioritizes accountability, humanitarian protection, and a political settlement rooted in more than military control, this democratic crisis will only become harder to manage.

The post Neither free nor fair: What Myanmar’s ‘sham’ elections mean for the country and its neighbors appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s war on Ukrainian farmers threatens global food security

Oleksandr Tolokonnikov — Thu, 08 Jan 2026 22:10:44 +0000

Ukrainian farmer Oleksandr Hordiienko was a well known figure in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region, where he was widely viewed as a symbol of the local agricultural community’s wartime resilience. During the first three-and-a-half years of Russia’s invasion, Hordiienko was credited with shooting down dozens of Russian drones and helping de-mine thousands of hectares of farmland. On September 5 last year, he was killed in a Russian drone strike.

Hordiienko’s death was part of a broader Kremlin campaign to methodically target and destroy Ukraine’s agricultural industry. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, at least fifteen farmers have been killed in the Kherson region alone.

Meanwhile, vast quantities of farmland remain inaccessible due to mining or have sustained damage as a result of fires caused by Russian military actions. Ukrainian agricultural workers face a daily threat of drone, artillery, or missile strikes. Some farmers have responded to the danger by taking measures to defend themselves, their land, and their livestock, such as investing in drone monitoring equipment and hiring military veterans.

Over the past year, Russian attacks on Ukraine’s agricultural sector have escalated alarmingly. According to research conducted by the University of Strasbourg, the University of Maryland, and NASA’s Harvest program, the number of farmland fires identified in Ukrainian-controlled areas of the Kherson region during 2025 rose by 87.5 percent.

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The Kherson farming community’s wartime experience is mirrored throughout Ukraine, particularly in areas close to the front lines of the invasion. By attacking agricultural infrastructure, Russia seeks to undermine Ukraine’s food security, just as it targets the country’s energy infrastructure to deprive Ukraine’s civilian population of access to electricity and heating.

The implications of Russia’s war on Ukrainian farmers are international in scope. Known historically as the breadbasket of Europe, Ukraine is home to around one quarter of the world’s black soil, the most fertile farmland on the planet. This makes Ukraine a potential agricultural superpower and a key contributor to global food security. Ukrainian farmers are among the leading exporters of foodstuffs to the European Union, with Ukrainian produce also playing a prominent role in aid programs to counter hunger throughout the developing world.

Russia’s invasion has had a devastating impact on Ukrainian agricultural output. In addition to mined fields, burned crops, and bombed facilities, large numbers of Ukrainian farms are currently in Kremlin-controlled regions, leading to seized harvests.

Kherson region farmers received a further blow in summer 2023 when a suspected Russian sabotage operation destroyed the Kakhovka Dam in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine. This act of ecocide undermined one of Europe’s largest irrigation systems, leaving hundreds of thousands of hectares without access to water. The impact on the environment was catastrophic, leading to drought conditions, failed crops, and the loss of farmland.

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Despite the unprecedented challenges posed by Russia’s ongoing invasion, Kherson’s farmers continue to work. In 2025, they managed to harvest a remarkable quantity of the watermelons that serve as the region’s unofficial calling card. Other key Kherson crops include wheat and potatoes.

Since 2022, domestic and international support programs have proved instrumental in bolstering the resilience of the Kherson agricultural industry. Initiatives in recent years have included subsidies for farmers and technical assistance focused on areas such as irrigation, with the goal of helping farmers adapt to the new wartime realities.

Kherson agricultural businesses are also responding to the changing conditions. Due to water scarcity and rising temperatures, some farms have reduced planting areas and turned to cultivating crops that utilize soil moisture more efficiently. Research is also underway to develop additional drought-resistant crops better suited to the current environment.

Further international support for Ukrainian farmers will be critically important during 2026. Ukraine’s agricultural industry is one of the cornerstones of the national economy and a major exporter to global markets. By targeting farmers and their land, Russia aims to make Ukraine unlivable and break the country’s resistance. This strategy poses a significant threat to international food security and must be addressed.

Oleksandr Tolokonnikov is Deputy Head of the Kherson Regional Military Administration.

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The current emphasis on UGVs is part of a broader technological transformation taking place on the battlefields of Ukraine. This generational shift in military tech is redefining how modern wars are fought.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, homegrown innovation has played a critical role in Ukraine’s defense. Early in the war, Ukrainian troops deployed cheap commercial drones to conduct reconnaissance. These platforms were soon being adapted to carry explosives, dramatically expanding their combat role. By the second year of the war, Ukraine had developed a powerful domestic drone industry capable of producing millions of units per year while rapidly adapting to the ever-changing requirements of the battlefield.

A similar process has also been underway at sea, with Ukraine deploying domestically produced naval drones to sink or damage more than a dozen Russian warships. This has forced Putin to withdraw the remainder of the Black Sea Fleet from occupied Crimea to Russia itself. Recent successes have included the downing of Russian helicopters over the Black Sea using naval drones armed with missiles, and an audacious strike on a Russian submarine by an underwater Ukrainian drone.

By late 2023, drones were dominating the skies over the Ukrainian battlefield, making it extremely dangerous to use vehicles or armor close to the front lines. In response to this changing dynamic, Ukrainian forces began experimenting with wheeled and tracked land drones to handle logistical tasks such as the delivery of food and ammunition to front line positions and the evacuation of wounded troops.

Over the past year, Russia’s expanding use of fiber-optic drones and tactical focus on disrupting Ukrainian supply lines has further underlined the importance of UGVs. Fiber-optic drones have expanded the kill zone deep into the Ukrainian rear, complicating the task of resupplying combat units and leading to shortages that weaken Ukraine’s defenses. Robotic systems help counter this threat.

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Remote controlled land drones offer a range of practical advantages. They are more difficult to jam electronically than aerial drones, and are far harder to spot than trucks or cars. These benefits are making them increasingly indispensable for the Ukrainian military. In November 2025, the BBC reported that up to 90 percent of all supplies to Ukrainian front line positions around Pokrovsk were being delivered by UGVs.

In addition to logistical functions, the Ukrainian military is also pioneering the use of land drones in combat roles. It is easy to see why this is appealing. After all, Ukrainian commanders are being asked to defend a front line stretching more than one thousand kilometers with limited numbers of troops against a far larger and better equipped enemy.

Experts caution that while UGVs can serve as a key element of Ukraine’s defenses, they are not a realistic alternative to boots on the ground. Former Ukrainian commander in chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi has acknowledged that robotic systems are already making it possible to remove personnel from the front lines and reduce casualties, but stressed that current technology remains insufficient to replace humans at scale.

Despite the advances of the past four years, Ukraine’s expanding robot army remains incapable of carrying out many military functions that require infantry. When small groups of Russian troops infiltrate Ukrainian positions and push into urban areas, for example, soldiers are needed to clear and hold terrain. Advocates of drone warfare need to recognize these limitations when making the case for greater reliance on unmanned systems.

UGVs will likely prove vital for Ukraine in 2026, but they are not wonder weapons and cannot serve as a miracle cure for Kyiv’s manpower challenges. Instead, Ukraine’s robot army should be viewed as an important part of the country’s constantly evolving defenses that can help save lives while raising the cost of Russia’s invasion.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Delcy Rodríguez’s untenable balancing act

Iria Puyosa — Thu, 08 Jan 2026 20:32:51 +0000

The United States’ extraction of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from his bunker on January 3 triggered an explosion of activity across Venezuelan social media. Across Instagram, TikTok, and WhatsApp status updates, millions of Venezuelans shared jubilant reactions to images of the former dictator in custody. Venezuelan diaspora communities from Buenos Aires to Madrid posted celebratory videos, while domestic users circumvented internet restrictions to express relief and hope.

The regime’s communication apparatus—typically one of its most formidable weapons—collapsed during the crucial first fifteen hours following the operation. Targeted strikes on antennas disrupted the radio communications of the security forces, while an electricity outage impacted the area around the Fuerte Tiuna Army Base. However, internet and phone communications continued to function normally. State TV and radio stations were broadcasting prerecorded programming rather than providing critical news coverage. Chavismo took refuge on Telegram channels and groups.

When government communications finally resumed, conflicting statements revealed chaos within the regime. Late on January 3, former Vice President Delcy Rodríguez proclaimed Maduro “the only president of Venezuela” and demanded his release while simultaneously assuming the role of acting president. In contrast, US President Donald Trump claimed that she was cooperating with his administration and was willing to fulfill all his requests regarding the US takeover of the Venezuelan oil industry. This dissonance highlighted the regime’s turmoil, torn between defiant rhetoric for domestic audiences and pliant negotiations with Washington.

The regime’s double game

Hours after Maduro’s removal, María Corina Machado, the leader of Venezuela’s democratic opposition movement, whose candidate won 67 percent of the vote according to tallies from the stolen 2024 election, declared on social media “Venezuelans, the HOUR OF FREEDOM has arrived!” However, despite her overwhelming popular legitimacy and moral authority, she operates under the constraints of surveillance and repression. The opposition’s mobilization capacity remains uncertain, as the Maduro regime’s systematic repression has crushed the country’s civil society.

For her part, Rodríguez confronts an unprecedented challenge for a Venezuelan leader: She must satisfy Washington’s demands while maintaining sufficient Chavista coalition support to prevent an internal fracture or a military coup. The Trump administration demands sufficient cooperation to enable US oil company operations, likely including transparent property contracts and regulatory stability—precisely the institutional environment that Chavismo systematically dismantled. Rodríguez making such an agreement with Trump would alienate the regime’s hardliners, who would view her accommodation as a betrayal. Thus, Rodríguez may be unable to guarantee the stability required for the business operations Trump wants to run in Venezuela.

Her public contradictions reflect this impossible position. In her first televised addresses as interim president, she demanded Maduro’s immediate release to demonstrate loyalty to domestic audiences. Less than twenty-four hours later, however, she declared it a priority to move toward a “balanced and respectful” economic cooperation between the United States and Venezuela.

This double game cannot persist indefinitely. Rodríguez must choose between accommodating Trump’s demands or preserving Chavista unity. Trump’s threat that if Rodríguez “doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro” makes clear that there will be consequences of noncompliance. Purging the hardliners may be Rodríguez’s best option.

Navigating the geopolitical minefield

Perhaps Rodríguez’s most complex challenge is managing Venezuela’s deep entanglements with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba while simultaneously partnering with the Trump administration. This is especially the case after the Trump administration demanded that Venezuela immediately cut ties and cease intelligence cooperation with Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba. These relationships represent more than diplomatic alignments—they constitute binding financial obligations, operational dependencies, and strategic commitments that cannot simply be abandoned without triggering massive economic and security consequences.

China presents the most significant financial exposure. Venezuela owes Beijing around twenty billion dollars in loans. These debts are secured through oil-for-loan arrangements that require repayment through crude deliveries, with China currently absorbing more than half of Venezuela’s oil exports (approximately 746,000 barrels per day in November 2025).

Beyond petroleum, Chinese state enterprises control critical Venezuelan infrastructure. Huawei built and maintains control over Venezuela’s national fiber-optic backbone. China Electronics Import & Export Corporation built and operates the VEN911 surveillance system. ZTE Corporation designed the Homeland Card system and operationalized the Patria System database used for social control. These companies don’t simply provide services—they embed operational control within Venezuela’s digital infrastructure, creating dependencies that cannot be severed without system collapse. Expelling Chinese technology companies would require the complete reconstruction of Venezuela’s telecommunications and surveillance systems.

Russia’s Strategic Partnership Treaty with Venezuela, signed in May 2025, commits Caracas to comprehensive cooperation with Moscow across the hydrocarbons, military technology, and strategic sectors. Russia is Venezuela’s primary supplier of naphtha and diluents—essential additives for processing Venezuela’s heavy crude. These Russian commitments create immediate conflicts with a potential US partnership, as the Trump administration’s demands make clear. The energy deal announced by the Trump administration on January 7 indicates that US diluent will be sent to Venezuela, meaning that Russia will have to withdraw from that market.

Iran provides Venezuela’s most operationally sensitive international cooperation—drone technology production at El Libertador Air Base, where Iranian personnel set up operations. On December 30, 2025, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on Empresa Aeronautica Nacional SA, the Venezuelan company operating in a joint venture with Iranian companies at drone manufacturing facilities in Venezuela. This military-technical cooperation directly threatens US interests and almost certainly constitutes a nonnegotiable red line for Washington.

Cutting ties with Cuba would resent the deepest ideological and operational challenge for the regime. Cuban intelligence advisors remain embedded throughout Venezuelan security services despite the neutralization of Maduro’s personal protection unit. These advisors provide counterintelligence expertise, interrogation training, and repression coordination—exactly the capabilities Rodríguez needs to maintain internal control against potential coup attempts. Cuba’s own survival depends on Venezuelan oil shipments, with Havana receiving subsidized petroleum. Severing Cuban intelligence cooperation would affect operational expertise within the security forces, potentially triggering a military fracture. Yet Washington has demanded the immediate severance of Venezuela’s ties to Cuban intelligence. Moreover, on January 3, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a warning to the Cuban leadership: “If I lived in Havana and was part of the government, I’d be at least a little concerned.” He also emphasized that Cuba would no longer receive oil from Venezuela.

Democracy deferred

Each day of ambiguity increases pressure from all directions, making Rodríguez’s balancing act increasingly untenable. There are three competing scenarios: First, Rodríguez could successfully navigate between Washington and Chavismo. Second, hardliners could resist accommodation with the United States, triggering Trump’s threatened “second wave” operation. Third, a rebellion could replace Chavista leadership, opening the door to a transition.

Amid this uncertain picture, Venezuelan civil society, having demonstrated extraordinary resilience through the October 2023 primary elections and the July 2024 presidential campaign despite systematic repression, now confronts a different challenge. It must fight to remain relevant amid a power transition dominated by US economic interests and Chavista factional negotiations. In the days following Maduro’s capture, a clear priority has emerged for Venezuelan civil society: the total liberation of all the regime’s political prisoners, who currently number nearly one thousand. Only then will Venezuela’s transition to democracy truly begin.

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Ukraine security guarantees are futile without increased pressure on Putin

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 07 Jan 2026 15:57:40 +0000

Kyiv’s allies hailed progress toward “robust” security guarantees for Ukraine on January 6 following a meeting in Paris attended by representatives of more than thirty countries who together make up the Coalition of the Willing.

As details of a possible security framework for postwar Ukraine continue to take shape, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a joint declaration committing to deploy troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace agreement between Moscow and Kyiv. Crucially, US officials attending the talks in France also voiced American backing for security guarantees, with the United States expected to play a supporting role that will focus on ceasefire monitoring.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy praised the “substantive discussions” and suggested that he was now more confident about the credibility of the security commitments being proposed by Ukraine’s partners. “Military officials from France, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine worked in detail on force deployment, numbers, specific types of weapons, and the components of the armed forces required and able to operate effectively. We already have these necessary details,” he commented.

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This was the latest in a series of meetings over the past year that have sought to define workable security guarantees for Ukraine as a key element of the US-led push to end Russia’s invasion. Since early 2025, Britain and France have been at the forefront of ongoing efforts to establish a Coalition of the Willing bringing together countries prepared to contribute to postwar security measures. The objective is to prevent a resumption of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The Paris Declaration signed on January 6 is a step in the right direction, but many key questions remain unanswered. The document does not provide the kind of NATO-style commitment to collective security that many believe is essential in order to deter Putin. Nor does it clarify the exact role of a potential European military contingent on Ukrainian territory, or define whether their mandate would include defending themselves in the event of a Russian attack. Instead, it contains vague references to “the use of military capabilities.” This language is hardly likely to convince the Kremlin, especially in light of the escalation fears that have dominated the Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The other obvious problem with the current peace plan is implementation. The signatories of the Paris Declaration all agree that the envisioned package of security guarantees for Ukraine can only be put in place once a ceasefire has been agreed. This will inevitably strengthen Moscow’s objections. Over the past year, Russia has repeatedly rejected ceasefire proposals while stressing its unwavering opposition to any Western military presence in Ukraine. That is exactly what the Coalition of the Willing is now proposing.

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As Ukraine’s partners discuss the technical aspects of security guarantees, the elephant in the room remains Russia’s lack of interest in peace. The Kremlin was not represented at talks in the French capital this week, just as it has been absent during a similar series of recent meetings between US, Ukrainian, and European officials.

While the Trump administration has sought to maintain a parallel dialogue with Moscow, there is no indication whatsoever that Russia shares the optimistic assessments being offered by Zelenskyy and other Western leaders. On the contrary, Putin and his Kremlin colleagues continue to signal that they have no intention of compromising and remain committed to the maximalist goals set out at the start of the invasion in February 2022.

Throughout the past year, Putin has been careful to avoid openly rejecting US peace proposals due to concerns over possible retaliatory sanctions. Nevertheless, his actions speak for themselves and underline his opposition to ending the war.

Just one day after Trump and Zelenskyy met in Florida in late December and announced significant progress toward a settlement, Putin called the US leader and accused Ukraine of launching an attack on his presidential residence. The news appeared to shock Trump and placed the entire peace process in jeopardy. However, it soon transpired that the incident had been hastily invented in a bid to discredit Ukraine and derail peace talks. Trump has since acknowledged that Putin’s resident was not targeted. “I don’t believe that strike happened,” he told reporters on January 4.

The Kremlin dictator’s apparent readiness to lie directly to Trump says much about his determination to disrupt peace efforts. The faked attack on Putin’s residence was the latest in a series of Russian steps over the past year to stall or otherwise obstruct negotiations. This has led to mounting claims that Putin is playing for time without having any intention of ending his invasion.

Putin’s rejection of a negotiated settlement should come as no surprise. His army is advancing in Ukraine and retains the upper hand in a war of attrition that strongly favors Russia. With the Ukrainian military suffering from increasingly acute manpower shortages and Kyiv’s allies showing growing signs of weakening resolve, Putin remains confident that he can achieve a decisive breakthrough in 2026.

Even if he did not believe that victory was on the horizon, Putin would be highly unlikely to risk a compromise peace involving limited territorial gains. After all, he is not fighting for land in Ukraine; he fighting for Ukraine itself.

Putin views the invasion of Ukraine in the broadest of possible historical contexts as a sacred mission to reverse the injustice of the Soviet collapse and revive the Russian Empire. The terms currently on offer would leave around 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and free to pursue further European integration. To Putin, that would not be a partial victory; it would be a catastrophic defeat.

In the coming weeks, Russia will almost certainly reject the latest peace framework agreed in Paris. How will the Coalition of the Willing respond to this setback? Unless they are willing to impose more costs on the Kremlin and bolster Ukraine’s ability to hurt Russia militarily, all talk of postwar security guarantees and reassurance forces will continue to ring hollow. If Western leaders are serious about ending the war in Ukraine and safeguarding European security, they must acknowledge that there is no alternative to increasing the pressure on Putin.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Unmanned systems of all kinds have emerged since 2022 as a fundamental element of modern military doctrine. This is radically changing everything from the structure of armies to the role of the individual soldier. Remotely controlled equipment no longer needs a large crew to support it, while individual models are becoming more compact and maneuverable. As a result, the power of unmanned weapons systems is increasing exponentially, while production is expanding to industrial scale and becoming significantly cheaper.

More and more soldiers now serve as unmanned systems operators. Those who remain in more traditional roles perform tasks such as special operations, guard duties, or logistical functions. The war being waged by Ukraine has demonstrated that the modern battlefield features a kill zone up to 25 miles deep and spanning the entire front line. This zone is controlled by drones that destroy any infantry or equipment. Combat operations are increasingly conducted by drone operators located deep in the rear or in underground bunkers.

In these conditions of drone dominance over the battlefield, any attempts to stage major breakthroughs are doomed to failure. Instead of tank columns and artillery duels, offensive operations require maximum dispersal of forces and the greatest possible camouflage. The main task of troops is to gradually shift the kill zone deeper into the enemy’s rear.

Success depends upon the ability to rapidly produce large quantities of inexpensive combat drones and continually update their control systems. Initial tactics involving single drones and individual targets are already becoming a thing of a past. Instead, operators can now use artificial intelligence to control entire fleets featuring large numbers of drones deployed simultaneously. This approach allows a single soldier to manage kilometers of front line space rather than just a few hundred meters. The result is a reduction in the need for mass mobilization and an emphasis on the professionalism and technical skills of each operator manning the front.

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Combat operations now boil down to two main scenarios: Either the collapse of an enemy who is not prepared for the new intensity of combat, or a positional struggle in the style of World War I. In a protracted positional war, it is crucial to ensure control over the kill zone and maintain sufficient supplies while depriving the enemy of similar capabilities. The protection of logistics networks and the infliction of maximum damage on the enemy’s rear areas is of decisive importance.

First and foremost, this means cutting off ground supply routes. To protect logistics, armies must develop fleets of maneuverable transport drones that are not dependent on road quality and can navigate minefields. Meanwhile, to ensure the steady supply of ammunition and spare parts to underground storage points along the front lines, a mobile air defense system featuring interceptor drones is necessary.

At the strategic level, key targets are now weapons factories, logistics centers, and command posts, which are often hidden deep in the rear or located inside underground bunkers close to the front lines. Destroying these high-value targets requires guided missiles or other air strike capabilities. Military planners are therefore faced with the challenge of moving away from expensive manned aircraft toward reusable strategic drones.

Testing of fully-fledged unmanned aircraft is already underway. The transition toward unmanned aviation will open up the mass deployment of guided aerial bombs, which are significantly cheaper than missiles. In addition, strategic drones will themselves be able to act as “aircraft carriers” for kamikaze drones.

The same principles apply equally to the maritime theater of operations. Ukrainian Sea Baby naval drones have already proven themselves by destroying numerous warships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and carrying out attacks on Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers.

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To ensure their future national security, states must focus on the mass production of unmanned systems and their components. China currently accounts for the lion’s share of component parts. This is a challenge for any country that seeks to play a role in global affairs. China must be deprived of the strategic advantages it enjoys due to its status as the leading producer of components for unmanned systems.

Many NATO generals appear to think that recent technological advances are making war cheaper and creating a more level military playing field. This is a mistake. In reality, any reduction in the cost of weapons is more than offset by the need for increased quantities.

It is also important to stress that unmanned technologies alone are not enough. Another key factor is an army’s access to reliable digital communications similar to Starlink. Without this capability, it is impossible to coordinate combat operations, collect data, and maintain connections between individual units and command structures. It is no coincidence that China is already investing billions to address this issue.

The transformation currently underway in the military sphere also increases the role of cyber warfare. Disruption to logistics, power outages, and communications breakdowns can all provide the enemy with the opportunity to advance. A hacked cyber system can expose vital defenses or dramatically reduce the possibility of recovery.

Looking ahead, technological innovation in the military must be recognized as a national priority when allocating defense budgets. This applies to everything from unmanned systems to the development of artificial intelligence.

The most important revolution must take place within the minds of today’s military generals. A comprehensive rethink of existing military doctrines is currently needed. Armies must be completely re-equipped. It is time for the top brass to acknowledge that they should either change or give way to a new generation of military strategists.

Ukraine’s experience since 2022 has confirmed that in order to be successful in modern warfare, armies should model themselves on technological giants like Amazon and SpaceX. They must embrace flexible thinking and be capable of competing in terms of implementing new innovations.

In an era of accelerated military change, all countries face a simple choice of adapting or accepting the inevitability of defeat. The winners will be those who embrace the lessons from the technological revolution currently underway on the battlefields of Ukraine.

Oleg Dunda is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament from the Servant of the People party.

What distinguishes the current moment is not just the persistence of these conflicts, but the degree to which escalation in one theater is increasingly likely to trigger responses across others. With Washington focused on a military buildup in the Caribbean and negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, US policymakers should not take their eye off the prospect of a renewed crisis in the Middle East.

Iran, proxies, and the reconstitution of deterrence

Iran’s regional strategy has long relied on a layered deterrence model built around proxies, long-range fires, and ambiguity rather than direct state-to-state confrontation. This model seeks to impose cumulative costs on adversaries while insulating Iran from direct retaliation.

According to repeated assessments by the US Department of Defense and the United Nations, Iran maintains the largest and most diverse missile force in the Middle East and continues to invest in survivability, underground basing, and production capacity. These capabilities are complemented by Iran-aligned armed groups operating across Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

From Israel’s perspective, this proxy-based deterrence architecture is an existential threat. Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack fundamentally altered Israeli threat perception by demonstrating that Iran-aligned groups could inflict a strategic shock without triggering immediate regional war. Israeli officials have since made clear that they will not allow Iran to reestablish a deterrence environment that sets conditions for similar attacks in the future.

This dynamic significantly narrows Israel’s tolerance for Iranian rearmament and proxy consolidation, particularly when combined with explicit timelines it has set for Hezbollah on its northern border.

Hezbollah, Lebanon, and the limits of state authority

Among Iran-aligned groups, Hezbollah remains the most capable militarily. Independent assessments estimate that Hezbollah possesses tens of thousands of rockets and missiles, including increasingly accurate systems capable of striking deep into Israel.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended Israel’s 2006 war with Lebanon, requires the disarmament of nonstate armed groups in southern Lebanon and the extension of Lebanese state authority. Nearly two decades later, Hezbollah has explicitly refused to disarm, framing its arsenal as a necessary resistance force.

The Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces have acknowledged that they are unwilling or unable to forcibly disarm Hezbollah. Public statements by Lebanese officials and international reporting confirm that the state lacks the capacity and consensus to enforce Resolution 1701 without risking internal conflict.

This reality has increasingly shaped Israeli planning. Israeli officials have framed the issue not as Lebanon’s unwillingness to disarm Hezbollah but its inability to do so. They have also argued that continued Hezbollah entrenchment along the border is incompatible with long-term stability. Since the 2024 cease-fire was signed between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel has been sporadically striking targets in southern Lebanon, and Iran has attempted to resupply Hezbollah with funds and weapons, exacerbating tensions that could reach a tipping point.

Gaza, phase two, and the missing path to disarmament

In Gaza, Hamas remains an armed political actor despite sustained Israeli military operations and international mediation. Hamas has explicitly rejected disarmament as a condition for any cease-fire or post war arrangement.

The US proposal for phase two of the Gaza cease-fire envisions a transition from active combat to a sustainable security and governance arrangement. However, none of the regional or international actors that have expressed willingness to participate in a future international or Arab-led stabilization force in Gaza have committed to forcibly disarming Hamas.

Arab states have made clear in public and private statements that they will not assume responsibility for Gaza if it requires direct confrontation with Hamas. As a result, phase two currently lacks an enforcement mechanism capable of eliminating Hamas’s armed capacity, leaving Israel skeptical that any interim arrangement can prevent future attacks.

This gap reinforces Israeli concerns that de-escalation without disarmament merely postpones rather than resolves conflict.

Cascading triggers across theaters

The central risk facing the region is cascading escalation.

Israeli military action in Gaza could intensify pressure along the northern border with Lebanon. Escalation with Hezbollah could increase the likelihood of direct or indirect confrontation with Iran. Iranian or Israeli strikes could, in turn, prompt the Houthis to resume missile and drone attacks against Red Sea shipping or launch long-range systems toward Israel, as they have previously done in response to regional military action.

Simultaneously, escalation elsewhere has historically coincided with increased activity by Iran-aligned groups in Iraq, including rocket and drone attacks on US and coalition facilities.

These pathways are not theoretical. They reflect repeated patterns observed over the past decade, now compressed by explicit timelines, rearmament efforts, and eroding deterrence.

Policy and the challenge of a stable end state

US policy should help shape an end state in which Israel’s security is credibly guaranteed and regional actors believe that further escalation will not produce strategic gain.

This is an exceptionally difficult balance. Historically, Iran’s use of proxies to establish deterrence has rested on its ability to convince adversaries that attacks on Iranian interests will produce widespread retaliation throughout the region. Israel, particularly after October 7, is unwilling to accept that framework and is increasingly determined to dismantle it rather than manage it.

US policy should therefore focus on restoring deterrence rather than pursuing temporary de-escalation alone. This means reinforcing credible regional defense postures, protecting maritime commerce, and ensuring that Iran and its partners understand that further proxy escalation will impose direct and cumulative costs.

At the same time, policy should define enforceable security arrangements, not aspirational ones. Stabilization frameworks in Gaza or Lebanon that lack credible disarmament or enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to reassure Israel or deter future attacks.

Finally, the creation of escalation management mechanisms that preserve decision space during crises. These include crisis communication channels, regional military deconfliction, and diplomatic engagement designed to prevent miscalculation even when underlying conflicts remain unresolved.

The region is not yet in open war. But the convergence of unresolved conflicts, proxy-based deterrence, and explicit timelines for disarmament has sharply reduced the margin for error. Preventing escalation now requires addressing not only immediate triggers, but the deterrence structures that made them possible.

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Reclaiming Russia’s ‘historical lands’: How far do Putin’s imperial ambitions extend?

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 23 Dec 2025 14:42:53 +0000

As US officials talk up the prospects of a compromise peace with the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin has once again signaled that his expansionist appetite is far from sated. In a bellicose address delivered to Russian Defense Ministry officials in Moscow on December 17, Putin declared that the maximalist goals of his Ukraine invasion will be met “unconditionally” and framed the war as a crusade to reverse Russia’s post-Soviet retreat. “If the opposing side and their foreign patrons refuse to engage in substantive discussions, Russia will achieve ⁠the liberation of its historical lands by ‌military means,” he declared.

None of this is entirely new, of course. Putin has long been notorious for delivering rambling history lectures to justify Russia’s war against Ukraine, and has directly compared the current invasion to Russian Czar Peter the Great’s eighteenth-century wars of imperial conquest. Nevertheless, at a time when European leaders are already looking to the eastern horizon with trepidation, it makes sense to explore what Putin means by “historically Russian lands” and examine just how far his imperial ambitions may actually stretch.

The most straightforward interpretation of Putin’s latest comments would suggest that he was referring to the portion of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region that remains under Ukrainian control. After all, this small but heavily fortified and strategically important territory is currently at the heart of negotiations and has been named by Moscow as its price for a ceasefire. However, Kremlin officials are well known for sending contradictory signals regarding their territorial objectives in Ukraine, with Putin himself speaking this month about the “inevitable liberation of the Donbas and Novorossiya.”

Putin’s reference to “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”) raised eyebrows and was widely seen as a signal that Russia may be preparing to increase its territorial demands. The Czarist era term “Novorossiya” was first employed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by imperial administrators to describe large swathes of southern and eastern Ukraine then under Russian rule. It fell into disuse during the Soviet period, only to be resurrected by the Kremlin following the onset of Russia’s Ukraine invasion in 2014.

Russian nationalists have yet to agree on the exact boundaries of Novorossiya, but most envisage a territory stretching far beyond the partially occupied Ukrainian provinces of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson that are currently claimed by the Kremlin. Putin has indicated that his definition of Novorossiya encompasses approximately half of Ukraine, including the country’s entire Black Sea coastline and major cities such as Odesa and Kharkiv.

Then there is the question of Kyiv. According to Russia’s own national mythology, the capital of Ukraine is also the mother of Russian cities and the spiritual birthplace of Russian Orthodoxy. Putin has repeatedly referenced the sacred status of Kyiv in his many essays and speeches denying the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood. It is therefore extremely difficult to imagine him accepting any peace proposal that secures Kyiv’s postwar position as the capital of an independent Ukraine. Putin can hardly claim to be reuniting Russia’s historic lands if he leaves the most Russian city of them all firmly in the hands of a hostile state.

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Based on his own public pronouncements and extensive writings on the subject, it seems reasonable to conclude that Putin’s understanding of historically Russian lands includes the whole of Ukraine. Indeed, he has made no real secret of this conviction. “I have said many times that I consider the Russian and Ukrainian peoples to be one people. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours,” Putin told guests at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in summer 2025. The real question is whether his imperial agenda extends beyond the borders of Ukraine.

In a geographical sense, Putin’s vision of historical Russia is definitely not confined to Ukraine alone. Instead, it includes the vast additional expanses of the Czarist Russian Empire and its Soviet successor. “What is the Soviet Union? It is historical Russia,” Putin declared in 2022. A year earlier, he had lamented the fall of the USSR as “the disintegration of historical Russia” by another name. “We turned into a completely different country,” Putin stated. “And what had been built up over 1,000 years was largely lost.”

When European dictators start ranting about lost thousand-year empires, it rarely bodes well for international security. Putin is no exception. The Kremlin dictator’s determination to reverse modern Russia’s fall from grace has come to dominate his reign and has led directly to the biggest European war since World War II. His deeply felt sense of historical grievance over the Soviet collapse has fueled a poisonous obsession with Ukraine, which Putin regards as the ultimate symbol of the injustice resulting from the breakup of the USSR.

Due to its large size, geographical proximity, shared history, significant ethnic Russian population, and perceived cultural closeness, Ukraine occupies a prominent place in Russia’s imperial identity. However, it is wishful thinking to imagine that sacrificing Ukraine will appease Putin or persuade him to forget about the rest of the former Russian Empire. Instead, the same bogus historical arguments used to justify the invasion of Ukraine could easily be applied to a host of other nations. Any country that was previously subjected to Russian imperial rule could technically fall within Putin’s broad definition of historically Russian lands. “We have an old rule,” he commented earlier this year. “Wherever a Russian soldier sets foot is ours.”

Based on the boundaries of the Czarist Empire at its greatest extent on the eve of World War I, potential targets of future Russian aggression could include Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the nations of Central Asia. Nor is this list exhaustive. A truly maximalist approach would also require the inclusion of the many former Soviet satellite states that made up the Eastern Bloc during the second half of the twentieth century.

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With the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine about to enter a fifth year, many in the West are now beginning to take Putin’s imperial ambitions increasingly seriously. According to Reuters, recent United States intelligence assessments confirm that Putin has not abandoned his aims of capturing all of Ukraine and reclaiming parts of Europe that once belonged to the former Soviet Empire. “The Europeans are convinced of it. The Poles are absolutely convinced of it. The Baltics think they’re first,” the report noted.

Not everyone is so sure. Skeptics tend to question Putin’s ability to wage a major war against the West, with many pointing to his army’s underwhelming performance in Ukraine as proof of Russia’s military limitations. This is comforting but dangerously misleading. In reality, Russia’s lack of progress since 2022 is not a sign of any fundamental weakness; it is testament to the formidable strength and staggering sacrifices of the Ukrainian nation. However, Ukraine’s remarkable resistance against overwhelming odds cannot continue indefinitely and must not be taken for granted. If Ukraine falls, Europe will face a challenge it is utterly unprepared for.

Today, the Ukrainian army is by far the biggest and most experienced fighting force in Europe, other than Russia itself. It is backed by a rapidly expanding and highly innovative domestic military industry that is rewriting the rules of modern warfare. If Putin is permitted to succeed in establishing control over Ukraine, all this will be rapidly integrated into the Kremlin war machine. A partially disarmed Europe will then find itself confronted by a dramatically emboldened Putin, who will have the continent’s two largest armies at his disposal. In such uniquely favorable circumstances, the chances of him choosing not to press home his advantage are next to zero.

The internal logic of the Putin regime is an additional factor driving Russia’s expansionist impulse. Economically, politically, and culturally, Russian society is now deeply militarized in ways that will be extremely difficult to reverse without destabilizing the country. Nor is the Kremlin in any hurry to deal with the hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers currently fighting in Ukraine. These men are now used to receiving vastly inflated salaries and have been brutalized by the bloodiest invasion in modern history. Keeping them occupied, and preferably as far away from Russia as possible, is now a very real national security priority for Moscow.

Putin may also be encouraged to act by the current geopolitical climate, which presents a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to advance Russia’s imperial agenda. The return of Donald Trump to the White House has signaled a radical shift in US policy toward the war in Ukraine and the broader defense of Europe. This has led to a mounting sense of insecurity in European capitals amid unprecedented concerns over America’s commitment to NATO collective security. Would a Russian attack on the Baltic states trigger an Article 5 response from the US? Given Trump’s posturing on NATO budgets and his administration’s ambivalent attitude toward Europe, some believe this can no longer be taken for granted.

Europe alone is not yet in a position to defend itself against Russia. After decades of defense sector neglect, effective rearmament will take years to complete. European leaders have also failed to demonstrate the kind of collective political will necessary to deter the Kremlin. The recent failure to agree on the use of frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s war effort was the latest in a long line of climb downs that have signaled Europe’s chronic disunity and crippling fear of escalation. There are many good reasons why Putin may not rush to expand the war, but concern over a potentially decisive European response is not one of them.

As evidence of Western weakness continues to mount, Putin is growing bolder. In recent months, he has escalated Russia’s hybrid war against Europe with sabotage attacks on critical infrastructure and drone incursions across the continent. In the diplomatic arena, Kremlin officials recently renewed calls for NATO to retreat from central and Eastern Europe, a move that would expose more than a dozen countries to the threat of Russian aggression for the first time in a generation. Meanwhile, rhetoric in the Russian state media targeting Finland, the Baltic states, and other front line countries now increasingly echoes the propaganda that preceded the invasion of Ukraine.

As he plots to rebuild the Russian Empire, Putin is unlikely to be working to any set schedule or clearly defined territorial goal. Instead, the gradual escalation of Russia’s Ukraine invasion over the past twelve years indicates that he is an opportunistic imperialist whose appetite grows with eating. At the same time, it is obvious that his radical revisionist agenda is not limited to Ukraine and poses a very real threat to European security.

Putin believes he is on an historic mission to restore Russia to its rightful place as a global superpower and the dominant force in Europe. Erasing Ukrainian statehood is just the beginning. While we cannot know for sure where he will strike next or how far he ultimately plans to go, it is delusional to think that handing Putin victory in Ukraine will convince him to stop. On the contrary, a Russian success in Ukraine would almost certainly mean more war and lead to decades of European instability.

Putin’s vow to liberate historically Russian lands is an open-ended excuse for imperial expansion that makes a complete mockery of US-led efforts to broker a compromise peace based on limited Russian gains in southern and eastern Ukraine. Clearly, this would not be enough to placate Putin and cannot serve as the basis for a sustainable settlement.

The peace terms currently being discussed would leave approximately 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and free to continue integrating with the West. This is exactly what Putin aims to prevent. After four years of fighting to reverse the verdict of the Cold War, any peace deal that safeguards Ukrainian independence would be recognized in Moscow as a Russian defeat of historic proportions. Instead, Putin knows he must continue the invasion until a fully subjugated Ukraine can become a stepping stone for the next stage in his expansionist agenda.

In his quest to secure a place in history among Russia’s greatest rulers, Putin has long since passed the point of no return. He will not deviate from this messianic goal for the sake of sanctions relief or minor territorial concessions. Any efforts to establish a lasting peace must be firmly grounded in this sobering reality. Peace is possible, but only if the pressure on Putin is increased to the point where he begins to fear defeat on the battlefields of Ukraine and potential collapse on the home front inside Russia.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

For example, hybrid threats to offshore energy infrastructure could cause considerable disruptions to countries’ entire energy sectors. Romania’s Neptun Deep and Turkey’s Sakarya gas fields are especially exposed to such risks, requiring new technologies, such as unmanned undersea systems, to counter these hybrid threats. The Black Sea littoral states are also vulnerable to Russian-sponsored lawfare and maritime coercion, including the use of floating mines and other threats to maritime traffic and naval operations. Russia has designated large sections of the Black Sea off limits to maritime traffic for the purpose of military exercises, which impede freedom of navigation and commercial activity. These exercises are often unannounced or conducted with little advance warning, reducing investor confidence, creating timetable delays, and eroding the Black Sea’s longstanding maritime legal regime.

Black Sea regional stability is key to deterring Russian expansion into Eastern Europe, where the Kremlin wishes to splinter NATO and widen its sphere of influence. China and Iran are also trying to gain regional influence, leading to greater tensions on NATO’s southeastern flank. As Russia’s long-term goals in the wider Black Sea region are diametrically opposed to those of the West, much remains to be done to advance a counterstrategy. The Black Sea region’s instability demands greater transatlantic engagement across all domains and economic sectors. The United States’ Black Sea strategy, which was proposed in 2023 under the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, has languished. On May 28, 2025, the European Commission submitted a Black Sea strategy, but it is too soon to evaluate its impact.

Over the long term, there is a need for more resilient civil-military infrastructure, as well as for increased military capability and interoperability in the region. While all the Black Sea littoral states will benefit from a continued transatlantic presence, three nations in particular stand out. Ukraine is bearing the brunt of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Romania’s size, strategic location, and strong transatlantic credentials have positioned it to become a military and economic hub, particularly as more NATO assets are deployed there. Turkey, with its burgeoning defense industry, has NATO’s second-largest military and serves a vital security role as the Alliance’s guardian of the straits, as codified under the Montreux Convention of 1936. NATO’s Black Sea states have taken the initiative in the face of growing regional threats from Russia. For instance, in January 2024, Romania, Turkey, and Bulgaria signed the Mine Counter Measures, which creates a framework for joint efforts to address naval mine threats and improve operational coordination among Black Sea NATO allies.

Countering Russian aggression in the wider Black Sea region will be expensive in both funds and political capital. It will also require greater collaboration among the Black Sea’s non-Russian littoral states. While not a NATO member, Ukraine has emerged as Europe’s most seasoned military power, capable of rapidly innovating and deploying new technologies. For example, Ukraine’s use of unmanned systems has inflicted considerable losses on the Russian Black Sea fleet, forcing it to disperse to safer ports and diminishing its effectiveness. In this regard, the Alliance has much to learn from Ukraine, particularly in twenty-first century multi-domain operations.

Whether or not a lasting cease-fire is implemented in Ukraine any time soon, Russian aggression has forever altered the Black Sea region’s security landscape. This escalation of the Black Sea’s militarization has heightened tensions, forcing regional governments to allocate increasing portions of their budgets to defense. All this portends greater destabilization, increased national debts, and the absence of a predictable commercial environment well into this century.

An effective response from NATO allies and partners requires novel and forceful policies that energize governments and private sectors to address key weaknesses in energy security and the DTIB. Indeed, a special emphasis should be placed on the private sector, which has demonstrated tremendous innovation and flexibility in the rapidly evolving battlespace.

While Kyiv’s role as a bulwark against Russian aggression deserves the greatest attention, Romania and Turkey have a major role to play in the Black Sea region’s security, as well. Both countries have increased their defense expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product, stepped up joint exercises, and enhanced cross-border collaboration. But further actions will be needed if Turkey, Romania, and their littoral allies and partners are to help defend the Black Sea from Russian aggression. While Turkey has a generally robust DTIB, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s are underfunded and in need of reform. Additionally, the region’s infrastructure is in need of rapid expansion and modernization, especially when it comes to trade routes running north-to-south and energy interconnectors. Admittedly, there have been positive steps on this front, including the launch of the Gas Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria, which became operational in October 2022, among other successful Black Sea infrastructure projects. Romania’s efforts to increase its energy interconnection with Moldova are laudable, as well. And in December, Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria announced a joint project to build three new bridges over the Danube. Even so, time is not on NATO’s side.

These states and their neighbors cannot secure the Black Sea alone; this will require greater support from the transatlantic community. Moreover, the Black Sea states will need to find solutions with limited US involvement; the new 2025 US National Security Strategy makes it clear that Washington’s attention will be on the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific.

As Russia continues to destabilize and militarize the wider Black Sea region, helping bolster its security will require a concerted focus on informed government policies supported by a robust private sector to advance resilience, capabilities, and interoperability in the face of these growing security threats.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Program.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Prisoner releases are welcome news but talk of a Belarus thaw is premature

Hanna Liubakova — Thu, 18 Dec 2025 22:02:36 +0000

The freeing of 123 political prisoners in Belarus last week, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Ales Bialiatski and 2020 protest leader Maria Kalesnikava, must be seen as a major humanitarian win. Lives have been saved and families have been reunited. However, this large-scale prisoner release should not be interpreted as an indication of more fundamental change. On the contrary, it is a calculated move by Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka to extract concessions from the West without abandoning his reliance on domestic repression.

Commenting on the releases, US Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale confirmed that Washington planned to lift sanctions on Belarusian fertilizer exports. He also suggested that all remaining Belarusian political prisoners could be freed in the coming months, potentially in a single group. This prompted some talk of a potential thaw, but it is premature to draw such conclusions. In reality, the Lukashenka regime remains as authoritarian as ever and is not reforming. Instead, it is bargaining.

When assessing the significance of the recent prisoner releases, it is important to maintain a sense of perspective. The 123 people freed in early December represent only a relatively small portion of the more than 1100 political prisoners currently being held in Belarus. Meanwhile, more names are regularly added to the list. During November 2025, human rights group Viasna identified 33 new political prisoners in Belarus.

The Lukashenka regime has clearly learned from similar agreements with the United States earlier this year, which also saw prisoners freed in exchange for sanctions relief. This is fueling a transactional approach to what should be primarily a human rights issue.

While this year’s prisoner releases demonstrate that sanctions relief can produce welcome results, any further reduction in sanctions pressure by the United States should be approached with caution. If prisoner releases are rewarded without any expectation of broader shifts away from authoritarian policies, repression itself becomes a bargaining tool. In such a scenario, there is a very real danger that political prisoners could become virtually inexhaustible bargaining chips for Lukashenka.

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In one if his first interviews following his release, Ales Bialiatski warned about the dangers of negotiating with Lukashenka without demanding wholesale change. He noted that releasing individual prisoners will not be enough to end repression in Belarus. The regime could easily exchange prisoners on a regular basis, he cautioned, freeing some and imprisoning others while asking for new concessions. Bialiatski’s insights should help inform international engagement with Belarus.

Looking ahead, the United States and European Union can play complementary roles in relations between Belarus and the democratic world. Washington’s sanctions tend to be intentionally more flexible. This makes it possible to offer targeted relief based on concrete humanitarian progress, while also allowing for an increase in pressure if Minsk backslides.

In contrast, European sanctions are more focused on systemic change. They are tied to ending policies of political persecution, embracing elements of democratic transition, and addressing Belarusian participation in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Any steps to weaken EU sanctions would reduce Europe’s ability to influence Minsk and rob Brussels of the tools to bring about more meaningful change.

Recent events have highlighted the lack of genuine progress toward constructive engagement between Belarus and the country’s European neighbors. Despite a number of goodwill gestures toward Belarus such as the reopening of EU border crossings, Minsk has continued to engage in provocative actions such as launching weather balloons into Lithuanian airspace.

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Lukashenka may have economic motives for seeking to secure sanctions relief in exchange for limited concessions. The Belarusian economy has benefited in recent years from a spike in wartime demand linked to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but this growth is now cooling. With less room to maneuver. the Belarusian dictator has good reason to engage in deals that can relieve the financial pressure.

He may also believe the time is right to reestablish his credentials on the geopolitical stage. As US-led negotiations to end Russia’s war against Ukraine continue, Lukashenka might see opportunities for a return to the mediator role he occupied during the initial stages of Russian aggression just over a decade ago. Many observers noted that during the latest prisoner releases, most of the freed detainees were sent to Ukraine rather than Lithuania, which has previously served as the main destination. This may have been an attempt to highlight ongoing cooperation between Kyiv and Minsk.

Greater engagement between the Lukashenka regime and the West could potentially be beneficial but a measured approach is essential. Future sanctions relief must be conditional and tied to verifiable steps such as the release of all political prisoners, an end to new politically motivated arrests, and the restoration of basic civic liberties. The rights of released prisoners must also be respected. This includes allowing them the option to remain in Belarus and providing them with full documentation.

Further steps to improve dialogue with Belarus should also be based on a realistic assessment of achievable goals. For example, it is wishful thinking to suggest that limited sanctions relief could somehow pull Minsk out of the Kremlin orbit. On the contrary, Lukashenka is now more dependent than ever on the Kremlin and will almost certainly never dare to distance himself from Russia, regardless of how skillfully sanctions are applied and relaxed.

What sanctions can do is constrain Lukashenka’s options and secure specific concessions. The ultimate objective should be an end to all human rights abuses and oppressive policies, rather than the targeted release of high-profile prisoners. Until that goal is within reach, the European Union in particular has a key part to play in maintaining pressure on Lukashenka.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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In June, the Department of Defense redirected 20,000 anti-drone air defense interceptors specially made for Ukraine under USAI to Israel and US forces in the Middle East. Congress is now using the NDAA to make it more difficult for the Pentagon to repeat this, while also requiring that any arms redirected into US stocks are ultimately replaced for Ukraine.

Though Congress doesn’t expect the White House to make use of USAI in the near future, the NDAA modifies the program so that these funds will now remain available until 2029. As the Trump administration looks for ways to both revitalize the US defense industrial base and provide Ukraine with credible security arrangements, USAI could make a return as a useful way to bolster Ukraine’s defenses.

During 2025, the Trump administration has sought to pressure Ukraine with the prospect of withholding US intelligence support. The NDAA creates strict new reporting requirements to discourage any such moves. As recently as November, the White House said that unless Kyiv agreed to a new US proposal to end the war, it would stop sending weapons and providing the intelligence Ukraine uses in its defense, including to detect Russian air raids.

The new legislation requires the US Secretary of Defense to submit reports to Congress within 48 hours of any decision to “pause, terminate, or otherwise restrict or materially downgrade intelligence support, including information, intelligence, and imagery collection,” to Ukraine. This does not concretely prevent the administration from ending intelligence support, but it is a clear signal from Congress that any action to do so would be met with sharp political backlash.

The NDAA also creates significant new reporting requirements related to the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), the primary mechanism for arms sales to Ukraine. In order to increase the transparency of the PURL system, Congress will use its oversight power to mandate quarterly reports.

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The NDAA includes the Abducted Ukrainian Children Recovery and Accountability Act, a bipartisan bill introduced by Senators Chuck Grassley (R-IA) and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) to support efforts to locate, return, and rehabilitate Ukrainian children abducted by Russia. The mass abduction of Ukrainian children has united Republicans and Democrats in Washington. In early December, Congress held a hearing with Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States and experts working to rescue and rehabilitate abducted children.

The bill authorizes the State Department and Department of Justice to assist Ukraine in locating and returning Ukrainian children as well as prisoners of war and civilian detainees, and to support the rehabilitation of returned children and seek accountability for the Russians who abducted them. It also authorizes the Secretary of State to provide support to Ukraine’s government and civil society groups in providing rehabilitation services for victims.

As it stands, unless Congress exercises its foreign policy powers, efforts to end Russia’s invasion will be stymied by limited US assistance to Ukraine. However, there are some signs that Congress is taking critical steps forward. Recently, Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA) reportedly worked with Democrats to advance a discharge petition to force a vote on Russia sanctions and potential new military assistance to Ukraine. If passed, new Russia sanctions could deliver a much-needed shot in the arm to the Trump administration’s peace efforts.

While it includes measures that will be welcomed by Kyiv, the NDAA’s Ukraine provisions are largely about mitigating potential harm from the Trump administration. In order to provide significant new material assistance to Ukraine, Congress will need to advance other legislation that it has so far kept on ice while awaiting approval from the White House.

Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and the deputy director for policy and strategy at Razom for Ukraine, a nonprofit humanitarian aid and advocacy organization.

Can US leaders convince Americans that Taiwan is worth fighting for?

Phillip M. Ramirez — Thu, 18 Dec 2025 14:58:09 +0000

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A troubling gap is emerging between US public opinion and Washington’s cross-strait policy. US public opinion polling shows no consensus on sending troops to defend Taiwan from a possible Chinese invasion or blockade. On the other hand, credible threats of US military force are essential to the current US policy—deterring Chinese attempts to unify Taiwan by force. Allies and competitors alike are taking notice. Credibility, therefore, has become perhaps the weakest link in the United States’ policy on cross-strait relations.

But elected officials have ample opportunity to influence US public opinion. If leaders in the White House and Congress are committed to current US policy, then they must work to close this credibility gap to convince Beijing that Americans would support and even fight for Taiwan.

The public mood

Washington has long maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity, neither committing to defending Taiwan nor promising Beijing to stay out of a conflict. This approach enables the United States to deter Chinese attempts to unify Taiwan by force and to reassure China that the United States does not seek a change in the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

Today, a number of prominent US policymakers believe that US deterrence toward China is eroding due to changes in Beijing’s military capabilities. China’s growing capabilities have prompted US attempts to increase its own. Deterrence, however, requires both capability and credibility—and, on credibility, the United States risks coming up short.

Americans generally view Taiwan favorably. According to a 2025 survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 70 percent of Americans believe the US-Taiwan trade relationship strengthens US national security and the number of Americans who would support military action to defend Taiwan has grown over the past year. While some polls even indicate that a majority of Americans support using military action to defend Taiwan from an attack by China, polling that asks respondents about specific actions complicates those findings. For example, the 2025 Chicago Council Survey found broad support for indirect action in the event of a crisis in the strait: 77 percent of respondents said they support military airlifts of supplies to Taiwan, 71 percent said they favor economic or diplomatic sanctions on China, and 63 percent said they support sending military arms to Taiwan. But only 43 percent said they support sending US troops, while 51 percent opposed doing so.

This aversion holds for other types of direct US military action. Only 47 percent of respondents in the same survey supported “using the US Navy to break a Chinese blockade around Taiwan, even if this might trigger a direct conflict between the United States and China.” An equal number were opposed. There is clearly no consensus among the American public on committing US troops to Taiwan’s defense.

Strategic consequences

This hesitation is not new or unique to Taiwan. President Franklin D. Roosevelt faced a public strongly opposed to foreign intervention before World War II. Even President George HW Bush did not have majority US support for the use of troops to liberate Kuwait until days before bombs started falling in Baghdad. Both had the benefit of time—months or even years—and ongoing conflicts to build public support for US intervention.

US leaders may not have that luxury today. Taiwan’s ability to defend itself against China hinges on timely US intervention. There will be immediate strategic pressure to intervene, and public support will be crucial to ensure successful military action. Further, US military intervention will likely result in a protracted conflict with untold casualties, which would test US resolve. China will almost certainly attempt to weaken that resolve, injecting disinformation into the public debate through both overt and covert means.

Beijing is also increasingly exploring military options that do not involve a strike on US forces. This would deny Washington a galvanizing event, such as Pearl Harbor or Sputnik, that would quickly change public opinion. If the public reaction to the war in Ukraine is any indication, Chinese military action alone will not sway a skeptical public. In July 2021, seven months before Russia’s invasion, 50 percent of Americans supported sending US troops to Ukraine “if Russia invades the rest of Ukraine.” By mid-2022, six months after Russia’s invasion, only 38 percent did.

Closing the credibility gap

Public opinion is not fixed. Taiwan certainly has a part to play in convincing the United States of its will and ability to fight. But if elected leaders in the United States want to continue to deter Chinese military action, they must lead the American public by deploying a clear, bipartisan, and principled messaging campaign.

Clear messaging: Americans are getting mixed signals on China and Taiwan. This year alone has seen delays in the implementation of the TikTok ban, the placement of 20 percent tariffs on Taiwanese goods, the loosening of export restrictions on certain advanced semiconductors to China, and a refocusing of the National Security Strategy on the Western Hemisphere. Even if some of these policies are important for executing the broader US foreign policy mission, taken together, they muddle public perceptions of US policy toward China and Taiwan. Meanwhile, some elected officials are also advocating a US global retrenchment. Regardless of the merits of this vision, it weakens the credibility of US threats to use military force over Taiwan.

Admittedly, elected officials have a tough needle to thread: Too much clarity risks undermining strategic ambiguity. But there is a difference between strategic ambiguity and strategic confusion. While deterrence is a careful balance, if elected officials truly believe it is eroding, then there is more upside to a clearer public messaging campaign coordinated between the White House and Congress.

Bipartisan messaging: The war in Ukraine highlights the importance of ensuring that messaging around conflicts remains bipartisan. In March 2022, a month after the start of the war, 79 percent of Americans supported sending US military aid to Ukraine. Three years later, support dropped to 52 percent, driven largely by a fifty-percentage-point decline among Republicans. These swings demonstrate how rapid shifts in partisan framing can influence public opinion.

Elected officials of both parties committed to defending Taiwan must anticipate this if they want to build and maintain support for Taipei among the American public. They must speak strongly, clearly, and consistently about defending Taiwan, and not fall victim to the political winds of the moment. Doing so will not be easy, but overcoming short-term political incentives will be key to convincing China that the United States can maintain the will to fight.

Principled messaging: Much of today’s messaging emphasizes policy-forward arguments: Taiwan’s role in the semiconductor industry, its geostrategic location, and the impact a successful Chinese invasion would have on the US alliance system. While these may be strong arguments in policy circles, they have not resonated with many Americans.

To sway skeptical publics, past presidents appealed to their consciences. In the runup to the Gulf War, Bush did not highlight the value of Kuwaiti oil; he emphasized the fight against aggression and for “a new world order.” Roosevelt did not emphasize the geopolitical risk of a German-dominated Europe; he christened the United States the “arsenal of democracy” and roused the public to action in defense of the “four essential human freedoms.” These were not trite messages. Americans were challenged to fight for a particular vision of the world, and it worked. Bush shifted public opinion by 16 percentage points in a month to favor intervention, and Roosevelt helped shift public opinion by nearly 40 percentage points between 1939 and 1941, well before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Americans step up when inspired by principled goals.

The stakes

Polls cannot perfectly predict how Americans will respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, but they can provide clues about the public mood. Polling has shown that Americans are receptive to messages from their leaders. During wars over past century, US public support for the government’s preferred policies depended on how elected leaders communicated with the American public.

Beijing’s leaders know how to read American public opinion polling, too. If they perceive a lack of American public consensus on Taiwan’s defense, the United States’ ability to deter Chinese military action will be undermined. But if American elected leaders can simultaneously improve US military capabilities and rally public support for the defense of Taiwan, they can strengthen the United States’ cross-strait policy for years to come.

Lieutenant Phillip M. Ramirez is a military SkillBridge fellow for Forward Defense in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

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To curb violence in Nigeria, the US should offer Abuja carrots, not sticks

Haleigh Bartos, John Chin, and Julien Derroitte — Wed, 17 Dec 2025 19:25:19 +0000

Late last month, following two mass abductions of schoolchildren by armed groups, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu declared a nationwide state of emergency. He also launched a working group to coordinate and deepen security cooperation with the United States. These moves came after US President Donald Trump’s redesignation of Nigeria as a “country of particular concern” on October 31, reportedly in response to a Fox News report on the killings of Christians in the West African nation. Trump went so far as to instruct the US military to prepare for “action” against Islamist groups and other insurgents targeting Christian populations in Nigeria. Nearly a month after Trump’s redesignation, Reuters reported that the United States was still considering sanctions and military action to jolt Nigeria’s government into better protecting Christians.

There are compelling reasons for the United States to increase its footprint in Nigeria, but fears of a genocide against Nigeria’s Christian population are unfounded. In fact, both Christians and Muslims are victims of violence and terrorism in Nigeria, as Trump’s own senior advisor for Arab and African affairs, Massad Boulos, has noted. If the United States is genuinely interested in helping the Nigerian government address violence and terrorism, then it must change course. After all, applying pressure on Nigeria risks driving it toward greater economic dependence on China or deeper military reliance on Russia, as has occurred with some of Nigeria’s Sahelian neighbors in recent years.

Why Nigeria matters

Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, is a major oil producer, and has the potential to become an African superpower. Contrary to the trajectory of many Sahel states in recent years, Abuja stands as a bulwark against further destabilization in West Africa and is a leader within the Economic Community of West African States. Though the country experienced democratic backsliding under former President Muhammadu Buhari from 2015 to 2023, Nigeria has been an electoral democracy since 1999—and it remains politically stable despite last month’s unconfirmed coup plot and military reshuffle.

Among African countries, Nigeria had the most favorable view of the United States in 2025, according to surveys by the Pew Research Center. While US favorability ratings in Kenya have dropped by double digits over the past year, Nigerian favorability ratings have remained relatively stable. Last year, two-thirds of Nigerians expressed confidence that Trump would do the right thing in world affairs, putting him three points ahead of former US President Joe Biden. By applying overt pressure in dealing with Nigeria, the United States would risk alienating a key regional partner whose population still expresses confidence in US leadership.

Moreover, if US ties with Nigeria were to deteriorate, this could provide an opening for China or Russia to gain influence. The Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity Index shows a steep rise in Chinese influence in Nigeria over the past decade and a half. China has become Nigeria’s largest trading partner, and Nigeria is one of the most active participants in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Last September, Tinubu met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, where the two leaders formally elevated China-Nigeria relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”

Russia, too, has increased its influence over Nigeria in the past decade, signing a military cooperation agreement with Abuja in late 2021. In May 2025, the head of Nigeria’s military visited Moscow for discussions with top Russian military officials. Russia offered additional weaponry and training, which the Nigerian military saw as a reaffirmation of Russian support. Following Trump’s comments about potential US military action in Nigeria, Russia warned that such a step could escalate global tensions.

Given these dynamics, US pressure on Nigeria could backfire, inadvertently driving the country into the arms of Russia and China. This would ultimately weaken US influence in a strategically vital region and mirror the path of some members of the Alliance of Sahel States—a bloc comprising Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—that have come to depend on Moscow for security and on Beijing for economic support.

Surveying political violence in Nigeria

Violence is a big problem in Nigeria, but it’s also a complex one. It’s local and it’s regional, occurring both between groups and within them. To shape effective US policy, it is important to understand the country’s complex landscape of political violence.

Nigeria ranks sixth among countries most afflicted by terrorism, according to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project lists Nigeria as one of ten countries globally—and three in Africa—experiencing “extreme” levels of conflict. As the charts below show, political violence in Nigeria has grown significantly since 2020, reaching all-time highs in 2025, though fatalities have not increased proportionally.

Political violence in Nigeria has risen—though fatalities have not grown at the same rate

Political violence in Nigeria Demonstrations in Nigeria Fatalities in Nigeria

Source: ACLED, accessed November 1, 2025

Terrorism in the northeast

The terrorist group Boko Haram has been militarily active in Nigeria’s northeastern states since 2009. The group’s violent attacks surged in 2014 and 2015, after it infamously abducted 276 schoolgirls in the town of Chibok and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). However, internal disputes prompted the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) to split from Boko Haram by 2016. Since then, an inter-jihadist turf war has been waged, leaving Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau dead in 2021. In 2024, armed conflict involving the two groups killed nearly 1,400 people, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)—and in 2025, they attempted at least twenty ambushes on military positions in Nigeria’s northeastern Borno State. On November 17, ISWAP militants claimed to have captured and killed a Nigerian brigadier general.

Banditry and kidnappings in the northwest

Nigeria’s northwest is a hub for criminal violence. Kidnappings in this region and throughout Nigeria are generally carried out by criminal gangs rather than ideologically motivated groups. In November, twenty-five schoolchildren were kidnapped in Kebbi State in northwest Nigeria and fifty-two more in Niger State in the country’s Middle Belt region. In March 2024, militants kidnapped 280 schoolchildren in the northwest state of Kaduna. Ansaru, a Boko Haram offshoot, is also active in this region. It is responsible for a series of kidnappings for ransoms and attacks against the Nigerian government.

Middle Belt violence

The crisis in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, one of the country’s most ethnically diverse regions, is mostly driven by farmer-herder conflicts. Violence in the Middle Belt occurs primarily between ethno-religious groups amid disputes over resources and land. These conflicts have long and complex roots, exacerbated by climate change and desertification. However, conflating violence by primarily Muslim Fulani herders against mostly Christian farmers with jihadist violence has, in part, led to misconceptions of a “Christian genocide” in the country. In some years, pastoral violence has indeed resulted in more fatalities than Boko Haram-ISWAP insurgencies—for instance, in 2018. However, this was not the case in 2025.

Oil militancy and piracy

Decentralized networks of oil militants, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), have attacked oil infrastructure and kidnapped oil workers in Nigeria’s southeast for two decades. While less threatening than in the 2000s, oil militants remain active, as evidenced by a MEND attack on an oil facility earlier this year. Piracy off Nigeria’s coast, once more severe than Somali piracy, has declined due to shipping security measures, but both pirates and militants continue to evolve and collaborate whenever opportunities arise.

Separatist troubles

Aiming to restore the short-lived Republic of Biafra, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) was established in 2014. Protesting the marginalization of the Igbo people, IPOB’s militant wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), has waged a low-level insurgency against the Nigerian government. In 2024, this conflict caused about two hundred fatalities, according to UCDP data. On November 6, just days after Trump’s statements about Nigeria, IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu appealed to the US president to investigate state-sponsored killings of Christians in eastern Nigeria. On November 20, Kanu was sentenced to life in prison for terrorism, raising the risk of further clashes between the ESN and security forces.

Neighboring problems

In neighboring Mali, the deadliest Salafi jihadist terrorist group, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), continues to expand its influence. JNIM launched its first attack in Nigeria’s Kwara State on October 28, killing one soldier. Of additional concern are potential links between JNIM and Ansaru. In late August, Nigerian security officials arrested two Ansaru leaders who allegedly underwent substantial training from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, now a part of JNIM. Boko Haram also operates in Cameroon’s Far North region.

How the United States can support Nigeria

Nigeria faces major security challenges, but carrots, rather than sticks, are more likely to succeed when it comes to US-Nigeria security cooperation. Two primary areas for strategic cooperation should be prioritized:

First, help professionalize Nigeria’s security services. A new US-supported working group presents opportunities for increased engagement with Nigerian military and security forces. This can help Nigeria build a force that appreciates the importance of professionalization, training, and respect for human rights. In late November, Nigeria’s national security advisor met with US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth in Washington. According to a State Department official, the United States is considering an “expansive” engagement plan, including intelligence sharing. Given Nigeria’s record of operational mishaps—including incidents that have killed civilians—this is an opportunity for the United States to help train the Nigerian military on intelligence analysis and mission planning.

Similarly, the United States can support Nigeria as it incorporates advanced technology into its military. In recent years, the country has expanded its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but there are risks to such rapid UAV adoption. In fact, the proliferation of drone technology can exacerbate domestic conflicts—and Nigeria is no exception. Between 2017 and 2023, at least three hundred Nigerian civilians were killed in Nigerian air force strikes. Extensive training and engagement, potentially including better communication systems and intelligence integration, could reduce casualties.

In addition to broader military engagement, the United States has pursued specialized partnerships with Nigerian forces. Last year, for instance, the US Coast Guard proposed a partnership with the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, and in the past, US special forces have trained the so-called Special Boat Service, a special forces unit of the Nigerian Navy—though this hasn’t occurred since 2021. Such efforts can both strengthen the integrity of the bilateral relationship and professionalize Nigerian forces. This cooperation can also help shape the force into a pro-Western military and build relationships between Nigerian and US soldiers that could foster future collaboration.

Second, support anti-corruption efforts. Nigeria’s security challenges exist within a context of widespread government corruption, which fuels the grievances of various rebel groups. In Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, Nigeria ranks 140 out of 180 countries, with 180 indicating the highest level of perceived corruption. For many Nigerians, working toward changing this status quo is a priority—and both the US administration and the Nigerian government should keep that in mind. Security cooperation alone isn’t enough. There must also be political action that improves government performance and accountability more broadly—something the United States could assist with. Recently, the Nigerian president warned public officials about corruption and government theft, opening the door for the United States to offer support for and encourage anti-corruption programs.

Despite its myriad security challenges, Nigeria remains a major regional power. Trump is not wrong to focus on the country, but a punitive approach or unauthorized military action risks missing key opportunities to deepen engagement. If the United States relies solely on sanctions and threats, then it may find itself on the outside looking in. A more effective strategy is to engage Nigeria from within—offering carrots rather than sticks.

Haleigh Bartos is an associate professor of the practice in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. She teaches courses on policy writing and national security at Carnegie Mellon University.

John Chin is an assistant teaching professor of political science in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. He is the lead author of the Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups D’état, which was named one of the best historical materials published in 2022-2023 by the American Library Association.

Julien Derroitte is completing a BA in architecture with dual minors in international relations and political science and in American politics and law at Carnegie Mellon University.

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‘Putin is lying’: Zelenskyy visits front to expose false claims of Russian gains

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 16 Dec 2025 23:00:14 +0000

According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the invasion of Ukraine is going entirely according to plan, with Russian troops advancing everywhere and conquering all before them. This swaggering stance is intended to bolster Russian support for the war while demoralizing Ukrainians and deterring Kyiv’s partners. Most of all, it is designed to secure US President Donald Trump’s support for a Kremlin-friendly peace by convincing him that Russian victory is inevitable.

In order to maintain this air of inevitability, Putin stands accused of routinely inflating Russian battlefield achievements. At a time when Kyiv is already coming under mounting pressure to make painful concessions, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is clearly conscious of the dangers posed by these exaggerated claims. In a bid to expose the Kremlin’s disinformation efforts, Zelenskyy traveled personally to the front lines in eastern Ukraine last week to visit a city that Putin and his colleagues have repeatedly bragged of seizing.

Zelenskyy’s trip to Kupyansk came amid a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in the vicinity that resulted in significant gains. The selfie video he recorded during his visit was masterclass in wartime messaging that debunked Putin’s boasts while also underlining Ukraine’s continued ability to defeat Russia on the battlefield. “Putin publicly lied, claiming that Russian forces had already taken the city. So I went to Kupyansk myself to show the world that Putin is lying,” the Ukrainian leader commented. “We must keep exposing every single Russian falsehood because truth restores justice.”

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Kupyansk is a strategically important city located close to the Russian border in northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region. It was occupied by Russian troops in the initial stages of the full-scale invasion before being liberated during Ukraine’s September 2022 counteroffensive. In recent months, the city has once again become a key target for the advancing Russian army, with Putin and his generals announcing the capture of Kupyansk on multiple occasions.

Putin’s proclamations of victory in Kupyansk began in late October, when he issued an invitation to international journalists and promised to provide them with safe passage to witness the encirclement of Ukrainian units trapped in the city. Days later, he told a meeting of Russia’s National Security Council that Kupyansk was “practically in the hands of Russian forces,” with victorious troops engaged in mopping up operations. “The city’s future has already been determined,” Putin stated.

On November 20, Russia’s top general Valery Gerasimov informed Putin that Russian forces had established full control over Kupyansk. The following day, Putin invoked the alleged fall of the city in an attempt to project Russian strength and intimidate Ukraine. “If Kyiv does not want to discuss President Trump’s proposals and refuses it, then both they and the European warmongers should understand the events that took place in Kupyansk will inevitably be repeated in other key areas of the front,” he warned.

Similarly bold Russian statements continued into the current month. On December 2, Putin remarked that Kupyansk had been under Russian occupation “for several weeks now,” and accused the Ukrainian authorities of being completely detached from reality. In fact, it is now apparent that Ukrainian assessments of the battle were broadly accurate, while Putin was guilty of spinning fantasies about the imaginary conquest of Kupyansk. Speaking on the outskirts of the evidently unconquered city, Zelenskyy openly mocked the Kremlin dictator’s dishonesty. “The Russians have had a lot to say about Kupyansk,” he commented. “The reality speaks for itself.”

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Zelenskyy’s latest front line appearance was much more than a high stakes photo opportunity or a chance to troll the Kremlin. In his selfie video, the Ukrainian leader acknowledged the importance of challenging false Russian narratives and stressed the need to shape international perceptions of the war in order to strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position. “Today, achieving results on the front line is crucial so that Ukraine can achieve results in diplomacy,” he noted. “This is exactly how it works: All our strong positions within the country translate into strong positions in the negotiations to end the war.”

Ukraine’s recent gains in the Battle of Kupyansk do not alter the country’s precarious position at various other points along the vast front lines of Europe’s largest armed conflict since World War II. Nevertheless, Zelenskyy was right to shine a spotlight on the city. His headline-grabbing selfie video served as a timely reminder that Putin is a proven liar whose word cannot be trusted. It also confirmed that contrary to Kremlin propaganda, the Ukrainian army is far from collapse and remains a formidable fighting force.

These are exactly the messages Ukraine needs to convey to the current US administration. Donald Trump seems remarkably susceptible to Putin’s portrayal of Russia as an irresistible military force, and has repeatedly suggested that Ukraine should accept a Kremlin-friendly peace or risk destruction. The facts on the ground simply do not support this defeatist assessment.

While the Russian military holds the overall initiative and is currently advancing, it is grinding forward at glacial pace while suffering catastrophic losses. Nobody understands this better than Putin himself, who must be acutely aware that he would not need to exaggerate Russian gains and invent new triumphs if his invasion had not yielded such underwhelming results at so high a cost.

Last week’s front line visit by the Ukrainian leader underscored the fact that Russian victory is anything but inevitable. The military outlook for 2026 is actually far more nuanced. With enough international support, there is good reason to conclude that the Ukrainian army could replicate its recent Kupyansk success elsewhere and eventually stem the tide of Russia’s invasion. This is a realistic recipe for peace. Indeed, it may be the only way to pressure Moscow into serious negotiations. Putin wants the world to believe he cannot be beaten on the battlefield, but the Russian troops retreating from Kupyansk would likely tell a different story.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The only winner from Ukrainian wartime elections would be Putin

Yuriy Boyechko — Tue, 16 Dec 2025 19:34:10 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is once again facing pressure to hold wartime elections after US President Donald Trump accused the Ukrainian leader of using Russia’s invasion to postpone a vote and suggested it was now time for the country to go to the polls. Zelenskyy has responded to Trump’s recent comments by expressing his readiness to organize elections in the next two to three months, while calling on Ukraine’s Western partners to play a role in preparations. “I’m asking now, and I’m stating this openly, for the US to help me, perhaps together with our European colleagues, to ensure security for the elections,” he said on December 10.

Zelenskyy’s commitment to democratic principles is commendable, but he should nevertheless resist international pressure to rush into wartime elections. Attempting to hold a national vote at a time when the country is under relentless Russian bombardment and while millions of Ukrainians remain displaced by the war would not be a demonstration of democracy; it would be a strategic blunder that could hand a propaganda victory to Moscow.

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The issue of potential wartime elections in Ukraine has been raised on numerous occasions since spring 2024 when Zelenskyy’s presidential term officially ended, with Russia frequently referencing the absence of elections in Ukraine as part of efforts to undermine the legitimacy of the current Ukrainian authorities. These Kremlin claims of illegitimacy are inaccurate. The Ukrainian Constitution specifically forbids elections while martial law is in place, which has been the case in Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

This constitutional barrier to wartime elections is not a mere legal loophole or a convenient excuse. It is a foundational safeguard designed to ensure the continuity of governance during times of national crisis. Of course, it is possible to argue that the relevant legislation could be revised. But any attempt to change the Ukrainian Constitution would risk a constitutional crisis in the middle of a major war. It would divert the attention of Ukraine’s parliament, the country’s judicial system, and the public away from the war effort, with obvious potential for political infighting and domestic instability.

The constitutional arguments against a wartime election are convincing, but the main reason why Ukraine cannot go to the polls while the Russian invasion continues is because any such vote would fall far short of recognized democratic standards in terms of freedom, fairness, and representation. A truly democratic election requires a level playing field, security for participants, and the ability for all eligible citizens to cast their ballots. None of these conditions can be met in today’s Ukraine.

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Security problems alone should be enough to rule out the idea of a wartime ballot. With Russia bombing civilian targets across Ukraine on a daily basis, candidates would be unable to stage any public campaign gatherings in safety. Likewise, polling stations would become high-value targets for Russian drones and missiles, creating unacceptable risks for thousands of election workers and millions of voters.

The logistical challenges of a wartime vote would be similarly overwhelming. Millions of Ukrainians are currently located abroad as refugees in the European Union and elsewhere. Millions more are internally displaced inside Ukraine. This creates huge issues for voter registries, which would need to be completely revised and updated. Furthermore, the voices of Ukrainian citizens living under Russian occupation would be silenced entirely, disenfranchising a large portion of the overall electorate and further undermining the credibility of any vote.

If Zelenskyy chooses to proceed with a wartime election, the potential for domestic political destabilization would be huge. An election held under wartime conditions would inevitably be a flawed process, with millions unable to vote and security restrictions placing limits on meaningful campaigning opportunities. Regardless of the outcome, Russia would seize on these flaws in order to declare the results illegitimate, sow internal discord, and undermine the credibility of the Ukrainian government in the eyes of the international community. The resulting instability could prove a far greater threat to Ukraine’s survival than any perceived democratic deficit.

According to his country’s constitution, Zelenskyy is the legally elected leader of Ukraine and will remain so until conditions in the country allow for the relaxation of martial law restrictions and the organization of genuinely free and fair elections. This will only become possible once a comprehensive and verifiable ceasefire is in place. Until the bombs stop falling, the Ukrainian government’s priority must remain the defense of the nation.

Ukrainians are fighting to defend their democracy against Russian authoritarianism, but they are also in no rush to hold a wartime vote. Instead, opinion polls consistently demonstrate that most Ukrainians oppose the idea of any elections while active hostilities continue. When the right moment arrives, Ukrainians will be the first to demand their democratic rights and will insist on new elections. However, they understand that the right moment has not yet arrived.

Yuriy Boyechko is CEO of Hope For Ukraine.

Europe’s battle over Russia’s blocked assets is nearing its endgame

Charles Lichfield — Tue, 16 Dec 2025 15:32:41 +0000

WASHINGTON—Will this be the week where Europe takes its boldest step yet on Russia’s immobilized assets?

The prize would be substantial. A financial commitment of €210 billion ($247 billion)—to be spread across regular spending, defense, and reconstruction—would be a lifeline to Ukraine. It could even enable Kyiv to resist pressure to accept a possible bad deal that would set it up for further Russian aggression. Take it from someone who’s argued against confiscating the assets: It’s a risk worth taking.

Shortly after Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Group of Seven (G7) and like-minded partners imposed sanctions on Russia that immobilized between $300 billion and $350 billion in Russian central bank assets held in their jurisdictions. Most turned up in the European Union (EU), where the sanction underpinning the immobilization has had to be renewed every six months. Slowly, the EU has explored ways to mobilize their value to boost its support to Ukraine, first by siphoning off interest income, then by channeling that interest income into repayments on the $50 billion of the G7’s Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans that have largely spared Kyiv from cash flow issues this year. The EU has resisted calls to take the irreversible step of seizing the assets.

Now, as Ukraine looks likely to run out of money this coming spring, the European Commission is trying, with the support of key member states including France and Germany, to switch to a “reparations loan,” which mobilizes the principal now. If EU leaders agree to the plan this week, the scheme will not confiscate sovereign assets. Russia’s central bank and its National Welfare Fund will still be able to log into their proverbial online banking portals, and their claim on money stored in the EU will still be valid. And, importantly, they will still be unable to move the money.

What will change is that the international central securities depository Euroclear, along with other institutions holding smaller piles of immobilized Russian cash than Euroclear does, will be able to swap this for zero-interest loans. Liberating the accumulated cash avoids the need to borrow money on the markets in the coming months for Ukraine’s needs. According to a document the European Commission produced to coax EU member states to support its preferred plan, if the bloc does not pass the “reparations loan” scheme, then the interest payments on new borrowing to support Ukraine would cost EU member states at least five billion euros per year. And finding a consensus on more joint borrowing may prove even more difficult.

This Thursday and Friday, EU heads of state and government will meet to discuss and vote on this plan. The meeting might not settle every question to do with the complex scheme, but it will reveal whether the plan has the necessary support to move forward. With another vote scheduled on the controversial EU-Mercosur free trade agreement for the same meeting, there are so many moving parts that it is reminiscent of some of the truly memorable summits during the Greek sovereign debt crisis, Brexit, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The Council Conclusions—which may only be published late at night on Friday or even Saturday—will be pored over down to the last comma.

What’s in the plan

The details are important. This vote follows the important EU decision last week to use Article 122, the “emergency” provision of the EU’s treaty, to make the release to Moscow of Russia’s immobilized assets conditional on a peace plan and Russia paying reparations. While this move lifted a key hurdle to the reparations loan, it doesn’t mean the plan is a done deal. Belgium, where most of the assets are held, has objected to the plan, and Italy, Czechia, Bulgaria, and Malta have called on the EU to use alternative funding arrangements for Ukraine instead.

One possible reason for this objection can be found in rumors that the Trump administration has told European capitals that it does not want the scheme to go ahead. One of the points in the Trump administration’s recently leaked twenty-eight-point peace plan noted that $100 billion of the immobilized assets should be returned to Russia with another $100 billion for “US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine,” with the United States receiving “50% of the profits from this venture.”

The European leaders signaling skepticism about the plan may earn themselves some brownie points in Washington, but they must also understand that the Trump administration’s alternative plan was buried by the decision they supported last week to invoke Article 122. Henceforth, the immobilization cannot be lifted until Russia pays Ukraine reparations.

What Belgium is thinking

The list of capitals expressing skepticism isn’t yet long enough to block the plans. But the arithmetic of qualified majority voting—which requires 55 percent of member states representing 65 percent of the EU’s population—isn’t the full story either. A “no” vote by Belgium could imply that member states can be forced to take steps that they perceive to be against their interests. So the main goal of the additional guarantees that are reportedly being prepared for Belgium is to convince its prime minister, Bart De Wever, at least to abstain from the vote.

At the same time, De Wever’s objections to the scheme should not be dismissed out of hand. Much was made of his comments earlier this month suggesting that Ukrainian victory was a “a fairy tale, a complete illusion.” There are indeed few examples of reparations being paid by a country that has not lost a war to a country that has not won it. The scheme being discussed relies on there being some chance that Moscow will pay reparations, so it is not unreasonable to raise how likely this is—even if the initial draft offered to mutualize the risk so that the principal would be repaid by all EU member states and not Ukraine if Russia doesn’t pay.

Russia is already wielding the threat of asymmetric retaliation against Belgium. Some of these risks also deserve to be mutualized, such as if Russia confiscates assets under Euroclear’s custodianship that have been immobilized inside Russia. While Euroclear has already built up a partial buffer against this, a stronger commitment by all EU member states would be fair. However, Belgium should not expect to be compensated for any asymmetric attack it may face, such as drone incursions. The EU should face the risks together but should not sponsor Belgium for doing its part against this collective threat.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Prime Minister Bart De Wever, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz meet in Brussels on December 5, 2025. (BELGA via Reuters Connect)

On December 5, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who has invested a lot of political capital in this scheme, and European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen met with De Wever to discuss these issues over dinner. The outcome appears constructive. The technical work to provide Belgium with assurances on some of its concerns has reportedly continued apace. Germany has even signaled that it is willing to cover more of the risk than its share of EU gross national product normally dictates, but there is still quite a way to go.

De Wever’s steeliness has fed a wave of Belgian pluckiness, and the derogatory press speculation on his motives has made reaching a deal more difficult. The unlikely prime minister’s entire career has been built on Flemish nationalism and yet even Francophones trust he is standing up for Belgium’s national interest. And so, it is vital to provide him with enough legal and financial assurances. The institutions in Luxembourg, France, and the United Kingdom that hold smaller amounts of the immobilized assets should also be required to make the same move to make a U-turn palatable for Belgium. There are, moreover, solid arguments available to them. Even in friendly jurisdictions, Russia will struggle to prove its assets have been seized thanks to the reparations loan’s design, which does not constitute confiscation.

Where the money will go

What the cash is used for is an important and underdiscussed question, and it is bound to come up during the summit this week. The figure that would be made available to Ukraine next year has varied because of the number of parameters at play. Of the €95 billion allocated to macro financial assistance, €45 billion will actually have to be used to repay the G7’s ERA loans, which were meant to be repaid using interest revenue generated by the cash now being put to work in a different way. The remaining €155 billion allocated to supporting Ukraine’s defense industrial capacities should remain the plan even if there is a peace deal, as the money will provide Ukraine with the resources to rebuild and maintain a credible defense. Within this portion of the budget, it is very reasonable for there to be a quota devoted to supporting Europe’s defense industrial base. The arguments this week will likely focus on the level of the threshold.

So how will this week play out? European Council meetings featuring heads of state and government from all twenty-seven member states are described as historic a little too often. But what’s decided in the coming days will say a lot about how the EU deals with a world in which it must fend for itself.

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Bosnia’s forgotten war is still with us

Thom Shanker — Thu, 11 Dec 2025 21:30:14 +0000

THE BIG STORY | December 11, 2025

Bosnia’s forgotten war is still with us

Thirty years after the Dayton Accords brought peace to Bosnia, a former war correspondent investigates how a conflict that ended in 1995 still shapes warfare and world affairs in 2025.

By Thom Shanker

Before Vladimir Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine spawned the largest war in Europe since World War II, that grim distinction belonged to a conflict that accompanied the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s—the fighting to carve up or hold onto Bosnia-Herzegovina by Eastern Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croatians, and Muslim Bosniaks. In Bosnia, less than fifty years after the horror of the Nazi “final solution,” genocide returned to Europe.

The Bosnian war was fought with medieval tactics and twentieth-century weapons. Its signatures were siege, mass expulsion, the burning of villages and leveling of houses of worship, and mass rape and mass murder. The carnage ended thirty years ago this week, on December 14, 1995, with the signing of the US-brokered Dayton Accords.

The Balkans produce more history than can be consumed, goes the aphorism usually attributed to Winston Churchill, and that is true of the Bosnian war. Yet too many in the United States and around the world—though certainly not in the Balkans—have consigned the conflict to history or forgotten about it entirely.

Several decades on, the war’s consequences and lessons still have influence and resonance in many areas of modern warfare, including conflict diplomacy, intelligence gathering, war reporting, humanitarian relief missions, justice for war criminals, and the application of military power. In some instances, the Bosnian war has had concrete, lasting impact on more recent conflicts. In others, the war has offered relevant lessons that have nevertheless gone unheeded.

In reflecting on my nearly three years covering the Bosnian conflict for The Chicago Tribune, and the ways in which it has stayed with me in the three decades since, I have concluded that when you go off to cover a war, the war covers you. That is true not just for the journalists who risked all to witness and report on the conflict, but also for those who worked to provide assistance to civilians at risk, negotiate a peace plan, enforce an eventual cease-fire, and bring some measure of justice to the region when the guns finally fell silent. And it is true for all of us—even those with no firsthand experience of the conflict—in ways that should be more fully appreciated.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia united six multi-ethnic, multi-religious republics. As they began declaring independence amid the collapse of Communist rule across the Soviet Bloc, ethnonationalist feeling surged. In 1990 a classified CIA report predicted the chain of events that would add the phrase “ethnic cleansing” to the lexicon of war: “Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within one year, and will probably dissolve within two … with attendant and bloody shifts in population.” (Map data courtesy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia)

Conflict diplomacy

Militaries do not win wars. Militaries set the conditions—or, more often, impose the conditions—under which governments and their representatives end wars.

That is the conclusion of an American diplomat who played a pivotal role in ending the fighting in Bosnia—Christopher Hill, who served as a deputy to the late Richard Holbrooke, chief architect of the Dayton Accords.

“People felt that it was our willingness to use force that ultimately was the success at Dayton,” Hill told me, referring to the punishing bombing campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, that NATO carried out on Bosnian Serb targets in late summer 1995 after Bosnian Serb troops massacred eight thousand Muslims of fighting age around the town of Srebrenica. “There’s no question that we used force—but force was in support of diplomacy. It wasn’t the other way around.”

Hill, whose résumé includes posts as US ambassador to Serbia, the Republic of Macedonia, Iraq, South Korea, and Poland, and special envoy to Kosovo, identified a key element beyond military power that forced signatures on the peace plan from leaders of three warring republics—Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia. (The leadership of the self-declared Republika Srpska inside Bosnia were deliberately excluded.)

US envoy Richard Holbrooke checks the time on his deputy Christopher Hill’s watch after landing in Sarajevo October 5, 1995. Holbrooke, Hill, and other US officials shuttled between Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade through the summer and fall of 1995, eventually succeeding in getting the three warring factions around a negotiating table at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, where they hammered out the peace accords that would end the war in December. (Oleg Popov/Reuters)

“We ended the war on terms that left no one terribly happy—but everyone got something from it,” Hill said. “We ended it in a way where we understood the equities on all sides. We did not try to create a situation where someone is a total loser and someone is a total winner, because that is just a recipe for more war.”

Hill credited Holbrooke as an example of how sometimes a strong, even overbearing, individual is needed to knock heads of autocratic bullies. The strategy of strong-arm negotiations under pressure of military punishment proved, Hill said, “that American diplomacy is not an oxymoron.”

Hill, who is now a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, grew pensive when assessing why the slaughter in Bosnia was allowed to continue for more than three years before decisive Western action. “Yes, it took a while, obviously, for people to understand that this situation, Bosnia, was making a mockery of a ‘Europe whole and free,’ and at peace. It took a while to realize that if we—the US and our European allies—pulled together instead of finger-pointing, we could get something done. And it ultimately succeeded in halting the killing.”

Underscoring the enduring value of the Atlantic alliance, Hill argued that “relationships between nations extend your reach, rather than inhibit your reach.” At the time of the Bosnian war, he added, “we had trust issues with some countries. But I’ve never seen it like it is today. If we can rebuild trust and a sense that, ‘together, we can do more,’ we can go further.”

The Bosnian war also was a defining moment for Europe. The initial response from European powers when war broke out on their continent in the 1990s was mostly hands-off. Then the Europe-backed United Nations Protection Force that did respond was handcuffed by insufficient personnel, the absence of effective weapons deployments, and rules of engagement distributed across so many capitals that it weighted the power of “no.” But out of that experience—of European capitals standing by powerlessly and watching Washington halt slaughter in Europe’s southeastern corner—came the roots of the still-evolving European common defense, foreign, and security policy, as well as Europe’s efforts to play a much stronger role in helping defend Ukraine than it did in protecting the victims of aggression in Bosnia.

Hill identified another essential ingredient in the success at Dayton in ending the war: “The intelligence was really good. We understood what the Serbs were after. By the way, I didn’t feel that way when I was in Iraq, nor did I feel that way when I was dealing with the North Koreans. But on Bosnia, the intel people really had it right.”

Intelligence gathering

The American intelligence community saw it coming.

A year before fighting broke out in Croatia, and two years before the far bloodier and longer war in Bosnia began, a detailed National Intelligence Estimate predicted with stunning accuracy that Yugoslavia—once a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, peaceful, nonaligned communist country with a standard of living far above its Soviet-bloc neighbors—would convulse with violence: Serbian Eastern Orthodox versus Croatian Catholic versus Bosnian Muslim.

“Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within one year, and will probably dissolve within two,” the National Intelligence Estimate, titled Yugoslavia Transformed, declared—a timeline that proved correct. The report’s only significant error was one of sequencing, as it predicted that violence would most likely start in Serbia’s Muslim region of Kosovo; the Kosovo war did not begin until 1998, after fighting in Croatia ignited in 1991 and in Bosnia in 1992.

Diplomats had been withdrawn, and the United Nations Protection Force proved unable to protect Bosnians, its own troops, or anybody else.

The report, stamped SECRET when it was completed on October 18, 1990, was declassified in 2006, and it now offers a lesson of what good intelligence looks like—even if its assessments did not inspire action by American and Western European leaders, who were hoping to reap the benefits of a peace dividend after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

After all, many Americans could not find Bosnia on a map and did not grasp its importance. US leaders incurred no political cost in looking the other way, certainly not in the early years of the war. The US-led NATO bombing and muscular diplomacy leading to Dayton only occurred after Bosnian Serbs cuffed and humiliated Dutch peacekeepers, and the discovery of the Srebrenica massacre.

The National Intelligence Estimate contained this prophecy: “The most plausible scenario for interrepublic violence is one in which Serbia, assisted by disaffected Serbian minorities in the other republics, moves to reincorporate disputed territory into a greater Serbia, with attendant and bloody shifts in population.”

The report also predicted, correctly, that Serbia would inherit the bulk of the armor and other weapons of the Yugoslav National Army when the central government dissolved, and would cite protection of fellow Serbs in neighboring republics as an excuse to turn those guns on Croatia and Bosnia to carve out a Greater Serbia. (In Croatia, people tended to live in communities that were mostly segregated, and war there was shorter. In Bosnia, as an accidental result of history, the different communities were intermingled.)

The National Intelligence Estimate assessed that a system designed to turn nonaligned Yugoslavia into a porcupine in the event of invasion from the west or the east—the creation of local militias, with command-and-control and plentiful small arms—would allow each minority group to take up arms against the others. That is precisely what happened.

The intelligence in advance of the war in Bosnia contrasts sharply with the community’s work on weapons of mass destruction held by Saddam Hussein, which was used by President George W. Bush to make a case—falsely—for invading Iraq a decade later, in 2003.

Yet three decades after the war in Bosnia and two decades after the invasion of Iraq, in the weeks before Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the intelligence community again showed what getting it right looks like—and, this time, how good intelligence could be put to good use in advance of conflict erupting. The CIA director at the time, William Burns, was a veteran diplomat who had served as ambassador to Moscow, and who often said that his insights into gathering and assessing intelligence stemmed from his decades as a consumer of intelligence at the State Department. With a diplomat’s sense for what it would take to rally a coalition to counter the Kremlin, he declassified and shared intelligence—with Ukraine, with European allies, and with the US media—predicting a Russian invasion. The world was warned, again. But, in an echo of what transpired in Bosnia, too few accepted the truth about Putin’s imminent intentions for Ukraine until blood was shed.

“The real action was deep in the provinces, far from the cameras,” Newsday reporter Roy Gutman recalled. To cover the Bosnian war, reporters accepted new levels of risk, crossing heavily guarded checkpoints and closed borders. The author’s press passes, atlas, and Bosnian papers are pictured here.

War reporting

Bosnia was a war crime masquerading as a war.

That dawned on Roy Gutman, who covered the conflict for Long Island’s Newsday newspaper. Like so many others in the band of brothers and sisters who took immense risks to relay the tragedy in Bosnia to the world, he devoted much of his time to tracking artillery, mortars, and troop movements. (As ever, since Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, scribes chase the sound of fighting.)

“That fighting was right in front of you,” Gutman told me. “Bosnian Serbs were doing normal military operations in some ways, like the siege of Sarajevo—but the real action was deep in the provinces, far from the cameras, where they were cleansing the population by using methods of terror—war crimes.”

Gutman was the first to widely publicize the Bosnian Serbs’ chain of concentration camps in Bosnia, where the mostly Muslim detainees were deposited after transport by bus, by forced march, or in cattle cars to be tortured and murdered. He wrote about the Serb campaign of systematic mass rape of Muslim girls and women and documented the destruction of mosques.

“I decided that was going to be my coverage, not just the bang-bang,” Gutman said. “I was going to cover the expulsions, the deportation of the populations—but looking carefully for examples where you can prove that the government is involved and responsible.” Gutman received the 1993 Pulitzer Prize in international reporting for “his courageous and persistent reporting that disclosed atrocities and other human rights violations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.” (He shared the prize that year with John Burns of The New York Times, who put the Bosnian war on the map for global readers with his heartfelt stories documenting the siege of Sarajevo and the destruction of what once had been an Olympic city and a multicultural gem.)

In earlier conflicts, the press often traveled with military units, and could hope for assistance in emergencies from those forces or their embassy. Not in Bosnia. Diplomats had been withdrawn, and the United Nations Protection Force proved unable to protect Bosnians, its own troops, or anybody else.

The Bosnian conflict accelerated a trend of war reporting becoming increasingly dangerous. Journalists were targeted by snipers, mortars, and artillery, and getting the story often required traversing a series of roadblocks and checkpoints guarded by angry men with guns.

Every time I crossed into Bosnia, I brought a flak jacket with ballistic plates on the front and back (and my name and blood type stenciled on the front), a helmet, food, and a sleeping bag—and made sure that I had filled two five-gallon canisters of fuel in the trunk of my vehicle. Larger news organizations provided their reporters with armored cars and satellite phones. Also required were supplies of Marlboros, Deutsche marks, and whiskey—to bribe your way past Serb militia checkpoints. (After the Tribune’s accounting department initially kicked back my receipts—“We don’t pay for your booze and tobacco”—I created a new category called General Reporting Expenses. One colleague filed his receipts for checkpoint bribes as “chemische Reinigung,” German for dry cleaning.)

To move people out of Sarajevo … we had to sometimes cross, literally, more than thirty checkpoints staffed by different militias, all armed and all ready to shoot.

—Amir Shaviv

Getting to the story also required creativity. Early in the war, when Bosniak refugees reached safety and told of a new and vicious cycle of ethnic cleansing in the east of the republic, Serb forces on the Serbian side of the Drina River shut the border, obviously to assist their Bosnian Serb mates in continuing the violence with no outside witnesses.

At the time a group of us were working with a brilliant interpreter and “fixer,” a local journalist who was enterprising and courageous to the point that we fondly nicknamed her “Mad Alex.” Alex and I once made an appointment at the Bosnian Serb legation in Belgrade. While we were kept waiting in the reception area, we managed to lift a dozen sheets of formal Republika Srpska letterhead. We forged official-looking papers conferring the right to pass first the Serb and then the Bosnian Serb checkpoints on both banks of the Drina. (Think “letters of transit” in the film Casablanca.) Over several days, our band of reporters was the first to document a well-organized offensive to force the expulsion of thousands of Muslims from eastern Bosnia—a brutal ethnic-cleansing campaign accompanied by the looting and torching of their villages, and the toppling of the minarets of their mosques.

Attempts to prevent reporters from witnessing atrocities “is what drew me to Syria later,” Gutman said. “I just saw Bosnia all over again—where all the operations of the war were war crimes. But [Bashar al-Assad] learned the lesson of Bosnia: Don’t let in the media.”

And Putin has learned that lesson too. “On the Ukrainian side of the war, reporters have what looks like almost total freedom, and are doing a really fine job of on-the-ground war reporting,” Gutman said. “How many can go to the Russian side of the lines?”

Humanitarian relief

The fragmentation of Bosnia along ethnic and religious lines challenged the efforts of international relief organizations to an extent that they had rarely faced before—challenges intensified by the large scale and long duration of the conflict.

Many previous relief efforts around the world had followed a model of bringing aid to people in need on one side or the other of identifiable frontlines.

Before Bosnia, large-scale humanitarian aid missions were mostly “dancing with one devil,” said Amir Shaviv of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, or JDC, a relief organization founded in the shadow of World War I.

Instead of negotiating with a single aggressor to funnel relief to a population in need, aid organizations in Bosnia were forced to negotiate with numerous ethnic militias and rogue warlords to deliver help across a terrain contested by three factions, with large Muslim populations pushed from villages across swaths of Bosnia and locked mostly inside the besieged areas of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Zepa, and Bihac.

Shaviv’s title during the three years of the Bosnia relief effort said it all: assistant executive vice-president for special operations of the Joint Distribution Committee—a military-sounding title that reflected the need for strict command-and-control, discretion to the point of secrecy, and negotiations with a criminal lineup of local militia captains.

Refugees evacuate from besieged Srebrenica on March 31, 1993. Tens of thousands of Bosniaks from outlying villages sought refuge in Srebrenica from attacks by Serb militants. In July 1995, Serb forces would sweep into the town, overrun UN-designated safe areas, and massacre eight thousand Muslim men and boys. (Reuters)

“To move people out of Sarajevo and to bring them to safety in Croatia, we had to sometimes cross, literally, more than thirty checkpoints staffed by different militias, all armed and all ready to shoot,” Shaviv recalled when we spoke. “Some wanted money. Others wanted medications, which we happily gave them. Often, a case of whiskey settled it.”

Over the course of the war, JDC evacuated about 2,500 people from besieged Sarajevo. Women, children, and the elderly. Muslims, Christians, and Jews. All of the evacuations, he said, “were accomplished without a single injury or death.”

Many humanitarian aid groups did heroic work in Bosnia. But those identified with one faction or another risked failure at checkpoints operated by a rival group. What was JDC’s secret for success, even as the efforts of other, larger relief organizations were sometimes stymied?

“JDC operated in a nonsectarian, nonpolitical way,” he said. “When we brought food in, they cooked for Jews, Muslims, Christians, anybody. When we took people out, it was also the same thing—same with medicines.”

JDC even established a wireless radio connection after the Sarajevo phone system was destroyed by Serb artillery. Time slots for communicating outside the siege zone were allotted to the range of Sarajevo’s diverse residents.

Shaviv said that one of the Bosnian war’s lessons for today is that relief missions must be designed with stamina and resilience, since contemporary armed conflict seems never-ending and tends to feature complex webs of combatants. There are “no longer ‘slam dunk’ rescue operations” in which “you deal with a regime, execute a swift operation, get your people out—and celebrate,” Shaviv noted.

International law

Rape, enslavement, and the torching of entire villages by invading armies are tactics as old as human history. In the time of the Ancient Greeks, military commanders prayed to their gods atop Olympus for guidance on how to adjudicate whether people, property, and titles were fitting spoils of war. More recently, mortals have tried to legislate against and sit in judgment of war crimes, with varying effectiveness.

The war in Bosnia increased understanding and scrutiny of war crimes and conduct of aggressors. In subsequent conflicts—from Myanmar and Ukraine to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and South Sudan—military acts of mass murder, mass rape, and ethnic cleansing have been identified for what they are: not an expected if horrific part of the battlefield, with spoils going to the victor, but illegal actions that deserve the world’s attention and legal penalties. The term “ethnic cleansing” itself—now a core part of the world’s lexicon for conflict—is a product of the Bosnian war, stemming from the Serbo-Croatian phrase etnicko ciscenje.

“The Bosnia conflict made war crimes as a concept an important part of the global vernacular,” said Diane Orentlicher, a professor of international law at American University who specializes in war crimes tribunals. “The phenomenon is hardly new, but attention to war crimes used to be largely the province of human rights organizations and military lawyers. As a result of the Bosnia conflict, I think awareness of war crimes was globalized.” Orentlicher is the author of Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY’s Impact in Bosnia and Serbia, the definitive account of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as it sought to hold political and military leaders accountable for war crimes.

Until the conclusion of its final case in 2017, the UN-established International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia worked to prosecute those responsible for crimes committed during the Yugoslav wars, including Bosnia’s. (Data courtesy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia)

The UN Security Council established the tribunal in May 1993 with a mandate to prosecute “those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991 and thus contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the region.” The court delivered justice to victims of the Balkans wars by bringing to trial and convicting ninety-three people—Bosniak, Croat, and Serb—including Radovan Karadzic, the political leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military commander. Both are serving life sentences. The mastermind of the wars across the former Yugoslavia, Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic, also was brought to trial at The Hague on charges including genocide, but he died before a verdict was handed down.

While she acknowledges that the court was flawed, Orentlicher said its impact on efforts to deliver justice (however imperfect) after peace (however fragile) continues today.

“The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was the template that provided guidance for all subsequent international and hybrid tribunals, both in a positive and negative way,” she said. “For all its achievements, it wasn’t a perfect tribunal, and tribunals created since then have tried to improve on its example by, for example, enhancing victims’ participation in their work.”

The tribunal raised awareness about specific war crimes, especially the use of sexual violence as a tool of combat.*

“When there were reports of mass rapes in Bosnia, before the ICTY was even created, a global women’s rights movement demanded that these atrocities be prosecuted as war crimes, and their advocacy helped create momentum to create the Yugoslavia tribunal itself,” she added. “So the Bosnia conflict brought unprecedented attention to the issue and helped galvanize global efforts to combat sexual violence in war.”

Military power

With war in Ukraine now overshadowing the Bosnian war as Europe’s largest conflict since 1945, no lessons of the Balkans bloodshed are as relevant today as those on the smart application of military power—when to use it, how much to use, and how to do so with a clear eye on the adversary’s pressure points.

General Wesley Clark was the US Defense Department’s representative to the US negotiating team for Bosnia, and he was by Holbrooke’s side for treacherous trips into and out of Sarajevo and throughout the Dayton peace talks. He returned to the continent in 1997 with one of the military’s most prized assignments: NATO’s supreme allied commander, Europe. In 1999, he oversaw Operation Allied Force, the bombing campaign to punish Milosevic’s Serbia for its cleansing of ethnic Albanians in the province of Kosovo—in some ways, unfinished business from the Bosnian war.

Clark, who is now a member of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors, recalled that following the Dayton Accords, NATO deployed a US-led Implementation Force (or IFOR) into Bosnia that, unlike previous United Nations efforts, went in with armaments that clearly overmatched those of the three warring parties—and, just as importantly, with clear approvals for punishing violators of the peace deal.

“We gave the military more or less unlimited authorization in Bosnia,” Clark said. “We gave the military commander what was essentially a silver-bullet capacity so he could intervene at any time on any issue in any manner he chose. This was necessary to assure that we had US congressional support for the troops that went in—but it was also a powerful warning to the warring factions: No more messing around.”

A forgotten footnote of the IFOR mission was how clearly Serbians, Croatians, and Bosniaks heard the message. Not a single American combat death occurred during the peacekeeping—really peace-enforcement—mission.

We gave the military more or less unlimited authorization in Bosnia … [the US commander] could intervene at any time on any issue in any manner he chose.

—General Wesley Clark

Assessing the war in Ukraine in light of the lessons of Bosnia, Clark argues that the still-tentative proposals for deploying forces to support any armistice in the country should approach a peacekeeping mission with all of the tools required for a warfighting mission in order to deter further aggression. And those forces have to be forward-deployed at whatever border between Ukraine and Russia is set by an agreement, and with clear authorities to deal forcefully with cease-fire violations.

And just as the Dayton Accords required the assent of Serbia’s strongman Milosevic, peace in Ukraine is dependent on one person: Putin.

“The reason Dayton worked was because the Serbs wanted a deal,” Clark said. “Milosevic realized he had reached the end of the line, militarily, in Bosnia.”

In contrast, Putin has not reached that point. “The lesson of Bosnia is that you’re not going to be able to bring the war in Ukraine to an end until Putin thinks he’s losing,” Clark said. “And Putin does not think he’s losing, and right now sees no reason to think he is going to lose.”

What finally brought the vile war in Bosnia to a conclusion was a form of American idealism personified in Holbrooke, “a man who believed passionately in America’s power to do good in the world and to spread—it seems almost quaint today to talk about them—American values.”

That assessment came from Roger Cohen of The New York Times, speaking at an Atlantic Council panel convened by the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative to reflect on risks to journalists and diplomats thirty years after the negotiations in Dayton ended the slaughter.

The horrors of the war drove Holbrooke to Dayton. But so too did values: freedom, democracy, the right of peoples to govern themselves, the sanctity of borders, and the rule of law.

Holbrooke “wanted very much, and fought very hard, to bring that to Bosnia,” Cohen said.

“And if we forget those values, if we lose sight of those values, if we allow those values to be trampled in a way that they die,” Cohen warned, “then I think that will be at once a terrible thing for the world, and a very dangerous one.”

*This sentence was updated December 22 to clarify wording related to the legal definitions of genocide and sexual violence as a tool of combat.

about the author

Thom Shanker covered the war in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995 for The Chicago Tribune, before joining The New York Times as a national security reporter and editor. He directs the Project for Media and National Security at George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs, and is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

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Video footage of Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, filmed May 19, 1994, courtesy of Reuters.

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Russia’s insistence on a defenseless Ukraine betrays Putin’s true intentions

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 11 Dec 2025 08:21:08 +0000

As American, Ukrainian, and European officials continue to debate potential peace plans among themselves, there remains very little to indicate that Russia is genuinely interested in ending the war. On the contrary, many of the Kremlin’s key demands during negotiations appear tailored to facilitate a continuation of the invasion on more favorable terms.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s territorial claims alone should be enough to set off alarm bells. He insists that in order to secure a ceasefire, Ukraine must first hand over the remaining 10 percent of the Donbas region that his troops have failed to seize since the invasion first began eleven years ago.

As the ruler of what is by far the largest country in the world, Putin has no pressing need for the approximately 6600 square kilometers of Donbas territory still under Ukrainian control. Nor does the region contain any particularly important natural resources or historic sites that could justify its present position at the very heart of the peace process.

Putin’s true motivation is not difficult to discern. The unoccupied portion of the Donbas that he now so openly covets may seem relatively inconspicuous on the map, but it plays host to some of Ukraine’s strongest fortifications. Developed over the past decade, this fortress belt represents a formidable obstacle to Moscow’s invasion.

Analysts estimate that it could take years for Russia to occupy the area by force, and would likely cost the Kremlin hundreds of thousands of additional casualties. Beyond the fortress belt, the way would be open for further sweeping Russian advances into central Ukraine and toward Kyiv itself. This vital role in Ukraine’s overall defense explains why Putin is prepared to reduce his demands elsewhere but remains so eager for Kyiv to hand over this particular territory without a fight.

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Among Moscow’s many demands, the biggest red flag of all is the Kremlin’s determination to demilitarize Ukraine and deprive the country of international allies. Ever since the first round of peace talks during the initial months of the war, Putin has consistently sought to impose restrictions on the size of the Ukrainian military and the categories of weapons the country can possess. While recent drafts envision a Ukrainian army of 600,000 troops, the fact that Russia remains so keen on limiting Ukraine’s ability to defend itself is an unambiguous signal of Putin’s bad intentions.

Likewise, the Kremlin’s bitter opposition to continued international support for Ukraine betrays the reality behind Moscow’s current peace posturing. This extends far beyond Russia’s well-documented objections to Ukrainian membership of NATO. Putin’s negotiators also seek to block future arms supplies to Kyiv and have completely ruled out the possibility of even a symbolic Western troop presence in postwar Ukraine, while demonstrating a deep reluctance to accept anything resembling credible security guarantees.

Attempts to defend Russian objections on security grounds are unconvincing. Putin has debunked his own claims of a NATO security threat to Russia by reacting with obvious indifference to neighboring Finland’s NATO accession in 2022, just months after using the issue as a convenient pretext for the invasion of Ukraine. According to this bizarre Kremlin logic, Ukraine’s slim hopes of joining NATO in the distant future were sufficient grounds to unleash the largest European war since World War II, but Finland’s almost immediate membership of the alliance was “no problem” for Moscow, despite the fact that both countries share long land borders with Russia.

Putin’s refusal to countenance purely defensive commitments from Kyiv’s allies that are clearly designed to safeguard Ukrainian sovereignty is even harder to justify. If the Russian ruler intended to coexist with an independent Ukraine, he would surely recognize the need for international involvement in efforts to reestablish stability in the region. Instead, he has adopted the opposite approach. While Ukraine appeals for security guarantees, Putin seeks to guarantee Ukraine’s insecurity.

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The insincerity of Russia’s current approach to the US-led peace process should come as no surprise. After all, while Putin may be willing to consider a pause in hostilities if it comes on Kremlin-friendly terms, he simply cannot risk a peace deal that secures the continued existence of an independent Ukrainian state. Any settlement based on the present front lines of the war would leave around 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and free to continue along the path toward greater European integration. That is exactly what Putin is fighting to prevent.

The Kremlin dictator has always viewed his war against Ukraine in the broadest of historical contexts as a crusade to reverse the verdict of 1991 and return Russia to its rightful place as a global superpower. Like many of his contemporaries, Putin remains embittered by the Soviet collapse and determined to avenge what he perceives as modern Russia’s humiliating fall from grace. This has fuelled his obsession with independent Ukraine, which he has come to regard as the ultimate symbol of the historical injustice resulting from the breakup of the USSR.

Putin’s increasingly rabid opposition to Ukrainian independence reflects his Cold War experience as a KGB officer in East Germany, where he witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet Empire firsthand. This traumatic experience has helped to convince him that the Ukrainian state-building project now poses an existential threat to Russia itself. If Ukraine is able to consolidate its statehood and emerge as a recognizably European democracy, Putin fears this could serve as a catalyst for the next phase in a Russian imperial retreat that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Over the past two decades, Putin’s determination to undermine Ukrainian statehood has come to dominate his entire reign and has led directly to a new Cold War. From the 2004 Orange Revolution to the 2014 seizure of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of 2022, Ukraine has been at the epicenter of each new milestone in the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West.

Time after time, Putin has demonstrated his readiness to sacrifice all other Russian national interests in his quest to subjugate Ukraine and force the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. He has reversed decades of integration into Western economies, placed Russian society on a wartime footing, and sent hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers to their deaths. It is deeply delusional to think that he is now suddenly ready to abandon all of this and accept the reality of Ukrainian independence in exchange for the marginal gains of a compromise peace.

Putin’s own position during peace talks betrays his complete lack of interest in ending the war. His territorial demands would rob Ukraine of crucial fortifications and set the stage for further Russian advances, while his calls for restrictions on the Ukrainian armed forces and Kyiv’s ability to maintain military ties with the West would leave postwar Ukraine disarmed and defenseless. In isolation, any of these demands would look deeply suspect. Taken together, they represent overwhelming evidence of Putin’s intention to continue the invasion.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Using frozen Russian funds as security for a major Ukrainian loan would send a message to Moscow about Kyiv’s ability to continue defending itself for years to come. Advocates of the reparations loan see it as a justified move to make Russia pay for the invasion, but the proposal faces obstacles on both sides of the Atlantic.

The Trump administration has reportedly been working behind the scenes to obstruct the reparations loan. US officials argue that the frozen Russian assets should instead become bargaining chips during negotiations with Putin to end the war.

Belgium, which hosts the largest portion of immobilized Russian funds in Europe, remains the main obstacle. The Belgian government has complained that seizing the Russian assets will expose it to legal liabilities that could bankrupt the country. Meanwhile, Belgian Prime Minister Bart de Wever claims that Moscow has “let us know that if the assets are seized, Belgium, and me personally, will feel the effects for eternity.”

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The debate over further funding for Ukraine comes at the precise moment when Russia’s own economic model is showing signs of fragility. Indeed, some forecasts indicate that Putin’s war economy will face mounting challenges in 2026 that could have a major impact on the Kremlin’s ability to continue the invasion. This may be a factor driving Moscow’s determination to block further EU funding for Ukraine.

As Russian military spending reaches new highs, the Kremlin is rapidly burning through strategic reserves. At the same time, revenues from Russia’s economically crucial energy exports have recently fallen to multi-year lows amid mounting sanctions pressures and escalating long-range Ukrainian attacks on oil and gas industry infrastructure across the Russian Federation.

For now, Putin can still afford to pay his military. However, as Russia’s economic outlook worsens, he will have to prioritize the invasion of Ukraine over other state expenditures, while shifting the burden increasingly onto the Russian public. These trends do not imply imminent collapse, but they do expose a vulnerability reminiscent of the late Soviet era that Western governments could exploit in order to push the Russian dictator toward the negotiating table.

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One of the best ways to pressure Putin is by backing Ukraine. Right now, Kyiv faces a massive funding gap for the coming year that could have serious implications for the war. Unless Ukraine can secure tens of billions of dollars in additional financing, it will be extremely difficult to pay for the military, rebuild battered energy infrastructure, and cover basic social expenditures.

Crucially, a lack of Western financial backing for Ukraine will also embolden Russia. Why should Putin consider ending the invasion when Ukraine is running out of money and Kyiv’s Western partners are showing such obvious signs of hesitation?

Europe’s reluctance to pay for Ukraine’s defense is shortsighted, to say the least. If Russia’s invasion succeeds, European governments will soon have to boost defense spending to levels that would dwarf the current cost of backing Ukraine.

A recent New York Post article highlighted the sheer scale of the likely price tag for Europe if Russia achieves victory in Ukraine. Citing research by Scandinavian think tanks, the report predicted that the expense of fortifying Europe’s eastern flank against a triumphant Russia would be approximately $1.6 trillion, or more than double the likely figure required to finance the Ukrainian war effort for four more years.

The EU’s reparations loan initiative is lawful, financially sound, and strategically necessary. By hesitating now, Western leaders risk repeating the same mistakes that shaped earlier phases of Russia’s invasion, when delayed decisions and piecemeal support only served to embolden the Kremlin and prolong the war. If European leaders are unable to act decisively on December 18, Putin will toast another strategic victory and the cost of stopping Russia will rise even further.

Elena Davlikanova is a senior fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis and Sahaidachny Security Center. Lesia Orobets is the founder of the Price of Freedom air defense initiative and a former member of the Ukrainian parliament.

Atlantic Council — Mon, 08 Dec 2025 19:12:11 +0000

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Ukraine’s wartime experience provides blueprint for infrastructure protection

Oleksandr Bakalinskyi, Maggie McDonough — Mon, 08 Dec 2025 15:36:56 +0000

When cyberattacks and missile strikes converge on the same targets, infrastructure resilience becomes more than a technical mandate; it becomes a matter of national survival. For Ukraine, this is not a hypothetical future scenario. On the contrary, it has been daily reality for more than a decade.

Since 2014, Ukraine’s power grid, banking system, telecommunications networks, and digital infrastructure have faced sustained and increasingly sophisticated attacks. Yet these systems continue to function, adapt, and evolve, offering the world one of the most comprehensive case studies for how national infrastructure can endure under unrelenting cyber-kinetic pressure.

Ukraine’s experience reveals clearly that defending critical infrastructure is no longer simply a matter of cybersecurity. It requires a fundamentally different approach grounded in cyber-physical resilience, decentralization, system redundancy, institutional autonomy, and the capacity to sustain essential services, even when networks fail.

Industrial control systems were not designed for modern cyber warfare. The systems that operate electrical substations, power distribution logistics, and grid balancing typically prioritize availability and uptime rather than cyber defense. Russia exploited this structural vulnerability in 2015 and 2016, when Ukraine became the first country in history to suffer a nationwide power outage triggered by a cyberattack.

The same attacks that exposed digital fragility also revealed Ukraine’s greatest source of strength: Analog resilience. Even as digital control systems were compromised, engineers were able to manually isolate impacted grid segments, reroute power, and restore transmission through mechanical overrides and localized network segmentation.

The lessons are clear. While digital modernization delivers efficiency, full digital dependency creates systemic brittleness. Meanwhile, resilience can be enhanced through layered systems that incorporate manual fallbacks, localized control, and the ability to physically outmaneuver a digital attack. And while the ability to manually connect electricity to an electrical substation was not by design, the lack of digitalization at the time of the attacks proved to be an advantage in terms of service restoration speed.

The global takeaway from Ukraine’s grid defense is not a rejection of modernization; it is a rejection of exclusively digital modernization. True resilience requires hybrid architectures in which digital innovation is paired with analog redundancy, segmented control, and last resort options when networks are taken down.

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If the Ukrainian power grid demonstrated the value of technical redundancy, Ukraine’s banking sector has shown the value of institutional autonomy. The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) has emerged since the onset of Russian aggression as one of the most effective national actors in defending and sustaining critical infrastructure under attack. This has not only been due to advanced cybersecurity measures, but also thanks to operational freedom to act in line with the pace of the threat environment. The NBU has rapidly introduced mandatory security protocols, created a dedicated incident response unit, synchronized directly with law enforcement, and deployed real-time regulatory updates to address emerging vulnerabilities.

This capacity for decisiveness has helped ensure continuity in one of the country’s most essential sectors. Even under sustained digital attack, Ukrainians could still access their bank accounts, make electronic payments, and rely on national financial infrastructure without systemic interruption.

The most innovative aspect of this resilience came in the form of the Power Banking Initiative, a nationwide network of bank branches retrofitted for operational continuity during extended outages. Equipped with alternative energy sources, satellite communications, secure cash storage, and offline transaction capacities, these branches ensured uninterrupted access to currency, transfers, and basic banking services during power blackouts and infrastructure disruptions.

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Ukraine’s experience confirms that the boundary between cyberattacks and conventional warfare is often blurred. In many cases, the two elements are sequenced, synchronized, and structurally interdependent. Cyber operations can blind infrastructure sensors, disrupt communications, compromise operational decision-making, and erode trust in essential systems, often in direct coordination with physical strikes.

Resilience does not depend on preventing breaches, but on the ability to sustain essential services when breaches succeed. This requires a hybrid framework that integrates digital security, infrastructure continuity planning, and decentralized operational responses.

Alignment with EU and NATO standards will accelerate interoperability with allied infrastructure defense systems and enable long-term investment security. Compliance must move beyond voluntary adoption to formal certification, standardized auditing, and enforceable resilience benchmarks for infrastructure operators.

Ukraine’s national bank has shown the importance of sector-specific response units. This model should expand to the energy, telecommunications, transportation, healthcare, and regional government systems. In order to be effective, response units require independent monitoring authority, 24/7 threat detection, digital forensics, and integration into NATO and EU cyber fusion hubs.

Infrastructure resilience also demands institutionalized public-private intelligence sharing. A legally protected, mandatory, real-time intelligence exchange will shorten detection timelines and prevent cascading failures. Critical infrastructure owners must integrate into national security information-sharing with liability protections, rapid alert systems, and reciprocal intelligence flows.

Looking ahead, a national resilience investment fund should pool Ukrainian government resources, EU support, World Bank guarantees, EBRD/EIB financing, and private capital to enable infrastructure segmentation, micro-grid deployment, backup power systems, secure cloud environments, and hardened data centers. However, none of these technical investments will succeed without sufficient human capital. Ukraine should aim to develop a minimum of 10,000 new security specialists through university partnerships, military-civilian pipelines, veteran reskilling programs, and national cyber reserves.

Today, Ukraine possesses infrastructure resilience tested continuously under real cyber-kinetic attack. This unique experience should form the basis of international efforts to enhance critical infrastructure resilience. Ukraine can lead an international training center, host multinational resilience exercises, publish attack anatomy case files, and shape new NATO and EU doctrine. This would allow Kyiv to position itself not only as a defender, but as an architect of resilient infrastructure strategy.

Dr. Oleksandr Bakalinskyi is a Senior Researcher at the G. E. Pukhov Institute for Modeling in Energy Engineering at the National Academy of Sciences in Ukraine. Maggie McDonough is the Senior Vice President and Chief Innovation Officer at the Baltimore Development Corporation. She was previously affiliated with the Purdue Applied Research Institute (PARI) and Purdue’s Center for Education & Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS), where she served as a technical advisor on global cyber security resilience programming.

The cost of an unjust peace in Ukraine? An emboldened China.

Phillip M. Ramirez — Fri, 05 Dec 2025 22:27:37 +0000

In recent weeks, the Trump administration again engaged in talks aimed at ending Russia’s war in Ukraine. Trump and his envoys should be applauded for attempting to end a conflict that has dragged on for nearly four years at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives. Unfortunately, given the current realities of the battlefield, any negotiated peace will almost certainly favor Russia. On this, the Trump administration is correct.

However, the administration should consider the consequences of agreeing to a deal that favors the clear aggressor instead of fighting for a more balanced and just peace. The effects of the former would be felt far beyond Ukraine, Russia, and Europe: the very terms that would be agreeable to Russian President Vladimir Putin are exactly the ones that could embolden China to take military action of its own. The United States cannot isolate its actions in one part of the world from its goals in another. China will learn from any peace in Ukraine made under the current situation. The United States will reap the consequences.

Unacceptable terms

The most contentious issue in any peace deal is that of territory. Russia occupies large portions of eastern and southern Ukraine. Putin thinks he can lay claim to what his forces already occupy (and potentially more) in any negotiated settlement, especially because Ukraine has not demonstrated the ability to reclaim that territory. Also concerning are the implications of a potential near-term peace deal on the issues of Ukrainian sovereignty and a renewal of international economic cooperation with Russia. Putin wants limits on Ukraine’s military and its ability to join NATO. He also wants a cessation of sanctions against Russia, Moscow’s readmittance to the Group of Eight (G8), and the restoration of frozen Russian assets. Instead of a pariah, Putin wants Russia to be a respected member of the international community—the status quo ante but better.

China will learn from the outcome of Putin’s bid to secure these terms, just as Beijing has learned from the rest of the war. If Putin can secure vast amounts of territory through military force, then so can China. If Putin can restrict Ukrainian sovereignty via an invasion, then China can secure similar limitations on Taiwan. Given that Beijing’s greatest concerns vis-à-vis Taiwan revolve around questions of the island’s sovereignty, such peace terms for Russia would be a veritable coup for China.

Similarly, if Putin can forestall any permanent economic consequences for his invasion, China will learn it can do the same. The economic consequences China would face as a result of an invasion of Taiwan are some of the most important deterrents to a possible conflict. If China is led to believe it can return to its place in the global economic community—or even improve on it—after the short-term pain of a conflict, the deterrent value of these tools will be reduced.

Questions of resolve

The Trump administration seems prepared to give Russia what it wants because it assesses that Russia is winning, and winners dictate the terms. Underlying the urgency to actually end the conflict, however, is a desire by some in the Trump administration to shift resources away from Europe and to the Indo-Pacific to better deter conflict there. However, the actual amount of blood and treasure the United States has spent on Ukraine, while significant for the Ukrainians, is relatively small for the United States. The United States has no direct military involvement in the war in Ukraine, has not lost a single service member, and has deeply degraded the Russian military with relatively little cost to itself, all while spurring increased competition and growth in the US defense industrial base.

Therefore, ending the war in Ukraine under these conditions will not strengthen the United States’ hand in the Indo-Pacific. It will do the opposite. Peace under these terms will teach China what it stands to gain from military action and demonstrate the limits of US resolve. Deterring a conflict over Taiwan or elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific is as much about having the proper capabilities to fight a war as it is about having the will to see it through. If Beijing’s leaders are led to believe that US resolve over the Taiwan issue will dissipate before their own, deterrence will fail regardless of how many US ships, missiles, and aircraft are in the theater.

Changing the calculus

Given his current calculus, any peace that Putin will sign will send the wrong messages to Beijing. Thus, the United States must change Putin’s calculus. To do so, and thereby strengthen the Washington’s hand vis-à-vis Beijing, the United States and its allies and partners should make Putin question the idea that a Russian victory is assured. They must demonstrate the will and resolve to outlast him in Ukraine. Only then will Putin sign a peace that does not teach the wrong lessons to China. Anything less, and the administration may find the peace it has brokered to be fleeting.

Lieutenant Phillip M. Ramirez is a military SkillBridge fellow for Forward Defense in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

The post The cost of an unjust peace in Ukraine? An emboldened China. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s warning to the West: A bad peace will lead to a bigger war

Myroslava Gongadze — Thu, 04 Dec 2025 22:04:35 +0000

Almost every night last week, I woke up in Kyiv to the piercing sound of air raid sirens. Like countless other Ukrainians, I scrambled out of bed, grabbed a few essentials, and headed down to the bomb shelter.

Not everyone follows this routine. Some people, tired of the nightly bombardments, choose to sleep through air raid alarms, even if that means risking potential death. Many others, including the elderly and those with physical impediments, are unable to make their way downstairs every time the sirens sound. Each new Russian attack is a reminder of how precarious life has become in wartime Ukraine.

While civilians struggle to maintain a sense of normality, the reality on the front lines could hardly be more dramatic. Ukrainian troops are overstretched and desperately short of reinforcements, ammunition, and equipment. Inch by inch, the Russian army continues to grind forward, testing each vulnerability and exploiting every weakness.

Despite these incredible challenges, the Ukrainian military continues to adapt and innovate as it seeks to hold the line with new tools and evolving strategies. The will to resist remains unbroken, but the toll this struggle exacts on soldiers, their families, and the entire Ukrainian nation often feels unbearable.

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As Ukrainians fight for national survival on the battlefield, another struggle is also playing out against domestic corruption. Ukraine’s efforts to move toward a more accountable and democratic system of government are a key cause of Moscow’s escalating aggression, with Putin viewing Ukrainian democracy as an existential threat to Russian authoritarianism. Ukrainians understand that battling corruption is just as vital in this war as resisting Russia on the battlefield.

Ukrainian society has been attempting to combat corruption for decades. Exactly twenty-five years ago, the Kuchmagate scandal rocked Ukraine. This implicated then-president Leonid Kuchma in the murder of my husband Georgiy Gongadze, a prominent investigative journalist and the founder of the Ukrainska Pravda news site. On that occasion, the pathway to the truth began with a lone whistleblower from the presidential security team, who took huge risks to expose what he saw as grave misconduct.

A quarter of a century later, there are strong indications that Ukraine is making progress in the fight against corruption. In late November, one of Ukraine’s most powerful men, presidential administration head Andriy Yermak, resigned following a search of his home by the country’s anti-corruption authorities amid a rapidly unfolding scandal involving figures close to the very highest levels of power.

Once again, Ukrainska Pravda journalists were instrumental in breaking the story, but the differences between then and now are also striking. Back when my husband was murdered, there were no institutional checks in place and no raids on the homes of senior officials. Today, Ukraine has built institutions capable of pushing back and producing results.

Clearly, the ghosts of corruption still haunt Ukraine’s corridors of power, but impunity is giving way to accountability. This is exactly the transformation that many Ukrainians are fighting for, and one of the main reasons why Ukraine scares Putin so much.

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After nearly four years of full-scale war, most Ukrainians want peace, but they also realize that peace will only be possible if accompanied by justice and security. For a generation, Ukrainians have fought for these goals. They know that simply stopping the shooting will not bring real peace, and are committed to ending the war in a way that will last.

From Kyiv to Lviv, I hear the same message from people who desperately want the war to be over but understand that a rushed peace could have disastrous consequences. “We have sheltered too long in the dark to accept a peace that isn’t just,” one woman commented. “Our sons and daughters are not only fighting to defend our land, but for the justice that must come after,” a taxi driver told me.

The world needs to understand that Russia’s invasion is already reshaping global security. Putin is not just seizing Ukrainian territory; he is trying to erase Ukraine as a nation and erode the entire international order. If the world lets this happen, a much larger war will no longer be a distant risk. It will become inevitable.

There is now a clear danger that Western leaders will support a hurried and unfair peace deal. This would send a dangerous message that aggression pays. Autocrats around the world would draw the obvious conclusion that they can change borders by force. This would undermine the foundational principles of international relations established in the post-World War II era. Europe cannot afford to set such a precedent.

With the Russian invasion entering a critical phase and Moscow’s hybrid war spreading across Europe, the time to act is now. Ukraine’s defense is Europe’s defense. The West must increase support and stop Putin before he goes even further. It is delusional to think that sacrificing Ukraine will satisfy Russia. Instead, a bad peace will only lead to a bigger war. The price of hesitation will be far higher than the cost of action.

Myroslava Gongadze is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior fellow at Friends of Europe.

At the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector represented an important asset that the authorities in Kyiv were quick to mobilize. This tech prowess helped cement the country’s strategic focus on drones, which could be designed and produced domestically to compensate for a lack of more conventional weapons.

Since 2022, the number of Ukrainian companies developing drones has skyrocketed, while annual output has risen to millions of units. This has allowed Ukraine to establish a “drone wall” along the front lines of the conflict, making any buildup of enemy forces extremely challenging. Over the past year, around three-quarters of all Russian casualties have been as a result of Ukrainian drones.

At sea, Ukraine has used drones to sink multiple warships and break the Russian navy’s Black Sea blockade, forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his remaining fleet from Russian-occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s growing drone capabilities have also made it possible to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia with an escalating campaign of deep strikes on military and industrial targets across the Russian Federation.

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Russia has responded to Kyiv’s groundbreaking use of drone warfare by studying Ukrainian tactics and technologies, while also dramatically expanding its own domestic drone manufacturing base. The Kremlin has been aided in this by allies including China and Iran, who have provided vital components along with the blueprints for key drone designs.

The Kremlin strategy has focused on mass producing a limited range of models for use on the battlefield and in the bombardment of Ukrainian cities. This methodical approach has paid dividends. By the end of 2024, it was already becoming clear that the drone war was turning in Russia’s favor. This trend has only intensified over the past year.

One of Russia’s most important innovations has been the widespread use of fiber-optic drones. These drones are controlled by a wire connected directly to the operator, making them immune to jamming technologies and extremely difficult to intercept.

Russian commanders first began using large quantities of fiber-optic drones during fighting in late 2024 to push Ukrainian troops out of Russia’s Kursk region. The drones proved highly effective at disrupting Ukrainian logistics by targeting supply vehicles. This was widely seen as a crucial factor behind the success of the operation.

Russia has now replicated and scaled up these tactics throughout southern and eastern Ukraine, creating a drone wall of its own while reaching deeper and deeper into Ukrainian-controlled territory. Fiber-optic drones are being used to ambush supply vehicles far behind the front lines, forcing Ukraine to become increasingly reliant on ground robotics to supply combat units and evacuate the wounded.

In addition to striking Ukrainian logistics, Russian drone forces are also prioritising attacks on their Ukrainian counterparts, forcing Ukrainian drone crews to pull further back from the line of contact to ensure safety. This distance gives Russian operators room to move their own teams forward, increasing their ability to dominate the battlefield.

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Russia’s Rubicon drone unit has emerged during 2025 as a prominent symbol of the Kremlin’s rapidly evolving and increasingly effective drone warfare strategy. Highly trained and well funded Rubicon teams are leading the campaign to cut Ukraine’s supply lines and widen the kill zone.

Crucially, Rubicon pilots pass their experience on to newcomers and provide extensive training that is helping to improve the effectiveness of other Russian army drone units. According to Ukrainian drone commander Yurii Fedorenko, Rubicon can rapidly scale up drone units using manpower and financial advantages that Ukraine cannot replicate.

In the drone war between Russia and Ukraine, the Kremlin is betting on mass and hoping that a combination of smart choices, specialised production, extensive training, and sheer numbers will eventually overwhelm Ukraine’s technological edge. In contrast, Kyiv continues to rely on a highly decentralised ecosystem of volunteer groups, startups, and military workshops producing a wide variety of different drone models. This diversity helps to drive innovation but also creates coordination challenges.

The current effectiveness of Russia’s drone units does not mean the drone war has shifted decisively in Moscow’s favor, but recent trends do expose a gap that Ukraine must urgently close. In order to counter Russia’s increasingly centralised and well-resourced drone formations, Kyiv needs to adopt key elements of the Rubicon model. This means scaling up training pipelines, sharing front line experience more systematically, and ensuring Ukrainian drone units have all the resources they need to hunt down Russian operators and regain the initiative.

Since 2022, the Russian military has been widely mocked for its primitive “human wave” tactics and generally poor performance in Ukraine. However, the progress made by Russia in drone warfare indicates an army that is fully capable of learning, adapting, and innovating. Moscow has not been able to achieve any major technological breakthroughs, but Russian military strategists have significantly strengthened their country’s position by concentrating on scale, training, and relentless battlefield experimentation.

This progress should be a major wake-up call for European leaders. Small numbers of suspected Russian drones are already causing chaos and disruption across Europe. The longer the war in Ukraine lasts, the more advanced Russia’s drone capabilities will become.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Returning Ukraine’s abducted children should be central to any peace plan

Kristina Hook — Wed, 03 Dec 2025 21:30:17 +0000

This week, the US Senate is holding a landmark Congressional hearing on Russia’s mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Most will understandably frame the issue as a grave human rights crisis, but it is also much more. Rescuing Ukraine’s abducted children can help pave the way for peace, while allowing Russia’s crimes to go unpunished would set a disastrous precedent for global security.

Russia’s systematic removal, indoctrination, and militarization of Ukrainian children goes to the heart of the broader security dilemma that must be resolved before the war in Ukraine can end. Any credible conversation about peace negotiations or security guarantees for Ukraine must begin with a demonstration that the United States and its allies can meaningfully influence Russian behavior. Ensuring the safe return of these children is a concrete way to do that.

The scale of the crime is staggering. Ukrainian authorities have verified 19,456 children taken to Russian or Russian-occupied territories, while independent experts estimate the actual number of victims may exceed 35,000.

What is indisputable is that Russia’s mass deportations are now among the best-documented crimes of modern warfare. Among numerous other investigations, the Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab identified at least 210 facilities inside Russia or Russian-occupied territory where deported Ukrainian children have been sent for “re-education,” forced assimilation, and in many places, military-style training.

The evidence is overwhelming and includes coerced relocations, illegal adoptions and naturalization under Russian citizenship, ideological indoctrination aimed at erasing Ukrainian identity, and numerous violations of international law. This is not incidental collateral damage. It is a deliberate state policy of population transfer and Ukrainian national identity destruction; a Russian program that mirrors the legal definitions of numerous atrocity crimes, including genocide.

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So far, it has only been possible to rescue a small fraction of abducted children. As of November 2025, 1,859 children have returned to Ukraine, while international experts estimate that 90 percent of the burden of rescue currently falls to Ukrainians themselves.

Moscow’s refusal to facilitate repatriation and its ongoing efforts to conceal identities and locations underscores the impossibility of any stable post-war order without addressing this crime. Humanitarian language alone obscures a critical truth: The forced transfer of children is not a peripheral human rights issue; it is a central obstacle to any credible security settlement in Europe.

For months, United States and European officials have been exploring frameworks for eventual peace talks with Russia and long-term security guarantees for Ukraine. But these conversations often treat Russian atrocities, including child deportations, as adjacent to the real business of hard security. This is a mistake.

Russia’s abduction of children is a window into its strategic intent. The Kremlin campaign to kidnap young Ukrainians and turn them into Russians reveals that Moscow’s war is not merely about territory but about imperial restoration. If Vladimir Putin only sought to adjust borders, the millions spent on relocating, indoctrinating, and militarizing thousands of Ukrainian children would make little sense.

Putin’s ominous intent becomes clearer when viewed alongside Russia’s broader atrocities. The Russian ruler clearly seeks to diminish the demographic future of an entire neighboring nation, while preparing the next generation for future Russian military aggression.

The issue of abducted Ukrainian children is especially relevant for Ukrainians as they debate painful political compromises, territorial concessions, and security guarantees premised on Western assurances. If world leaders cannot secure the return of the most vulnerable victims of Russia’s aggression, how could Ukrainians trust that those same leaders can prevent Russia from reigniting the war or committing new atrocities?

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Western policymakers insist that any post-war settlement must include credible enforcement mechanisms. But credibility is not defined by rhetoric; it is a matter of capability and political will. Right now, both are in question.

If the United States, with its immense military, diplomatic, and economic power, cannot compel Russia to return thousands of abducted Ukrainian children, it becomes harder to argue that Washington can deter further aggression or prevent violations of a future peace agreement. Ukrainians understand this reality well.

Demonstrating US leverage over Russia is therefore not merely symbolic. It is a strategic prerequisite to any durable peace. The United States has untapped tools at its disposal. These include sanctioning individuals and institutions directly involved in the abduction of Ukrainian children, while supporting multilateral accountability efforts. It should be also possible to condition further diplomatic engagement on verifiable steps toward repatriation. Meanwhile, the United States could lead a coordinated information effort to identify children and counter Russian concealment tactics.

These measures are proportional responses to atrocity crimes recognized under international law. The forcible transfer of children is a premeditated crime designed to shatter Ukraine’s future. A successful effort to bring Ukrainian children home will demonstrate that the United States can influence Russian behavior. This is a critical condition for any effective peace initiative.

Securing the return of abducted children would also help to build the trust needed for Ukrainian society to accept Western-backed security frameworks. After many failed efforts to constrain Russian aggression, Ukrainian society needs to know that Western promises are not empty.

Ignoring the issue, or relegating it to the humanitarian margins, undermines the very negotiations that the Trump administration is seeking to advance. Ending the war requires Ukrainian faith in international guarantees.

Child abduction is among the clearest moral red lines in global conflict. Failure to uphold this red line in Ukraine will invite repetition elsewhere. If Russia can abduct tens of thousands of children with impunity during a major European war and face no real consequences, then no norms protecting children in conflict can hold anywhere.

This week’s hearing marks an opportunity for Congress, the Trump administration, and Ukraine’s other partners to clarify that returning abducted Ukrainian children is not optional, negotiable, or separate from security discussions. It is central.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A “Russia-friendly” peace deal—one that legitimizes occupation or implicitly accepts the Kremlin’s claims to expand its territorial gains in Ukraine—would destabilize the region and seriously damage Turkey’s long-term position. A weakened Ukraine, stripped of its territorial integrity and military capacity, would alter the balance of power in the Black Sea in Russia’s favor—a scenario for which Turkey would pay a heavy price. From Crimea to the Caucasus, the consequences would reverberate across Ankara’s geopolitical environment.

As Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said last month, a peace plan can only be acceptable if it “meets the legitimate expectations and security needs of both sides, without creating new instability.” And Turkish analysts warn that an unfavorable settlement for Kyiv would directly undermine Turkey’s strategic interests, as Russia has not abandoned its imperial ambitions to reassert control over the former Soviet space—from the South Caucasus and Central Asia to the Baltics.

For its own interests, Turkey should take a strong stance—particularly in its diplomatic interactions with the United States—that any proposal that cements Russia’s territorial gains and prepares the battlefield for Moscow’s next offensive is unacceptable and dangerous for the region.

If territorial concessions formalize Russia’s control over eastern and southern Ukraine and the Sea of Azov, Moscow would effectively turn it into a Russian inland sea. Combined with Russia’s attempts to militarize and dominate the wider Black Sea, this would reverse the naval balance of power, which has been favorable to Turkey since Ukraine’s successful attacks on Russia’s Black Sea fleet.

Crimea is a particularly sensitive issue. For Turkey, it is not an abstract bargaining chip—it defines forward posture in the Black Sea and is home to a Tatar community with deep cultural and historical ties to Ankara. Any deal legitimizing its illegal annexation would not only be a diplomatic defeat for Ukraine; it would be a strategic blow to Turkey. Any deal that allows Russia to expand or consolidate territorial gains would embolden Moscow, enable it to revive its naval capabilities, and deepen its foothold in the wider Black Sea region. Such an outcome would not only threaten Ukraine but also constrain Turkey’s influence from the Caucasus to the Middle East and North Africa and beyond.

What can Ankara do?

While the current talks are being held between US, Russian, and Ukrainian negotiators, European countries have also been conducting diplomatic outreach to Washington to advocate their positions on elements of a potential peace deal that are critical for their interests. Turkey should do the same. Turkey possesses real leverage—diplomatic, economic, and military—to influence the outcome of the peace talks aimed at ending the war. The country’s leaders should not shy away from using it.

Turkey’s role as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, especially on the humanitarian track, remains important. For Ukraine, the return of abducted Ukrainian children and all prisoners of war and political detainees, including Crimean Tatars and religious prisoners, is a “mandatory element” for any peace process. During Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Ankara last month, these issues were at the core of his discussions with Erdoğan. Taking a proactive role in advocating for the return of Ukrainian prisoners of war and abducted children—including by raising these issues in bilateral engagements with Russia and in multilateral diplomatic fora—would bolster Turkey’s reputation as a key regional actor, humanitarian power, and credible mediator.

Beyond pressing for a fair deal in peace negotiations, Turkey must also take the lead in the maritime coalition of the willing and step up efforts to restore rules-based order and stability in the Black Sea. As NATO’s largest naval power in the region, Ankara is central to regional deterrence. Moscow’s aggression has increasingly spilled into NATO’s maritime space, directly affecting Turkey and Romania. Last month, a Turkish liquefied natural gas tanker operating in the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail—mere meters from the Romanian border—was struck by Russian drones. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, several other Turkish or Turkish-flagged vessels have been struck by missiles in Ukrainian ports, including the seaports of Odesa and Kherson. According to the Black Sea Monitoring Group, more than 40 percent of vessels entering Greater Odesa ports this year belong to Turkish companies, the largest share of any country. Thus, these attacks significantly undermine Turkish trade across both the Black Sea and the Danube.

Overall, this year alone, at least fourteen vessels have been hit in Ukrainian Black Sea ports. These are not isolated incidents, but clear indicators of Russia’s attempt to weaponize maritime trade, intimidate neighbors, and test the resolve of Turkey and NATO. Russia has targeted logistics nodes such as the Orlovka–Isaccea ferry terminal, struck Danube ports, and breached Moldovan and Romanian airspace with drones.

On the economic front, Russia has intensified the use of a “shadow fleet” of unregistered, sanctions-evading tankers transporting oil and military dual-use cargoes. This past week, Ukrainian naval drones struck two shadow fleet vessels, demonstrating that Kyiv is determined to deprive Russia of this source of revenue for its war machine. To keep the Black Sea stable, Turkey should step up efforts to counter the shadow fleet, prevent illicit maritime traffic, and ensure that the Black Sea does not become a safe haven for sanctions evasion.

Turkey has expressed concern over the attacks on oil tankers off its Black Sea coast arguing they “have posed serious risks to navigation, life, property and environmental safety in the region.” While Turkey’s call to protect commercial vessels is legitimate, it can hardly extend to unregistered—and therefore unlawful—vessels. Moreover, no comparable arrangements exist to safeguard official commercial shipping bound for Ukrainian ports, which remains subject to sustained Russian attacks.

Limits to only Ukraine’s actions cannot credibly be framed as de-escalatory, as they increase the risk of Russia’s unilateral escalation. Given that sea lanes and energy-export revenues are central to the Kremlin’s war effort, targeting oil tankers and related infrastructure is one of the few effective means of imposing costs and constraining Moscow’s ability to finance the conflict—an approach that may bring an end to the war closer.

To deter Russia’s maritime and aerial attacks, Ankara should invest more political capital and capabilities into the maritime coalition of the willing. Turkey should encourage the expansion of trilateral formats such as the Bulgaria–Turkey–Romania demining group, broadening its mandate to include sea patrols, critical infrastructure protection, and maritime domain awareness. It should deepen coordination with Romania on air defense and contribute to a “Black Sea sky shield” capable of monitoring Russian drone incursions and protecting critical maritime infrastructure and port facilities. Turkey must also continue to restrict the passage of Russian warships through the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits under the terms of the Montreux Convention—a measure that has prevented Moscow from rapidly reconstituting its naval forces. These steps could serve as real “security guarantees” under any peace plan, rendering Russia’s war in the maritime and air domains operationally pointless.

Turkey has a right to protect its regional interests

Turkey should oppose several potential terms that have been discussed in recent rounds of peace talks.

First, any cap on Ukraine’s armed forces would undermine Turkey’s own deterrence posture. A militarily constrained Ukraine is not a buffer; it is an invitation for renewed Russian aggression and a weakened front line for European security. Ankara does not benefit from a disarmed Ukraine. It benefits from a capable Ukraine that can prevent Russia from projecting power across the Black Sea.

Second, Turkey should reject restrictions on Ukraine’s international defense-industrial cooperation. Ankara has invested heavily in joint development with Kyiv—in drones, naval systems, and engines—which strengthens both countries’ strategic autonomy. Blocking Ukraine’s access to advanced defense ecosystems would weaken Kyiv and strike at Turkey’s ambitions to become a leading regional producer of defense technologies.

Third, Turkey should resist attempts to impose “neutrality” on Ukraine. Turkey has historically supported Ukraine’s integration into NATO because a NATO-aligned Ukraine strengthens the collective deterrence against Russia in the wider Black Sea region. Ukrainian membership would reinforce NATO’s southeastern flank, helping protect the Alliance against Russia, Iran, and other revisionist actors.

More fundamentally, the idea that great powers may unilaterally impose their terms on other nations contradicts Turkey’s worldview: that sovereign states—including regional powers—must have agency to decide their own geopolitical orientation.

The interests of Ukraine, Turkey, and NATO are aligned: deterring Russia, protecting maritime infrastructure, preserving sovereignty, and preventing the normalization of territorial aggression. At this critical moment, Turkey cannot wait until the United States and Russia negotiate outcomes that reshape its neighborhood. It must reassert regional leadership, defend its strategic interests, and help secure a sustainable peace in Ukraine and in the Black Sea.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program. She previously served as a Ukrainian foreign policy adviser and diplomat, including serving in the Ukrainian embassy in Ankara from 2014 to 2018.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not represent the official positions of the Atlantic Council or any other institution or government.

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Ukraine peace plan must not include amnesty for Russian war crimes

Ivan Horodyskyy — Tue, 02 Dec 2025 18:50:39 +0000

The recent Hollywood movie “Nuremberg” provided a timely reminder of the role played by Soviet consent in the creation and legitimacy of the International Military Tribunal established to prosecute Nazi leaders after World War II. The broad outlines of the tribunal had been agreed before the end of the war during the February 1945 Yalta Conference, with both Churchill and Roosevelt noting Stalin’s readiness to support the initiative.

The Soviet leader’s stance should probably not have come as such a surprise. His apparent enthusiasm for prosecuting Germany’s wartime leadership was not a reflection of faith in international justice or the rule of law, but due to his own personal experience with show trials during the 1930s. For Stalin, the trial of the Nazis was another political performance with a preordained outcome.

Several generations later, the Kremlin’s attitude appears to have changed little. Russian President Vladimir Putin stands accused of imprisoning his domestic opponents on politically motivated charges, but regards any attempt to hold Russia legally accountable for the invasion of Ukraine as unacceptable. This includes the efforts of Ukraine and its allies to create a Special Tribunal for the crime of aggression, and extends to investigations conducted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

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One of the most striking provisions in US President Donald Trump’s recently unveiled 28-point Ukraine peace plan was a full amnesty for all parties for their actions during the war in Ukraine and an agreement not to make any claims or consider any complaints in future. While Trump’s initial plan has already been subject to multiple revisions, the idea of a blanket amnesty has sparked alarm and outrage among Ukrainians, with critics viewing it as a move to pardon all Russians responsible for war crimes in Ukraine.

The Trump peace plan first emerged just days after a Russian missile strike on a residential building in Ternopil that killed more than thirty people including seven children. Many Ukrainians recalled this attack following the publication of Trump’s plan, noting that it served to highlight the injustice of offering an amnesty for the vast quantity of crimes committed since the start of the full-scale invasion almost four years ago.

Some have also pointed out that failure to prosecute war crimes in Ukraine could have disastrous implications for the future of global security. “It would ruin international law and create a precedent that would encourage other authoritarian leaders to think that you can invade a country, kill people and erase their identity, and you will be rewarded with new territories,” commented Ukrainian Nobel prize winner Oleksandra Matviichuk.

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Addressing Russian war crimes in Ukraine is not only a matter of providing justice for victims. It is also essential in order to prevent further Kremlin aggression. While the legitimacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal continues to provoke discussion, few would argue that it provided important lessons for Germany and sent an unambiguous message that international aggression ends in defeat and accountability.

Russian society has never experienced anything comparable to Nuremberg. They was no accountability for the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968, or the invasion of Afghanistan. Since the fall of the USSR, there have been no systematic investigations into crimes committed during Russia’s Chechen wars, the 2008 invasion of Georgia, or the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

This absence of accountability has fueled a sense of impunity in the Kremlin and throughout Russian society that has been instrumental in creating the political climate for the current attack on Ukraine. Unless addressed, this historically rooted sense of Russian impunity will inevitably fuel further aggression.

Advocates of the US-led peace initiative have suggested that the priority now should be securing peace rather than seeking justice. In reality, however, the two goals are interlinked. It is delusional to think that any future treaty obligations or declarations of non-aggression from Russia’s leaders can be trusted, especially if they are not held to account for the crimes of the past four years.

It is important to recognize that many of the 28 points featured in the United States plan are realistic and could serve as the basis for a viable peace settlement. At the same time, it is also abundantly clear that the proposed amnesty for war crimes will only embolden the Kremlin. If adopted, it would encourage Russia to continue the invasion of Ukraine or escalate elsewhere in the Baltic region, the southern Caucasus, or Central Asia. That is clearly not in the interests of the United States, Europe, or the wider international community.

It is therefore vital to thoroughly investigate all war crimes committed in Ukraine and establish the facts in a manner that challenges Russia’s sense of impunity and allows for the rehabilitation of victims. The Nuremberg Tribunal did not succeed in ending wars of aggression, but it did establish a precedent of legal responsibility. If we now forego this principle of accountability entirely, progress toward a safer world will not be possible.

Ivan Horodyskyy is an associate professor of the School of Public Management at the Ukrainian Catholic University.

The decree, entitled “Russian National Policy Until 2036,” was published on November 25 and is set to come into force in January 2026, Reuters reports. It calls on the Russian authorities in occupied Ukraine to “adopt additional measures to strengthen overall Russian civic identity.” The policy document also praises the invasion of Ukraine for “creating conditions for restoring the unity of the historical territories of the Russian state.”

This bureaucratic language is an attempt to sanitize the Kremlin’s ongoing campaign to erase Ukrainian national identity. Throughout Russian-occupied regions in the south and east of the country, Moscow has instituted a reign of terror against the civilian population while systematically targeting the symbols of Ukrainian statehood, language, heritage, and culture.

Wherever Russian troops advance, local populations are subjected to large-scale arrests, with anyone deemed a potential threat to the occupation authorities likely to disappear into a vast network of camps and prisons. Victims typically include elected officials, journalists, religious leaders, activists, and military veterans. A UN investigation published in spring 2025 found that these detentions constituted a crime against humanity.

Those who remain are pressured to accept Russian citizenship or face being deprived of access to essentials such as healthcare, pensions, and banking services. In line with Kremlin legislation adopted earlier this year, property owners who refuse Russian passports can be evicted from their homes and deported. Meanwhile, schoolchildren are being taught a heavily militarized Kremlin curriculum that demonizes Ukrainians while praising Russian imperialism and glorifying the invasion of their country. Any parents who resist these policies risk losing custody of their children.

The most notorious element of Moscow’s campaign to extinguish Ukrainian identity is the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, around twenty thousand victims are believed to have been taken to Russia and subjected to ideological indoctrination designed to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian identity. In 2023, the International Criminal Court of The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin over his personal involvement in these child abductions.

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Russian policies in occupied Ukraine serve as a chilling blueprint for Putin’s future actions if he is able to establish control over the entire country. Indeed, Russia is already actively seeking to depopulate large parts of Ukraine that remain beyond Moscow’s grasp. In front line areas throughout southern Ukraine, the Russian military has embarked on an unprecedented campaign of targeted drone strikes against the civilian population that has killed hundreds and been branded a “human safari.” A recent United Nations probe concluded that these attacks are war crimes with the goal of making whole towns and cities unlivable.

Likewise, during 2025 Russia has intensified the missile and drone bombardment of Ukraine’s civilian population and the country’s critical infrastructure in an apparent attempt to spark fresh waves of refugees. Due in part to these attacks, Ukrainian civilian casualties rose by 27 percent during the first ten months of the year, according to the United Nations Monitoring Mission in Ukraine.

Putin’s posture during peace talks has raised further fundamental questions over his willingness to coexist with an independent and sovereign Ukraine. Ever since the initial round of negotiations in spring 2022, Russia has consistently demanded the comprehensive demilitarization of Ukraine. This has included calls for strict limits on the size of the Ukrainian army and the categories of weapons the country is allowed to possess, along with a ban on NATO membership or any other form of military cooperation with Western partners.

Russia’s insistence on an internationally isolated and disarmed Ukraine remains at the heart of the current negotiations. This should serve as a massive red flag for anyone who still believes that Putin is ready for peace. The Russian dictator obviously has no intention of abandoning the reconquest of Ukraine and aims to resume the invasion in more favorable circumstances once Ukraine has been stripped of allies and rendered defenseless.

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Putin’s determination to continue the invasion of Ukraine should come as no surprise. While Trump sees the current war as a geopolitical real estate deal, Putin believes he is on an historic mission to reverse the Soviet collapse and revive the Russian Empire. This explains his otherwise inexplicable obsession with ending Ukrainian independence, which Putin has come to view as the ultimate symbol of modern Russia’s humiliating fall from grace.

On the eve of the full-scale invasion, Putin called Ukraine “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” But his desire to extinguish Ukrainian statehood goes far beyond any toxic feelings of shared kinship. For Putin, the consolidation of a democratic, European Ukraine poses an existential threat to authoritarian Russia that could serve as a catalyst for the next stage in an imperial retreat that begin with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Haunted by the people power uprisings that brought down the USSR, he will do almost anything to prevent a repeat.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began with the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Putin’s crusade to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit has come to dominate his reign. In pursuit of this goal, he has sacrificed Russia’s relationship with the democratic world, while also doing untold damage to the country’s economic prosperity and international standing. After everything that has happened, he can hardly now accept a peace deal that leaves 80 percent of Ukraine permanently hostile to Russia and firmly embedded in the West. Putin’s propaganda machine is perhaps the most powerful in the world, but even his most skilled media managers would struggle to spin such an outcome as anything other than a disastrous Russian defeat.

Putin’s latest presidential decree demanding further efforts to create a Ukraine without Ukrainians underlines the absurdity of attempts to find any meaningful middle ground between Moscow and Kyiv. With a compromise peace out of the question, Putin’s plan is to keep fighting while hoping to outlast the West and exhaust Ukraine. He will continue to engage in negotiations with the United States as a tactic to stall further sanctions and divide his enemies, but there is virtually zero chance of Russia voluntarily accepting any deal that guarantees the continued existence of a Ukrainian state.

This does not mean that Putin cannot be forced to end his invasion. But it does mean that current efforts to broker a negotiated settlement are doomed to fail. Putin is convinced that in order to correct the historical injustices of the past three decades and safeguard Russia’s place in the world, he must destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. It is delusional to think that a man committed to criminality on such a grand scale could be swayed by talk of sanctions relief and minor territorial concessions.

Instead, the objective should be to increase the economic and military pressure on Putin until he begins to fear a new Russian collapse in the tradition of 1917 and 1991. This will require the kind of political courage from Ukraine’s partners that has been in short supply since 2022, but it is the only way to secure a sustainable peace in Europe. Putin dreams of taking his place in Russian history alongside Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Joseph Stalin, but he most definitely does not want to share the ignominious fate of Czar Nicholas II and Mikhail Gorbachev.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

aozen — Thu, 27 Nov 2025 08:16:26 +0000

original source

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What prolonged Russian aggression against Europe could mean for the Balkans

Agon Maliqi — Wed, 26 Nov 2025 20:59:16 +0000

The recently renewed push for a peace agreement between Kyiv and Moscow is once again testing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to abandon his maximalist goal of fully subjugating Ukraine. The previous failure to get Putin to negotiate earlier this year led the West to intensify energy sanctions against Russia, while Moscow engaged in nuclear saber-rattling and probed NATO territory through aircraft and drone incursions, as well as hybrid attacks on European infrastructure.

Overall, the prospects for peace appear grim: In October, a US intelligence assessment reportedly concluded that Putin has “dug in” and is committed to a long war. And NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has warned that even if there was a settlement over Ukraine, Moscow was preparing for a “long-term confrontation” with the West and could develop the capabilities to attack NATO in five years. If these current talks run break down, expect renewed escalation.

In part concerned about strategic divergence with Washington—especially in the context of US resources moving to the Asia-Pacific to deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan—European NATO members pledged in June to raise defense spending to 5 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP). And in October, the European Union (EU) approved the €800 billion “Readiness 2030” program to boost defense investment and industrial capacity.

The prospect of a prolonged, wider European war in the coming years is reshaping strategic calculations in Europe’s vulnerable “gray zones”—especially the Balkans. British officials have described the Balkans as the Kremlin’s “next playground,” a pressure point that could divert Western resources from NATO’s eastern flank. Because Russia is geographically distant from the Balkans, it has and will continue to rely on its partners—militarily-neutral Serbia and pro-Russian Serbian proxies around the region—to agitate and reopen the question of the regional borders set by the West after the 1990s wars in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

NATO has deterrence, but ‘everyone is preparing for war‘

So far, NATO countries have limited Russian troublemaking in the Balkans. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, Milorad Dodik, the Kremlin-friendly former president of Republika Srpska, repeatedly threatened the entity’s secession from Bosnia and Herzogovina only to retreat after Western pushback. And in 2023, when Belgrade-backed Serbs led by Milan Radojičić launched an armed insurgency in northern Kosovo, Kosovo’s police repelled the attack within a day while NATO—which controls Kosovo’s borders—drew clear red lines to deter Serbia’s military involvement.

Meanwhile, Belgrade has maintained plausible deniability from Dodik’s and Radojičić’s actions, conveniently gaining leverage in the West as a “moderating force.” Serbia has also sought to ease Western concerns over its intentions by purchasing French warplanes, supplying weapons to Ukraine, and offering the West access to its lithium reserves.

Yet since 2022, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has notably avoided steering Serbian society toward the West, despite Russia’s aggression in Ukraine providing an opening to do so. On the contrary, an International Republican Institute poll published in September found that in a country where the government tightly controls media narratives, 78 percent of Serbs view Putin favorably and only 6 percent see Russia as solely to blame for the war.

Russian proxies continue to use Serbian territory for disruptive operations. Moscow favorite Aleksandar Vulin—who was discharged as Serbia’s intelligence chief two years ago under Western pressure—actively promotes the “Serbian World” project to unite Serbs across the region. Radojičić enjoys state protection, despite NATO calls for accountability over the attack on Kosovo. Officers from Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) are reportedly receiving Serbian citizenship with expedited procedures, enabling them to travel to Europe visa-free. And earlier this year, Russia even reportedly used Serbia as a base to train saboteurs to interfere in Moldova’s elections.

Serbia’s neighbors are growing increasingly wary of Belgrade’s continued ties to Russian proxies and its major military build-up over the past decade. In the event of a war between Russia and the West, neighbors worry that Serbia would use the opportunity to enact its own designs on the region. Serbia has military preponderance—it is not only the largest country in the Balkans, but also the only one spending at least 2 percent of its GDP on defense, dwarfing Kosovo’s spending by tenfold.

In line with the broader rearmament wave throughout Europe, several of Serbia’s neighbors are now ramping up their defense spending and taking joint steps to strengthen deterrence. Kosovo, for example, is planning major investments in drone and ammunition production, largely with Turkish support. In March, Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo signed a defense cooperation pact to boost interoperability, pursue joint military investments, and coordinate the procurement of arms, including US weaponry.

Earlier this year, the regional pact triggered a furious reaction from Vučic, who cast it as a sign of aggression against Serbia. Then in September, he responded with Serbia’s largest-ever military parade, displaying a mix of Western, Russian, Iranian, and Chinese equipment. In October, when it was announced that Turkey had supplied Kosovo with Skydagger kamikaze drones, Vučić posted an unusually harsh tirade against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, accusing him of “dreaming to restore the Ottoman Empire.”

Vučić’s extreme sensitivity to his neighbors’ military upgrades only reinforces their doubts about his long-term intentions. In October, Vučić remarked that “since everyone is preparing for war. . . it means there will be one”—a statement widely perceived as a threat in the region.

Insulating the Balkans from a Russian escalation

Much of this regional fearmongering is driven by domestic politics. Vučiċ’s military parades and his emphasis on threats from neighbors conveniently diverts attention from the mass protests that have shaken his rule. Regional military build-ups also have other geopolitical motives, such as securing political favor from countries through arms purchases. In Albania, for instance, defense spending is also seen as a chance to rebuild an industrial base long abandoned after it shut down its communist-era plants.

Some may therefore be tempted to downplay the motives behind the regional military build-up and argue that short-term deterrence against attempts to change Balkan borders remains strong. NATO and the EU still have decisive leverage, and the region’s fresh memory of war is a powerful restraint. Trump’s “peace through strength” approach may also have curbed troublemaking in a region reliant on US security.

But a broader war—one Europe is now arming for—would erode these deterrence factors, deepen security dilemmas, and heighten the risk of miscalculation, creating openings for Russia to incite and enable a new front. The United States and its European partners must therefore use this moment to insulate the Balkans from Moscow’s leverage.

Serbia’s continued nonalignment remains the core problem, giving Russia room to operate and fuel revisionism in the region. Vučić’s geopolitical balancing is the oxygen of his rule: it lets him coerce the West by casting himself as the guarantor of stability. The West’s tolerance for this has enabled democratic backsliding in Serbia and stalled the prospects of EU accession for Western Balkan countries, a goal that was originally intended to make the region’s borders irrelevant and sustain peace.

There are signs that the West is moving to constrain Vučić’s maneuvering. The Trump administration’s decision last month to push Gazprom out of Serbia’s energy sector and end sanctions exemptions on the country’s oil and gas companies is a good start to reduce Belgrade’s dependency on Moscow. EU officials are also speaking more plainly about Serbia’s trajectory and emphasizing the costs of Vučić’s policies. Moreover, Brussels is now accelerating the EU path of neighboring Albania and Montenegro while sidelining Serbia, making clear the opportunity costs of nonalignment.

Going forward, the United States should continue supporting allies in the region that are investing in their own defense, enabling them to become security contributors and to deter threats by increasing the costs of aggression. But nothing will reduce the risk of future escalation in the region more than the consolidation of the region’s security architecture. Getting Kosovo recognized by Serbia and fully embedded in Western security structures such as NATO, for example, would be a regional game changer.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

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Michta interviewed in Defense24 on Ukraine peace plan

dfitzsimmons — Wed, 26 Nov 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Original Source

On November 26, Andrew Michta, nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Scowcroft Center, was interviewed for an article in “Defense24”. He argues that as proposed, the deal could reward Russia and prove costly for Ukraine.

If the Russians managed to reach an agreement, they would be rewarded for aggression. From their point of view, they would have beaten NATO… In my view they would then be even more willing to take risks in pressing for concessions from Europe.

Andrew Michta

Fellow

Andrew A. Michta

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

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How a Venezuela shock could raise global oil and food prices

Joseph Webster, David L. Goldwyn — Wed, 26 Nov 2025 12:00:00 +0000

Tensions between Washington and Caracas are high and could boil over. Thousands of US military personnel and about a dozen warships, including the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier and an amphibious ready group, are deployed around Venezuela, while the Maduro regime has launched a “massive mobilization” of military personnel and equipment.

Hopes are high that this moment could present momentum for the long-awaited democratic transition in Venezuela, and US policy should continue to press hard for it. Still, while Washington should continue to ratchet up pressure on the Maduro regime, a military intervention would hold first- and second-order risks to global energy and food markets.

Strikes limited to counternarcotics targets are unlikely to affect energy production or food markets. But any action attacking the regime itself or damaging single points of failure in the energy system, such as ports, is another matter altogether. Some proponents of military intervention in Venezuela are hopeful that any intervention would be relatively small and contained; skeptics, conversely, warn that air strikes could unleash unpredictable forces and lead to “difficult choices about whether and how to escalate.” With President Donald Trump reportedly seeking to speak directly with Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro, a diplomatic solution may also emerge. We leave it to others to assess the dynamics and pathways of a coercive campaign. Still, if a small-scale intervention becomes a large one, several consequences are likely.

Even with high US domestic oil production, spare production capacity in the Gulf, and a well-stocked US Strategic Petroleum Reserve buffering crude markets, the loss of Venezuela’s heavy-sour barrels would tighten already-strained diesel markets. More dangerously, a conflict could spill over into regional oil or ammonia infrastructure—especially Trinidad and Tobago’s Point Lisas complex—likely resulting in an increase in fertilizer and food prices, which could potentially set off another bout of global inflation.

Global oil markets and Venezuela

Although it is still a significant player, Venezuela is at present not as important in oil markets as it was in pre-Hugo Chávez times. Venezuela exports stand at 800,000 barrels per day (bpd), or a little under 1 percent of total world oil consumption (although exports briefly exceeded one million bpd in September). Most export volumes head to China, directly or indirectly, while US imports have fallen below 100,000 bpd in recent months.

In the event of a US military intervention, Venezuelan production and exports would almost certainly plummet. Furthermore, US military strikes on Venezuelan territory could cause the regime to retaliate, especially if the United States attacked Venezuelan military installations or leadership offices. Venezuelan retaliation could take several forms, including sabotaging production to handicap a potential successor regime, attacking neighbors that seem to be supporting US military action, and fomenting internal political instability that makes continued operation unsafe.

Venezuela’s history shows how quickly production can drop even absent a military intervention. In 2002–2003, a Venezuelan oil workers’ strike, led by opposition to then President Hugo Chávez, reduced Venezuelan oil exports from three million barrels per day to less than 200,000 barrels per day.

At the same time, high US domestic crude and natural gas liquids (NGL) production, significant spare production capacity in Gulf states, and continued expectations for an oil market glut will put a ceiling on global oil prices—even if Venezuelan production outages occur in the short term. Additionally, the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve is well stocked.

But the longer-term picture is much more mixed. Venezuelan production would likely require several years to recover from any large-scale US military intervention. Though imperfect, comparative experiences point to the challenge of bringing postwar oil production back online. During the US invasion of Iraq, for instance, Iraqi liquids production fell to zero for several months after the invasion; annual production did not return to pre-war levels until 2011. Libya’s experience, too, suggests a disorderly political transition can severely hamper oil production. Since Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi’s overthrow in 2011, Libyan liquids production has never returned to prior levels: 2024 annual production stood at 1,188 kbpd, down 32 percent from 2010 levels.

The incompetency of the Chávez and Maduro regimes leaves open the possibility that a post-Chavismo Venezuela could eventually see higher production. Indeed, the Venezuelan opposition has released a thoughtful and credible plan for bolstering oil and mining production, including by pursuing best practices. However, rebounding production will depend on several factors. For example, capital and labor will need to return to Venezuela. State-owned Petróleos de Venezuela, SA, which is debt-laden and has deferred maintenance on key pieces of field infrastructure, will need to be overhauled. And many of Venezuela’s reservoirs, which have suffered from poor production practices, will need to be restored.

Long-term Venezuelan outages would therefore likely lift oil prices, especially diesel. This is because Venezuela’s heavy-sour crude oil grades are highly suitable for producing diesel, which is a key input into virtually every industry. Recently, the International Energy Agency has warned that middle distillate markets—including diesel—are already tight. Accordingly, if Venezuela production is removed from the market, then diesel prices could shift higher, which is likely to increase global inflation.

Indeed, if US policymakers undertake military intervention in Venezuela, then they should both anticipate higher inflation via diesel markets and prepare for a post-intervention environment wherein Venezuela’s oil production takes time, and requires support, to fully rebound.

Horizontal escalation risks

A US military intervention in Venezuela might have wider regional impacts should the Maduro regime, faced with an existential threat, escalate a conflict horizontally to other countries or regions via semi-deniable proxies.

Horizontal escalation would expand the aperture of commodity-related risks. For instance, energy infrastructure in Colombia, especially pipelines, could be one such target, given links between Caracas and the ELN, a US-designated foreign terrorist organization. The ELN operates extensively in the Venezuela–Colombia borderlands, where the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline has been regularly attacked since it opened in 1986, including as recently as July of this year. An attack by ELN on a Colombian pipeline—either implicitly or explicitly supported by Caracas—would offer Maduro an opportunity to increase the costs of a conflict in an asymmetric or deniable manner, as even short-lived outages in Colombia would compound Venezuela’s supply losses and harm US refinery economics.

Maduro seems unlikely to approve an attack on Colombian infrastructure, for now, given his need for a diplomatic lifeline with Colombian President Gustavo Petro, a fellow leftist. But his calculus could shift after Colombia’s upcoming legislative and presidential elections in early 2026. If leftist candidate Iván Cepeda prevails, Maduro will likely still seek to preserve ties with Bogotá, but after the election he is less likely to worry that escalation might electorally empower his opponents. If a non-leftist candidate wins, conversely, Maduro may feel freer to escalate inside Colombia. Crucially, Colombia’s exports of heavy and medium sour crude oil, including medium-sour production in Caño Limón sent to the Coveñas terminal on the Caribbean for export, are highly suitable for producing middle distillates. About 40 percent of Colombian crude oil was shipped directly to the United States in 2024, and many Panama-bound shipments are transshipped to US Gulf Coast refineries. Accordingly, losses of Venezuelan and Colombian crude may significantly impact domestic fuel prices, especially for diesel.

Trinidad and Tobago’s ammonia supply chains are also vulnerable to disruption in a military conflict, especially one that expands beyond Venezuela. While accounting for only 2.5 percent of all global ammonia production, Trinidad and Tobago is responsible for 15-20 percent of global ammonia seaborne trade, and the country is the second-largest exporter to the United States, after Canada. This supply chain centers on Point Lisas, which sits on Trinidad’s west coast in the Gulf of Paria, directly facing Venezuela, about fifty kilometers away, leaving it exposed to disruption and retaliation in a prolonged conflict with the Maduro regime. Point Lisas has limited redundancy, with potential single points of failure such as the Phoenix Park Valve Station, a key hub for processing and routing gas feedstock to ammonia plants.

If Maduro sympathizers disrupt Point Lisas with cyber or kinetic attacks—including asymmetrical methods such as drones—then the effects will be felt throughout the Americas and potentially beyond. While the United States and Europe are Trinidad and Tobago’s largest ammonia partners by volumes, Mexico’s, Chile’s, and Brazil’s fertilizer markets are disproportionately exposed. Accordingly, an outage at Point Lisas would reverberate throughout the region. Mexico, too, would be impacted: It imported 250,000 tons of anhydrous ammonia from Trinidad and Tobago in 2024, while domestic ammonia production stood at only 319,000 tons. Due to deep US-Mexico agricultural ties—22.8 percent of US agricultural imports in 2024 by value hailed from Mexico—a fertilizer disruption at Point Lisas would likely send US, regional, and global food prices higher.

Carry a big stick, but think before swinging

The Maduro regime is one of the world’s worst, and it lost its legitimacy long ago. And while Maduro must step down, US policymakers should think carefully about the consequences that would accompany military force.

The United States’ strong domestic oil production and Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Venezuela’s limited role in global oil markets, and a projected state of market oversupply all lower the probability of an immediate crude-oil price spike in the event of hostilities. Yet a long road ahead for Venezuela’s oil production to rebound, as well as the possibility of spillover to other oil- or ammonia-producing countries, speaks to a wider and perhaps deeper set of inflationary risks that policymakers and market participants should take into account.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report.

David Goldwyn is president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC (GGS), an international energy advisory consultancy, and chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group.

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Trump’s latest Ukraine peace proposal sparks strong Republican reaction

Doug Klain — Tue, 25 Nov 2025 22:39:27 +0000

A new attempt by the United States to broker peace between Russia and Ukraine has sparked fresh hopes for an end to the largest European war since World War II, while also drawing accusations of echoing key Kremlin demands. Launched late last week, this peace initiative has provoked a particularly strong reaction from some of US President Donald Trump’s colleagues within the Republican Party.

Trump’s team is now working with counterparts in Ukraine and the rest of Europe to agree on a potential common framework for a settlement with Russia. Despite tensions between Republicans in Congress worried by White House pressure on Kyiv, US efforts to end the war will only be strengthened by a more activist Congress that resumes legislating on foreign policy.

The original US plan envisioned a peace built on twenty-eight points. These included a cap on Ukraine’s armed forces, a ban on Ukraine joining NATO, and the surrender of some of the most heavily fortified land in eastern Ukraine to Moscow.

The proposal drew criticism from a number of congressional Republicans. “Those who think pressuring the victim and appeasing the aggressor will bring peace are kidding themselves,” wrote Senator Mitch McConnell, who likened the plan to “a capitulation like [former US President Joe] Biden’s abandonment of Afghanistan.”

“This so-called ‘peace plan’ has real problems, and I am highly skeptical it will achieve peace,” said Roger Wicker, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

A Wall Street Journal report that Trump would withhold arms sales to Ukraine if Kyiv didn’t accept the proposal by Thanksgiving elicited a rebuke from Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick, who wrote: “Correction: The United States wants Russia’s answer on an unconditional withdrawal of Ukraine by Thursday. This Russian-drafted propaganda must be rejected and disregarded for the unserious nonsense that it is.”

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Comments from US Vice President JD Vance indicate that the White House has received significant pushback from Republicans in Congress over its recent handling of the Russia-Ukraine peace process. “The level of passion over this one issue when your own country has serious problems is bonkers,” he posted on November 24.

Perhaps the biggest challenge to the Trump administration’s position on Ukraine peace talks has come from Fitzpatrick, who filed a discharge petition to force a vote in the House of Representatives on Russia sanctions once a majority of members have signed on. This is the same mechanism used in 2024 to pressure Speaker of the House Mike Johnson to pass a $61 billion aid package for Ukraine.

A more prominent congressional role in Russia-Ukraine peace efforts would mark a departure from recent trends. At present, 2025 is the first year since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion that Congress has not passed any legislation to assist Ukraine. From the US-Ukraine minerals deal to shuttle diplomacy in Istanbul and arms sales to NATO, the White House has made it clear that ending the war in Ukraine is Trump’s portfolio.

This helps to explain why the Sanctioning Russia Act, introduced in April 2025 by Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), has gone nearly eight months without a vote despite pledges of support from 85 percent of senators. Originally written to signal strong congressional support for Russia sanctions, the legislation has since undergone technical changes to improve the effectiveness of the sanctions and gain Trump’s approval, according to congressional staff.

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Fitzpatrick’s initiative could now change things. The discharge petition, which he says would force a vote on a version of the Sanctioning Russia Act and potentially also the Democrat-led Ukraine Support Act, which includes both sanctions and new military support for Kyiv, could mobilize Republicans uneasy with current peace efforts.

After nearly a year of deferring to Trump to manage a peace process, Republican criticism in Congress is growing. “The President’s appeasement plan to Russia is forcing our hand,” commented Rep. Don Bacon (R-NE), who says he considered resigning from Congress in protest over the recently proposed peace plan.

To force a vote, the discharge petition will require majority support from House members. Most Democrats will likely back the move, though some are privately sharing concerns about granting Trump increased authority to levy tariffs, should that provision remain in the final legislation attached to the petition. A handful of Republicans could push it over the line.

Further action to back Ukraine and pressure Russia is likely to find support among Trump’s base. Fresh polling from the right-leaning Vandenberg Coalition found that only 16 percent of Trump voters agree with the proposal that Ukraine should surrender territory to the Kremlin, while 76 percent support sanctioning Russia.

The reality is that without serious additional pressure on Russia, Putin is unlikely to agree to any of the peace frameworks currently being floated. However, if Congress pushes to enact crippling sanctions, extend military assistance to Ukraine, and codify security guarantees, the Trump administration’s peace efforts could finally bear fruit.

The last few days have shown that Congress is eager to help Trump force Russia to end its war in Ukraine. Capitalizing on the revised peace framework agreed by US and Ukrainian negotiators in Switzerland will now require action from both sides of Pennsylvania Avenue.

Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He also serves as deputy director for policy and strategy at Razom for Ukraine, a US-based nonprofit humanitarian aid and advocacy organization.

Every city the Russian military bombs, every child it kidnaps, every Ukrainian life it destroys today can only be understood within the long genealogy of Russia’s imperialistic state ideology. For centuries, this violent brand of expansionism has been directed at Ukraine.

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The present full-scale invasion of Ukraine will soon pass the four-year mark, but the war did not begin in 2022. It was preceded by eight years of warfare in eastern Ukraine following Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea. This has been recognized by the European Court of Human Rights, which has ruled that Russia has been conducting sustained military operations in Ukraine since at least 2014. But even this is only the most recent chapter in a far older story.

During the eras of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the authorities consistently pursued policies aimed at dismantling Ukrainian identity. Tactics included banning the Ukrainian language, repressing cultural and religious leaders, and imprisoning advocates of Ukrainian independence.

Most devastatingly, Stalin and his regime engineered an artificial famine in the 1930s that killed at least four million Ukrainians in less than two years. Today, this deliberate mass starvation of Ukrainians is known as the Holodomor (“killing by hunger”). No outlier, the Holodomor was central to a broader Soviet campaign aimed at breaking Ukrainian resistance and other assertions of political autonomy. The lawyer who coined the term “genocide,” Raphael Lemkin, identified this attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation as the “classic example” of Soviet genocide.

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What unites these episodes is not only the violence itself but the ideology behind it. Moscow’s long history of crimes in Ukraine reflects an imperial worldview that treats human beings as resources to be harnessed for the state and as obstacles to be eliminated in the pursuit of total domination.

This ideology has evolved over time, but its core logic has remained remarkably consistent. Crucially, it has never faced sustained, meaningful repudiation by the international community. Because it was never confronted, Russia’s imperial ideology has been allowed to regenerate. A clear line of impunity links Stalin’s starvation of Ukrainian society in the 1930s to today’s Kremlin rhetoric insisting Ukraine is not a real nation at all.

This continuity is not abstract; it directly shapes present-day atrocities. When a state views humans as raw material for empire, the kidnapping and forced Russification of thousands of Ukrainian children becomes an acceptable instrument of policy rather than an aberration. This logic also applies to other aspects of the current invasion including filtration camps, torture chambers, rape and sexual violence, and mass deportations, along with the systematic destruction of Ukrainian cultural and religious life throughout every area under Russian control.

Ukraine’s top prosecutor notes that the number of open war crimes investigations has reached 178,391 documented cases. Indicating deliberate Kremlin policy, the former US ambassador-at-large for global criminal justice recently stated that Russian atrocities in Ukraine are “systematic” and have been identified “literally everywhere that Russia’s troops have been deployed.”

The current actions of Putin’s occupation forces in Ukraine are the same state practices that have long defined Russian imperial rule: Absorb what can be absorbed, erase what cannot, and turn the conquered into fuel for the next stage of expansion.

Russia’s genocidal intent is not limited to eliminating Ukrainian identity. Putin’s extreme ideology drives him to pursue the incorporation of Ukrainians into Russia’s war machine against the West. The danger is not only the destruction of Ukraine as a nation, but the possibility that Russia will assimilate as much of Ukraine’s territory, cutting-edge technology, and population as it can before continuing further.

Contemporary Russian rhetoric makes this explicit. Strikingly, the Putin era has witnessed the resurgence of the slogan “We can do it again.” Originally graffiti scrawled on the Reichstag by Red Army soldiers in 1945, the popularity of this phrase surged after Russia’s 2014 occupation of Crimea to become a menacing mantra of modern Russian nationalism that signals a society intent on conquest and domination.

The atrocities we are witnessing today in Ukraine reflect centuries of Russian impunity. Impunity not only allows perpetrators to continue; it invites them to escalate. Russia’s imperial ideology has never been confronted with the kind of accountability needed to dismantle it. As long as this ideology persists unchallenged, the threat will not stop at Ukraine’s borders.

The international community now finds itself confronted with the consequences of a genocidal worldview that has been left intact for generations. The urgent question is not only how to halt Russia’s genocidal actions against Ukrainians today, but how to ensure that the world finally repudiates the extremist ideology that made this war possible. Without that repudiation, millions of Russians will remain convinced that they can, in fact, “do it again.”

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

While recent US sanctions on two Russian energy giants mark an important step forward in efforts to pressure Putin, their immediate impact is limited as China and India are unlikely to stop buying Russian oil. Moreover, sanctions alone will not force Putin to abandon an invasion that he regards as central to his entire reign.

The coming fourth winter of the war will arguably be Ukraine’s most arduous since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Ukraine faces a constant barrage of Russian missiles and drones, along with a persistently worsening economic outlook and acute manpower crisis on the front lines. Russian President Vladimir Putin is confident that he can wear down Ukrainian military and civilian resistance, and is also counting on Western support to dwindle.

The war is now as much a test of economic endurance as it is a military struggle. The United States and Europe should be under no illusions that Putin is unlikely to compromise on Ukraine unless he is forced to accept that continuing the war will be prohibitively costly.

The Kremlin dictator’s intransigence was underscored by a recent US intelligence assessment stating that he is more determined than ever to prevail. This makes it even more important to underline the West’s own unwavering determination to continue supporting Ukraine economically as well as militarily.

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To effectively support Ukraine, Washington and Brussels need to move beyond short-term crisis responses and embrace a longer term strategy. The goal should be to help Ukraine strengthen its wartime economy and put the country in a position to continue military operations throughout 2026 and beyond.

The most pressing issue is removing obstacles to the use of immobilized Russian assets. Before the end of 2025, EU leaders must resolve internal disagreements that are currently preventing Europe from utilizing these frozen assets to cover large gaps in Ukraine’s budget for the coming year.

Plans for a $160 billion reparations loan have so far been blocked by Belgium over concerns of retaliatory Russian lawsuits and other potential Kremlin countermeasures. In order to minimize the threat, Belgium wants all EU member states to offer political guarantees for the loan. One option is to have Norway step up as guarantor, but Oslo has so far refused to take on that role alone. The United States could use its influence and leverage to offset European concerns. Alternatives to the reparations loan are subpar and would signal a weakening of Western resolve to Moscow.

Any breakthrough on the issue of immobilized Russian assets would set the stage for a proposed “mega deal” that would see Ukraine purchase large quantities of arms from the United States using $90 billion backed by European partners. Washington’s weapons deliveries to Ukraine could also be accelerated by working with Brussels through the EU’s $170 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) funding mechanism. This kind of transatlantic coordination would ensure that Ukraine receives the weapons it so urgently needs while strengthening NATO’s industrial base.

Support for Ukraine’s energy sector will also be vital as Western partners seek to provide Kyiv with greater economic stability. The Kremlin has dramatically expanded domestic drone production over the past year, making it possible to increase the bombardment of Ukraine’s cities and energy infrastructure. This is leading to widespread blackouts that undermine Ukrainian morale while impacting economic activity and military production.

Brussels must do more to persuade EU member states including Romania and Slovakia to lift existing restrictions on gas exports to Ukraine. This would help Kyiv cover energy supply shortfalls. Increased funding is equally crucial. Energy experts currently estimate that it will take $2.5 billion for Ukraine to import enough gas to get through the coming winter heating season. Meanwhile, the US and EU should take steps to encourage investment in Ukraine’s energy security to help repair, replace, and upgrade critical infrastructure.

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As Russia’s full-scale invasion approaches the four-year mark, policymakers in Washington, London, and across the EU must recognize that strengthening Ukraine’s wartime economy is a top strategic priority. Ukraine’s economic resilience will shape the outcome of the war and help determine European security for decades to come.

Funding Ukraine is expensive, but the arguments in favor of such an investment are convincing. After all, the cost of supporting the Ukrainian economy today would be dwarfed by the far higher price Western governments will have to pay in terms of increased defense spending if Putin’s invasion succeeds.

At present, there is little reason to believe a just and lasting peace is close. Ukraine is suffering on the battlefield, while the credibility of the country’s leadership has been seriously undermined by the largest domestic corruption scandal of the wartime period. Nevertheless, the public mood across Ukraine remains defiant and determined. In Russia, Western sanctions and Ukrainian airstrikes are causing real pain for Putin’s wartime economy, but his fixation on establishing political control over Ukraine far outweighs his need to address these mounting costs.

The United States and Europe must adopt a long-term perspective to effectively counter Moscow’s maximalist aims. Current efforts to broker a hasty peace deal risk emboldening Putin, sacrificing Ukrainian sovereignty, and compromising European security. Instead, Western leaders should send a clear message to the Kremlin that their own resolve is as strong as ever. Taking steps to strengthen Ukraine’s economic resilience would certainly underline this message, and could help to convince Putin that his hopes of outlasting the West are futile.

Zahar Hryniv is a Young Global Professional at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Once the group pushed into El Fasher, reports and footage circulating across social media and television revealed widespread killings of civilians. Around 1,500 people were killed and some ninety thousand displaced, with another fifty thousand fleeing violence in the neighboring North and South Kordofan provinces, according to the Sudan Doctors Network and the United Nations.

El Fasher had long been one of the most violent fronts in the devastating conflict between Sudan’s national army and the RSF. In April, the paramilitary group had intensified its offensive on the city, shortly after being driven out of the capital, Khartoum.

The world’s most serious humanitarian crisis

For years, the genocide unfolding in Sudan barely registered on the world’s radar. The international community remained more focused on crises in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine. But the fighting and killing in Sudan never stopped.

In a country in tatters, where there is no systematic record of the dead, casualty estimates vary. Some sources suggest that the number hovers somewhere around 150,000. However, human rights organizations believe that the real toll of the civil war is likely much higher. The conflict has displaced about fourteen million people out of a population of fifty-one million. Half of them are refugees in neighboring countries. As of April 2025, twenty-five million Sudanese were facing acute famine—and according to Doctors Without Borders, over 70 percent of children under the age of five were acutely malnourished. Among those who fled El Fasher, 35 percent suffered from “severe acute malnutrition.”

With severe damage to its hospitals and water supply, Sudan now faces one of the world’s gravest humanitarian crises—one that some experts say even eclipses the emergencies in Gaza and Ukraine. Still, El Fasher is not the first, but merely the latest genocidal campaign in the country.

Naming the genocide

Engaging in war crimes and crimes against humanity, RSF soldiers have carried out child abductions, mass rape, sexual slavery, and village burnings for years, mostly in Darfur in western Sudan. Even as far back as 2001, the predecessor of the RSF—a militia known as the Janjaweed—repeatedly looted homes and engaged in gang rape in the region. Between 2003 and 2008, the group killed hundreds of thousands of non-Arab civilians. The campaign displaced around three million people and was described as a “genocide” by US President Joe Biden just before leaving the White House and as a “ethnic cleansing” by international observers. Against this background, Darfur is not a newly emerging hotspot. Home to several long-persecuted non-Arab tribes—Fur, Masalit, Berti, and Zaghawa—it is, in fact, again becoming one.

The Zaghawa, who are the majority group in El Fasher, rallied to the army in late 2023 after the RSF committed massacres against the Masalit and other non-Arab communities in the city of El Geneina in West Darfur. In a report released in May 2024, Human Rights Watch documented these killings as ethnic cleansing. The report cited the testimony of a seventeen-year-old boy who described the murder of twelve children and five adults from several families: “Two members of the RSF… tore the children from their parents and, as the parents began to scream, two other members of the RSF shot and killed the parents. Then they piled the children up and shot them. They threw their bodies into the river, along with their belongings.”

African apathy—and cynical regional powers

With its paltry communiqués, a powerless African Union has, for two years, contented itself with calling for an end to the fighting or expressing its concern about the humanitarian crisis, without ever sending a single African head of state to the front lines in Khartoum or to visit the victims of the El Geneina massacre.

In a press release marking two years of conflict, Amnesty International noted that “the world has only contributed 6.6% of the funds needed to address the humanitarian catastrophe raging in the country.” Observers usually recommend enforcement of the arms embargo, increased emergency humanitarian aid, and justice for the victims. However, there is one issue on which the United Nations Security Council and the mediators remain discreetly, if not embarrassingly, silent: the armed support that the belligerents receive from regional powers.

Egypt, Iran, Turkey, China, the UAE, and even Russia and Ukraine have all turned their attention to Sudan, siding either with the SAF or the RSF. Drones, gold, military intelligence, and mercenaries are all being used to intensify the violence of the war, while the meddling regional powers deny any involvement. Motivations for their involvement include securing the Nile’s waters, controlling the eight hundred kilometers of Sudanese Red Sea coastline, and the mineral resources of eastern Sudan. Sudan has also accused Chad and Kenya of being parties to the conflict. At the London Sudan Conference on April 15, the second anniversary of the outbreak of the civil war, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef reiterated these allegations.

Clearly, the complex web of geostrategic interests in the region makes any mediation difficult, with Sudan even considering taking action against the UAE before the International Court of Justice for supplying the RSF with weapons.

The people as a solution

As it stands, Sudan is trapped in a dangerous regional power play and is threatened with partition. Should the country fall apart, this would not only destabilize the African continent but also endanger the exceptional Sudanese cultural heritage.

Any solution in Sudan must run through its civil society and, ultimately, its people. They are strong in part because of—and shown by—their history. With eight borders and a geostrategic position between the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, Sudan is a crossroads of African cultures, religions, and civilizations. The country still bears a name that means “land of the Blacks,” despite the attempts to erase its African roots carried out by the Islamist regime of long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir. Sudan, which rivaled ancient Egypt, eventually conquered and ruled the Egyptian throne, becoming the twenty-fifth dynasty of pharaohs. All this happened a long time ago, under Black African leadership, before Christians and Muslim Arabs expanded their influence in the country.

This history and legacy help explain the political resilience of the Sudanese people and the dynamism of Sudan’s civil society. Bashir’s ousting in 2019 would not have been possible without democratic resistance, embodied by civic organizations such as the Sudanese Professionals Association, the nonviolent Forces of Freedom and Change coalition, and the grassroots Girifna movement.

Today, as in the past, the Sudanese people—rather than an apathetic international community or meddling regional powers—could once again be the decisive force for change. Empowering civil society and grassroots organizations should therefore be the starting point for any diplomatic initiative.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Sotiriadis on Fox News on Ukraine peace deal, Venezuela

dfitzsimmons — Sat, 22 Nov 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Original Source

On November 22, Jake Sotiriadis, nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, appeared on Fox News to discuss President Trump’s proposed Russia-Ukraine peace deal and the administration’s actions in Venezuela.

If we keep looking through these situations through our own lens, and mirror imaging how we as Americans view other people’s interests and interpretations of geopolitics, we’re going to be surprised.

Jake Sotiriadis

Fellow

Jake Sotiriadis

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

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The expert conversation: Separating signal from noise in Trump’s Ukraine peace plan

John E. Herbst — Fri, 21 Nov 2025 23:44:15 +0000

Ukraine is facing a “very difficult choice,” President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said today. “Either loss of dignity, or the risk of losing a key partner.” His speech, marking Ukraine’s Day of Dignity and Freedom, came amid reports of increasing pressure from the United States to accept a twenty-eight-point plan to end the war that Russia launched against Ukraine in February 2022.

To dive into the details of the proposal and understand its bigger-picture significance, we turned to John Herbst, the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine, who always has his finger on the pulse of US President Donald Trump’s efforts to end the war. This expert conversation has been edited and condensed below.

Trump has now given Ukrainian leaders a deadline of Thursday—Thanksgiving in the United States—to respond to a US plan to end the war in Ukraine. That’s presented Ukraine with “one of the most difficult moments” in its history, in the words of Zelenskyy. Is this the pivotal moment that it seems like? And how do you expect Ukraine to respond?

John Herbst

The meaning of this deadline is unclear. In addition to this statement, Trump said that the deadline could slip if there is “positive movement.” It is also true that despite the Kremlin’s rejection of Trump’s cease-fire proposal in August, Trump ignored his own deadline for Russian compliance. There is no reason to assume that the president would severely sanction Ukraine for not quickly accepting a document that appears to have many Kremlin-friendly points.

What do you make of the draft twenty-eight-point peace plan that has been circulating in reports?

John Herbst: I think that some version [of the reported draft]—or similar to that—is being discussed in Kyiv, if not that actual draft.

Security is the principal problem. You have massive aggression by a nuclear superpower against its neighbor. One of the points in the reported draft appeared to suggest giving the Kremlin strategic territory that it has been unable to conquer in over three and a half years of the massive invasion. This would seem to be a fatuous idea, rewarding the aggressor. Then there are the limitations on the Ukrainian military, the victim. Now, it’s true that the points suggest a sizable Ukrainian military of 600,000 people, but that’s still less than the Ukrainian armed forces today and maybe less than they need. The plan also talks about limitations on arms that Ukraine could have. Here too, why are there limitations on the arms and forces of the victim nation and none on the aggressor? So these points are on the negative side. I’m not sure they comport with Trump’s stated objective—which I believe he’s serious about—of achieving a durable peace which leaves Ukraine an independent and secure nation.

On the other side of the ledger, a possible positive is this discussion of US security guarantees. Now, if this phrase turns out to be security guarantees as solid as Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, then that’s a very serious and positive development. The Russians, of course, don’t want that. But if you had a bilateral security guarantee from the United States, like Article 5, that would certainly deter future Russian aggression, because the Russians are afraid of our military, as they should be. After all, they can’t even beat the Ukrainian military, as we’ve seen.

It is worth noting that there is some clarity in the reported draft on the items that work to Moscow’s advantage, but no similar clarity on the security guarantees that are supposed to deter and to protect Ukraine from future Russian aggression.

Obviously, there would have to be true clarity on what that NATO-like commitment means for Ukraine if a deal were to be reached with that as the key security point.

Do you see anything in the draft plans that would prevent Russia from invading Ukraine again?

John Herbst: In theory, Moscow would make a commitment, just like it did in its peace treaty with Ukraine in the 1990s and in the Budapest Memorandum, to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity. But Moscow’s war on Ukraine and “annexation” of Crimea and other oblasts show Moscow cannot be counted on to meet its commitments.

Zooming out, this war has been going on for nearly four years—nearly twelve years since Russia’s initial 2014 invasion. Why do you think all this activity is happening now?

John Herbst: This is just part of who Trump is and his policy world. He’s constantly in motion, bringing up ideas. He fancies himself a peacemaker. And I say that with respect, because he’s done some remarkable things—from Africa to the Middle East to East Asia. So he’s wondering why he can’t get this thing done [in Ukraine], and his team goes from one idea to another. That, I believe, explains this.

Does the corruption scandal that Zelenskyy is dealing with in Ukraine have any tie-in here?

John Herbst: It’s certainly related. There were clearly Kremlin narratives in the press that Ukraine is losing on the battlefield, [and] Zelenskyy is besieged because of corruption in Ukraine, now’s the time to push him to make concessions. I think those types of narratives demonstrate a misunderstanding of Ukraine. For example, the anti-corruption groups in Ukraine, the civil society folks whom I know well, they’re also the strongest opponents of Kremlin aggression. And if Zelenskyy is weak vis-à-vis them, the worst thing he could do is to make ill-considered, dangerous concessions to Moscow, right? I think there was some wishful Kremlin-type thinking being channeled to American media by people who, in fact, due to their limited knowledge, are all too accommodating of Kremlin aggression.

It wasn’t so long ago that we were talking about a major drone deal between the United States and Ukraine. Trump has helped broker deals for European countries to provide more weapons to Ukraine, plus provided intelligence support. And then we have these latest reports about threats to withdraw US support for Ukraine if it doesn’t sign this peace deal. How do you assess the state of US support for Ukraine in this moment?

John Herbst: One thing we have not heard amid all this sound and fury in the past several days is that the sale of arms and the drone deal are off the table—these are two separate deals, both of great importance. In my understanding, serious negotiations are going on regarding those arms deals. So I don’t see what we’ve seen this week as a rejection of that part of administration policy, but you can be sure that whoever was briefing Axios doesn’t like those deals.

Trump is a mercurial figure. He moves in this direction, in that direction, as he tries to come up with a solution. There have obviously been times when that’s worked for him. I don’t think that works in the current war because Putin’s aim has not changed. He is not going to give up his desire of achieving effective political control of Ukraine. So if a deal along the lines that have been outlined were to go into effect, Putin may lie low for six months, twelve months, twenty-four months before he makes his next move to take additional Ukrainian territory—until either he has a government he wants in Kyiv or he has so much territory that he’s reduced Ukraine to a landlocked, small state somewhere in the western part of its territory.

The only way Trump can be a Nobel Prize winner for ending this brutal aggression is by making sure Putin can’t do that. And that’s ultimately why I think that efforts, including by credulous people who have access to President Trump, to make a deal that enables Putin to achieve his goal are not going to succeed. The only way Trump gets the peace he wants is by making it clear to Putin that he’s going to pay a very high price to continue his aggression.

European partners will now reportedly meet on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Johannesburg to develop their own peace proposal. Do you think that has legs?

John Herbst: Yes. Active European engagement with President Trump has made it much harder for Putin to persuade Trump of something that is against not just Ukraine’s interest or Europe’s interests, but also American interests. Steps like increasing defense spending and a willingness to put European troops on the ground in Ukraine have been important in making it harder for Putin to sell snake oil to the White House. Several European leaders have terrific relations with Trump.

It sounds like you’re saying what we’re witnessing isn’t necessarily the endgame of the war or even the beginning of the end.

John Herbst: We’re really, really, really far from any true endgame negotiation. This is just one more turn of the wheel, and we’re going to have a lot more turns in the future.

There’s clearly a play led by [Russian envoy Kirill] Dmitriev, because of his special relationship with [US envoy Steve] Witkoff, to get a deal that hands over to Russia hard-to-conquer territory in western Donbas and improves relations between Trump and Putin. From Dmitriev’s perspective, the goal is to create conditions that allow Putin to gobble up more of Ukraine—eighteen months, twenty-four months down the road, or maybe right after Trump leaves office. That’s the game. And because the White House does want a deal, which I think is laudable, there are some people playing on that desire to accommodate Russia in ways that undermine American interests in Europe, create an existential threat to the Ukrainian people, and increase the possibility of Russia taking even more provocative actions against NATO allies.

Moscow is conducting ever more serious provocations in Europe—having a MiG [fighter jet] in Baltic airspace for thirteen minutes, having all these drone flights, the sabotage of the railroad in eastern Poland—and NATO has done very little. It’s important for NATO to take serious countersteps to make Russia pay a price for this. President Trump, who considers himself to be a very strong leader, should be taking the lead on that. That’s another way to let Putin know that he cannot simply waltz into the rest of Ukraine.

Say Trump calls you into the Oval: What guidance would you give him? How would you brief him regarding what to do next?

John Herbst: I start by saying, Mr. President, you proved yourself a remarkable peacemaker, but you’re having a hard time on this one, and here’s why: You’ve established a goal which meets American interests. You say you want to create a durable peace by having roughly a cease-fire along the present [battle] lines. In fact, that is a real gift to Putin, because the US is not saying Putin has to withdraw from conquered territory or pay a price for the great evils he’s inflicted on millions of Ukrainians. Still, in an imperfect world, that’s not a bad outcome—if, in fact, you put in place conditions that ensure that Russian aggression is not renewed. The problem you face is Putin does not want that. He wants effective political control of Ukraine. That means he wants to control all of the cities on the Dnipro River, from the north to the south, including especially Kyiv and Odesa. He wants to make sure that Ukraine, as it exists following any peace deal, has no access to the Black Sea. And obviously, if he were to agree to President Trump’s basic concept for peace, he cannot achieve those objectives.

You have to choose what’s more important: a friendly relationship with an aggressor—whose policies are, in fact, adversarial to the United States—or a durable peace. The only way you get [a durable peace] is to make it unpleasant for Putin to continue his war of aggression.

That means you need to send more advanced weapons to Ukraine. That means you have to help Ukraine find a way to finance the war. If you’re not going to send American assistance, okay, but you have these $300-billion worth of frozen Russian assets sitting in the Western financial system. American advocacy of handing those over to Ukraine to deal with its economic needs and to purchase weapons would go a long way. And of course, the sanctions the administration finally put down on Lukoil and Rosneft were excellent, but more needs to come. The administration mentioned after those sanctions that they want to calibrate this. That, frankly, is Biden talk—gradual escalation, which is not the way to persuade Putin to make peace.

Putin thinks, correctly, that he’s outwaited every Western leader in conducting this now nearly twelve-year war of aggression and nearly four-year war of big invasion. And he’s been right. He’s been able to outlast them. He thinks he can outlast President Trump. I think Trump is too smart to allow Putin to do that. Trump has actually made that point in public.

So the administration needs to bring the hammer down on President Putin at the same time it expresses its willingness to have the best relations in the world with him and with Russia once they stop this aggression. Trump was very successful in the Middle East because he was willing to put the hammer on Iran. And until it puts the hammer down on the aggressor in Europe, it’s not going to achieve a durable peace there.

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The good, the bad, and the ugly in the US peace plan for Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Fri, 21 Nov 2025 22:33:36 +0000

JUST IN

“Thursday is it.” Today US President Donald Trump gave Ukraine a Thanksgiving deadline to approve a twenty-eight-point peace plan. The proposal reportedly gives Russia large chunks of Ukrainian territory and restricts Ukraine’s armed forces, while providing Ukraine a new security guarantee—though without Western troops. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the choice could come down to “loss of dignity, or the risk of losing a key partner.” As always, we turned to our plan of asking our experts to assess the proposal and what to expect next.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser Family distinguished fellow and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe
John E. Herbst  (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
Leslie Shedd (@leslieshedd): Nonresident fellow at the Eurasia Center and former senior advisor to members of the US Congress, as well as US senatorial and presidential candidates

What’s in the deal

Dan calls the US proposal “a hot mess” because it “is sloppy, internally inconsistent, and retreats from Trump’s stated position on ending the conflict—for example, that the current front line be the cease-fire line.”
The idea of granting Russia all of the Donbas region even without the Kremlin having conquered it on the battlefield is “a fatuous idea,” John argues, “rewarding the aggressor.”
But John adds that the inclusion of language on security guarantees is “a possible positive,” and a strong bilateral guarantee from the United States “would certainly deter future Russian aggression, because the Russians are afraid of our military.”
Dan also notes the deal’s “workable elements, including a provision that all commitments to Russia fall if it again attacks Ukraine” and points out that “we saw earlier this year how a bad initial US proposal—the ‘minerals deal’—could be transformed into a reasonable deal for development and a plus for US-Ukraine relations.”

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Trumpology

Leslie says Trump believes that the refusal of his predecessor, Joe Biden, “to send Ukraine the weapons it needed to fully repel Russia early in the invasion (and before Russian troops became entrenched inside the country) created a stalemate that Ukraine is unlikely to break.”
So in Trump’s mind, Leslie says, “a negotiated settlement that includes giving up some land is likely the only way to stop the killing.”
With European leaders now trying to get involved, John says he expects Trump to be receptive to their views, given that “several of those European leaders have terrific relations with Trump.” European leaders’ moves to increase “defense spending and willingness to put European troops on the ground in Ukraine have been important in making it harder for Putin to sell snake oil to the White House.”
John notes that “Trump is a mercurial figure,” who moves in different directions as he seeks a solution. “There have obviously been times when that’s worked for him. I don’t think that works in the current war because Putin’s aim has not changed. He is not going to give up his desire of achieving effective political control of Ukraine.”

The next moves

“The Ukrainians are in a tight place,” Dan says, because if they reject the plan “they are apt to trigger another Trump explosion and even more US withdrawal of support for Ukraine.”
So Dan advises Zelenskyy to work with Trump on the text. “It will not be pretty. But the Ukrainian objective should be to make sure the peace plan is not a disaster and to avoid blame for its likely failure.”
If they do reach a deal, Leslie says the Trump administration should submit the agreement to the US Senate to ratify as a treaty. “This will send a powerful message to Putin that Republicans and Democrats in both the executive and legislative branches are united in their commitment to following through on the security guarantees if [Putin] puts a toe into Ukraine again.”

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Any serious Ukraine peace plan must address Putin’s imperial ambitions

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 20 Nov 2025 22:21:33 +0000

This week has seen a flurry of diplomatic activity around a new US peace plan to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. White House officials stated on Thursday that the plan had been developed by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff over the past month based on input from both Ukrainians and Russians. However, other reports have claimed that the document was drafted by Witkoff and his Russian counterpart without Ukraine’s involvement.

Details of the 28-point proposal have not yet been made public, but the terms are believed to include extensive Ukrainian concessions along with a series of economic and political incentives for Russia. This has led to widespread alarm, with many critics dismissing the proposal as a call for Ukraine’s “capitulation.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has so far offered a more diplomatic response. The Ukrainian leader received the plan in Kyiv on Thursday and commented that he intends to speak with US President Donald Trump in the coming days about “diplomatic opportunities and the key points required to achieve peace.”

While Zelenskyy is understandably eager not to alienate Trump, there is little optimism in Kyiv or across Europe that this latest US initiative can end the continent’s largest invasion since World War II. Multiple similar attempts to secure a settlement by offering the Kremlin generous terms have already been made without success.

This approach reflects a fundamental failure to recognize that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not driven by the same straightforward cost-benefit rationality as his Western counterparts. On the contrary, Putin believes he is engaged in an existential struggle to revive Russia’s great power status and secure his own place in history. It is therefore delusional to think that he can be satisfied by promises of minor territorial concessions or future economic opportunities.

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The disconnect between Moscow and Western capitals over Russia’s war aims has been most immediately apparent during Trump’s attempts to broker a peace agreement. Since February 2025, US-led discussions over a possible negotiated settlement have featured plenty of vague talk about lucrative joint ventures and potential US investments in Russia. Some Trump administration members may have interpreted the prominent role of Putin’s economic envoy Kirill Dmitriev as a positive signal that Moscow is open to such overtures. However, promises of business opportunities have not translated into any meaningful progress toward peace.

Trump has also often given the impression that he views the issue of a territorial settlement between Russia and Ukraine from the perspective of a real estate developer solving a property dispute. The US leader has spoken of the need for “land swaps” and described Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine as “prime territory,” while indicating that the two sides should sit down and agree on new boundaries. This overlooks the awkward but important fact that Putin is not actually fighting for Ukrainian land. He is fighting for Ukraine itself, and will regard the war as lost unless he is able to reassert complete Russian dominance over the whole country.

Another issue that highlights the tendency of Western leaders to project their own logic onto Putin is the topic of Russian military losses. Western officials and media outlets often identify the extremely high Russian casualty figures in Ukraine as a key argument for ending the war, while pointing to Russia’s slow advance as evidence that the invasion has reached a strategic stalemate.

From a Western perspective, this makes perfect sense. But high casualty rates are a traditional feature in the Russian army, which has always relied on mass to win wars. Furthermore, Putin has been careful to make sure his army’s heavy losses in Ukraine do not destabilize the domestic front. Since 2022, the Kremlin has focused recruitment efforts on the poorest provinces of Russia and has enlisted large numbers of inmates from the country’s vast prison network, while also offering extremely attractive financial packages to volunteers. This has helped reduce any social pressures to a minimum, despite the high death toll of the invasion.

Some Western leaders have sought to strike a chord by underlining the damage Putin is doing to Russia’s long-term prospects and his own legacy. Outgoing British MI6 chief Richard Moore offered a good example of this in his September 2025 farewell speech, which highlighted the threats posed by the ongoing invasion of Ukraine to Russia’s economic and demographic outlook. Moore’s logic would certainly have resonated with Western policymakers and electorates, but it meant little to an ageing autocrat guided by imperial delusions and his own distorted reading of history.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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If Western leaders wish to end the war, they must stop trying to implement peace plans that they themselves would find persuasive and accept that Putin’s motivations are altogether different. He sees the invasion of Ukraine as part of a sacred historic mission that will define his reign and determine Russia’s place in the world for decades to come. Extinguishing Ukrainian independence is only one part of this process. Putin ultimately aims to reshape the global order and end what he sees as the period of geopolitical humiliation suffered by Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Most of all, Western policymakers must finally come to grips with the sheer scale of Putin’s imperial ambitions and acknowledge the central role these ambitions play in fueling Russian aggression in Ukraine and beyond. This would be long overdue. Since 2022, Putin has publicly compared himself to Russian Emperor Peter the Great. He frequently claims to be returning historically Russian lands, and has declared that “all Ukraine is ours.”

Attempting to bargain with such a man by appealing to common sense or offering limited concessions is worse than futile; it actually helps convince Putin that his Western opponents are too weak and overindulged to grasp the historical significance of the moment. This makes him more confident than ever that his enemies will ultimately back down and hand him victory in Ukraine.

Instead of trying to appease Russia, Ukraine’s allies must first admit that Putin is playing for the highest possible stakes and has no interest whatsoever in a compromise peace. They must then demonstrate that they have the political will to prevent his twisted imperial fantasies from becoming reality.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Axis of authoritarians poses mounting threat on the global information front

William Dixon, Maksym Beznosiuk — Thu, 20 Nov 2025 20:19:56 +0000

Ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, there has been growing alarm over the support that Moscow is receiving from fellow authoritarian regimes including Iran, North Korea, Belarus, and China. However, while Western officials have publicly raised concerns over material support for the Russian war effort, the issue of cooperation in the information sphere has received less attention.

This is short-sighted. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the critical importance of the information front in modern conflicts. The lessons of the war in Ukraine have not been lost on the Kremlin, which invests vast sums to finance information operations and has repeatedly used disinformation to destabilize its opponents. China is also well aware of the increasing role played by information capabilities and has established a range of powerful tools. This is creating potentially significant challenges for Western policymakers.

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Many Western countries continue to view the issue of information warfare as primarily a matter of fact-checking and debunking fakes. In contrast, there are growing indications that Moscow and Beijing share a vision of the information space as a key element of their power projection and national security strategies.

A recent meeting between Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and his Chinese counterpart Li Qiang signaled deepening cooperation between Moscow and Beijing on the information front. The annual summit held in Hangzhou in early November featured commitments from both sides to partner on media initiatives, countering disinformation, and promoting traditional values.

Moscow already has extensive experience in information operations designed to disrupt and reshape Europe’s political landscape, and is widely regarded as a global pioneer in the use of multimedia information operations to advance foreign policy objectives. Beijing has also faced accusations of playing a role in these activities, which are aimed at exploiting social divisions and boosting polarizing narratives with a view to generating support for anti-establishment political forces throughout the Western world.

While measuring the success of information operations is not an exact science, there is certainly no shortage of evidence to suggest that these tactics are having an impact. Support for far-right political parties is now surging across Europe. While each party has its own individual agenda, these populist political forces tend to share a sympathetic stance toward Russia while enjoying extensive coverage on Kremlin-linked media platforms.

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Perhaps the clearest indication of cooperation between Russia and China in the information arena is the growing Russian state media presence on TikTok. This is alleged to include coordinated campaigns and the use of AI technologies.

Disinformation watchdogs from Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council have accused the Kremlin of using the TikTok platform to conduct information campaigns designed to demoralize Ukrainian society and undermine resistance to Russia’s invasion. Ukrainian officials claim Moscow has employed AI to create videos featuring “ordinary Ukrainians” conveying pessimistic messages.

Russia is also reportedly using Chinese social media platforms to recruit Chinese citizens for the war in Ukraine. The large volume of recruitment adverts across China’s strictly controlled and monitored social media sphere has been interpreted by some as a sign of tacit approval from the authorities in Beijing.

Chinese and Russian information ecosystems appear to be engaging in significant cross-promotion. Kremlin outlets actively promote war-related content on platforms such as China’s Weibo. Meanwhile, Chinese state media and officials amplify key Kremlin narratives blaming the West for the Russian invasion of Ukraine and framing sanctions policies as self-defeating. Both Beijing and Moscow employ similar language to describe the war in Ukraine, which they typically depict as a defensive reaction to the West’s provocative policies.

As information cooperation between Moscow, Beijing, and other authoritarian regimes expands, Western policymakers must recognize that information warfare is now a tier-one national security threat requiring a comprehensive response. This should include signaling that information offensives will be treated as comparable to other violations of sovereignty, with the European Union and NATO working to establish clear diplomatic, legal, and economic red lines in the information domain.

Efforts must be undertaken to defend the information space more effectively by combining the initiatives of individual governments along with civil society. This could draw on a wide range of specific examples, such as Ukraine’s wartime experience and recent elections in Romania and Moldova. Greater accountability for hostile information operations is also crucial. Western governments must be prepared to publicly expose attacks and impose tangible costs.

The authoritarian axis that has taken shape since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is currently setting new standards in terms of coordinated information operations across media platforms. The West’s response must be equally systematic. The tools and frameworks exist; Western governments must now demonstrate the necessary political will.

William Dixon is an associate fellow of the Royal United Service Institute specializing in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategic policy and security analyst with a focus on Ukraine, Russia, European security, and EU-Ukraine cooperation.

Vladimir Putin fears entering Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 18 Nov 2025 21:47:02 +0000

The invasion unleashed by Vladimir Putin almost four years ago has often been called unprovoked, but nobody can say it was entirely unexpected. On the contrary, the full-scale invasion of 2022 was merely the latest and most extreme stage in a prolonged campaign of escalating Russian aggression aimed at preventing Ukraine from leaving the Kremlin orbit and resuming its place among the European community of nations.

During the early years of Putin’s reign, this campaign had focused primarily on massive interference in Ukrainian domestic affairs. Following Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity, the Russian dictator opted for a far more forceful combination of military and political intervention. When even this descent into open aggression failed to derail Kyiv’s westward trajectory, Putin sought to solve Russia’s Ukraine problem once and for all by launching the largest European invasion since World War II.

As the fifth year of the war looms on the horizon, there is very little to indicate that Putin’s hard line tactics are working. While Russia has managed to occupy around 20 percent of Ukraine, opinion in the remaining 80 percent of the country is now overwhelmingly hostile to Moscow and supportive of closer European ties. For the vast majority of people in Ukraine, the invasions of 2014 and 2022 represent watershed moments that have profoundly impacted their understanding of Ukrainian identity while radically reshaping attitudes toward Russia.

The transformation in Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation is being mirrored by changes taking place domestically as the country’s center of gravity shifts decisively from east to west. For the first decade or so of independence, Ukraine was politically and economically dominated by the industrial east, with major cities including Donetsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia serving as power bases for billionaire oligarch clans who shaped the Ukrainian national narrative and helped maintain high levels of Russian influence across the country. At the time, the comparatively quaint cities of central and western Ukraine lacked the wealth and general wherewithal to compete.

The first indication of a significant change in this dynamic was the 2004 Orange Revolution, which saw an unprecedented nationwide protest movement erupt over an attempt to falsify the country’s presidential election orchestrated by Kremlin-backed political forces rooted firmly in eastern Ukraine. This popular uprising represented a clear and unambiguous rejection of the idea that Ukraine was inextricably bound to Russia. A decade later, the onset of Russian military aggression would turbo-charge modern Ukraine’s historic turn toward the west.

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Since 2014, traditional east Ukrainian bastions of Russian influence such as Donetsk and Luhansk have been occupied by Kremlin forces and effectively cut off from the rest of Ukraine. More recently, the full-scale invasion has left the broader Donbas region devastated and depopulated, while the formerly preeminent metropolises of the east face an uncertain future as fortified front line cities under relentless Russian bombardment.

The situation in western Ukraine is strikingly different. Cities throughout the region are experiencing rapid growth thanks to an influx of families and businesses seeking to relocate away from the war zone. The experience of Lviv since 2022 illustrates this trend. The largest city in western Ukraine, Lviv’s population has expanded by around a quarter since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion to reach approximately one million. The Lviv real estate market has comfortably surpassed the regional capitals of eastern Ukraine and now rivals Kyiv itself. Likewise, Lviv is also second only to the Ukrainian capital in terms of new companies and investments.

Politically and diplomatically, Lviv is clearly in the ascendancy. Many Kyiv embassies partially relocated to the city in 2022 and continue to maintain a presence. Over the past three years, Lviv has hosted a number of high-level international events including presidential summits and gatherings of EU ministers. The rise of Lviv has been so striking that it has sparked rumors of jealousy among the establishment in Kyiv, with some suggesting that the potential reopening of Lviv International Airport has been deliberately sidelined in order to prevent the further eclipse of the Ukrainian capital.

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Whatever happens in the war, the shift in Ukraine’s national center of gravity toward the west of the country is unlikely to be reversed. In addition to the urgent impetus provided by Russia’s ongoing invasion, the emergence of western Ukraine is also being driven by the pull factor of EU integration. Over the past decade, Ukraine has secured visa-free EU travel and been granted official EU candidate status. This is transforming the investment climate in western Ukraine, which shares borders with four EU member states.

Large-scale infrastructure projects are already helping to cement western Ukraine’s status as the country’s most attractive region and gateway to the EU. Work on a 22km European-gauge railway line from the EU border to Uzhhorod was completed earlier this year, while construction of a far more ambitious Euro-gauge line connecting Lviv to the Polish border is scheduled to begin in 2026. As the EU accession process continues to gain momentum, these logistical links will only strengthen.

It remains unclear exactly when Ukraine will become a fully fledged EU member state, but there is a growing sense of confidence throughout the country that the once distant dream of EU membership is now finally within reach. For western Ukraine in particular, joining the European Union will complete the region’s historic journey from imperial outpost on the fringes of the Soviet Empire to economic engine nestled in the heart of the world’s largest single market.

All this is very bad news for Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin dictator’s Ukraine obsession reflects his fear that the consolidation of a democratic, European, and genuinely independent Ukraine could serve as a catalyst for the next phase in the long Russian retreat from empire that began almost four decades ago with the fall of the Berlin Wall. As Putin’s reign has progressed, his determination to prevent Ukraine’s geopolitical defection has only intensified, as has his readiness to sacrifice Russia’s more immediate national interests in pursuit of his anti-Ukrainian crusade. It is now increasingly obvious that his decision to invade Ukraine has backfired spectacularly, eroding centuries of Russian influence while accelerating the European integration he so bitterly opposes.

Unless Putin succeeds in dismantling Ukrainian statehood entirely and erasing the very idea of the Ukrainian nation, he must surely realize that the Ukraine of the postwar period is now destined to establish itself within the wider Western world while remaining implacably hostile to Russia. Rather than acknowledging this disastrous outcome, he will seek to continue the war indefinitely. If he stops now and accepts a compromise peace, Putin knows he will be doomed to enter Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The al-Sharaa element may be the most jarring. Much of Washington remains deeply skeptical of al-Sharaa’s intentions and ability to rein in extremism in his country, despite energetic and sustained support for sanctions relief and full engagement from the Trump administration. This is understandable given al-Sharaa’s past record of fighting against Western troops in Iraq and later helping al-Qaeda expand into Syria. But Westerners including former CIA Director David Petraeus had sensed a decade ago that al-Sharaa and his organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), were candidates for moderating and evolving into a force compatible with Western interests.

After breaking from and later targeting both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, HTS refocused its mission on representing all Sunnis in Syria and, since November 2024, all Syrians in a growing embrace of inclusivity and moderation. The Trump administration has taken the rhetorical and aspirational change as both substantive and likely to succeed. It has shown this by embracing the interim president of Syria in a high-profile manner—welcoming al-Sharaa to New York in September and Washington in November—that would have been almost inconceivable under any other US president.

Fidan’s visit and trilateral working meeting with his Syrian and American counterparts was equally remarkable. Fidan’s working relationship with Rubio’s predecessor, Antony Blinken, was cordial but focused more on mutual grievances than opportunities and reflected the process-heavy, results-challenged approach that marked Biden administration foreign policy more broadly. And Fidan’s predecessor, Mevlut Cavusoglu, had a fairly acrimonious relationship with Mike Pompeo, secretary of state during Trump’s first term in office. To see Rubio and Fidan working with their Syrian counterpart on details to keep a key Trump foreign policy initiative—stability in Syria—on track indicates a level of coordination and trust absent heretofore in the twenty-first century.

The hands that tied these two trips together belong to a man who appeared in some press photos but received scant mention otherwise—Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack. Barrack sees Turkey as critical to regional stability in multiple directions and Syria as critical to the security of both Israel and Turkey. Writing after the twin visits, Barrack assessed the results as potentially transformative on a range of US interests: peace in Gaza, Turco-Israeli rapprochement, containing Iran, and suppressing the Islamic State and other terror groups. Trump and Rubio have invested enough political capital in this embrace of Damascus and Ankara that it is clear Barrack has made the case for it convincingly. It also bears mention that Barrack’s close and supportive relationship with US Central Command chief Admiral Brad Cooper has amplified the voice and views of both men in Washington—they are the backstory of the dramatic changes reflected in last week’s visits. Such comity has not always pertained between senior Pentagon and State Department officials on the Syria file in the past.

What do the visits portend for the rest of the second Trump administration?

First, Syria will remain a top foreign policy priority for Trump, Rubio, Barrack, Cooper, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and others in Washington. It is the lynchpin of Trump’s Middle East approach: success there will have implications on the portfolios of regional counter-terrorism, security of Israel, countering Iranian militias, progress in Gaza, regional trade and development, and associated humanitarian concerns in Syria and surrounding countries.

Second, “there is no Plan B” to al-Sharaa—neither actively deconstructing Syria nor leaving it to its own devices is workable—and his survival will require continued close coordination with the Turks.

Third, after the headlines fade, an enormous amount of negotiation, business development, advisory efforts, investment, and deconfliction will be required for at least the rest of Trump’s term. Whether Washington has the patience to continue leading efforts with the degree of energy and salience seen in recent months remains an open question, especially with US midterm elections less than a year away. But at the end of a remarkable week, it may suffice to know that the path is open if the will is present.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Zelenskyy faces the biggest corruption scandal of his presidency

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Mon, 17 Nov 2025 15:58:20 +0000

Editor’s note: This article was updated on November 17 to include Herman Halushchenko’s response to the corruption investigation.

Amid Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukraine is now facing the largest corruption scandal of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s presidency. It is a scandal with the potential to reshape the country’s politics. The intrigue, which involves alleged kickbacks in the graft-prone energy sector laundered through Russian-linked channels by close associates of President Zelenskyy, may prove as big a test of his leadership as the war itself.

On November 10, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) exposed an alleged $110 million corruption scheme at state-owned nuclear company Energoatom. The charges are supported by a fifteen-month wiretap and over seventy searches carried out as part of a major investigation called Operation Midas.

According to NABU officials, the investigation uncovered a criminal enterprise run by Timur Mindich, a film producer and a former business partner of Zelenskyy. Additional suspects include former Minister of Energy and recently appointed Minister of Justice Herman Halushchenko; former Naftogaz CEO and Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Chernyshov; former Minister of Defense and current National Security and Defense Council member Rustem Umerov; and Ihor Myroniuk, former deputy head of the State Property Fund and former advisor to Halushchenko.

Mindich fled Ukraine the day before his premises were raided and is reportedly now in Israel. Both Chernyshov and Mindich have long had ties with Zelenskyy, who co-founded the latter’s production company in 2003. Thus far, formal charges have been filed against eight of those implicated. Halushchenko has said he would defend himself against the accusations.

The alleged theft took the form of 10-15 percent inflated prices for infrastructure project contracts, which contractors were forced to pay in order to avoid losing their supplier status. The kickback scheme reportedly included security measures for the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant. The Ministry of Energy is suspected of facilitating the scam.

The stolen funds were allegedly laundered through an office linked to fugitive ex-Ukrainian MP and now Russian Senator Andrii Derkach before being extracted from Ukraine. Derkach has been sanctioned since 2021 and was stripped of his Ukrainian citizenship in 2023.

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While the investigation is still underway, the scandal is already proving extremely damaging to Zelenskyy and his entire administration. The alleged involvement of a former Ukrainian MP turned Russian fugitive in the middle of the Kremlin’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine may be the most scandalous aspect of the accusations.

Meanwhile, Zelenskyy’s long contact with many of the accused and their high-level appointments has raised the political stakes for the President. This has led to speculation over whether the scandal could topple Zelenskyy and cost Ukraine the war.

The investigation comes in the wake of a recent standoff between Zelenskyy and his administration with Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. In July 2025, a law proposed by Zelenskyy’s political party was passed by the Ukrainian parliament stripping NABU and other anti-corruption institutions of their independence.

This led to vocal condemnation from Ukraine’s civil society and the international community, including the largest street protests since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Days later, Zelenskyy reconsidered and signed a law that restored and guaranteed the independence of the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

That guarantee has now been tested and proven credible. While the sheer number of criminal investigations and indictments targeting prominent Ukrainian officials has raised concerns about possible political prosecutions by NABU, the apparent success of Operation Midas and its exposure of alleged corruption on the part of some of the most powerful people in Ukraine would seem to confirm the agency’s independence and its efficacy.

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Zelenskyy appears to recognize the dangers of the situation and has begun responding to the crisis. The Cabinet of Ministers is looking at sanctions against Mindich and businessman Oleksandr Tsukerman, who was also implicated in the scandal. The Ukrainian leader has already forced the resignations of Halushchenko and newly appointed Minister of Energy Svitlana Hrynchuk.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko has announced a comprehensive audit of all state-owned companies, especially in the energy and defense sectors. Anastasia Radina, head of the parliament’s anti-corruption committee, has called for a parliamentary inquiry into the transfer of funds to Russia.

These steps are significant but are unlikely to prove adequate. The stakes are extremely high, not just for Zelenskyy’s political future, but for Ukraine’s conduct of the war. European leaders answer to their citizens, many of whom might now be wondering why they are sending massive aid to Ukraine if large sums are being siphoned off by privileged insiders. In the US, while Trump is slowly moving in the right direction with recent sanctions on Russia, there are still influential figures in his orbit who are looking for ways to end all American support for Ukraine’s defense against Kremlin aggression.

This means that Zelenskyy must turn his attention to the crisis energetically. A good next step would be for him to speak up on the issue publicly and strongly, much as he did in the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Zelenskyy might start by acknowledging, as former US President Harry Truman did when he said the buck stops with him, that as President of Ukraine, he is ultimately responsible for failures in his government. He should recognize the magnitude of the scandal and the underlying problem of corruption, while explaining how he intends to take the lead in fixing it. This means bringing to justice, in accordance with the law, all those responsible, no matter who they are and where they are. He can do this by vowing to empower NABU and other relevant state institutions fully.

Zelenskyy could frame the scandal as proof that despite clear progress made by Ukraine in dealing with corruption, much more remains to be done. He could demonstrate his openness by inviting advice from Ukrainian civil society and the country’s international partners. This current crisis has clearly demonstrated the dangers of relying on just a small circle at Bankova to get things done.

Such a speech should not be a one off. It should be the start of a dialogue with the Ukrainian public, much like Zelenskyy’s masterful wartime communications. This dialogue should include regular updates on efforts to bring those responsible for this theft to justice, and news about steps to strengthen state institutions against the scourge of corruption. Zelenskyy has the skills to take this on. Now is the time to do it.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Iakovenko is a small part of a big story about how Ukrainian entrepreneurship is contributing to local economies across the United States. A new report by the ISE Group, a think tank and startup accelerator with offices in Warsaw, Washington DC, and Kyiv, estimates that Ukrainian-American companies generate nearly $60 billion in annual revenue and support about 300,000 US jobs.

The findings are the first attempt to quantify the economic footprint of Ukrainian-American businesses in the US. Researchers mapped and verified 2,270 Ukrainian-American firms across all fifty states and surveyed a network of more than 45,000 diaspora enterprises. Collectively, the report says, these firms bring in around $55 billion in annual sales, pay out roughly $24 billion in wages, and contribute at least $8 billion in federal, state, and local taxes.

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Study lead Alexander Romanishyn said the team defined “Ukrainian-American” based on self-identification by business owners including diaspora firms, relocated companies, immigrant-founded ventures, and joint US–Ukrainian enterprises. “We estimate there are roughly 45,000 Ukrainian-American businesses in the US today, about one-third of which employ staff,” said Romanishyn, a former deputy minister of the economy in Ukraine. “We deliberately took a conservative approach to avoid overstating the diaspora’s economic weight.”

Technology is a particular strength, accounting for around 130,000 people, or nearly half of the total workforce in Ukrainian-American companies. With pockets in the Bay Area, New York, Boston, Austin, Dallas, and Seattle, they specialize in software development, AI and machine learning, and cloud integration. Many maintain teams in both the US and Ukraine, helping sustain both economies.

Beyond tech, Ukrainians run businesses in nearly every industry including consulting, healthcare, logistics, manufacturing, retail, construction, real estate, finance, and agriculture. Their presence is spread across the entire country, with concentrations in California, New York, Illinois, Florida, Texas, and New Jersey.

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While Ukrainian entrepreneurship in the United States dates back to the 1880s, most Ukrainian-American owned businesses have been launched recently, with around 40 percent opening since 2022. Approximately 180,000 Ukrainians have arrived in the US following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, often through humanitarian programs. Most are still finding their footing. In many cases this means opening small, necessity-driven ventures like home bakeries or cleaning services.

The potential for growth is significant. The report cites surveys indicating that many recent Ukrainian refugees have business experience. Projections suggest they could create 18,000–27,000 new enterprises in the next few years. New arrivals face steep barriers such as lack of savings, no US credit history, and complex visa requirements. Community networks have stepped in to help. In Silicon Valley, for example, the Ukrainian Syndicate Club co-invests in startups founded by Ukrainians.

The big picture is that Ukrainians in the US are builders not beneficiaries. Roman Nikitov, General Partner at United Heritage, a Polish–Ukrainian private equity firm that supported the study, put it this way: “The results mirror what we’ve already seen in Europe. Ukrainians are not beggars but builders, active contributors who strengthen every economy they become part of.” In Poland, for example, where more than a million Ukrainian refugees have settled since 2022, 69 percent are now employed and pay more in taxes than they receive in social support.

The Ukrainian Embassy in Washington DC welcomed the report’s findings. “This study highlights a reality often overlooked, that Ukrainian-American founded businesses in the US are driving local growth and job creation while serving as trusted partners for America’s engagement in Ukraine’s recovery,” said Ihor Baranetskyi, Minister-Counsellor for Economic Issues. “They understand both markets and are uniquely positioned to channel US capital and technology into Ukraine’s reconstruction, advancing prosperity and security for both nations.”

Melinda Haring is a senior advisor at Razom for Ukraine and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Minsk in Moscow’s grip: How Russia subjugated Belarus without annexation

Hanna Liubakova — Thu, 13 Nov 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 challenged much of the common Western understanding of Russia. How can the world better understand Russia? What are the steps forward for Western policy? The Eurasia Center’s new “Russia Tomorrow” series seeks to reevaluate conceptions of Russia today and better prepare for its future tomorrow.

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Introduction
Sovereignty eroded: How Belarus became a Russian satellite
Military merger: From troublesome ally to armed outpost
From fence-sitter to foot soldier: How Belarus lost its foreign policy
Hostile takeover: Russia’s control of Belarus’s economy
Cultural hegemony: The appropriation of media and education
What Belarusians really want
Conclusion
About the author

For about five years, from 2015 to 2020, Belarus created an illusion that it was changing: a deceptive glimmer that suggested its leader, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, might steer his country away from Russia’s orbit and toward greater independence. In hindsight, this false dawn only masked the tightening grip of Moscow.

Two myths fueled misplaced optimism. First, there was a belief that Belarus could balance between the East and West through a multivector foreign policy. Second, there was a hope that Minsk’s limited reforms, release of some political prisoners, and especially its refusal to unconditionally back Moscow in the 2014 annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas signaled a liberalizing turn. Both illusions ultimately frayed during this period.

At first, Lukashenka positioned Belarus as a neutral host for peace talks on the Ukraine conflict—not a participant. The Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 fed Western hopes: Belarus as mediator, not accomplice. Lukashenka even rejected Russian demands for a new Russian airbase in Belarusian territory, wary of appearing too dependent.

A partial thaw followed. Some Belarusian political prisoners were released. The European Union (EU) lifted sanctions. Western officials applauded Lukashenka’s apparent pragmatism. Engagement resumed.

But beneath the surface, nothing fundamentally changed. The regime remained authoritarian and Soviet in ethos. The security apparatus stayed intact. Dissent was managed, not tolerated. And Moscow remained the indispensable lifeline—providing cheap energy, market access, and strategic cover.

By the end of the decade, the signs were unmistakable. Crackdowns against dissent intensified. Economic dependence on Moscow deepened. Russia’s regional aggression hardened. The scaffolding of sovereignty remained, but the core was hollow.

When mass protests erupted in 2020 and the West recoiled at the regime’s violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrators in 2020, Lukashenka had only one direction to turn. The illusion of neutrality collapsed. So did the myth of a buffer state. What had once looked like strategic balance was instead a drift toward absorption into Russia.

A rapid unraveling ensued. After the extreme crackdown on protesters came the forced landing of a Ryanair flight to detain a dissident journalist and the weaponization of migration at EU borders, both in 2021. Clearly, Lukashenka was no longer playing both sides. He had chosen one—and it was Moscow’s.

This report examines how Belarus moved close relations with Russia to full-scale integration under the Kremlin. From political alignment to economic subjugation. From linguistic erasure to cultural annexation. What looked like independence was dependency in disguise.

Yet beneath this transformation lies a deeper truth: Belarusians themselves have not chosen this path. Public opinion surveys consistently show opposition to war and to nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil. They reject the loss of sovereignty and the transformation of Belarus into a Russian-controlled satellite. The regime has chosen absorption. The people have not.

The following chapters trace Belarus’s evolution into a de facto Russian outpost: militarily, politically, diplomatically, economically, and culturally. They also outline strategic options for ensuring that Belarus’s future is not decided solely in Moscow.

Sovereignty eroded: How Belarus became a Russian satellite

Lukashenka’s proclaimed neutrality during Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine was always a fiction. Belarus remained a loyal authoritarian ally, making no meaningful reforms. Still, until 2020, Minsk maintained a degree of strategic flexibility, balancing deep ties with Moscow against limited outreach to the West and to China. Now, however, the question is no longer whether Belarus is drifting into Russia’s orbit but how much autonomy Lukashenka still retains.

From the start of his presidency in 1994, Lukashenka aligned himself with Moscow, consolidating domestic power by dismantling democratic institutions and suppressing dissent. He courted Russian elites and even positioned himself in the 1990s as a possible successor to President Boris Yeltsin, garnering the support of some nationalists in Russia. His ambition culminated in the 1999 Union State Treaty, a blueprint for deep integration: shared currency, joint institutions, and equal rights for citizens. But when Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, Lukashenka’s dreams of entering the Kremlin were dashed. Putin used that treaty to attempt to end Belarusian sovereignty.

As a result, for over two decades, Lukashenka stalled implementation of the Union State Treaty, using the illusion of progress to extract economic concessions from the Kremlin—especially cheap energy—while avoiding genuine integration.

That strategy started to unravel in the late 2010s. Frustrated by Minsk’s endless demands for cheaper energy prices, Moscow began tying economic support to political concessions. In 2019, the two sides drafted thirty-one road maps for integration. Lukashenka sought better economic terms; Moscow wanted alignment. When Belarusians protested, he let the demonstrations proceed: a signal to Putin that public backlash might limit his flexibility.

Everything changed after the fraudulent 2020 presidential election, in which Lukashenka claimed victory over popular opposition forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Mass protests left Lukashenka isolated and unrecognized by the West. Desperate, he turned fully to Moscow, and Putin seized the opportunity. In November 2021, Belarus and Russia formally endorsed twenty-eight Union State programs, reviving integration plans that aimed to harmonize legal systems, unify markets, and align policies in energy, finance, customs, and taxation. Though framed as cooperation, these measures eroded Belarusian sovereignty.

Implementation continues today with minimal transparency. Lukashenka maintains vague, noncommittal rhetoric, but the direction is clear: Moscow is embedding itself deeper into the Belarusian state. If enacted in full, these reforms would strip Belarus of real independence in key areas of governance.

The most sensitive areas—oil, gas, taxation, and customs—expose the imbalance. While the creation of a joint energy market remains stalled and more controversial steps like a single currency or union parliament have been deferred, integration is advancing quietly. A unified tax system is particularly telling. It includes a common policy, a supranational committee, and a Russian-designed digital platform with access to centralized taxpayer data. Lukashenka insists Belarus still makes its own decisions, but Moscow now has unprecedented access to its economic infrastructure.

The same dynamic plays out in customs. Lukashenka’s proposed joint customs group, framed as merely advisory, opens the door to deeper dependency. The more Russia shapes Belarus’s regulatory and administrative frameworks, the less independent Minsk becomes as bureaucracies are built to serve Moscow’s interests.

Technically, Belarus retains sovereignty—just as other members of Russia-led blocs do, including the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). These alliances offer the illusion of multilateralism, but are structured to preserve Russian dominance.

Russia’s intentions are not subtle. In a 2021 essay, Putin asserted that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians form a “triune Russian nation,” denying Belarus a distinct identity. Lukashenka has echoed this logic, repeatedly affirming Belarus’s eternal closeness to Russia. Yet he continues to resist full annexation. Maintaining the appearance of sovereignty helps him contain domestic resistance and preserve what limited international engagement remains. For now, Russia seems content with this arrangement: decisive control without the complications of formal annexation.

Most Belarusians support independence. But every concession, every road map, chips away at the country’s ability to determine its future. Lukashenka has traded that future to retain power. Belarus remains a state in name—but, increasingly, a satellite in function.

Military merger: From troublesome ally to armed outpost

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO’s eastern flank faced a new reality. Belarus opened its skies, railways, and military infrastructure to support Moscow’s assault.

What began as logistical support has since evolved into something far more permanent: the transformation of Belarus into a de facto military outpost of the Russian state. Behind the facade of sovereignty, Lukashenka’s regime has traded independence for protection, welcoming Russian troops, hardware, and even nuclear weapons onto Belarusian soil.

Before 2022, Russia’s permanent military presence in Belarus was limited to two Soviet-era facilities: the Hantsavichy missile warning station and the Vileyka naval communication center. Moscow sought to expand its footprint as early as 2013, aiming for permanent bases and deploying fighter jets. But Lukashenka resisted. Particularly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and armed intervention in the Donbas in early 2014, he avoided the optics of occupation, maintaining the appearance of a balancing act between the East and West.He hosted the Minsk peace talks, freed some political prisoners, courted Western engagement, and even refrained from recognizing Crimea’s annexation, while publicly mocking the Kremlin’s “Russian World” ideology.

That balancing act ended after the August 2020 fraudulent election and the mass protests that followed, when Lukashenka relied heavily on Moscow’s political and security support to stay in power. In early February 2022 Belarus held a constitutional referendum—under conditions of repression and with no genuine debate—that ended the country’s nuclear-free status. The timing was no coincidence: Within days, Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine. And Belarus was complicit from day one.

Since then, Belarus has allowed its territory and infrastructure to be used by Russian forces. Military and civilian airfields—including Homiel airport—have served as operational hubs for launching missile and drone attacks, conducting maintenance, and supporting logistics for Russian military operations against Ukraine.

But Belarus provided more than runways. Its integrated air defense systems, navigation networks, and flight control infrastructure supported Russian operations. The Mazyr Oil Refinery fueled the war machine. Belarusian railways became arteries of invasion, shuttling tanks, troops, and ammunition across the Ukrainian border.Belarusian roads, depots, and logistics hubs sustained the assault on Kyiv.

By December 2022, the depth of this integration became unmistakable. Putin announced that Belarusian SU-25 aircraft would be modified to carry nuclear weapons and that Russia’s Iskander-M missile systems—capable of carrying nuclear payloads—had been delivered to Belarus. Because the operational control remained with Russia, the symbolic shift was profound.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko take part in a signing ceremony following a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State of Russia and Belarus in Minsk, Belarus December 6, 2024. Sputnik/Gavriil Grigorov/Pool via REUTERS.

Meanwhile, Belarus’s defense industry quietly joined the war effort: repairing Russian tanks, modernizing aircraft, and supplying optical systems for missiles. Trains loaded with weapons and parts began moving in both directions, solidifying a more profound military-industrial interdependence.

Between February 2022 and March 2023, more than seven hundred missiles were launched from Belarus into Ukraine.However, as the front lines stabilized, Belarus’s role shifted from an active launchpad to a strategic rear base.

In October 2022, as Ukrainian counteroffensives gained ground, Minsk and Moscow activated the Regional Grouping of Forces (RGF), a bilateral military formation that provided legal cover for new Russian deployments. Around nine thousand Russian troops, along with hundreds of tanks and artillery systems, arrived in Belarus under a joint command. The RGF marked a turning point: ad hoc cooperation became institutionalized military integration.

By mid-2023, most Russian troops deployed under the RGF had withdrawn, likely due to manpower constraints elsewhere. But the infrastructure remained—ready for rapid reactivation.

In March 2023, Putin announced that Russia had reached an agreement with Belarus to station tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory, with the construction of a special storage facility to be completed by July. The establishment of a Russian military base complete with nuclear weapons would significantly increase Moscow’s leverage over Belarus and cement Putin’s grip on the country.

By early 2023, Belarusian crews had completed training on using the Iskander tactical missile system for potential nuclear strikes. However, independent monitors have found no visual evidence of actual nuclear weapon deployments in Belarus, casting doubt on whether Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric reflects the reality on the ground.

Throughout 2024, Belarus adopted a new military doctrine that codified deeper integration with Russia’s armed forces. For the first time, it explicitly allowed the deployment and potential use of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory—framed as a deterrent against external threats. In practice, the doctrine handed Moscow strategic leverage near NATO’s borders, while letting Lukashenka claim a protective nuclear umbrella at home. The price was a further erosion of Belarusian autonomy.

Even as Russian MiG-31K fighters armed with hypersonic Kinzhal missiles maintained their presence on Belarusian territory, keeping Ukraine’s air defenses on constant alert, the relationship was becoming institutionalized rather than episodic.

In December 2024, Russia and Belarus signed the Treaty on Security Guarantees under the Union State framework. The agreement enabled permanent Russian bases and deployments in Belarus and committed both sides to mutual defense—including in response to threats against “sovereignty” or “constitutional order.” It further folded Belarus into Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy.

As of mid-2025, roughly two thousand Russian military personnel remain in Belarus, including air defense units and aerospace forces. Russian operations continue from key locations, such as the Mazyr (Bokau) and Ziabrauka airfields.

New satellite imagery from May 2025 revealed expanded infrastructure at the Asipovichy base: new fencing, loading platforms, and air defenses—all consistent with preparations for storing and potentially deploying tactical nuclear weapons.

While Belarus has gestured toward de-escalation, suggesting it might scale back the Zapad-2025 joint exercises with Russia, these moves are largely symbolic and likely reflect Russia’s shifting priorities on the battlefield rather than a genuine reduction in military activity. In September, separate large-scale drills took place—both the Zapad-2025 exercises and joint CSTO operations—keeping the region on edge.

Meanwhile, Minsk confirmed plans to host the Oreshnik missile system; Russia has already used this system in strikes against Ukraine. For Lukashenka, this is both a pledge of loyalty to Putin and a way to remain strategically indispensable.

In less than three years, Belarus has transitioned from a reluctant ally to a satellite state. Lukashenka has surrendered control over the country’s military and security policy in exchange for Kremlin backing. The result: Belarus is now a forward base for Russian aggression—potentially with nuclear weapons.

This development reshapes NATO’s eastern frontier, attempts to legitimize the forward deployment of Russian nuclear assets, and dismantles the boundaries between sovereign ally and subjugated proxy. The implications are stark. A former buffer state has become a Russian military outpost. Belarus is on the front line of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the West.

From fence-sitter to foot soldier: How Belarus lost its foreign policy

After Lukashenka spent decades creating the illusion of maneuvering between the East and West to preserve regime autonomy, poof—it’s gone. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Belarus’s foreign policy has collapsed into a one-way street leading straight to Moscow.

Facing sweeping Western sanctions and mounting isolation, the Belarusian regime claims to be pivoting toward Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Officials describe this reorientation as a strategic reset, aimed at offsetting annual losses estimated at $16 billion to $18 billion due to sanctions. But the pivot is largely rhetorical. Minsk’s global engagement has narrowed to improvised alliances, symbolic gestures, and tactical outreach.

Lukashenka’s facade of neutrality—avoiding recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and refraining from endorsement of Kremlin claims over Abkhazia and South Ossetia—crumbled in 2021 when he acknowledged Crimea as Russian territory. By 2024, he was hosting bilateral meetings with Denis Pushilin, the Moscow-backed head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic.

At the United Nations, Belarus has become one of Moscow’s most reliable allies. On March 2, 2022, it was one of just five countries to vote against a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—alongside North Korea, Eritrea, Syria, and Russia itself. Diplomatic independence has all but evaporated.

Western sanctions have gutted Belarus’s traditional export markets. In 2019, Belarus exported goods valued at $8.5 billion to the EU. By 2024, that figure had dropped to just over $1 billion. Potash, oil products, and timber—key sources of revenue—have been hard-hit.

In response, Lukashenka launched an outreach campaign focused on the Global South. He visited Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, promising closer ties and “anti-colonial solidarity.” Yet these trips have produced little beyond vague memoranda and photo ops. The case of Zimbabwe is telling: Lukashenka offered tractors and equipment, and trade reached $25 million in 2021. More significant, however, are Belarusian elite links to Zimbabwe’s gold and lithium sectors, and growing military ties between the two regimes. These are not signs of diversification, but transactions rooted in authoritarian clientelism.

Nowhere is the asymmetry of Belarus’s foreign policy more visible than in its relationship with China. While Minsk promotes Beijing as a key partner, the reality is marked by caution, imbalance, and diminishing returns. Lukashenka’s fifteenth visit to Beijing, delayed until June 2025, was described in state media as “family style,” which sounds like a cozy familiarity but produced no major agreements.

Belarus remains a logistical node in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, but its value has declined amid the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions. In 2024, Lukashenka announced fifteen new “strategic” Chinese investment projects totaling three billion dollars, but much of this support is conditional and geared toward Chinese interests. The China-Belarus Industrial Park Great Stone lacks fresh momentum. With Western investors gone, it increasingly targets Russian and domestic firms.

Belarus’s 2024 accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was meant to signal a turn from the West. In practice, trade with China is lopsided. Belarus exports potash and foodstuffs, while importing higher-value Chinese machinery and electronics. Belarusian defense firms are incorporating Chinese components into optics used by Russian tanks. In July 2024, Chinese and Belarusian troops held joint drills near NATO’s borders. The two countries have also codeveloped the Polonez multiple-launch rocket system.

Even as formal economic cooperation stalls, Lukashenka remains politically useful to Beijing. His public support for China on the status of Taiwan and Hong Kong reinforces shared authoritarian alignment. As China expands its global reach, Belarus’s transit infrastructure may retain some relevance. But the broader partnership remains shallow. China is watching carefully, but is not investing heavily. Not yet.

With traditional diplomacy in ruins, Minsk has embraced a model of “shadow diplomacy,” a murky blend of military deals, sanctions evasion, and autocratic alignment. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as a key enabler. A UAE-based company acquired the Belarusian arm of Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank after it came under pressure to exit. Investigative journalists from the Belarusian Investigative Center and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project network have alleged Dubai’s involvement in laundering Belarusian assets through shell companies.

Ties with Iran have deepened. Since 2023, Minsk and Tehran have signed a string of defense agreements. A 2023 Kyiv Post article, citing unconfirmed reports and Western analysts, suggested Belarus may begin producing Iranian Shahed drones. During the 2024 military parade in Minsk, Belarus showcased its domestically produced “Geran” strike drones—closely resembling the Iranian Shahed-136 model widely used by Russia in Ukraine—marking their first public appearance. Defense ministers have met repeatedly, underscoring the growing military dimension of the partnership.

Meanwhile, Belarus is bypassing Western restrictions via new trade corridors. In 2024, the port of Makhachkala in Dagestan began handling Belarusian potash as part of the North-South Transport Corridor linking Russia and Iran.

Despite occasional overtures, such as Lukashenka’s claimed willingness to mediate peace or restore dialogue with Washington, the regime shows no signs of meaningful reform. Recent prisoner releases have been tokenistic, used as bargaining chips rather than a shift in policy.

Belarus’s foreign messaging now mirrors the Kremlin’s almost entirely. From Ukraine to NATO to US policy, Minsk speaks with Moscow’s voice. The country that once sought to straddle the East-West divide has become, decisively, a satellite of its eastern neighbor.

Hostile takeover: Russia’s control of Belarus’s economy

Since 2020, Belarus has undergone a profound economic shift: not toward growth or innovation, but into near-total dependence on Russia. What may look to some like recovery is, in fact, economic subjugation. Following a 4.7 percent decline in gross domestic product (GDP) in 2022 due to Western sanctions, the Belarusian economy rebounded by 4 percent in 2024, according to the World Bank. But this growth was driven to a large extent by Russian demand. Today, nearly every major Belarusian export, investment, and banking channel runs through Moscow. Belarusian factories feed Putin’s war machine, the Russian ruble dominates the Belarusian ruble, and tens of thousands of skilled workers have fled to EU countries. This is not a partnership—it’s an economic takeover. Russia no longer needs troops in Belarus to control it; it already controls the country through trade, credit, and industry.

State-owned enterprises have been systematically repurposed to support the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine. Electronics firms like Integral and JSC Planar, once producers of civilian components, now supply Russian weapons manufacturers. Backed by nearly $120 million in Russian investment, Integral produces microchips found in Russian cruise missiles. Legmash in Orsha, which once manufactured textile machinery, now produces components for the Grad multiple rocket launchers. StankoGomel builds machine tools for the Russian arms industry. Textile giant Mogotex signed a contract with Chechnya’s Erzu to produce military uniforms.

Even before the full-scale invasion, Belarus played a significant role in Russia’s military supply chains, but recent disclosures reveal a dramatic escalation. By early 2025, according to BelPol, a group of anti-regime former security officers, at least 287 Belarusian state enterprises have become involved in producing weapons, components, or munitions for Russia, with the real figure potentially approaching 500 when private firms are included. Belarusian factories now manufacture or supply everything from artillery shells and rocket parts to drones and electronics components, making the country a crucial node in the Russian military-industrial complex.

Belarus’s economy has long mirrored its authoritarian politics: centralized, state-controlled, and resistant to market reforms. Under Lukashenka, state-owned enterprises still account for more than half of GDP. This Soviet-style model prioritizes loyalty over innovation—a vulnerability Putin has exploited.

Today, up to 70 percent of Belarus’s exports flow to Russia. When including transit through Russian-controlled ports and railways, Moscow effectively controls more than 90 percent of Belarus’s outbound trade.

This near-total dependence extends beyond simple trade flows. With traditional European export routes blocked, Belarus has become locked into Russian transit corridors. In 2023, Belarusian exporters utilized twenty Russian ports, double the number from the previous year. Even goods destined for third countries must pass through Russia, inflating costs and shrinking profit margins. Key exports, such as potash and oil products, are especially vulnerable, with state-owned producer Belaruskali facing costly delays at Russian-controlled ports.

Moreover, Belarus’s fiscal survival depends almost entirely on Russian support. The country owes roughly eight billion dollars in intergovernmental loans to Russia, making it Moscow’s largest debtor. Last year, Russia granted a seven-year deferral on debt repayments—effectively writing a blank check to preserve Lukashenka’s loyalty.

The Belarusian ruble is informally pegged to a currency basket, half of which is the Russian ruble, meaning it rises and falls with Moscow’s economic fortunes, limiting Minsk’s ability to pursue an independent monetary policy.

Russian banks now handle an increasing share of Belarusian exports, while local financial institutions have been integrated into Russia’s payment and messaging systems. Western sanctions have forced Belarus to adopt Russian digital infrastructure—from tax administration tools to consumer payment platforms—further eroding what remains of its economic sovereignty.

In 2024, more than half of foreign direct investment in Belarus came from Russia. Under the banner of “import substitution” and joint ventures, Russian firms aren’t merely filling gaps left by departing Western companies, they’re systematically displacing Belarusian competitors in a quiet economic conquest.

For Belarusian manufacturers, access to the Russian market represents both a lifeline and a trap. The more dependent they become on Russian demand, the more vulnerable they are to Moscow’s political whims. In critical sectors, Russia has evolved from the largest customer to the sole customer, giving Putin effective veto power over Belarus’s industrial base.

This process is hollowing out Belarus’s economy from within. Domestic policies—such as price freezes and retaliatory sanctions—have only added strain. Prices are rising, and consumer choice is shrinking. When Lukashenka occasionally pushes back, such as blocking McDonald’s rebranding to Russia’s “Vkusno i Tochka” (which means “Tasty, Period”) and instead insisting on a Belarusian brand, these gestures prove meaningless against the broader trajectory of economic surrender.

Nowhere is Belarus’s decline more visible than in its once-thriving information technology (IT) sector, formerly a symbol of innovation and Western integration. The transformation has been devastating: IT exports plummeted 45 percent from $3.2 billion in 2021 to $1.8 billion in 2023, while the sector shed over 19,000 workers.

Russian investors, who previously comprised just 10 percent of foreign IT involvement, now account for nearly a third of the market. While these contracts offer short-term stability, they represent a strategic dead end: constraining growth potential, limiting global market access, and tying Belarus’s technological future to Russia’s isolated digital ecosystem.

The brain drain extends beyond IT. As Belarus’s most talented professionals flee westward, the country loses not just individual expertise but entire innovation networks that took decades to build. This hemorrhaging of human capital ensures Belarus’s long-term economic stagnation regardless of short-term Russian subsidies.

Cultural hegemony: The appropriation of media and education

Moscow is attempting to methodically redefine what it means to be Belarusian. Since the mass protests following the flawed election of August 2020, the Kremlin has fused its propaganda machine with Minsk’s state media, rewritten school curricula, and flooded the cultural sphere with programming promoting “brotherly unity.” The objective is unmistakable: erase the idea that Belarus can stand apart from Russia.

Russian cash and consultants now dictate prime-time narratives across Belarusian television. A joint history textbook portrays Belarus as a junior branch of Russian civilization, while concert stages and museums celebrate Kremlin-approved myths, silencing dissenting voices. This soft-power offensive, reinforced by Lukashenka’s brutal repression, amounts to a slow-motion annexation of memory and identity.

The transformation began in August 2020, when Belarusian state media workers walked off the job to protest the regime’s violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrators. Almost immediately, rumors spread that Russian journalists—particularly from Kremlin-backed outlets like RT—had replaced them. Lukashenka fueled the speculation by publicly thanking Russian media, while RT admitted only to “advising” local teams.

Soon after, state channels began parroting Moscow’s talking points. Anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric surged. When Russia launched its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Lukashenka was framed as a bystander, even as Belarusian territory was used as a launchpad for missile strikes and military operations.

Russia isn’t just influencing Belarusian media—it’s bankrolling it. In 2025, a new Union State joint media holding is set to launch with a budget of one billion Russian rubles (approximately eleven million dollars), headquartered in Moscow with a representative office in Minsk. The venture will encompass television, radio, and print outlets, marking a significant step toward media integration under Kremlin direction. In February, RT hosted a two-day “media school” at the Russian House in Minsk, an unmistakable effort to cultivate a new generation of regime-aligned Belarusian journalists.

Independent outlets, by contrast, are suffocating. Since 2020, the Information Ministry has blocked about eighteen thousand websites, branding nearly seven thousand as “extremist.” Dozens of newsrooms have fled abroad; those that remain work under constant threat. For most Belarusians, uncensored news is becoming increasingly scarce.

After the 2020 protests, the regime also sharply curtailed academic freedom. Student activism is met with expulsions, imprisonment, forced “repentance” videos, and mobile court trials held at universities. The government has intensified its ideological campaign, blaming “internet technologies” and foreign influence for corrupting students and responding with stricter controls on campus life.

This campaign extends into all areas of student life. In 2023, Belarus’s largest university banned Valentine’s Day, citing it as “too Western,” following a previous ban on Halloween for similar reasons. Since 2024, military training has been introduced into curricula, and even kindergartens now host military-themed events.

The state is also strangling educational choice. Licensing rules adopted in 2022 shut dozens of private schools and those that have survived face intrusive oversight. Belarusian-language teaching is in decline: Fewer than one in ten pupils study it, and no university offers a full Belarusian curriculum. In 1999, 86 percent of citizens identified Belarusian as their native language; by 2019, that figure had dropped to 61 percent and continued to fall.

At the same time, Belarusians are being steered toward Russian universities. State‑funded places for Belarusians at Russian universities jumped from 72 in 2019 to 1,300 in 2023—plus an unprecedented 30,000‑seat quota through the Rossotrudnichestvo exchange program. The Kremlin is grooming a generation whose professional networks and intellectual loyalties lie in the East, not the West.

Russia’s cultural dominance in Belarus has grown in parallel with its political and media influence. Joint exhibitions, concerts, and museum partnerships—especially those highlighting shared military history—further embed Belarus within Russia’s ideological orbit.

Events like the Slavianski Bazaar celebrate “Slavic unity,” but the content increasingly serves pro-Kremlin narratives. Russian artists who openly support Moscow’s foreign policy are welcomed, while Belarusian and Western performers and authors critical of the war in Ukraine or Lukashenka’s regime are banned.

Since 2020, independent Belarusian culture has been gutted. State funding has shifted toward Russian-backed projects, leaving little room for local voices. The result is a cultural landscape where Belarus’s distinct identity is increasingly blurred and, in many cases, erased.

What Belarusians really want

Most Belarusians aren’t choosing Russia’s path—they’re being dragged down it.

While the Kremlin tightens its grip on Belarus’s military, economy, and foreign policy, public opinion tells a very different story. Independent polling consistently shows that the Belarusian people reject war, oppose Russian nuclear deployments, and are uneasy about their country’s deepening dependence on Moscow.

Over 85 percent of Belarusians oppose sending troops to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and more than half disapprove of missile attacks launched from Belarusian soil. These numbers have remained remarkably stable over time, signaling deep and consistent anti-war sentiment that transcends political divisions. Belarusians want stability, but not if it means becoming a launchpad for Russian aggression.

Russian nuclear weapons represent another red line. Two-thirds of Belarusians oppose their deployment on Belarusian territory, though support has ticked up slightly since Moscow reportedly moved tactical nuclear weapons into the country in 2023. This resistance to militarization extends to broader security arrangements. Support for remaining in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization dropped from 63 percent in 2020 to 54 percent in 2023. When Russia invaded Ukraine, more Belarusians briefly preferred remaining outside any military bloc than staying in the CSTO—showing growing distrust of Russian-led alliances. These trends suggest Belarusians are not deeply attached to such alliances and may be open to neutrality or alternative security options.

Geopolitical preferences reveal a more complex picture. While half of Belarusians still back an alliance with Russia, 16 percent favor alignment with the EU, and 30 percent support neutrality. More telling, 57 percent believe Belarus should improve ties with the EU, with 37 percent specifically wanting stronger trade relationships.

Support for NATO remains low, between 6 percent and 11 percent, typically, but this reflects mistrust on all sides, limited access to open debate, and years of regime-driven anti-Western messaging rather than wholehearted embrace of Russia. Importantly, even among those who back integration with Russia, few envision a single state. Belarusians may accept cooperation, but not annexation.

Media access explains much of this complexity. Among those who rely on state-controlled media, 63 percent support closer ties with Russia and only 2 percent support EU integration. However, among consumers of independent media, the numbers flip: 44 percent support moving toward Europe, while just 11 percent back greater integration with Russia.

This data point carries profound implications for Western strategy. Propaganda works, but only when it monopolizes the conversation. Where independent journalism survives, even underground or in exile, it shapes opinions and maintains space for alternative futures. Belarusians who access independent information are more likely to oppose war, support Ukraine, and envision a sovereign development path.

The regime may have crushed street protests, but resistance persists through underground sabotage, cyber leaks, and digital dissent. These aren’t isolated acts of defiance; they signal a society that refuses to surrender its agency.

Belarusians are not ideologues. They are pragmatic. While geopolitical views are fragmented, public support for economic reforms is strong. Nearly 80 percent support fair competition between the public and private sectors. Most also want stock market development, tax cuts for small businesses, and less state interference.

That said, there are anxieties. Inflation, shrinking social safety nets, and the risk of economic shock are real concerns. Attitudes are nuanced: people support market mechanisms but fear short-term pain. Trust in the business elite is limited, but support for entrepreneurship is high.

The regime’s choices do not reflect the will of the Belarusian people. Most Belarusians oppose the war, reject nuclear deployments, and favor neutrality over dependence on Moscow. Despite repression and propaganda, quiet resistance persists: in attitudes, media habits, and daily acts of dissent. This gap between state and society is strategic. The regime is brittle; the people are not. Western policy must begin here: Belarus is not lost, and its future is still in play.

Conclusion

Belarus has not been formally annexed, but it has been absorbed. Militarily, politically, economically, and culturally, it has become a Russian outpost: a launchpad for aggression and repression alike. Yet this transformation is not complete, and it is not irreversible. The Belarusian regime survives through coercion and dependence, not legitimacy. Beneath the surface lies a society that still aspires to sovereignty, stability, and connection to the democratic world.

This report has shown how absorption happened, sector by sector—but also why it matters. A captive Belarus threatens NATO’s flank, enables Kremlin aggression, and offers a template for authoritarian consolidation elsewhere. For the United States and its allies, the time to act is now. Containing Russia, defending Europe, and supporting democracy all run through Minsk. The path to long-term regional security runs not only through Kyiv but also through a free and sovereign Belarus.

Belarus in the balance: Strategic recommendations for US and allied policy

The West can no longer afford to treat Belarus as a sideshow. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Belarus has become a critical platform for Kremlin aggression: militarily, economically, and ideologically. Restoring Belarusian sovereignty is now a strategic imperative for NATO’s eastern security and the broader defense of democratic values.

To counter Belarus’s deepening alignment with Russia, Western policymakers must adopt a four-part strategy: reframe Belarus as a frontline issue, enforce synchronized pressure, build democratic resilience, and prepare for regime rupture.

First, the United States must elevate Belarus as a national security priority. It should be fully integrated into NATO and EU threat assessments, treated alongside Ukraine and the Baltic states in strategic planning. Russian bases, nuclear deployments, and hybrid threats from Belarus are not theoretical: They are already altering Europe’s security landscape.

Second, sanctions must be expanded, enforced, and fully aligned with allies. Belarus is a central hub for sanctions evasion and war logistics, leveraging smuggling networks, trade rerouting, and Russian support. The United States, the EU, and the Group of Seven should synchronize measures against Belarus’s military-industrial complex, financial institutions, and dual-use sectors, extend secondary sanctions to enablers in China, Iran, and elsewhere, and close loopholes to raise the cost of Minsk’s subjugation to Moscow and deter further aggression.

Third, pressure must be matched by investment in Belarusian democratic infrastructure. This includes independent media, secure digital tools, exile education, and cultural preservation. These aren’t symbolic; they sustain the capacity for democratic self-rule and offer a credible alternative to Kremlin domination.

American leadership is vital. Appointing a US special envoy for the Belarusian democratic forces would centralize policy coordination and ensure Belarus stays on the transatlantic agenda. Belarusian democratic leaders must also be present in any future diplomatic process on postwar regional security. No high-level engagement with Lukashenka should resume until more than one thousand political prisoners are freed.

Thanks to US mediation, a number of Belarusian political prisoners and foreign nationals have been freed this year. This humanitarian track should continue. However, it is crucial not to legitimize Lukashenka or ease pressure prematurely. The United States must adopt long-term strategic thinking on Belarus. Ultimately, Western policy should be guided by the understanding that only a democratic Belarus can ensure lasting stability for the entire region.

Finally, contingency planning is essential. Lukashenka’s regime is fragile. The West must be prepared for scenarios ranging from internal collapse to Russian destabilization. Planning should cover political transition, humanitarian assistance, and infrastructure security. Clear public guarantees of post-Lukashenka support—from economic aid to security cooperation—could hasten regime erosion and incentivize elite defections.

Belarus’s future must be embedded in the broader strategy to end the war in Ukraine and roll back authoritarian influence. A free Belarus would deny Moscow a key launchpad, reduce NATO’s exposure, and weaken Russian and Chinese leverage in the region.

The window for action is narrowing. A coherent Western strategy that combines pressure with preparation can still tip the balance.

Read the full issue brief

About the author

Hanna Liubakova is a Belarusian journalist and political analyst. She is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and has reported on developments in Belarus for international outlets including the Washington Post, the Economist, and others.

Liubakova began her career at Belsat TV, the only independent Belarusian television channel, which has been banned by the regime in Minsk. She later worked for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) in Prague, Czechia, and is currently writing a book about Belarus.

Her reporting has earned multiple honors, including the Freedom of the Media Award from the Transatlantic Leadership Network and the One Young World Journalist of the Year Award. She was also a finalist for the European Press Prize. In retaliation for her work, the Lukashenka regime sentenced her in absentia to ten years in prison. She is wanted by authorities in Russia and across all Commonwealth of Independent States countries.

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David Kirichenko — Tue, 11 Nov 2025 00:47:02 +0000

As Europe races to strengthen its defenses against the mounting threat posed by Russian drones, more and more countries are looking to learn from Ukraine’s experience. Speaking in October, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen acknowledged that Ukraine is currently a world leader in drone warfare and called on her European colleagues to “take all the experiences, all the new technology, all the innovation from Ukraine, and put it into our own rearming.”

It is clear that Europe has much to learn. A spate of suspected Russian drone incursions during the second half of 2025 have highlighted the continent’s vulnerability to drone-based aggression and raised fundamental questions over whether European armies are currently preparing for the wrong kind of war. While Europe’s rearmament efforts continue to gain ground, even big spenders like Poland remain focused primarily on traditional weapons systems. This is fueling concerns that European defense policymakers may not fully appreciate the growing dominance of drones on the battlefields of Ukraine.

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Ukraine’s embrace of drone warfare since 2022 can provide Kyiv’s partners with a wide range of important insights. Following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost four years ago, Ukraine has turned to relatively cheap drone technologies in order to offset Moscow’s often overwhelming advantages in conventional firepower and reduce the country’s dependence on Western weapons supplies. As a result, the number of Ukrainian drone producers has skyrocketed from a handful of companies to hundreds, while overall drone output has shot up to millions of units per year.

Ukraine’s vibrant prewar tech sector has proved a major asset, serving as fertile ground for the dynamic expansion of the country’s defense sector. Meanwhile, Ukrainian initiatives like the government-backed Brave1 defense tech cluster have helped to empower innovators and optimize cooperation between the army, the state, and individual drone producers. In summer 2024, Ukraine became the first country to establish a separate branch of the military dedicated to drones with the launch of the Unmanned Systems Forces.

The results speak for themselves. Drones are now thought to be responsible for up to three-quarters of Russian battlefield casualties, with Ukrainian army units creating a “drone wall” around ten kilometers in depth along the front lines of the war. At sea, Ukraine has used naval drones to break the Russian blockade of the country’s ports and force Putin to withdraw the bulk of his fleet away from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea coast. Kyiv has also deployed an expanding arsenal of long-range drones to strike high-value targets with increasing frequency deep inside Russia.

In addition to these offensive roles, drones have become a vital element in Ukraine’s air defenses. Since 2024, Russia has dramatically increased the production of kamikaze bomber drones, making it possible to launch hundreds of drones at targets across Ukraine in a single night. The sheer scale of these attacks has meant that traditional missile-based air defenses are no longer practical due to the high cost and limited availability of interceptor missiles. Instead, Ukrainian defense companies have focused on developing and producing interceptor drones in large quantities.

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So far, European efforts to learn from Ukraine’s drone warfare experience have concentrated primarily on securing access to the latest Ukrainian drone innovations. This approach certainly makes sense. However, many Ukrainian specialists have stressed that as their European partners look to develop drone capabilities of their own, effective training programs will be just as important as advanced technologies.

Maria Berlinska, who heads Ukraine’s Victory Drones project, has argued that up to 90 percent of success in drone warfare depends on the training of the team behind the drone rather than the technology involved. “A drone on its own, without the coordinated work of the team, delivers nothing,” she commented in an October 2025 article addressing the need for skilled drone crews.

Training an effective drone pilot is a complex task that can take at least three months. Many categories of drone operators must also be able to act as engineers and mechanics with the ability to repair and reconfigure their systems in the field. To help meet this challenge, Ukraine has developed a strong network of volunteer organizations dedicated to training new drone pilots and preparing them for combat operations. By late 2024, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense had certified over thirty training centers for drone operators. Novel innovations include a mobile drone school located inside a converted bus.

Speaking to Euronews in October, Ukrainian drone warfare expert Fedir Serdiuk warned that Europe was currently focusing too much on drone technologies while overlooking the need to train operators and commanders in the effective battlefield use of drones. “I don’t see as many training centers being built as factories. It’s a major mistake. Not only for technical skills but also for tactical skills,” he commented.

Ukraine appears poised to play a central part in the training of Europe’s drone forces. Ukrainian trainers have already reportedly begun sharing their expertise with a number of countries including Britain, Denmark, and Poland. This trend reflects an important eastward shift in Europe’s defense landscape, with Ukraine emerging as a key contributor to the continent’s future security. This contribution will draw heavily on technological innovations developed during the war with Russia, but it will also emphasize the importance of effective training.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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Jolie’s visit struck a chord with the Ukrainian public at a time when concerns are mounting that the country’s fight for national survival is slipping out of the international headlines. With the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion now approaching, Ukrainians are painfully aware that global audiences have become jaded by endless war coverage and are now no longer shocked or even particularly surprised by reports of fresh Russian war crimes. The high-profile actor’s decision to personally visit some of the most dangerous places in Ukraine was therefore welcomed as a particularly timely and meaningful gesture.

Many Ukrainians praised Jolie for exposing herself to considerable risk in cities that few international guests dare to visit. “Much respect and many thanks for your kind heart, Angelina Jolie!” commented the deputy speaker of the Ukrainian parliament Olena Kondratiuk. “Angelina Jolie went to Kherson, where Russian drones hunt civilians daily. That takes courage,” wrote Ukrainian journalist Svitlana Morenets. “I can’t help but praise her selflessness and kindness in choosing to help draw attention to Ukrainian civilians, especially children, suffering from the war.”

Ukrainian human rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk called Jolie “one of Hollywood’s bravest hearts” and expressed her hope that press and social media coverage of the star’s trip could help educate international audiences about “the cynical drone safaris on civilians that the Russians love to do.” Fellow Ukrainian civil society activist Olena Tregub said she had been personally moved by Jolie’s visit and noted that it sent a “powerful message” to the local population that they have not been forgotten.

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Angelina Jolie is not alone in attempting to focus international attention on Russia’s ‘human safari’ tactics in Ukraine. A United Nations probe recently addressed the issue and confirmed that the Russian military is purposely targeting Ukrainian civilians in a coordinated campaign of drone killings with the aim of depopulating large parts of the country. In an October report by the UN Human Rights Council-appointed Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, investigators concluded that Russia’s actions in southern Ukraine amount to the crimes against humanity of “murder and of forcible transfer of population.”

The UN investigation covered Russian drone activity across three provinces of southern Ukraine including the regions visited by Jolie. It found evidence of systematic attacks against civilians including drone strikes on pedestrians, public transport, essential infrastructure, and emergency services workers, leading to the deaths of at least 200 people since July 2024. As a result of this relentless and coordinated bombing campaign, some of the targeted areas are now said to be “almost entirely vacated.” Crucially, the drones used in these attacks all featured video cameras allowing operators to methodically select and track victims, leaving no room for doubt regarding the deliberate nature of the killings.

Russia stands accused of committing a staggering quantity of war crimes in Ukraine, ranging from the destruction of entire towns and cities and the bombing of vital civilian infrastructure, to the mass detention Ukrainian citizens and the torture of prisoners. The International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin on war crimes charges for his personal involvement in the mass abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children, which may qualify as an act of genocide.

So far, there has been little concrete progress toward holding Russia legally accountable for the invasion. Ukraine and the Council of Europe signed an agreement in summer 2025 to establish a special tribunal, but is remains unclear when further steps can be expected. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has signaled that the United States will no longer back international efforts to prosecute Putin. Despite these setbacks, Russia’s ‘human safari’ is worthy of special attention as it provides such conclusive proof of the Kremlin’s intention to kill Ukrainian civilians.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an attempt to shatter the existing international order and rewrite the rules of war. If Western leaders fail to impose additional costs on the Kremlin over the deliberate use of drones to hunt down civilian populations, this will set a potentially disastrous precedent that could soon be extended to the rest of Ukraine and beyond. Angelina Jolie’s efforts to highlight this crime against humanity will not prove decisive, but her celebrity intervention has at least made it more difficult for others to claim they did not know.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Representative Adam Smith (D-WA), ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, shares his priorities for the upcoming National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and discusses how Congress can ensure the Pentagon meets today’s security challenges.

Security & Defense United States and Canada

“I don’t think simply committing this large number of assets—hundreds of millions, probably billions of dollars by the time it’s done—to blow up some drug boats in international waters in Latin America is going to make an appreciable difference” in the fight against drug trafficking, said Representative Adam Smith (D-WA), the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Thursday.

The event, part of the Atlantic Council’s Commanders Series, came amid uncertainty over whether the Trump administration’s campaign of attacks on boats that it claims are trafficking drugs will escalate into an effort to overthrow Venezuelan autocrat Nicolás Maduro.

Based on a briefing he received from the State Department and Department of Defense on Wednesday, Smith said he thinks that “the administration does not want to go to war with Venezuela.” But, Smith added, US President Donald Trump sometimes “very quickly” changes his mind. “So who knows?”

Thursday’s event also came amid the longest US government shutdown in history, with the House out of session even as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the next fiscal year has yet to be passed, a situation Smith called “unbelievably disruptive.”

Read below for more highlights from this conversation with Smith, which was moderated by Fox News Chief National Security Correspondent Jennifer Griffin.

The NDAA

“The NDAA itself is moving forward,” Smith said of the annual bill, noting that different versions have been passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and now the two versions need to be reconciled.
One of Smith’s priorities for the bill is acquisition reform: “My position is we’ve had the risk wrong for a long time” on defense acquisition policy, said Smith. “We’ve been only focused” on the risk of corruption in the procurement process “as opposed to the risk of not moving fast enough,” he said. One way to speed up acquisition, he said, is “consolidating the decision makers” in the process “instead of having to go through nine or ten different layers.”
Smith also said he wants to “have procurement people stay in their job longer.” Constant turnover in procurement roles, he said, “doesn’t really help with corruption. It just means that the person doesn’t know the system as well when they’re working on it.”

US strikes on boats in the Caribbean and Pacific

Transnational drug-trafficking gangs in the Western Hemisphere are “a problem for our national security” and “a problem for Latin America,” Smith said. “You’ve got budding narco-states down there. They’re having a harder and harder time dealing with that. We need to be engaged and involved in that.”
However, Smith was critical of the Trump administration’s campaign of attacks on alleged drug-trafficking boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific. “It seems very problematic to me that we have decided that drug dealing will now have the death penalty attached to it,” with “no process whatsoever.”
“They’re certainly bad policy in my view,” Smith said of the strikes.

US military presence abroad

“I think one of the mistakes that we have made is to assume that our global presence is just a cost that isn’t benefiting us,” Smith said of US troop deployments abroad.
Citing threats posed by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorist organizations, Smith said that to pull US troops back from allied countries now and “ignore” these dangers “places us at risk.”
Smith took issue with the Trump administration’s decision to draw down its forces in Romania and noted that there is “bipartisan, bicameral support” in the House and Senate armed services committees “to maintain our presence in Europe and defend them.”
“If any of you have been to Romania, the Baltics, Poland,” said Smith, addressing the crowd, “they want a lot of things, but the one thing they want more than anything is us,” meaning a US military presence. “They don’t believe Russia wants to come in and kill a bunch of US troops. So a little bit of presence can give us a maximum amount of deterrence, and we’re going to fight that out in the defense bill.”

Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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Vladimir Putin’s endless nuclear threats are a sign of Russian weakness

Stephen Blank — Thu, 06 Nov 2025 21:41:31 +0000

When Russian President Vladimir Putin first announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, his official video address was accompanied by thinly-veiled nuclear threats aimed at Western leaders. This Russian nuclear saber-rattling has remained a prominent feature of the war ever since.

Putin’s nuclear threats have made plenty of headlines but have only partially succeeded in deterring Western countries. For more than three and a half years, this strategy has helped Russia to slow down the flow of military aid to Ukraine without ever cutting off Western support entirely. Nevertheless, Kremlin leaders are seemingly unwilling or unable to abandon their nuclear scare tactics.

Putin himself frequently hints at possible nuclear escalation and has even officially revised Russia’s nuclear doctrine to lower the threshold for nuclear strikes. Meanwhile, Russian nukes have reportedly been deployed in Belarus, with Kremlin officials also recently threatening to supply nuclear weapons to Cuba and Venezuela. On November 5, Putin ordered Russian officials to begin preparations for the possible resumption of nuclear testing.

The Kremlin dictator is particularly fond of showcasing new weapons with nuclear capabilities. In late October, Putin announced the successful testing of the nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable Burevestnik missile. “This is a unique product that nobody else in the world has,” he commented. Days later, Putin hailed the similarly successful testing of the Poseidon drone, an atomic-powered and nuclear-capable underwater weapon. He trumpeted the Poseidon’s supposedly unmatched capabilities and stated that “there is no way to intercept it.”

It is impossible to independently assess the veracity of Putin’s claims or confirm the effectiveness of his latest alleged “wonder weapons.” Many have noted that neither weapon is entirely new, with the development of both being first announced back in 2018. In reality, the timing of these alleged tests is probably far more significant that the weapons themselves, and reflects Russia’s desire to engage in yet more nuclear saber-rattling.

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Russia’s latest bout of nuclear posturing reveals much about Moscow’s frustration over continued Western support for Ukraine, and is likely a direct response to strong energy sector sanctions imposed in recent weeks by US President Donald Trump. It is a tactic that could eventually backfire on the Kremlin. By threatening to renew nuclear tests and boasting of unstoppable nuclear-capable wonder weapons, Putin risks highlighting Russia’s inability to project strength via more conventional means. In other words, the Kremlin dictator’s increasingly frequent use of nuclear blackmail may actually be a sign of weakness rather than strength.

Like a geopolitical gangster, Putin has come to rely on Mafia-style intimidation tactics as he seeks to reassert Russia’s great power status amid mounting evidence of his country’s steadily eroding military capabilities. Putin’s nuclear threats are at least in part an attempt to distract attention from the lackluster performance of the Russian army in Ukraine. While Russian forces currently hold the battlefield initiative and continue to advance, they have only managed to seize around one percent of Ukrainian territory over the past three years while suffering exceptionally high losses. This underwhelming outcome led Trump to brand Russia a “paper tiger” in September. The insult is believed to have struck a particularly raw nerve with Putin.

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By brandishing his nuclear arsenal on the international stage, Putin aims to menace risk-averse Western leaders and deter them from opposing Russia in Ukraine. He also hopes to underline that victory over Ukraine remains Moscow’s overriding goal. Putin seeks to demonstrate his readiness to prioritize this quest for victory above all other considerations, including the nuclear deterrence system established over decades by Russia and the United States.

So far, Trump has offered a fairly robust reaction to Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling. This has included ordering US nuclear submarines to be moved closer to Russia in response to “provocative statements,” and indicating a readiness to resume nuclear testing “on an equal basis.” The US leader’s stance is a welcome sign that he is no longer easily swayed by Putin’s dramatics and recognizes the dangers of allowing himself to be intimidated.

Other Western leaders should now follow Trump’s example and acknowledge that the only way to bring Putin’s reckless nuclear blackmail to an end is by demonstrating resolve and reviving deterrence. This must include regenerating sufficient European and American conventional forces to deter Russia from attacking its neighbors. In parallel, sanctions on Putin’s war economy should be tightened, while Ukraine must finally be provided with the weapons its needs to defeat Russia’s invasion.

Nobody can afford to to take the risk of nuclear war lightly, of course. Nevertheless, it is unfortunately necessary to remind the Kremlin that Russia is not the only country with a nuclear arsenal. Genuine conventional and nuclear deterrence must be restored to deprive gamblers like Putin of the ability, let alone the desire, to employ nuclear blackmail in order to enable further acts of international aggression. Unless this is achieved, Putin will continue to use nuclear threats as a tool to intimidate his opponents and disguise Russian weakness.

Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

The expert conversation: What’s Trump’s endgame in Venezuela?

Matthew Kroenig, Jason Marczak — Thu, 06 Nov 2025 21:20:39 +0000

US President Donald Trump has steadily accelerated his campaign of attacks on alleged drug boats in the Caribbean and Pacific Ocean, while building up US military forces in the region. Aside from the anti-drug mission, the US president and his allies have indicated that they intend to force out Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro, though the administration reportedly told Congress this week that it doesn’t have the legal justifications for strikes inside the country right now.

To shed light on what’s going on and what to expect next, we spoke earlier this week with Matt Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and Jason Marczak, vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. This expert conversation has been lightly edited and condensed below.

Matt, you host a show called “So What’s the Strategy?” What do you think US strategy in the region is right now?

Matt Kroenig

If there is a strategy, it’s not clear to me. Maybe there is, but it just hasn’t been articulated. A good strategy starts with clear goals. So, what is it that they’re trying to achieve? It seems like there are at least two possibilities—and, of course, it could be both.

One is that this is about removing Maduro from power, and that could make sense. Maduro has obviously been an anti-American dictator, not good for Venezuela or the United States. Option two is that this is about border security and stopping narco-trafficking.

So, what are the major steps to achieve these goals? The military buildup has been the most prominent recent element. Is this just about striking drug boats? Seems like it’s more than that. If it’s about removing Maduro, then is the hope that he’ll self-deport? Senators Rick Scott and Lindsey Graham were on the Sunday shows last week with similar talking points about how Maduro should just go to Russia or China. Or is it possibly preparing for strikes on the mainland, maybe against Maduro himself? The United States has had a long-standing policy against assassinating foreign leaders, but Trump doesn’t seem to mind breaking norms.

Jason, how do you hear that from a regional standpoint?

Jason Marczak

The president has said that his top goal is stopping the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. And in the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago in particular has been quite supportive of the strikes on the alleged drug-carrying vessels.

I think it’s also a signal to other countries in the region and around the world of how serious this administration is on security and stopping the flow of drugs. There have been other countries in the hemisphere where the administration has been putting pressure to do more to stop the flow of drugs into the United States, such as Colombia with the sanctioning of President Gustavo Petro and the decertification of Colombia as cooperating with the United States on drug-control strategy.

At the same time, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has been very clear on this from his days as a senator. The secretary wants to see the dictator Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela out of power. Given [Rubio’s] Cuban ancestry, it’s very personal to him as well—the rise of dictators and what that means for the people and the erosion of civil liberties that we’ve seen across Venezuela hits home for Rubio. As the president mentioned on 60 Minutes, he does want to see Maduro go. He does see his days as numbered. The question is, to what extent will the United States go to actually advance the removal of Maduro?

I do expect there to be limited strikes at some point on Venezuelan territory, linked to the illicit drug trade.

At the same time, Maduro is seen across the region as a cancer. The erosion of the Venezuelan economy, the erosion of civil rights, the erosion of political freedoms—that has led to the largest mass-migration crisis that this hemisphere has seen. And the implications of that are not just migrants coming to the US southern border. There are migrants coming to parts of the region that have never seen such numbers of migrants—Chile, for example.

Lastly, there are a number of indications that the Western Hemisphere will figure more prominently in [the Trump administration’s forthcoming] National Defense Strategy (NDS) than in previous defense strategies. And security and stability in our hemisphere requires Nicolás Maduro not being in the Miraflores Palace in Venezuela; he creates instability across the broader region.

Matt, this is your wheelhouse. Is this Caribbean buildup a soft launch of that strategy?

Matt Kroenig

Every national defense strategy essentially starts by saying the homeland is the most important. And I think that’s true for any country and any leader. What I’m hearing is that this NDS will start by saying the homeland and the Western Hemisphere are priority number one, but then the Indo-Pacific and China are number two, and so on.

But you do already see more of a focus on the Western Hemisphere than in past administrations, and clearly, with this military buildup, we haven’t seen anything like this in many years.

Coming back to something that Jason said, there are different camps within this administration who may see this issue differently. Jason is absolutely right that Rubio has long been calling for the removal of Maduro, and he’s obviously empowered as secretary of state and national security advisor. There are probably others in the administration, more in the MAGA restraint camp, who are more worried about border security and the flow of drugs but are probably opposed to military conflict against Venezuela directly. This is a group that’s been criticizing US policy toward Iraq and Afghanistan over the years for failed military intervention. So for now, the camps are aligned in favor of greater pressure against Venezuela, but I doubt that there’s a coherent strategy that they’ve all signed off on.

This military buildup comes as Trump just returned from Asia, where he presided over a peace agreement between Cambodia and Thailand. He frequently talks up his role as a peacemaker. Are we seeing a foreign policy doctrine emerge at this point from Trump?

Matt Kroenig

Well, he’s always used the term “peace through strength,” and I think both parts of that phrase are important. It’s peace through deterrence. He is skeptical of long, drawn-out military campaigns like [those in] Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Ukraine, but is willing to use short, sharp, decisive force. We saw the strikes against Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in the first term. We saw the strikes against Iran’s nuclear program this summer.

And so, for him, strikes against drug infrastructure in Venezuela, as Jason just alluded to, or maybe even against Maduro or regime targets themselves, is not inconsistent with this idea of peace through strength. What I would not expect to see, though, is some kind of Panama or Grenada situation of a full-scale, boots-on-the-ground, regime-change operation. It’s hard for me to see the Trump-Vance administration going for that kind of military action.

Jason Marczak

I fully agree with Matt, and this is consistent with everything that I’ve been hearing as well. There’s a high potential that we’re going to see limited strikes in Venezuela but, again, no commitment of any type of US forces in a way that would put American troops in harm’s way. Although [it’s] outdated, Venezuela does have an air-defense system. The Russians were tweeting the other day that they’re willing to come and assist the Venezuelans as needed, although I doubt that Russia has any capacity to do so at this point. But the question is: For Trump, does Maduro actually need to be removed from power for him to claim success?

Jason Marczak

There have been a number of different attempts at overthrowing Maduro over the years, and they are squashed pretty quickly. For one, you have Cuban agents who are embedded across the Venezuelan military and can quickly report any rebellious activities. And over the last twenty-five years, Venezuelan officials have also ensured that there is minimal communication among different military units to make it more difficult for a mass uprising. The most notable attempt to remove Maduro was five years ago—termed Operation Gideon—but the former Venezuelan troops never made it past the shores.

One of the ways that Maduro maintains that grip over the military is through the illicit activities that enrich the regime and thereby enrich the generals. So if we are able to significantly degrade Venezuela’s ability to engage in illicit activities—whether it’s drug trafficking, gold mining, arms trafficking, human smuggling, you name it—then Maduro has less resources to be able to pay off his generals, and that can hopefully lead to a desire from the armed forces to find a different path than one that’s dependent upon Maduro.

The context in Venezuela is really important as well. Unlike other countries where the US has intervened in order to topple a dictator without a clear democratic successor, there are clear leaders in waiting. There was a presidential election a year ago, in which Edmundo González, according to all voting sheets that have been made public, was elected as president. And he’s currently living in exile. María Corina Machado, who won the Nobel Peace Prize, is there in Venezuela fighting for the government that was actually elected a year ago. Venezuela also has its own vast critical resources and oil reserves to provide key economic resources, and there is a regional desire to help to promote stability [in the country].

Now, Maduro has supposedly offered to leave power. The administration has said that those offers have been rejected. But what we would need to avoid, in the case of Maduro leaving power, is that another one of his henchmen just assumes the presidency. There is robust support for the democratic opposition in Venezuela, but it’s about making it clear to the Venezuelan military as well that their future rests on respecting a transition that adheres to democratic principles.

Matt Kroenig

Jason was talking about other contexts. I’ve worked on US policy toward Iran for more than twenty years, and we have seen uprisings against the regime there, but the reality has been that the regime has been willing to kill to stay in power. That could also be a critical issue in Venezuela. As long as the security forces are willing to kill innocent civilians to keep Maduro or his successors in power, the US ability to engineer regime change from afar is limited.

Just Maduro himself leaving is probably not enough to get the goals that the Trump administration is looking for.

Jason Marczak

Picking up on Matt’s point, in the hopeful event that Maduro leaves, it needs to be made abundantly clear to the Venezuelan military the severe consequences of killing to remain in power. Most of these forces are not loyal to Nicolás Maduro. Many are either scared of being thrown in jail if they go against Maduro or are directly benefiting from the illicit financial resources that Maduro procures and then doles out to military officials. If those resources are drying up, well, do you want to take additional action to perpetuate a regime that’s falling? Or do you want to be on the right side of history?

Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Ukraine’s youth exodus highlights mounting demographic challenges

Kateryna Odarchenko, Zoryana Golovata — Thu, 06 Nov 2025 20:26:31 +0000

A large number of young Ukrainian men have left the country in the past two months following an August 2025 decision allowing males aged between eighteen and twenty-two to travel internationally. While there are no exact figures confirming how many men have exited, the exodus has sparked a lively debate within Ukrainian society and added to existing concerns over the deteriorating demographic situation in wartime Ukraine.

With millions of Ukrainians crossing the border in both directions each week, it is difficult to gain a clear sense of the recent surge in young men traveling abroad. Britain’s Daily Telegraph reported in late October that almost one hundred thousand Ukrainian males in the eighteen to twenty-two age bracket had entered Poland during the previous two months. Meanwhile, Germany’s Interior Ministry noted that the number of young Ukrainian men registering in the country had risen tenfold from around one hundred per week to almost a thousand.

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With men younger than twenty-five not currently subject to mobilization by the Ukrainian military, the recent outflow has been primarily felt in the employment sector. Since the relaxation of martial law travel restrictions in August, many labor-intensive industries that have traditionally relied on large numbers of young employees have reported a sharp decline in the workforce.

Ukraine’s low birth rates and high levels of economic migration meant that the country was already experiencing mounting labor shortages prior to 2022. Following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, these demographic challenges have become far more acute, with millions displaced internally or crossing the border into the European Union. A 2024 survey conducted by Ukraine’s European Business Association found that 71 percent of companies were experiencing significant workforce deficits.

Ukrainian companies are responding to these new recruitment realities in a variety of ways. With hundreds of thousands of men now serving in the military, more and more women are being recruited to take on professional roles traditionally occupied by males. In an August 2024 article highlighting this employment trend, the New York Times claimed that the unprecedented wartime influx of women was “reshaping Ukraine’s traditionally male-dominated workforce, which experts say has long been marked by biases inherited from the Soviet Union.”

There has also been increased focus on retraining opportunities and vocational programs as business owners and educational institutions seeks to fill gaps in the workforce. With current shortages most severe in skilled blue collar professions, many of these training initiatives are geared toward producing candidates with the skills to address immediate shortages in strategically important sectors of the economy. According to Ukraine’s State Employment Service, the industries experiencing the largest shortfalls include construction, manufacturing, and transportation.

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In the Ukrainian retail sector, some companies are turning to teenagers and seeking to employ those aged fifteen to seventeen during vacation periods and after school hours. This trend is expected to gain momentum as employers search for practical solutions to staffing shortages. As a result, large numbers of Ukrainian teens may now be set to gain an unprecedented degree of economic independence, with possible knock-on effects for the job market and beyond.

Nobody currently anticipates a wave of returning Ukrainian refugees anytime soon. Instead, Ukrainians living in the EU are now widely recognized as an economic asset for their host countries. Research conducted in summer 2025 for the UN Refugee Agency found that Ukrainian refugees living in Poland generate around 2.7 percent of Polish GDP. “All evidence shows that Ukrainian refugees will continue having a positive economic impact while they remain in Poland, vastly outstripping the cost of any support they received,” the report concluded.

As the wartime Ukrainian diaspora becomes increasingly well established in the European Union, fewer and fewer refugees will seek to relocate back to Ukraine. At the same time, however, many of those living and working abroad continue to maintain strong ties with friends and relatives in their home country. These transnational networks are often led by Ukrainian women. They serve as an informal but importance source of economic support for families separated by the war and those based in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s demographic challenges were present long before Russia’s full-scale invasion, but the outlook has worsened significantly as a result of the war. Addressing these challenges will require coordinated efforts to integrate young Ukrainians into the workforce, mobilize underutilized labor, provide more opportunities for vocational training, and take steps to support return migration. For now, the Ukrainian labor market reflects the harsh realities of the Russian invasion, while also highlighting the resilience, resourcefulness, and ingenuity of the Ukrainian population.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group USA and president of the PolitA Institute for Democracy and Development. Zoryana Golovata is head of the Expert Group on Cognitive Management at the Ukrainian Political Science Association and founder of Women’s Voice in Action, focusing on economic resilience and mental health recovery for women in wartime Ukraine.

Learning the lessons from Ukraine’s fight against Russian cyber warfare

Oleksandr Bakalynskyi, Maggie McDonough — Thu, 06 Nov 2025 19:36:30 +0000

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine is among the most technologically advanced wars the world has ever seen. But while the rapid developments taking place in drone warfare tend to attract most attention, the cyber front of the conflict also offers important lessons for international audiences.

The Russian state and affiliated groups have been refining their cyber warfare tactics in Ukraine ever since the initial onset of Russian aggression in 2014. In January 2022, Ukrainian government sites and other critical elements of the country’s digital infrastructure experienced a series of major cyber attacks in a precursor to the full-scale invasion, which began weeks later.

This escalating cyber war has made Ukraine both a critical source of intelligence on Russia’s evolving cyber capabilities and a front line arena for cyber defense strategies. Cyber operations have become integral to Russia’s campaign of aggression, with cyber attacks and kinetic strikes frequently coordinated. Today’s Russian cyber strategy involves continuous, adaptive, and multi-vector operations encompassing malware, phishing, and disinformation.

Ukraine’s cyber defense is critical to international security and the stability of the global digital environment. As a testing ground for Russian cyber tools, Ukraine faces attacks that, once refined, can be directed against allied governments, critical infrastructure, and private sector entities. The question is not whether such attacks will occur, but when this will happen, how costly these attacks will be, and how quickly recovery can be achieved.

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Unlike conventional warfare, cyberspace has no borders. A criminal or adversary can strike targets in Kyiv, Washington, or New York with equal ease. Sustained collaboration between Ukrainian, United States, and allied cyber specialists is therefore critical, especially given the escalating cyber threat posed by China, North Korea, Iran, Belarus, and their state-backed proxy groups.

Despite the growing threat, institutional capabilities for a coordinated response by Ukraine, Europe, the US, and other allies are still underdeveloped. The NIS2 Directive, the legal framework that sets minimum cyber security standards across the EU, was an important step toward increasing coordination around risk management, threat sharing, and supply chain security. However, the process of building a dynamic cyber defense coalition has been slow, given the large number of jurisdictions in Europe.

To compound these challenges, Western governments have often been hesitant to share sensitive information with Ukrainian counterparts, or even with each other. Thankfully, there are measures that can be adopted to offer more effective support to Ukraine while still safeguarding classified information. These include sharing tiered or sanitized intelligence reports, conducting joint cyber security operations, and expanding advisory access to expertise. Sustained knowledge exchange, international assistance, and cooperative engagement remain essential to countering the breadth and sophistication of Russian cyber operations.

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Ukraine’s experience highlights the importance of increased investment in critical infrastructure protection. Since 2014, Russia has repeatedly targeted Ukraine’s critical infrastructure with cyber offensives designed to disrupt vital services. The cyber defense of these assets is highly specialized and requires specific strategies.

Cooperation between the public and private sectors is crucial in the fight against Russian cyber warfare. Civilian engagement and private sector partnerships have played important roles in Ukraine’s cyber defense, with both groups filling gaps that government and military structures cannot fully cover, especially under conditions of relentless hybrid warfare. However, there are a number of problematic related issues that need to be resolved.

One of the most difficult topics in terms of legislation is the issue of cyber volunteers. Ukrainian initiatives such as the IT Army have shown that civilians are prepared to work long hours to protect their country. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s private sector and international companies have provided a multi-layered defense by combining technical expertise, rapid incident response, and coordination with state authorities and civilian volunteers.

These contributions have proved vital in the struggle to preserve Ukraine’s digital sovereignty, protect citizens, and support the broader war effort. But many questions remain. How can large numbers of volunteers be effectively vetted? How should they be organized, when in many cases they are not cyber security specialists? Who should lead? Do volunteer cyber defenders become legitimate military targets? One solution could be to formalize a framework for civil-military-tech collaboration integrating vetted civilian volunteers with appropriate oversight.

There is a strong case for strengthening sanctions against Russia’s IT sector. Sanctions already play a critical role in constraining the Kremlin’s offensive cyber capabilities, but additional measures could further limit access to advanced technologies and signal the risks of collaboration with sanctioned entities, thereby reducing opportunities for knowledge transfer.

Potential measures include technology export bans, targeted entity designations, secondary sanctions, restrictions on software and cloud services, limitations on talent pipelines, and the financial isolation of IT firms. Implemented multilaterally, these steps could weaken Russia’s ability to innovate in cyber warfare, increase the Kremlin’s reliance on less advanced domestic technologies, and raise the cost of sustaining long-term cyber operations against Ukraine and its allies.

Finally, it is important to underscore that people remain the central element of effective cyber defense. Even with regular training designed to strengthen the skills of cyber defenders, individuals remain vulnerable to cyber fraud and social engineering techniques. Addressing these risks requires not only technical safeguards but also robust organizational policies and a sustained commitment to individual vigilance. Continuous awareness, preparedness, and adaptability are therefore essential components of a comprehensive cyber security posture.

Dr. Oleksandr Bakalinskyi is a Senior Researcher at the G. E. Pukhov Institute for Modeling in Energy Engineering at the National Academy of Sciences in Ukraine. Maggie McDonough is currently affiliated with the Center for Education & Research in Information Assurance and Security at Purdue University, where she serves as a technical advisor on global cyber security resilience programming.

Trump has an opportunity to unblock Ukraine’s EU accession in his meeting with Orbán

James Batchik — Tue, 04 Nov 2025 22:11:00 +0000

On November 7, US President Donald Trump will host Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the White House. There, Trump could do something unexpected and, ultimately, to the advantage of his own agenda: demand Orbán stop being an obstacle to Ukraine’s European Union (EU) accession efforts.

When it comes to the EU’s mostly aligned position on Ukraine and Russia, Hungary stands as the biggest outlier. Orbán has repeatedly echoed Russian talking points about Ukraine. And while other EU member states have worked to wean themselves off Russian energy, Budapest has deepened its dependency on Moscow, providing more than five billion euros to Russia’s tax revenues since the Kremlin launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Hungary has also both delayed and derailed EU-wide efforts. The EU’s decision-making procedures, which require unanimity on key issues, provide Hungary ample opportunity to delay or veto EU action. Budapest, for example, is almost always among the last holdouts to agree to place new sanctions on Russia. For months, Orbán delayed the fifty-billion-euro package that the EU prepared for Kyiv, before finally relenting in February 2024 after receiving some concessions on its access to EU funds that had been frozen over Budapest’s rule-of-law violations.

Even if it is a long way off, Ukraine’s EU membership is in the US interest.

In addition, Hungary has been blocking Ukraine’s bid for EU membership since the bloc opened accession negotiations with Kyiv in December 2023. Orbán has continued to block progress despite the European Commission affirming Ukraine’s readiness earlier this year and stating that there are “no objective reasons” for the blockage. The Commission on November 4 reiterated that Kyiv had met the conditions required to open negotiating chapters, despite Hungary’s veto.

As a result, the EU must move increasingly without Hungary in a nonofficial capacity. For example, the European Council opened accession negotiations with Ukraine in the December 2023 Council meeting only after Orbán dropped his veto by physically leaving the room when the decision came to a head. The Council has continued to resort to holding discussions on Ukraine without Orbán to avoid the political theater of a Hungarian veto on Council decisions. At the last European Council meeting in October, Orbán skipped the conversation on Ukraine entirely.

That the EU has been able to navigate Hungary’s intransigence to secure nineteen rounds of sanctions packages, provide financial support for Ukraine, and grant Kyiv EU candidate status is a feat of diplomatic prowess for the bloc’s leaders, who have used significant financial carrots and sticks to secure Orbán’s reluctant acquiescence.

But the lack of unanimity does a disservice to Ukraine, to Europe, and to the United States. Hungary is not always alone in its obstruction. Still, Budapest has weakened the EU’s hand at a moment when the demands that Europe step up in support of Ukraine are growing, particularly from Washington.

The White House should be clear-eyed about the fact that, despite Trump’s chumminess with Orbán, he has been the roadblock to the action the United States is demanding from Europe. Especially on the provision of financial assistance to Ukraine and advancing Ukraine’s EU membership, Orbán is the problem.

At Friday’s meeting in Washington, Orbán will seek to strengthen his relationship with Trump. Orbán seemed ascendent earlier this fall with the announcement of a meeting between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Budapest—a meeting Orbán heralded as a sign of his influence over the proceedings. Now, his position is tenuous. The meeting’s cancellation denies Orbán any such diplomatic weight, and he faces the added problem of potentially disastrous effects from the new US energy sanctions on Russia. He will head to Washington looking to secure desperately needed sanctions exemptions, and he has claimed that Hungary would otherwise face an economic collapse.

This means Trump has leverage. The Trump team should press Orbán to stop playing spoiler and allow Europe to take the meaningful action it needs to as Ukraine’s biggest backer. So in exchange for any sanctions relief or economic deals, Orbán’s White House visit would be a perfect opportunity to end Budapest’s obstruction of Ukraine’s EU accession progress.

Even if it is a long way off, Ukraine’s EU membership is in the US interest—and in Trump’s interest, as it would advance his goal of a lasting peace in Ukraine and help facilitate commercial deals for the United States. Ukraine’s integration into the EU’s single market would greatly expand Kyiv’s economic potential. US investments in Ukraine, through the US-Ukraine Investment Fund, would very likely stand to gain if Kyiv received the associated benefits of EU membership in the future. Further, Ukraine’s progress on the path to membership would provide the necessary reforms to keep the country stable and give a clear signal that Europe is bearing the burden of support for Kyiv, a frequent demand from Washington.

Trump has heard this line of reasoning before and picked up on the issue. At the White House meeting with seven European leaders in August, Trump confronted Orbán about his opposition to Ukraine’s EU membership in an impromptu phone call. With Orbán in town, it is the right moment to raise the issue again. Getting Orbán to drop his opposition to Ukraine’s accession would be a diplomatic feat for the White House, highlight the influence Trump has over other world leaders, and represent a strategic coup for Ukraine, Europe, and Washington.

Of course, Orbán has skirted promises before, and Trump may want to cut his friend some slack. But putting the issue front and center at Friday’s meeting will be an important move to show that Washington is watching Europe’s stepped-up efforts on defense and support for Ukraine, and that Trump expects even the most troublesome EU member states to get out of the way of this progress.

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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EU praises Ukraine’s progress but warns Zelenskyy over corruption

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 04 Nov 2025 22:01:55 +0000

Ukraine’s bid to join the European Union received a boost this week with the release of an annual assessment praising the war-torn country’s progress toward future membership. The European Commission’s yearly overview of potential future EU members identified Ukraine as one of the best performers among ten candidate countries, acknowledging advances made by Kyiv in a number of reform areas including public administration, democratic institutions, rule of law, and the rights of national minorities. “Despite Russia’s unrelenting war of aggression, Ukraine remains strongly committed to its EU accession path, having successfully completed the screening process and advanced on key reforms,” the report noted.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed this positive appraisal of his country’s efforts and said the European Commission report confirmed that Ukraine “is confidently moving toward EU membership.” It was not all good news for the Ukrainian leader, however. EU officials also raised concerns over Zelenskyy’s domestic policies amid mounting allegations of backsliding in Kyiv on core anti-corruption reforms that are widely regarded as vital for Ukraine’s further European integration. “Recent negative trends, including pressure on the specialized anti-corruption agencies and civil society, must be decisively reversed,” the annual accession review underlined.

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The criticism currently being leveled at the Ukrainian authorities in Brussels is not entirely unexpected. In July 2025, Zelenskyy stunned Ukraine’s Western allies and sparked domestic outrage by backing a controversial parliamentary bill that was widely interpreted as an attempt to end the independence of the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

The scandal provoked Ukraine’s largest street protests since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, with thousands of Ukrainians braving possible Russian bombardment to rally in cities across the country against Zelenskyy’s apparent power grab. Kyiv’s partners were also quick to voice their alarm and signal that the move could put future international support for the Ukrainian war effort at risk.

Faced with overwhelming opposition at home and anger in key foreign capitals, Zelenskyy quickly backed down and reversed efforts to assert control over Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. Nevertheless, this week’s European Commission Enlargement Report has highlighted the lingering damage done by this brief and entirely self-inflicted crisis to the Ukrainian leader’s credibility.

Nor is this the only fly in the ointment. In addition to his headline-grabbing summer 2025 U-turn over Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms, Zelenskyy is also facing accusations from political opponents and civil society representatives of using lawfare to silence critics and consolidate power in his own hands. This is not a good look for a man who has sought to position himself as one of the leaders of the democratic world.

Zelenskyy has pushed back hard against his critics. He has pointed to Ukraine’s unprecedented success in meeting EU accession targets amid extremely challenging wartime conditions, while underlining the scale of his country’s anti-corruption reforms. “We have implemented the widest, the broadest anti-corruption infrastructure in Europe. I don’t know about any country that has as many anti-corruption authorities,” he commented in response to this week’s report. “We are doing everything possible.”

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For the time being, any disquiet over Zelenskyy’s anti-corruption credentials is unlikely to derail Ukraine’s EU membership momentum. While there is no agreement on how soon Ukraine can expect to join, the country’s eventual accession is now viewed in most European capitals as crucial for the continent’s future stability and security.

Ukrainian aspirations to join the EU first began to take shape in the wake of the country’s 2004 Orange Revolution, leading to years of meandering negotiations over a possible Association Agreement between Kyiv and Brussels. When this document was finally ready to be signed in 2013, Russia intervened and pressured the Ukrainian authorities to reject the deal. This led directly to a second Ukrainian revolution and the fall of the country’s pro-Kremlin government.

With Moscow’s efforts to thwart Ukraine’s European integration rapidly unraveling, Russian President Vladimir Putin chose to escalate and launched the invasion of Crimea in February 2014. This watershed moment marked the start of Russian armed aggression against Ukraine. Following the seizure of the Crimean peninsula, Moscow established Kremlin-controlled “separatist republics” in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. When this limited Russian military intervention failed to derail Ukraine’s EU ambitions, Putin raised the stakes further with the full-scale invasion of 2022.

As Russian aggression has escalated, Ukrainian public support for EU membership has increased and opposition has withered away. An issue that once divided Ukrainians fairly evenly now unites the nation. This is hardly surprising. For millions of Ukrainians, the quest to join the EU has become synonymous with the country’s civilizational choice of European democracy over Russian autocracy.

Zelenskyy would be well advised to keep this in mind as he seeks to balance domestic political considerations with Ukraine’s EU aspirations and the urgent need to maintain international support for the war effort. Ukrainians have made staggering sacrifices along the road toward EU membership and will not take kindly to anyone who places this progress in jeopardy. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s EU integration currently enjoys strong public and political support across Europe, but backsliding on core values could still undermine Kyiv’s case and provide fuel for Russia as it seeks to discredit Ukraine and prevent the country’s historic exit from the Kremlin orbit.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

A long-standing partnership

Russia and Venezuela have long had close ties, with the partnership deepening significantly after then Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez reached out to Putin in 2000 for much-needed support. In the twenty-five years since then, Russia has been a vital source of military and economic aid for Venezuela. While Russian state-linked oil companies receive some oil in return for their investments, the real benefit of Moscow’s investment in Venezuela is geopolitical. In return for arms and money, Russia gains a significant foothold in South America, helping to fulfill Putin’s ambitions of making Russia a great power and challenging the United States in its own hemisphere. Russia’s support for Venezuela furthers the Kremlin’s ability to act as a spoiler for US interests, and it has the potential to pull US attention and resources away from opposing Russian aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe.

Russian oil companies have invested in Venezuela for decades, and this investment helped ensure that Venezuelan state-owned oil company PDVSA was able to sustain its output in recent years. Last month, Russia and Venezuela signed a Strategic Partnership Treaty, which calls for expanded collaboration in sectors such as energy, mining, transport, communications, and counterterrorism. Yet, the financial returns on these investments have not always been substantial. In 2019, Reuters reported that Russian companies had yet to break even on the billions of dollars’ worth of investments in the country’s oil sector over the preceding decade. Even so, Russian companies also have the exploration rights for oil and gas reserves, which are potentially worth billions of dollars. These untapped reserves continue to incentivize Moscow’s sustained presence in the country despite its early investments failing to provide a financial windfall.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine became the Kremlin’s main priority and a drain on Russia’s resources, Moscow has dialed back interest in, and likely its aid to, Venezuela. However, Russia continues to value projecting the image of a formidable ally, investing instead in cultivating ties through military diplomacy. Russia and Venezuela have carried out at least nine military exchanges since 2022, and this included Venezuela hosting part of Russia’s 2022 International Army Games. Though reduced from earlier years, Russia does still provide Venezuela military aid. In July, Venezuela opened a factory to produce Russian Kalashnikov munitions, and last week, a Russian transport aircraft linked to the Russian military landed in Caracas.

In the past, Russia has been willing to deploy military assets to Venezuela when the regime has faced threats. In December 2018, Putin sent two Tu-160 strategic bombers alongside other aircraft to Caracas as Maduro faced international pressure following the election in May of that year, the outcome of which was rejected by Venezuelan opposition candidates. Then in early 2019, as Maduro continued to face opposition, Russia deployed the S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Venezuela, a clear sign of support.

What will Russian support look like this time?

Russia has had success in propping up its autocratic allies in the past. Most notably, Russia’s direct military intervention in Syria in 2015 helped change the course of the civil war and propped up the regime of Bashar al-Assad for years. But the Kremlin’s support for Assad waned after it launched the war in Ukraine, which contributed to the Syrian regime’s collapse in December 2024. This delivered a blow to Russia’s credibility as a reliable ally for Putin’s autocratic friends and should serve as a warning to Maduro.

Maduro’s appeals to Moscow for help may result in some aid, but he should not expect Putin to be his savior. Russia continues to face real economic constraints that limit its ability to provide an economic lifeline to Venezuela. When Maduro traveled to Moscow in August to mark eighty years of the bilateral relationship, he came home without any new loans or funding. Trade between the two topped out at $1.2 billion in 2024, less than a third of Russia’s trade with other Latin American nations such as Brazil and Mexico. With Russia’s wartime economy facing stagnation and potential decline, Moscow is likely hesitant to spend already limited funds on propping up Maduro.

Significant Russian military support is also unlikely to be forthcoming, even if the United States launches some sort of targeted strike within Venezuela. Today, Russia’s war against Ukraine has made it more reliant on China, Iran, and North Korea. As Russia scholar Angela Stent wrote in an Atlantic Council report released last month, these countries are “essential for Russia’s continued prosecution of the war.” Notably missing from this list of key allies is Venezuela. And even being part of this group, sometimes referred to as an “axis,” does not ensure Russian aid. Though Iran is a critical supplier of Shahed drones, the strategic partnership treaty between Moscow and Tehran signed in January stipulates that Russia will not come to Iran’s defense if it is attacked by Israel or the United States.

Indeed, following the US strikes on Iran earlier this year, Russia responded with words of condemnation, but no tangible actions of support. Instead, Moscow welcomed the distraction from its war in Ukraine that the attacks provided. Should the United States strike Venezuela, Moscow would likely repeat this playbook and avoid coming to Venezuela’s aid in any meaningful way.

Expect Russian bluster over real benefits

Despite the limits he faces in providing economic or significant military aid to Maduro, Putin certainly still wants to be seen as a reliable and valuable partner to autocracies around the world. One option that Putin may employ is nuclear saber-rattling. Earlier this year, Russian lawmakers proposed deploying nuclear missiles to Venezuela and Cuba. While nothing has come of this threat, such statements allow Moscow to convey support for its ally in Caracas without undertaking action.

Don’t be surprised if, to up the ante now, Putin openly muses about such deployments in the coming weeks. But Russia’s economic constraints and its focus on Ukraine mean that there is simply not much that Moscow can really provide to Venezuela. Bold rhetoric from the Kremlin will continue, but not much else is likely to follow.

Imran Bayoumi is an associate director with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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The Millennium Challenge Corporation is needed for peace in the Great Lakes Region—and US mineral security

Aubrey Hruby — Tue, 04 Nov 2025 17:16:12 +0000

The accord between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda brokered by the United States in June represents more than a diplomatic breakthrough for the Trump administration. It is a test of whether Washington can transform plans for peace into a durable, mutually beneficial economic and security outcome in one of the most mineral-rich regions in the world.

The African Great Lakes region is where nearly three‑quarters of global cobalt is mined and where flows of untraceable tantalum, tin, and tungsten continue to fuel sustainability risks that ripple through the supply chains of US manufacturers. If the peace agreement and the related US-DRC critical minerals deal fail to deliver on their promises, illicit networks will entrench themselves further, and China will remain the default processor and refiner of the minerals core to electric vehicles, semiconductors, and defense systems. The United States has one instrument that can respond with the scale, speed, and credibility this moment demands—the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).

Designed to turn political will into economic transformation

Founded in 2004, the MCC set out with the aim of using large grants to spur economic growth and open markets in poor countries with good governance. The MCC has been active in twenty-four African countries, making investments of over ten billion dollars in energy, agriculture, and infrastructure, with a notable 3,800 kilometers of road completed. Within the US government’s economic statecraft toolbox, the MCC’s large-scale grant capital is a rare and strategic asset able to fund enabling infrastructure for US investment in markets of strategic import. The MCC can also work regionally, not just bilaterally, which is exactly what a cross-border security and trade deal requires. Reimagined as “MCC 2.0,” it can accelerate the development of minerals-corridor infrastructure in African markets, help investors navigate complex permitting regimes, and crowd in US private investment. Armed with flexible funds, MCC compacts finance feasibility studies, workforce upskilling, data gathering, energy, and infrastructure that create the “bankability” that US investors need to move into the DRC market, while also driving regional economic development.

Unlike the US Development Finance Corporation, which is driving the US-Ukraine minerals deal signed earlier this year, the MCC has expertise in driving policy shifts by conditioning disbursements on reforms, addressing market entry barriers. The corporation’s regional focus also suits the fact that mineral supply chains will cross borders, allowing the MCC to reinforce both the corridor‑based US-DRC minerals deal and the related DRC‑Rwanda agreement. Tying disbursements to measurable governance benchmarks gives the United States leverage beyond diplomacy and makes reform inseparable from financing. With the MCC, the Trump administration has an execution platform, not just a financing source, that can support the long-term success of the US-DRC critical minerals deal.

Country eligibility requirements: An operational choice, not legislative constraint

Over the past twenty years, the MCC has developed complex and often onerous eligibility requirements that score countries—using data from Freedom House, Reporters without Borders, and the World Bank, among others—and determine which can receive grants. Neither the DRC nor Rwanda would qualify for a full compact under MCC’s current scoring regime.

However, these eligibility practices do not have to stand in the way of the MCC being mobilized to make the peace and economic agreements successful. The metrics that are currently used to determine country eligibility are an operational choice: Such use of these metrics is not mandated by the statute that created the MCC, and it precludes the agency from adapting to urgent, strategic opportunities like the one now unfolding in Central Africa. Congress instructed the MCC to partner with countries demonstrating a commitment to governance, economic freedom, and investment in people, and the compacts must align with US national interests.

The procedural hurdles and rigid scorecard formulas that have been layered on the law’s framework can be removed by new political leadership. To let operational rigidity block US minerals security and Congolese development ambition is to let process defeat purpose.

MCC needs political direction

There is no need to rewrite the MCC’s authorizing statute. Congress has already put in place its legal authority and full‑year appropriations. What is needed is political direction. Now that the corporation has a new board that met in August, the agency is beginning work on compacts that had been paused during the foreign assistance review. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as chair of the MCC board, should instruct the MCC to fast-track a Great Lakes regional compact to become the platform for the execution of the peace agreement and critical minerals deal. Such a compact, focusing on power, rail, border systems, mining-skills training, and rule‑of‑law, could create an investible minerals corridor integrated with the US-supported Lobito Trans‑Africa Corridor * connecting the DRC to ports in Angola.

At the least, a $750 million Great Lakes regional compact could rapidly do the following:

Support data collection and the use of artificial intelligence in minerals exploration;
Fund the basics of bankability, including through feasibility and environmental studies;
Co‑fund last‑mile rail and road spurs to connect the Kivu (in the DRC) and Copperbelt (in Zambia) nodes to Lobito rail and border crossings in coordination with the DFC’s Lobito financing;
Finance substation upgrades and dedicated lines to processing zones in eastern DRC;
Digitize customs, implement pre‑clearance for certified minerals, and modernize warehousing;
Support metallurgy/geoscience training and tech transfer programs; and
Accelerate traceability and the formalization of the artisanal mining sector through digitization.

The metrics for success could be visible within a year in terms of private capital mobilized, US offtake agreements, and reduced cost of production. As specific mining projects mature, DFC and Export–Import Bank financing could be leveraged to match the growing need for equity and debt financing and insurance products.

The bottom line for the administration

The Trump administration should be applauded for its diplomatic efforts in Central Africa. Now it must back that diplomacy with a minerals corridor that demonstrates the shared economic dividends of peace. The MCC is operating, the board is engaged, and the legal and financial authorities exist to move now. A Great Lakes regional compact would leverage the MCC’s unique strengths—flexible grants, reform conditionality, and regional scope—to turn a fragile deal into durable minerals security and local development. Any delay would simply entrench China‑centric processing. It’s time to move fast, with the MCC in front.

Aubrey Hruby is a senior adviser and senior fellow at the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council and leads the center’s Critical Minerals Task Force.

*Rawbank, which supports the Atlantic Council Africa Center’s work on the Democratic Republic of Congo, has an equity stake in the Africa Finance Corporation, which leads the development of the Lobito Corridor.

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Europe finally moves to ban Russian gas but potential loopholes remain

Aura Sabadus — Sat, 01 Nov 2025 00:30:25 +0000

In late October, the European Union moved to impose a full ban on Russian gas imports by 2028. After years of using energy exports as a political tool to blackmail Europe and fund the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow may finally be facing the loss of its last European costumers.

The decision to impose a complete ban on Russian gas is the latest stage in ongoing efforts to exclude the Kremlin from European energy markets. Since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow has lost nearly 80 percent of its European market share after curtailing supplies to undermine Western support for Ukraine. Even so, Russia has earned no less than €215 billion during the wartime period through the reduced but ongoing sale of gas to some EU clients.

EU policymakers now say European consumers can no longer bankroll Russia’s war budget. The move is timely because Europe could soon benefit from an abundance of liquefied natural gas (LNG) as the United States and Qatar are set to double their production in the upcoming years. However, there are still many challenges and possible loopholes that could stymie the process.

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A number of legislative complexities will need to be addressed during negotiations to determine the final version of the ban, with talks expected to continue into next year. The European Commission published the first draft of the phaseout roadmap for imports of Russian pipeline and liquefied natural gas during summer 2025. The document stipulated that short-term contracts of less than a year would be discontinued in 2026, while longer-term contracts would be terminated by January 2028.

The draft proposal raised some eyebrows, particularly due to the introduction of an article suggesting that the ban could be temporarily lifted in case of market emergencies. Contrary to expectations, the clause was not pushed through by Hungary and Slovakia, the EU’s most Kremlin-friendly Russian gas buyers. Instead, it was introduced under pressure from Spain, where several companies still hold long-term LNG import contracts with Russian producers.

The text has been reviewed by both the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, with the former pushing for even more ambitious terms. For example, MEPs would like to see all imports terminated by 2027, a year earlier than initially stated by the European Commission. They also insist on closing loopholes by targeting circumvention risks.

The draft version adopted by the Council of Ministers aligns to a large degree with the version circulated by the European Commission and continues to include an emergency brake. The final text will have to be negotiated as part of talks involving the European Parliament, Council of Ministers, and European Commission.

To further complicate matters, the EU recently adopted its nineteenth Russian sanctions package, which includes a ban on Russian LNG imports from 2027, a year earlier than the deadline proposed by the EU’s own phaseout roadmap. This fast-tracked LNG ban was likely introduced in response to pressure from US President Donald Trump, who has singled out Europe for continuing to buy Russian fossil fuels.

While this sanctions-mandated ban may lead to an earlier block on Russian LNG exports, many observers fear that it is insufficiently robust and could be overturned, since EU sanctions are up for review every six months and require unanimous backing in order to be extended. This means the fast-tracked LNG ban could be vulnerable to opposition from any individual EU member.

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While the legislative path toward a full EU ban on Russian gas imports remains long and complex, enforcement may prove even more difficult. The ban enjoys strong political backing across Europe, but there are widespread concerns that the Kremlin will try to identify potential loopholes to evade the ban.

Russian gas is currently exported to Europe via the Black Sea and Turkey, using a dedicated pipeline transporting the gas to the Balkans and Hungary. The EU has included this entry point in legislation and notes that flows must stop from 2028, but Russian gas arriving in Turkey via an interconnection point nearby could be relabelled and sold under a different name. The risk of relabelling Russian gas also extends to the entire bloc because there are still a number of companies with large import portfolios which hold long-term LNG contracts with Russian producers.

Regulations related to the enforcement of the EU ban, including penalties for potential breaches, will need to be reviewed and tightened up. Existing EU proposals may not be sufficient, while it is still unclear how violations will be penalised. This must be addressed in order to deter non-compliance.

EU officials are well aware that Moscow will fight efforts to exclude it from lucrative European markets. Deprived of fossil fuel revenue and with its economy facing mounting difficulties, the Kremlin will seek any opportunity to continue selling oil and gas to Europe. Allowing loopholes to remain could create large grey areas in European energy markets that would fuel Russia’s war in Ukraine and allow the Kremlin to retain leverage over Europe.

Dr. Aura Sabadus is a senior energy journalist who writes about Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine for Independent Commodity Intelligence Services (ICIS), a London-based global energy and petrochemicals news and market data provider. Her views are her own.

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The mobilization issue has been exacerbated by President Zelenskyy’s reluctance to lower the age for compulsory military service from twenty-five to eighteen. This has led to criticism from Ukraine’s Western partners, who have argued that it is unrealistic to wage a major war while exempting so many young Ukrainians from mobilization. Rather than take the politically dangerous decision to reduce the conscription age, Zelenskyy has backed an incentive scheme to attract volunteers in the eighteen to twenty-five age bracket. However, the initiative has so far failed to fill the gaps in Ukraine’s decimated front line units.

The recent decision to lift international travel restrictions on young Ukrainian men aged eighteen to twenty-two has further complicated Ukraine’s manpower problems. Around 100,000 Ukrainian males have left the country since restrictions were eased around two months ago, Britain’s Daily Telegraph reports. This exodus deprives the country of potential future army recruits and has created a range of more immediate personnel issues that are already reverberating throughout the Ukrainian economy. While some of these men may plan on returning to Ukraine, experience since 2022 suggests that many will seek to settle elsewhere in the European Union.

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Moscow is also facing difficulties replenishing its invasion force amid catastrophic losses in Ukraine that dwarf the death toll from every other Kremlin war since 1945. Putin initially sought to address this problem by launching a partial mobilization in September 2022, but the move proved hugely unpopular and led to around one million young Russians fleeing the country. Instead, the Kremlin has introduced a system a lavish financial incentives including huge enlistment bounties and generous monthly salaries in order to attract volunteers willing to join the invasion of Ukraine. While it has proved necessary to repeatedly increase the sums on offer, this approach has made it possible to secure around thirty thousand new recruits per month.

Based on the current trajectory of the war, Russia’s manpower advantage over Ukraine will only grow wider during the coming year. This is already making itself on the battlefield, with Russian forces exploiting gaps in Ukraine’s defenses along the more than one thousand kilometers of front line and edging forward at multiple points. While Putin’s troops have so far been unable to achieve any major breakthroughs, Russia’s territorial gains are slowly but surely adding up.

The most intensive fighting is currently taking place in the Donetsk region as Russia seeks to complete the capture of Pokrovsk. If Putin’s commanders succeed in taking the city, it will be seen by many as vindication of the Kremlin strategy to grind out victory by relying on the sheer size of the Russian army. Putin has long believed that he can win the war by outlasting the West and overwhelming Ukraine. He will view Kyiv’s increasingly evident infantry shortage as a strong indication that time is on his side.

For Zelenskyy, there are no easy options. Lowering the mobilization age would generate a new wave of recruits but could also pose a significant threat to Ukrainian national morale. Reforming the terms of military service to provide greater rotation guarantees while also adopting a more meritocratic approach to the appointment of army commanders may help restore flagging public confidence and attract more volunteers, but this would take time that Ukraine quite frankly no longer possesses.

For now, the battle-hardened but exhausted and outnumbered Ukrainian army has little choice but to remain in a defensive posture. Ukraine’s commanders must be prepared to cede ground when necessary in order to preserve precious fighting strength, while looking for opportunities to maximize enemy casualties. The goal should be to withstand the Russian onslaught until a combination of punishing front line losses, escalating long-range strikes inside Russia, and deepening economic woes finally forces Putin to the negotiating table.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen echoed Nausėda’s comments and expressed solidarity with Lithuania, calling the Belarusian balloons a “hybrid threat” that Europe will not tolerate. She linked the issue to the European Union’s broader push for enhanced military readiness, particularly in terms of airspace defense capabilities against the growing threat posed by Russian drones and aircraft.

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Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has dismissed European concerns and attacked the Lithuanian decision to close the border as a “crazy scam,” while also accusing the West of waging a hybrid war against Belarus and Russia. His denials lack credibility, however, given the recent spate of airspace violations across Europe and along the EU’s eastern frontier with Russia and Belarus.

Around twenty Russian drones penetrated Polish airspace in early September, leading to an unprecedented armed response from NATO jets. Some of the Russian drones entered Poland via Belarus, highlighting Minsk’s role in Moscow’s campaign of hybrid aggression. Days later, a small group of Russian fighters violated NATO airspace off the coast of Estonia.

There have also been numerous incidents over the past two months involving suspected Russian drones close to strategic sites throughout Europe including military bases and international airports. Speaking in September, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen claimed the drone incursions were part of a Russian hybrid war and said Europe was facing its “most difficult and dangerous situation” since the end of World War II.

European airspace violations serve a number of purposes for Putin and his Belarusian proxy. In practical terms, they allow the Kremlin to probe NATO defenses and test the alliance’s readiness to combat incursions. Russian drones and Belarusian balloons also inconvenience the European public and intimidate European leaders at a time when the continent is already increasingly alarmed by US President Donald Trump’s mixed messaging over America’s commitment to European security.

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In response to Lithuania’s border closure, Lukashenka has warned that he may now stop cooperating with Brussels on migration issues. Given his regime’s well-documented prior weaponization of migrants on the Belarusian border with the European Union, this is a very thinly-veiled threat.

At the same time, the Belarusian ruler is also attempting to engage in renewed outreach to the West, with a particular emphasis on the US. Lukashenka has held a number of meetings with United States officials in recent months, leading to the release of political prisoners held by Belarus and an easing of American sanctions against Belarusian national airline Belavia.

This apparent thaw has been hailed in Washington as a sign of progress, but not everyone is convinced. Human rights groups have identified 77 new political prisoners in Belarus during September 2025, more than the total number of detainees freed in US-brokered releases since the start of the year. In other words, it would appear that Lukashenka is seeking sanctions relief without committing to end repressive policies at home and while continuing to serve Moscow’s strategic interests.

The Trump administration has signaled its dissatisfaction over recent Belarusian balloon violations of Lithuanian airspace. “I made clear we stand in solidarity with Lithuania amidst recent balloon incursions. Belarus should prevent further such incidents,” commented US Special Envoy John Coale, who has been directly involved in this year’s talks with the Lukashenka regime.

Growing tensions on the Lithuanian border with Belarus should serve as further confirmation that Lukashenka remains fully committed to participating in Russia’s confrontation with the West. Belarusian balloon violations of EU airspace are part of a Kremlin-led campaign to test Western resolve, strain NATO solidarity, and intimidate Europe. As long as Lukashenka continues to play a supporting role in Putin’s hybrid war against the West, he should be regarded as an adversary.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The UN investigation identified numerous instances on Russian attacks on first responders, including the bombing of ambulances and fire brigade crews attempting to provide emergency aid following earlier strikes. With sudden death from above now an everyday fact of life for the local population, residents of southern Ukraine say they feel hunted and refer to the relentless Russian drone attacks as a “human safari.”

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The drones deployed by the Russian military in this bombing campaign feature video cameras allowing operators to carefully select and track victims, confirming the deliberate and calculated nature of the killings. “All the types of short-range drones used in these attacks are equipped with live streaming cameras that focus on particular targets, leaving no doubt about the knowledge and intent of the perpetrators,” the UN report confirmed.

Russian intent it further underlined by the widespread practice of posting ghoulish video footage online celebrating drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians. These posts are often accompanied by menacing language and warnings for remaining Ukrainian residents to flee the area. “Russian military units often release videos of drone-eye views of civilians being killed, to be posted online by the units or groups affiliated with the Russian army, apparently as a means of amplifying the threat,” reports the New York Times.

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This new UN report underscores the industrial scale and systematic nature of Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Moscow’s efforts to displace the civilian population in the Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv provinces are only one part of a broader Kremlin campaign to render much of Ukraine unlivable. This depopulation strategy is designed to fuel anti-government sentiment within Ukrainian society and increase the pressure on the Kyiv authorities to capitulate, while also generating fresh waves of Ukrainian refugees and setting the stage for further Russian advances.

In addition to the human safari tactics employed in regions of southern Ukraine located close to the front lines, Russia is engaged in a nationwide bombing campaign of civilian infrastructure that aims to deny Ukrainians access to basic amenities such as heating, electricity, and running water. These attacks are part of a long-running airstrike offensive that escalates each year on the eve of the winter season as Russia seeks to weaponize subzero temperatures and freeze the Ukrainian population into submission.

Since the beginning of the current year, Moscow has also increased the terror bombing of residential districts and other civilian targets such as hospitals and kindergartens in cities across Ukraine. This is fueling a climate of fear and has resulted in a series of mass casualty attacks including a ballistic missile strike targeting Palm Sunday churchgoers in Sumy and the bombing of a park and children’s playground in Kryvyi Rih. Ukrainian civilian casualties surged by 31 percent year-on-year during the first nine months of 2025 due to this intensification of Russian drone and missile strikes.

In a separate probe conducted earlier this year, UN human rights investigators determined that Russia is also guilty of committing crimes against humanity targeting the civilian population in occupied regions of Ukraine. A report released in March 2025 found that Moscow’s large-scale program of illegal detentions and mass deportations throughout areas of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control was “perpetrated pursuant to a coordinated state policy and amounts to crimes against humanity.”

These United Nations findings make a complete mockery of Russia’s attempts to deny targeting Ukrainian civilians. While Kremlin officials frequently assert that the Russian army never deliberately conducts strikes on non-military objects and respects the human rights of noncombatants, overwhelming evidence identified by United Nations investigators demonstrates that Russia is in fact engaged in systematic and centrally coordinated efforts to attack Ukraine’s civilian population.

Russia’s use of drones to conduct a “human safari” in southern Ukraine marks a grim new milestone in the long history of Kremlin war crimes against civilians. UN investigators have now recognized this lethal drone campaign as a crime against humanity. Putin’s decision to target the Ukrainian civilian population in this coordinated manner is a reminder that the current Russian invasion is not only an attempt to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation; it is also an attack on the fundamental principles of international law.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Oleksandr Tolokonnikov — Thu, 23 Oct 2025 20:57:59 +0000

On October 20, pensioner Larisa Vakulyuk was killed by a Russian drone while tending to her goats in the Ukrainian city of Kherson. The murder of the 84 year old Ukrainian grandmother was a deliberate act carried out by a Russian drone operator using a video camera to hunt his victim. There can be no realistic doubt that he knew exactly what he was doing. One week earlier, Russian drones attacked a United Nations convoy traveling in the nearby area, damaging two clearly marked lorries carrying humanitarian aid. “This is a reminder of the incredible dangers Ukrainians face every day to feed themselves,” commented UN World Food Program Country Director for Ukraine Richard Ragan.

These two incidents are part of a comprehensive Russian bombing campaign targeting the civilian population in the Kherson region of southern Ukraine. Kherson lies on the right bank of the Dnipro River, directly across the river from territory currently under Russian occupation, placing it well within range of Russian drone operators. Since summer 2024, Russia has been conducting an unprecedented drone offensive designed to terrorize local residents and render the entire region unlivable. The indiscriminate nature of these attacks and the scale of the killings have led some to label the campaign a human safari.

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Anyone approaching Kherson is immediately made aware of the threat from above. The entrance to the city is marked by signs reading “Warning! Danger! Enemy Drones.” Meanwhile, major roads leading into the heart of Kherson and the Dnipro River are covered in improvised netting in a bid to offer some basic protection against the ever-present threat of Russian drones.

For local residents, Russia’s human safari has made sudden death from above an everyday fact of life. During the first nine months of 2025, more than a hundred people were killed and over one thousand were wounded in drone attacks. Those who remain say they feel hunted whenever they dare to leave their homes and venture out into the open air. A United Nations report released in May 2025 concluded that the Russian drone attacks were part of a systematic, coordinated state policy and constituted a crime against humanity.

The Russian side does not appear to have any serious reservations about the routine targeting of Ukrainian civilians in this manner. On the contrary, video footage of drone attacks on the Kherson population are posted online on an almost daily basis and are typically met with overwhelming approval. Nowhere is deemed off-limits by Russian drone teams. Targets have included private homes and residential buildings, cars, buses, and pedestrians. On numerous occasions, ambulances have been targeted as they have attempted to provide emergency care for victims of earlier attacks.

The hardest hit communities are those located along the banks of the Dnipro River and therefore closest to the Russians. In these riverside districts, Russian drones are a more or less constant feature circling in the sky and waiting to attack anything that moves. This makes it extremely difficult to repair damaged infrastructure or deliver essential supplies such as food and medicine. Instead, life has ground to a halt.

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Combating the Russian drone menace is a relentless technological struggle as each side races to innovate and evade the latest countermeasures. In practical terms, it is often difficult for the Ukrainians to cope with the very large numbers of drones deployed by the Russians. The present interception rate in late October of around 80 percent may sound impressive, but this means that 20 percent of drones are still getting through.

Kherson’s current predicament should set alarm bells ringing across Europe and beyond. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is widely recognized as the world’s first drone war. Moscow’s human safari tactics in Kherson offer a chilling window into what this could mean when military drone technologies are unleashed against civilian populations.

Based on what is known about the Russian human safari campaign in the Kherson region, it should now be abundantly clear that drones can potentially paralyze the life of any modern city. They can be used to leave the population without access to electricity, water, and heating, while also disrupting core supply chains and even preventing people from setting foot outside.

Few countries are currently ready to address this threat. Indeed, the recent appearance of small numbers of Russian drones in Polish airspace and above strategic sites such as airports across Europe has highlighted how unprepared many NATO members are to face the rapidly evolving challenges of drone warfare.

These challenges are nowhere more immediately apparent than in Kherson, which has been living with the horrors of Russia’s human safari for more than a year. The fate of Kherson should serve as a warning to the wider world about the threat posed to civilians by military drone technologies. As countries seek to protest their populations, Ukraine’s unrivaled experience will prove priceless.

Oleksandr Tolokonnikov is Deputy Head of the Kherson Regional Military Administration.

US voices concern over Chinese support for Russia’s Ukraine invasion

Katherine Spencer — Thu, 23 Oct 2025 14:20:49 +0000

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has raised concerns over Chinese components in Russian military drones amid fresh allegations of Beijing’s mounting support for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Speaking in mid-October, Bessent announced that the US would soon release photo evidence supplied by the Ukrainian government indicating China’s growing involvement in the war.

China has claimed neutrality throughout Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and denies providing lethal weapons to either party in the conflict. However, evidence including publicly available trade data, satellite activity, and indications of drone development between Russian and Chinese companies tell a different story.

A Washington Post report published on October 13 claimed that China has dramatically increased shipments to Russia of critical parts required to build fiber-optic drones used extensively by Putin’s army on the battlefields of Ukraine. In particular, the quantity of exported fiber-optic cables and lithium-ion batteries has skyrocketed in recent months. In August 2025, China exported a record 328,000 miles of fiber optic cable to Russia. In the same month, China supplied the Russians with approximately $47 million of lithium-ion batteries.

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Both Russia and Ukraine have been heavily reliant on Chinese drone components throughout the past three and a half years of full-scale war. However, export volumes to Russia now dwarf deliveries of key component categories to Ukraine. Many Ukrainians have come to view their dependence on Chinese suppliers as a strategic liability. This vulnerability has been highlighted by restrictions imposed by China on drone component exports to Ukraine including motors, navigation cameras, and flight controllers.

Beijing’s support for the Russian war effort allegedly goes far beyond the provision of drone components. At the end of September, Reuters reported that Chinese experts were traveling to Russia to develop military drones at a state-owned weapons manufacturer currently under Western sanctions. The Russian arms maker in question was accused of producing a new drone, the Garpiya-3, in collaboration with Chinese experts.

Garpiya-3 strike drones are said to feature Chinese technologies and have an operational range extending hundreds of kilometers. Kyiv claims around five hundred of these drones are now being launched at targets inside Ukraine every month. China has denied the reports. If confirmed, this and other instances of collaboration between Russian arms producers and Chinese companies would represent a flagrant violation of Beijing’s stated neutrality.

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Chinese support for the Russian military has also extended to assisting Moscow with the provision of satellite imagery in order to help Russian forces identify potential Ukrainian targets. In October, a senior Ukrainian intelligence official stated that China was supplying satellite intelligence to Russia to facilitate missile strikes inside Ukraine.

Such accusations are not new. In 2023, the US Treasury Department sanctioned seven Chinese firms for providing high-resolution satellite imagery to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. In 2024, a Financial Times report citing senior US officials asserted that China was assisting in the development of Russia’s satellite and space-based capabilities, while also sharing current satellite imagery in support of the Russian war effort.

Claims of deepening military collaboration between China and Russia are complicating efforts by the Trump administration to broker a peace deal and end the largest European invasion since World War II. Despite multiple rounds of sanctions on Russian and Chinese companies, the US and EU do not appear to have made any progress toward reducing the stream of dual use Chinese components heading to Russia.

In recent months, US State Department officials have estimated that China is now providing “nearly 80 percent” of the sanctioned dual use items Russia requires to continue the war in Ukraine. The significance of this Chinese contribution cannot be overstated. Without a steady supply of cheap Chinese drone components, for example, it is unlikely that Russia would be able to maintain the bombardment of Ukrainian cities and the country’s civilian infrastructure at anything like the current intensity.

Bessent’s recent remarks are an encouraging sign that the US authorities recognize China’s integral role in enabling Russia’s invasion. However, further steps are needed. Cooperation between Beijing and Moscow in areas including the development of new military technologies and the sharing of satellite information for bombing raids cannot be ignored. This problematic collaboration will continue to undercut efforts to end the war in Ukraine until it is addressed.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

How will Trump’s new Russian oil sanctions shift the war?

Atlantic Council — Thu, 23 Oct 2025 02:11:02 +0000

JUST IN

“It was time,” President Donald Trump said on Wednesday as he announced that the United States was ratcheting up sanctions on Russia. The new measures—the first such action against Russia in Trump’s second term—target Russian energy giants Rosneft and Lukoil, as well as more than thirty subsidiaries. The sanctions come as US-led efforts to end Russia’s war in Ukraine have stalled, with a proposed meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Trump in Budapest now cancelled. How much of a punch do the new sanctions pack? How might Moscow respond? Atlantic Council experts answer below.

Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser Family distinguished fellow and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe
John E. Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
Kimberly Donovan: (@KDonovan_AC): Director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the GeoEconomics Center and former White House and Treasury official

Why now?

“This is the first time the Trump administration has imposed any new financial restrictions on Russia,” in this term, Dan tells us. This action came “after Putin stonewalled on a cease-fire and patronized Trump” during a call between the two leaders last week.
“Today’s move is a welcome warning shot to Putin to knock off the games and maximalism and get serious about ending the war,” says Dan.
And yet, John warns, “Putin still thinks that he can outlast any Western leader in pursuing his war of conquest.”

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What’s the impact?

Kim predicts a “direct and immediate impact on Russia’s oil profits,” both from legal sales and those via the Kremlin’s price cap-busting shadow fleet.
The primary sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil, Kim notes, were pursuant to Executive Order 14024, which she says is significant because it “carries the threat of secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that continue to do business with the sanctioned companies.”
But these sanctions are “not a maximal blow,” says Dan. Tougher US actions, he adds, could include “joining Europe in lowering the price cap on Russian oil, enforcing the oil price cap by putting sanctions on the Russian shadow fleet of tankers,” and sanctioning ports that service them.
Nevertheless, Dan says the sanctions are “a strong move.” He explains that they could “put even more downward pressure on Russian oil revenues” by forcing Moscow to further discount its oil and “forcing purchasers to consider alternative sources of oil.”

What’s next?

Kim notes that the US Treasury Department also issued a general license on Wednesday that will “allow for a wind down of transactions with Rosneft and Lukoil, which expires on November 21.” This window, she says should give countries that purchase large amounts of Russian oil, such as China and India, “time to decide if they will stop importing Russian oil or face the threat of secondary sanctions by the United States.”
Going forward, says Kim, the United States should continue aligning sanctions policy with the United Kingdom and the European Union. (Though the latter has not yet sanctioned Lukoil.) Such alignment and “consistent enforcement,” she writes, “will ensure these actions achieve the desired result and get Putin to negotiate an end to this bloody war.”
To achieve his goal of ending the war, Trump should “prepare for a monthslong ratcheting up of pressure on Moscow,” says John. “At the moment, all Putin sees for sure is another round of sanctions. It must not be the last round.”
The United States, “also needs to do more on the military side,” John argues. Even if the Trump administration does not want to give Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine now, John asks: “Why repeat the Biden tactic of ruling out measures that make the Kremlin nervous?”
“Trump can only achieve a durable peace,” says John, “if he persuades Putin that the United States and its allies will arm Ukraine to the point that further Russian military gains are not possible.”

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Budapest summit postponed as Putin rejects Trump’s ceasefire proposal

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 21 Oct 2025 21:27:35 +0000

Just days after US President Donald Trump announced plans for a new peace summit with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, their proposed Budapest meeting has been thrown into doubt. Trump first shared news of the summit late last week following a lengthy and “very productive” telephone call with Putin. Speaking on Tuesday, however, White House officials said there were now “no plans” for the two leaders to meet in the “immediate future.”

This sudden change in tone came after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reportedly failed to make any meaningful progress during a preliminary call ahead of planned talks in Budapest. Lavrov later confirmed that Putin had dismissed Trump’s ceasefire proposal and remained fully committed to achieving the maximalist goals of his invasion. “A ceasefire now would mean only one thing: A large part of Ukraine would remain under Nazi rule,” Russia’s top diplomat stated.

Lavrov’s latest comments serve as a timely reminder that Moscow’s objectives in Ukraine go far beyond limited territorial concessions and extend to regime change in Kyiv. His insistence on branding the Ukrainian government as “Nazis” is nothing new, of course, but it does underline Russia’s rejection of peaceful coexistence with an independent Ukraine, while also highlighting the scale of the current disconnect between Moscow and Washington. While Trump attempts to broker a geopolitical real estate deal, Putin is seeking to secure his place in history by extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and reviving the Russian Empire.

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It is not surprising that some within the Trump administration still struggle to grasp the true motives behind Russia’s attack on Ukraine. After all, the current invasion has been accompanied by an unprecedented deluge of disinformation designed to distract international attention from Putin’s imperial ambitions. Since 2022, the Kremlin has sought to pin the blame for the invasion on everything from NATO enlargement to phantom fascists. Moscow’s many excuses have undeniably succeeded in clouding perceptions of the war, but none of the justifications presented by the Kremlin can stand up to serious scrutiny.

Putin has repeatedly framed the war as a response to decades of NATO expansion that has brought the alliance ever closer to Russia’s borders. His own actions, however, have largely debunked this argument. When neighboring Finland responded to the invasion of Ukraine in spring 2022 by announcing plans to join NATO, Putin did nothing and said he had “no problem” with Helsinki’s decision. He has since gone even further and withdrawn most Russian troops from the frontier with Finland. Given the fact that Finnish accession virtually doubled Russia’s shared border with NATO, this nonchalance is revealing. Clearly, Putin knows very well that NATO poses no threat to Russia itself. His real problem is with Ukrainian independence not NATO expansion.

The Kremlin’s claims to be waging a crusade against Ukrainian Nazis are even more far-fetched. Russian attempts to equate Ukrainian national identity with Nazism date all the way back to World War II and have been enthusiastically revived by the Putin regime. This approach shamelessly exploits the Russian public’s reverence for the Soviet role in the defeat of Hitler, while conveniently ignoring the political realities in today’s Ukraine.

Ever since Ukraine regained independence in 1991, Far Right political parties have been relegated to the margins of the country’s fledgling democracy. During Ukraine’s last prewar parliamentary election in 2019, most nationalist parties formed a single coalition in a bid to overcome years of ballot box disappointment. They failed miserably, receiving just 2.16 percent of the vote.

Nothing has exposed the absurdity of Kremlin attempts to portray Ukrainians as Nazis more than the election of Jewish candidate Volodymyr Zelenskyy as the country’s president. Ever since Zelenskyy won the presidency by a landslide in 2019, Putin and other Kremlin officials have engaged in deeply unsavory mental gymnastics as they have struggled to explain how a supposedly Nazi nation could overwhelmingly vote for a Jewish leader. The most notorious example of this disgraceful trend came in spring 2022, when Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov declared during an Italian television interview that “Hitler also had Jewish blood.”

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Putin has typically been far franker about his war aims when speaking to domestic Russian audiences. For years, he has argued that Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”) who are occupying historically Russian lands and have no right to a separate nation of their own. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he began referring to Ukraine as an artificial “anti-Russia,” and took the highly unusual step of publishing a rambling 5000-word history essay that read like a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. Following the outbreak of hostilities, he began proclaiming the “return” of Russian lands and comparing his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great.

The criminal actions of the Russian army in Ukraine have been profoundly shaped by Putin’s bitter opposition to Ukrainian national identity. In areas under Kremlin control, anyone viewed as a Ukrainian patriot or deemed a potential threat to the occupation authorities is likely to disappear into a vast network of camps and prisons. A United Nations probe has ruled that these mass detentions represent a crime against humanity.

Huge numbers have also been deported. This includes tens of thousands of children, who are subjected to ideological indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian identity. Those who remain in occupied Ukraine are being forced to accept Russian citizenship amid a brutal campaign to systematically erase all traces of Ukrainian history, culture, language, and identity. This genocidal conduct makes a complete mockery of attempts to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a mere border dispute that can be settled via limited land swaps.

Putin’s Ukraine obsession is rooted in his experience as an eye witness to the collapse of the Soviet Empire while serving as a KGB officer in East Germany, and reflects his fears that the further consolidation of a democratic and European Ukraine could act as a catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s imperial retreat. Beginning with the 2004 Orange Revolution, his determination to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit has come to dominate Russian foreign policy and has slowly but steadily compromised Moscow’s relationship with the wider Western world. Putin has now bet everything on the reconquest of Ukraine and knows that his entire reign will be judged by the outcome of the current war.

If Trump wishes to end the bloodshed in Ukraine and secure his precious Nobel Peace Prize, he must first recognize that Putin is playing for the highest possible stakes on the stage of history and will never compromise unless forced to do so. Indeed, he dare not back down. At this point, anything less than the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation would be regarded in Moscow as a major defeat that would plunge the Kremlin into crisis.

Putin will doubtless continue to profess his desire for peace while engaging in stalling tactics and playing for time. He will string Trump along with yet more seductive phone calls and headline-grabbing summits that flatter the US leader’s ego, but he will almost certainly not enter into genuine peace negotiations until the alternative is defeat in Ukraine and disaster for Russia itself. The sooner Trump accepts this reality, the sooner we can move beyond the current phony peace process and begin the hard work of securing a sustainable settlement through the long overdue application of Western strength.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Vladimir Putin’s war machine may finally be running out of fuel

Vladyslav Davydov — Tue, 21 Oct 2025 20:46:18 +0000

As reports of cracks in Russia’s wartime economy continue to mount, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is now predicting that the Kremlin will face an unprecedented budget deficit of around $100 billion in 2026. The Ukrainian leader is far from alone in forecasting more economic pain in the pipeline for Russian dictator Vladimir Putin. US President Donald Trump has recent stated that the Russian economy is “going to collapse” unless Putin ends the invasion of Ukraine.

This is not the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion that Russia has faced major budgetary strains. In 2022, the Kremlin’s urgent need to cover rising military expenditures forced it to resort to improvised measures such as windfall taxes on the energy and banking sectors. A surge in commodity prices then helped cover Russia’s ballooning defense budget, while mobilization and additional recruitment in 2023 and 2024 were financed mainly through municipal and regional budgets, along with minor tax hikes.

For much of the past three and a half years, international attention has focused on Russia’s apparent success in overcoming the impact of sanctions, along with the Kremlin’s ability to maintain modest GDP growth while transitioning to wartime conditions. However, the economic strain of the ongoing invasion is now becoming increasingly hard to disguise.

Russia’s deepening economic difficulties have been exacerbated by a highly effective Ukrainian campaign of long-range air strikes targeting the oil and gas industry that fuels Putin’s war machine. Since August 2025, Ukraine has launched a large-scale air offensive against oil refineries, gas processing plants, fuel depots, pipelines, logistics hubs, and export terminals across the Russian Federation. This has contributed to a sharp drop in Russian energy export revenues and led to spikes in fuel prices for domestic consumers. In recent months, fuel shortages have been reported in regions throughout Russia, with car owners forced to queue for hours in search of limited supplies.

The current fuel crisis in Russia is unlikely to be resolved soon. In a recent assessment, the Paris-based International Energy Agency stated that the impact from Ukrainian drone strikes is expected to suppress refinery processing rates for Russia’s economically crucial oil industry until at least mid-2026. Ukrainian strikes are also continuing to gain pace, with Kyiv in the process of developing a new generation of domestically produced missiles that should enable a further escalation in the bombing campaign.

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To cover the growing gaps in the Russian budget and continue funding the war, the Kremlin plans to hike the country’s VAT rate from 20 to 22 percent. Tax increases are also expected to impact entrepreneurs, as the threshold for Russia’s simplified system with lower rates is set to be reduced fourfold. Critics have characterized this strategy as redirecting money away from ordinary Russian citizens and private businesses in order to finance the invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s deteriorating economic situation places the Kremlin in a difficult position. On the one hand, a combination of sustained Western support for Ukraine and funding issues in Moscow mean that the Russian military could soon face increasing difficulties on the battlefield. On the other hand, the longer the fighting drags on, the more Russia’s economy is likely to suffer. Meanwhile, further sanctions measures and Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s energy industry are creating new pressure points that risk fueling domestic discontent inside Russia.

With relatively little movement along the military front lines in Ukraine over the past two years, the economic front of the war may ultimately prove decisive. “Putin will only stop this war when he thinks he can’t win, and for him to come to that conclusion, there needs to be more pressure on the Russian economy and more help for the Ukrainians,” commented Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski in September. “The war will likely end the way World War I ended. One side or another will run out of resources to carry on.”

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The objective in Western capitals must now be to make sure Russia runs out of resources before Ukraine. This should not be beyond the realms of possibility, given the vastly superior resources of Ukraine’s allies.

Russia’s current goal is to reduce its dependence on oil and gas. The planned Russian budget for 2026 is based on a lower oil price and aims to rely more on domestic taxes instead. Over time, this approach could make Russian state finances more resilient by cutting the share of oil and gas revenues from the current level of around 40 percent to about half that figure. But if Western countries tighten sanctions at the right moment, this plan could backfire, triggering runaway inflation and a further slowdown in Russian economic activity.

There are currently encouraging signs of Western readiness to increasingly target Putin’s war economy. Trump’s efforts to impose tariffs on countries that buy Russian oil have already made some nervous about trading with Moscow. The EU and UK have also stepped up sanctions, including blacklisting more ships from Russia’s shadow fleet. These measures are having an impact. For example, China’s Qingdao Port recently introduced technical restrictions on tankers that will effectively ban shadow fleet vessels, a move that underscores growing caution toward doing business with the Kremlin.

Ukraine’s deep strikes have exposed Putin’s Achilles heel and have helped demonstrate that the Russian economy is far more fragile than many in Moscow would like us to believe. Kyiv’s Western partners should now exploit their economic leverage over Russia in order to increase the pressure on Putin and convince the Kremlin that continuing the war could lead to economic ruin.

Vladyslav Davydov is an advisor to Ukraine’s First Deputy Minister for Development of Communities and Territories.

Specifically, Trump’s engineering of a deal between Israel and Hamas was a tour de force achieved through military and diplomatic pressure. The US president utilized both brilliantly.

The military pressure came mainly from Israel but also from the United States. Israel’s full-bore assault on Gaza after the horrors of Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack immediately put Hamas on the defensive. But as often happens when Israel responds to a Palestinian attack with major force, this led to major international pressure on Israel to ease up. The Trump administration largely—but not entirely—worked to shield Israel from that pressure, which meant that Israel kept the heat on Hamas.

Israel further strengthened its position with its ingenious operations against the leadership and soldiers of Hezbollah, dealing a near-fatal blow to Iran’s principal instrument of influence in Lebanon. US and Israeli strikes against the Houthis also weakened Iran’s surrogate in Yemen. Finally, the Israeli and US strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities in June significantly set back its nuclear program. As a result of these operations, Israel and the United States greatly weakened Iran, Hamas’s major sponsor and principal source of arms.

But that was not Hamas’s only problem. Trump’s diplomacy applied additional pressure on the group. He leveraged the close relationships he has cultivated with Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt to push Hamas to accept his terms for peace, something they were more willing to do because Trump’s twenty-point peace proposal left open the prospect of an independent Palestinian state. Trump also applied diplomatic pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept the terms, despite the plan’s deep unpopularity with the far-right members of his coalition.

What’s needed in Europe

The Trump administration has devoted at least as much effort to achieving a durable peace in Ukraine as it has to ending the conflict in Gaza, but the results thus far have been inconclusive. The principal difference between the administration’s approach to the two wars is this: In the Middle East, the White House energetically followed its overarching principle of peace through strength. In Europe, the administration has applied this principle inconsistently.

By the end of April, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s deflection of numerous Trump cease-fire proposals—proposals that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accepted—made clear that the Kremlin was the obstacle to peace. From that point forward, the Trump administration began to talk about sending advanced weapons to Ukraine, which European countries would pay for, and about putting major tariffs and restrictive economic measures on Russia and its trading partners.

On three occasions, the White House appeared to be on the verge of ramping up pressure on Moscow. In May, Trump threatened to join European leaders in placing additional sanctions on Russia if it did not implement an immediate cease-fire. Later in the summer, Trump set a deadline for restrictive measures and advanced weapons supplies if Russia did not stop shooting by August 8. And this month, Trump spoke publicly about the possibility of providing Ukraine with Tomahawk cruise missiles—which have the ability to travel 1,500 miles and accurately deliver a heavy payload—to make clear to Putin that the Russian leader’s goal of conquering Ukraine is futile.

On the first two occasions, Trump let the moment pass without providing Ukraine major new weapons systems or putting in place heavy restrictive measures against the Russian economy (with the exception of pressing India to reduce Russian oil purchases). In his October 17 meeting with Zelenskyy, Trump made it clear that he was not ready to offer Ukraine Tomahawks, and he was counting on an upcoming meeting with Putin in Hungary to establish a cease-fire.

Notably, each of Trump’s decisions not to increase pressure on Russia followed a suggestion by Putin to restart negotiations on a peace agreement. Equally notable is what followed. In May, once the United States decided not to add new sanctions against Russia, Putin lost interest in meeting with Zelenskyy to talk peace. In August, when meeting with Trump in Alaska, Putin offered no flexibility—and no progress was made toward an actual end to the fighting.

This is no surprise because Putin does not want to end the war. He wants effective political control of Ukraine, which requires his military to take far more Ukrainian land.

So, what can the White House do? The United States, working with its partners in Europe and elsewhere, has the power to put substantial pressure on Russia’s faltering economy. The United States also has the weapons that would make it far more difficult for Russia to conquer more Ukrainian land or to prolong the war. Some advisers to Trump follow the lead of their Biden administration predecessors and say that since Russia is a nuclear-weapons power, the United States should not dare give Ukraine advanced weapons. They seem to believe that even Tomahawks, which are based on technology from the last century, would “escalate” the conflict. The fact is that Russia has escalated the conflict on numerous occasions, including when it chose to use ballistic missiles, which are far more dangerous than Tomahawks. This form of self-deterrence by the United States is not peace through strength. It only persuades Putin that he can have his way.

Trump seems to understand this. He told the press this past Friday that perhaps Putin is “playing him” for time, but that others had played him before and he still came out on top. He also mentioned at the Sharm el Sheikh summit—held to formalize the Hamas-Israel agreement—that there would have been no agreement had he not bombed Iran. This suggests that he may be biding his time before applying the screws to the Kremlin. It is not clear, however, why he sees a need to wait.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine. He also served as a US consul general in Jerusalem and in other roles at the US Embassy in Tel Aviv.

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Pınar Dost op-ed for Turkiye Today on Russia-Ukraine and Gaza conflicts

aozen — Mon, 20 Oct 2025 13:17:18 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

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Gray on Fox News ‘America Reports’ on the Gaza ceasefire deal

dfitzsimmons — Mon, 20 Oct 2025 13:00:00 +0000

Original Source

On October 20, Alexander B. Gray, nonresident senior fellow of the GeoStrategy Initiative of the Scowcroft Center, appeared on Fox News to discuss the terms and implications of the Gaza ceasefire deal.

Ultimately, President Trump is going to have to continue to exert pressure through Israel and other means to keep Hamas and all of them to their word.

Alexander B. Gray

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

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Putin seeks more foreign fighters amid mounting Russian losses in Ukraine

David Kirichenko — Thu, 16 Oct 2025 20:55:05 +0000

As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches the four-year mark, Moscow is facing increasing difficulties replenishing the ranks of its invading army. With fewer Russians now prepared to volunteer, the Kremlin is seeking to recruit more foreign fighters to serve in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s colonial war.

A number of recent media reports have highlighted the growing role of foreign nationals in the Russian military. In early October, an Indian citizen was captured by Ukrainian forces while fighting for Russia. The 22 year old claimed to have been arrested in Russia while studying and pressured into signing a contract with the Russian army in order to secure his release from prison. After just two weeks of basic training, he was sent to the front lines of the war in Ukraine.

Also in early October, the Los Angeles Times reported that Russia may have recruited tens of thousands of foreign fighters via social media, with many coming from disadvantaged countries across the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia. The article detailed how many of these recruits are allegedly enticed with offers of generous benefits including large salaries and Russian citizenship in exchange for military service in non-combat roles. In practice, however, most are soon sent straight into battle.

Meanwhile, a group of more than twenty Kenyan men were rescued from a suspected human trafficking ring in September following a raid on a residential complex in Nairobi. The men had reportedly been promised jobs in Russia but were set to be sent to fight in Ukraine. The multi-agency operation highlighted growing concerns that Moscow is stepping up efforts to lure African men to Russia and forcing them to join the Russian army.

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The single largest contingent of foreigners currently fighting for Russia may be Cubans. An October 2 cable from the US State Department sent to dozens of US diplomatic missions claimed that up to 5000 Cuban nationals are currently serving in the ranks of Putin’s army. Ukrainian officials say the total number could actually be far higher and estimate that as many as 20,000 Cubans may have been recruited by Russia.

While Russian officials have typically been tight-lipped about the presence of foreigners in the country’s military, some have recently acknowledged the growing presence of Cuban troops. Andrey Kartapolov, who heads the Russian Parliament’s Defense Committee, defended the practice of recruiting Cubans and indicated that many more may soon be joining the invasion of Ukraine. “If young people from Cuba want to help our country, there is nothing strange about that,” he commented.

This increasing openness has also been evident in relation to the participation North Korean soldiers in Russia’s war. When reports first emerged of North Korean troops being deployed to Russia in late 2024, the Kremlin responded with a series of denials. Months later, Putin himself officially confirmed the presence of a North Korean contingent. “We will always honor the Korean heroes who gave their lives for Russia, for our common freedom, on an equal basis with their Russian brothers in arms,” he commented in April 2025.

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It is easy to understand why Moscow is so interested in enlisting foreigners to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to Britain’s Ministry of Defense, more than one million Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded since the start of the full-scale invasion, making the current war by far the costliest undertaken by the Kremlin since World War II.

The human wave tactics favored by Russian commanders require a steady supply of fresh troops, but Moscow is reluctant to conscript large numbers of Russian civilians into the army. A partial mobilization in September 2022 sparked a major backlash, with hundreds of thousands of Russians fleeing the country to avoid wartime service. Instead, the Kremlin has focused on sourcing manpower from Russia’s prison population and attracting volunteers by offering increasingly large financial incentives. CNN reports that numerous Russian regions have dramatically increased the amounts they offer to new recruits in recent months amid a decline in volunteers.

There are growing indications that the current approach may no longer be enough to compensate for Russia’s heavy losses on the front lines in Ukraine. The number of new recruits receiving signing-on bonuses during the second quarter of 2025 was the lowest in two years, according to research by independent Russian investigative outlet iStories based on Russian federal budget data. The outlet’s findings indicated that around 38,000 people volunteered for military service between April and June 2025, two and a half times lower than the figure for the same period one year earlier.

The Kremlin’s appetite for foreign fighters is not merely an attempt to make up the numbers. Crucially, Moscow also regards the recruitment of non-Russian troops as significantly cheaper and less politically risky. Since 2022, the Kremlin has established an extensive system of compensation payments for Russian soldiers killed or wounded in Ukraine. None of this applies to foreigners. Likewise, every Russian military death on the Ukrainian front lines risks fueling anti-war sentiment at home, while casualties from faraway lands have virtually no impact on Russian public sentiment.

These factors have encouraged Putin and other Kremlin leaders to view foreign fighters as an expendable alternative to dwindling numbers of Russian recruits. “If a foreigner dies, there are no social payouts and no responsibility. There are no relatives inside Russia who are unhappy with the war, and of course there are fewer dead Russians,” Ukrainian Military Intelligence spokesman Andriy Yusov told US Congress officials in September.

Moscow’s efforts to secure more foreign troops are an indication of the mounting manpower challenges confronting the Kremlin. Russia is still a very long way from running out of soldiers, but Putin has no more easy options as he seeks to replenish his decimated invasion force and continue the war into a fifth year. With declining numbers of Russians prepared to risk their lives in exchange for financial incentives, Putin may have to choose between a deeply unpopular mobilization or a further expansion of Russia’s international recruitment campaign. Neither option is likely to produce the kind of skilled and motivated fighting force capable of defeating Ukraine.

The presence of assorted Cubans, North Koreans, Indians, Africans, and other foreign troops within Putin’s military directly undermines widespread but misleading notions of Russia’s limitless resources. In reality, the Russian army in Ukraine is increasingly overstretched and may be far more vulnerable than Moscow would like us to believe. This should motivate Kyiv’s partners to expand their support for the Ukrainian war effort. Putin currently has no interest in ending his invasion, but the prospect of military defeat could force him to accept the necessity of a negotiated peace deal.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

The so-called social contract between Putin and the Russian population had already begun to unravel long before the present wave of Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s energy industry. Over the past three and a half years, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resulted in military losses unseen in Europe since World War II. At least one million Russians have been killed or wounded in the conflict, according to Britain’s Ministry of Defense and other international sources.

In parallel, economic growth in all but the defense sector has stagnated, with massive payments to military personnel deepening public dependency on the war. Throughout Russian society, policies of repression have reached unprecedented new levels as Putin has exploited wartime conditions to complete the country’s transition from flawed democracy to authoritarian dictatorship. Despite this deteriorating domestic situation, there is still no sign of any significant anti-war movement in today’s Russia.

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It is probably unrealistic to expect any Russian revolt over Putin’s breach of the social contract. This should not come as a surprise. While opinion polls have often indicated strong public support for the Putin regime, the Kremlin has always relied primarily on coercion rather than consensus. Throughout Putin’s reign, opposition figures have been exiled, imprisoned, or silenced, while the independent media has been muzzled and civil society suppressed. Following the onset of the full-scale invasion, these trends have all intensified. As a result, there is currently little prospect of any grassroots protests.

Opposition from within Russia’s elite looks equally unlikely. With the Russian economy increasingly on a war footing, the full-scale invasion is now a crucial factor determining the wealth and status of the country’s political and business establishment. With most members of the elite personally dependent on Putin and largely locked out of the Western world, the conditions for a Kremlin coup appear to be almost entirely absent. Instead, the invasion of Ukraine has allowed Putin to consolidate his grip on power and has forced those around him to draw closer to the throne.

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This does not mean that Ukraine’s current strategy of long-range strikes against the Russian energy sector is futile. Far from it, in fact. But with Putin firmly entrenched on the home front, only external pressures can realistically force him to abandon his invasion. Ukrainian attacks on Putin’s oil and gas industry are already having a significant impact on the Russian economy. If the current momentum can be maintained into 2026, the economic damage could become far more severe. This will curtail Moscow’s ability to finance and prosecute the war in Ukraine, while also negatively impacting many other aspects of Russian daily life.

Ukrainian efforts to push Putin to the negotiating table can only succeed with stronger Western support. Despite Russia’s claims of resilience, its economy remains heavily dependent on energy exports, with China and India the main clients. Effective Western action should include tightening sanctions on these buyers. Efforts must also continue to end all European purchases of Russian energy exports, either directly or via third parties. Additionally, Western leaders could help end the war by working to bring down global oil prices, thereby starving the Kremlin of much-needed export revenues.

Economic measures alone will not be enough. Military aid to Ukraine should also increase, with an emphasis on the provision of weapons systems capable of strengthening Ukraine’s domestic defenses while allowing Kyiv to expand attacks inside Russia. The objective should be to stabilize the front lines in Ukraine and protect Ukrainian cities from bombardment, while escalating the destruction of Russia’s war economy through a combination of air strikes and sanctions. If these goals can be achieved, Putin may finally be compelled to seek a settlement.

Christopher Isajiw is an international relations commentator and business development consultant to private, governmental, and non-governmental organizations.

Off the coast of the Philippines, China uses its coast guard forces, naval vessels, maritime militias, and other low-intensity methods to assert physical control and create “irreversible facts” in the South China Sea. These gray-zone operations enable Beijing to assert dominance in disputed maritime areas and secure strategic and economic interests while minimizing the international backlash that more direct military aggression could provoke.

China employs distinct tactics toward Taiwan—slow, persistent maritime incursions in the South China Sea challenge Philippine sovereignty and establish control, while high-speed aerial harassment in Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) delivers more aggressive messages. In its gray-zone operations aimed at Taiwan Beijing’s aims are to gradually erode Taiwan’s defense capabilities and political resolve to facilitate potential reunification.

Despite the differences, the Philippines’ responses to Chinese assertiveness offers lessons and policy recommendations that Taiwan can adopt to strengthen its resilience, sharpen deterrence, and counter China’s coercive tactics effectively. This new study by Chung-Yu Chou, a lieutenant colonel in the Taiwanese army, aims to derive practical insights from Manila’s experience that can inform Taiwan’s own strategic responses to ongoing Chinese pressure. Chou is a military instructor at the Taiwanese Army Command and Staff College and a visiting military fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

The study’s results make clear that there is much Taiwan can do to create escalatory limits on Chinese action without triggering open conflict. High-profile joint drills, for instance, can be politically sensitive and provoke Beijing. Military training exchanges in which military officers and noncommissioned officers from unofficial partner nations including the United States, Japan, European countries, and others participate in professional military education and related training courses in Taiwan are lower profile but no less effective.

Deepening unofficial partnerships through arms purchases, strengthening intelligence sharing, and reducing economic dependence on China can also boost Taiwan’s military readiness—and its international support. Ultimately, sustained engagement in these areas is essential for Taiwan to mitigate China’s gray-zone coercion effectively.

View the full report

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The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.

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How the US and Europe can deter and respond to Russia’s chemical, biological, and nuclear threats

Philippe Dickinson, Ryan Arick, Natasha Lander Finch — Wed, 15 Oct 2025 19:19:48 +0000

Introduction
Key findings summary
Methodology
Part I: Russian intent
Part II: Deterrence
Part III: Response
Recommendations and key findings
Conclusion

Key findings

Russia will likely continue using chemical weapons in Europe in a range of scenarios over the next five to ten years, particularly if doing so undermines Alliance unity and disrupts Ukraine’s integration into the West. Based on its recent behavior, however, Russia appears less likely to use biological weapons. Furthermore, while Russia has threatened nuclear use, a large-scale nuclear attack appears unlikely.
To credibly deter Russia from nuclear escalation, the United States and its European allies and partners must ensure that Russia understands that using—or threatening to use—chemical and biological weapons would both fail to achieve its intended outcome and incur intolerable costs.
Since the end of the Cold War, CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) defense has been deprioritized among NATO allies, including the United States. Amid calls for increased defense spending, CBRN defense capability development is an area primed for greater investment.
The United States should leverage NATO to facilitate greater coordination between civilian and military entities to enhance whole-of-society resilience to CBRN threats.
Information and intelligence sharing is critical to achieving a common threat perception among NATO allies and partners. Expanded information sharing and effective strategic communications can deter Russian use of chemical or biological weapons and ensure a coordinated response if deterrence fails.
The United States and its European allies and partners should take steps to raise the public IQ related to CBRN threats, particularly as it pertains to chemical and biological threats.
The governance of emerging and applied technologies is difficult within the bounds of existing treaty regimes. Sanctions and export controls can complement treaty organizations to monitor and contain potential CBRN threats from such technologies, including dual-use systems and components.

Download PDF

Introduction

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the Atlantic Council project, Sustaining Allied Responses to the Threat of Russian Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Escalation. The objective of the project was to analyze the prospects for Russian use of chemical or biological weapons specifically in Europe over the next five to ten years; identify how the United States and its European allies and partners could deter and prevent Russian use of these weapons in Europe; and, should deterrence fail, assess response options.

Background

Russia has a well-established and clearly demonstrated strategic objective of undermining stability in the Euro-Atlantic region to reverse its loss of status following the end of the Cold War.¹ This strategy is characterized by hostility toward the United States and its allies and partners in Europe.²

Over recent years, Russia has demonstrated its intent to provoke instability in Europe by acting with malign aggression that is both overt and hybrid in nature. The starkest example of Russia’s revanchist aggression is its full-scale illegal invasion of Ukraine, launched in 2022. Russia has also been conducting hybrid attacks—hostile activities using tools of statecraft below the threshold of conventional warfare to shift the balance of power in its favor—against the United States and its allies in Europe.³

A willingness to use chemical weapons has long been a feature of Russian aggression, both on the battlefield in Ukraine (specifically chloropicrin), and on the streets of Europe.⁴ As a result, Russia was described as “the most acute nuclear, biological, and chemical threat in the near-term” in the United States’ 2023 Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction.⁵ This parallels the same terminology used in the 2022 National Defense Strategy and 2022 National Security Strategy.⁶ Undermining the cohesion of the United States and its NATO allies is a core goal of Russia’s political and military strategy. The Kremlin has shown that it is willing to use, or threaten to use, whatever capabilities it possesses, including CBRN weapons, to achieve this goal.

Research question

Our primary research question was, “What are the prospects for Russian use of chemical or biological weapons in Europe over the next five to ten years, and how can the United States and its European allies and partners counter such threats?” To address this question, the project team examined the following:

In what scenarios might Russia use its arsenal of chemical and biological capabilities to achieve its geopolitical goals in the five-to-ten-year time frame? What developments in European security more broadly over the same period would increase or decrease the risk of Russian use of chemical or biological weapons?
How might the United States and its European allies and partners enhance their overall defense and deterrence posture to reduce the risk of potential chemical or biological weapons use in the next five to ten years?
How can the United States work with European allies and partners to coordinate and standardize comprehensive responses to the potential deployment of Russian chemical and biological weapons?
To what extent could Russian use of chemical or biological weapons in Europe escalate further to the use of nuclear weapons, and how can the United States work with its European allies and partners to reduce the risk of escalation?

Key findings summary

Our project illuminated several findings for US and European decision-makers:

Russia will likely continue using chemical weapons in Europe in a range of scenarios over the next five to ten years, particularly if doing so undermines Alliance unity and disrupts Ukraine’s integration into the West. Based on its recent behavior, however, Russia appears less likely to use biological weapons. Furthermore, while Russia has threatened nuclear use, a large-scale nuclear attack appears unlikely.
To credibly deter Russia from nuclear escalation, the United States and its European allies and partners must ensure that Russia understands that using—or threatening to use—chemical and biological weapons would both fail to achieve its intended outcome and incur intolerable costs.
Since the end of the Cold War, CBRN defense has been deprioritized among NATO allies, including the United States. Amid calls for increased defense spending, CBRN defense capability development is an area primed for greater investment.
The United States should leverage NATO to facilitate greater coordination between civilian and military entities to enhance whole-of-society resilience to CBRN threats.
Information and intelligence sharing is critical to achieving a common threat perception among NATO allies and partners. Expanded information sharing and effective strategic communications can deter Russian use of chemical or biological weapons and ensure a coordinated response if deterrence fails.
The United States and its European allies and partners should take steps to raise the public IQ related to CBRN threats, particularly as it pertains to chemical and biological threats.
The governance of emerging and applied technologies is difficult within the bounds of existing treaty regimes. Sanctions and export controls can complement treaty organizations to monitor and contain potential CBRN threats from such technologies, including dual-use systems and components.

Ground crew in protective gear decontaminate an aircraft as part of NATO’s efforts to prepare first responders to address CBRN incidents, September 15, 2013. NATO

Methodology

The project team adopted two principal research methods for this project: a series of scenario-based workshops and interviews with subject matter experts and officials from the United States, Europe, and NATO. The team also conducted secondary research to develop the workshop methodology and to corroborate information and insights gleaned during the workshops and interviews.

Scenario-based workshops

In January 2025, the project team convened experts and officials to take part in two scenario-based exercises. The first group, which was convened virtually, consisted of subject matter experts and researchers from the United States and Europe, while the second group (convened in hybrid format) consisted of officials from the United States, NATO, and European governments. See Appendixes B and C for more information about the participants and the methodology, respectively.

The project team created a plausible exploratory scenario in which tensions between Russia and the United States and its European allies and partners (primarily Ukraine) had grown over a five-year time frame. The scenario provided a framework for participants to consider the key questions of Russian strategic intent, and implications for allied deterrence and responses to Russian aggression.

The workshops presented two scenarios in the year 2030: one in which Russia carried out a chemical attack against NATO allies based in Ukraine, and one in which Russia carried out targeted biological attacks against allied officials in Europe. These attacks concerned low-level use of chemical and biological agents, rather than major battlefield use of such weapons. Thus, the focus was on how Russia might use these capabilities to test escalatory dynamics, rather than to achieve major military objectives. The workshops divided participants into two groups; each group focused on either the chemical or biological scenario. The workshops primarily asked participants to analyze why Russia might consider the use of chemical or biological weapons strategically advantageous in these scenarios; propose how to deter Russia from further use of chemical and biological weapons; and recommend how the United States and Europe should respond to Russia’s use of such weapons. The two groups reconvened after the exercise to share key findings from their discussions.

Interviews with officials and experts

Informed by the insights from the workshops, the project team conducted interviews with US, European, and NATO officials and experts. The interviews provided direct perspectives on the potential for Russian CBRN escalation over the next five to ten years and how the alliance can deter and respond to possible Russian chemical and biological escalation. The interview stage also enabled the project team to explore the additional question of nuclear escalation following Russia’s potential use of chemical or biological weapons.

The following report presents our analysis of Russia’s intent to use CBRN weapons, possible deterrence considerations to be employed by the United States and its European allies and partners, and response options for the United States and Europe to respond should deterrence fail. The report concludes with our overall findings and recommendations.

Part I: Russian intent

Vladimir Putin described the breakup of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”⁷ NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept makes clear that Putin’s ambition to reverse the outcome of the Cold War is at the heart of Russia’s efforts to reestablish spheres of influence and direct control over its former Soviet empire, including NATO allies.⁸ Russia’s hostile actions seek to undermine the rules-based international order that defines the worldview of NATO and its members.⁹

At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin signaled clearly to the world that he believed undermining the international rules-based system was necessary to carry out his revanchist ambitions.¹⁰ Russia has since demonstrated repeatedly that it is willing to use violent and aggressive means to further this ambition. This includes conventional military aggression, as demonstrated by Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, 2014 annexation of Crimea, and 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.¹¹

Russia’s hybrid campaign of aggression

In addition to conventional military aggression, Russia’s campaign has included a well-documented and long-running “shadow war” of hybrid tactics against NATO and its allies.¹² This hybrid campaign has included critical infrastructure attacks, acts of violence, weaponized migration, election interference, and information campaigns, which have intensified in volume since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.¹³

The threat and the use of Russia’s CBRN capabilities has been a feature of Moscow’s hybrid campaign. In spite of the long-standing norms against using CBRN weapons, enshrined in international treaties and conventions, Russia has demonstrated that it is able and willing to deploy these weapons,¹⁴ including in NATO territory.¹⁵ Russia has also demonstrated a willingness to use chemical weapons during its illegal invasion of Ukraine and long supported the former Assad regime in Syria that used chemical weapons against civilians.¹⁶

The psychological value of chemical and biological weapons

For Russia, chemical and biological weapons have many potential uses and bring many advantages. At their most basic level, chemical and biological weapons, either in a battlefield scenario or a civilian context, are agents of terror. Several interviewees noted the Russian state employs these weapons—or threatens to—to instill fear in European populations and among Russian dissidents in exile.¹⁷ Russian willingness to use chemical weapons in this manner also sends a clear signal to the domestic Russian population about the Putin regime’s tolerance for any potential threats and challenges. A clear demonstration of this tactic was the 2020 Novichok poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, which took place in Russia.¹⁸ While untested, it can be safely assumed that Putin would resort to extreme measures, including using CBRN weapons as necessary, to ensure the survival of his regime.

Some participants described public awareness in much of Europe about how chemical or biological weapons are used and the effects they can have as generally low. Those participants suggested that Russian use of CBRN weapons would be a means of causing widespread panic and manipulating emotions and public actions. The confusion they could potentially sow could create fertile ground for disinformation campaigns designed to undermine public trust in their governments.¹⁹ Such an attack could also expose frailties in broader social resilience in the target community.

Challenging norms–and NATO

Many participants in both the workshops and interviews reflected that a significant incentive for the use of chemical or biological weapons is to further degrade the broadly accepted international norms and standards in place since World War II. Russia’s documented use of chemical weapons sends a signal that it does not consider itself to be constrained by rules, norms, or obligations like other countries. It is an assertion that, as a supposed great power with an extensive and sophisticated CBRN toolbox (a legacy maintained from the Soviet era), and a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, Russia can act with relative impunity to flout and degrade the rules-based system that it opposes. Allies should continue to acknowledge and challenge this behavior, but more public reporting on Russian chemical and biological weapons and how they compare to restrictions outlined in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) could improve awareness of Russia’s possible intent.

In more general terms, the actions of the Russian regime demonstrate that Russia places lower value on human life than the United States and its allies, whether that is of Ukrainian civilians, unwitting bystanders to Russian crimes, or its own military personnel.²⁰ This cultural disregard for the suffering of even its own people affords Russia the space to conduct more reckless attacks and bear the subsequent consequences that the United States and its European allies and partners would not.

By their nature, different chemical and biological weapons have a broad range of properties, methods of delivery, rates of contagion, and lethality.²¹ While the CWC includes verification measures, the BWC does not. Participants noted that Russia could calibrate the nature, scale, and target of any chemical or biological weapon attack to create maximum uncertainty, exploit potential differences in threat perceptions and willingness to stand up against Russian aggression, and degrade international conventions. In many senses, the greater utility of chemical or biological weapons is not their lethality, but their impact on the adversary’s thinking. As one participant put it, “the intention isn’t to kill, but to complicate.”

This coercive element confers chemical and biological weapons and the range of effects they can create, with significant strategic value for Russia. Through the use (or threatened use) of different chemical or biological weapons in a range of scenarios, Russia might hope to influence allied decision-making and actions, such as potential Ukrainian integration into Western-oriented institutions. Participants observed that Russian use of chemical and biological weapons in these scenarios could be a means of Russia signaling that it considers the West has crossed its political red lines.

In a hypothetical battlefield context, the threat of chemical weapons use could limit the efficiency of allied military operations by imposing extra precautionary measures and influencing battlefield planning. In Iraq, the fear that Saddam Hussein could use chemical weapons degraded efficiency on the battlefield.²² After decades of underinvestment and neglect in the principles of operating in CBRN contaminated environments, Russia may be tempted to expose shortfalls in allied CBRN readiness on the battlefield.

For Russia, chemical and biological weapons serve an additional military function of making up for potential conventional military shortcomings. Where the Russians might be outmatched by NATO in conventional terms, unencumbered by moral or legal constraints, they might consider it a legitimate part of their doctrine to use asymmetric capabilities that can tilt the scales in their favor.²³ Participants in our exercises speculated that the likelihood of Russia resorting to chemical or biological weapons would increase should Russia face imminent conventional defeat on the battlefield, either against Ukraine or NATO. This assumption is supported by the 2024 change in Russian nuclear doctrine, which lowered the threshold for first use of nuclear weapons to a new, lower standard.²⁴

A Dutch Air Force F-35 fighter jet conducts air operations during exercise Steadfast Noon. Thirteen NATO allies participated in NATO’s annual nuclear deterrence exercise in 2024. October 21, 2024. NATO

The escalatory dilemma

Russia’s recent changes to its military doctrine, and the potential use of chemical and biological weapons either in civilian or battlefield contexts, must be considered within the framework of political and military escalation.²⁵ Several interviewees noted that, because these are weapons that NATO allies do not and would not use, Russia’s previous use of chemical weapons and potential willingness to turn to biological weapons give the Kremlin an extra rung on the escalatory ladder.

Unlike nuclear escalation—which is well-studied, more clearly defined, and more widely considered taboo in the case of first-use of nuclear weapons—the escalatory dynamics of chemical and biological weapons use are more ambiguous and less certain. The scale and severity of chemical or biological weapon use could be calibrated to avoid crossing an obvious threshold that demands a military response, while at the same time clearly crossing a normative line that NATO allies would not cross, all the while posing a difficult conundrum about the appropriate and proportionate response.

Additionally, the dual-use nature of many of these chemical or biological agents (which may have legitimate and peaceful origins and uses) makes attribution challenging and presents sufficient deniability. This makes it difficult to establish clear lines of acceptable use and potentially hampers efforts to cohere a forceful and united response. At the same time, it allows Russia to simultaneously send a message of intent to allies and sow further confusion and distrust, while mostly avoiding (or limiting) punishment. In short, per one workshop participant, “it helps Russia to establish escalation dominance without committing to war.”

However, in many discussions throughout the project, there was considerable uncertainty over whether and how escalation to chemical and biological weapons use would increase the subsequent prospects of nuclear escalation. While many participants recognized that Russia’s willingness to disregard norms when it comes to chemical weapons in particular could logically lead to nuclear escalation and that Russia had invoked rhetoric around nuclear weapons use in recent years, participants agreed that taboos around nuclear weapons use exert more of a constraining force on Russia. Several participants noted the reported influence that China and India were able to wield against Russia in October 2022 to help de-escalate Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric at the time.²⁶

Participants noted that where chemical or biological weapons can be deployed in such a way as to sow confusion and inject escalatory ambiguity, the line that nuclear weapons use would cross is much more definitive. No participants envisaged these scenarios escalating to the use of nuclear weapons unless Putin felt it was the last and only option for his personal survival.

Part II: Deterrence

As outlined above, Russia has and could continue to use chemical or biological weapons depending on the state of its conventional capabilities. The United States and its European allies and partners play a crucial role in deterring Russia from using any CBRN weapon. It is therefore critical to consider the scenarios in which Russia might turn to such weapons. Russia might even assume that previous responses to chemical attacks give them scope to escalate to larger-scale strategic weapons.²⁷

For deterrence to be effective, like-minded nations must make clear that they are prepared to impose intolerable costs (economic, geopolitical, or military) on Russia should it use chemical or biological weapons, while also maintaining some ambiguity as to the exact nature of a response. Demonstrations of intelligence sharing among allies to present a unified threat assessment may clarify how the United States observes the Russian threat in the CBRN domain. Given how critical it is for civilian institutions to be integrated in the response to a potential CBRN attack, particularly related to chemical and biological threats, a whole-of-government approach to deterrence is essential for how the United States and its European allies and partners should position themselves vis-à-vis Russia. Outside-the-box thinking around potential partners and nontraditional allies may also aid in strengthening deterrence. The following takeaways emerged from our analysis, including discussions with key stakeholders in the United States and Europe.

Deterrence can yield powerful results

Deterrence by punishment would be harder to inflict if Russia were to use a chemical or biological weapon, given that there would not be a proportional response.²⁸ However, the United States and Europe still have options for precise, measured, and consequential actions. Workshop participants agreed that specific actions or escalation using CBRN threats from Russia would have severe consequences warranting a response, including stringent economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure campaigns, and, in some instances, retaliatory military strikes. With the nuclear deterrent as the foundation for any response from the United States (alongside that of the United Kingdom and France), any threat of retaliation against Russia will be stronger.²⁹ In addition, the United States and European countries could implement measures such as export controls, sanctions, international condemnation, or stationing NATO troops closer to Russia’s borders to deter Russian CBRN use.

Participants reflected that the most likely scenario in which Russia would turn to CBRN threats would include hybrid attacks on the United States and Europe. Deterrence of such threats remains a “riddle” as one interviewee put it, where more degrees of ambiguity are present that do not apply to conventional (or nuclear) escalation. When approaching the more tactical use of chemical or biological weapons, there is more opaqueness given the dual-purpose nature of substances, technologies, and delivery systems. Workshop participants did not come to consensus on how the United States and its European allies should view (or respond to) such threats within the hybrid domain or at the tactical applications of chemical or biological weapons.

The role of attribution in deterring CBRN use

During the workshops and interviews, participants continuously reiterated that attribution is critical to deterring Russian chemical and biological threats and holding Russia accountable for past use of chemical weapons. Intelligence and information sharing play an important role in attribution. One interviewee remarked that Russia may think twice about staging chemical and biological attacks if there is more publicly available information about their chemical and biological capabilities, facilities, and deployment means.

However, timely technical collection and forensic analysis capabilities are lacking among NATO allies, leading to questions about the accuracy and reliability of attributing attacks. Several existing capabilities—including detection, intelligence, and surveillance systems—could prevent escalation with chemical and biological weapons, but these systems are not well resourced across the Alliance. Many NATO member states lack adequate expertise in sample collection, robust laboratory infrastructure, and the requisite instruments to conduct analysis, all of which impede attribution.

Some participants we spoke to, particularly on NATO’s eastern flank, reflected on a need to strengthen intelligence, monitoring, and detection capabilities to improve their overall deterrence and response posture. Investment in capabilities to investigate and attribute attacks could prevent Russian escalation. For attribution to be effective, the United States and European allies and partners must also possess a shared understanding of indicators and warning signals ahead of an attack.

Russian President Vladimir Putin conducts an exercise of Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence forces in Moscow via video conference. Putin approved Russia’s new nuclear doctrine in 2024. Mikhail Metzel/Reuters

Preparedness and resilience are essential

Participants described the need for the United States and its European allies and partners to limit the consequences of Russian chemical and biological attacks. The notion of “deterrence by resilience” or “deterrence by preparedness” (a subcategory of the broader notion of “deterrence by denial”) is one paradigm for thinking of how the United States could successfully prevent Russia from turning to chemical or biological weapons. The following considerations came up most frequently as areas for investment.

Capability development and deployment

Allied military representatives broadly agreed that CBRN-related equipment—either related to attribution (including detection and surveillance systems) or response (such as decontamination or personal protective equipment [PPE])—is often overlooked in favor of high-caliber defense systems. Counter-CBRN capabilities are frequently considered too niche for broader collective defense.

Investment in CBRN defense capabilities, discussed further in the response section of this report, provides a deterrent signal in addition to preparing allies to fight through a chemical or biological attack. However, nearly everyone we interviewed recognized that these capabilities are often siloed to specialist forces and not broadly integrated within general purpose forces. Ministries of defense across the Alliance should set baselines for CBRN defense-capability targets, including PPE, gas masks, and treatment, across the total force and resource these priorities accordingly.

Exercises and training

Regular and comprehensive exercises that incorporate a variety of US and European military forces would underpin an effective deterrence strategy toward Russia. Some participants described the importance of joint training among special operations forces (SOF) that might be equipped to respond to chemical and biological weapons use. Components of these exercises should be incorporated into broader training, which can enable preparedness in times of crisis. Participants pointed to several preexisting multinational exercises as examples to demonstrate readiness to deter CBRN escalation.³⁰

Other training—including tabletop exercises and war-games—can be deployed to help decision-makers design more effective standards to aid and inform how the United States and its European allies and partners can deter potential Russian use of CBRN threats. Tabletop exercises and war-games leveraged by the Pentagon and DTRA with their European counterparts can be used to strengthen strategic and operational thinking about how to deter Russian escalation by providing opportunities to try new approaches under the guidance of expert facilitators.

Whole-of-society resilience

To be effective, deterrence by resilience must incorporate all facets of society to respond to instances of crisis or threats.³¹ To deter potential CBRN threats through preparedness, European allies and partners must warn the public, without fear-mongering, of the risk of escalation. Several participants noted the importance of preparing populations to withstand and defy threats from Russia, which includes activating and sustaining civilian institutions such as hospitals that would treat those affected by a chemical or biological attack. As part of a whole-of-society approach, greater awareness of chemical and biological threats is needed; public health personnel, first responders, law enforcement, teachers, and others ought to understand the effects of chemical and biological agents and how to respond appropriately. Similar to the military, civilian agencies should procure and maintain CBRN defense capabilities to protect and treat civilian populations in the event of a chemical or biological attack.

One phrase that is often repeated in expert circles is “raising the IQ” on nuclear threats. This concept applies to chemical and biological threats as well so that more individuals are cognizant of their scale and severity. Mental and emotional preparedness would enable the public to resist Russian efforts and contain the potential consequences associated with a Russian attack. Demonstrating societal resilience, in which wider social and civil functions can withstand CBRN escalation, could deter Russia from employing CBRN weapons.

Wielding the information space

Russia consistently utilizes the information space to instill fear, distrust, and confusion.³² In addition to responding to these types of stories with clear, fact-based information that demonstrates why Russian claims are false, the United States and its European allies and partners can also pre-bunk and dispel any false or misleading claims that Russia produces about CBRN-related threats. Participants pointed to the importance of sharing proactive messages about resistance to such narratives through a variety of means—including traditional media, official government communications, and social media—to dissuade Russian perpetrators from deploying attacks. Eye-catching social media posts and multimedia tools can extend reach to nontraditional communities to help dispel Russian claims. As one participant noted, winning the information war must be combined with the requisite military power and civilian capability to deter Russia.

Be cautious of setting red lines

While US and European officials must be clear about the consequences of escalation, interviewees resisted establishing so-called red lines that are overly specific. Many interviewees pointed to the infamous case of the Obama administration’s supposed red lines regarding Syria’s use of chemical weapons during its civil war in the 2010s. Such thresholds, which may be politically sensitive to apply, would leave the international community in a difficult position with respect to enforcement or punishment, which could undermine the credibility of deterrence.

Participants called instead for political rhetoric to be vague externally, where Russia and its allies would have difficulty determining the threshold for response, while being precise internally about the consequences of Russia’s actions. This distinction would provide space for the United States and its European allies and partners to determine the requisite response to CBRN threats stemming from Russia.

Diplomacy as a deterrent

Russia finds itself somewhat isolated in the current geopolitical environment. However, the Kremlin frequently looks to several nations—including China, Iran, and North Korea—to bolster Russia’s defense. These relationships could provide options to engage non-European nations to deter Russia from CBRN escalation. For example, China reportedly engaged Russia to discourage the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and the deployment of nuclear weapons in space.³³ Given the degree to which Russia depends on China to prop up its wartime economy, there may be an opportunity to leverage China to dissuade Russia from turning to CBRN escalation, particularly if China upholds international regimes regarding CBRN use.³⁴ India may also be able to influence Russia given its role in supporting Russia’s economic stability amid Western sanctions and may have sway in discouraging CBRN escalation.

A CBRN specialist trains in the Czech Republic as part of the CORONAT MASK 2024 training. More than 800 CBRN specialists from 13 NATO nations participated to exercise collective CBRN capabilities. June 24, 2024. US European Command

Part III: Response

The results of our workshops, interviews, and secondary research illuminated opportunities to enhance US and European responses to a CBRN attack should deterrence fail. Given its role in coordinating allied planning, NATO will be a critical actor in any response effort. Our discussions with NATO and European officials revealed consistent, close cooperation among military elements at NATO, while understanding that support required from civilian entities is a more nascent effort. However, the mandate for responding to a CBRN incident typically falls within the civilian sectors of many European governments, so political-military coordination is essential to ensuring all facets of government are aware of their roles in the event of a CBRN attack. Enhancing cooperation to promote coordinated responses includes the following best practices.

Ensure broad awareness of CBRN threats

Allies we interviewed broadly agreed that awareness of Russian CBRN threats cannot only reside within the specialist communities at NATO or in national militaries. At the political level, there is general agreement at NATO and within European capitals that Russia’s CBRN threats are an immediate concern. However, it is less clear how much allies are willing to invest to counter these threats, both now and in the five-to-ten-year time frame. Those geographically closest to Russia were most acutely aware of the threats and adamant about engaging with NATO allies via training, exercises, and exchanges to ensure active cooperation.

Variations in threat perception also appeared to be generational, according to our discussions. For example, officers who have served since the end of the Cold War described a lack of investment in CBRN defense in the absence of acute Soviet chemical, biological, and nuclear threats. The perception of such threats was lower in the post-Cold War era, which led the United States and Europe to deprioritize investment in preparedness. Given Russia’s continued flouting of international norms against the use of chemical weapons, and the primacy of nuclear warfare in its military doctrine, US, NATO, and European leaders need to uphold what they have recognized in recent strategic guidance as a critical threat emanating from Russia and invest in their forces accordingly.

Expand CBRN training to the total force

Training is an area that appears ripe for further investment. European military leaders we interviewed agreed that expertise cannot reside in the CBRN specialist communities alone. General purpose forces must also be trained on CBRN threats and equipped to fight through contaminated environments. To ensure broader awareness of CBRN threats, NATO and national military exercises should include elements of chemical, biological, or limited nuclear use scenarios. Military and civilian leaders we interviewed recognized the drawbacks of having personnel exercise in restrictive protective gear, given how it can slow maneuver, but it also puts troops at a disadvantage if they need to operate wearing the gear in a real-time scenario without much experience. NATO’s CBRN-focused exercises, described in the previous section, are an important step toward ensuring interoperability among NATO forces, but these lessons can be expanded beyond CBRN defense units to include NATO SOF and other elements of NATO’s deployable forces.

Better integrate military and civilian components

Apart from military preparedness, it is critical for national military and NATO elements to understand the capacity of civilian institutions, as first responders will have the authority for coordinating a response to incidents that occur outside of military operations. During the workshops and the interviews, participants expressed the need for greater integration of civilian and military personnel on topics such as decontamination and training, which necessitates the ability to share information between sectors.

Civilian institutions also play a critical role in responding to chemical and biological incidents, which could include attacks. Preparedness within national, subnational, and local institutions—including, for example, hospitals, research laboratories, public health institutions, law enforcement agencies, manufacturing facilities, and entities managing critical infrastructure—are essential to ensuring readiness for potential chemical and biological attacks. Civilian institutions could be underprepared for the crisis operations that would be required in the event of a chemical or biological attack. Better coordination with military counterparts can bridge these gaps to ensure a whole-of-society response to potential attacks, which also has an important deterrent effect when highlighted via strategic communications campaigns.

The European Union can play a role in fostering greater access to critical resources, such as PPE and laboratory equipment, particularly in times of crisis where traditional processes are too slow. The European External Action Service, which is the EU’s diplomatic service, has long partnered with NATO to ensure mutual understanding of threats and how to best prepare NATO allies and EU member states for possible CBRN attacks with information and tangible assets.³⁵ This relationship is vital to ensure stronger political-military coordination and should be expanded to account for greater CBRN-related cooperation.

Leverage NATO for coordination and capabilities

NATO’s 2022 CBRN defense policy represented a shift from the focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism of the early 2000s to a state-based threat actor that more closely aligns with the modern security environment.³⁶ NATO’s International Staff is overseeing the implementation of this policy, which is critical to ensure guidance flows to capitals so national authorities can promote a consistent approach. A response aligned with NATO demonstrates unity, which in turn demonstrates alliance cohesion in the face of continued Russian threats. Several NATO allies, including the United States, UK, and Finland, have their own national policies, but for those that do not, the NATO policy provides a roadmap for driving national prioritization of CBRN threats and response options for these threats aligned with NATO’s priorities.³⁷

As NATO allies consider greater thresholds for defense spending, more investment is needed in CBRN defense equipment and capabilities. An essential aspect of capability development is deploying and positioning of attribution, detection, and surveillance systems. NATO is well poised to lead collaborative efforts and ensure that states without adequate CBRN defenses learn from leaders in the field. NATO’s High Visibility Projects (HVP) includes three initiatives to improve cooperation around facilities, equipment, and detection.³⁸ CBRN defense projects have also been part of NATO’s Smart Defence Initiative since 2014.³⁹

Consider the information domain

As noted in the deterrence section, proactive communication about military and civilian activities to safeguard the entire population from a CBRN attack serves an important deterrent function while bolstering societal resilience. Effective use of the information domain is equally critical to reassuring the public regarding CBRN responses.

States can disseminate proactive messages to get ahead of any false or misleading information that Russia may seek to inject within open societies. This includes emphasis on strategic communications, fact-checking initiatives, media literacy, and education campaigns for adults and children alike.

The health sector can offer lessons in disseminating information about emotionally sensitive topics in a way that recognizes the severity of a threat without stoking fear. For example, the UK Health Service launched a public health campaign in 2025 to counter fears of taking antibiotics, which has become a top issue among UK residents.⁴⁰ Similar approaches can be taken to inform the public about chloropicrin or other agents Russia has used. Such communications should focus on facts, and in the realm of CBRN weapons, be clear about the rare and limited nature of exposure to such threats so as not to provoke undue stress or fear.

Integrating deterrence and response

Through the course of our research, we identified two activities that served both deterrent and response functions. First, being clear and unafraid of imposing massive costs to Russia (including economic, geopolitical, or military actions) for its use of chemical weapons could deter it from continuing to deploy chemical weapons or prevent escalation. Accountability is also an important part of response. Since 2014, Russia has acted with impunity in the absence of credible deterrent threats to its use of chemical weapons. Although many countries and international organizations have condemned Russia’s use of chemical weapons and imposed sanctions on Moscow, these actions have not stopped Russia from using chemical agents to achieve geopolitical goals. The consensus during our workshops and interviews is that Russia has a long history of incorporating CBRN weapons into its strategy and planning, which makes them both a near-term threat and a long-term strategic threat. Bringing treaty violations forward has had limited impact on Russia’s behavior, but increasing economic sanctions could reduce Russian access to funding, equipment, facilities, and technologies that could advance their chemical and biological weapons ambitions.

Second, the United States and its European allies and partners should clearly communicate potential consequences to deter future actions and inflict damage on the sectors on which Russia relies on for the development of its chemical and biological capabilities. The apparent threat of what a potential CBRN escalation would entail, including the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic implications, is essential for deterring Russia from turning to these threats, but following through on these actions also serves to punish Russia in response to its illicit activities.

Participants engage in a counter-CBRN defense training as part of a NATO-led exercise. 2025. NATO

Recommendations and key findings

Finding: Russia will likely continue using chemical weapons in Europe in a range of scenarios over the next five to ten years, particularly if doing so undermines Alliance unity and disrupts Ukraine’s integration into the West. Based on its recent behavior, however, Russia appears less likely to use biological weapons. Furthermore, while Russia has threatened nuclear use, a large-scale nuclear attack appears unlikely.

Recommendation: Allies should continuously assess and evaluate Russia’s strategic objectives. To better coordinate threat perceptions across the Alliance, the United States and its European allies and partners should consider opportunities to expand collaboration on joint threat assessments related to Russia’s CBRN capabilities. As the Office of the Director of National Intelligence crafts the annual joint threat assessment report, insights from European allies and partners will be critical to assemble the most comprehensive picture of Russian CBRN threats; integrating perspectives from the Office of the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security will be paramount in this effort.

Finding: To credibly deter Russia from nuclear escalation, the United States and its European allies and partners must ensure that Russia understands that using—or threatening to use—chemical and biological weapons would both fail to achieve its intended outcome and incur intolerable costs.

Recommendation: Instead of publicizing red lines, the United States should champion the achievement of internal consensus regarding acceptable thresholds of Russian activity based on treaty obligations, while externally preserving ambiguity as a component of deterrence. NATO, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the United Nations are valuable forums for such deliberations and can play roles in imposing costs on Russia for CBRN use. However, internal debates within national governments are required to achieve consensus, which can take time. International investigations, such as those previously led in Syria by the OPCW (an intergovernmental body), are also time-consuming, and Russia politicizes the results to undermine effectiveness. Therefore, this recommendation could take years of sustained effort to carry out.

Recommendation: Within the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD) should work with the relevant authorities within the Treasury and Commerce departments to inflict the requisite economic pain on Russia through, for example, sanctions and export controls, to undermine its ability to sustain its biological and chemical weapons programs. Unified public messaging campaigns from the United States and Europe that condemn Russian CBRN weapons deployment would reinforce activities conducted behind the scenes.

Recommendation: The United States and its European allies and partners should identify methods for cooperation with nontraditional partners to dissuade Russia from leveraging CBRN threats as part of their military doctrine. Through NATO or the UN, the United States should explore opportunities to engage China and India to dissuade Moscow from pursuing further CBRN weapons development and use.

Finding: Since the end of the Cold War, CBRN defense has been deprioritized among NATO allies, including the United States. Amid calls for increased defense spending, CBRN defense capability development is an area primed for greater investment.

Recommendation: As concerns about potential deployment of Russian CBRN weapons grow, the US DoD should emphasize and prioritize efforts to expand counter-CBRN capabilities. Specific needs include sufficient systems to detect, surveil, and attribute CBRN threats. The United States could leverage the OPCW (and vice versa) for its experience in investigations. As the United States and its European allies and partners update guidelines for defense spending, CBRN defense warrants renewed attention and investment. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) should advocate for European counterparts to place greater emphasis on CBRN defense. The DoD and the relevant subagencies should emphasize these systems when outlining US defense policy and national security strategies as they pertain to CBRN threats. Such systems will aid in deterring Russian CBRN threats while expanding readiness, preparedness, and resilience within the United States and across the transatlantic community. Ministries of defense and crisis response agencies should set baselines for CBRN defense capabilities and stockpile accordingly, including PPE, gas masks, antibiotics, and laboratory equipment.

Recommendation: DTRA and the broader US defense community should expand training on CBRN threats by incorporating elements of chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare scenarios in tabletop exercises and war-games. Inclusion of these scenarios can complement crisis situations posited in Europe to identify deterrence strategies and response options. CBRN considerations are often perceived to be too niche and left to specialist communities to design strategy and crisis responses. However, it is critical for decision-makers within the entire chain of command to possess a broad awareness of CBRN threats and simulate planning. The Joint Staff should ensure that service-level training incorporates these considerations into doctrine and training. Then, DTRA’s liaison officers could support training at US military commands and within multilateral institutions, such as NATO.

Recommendation: The United States and its NATO allies should incorporate the NATO SOF Command more directly into operational planning, particularly when thinking through the requisite deterrence and response implications of Russia deploying a CBRN weapon. NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) could help drive this coordination with support from the United States. Given the hybrid nature of many CBRN threats from Russia, within SHAPE and NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO), the United States and its NATO allies could consider a greater role for responding to hybrid threats alongside preexisting military structures. The US should expand CBRN defense cooperation, particularly on training, exercising, and information sharing. Elsewhere in Europe, allies recognized the leading role the United States plays (as well as the UK) in sharing intelligence with NATO; for allies with limited intelligence capabilities of their own, US information might be the only source of CBRN-related intelligence. Some allies expressed uncertainty over the prioritization of CBRN-related cooperation as a new administration begins its work in Washington, but at the individual level, cooperation remains close. NATO leaders should leverage productive working relationships to ensure sustained, coordinated prioritization for CBRN defense across all echelons of NATO planning.

Recommendation: As the need for additional CBRN defense capabilities and equipment grows, so too does the need to strengthen the private-sector capacity to supply the requisite functionalities. The US government should expand relationships with the defense industry and bolster production capacity to sustain supply chains and replenish depleted stockpiles of PPE. The DoD can also leverage lessons learned for production capacity and procurement protocols from the COVID-19 pandemic, when the Pentagon supported the production of PPE through the Defense Production Act to increase production of critical supplies and equipment. The DoD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Defense Logistics Agency can both play an important role in facilitating these relationships while removing unnecessary barriers to procurement processes within the DoD. Similar efforts should be undertaken with European counterparts of these agencies and at NATO, though the implementation of this recommendation could require years of investment.

Finding: The United States should leverage NATO to facilitate greater coordination between civilian and military entities to enhance whole-of-society resilience to CBRN threats.

Recommendation: Demonstrating close cooperation between civilian and military entities can have a deterrent effect if communicated properly, while also ensuring military entities are aware of the resources that reside in civilian institutions. Key areas for investment include interoperability of CBRN defense equipment; standards and procedures for treating exposure to chemical or biological agents; availability of civilian infrastructure for military use; and protocols for military members seeking care in civilian hospitals. NATO is well poised to encourage cooperation between military forces and critical civilian institutions that are often on the front lines of such responses, including public health agencies, local hospitals, and law enforcement. European nations can leverage the examples of their peers to their advantage. In the United States, the DoD is well positioned to support interagency coordination among European allies and partners with respect to emergency preparedness mechanisms, capability development, and training. OSD should consider embedding highly skilled personnel within US military commands, diplomatic missions, and other frameworks to facilitate the exchange of information and expertise.

Recommendation: A whole-of-society approach to resilience—to include health institutions, law enforcement, critical infrastructure, business community, and other sectors—can help strengthen attribution systems for identifying and attributing chemical and biological attacks. The United States should coordinate with its European allies and partners to encourage greater resilience and preparedness within civilian institutions and foster information sharing across national borders.

Finding: Information and intelligence sharing is critical to achieving a common threat perception among NATO allies and partners. Expanded information sharing and effective strategic communications can deter Russian use of chemical or biological weapons and ensure a coordinated response if deterrence fails.

Recommendation: Preemptive and frequent intelligence sharing, in classified and open-source settings, is critical to deterring Russia from using CBRN weapons; this practice presents a unified approach among the United States and its European allies and partners. All allies should aim to more regularly share relevant information. The US national security apparatus should conduct a complete review of potential barriers to information and intelligence sharing to identify areas for streamlined sharing with NATO allies. The Defense Intelligence Agency could lead such an initiative on behalf of the DoD, with a focus on greater use of open-source intelligence to draw further public attention to Russia’s CBRN capabilities, facilities, and development. The United States should encourage similar reviews across NATO member states to improve Alliance-wide access to intelligence and information and ensure that this subject is a standing agenda item for the relevant NATO committees, including the Defense Policy and Planning Committee and the Civilian Intelligence Committee.

Recommendation: To support NATO’s 2022 CBRN Defense Strategy’s effort to improve shared understanding across the Alliance, more consistent and comprehensive messaging is needed within the capitals of NATO allies, particularly around the policy planning process and the integration of civilian entities within a coordinated military response in the event of a CBRN-related contingency. The US Mission to NATO can champion efforts to expand knowledge and understanding of Russian CBRN threats within NATO while sharing lessons learned from European allies and partners throughout the US government.

Finding: The United States and its European allies and partners should take steps to raise the public IQ related to CBRN threats, particularly as it pertains to chemical and biological threats.

Recommendation: The US Defense, State, and Homeland Security departments have produced public messaging campaigns related to Russian CBRN threats and methods to improve media literacy. These efforts should expand to include greater emphasis on debunking false and misleading claims related to CBRN threats. Additionally, the US government should incorporate European allies and partners in messaging efforts to counter Russian malign influence operations around CBRN threats.

Recommendation: The United States should work with European allies to identify best practices in crafting public awareness-raising campaigns for how to respond to suspected CBRN attacks. Public messaging should focus on practical steps individuals can take in an emergency, without prompting undue alarm among the wider population.

Recommendation: US and European governments should explore opportunities to partner with civil society organizations to craft prebunking, media literacy, and fact-checking initiatives that can successfully communicate proactive messaging to broader publics in the Euro-Atlantic area, particularly given the scientific and technical nature of CBRN threats. Proactive messages about resistance to Russian narratives should be disseminated through a combination of means, including traditional media, official government communications, and social media. The United States could also explore joint research initiatives with European institutions. EU member states can leverage the European Defense Fund, which provides research into common defense and security priorities, including in CBRN-related issues. Partnerships between universities, scientific foundations, and think tanks can facilitate greater knowledge and information sharing related to CBRN threats.

Finding: The governance of emerging and applied technologies is difficult within the bounds of existing treaty regimes. Sanctions and export controls can complement treaty organizations to monitor and contain potential CBRN threats from such technologies, including dual-use systems and components.

Recommendation: Technologies such as synthetic biology and additive manufacturing continue to evolve, and their applications will remain difficult to foresee. The international community must remain vigilant to how technologies can be exploited. To that end, the United States must continue and expand its restrictions for known suppliers of potential dual-use technologies to Russia. The DoD should coordinate with the Department of Commerce to expand the use of export controls to address instances where Russia is able to obtain capabilities and equipment, such as pharmaceutical components, biotechnologies, and chemical precursors. Critical to the success of these controls, however, is including like-minded European allies and partners into conversations about technologies of concern. The Department of Defense should work with the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to strengthen and expand the list of sanctioned entities that aid and abet Russia’s biological and chemical weapons development programs.

Conclusion

This project demonstrates that Russian chemical and biological threats are a concern now and will continue to pose challenges to European security in the next five to ten years. To enable European allies and partners to counter these threats, the United States can leverage its strong security and defense relationships with European allies and partners to improve capabilities and raise the profile of chemical and biological weapons issues within governments and among populations. The existing chemical and biological defense infrastructure in the United States, NATO, and in some European countries provides lessons for the broader Euro-Atlantic community. With greater investment comes greater confidence that deterring Russia is feasible, but if deterrence fails, attention now can ensure that the United States and Europe are prepared to effectively respond.

Please note that the appendixes are not included in the online version of this publication, but they can be accessed in the attached PDF file. The appendixes contain the following information: Appendix A – Acronym List; Appendix B – Workshop Participants; Appendix C – Exercise Methodology; Appendix D – Interview Participants; Appendix E – Biographies. These appendixes provide additional details and insights on the research methods and findings.

The research team thanks the US Department of Defense for sponsoring this work and for the guidance and support provided throughout the course of the project. Special thanks go to the wide range of experts and stakeholders, inside and outside of the US and European governments, who took part in the scenario-building exercises, contributed their perspectives during the interview process, spoke during roundtable discussions, and participated in other contexts to enrich the analysis.

We would also like to acknowledge Hans Binnendijk and John Watts for their support in conceptualizing the methodology and structure of the scenario workshop exercises. Hans and Katarzyna Zysk provided useful peer reviews to improve the quality of the report. In addition, we would like to thank Torrey Taussig and Matthew Kroenig, who offered strategic direction, peer review, and key perspectives throughout the project. Within the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative team, we recognize our current and recent colleagues Inga Samoškaitė, Zak Schneider, Kristen Taylor, Kimberly Talley, and Luka Ignac for their project management and research support. We would also like to thank the Atlantic Council’s Gretchen Ehle, Nicholas O’Connell, and Caroline Simpson, whose support for this project was invaluable.

This report is intended to live up to General Brent Scowcroft’s standard for rigorous, relevant, and nonpartisan analysis on national security issues. The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to continue his nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Department of Defense or the United States Government.

About the authors

Staff

Philippe Dickinson

Deputy Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Chinese East Asia

Fellow

Ryan Arick

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

Fellow

Natasha Lander Finch

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Arms Control Europe & Eurasia

Explore the program

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

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1 Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky, “Etched in Stone: Russian Strategic Culture and the Future of Transatlantic Security,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/09/etched-in-stone-russian-strategic-culture-and-the-future-of-transatlantic-security?lang=en

2 Robert Person and Michael McFaul, “What Putin Fears Most,” Journal of Democracy 33, no. 2 (2022): 18–27, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-putinfears-most/

3 Russia conceptualizes hybrid warfare—particularly in how it is deployed to subvert and undermine politics and security—much differently than the United States and Europe. See Seth G. Jones, “Russia’s Shadow War with the West,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 18, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russiasshadow-war-against-west

4 Russia has carried out attacks in London (2006), Sofia (2015), and Salisbury, United Kingdom (2018). See Mina Rozei, “US Accuses Russia of Chemical Weapons Use in Ukraine,” Arms Control Association, June 2024, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-06/news/us-accuses-russia-chemical-weapons-use-ukraine; and “Novichok Nerve Agent Use in Salisbury: UK Government Response, March to April 2018,” UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, Home Office, and Ministry of Defence, March 14, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/novichok-nerve-agent-use-in-salisbury-uk-government-response

5 “2023 Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” US Department of Defense, Press Release, September 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3541619/dod-announces-release-of-2023-strategy-for-countering-weapons-of-mass-destructi/

6 See 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, US Department of Defense, 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf; and US National Security Strategy, White House, October 2022, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf

7 Andrew Osborn and Andrey Ostroukh, “Putin Rues Soviet Collapse as Demise of Humanity,” Reuters, December 12, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/

8 NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept specifically mentions Russia will seek to exert power and control “through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation” via conventional, cyber, and hybrid means. See “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” NATO, June 2022, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/

9 “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” NATO, June 2022, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/

10 Thom Shanker and Mark Landler, “Putin Says US Is Undermining Global Stability,” New York Times, February 11, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/world/europe/11munich.html

11 Ketevan Chincharadze and Larry P. Goodson, “The Enduring Impact of the 2008 Russia-Georgian War,” War Room, US Army War College, December 19, 2024, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/enduring-impact/

12 “Hearing–Russia’s Shadow War on NATO,” US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, September 24, 2024, https://www.csce.gov/press-releases/hearing-russias-shadow-war-on-nato/

13 For more, see “Spotlight on the Shadow War: Inside Russia’s Attacks on NATO Territory,” Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, US Helsinki Commission, December 12, 2024, https://www.csce.gov/publications/spotlight-on-the-shadow-war-inside-russias-attacks-on-nato-territory/; and Seth G. Jones, “Russia’s Shadow War with the West,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 18, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-shadow-war-against-west

14 For more information, see “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” United Nations, https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/npt/; “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction,” United Nations, https://treaties.unoda.org/t/bwc; “Chemical Weapons Convention,” Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention; and Mathias Hammer, “The Collapse of Global Arms Control,” Time, November 13, 2023, https://time.com/6334258/putin-nuclear-arms-control/

15 Russia carried out CBRN-based attempted assassinations in the UK in 2006 and 2018 and is suspected of the 2015 assassination attempt against a Bulgarian arms dealer, Emilian Gebrev. See “Russia Behind Litvinenko Murder, Rules European Rights Court,” BBC, September 21, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-58637572; “Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Use of a Nerve Agent in Salisbury,” NATO, March 14, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_152787.htm; and Krassen Nikolov, “Bulgaria Seeks Extradition of Three Spies from Russia in Novichok Case,” Euractiv, November 21, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/bulgaria-seeks-extradition-of-three-spies-from-russia-in-novichok-case/

16 See “OPCW Finds Toxic Chemical Use in Ukraine,” Arms Control Association, December 2024, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-12/news-briefs/opcw-findstoxic-chemical-use-ukraine; and Kenneth D. Ward, “Syria, Russia, and the Global Chemical Weapons Crisis,” Arms Control Association, September 2021, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-09/features/syria-russia-and-global-chemical-weapons-crisis

17 One subject matter expert interviewed for the project noted that “some of [Russia’s strategic motivation] is about showing reach into Western Europe and that they can get to us. Some of it is a fear element for dissident populations, and to show that we have a range of stuff that you might not know about and we’re not afraid to use it.”

18 “Putin’s Poisons: 2020 Attack on Aleksey Navalny,” US Embassy in Georgia, April 18, 2022, https://ge.usembassy.gov/putins-poisons-2020-attack-on-aleksey-navalny/

19 Michael J. Kelley, “Understanding Russian Disinformation and How the Joint Force Can Address It,” US Army War College, May 29, 2024, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3789933/understanding-russian-disinformation-and-how-the-joint-force-can-address-it/

20 For more, see Olha Polishchuk and Nichita Gurcov, “Bombing into Submission: Russian Targeting of Civilians and Infrastructure in Ukraine,” Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, February 21, 2025, https://acleddata.com/2025/02/21/bombing-into-submission-russian-targeting-of-civilians-and-infrastructure-in-ukraine/; “Litvinenko: Images of Radiation Trail Revealed,” SkyNews, January 27, 2015, https://news.sky.com/story/litvinenko-images-of-radiation-trail-revealed-10373703; and Alexey Kovalev, “Putin Is Throwing Human Waves at Ukraine but Can’t Do It Forever,” Foreign Policy, November 25, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/25/russia-ukrainewar-casualties-deaths-losses-soldiers-killed-meatgrinder-attacks/

21 Gert G. Harigel, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Use in Warfare, Impact on Society and Environment,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 18, 2001, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2001/01/introduction-to-chemical-and-biological-weapons

22 Major General Robert D. Orton and Major Robert C. Neumann, “The Impact of Weapons of Mass Destruction on Battlefield Operations,” Army University Press: Military Review, December 1993, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2022/Orton-Impact-WMD-1993/

23 From the Russian doctrine: “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.” (italics added for emphasis). See George Allison, “NATO Outmatches Russia in ‘Every Domain Except Nuclear,’” UK Defense Journal, December 6, 2024, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/nato-outmatches-russia-in-every-domain-except-nuclear/

24 Escalation can be defined as “an increase in the intensity or scope of conflict that crosses threshold(s) considered significant by one or more of the participants. For more, see “Russia’s Military Doctrine,” Arms Control Association, May 2005, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-05/russias-military-doctrine

25 Forrest E. Morgan et al., “The Nature of Escalation,” in Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 7–46, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg614af.9

26 Jim Sciutto, “Exclusive: US Prepared ‘Rigorously’ for Potential Russian Nuclear Strike in Ukraine in Late 2022, Officials Say,” CNN, March 9, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/09/politics/us-prepared-rigorously-potential-russian-nuclear-strike-ukraine/index.html

27 Natasha Hall and Doreen Horschig, “Reviving Chemical Weapons Accountability in a Multipolar World,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 21, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/reviving-chemical-weapons-accountability-multipolar-world

28 There is wide body of literature on deterrence, including varying definitions of types of deterrence. We use Michael J. Mazarr’s definitions of deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by punishment involves the threat of “severe penalties, such as nuclear escalation or severe economic sanctions if an attack occurs.” For more, see Michael J. Mazarr, “Understanding Deterrence,” RAND Corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE295.html

29 Similarly, the concept of extended deterrence includes the discouragement of the use of nuclear weapons against an ally or partner nation of the United States from an adversary in which the threat of retaliation from the United States extends protection. The United States and the United Kingdom provide extended deterrence for NATO allies. It is important to note that France, another NATO ally and nuclear-capable state, does not contribute to NATO’s nuclear defense. See Mazarr, “Understanding Deterrence.”

30 Such exercises include the 2022 Toxic Valley training led by Slovakia and the 2024 Coronat Mask training led by the Czech Republic. See “International Exercise of Chemical Units CORONAT MASK 2024 Will Take Place Again After Years,” CZ Defence, May 18, 2024, https://www.czdefence.com/article/international-exercise-of-chemical-units-coronat-mask-2024-will-take-place-again-after-years

31 A whole-of-society approach includes integrating the “full range of military and civilian capabilities” with cooperation from government, civil society, and private sector stakeholders. For more, see “Resilience, Civil Preparedness, and Article 3,” NATO, November 13, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm

32 The Kremlin has a long history of accusing the United States and European nations of biological weapons development and nuclear expansion as cover for its own activities. See Sarah Jacobs Gamberini and Justin Anderson, “Russian and Other (Dis)Information Undermining WMD Arms Control: Considerations for NATO,” NATO Committee on Proliferation, Speech presented to the NATO Committee on Proliferation, July 12, 2022, https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/3768119/presentation-russian-and-other-disinformation-undermining-wmd-arms-control-cons/

33 Demetri Sevastopulo, “Antony Blinken: ‘China has Been Trying to Have It Both Ways,’” Financial Times, January 3, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/25798b9f-1ad9-4f7f-ab9e-d6f36bbe3edf

34 Patricia M. Kim et al., “China and Russia’s Strategic Relationship amid a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape,” Brookings Institution, March 6, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/china-and-russias-strategic-relationship-amid-a-shifting-geopolitical-landscape/

35 “EU-NATO Cooperation,” European External Action Service, March 26, 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-nato-cooperation-0_en

36 For more, see NATO’s CBRN defense policy: “NATO’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Policy,” NATO, last updated July 5, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_197768.htm

37 For more, see “CBRNE Strategy 2024,” Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland, December 11, 2024, https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/165973; “2023 Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” US Department of Defense, September 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3541619/dod-announces-release-of-2023-strategy-for-countering-weapons-of-mass-destructi/; “Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction in Military Operations (AJP-3.23),” Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom, September 28, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/allied-joint-doctrine-for-countering-weapons-of-mass-destruction-in-military-operations-ajp-323; and “NATO’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Policy,” NATO.

38 “Multinational Capability Cooperation,” NATO, March 3, 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_163289.htm

39 “Multinational Projects,” NATO, June 2014, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_06/20140602_140602-media-backgrounder_multinational-projects_en.pdf

40 “UKHSA Launches Campaign to Tackle Misconceptions on Antibiotics,” UK Health Security Agency, April 7, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukhsa-launches-campaign-to-tackle-misconceptions-on-antibiotics

The post How the US and Europe can deter and respond to Russia’s chemical, biological, and nuclear threats appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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