Security & Defense - Atlantic Council

Explore the #ATLANTICDEBRIEF series

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Ukraine’s most immediate contribution to European security is likely to be in terms of helping countries defend against the mounting threat posed by Russian drones. The Kremlin’s current harassing activities around airports and other strategic sites across Europe are essentially an annoyance, but even such small-scale drone operations have exposed an alarming lack of readiness. At present, it seems safe to say that the continent as a whole is utterly unprepared for the kind of large-scale Russian drone attacks that have become a routine feature of the war in Ukraine.

Europe has responded to escalating Russian drone activity by developing plans to establish a “drone wall” along the continent’s exposed eastern flank. So far, however, this initiative remains somewhat fragmented with no unified concept or central coordination. While a collective response could eventually prove effective, pursuing this goal without learning from Ukraine’s unique experience makes little sense. Only Kyiv has the data and insights necessary to build layered defensive networks capable of combating waves of Russian drones.

In recent months, a growing number of European countries have taken the practical step of seeking to tap into Ukraine’s drone warfare prowess by working with Ukrainian trainers or establishing joint production initiatives. “Ukraine’s experience is the most relevant in Europe right now. Our specialists and technologies can become a key element of the future European drone wall, a large-scale project that will ensure safety in the skies,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy commented in September 2025.

In addition to drone tactics and technologies, Ukraine can also offer its European partners an unrivaled environment for drone operator training and weapons development. The whole of Ukraine is now a vast drone warfare laboratory where novel threats are identified and addressed on a daily basis. As a result, new drone models and upgraded designs can move from the drawing board to the battlefield at a pace that is unheard of in peacetime Europe.

Drone warfare is just one of the many areas where Europe can learn from Ukraine. As European leaders explore new security strategies in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment, it should be abundantly clear that Kyiv has a crucial role to play. No other European country has such a battle-hardened army or intimate knowledge of modern warfare. In an increasingly unpredictable world, that makes Ukraine a vital partner.

Lesia Orobets is the founder of the Price of Freedom air defense initiative and a former member of the Ukrainian parliament.

The primary US policy tool—and the more immediate deadline—is TPS, a bipartisan humanitarian protection program that allows migrants from countries deemed unsafe to live and work in the United States for a temporary but extendable period. Haiti was first designated for TPS just days after a catastrophic earthquake struck the country in January 2010, and it has since remained eligible amid worsening political and security crises. As of March 2025, 330,735 Haitian nationals living in the United States had TPS, according to US Citizenship and Immigration Services. The US-based diaspora sends billions of dollars home each year in remittances, an economic lifeline for Haitians facing economic deprivation.

Barring further extensions, which are not expected at this point, TPS for Haiti is set to expire on February 3. After that date, Haitians in the United States will need to have another lawful status to remain in the country or risk deportation, even though crisis conditions persist in Haiti.

. . . and so does the TPC’s mandate

Just days after TPS ends, Haiti faces an internal deadline that reveals another layer of dysfunction: governance.

This year marks the country’s fifth without a president, its tenth without holding presidential elections, and its third without a single democratically elected official in power. On February 7, the TPC—the nine-member interim body currently running the Haitian government—will reach the end of its mandate.

Since 2024, the TPC’s principal duty has been to create the conditions needed to hold free and fair elections by the time their term expired. Despite undertaking several notable efforts, the TPC stated that the country’s unfettered security situation rendered elections “materially impossible” by the February deadline. The first round of elections is now set for August 2026, though experts warn the timeline will be difficult to meet absent meaningful security gains.

As the clock winds down on the TPC’s mandate, some members have launched a last-ditch effort to remove the sitting prime minister, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé. Appointed by the TPC and viewed as Washington’s preferred pick to run the government after February 7, Fils-Aimé has become the target of members’ efforts to maintain influence beyond the transition window. In response, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Fils-Aimé to offer support and restricted the visas of multiple members of the TPC.

There is little consensus on what will replace the TPC when its term inevitably ends. Will there be a power vacuum, and if so, will gangs fill it? Fils-Aimé has ruled out negotiations with powerful gangs regarding Haiti’s political future. This lack of clarity risks undermining legitimacy and further weakening the state’s capacity to combat the security crisis.

Consequences of these looming deadlines

While the expiration of both TPS and Haiti’s interim government in the same week is coincidental, the possible consequences of each could exacerbate Haiti’s internal crisis and expand the risks it poses to regional security.

In this context, the Trump administration’s decision not to renew TPS for Haiti risks accelerating the country’s decline and backfiring by fueling additional migration. In the absence of a stable government in place to manage returns, large-scale deportations to an already fragile country—even though the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has deemed it “safe” enough for return—could deepen internal displacement and drive more irregular migration, including to the Dominican Republic and the United States.

Early signs of this strain are already visible on the ground. With Toussaint Louverture Airport in Port-au-Prince closed for more than a year due to gang violence, US deportation flights have arrived in Cap-Haitien, a comparatively stable northern city already strained by internal displacement and limited municipal services. Cap-Haitien is also home to Haiti’s vital textile sector, which the US Congress recently voted to continue supporting through reauthorization of the HOPE and HELP Acts. Any large-scale increase in deportations could further overwhelm local capacity, risking the destabilization of one of the country’s most stable regions.

And the repercussions of these deadlines would extend beyond increased migration. According to the Organized Crime Index, Haiti’s porous borders and weak enforcement mechanisms have enabled transnational criminal networks to thrive, engaging in drug and weapons smuggling that is likely to continue. As of May 2025, two Haitian gangs—the powerful Viv Ansanm coalition and the Gran Grif gang—have been designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the US government, underscoring the security threat that they pose.

What Washington can do

Haiti’s overlapping crises are multi-pronged and deeply rooted, and no single policy measure will remedy years of state collapse. Amid renewed discussions of the Monroe Doctrine, past US involvement in Haiti—from the 1915 occupation to later interventions in the 1990s and 2000s—can rightly be critiqued for contributing to the erosion of Haitian institutions. Despite these challenges, it remains in the United States’ best interest to help restore a measure of stability in Haiti.

Redesignating Haiti for TPS would help advance the administration’s broader goal of ensuring the Western Hemisphere “remains reasonably stable and well-governed enough” to prevent mass migration to US borders. Extending TPS would provide humanitarian protection and create economic opportunity for Haitians while also giving Haitian authorities time to rebuild governing capacity after the TPC’s mandate expires. However, the Trump administration is unlikely to pursue this option.

But the administration has options to improve state capacity beyond immigration policy.

One is the UN-authorized Gang Suppression Force (GSF), which has received US support in its aim to both suppress violence and pave the path for eventual elections. Although intended to improve previous models, critics warn that the GSF, which is expected to reach full strength by summer, is still unlikely to produce meaningful results.

The GSF illustrates a long-recurring pattern in Haiti policy, in which external actors construct parallel structures separate from Haitian institutions to address short-term challenges, only to leave little to no state capacity once funding or political support inevitably dissipates. Rather than repeating this pattern, a comprehensive vision for US-backed security policy should explicitly prioritize training and supporting Haitian forces—whether that be the Haitian National Police or a revitalized national military—so that security gains can endure long after international forces depart.

The same logic should guide US thinking on a democratic transition. While holding elections is politically necessary and could help re-establish the rule of law, conditions on the ground mean a vote is currently infeasible and could result in a worse outcome than the status quo.

To ensure elections are the result of stability rather than a substitute for it, the United States should prioritize institution-building approaches such as the Global Fragility Act (GFA), which was signed into law by US President Donald Trump in 2019 and implemented under the Biden administration. Although the GFA has since lapsed (and Haiti is no longer listed as a target country), a similar whole-of-government approach would align US diplomatic, security, and development tools around bolstering Haiti’s resilient civil society and the preliminary work done by the TPC. The framework for this involvement already provides a clear roadmap—now it is up to lawmakers and policymakers to follow it.

Critics of US involvement in Haiti often argue that the country is beyond repair. Yet, if the United States wants to send Haitian temporary residents home and build a more prosperous Western Hemisphere, it should support positive change rather than compound Haiti’s crises.

The United States may not be able to deliver immediate prosperity in Haiti, but promoting stability through coordinated action that strengthens Haitian state capacity is firmly in the US strategic interest.

The post Haiti’s week ahead is the next test for Trump’s Western Hemisphere focus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

#AtlanticDebrief – What was the geopolitical significance of the EU-India summit? | A Debrief from Rachel Rizzo

nlawler — Fri, 30 Jan 2026 17:06:26 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

The EU-India summit came at a pivotal moment with both powers concluding the largest trade agreement either has ever signed, paired with a new security and defence partnership, elevating the relationship to a new strategic level. This marks a major shift in how both sides think about economic resilience and security cooperation, especially in a time of rising global and transatlantic uncertainty.

On this episode of the #AtlanticDebrief, Jörn Fleck sits down with Senior Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme Rachel Rizzo to debrief on the EU-India summit and the strategic rationale of increased bilateral cooperation.

ABOUT #ATLANTICDEBRIEF

SUBSCRIBE TO #ATLANTICdebrief

MEET THE #ATLANTICDEBRIEF HOST

Staff

Jörn Fleck

Senior Director

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Digital Policy Economy & Business

The post #AtlanticDebrief – What was the geopolitical significance of the EU-India summit? | A Debrief from Rachel Rizzo appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in Wall Street Journal on adversary nuclear capabilities

Atlantic Council — Fri, 30 Jan 2026 16:37:52 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On January 30, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in The Wall Street Journal on Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities amid discussions on renewing New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Wall Street Journal on adversary nuclear capabilities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Amato in RealClearDefense on the 2025 National Security Strategy

Atlantic Council — Fri, 30 Jan 2026 16:36:55 +0000

Original source

On January 29, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Paul Amato published an article in RealClearDefense on the Trump administration’s ambiguity on nuclear deterrence in the Korean peninsula. In the article, Amato argues that silence on the regime ending policy risks emboldening North Korea and unsettling South Korea and Japan.

Fellow

Paul Amato

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Missile Defense Nuclear Deterrence

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

The post Amato in RealClearDefense on the 2025 National Security Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine changes tone on Belarus and engages exiled opposition

Hanna Liubakova — Thu, 29 Jan 2026 22:05:12 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held his first official meeting with exiled Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya last weekend during a visit to Vilnius. Their meeting was the latest indication of a significant policy shift underway in Ukraine toward the country’s northern neighbor that could have implications for the wider region.

For years, Zelenskyy had kept the Belarusian democratic opposition at arm’s length as part of Ukrainian efforts to avoid angering Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka and pushing him further toward the Kremlin. That approach has brought few benefits. Ukraine now appears to have recognized that a new strategy to bilateral relations may be more appropriate.

Sunday’s meeting did not come as a complete surprise. Days earlier in Davos, Zelenskyy had identified Belarus’s 2020 pro-democracy protests as a turning point for the region and a missed opportunity for Europe. The Ukrainian leader argued that the democratic world made a mistake by failing to support nationwide protests in Belarus. As a result, the country now poses a threat to all Europe and serves as a forward base for Russia’s hybrid war against the West.

During his recent visit to Lithuania, Zelenskyy addressed the Belarusian population directly and expressed his support for their European future. He also met with recently released Belarusian political prisoners and paid tribute to Belarusian volunteers serving alongside Ukrainian forces in the fight against Russia’s invasion.

Ukrainian officials have recently made clear that Lukashenka and his regime must be held accountable for complicity in Russia’s aggression. Meanwhile, in a further indication that Ukraine is moving toward more systemic engagement with the Belarusian democratic opposition, plans have emerged to potentially appoint a special envoy and host Tsikhanouskaya in Kyiv.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Some analysts believe this recent change in tone toward Belarus may reflect the growing influence of former Ukrainian spymaster Kyrylo Budanov, who was recently appointed as President Zelenskyy’s new chief of staff. Budanov has long been involved in contacts with the Belarusian side and helped facilitate the transfer of released political prisoners to Ukraine in December 2025.

Kyiv’s apparent pivot may also reflect the fact that Russia’s military footprint in Belarus continues to grow. Ukrainian officials claim Russia uses Belarus to conduct drone attacks on Ukraine and evade air defenses. Lukashenka recently announced the deployment of nuclear-capable Russian Oreshnik missiles to Belarus, which Zelenskyy described as a threat to both Ukraine and the European Union.

Meanwhile, Russia’s integration of the Belarusian military industrial complex continues, with up to 80 percent of Belarusian enterprises reportedly now engaged in production for Russia’s military needs. Belarus is accused of supplying ammunition, providing repair services for Russian equipment, and channeling sanctioned technology to Russian defense companies.

Lukashenka is understandably eager to distance himself from any direct ties to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the available evidence indicates that his regime is becoming more deeply embedded in the Kremlin war effort. This is the reality confronting the Ukrainian authorities. As long as Belarus remains firmly under Kremlin control, it will continue to pose a serious security threat along Ukraine’s northern border.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Europe should be paying particular attention to indications of a new Ukrainian approach to Belarus. As US foreign policy priorities shift, responsibility for managing relations between Belarus and the West will increasingly fall on the European Union. EU officials must decide between freezing the Belarus issue or recognizing the country as a strategic challenge that requires European leadership.

Belarus has most recently made headlines due to a series of prisoner releases tied to partial US sanctions relief. The humanitarian impact of these deals should not be underestimated, but it is also important to underline that more than one thousand Belarusian political prisoners remain incarcerated. Some skeptics have argued that without a broader strategy, reducing sanctions pressure on Minsk in exchange for prisoner releases risks strengthening the current regime and reinforcing an oppressive system that imprisons political opponents.

This presents opportunities for Europe to demonstrate its ability to take the lead on the international stage. While the US seeks practical short-term results such as the release of political prisoners, Europe can push for more systemic change and democratic transition in Belarus. In this context, sanctions should be seen as a tool to undermine authoritarian rule rather than locking in the current status quo. This can be achieved by closing existing loopholes while targeting the revenue streams and logistical networks that sustain the Lukashenka regime and support the Russian war machine.

In the current geopolitical climate, any talk of a neutral Belarus is delusional. Lukashenka will not turn away from his patrons in the Kremlin voluntarily. If European policymakers wish to see genuine change in Belarus, they will need to demonstrate a readiness to increase the pressure on Minsk. The enticing prospect of future European integration can play a crucial role in these efforts.

Belarus now occupies a strategic position in Europe’s rapidly shifting security landscape. The country remains deeply involved in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and also represents a key challenge for European leaders as they seek to prove that the continent is capable of defending itself in an era when US support can no longer be taken for granted. The Ukrainian authorities clearly feel the time is right for a more proactive approach to Belarus. The question now is whether Europe will follow suit.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

read part two

About the authors

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow and board director at the Atlantic Council. Kramer has served as a senior political appointee in two administrations, including as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Robert J. Butler serves as the Managing Director for Cyber Strategies LLC.

Melanie J. Teplinsky is a cyber law and policy expert with over thirty years of experience spanning the private sector, government, and academia. She is an adjunct professor at American University, Washington College of Law (WCL); a senior fellow in the Technology, Law and Security Program at WCL; and a faculty fellow at American University’s Internet Governance Laboratory.

Explore the programs

The Atlantic Council Technology Programs comprises five existing efforts—the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), the GeoTech Center, the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, the Democracy + Tech Initiative, and the Capacity Building Initiative. These operations work together to address the geopolitical implications of technology and provide policymakers and global stakeholders necessary research, insights, and convenings to address challenges around global technology and ensure its responsible advancement.

The post The US needs a cybersecurity roadmap appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard: Grading Trump’s second National Defense Strategy

Atlantic Council — Thu, 29 Jan 2026 20:23:25 +0000

Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard:
Grading Trump’s second National Defense Strategy

On January 23, the Pentagon released the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), a document that builds on the previously released National Security Strategy. The NDS gives the Trump administration a chance to define the military threats facing the United States and how it plans to counter them. Read on to see how our experts grade the latest strategy.

Matthew Kroenig

Vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

This strategy marks a shift from past National Defense Strategies, with a distinctive focus on the Western Hemisphere. It correctly recognizes the risk of a simultaneous conflict, but would have benefited from more clearly defined goals.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

Prioritizing the homeland and the Western Hemisphere is distinctive and marks a shift from the past two National Defense Strategies, which both prioritized great power competition with China. The strong focus on both the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific, however, raises the question of whether hard decisions were taken about prioritization, or does this document instead reflect compromises between different factions within the administration focused on different theaters.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

Yes, this strategy contains a dedicated section on the current security environment that outlines the challenges posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and importantly recognizes the challenge of strategic simultaneity, the risk of multiple conflicts occurring in overlapping time frames. This section risks downplaying the threat from Russia and Iran. Several past administrations, going back to at least President Barack Obama, had also hoped to do less in Europe and the Middle East in order to pivot towards Asia, only to have serious security crises erupt and thwart their plans.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The strategy would have benefited from a dedicated goals section. Past NDSs have laid out broader, global defense goals, such as deterring attacks against the United States and its allies, defeating adversaries if deterrence fails, and assuring allies. This strategy does not articulate such overarching goals. To be sure, it mentions more specific goals in the sections on lines of effort, such as deterring conflict in the First Island Chain, but would have benefited from providing a clearer vision of success.

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of US foreign policy activities?

The strategy very clearly identifies four important lines of effort: defend the US homeland; deter China in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation; increase burden-sharing with US allies and partners; and supercharge the US defense industrial base. The section on China seems to incorrectly imply that a confrontational US stance raises the risk of conflict, when in fact the problem is the Chinese Communist Party’s stated revisionist goals.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

For more than four years, I have argued that the United States needs to do three things to resource the strategic simultaneity problem: revitalize the US defense industrial base, strengthen nuclear deterrence, and get allies to step up and do more. This strategy recognizes and affirms all three of these steps, with a heavy emphasis on revitalizing the US defense industrial base, which will be supported by US President Donald Trump’s promised $1.5 trillion 2027 defense budget, and increased allied burden sharing.

Joe Costa

Director, Forward Defense Initative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The strategy reaffirms longstanding US principles, such as nuclear deterrence, preventing adversary dominance in key regions, increasing burden-sharing, and reinvigorating the defense industrial base. It rightfully articulates the perennial problem that global requirements consistently outpace the demand of military forces, and therefore ruthless prioritization is required. The biggest risk is the reward and punishment approach toward allies and partners. Unquantifiable factors such as unity of purpose, trust, cohesion, and reliability are the essential elements for creating these durable military alliances. By largely ignoring the core values that hold US military alliances together, and explicitly stating that the Department of Defense (DOD) will prioritize cooperating with “model allies,” this strategy could create long-term structural risks that significantly limit the DOD’s ability to deter and prevail against adversaries.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

Yes. Homeland defense is explicitly tied to border security and US “military dominance” in the Western Hemisphere. Allies and partners are implicitly rewarded or punished to take primary responsibility for their own defense. Economic interests prevail over core values that underpin military cooperation, and the threats posed by the United States’ adversaries are deemphasized in favor of the main message, which is: keep your “demands reasonable and cabined,” and we can maintain a “sustainable balance of power.”

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

Persistent threats posed by the United States’ adversaries are deemphasized in favor of the larger message on deconfliction and deescalation. The strategy makes three key assumptions that deserve serious examination:

the DOD can achieve NDS objectives absent a coherent approach to allies and partners across the US government (e.g., if allied economies are hurt by tariffs, will they still spend more on defense?);
allies and partners will respond to US rewards and punishments in a way that aligns with NDS objectives; and
US adversaries will adjust their longstanding goals and accept the DOD’s “gracious offer” in favor of a “sustainable balance of power.”

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

Yes. The four priorities are clearly stated throughout the document.

Defend the US homeland
Deter China in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation
Increase burden-sharing with US allies and partners
Supercharge the US defense industrial base

Clear lines of effort

Lines of effort are defined with varying degrees of specificity. Tradeoffs exist between the four priorities. For example, forces off the coast of Venezuela, and the naval “armada” recently redeployed from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, limit what’s available now and potentially degrade future readiness to deter China in the First Island Chain. If this new strategic approach erodes trust with allies and partners, it could adversely impact their collaboration in areas that are essential to achieving the strategy’s end states. How the DOD manages and balances the risks that come with these tradeoffs will determine the success of the overall strategy.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

Further analysis is required, but aspects of the strategy likely will have to be modified. For example, the Congressional Budget Office estimates the Golden Dome could cost more than $800 billion over twenty years, with other estimates going even higher. In addition, the full impact of the DOD’s personnel actions is still unclear—including reported reductions to the cyber workforce, which could adversely impact homeland defense. Lastly, it remains an open question how allies and partners will react to this shift in US defense strategy.

Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident senior fellow, Geostrategy Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The NDS builds usefully upon the National Security Strategy (NSS) by carefully reflecting on the primary security threats to the United States and prioritizing those threats alongside the regional areas of greatest importance to core US interests. This exercise, while contrary to nearly four decades of US strategy, is both overdue and salutary in an era of rising great power threats and diminishing domestic resources. The NDS’s call for a wartime-level mobilization of the defense industrial base (DIB) reflects the seriousness of the challenge and the DIB’s criticality in meeting even the whittled-down priorities found in the NSS and NDS. Taken together, the NSS and NDS are an epochal shift in US strategy and represent a decisive break with post-Cold War conceptions of the United States’ limitless strategic bandwidth.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

As with the National Security Strategy, the NDS represents an abrupt break from the strategic documents from previous administrations of both political parties. The NDS rejects explicitly the need to uphold the “liberal international order” and instead prioritizes the capabilities and requirements needed to implement the core US interests outlined in the NSS: defense of the homeland, the Western Hemisphere, and a “free and open” Indo-Pacific.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

Building upon the NSS, the NDS captures both the greatest challenges facing the United States, beginning with China and its threat to the three core regions of US concern (the homeland, the hemisphere, and the Indo-Pacific), and the need to prioritize in a world of limited resources and domestic political constraints. By understanding the threats but also the limitations facing Washington, the NDS captures the unique environment at this moment in US security policy.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The NDS forces clear priorities and largely explains how the administration envisions converting those priorities, whether regions of focus or a renewed emphasis on a revitalized defense industrial base, into actionable policy. In its ruthless focus on avoiding previous periods of strategic overstretch, the NDS (like the NSS) succeeds in a goal-oriented approach to strategy.

Clear lines of effort

The NDS is anything but a laundry list, and the prioritization exercise it represents will have a cathartic effect on both resource allocation and the time and attention of government officials across the chain of command. For each priority, the NDS explains broadly how the administration will define success, which will be useful in holding officials to account for execution.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The strategy can be implemented but will face fierce congressional and institutional resistance by forcing prioritization on a bureaucracy and larger national security apparatus that has become accustomed to avoiding hard choices and doing everything, everywhere, simultaneously. The NDS is appropriate to available resources but must be advocated for consistently to avoid the inevitable mission creep that will be encouraged in many parts of Washington.

Imran Bayoumi

Associate director, GeoStrategy Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The National Defense Strategy makes clear the priorities of the Department of Defense. It has clear goals and lines of effort but lacks detail in how it plans to achieve these stated outcomes. The strategy overlooks key regions and allies, such as Taiwan and Australia, and risks underestimating the threat posed by China. Failure to account for the strategic reality and the nature of the threats that the United States finds itself facing will make it harder to achieve the goals set out within the strategy.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

The 2026 National Defense Strategy builds on the 2025 National Security Strategy with its clear focus on defending the homeland, with the claim that “for decades, America’s foreign policy establishment neglected our nation’s Homeland defenses.” But past NDSs have also prioritized the homeland, including the 2022 NDS, which listed “Defending the homeland” as its top priority, albeit while recognizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a pacing threat. The strategy is distinct through its continued promotion of the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, but this concept is not expanded on throughout the document.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The strategy rightly recognizes that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea all pose threats to the United States, but it does not mention China’s position towards Taiwan and seemingly downplays the global threat posed by Russia in Africa, the Arctic, and elsewhere. In Africa, the focus only on the threat from “Islamic terrorists” ignores the support provided by China and Russia to governments across the continent. At the same time, the strategy overstates some threats, saying that in the past “U.S. access to key terrain like the Panama Canal and Greenland was increasingly in doubt,” which is not true.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The strategy has four clearly defined goals that build on the priorities set forth in the National Security Strategy.

Clear lines of effort

The strategy clearly lays out four lines of effort that build on the defined goals, but some are more detailed than others. More clarity on how the DOD seeks to deter China or supercharge the defense industrial base would be helpful.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The strategy calls for having allies in Europe, in the Middle East, and on the Korean Peninsula take on more of a role in their own defense but does not detail changes in US force posture or presence that would likely be expected with such an announcement. The lack of details makes it difficult to understand how exactly the strategy will be implemented and how challenging it will be to do so.

Explore the program

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard: Grading Trump’s second National Defense Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s defense tech sector can play a key role in economic security

Eric K. Hontz — Thu, 29 Jan 2026 20:22:33 +0000

Ukraine’s defense tech and dual-use sector is a rare wartime success story, with over six hundred innovative and combat‑tested firms becoming increasingly attractive to international investors. However, the future growth of this sector is constrained by obstacles including export licensing bottlenecks, currency controls, weak intellectual property protection, inconsistent consultation between government and business, and fears that old problems including corruption and rent-seeking could re‑emerge.

The Ukrainian government has an obvious interest in supporting the growth of the defense tech sector, but many officials believe the top priority remains preventing strategic vulnerabilities. The list of potential threats includes infiltration by corrosive capital, a loss of sensitive technologies, and systemic risks arising from insufficiently regulated markets. Experts emphasize the need for new policy instruments, clearer definitions, monitoring systems, and alignment with G7‑style economic security practices. So far, discussion of these issues remains mostly conceptual, leaving businesses uncertain about rules, timelines, and risks.

Ukraine’s economic security debate is currently being shaped by three overlapping realities. First, the global economy has shifted away from maximum trade liberalization toward a more security-based paradigm, particularly in strategic sectors such as defense, energy, critical minerals, and advanced technology. Second, Ukraine is fighting a full‑scale war, making economic resilience and industrial capacity existential concerns rather than abstract policy goals. Lastly, Ukraine’s defense and dual‑use sectors have undergone an unprecedented transformation since 2022, emerging from a prewar model dominated by state enterprises to become one of the most dynamic segments of the Ukrainian economy.

The core question now is not whether the state should intervene, but how to design intervention that protects national interests without suffocating private initiative or driving away international investors. This means finding the middle ground between security and economic freedom. Democratic Ukraine must seek to strike a better balance than its authoritarian adversary in order to enable the kind of continued defense tech innovation necessary to prevail on the battlefield and increase deterrence.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

There are currently concerns that Ukraine’s fast‑growing defense tech sector risks inheriting longstanding governance problems including opaque procedures, slow decision‑making, and uneven enforcement. Recent corruption scandals in Kyiv have already damaged trust, creating what some businesses have described as “negative expectations.”

From the Ukrainian government’s side, there is recognition that institutions are still adapting, with many of the available economic security tools still fragmented or not yet fully operational. This represents an opportunity for Ukraine if the country is able to build governance structures tailored to strategic sectors rather than retrofitting existing and outdated bureaucratic models. Creating a new generation of transparent institutions to address defense sector exports, investment screening, and procurement could become a competitive advantage for Ukraine if designed with private sector input from the outset.

Export licensing is one of the most acute potential bottlenecks. Ukraine’s defense tech businesses currently face a process requiring excessive approvals from multiple institutions, with little accountability or predictability. There is also a perception of unequal treatment, undermining confidence in the system. Ukrainian officials, meanwhile, tend to stress the necessity of strict controls to prevent leakage of sensitive technologies.

A risk‑based and tiered export control regime could address these concerns. By clearly defining a narrow list of highly sensitive technologies requiring strict oversight, the Ukrainian authorities could create faster and more predictable export pathways for less sensitive defense and dual‑use products. This would support economic growth while preserving core security interests.

Wartime currency controls and capital movement restrictions severely limit the ability of Ukrainian defense sector companies to expand internationally. Multiple investors have noted the paradox of profitable Ukrainian firms being unable to deploy their own capital abroad, forcing them to raise funds outside the country simply to operate globally.

From the perspective of Ukrainian policymakers, currency restrictions are viewed as necessary to preserve macro‑financial stability and to prevent capital flight. Targeted exemptions for vetted defense and dual‑use companies, particularly those pursuing foreign acquisitions or joint ventures aligned with national priorities, could unlock growth without undermining financial stability. Such a mechanism would signal trust in compliant firms and reward transparency.

Another key issue is intellectual property (IP). Standard IP processes are too slow for wartime innovation cycles. In the dynamic current environment, Ukrainian companies rely on trade secrets and know‑how rather than formal patents, but this increases risks when partnering internationally.

Ukrainian officials acknowledge the importance of innovation but have so far only been able to offer limited concrete solutions. Accelerated IP pathways for defense and dual‑use technologies, combined with support for joint research and development frameworks with trusted foreign partners, could help Ukrainian firms secure protection in allied jurisdictions while strengthening international integration.

Eurasia Center events

Nonresident Senior Fellow, N7 Initiative

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

There is a degree of uncertainty in Ukraine’s expanding defense tech sector that can be seen in inconsistent terminology, unclear boundaries, and undefined red lines. A shared vocabulary and published strategic framework, co‑developed by the public and private sectors, could help reduce this uncertainty.

Different priorities lead to diverging visions. Defense tech industry executives and investors tend to view the issue of economic security primarily through the lens of scalability, competitiveness, and speed. Their key assumptions include the notion that innovation thrives in predictable, transparent environments.

Many also argue that Ukraine’s combat‑tested technologies represent a unique global opportunity, while cautioning that excessive controls risk pushing talent, capital, and IP abroad. With this in mind, industry representatives and investors generally support targeted security measures but fear blanket restrictions that treat all technologies and companies as equally sensitive.

Ukrainian officials tend to frame economic security primarily as a defensive necessity. They warn that adversaries actively use markets, investment, and technology transfer as weapons. Many are also concerned that under‑regulation could result in irreversible strategic losses. Naturally, their perspective prioritizes caution, monitoring, and alignment with allied security frameworks, even at the cost of slower growth.

The central tension here is time-based and risk‑based. Businesses operate on market timelines and accept calculated risk, while governments operate on security timelines and seek to minimize worst‑case scenarios. Without structured dialogue, these differences manifest as mistrust rather than complementary roles.

If managed effectively, wartime Ukraine’s approach to economic security in the defense tech and dual-use sectors could become a model for the country’s broader postwar reconstruction. Ukraine has the opportunity to redesign institutions in a strategic sector that already commands global attention. Success may depend on whether government policy is seen by businesses as a partnership or as an obstacle.

Constructive cooperation grounded in transparency, risk‑based policy, and continuous dialogue can transform economic security from a constraint into a catalyst for Ukraine’s long‑term strength and sovereignty, providing significant security benefits for allies and partners along the way. This is a realistic objective. After all, industry, investors, and government all ultimately seek the common goal of a resilient, innovative Ukrainian economy integrated with democratic allies and protected from adversarial exploitation.

Bridging the gap between perspectives is less a matter of ideology than of process, trust, and execution. Ukraine is currently in a period of transition that is marked by many significant challenges but no irreconcilable obstacles. Industry and investors are ready to scale globally while the government is racing to build safeguards against unprecedented threats. The task now is to synchronize these efforts.

Eric K. Hontz is director of the Accountable Investment Practice Area at the Center for International Private Enterprise.

South Korea

The Philippines

Australia

Taiwan

The NDS’s emphasis on allies is reassuring for Japan, but questions over commitments remain

For Japan, the United States’ new NDS and its emphasis on working with Indo-Pacific allies to strengthen “collective defense” in the First Island Chain provided some assurance. But the NDS also further underlined long-standing questions about the Trump administration’s intentions and expectations toward allies.

To some extent, the NDS brought a sigh of relief in Japan, given that there were concerns about how the Trump administration’s focus on the Western Hemisphere and the administration’s arguably somewhat softer posture toward China in recent months would impact Washington’s defense efforts and regional partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. In this light, the NDS was reassuring, as it did not completely de-prioritize the Indo-Pacific region.

Still, some concerns remain. Above all, while the NDS suggests that the United States will deter full-scale aggression by China, much remains unknown about Washington’s posture toward the gray-zone situations that persist in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the NDS makes clear its demand that allies and partners “take on a greater share of the burden,” adding pressure on states like Japan to increase defense expenditures and take on a more proactive defense role. Combined with the United States’ strategic ambiguity toward China and North Korea, Japan remains concerned about when and how Washington will respond if a contingency were to erupt. Such ambiguities and gaps undermine progress toward enhancing strategic, operational, and tactical readiness of the bilateral alliance US-Japan alliance, as well as US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation and other vital frameworks in the Indo-Pacific region.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

The NDS’s call for collective defense of the region is thin on details

From Seoul’s vantage point, two phrases stood out most: “critical but limited support from U.S. forces” and “collective defense” along the First Island Chain.

If the premise is that Seoul—and other regional allies—assume primary responsibility in the conventional domain, a central question is whether (and how far) that logic could bleed into the nuclear backstop. This would mark, not a “shift” in declaratory terms, perhaps, but a perceptible change in the visibility, tempo, and scope of the United States’ provision of extended deterrence.

At the same time, while the latest NDS and National Security Strategy both prescribe building “collective defense” in the region, both documents are notably thin on how Washington intends to operationalize it. The NDS states that the United States will seek to “make it as easy as possible for allies and partners to take on a greater share of the burden of our collective defense, including through close collaboration on force and operational planning and working closely to bolster their forces’ readiness for key missions.” Yet it avoids specifying the connective tissue—South Korea–US–Japan trilateral cooperation, or other mini- or multilateral pathways—that could be the key means to implement the concept.

None of this, however, makes me doubt that the South Korea–US alliance will keep adapting; if anything, Seoul’s description in the NDS as a “model ally” reinforces that expectation. But precisely because adversaries look for seams, the United States and South Korea need tighter communication, coordination, and signaling—so that capability shifts or posture adjustments do not create deterrence vacuums or generate unnecessary provocation in the region.

—Bee Yun Jo, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and research fellow in the Security Strategy Division at the Sejong Institute.

Manila has a ‘pragmatic’ response to the NDS amid tensions with China

The reaction in Metro Manila to the Pentagon’s 2026 NDS has been largely pragmatic and firmly Philippine-focused. The softer language on China has not generated public backlash among government officials, politicians, and policymakers. This is largely because Philippine policy debates are driven less by Washington’s terminology than by concrete security conditions in the West Philippine Sea, domestic development imperatives, and existing military cooperation with the United States anchored by the National Defense Authorization Act.

At the same time, there has been a subtle recalibration among some Philippine policymakers toward a more pragmatic approach to economic engagement with China. This shift has been hinted at by the Philippines’ ambassador to the United States, Jose Manuel “Babe” Romualdez, who has argued that persistent geopolitical frictions should not preclude selective economic cooperation with China. This recalibration reflects growing concern that the Philippines is falling behind regional peers, particularly Vietnam, whose manufacturing sector has expanded rapidly through export-oriented growth and deeper integration into global supply chains. Economic underperformance has also become increasingly visible in tourism vis-à-vis neighboring countries, prompting policy responses aimed at stimulating demand. One such measure has been the introduction of fourteen-day visa-free entry for Chinese citizens, a move widely interpreted in Manila as economically motivated rather than geopolitical signaling.

However, this pragmatism has not translated into accommodation toward Beijing on sovereignty issues or political influence. This week, Philippine senators across party lines signed a resolution condemning what they describe as verbal attacks and intimidation by Chinese officials against Philippine institutions defending the West Philippine Sea. In addition, the publicly disclosed meeting between the Chinese ambassador to the Philippines and Davao City Mayor Sebastian “Baste” Duterte drew scrutiny in Manila political circles. The meeting’s timing coincided with heightened tensions in the West Philippine Sea, reinforcing concerns about political signaling and elite influence pathways, anxieties that have been shaped by China’s prior patterns of elite engagement across Southeast Asia.

—Alvin Camba is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Australia will welcome clear messaging on China and an emphasis on re-industrialization

On the surface, the 2026 NDS is a radical departure from its predecessors. Its bombastic rhetoric, political focus, and sharp tone make it an unconventional document and in key areas it represents significant policy shifts, particularly as it relates to European allies and the threat Russia presents. Moreover, while it repeatedly states that it is not isolationist in nature, the document also heavily emphasizes a refocus to its own region through the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Beneath the surface, however, there is also a lot of continuity, and for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific there is a lot in the document to be reassured by.

For Australia, the clear articulation of the threat China poses, the need to deter rather than confront, along with a clear message to China on what the United States considers an acceptable balance of power in the region will be encouraging, particularly as China has often exploited the strategic ambiguity of previous policy documents. However, the lack of any mention of Taiwan or how the United States will view a potential crisis there will create uncertainty and anxiety.

But the acknowledgment of the speed and scope of the threat China poses, and reassurances that the United States will continue to support efforts to stand up to it will be well received in Canberra. The need for increased burden sharing and re-prioritization of effort have reverberated throughout the national security community for over a decade and will come as no surprise to Australian policymakers. Moreover, the emphasis on re-industrialization is a trend already under way there, and the NDS’s language will be viewed as a seriousness of intent on the part of the United States. While the document is simplistic and short on details, its strength is the clarity of messaging and pragmatic views on the reality of regional and global threats. For those in Australia, that statement will be well received.

—John T. Watts is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served as a senior policy advisor to the US Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy and a staff officer at the Australian Department of Defence.

The NDS leaves unanswered questions about what a ‘decent’ US-China peace would mean for Taiwan

Taiwan is concerned about being left out of US defense perimeters and becoming seen as primarily an economic issue, rather than a security one, for Washington.

The clearest sign is that the 2026 NDS does not mention Taiwan by name at all. There is also the softening in NDS language concerning China. The 2018 NDS from Trump’s first term referred to China and Russia as “revisionist powers”; the 2026 NDS no longer does. This raises the question of whether China’s repeated claim that it will annex Taiwan, by force if necessary, is no longer considered an act of revisionism.

The NDS does talk about the importance of deterrence by denial and pledges to “make clear that any attempt at aggression against U.S. interests will fail.” But is defense of the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait still a US interest?

The answer is unclear. The NDS mentions five areas where the United States will prioritize the provision of “critical but limited support from U.S. forces,” and the Taiwan Strait is not one of them.

Furthermore, while it may be reassuring for some to read the NDS’s promise “to prevent anyone, including China, from being able to dominate us or our allies,” Taiwan is not a US ally.

The NDS does say that all nations should “recognize that their interests are best served through peace and restraint.” Is “restraint,” then, what the United States expects from Taiwan?

The NDS also calls for reaching a “decent peace” with China, stating later that such an accord “on terms favorable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under is possible.” This language brings back the long-standing specter of a US-China “grand bargain” over Taiwan. Especially since Beijing has long seen Taiwan as nonnegotiable and a core interest, Washington seeking to strike a deal on “terms that China can accept” is not generating much optimism inside Taiwan.

Yet with crisis comes opportunity. Taiwan’s strategy should be threefold. First, Taiwan needs to reassure domestic audiences that Taiwan is not mentioned in the NDS because strong US-Taiwan relations are now a given. Second, increase Taiwan’s defense spending to show that Taipei is not a security free-rider and is doing its fair share. To this end, Taiwan’s defense spending is set to reach 3.32 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2026, and Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te has pledged to reach 5 percent of GDP on defense spending before 2030. Third, Taiwan needs to contribute to the Trump administration’s reindustrialization agenda. Taiwan has made progress in this area as well. This month, Taiwanese companies committed to investing at least $250 billion in the United States, especially in the semiconductor and technology sectors.

Taken together, Taiwan is seeking to signal that it is an understanding, responsible, and helpful partner to the United States, one that is too valuable to let fall into Beijing’s hands.

—Wen-Ti Sung is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

The post What the Indo-Pacific thinks of the new US National Defense Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Congress has championed the Abraham Accords. Here’s how it can push them forward.

Adam Kozloski — Thu, 29 Jan 2026 17:10:43 +0000

Bottom lines up front

Congress has been the most consistent supporter of the Abraham Accords and should pass additional authorizations and appropriations to advance them.
Lawmakers should pursue legislation that bolsters US leadership on regional economic and trade cooperation, helping lay the groundwork for the Middle Eastern prosperity envisioned by the Abraham Accords.
Congressional actions should include restoring the Abraham Fund, mandating consistent trade delegations to the region, and providing targeted bilateral leadership through congressional delegations.

Introduction

Following a brief respite after a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas brokered by US President Donald Trump, and in the wake of the twelve-day war and US-backed strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Middle East appears once again to be sliding toward broader instability. Fractures among the Gulf states over Yemen’s future, growing instability inside Iran, and ongoing efforts to stabilize Syria are only some of the complex challenges confronting the region.

Despite these pressures, the Abraham Accords have endured, reinforcing their long-term significance. The United States—through both executive and congressional leadership—has continued to champion their success. Yet after Congress failed to reintroduce the Regional Integration Normalization Act (RINA) following the disgraceful exit of its former sponsor, Senator Bob Menendez, congressional engagement has largely become incremental and narrowly focused on defense relationships. This need not be the case.

In the summer of 2025, the Atlantic Council’s regional integration project—dedicated to strengthening cooperation between the United States, Israel, and Arab and Muslim countries—led its first-ever congressional delegation focused on the Abraham Accords to the Middle East amid the twelve-day war. Bipartisan engagement with Abraham Accords countries—then, as now—across areas such as interfaith dialogue, trade, and regional investment demonstrates that meaningful progress on normalization is possible, and may even accelerate, during turbulent times. This issue brief offers recommendations for Congress to reassert its leadership role in supporting the Abraham Accords and to expand the scope of US engagement on normalization and regional prosperity.

Advance regional prosperity through the Abraham Accords

Recommendation one: Expand business and commercial delegations supporting the economic integration of Abraham Accords countries.

US trade missions are an essential bridge for US and foreign companies to connect and identify areas of mutual interest. Congress should consider requiring an annual US trade mission focused on a topic of high interest for regional integration, including travel to multiple Abraham Accords countries.

Following the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, then Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin led a trade delegation to Israel, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to support the “expanded economic cooperation” promised by the Accords and announced the Abraham Fund—a planned $3 billion fund designed to support private-sector-led development projects. However, lower-level but consistent missions are also crucial to facilitate regional economic integration and prosperity. In 2022, the US Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration led two trade missions to the Middle East: one to Israel, Bahrain, and the UAE, engaging aerospace and defense industries, and a flagship “Trade Winds” mission to the UAE that included an optional visit to Israel or Morocco before the main event. While these missions succeeded in connecting US firms with regional industries, there have been fewer recent US-led trade missions supporting regional integration through multi-country engagement. Against this background, Congress should make regional integration a clear priority when it benefits US commercial interests and consider codifying support for the Abraham Accords.

Recommendation two: Expand Abraham Accord Caucus engagement on regional economic projects, including the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a proposed transportation, energy, and digital corridor designed to provide more efficient and resilient infrastructure capable of meeting the needs of a changing global economy. It could serve as the backbone for regional integration while unlocking substantial economic incentives by leveraging the Middle East’s role as a bridge between Europe and Asia. If the United States can help shape IMEC development—setting standards for ports and digital infrastructure, identifying opportunities for US companies, and countering influence from Russia and China—it could effectively balance against China’s Belt and Road Initiative while reasserting US economic leadership in a critical region.

The Abraham Accords Caucus co-chairs and congressional committee leaders should organize regular briefings with both the administration and relevant private-sector stakeholders to explore how the United States can influence the development of IMEC and ensure opportunities for US companies. While Congress has advanced political and security integration initiatives, economic integration, which is foundational for regional peace and prosperity, has received less attention. IMEC and similar initiatives offer an opportunity for Congress to do more on this front. The Abraham Accords Caucuses should also establish staff-level working groups for frequent engagement on economic integration projects. Recent efforts by Representatives Brad Schneider (who joined the June congressional delegation) and Blake Moore to launch a House Abraham Accords Caucus trade working group offer excellent platforms for such briefings. Additionally, the Abraham Accords Caucus should coordinate with the US Department of Commerce to identify businesses and industries that could benefit from regional integration, generating district- and state-level connections that strengthen Middle East prosperity.

Recommendation three: Formally authorize and support the Abraham Fund and prioritize regional Abraham Accords projects for US International Development Finance Cooperation support.

After the signing of the Abraham Accords, the United States, Israel, and the UAE established a $3 billion fund to support private-sector investments and development initiatives advancing regional economic integration. Efforts by the US International Development Finance Cooperation (DFC) late in the first Trump administration attempted to energize the fund, including a call for proposals for projects in Morocco and a $50 million commitment from Uzbekistan. However, since a 2021 interagency review under then-US President Joe Biden, no public activity has been registered regarding the Abraham Fund.

In 2023, Congress signaled continued interest in supporting economic integration through Section 8 of the RINA, which would have authorized the creation of the “Abraham Accords, Negev Forum, and Regional Integration Opportunity Fund” with $105 million, enabling the US secretary of state to support interagency projects including the Abraham Fund. While this number was far lower than the Abraham Fund’s announced $3 billion, it demonstrated robust bipartisan support for US diplomatic leadership and the potential for a rigorous approach to leveraging development finance. Congress should build on the RINA example by authorizing and appropriating funds for regional economic integration projects while maintaining the current framework for special envoy leadership of the fund and clarifying the role of such an envoy in fund dispersal. By building on recent changes to DFC through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 , Congress can advance the Abraham Fund in parallel with other new initiatives.

Institutionalize and expand US diplomatic leadership on the accords

Recommendation four: Allow exceptions for a dual-hatted Abraham Accords envoy.

Both the Biden and Trump administrations have demonstrated commitment to senior official engagement on expanding the Abraham Accords. Under Biden, this included the appointment of Dan Shapiro, former ambassador to Israel, as the first Abraham Accords envoy. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, Congress codified the role of Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords, Negev Forum, and Related Integration and Normalization Fora and Agreements. However, despite the creation of this new role, no one has been nominated to the Senate-confirmed position. Members of Congress have expressed interest in seeing the vacant slot filled, including in a widely signed letter in January 2025. One possible reason for the vacancy is that legislation codifying the role explicitly requires that the individual “. . . shall not be a dual-hatted official with other responsibilities,” which may have discouraged both the Biden and Trump administrations from making a nomination. While there is significant value in having a senior official dedicated to advancing the Abraham Accords, the reality is that the kinds of strategic economic, security, and diplomatic cooperation associated with the accords can overlap with existing portfolios within the US government. For example, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff engaged on the Abraham Accords, but this represents just one of his many priorities.

Congress should consider modifying this restriction, enabling more senior US officials with synergistic portfolios to fill the position. This would enable the administration to formally designate a “lead” for the accords, elevating their priority.

Recommendation five: Authorize the State Department to lead a new strategic multilateral forum reflecting US and regional priorities.

While the Negev Forum had a robust start in 2022, a new strategic approach is needed to operationalize the goals of the Abraham Accords. Congress should direct the State Department to develop an updated plan for a new multilateral forum that regularly brings together senior officials, advancing strategic US and regional priorities in energy, investment, and security—topics not fully covered by the Negev Forum. This forum should learn from the disruption that the Negev Forum has experienced over the past two years and adapt to evolving regional dynamics. Congress should consider constructs similar to previous regional integration legislation, such as the Deterring Enemy Forces and Enabling National Defense (DEFEND) Act and the Learning Integrated National Knowledge for the Abraham Accords Act, which authorize specific objectives and activities for the executive branch to carry out and require measurable progress—through strategies, reports, and direct action—to meet congressional intent. Priority areas for multilateral coordination among accords countries include:

Regional security cooperation: While the present environment might not be conducive to a comprehensive security partnership, a new multilateral forum should incorporate a pathway for regional security cooperation. This could include building on existing platforms such as the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA) and leveraging ideas associated with past initiatives, such as the Middle East Strategic Alliance. Section 1299 of the recently passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 provides a foundation for the further expansion of C-SIPA by requiring an assessment of the agreement’s strategic importance and its potential expansion.
Traditional energy: Many Gulf states are seeking to diversify their economy away from fossil fuels. However, growing energy demand and the need for resilient, diverse energy systems mean that traditional energy sources will remain a critical part of the equation for the foreseeable future. Consequently, Israel, Egypt, and others have continued to develop natural gas and other traditional energy sources and have worked to integrate their projects across the region, leading to regional bodies such as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which includes both Israeli and Palestinian representation. In line with Trump’s executive orders titled “Unleashing American Energy,” the State Department should use a revived accords multilateral framework to explore how initiatives like the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum can support regional economic integration.
Investment: In addition to traditional energy, the State Department should encourage more integration in the financial space, including cooperation on regional investments and domestic barriers to intra-regional investments. This could include new forms of cooperation, such as around coordinated regulation of cryptocurrency consistent with the goals of the recent GENIUS Act. While this will take time and trust to build, integrating wealthier states with regional entrepreneurial projects would allow for an immediate and tangible demonstration of how the Abraham Accords advance participants’ prosperity. Efforts to advance investment and financial partnerships are familiar to Congress. Section 9 of the RINA, a bipartisan effort by the then-leadership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and all four Abraham Accords Caucus co-chairs in the Senate, outlines a directive for the special envoy for the Abraham Accords to negotiate the creation of such a financial forum.

Mobilize and deepen people-to-people and legislative exchanges

Recommendation six: Authorize and appropriate funds for interfaith religious dialogues to support tolerance and understanding across Abraham Accords countries.

The second paragraph of the Abraham Accords declaration supports promoting “interfaith and intercultural dialogue” to advance the accords’ mission of peace and prosperity. However, no State Department grants have yet been publicly made available to support interfaith dialogues across Abraham Accords countries. Such grants could support the work of organizations such as the Mimouna Association, which connects Jewish and Muslim youths through interfaith programming. The State Department’s reluctance to issue such grants contrasts with a bipartisan and bicameral effort by all eight House and Senate co-chairs of the Abraham Accords Caucus who formally requested their issuance in 2023. In addition to encouraging the use of existing funding for such efforts, the Senate included $1 million for such grants in Section 10 of the RINA. While the act remains only proposed legislation, Congress should revisit the oversight and appropriations efforts from 2023 and renew calls for interfaith and intercultural dialogue grants. The Trump administration has clarified that advancing and expanding the Abraham Accords is a priority. The Abraham Accords declaration clearly supports interfaith dialogues, and the promotion of such dialogues in the Middle East is particularly important in the current environment, as the region seeks to move past historical biases toward new bonds. Few interfaith efforts are as worthy of support.

Recommendation seven: Expand bilateral-focused congressional travel to Abraham Accords countries to support the accords.

While more than a dozen congressional delegations travel to the Middle East annually and engage with Abraham Accords partner countries, fewer delegations travel with the explicit objective of supporting regional integration. Unfortunately, even fewer congressional delegations spend sufficient time in a partner country to build the government-to-government ties essential for moving Abraham Accords countries toward further integration. The Abraham Accords Caucus, or another member-driven initiative, should organize more regular congressional delegations to Abraham Accords partner countries. These delegations should focus on specific projects or initiatives that can generate tangible improvements in bilateral cooperation, such as trade, and ultimately promote regional integration. Congress should look to the US Departments of Commerce, State, and Agriculture to help identify issues and topics that members can use to advance the bilateral relationship toward greater integration. Agencies can also assist in supporting the identification of shared commercial interests or frictions based on members’ constituencies.

Model legislation annex

The following legislative text is provided solely for educational and informational purposes as illustrative “model” language. It is not intended to advocate for or against the passage of any particular bill, nor to influence specific legislation pending before Congress. The sample provisions are offered to demonstrate how recommendations in this report could be operationalized in statutory form. Inclusion of this text should not be construed as lobbying activity but, rather, as a nonpartisan resource for policymakers, researchers, and stakeholders.

Read the full annex

Download PDF

About the author

Fellow

Adam Kozloski

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

Indo-Pacific Middle East

Explore the program

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

1. What’s the most likely outcome if Trump acts on his pledge to protect the Iranian protesters?

The post Congress has championed the Abraham Accords. Here’s how it can push them forward. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why Syria’s government must turn inward in 2026

Gregory Waters — Thu, 29 Jan 2026 11:30:00 +0000

Syria’s political and security landscape has not stopped evolving in the one year after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. 2025 saw major security incidents across the country in conjuction with significant structural state-building initiatives by the new government, but the year ended with most of the Sweida governorate and the country’s northeast still outside of Damascus’s control. Months of negotiations between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurdish-led armed group which controlled parts of Aleppo city and the northeast, had failed to achieve a peaceful integration of the two sides. Following renewed skirmishes between the two sides earlier this month, Damascus launched a widescale military operation that has, in a matter of weeks, returned most of the country to Syrian state control.

Both the negotiations and military operations against the SDF have relied heavily on the relationships the new government has built with the international community in general, and the US government in particular. These relationships are a result of a strong focus in 2025 by Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani on re-connecting Syria to the international world. Now, in 2026, Syria’s government must turn inward, prioritizing further domestic reforms and improvements. Chief among these are continued security reforms, economic development, and writing a new constitution.

Changing domestic perceptions

On November 25, thousands of Alawis took to the streets across western Syria. It wasn’t just the first Alawi demonstration since the fall of Assad; it was the first time the community had voluntarily held a protest to voice their demands in Syria’s modern history.

One resident of rural Jableh described the event to me a few days later with a proud smile on his face,“ I am fifty five years old, during my entire life any protest here was forced by the regime,” he said. “Yesterday was special, it was by our own free will, we said our demands and returned to our homes relaxed.”

The demonstrators had three demands: rejecting sectarianism, releasing the Alawi soldiers captured during the final weeks of Assad’s reign, and implementing federalism in the coast. The demonstrations were guarded against Sunni counter-protestors by the new government’s General Security Forces.

In the hours and days afterwards, many Alawi activists and residents of the coast—those who did and did not participate—spoke to me with pleasant surprise about the security forces’ professional conduct. Other commentators noted that it was the first time in Syria’s history the government had protected people criticizing it.

“So many were terrified of how the government would respond,” remarked a media activist from rural Jableh, “but we made our speeches and we were safe, and now the area feels relaxed for the first time.”

Several Alawi activists who had previously distrusted security forces told me that the day was a potential turning point in how they view local government forces.

“We trust the Ministry of Interior now, even if we don’t trust the government politically,” added the activist.

It was a stark change from the first months after Assad fell, when members of the nascent General Security forces were frequently accused of robbings and beatings, engaging in sectarian harassment, and at times executing Alawi civilians and ex-regime soldiers during raids on insurgents.

Their discipline in these most recent protests was a result of a year of reforms and institution building, reflecting broader developments across all Syrian ministries. This first year focused on rebuilding core state institutions, from security to basic administration.

Rebuilding government institutions

Outside of the public’s view, Syria’s new government spent much of its first year rebuilding the basic bureaucratic capacities of the state, which had been left gutted and derelict by the Assad regime. Regulatory agencies, courts, and basic services departments all needed to be repaired, staffed up, and streamlined. Critical but mundane state functions like water well licensing and civil registries took much of the year to rebuild. By the fall of 2025 many of these offices had begun functioning again, though often inundated with paperwork and requests from their communities.

In Homs, for example, the central court processes nearly two thousand cases a month involving administrative registrations such as property transfers, birth and death certificates, and marriage and divorce papers, a senior official told me in December. Of the twelve sub-courts across the Homs countryside, those in Palmyra and Qusayr remain non-functional due to physical damage while the courts in Talkalakh and Hassiyah are only partially functioning, having received only basic emergency repairs, according to the same official.

The massive task of (re)building the state forced the new authorities to adopt a pragmatic approach to employment. Most government employees today are the same people who were employed under the old regime. Even the Ministry of Interior (MoI) has retained non-Sunni administrative staff across several departments. Yet, every ministry still had to investigate and purge corrupt, regime-era employees or those who had criminal records, according to my discussions with officials from multiple ministries. Replacing these individuals with a qualified workforce has taken time. For the Ministry of Justice, it has been training a new batch of government judges and lawyers throughout the second half of 2025, with the first class slated to finish by early 2026.

Partial security reforms

These core state-building steps have begun to bear fruit in recent months. Governorate-level institutions have now expanded into the countrysides, and basic services like electricity have improved across both cities and the countryside (though to a lesser extent in the latter). Parallel to this, the new government had also undertaken the monumental task of creating new security and military forces. The MoI and Ministry of Defense (MoD) faced unique challenges and circumstances, each pursuing its own path and ultimately resulting in divergent outcomes. The MoI, responsible for civil policing and internal security, had to rapidly expand its forces while immediately dealing with the triple threat of ongoing Islamic State attacks, inter-communal and vigilante violence, and a growing ex-regime insurgency. The MoD, on the other hand, has had to merge dozens of armed factions with a long history of competition and violations against civilians into a single army.

Security reforms have been centered around internal accountability and coordination mechanisms. For example, Damascus formed the Military Police and Military Intelligence to monitor, investigate, and arrest security members implicated in crimes, and created additional command layers to strengthen command and control. Despite these structural improvements, Syrian opinions of the two security branches remain mixed. One year on, the MoI is generally viewed as responsive and professional, based on my months of fieldwork. Nearly every one of the activists and civilians that I have worked with over the past year have spoken about the improved professionalism and the positive engagement by most local MoI officials. Nonetheless, many remain unsure if this improvement is structural or simply, “a response to American pressure.”

Yet the army is widely distrusted due to its role in the March coastal massacres and July Sweida massacres. While its conduct has markedly improved during the fighting against the SDF in Aleppo and the northeast, many Syrians still distrust army units, especially compared to the MoI. Most army units have been pulled away from civilian areas, yet the presence of small bases on the outskirts of some rural areas remains a major complaint.

One man in southern Tartous governorate put concisely a feeling many have expressed to me in recent months: “Please just replace the army with general security checkpoints.”

Key goals in 2026

The first year of liberation saw the foundation laid for a new Syrian state. The two most important projects were the aforementioned security reforms and al-Sharaa’s tireless campaign to reconnect the country with the international community. Hundreds of diplomatic meetings in Damascus and international visits have succeeded in removing the final major sanctions against Syria and its leaders. Now, the country’s new government must prioritize three key domestic files: the economy, the constitution, and civil peace.

In September, I attended a meeting with al-Sharaa in which the president emphasized the importance of providing jobs and economic security to the entire country. Al-Sharaa has repeatedly linked economic development to social stability, something echoed by most Syrians I have met. Damascus is now largely unfettered in this pursuit as it enters its second year post-Assad, but it must begin to make tangible progress on the ground where most Syrians feel there has been little to no economic improvement.

The second most common complaint I’ve heard from Syrians is the lack of a new constitution or transitional justice for regime-era criminals. These two developments are directly linked and will likely be the two biggest milestones of 2026. Serious transitional justice steps have been delayed by the lack of a new constitution, as the current regime-era constitution lacks the necessary legal codes for trying regime officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Therefore, the first test will come when al-Sharaa appoints the remaining one-third of the People’s Assembly, whose first two-thirds were elected by committees across the country in August. The People’s Assembly will then be tasked with drafting a new constitution. The composition of the al-Sharaa-appointed third and the contents of this constitution will be closely judged and must reflect a commitment to equal rights under a civil state. Once ratified, this new constitution will allow for the full transitional justice process to unfold.

Despite the significant structural improvements that have been within government institutions over the past year, major fault lines remain within the society. These divisions are more nuanced than simple sectarian divides and are unique to each locality. For this reason, a local approach to national dialogue and inter-communal peace is required. The improvements that have been made within the MoI must be joined by improvements in local dialogues, particularly in coastal and central Syria, led by civil society and influential locals with the support of local security officials. These can take the forms of civil peace committees, civil councils, or civil and humanitarian work that brings together members of diverse communities.

Local security and political leaders will play a key role in addressing the grave security threats and civil strife prevalent across many regions. But their efforts are limited at times by ineffective or oppressive local officials, who can be damaging to trust building. This year should be one of local dialogue, both within communities and between them, with an expanded effort from the central government in Damascus as well as Syrian and international non-governmental organizations to work on social cohesion and civil peace. This requires consistent government engagement with local civil society as well as tangible changes on the ground regarding economic and security concerns.

The government would be remiss to view these solely as state-building files. Syria faces ongoing internal and external security threats exacerbating a fragmented society reeling from sixty years of Assad regime crimes. These three files are the foundations of Syria’s near future. Damascus should support the work of local and national activists, whether in civil peace initiatives or humanitarian outreach, to strengthen its approach to the constitutional drafting process and to local civil peace. Syria’s new government may feel confident in the real progress it has made in rebuilding the state after one year of liberation, but it cannot underestimate the difficulty it faces in gaining the trust of the country in year two.

Gregory Waters is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and writes about Syria’s security institutions and social dynamics.

The post Why Syria’s government must turn inward in 2026 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Syria’s Kurds could be al-Sharaa’s partners in rebuilding. Why did Damascus assault them instead?

Amy Austin Holmes — Wed, 28 Jan 2026 23:26:29 +0000

Among the unsung success stories of Syria’s transition after the fall of Bashar al-Assad were two agreements between the interim government in Damascus and Syrian Kurds—rare examples of peaceful compromise in a year marked by sectarian killings of other minorities, including Alawites and Druze.

The March 10 agreement between Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi and interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa was intended to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian army. The Aleppo Agreement, signed in Syria’s second largest city in April, was the first practical implementation of the March 10 agreement, because it entailed the integration of local police forces: the Kurdish Asayish and Internal Security Forces linked to the interim government.

When I visited Aleppo several months after that agreement was signed, it was still largely holding. I interviewed Hefin Suleiman and Nouri Sheiko, the two Kurdish signatories of the agreement, as well as officials from the Aleppo governor’s office. Both sides were committed to continuing to work together.

I also met a dozen Kurdish and Arab women in the Sheik Maqsoud Women’s House. The new flag of the Syrian government was on display in their spacious office. They told me proudly how they had applied for—and received—official permission to operate as a non-governmental organization (NGO) from Minister of Social Affairs and Labor Hind Qabawat, who is also the only female minister in the cabinet of the interim government in Damascus. They were genuinely eager to work with her and were planning a conference for women all across Syria. These Kurdish women in Sheik Maqsoud were literally working with Damascus down to the minutiae of complying with their rules and regulations for NGO registration. They, too, appeared committed to the Aleppo Agreement.

The Kurdish Asayish and Arab Internal Security Forces were already operating shared check points in Aleppo. In October, the SDF has submitted a list of their commanders who could serve in the Ministry of Defense in Damascus, as part of integration talks. And in other parts of Syria, the SDF and certain units of the new Syrian army aligned with Damascus had already begun coordinated activities under US supervision, as I learned during fieldwork in Syria in December.

But on January 6, Damascus launched an assault on Aleppo.

Some 150,000 people were displaced just in two days of fighting, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. An estimated 1,200 Yezidi families were caught up in the fighting, some of whom were resisting what Iraqi Member of Parliament Murad Ismael described as a “brutal attack” by the factions of the Damascus authorities.

Why did al-Sharaa launch an assault on the very people with whom he had signed not one, but two agreements? What went wrong?

A stalemate in negotiations

Both agreements were due to quiet US diplomacy. It was hoped they would help reunify the fractured country after over a decade of conflict.

US mediation efforts have been led by Tom Barrack, who is dual hatted as the US ambassador to Turkey and also special envoy to Syria. The mediation was a tough job, but it had already achieved important progress. The two sides did not trust each other, having fought against each other in the past. Al-Sharaa is the former commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which evolved out of Jebhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda offshoot. In an earlier phase of the war, Jebhat al-Nusra had fought against Syrian Kurds in the Kurdish People’s Defense Units, or YPG (the predecessor of the SDF).

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shibani, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi and US special envoy for Syria Tom Barrack stand after signing an agreement to restore normalcy in the city of Sweida, in Damascus, Syria September 16, 2025. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

This distrust was only compounded after sectarian killings of Alawites in the coastal regions in March, and then another round of killing in the Druze stronghold of Sweida. A Reuters investigation of the massacres of Alawites found that the “chain of command led to Damascus.” A United Nations investigation into the events in Sweida is still ongoing.

Kurds had reason to be skeptical of the new authorities in Damascus. After assuming power in Damascus, al-Sharaa has promoted several rebel leaders into positions of power who have been sanctioned by the United States for serious human rights violations. They include two notorious warlords. Sayf Boulad Abu Bakr, who had been sanctioned for kidnapping Kurdish women and abusing prisoners, was promoted to commander of the Seventy-Sixth Division overseeing Aleppo. And Mohammed Hussein al-Jasim, known as Abu Amsha, was promoted to lead the Sixty-Second Division in Hama. The US Treasury estimated that his militia generated tens of millions of dollars a year through abduction and confiscation of property in Afrin, where Turkey maintains a large security presence.

But Kurds were under significant US pressure, and the Syrian Kurdish leadership is pragmatic.

Furthermore, Kurds in Aleppo had survived under siege and managed to preserve control of the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah neighborhoods throughout the civil war. Now Assad was gone and al-Sharaa had made verbal promises about Kurdish rights—although no constitutional guarantees until now. So in April the Kurds agreed to withdraw their military forces from Aleppo and only maintain police forces, which would also fully integrate with the Syrian government’s police forces.

In other words, they agreed to place their trust in Damascus, knowing they would have no military forces of their own once the SDF withdrew—knowing they would be surrounded on all sides. For years, the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration has controlled a vast oil-rich region in the northeast, but it is not geographically connected to Aleppo.

The Aleppo Agreement in April was celebrated as a success story by both sides.

The Aleppo offensive, hate speech, and disinformation

Leading up to and during the government’s offensive in Aleppo and eastern Syria in January, there was an alarming rise of anti-Kurdish hate speech and disinformation, as well as more subtle attempts to undermine the SDF.

For example, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Interior in Damascus, Nour al-Din Baba, referred to them as the “so-called SDF” in an interview with Al Jazeera in late December. In the initial days of the Aleppo offensive, false news was circulated claiming that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi had said that the SDF intended to “fully recapture all of Aleppo.” Verify Syria debunked this as disinformation. In reality, the SDF had agreed to withdraw and had never controlled all of Aleppo to begin with. Less than a week later, a video clip was circulated on social media claiming to feature a former officer of the Assad regime who was positioned alongside the SDF in Deir Hafer. Verify Syria documented that it was a fake video generated using AI techniques.

The armed groups who carried out the assault on Aleppo have made their own videos where they refer to Kurds as “sheep” or “pigs” and posted them on social media. In one particularly horrific video, which has since been verified, the corpse of a woman was thrown out of a building as men celebrated and chanted Allahu Akhbar. The Kurds identified the woman as having been a member of the Internal Security Forces—according to reports—the very police force created by the Aleppo Agreement.

The Aleppo violence is even more tragic because Damascus and the SDF were on the verge of a larger national agreement to integrate their forces.

According to reporting by Al Monitor, it was Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani who interrupted the last round of US-brokered talks on January 4 between the SDF and Damascus. After abruptly entering the room, he asked that US Brigadier General Kevin Lambert leave the meeting, and promised that the talks would resume on January 8.

But before talks could resume, Damascus launched its assault on Aleppo on January 6.

Moving forward

On January 10, Barrack called for a return to the March 10 and Aleppo agreements. Turkish Ambassador to Syria Nuh Yilmaz said he also welcomed the return to the Aleppo Agreement, which allows for local governance in the two Kurdish neighborhoods.

In the days that followed, al-Sharaa’s forces continued their offensive against SDF-held areas, capturing large parts of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, areas the SDF had held after defeating the Islamic State. On January 17, US Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper called on al-Sharaa’s forces to “cease any offensive actions.” But the offensive continued.

As al-Sharaa’s forces moved east, chaos ensued and numerous detention facilities housing Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) militants were opened. According to one report, at least four separate detention facilities were opened, which collectively held some 33,500 ISIS militants. It remains unclear how many have escaped.

Forces aligned with Damascus have also taken videos of themselves desecrating SDF cemeteries in Hasakah in the northeast, an area controlled by the SDF for many years.

Understanding the origins of the violence in Aleppo is critical. While each side blames the other for the escalation, a full investigation will be needed to establish the facts. But it is equally important to examine the underlying conditions that made this eruption possible.

The Aleppo Agreement was proof that both decentralization and integration could work in practice.

Damascus had agreed that the two Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo could continue to provide their own local security, could continue to offer Kurdish language instruction, and that women could continue to serve in the police—just not at shared checkpoints with men. Both sides agreed to all of this, illustrating that the two major power blocs could come to a peaceful compromise and coexist. This set an important precedent for how other contested regions of Syria could potentially be integrated.

But Turkey remains influential in these negotiations. As early as 2015, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had said he will “never allow” a Kurdish statelet in Syria. After the fall of the Assad regime, he has continued to publicly state his opposition to the continuation of Kurdish-led local governance or decentralization in Syria. Al-Sharaa’s desire to assert control over all Syrian territory appears to have aligned with Erdogan’s own opposition to Kurdish self-rule. Furthermore, Erdogan may believe that by dealing the SDF another blow, that he can extract greater concessions from the peace process with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The PKK is a US and EU designated terror organization. The SDF is dominated by the People’s Defense Units (YPG), which Turkey views as an offshoot of the PKK.

On January 16, al-Sharaa announced a presidential decree “affirming the rights of Syrian Kurds.” While this is an important step, it could also be easily revoked by another presidential decree. Meanwhile, al-Sharaa’s forces continued their offensive into Kurdish-held areas. On January 18, a four-day new cease-fire agreement was announced. It has since been extended by another 15 days. This new timeline is divorced from the new realities on the ground.

Rebuilding trust will be even harder than before, and will take time.

Proper vetting of the various armed factions will also take time. The Islamic State militant who killed three US troops in December was a member of the Syrian government’s security forces. Al-Sharaa should prioritize rooting out jihadists from within his own ranks, rather than attempting to seize more territory and subjugate minorities.

Instead of pressuring the SDF to integrate on a rushed timeline that carries serious risks, President Trump should pressure al-Sharaa to remove sanctioned warlords from his army and guarantee equal citizenship rights for all Syrians. Al-Sharaa must accomplish this through a constitutional guarantee, not a presidential decree that could be easily revoked.

Amy Austin Holmes is a research professor of international affairs and acting director of the Foreign Area Officers Program at George Washington University. Her work focuses on Washington’s global military posture, the NATO alliance, non-state actors, revolutions, military coups, and de-facto states. She is the author of three books, including most recently, “Statelet of Survivors: The Making of a Semi-Autonomous Region in Northeast Syria.”

The post Syria’s Kurds could be al-Sharaa’s partners in rebuilding. Why did Damascus assault them instead? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The expert conversation: Should Trump strike Iran? What happens next if he does?

Jason M. Brodsky and Danny Citrinowicz — Wed, 28 Jan 2026 17:02:06 +0000

On Wednesday, US President Donald Trump posted on social media that a “massive” US armada led by the USS Abraham Lincoln was nearing Iran. “Like with Venezuela, it is, ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary,” he wrote.

Jason Brodsky and Danny Citrinowicz have years of experience working on Iran and thoughtful but significantly different viewpoints. After they engaged in a fascinating back-and-forth on X, we asked if they would expand the conversation about the opportunities, uncertainties, and risks associated with a US military strike on Iran.

Click to jump to a question and answer:

2. How might regime change in Iran happen?

3. What happens if the Iranian regime hangs on?

4. What would you recommend to the US president?

1. What’s the most likely outcome if Trump acts on his pledge to protect the Iranian protesters?

Brodsky: I urge humility in predictions of what will ensue should Trump decide to militarily intervene in Iran following the protests. In the lead-up to the decision, I think the president is engaging in his usual approach of simultaneously issuing confrontational and conciliatory messages towards Tehran. This forms the basis of a psychological operation to confuse Iranian decision-making, and it feeds into the Islamic Republic’s impression of Trump as unpredictable. That has benefits, as it keeps US adversaries off base.

Nevertheless, the president has a documented record in his first term of such military interventions following human rights abuses among autocratic regimes in the Middle East. He authorized airstrikes against the Assad government in Syria after it used chemical weapons against its people in 2017 and 2018. Trump criticized his predecessor former President Barack Obama for setting a red line and then retreating from action in 2013. Therefore, I believe this, coupled with the Islamic Republic’s historic weakness and his very public messaging that help is on the way, will motivate the president to act. He favors quick, surgical, targeted, dramatic, and decisive military operations, and this will be his likely approach, potentially combining leadership decapitations with degradation of Iran’s military and security apparatuses.

Such a US military operation in Iran would be unprecedented. Thus, it is difficult to assess with great precision what might follow it in Iran. It depends on the extent of the US strikes. The Islamic Republic is bigger than Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and it has institutions, plans, and procedures to fill the void should he be eliminated. Nevertheless, Khamenei has personalized his power to a significant degree in Iran, and that, coupled with the longevity of his rule, could have short-term destabilizing impacts. It is true that observers also speculated whether the Islamic Republic would be able to survive following the death of Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s first supreme leader, in 1989, given the singularity of his leadership. Yet the system endured. But Khamenei’s leadership style is different from Khomeini’s era, especially in his centralization of power around him and his office.

Questions remain: If the US government decides to target Khamenei, does it also target his son Mojtaba Khamenei, who is a key lieutenant of his father and considered by some to be a potential successor? There are also clerics such as Alireza Arafi, Hashem Hosseini Bushehri, Mohsen Qomi, Mohsen Araki, Ahmad Khatami, Mohammad-Mehdi Mirbagheri, Mohammad-Reza Modarresi Yazdi, Hassan Rouhani, and Ali and Hassan Khomeini, who are potential contenders to replace Khamenei.

Does the Trump administration target other military and political personalities in Iran, such as members of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and Defense Council? This would have the potential of being doubly destabilizing should Khamenei perish, as it is from this cohort that a constitutional interim leadership council is formed—the president, chief justice, and a member of the Guardian Council—if the Office of Supreme Leader is vacant. This could spark confusion and demoralization within the armed forces and security services as to the chain of command.

Citrinowicz: The latest wave of protests in Iran caught the United States by surprise, much as it did the rest of the world. Despite tough rhetoric from Washington, the reality is that the US government had no coherent plan for regime change in Tehran—and no meaningful operational capability to engineer political transformation inside a highly repressive, tightly controlled state.

Even now, it remains unclear how Trump intends to translate rhetorical support for Iranian protesters into effective policy. His statements and social media posts leave open two competing interpretations: that Washington seeks to leverage its substantial military presence in the Persian Gulf to pressure Iran on specific issues, such as its nuclear program and conventional military buildup, or that it harbors broader ambitions of undermining or even toppling the regime itself. The latter, however appealing rhetorically, is not grounded in strategic reality.

It is critical to recognize that US military action, limited or large-scale, is unlikely to catalyze mass political mobilization inside Iran. On the contrary, a strike would more likely consolidate elite cohesion around the regime, marginalize protesters, and reinforce Tehran’s long-standing narrative of external siege.

2. How might regime change in Iran happen?

Brodsky: Should there be a leadership void, there is the very distinct possibility of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) takeover, anointing an IRGC commander such as the speaker of the parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, to assume power.

There are other potential scenarios, including a total collapse of the regime. Yet this would require mass defections within the armed forces and security services. Iran’s own history has a precedent, in February 1979, when Air Force commanders from the pre-revolutionary government pledged allegiance to Khomeini, in an episode called the Homafaran Allegiance.

Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi is relevant here. His name has been invoked during the protests—he is apparently the only specific opposition leader for whom Iranians have chanted. Iranians demonstrating view him as not only a symbol but also a potential transitional leader. This does not mean every Iranian protesting for the fall of the Islamic Republic wants a return to the monarchy per se. But it would be a mistake to dismiss him as he embodies an enduring nostalgia for the Pahlavi era among younger generations. These Iranians view the Islamic Republic as a historic mistake.

Citrinowicz: Iran lacks a credible, organized opposition capable of governing the country, even in the unlikely event of regime collapse. For Washington, regime failure without a viable successor would represent not a victory but a strategic liability.

At present, there is no credible alternative pathway to a stable and democratic Iran.

Any attempt by the United States to impose regime change by force, whether through the assassination of Khamenei or the dismantling of the regime would almost certainly produce catastrophic outcomes. The most likely scenarios would be a full takeover by the IRCG or a descent into civil war. Iran currently lacks a viable domestic opposition capable of governing the country. At the same time, the exiled opposition, including figures such as Pahlavi, remains fragmented, weak, and organizationally unprepared to assume power.

Consequently, externally imposed regime change would likely result in a more repressive and unstable Iran, not a democratic and prosperous one. A more realistic strategy is strategic patience: allowing internal dynamics to unfold in the post-Khamenei era while maintaining and improving the enforcement of crippling sanctions. Sanctions should not be lifted prematurely. They remain one of the few effective tools for pressuring the regime until it is either forced to reform or collapses under its own weight. At present, there is no credible alternative pathway to a stable and democratic Iran.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei waves during a meeting in Tehran on January 17, 2026. (ZUMA Press Wire via Reuters Connect)

3. What happens if the Iranian regime hangs on?

Brodsky: The baseline for US policy moving forward should be that these protests have not stopped. They are merely paused because of severe repression. The drivers motivating Iranians seeking to oust the Islamic Republic have remained unchanged, and the grievances have only grown with time, with the system reaching a dead end and facing an economic crisis, a water crisis, an energy crisis, a deterrence crisis, and a crisis of confidence between state and society.

The Iranian system aspires for the United States and its allies to operate from the assumption that Tehran has the situation under control, there is nothing to see here, and the regime is going nowhere. But it would be misguided to center US policy on this regime-driven narrative.

Citrinowicz: Absent a fundamental change in Iranian regime policy, and despite its short-term success in suppressing recent protests, the Islamic Republic lacks the capacity to meet the basic economic and social needs of its population. As a result, regime change in Iran is highly likely in the long term, almost certainly following Khamenei’s death. The current system is not sustainable. This process may take months or even years, but as with the Soviet Union, continued stagnation without a dramatic ideological shift will eventually lead to collapse. Such a shift, however, is highly unlikely under Khamenei’s leadership.

This process may take weeks, months, or even years, but the outcome is inevitable. Iran is facing deep and persistent structural pressures: severe economic distress, deteriorating infrastructure, a collapsing energy sector, and recurring natural disasters. None of these challenges are temporary, and none are being meaningfully addressed.

While change is unlikely to be immediate, as long as the regime refuses to alter its policies and international economic and diplomatic pressure remains in place, its prospects will continue to deteriorate. Deeper ties with China, Russia, or the BRICS group cannot offset the impact of sanctions or structural mismanagement. Without sanctions relief, Iran’s economic situation will not improve, and renewed domestic unrest or internal change is only a matter of time.

Brodsky: The Trump administration should adopt a whole-of-government approach aimed at weakening the Iranian regime, using diplomatic, economic, military, kinetic, cyber, and covert tools.

First, the US government should freeze all diplomacy with the Islamic Republic. If the United States were to agree to a nuclear deal with Tehran now, the Iranians protesting would view it as an external US intervention to bolster the Islamic Republic when they want it gone. It would be seen as a betrayal. The Iranian protesters largely view the regime as irredeemable and incapable of reform.

Diplomacy between the United States and Iran since 1979 has repeatedly failed because of the ideological nature of the Islamic Republic, whose leadership has no interest in a rapprochement with the US government. It is also highly unlikely the current system of power in Iran will agree to the far-reaching concessions the Trump administration is demanding, as historically the existence of protests have not moderated Iranian negotiating positions.

The Iranian regime aspires to entrap the United States in a negotiating process because the process itself offers protection—in bolstering the currency and thwarting US military action—even without a deal. Iranian diplomats get something for just showing up. Whereas the US government would not.

Right now, unarmed Iranians are facing off against a highly armed state apparatus. That power differential should be reduced.

In addition to putting diplomacy on ice, the Trump administration should work with its allies and partners to more fully isolate the Islamic Republic diplomatically. They should seek to bar its representatives from leadership roles in international organizations, downgrade diplomatic ties with Tehran, especially in Europe, and work to deport regime-linked individuals residing in the West and freeze their assets to the extent permitted by law. In doing so, the US government can form an Iranian Elites, Oligarchs, and Proxies Task Force (IEPO), modeled after what it constructed with respect to Russia after it invaded Ukraine in 2022.

Second, the United States should continue levying economic sanctions against the Iranian regime—especially implementing the MAHSA Act to sanction the supreme leader personally for human rights abuses. Such designations deprive the Iranian regime of revenue, and the economic tailspin Tehran is facing is proof that US sanctions are eroding the power of the Islamic Republic. The Trump administration should proceed with this sanctions pressure for as long as this system endures. Designations of Iran’s supreme leader would also send an important symbolic signal to the Iranian people that the US government hears their calls and views Khamenei as an illegitimate leader.

Third, the US Justice Department and its partners around the world should seek to criminally indict Iran’s supreme leader and members of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Khamenei reportedly issued an order to the SNSC to “crush the protests by any means necessary” and to show “no mercy,” according to The New York Times. Such steps implicate these officials in crimes against humanity. Khamenei and the SNSC members should also be made to face additional legal exposure for their roles in approving assassination and terrorism operations throughout the West spanning years.

Fourth, the Trump administration should pursue targeted military action against Iran’s regime. The goal here would be to hold it accountable for its abuses of the Iranian people, deter the regime from further aggression, erode its ability to retaliate and repress its people, and provide the time, space, and resources to even the playing field for the Iranian people to reclaim their country. Right now, unarmed Iranians are facing off against a highly armed state apparatus. That power differential should be reduced. Along with such operations, the Trump administration and its allies should deploy their formidable cyber and covert capabilities to assist in this effort.

If the regime limps along after such military operations, the US government should maintain pressure on the system—especially using economic pressure and diplomatic isolation—to ensure that Iranians are one day able to fulfill their national aspirations. The goal here is to give Iranians the time, space, and opportunity to take their country back from the Islamic Republic.

Citrinowicz: The dilemma facing US policymakers is stark. Military action carries a high risk of regional escalation, threatens US partners and assets in the Gulf, and could draw the United States into yet another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict. Such an outcome runs counter both to American public fatigue with endless wars and to Trump’s own preference for short, decisive engagements with clear endpoints.

As a result, the most effective tools available to Washington remain economic and diplomatic pressure. Sanctions, international isolation, and sustained constraints on Iran’s access to global markets do not guarantee political change, but they do force the regime toward a strategic crossroads: either moderate its behavior and make limited concessions to reduce pressure, or maintain ideological rigidity at the cost of a deepening economic crisis and the long-term erosion of domestic legitimacy.

From a US standpoint, encouraging political change from within the existing system is far preferable to attempting to impose regime change from without, the latter a goal that is costly, unpredictable, and historically fraught. Even if Trump ultimately opts for military action, US interests would be best served by a symbolic, tightly calibrated strike, one aimed at preserving deterrence while enabling a controlled de-escalation and maintaining broader pressure on Tehran.

Ultimately, the challenge for the United States is not to overthrow the Iranian regime, but to manage a long-term confrontation in a way that constrains Iran’s ambitions, protects US interests, and leaves the burden of internal political change where it belongs: with Iranian society and Iran’s own political system.

US demands should focus narrowly on constraining Iran’s military and nuclear capacity.

The US administration should leverage its significant military presence in the Gulf to strengthen the enforcement of sanctions on Tehran, with a particular focus on preventing Iranian oil exports to China. The sanctions regime should be preserved and tightened wherever possible, until the Iranian regime demonstrates a genuine willingness to make the necessary concessions.

In any renewed engagement with Iran, Washington should reassert clear and non-negotiable demands: a complete abandonment of Iran’s enrichment capabilities, including the removal of all enriched material, alongside meaningful restrictions on its missile program. At the same time, it would be counterproductive to condition diplomacy on Iran’s stance toward Israel or the Abraham Accords. Introducing such demands would likely foreclose the possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough that, under certain circumstances, could help prevent escalation.

Accordingly, as long as Iran does not fundamentally alter its behavior, the United States should maintain and intensify sanctions enforcement while continuing to project deterrence and military credibility without resorting to direct military action. US demands should focus narrowly on constraining Iran’s military and nuclear capacity, rather than on its regional posture toward Israel. Military strikes should remain a last resort, as any attack carries a high risk of triggering a broader regional escalation.

The post The expert conversation: Should Trump strike Iran? What happens next if he does? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Trump’s National Security Strategy doesn’t downgrade the Middle East, it redefines it

Kristian Alexander — Wed, 28 Jan 2026 12:42:37 +0000

At the end of 2025, the White House released a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS) that reflects the strategic worldview of US President Donald Trump’s current administration. Like the 2017 NSS issued during Trump’s first term, this new document is branded as “America First,” but it goes further in its clarity, prioritization, and ideological framing. The 2017 NSS already emphasized border security, economic nationalism, sovereign decision-making, and a renewed focus on great-power competition, yet the newly issued NSS formalizes these instincts more sharply. It treats sovereignty, industrial revival, the end of mass migration, tight border control, and burden-shifting to regional partners as core national objectives rather than rhetorical elements of diplomacy. The subsequently released National Defense Strategy (NDS) reinforces this hierarchy by translating these political priorities into concrete force-planning choices, especially around Iran, Israel, and the role of Gulf partners as frontline regional security providers.

At the same time, Trump’s current NSS is more explicit than its 2017 predecessor in delineating a hierarchy of regions and interests. Whereas earlier versions still treated the Middle East as a central theater of policy execution, the new strategy bluntly states that not all regions matter equally at all times—and that the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific should receive the lion’s share of strategic attention. The NSS also reinforces the notion that economic security, energy dominance, and revival of the defense industrial base are fundamental to national security, not peripheral to it. Although the NSS is a statutory planning document and therefore binding on departments for implementation, Trump’s foreign policy style has always been adaptive, personalized, and operationally flexible. Thus, the NSS should be treated as a reliable directional guide, one that shapes expectations, alliances, budgeting, and bureaucratic activity, while leaving room for Trump’s preference for personal diplomacy and transactional deal-making where needed.

It is in this context that the Middle East—and particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—emerges not as a downgraded region, but as a strategically redefined one: less central to day-to-day US force planning, yet still pivotal to the administration’s concepts of burden-sharing, deterrence, and regional stabilization.

The Middle East: Enduring interest, but no longer central

Among the most striking elements of the new NSS is its recalibration of the Middle East’s place in US foreign policy. For decades, the region consumed disproportionate diplomatic attention, military deployments, and crisis-management resources because it supplied vital energy, served as a Cold War battleground, and generated conflicts with global spillover potential. Today, those foundations have weakened: the United States is a net energy exporter with greater resilience to supply shocks, and great-power competition now plays out far more in the Indo-Pacific and in technological and economic domains than through Middle Eastern proxy wars.

However, the fact that the Middle East no longer dominates US strategic planning does not imply disengagement or irrelevance. The NSS is careful to define the Middle East as a region of enduring interests that must not be relegated to instability or hostile domination. The United States retains core objectives: preventing any adversarial power from controlling Gulf hydrocarbons or the chokepoints through which they transit, ensuring freedom of navigation of waterways such as the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, countering terrorism and radical movements, supporting Israel’s security, and expanding the normalization dynamic of the Abraham Accords.

The regional focus is therefore shifting from militarized management toward political stabilization, strategic deterrence, investment collaborations, and cost-efficient conflict management. The NSS frames the Middle East increasingly as a zone of partnership, innovation, and capital exchange rather than as the site of long, resource-intensive wars. The NDS adds an important nuance: while confirming that the Middle East is no longer the central theater for US force planning, it explicitly commits to retaining the capability for “focused, decisive action” in the region, illustrated by operations such as Midnight Hammer against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and Rough Rider against the Houthis, while expecting regional actors to manage most of the security workload between such interventions.

Burden-shifting: The GCC as regional security providers

One of the clearest implications for GCC states is the NSS’s burden-shifting logic. Washington does not intend to underwrite regional security in the same way it once did. Instead, the White House expects capable regional actors, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and to a lesser extent Qatar, to assume leadership in securing maritime routes, deterring hostile adventurism, stabilizing proximate conflict zones, and countering terrorist networks. The United States will remain a strategic backstop, especially at the high end of military power, but the NSS encourages a division of labor where Washington leverages diplomatic influence, advanced deterrent capabilities, and intelligence, while expecting Gulf capitals to provide financial, logistical, and regional operational support. The NDS makes this division of labor more explicit by directing the Department of Defense to “empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies,” while the United States concentrates on high-end enablers, surge operations, and global priorities such as homeland defense and the Indo-Pacific.

This is not a sudden change, but rather a deeper institutionalization of trends that have been emerging for a decade. The GCC has long demonstrated an increased appetite for autonomous security roles, whether through counter-piracy patrols, Yemen interventions, Red Sea stabilization efforts, or investments in Central African and Horn of Africa equilibria. Trump’s NSS validates these ambitions and situates them within a US strategic architecture, rather than treating them as ad hoc regional experiments. For Gulf capitals, this recognition is beneficial: their regional activism is not only tolerated, it is encouraged as a core element of maintaining regional stability in lieu of direct US military domination.

From conflict theater to economic and technological platform

Another significant shift in the NSS narrative is the re-casting of the Middle East as an economic, technological, and financial platform, rather than a theater for perpetual conflict. The NSS recognizes that regional leaders have embraced diversification, industrial development, and sovereign wealth strategies that expand beyond hydrocarbons. It also emphasizes US opportunities in nuclear energy, artificial intelligence (AI), defense industrial cooperation, logistics networks, and supply chain localization. The Middle East is treated as an increasingly strategic geography for future economic corridors, especially those linking Africa, South Asia, and the Mediterranean.

This framing aligns neatly with GCC trajectories. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have long sought to position themselves as global logistics hubs, aviation nodes, sovereign wealth investors, and technology accelerators. With the NSS emphasizing US economic security, energy dominance, and domestic manufacturing revival, Gulf states can leverage bilateral partnerships to show how investment projects, whether in nuclear energy, AI, aerospace, or critical minerals, support American jobs, reindustrialization needs, and technological gains. If packaged correctly, a Gulf-US economic deal now has political value in Washington that goes far beyond foreign direct investment: it can be framed as contributing to domestic industrial revival and strategic supply chain safety. The NDS reinforces this economic-security linkage by treating arms sales and defense industrial cooperation with GCC states as part of a broader effort to “supercharge” the US defense industrial base, making Gulf procurement and potential co-production not only a regional stabilizer but also a mechanism for sustaining US military capacity.

From deterrence to decisive operations: The NSS–NDS approach to Iran

The NSS conveys a strong view that Iran’s disruptive influence has weakened due to Israeli military pressure and to targeted US actions designed to degrade Iran’s nuclear potential. However, the situation has shifted dramatically in recent weeks. Widespread protests across Iran, triggered by deep socioeconomic grievances and political repression, have created an atmosphere of internal volatility not fully captured in the NSS released in late 2025. The Trump administration has responded with forceful rhetoric, warning Tehran that further repression or attempted regional escalation could trigger additional US military strikes. These warnings, coupled with reports that Washington is actively considering another limited, targeted strike on Iranian military infrastructure, have generated both reassurance and unease in GCC capitals. Here, the NDS adds two revealing elements: first, it publicly frames Operation Midnight Hammer as having “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program and weakened the regime and its Axis of Resistance. Second, it explicitly states that Gulf partners and Israel are now expected to carry primary responsibility for containing Iran’s conventional and proxy capabilities, with the United States stepping in episodically when decisive force is required.

The ongoing instability in Iran introduces a new variable into the regional equation. While the NSS presents Iran as strategically weakened, current developments demonstrate that internal unrest can make the regime simultaneously vulnerable and unpredictable. The possibility of US kinetic action raises concerns about Iranian retaliation across the Gulf, whether through drones, cyberattacks, missile strikes, or activation of regional proxies. GCC leaders therefore view current tensions through a dual lens: understanding that US pressure aligns with long-standing Gulf concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, yet also wary of the escalation risks that accompany any US–Iran confrontation.

The NSS balances deterrence with an emphasis on pursuing peace deals and post-conflict stabilization, including in Gaza and Syria. Trump’s political style is highly confident about presidential diplomacy and conflict resolution, and the NSS treats mediation as a strategic tool to bring difficult bilateral environments into a more stable architecture. This dynamic underscores that while the NSS prioritizes stability and “realignment through peace,” the Trump administration remains fully prepared to use force when it believes core US and allied interests are threatened, a stance entirely consistent with the NSS’s emphasis on “peace through strength.”

Although this is broadly reassuring for the GCC, residual anxiety remains. If Washington chooses to secure regional stability through big-ticket diplomatic bargains, especially where Russia or Israel are involved, Gulf capitals will expect assurances that their security will not be traded for conflict de-escalation. However, many Gulf leaders now possess significant diplomatic capacity and mediation credibility of their own. The NSS creates an opening for GCC states to position themselves as mediators or stabilizers rather than as passive recipients of US decisions. The Gulf’s growing diplomatic centrality, from Gaza cease-fire talks to Sudan, Libya, or the Horn of Africa, fits well with an NSS that prefers localized responsibility and regional realignment rather than direct US intervention. Still, the current crisis underscores a critical reality: any US–Iran confrontation, even a limited one, will have immediate consequences for Gulf security, energy markets, and maritime stability, reinforcing the importance of GCC preparedness, joint air and missile defense integration, and sustained coordination with Washington as the situation continues to evolve. In this sense, the NDS largely confirms the NSS’s direction of travel but narrows the margin for ambiguity: it signals that future Iran-related crises will be handled through short, sharp US operations nested within a regional architecture in which the GCC and Israel shoulder greater routine responsibility.

Will GCC capitals be surprised or concerned?

Little in the NSS will shock senior decision-makers in the GCC. Most regional governments have already experienced Trump’s approach firsthand, benefitted from strong bilateral ties, and understand that Washington’s foreign policy has permanently moved away from nation-building, democracy promotion, and open-ended security commitments. The more consequential shift in recent weeks has been the intensification of US–Iran tensions, which has temporarily elevated the Gulf within Washington’s strategic focus despite the NSS’s assertion that the region is no longer central. GCC capitals now find themselves preparing for multiple scenarios, ranging from a calibrated US strike on Iran to potential Iranian retaliation, even as they recognize that none of this contradicts the NSS’s underlying logic of deterrence, burden-shifting, and threat-management rather than long-term occupation or nation-building.

Overall, the NSS is more likely to produce re-calibration than alarm. The strategy is consistent with Gulf countries’ expectations that they will be treated as indispensable pillars of regional stability and as partners in defense technology, energy investment, and maritime security. The NDS largely reinforces this assessment: it does not downgrade GCC importance, but instead clarifies the price of being central—greater spending, deeper integration with Israeli and US forces, and a willingness to absorb more day-to-day risk in managing Iran and regional crises.

How the NSS will guide GCC responses

The NSS will provide Gulf policymakers with an actionable framework for deepening relations with Washington. First, Gulf capitals can present themselves as regional security providers, offering maritime patrols, counter-terrorism support, Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab stabilization, and specialized capacity-building. Second, GCC countries can frame investment deals as US industrial wins, emphasizing how AI, aerospace, nuclear, and defense co-production create US jobs and secure American supply chains. Third, Gulf states can symbolically align with Washington on sovereignty narratives, emphasizing secure borders, state authority, and skepticism toward external ideological intervention, areas where their domestic priorities already converge.

Finally, GCC states will possibly manage their relationship with China more carefully, offering Washington assurances that high-sensitivity sectors will remain insulated from Chinese involvement while still leveraging Chinese trade and capital where appropriate. In doing so, Gulf leaders can demonstrate that multi-vectorism increases stability and economic growth without jeopardizing strategic trust.

A strategically manageable landscape

The Trump administration’s NSS is a sophisticated refinement of “America First.” It sets clear priorities, clarifies regional hierarchies, and emphasizes economic and technological competition as the foundation of power. For the GCC, the implications are significant, but manageable. Rather than being marginalized, Gulf partners are now expected to assume greater security responsibility, serve as stabilizers, and act as premium platforms for bilateral economic and technological exchange. The NSS ultimately positions GCC countries not as passive dependents of US security guarantees, but as mature strategic actors capable of shaping their region while deepening mutually beneficial ties to Washington.

Read together with the NDS, the picture becomes sharper: the GCC is central to a burden-sharing model in which the Middle East is no longer the main theater of US strategy, but remains a crucial test case for how America First can combine limited, decisive US force with empowered regional allies to deliver “peace through strength” without returning to the era of open-ended wars.

Kristian Alexander is a senior fellow and lead researcher at the Rabdan Security & Defense Institute (RSDI) in Abu Dhabi.

The post Trump’s National Security Strategy doesn’t downgrade the Middle East, it redefines it appeared first on Atlantic Council.

TikTok’s new ownership structure doesn’t solve security concerns for Americans

Kenton Thibaut — Tue, 27 Jan 2026 22:45:09 +0000

TikTok has entered a new era in the United States, but it’s hardly a less risky one.

Last week, the company disclosed the contours of a deal intended to allow the platform to continue operating in the United States, bringing it into compliance with a 2024 US law. The arrangement appears largely consistent with the framework reportedly negotiated between US and Chinese officials last fall. Under the proposed structure, a newly created entity called TikTok USDS Joint Venture would assume responsibility for data security and content moderation, with US investors—including the software company Oracle—holding majority control while ByteDance remains the largest single shareholder at 19.9 percent. TikTok’s existing US-based companies would retain control over the platform’s commercial operations, including advertising, e-commerce, and marketing. While the ownership of TikTok’s recommendation algorithm is not explicitly addressed in the latest announcement, a December memo from TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew indicated that ByteDance would keep ownership of the algorithm’s intellectual property and license it to the joint venture for a fee.

The deal has been framed by some officials and commentators as a meaningful step toward addressing long-standing US concerns about People’s Republic of China (PRC) information manipulation, foreign influence, and data security. In practice, it does little to alter the underlying risks that animated the debate during the previous US administration.

On disinformation and influence operations, the deal is unlikely to be transformative. As we argued in a 2024 report examining TikTok’s national security implications, Beijing’s ability to conduct influence operations does not depend on ownership of a single platform. While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could theoretically attempt to shape content via TikTok’s recommendation algorithm, it already engages in influence campaigns across US-based social media platforms and will continue to do so even with TikTok’s structural reorganization. Restricting TikTok does not dismantle the broader information ecosystem in which foreign influence campaigns operate.

The data security case is even more revealing. The type of data generated by TikTok is not fundamentally different from that collected across the digital advertising ecosystem, which over the past decade has evolved into a system capable of extremely granular micro-targeting. Data brokers routinely aggregate information from mobile advertising identifiers, cookies, location data, and online activity to build detailed dossiers on individuals. Although these identifiers are often described as “anonymized,” it is widely understood that combining multiple datasets makes re-identification fairly straightforward.

This ecosystem enables the creation of highly specific audience segments—such as military personnel with financial vulnerabilities, politically active voters, or individuals likely to participate in protests—drawing on data that includes location histories, credit card transactions, employment records, social media activity, and government filings. Investigations by civil society organizations and journalists have repeatedly demonstrated how easy it is to access such data, often with minimal vetting, and how readily it could be exploited by foreign intelligence services or malign actors.

Importantly, this data is not confined to fringe actors. Major US technology platforms continue to earn significant revenue from foreign advertisers, including Chinese firms, even as they attempt to place guardrails on data flows. While companies such as Google have introduced measures to limit the sharing of certain identifiers with Chinese entities, advertising experts note that these restrictions are often porous. Once an ad is served, advertisers can still infer sensitive information—such as IP addresses and device characteristics—and real-time bidding systems offer no technical guarantee that data will not be misused after it is received.

Compared to this sprawling and still inadequately regulated market, TikTok’s data practices are not uniquely dangerous. Focusing narrowly on this one app risks obscuring the far more consequential vulnerabilities embedded in the broader data economy.

Finally, it is worth underscoring how little ByteDance has conceded in the deal. If ByteDance has in fact licensed the algorithm, as subsequent reporting has indicated, the company has preserved control over its most valuable intellectual property. The principal concession—that is, the loss of majority ownership in the entity overseeing data security—imposes limited strategic costs.

In addition, depending on how the actual licensing deal is laid out, this structure could still hypothetically leave room for PRC influence over the algorithm—though it will likely be more difficult than it would be if ByteDance retained full ownership. The licensed algorithm is a continuously trained system shaped by design choices, training data, model updates, and operational parameters. If ByteDance is retaining control over that core intellectual property, in theory, the PRC government could exert some influence over how the system evolves, even if day-to-day content moderation or data security oversight is localized. Once further details of the licensing agreement are released, this risk will be better understood.

At the same time, it is important not to overstate what that influence could look like in practice. Rather than eliminate the risk of manipulation, this structure redistributes it among a different set of actors. Algorithmic manipulation is unlikely to take the form of overt, platform-wide promotion of pro-CCP content. Should manipulation occur, it would likely take the form of more subtle interventions that would be difficult to attribute to PRC influence or parse out from how the recommender system is working on US user data. This is especially the case now as the handover gets under way and the algorithm is being trained on US user data from scratch; in the short term, the app could exhibit high variability in terms of the content it surfaces while the system learns what users want and curates their “For You” page accordingly.

In essence, this structure largely shifts visible forms of control from Beijing to other actors without eliminating the underlying vulnerabilities inherent in the US social media ecosystem. While the deal may reduce political pressure in Washington and be framed as a decisive step to protect the US information environment from PRC interference, it does little to resolve the systemic challenges of information manipulation, foreign influence, and data exploitation. Those risks are embedded in the architecture of the digital ecosystem itself, and mitigating them will require far more than rearranging the ownership of a single platform.

The post TikTok’s new ownership structure doesn’t solve security concerns for Americans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Unable to win on the battlefield, Putin escalates war on Ukrainian civilians

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 27 Jan 2026 22:05:41 +0000

Russian strikes against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure are nothing new, of course. On the contrary, such attacks have been a routine feature since the onset of the full-scale invasion nearly four years ago. However, the current bombing campaign is by far the most comprehensive of the war. In recent months, Russia’s attacks on civilian targets have expanded dramatically in scope as the Kremlin seeks to inflict maximum harm on Ukraine’s population by denying them access to heating, electricity, gas, and water during the coldest period of the winter season.

The impact has been devastating, particularly as most residential districts in Ukrainian cities continue to rely on Soviet-era central heating systems powered by huge plants that are almost impossible to defend. The Kremlin has ruthlessly exploited this weakness with repeated bombardments of the same facilities to disrupt repair efforts. While teams of Ukrainian engineers continue to work miracles, each successive attack makes their task more difficult.

Ukrainians have responded to plummeting temperatures and freezing apartments with a range of improvised solutions such as erecting tents indoors and heating bricks on gas stoves to generate some precious warmth. There has also been plenty of trademark Ukrainian wartime defiance on display, with local communities rallying in support of one another, posting lighthearted videos on social media, and holding street parties in the snow.

At the same time, many have expressed frustration over the continued media emphasis on Ukrainian resilience amid a mounting humanitarian crisis that has left much of the country in desperate need of help. “Resilience doesn’t mean immunity. Ukraine cannot withstand everything indefinitely,” wrote Ukrainian commentator Iryna Voichuk on January 16. “Framing this as only a story of strength risks dulling the urgency of what’s happening.”

Others have echoed this sentiment, including some of Ukraine’s most prominent international supporters. “Mythologizing endurance is a quiet form of abandonment. Resilience does not mean invulnerability,” cautioned R.T. Weatherman Foundation president Meaghan Mobbs in a recent post. “When we speak as if Ukrainians can simply ‘take it,’ we absolve ourselves of responsibility.”

With the present arctic weather conditions expected to continue well into February, the situation in Ukraine is critical. In the high-rise apartment blocks that dominate Ukraine’s cities, many less mobile residents have already been housebound for weeks and will likely remain trapped in frigid darkness throughout the coming month. The outlook is particularly grave for the elderly, those with young families, and people in need of medical care. In other words, Russia’s present bombing strategy appears to have been specifically tailored to target the most vulnerable members of Ukrainian society.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

As the potential for large-scale loss of life becomes increasingly apparent, international audiences are waking up to the true extent of Russia’s criminal intentions. Wall Street Journal chief foreign affairs correspondent Yaroslav Trofimov recently referred to Russia’s winter bombing campaign as “Putin’s genocidal effort to make Kyiv unlivable.” It is easy to see why such terms are now being employed. The 1948 UN Genocide Convention identifies “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,” as one of five recognized acts of genocide. At the very least, Russia’s current actions closely resemble this definition.

The current winter bombing campaign reflects a broader trend of mounting Russian attacks against Ukraine’s civilian population. According to UN data, 2025 was the deadliest year of the war for Ukrainian civilians since 2022, with more than 2,500 people killed and over twelve thousand injured. This was 31 percent higher than the figure for the previous year and 70 percent more than in 2023. Many of these deaths were due to a spike in Russian missile and drone strikes on civilian targets including residential buildings, hospitals, and a children’s playground.

Russia also stands accused of conducting a systematic campaign of drone strikes targeting members of the public in the front line regions of southern Ukraine. These attacks have been dubbed a “human safari” by terrified locals. They involve the use of drones with video camera guidance systems to hunt individual victims, underlining the deliberate nature of the killings. An October 2025 United Nations investigation into this drone terror found that Russia was guilty of “systematically coordinated actions designed to drive Ukrainians out of their homes,” and concluded that the Kremlin’s actions in southern Ukraine qualified as the crimes against humanity of murder and of forcible transfer of civilians.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Putin is dramatically escalating attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population because he cannot win the war on the battlefield. When he first launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Putin was expecting a quick and complete victory. Instead, his army has become bogged down in a brutal war of attrition that will soon enter a fifth year.

Despite pouring vast resources into the invasion and placing his entire country on a war footing, the Kremlin dictator has been unable to secure a decisive breakthrough. Many in Moscow had hoped the return of Donald Trump to the White House would transform the military situation, but even a dramatic decline in US aid for Ukraine over the past year has failed to turn the tide in Russia’s favor. Putin’s army captured less than one percent of Ukrainian territory during 2025, while suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties. At the present glacial pace, it would take Russia decades and millions of men to fully subjugate Ukraine.

In his official statements, Putin continues to project confidence and boast of his invading army’s success. However, with so few genuine victories to toast, this has often meant inventing imaginary advances. Putin’s habit of exaggerating Russian gains came back to haunt him in late 2025 when he repeatedly claimed to have captured the Ukrainian city of Kupyansk, only for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to personally visit the city and record a selfie video exposing the Russian ruler’s lies. This embarrassing episode underlined the growing credibility gap between Putin’s bold talk of inevitable Russian victory and the far more sobering battlefield reality of minimal Russian gains and disastrous losses.

With no obvious route to military victory, Putin is now openly embracing a strategy of terror tactics against Ukraine’s civilian population. He hopes that by weaponizing winter and putting millions of lives at risk, he can finally break Ukrainian resistance and force Kyiv to capitulate. Europe has not witnessed criminality on such a grand and terrible scale since the days of Hitler and Stalin.

So far, the international response to Russia’s winter bombing campaign has been utterly inadequate. While many of Kyiv’s partners have rushed to provide humanitarian aid, no additional costs whatsoever have been imposed on the Kremlin. Instead, it is Ukraine and not Russia that is reportedly being asked to make concessions. Unless this changes, the normalization of Russian war crimes will continue and Putin’s sense of impunity will become even more deeply entrenched. It will then only be a matter of time before other civilian populations experience the horrors currently taking place in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

A regional forum with strategic intent

As the year begins, Estonia assumes the rotational chairmanship of the NB8, with an agenda focused on strengthening cooperation and raising the group’s international profile. This ambition underscores that the group’s influence is not tied to a single crisis or a particular leadership term. It is becoming structural. Coordination rotates, but strategic intent remains stable, backed by a growing track record of action and results.

Even as Greenland dominates headlines, Ukraine remains the issue that anchors the NB8’s credibility. Throughout 2025, the group turned recurring joint signaling into a near-institutional voice, with coordinated statements issued in February, August, September, and November. Together, the members formed a sustained narrative: rejecting any settlement imposed on Kyiv, insisting that borders cannot be changed by force, and reaffirming that support for Ukraine must continue as long as Russia refuses a genuine cease-fire.

What gives the NB8 credibility, however, is not just what it says but what it does—specifically, what it funds and delivers. Not only are the Nordic and Baltic states well on track—or already meeting—NATO’s defense spending target of 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), they are among the leading contributors of military support to Ukraine relative to GDP. Increasingly, this support is coordinated. In November, all eight Nordic-Baltic states jointly financed a $500 million package of US-sourced military equipment and munitions for Ukraine through NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List. This was one of the largest coordinated European contributions of the year and a clear example of what a European coalition looks like when political alignment translates into operational effect.

Over the course of 2025, Nordic-Baltic states moved from drawing down stockpiles to building sustainable capacity, including co-production with Ukraine. Sweden’s work with Kyiv on future air capabilities and Denmark’s efforts to facilitate Ukrainian defense manufacturing on Danish territory signal a shift from short-term transfers to enduring war-fighting capacity.

That industrial turn has been matched by a dense ecosystem of Nordic-Baltic-led coalitions: Latvia driving Europe’s most dynamic drone procurement for Ukraine, Lithuania anchoring multinational demining efforts, Estonia committing a fixed share of GDP to sustained military support, and a broader Nordic-Baltic initiative training and equipping Ukrainian brigades alongside Poland. Together, these efforts translate political will into deployable capabilities, reaching the battlefield faster and with fewer institutional frictions than those of larger European formats.

Countering Russia in the Baltic Sea is yet another example of Nordic-Baltic action. Today, the Baltic Sea is one of the most monitored maritime spaces in Europe, with continuous naval patrols, air surveillance, and undersea infrastructure protection driven largely by Nordic-Baltic contributions. The launch of NATO’s Operation Baltic Sentry in early 2025, combined with Sweden’s first major NATO maritime deployments, signals that the Alliance’s northern defense posture is moving from political concept to operational reality.

This effort has expanded beyond ships and aircraft to the legal and regulatory domain. Countering Russia’s shadow fleet and grey-zone maritime activity, enforcing sanctions, and coordinating maritime regulation have become part of the same security logic, reflecting a Nordic-Baltic approach that treats coercion at sea as both a governance and a military challenge.

The signal to Moscow is clear, and Beijing is registering it too. Coordinated European action, when sustained and enforced, carries strategic weight.

This message is particularly poignant today, as deterrence is increasingly about the ability to stay the course for years—whether in supporting Ukraine, countering hybrid threats, or maintaining political clarity on values and interests. Against this backdrop, Nordic-Baltic states are far from the “small” actors they’re often assumed to be. Together, their combined economic weight rivals that of Europe’s largest powers—a reminder that scale in security is often a political choice. The Nordic-Baltic states have acted on this insight, translating pooled resources into procurement decisions, industrial planning, and sustained policy commitments.

The next phase of Nordic-Baltic leadership

What comes next is likely to follow two main tracks. First, Greenland will remain a test of allied norms and Nordic-Baltic cohesion, requiring sustained political backing as diplomacy with the United States continues. For years, Nordic-Baltic defense policy rested on a familiar logic: stay close to Washington, prove seriousness, and earn reassurance. That logic still matters, but the Greenland crisis shows it can no longer be taken for granted. In response to the US escalation, Denmark and its Nordic-Baltic partners have focused on keeping the issue firmly within a diplomatic and legal framework, while reinforcing the principle that Arctic security remains a collective NATO responsibility.

Second, Ukraine will remain the central credibility test, demanding resistance to premature settlements and continued investment in military, industrial, and political support.

There is also a broader strategic task. The NB8 is well-positioned to strengthen the European pillar within NATO while bridging gaps between NATO and the European Union, particularly in areas where security, industrial capacity, and sanctions enforcement increasingly overlap. Equally important, the group must avoid becoming a northern island detached from the rest of Europe. The new habit of including Poland and Germany in the NB8 meetings is wise in this regard. However, credible deterrence and resilience across Europe require wider networks beyond the region, including engagement with partners in the south and the ability to connect regional leadership to continental cohesion.

The deeper lesson, however, is the same across Greenland and Ukraine: credibility is cumulative. It is built by acting together early, speaking clearly about principles, and turning solidarity into capabilities and delivery.

In 2026, Europe will spend more time debating which coalitions can be relied upon, which will hold under pressure, and which can shoulder responsibility amid ongoing geopolitical uncertainty. Increasingly, the answer points north—not because the members of the NB8 are Europe’s largest powers, but because they consistently deliver on their promises.

The post How the Nordic-Baltic states became Europe’s reliable security engine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Taiwan has been a strategic blind spot for South Korea

Bee Yun Jo — Tue, 27 Jan 2026 15:07:41 +0000

SEOUL—This past November, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made waves in the Western Pacific by saying that Chinese military action against Taiwan could pose a “survival-threatening situation” to her country. This implied that Chinese action against Taiwan might justify a Japanese response. This apparently sudden and consequential shift in Japan’s public stance toward Taiwan caught the attention of the international press as well as Beijing’s leaders, who criticized the statement. While no leader in Seoul has made an equivalent shift in South Korean policy toward Taiwan—and none should be expected—it would be too much to say that South Korea’s view of the island and its place in regional security remains entirely static.

Shortly before Takaichi made her comments, I visited Taiwan as part of an annual high-level Atlantic Council delegation. My trip to Taipei included intensive engagements with Taiwan’s senior leadership—including the minister of national defense, the minister of foreign affairs, and the secretary-general of the National Security Council—culminating in a meeting with the vice president.

Click on the banner above to explore the Tiger Project.

Coming from Seoul, where relations with Taipei have remained muted since the severing of diplomatic ties in 1992, I often found myself in a unique position within the delegation. Others spoke from a foundation of established alignment: The former Lithuanian foreign minister who led our delegation is known for his advocacy for Taiwan, and the American experts on the trip have worked for years on strengthening US-Taiwan relations. In contrast, Seoul’s strategic approach placed me in an ambiguous position. I listened carefully but contributed selectively, hovering just outside the cadence of shared convictions for cooperation.

Two thoughts have stayed with me since returning home. First, despite geographic proximity, Taiwan remains absent from Seoul’s strategic discourse—just as Seoul is notably absent from Taiwan’s. The blind spot is mutual.

Second, this realization sharpened my reflections on the increasingly popular narrative of “division of labor” among US allies. The idea—that each ally focusing on its primary threat inherently contributes to regional deterrence—may offer political convenience, but it also risks reinforcing strategic silos at a time when adversaries increasingly operate across connected theaters.

South Korea’s relationship with Taiwan has long remained deliberately understated. Even as the Indo-Pacific security environment has become more interconnected, Seoul’s posture toward Taiwan has reflected the structural reality of its strategic position between the United States and China, as well as the enduring centrality of the threat from North Korea. For decades, this has meant that Seoul was rarely viewed as a meaningful partner for Taiwan-related security cooperation. Unlike Japan or the Philippines, South Korea avoided appearing as a frontline stakeholder in cross-Strait contingencies, preferring instead to manage its delicate balance between Washington and Beijing.

This approach created a predictable pattern: Seoul refrained from public engagement on the Taiwan issue to avoid antagonizing China, instead focusing almost exclusively on deterring North Korea—which, by any measure, remains its most immediate threat. In doing so, South Korea adopted a cautious regional diplomacy that kept the Taiwan Strait at arm’s length. As a result, Taiwan appears to perceive Seoul as a “potential but limited partner.” In conversations with Taiwanese officials, this idea repeatedly surfaced, reflecting the enduring view that South Korean strategy remains rooted in a single-theater mindset, in which the Korean Peninsula takes precedence over all other regional contingencies.

But this is changing, at least at the margins.

The Taiwan Strait enters Seoul’s strategic vocabulary

Despite Seoul’s historical caution, the Taiwan Strait now appears regularly in South Korea’s official statements and alliance documents. Several developments have driven this shift.

First, China’s growing assertiveness around the Korean Peninsula has changed Seoul’s perception of the strategic landscape. In the West/Yellow Sea, Beijing has expanded military and paramilitary activities, including the construction of artificial structures in the Provisional Measures Zone, preventing South Korean research vessels from nearing those structures by dispatching warships. South Korean policymakers from across the political spectrum now openly describe China as a source of maritime pressure. China’s expanding military presence is pushing Seoul to see the Taiwan Strait and the West Sea not as separate as they once appeared to be.

Second, the deepening alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia has created a new strategic simultaneity across regions. North Korea’s accelerated nuclear and missile developments now unfold in tandem with its revived defense pact with Russia and its improving relations with China. North Korea can no longer be treated as an isolated security challenge. And this interconnected threat environment makes it difficult for Seoul to treat the Peninsula as insulated from developments elsewhere.

Third, and perhaps most visibly, Washington and Seoul have over time institutionalized Taiwan-related language in its alliance diplomacy. Since the Moon Jae-in and Biden administrations, preserving “peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” has continued to be reiterated in US-South Korea joint statements. The latest joint factsheet, released by the Lee Jae-myung and Trump administrations on November 13, 2025, also emphasized “the importance of preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,” encouraged a “peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues,” and opposed “unilateral changes to the status quo.”

US President Donald Trump welcomes South Korean President Lee Jae-myung at the White House on August 25, 2025. (REUTERS/Brian Snyder)

Seoul and Washington have also shown progress in coordinating the “strategic flexibility” of US forces in the region. Although both sides deliberately avoided the phrase “strategic flexibility”—referring instead to “relevant understandings since 2006,” a strategically prudent choice—the latest joint factsheet states that the United States and South Korea will enhance “U.S. conventional deterrence posture against all regional threats to the Alliance, including the DPRK.” This formulation signals that newly deployed assets such as the MQ-9 Reaper squadron, as well as future deployments, are intended to deter threats extending beyond North Korea.

These developments would have been unthinkable additions to Seoul’s diplomatic vocabulary just a decade ago. South Korea is gradually weaving the Strait into its broader understanding of regional security and alliance management.

Rethinking the “division of labor”

As these changes unfold, a strategic narrative has gained traction: the concept of a functional “division of labor” among US allies. I myself have endorsed the concept on several occasions, building from the view that Indo-Pacific allies have different threat priorities: South Korea is focused on North Korea, Japan on China, and Australia on regional stability. These US allies could nonetheless, under the division-of-labor concept, meaningfully contribute to broader regional deterrence if each ensured that its primary threat was effectively checked. The Biden administration’s “latticework,” or coalition-of-the-willing approach, was in many ways built on this logic. It sought to knit together a North Korea–focused South Korea and a China-focused Japan, alongside other regional partners, to strengthen overall US influence and deterrence across the first and second island chains.

But what may have been a pragmatic arrangement in earlier years—reflecting divergent allied priorities and capabilities—risks becoming increasingly untenable.

If the United States diminishes its interest in Pacific allies or its military presence in their territories, then adversaries may start to view this division of labor as developing seams that they can exploit. For instance, under the Trump administration’s repeated calls for Seoul to assume “overwhelming responsibility” for the Peninsula, North Korea may interpret this not as an efficient allocation of allied resources but as a signal that US commitment is becoming more compartmentalized or even reduced. If adversaries conclude that allies are divided in their responsibilities, then they may also conclude that allies are divided in their commitments.

This is particularly dangerous given the increasing coordination among North Korea, Russia, and China. In an environment where adversaries act across multiple theaters simultaneously, deterrence cannot be built on a framework that unintentionally communicates fragmentation among allies. Division of labor may function as a diplomatic tool, but it does not function as a deterrence strategy unless it is explicitly framed as an interim step toward deeper collective action.

For this reason, South Korea must recognize that its responsibility to deter North Korea does not remove the need to play a constructive role in broader regional security. Rather, the opposite is true: the more North Korea enhances its capabilities, the more South Korea must invest in regional frameworks that strengthen collective deterrence. The Taiwan question is central to this logic because the stability of the Strait directly influences the strategic choices of China and North Korea. Seoul’s willingness to acknowledge this connection—reflected in the recent South Korea–US joint presidential summit factsheet, Security Consultative Meeting joint communiqué, and Military Committee Meeting joint statement—is a necessary starting point for building a more coherent regional posture.

Toward a regionally engaged South Korea

South Korea’s historically low-visibility stance toward Taiwan is giving way to a more integrated regional strategy. Beijing’s maritime coercion, the tightening cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia, and the increasing incorporation of Taiwan-related language into South Korea–US statements all underscore that the strategic distance between the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait is closing.

The challenge now is to ensure that the division of labor narrative does not become a strategic trap. If interpreted as a permanent arrangement or a form of compartmentalized responsibility, it risks signaling to adversaries that allied commitments are divisible. Deterrence in an era of interconnected threats demands the opposite: unified signaling, cross-theater coordination, and collective resilience.

The Lee Jae-myung administration’s decision to articulate this broader perspective in joint statements with the United States marks an important evolution. For South Korea, protecting its core interests on the Peninsula increasingly requires contributing to the stability of the Indo-Pacific as a whole.

South Korea does not need to—and should not be compelled to—militarize its Taiwan policy, but it must continue acknowledging that cross-Strait stability has become a foundational element of Northeast Asian security. The future of South Korea’s external strategy will depend on how effectively it acts on this recognition, not only in words but through sustained and deliberate regional engagement.

Note: The Atlantic Council delegation’s visit to Taiwan was supported by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO). This analysis represents the author’s views and not those of the government of Taiwan or those of any other entity.

The post Taiwan has been a strategic blind spot for South Korea appeared first on Atlantic Council.

When UNIFIL leaves, south Lebanon still needs an international presence

Nicholas Blanford — Tue, 27 Jan 2026 14:52:44 +0000

With the arrival of 2026, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has entered its final twelve months of operations after a presence of forty-eight years in this volatile sector of the Middle East. While UNIFIL is expected to draw down and depart within a twelve-month timeframe in 2027, much thought is being given toward what could serve as an alternative presence in south Lebanon. Lebanon is concerned that a lack of external support will place a huge burden on an already strained Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which are responsible for security in south Lebanon. In addition, the absence of an international eye on a volatile corner of the Middle East could encourage Hezbollah and Israel into actions that lead to renewed conflict.

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam urged for the continuation of an international force in south Lebanon during a meeting last week in Paris with French President Emmanuel Macron.

“We will always need an international presence in the south, and preferably a UN presence, given the impartiality and neutrality that only the UN can provide,” he told reporters a day after the meeting.

There is a general understanding that the international community cannot simply abandon south Lebanon once UNIFIL withdraws, especially given that the area remains highly volatile. Despite a November 2024 cease-fire, south Lebanon is subject to near-daily Israeli air strikes against alleged Hezbollah military infrastructure and militants. Nearly 65,000 Lebanese residents of the southern border district are unable to return to their homes in villages heavily damaged by the 2023-2024 war, and by a subsequent campaign of controlled demolitions by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The IDF has constructed five imposing Forward Operating Bases on hills in Lebanese territory and enforces a no-go buffer zone adjacent to the Blue Line, the UN’s term for Lebanon’s southern border.

Given this volatility, some European countries are mulling deploying a new military force to the South Litani Sector (SLS), the 1,057-square-kilometer area between the Blue Line and the Litani river that serves as UNIFIL’s Area of Operations (AO). No concrete proposals have yet emerged; it remains unclear whether the preference is to establish a formal European Union (EU) mission led out of Brussels, to mold an ad hoc coalition of willing countries that would operate under a bilateral agreement with the Lebanese government, or, indeed, to create some other formulation.

Either way, proponents of a new mission to south Lebanon should be modest in their expectations and goals. There is little point in replacing UNIFIL with another military mission that could face the same mandate constrictions and potential threats as experienced by UNIFIL over the past nineteen years since it expanded from two thousand armed observers to a force of more than ten thousand peacekeepers following the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. UNIFIL was seen to have fundamentally failed in its mission, resulting last August in the UN Security Council (UNSC) agreeing to terminate the force at the end of 2026. UNIFIL was unable to halt Israel’s daily aerial violations of Lebanese air space, nor block Hezbollah’s accelerated military expansion in the UNIFIL AO from around 2020, which included erecting observation posts along the Blue Line and even building several firing ranges. If UNIFIL, with its ten thousand troops drawn from more than forty countries, backed by the moral and political weight of the UNSC, ended up impotent before the competing actions, objectives, and interests of Hezbollah and Israel, what makes anyone think that a new European-dominated military force in the SLS would fare any better?

Furthermore, if a proposal emerges for a new EU-dominated military force to deploy into south Lebanon, Hezbollah would vehemently oppose it. Even if the Lebanese government chose to ignore Hezbollah’s objections and approve the mission, the soldiers comprising the new force would be deploying into a hostile and potentially dangerous environment. As UNIFIL knows all too well, Hezbollah controls the public space in the SLS, and it has the proven ability to escalate or de-escalate hostile sentiment toward the peacekeepers according to its will.

That is not to say that the international community should abandon any notion of a military mission to the SLS once UNIFIL departs and simply wash its hands of south Lebanon. There are a number of important stabilizing elements that should be implemented during, and after, UNIFIL’s withdrawal.

The first is the necessity of the international community maintaining an eye on south Lebanon to ensure that the two main players, Hezbollah and Israel, cannot act with unseen impunity. To this extent, it may not be necessary to raise a new military force for south Lebanon. When UNIFIL departs Lebanon in 2027, it will leave in place another, albeit much smaller, UN mission, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

UNTSO Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) has been patrolling the Lebanon-Israel border for nearly eight decades to monitor compliance with the 1949 Armistice Agreement. OGL consists of fifty officers (captains and majors), operates from two patrol bases, and since 2006 has been embedded logistically inside UNIFIL. Perhaps a realistic and suitable solution to the post-UNIFIL vacuum would be to boost OGL’s numbers as required and slightly adjust the mandate to allow it to monitor the cease-fire arrangement and UNSC Resolution 1701 (which in part called for a weapons-free zone between the Litani and Lebanon’s southern border with Israel) as well as its original mission of observing the Armistice Demarcation Line (the original UN name given to the border).

As for any force protection concerns, its unarmed status and lack of any mandate enforcement capacity mean Hezbollah should not object to its expansion and continued presence. Furthermore, UNTSO-OGL has an institutional experience of operating alone in a worsening security environment. In the mid-1970s, before UNIFIL arrived in March 1978, the Palestine Liberation Organization was deeply entrenched in south Lebanon from where it launched attacks into Israel. The IDF erected a security fence along the border, maintained day-time observation positions just inside Lebanese territory, and regularly staged cross-border air strikes and commando raids, a situation not greatly removed from the one that exists today. Through all that, UNTSO-OGL diligently patrolled, observed, and reported.

A second critical element of stability is the continued maintenance of a tactical liaison channel between the Lebanese and Israelis. UNIFIL has long served as a vital intermediary between Lebanon and Israel, providing a trusted tactical-level channel for communication, de-escalation, and incident management along the Blue Line that has helped contain crises that might otherwise have spiraled into wider confrontation. Currently, there is a group composed of delegates from Lebanon, Israel, France, the United States, and UNIFIL, known as the “Mechanism,” which was formed after the November 2024 cease-fire agreement. The Mechanism has been criticized for focusing more on the process of disarming Hezbollah rather than ensuring both sides adhere to the cease-fire. Nevertheless, in November, Lebanon and Israel added civilian diplomats to the Mechanism, allowing for a potential expansion of discussions away from purely military matters directly related to the SLS. In the absence of such a third-party interlocutor, routine incidents, misunderstandings, or localized clashes would carry a far higher risk of rapid escalation, miscalculation, and unintended conflict between two adversaries with no direct diplomatic or military liaison mechanisms.

The third imperative for prolonged stability in the SLS is to ensure continued international support for the LAF. The LAF is seriously overstretched with a required deployment of up to ten thousand troops into south Lebanon, while simultaneously reinforcing its presence along the potentially volatile border with Syria as well as its daily internal security taskings. This is where foreign military support to Lebanon could be more usefully employed. Instead of dispatching a new military mission to south Lebanon to emulate UNIFIL’s vague mandate of supporting a weapons-free zone south of the Litani, a small LAF support mission could focus on enabling a sustained LAF presence in the SLS through logistics, training, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance sharing, mobility support, and joint planning, areas where the LAF’s constraints are structural rather than political. This would shift the optics and substance of enforcement away from foreign troops and toward the Lebanese state with the LAF at the center of security provision. This new mission could operate in coordination with, and alongside, an expanded UNTSO-OGL, leaving monitoring tasks to the latter while the former concentrates on supporting the LAF.

Additionally, indirect support for the LAF could be achieved by bolstering the capabilities of the Internal Security Forces (ISF), Lebanon’s police force. For decades, the LAF has had to compensate for the ISF’s weaknesses by engaging in public order operations and pursuit of criminals which should be the remit of the ISF. ISF capacity building would in time allow the LAF to divert its scant resources to its core tasks of maintaining security and protecting the borders.

The imminent departure of UNIFIL, after nearly five decades of presence in south Lebanon, offers opportunities to redress the failings of the UN mission by adopting realistic and focused alternatives. Those alternatives could combine a monitoring and reporting capacity, a third-party tactical liaison channel to allow communication between Lebanon and Israel, and strengthening support to the LAF. A failure by the international community to deliver the requisite support risks overstretching the LAF to a breaking point, paving the way for a potential resurgence of Hezbollah in the SLS and further aggressive behavior from the IDF, which could lead to the resumption of a broader conflict.

Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, covering the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria. He is an acknowledged expert on Lebanese Hezbollah. Blanford is a Beirut-based defense and security consultant.

The post When UNIFIL leaves, south Lebanon still needs an international presence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Time matters: Why Europe needs Ukrainian defense innovation

Oleksiy Honcharuk — Mon, 26 Jan 2026 18:06:42 +0000

KYIV—In an age of global instability, the most important dimension is time. In Davos and throughout the continent in recent weeks, European leaders have spoken of the need for a common defense strategy. As European nations work to make this a reality, building joint investment processes in defense technology between Ukraine and the European Union (EU) is not merely desirable—it is strategically indispensable.

Europe is undergoing the deepest security reappraisal in the history of the EU. Since 2022, the continent has shed its illusions about a “stable order” and shifted into a phase of rapid rearmament. Over the past year alone, the EU has approved multiyear defense funds worth tens of billions of euros, launched new mechanisms for joint procurement and, for the first time, begun a serious conversation about defense autonomy.

This is hardly surprising: the United States continues to remind Europeans that they must be able to shoulder the burden of their own defense and rely on their own capabilities rather than await salvation from across the Atlantic. The question now is how Europeans can best accomplish this.

Europe is accelerating its defense industry but running into structural problems

Europe continues to be one of the key technological centers of the global defense industry and is actively investing in military innovation. The continent hosts both traditional defense giants and a new generation of defense-tech companies and start-ups. European states are investing in unmanned systems, cybersecurity, air and missile defense, space and sensor technologies, and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven military applications. The European Union also remains one of the world’s largest arms exporters—reaching sixty billion euros in 2024—underscoring the bloc’s industrial capacity and technological depth.

At the same time, several structural problems continue to hinder the development of Europe’s defense industry and its ability to meet new challenges. Three stand out in particular:

Spending gaps. Against the backdrop of constrained credit and fiscal rules, EU member states together spend roughly half as much on defense as the United States does. At the same time, moving toward spending 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense would represent a genuinely revolutionary shift for Europe. A series of statements by European leaders in 2025 have made it increasingly clear that such a change in approach is becoming politically unavoidable. Securing funding is, in effect, Europe’s primary political homework assignment.
Fragmentation of production, technologies, standards, and procurement. In his 2024 report on European competitiveness, former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi highlighted one of the EU’s core strategic weaknesses: fragmentation. By preserving the sovereignty and autonomy of member states, the EU has produced a kaleidoscope of defense approaches. Member states operate under different procurement policies and lack unified standards. This problem can’t be solved by simply increasing spending. Without common policies and standardization, Europe risks achieving lower levels of efficiency compared with other major military powers even with nominally comparable levels of expenditure.
Heavy dependence on foreign suppliers, especially the United States. As Draghi noted in his report, “The choice to procure from the US may be justified in some cases because the EU does not have some products in its catalogue, but in many other cases a European equivalent exists, or could be rapidly made available by the European defence industry.” This dependence constrains Europe’s strategic autonomy, and it slows the development of its own industrial and technological base.

Europe’s rearmament will cost hundreds of billions of euros. Yet the critical question is not only how much money is spent or what is bought today or tomorrow. What matters most is the speed of the defense-industrial system whose development these funds are intended to support.

What is missing? Speed.

Europe still lacks an adequate answer to Russia’s drone technologies, honed through years of war. In September 2025, the intrusion of nineteen Russian drones into NATO airspace forced the scrambling of F-35 fighter jets to shoot them down, an absurdly expensive response. When unidentified drones disrupt air traffic around European capitals, nobody is certain how to react. Inevitably, attention turns east—to Ukraine, which has learned to survive in a modern drone war, repel incursions of more than seven hundred airborne targets in a single night, and strike back. All this has been achieved through military innovation. As Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said in October 2025, “The only expert right now in the world when it comes to anti-drone capacities is Ukraine, because they are fighting the Russian drones almost every day.”

Many now argue that Ukrainian unmanned technologies are precisely what Europe needs—and could become the continent’s trump card in its hybrid confrontation with Russia. “Ukraine is already helping us and teaching us how to fight the wars of tomorrow. Ukrainian drones destroy 80 percent of targets on the ground,” said Andrius Kubilius, the EU’s defense commissioner, at the Conference on Ukraine’s European Future in November 2025.

Ukraine is often described as a drone superpower: It produces four million drones a year (the United States makes less than one hundred thousand a year), fields hundreds of systems and models, and has logged thousands of confirmed drone strikes on Russian targets. With drones, Ukraine has crippled Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, damaged its strategic aviation, and now threatens one of the foundations of Russia’s power: its oil infrastructure. The low cost of Ukrainian drone technology compared with conventional weaponry greatly impresses political leaders who must approve defense budgets. But the real issue runs deeper.

Defense technologies are constantly evolving: No matter what new weapons appear on the battlefield, none of them remains decisive for long. Within months, adversaries develop countermeasures—new tactics, new technologies. Wars are won not by those with the largest arsenals or the most soldiers but by those who win this race. Europe’s true strategic problem is slowness. The main thing Europe can learn from Ukraine’s defense sector is speed.

At the strategic level, Europe can win any war or technological race—if it buys itself a faster engine.

The Ukrainian precedent: Frontline research and development as a model

This is the first war in which dual-use products—such as agricultural drones and open-source software platforms—are often more lethal than conventional weapons. It has also made one thing clear: Preparation for war must involve not only professional armies, but the entire nation. During the war, millions of civilians joined in the defense of Ukraine, bringing their own approaches and fundamentally transforming the process of developing defense innovations.

Drone production in Ukraine resembles a vast open-source frontline research and development lab. Volunteers, private firms, military units and government agencies all test, iterate, and refine designs on a weekly basis. Strike videos circulate on social media; experts debate performance; thousands of chats buzz with feedback; ideas are exchanged in kitchens, workshops, and smoking areas. This may appear absurd from the perspective of traditional military rules and procedures, but it works.

There are almost no examples of drones built by defense giants remaining effective on the battlefield for long. The reason is the slow pace of adaptation and evolution. Ukrainian drones also do not last long on the battlefield—but the best of them evolve faster than the adversary can adapt to them.

No wonder NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte remarked in October 2025 that Ukraine is “a powerhouse when it comes to innovation, insights, for example, when it comes to anti-drone technology [and] anti-cyber threats.”

European militaries do not operate this way. Yet Europe possesses a strategic advantage of its own—one it can put to powerful use.

Europe’s slow money and Ukraine’s speed

Ukraine and Europe have opposite superpowers.

Europe is slow but has cheap, long-term capital. Slowness is, in fact, a form of trust: Investors know the rules will not change and their rights will be protected. This is precisely what Ukraine has long lacked.
Ukraine is fast and unpredictable, but its capital is always expensive. Speed means risk, which means a high cost of capital.

Combining Europe’s capital with Ukraine’s speed and innovation would create a unique dynamic.

Investment is not merely capital; it is a way to synchronize Europe’s pace with Ukraine’s school of fast-evolving combat systems.

Europe’s future hinges on integrating Ukraine into its defense ecosystem

Europe has entered an era of rapid military evolution. Ukraine is the country of the free world that best understands what modern war looks like. This is why European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen now speaks of a new drone alliance between Ukraine and Europe. “Before the war, Ukraine had no drones. Today, Ukrainian drones are responsible for over 23 percent of Russian equipment losses, highlighting the impact of human ingenuity in open societies,” she said in September 2025.

Europe is already entering a phase of practically implementing Ukrainian defense technologies and more closely cooperating with Ukrainian defense-tech companies. This is reflected both in joint manufacturing projects and in the integration of Ukrainian solutions into European rearmament programs—from cooperation on unmanned systems and counter-drone technologies to the creation of joint research and development teams. Notable examples include initiatives to establish joint ventures with Ukrainian manufacturers, as well as growing interest from European defense-tech players in Ukraine’s combat-tested experience with AI- and network-centric solutions.

The process has already begun. Many announcements have been made about joint investments and co-development of unmanned systems between European and Ukrainian firms. More will follow. It is part of a broader shared strategy.

If Europe and Ukraine carry this strategy through, the continent will at last acquire genuine defense autonomy, making it capable of withstanding any threat.

The post Time matters: Why Europe needs Ukrainian defense innovation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Amid Arab competition, the war in Sudan requires a US balancing act

Giorgio Cafiero — Mon, 26 Jan 2026 14:21:53 +0000

In the wake of the atrocities carried out by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in el-Fasher in late October, Sudan’s devastating conflict has drawn renewed international scrutiny.

In April 2023, this civil war erupted amid escalating tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF, stemming from disagreements over the RSF’s integration into the national army. These disputes followed a period of SAF-RSF power-sharing in the wake of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s ouster in 2019.

Thus far, the conflict has claimed perhaps more than 150,000 lives and displaced more than twelve million people, making it one of the world’s gravest humanitarian crises.

With every diplomatic initiative over the past thirty-three months failing to halt the violence, US President Donald Trump’s administration has recently focused more on Sudan. This month, a US-Saudi cease-fire initiative has been under review by the Security and Defence Council, a body that includes members of the SAF. Whether this initiative can move forward and help reverse the country’s descent into catastrophe remains to be seen.

Nonetheless, the Trump administration’s efforts to play a productive role in winding down the conflict will depend, in no small part, on how Washington chooses to engage—and with whom.

SIGN UP FOR THIS WEEK IN THE MIDEAST NEWSLETTER

Trump, MBS, and the personal diplomacy factor

The landmark visit by Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) to the White House in November helped direct Trump’s attention toward Sudan, which he described as the “most violent place on Earth” and the “single biggest humanitarian crisis.” As Trump acknowledged during his meeting with MBS, Sudan was “not on my charts to be involved in that,” adding that he viewed the conflict as “just something that was crazy and out of control.”

US President Donald Trump greets Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, during a dinner at the White House in Washington, DC, November 18, 2025. REUTERS/Tom Brenner

That MBS played a decisive role in bringing Sudan onto Trump’s radar underscores the depth of the US president’s personal ties with key Gulf leaders. In contrast to previous US administrations that relied heavily on institutional channels such as the State Department for Middle East engagement, Trump has consistently favored leader-to-leader relationships as the foundation of his administration’s foreign policy decision-making.

Challenges before the Quad

Trump is determined to work with the so-called Quad—the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—to bring Sudan’s war to an end. However, this effort will face stiff resistance from both belligerents: the SAF, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF, commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (popularly known as Hemedti).

Deputy head of Sudan’s sovereign council General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo speaks during a press conference at Rapid Support Forces headquarters in Khartoum, Sudan, February 19, 2023. REUTERS/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah

Each side remains unwilling to make painful compromises, instead pursuing maximalist objectives. Their intransigence will complicate efforts by Trump, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Special Envoy Massad Boulos to secure a cease-fire, deliver humanitarian assistance, and launch negotiations under the auspices of a civilian-led government in Khartoum. Within the Quad, however, each regional partner brings distinct priorities shaped by geography, security concerns, and geopolitical pressures.

Egypt has firmly backed the SAF, positioning itself as Burhan’s principal regional supporter while viewing the RSF as a destabilizing force and an immediate security threat. Cairo sees the SAF as possessing the legitimacy of a national institution and the capacity to restore stability. With a shared 793-mile border with Sudan and the arrival of at least 1.5 million Sudanese refugees since April 2023, Egypt has a strong interest in preventing further displacement. This imperative underscores Cairo’s desire to see the conflict end.

Earlier on in this conflict, Saudi Arabia took care to present itself as a relatively neutral mediator between the two sides, yet its posture tilted toward the SAF. Following Saudi Arabia’s reversal of Emirati gains in Yemen in late 2025 and early 2026, Riyadh has grown increasingly determined to leverage its enhanced regional credibility to counter Abu Dhabi’s influence in the Sudanese conflict through multiple channels.

Riyadh’s ambitious Vision 2030 agenda depends on stability along the Red Sea, where major investments, particularly in tourism, are underway. Prolonged fighting in Sudan, and the risk of its escalation into a broader regional crisis, therefore deeply concerns the Saudi leadership. In this context, Saudi officials view a state army such as the SAF as far preferable to a militia such as the RSF, which they regard as unpredictable, institutionally weak, and lacking legitimacy. Ultimately, Riyadh seeks a coherent authority in Sudan capable of effective governance and control over Red Sea ports, which is not a role that Saudi Arabia sees the RSF fulfilling.

The UAE has charted a markedly different course than Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Though Abu Dhabi officially denies it, United Nations experts, human rights organizations, and many media outlets have concluded that the UAE has been arming the RSF, bearing significant responsibility for Hemedti’s rise. However, Abu Dhabi sees the force as a vehicle for projecting Emirati influence in Sudan and, by extension, across parts of Africa. Dependent on external financing and logistics, the RSF has become deeply reliant on financial networks in the UAE, particularly in Dubai. This reliance has substantially expanded Abu Dhabi’s leverage in Sudan. It is notable how Ethiopia, which is under much Emirati influence, has aligned closely with Abu Dhabi in terms of backing the RSF.

Ideologically, the UAE casts Burhan and the SAF as Muslim Brotherhood-aligned, while perceiving the RSF as a dependable anti-Islamist force capable of shaping a post-conflict order consistent with Abu Dhabi’s campaign to marginalize Brotherhood-linked movements across the Arab world.

Emirati support for the RSF reflects a desire to safeguard Abu Dhabi’s interests and preserve the UAE’s autonomy of action in a volatile environment. This approach is occurring within a broader context of intensifying economic and political competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi across the Arab world and parts of Africa, amid heavy involvement by multiple regional and extra-regional actors.

Although Saudi Arabia followed the UAE in designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization back in 2014, Riyadh adopts a notably less rigid stance toward the Islamist movement than Abu Dhabi. Collaborating closely with Turkey and Qatar—both known for their Muslim Brotherhood–friendly foreign policies—on a host of regional issues, Saudi Arabia increasingly prioritizes regional stability and the prevention of state collapse in countries such as Sudan and Syria.

In practice, the Quad’s internal contradictions risk undermining its diplomatic effectiveness, while Washington’s engagement risks being somewhat empty and reactive unless the Trump administration develops a comprehensive strategy that applies sustained pressure on both Sudanese and external actors. Yet, given Trump’s close ties to Abu Dhabi’s leadership, there is reason to doubt whether the White House would press the UAE to curtail its support for the RSF. Despite such challenges, there are good reasons to believe that Trump will see it in Washington’s interests to become more involved in Sudan’s civil war, which brings us to Iran.

The Iranian factor in Sudan’s civil war

While Arab states dominate coverage of regional involvement in Sudan, Iran has also intervened in the civil war. Tehran has supplied the SAF with military support, chiefly Mohajer-6 drones, since late 2023. After the setbacks suffered by the “Axis of Resistance” in 2024, Iran’s foreign policy has increasingly focused on exerting influence near two strategic global chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab. Its leverage over the latter is reinforced by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, now the strongest faction in the Iran-led axis. Sudan, for its part, offers Tehran an opportunity to expand influence along the Red Sea through state-level engagement, rather than warfare via surrogates.

With Burhan dependent on external backing, the Sudanese civil war has given Iran a chance to reclaim influence in Khartoum. Iran lost that foothold in the 2010s when Saudi Arabia and the UAE drew Omar al-Bashir’s regime away from Tehran, culminating in Khartoum joining Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in severing diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic in early 2016.

In this context, the Trump administration is likely concerned that a prolonged conflict in Sudan could advance Iranian interests and undermine the White House’s “maximum pressure 2.0” campaign. Alongside Israel, the Trump team seeks to prevent Sudan from reverting to its former role as an Iran-friendly state along the Red Sea, at the strategic crossroads of the Arab and African worlds.

Navigating Sudan’s geopolitical crossroads

In sum, Sudan’s civil war illustrates how local conflict can become a crucible for regional rivalries. The Trump administration’s new focus on Sudan, spurred by MBS’s November visit to Washington, may place the United States at the center of a complex interplay among competing Arab ambitions, Iranian strategic calculations, and the entrenched divisions between Sudanese actors.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia favor the SAF as the guarantor of stability and state legitimacy, while the UAE’s support for the RSF reflects a broader strategy of influence projection and counterweighting Riyadh. Iran’s involvement further complicates the calculus, presenting both a challenge to the US-Israeli alliance’s desire to counter Iran’s influence near the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, and an opportunity for Tehran to regain lost ground in Khartoum.

Actors within Sudan’s rich, complicated, and layered civil society—from established organizations to grassroots resistance committees—have been delivering humanitarian aid, organizing communities, and articulating credible visions for a democratic transition. No sustainable peace process can succeed without the inclusion of these civil society groups, which retain local legitimacy and organizing capacity. As the White House seeks to restore peace, the Trump administration cannot afford to sideline these actors again, because ignoring Sudanese civil society would mean repeating strategies that have already proven ineffective and unstable.

Additionally, there is the African Union (AU), which has sought to serve as the central diplomatic convener on Sudan, advancing a roadmap focused on a cease-fire, civilian protection, humanitarian access, and a Sudanese-led political transition. Through the Peace and Security Council, coordination with the United Nations and regional bodies, and public condemnation of atrocities such as those in el-Fasher, the AU has worked to align international efforts around an African-led approach, even as its limited enforcement capacity has constrained outcomes. Nonetheless, the AU remains the only actor with continent-wide legitimacy, sustained engagement with Sudanese stakeholders, and an existing framework for coordination.

For US policymakers, the path forward demands more than reactive diplomacy. Sustained pressure on Sudanese factions and regional patrons, careful balancing of rival interests, and an emphasis on humanitarian relief and durable governance are all necessary. Ultimately, the outcome in Sudan will not only determine the future of its people, but also serve as a test of how effectively external powers can navigate the overlapping ambitions, alliances, and rivalries that define Sudan’s position in a complicated geopolitical order.

Giorgio Cafiero is the chief executive officer of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He is also an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.

The post Amid Arab competition, the war in Sudan requires a US balancing act appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At Davos, Trump’s ‘shock therapy’ leaves Europe shaken but healthier

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 25 Jan 2026 12:00:00 +0000

A senior European official, who was in Davos this past week for the World Economic Forum, refers to US President Donald Trump’s approach to Europe as “shock therapy.” After enduring several tough doses in the first year of Trump’s second term—on Ukraine, on tariffs, on Europe’s so-called “civilizational erasure,” and then on Greenland—the patient’s condition is shaken, the official says. But it is stronger.

I asked this European official for further explanation. Shock therapy, after all, is more commonly a description of electrical currents treating mental illness than a theory of international affairs. In the context of European-US relations in 2025 and 2026, he said, shock therapy refers to the “rapid, disruptive, and painful transitions” forced on Europe by Trumpian jolts to the traditional transatlantic security and trade partnership.

Europe isn’t enjoying the treatment, he said, but it is responding to it—more consequentially with every shock. Europeans have long spoken somewhat helplessly about the chronic conditions they suffer: a lack of economic competitiveness, an inability to provide for their own security, and insufficient political unity. Together these conditions have resulted in the continent’s inability to translate the weight of its 450 million people, $22 trillion-plus gross domestic product (GDP), and advanced market into geopolitical heft.

This diagnosis hasn’t changed. But European leaders now recognize that, in the face of Trump’s United States, the continent must fundamentally treat its maladies or further surrender global relevance. What’s also changed for Europe is a growing recognition that it can no longer rely on the post–World War II global order, whose institutions and rules provided the safe context for the creation and growth of the European Union (EU).

Trump’s dramatic climbdown this week from his ultimatum that Europe either give him Greenland or face tariffs had many sources, ranging from market jitters over EU countermeasures and congressional opposition to a lack of popular American support. Most significant in Europe was that it triggered greater unity among the EU’s twenty-seven members against Trump, even among the right-wing parties that usually back him, than at any time previously.

Even after the immediate crisis was defused in Davos on Wednesday, EU leaders still met at an emergency summit in Brussels on Thursday. The Atlantic Council’s Jörn Fleck and James Batchik write about how that meeting signaled “a quiet yet dogged determination . . . to strengthen Europe’s ability to withstand US pressure in any future scenarios.”

If this change is permanent

It took a Canadian in Davos to best describe the abrupt changes unsettling European countries—and other nations that he referred to as middle powers. “We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition,” said Prime Minister Mark Carney. Great powers, he continued, “have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.” His conclusion: “You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration, when integration becomes the source of subordination.”

However, it was European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen who captured the historic moment at Davos for a continent whose current boundaries, ideologies, and collaborative structure have been forged by the previous shocks of World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Where she agreed with Carney, without mentioning Trump by name, is that his administration is sweeping away the nostalgia of common cause that has helped hold together the transatlantic alliance for eight decades.

“Of course, nostalgia is part of our human story. But nostalgia will not bring back the old order,” she said in a speech less celebrated than Carney’s but just as consequential. “And playing for time, and hoping that things will revert soon, will not fix the structural dependencies we have. So, my point is, if this change is permanent, then Europe must change permanently, too.”

The will to match the ambition

What many in the Trump administration have missed, with their focus on Europe’s weaknesses, is that the EU has been seizing upon the Trump moment for new trade deals. Von der Leyen came to Davos from Paraguay, where she signed the EU-Mercosur trade agreement, through which the EU and Latin American countries have created what she called “the largest free trade zone in the world, a market worth over 20 percent of global GDP; thirty-one countries with over 700 million consumers.”

Her next lines were aimed at Trump, without naming him. “So, this agreement sends a powerful message to the world that we are choosing fair trade over tariffs, partnership over isolation, sustainability over exploitation, and that we are serious about de-risking our economies and diversifying our supply chains.”

For those paying attention, that was something new. De-risking has been a term that Europe has associated with China until now, but in Davos this past week European political and corporate leaders increasingly applied it to the United States. A few US companies complained privately in Davos that European officials cancelled meetings—presumably to send a message. US companies with big business and investments in Europe sound more alarmed than ever that their European partners will look for ways, wherever they can, to operate without them. One US business leader told me that EU regulators are talking openly about more aggressively reducing their reliance on US technology, social media, and payment giants over the next three to five years.

Though misgivings about dealing with China remain substantial, European leaders believe they must hedge, if only to signal to Washington that they have alternatives. As evidence of this, European leaders are lining up to visit Beijing to drum up business. Carney was there just before Davos. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz will each visit in the coming days. French President Emmanuel Macron, who visited China in December, said in Davos that Europe needs to seek more Chinese foreign direct investment.

In her Davos speech, von der Leyen spoke about new trade agreements in the past year alone with Mexico, Indonesia, and Switzerland (while Trump has been slapping tariffs on them) and a new arrangement soon with Australia. The EU is also “advancing,” she said, with the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and the United Arab Emirates. This weekend, she is in India, whose officials prioritized the EU after Trump’s tariff hit on them.

“There’s still work to do, but we are on the cusp of a historic trade agreement” with India, von der Leyen said. Then, channeling Trump-like language that no EU leader would have used previously, she said, “Indeed, some call it the mother of all deals. One that would create a market of two billion people, accounting for almost a quarter of global GDP and, crucially, that would provide a first-mover advantage for Europe with one of the world’s fastest-growing and most dynamic countries.”

At the same time, European Union countries have launched a surge in defense spending of some €800 billion through 2030. That pledged surge, von der Leyen said, had helped triple the market value of European defense companies since January 2022, making them one of the best global investments anywhere in that time.

“All of this would have been unthinkable even a few years ago,” she said. “This now only shows how economy and national security are more linked than ever, but also what we can do when Europeans have the will to match the ambition.”

Interrupting the equilibrium

One of the other quiet takeaways from Davos was just how serious European policymakers are about economic integration. “The long-debated savings and investment union is now on a fast track, and Trump is a major factor,” says Josh Lipsky, chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council, who was in Davos this past week. “The stark realization that the US can’t always be relied on as an economic partner put new urgency in the minds of every finance official. I expect this is finally going to get done.”

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, the European who negotiated the deal that defused what might have been the worst transatlantic crisis in decades, gave Trump credit in Davos for a more determined Europe. “I’m not popular with you now because I’m defending Donald Trump,” he said, “but I really believe you can be happy that he is there. He has forced us in Europe to step up.” He added, “Without Donald Trump, this would never have happened.”

Whether Europe’s new steeliness endures beyond Davos remains to be seen. As a life-long Atlanticist, one who runs an institution dedicated to shaping the global future alongside US partners and allies, I regret the nature of the therapy but hope the eventual outcome will be a stronger and more confident Europe within a restored and resurgent transatlantic community, one up to the challenges of the coming century.

One can only hope that it won’t require an ever more severe shock to get there, more than likely administered by autocratic powers such as Russia and China, sensing a moment of opportunity provided by weaknesses among democratic allies.

Shock therapy succeeds in medicine not because it heals but because it interrupts a potentially fatal equilibrium and creates a window for recovery. Applied to Europe, Trump’s shock has broken decades of strategic complacency and forced long-postponed decisions on defense, trade, and autonomy. Both in medicine and politics, a jolt can restart the system, but only sustained care determines whether it survives.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post At Davos, Trump’s ‘shock therapy’ leaves Europe shaken but healthier appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What Trump could do next in Iran

Nate Swanson — Fri, 23 Jan 2026 21:10:11 +0000

“We’re watching Iran,” US President Donald Trump told reporters Thursday as he returned from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. “We have a big flotilla going in that direction, and we’ll see what happens.” For the past week, a US carrier strike group led by the USS Abraham Lincoln has proceeded west from the South China Sea to the Persian Gulf near Iran.

Earlier this month, as anti-regime protests in Iran spread and reports of Iranian security forces killing demonstrators emerged, Trump pledged that the United States would “come to their rescue.” Is the arrival of US naval forces near Iran a prelude to a strike on the regime? For answers, we turned to Nate Swanson, who was the director for Iran at the National Security Council in the Biden White House and a member of the Trump administration’s Iran negotiating team:

1. What are Trump’s options in Iran?

We are in unprecedented territory. Prior to Operation Midnight Hammer in June, the United States had never directly attacked Iran. The United States spent years developing the technology and expertise necessary to successfully carry out an operation against Iran’s nuclear program. Initiating strikes to protect protesters is an entirely different set of targets and objectives that are likely being developed in real time.

As the USS Abraham Lincoln enters the region, Trump likely has a range of options that fall into following broad categories.

Symbolic strikes: This could include strikes on conventional targets, such as Iran’s nuclear or missile program. While these strikes would do little to tangibly help the protesters, it will ensure that nobody can accuse the president of drawing “red lines” and then ignoring them.
Strikes targeting the security apparatus: Trump likely has intelligence on a range of facilities and personnel connected to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, law enforcement forces, and the paramilitary Basij militia that may be connected to the crackdown on the protest movement. Cyberattacks against the security apparatus also fall into this category. These strikes might provide a measure of revenge and consolation to the protesters, but it’s unclear what impact this would have in preventing the regime from cracking down. Iran has more than a million individuals in its security apparatus. A one-off strike is unlikely to change the regime’s calculus about killing protesters. A sustained campaign against security personnel is plausible, but it would require a durable commitment that the Trump administration has thus far avoided in its use of military force.
Economic targets: During confrontations between Iran and Israel over the past year, there was speculation that Israel might attack Iranian economic targets. This could include oil export terminals, such as Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf, as well as critical natural gas infrastructure. Such an operation would be risky and could impact energy markets, but it would also get the attention of a government that is teetering on the brink of economic collapse.
The supreme leader: Many protesters in Iran and observers outside of the country are clamoring for a strike that removes Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. While it’s unclear whether such a strike is feasible (much less advisable), it would be a game changer. Iran’s supreme leader is the highest political and religious authority inside Iran. There has only been one prior succession in the history of the Islamic Republic, and there is no consensus successor for Khamenei. Removing him creates an unprecedented power vacuum, and it is impossible to predict what comes next.
Non-kinetic options: There are numerous tangible non-kinetic options that the United States can take. Former US Deputy Special Envoy for Iran Abram Paley and I offered our own suggestions for supporting protesters, including pausing non-protest-related policy initiatives. Realistically, none would likely be decisive or would change the trajectory of the current protests. They are geared toward the next round of protests and ensuring protesters have the tools to make their own decisions about Iran’s future.

2. Would a US strike help Iranian protesters?

I am skeptical it will have a major impact, but it’s impossible to predict, because the success of a strike would best be measured on the impact it has on both the protesters’ and the regime’s psyche. Maybe a strike will provide such a significant morale boost to the protesters that they decide to keep protesting to the point that regime fissures emerge, defections ensue, and the Iranian regime collapses. An alternative is that the Iranian regime kills more of its own people. This scenario has parallels to Hungary in 1956 and Kurdish Iraq in 1991, where the United States called for the people to rise up, but had limited resources to offer, and the protesters were brutally crushed.

In all strike scenarios, the administration will need to consider and articulate a vision for what comes next. The regime might fall and a pro-Western democracy could emerge, but an equally plausible scenario is that an even more hardline government emerges, one that is even more eager to develop nuclear weapons and utilize its missile arsenal. This concern is partially why several Gulf nations have advocated against striking Iran.

Finally, it seems highly unlikely that US troops would be deployed on the ground in Iran. This means a political transition in Iran won’t happen because US soldiers liberate Iran or because an outside force intervenes. Instead, it will have to be a change driven by Iranians.

3. What should we expect from the Iranian regime?

Having the USS Abraham Lincoln in theater serves two functions. First it allows the United States to more easily defend against any retaliation from Iran, thus providing greater optionality for a strike. It also provides a psychological advantage. Iran knows that any actions it takes in response to a US action could be met with a further escalation from US forces.

This dynamic will likely deter Iran from doing anything overly escalatory. The Iranian regime will likely calibrate its response to be proportional (in its estimation) to that of any US action. For example, if the United States hits Iran with symbolic strikes, Iran will likely do something symbolic as well. Iran’s attack against US forces in Qatar in June is a useful example of what a response could look like. This scenario allows both sides to claim victory and de-escalate.

Alternatively, in regard to a strike on Khamenei, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated earlier this month that “an attack on the great leader of our country is tantamount to a full-scale war with the Iranian nation.” What this would look like is impossible to predict, but the United States is at least now better prepared to respond to such a scenario.

The post What Trump could do next in Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Trump may move on from Greenland. Europe won’t.

Jörn Fleck, James Batchik — Thu, 22 Jan 2026 23:23:14 +0000

WASHINGTON—Relief and exasperation may have been the initial reactions across European capitals as US President Donald Trump folded the cards on his Greenland gamble from Davos on Wednesday. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte excelled once again as the unrivaled Trump whisperer, helped by a combination of financial market jitters and an unexpectedly united Europe holding its ground. Rutte’s framework deal with Trump, however scarce the details, seemed to vindicate those arguing for Europe to “engage, not escalate” with the US president.

But a day after the news of the Arctic deal from the Alps, the mood among European policymakers is shifting away from mere relief. It was Trump who threatened to remember if he didn’t get his way on Greenland, but it is the Europeans who will remember this dispute even as Trump moves on. Few are celebrating the de-escalation because of how pointless and reckless they view this latest test of the Alliance’s credibility and cohesion. And because they know it’s likely only a temporary reprieve and hardly the last transatlantic crisis they can expect from this US administration. As a result, a quiet yet dogged determination is emerging to strengthen Europe’s ability to withstand US pressure in any future scenarios brought on by a US president who is seen as unpredictable, if not erratic. In a sign of the impression the last few days and weeks have left, European Union (EU) leaders still met at a special summit in Brussels on Thursday despite the immediate issue having been defused.

Trump’s speech in Davos made an impression on European decision makers. The US president appeared to be setting the terms for negotiations, forcing Europe to choose between acquiescing on his acquisition of Greenland and maintaining US support for NATO. While doing away with any potential military action, Trump outlined a nebulous rationale of US control of Greenland: No one else could supposedly defend it, and the United States needed it to protect against adversaries. He reminded Europeans of their dependencies on the United States from energy and trade to security and Ukraine. It all looked like an attempt to boost his leverage in any of these areas. But by the evening Davos time, Trump had struck a preliminary deal with Rutte.

Europeans will want to better understand the details of that agreement and what it means for Greenland, Denmark, and Europe. As long as military options and tariffs are off the table, Nuuk’s and Copenhagen’s sovereignty are respected, and the White House’s sharp rhetoric and threats subside, then NATO and EU capitals will hold back on their criticism for now. Some may even be going back to the pretense of transatlantic dialogue, cooperation, and partnership.

But beyond the diplomatic protocol and time bought, Trump’s ready willingness to engage in brinkmanship with the alliance, Europe’s economy, and personal relationships with key leaders will have a lasting impact. Trump’s approach toward Greenland has destroyed much of the domestic political space for those arguing that Europe has a weak hand and therefore few options but to engage, assuage, and accommodate Trump. That same argument, which led the EU to accept a lopsided trade deal with the United States this past summer in pursuit of “stability and predictability” in the relationship, has taken a major hit, even if few European leaders say this out loud for now.

There are clear lessons here for Europe. Over the past few days, European resolve had been building to stand tall and stay united. Markets took note of the potential costs of that cohesion, including retaliatory tariffs and a “Sell America” turn away from US assets. Europe fared better than many expected in raising the complexity for Trump in Greenland, including by swiftly deploying even just small numbers of troops to prepare joint exercises. Denmark proved resilient and built more effective rapport with Greenlanders over historically difficult relations and, together with Europe, it made important commitments to the territory and Arctic security.

Whatever time the de-escalation over this latest rift has bought Europe, it better use that reprieve effectively. It likely won’t be the last such episode under this president. Europe will have to swiftly translate the lessons from the past few weeks into building greater resilience and sovereignty, if not strategic autonomy. Efforts to strengthen defense capabilities, defense industrial capacity, and long-term support for Ukraine are well underway. But much like Europe’s initiatives at boosting its competitiveness, intensifying trade diversification, and deepening its capital markets, these efforts require greater speed, ambition, and follow-through.

Europeans will be well advised to do even more contingency planning on how to resist economic coercion, even from partners, and make unwieldy tools such as the Anti-Coercion Instrument more effective politically. Other areas to watch in the coming months are progress on new trade and critical raw materials deals or breakthroughs on long-standing initiatives such as the savings and investment union. Front and center for European decision makers’ thinking will be the problem described in Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Davos speech of a “rupture, not a transition” in the world order. Whether they can act on his remedies of “strength at home [and] diversifying abroad” remains to be seen.

The post Trump may move on from Greenland. Europe won’t. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To get the Greenland issue right, focus on alignment

András Simonyi — Thu, 22 Jan 2026 18:55:27 +0000

BRUSSELS—On Wednesday, US President Donald Trump announced that he would not implement planned tariffs on European allies after reaching a “framework of a future deal” with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Greenland and the Arctic. Coming after weeks of sharp rhetoric and threats that often obscured the strategic issues at play, this development presents an opportunity for the United States and its allies to refocus on what is actually at stake.

Greenland is the world’s largest island, located in an increasingly contested Arctic region, making it a target for Russian pressure and Chinese influence. That reality deserves serious conversation among partners, not a public quarrel that weakens all sides.

Why Greenland matters

As Trump said earlier Wednesday during his address to the World Economic Forum in Davos, the United States has had a long history with Greenland. Washington first made an offer to acquire Greenland in 1867, and the idea has resurfaced repeatedly, including after World War II. Trump, too, has a history with the island. During his first term, Trump described his approach as essentially “a large real estate deal,” and he returned to that language in his speech in Davos.

It is unsurprising that Trump, who has had a long career in real estate, would approach this issue in this manner. But Greenland has never been a simple real-estate transaction. Its strategic location and mineral potential make it consequential to twenty-first-century security and economics. Its position in the Arctic among US allies and Russia introduces important geopolitical factors, as well. The problem is not the underlying interests; it is how they have been presented in recent weeks, through rhetoric and actions that have inflamed emotions and narrowed the path to a diplomatic solution that could strengthen US and allied security.

Not ownership, but alignment

Looking past the recent attention-grabbing rhetoric, there is an important issue here: Without a credible US security guarantee, the world’s largest island—sitting in a volatile and strategically critical Arctic region—is potentially vulnerable against future pressure from Russia and, more importantly, China.

That is why the central question is not ownership but alignment, especially as Greenland moves toward its expected independence from Denmark. In that event, will Greenland’s political and economic future remain anchored in the transatlantic community, where its natural resources can benefit Greenlanders and strengthen the free world? Or, will an independent Greenland drift into a gray zone of influence and insecurity that the adversaries of the United States and Europe could exploit?

Trump’s announcement that he would not levy additional tariffs on European allies could offer much-needed diplomatic space for a new approach that would address these questions. Driven by both national security and economic realities, the United States could use this moment to seek strategic certainty that Greenland will remain secure, stable, and anchored in the West.

For Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and other political leaders in Denmark in an election year, there is little room for nuance: Greenland is not for sale. Many Greenlanders feel insulted by the mere suggestion of being “bought,” and that reaction is understandable. But the recent outrage has also made it harder to have a rational conversation about the realities shaping Greenland’s future. Moreover, it distracts from the fact that Danish-Greenlandic relations remain complicated, shaped by history and unresolved questions about Greenland identity and autonomy as a nation.

As Anne-Sofie Allarp, a well-respected Danish journalist and author, wrote ahead of last week’s meeting in Washington between high-level US officials and their Danish and Greenlandic counterparts, “Danish and Greenlandic politicians of the past 30-40 years need a conversation with themselves about the real relationship between Greenland and Denmark.” She goes on to warn that Greenland’s independence could leave this “strategically important area close to the United States, on which the United States has important installations and which has important rare earths and metals, with an absolutely uncertain political future.”

The China factor

What has been underrepresented in the current debate, however, is that China has previously made overtures to Greenland—something that understandably raises concern in Washington. A 2022 study by the University of Copenhagen concluded that “Greenland views China as a deep-pocketed investor and a huge consumer market, especially in the mining, fishing, and tourism industries. Greenland therefore views China as an important partner in its economic development, which is important for its independence from Denmark.”

Chinese eﬀorts to build infrastructure and gain economic leverage in Greenland have, so far, been held back by Danish and allied pressure. Without Danish insistence, Greenland might have allowed it to move forward. In 2018, for example, the Chinese state-owned company China Communications Construction Company was shortlisted to build three airports in Greenland, in Nuuk, Ilulissat, and Qaqortoq. This effort stalled only after Danish and US officials stepped in. China has also proposed to build “science stations” in the region with dual-use capabilities, consistent with Beijing’s broader ambition to expand its presence in the Arctic through the Polar Silk Road initiative. And the Chinese company Shenghe Resources has sought through other companies to exploit rare earth and uranium mining projects, including Kvanefjeld in Greenland, which was halted on environmental rather than geopolitical grounds.

For now, Chinese ambitions in Greenland have been constrained by Denmark. But the political trajectory inside Greenland is moving in the direction of independence. Nearly all the major political parties in Greenland support independence, only differing on the timing and the process. A referendum in Greenland to break with Denmark, while unlikely after the recent developments, cannot be excluded in the future. Even if a valid, pro-independence referendum required negotiations with Denmark to move forward, the long-term impact could be precarious. An independent Greenland would be free to pursue partnerships of its choosing, and it might choose to remain outside of the European Union and keep its distance from NATO. It might even attempt to balance between the United States and China, expecting investment and other benefits to be extracted from each. In short, preventing Beijing from gaining a lasting foothold in the Arctic could be far more diﬃcult at that point than it is today.

There are no simple answers to these challenges. But to avoid an uncertain and dangerous future, the United States, Denmark, and Greenland need a sober and results-oriented conversation that begins to resolve these issues. This conversation must, moreover, treat Greenland’s people with respect while confronting the hard security realities of the Arctic. Those who wish to weaken the transatlantic alliance are watching this process closely. The task now is not rhetorical escalation, but strategic certainty that secures Greenland, anchors it in the West, and protects the long-term interests of all three parties.

The post To get the Greenland issue right, focus on alignment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The US is taking action against Russia’s shadow fleet. In the Baltic Sea, Europe should follow suit.

Justina Budginaite-Froehly — Thu, 22 Jan 2026 18:52:13 +0000

WASHINGTON—For years, Russia has operated a so-called “shadow fleet” of sanctions-evading oil tankers, which have provided revenue for the Kremlin to continue its war against Ukraine. For nearly as long, Western maritime policy toward this fleet has been reactive, legalistic, and ultimately permissive.

That changed late last year, when the Trump administration started taking bold action against the shadow fleet to enforce its blockade of Venezuelan oil exports. By targeting the vessels, logistics, and enablers of this opaque maritime network, the United States flipped the initiative. Instead of allowing Russia to exploit legal gray zones and Western restraint, Washington forced Moscow into a defensive crouch—raising costs, increasing uncertainty, and signaling that abuse of maritime norms would no longer be consequence-free.

This matters well beyond oil tankers. Strategic initiative is not about a single sanctions package or interdiction; it is about shaping the overall operating environment. By introducing ambiguity over what it will tolerate, the United States demonstrated that Russia’s shadow fleet is not an untouchable fact of life but a vulnerability. European states—especially the Baltic and Nordic states—should recognize that this is precisely the approach they should have applied long ago in the Baltic Sea.

Russia’s “shadow fleet” is a malign actor in the Baltics

Russia’s shadow fleet is an instrument of state power operating under civilian cover. In the Baltic Sea, its malign activity has taken several forms.

First, the tankers help Russia evade sanctions. Shadow tankers—often uninsured, aging, and operating under flags of convenience—have become essential to sustaining Russian energy exports in defiance of international restrictions. Their opaque ownership structures, frequent flag-hopping, and noncompliance with safety and reporting standards create systemic risks in one of the world’s most congested and environmentally sensitive maritime spaces.

Second, the shadow fleet poses a threat to undersea critical infrastructure. The Baltic Sea hosts a dense web of pipelines, power cables, and data links essential to European security and economic life. The presence of poorly regulated, state-directed vessels with unusual loitering patterns near such infrastructure has rightly raised alarm. Several pipelines and cables under the Baltic Sea, including the Balticconnector gas pipeline and Estlink 2 power cable connecting Estonia and Finland, as well as fiber-optic cables between Lithuania and Sweden, and between Finland and Germany, have been damaged between October 2023 and December 2024. Even when direct attribution is difficult, the pattern is unmistakable: Russia has both the capability and the incentive to use maritime assets to map, probe, and potentially sabotage critical seabed infrastructure.

Third, the shadow fleet increasingly functions as a platform for hybrid operations. There are growing concerns that shadow fleet vessels serve as launchpads, logistical nodes, or intelligence enablers for drone and electronic operations. Incidents involving unidentified drones near critical sites, including major airports near Copenhagen and Oslo, underscore how maritime proximity can be exploited to project disruptive capabilities ashore while maintaining deniability.

Taken together, the shadow fleet’s actions go well beyond commerce. They are committing acts of hybrid warfare at sea.

Europe’s self-imposed restraint

Europe has taken important initial steps to address Russia’s shadow fleet. To date, the European Union has imposed sanctions on hundreds of vessels, subjecting them to port access and servicing bans. Some European countries—Finland, Estonia, Germany, and France—have boarded some suspicious vessels in the past months but have claimed a lack of sufficient grounds under international maritime law to justify permanent seizure. Most recently, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that the French navy intercepted and boarded a sanctioned Russian-linked tanker in the Mediterranean, reiterating that such operations are necessary to enforce sanctions and disrupt the shadow fleet’s role in financing Russia’s war effort.

Despite these positive steps, European nations have been unable to stop the vast majority of shadow fleet vessels from transiting the Baltic Sea, even though it is known that Russia transports around 60 percent of its seaborne oil exports using this illicit sanctions-evasion network, with many of the tankers crossing the Baltic Sea. The primary justification for this reticence to apply stronger sanctions enforcement is often legal: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principle of freedom of navigation. These are important norms—but Europe has turned them into a strategic straitjacket.

UNCLOS was adopted in 1982, in a radically different security environment. It was designed for an era when maritime threats were largely military-to-military and when civilian vessels were not routinely weaponized as tools of sabotage, coercion, and deniable attack. Today’s maritime actors possess a vastly expanded toolkit: drones, cyber capabilities, seabed interference, and hybrid operations that deliberately exploit the protections afforded to civilian shipping.

More importantly, the legal restraint is one-sided. Russia does not respect the spirit—or often the letter—of the rules Europe clings to. Shadow-fleet vessels routinely operate without proper insurance, obscure their ownership, falsify registries, and sail in conditions that would not be tolerated for legitimate commercial shipping. These practices alone raise serious questions about seaworthiness, environmental safety, and compliance with international law. Europe is not defending UNCLOS by tolerating such behavior; it is hollowing it out. A legal regime that is systematically abused by hostile actors cannot be treated as sacrosanct if it undermines the security of those who follow it in good faith.

Time to join the momentum

By moving decisively against the shadow fleet, the United States, having never ratified UNCLOS but operating largely in accordance with its provisions as customary international law, has established the very strategic ambiguity Europe has long advocated. The US seizure and boarding of the illicit tankers demonstrate that states can reassert deterrence in the hybrid domain when they are willing to broadly interpret UNCLOS’s provisions on boarding and seizing ships, thus defending the intent—not just the letter—of maritime law.

Baltic and Nordic countries are uniquely positioned to act. They possess exceptional maritime domain awareness, capable coast guards and navies, and dense legal and regulatory ecosystems. This enables them to broadly interpret UNCLOS’s legal authority to board and seize shadow fleet tankers, especially as they violate Article 92 of UNCLOS by engaging in flag-hopping and operating without proper insurance. Coordinated pressure can raise the operational and financial costs of shadow-fleet activity and make the Baltic Sea inhospitable to Russia’s illegal and dangerous maritime practices.

By stepping up its measures against shadow fleet vessels, Europe can seize this moment to make a substantive contribution to the reform and modernization of the UNCLOS framework. This does not mean abandoning UNCLOS but interpreting its provisions broadly to uphold the values underpinning it—above all, the obligation to ensure safety at sea. The convention was never designed for a world in which civilian vessels are routinely applied to dual-use purposes. Nor did it anticipate today’s vast networks of undersea critical infrastructure, now central to national security and economic resilience.

Strategic initiative in the hybrid domain is shifting. The United States has set a clear example of the operational possibilities at hand. In this changing environment, Europe should not hold itself hostage to regulations that adversaries openly flout and deliberately weaponize. This is a chance for Europe to act decisively by forcing Russia’s shadow fleet out of the Baltic Sea and helping to reshape the maritime legal order so that it responds to today’s challenges.

Energy Sanctions Dashboard

This dashboard focuses on US sanctions and restrictive measures placed on crude oil from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela—including the unintended consequences and the lessons learned.

The post The US is taking action against Russia’s shadow fleet. In the Baltic Sea, Europe should follow suit. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Grundman in CNN reporting on defense contracting

clee — Thu, 22 Jan 2026 18:37:18 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On January 7, Forward Defense Senior Fellow Steven Grundman was featured in an article on CNN entitled “Trump threatens defense contractors with restrictions while promising sharp increase in spending,” arguing that Trump’s proposed limits on defense contractors’ buybacks, dividends, and executive pay would amount to an unprecedented form of state intervention. In his view, even if the intent is justified, the approach risks damaging incentives, investment, and the long-term health of the defense industrial base.

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Senior Fellow

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The post Grundman in CNN reporting on defense contracting appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wang Yi’s MENA tour was long on messaging, short on outcomes

Jonathan Fulton — Thu, 22 Jan 2026 12:17:45 +0000

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was in the Middle East recently, visiting the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Jordan from December 12 to 16. The trip was long on messaging and short on outcomes, as Wang worked to position China as a defender of free trade and a reliable partner for his hosts.

An unusual stop in Jordan

Of the three countries on Wang’s itinerary, Jordan stands out as unusual. Chinese leaders frequently engage with countries in the Gulf, but Jordan isn’t a typical destination for Beijing’s officials. While in Amman, he met with King Abdullah II, Crown Prince Hussein, and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi.

At the bilateral level, the message was that China wants to enhance the strategic partnership signed during the king’s 2015 visit to Beijing. This elevated partnership would focus on increased economic and investment cooperation and deeper political trust. As Wang conveyed to Safadi, “China will remain Jordan’s most reliable strategic partner in its development and revitalization process.”

SIGN UP FOR THIS WEEK IN THE MIDEAST NEWSLETTER

This is an odd description of the China-Jordan relationship, which is not especially strategic. There has been little in the way of political or security cooperation between the two; Jordan is deeply tethered to the United States, limiting opportunities for China to make serious inroads. The economic side of the relationship has also been modest. Data from the American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker shows relatively insignificant engagement, with $1.96 billion in investments over the past twenty years and $5.54 billion in construction contracts for Chinese companies in Jordan since 2005. Trade has also been muted. Data from 2023 shows China exported $5.44 billion to Jordan, while Jordan exported $986 million to China.

Given the limited political and economic relations at the bilateral level, the likely reason for the Amman stop in Wang’s Middle East trip was to discuss diplomatic efforts on the Palestine issue. Beijing has been making efforts to be a more significant actor on the Israel-Palestine conflict, and with no influence with the Israelis, working with the Palestinians is China’s only access point. In July 2024, Beijing hosted a delegation of fourteen Palestinian political groups, releasing the Beijing Declaration in which these factions pledged to end their divisions and form an interim national unity government. Since then, Chinese diplomacy has been active but not particularly effective, although to their credit, they continue to advocate for Palestine, regularly voicing support in the United Nations and offering Beijing as a potential mediator.

In Wang’s talks with the king and crown prince, the focus was on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, “the need for cooperation between China and the Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization,” the cease-fire in Gaza, and the urgency of stopping attacks on West Bank Palestinians.

The week before Wang’s trip, the third round of China-Saudi-Iran trilateral talks were held in Tehran, and discussions significantly focused on regional security issues—including on Israel-Palestine. Clearly, Chinese diplomats are working to enhance their profile on the issue.

With the China-Arab States Summit scheduled for June 2026, regional analysts should expect more coordination between China and the Arab League on Palestine. And Wang’s visit to Jordan might indicate King Abdullah’s presence at the summit. If so, it would be his first trip to China since 2015, when the strategic partnership was announced.

Engagements with the Gulf

The Saudi visit was not at all surprising given the depth of relations between Beijing and Riyadh. Chinese capital has been flowing into the kingdom at a higher rate in recent years, with Saudi media noting a 29 percent gain in the stock of Chinese investment in Saudi Arabia from 2023 to 2024. Trade continues to surge, with China ranking as Saudi Arabia’s top trade partner.

During the visit, Wang met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan. The foreign ministers jointly held the fifth High-Level Joint Committee (HLJC) meeting, a mechanism developed after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2016 state visit, which resulted in the China-Saudi comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. Since then, the HLJC has been used to chart the course for bilateral cooperation, with regular senior meetings that coordinate trade, investment, contracting, and diplomatic efforts.

Wang emphasized the increasing depth of the partnership while meeting with the Saudi crown prince, telling him that “China is ready to be the most trustworthy and reliable partner in Saudi Arabia’s national revitalization process.”

Contrasting the United States on trade

That Wang focused on trustworthiness and reliability in both Amman and Riyadh was clearly carefully chosen messaging. In his meeting with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary-General Jasem al-Budaiwi, Wang tried to position China’s reliability as a reason to jump back into talks for the long-negotiated China-GCC free trade agreement. Wang noted that “the talks have lasted for more than twenty years, and conditions for all aspects are basically mature, it is time to make a final decision.” Claiming that free trade is “under attack,” he described a China-GCC free trade agreement (FTA) as “a strong signal to the world about defending multilateralism.” All of this served as a not-particularly-subtle means of comparing China as a defender of trade in the face of US tariffs.

The FTA was also a focus in Wang’s talks with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed. Wang expressed hope that the UAE could play a role in moving the FTA towards a conclusion, while his counterpart responded that he’s willing to play a positive role in the matter.

Despite Wang’s positioning of Beijing as a reliable trade partner, the China-GCC FTA talks have been stalled for nearly a decade. During Xi’s 2016 visit to Riyadh, he said he wanted a deal done within a year. Four rounds of talks that year didn’t get the FTA finished, and the GCC rupture from 2017 to 2021 put negotiations on hiatus. Since then, every meeting between senior Chinese and Gulf officials has included Chinese statements about the need to conclude the agreement as soon as possible.

It’s worth pointing out that since 2023, the GCC initiated six anti-dumping investigations against China, while Saudi Arabia has launched four of its own and Oman recently launched one as well, citing the need to “safeguard the local market from price distortions caused by imported products sold at unfair prices that do not reflect actual production costs.” UAE Minister of Foreign Trade Thani al-Zayoudi said at the World Economic Forum in October that “we are seeing huge dumping coming from China to our local markets,” and “we must make sure we are protecting our industries.”

As Gulf countries look to develop local manufacturing, free trade with China isn’t an easy sell. Yes, China is a global trading superpower, but it is very much a one-sided trader, pursuing a mercantilist growth model that floods other countries’ markets while decreasing its own imports. Unfettered Chinese imports look more like a threat than an opportunity for Gulf countries at this stage in their development.

In any case, Wang’s visit did highlight the many areas of cooperation between China, the Saudis, and Emiratis. Talks included cooperation on oil and natural gas, renewable energy, technology, research and science, education, tourism, and security. China may not have reached the status of most reliable and trustworthy, but it is clearly signaling its ambition to be a more serious partner.

Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He also serves as an associate professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi.

The post Wang Yi’s MENA tour was long on messaging, short on outcomes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The future of Greenland and NATO after Trump’s Davos deal

Atlantic Council — Thu, 22 Jan 2026 00:51:42 +0000

GET UP TO SPEED

Today started with ice and ended with a thaw. Shortly after a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland—in which he made his case for why the United States should own the “big, beautiful piece of ice” that is Greenland—Donald Trump announced that he had reached a “framework of a future deal” on the issue. The breakthrough came after Trump met with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, and led to the US president dropping his tariff threats against European nations that had opposed the US acquisition of the semiautonomous Danish territory. According to Trump, the deal will concern potential US rights over Greenland’s minerals, as well as the island’s involvement in his administration’s proposed “Golden Dome” missile defense system. Below, our experts shed light on all the transatlantic tumult.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Josh Lipsky (@joshualipsky): Chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council, senior director of the GeoEconomics Center, and former International Monetary Fund advisor
Matthew Kroenig (@MatthewKroenig): Vice president and senior director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Tressa Guenov: Director for programs and operations and senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and former US principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs
Jörn Fleck (@JornFleck): Senior director of the Europe Center and former European Parliament staffer

Tariff troubles

Now that Trump appears to have backed down from both his military and economic threats, “Europe is breathing a sigh of relief,” Josh reports from the World Economic Forum, but it’s one that “will be short-lived.”
Don’t expect Europe to jump back in to last year’s US-EU trade deal, which Brussels paused in recent days. European leaders “feel like they’ve been burned by the volatility, paid a political price at home, and want commitments that next weekend they don’t wake up to new tariff threats,” Josh tells us. “Businesses, many of which said as much privately to the Trump administration this week in Davos, want the same” sort of commitments.
“Markets had their say” as well, Josh writes, noting that fears of a US-EU trade war drove up bond yields in recent days. That’s “the exact kind of pressure point that made Trump relent” in April 2025 when he paused his “Liberation Day” tariffs. “With mortgage rates shooting up” in response to the volatility, says Josh, “Trump showed that he can be especially sensitive to the bond markets.”

Sign up to receive rapid insight in your inbox from Atlantic Council experts on global events as they unfold.

NATO’s next steps

“The idea that Trump would attack a NATO ally was always hard to imagine,” says Matt, who argues that “Trump’s threats were clearly part of his now-trademark style of building leverage to force a negotiation.”
Matt now expects a future deal to include “increased military presence in Greenland from Denmark and other NATO allies and increased access and basing for the United States.”
The “hard work” ahead for negotiators, he explains, will be “hammering out an agreement that addresses Trump’s legitimate security concerns while also respecting the sovereignty of NATO allies.”
Matt identifies several cases that could provide “creative solutions,” including “the United Kingdom’s ‘sovereign base area’ in Cyprus, the bishop of Urgell and the president of France’s ‘shared sovereignty’ over Andorra, and the United States’ possession of a perpetual lease in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”

The bigger picture

But even if a deal gets done, says Tressa, Trump’s pressure campaign against Europe over Greenland could have consequences for security issues that must be solved on both sides of the Atlantic: “A sustained atmosphere of crisis has the potential to detract from Trump’s own success in getting NATO countries to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense and, he hopes, buy American products.” She points out that “many of the countries that he threatened with tariffs are the ones who have stepped up defense spending the most.”
Jörn agrees on the lasting impact of “Trump’s willingness to engage in brinkmanship with the Alliance, Europe’s economy, and personal relationships with key leaders.” The approach “has destroyed much of the domestic political space in Europe for those arguing that Europe has a weak hand and therefore few options but to engage, assuage, and accommodate” the US president, “even if few European leaders will say this out loud for now.”
Still, while “Davos is sometimes criticized for a lot of talk but little action, this year no one can doubt the forum mattered,” Josh adds. “Having Trump meet in person with leaders—privately—is where the US-European alliance was, at least temporarily, put back on track.”

The post The future of Greenland and NATO after Trump’s Davos deal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

By taking a win on Greenland, Trump set US and allied security in the Arctic on a better path

Daniel Fried — Wed, 21 Jan 2026 23:57:44 +0000

WASHINGTON—The best line of Donald Trump’s speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos was his pledge that the United States would not use force to seize Greenland. But the best news of the day was the announcement a short time later that the United States had reached a “framework” deal with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Arctic security, and the US president was therefore rescinding the tariffs against Denmark and several other European countries that Trump had announced just days earlier.

While the details of the deal are still emerging, it may be that when faced with Denmark’s and Greenland’s resistance to US threats, European solidarity against those threats, unease in financial markets, and significant congressional unhappiness with the United States bullying a loyal ally, Trump decided to take a win on Arctic security and forgo a needless fight on Greenland’s sovereignty.

Taking force off the table

In the speech, Trump took the use of force to seize Greenland off the table. But he continued to demand US sovereignty over Greenland, rooting his argument in dubious history and poor logic. He claimed, for example, that countries that cannot defend their own territory cannot claim the right to possess it. That echoes a similar assertion by White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller. But the whole purpose of alliances, including NATO, is that security is greater if responsibility for it is shared. A doctrine that the power to seize territory is its own justification—which is close to what Trump and Miller argue—would legitimize every aggressor.

Trump also claimed that to defend territory, the United States needs “title” to it. But the United States successfully defended Germany, South Korea, Japan, and hosts of other countries during and after the Cold War without seeking to annex them, and it did so from military bases that were “rented” and not part of the United States.

Trump argued that the United States was mistaken to “return” Greenland to Denmark after World War II. The United States did put military bases on Greenland during the war after Germany conquered Denmark in April 1940. But the United States never annexed Greenland during the war: it put military facilities on it pursuant to an agreement with the Danish government-in-exile, and that agreement recognized continued Danish sovereignty over Greenland. In 1951, the United States and Denmark concluded the Defense of Greenland Agreement, which enshrined extensive US basing rights.

While Trump ruled out war to conquer Greenland, he did suggest, albeit obliquely, that continued US support for Ukraine and for NATO depended on European acquiescence in his demands for Greenland. “Now what I’m asking for is a piece of ice,” Trump said of Greenland. “It’s a very small ask compared to what we have given them for many, many decades,” he added about NATO. To underscore the point, Trump said several times in the speech that allies had not been there for the United States.

In fact, NATO has invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty once in its history: that was on September 12, 2001, the day after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. I was in the White House that day as part of my job on the National Security Council staff. “We need this,” is what then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice told the French government, referring to the decision to invoke Article 5. So the allies did—and it was not an empty gesture. NATO members, Denmark among them, later sent forces to fight alongside the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some of those soldiers did not come home.

Trump rightly pointed out that NATO nations have not devoted enough to defense. He also took credit, also rightly, for helping fix that problem by pushing for NATO’s decision at its 2025 summit in The Hague to set new, high targets for members’ military spending. But Trump cannot take a win on NATO defense spending and then demand that NATO members acquiesce to US aggression against a fellow NATO member.

Trump seemed to be counting on threats of US economic pressure plus US reduction of support for NATO and Ukraine as sufficient leverage to force Denmark’s allies to abandon Greenland. That didn’t happen.

Getting to a deal in Davos

Europe does need US support against Russia’s aggression. But Denmark did not yield, and its fellow European countries largely held together. In the United States, many Americans seemed skeptical of the administration spending a great deal of time and money to acquire Greenland, especially as economic conditions at home remain uneven. More immediately, an adverse Supreme Court decision on the president’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act statute for imposition of tariffs could attenuate Trump’s economic leverage. And Congress has already passed legislation (the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act) that complicates Trump’s ability to withdraw US forces from Europe.

The Europeans (and especially the Danes) knew all this, and it bolstered their willingness to resist. Their response from the start has been to offer Trump all the security cooperation he wants in the Arctic but stand firm against US demands for annexation, knowing that they can make the case to Congress and the US public. They were offering security but not surrendering on sovereignty.

Though details so far are thin, the meeting between Trump and Rutte seems to have settled on just that sort of deal: some arrangement to bolster security in the Arctic and, one hopes, the United States backing off on meritless claims to Greenland. Trump could justly claim such an arrangement as a win for both US and allied security in the Arctic.

Trump’s walk back of the threat of war in his speech and rescission of the tariff threats as part of an apparent framework deal on Arctic security may mean that, after unnecessary drama, a way out of this crisis can be found.

The post By taking a win on Greenland, Trump set US and allied security in the Arctic on a better path appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To adapt to today’s security threats, NATO should prioritize the basics of defense innovation

jcookson — Wed, 21 Jan 2026 20:40:57 +0000

WASHINGTON—From the specter of US retrenchment to ongoing Russian revanchism, European NATO members must face up to a harsh reality: the Alliance lacks the industrial capabilities to meet today’s security challenges. Their recent promises to increase defense spending, while substantial and welcome, will not be enough alone to change this.

To adapt quickly enough to confront evolving threats, NATO allies must get the basics right. This means adopting functional and flexible financing mechanisms, streamlining regulatory frameworks, and building production foundations that prioritize scalable and sustainable innovation.

These challenges that NATO faces, as well as the need for the Alliance to get the basics right, are being actively discussed, including at the 2025 Netherlands-US Defense Industry Days conference in Washington, DC, this past October. At this event, organized by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Atlantic Council, policymakers, industry leaders, financiers, and experts discussed how transatlantic allies can accelerate defense innovation while strengthening their defense industrial bases. Below are a few of the authors’ major takeaways from this conference on how NATO can meet these challenges.

Don’t just spend more—spend smarter

Increasingly, the battlefields of the future will be won in the realm of innovation. Building ecosystems to support technology development will require allies to use newly unlocked defense dollars to fill immediate capability gaps and build flexible financing pathways to foster innovation. If done right, these defense ecosystems can allocate more resources directly to innovators, boosting returns on investment and generating cutting-edge capabilities in North America and Europe.

To do this, allies should take a two-pronged approach to financing innovation:

Accept risk to accelerate adoption. Many innovation initiatives—such as NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) organization—too often fall short because they prioritize immediate return on investment or quick-turn results over long-term innovation development. This places a strain on innovators, limiting their access to seed money and signaling to the private sector that the Alliance does not prioritize lasting defense technology innovation. Instead, NATO should give these initiatives greater latitude to prioritize experimentation and iteration rather than meeting often arbitrary metrics and quotas.

Protect research and development budgets. From the rise of the space domain to electromagnetic warfare, NATO allies must win not just a single innovation race; they need to win many at once. Research and development (R&D) budgets are critical to this effort. Yet, far too often, as participants at the conference noted, R&D budgets for defense technologies are cannibalized in favor of immediate operational needs, particularly during periods of heightened security pressure. By prioritizing R&D budgets, governments can send a clear signal to defense industries, investment bankers, and venture capitalists that NATO members see investment in defense technology as a long-term and sustainable demand. These signals can help spur greater private-sector investment in these technologies.

To produce at scale, regulate at scale

Current regulatory environments on both sides of the Atlantic are not designed for the speed of innovation or adoption needed in today’s rapidly evolving security environment. Instead, NATO allies must strike a careful balance: NATO countries should impose regulations that protect sensitive technologies and intellectual property while also encouraging cooperation among allies on innovation development. Two main principles should inform this approach:

Break down barriers to transatlantic defense industrial cooperation. In the United States, having to navigate dense bureaucracy can stifle innovation, hamper collaborative partnerships, and stretch lead times for critical defense technologies. However, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently made several announcements that show promise in this area—including loosening restrictions on defense contractors and emphasizing speed—indicating that the Pentagon will work to streamline defense cooperation for allies looking to buy US capabilities. Despite this positive momentum, meaningful changes to US foreign military sales and armaments cooperation will require sustained efforts to reform these overly burdensome bureaucratic processes.

Keep agile firms top of mind when writing regulations. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will make or break the next era of warfare. Yet defense industrial and innovation regulations often impose disproportionate costs on SMEs because they are designed only for the largest defense companies. For example, the US Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification rightly protects sensitive data through third-party audit and monitoring requirements. But as written, the cost of compliance with these regulations is prohibitively expensive for SMEs, risking pushing many smaller defense firms out of the market altogether. Therefore, policymakers and military planners must establish more frequent, institutionalized relationships with SMEs to better understand how regulations affect these new players. A good step in the right direction would be for policymakers to apply regulations on a sliding scale, setting thresholds for how large a defense company must grow before it has to comply with certain requirements.

Build integrated innovation ecosystems

NATO should adopt a holistic approach to capability development that marries research, design, and production to turn industrial development into more than just the sum of its structural parts. Three ways to build this holistic approach are:

Champion defense industrial cooperation. To innovate at the necessary pace, the Alliance must build defense industrial co-development, co-production, and co-assembly pathways. Working industry-to-industry or industry-to-partner, such collaborative efforts can help enable allied industries to scale up production and develop cutting-edge defense technologies. This approach defrays risk for industry, builds stronger transatlantic bonds, and shortens lead times for capability delivery.

Advance a model that combines expertise across sectors. To build more resilient and sustainable defense innovation ecosystems, allies should foster a defense innovation model that integrates government, industry, and academia. With these three sectors working together, allies can coordinate experimentation, testing, and manufacturing efforts to accelerate development and deployment timelines. Applied across the Atlantic, such a model could replace isolated national pilot projects with a coordinated framework for sustained, interoperable innovation.

Establish a NATO Defense Innovation Unit to spur development. Modeled after the United States’ own Defense Innovation Unit, a NATO version of the institution would help the Alliance coordinate funding, regulation, and capability development. A NATO Defense Innovation Unit would maintain shared test facilities, align technical standards, and guide the transition of prototypes into fielded systems. It would serve as a permanent platform connecting NATO’s innovation initiatives—such as DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund—with national and private-sector efforts.

Building transatlantic innovation ecosystems must begin with the basics: financing innovation wisely, regulating for speed and scalability, and building integrated defense innovation models across sectors and allied capitals. A roadmap grounded in smart investment, adaptive regulations, and collaborative production can transform innovation into readiness.

The post To adapt to today’s security threats, NATO should prioritize the basics of defense innovation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wieslander on Swedish radio

cagard — Wed, 21 Jan 2026 20:11:00 +0000

On Wednesday, January 21, Director for Northern Europe, Anna Wieslander, was interviewed on Swedish national radio to comment on Donald Trump’s speech in Davos.

Following a week marked by a “war of words,” during which the U.S. President issued a series of escalatory statements, the announcement to refrain from the use of force against Greenland can be seen as a measure of de-escalation, argues Wieslander.

“The decision not to use force may have been influenced by negative market reactions, or by initiatives in Congress aimed at preventing him from using federal funds for a military move on Greenland,” Wieslander said, adding that there had also been rumours suggesting the Pentagon would have opposed such a move.

Listen to the broadcast here. It is recorded in Swedish.

Listen here

The post Wieslander on Swedish radio appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Countering Russian escalation in space

John Klein, Clementine G. Starling-Daniels — Wed, 21 Jan 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Download PDF

Executive summary

This report’s findings are meant to guide policymakers in making important decisions about safety, security, and sustainability in the space domain, as well as to better inform the public on these issues. The report explains why current US space policy, Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs, and commercial integration strategies by themselves are inadequate to address the growing threats from Russia in space. The report makes the case for the development of policies, practical strategies, and more effective acquisition programs to better address a range of potential futures, considering possible space-related actions by Russia’s political leadership.

Beyond recommending changes to US declaratory policy, this report details why the United States needs a more resilient space architecture. It examines how Russia’s nuclear threat—specifically, its designs to place a nuclear weapon in orbit, in clear violation of its obligations under international law—could alter the rationale for pursuing proliferated low-Earth orbit (LEO) constellations. This report also explores the kind of space architecture the United States would need during a conflict against a major power, and how the United States can further integrate the private sector and allies in pursuit of its national security objectives. Each of these issues carries significant near-term policy and acquisition implications.

This report explains why some US policymakers might be reluctant to take the necessary coercive action to compel acquiescence by Russian political and military leaders. This reluctance is driven by a Western sense of morality and “rightness,” an inherent right of self-defense mentality, and current conceptions of international humanitarian law. US anticipatory actions seeking to deter Russian malicious actions might prove unreliable because any anticipatory action will be a political decision based upon a Western mindset and worldview. This observation underscores that deterrence by denial of benefit—including resilience and active defense—should play a substantial role in military strategies, one even more substantial than cost-imposition efforts. Additionally, assurance and reassurance efforts directed toward Chinese and Indian leadership could help dissuade potential Russian aggressive behavior and deescalate crises.

This report’s analysis illuminates important defense and force planning considerations. Its three scenarios span a catastrophic nuclear detonation (NUDET) in LEO to debris-generating anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons to less aggressive action against commercial satellites. A qualitative assessment using a detailed framework highlights the relative importance of the methods used to dissuade potential aggression while also prevailing in conflict. In priority order, the relative importance of affecting Russian leadership’s decision calculus is: deterrence by denial of benefit; assurance and reassurance; and deterrence by cost imposition.

Finally, this report provides fifteen actionable policy and defense acquisition recommendations for advancing a comprehensive and practical framework to counter potential Russian aggression and escalation in space. Should dissuasion efforts fail and conflict in space occur, it is necessary that the United States, its allies, and commercial partners fight through Russia’s irresponsible and aggressive actions in space, while working to deescalate any crisis and seek a lasting peace.

Read the full report

About the authors

John J. Klein, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Klein is a subject matter expert on space strategy and also instructs space policy and strategy courses at the undergraduate, graduate, and doctorate levels at several universities around Washington, DC. He routinely writes on space strategy, deterrence, and the law of armed conflict. He is the author of the books Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy, 2nd Edition (2024), Understanding Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space (2019), and Fight for the Final Frontier: Irregular Warfare in Space (2023), along with a score of other book chapters and articles.

Klein is also a retired United States Navy commander, receiving his commission through the Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps program at Georgia Tech. He served for twenty-two years as a naval flight officer, primarily flying in the S-3B Viking carrier based aircraft. Klein supported combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. His tours included service as the executive officer of Sea Control Squadron Twenty-Four and the final commanding officer of the Sea Control Weapons School.

Clementine Starling-Daniels is a vice president at Beacon Global Strategies, the former director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. At Beacon, she advises at the intersection of national security and technology policy, helping clients navigate evolving defense, intelligence, and technology landscapes. As a national security expert, her research explores how emerging technologies and operational innovation enhance US and allied deterrence, defense, and joint warfighter capabilities amid strategic competition with China and Russia. Her work particularly focuses on space strategy and policy, and on the role of special operations and unconventional warfare in modern deterrence and conflict.

As founding director of Forward Defense, Starling-Daniels led a team advancing research and thought leadership on the future of warfare. She spearheaded bipartisan commissions on Defense Innovation Adoption and Software-Defined Warfare, developing approaches to leverage technologies—including AI, hypersonics, autonomy, and space systems—to solve complex defense challenges. Earlier in her career, she served as deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, guiding task forces on NATO force posture, military mobility, contested logistics, and Arctic security. She also supported NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division during key summits and gained extensive experience in NATO and EU defense policy and industrial cooperation.

Acknowledgements

This report was produced in accord with the Atlantic Council’s policy on intellectual independence, which states that the Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.

The Atlantic Council maintains strict intellectual independence for all of its projects and publications. Council staff, fellows, and directors and those who the Council engages to work on specific projects, are responsible for generating and communicating intellectual content resulting from Council projects. The Council requires all donors to agree to the Council maintaining independent control of the content and conclusions of any products resulting from sponsored projects. The Council also discloses sources of financial support in its annual reports to ensure transparency.

This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the US Department of Defense, the US Department of the Air Force, or any other institution with which either of the co-authors or any of the contributors are now, or have in the past been, affiliated.

The co-authors acknowledge with gratitude the sponsorship of the Smith Richardson Foundation for this project.

Explore the program

The post Countering Russian escalation in space appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Surrender or freeze: Putin’s winter blitz targets Ukrainian civilians

Yuliya Kazdobina — Tue, 20 Jan 2026 21:16:26 +0000

Millions of Ukrainians have spent much of January without electricity and heating amid subzero winter temperatures, sparking fears that the country is on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe. This desperate situation has been deliberately provoked by a sustained Russian bombing campaign against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, as Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin targets the civilian population in order to pressure Kyiv into capitulation.

Russia’s attacks have led to dramatically deteriorating living conditions across Ukraine. Thousands of high-rise apartment buildings in large cities as well as smaller rural homes have been cut off from power, heating, and water for days at a time. As a result, indoor temperatures have dropped to dangerous levels. For the elderly, those with young children, and people suffering from health issues, the risks are particularly grave.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has declared a state of emergency in the country’s energy sector, while other Ukrainian officials have appealed to partners for urgent support. While international aid has begun arriving, the sheer scale of the crisis means that much may depend on weather conditions in the coming weeks.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure have been a routine feature of the war ever since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. According to Ukrainian Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal, every single energy-generating facility in the country has been bombed. “There is not a single power plant in Ukraine that has not been hit by the enemy since the beginning of the war,” he commented last week. “Thousands of megawatts of generation capacity have been knocked out. Nobody else in the world has ever faced a challenge like this.”

Russia’s current aerial offensive began to escalate noticeably during the final months of 2025 ahead of the cold season. As temperatures plummeted in early January, there was a further intensification of attacks on Ukraine’s power and heating infrastructure, with large numbers of drones and missiles concentrated on specific cities to overwhelm air defenses. The timing of Russia’s bombing campaign leaves no room for reasonable doubt; this was a premeditated attempt to target the Ukrainian population by weaponizing the winter weather.

The Kremlin’s goal is easy enough to decipher. By making Ukrainian cities unlivable and threatening to freeze millions of civilians, Moscow aims to break Ukraine’s resistance and force the Kyiv authorities to accept peace on Russian terms. In other words, the present bombing offensive is Putin’s response to US President Donald Trump’s peace efforts. Rather than agree to a ceasefire or offer concessions, Putin uses terror as a negotiating tool to secure Ukraine’s surrender.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

The targeting of Ukrainian civilians is not limited to attacks on critical infrastructure. According to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, 2025 was the deadliest year of the invasion for Ukrainian civilians since 2022. In a report released in early January, United Nations officials confirmed that more than 2500 Ukrainian civilians were killed in 2025. This was 31 percent higher than the figure for the previous year and 70 percent more than in 2023. A separate assessment by European governments reached similar conclusions and found that the scale of Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians increased whenever the Trump administration attempted to advance peace negotiations.

The rising civilian death toll in Ukraine is largely due to increased Russian bombing of Ukrainian cities. Moscow’s mounting air offensive owed much to a spike in domestic drone production, which has made it possible to launch hundreds of drones at Ukraine in a single night. Russia has also been accused of conducting a large-scale campaign of individual drone strikes against civilians in southern Ukraine that terrified locals have branded a “human safari.” UN investigators reported in October 2025 that Russia’s targeted drone strikes on civilians were a crime against humanity.

Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians have increased amid mounting frustration in Moscow over the slow pace of the invasion. Despite holding the battlefield initiative throughout 2025, Putin’s army failed to achieve any significant breakthroughs and gained less than one percent of Ukrainian territory while suffering heavy losses. With little immediate prospect of military success, Putin seems to have decided that his best chance of victory lies in terrorizing the civilian population.

So far, Russia’s terror tactics do not appear to be working. A nationwide poll conducted in mid-January by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that a majority of Ukrainians continue to reject the Kremlin’s territorial demands in eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, more than two-thirds of Ukrainians do not believe the present round of US-led negotiations will result in a lasting peace. Instead, most Ukrainians remain convinced that Russia aims to continue the war.

Today’s arctic conditions will eventually give way to milder weather, but the damage done to Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure in recent weeks will take months to repair. Nor is there any reason to believe that Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians will abate. On the contrary, the Kremlin is likely to escalate further in a bid to demoralize, destabilize, and depopulate the country. By seeking to freeze millions of Ukrainians, Putin has underlined his readiness to target civilians as he seeks to impose an imperialistic vision of peace through submission.

Yuliya Kazdobina is a senior fellow at the “Ukrainian Prism” nongovernmental analytical center.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s arsenal of long-range weapons has evolved significantly since 2022. Over the past four years, the country has managed to develop a variety of strike drones with the capacity to reach targets located well over a thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Ukraine also now boasts an expanding selection of domestically produced cruise missiles. This enhanced long-range firepower has made it possible for Ukraine to conduct an escalating bombing campaign inside Russia that has already changed the geography of the war.

Since summer 2025, long-range Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory have reached record highs. Ukraine has struck dozens of military facilities and defense industry enterprises, while also paying special attention to the oil and gas infrastructure that fuels the Russian war economy. Ukraine has hit refineries, pipelines, oil rigs, ports, and a number of tankers belonging to the Kremlin’s so-called shadow fleet. These strikes have complicated the logistics of the invasion while contributing to a significant decline in Russia’s energy export revenues.

In addition to hampering the Kremlin war machine and causing economic damage, Ukraine’s mounting campaign of long-range strikes has also had a major psychological impact that is helping to bring home the reality of the war to the Russian public. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin has worked hard to shield ordinary Russians and contain the conflict within the borders of Ukraine. However, with air raid sirens becoming an increasingly routine feature of daily life in Russian towns and cities, the Putin regime is no longer able to control the narrative.

A recent survey conducted by Russia’s only remaining independent pollster, the Levada Center, has highlighted the impact Ukrainian strikes are having on Russian public sentiment. Asked to name the most notable event of the past year, 28 percent of respondents cited Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian cities and industrial facilities, making this the third most popular answer. Clearly, Ukraine’s long-range bombing campaign has succeeded in breaking through the Kremlin propaganda bubble and has made a strong impression on the Russian population.

Eurasia Center events

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

For Ukraine’s partners, the objective now should be to boost Ukraine’s long-range capabilities to the maximum in order to equip the country with the kind of strike power that can deter Russia. Numerous Western leaders have shied away from providing Kyiv with long-range missiles from their own arsenals due to escalation fears. The solution is simple: Western partners should focus their efforts on helping Ukraine produce sufficient quantities of drones and missiles domestically.

Ukrainian officials are well aware that the ability to hit targets across the Russian Federation may be their country’s most effective security guarantee against further Kremlin aggression. They are now appealing to Kyiv’s international partners for increased support as they seek to exploit the country’s considerable spare defense industry production capacity and crank up output.

“The modern arms race is not about nukes. It is about millions of cheap drones. Those who can scale up production quicker will secure peace,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha in late 2025. “This requires quick and sufficient funding for Ukraine’s defense industry, which is now the greatest source of defense innovation in the world. We can produce up to twenty million drones next year if we get sufficient funding.”

Throughout the past year of faltering US-led peace efforts, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that he has no intention of ending the invasion. As long as the war is being fought predominantly inside Ukraine, he is unlikely to change his position, regardless of Russian combat losses. However, if Ukrainian drone and missile strikes inside Russia continue to expand during 2026, the economic and social impact may become too serious to ignore. This could force Putin to abandon his stalling tactics and finally enter into genuine negotiations. It would also oblige him to think carefully before restarting his invasion in the years ahead.

Serhii Kuzan is chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). He formerly served as an adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (2022-2023) and as an advisor to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (2014).

At Davos, Trump’s 19th-century instincts will collide with 21st-century uncertainty

Frederick Kempe — Tue, 20 Jan 2026 05:00:00 +0000

It’s hard to imagine a more discordant way for Donald Trump to mark the first anniversary of his second inauguration than by attending the World Economic Forum’s annual gathering of global leaders in Davos. When he speaks in the Swiss Alps on Wednesday, the US president will be contesting—whether intentionally or not—the very notions of global common cause Davos was designed to advance.

Klaus Schwab founded the World Economic Forum in 1971, a decade after the Atlantic Council’s own birth, with a post-World War II premise that held until recently: that greater security cooperation, economic interdependence, institutional cooperation, and shared rules could prevent another global catastrophe and advance more lasting peace and prosperity in a manner that also served US interests.

Trump travels to Switzerland this week as perhaps the most forceful skeptic of that internationalist assumption ever to occupy the Oval Office. He set the stage on Saturday by threatening new 10 percent tariffs on European nations that stood in the way of his heightened efforts to acquire the Danish territory of Greenland.

Trump has pledged to slap those tariffs on NATO allies Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Finland on February 1. If those countries don’t yield, Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform, he will jack up the tariffs to 25 percent—presumably atop the tariffs he has already put on Europe—on June 1 “until such time as a Deal is reached for the Complete and Total purchase of Greenland.”

For their part, European leaders are considering a number of possible economic counterstrikes. The Financial Times reports that the European Union (EU) is considering €93 billion of new tariffs, while the French are reportedly pushing for the first-ever use of Brussels’s “Anti-Coercion Instrument.” Known as ACI, it is regarded as the nuclear option in that it could put limits on foreign direct investment, restrict US suppliers’ access to the EU market (excluding them from public tenders), and place export and import restrictions on goods and services.

That turns Davos, whose theme this year is “A Spirit of Dialogue,” into the epicenter of the worst transatlantic economic conflict in memory. European leaders hope they can still reach yet another deal with Trump. That said, one senior allied official told me it is hard to imagine common ground given Trump’s “absolutist” position that the only outcome he will accept is Greenland becoming US property. Another European official described Trump to me as an aberrational bully willing to risk eighty years of accumulated transatlantic trust to achieve territorial ambitions.

A nineteenth-century president in a twenty-first-century world

To better understand who they’re dealing with, a long-time friend of Trump’s suggested to me that European leaders should look less to the past eighty years and more to the time before the world wars. He calls Trump a nineteenth-century US president governing in a twenty-first-century world—a leader who combines the expansionism of US President James Polk, pushing to enlarge the United States’ territorial realm as part of a “Modern Manifest Destiny,” with the twenty-first-century nationalism of current counterparts like Russian President Vladimir Putin (whom the Kremlin claims has just been asked to join Trump’s Gaza peace board), China’s Xi Jinping, India’s Narendra Modi, and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

While it was journalist John L. O’Sullivan who coined the term “Manifest Destiny,” it was Polk who popularized and implemented the notion that the United States was divinely ordained to expand its realm and spread democracy, capitalism, and American values across the entire North American continent.

To refresh your history: Polk, the eleventh US president, presided over Texas’s formal entry into the United States on December 29, 1845, though President John Tyler and Congress had initiated the process before Polk took office. That helped trigger the Mexican-American war that resulted in Mexico’s ceding of the entire American southwest to the United States. After a negotiation fraught with the risk of war, Polk acquired the Oregon Territory from Great Britain in 1846, giving the United States land for the future states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, along with parts of Montana and Wyoming, while Britain kept Vancouver Island.

That history lesson won’t hearten the leaders of Denmark or its Europeans allies, who presumably believed the nineteenth century was, well, history. Polk’s era was an age not of global governance but of sovereign states, great power competition, mercantilism, and jealously guarded spheres of influence, followed by two world wars. Diplomacy was personal and transactional—just as Trump likes it. Leaders wielded commitments as conditional and trade as an instrument of power, as was the case this week when Trump upended trade deals he had negotiated with European states to open a new fight over Greenland.

What’s further capturing conversation in Davos is Trump’s military-judicial operation that brought Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro to New York to face criminal charges, part of a heightened focus on the Western Hemisphere through his “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine; his on-again, off-again threats to strike Iranian targets in response to Tehran’s killing of protesters; the US Department of Justice’s criminal investigation into Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell; and a series of domestic events that have made global headlines, most significantly the death of Renee Good in Minneapolis at the hands of an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent.

A world-historic figure—but in what sense?

Many in Trump’s electoral base charge that he’s paying far too much attention to global affairs at the expense of their own economic struggles. However, don’t expect Trump’s focus to shift—not even in a mid-term electoral year when the Republican hold on Congress is in doubt. Trump’s eye is on history, not congressional seats.

“The world, he thinks, is where a political figure makes his mark,” writes Wall Street Journal columnist Peggy Noonan. “He desires a big legacy, still wants to show Manhattan (not to be too reductive, but there’s still something in it) that the outer-borough kid you patronized became a world-historic figure.” If that’s true regarding Manhattan, it is even more so for Davos, given that it symbolizes for Trump the club of first-tier global business leaders to which he never previously belonged.

If Trump’s aim is to be a world-historic figure—and that’s increasingly beyond dispute early in his second term—then what’s most important to ask is: world-historic in what sense? For that reason alone, it will be worth listening closely to how Trump describes himself this week in Davos and comparing that to his previous three appearances.

In 2018, early in his first administration, he declared in Davos, “America first doesn’t mean America alone. When the United States grows, so does the world.” In 2020, ten months before his electoral defeat, he highlighted two trade deals he had just closed, one with China and the other with Mexico and Canada. “These agreements represent a new model of trade for the twenty-first century—agreements that are fair, reciprocal, and that prioritize the needs of workers and families.”

Then in 2025, three days after his second inauguration, he set a far feistier tone. Appearing remotely via video, Trump declared the beginning of “a golden age of America,” speaking of the most significant US election in 129 years, lambasting his predecessor President Joe Biden, and announcing a storm of executive orders to address a “calamity,” particularly regarding immigration, crime, and inflation. He said little about the tariffs that would follow. “They say that there’s a light shining all over the world since the election,” Trump told the Davos crowd.

The big question chasing Trump this week, as I asked earlier this year in this space, is: “What sticks?”

It’s still uncertain whether Trumpism will usher in a new and enduring ideology of some sort. US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt brought the world New Deal liberalism, an ideology that has remained until this day; US President Ronald Reagan ushered in an era of internationalist conservatism that won the Cold War alongside allies, and it still lingers. When American presidents break with the past and usher in new eras, those trends tend to stick.

Many argue that Trump’s emergence underscores and advances a new nationalist era, one of nineteenth-century tenets laced with twenty-first-century technologies and geographies, even though those who know him best say Trump is not a student of history himself.

If it’s a new nationalism that’s emerging, what brand of nationalism might that be? Autocratic or democratic? Isolationist or internationalist? Realist or imperialist? The range of possibilities is immense.

A new vocabulary

What has stuck over the past year—a shift that’s palpable in Davos—is the erosion of old certainties. Trump’s emphasis on tariffs, industrial policy, and economic security has redrawn global trade rules and attitudes. His skepticism about multilateral arrangements has forced allies and partners to question systems they’ve depended upon since World War II. Trump’s blunt focus on borders, energy dominance, and the Western Hemisphere has global partners rethinking their own concepts of geography and leverage.

Davos matters this week not in terms of whether Trump will convert his listeners to his worldview, but rather because the world has already begun to change around those gathering there. The Davos vocabulary of cooperation and convergence coexists now with the new language of fragmentation, national interest, and strategic autonomy.

When he appears at Davos this week, Trump arrives with the ambitions of a nineteenth-century president confronting leaders with a twentieth-century mindset inadequate to the uncertainties of a twenty-first-century world. At this inflection point, all three eras are colliding. There’s no settled script for what comes next.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post At Davos, Trump’s 19th-century instincts will collide with 21st-century uncertainty appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in Wall Street Journal on Greenland

Atlantic Council — Mon, 19 Jan 2026 23:00:00 +0000

ORiginal Source

On January 19, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in The Wall Street Journal on the Trump administration’s policy toward Greenland, arguing that threats are a negotiating tool.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Wall Street Journal on Greenland appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wieslander on Swedish national television

cagard — Sun, 18 Jan 2026 20:00:00 +0000

On Sunday, January 18, Anna Wieslander, Director for Northern Europe, participated in a panel on the Swedish news program Agenda to discuss the threat of U.S. tariffs and the escalating Greenland crisis.

“With Trump’s inauguration, we entered a new era, and we are now experiencing its effects,” Wieslander argues, noting that the new administration’s foreign policy posture has left Europe squeezed not only from Russia in the east, but also from its ally in the west.

Wieslander further emphasizes that the situation risks diverting attention from Ukraine and could severely undermine cooperation within NATO.

Watch the full program to learn more. It is recorded in Swedish.

Watch here

The post Wieslander on Swedish national television appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The US and NATO can avoid catastrophe over Greenland and emerge stronger. Here’s how.

Daniel Fried — Sun, 18 Jan 2026 03:26:09 +0000

WASHINGTON—The transatlantic divide over Greenland just deepened, with US President Donald Trump announcing on Saturday that he will impose escalating tariffs on Denmark and other European nations until they agree to a deal for the United States to purchase Greenland. At this precarious moment, three lines of effort are underway to avoid a catastrophic clash over the world’s largest island.

One is diplomatic: through the high-level working group agreed to at a January 14 meeting in Washington between US, Danish, and Greenlandic officials. The second includes congressional efforts to block an outright US invasion of Greenland. The third is deterrence: an increase of Danish and NATO member states’ military presence and exercises in and around Greenland.

This problem should not have arisen. But it is still possible to achieve an outcome that leaves NATO and the transatlantic alliance intact and Arctic security strengthened.

What does the White House want with Greenland (and what might it settle for)?

The United States has longstanding and legitimate security interests in Greenland. Because of these interests, Washington has sought several times since the mid-nineteenth century to acquire it. After World War II, the United States addressed its security interests through the 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement, which gives the United States extensive military basing rights on the island and does not question Denmark’s sovereignty or Greenland’s status. That agreement served US interests well throughout the Cold War and is still in force.

Those interests do not seem to be driving policy, however. Currently, notwithstanding White House claims of Chinese and Russian threats to Greenland, neither Trump nor his administration has cited specific, unmet US security requests related to Greenland. Nor has the Trump administration taken steps to increase US military presence in Greenland. The Trump administration also has not cited unmet requests with respect to Greenland’s mineral deposits.

As it often does, the Trump administration is starting with an extreme position that is not simply tactical. Trump seems to really want to plant the American flag in a nineteenth-century expansionist style. The US president recently told The New York Times that annexation of Greenland “was psychologically needed for success.” Asked by CNN about Greenland, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller claimed that the “iron laws” of the world include strength, force, and power, and little else, and that therefore the United States can take Greenland if it so decides. While seeking to purchase Greenland seems the administration’s preferred route, it has not ruled out the use of force to acquire the island.

Nevertheless, the Trump administration has sometimes backed off extreme initial positions when faced with counterpressure, as it has with tariff policy. Can counterpressure against the administration’s most extravagant ambitions in Greenland open up the possibility for a diplomatic deal?

The January 14 US-Danish/Greenlander meeting achieved about as much as it could have. The sides agreed to keep talking, and they announced the creation of an important working group. The intention of this group is to discern whether US interests in Greenland could be reconciled with Denmark’s red lines, including the integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark. The White House’s characterization of the working group as merely a mechanism to discuss US acquisition of Greenland didn’t help, but diplomacy still has a chance.

If the White House is interested in a deal, then there is space to make one through this working group. The group could affirm the generous terms of the Defense of Greenland Agreement or even renegotiate it. Though it is hard to see what more the United States could want in a renegotiated agreement, the ceremony of signing a new deal similarly generous in its terms could be claimed as a feather in the cap of the Trump administration.

The working group could also address one contingency in a useful way. Some Greenlanders have been pushing for independence. An independent Greenland would be unable to provide for its own security, and the working group could address that challenge. The Trump administration might insist that an independent Greenland join with the United States in, for example, a Compact of Free Association similar to US agreements with some of the smaller Pacific Island states. But a less fraught alternative might be to agree to apply the Defense of Greenland Agreement to an independent Greenland, if that were to happen, and to bring an independent Greenland into NATO. As a member of NATO, an independent Greenland would be in a position similar to Iceland, which has no military of its own but whose security has been assured by the Alliance. Iceland is home to an air base that is an important asset for US force projection.

Enter Congress and Europe

Given the Trump administration’s continued pressure, the US-Danish working group by itself is unlikely to lead to a solution. But the administration’s talk of annexation also has generated counter moves from the US Congress and from Europe that, if sustained, could create conditions for a more productive outcome.

In Congress, bipartisan bills have been introduced in both the House and Senate that would prohibit the use of appropriated funds for any military action against a NATO ally—including against Danish and other European forces defending Greenland. Whether those bills could capture a veto-proof majority is not clear, but public support among Americans for annexing Greenland is low (17 percent support annexation and only 4 percent support doing so through use of force). Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC) has said that if US military action against Greenland appeared imminent, legislation to block it could pass with veto-proof majorities.

Europe is responding as well. In the days since the Trump administration’s rhetoric about Greenland has intensified, Denmark has announced plans to increase military exercises and its military presence in Greenland. European NATO members—Germany, Sweden, France, Norway, the Netherlands, Finland, and the United Kingdom—have announced plans to send small military contingents to Greenland, with some already arriving. The contingents are likely to grow, and they could be supplemented by Danish special forces, some of which are working with the United States in the Middle East against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and other common adversaries. Trump’s response has been to accuse these countries of playing a “very dangerous game” and threaten them all with tariff increases of 10 percent as of February 1 and 25 percent by June.

The Danish military vessel P570 HDMS Knud Rasmussen is pictured moored in Nuuk, Greenland, on January 16, 2026. (REUTERS/Marko Djurica)

The Danish military presence in Greenland, supplemented by modest European contingents, is unlikely to withstand a determined US assault. But it could succeed in complicating US planning, effectively removing from consideration a risk-free and low-cost military occupation of Greenland’s capital Nuuk. Wisely, Danish and other Europeans have spoken in general terms about bolstering Arctic security and not about the threat from the United States. But they have used the word “deterrence.” For Europeans to speak in such terms about the United States, even implicitly, is a low point, but it is needed.

There’s a deal to be done

With counterpressure from Congress and European allies, the Trump administration may see the real opportunity to make a good deal without continuing down the risk-filled road to forced annexation.

Trump and his administration are capable of redefining their objectives quickly, and in so doing achieving real, positive results. Faced with inadequate defense spending by NATO allies, the Trump administration squeezed hard, even seeming to threaten to leave NATO. This effort achieved what US presidents had sought for decades: allied commitments at NATO’s 2025 Summit in The Hague to increase defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product for defense and defense-related infrastructure. Trump could claim, with a basis in fact, that his unorthodox and sometimes confrontational style achieved something that had eluded his predecessors back to President Dwight Eisenhower.

So it could prove with Greenland. US security in the Arctic is better achieved by working with Denmark and NATO allies, not against them, from Greenland to Norway’s Svalbard and Sweden’s Gotland. If NATO’s European members and Canada agreed to contribute more forces to Arctic security, the Trump administration could assert that its pressure tactics worked; Trump could claim a win and retroactively claim vindication for his initial threats.

The alternative—the United States acquiring Greenland through threats or war—poses far too many risks and costs. The United States and the free world alliances it built would likely not be able to recover from the United States launching an aggressive war for the sake of seizing Greenland. But a deal on Greenland and Arctic security is possible. The costs in transatlantic resentment and stress on US-European confidence will be real but can be recovered from. If greater Arctic security, with Europeans doing heavy lifting, lies at the other side of whatever it is the West is going through, NATO and the transatlantic alliance could emerge in still solid shape.

The post The US and NATO can avoid catastrophe over Greenland and emerge stronger. Here’s how. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why Israel is responding to protests in Iran with caution

Danny Citrinowicz — Fri, 16 Jan 2026 22:17:27 +0000

JERUSALEM—Since the outbreak of mass protests in Iran, Israel’s public response has been unusually muted.

Cabinet ministers were instructed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to refrain from commenting on the unfolding events, while Netanyahu himself limited his remarks to a brief statement expressing support for the Iranian protesters.

At first glance, this restraint appears puzzling. Iran is facing its most serious internal unrest since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. For Netanyahu, who has long argued that the Iranian regime is inherently unstable and illegitimate, this moment would seem to bring his strategic vision closer to realization. Yet it is precisely this possibility that explains Israel’s caution.

Iranian protesters demonstrate against the regime in Tehran on January 10, 2026. (Social Media via ZUMA Press Wire)

Netanyahu understands that overt Israeli involvement in encouraging the protests would be counterproductive. Public Israeli support would hand Tehran a ready-made justification for violent repression, reinforce the regime’s narrative of foreign interference, and provide Iran with diplomatic pretext to act against Israel. More importantly, Israel has little real capacity to influence Iran’s internal balance of power. Symbolic gestures by Israel would carry high costs and minimal benefits.

There is also a broader strategic consideration. If regime change in Iran were to materialize, then it would almost certainly be driven by US actions and decisions, not Israeli ones. For years, Netanyahu has pressed Washington to confront Iran more forcefully. He is acutely aware that visible Israeli activism now could be perceived in the United States as an attempt to push the administration toward military action, echoing the controversies surrounding his past interventions in American domestic debates, most notably in the run-up to the Iraq War.

Another important factor behind Israel’s silence is the fear of premature escalation. Jerusalem is concerned about being drawn into a direct confrontation with Tehran before completing its own military and civilian preparations. In this context, Israel has reportedly conveyed calming messages to Iran, some via Russian intermediaries, signaling that it is not seeking an immediate confrontation. The objective is to reduce the risk of miscalculation that could lead Iran to conclude, mistakenly, that an Israeli strike is imminent.

Behind the scenes, however, Israel remains deeply engaged. It is maintaining close military and diplomatic coordination with the US administration and quietly preparing for scenarios in which US action against Iran could trigger Iranian retaliation, possibly against Israel itself. Such retaliation could, in turn, provide Israel with both the justification and the strategic opening for a broader campaign against Iran.

It is worth recalling that shortly before the unrest erupted, Netanyahu met with US President Donald Trump and sought a green light for military action against Iran, citing Tehran’s accelerated missile buildup. From Israel’s perspective, regime change would be the optimal outcome—one that could spare Jerusalem from another major conflict driven by Iran’s growing strategic capabilities, which Israel is unwilling to tolerate indefinitely.

Yet even if Netanyahu’s long-standing goal were achieved and the Iranian regime were fundamentally transformed, Israel could still find itself facing a more complex and potentially dangerous reality.

One possibility is that Trump might seek to capitalize on the regime’s weakness by pursuing a new nuclear agreement with Tehran. Even if such a deal were to include significant Iranian concessions—such as limits on enrichment—Israel would likely oppose it, arguing that it would stabilize and legitimize the existing regime while constraining Israel’s ability to sustain international pressure on Iran.

Other scenarios are even more troubling. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could consolidate power, accelerate a dash toward a nuclear weapon, or preside over a fragmented state in which control over Iran’s strategic weapons becomes uncertain. There is no guarantee that moderate, pro-Western forces would emerge victorious from a period of instability.

In Israel, there is sometimes a romanticized vision of a return to pre-1979 relations with Iran, harking back to the era of the shah. In reality, the likelihood of such a scenario is extremely low. Some Israelis’ quiet support for Reza Pahlavi, the eldest son of the last shah, carries significant risks and may end in disappointment, given his limited domestic legitimacy and organizational capacity inside Iran.

Ultimately, Netanyahu appears closer than ever—at least in his own assessment—to seeing the collapse of the Iranian regime. This explains Israel’s current strategy: public silence combined with intense behind-the-scenes coordination with Washington. Yet, as in other strategic arenas, Israel lacks a coherent, well-developed plan for “the day after” in Iran beyond hopeful assumptions about regime change.

Absent such plans, perhaps it is best for Israel to focus on what it wants most to avoid. The most serious risk is that Israel could be drawn into a large-scale conflict under unfavorable conditions, at a time when the United States—focused primarily on protecting its own forces and regional assets, and increasingly focused on its own hemisphere—may have limited bandwidth or willingness to come to Israel’s aid.

The post Why Israel is responding to protests in Iran with caution appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s enhanced fortifications are increasing the cost of Putin’s invasion

David Kirichenko — Thu, 15 Jan 2026 22:01:39 +0000

Russian forces continued to gradually advance in Ukraine during 2025, but suffered huge losses in exchange for minimal gains. This unfavorable ratio reflects the increasing effectiveness of Ukraine’s defensive lines, which now feature a combination of layered fortifications backed by deadly drone coverage. Together, these elements have turned much of the front line into a controlled kill zone that makes large-scale offensive operations extremely challenging while dramatically raising the cost of each new assault.

As Ukraine focuses on preventing further Russian advances and solidifying the front lines of the war, Kyiv has invested consideration resources in a major upgrade of the country’s defenses. This has resulted in what Britain’s The Economist recently described as a “massive fortification system” up to two hundred meters in depth covering much of the Ukrainian battlefield. “Ukraine now has the fortress belt it wishes it had in 2022,” the publication reported in early January.

Physical obstacles play an important role in this approach. Anti-tank ditches, razor wire, and concrete obstacles are layered to slow Russian advances. Defensive lines are often spaced within mortar range of one another, allowing Ukrainian units to trade space for time and counterattack against exposed enemy assault groups before they have had an opportunity to consolidate. The emphasis is on attrition and disruption rather than rigid territorial defense.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s defensive strategy goes far beyond a reliance on traditional static barriers. Over the past year, there has also been a growing emphasis on dispersed, concealed, and flexible defensive networks. These small-scale fortified positions are often located underground or embedded in tree lines at strategic locations, and are supported by remote fires and decoys. Each individual node in these networks is designed to shape enemy movement rather than stop it outright, channeling attackers into deliberately prepared kill pockets without exposing defenders. By creating choke points for Russian troops, Ukraine aims to maximize Kremlin casualties and capitalize on its in-built advantages as the defending party in a war of attrition.

There are growing signs that this approach is working. Ukraine’s top military commander Oleksandr Syrskyi commented recently that the current strategy has proved particularly effective on the Pokrovsk front, which has witnessed some of the heaviest fighting of the entire war over the past year. According to Syrskyi, “timely and high-quality fortifications and engineering obstacles” enabled Ukrainian forces to inflict maximum losses on Russian units close to Pokrovsk and disrupt their plans, even when facing numerical superiority.

Where Ukrainian defenses have failed, the reasons are instructive. In areas such as Toretsk and parts of the Kharkiv front, troop rotations occurred without sufficient time or equipment to construct proper fortifications, leading to Russian gains. Constant Russian drone surveillance made the use of heavy engineering machinery dangerous, leaving units unprepared when assaults followed. These cases serve as confirmation that fortifications are not optional enhancements but foundational to battlefield survival under drone saturated conditions.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Drones are at the heart of Ukraine’s defensive strategy, serving as a ubiquitous presence over kill zones and preventing localized Russian advances from consolidating into more substantial breakthroughs. Meanwhile, in some sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk, ground robotic systems are now being used to deliver the vast majority of supplies to troops. With this in mind, Ukrainian commanders argue that all future defensive lines should be optimized for both aerial and ground drones.

These technological advances do not eliminate the need for manpower. Even the most sophisticated fortifications require soldiers to react to emerging threats. When Russian units manage to infiltrate defensive lines or push into urban areas, infantry forces remain essential in order to clear and secure ground. While Ukraine’s improved fortifications are an encouraging development for the war-weary nation, no physical barrier can realistically stop Russia unless it is supported by sufficient quantities of well-trained troops.

Strengthening Ukraine’s fortifications and addressing manpower shortages will be among the top priorities for incoming Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, who took up his post this week. Fedorov made his name in government as Minister of Digital Transformation. Since 2022, he has been one of the driving forces behind Ukraine’s rapidly expanding drone warfare capabilities.

Fedorov’s extensive defense tech background, along with his reputation as a modernizer who has countered institutional corruption through the digitalization of state services, has led to considerable optimism over his appointment. He is now faced with the twin challenges of improving Ukraine’s front line defenses while addressing the mobilization and desertion problems hindering the Ukrainian war effort. If he is able to make progress on these two fronts, Ukraine’s prospects for 2026 and beyond will begin to look a lot better.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

When conditions allow for free and fair Ukrainian elections to take place, a key issue will be the inclusion of those who are currently defending the country. According to a preliminary forecast by the Ministry of Veterans Affairs, after the war ends, the number of war veterans and their family members will reach five to six million people, or one in six Ukrainians.

Opinion polls indicate strong public trust in the Ukrainian military along with widespread support for the participation of veterans in Ukrainian politics. In contrast, Ukraine’s existing democratic and political institutions are among the least trusted entities in society. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that veteran involvement in politics could help counter this trust deficit and strengthen Ukrainian democracy.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

It is important to note that most Ukrainian veterans are not career military personnel. The vast majority of today’s Ukrainian soldiers joined the military voluntarily or were mobilized and expect to return to civilian life in peacetime. Veterans are also not a homogeneous group and do not represent a specific political agenda. They differ in views, values, and priorities, and should be understood as individuals seeking meaningful participation within legitimate democratic institutions.

Electing military personnel to public office is not without risk. Military experience does not automatically translate into political skill. Veterans transitioning from the battlefield to politics may face challenges in terms of essential political know-how such as policy coherence, negotiation tactics, coalition-building, and working within institutions. Without targeted support and a clear civilian framework, veterans risk being marginalized within political parties or exploited as symbolic figures without real influence.

Ukraine has previous practical experience of veterans entering politics, notably during the country’s 2014 parliamentary elections. One of the former military personnel elected on that occasion was Oksana Korchynska, who recalled at a recent Kyiv event how she “came from the front line, from Mariupol, two days before taking the oath of MP.”

Korchynska noted that in 2014, veterans were frequently included on electoral lists without being integrated into decision-making structures. While veterans enjoyed high public trust, their actual influence within parties and parliament has so far often been limited. This experience underscores a critical lesson: Political inclusion must be substantive, not symbolic. Veterans need pathways to real influence within parties and institutions, not mere visibility.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Members of Ukraine’s veteran community do not need to wait for elections to take up a role in public life. Many are already serving in local government or building civic organizations and veteran associations. Kateryna Yamshchykova is a veteran who became acting mayor of Poltava in 2023. “Opportunities already exist for everyone,” she reflected. “Did I really want the position of acting mayor? It was the last thing I wanted in my life, but I understood that this responsibility had to be taken on in order to build the country we are fighting for.”

This kind of local engagement can help veterans develop the skills they need to run as candidates in national elections after the war ends. Democratic participation, civic habits, and political responsibility cannot be developed overnight. Instead, early engagement can help bring about a stable postwar transition.

For established Ukrainian political parties, engagement with the country’s veteran community is already becoming increasingly necessary to maintain public support. This will likely lead to intensified internal competition as veterans seek leadership roles alongside longstanding party members.

Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK and former commander of the Ukrainian army, has warned that established political elites might see veterans as a threat to their position. If this happens, everyone in Ukraine stands to lose. Public trust in politicians would erode further, undermining the legitimacy of decisions that will be essential for European integration and postwar recovery.

A critical step toward the meaningful political participation of veterans is the development of a clear legal framework for Ukraine’s first postwar elections. This should ensure inclusive participation, clarify registration requirements for new political parties, and potentially impose stricter campaigning rules to protect electoral integrity.

Ukraine’s democracy is not on pause; it is being reshaped under fire. The emergence of veterans as political actors represents a profound structural change in Ukrainian society. In and of itself, this change is neither a threat to democracy nor a guarantee of positive change. Instead, it requires a deliberate and inclusive approach. If Ukraine succeeds in integrating veterans into civilian political life while preserving pluralism, accountability, and fair competition, it may emerge from the war with a more resilient democracy capable of sustaining inclusive recovery, reforms, and European integration.

Vasyl Sehin is the WFD Country Director in Ukraine.

After Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, what comes next?

Amit Yarom — Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:15:12 +0000

In a historic move, Israel has officially recognized the Republic of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. Preceded only by Taiwan, Israel is the first United Nations member to recognize Somaliland after more than three decades of international impasse. Announced on December 26, the recognition was formalized through a joint declaration signed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdallah. In parallel, Somaliland pledged to join the Abraham Accords, aligning itself with Washington’s regional normalization framework.

Somaliland’s leaders hailed Israel’s decision as “historic,” celebrating it as long-awaited validation of de facto statehood, with the Israeli flag projected in Somaliland’s capital, Hargeisa. The decision builds on Somaliland’s record of relative stability and functioning democratic institutions, factors that have long differentiated it within a volatile region. However, beyond its symbolism, the significance of recognition will be shaped by its implementation. How Israel translates this decision into security, economic, and diplomatic engagement, while managing regional sensitivities and coordinating with key partners, particularly the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), will determine whether recognition evolves into a durable framework for regional cooperation.

SIGN UP FOR THIS WEEK IN THE MIDEAST NEWSLETTER

Recognition and its limits

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland reshapes the scope of bilateral engagement but does not eliminate the diplomatic and political constraints tied to Somaliland’s contested status. In practical terms, recognition elevates Israel–Somaliland relations from informal coordination to institutionalized state-to-state ties, enabling formal bilateral channels for security dialogue, economic cooperation, and diplomatic presence. The Israeli statement has already signaled an intention to expand cooperation in areas such as agriculture, health, technology, and economic development with Somaliland.

The security implications are most pronounced in the Red Sea context. Israeli officials have confirmed that the recognition is linked to countering Iran and its regional proxies, particularly the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Somaliland’s leadership has, according to regional reporting, been open to hosting an Israeli security presence in exchange for recognition. Formal ties now allow for open discussions on intelligence sharing, port security, and, over time, potential logistical or monitoring arrangements aimed at Red Sea threats.

Economically, recognition reduces political risk for investment and long-term cooperation. Israeli engagement in sectors such as water management, agriculture, health technology, and logistics now rests on a formal diplomatic foundation, creating pathways for trade relations and tangible economic outcomes.

At the same time, recognition does not resolve Somaliland’s contested international status. The Somali Federal Government considers Somaliland part of its territory and opposes any foreign engagement implying recognition. Israel remains the sole United Nations member to have taken this step. The United States, European Union, African Union (AU) members, and even Somaliland’s closest regional partner, the United Arab Emirates, have thus far refrained from recognition. The AU has rejected Israel’s move, reaffirming its commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity and limiting Somaliland’s access to international institutions in the near term.

Nor does recognition eliminate regional resistance. Somalia’s federal government and several regional actors view Israel’s move as divisive rather than a stabilizing development. In a joint statement, Somalia, Egypt, Turkey, and Djibouti condemned Israel’s decision and reaffirmed their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. The recognition raises concerns about regional fragmentation and risks inflaming nationalist sentiment in Somalia, while straining Israel’s relations in Africa.

Taken together, recognition expands what can be done while narrowing the margin for error. It enables cooperation but also raises expectations and diplomatic costs that must now be actively managed.

Why this decision came now

Israel’s unprecedented recognition of Somaliland reflects a convergence of strategic and political calculations. Domestically, Netanyahu is under intense pressure from the “Qatargate” scandal: allegations that his top aides accepted Qatari funds to influence policy. With Netanyahu facing calls to resign and looking ahead to a 2026 election year, the move offers an opportunity to shift the narrative with a diplomatic win. Netanyahu explicitly framed the decision “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords,” aligning it with US President Donald Trump’s revived normalization framework. This alignment allows Netanyahu to tout a foreign-policy success at a time when both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia appear reluctant to normalize relations with Israel in the near term, largely due to sustained political sensitivities around the war in Gaza.

Security dynamics further help explain the timing. As Israel emerges from a multifront war in which it has significantly degraded Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iranian assets in Syria, one front remains unresolved: the Houthis in Yemen. Despite extensive US and Israeli military action, including more than 1,100 US strikes and repeated Israeli operations, the Iranian-backed group continues to strike Israel and disrupt international shipping in the Red Sea, exposing enduring intelligence and operational constraints for both Washington and Jerusalem.

In this context, Somaliland’s geography takes on heightened relevance. Located across from Yemen near the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint, Somaliland offers a stable platform for intelligence cooperation, maritime monitoring, and contingency planning against a shared Houthi threat that neither Israel nor the United States has been able to decisively neutralize. The recognition, therefore, is not merely diplomatic; it reflects a recalibration toward long-term Israeli positioning in a theater where the conflict is not over.

Washington’s calculus

Trump responded to Israel’s recognition by making clear that Washington is not prepared to follow Jerusalem’s lead, reiterating that the matter remains under review. This caution comes despite growing bipartisan pressure in Congress toward recognition. In August, Republican Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) publicly urged the administration to consider recognition, framing Somaliland as a reliable security partner and a strategically aligned actor in the region. At the time, Trump acknowledged that the administration was “looking into” the question of recognition, signaling openness without committing to a policy shift.

The hesitation reflects competing strategic calculations. On one hand, US defense planners have long recognized Somaliland’s value. Senior US Africa Command officials have recently visited Hargeisa, and Somaliland has reportedly offered military basing that could enhance US capabilities to counter Houthi maritime disruption and limit Chinese influence along the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, formal recognition carries diplomatic costs. A unilateral shift risks undermining US relations and counterterrorism coordination with Somalia’s federal government while also straining ties with regional partners.

Therefore, Washington will continue to face pressure from Mogadishu and the AU to preserve the status quo. Still, the strategic consequences of Israel’s move, combined with US interests in the region, make eventual US recognition increasingly plausible.

Abu Dhabi’s balancing act

The UAE takes a more nuanced position. Abu Dhabi has been Somaliland’s most significant partner for nearly a decade, investing heavily through DP World’s development of Berbera port and maintaining a diplomatic liaison office in Hargeisa. These ties reflect a strategic interest that predates Israel’s recognition and position the UAE as a central economic and security actor in Somaliland.

Notably, while the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) issued a collective statement condemning Israel’s recognition, the UAE has not issued a standalone national condemnation. This distinction matters. Abu Dhabi’s posture signals its careful balancing of Somaliland engagement against broader Gulf dynamics, particularly Saudi Arabia’s firm response. Riyadh’s stance, aligned with Somalia and reinforced through the GCC and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, constrains the UAE’s room for maneuver, even as intra-Gulf competition in the Horn of Africa continues to shape Emirati strategy.

In practice, the UAE is unlikely to scale back its presence in Somaliland. Instead, Abu Dhabi is expected to deepen engagement quietly, continuing port and infrastructure projects while avoiding a high-profile diplomatic break. Formal recognition remains possible over time, but would likely be pursued in coordination with Washington and in consultation with the AU.

Turning recognition into strategy

With Israel and Somaliland now formal partners, the priority should be to consolidate this diplomatic opening without inflaming regional tensions. What follows should be guided by coordination, restraint, and sequencing, particularly with the United States.

For Israel, close coordination with Washington is essential. Acting in parallel with the United States, rather than ahead of it, will reduce friction with regional partners and avoid working at cross purposes. At the same time, Israel should quietly engage key Arab and African partners, including the UAE, Ethiopia, and Kenya, to explain its move, encourage pragmatic cooperation, and mitigate long-term fallout.

Israel should prioritize a phased rollout of cooperation with Somaliland. Rushing into highly visible steps, such as military facilities or overt security deployments, risks provoking backlash from Somalia and its allies. In the near term, Israel would be better served by avoiding provocations and emphasizing civilian and developmental cooperation, signaling good faith and framing recognition as stabilizing rather than militarizing. Security cooperation, while clearly part of Israel’s calculus, should initially remain low-profile, focused on intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism rather than overt operations.

Finally, Israel should embed its engagement with Somaliland within a multilateral framework. Coordinating security and economic initiatives with the United States and the UAE, leveraging the UAE’s established military and logistical presence in Somaliland and existing US Africa Command infrastructure, would anchor cooperation within broader regional architectures, enhancing legitimacy and durability.

The United States, even if not prepared to recognize Somaliland at this stage, remains central to shaping outcomes through its regional security presence and diplomatic influence on both African and Arab actors. The Trump administration has stated that the issue remains under review; this window should be used to conduct a structured interagency assessment of US policy toward Somaliland and its implications for Red Sea security, counterterrorism, and regional diplomacy.

Short of recognition, Washington can deepen engagement incrementally. Options include upgrading its diplomatic presence in Hargeisa to a liaison office, expanding security cooperation and training, and increasing investment; steps that advance US interests while preserving strategic flexibility.

At the same time, Washington should leverage its influence with Mogadishu to discourage escalation with Somaliland. A US-facilitated confidence-building process, building on this administration’s successful mediation track record, could help preserve space for dialogue.

Ultimately, Israel’s unprecedented recognition of Somaliland reflects confidence in a stable partner and a belief that engagement can strengthen security in the Red Sea. If implemented in alignment with Washington, this move has the potential to reshape regional dynamics beyond the Horn of Africa.

Amit Yarom is a graduate student at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He is a foreign policy researcher, specializing in the Arabian Gulf.

The post After Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, what comes next? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The US is reengaging with Libya—and it’s the right call

Rose Keravuori, Maureen Farrell — Thu, 15 Jan 2026 15:20:31 +0000

This article is part of a series published by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and the GeoStrategy Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security exploring the nexus between US security and economic interests across Africa. The previous edition can be read here.

Fourteen years after the 2011 uprising and NATO-led military intervention that toppled Muammar Gaddafi, Libya remains divided. While the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) rules the northwest, the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by military leader Khalifa Haftar, controls most of eastern Libya—with both factions backed by competing foreign militaries.

For years, the situation on the ground seemed frozen. Yet two recent developments mark a shift: Oil majors are returning to the country, and the United States is stepping up its military engagement. The visits by the top leadership from US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in October and December last year and the announcement that Libya will join Exercise Flintlock—AFRICOM’s largest annual special operations exercise historically focused on West Africa—signal that the US administration now views Libya’s trajectory as inseparable from broader regional stability.

Against this backdrop, the United States has a narrow—but real—opportunity to reset conditions in Libya by combining carefully calibrated security engagement with strategic investment. Taking this opportunity is urgent, especially as Russia and other foreign powers seek to cement their influence over the southern Mediterranean’s political future.

Libya’s geostrategic significance for energy, Europe, and the Sahel

Libya straddles Europe and Africa. While its coastline faces Italy, its southern expanse feeds directly into the Sahel, where al-Qaeda-aligned groups such as Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State (IS) affiliates operate. What happens in Libya affects US and European energy security, regional counterterrorism efforts, and global migration flows. Moreover, the country produces between 1.2 and 1.4 million barrels of oil per day and aims to reach two million by 2030. With Western sanctions tightening on Russian energy, Europe increasingly views Libyan crude oil as a pressure-valve alternative.

In November, Shell, Chevron, Eni, TotalEnergies, and Repsol* were all pre-qualified to participate in Tripoli’s first exploration auction in eighteen years. However, instability in southern Libya continues to amplify extremist mobility and arms flows from the Sahel, directly threatening these investments. That risk is further compounded by the expansion of Russia’s Africa Corps—the successor to the paramilitary Wagner Group—in the east and south. Meanwhile, the Central Mediterranean migration route remains a sensitive domestic political issue for Italy. Rome’s Mattei Plan is explicitly built around stabilizing Libya’s energy production and migration management.

Navigating fragmentation and proxy competition to unlock investment

Progress in Libya’s hydrocarbons sector remains contingent on a minimum threshold of stability and predictability in governance, which is still fractured between the Tripoli-based GNU—backed by Turkey and Qatar—and Haftar’s LNA in the east, supported by Russia (via the Africa Corps), Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.

The signing of a 2019 maritime boundary treaty with the GNU has given Turkey de facto veto power over Libya’s western security sector and offshore zones. Meanwhile, Russia has entrenched itself in eastern Haftar-controlled areas since 2023. Instead of relying on the Wagner Group, however, Moscow has transitioned to formal involvement via the Ministry of Defense. Russia now controls airbases, logistics hubs, and key desert routes into the Sahel, with personnel positioned near critical oil fields and terminals—the same assets the Tripoli government is attempting to license to Western firms.

The result is that Libya has become the Mediterranean’s most active proxy chessboard, with foreign powers positioning themselves to capture future revenues from hydrocarbons and reconstruction. Absent a credible US counterweight, decisions on energy access, migration management, and political transition will be made in Moscow or elsewhere—but not in Washington or Brussels.

A new window for US reengagement

Two developments suggest a modest but meaningful upward trend in US reengagement. First, building on the US Navy ship visit to Libya in April (the first in fifty years), AFRICOM’s deputy commander visited GNU-controlled Tripoli and LNA-held Sirte in October. Inviting Libya to Exercise Flintlock was deliberate signaling: The US government seeks to pull Libya into a broader Western security network—rather than cede the field to other countries with stronger influence, such as Russia. This trajectory continued in early December, when Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah met AFRICOM’s commander to expand cooperation on training, equipment, and force professionalization. The GNU’s public request for deeper US support in professionalizing Libya’s security forces marks a notable shift after years of strategic hedging between Washington, Ankara, and Doha.

Second, there has been a surge of activity around Libya’s energy sector. Since 2023, oil output has stabilized, front lines have frozen, and neither the LNA nor the GNU has achieved decisive military or political dominance. This stalemate has created political space for external influence. Energy-sector momentum has been reinforced by high-level diplomatic traffic in both directions. The US special envoy for Africa and Arab Affairs, Massad Boulos, traveled to Tripoli and Benghazi in July, followed by a GNU delegation visit to Washington in August. That trip signaled the GNU’s intent to re-anchor Libya with Western stakeholders and request US assistance in pushing Russia out of eastern military bases to restore unified territorial control.

That momentum was further reinforced by a joint statement on November 26 from the United States, major European partners, Gulf states, Turkey, Egypt, and the United Kingdom. The statement backed a renewed mandate for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), endorsed a political roadmap by UNSMIL head Hanna Tetteh, and explicitly called for deeper east-west military and economic coordination—a rare moment of alignment among Libya’s external powerbrokers. For the US administration, this sent the strategic signal that Libya’s unification is now within reach. The window of opportunity, however, is closing fast—and another conflict cycle, election breakdown, or foreign miscalculation could shut it indefinitely.

The energy-security nexus: Why investment alone will fail

The return of oil majors represents the most consequential shift in Libya in a decade. But investment without security is unlikely to endure. In March last year, Libya launched its first licensing round for oil exploration in eighteen years, signaling a bid to attract Western technology, capital, and expertise. Shell, BP*, TotalEnergies, and Eni have reopened channels with the National Oil Corporation (NOC)—and ExxonMobil* signed a memorandum of understanding in August for offshore exploration in the Sirte Basin.

Yet these developments do not change the fact that some of Libya’s most valuable reserves remain under Russian influence. Western firms cannot scale operations without predictable access, enforceable contracts, and baseline security guarantees.

An intentional presence to protect investment

To consolidate recent political and economic gains—and protect sizable Western energy investments—the United States should deliberately expand its diplomatic, military, and economic presence in Libya, in close coordination with allies.

The March 2024 announcement that the United States will reopen an embassy in Libya is a critical step toward sustained engagement across military and economic channels. It will also enable closer coordination with key partners—including Italy, Egypt, Turkey, and the UN—whose objectives overlap with US interests.

As the multi-year process to open the embassy inches forward, AFRICOM and its components should pursue near-term, high-impact initiatives. US special operations forces should help build and professionalize vetted Libyan special forces units across both western and eastern factions, units that would pursue shared security interests, no matter the progress toward an eventually possible unification. Additionally, maritime partnerships should be expanded rapidly to strengthen Libyan Navy and Coast Guard capabilities, particularly in interdiction, offshore asset protection, and port security. At the same time, the United States could leverage its convening power to establish a technical deconfliction cell in Sirte, allowing GNU and LNA representatives to coordinate security around oil infrastructure and prevent escalation. Such mechanisms could also support counterterrorism cooperation, including targeting IS remnants and blocking spillover from the Sahel.

Layered US engagement can unlock stability

However, military engagement alone will not be sustainable without economic development. Given the complex legacy of US involvement—from the economically devastating sanctions of the 1980s to the 2011 NATO intervention and the overthrow of the Muammar Gaddafi regime—the United States must work through partners to advance both economic and counterterrorism objectives. The US International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank could prioritize export credits for pipelines, gas processing, and power generation, explicitly linking financing to transparency and anti-corruption benchmarks.

US and partner foreign assistance could also support long-overdue reforms at the NOC, including modern contracting practices, environmental standards, and shared revenue frameworks. These efforts should extend beyond governments: Western energy companies involved in Libya should participate in coordinated infrastructure planning, rather than simply launching isolated investments.

Layering diplomatic, military, and economic tools would allow the United States to establish a modest but coherent posture capable of unlocking outsized stabilization effects—and preventing any country that works against US interests from having dominance over Libya’s future. For the United States, Libya offers a proving ground for a new model of engagement—one built on security assistance that enables Western investment instead of substituting for it. AFRICOM’s renewed presence and the surge of Western energy interest create a rare opportunity to reintegrate Libya into a Western orbit. If the United States seeks stability in the Mediterranean, resilience in the Sahel, and credible alternatives to Russian energy, now is the time to make coordinated security and economic investments in Libya.

Rose Lopez Keravuori is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, an associate director at Strategia Worldwide, and chair of the board of advisors of GCR Group. She previously served as the director of intelligence at the US Africa Command.

Maureen Farrell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and vice president for global partnerships at Valar, a Nairobi-based strategic advisory and risk firm. She previously served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs and director for African affairs at the US National Security Council.

Note: Several companies mentioned in this article—Shell, BP, Chevron, Eni, TotalEnergies, Repsol, and ExxonMobil—are donors to the Atlantic Council but not to this article series.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

The GeoStrategy Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leverages strategy development and long-range foresight to serve as the preeminent thought-leader and convener for policy-relevant analysis and solutions to understand a complex and unpredictable world. Through its work, the initiative strives to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system in order to foster peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.

The post The US is reengaging with Libya—and it’s the right call appeared first on Atlantic Council.

China’s latest naval moves in the Western Hemisphere put Brazil in the diplomatic spotlight

Thayz Guimarães — Thu, 15 Jan 2026 01:11:04 +0000

BRASÍLIA—Brazil’s decision to allow a Chinese military hospital ship to dock in Rio de Janeiro could provide a case study of how Beijing is expanding its naval presence in the Western Hemisphere. It also demonstrates how regional powers are dealing with the pressures arising from the intensifying competition between the United States and China.

This past fall, China requested authorization from the Brazilian government for the People’s Liberation Army Navy hospital ship Ark Silk Road to dock in Rio de Janeiro from January 8 to 15. The request seemed, at first glance, to be just another routine stop on a humanitarian mission.

But in Brasília, the request triggered unusual discomfort. The Chinese diplomatic note, sent on September 15 last year, omitted any reference to Harmony Mission 2025, Beijing’s first global humanitarian naval operation. And it offered few details beyond a statement that no research activities were planned in Brazilian waters and that the vessel would not use any radio equipment. In fact, the note did not explain why the ship wanted to dock in Rio de Janeiro at all.

The lack of clarity raised concerns within Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and among some Brazilian Navy officers who spoke with me on the condition of anonymity. These officials were especially concerned because of the geopolitical context that served as the visit’s backdrop: China’s growing presence in a region traditionally perceived by Washington as part of its security sphere, just as the Trump administration is prioritizing Latin America and asserting itself with military force to impose its interests there.

Brazilian officials’ concerns over the Ark Silk Road, which have so far been raised only behind the scenes, highlight a structural tension in the country’s foreign policy: Brazil is economically dependent on China but has maintained a solid security partnership with the United States for decades. This duality is currently on full display. The US oceanographic vessel Ronald H. Brown is scheduled to dock at the Port of Suape, in northeastern Brazil, from January 14 to 21, for a scientific mission approved by the Navy General Staff. This means the US Navy mission will overlap with that of the Ark Silk Road, which arrived in Rio de Janeiro on January 8 as scheduled.

The coincidence of these maritime visits makes Brazil a reluctant arena for US-China competition. But it also offers Brazil an opportunity to demonstrate that the country wishes to act as a partner to both powers, without allowing itself to be instrumentalized by either of them.

Instrument of power projection

The Ark Silk Road is the second-largest ocean-going hospital ship designed and built by China. Weighing ten thousand tons and equipped with fourteen clinical departments, seven diagnostic units, and the capacity to perform more than sixty types of medical procedures, the ship is among the most visible faces of Chinese “smart power”: the deliberate combination of soft power and hard power that China’s defense doctrine increasingly relies on.

The humanitarian results so far, according to statistics publicized by Chinese officials, are impressive:

3,330 patients treated in Fiji, with 426 surgeries in just one week;
3,995 local patients treated, 679 surgical procedures, and 2,718 medical tests in Tonga;
771 consultations and 177 surgeries in Montego Bay, Jamaica, weeks after Hurricane Melissa devastated the country;
2,769 local patients treated and 207 surgeries completed in only three days in Kingston, Jamaica.

The Ark Silk Road, or the “ship of hope and envoy of peace” as Chinese authorities describe it, represents smart power in its purest form: It projects benevolence and technical capability, but this humanitarian narrative coexists with clear strategic calculations.

When I spoke with Rafael Almeida, a retired Brazilian Army colonel and defense and strategy analyst who holds a master’s degree from the National Defence University of China, he suggested that the Ark Silk Road’s capabilities extend well beyond medical functions for a hospital ship. For instance, he pointed to the ship’s unusually large number of sensors, antennas, and radar systems.

The ship’s itinerary included stops in need of humanitarian assistance, but it was also carefully designed with diplomacy in mind: With the exception of Mexico and Brazil, all of the Latin American countries included in the mission are part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In some countries, such as Nicaragua, the ship was received with military honors. The Nicaraguan National Assembly formally approved the ship’s visit as part of an exchange with its national army, marking the first time the People’s Liberation Army Navy has docked in the country.

The implicit message is unequivocal: China is gradually expanding its naval presence in the Western Hemisphere, and it is doing so under the banner of a humanitarian ship.

The South Atlantic enters the geopolitical arena

The Ark Silk Road’s passage along the Brazilian coast is occurring in an increasingly disputed region. In recent months, Washington has reinforced its presence in the Caribbean, following the resurgence of tensions between the United States and the regime of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, which culminated in Maduro’s extraction and arrest on January 3.

But the United States’ maritime military actions have gone beyond its policy toward Venezuela. Since September 2, the United States has destroyed more than thirty vessels in dozens of attacks carried out in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean against ships that, according to the White House, were transporting narcotics, though the administration has not presented any conclusive evidence linking these boats to drug trafficking.

Meanwhile, the Chinese humanitarian mission in the South Atlantic highlights the region’s growing strategic importance. The Ark Silk Road normalizes the Chinese navy’s presence in areas it was seen as unlikely to operate in until recently. Additionally, China has invested in ports in these areas for years, especially the mega-port of Chancay in Peru. This investment reinforces Beijing’s logistical capacity on the Pacific coast of South America. With Beijing’s humanitarian missions now reaching the Caribbean and the Atlantic, an arc of Chinese strategic infrastructure, naval diplomacy, and political influence is emerging.

It is no coincidence that China released an official document explaining its policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean less than a week after the United States unveiled its latest National Security Strategy, which places Latin America at the center of US foreign policy concerns.

Brazil’s discomfort

China’s request for the Ark Silk Road to visit Brazil thus comes at a sensitive moment for Brazilian foreign policy. This timing, as well as the opaque nature of the request, have caused discomfort in Brasília.

When I reached out to Mauricio Santoro, a political scientist who specializes in Sino-Brazilian relations and collaborates with the Brazilian Navy’s Center for Political-Strategic Studies, he told me that Brazil does not require the kind of humanitarian support that China is offering to other countries with its mission. The Brazilian Navy has its own disaster response capabilities, Santoro noted, including the Multipurpose Atlantic Aircraft Carrier, the largest warship in Latin America. Moreover, Brazil’s United Health System is recognized as the largest public health system in the world. Free and universal, it serves a population of more than 200 million Brazilians.

But rejecting the Chinese request would have been politically and perhaps economically costly. China is Brazil’s largest trading partner and a significant investor in the country’s infrastructure. An explicit “no” could have been interpreted as a pro-Washington geopolitical signal.

Given these factors, Brazil opted to buy time for a few months, but in November authorized the Ark Silk Road to dock in Rio de Janeiro on the requested dates. The announcement was made with little fanfare. Unlike in other countries in which the Ark Silk Road has operated, the Brazilian government has not yet issued a public statement on the matter and has refused to answer questions about the visit.

When I reached out to ask questions about the Ark Silk Roads’s visit, the Brazilian government passed the buck. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended that questions be directed to the Brazilian Navy and the Chinese embassy in Brazil. The Navy stated that it is only responsible for the technical and logistical aspects of the request. The Chinese embassy did not respond. I also contacted the Brazilian Ministry of Defense, which pointed me back to the Foreign Ministry. Documents obtained through the Access to Information Act confirm that official messages were exchanged only between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Navy.

Even after the Ark Silk Road docked in Rio de Janeiro on January 8, the Brazilian government has not commented on the matter, in contrast to the Chinese Embassy in Brazil and the Chinese Consulate in Rio de Janeiro.

Meanwhile, the Regional Medical Council of Rio de Janeiro (CREMERJ) formally notified the state health department, requesting clarification as to whether the ship would be providing medical services to the local population. Citing Brazilian law and Federal Medical Council regulations, the CREMERJ emphasized that any medical act performed within Brazilian territory—even during humanitarian or diplomatic missions—must be subject to oversight. However, there is no official authorization for the Ark Silk Road to provide medical care to Brazilians.

An ‘embarrassing’ situation

On January 10, a Brazilian Navy delegation, led by Captain Gustavo Sant’anna Coutinho, chief of staff of the 1st Naval District Command, met with People’s Liberation Army Navy officers aboard the Ark Silk Road. Brazilian Navy musicians also performed on the ship’s deck. According to a senior Brazilian military officer I spoke with, the visit was accompanied by a series of confidence-building activities, including courtesy calls, invitations to tour the vessel, and a friendly football match at the Navy’s Physical Education Center. Beyond these engagements, the same officer told me, there was little substantive interaction, and the agenda remained largely routine—consistent with standard naval diplomacy.

However, this routine contrasted sharply with the level of control surrounding access to the vessel. Spontaneous visitors were not permitted. According to multiple sources I spoke with, entry required prior authorization from the Chinese consulate, and visitor lists closed in December. The Chinese Consulate General in Rio de Janeiro did not respond when I contacted it.

Despite these restrictions, the ship’s arrival was met with a visible public reception. Chinese citizens gathered at Pier Mauá to welcome the vessel, waving Brazilian and Chinese flags—scenes reminiscent of organized demonstrations during the 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro. Brazilian media outlets have reported that similar groups at previous events were coordinated by intermediaries and accompanied by private security.

The tightly controlled access and carefully managed optics have fueled unease among some Brazilian military analysts and officers. Speaking on condition of anonymity, several of them described the visit to me as “embarrassing.” A Brazilian Navy officer told me that there had been pressure from Brazilian diplomats to ensure the Chinese were well received. However, the military did not know how to proceed since the visit had not been properly publicized.

Port visits routinely allow foreign navies to update their knowledge of port infrastructure, logistics, and coastal conditions. Such practices are common among long-established naval powers operating under bilateral frameworks. But according to Almeida, the retired Brazilian Army colonel, this marked the first time a Chinese military vessel conducted such an exercise in Brazil without a formal defense agreement in place.

Against this backdrop, Brasília’s refusal to provide more detail or otherwise draw attention to the Ark Silk Road’s docking, unlike several other countries on the itinerary, demonstrates that it is seeking maximum discretion to prevent any unwelcome geopolitical interpretations.

At the same time, this posture reflects an awareness that the convergence of Chinese and US naval presence creates a limited but significant opportunity for Brazil to reaffirm its longstanding preference for strategic autonomy. This means engaging both powers as partners, while making clear that such engagement does not amount to alignment and that Brazil does not intend to be instrumentalized in a dispute it did not choose.

The post China’s latest naval moves in the Western Hemisphere put Brazil in the diplomatic spotlight appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Voices from Iran: As rejection of government reaches all-time high, Iranians also wary of foreign intervention

Tara Kangarlou — Wed, 14 Jan 2026 20:01:43 +0000

Unlike any other time in modern history, a US president is encouraging protestors in a foreign country to “take over the institutions” in Iran, saying that “help is on its way”—potentially with the backing and support of Israel—while offering no clear policy toward either the fate of the country’s theocratic dictatorship or that of its ninety million people.

As of January 13, the Human Rights News Agency, a US-based human rights group, estimated that the death toll has climbed above two thousand since the start of the protests on December 28 last year. This is while the Iranian government, as it has done previously, enacted a complete internet blackout, where the entire nation continues to remain under the world’s largest digital prison.

“I saw snipers in our neighborhood—in all these years I’ve never seen such scenes,” said Sahar, a doctoral student in the Saadat Abad neighborhood in Tehran, in a brief phone conversation via Starlink satellite connection.

Her voice was more distraught than in our previous conversations earlier in the week. She also explained how, since Saturday, fewer people have been going on the streets. “At first, there were families, old, young, but now everyone’s terrified, given the bloodbath.”

So far, Tehran’s crackdown on the demonstrations appears to have turned into a bloodbath, in which the only victims appear to be ordinary Iranian people—those who for long have been paying the price of the brutality of the Islamic regime, topped with the global isolation resulting from decades of sanctions and pressure imposed by the United States and its allies.

Against this backdrop, US President Donald Trump may have a real opportunity to be an effective dealmaker with Iran. However, if he is serious about a durable, win-win outcome for both the United States and Iranians, there is only one asset worth betting on: the Iranian people.

Today, Iranian society is more unified against the Islamic Republic than at any point since 1979. Nearly three weeks into the latest nationwide protests, this time ignited not by a single spark but by the country’s wider economic freefall, Iranians have taken to the streets in extraordinary numbers.

Speaking shortly before the regime’s blackout began, Sepideh, an Iranian journalist who has been arrested multiple times and isn’t using her last name for security concerns, explained how she believes Iran is at one of the “most dangerous junctures” in its modern history.

“There is zero possibility of reform within this regime,” she told me. “But history also shows that the [United States], the UK, and Israel don’t prioritize the Iranian people either—only their own interests. This is what makes me afraid of what’s coming.”

Asked about Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last monarch, she says with a deep sigh that “he has some supporters because there is no strong domestic opposition, as those voices have been crushed domestically over the years. But I struggle to believe in someone backed by foreign powers, tied to monarchy, and unable to form a coalition.”

Some others express a more fatalistic openness, including Sahar, who—prior to the internet blackout—told me how many Iranians “believe anything after this regime will be better. We want a complete separation of religion and state. This deck of cards needs to be reshuffled.”

These voices capture the nuances within the Iranian society today—united in its rejection of the Islamic Republic, deeply wary of foreign agendas, and desperate to reclaim agency over their own future.

For the United States, meaningful support for the Iranian people requires resisting the impulse to frame their uprising through the language of takeover or intervention, and instead prioritizing concrete protections for civilians in light of the brutal repression inside Iran. This means keeping Iran connected to the world, shielding protesters and journalists from digital isolation, and ensuring that accountability efforts target perpetrators of violence rather than a population already trapped between domestic repression and coercion from abroad.

Furthermore, it means treating internet access as humanitarian aid—funding circumvention support, satellite connectivity where feasible, and protection for independent journalists. This can help to ensure that the regime cannot repeatedly convert blackouts into a weapon of mass impunity.

An open, empowered Iranian civil society would not be a liability to US interests; it would be one of Washington’s greatest assets.

If the goal is to empower Iranians rather than freeze them into permanent victimhood, economic engagement must run alongside pressure on the state. This does not mean enriching the regime or reopening a flood-gate of funds to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-backed entities. Rather, it means expanding lawful, carefully assessed, people-to-people commerce that bypasses state hijacking and manipulation.

This includes enabling small and medium-sized Iranian businesses, freelancers, and entrepreneurs to access global markets; lifting travel bans for Iranian students, artists, medics, scientists and civil society members while banning entry to government-affiliated individuals; widening licenses that allow US and European firms to provide cloud services, payment rails, logistics support, and professional tools directly to Iranian users; and supporting diaspora-led investment vehicles that fund Iranian startups, cooperatives, and cultural industries without routing capital through regime-controlled entities. Such engagement gives Iranians income, skills, and stake—converting isolation into leverage and dignity rather than dependency.

Despite decades of sanctions, Iran has cultivated one of the most educated populations in the region and a resilient tech ecosystem that mirrors Silicon Valley’s platforms under far harsher conditions. Iranian youth have built local equivalents of Amazon, Uber, YouTube, and DoorDash with little capital and almost no global access. With the right engagement, Iran could generate trillions in long-term value—benefiting not only Iranians but also US businesses and consumers. A reintegrated Iran, charged by its people, would open a new frontier in trade, education, technology, and culture.

Meanwhile, none of this negates Iran’s military capacity. After more than four decades of isolation, Iran recently went head-to-head with the world’s most powerful militaries. Even Israeli defense analysts were surprised by some of its capabilities—proof that such sophistication does not emerge from a broken society. Beneath the Islamic regime’s aggression lies decades of scientific and technological investment made by the Iranian people themselves, who—if empowered and allowed self-determination—could become Washington’s strongest allies in the region.

Trump’s rhetoric amplifies the contradictions Iranians already live with. His warnings to Tehran and expressions of solidarity have landed with equal parts validation and fear. For some protesters, his words signal that their struggle is finally seen as entwined with an uncertainty of what’s to come. For others, Washington’s bombast risks giving the regime a pretext to paint the Iranian people’s unified dissent as foreign-engineered. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s accusations that protesters act “to please Trump” reveal just how threatening even rhetorical pressure can be to a regime terrified of losing control—one that’s now at its weakest point than ever before.

Iranians understand the stakes. They have watched Russia and China extract economic leverage from their isolation, and they fear becoming yet another bargaining chip. As Behzad, an Iranian journalist who is going by his first name for security purposes, told me, “everyone wants a piece of Iran. Sometimes I wish we lived in a poorer, smaller country; so at least we could live freely—far from domestic corruption and foreign interference.”

Still, across class, gender, and belief, Iranians remain united in one demand: the dismantling of the current regime. They do not ask the United States for bombs or saviors. They ask for surgical, effective, and thought-through support that enables them to reclaim their own agency in the absence of the current regime.

If Trump is serious about peace, stability, and a lasting legacy, the path forward does not run through air strikes or transactional deals with a failing theocracy. It runs through the Iranian people who, if given the chance, could build one of the world’s most dynamic democracies and one of Washington’s most valuable partners.

Tara Kangarlou is an award-winning global affairs journalist, author, and humanitarian who has worked with news outlets such as NBC, CNN, CNN International, and Al Jazeera America. She is also the author of the bestselling book The Heartbeat of Iran, the founder of nonprofit Art of Hope, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, teaching on humanized storytelling and journalism.

The post Voices from Iran: As rejection of government reaches all-time high, Iranians also wary of foreign intervention appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin is weaponizing winter as Russia tries to freeze Ukraine into submission

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 13 Jan 2026 22:39:41 +0000

Russia is “going all in” to destroy Ukraine’s power system, Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister Mykola Kolisnyk said on January 13 following the latest in a series of major bombardments targeting civilian energy infrastructure in cities across the country. “Today, Russia launched an attack just five days after the previous bombardment, using drones and ballistic missiles. We see that the enemy is going all in, deploying its forces to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure,” he commented.

The current wave of attacks have hit the Ukrainian capital Kyiv particularly hard. “The Russians are trying to disconnect the city and force people to move outside Kyiv,” Ukrenergo CEO Vitaliy Zaichenko told the Kyiv Independent. According to Zaichenko, around 70 percent of the Ukrainian capital’s approximately 3.5 million residents were left without electricity on Tuesday. Meanwhile, large numbers of apartments also had no heating amid subzero winter conditions.

Kyiv is one of multiple Ukrainian population centers currently facing rolling blackouts that in many cases can last for over 24 hours. Russia’s air offensive has also struck energy infrastructure supplying Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Chernihiv, and many other major cities.

Teams of engineers are working around the clock to repair damaged facilities, fix power lines, and reconnect Ukrainian homes and businesses to the electricity grid. However, repeated Russian attacks are making it increasingly difficult to patch up battered equipment and find the necessary replacement component parts.

The bombing campaign appears to have been timed to coincide with the coldest period in over a year, with temperatures plummeting to minus fifteen Celsius (five degrees Fahrenheit) for extended periods of time. “ They deliberately waited for freezing weather to make things worse for our people. This is cynical Russian terror specifically against civilians,” stated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

This is not the first time Russian President Vladimir Putin has attempted to weaponize winter in his war against Ukraine. Russia launched a major air offensive against Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in October 2022, establishing a pattern that would be repeated each year as the cold season approached. While this tactic is not new, the present destruction of the Ukrainian power grid is widely recognized as the most severe of the entire war.

In Kyiv and other cities, the Ukrainian authorities have established so-called Points of Invincibility in heavily populated areas featuring heating and internet access along with electricity sources that can be used to charge up personal devices and power banks. Visitors can also expect hot drinks and a warm welcome.

Throughout Ukraine the buzz of generators has become the background noise of the winter season. Many Ukrainians have installed backup power sources in their homes, which are typically able to provide electricity for a limited period of time. Portable gas stoves are also a common feature as people adapt and improvise in the extreme conditions caused by Russia’s bombardment.

With millions of Ukrainian civilians at risk of being trapped in freezing darkness for days at a time, the potential for a humanitarian catastrophe is obvious. Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko has already urged residents of the Ukrainian capital to temporarily leave the city if they are able to and move to less affected areas where power and heating are more readily available. With the present cold snap set to last for at least another week and further Russian attacks widely expected, fears are now mounting over a possible winter exodus to neighboring EU countries.

That may be exactly what Putin has in mind. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia has repeatedly targeted Ukrainian civilians in a bid to break Ukraine’s resistance and depopulate large parts of the country. In addition to attacks on energy, heating, and other critical infrastructure, Russia has also launched large-scale drone strike campaigns designed to make entire towns and cities unlivable. A recent United Nations probe into Russia’s campaign of drone attacks throughout southern Ukraine’s front line regions concluded that Moscow’s actions amounted to the crimes against humanity of “murder and forcible transfer of population.”

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

As Russia attempts to freeze Ukrainians into submission, Kyiv desperately needs a wide range of international support. This includes alternative energy supplies to replace domestic gas production damaged in Russia’s attacks, along with spare parts to mend the country’s power stations and associated infrastructure.

Ukraine also urgently requires additional air defense systems and interceptor missiles. At present, Ukraine’s existing air defenses are struggling to cope with the dramatically increased intensity of Russia’s aerial attacks, which now routinely feature hundreds of drones along with dozens of cruise and ballistic missiles.

Most of all, Ukraine needs to be able to strike back. However much Ukraine’s network of air defenses improves, the sheer scale of the Russian bombardment means that a percentage of missiles and drones will inevitably reach their targets. The only truly effective defense is deterrence. In other words, Russia’s attacks will continue until Putin is restrained by the knowledge that Ukraine has the capacity to reply in kind.

The next few weeks will be among the most challenging of the war for Ukraine’s civilian population that will test the country’s famed resilience to the limit. “I think the Russians want to break us. They want to make Ukrainians angry and unhappy. They think this will make us go out on the streets and protest but that won’t happen,” Kyiv resident Valentina Verteletska told Britain’s Guardian newspaper. “This makes us tougher and more determined. War doesn’t make people bad or good but it amplifies who you are. It allows people to show who they are inside and we have seen a lot of people volunteering to help their neighbors.”

Many believe Russia’s wintertime bombardment of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure now represents Putin’s best chance to achieve some kind of breakthrough at a time when his army is struggling to advance on the battlefield. Russia gained less than one percent of Ukrainian territory in 2025 despite suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties, and is still fighting over villages located within walking distance of the front lines at the start of the invasion in February 2022.

Despite this lack of progress, Putin remains committed to his original invasion objective of extinguishing Ukrainian independence and forcing the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. He clearly has no qualms about targeting millions of Ukrainian civilians in pursuit of this criminal goal. “You can see with your own eyes what is going on,” commented Kyiv building manager Oleksandr Matienko. “They are trying to kill us. They can’t win any other way. So they are willing to do anything to destroy Ukraine.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

There are no signs that this trend will change anytime soon. Despite mounting economic challenges on the home front amid falling energy export revenues, Russia’s defense budget for 2026 remains close to record highs. Moscow will continue to prioritize domestic drone production this year, while also allocating large sums to finance the system of generous bonus payments and salaries for army recruits who volunteer to serve in Ukraine.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia’s refusal to embrace the idea of a compromise peace should come as no surprise. After all, Putin has built his entire reign around the promise of restoring Russian greatness and reversing the perceived humiliations of the Soviet collapse. After nearly four years of full-scale war, a negotiated settlement that secured Ukraine’s status as an independent country would represent a major political failure.

Since 2022, Kremlin officials and Russian state media have consistently portrayed the invasion of Ukraine as an existential struggle against Western aggression with the aim of establishing a new world order and returning Russia to its rightful place as a great power. However, a peace deal based on the current line of contact would leave approximately 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and firmly anchored in the West. Such an outcome would be viewed in Moscow as an historic Russian defeat.

This framing creates a political trap of Moscow’s own making. Putin knows he would face a potentially disastrous domestic backlash if he accepted anything less than a clear Russian victory in Ukraine. Peace terms that failed to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit would raise difficult questions about the enormous costs of the invasion. Russians would want to know why the country had spent vast sums of money and sacrificed so many men in order to achieve so little. Putin would risk entering Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Putin has begun 2026 in a challenging position. He remains reluctant to upset Trump, but he dare not accept the compromise peace the US leader is proposing. Instead, Putin needs either total victory in Ukraine or indefinite conflict. Any attempt to end the war without establishing complete political control over Ukraine would threaten the stability of Putin’s own regime. His interests are therefore best served by seeking to prolong negotiations while working toward a military solution.

If Western leaders wish to change the current political calculus in Moscow, they must first acknowledge that there is no alternative to increasing the pressure on Putin. At present, the Kremlin dictator views escalation as necessary for regime survival and has no plans to end the war.

Two scenarios could disrupt this trajectory. A collapse in global oil prices combined with successful secondary sanctions enforcement could create an economic crisis that would force Putin to revise his priorities. Alternatively, mass casualties during a failed spring 2026 Russian offensive could trigger domestic instability, while also highlighting the fading prospects of a military breakthrough.

Both these outcomes are realistic but would require significant additional action from Ukraine’s partners. If the West is unable to muster the requisite political will, escalation remains Moscow’s most rational path in 2026. Putin has little choice but to continue his invasion. Even if Russian victory remains out of reach in the coming year, he knows he cannot accept any peace deal that secures Ukrainian statehood.

William Dixon is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Service Institute specialising in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security.

Our experts unpack why violence erupted, what it means for Kurdish and wider minority safety and integration under the new Syrian government, and how Washington is engaging.

1. What is the political and military background of this conflict?

On April 1, Damascus and the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG)-dominated SDF agreed on a localized integration arrangement covering the two SDF-held neighborhoods of Aleppo city. Despite the initial atmosphere of goodwill, SDF-affiliated Asayish forces that remained in these neighborhoods obstructed the implementation phase and refused to subordinate themselves to Aleppo’s Internal Security Forces, as stipulated in the agreement.

On multiple occasions, Asayish units attacked civilians and civilian infrastructure, triggering violent clashes. Throughout this period, Damascus repeatedly agreed to cease-fires in an effort to preserve negotiations over the broader March 10 integration agreement with the SDF. However, after the deadline of the integration deal expired, final US-mediated talks in Damascus failed, and Asayish forces again targeted civilian infrastructure, and the Syrian army opted to launch a limited military operation.

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

For the last fourteen years, the Kurds enjoyed de facto autonomy, and they currently control a large chunk of eastern and northeastern Syria. An agreement inked in March last year, which the Kurds reluctantly agreed to under immense external pressure, was meant to see the SDF and the Kurdish civilian institutions integrated into the Syrian state. It has effectively gone nowhere, with both sides blaming each other.

The fighting in Aleppo broke out just days after negotiations stalled again and came to an end after external forces, notably the United States, intervened, preventing a potentially greater bloodbath. Turkey stated it would take action—if needed—on behalf of the Syrian government, and Israel threw its weight in behind the Kurds.

—Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA).

2. What does the withdrawal of SDF-affiliated units mean for stability in Aleppo?

The withdrawal does bring with it a sigh of relief for the residents of Aleppo. But taking stock of the destruction, for those who lost loved ones, it’s hardly a win. The days-long fighting further ripped open one of the many fissures that the Syrian government says it has been trying to repair as it attempts to consolidate power under Damascus. The Kurdish population—who largely remain wary of President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government—might just prove to be the toughest to win over.

While an even worse scenario has been avoided for the time being, if anything, the fighting is evidence of how much more work lies ahead for Syria and how its path to “stability” will not necessarily be free of suffering.

—Arwa Damon

3. What does the dismantling of the Kurdish military presence in Aleppo mean for SDF status in Syria?

Civilians carry their bags and belongings as they flee following renewed clashes between the Syrian army and the Syrian Democratic Forces in Aleppo, Syria on January 8, 2026. Photo via REUTERS/Mahmoud Hassano.

Losing Aleppo weakens the SDF’s negotiating position significantly. Damascus will never support the SDF in retaining an autonomous military or administrative structure in the northeast, but al-Sharaa has repeatedly said that Kurdish language and cultural rights will be enshrined in the future constitution. The current government is already highly localized, and we will likely see the same model applied to the northeast with or without a peaceful integration of the SDF.

—Gregory Waters is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and writes about Syria’s security institutions and social dynamics.

4. How credible are government assurances of inclusion and rights protections to Kurdish communities?

The components of the new Syrian government have a mixed track record of treatment towards Kurds. The factions that came from Idlib, most notably Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, have no serious history of ethnic targeting of Kurds, while several Syrian National Army (SNA) factions, which now serve in parts of the new army, have been sanctioned for years for systematic abuses against Kurds in northern Aleppo. It is now up to Damascus to ensure these ex-SNA factions no longer abuse or exploit Kurdish communities.

—Gregory Waters

There were no reports of large-scale violations by government security forces during the fighting in the Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiye neighborhoods, unlike the abuses that occurred in coastal areas or in Swaida last year. This demonstrates progress in managing security operations in areas where diverse communities live. Another episode of violence and killings would be too costly politically for Damascus. In Aleppo, security forces have been overall mindful to show that they are able to protect the Kurdish community.

—Marie Forestier is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. She is also currently a consultant for the European Institute of Peace.

Related reading

MENASource

Jul 24, 2025

In a sectarian Syria, the winners should refrain from taking all

By Marie Forestier

To avoid the complete supremacy of HTS-supporting Sunnis, it is crucial to adopt power-sharing mechanisms ensuring inclusiveness

Democratic Transitions International Norms

5. What does the Aleppo violence imply for future negotiations with other armed groups?

The issue in Aleppo is distinct from more general political or ideological dissent in Syria because it involved an armed group that controls territory. However, the government’s slower, methodical approach to the dispute this week, mixing continued diplomatic outreach with military pressure, shows a more mature leadership in Damascus compared to how it approached similar dissent in Swaida in July.

—Gregory Waters

Related reading

MENASource

Jul 22, 2025

Why the violence in my hometown, Swaida, goes beyond ‘rivalry.’

By Majd AlGhatrif

US officials described the events as “a rivalry” between Syria’s Druze and Bedouins. But this framing strips the crisis of its historical and political context.

Civil Society Conflict

The operation in Aleppo was not a response to dissent, but rather a consequence of the deadlock of negotiations. A significant part of the Syrian population would like to see Kurds and the northeastern region fully integrated into the new Syria. The positive outcome of the military operation in Aleppo—at least from the government’s perspective—and the way security forces managed it raise the question of a possible replication of a similar operation in other areas in the northeast.

—Marie Forestier

6. How does the confrontation fit into the broader Turkish-Israeli rivalry over Syria?

Israel and Turkey hold fundamentally opposing views on Syria. Ankara sees the evolving situation as an opportunity to promote stability through a strong and centralized Syrian state, while Israel views such an outcome as a strategic threat and prefers a weak and fragmented Syria.

During the clashes in Aleppo city, both countries once again positioned themselves on opposite sides. The intensity and limited duration of the fighting did not allow for direct or indirect intervention by either actor. Nevertheless, Turkey publicly signaled its readiness to support the Syrian army if requested, while Israel called on the international community to protect the Kurds. This contrast underscores Turkey’s greater capacity to intervene in northern Syria, as well as the constraints on Israel’s options.

In light of the outcome in Aleppo city, Turkey’s vision of a unified Syria appears to have scored a tactical victory. At the same time, the episode served as a reminder that Turkish-Israeli competition over Syria—rooted in irreconcilable strategic perspectives—will persist.

—Ömer Özkizilcik

7. Where does the United States stand in all of this?

The escalation highlights two key realities for US policy in Syria. First, US mediation efforts aimed at facilitating integration and supporting a unified Syrian state have failed. Washington repeatedly brought Damascus and the SDF to the negotiating table and attempted to steer the process in a constructive direction, yet no breakthrough was achieved.

Second, the crisis has created a new opportunity for the United States. The exposure of the SDF’s fragility in Aleppo city may increase its willingness to make concessions and accept Damascus’s terms. If Washington seeks to prevent a broader military escalation in northeastern Syria, it can once again convene talks and press the SDF to adopt a more pragmatic stance. Should the SDF demonstrate genuine willingness, the United States could play a constructive role in facilitating integration and rebuilding trust between the parties.

—Ömer Özkizilcik

Related reading

MENASource

Nov 21, 2025

Syria joining the anti-ISIS coalition is a westward pivot—with opportunities and risks

By Merissa Khurma and Giorgio Cafiero

The decision is a shift in the country’s alignment—from Russian and Iranian spheres of influence to one in NATO and GCC regional orbits.

Democratic Transitions Middle East

8. Did disagreements among SDF factions contribute to the violence?

The exact degree of internal disagreement within the SDF—and the extent of central command control over Asayish forces in Aleppo—remains contested. Nonetheless, it is evident that multiple decision-making centers are involved. Following the escalation, Damascus and the SDF agreed, under international mediation, to evacuate all Asayish forces from the contested neighborhoods. Some Asayish units, however, refused to comply and instead chose to fight.

According to Turkish intelligence sources cited in the media, this decision followed orders issued by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) cadres in Qandil, reportedly led by Bahoz Erdal. This suggests a rift between the Syrian branch of the PKK, which dominates the SDF, and the PKK’s central leadership in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq.

A second layer of fragmentation became visible on the battlefield itself. While the Syrian army initially pursued a limited operation, cohesion within the Asayish ranks collapsed, with many fighters deserting or laying down their weapons.

—Ömer Özkizilcik

The post Eight questions (and expert answers) on the SDF’s withdrawal from Syria’s Aleppo appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig interviewed on NPR on Trump’s threats against Iran

Atlantic Council — Tue, 13 Jan 2026 12:00:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On January 13, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed on NPR’s “Morning Edition” where he discussed the Trump administration’s threats of military action against Iran.

After the Maduro raid, you can’t count out something more creative, some kind of special operations move by the United States or Israel directly against the Iranian leadership.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig interviewed on NPR on Trump’s threats against Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wieslander on Swedish Radio podcast

cagard — Mon, 12 Jan 2026 20:44:00 +0000

On site at Rikskonferensen 2026, Sweden’s largest conference on defense and security, Anna Wieslander, Director for Northern Europe, featured on the podcast Europapodden (The Europe Podcast) to discuss the European response to Trump’s demands regarding Greenland.

“This is a serious crisis that has emerged. A military move by Trump would be NATO’s darkest hour, causing article five to lose its meaning”, said Wieslander.

Wieslander also argues that Trump’s departure from the rules of the UN Charter in favor of a revived Monroe Doctrine will widen the gap between the U.S. and Europe. However, the fact that military cooperation continues within NATO while the political crisis escalates suggests that a constructive path forward may still be found.

The podcast further explores how to strengthen the European pillar within NATO, which at present is “little more than loose discussions” according to Wieslander, and to what extent the EU could take on a more prominent role in future European defense.

Listen to the full episode to learn more. It is recorded in Swedish.

Listen HEre

The post Wieslander on Swedish Radio podcast appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Charai for The National Interest: Saudi Arabia, Strategic Clarity, and the Architecture of Middle East Stability

Atlantic Council — Mon, 12 Jan 2026 17:24:08 +0000

The post Charai for The National Interest: Saudi Arabia, Strategic Clarity, and the Architecture of Middle East Stability appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in Fox News on Trump Venezuela policy

Atlantic Council — Mon, 12 Jan 2026 14:00:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On January 12, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Fox News article titled “Marco Rubio emerges as key Trump power player after Venezuela operation.”

[Marco Rubio] understands who the boss is and channels those instincts into constructive directions.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Fox News on Trump Venezuela policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Venezuela-Iran connection and what Maduro’s capture means for Tehran, explained

Joze Pelayo, Kirsten Fontenrose, Ellie Sennett — Mon, 12 Jan 2026 13:14:20 +0000

As critics of Washington’s capture and criminal indictment of Venezuelan head of state Nicolás Maduro made connections to other US regime-change operations in the Middle East, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told CBS’s Face the Nation: “The whole foreign policy apparatus thinks everything is Libya, everything is Iraq, everything is Afghanistan. This is not the Middle East. And our mission here is very different. This is the Western Hemisphere.”

He also emphasized that Venezuela can “no longer cozy up to Hezbollah and Iran in our own hemisphere.”

There are clear implications of the Maduro arrest with respect to US-Iran policy and President Donald Trump’s calculus on strategic action against Washington’s adversaries. The US president has indicated he is weighing “very strong” options on Iran as demonstrations there escalated and the death toll rose sharply over the weekend, according to rights groups.

And as Rubio indicated, the operation could also have a more immediate impact on Tehran’s interests and operations abroad—with Venezuela serving as a foothold for Iran and its proxies in the Western Hemisphere.

Our experts break down Iran’s ties to Venezuela and the impact Maduro’s capture could have on Tehran’s interests both in and outside of Iran’s own borders.

Iran-Venezuela relations: From oil to resistance axis

Venezuela-Iran relations have strengthened in recent years: Both countries are oil producers, both have struggled under a robust Western sanctions regime, and as Tehran upgraded its relationship with Caracas, its proxies, such as Hezbollah, have established themselves inside Venezuela’s borders—creating a strategic foothold in the Western Hemisphere.

Both countries are founding members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and had an official relationship before the 1979 revolution in Iran that saw the overthrow of the shah. As the Iranian revolution unfolded and the Islamic Republic came to power in Tehran, Venezuela was one of the first countries to recognize the new Iranian government.

This relationship intensified, however, when Maduro’s predecessor, the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, became president in 1999.

Hugo Chavez welcomes Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at Miraflores Palace in Caracas on June 22, 2012. Photo by Jorge Silva via REUTERS.

Between 2001 and Chavez’s death from cancer in 2013, Chavez and his Iranian counterparts engaged in dozens of diplomatic visits, and “the two countries signed an estimated three hundred agreements of varying importance and value, ranging from working on low-income housing developments to cement plants and car factories,” according to analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Under Chavez, Tehran’s development projects in Venezuela “boosted Chavez’s image and advanced his anti-imperialist agenda throughout the region.” And through Venezuela, Tehran leveraged the partnership to bolster its posture in South America, including in Bolivia and Nicaragua.

By the tail-end of Chavez’s rule in 2012, Iran’s investments and loans in Venezuela were valued at $15 billion, according to CSIS.

Beyond oil and diplomatic agreements, gold smuggling has also shaped the relationship model between Tehran and Caracas. Venezuela holds the largest gold reserves in Latin America (just counting Central Bank reserves, and without including geological gold resources, which would place the country in the fifth place for gold reserves worldwide). Additionally, reports indicate that gold has been smuggled to Iran for years as a mode of payment for Iranian assistance to revive Venezuela’s oil sector.

A base for Hezbollah and the IRGC

Joze Pelayo, associate director for strategic initiatives and policy at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, explains

Against this backdrop, Iranian-backed Hezbollah and its affiliates have used Venezuela as a strategic hub in the Western Hemisphere. The country has served as a sanctuary for Hezbollah to evade sanctions, a center for operations and money laundering, and a base for its transnational criminal and drug trafficking network.

Hezbollah has flourished in key locations in Venezuela—establishing itself within business networks such as Margarita Island and the Paraguaná Peninsula, both with coastal access and a significant Lebanese diaspora community.

Iran also used the gold market in Venezuela to finance Hezbollah’s operations.

In 2022, a seizure order signed by former Israeli Defense Minister Gallant and published by the National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing in the Ministry of Defense exposed a smuggling ring involving gold being transported on sanctioned Iranian flights with proceeds directed to Hezbollah.

In addition to all these exchanges, Iran’s Quds Force (the external arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps responsible for asymmetric warfare, cover operations, and intelligence) maintains a robust presence in Venezuela to support Maduro in times of crisis, according to a report from December 2025.

The hierarchical structure in Venezuela is headed by Ahmad Asadzadeh Goljahi, who oversees operations and heads the “Department 11000,” a Quds Force subunit linked to international terrorist plots, and “Department 840,” involved in overseas assassinations. It is then no surprise that the Iranians attempting to abduct US journalist Masih Alinejad from her home in New York were supposed to make a stop in Venezuela before taking her to Iran.

Maduro’s capture and the potential realignment of Venezuela with the United States represent a major setback for the Quds Force operations and financing. Such a shift could significantly disrupt the group’s transnational criminal and drug-trafficking networks, oil-smuggling scheme, and other illicit activities tied to Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

One potential silver lining: Under US custody and influence, Maduro (and possibly Acting President Delcy Rodriguez) could provide critical intelligence as witnesses and cooperators, assisting to expose the extent of these networks, how to properly root out these toxic elements from the country, and key figures the United States could go after next.

A US signal to Tehran

Kirsten Fontenrose, nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, explains

A photograph which US President Donald Trump posted on his Truth Social account shows what he describes as Venezuelan President “Nicolas Maduro on board the USS Iwo Jima” amphibious assault ship. Photo by @realDonaldTrump via REUTERS.

The Maduro case is strategically relevant less as a template than as a signal. It suggests a US willingness to act decisively against leaders already criminalized and sanctioned, rather than allowing standoffs to persist on the assumption that the risk of escalation alone will deter action.

The Trump administration framed Maduro’s capture as a law-enforcement arrest rather than a military campaign. The United States did not invoke humanitarian intervention, collective self-defense, or congressional authorization for interstate hostilities. Instead, it relied on longstanding criminal indictments and sanctions authorities. Maduro has been under US indictment since March 26, 2020, for narcotics trafficking and narco-terrorism, and he has been subject to comprehensive Treasury sanctions well before the January 2026 operation. The legal basis for such extraterritorial law-enforcement action rests on domestic authorities rather than the law of armed conflict—a distinction that is controversial but not unprecedented in US practice.

For Tehran, the relevance is not the legal argument itself but the political signal embedded in its use. Iranian strategic planning has long assumed that US concern about escalation—particularly actions that could be interpreted as leadership targeting—would impose practical limits on Washington’s behavior. The Maduro episode complicates that assumption. It also reinforces a second point: US leverage does not depend exclusively on military operations. In this case, years of sanctions enforcement, financial pressure, indictments, and diplomatic isolation preceded the arrest, demonstrating that decisive outcomes can be pursued through non-military instruments even in high-risk contexts.

That sequencing intersects with current thinking about the timing of pressure on Iran. Analysis by Rapidan Energy Group Chief Executive Officer Scott Modell published in late 2025 argues that early 2026 presents unusually favorable market conditions for intensified pressure on Iranian oil exports. The analysis points to soft global demand growth, rising non-OPEC supply, spare capacity among OPEC+ producers, and subdued price expectations, suggesting that concerns about oil-price spikes—often a key political constraint on US action—would be less binding in the first quarter of 2026. If that assessment holds, market considerations would be unlikely to restrain US policymakers contemplating additional economic pressure on Iran during this period.

Trump’s public statements following the Venezuela operation reinforce this interpretation. He framed the action in terms of accountability and deterrence, not regime change or nation-building. His emphasis on speed and decisiveness is consistent with earlier US decisions favoring limited, time-bound uses of force—particularly in counterterrorism and retaliatory contexts—over extended military campaigns.

This posture aligns with the policy orientation of figures shaping the administration’s approach. Homeland Security Advisor Stephen Miller has emphasized coercive clarity; Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff has advocated transactional diplomacy backed by leverage; Vice President JD Vance has expressed skepticism toward open-ended military commitments. Reporting also suggests a US Central Intelligence Agency leadership preference for intelligence-driven, more aggressive collection and disruption posture.

Recent US actions elsewhere provide additional context. Strikes against Iran-aligned militias in Iraq following attacks on US personnel in 2024, and counter-ISIS airstrikes conducted with host-nation consent in Nigeria in December 2025, illustrate a preference for responding quickly to defined threats without prolonged warning or phased escalation. These cases do not establish a doctrine, but they reinforce the impression of a US approach that favors early, bounded action over incremental response. In this context, Operation Absolute Resolve is meaningful because it unsettles a core assumption within Tehran—that leadership insulation and escalation risk reliably constrain US action.

The core implication for Iran, then, is strategic rather than operational. The Maduro seizure suggests that the United States is prepared to act decisively against leaders who are already criminally indicted, comprehensively sanctioned, and politically isolated, and that it may do so during periods of internal strain rather than waiting for those pressures to resolve.

None of this implies imminent leadership targeting in Iran. But it does suggest that Washington is reassessing assumptions about timing, leverage, and leadership vulnerability.

The post The Venezuela-Iran connection and what Maduro’s capture means for Tehran, explained appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Belarus hosts nuclear-capable Russian missiles despite talk of US thaw

Mercedes Sapuppo — Sun, 11 Jan 2026 23:50:18 +0000

Russian nuclear-capable Oreshnik missiles are now in Belarus, Kremlin officials have confirmed. A video released by Russia’s Defense Ministry on December 30 showed multiple Russian Oreshnik mobile missile systems deployed in the forests of Belarus, a move designed to enhance the Kremlin’s ability to strike targets throughout Europe. This very deliberate act of nuclear saber-rattling has underlined the continued role of Belarus in Vladimir Putin’s war machine at a time when Minsk is also seeking to improve ties with the Trump administration.

In addition to hosting Oreshnik missiles, Belarus has also recently been accused of aiding Russian drone attacks on Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed on December 26 that Russian drone units are using Belarusian territory to penetrate Ukraine’s air defense network and strike targets across the country. “We note that the Russians are trying to bypass our defensive interceptor positions through Belarus. This is risky for Belarus,” Zelenskyy commented. “It ⁠is unfortunate that Belarus is ‌surrendering its sovereignty in favor of Russia’s aggressive ambitions.”

Meanwhile, Russia is reportedly building a major ammunition plant in Belarus to help supply the ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Construction is said to be underway close to Belarusian capital Minsk, according to opposition group BELPOL, comprised of former members of the Belarusian security services. Responding to news of the plant, exiled Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya accused Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka of “dragging Belarus deeper into Russia’s war.”

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Evidence of Belarusian involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine is not new, of course. On the eve of the invasion, Lukashenka allowed Putin to station tens of thousands of Russian troops in Belarus. The country then served as the main gateway and logistics hub for Russia’s blitzkrieg offensive to seize Kyiv in spring 2022. The Lukashenka regime is also implicated in the Kremlin campaign to abduct and indoctrinate thousands of Ukrainian children.

Reports of Lukashenka’s ongoing involvement in the Russian war effort come amid speculation of a potential thaw in diplomatic relations between Belarus and the United States. In December, 123 political prisoners were freed by the Belarusian authorities, with the US easing sanctions measures in exchange. This followed two smaller scale trade-offs earlier in 2025 as the Trump administration seeks to increase diplomatic dialogue with Minsk as part of ongoing efforts to broker a negotiated settlement to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Despite these headline-grabbing humanitarian steps, there is little sign of a more comprehensive shift in Minsk away from domestic repression or any reduction in support for Russia’s aggressive foreign policy agenda. On the contrary, the available evidence indicates that while Lukashenka may seek increased engagement with the West, he has no intention of turning away from Moscow or ending human rights abuses inside Belarus.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

By continuing to provide Moscow with its full backing, Belarus enhances Russia’s ability to wage war in Ukraine. This is undermining the Trump administration’s efforts to end the Russian invasion and secure a lasting peace settlement. Belarus also remains deeply implicated in Putin’s hybrid war against Europe and stands accused of weaponizing everything from migrants to balloons against its EU neighbors.

US outreach to Minsk over the past year has secured the release of many prominent prisoners, but continued arrests mean that the overall number of political detainees in the country remains high. Naturally, Lukashenka is happy to reengage with American officials in order to secure a relaxation of sanctions pressure, but there are also concerns that the current approach risks incentivizing hostage-taking.

Yes, a less isolated and more neighborly Belarus remains a worthwhile goal, but in the current circumstances, Lukashenka has little motivation to compromise. He is looking at possible gains without actually reducing the current level of repression in Belarus.

Sanctions relief would be a significant gain for Lukashenka. In exchange for that, the US should be able to achieve some limits on Belarusian facilitation of Kremlin aggression in Ukraine or, at a minimum, a notable decrease in the number of political prisoners in Belarus.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Imran Bayoumi

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The post Bayoumi quoted in AP News on the US lack of Arctic strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Gray in The Wall Street Journal on the Donroe doctrine in Greenland

Atlantic Council — Sat, 10 Jan 2026 02:00:00 +0000

On January 9, Alexander B. Gray, a GeoStrategy Initiative nonresident senior fellow, published an article in The Wall Street Journal titled “A Defense of the Donroe Doctrine in Greenland.”

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The post Gray in The Wall Street Journal on the Donroe doctrine in Greenland appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bayoumi interviewed on CBC News on Canada’s Arctic strategy

Atlantic Council — Fri, 09 Jan 2026 22:00:00 +0000

On January 9, Imran Bayoumi, associate director of the GeoStrategy Initiative, was interviewed on CBC News arguing that investments in Arctic capabilities will best position Canada for partnership with the US amidst threats to Greenland.

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The post Bayoumi interviewed on CBC News on Canada’s Arctic strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Neither free nor fair: What Myanmar’s ‘sham’ elections mean for the country and its neighbors

Rudabeh Shahid — Fri, 09 Jan 2026 10:59:00 +0000

On January 11, Myanmar will conduct the second phase of its general election, which began in December and will continue in a third phase later this month. When completed, it will have been the first such election in Myanmar since the 2021 military coup there. But what the ruling junta touts as a return to democratic governance is, in reality, a carefully managed exercise in self‑preservation by the generals who seized power almost five years ago. The elections, staged amid civil war and repression, will neither restore genuine democracy in Myanmar nor stabilize its fractured society. Instead, the electoral charade threatens renewed regional instability with implications for Bangladesh, India, and South Asia as a whole.

A “sham” election

Already, human rights organizations and civil society groups have condemned the process as illegitimate and incapable of meeting democratic standards. Human Rights Watch characterized the election as a “sham,” while the International Crisis Group, the International Republican Institute, and regional monitors such as the Asian Network for Free Elections have raised alarms about the absence of conditions for a credible vote.

The organizations’ concerns are valid. Myanmar’s vote is being conducted amid ongoing civil war, mass displacement, and widespread violations of political freedoms. Major opposition parties are blocked from meaningful participation. For example, the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party is contesting widely, but the National League for Democracy (NLD)—the party of imprisoned opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi—remains banned from meaningful competition, with most of its leadership detained or barred from standing. Reports indicate that civilians feel coerced into voting out of fear rather than choice. Testimonies describe pressure to vote from local authorities, military-linked administrators, and security actors, creating a climate in which participation is seen less as civic exercise and more as fearful compliance.

The geographic scope of the vote itself reflects the imbalance at the heart of this process. Rather than a nationwide election, only a portion of Myanmar’s townships are included in the polling, with the rest excluded on the grounds of conflict, insecurity, or administrative decisions that conveniently remove opposition strongholds from participation. Out of the country’s 330 townships, polling is scheduled in just 274; in other words, 56 townships—and in some assessments, even more—will not vote at all because authorities have designated them too unstable. Almost entire regions—particularly in the states of Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Sagaing, and Karenni—remain cut out of the process, highlighting how the vote is structured less as a democratic exercise and more as a managed performance of legitimacy.

Bangladesh: Caught between crisis and containment

For Bangladesh—already host to more than a million Rohingya refugees and undergoing its own fraught political transition—the outcome offers little hope of resolution. The Rohingya crisis dates back several decades, with the biggest influx happening in 2017 because of mass expulsions from Rakhine State, which occurred under the NLD-led government that many Western observers once hailed as Myanmar’s democratic success story. Successive crises since then have exposed Dhaka’s limited leverage over Naypyidaw’s rulers, whether in military uniform or in civilian dress, and these elections are unlikely to change that calculus. The forced return of refugees without guarantees of safety and citizenship remains unrealistic under a Myanmar regime seeking legitimacy rather than reconciliation.

Continued violence in western Myanmar risks further displacement toward Cox’s Bazar, in southeastern Bangladesh. The border region has also seen shifts in control by armed groups, complicating trade and security cooperation and heightening anxiety in Dhaka about criminal networks and militant spillover. Prospects for stable, collaborative border governance remain dim.

Analysts characterize the current moment as a Rohingya stalemate, warning that the junta-driven polls offer “no meaningful pathway” for resolving the crisis and that any hope of voluntary, safe return remains illusory while the junta remains in place. Bangladesh already hosts more than a million Rohingya, while fresh fighting in Rakhine since 2024 has generated another surge of displacement, estimated at 150,000 people. Dhaka has rejected requests to send election observers, interpreting them as a bid to manufacture legitimacy. The interim Bangladeshi government, under pressure from domestic rights advocates, refuses to negotiate with Myanmar authorities who have no intention of allowing a safe and dignified return.

Security concerns compound this stalemate. The northern frontier is contested by the Arakan Army, Rohingya armed groups, and splinter factions, driving militarization. Bangladesh’s fence-building and patrol deployments respond to periodic cross‑border raids and trafficking networks, while nongovernmental organizations document camp‑level violence and extortion. In this context, even small escalations could trigger humanitarian emergencies and force Dhaka into defensive postures rather than constructive diplomacy.

India: Strategic ambivalence in the face of uncertainty

India’s stance reflects a tension between strategic interests and democratic principles. New Delhi shares a long, porous border with Myanmar’s restive northwest—an area where insurgent groups have long operated across boundaries and where any new wave of refugees, fighters, or illicit flows can inflame fears about the demographic balance in sensitive frontier states such as Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland. India’s priority is to prevent these pressures from spilling deeper into its territory, a task historically underpinned by security cooperation with the Myanmar military. Yet such cooperation is now a political liability given international condemnation of the junta.

At the same time, India has clear interests in counterbalancing China in Myanmar. Connectivity and energy projects under the Act East Policy—including highways and ports—depend on at least a minimal degree of order in Myanmar. The ongoing elections, marred by conflict and exclusion, do not provide that. New Delhi faces tough choices as it seeks to balance pragmatic ties with the junta even as doing so could enable Myanmar’s authoritarian consolidation, all while Chinese-backed infrastructure and security influence deepens along India’s eastern flank. India’s recent willingness to engage a wide spectrum of actors in the region—from Myanmar’s military to the Taliban government in Kabul, which New Delhi hosted for talks in October 2025—underscores how far it is prepared to stretch diplomatic orthodoxy to protect its strategic and connectivity interests.

This pragmatism reflects security pressures as well. Since the 2021 coup in Myanmar, New Delhi has documented increased flows of arms, refugees, and insurgents into India’s northeast, with groups such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang exploiting Myanmar’s political vacuum. Analysts warn that if the junta’s authority erodes further, Indian factions could seek sanctuary across the border or develop support channels through Bangladesh, threatening to upset the demographic balance in sensitive border states. Meanwhile, India’s signature projects—the Kaladan multi‑modal transit route and the India–Myanmar–Thailand highway—remain stalled by conflict, allowing China‑aligned infrastructure to gain relative momentum. Even as India dispatches observers and calls for an “inclusive poll,” critics argue that if India aligns too closely with the junta, it would cause a future resistance‑led government to tilt more toward Beijing. The dilemma is clear: Stability is indispensable for India’s Act East calculus, but stability anchored in repression could prove strategically self‑defeating.

The regional stakes

Myanmar’s electoral theater unfolds against a backdrop of great‑power competition. China sees the process as a means to safeguard strategic corridors linking Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. For China, it is a dual‑track strategy—formal engagement with the junta, informal management of militias—ensuring continued influence regardless of electoral credibility. Beijing wants elections above all for the promise of order: Even a tightly controlled, unfair vote is preferable, from its perspective, to open-ended civil war that threatens pipelines, ports, and overland trade routes. Chinese officials have leaned on some ethnic armed organizations to enter talks with the junta, with activists alleging that elements of this pressure campaign have veered into coercive tactics. These actions underscore the lengths to which Beijing is prepared to go to secure border stability, energy corridors, and uninterrupted trade.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has sent inconsistent messages on Myanmar’s election. Publicly, the bloc signals unease and maintains a measure of diplomatic distance, showing little appetite for a strong multilateral stance. Privately, however, several member states have opened bilateral channels with Naypyidaw—through security cooperation, commercial agreements, and selective political engagement—effectively diluting ASEAN’s collective leverage. Malaysia has taken a more critical line, warning that partial elections “achieve nothing without peace,” while Vietnam has broken with the broader consensus by sending observers and portraying the polls as a possible starting point for stability.

In sum, the election functions less as a transition than as a diplomatic sorting mechanism, clarifying who will tolerate the junta for strategic gain and who will condition engagement on democratic legitimacy.

False dawn, real dangers

Myanmar’s ongoing elections do not mark a step toward democratic recovery; they mark the consolidation of an authoritarian holding pattern whose shockwaves extend far beyond Myanmar’s borders. What is unfolding is not a transition but a recalibration of power, engineered through selective participation, territorial exclusion, and coerced consent. If anything is clear for South Asia, it is that Myanmar’s unraveling is no longer contained within its borders. Elections may freeze formal politics, but the conflict itself continues to move—across borders, through refugee flows, supply routes, insurgent networks, and competing infrastructure projects.

In the absence of a coordinated regional response that prioritizes accountability, humanitarian protection, and a political settlement rooted in more than military control, this democratic crisis will only become harder to manage.

The post Neither free nor fair: What Myanmar’s ‘sham’ elections mean for the country and its neighbors appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s war on Ukrainian farmers threatens global food security

Oleksandr Tolokonnikov — Thu, 08 Jan 2026 22:10:44 +0000

Ukrainian farmer Oleksandr Hordiienko was a well known figure in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region, where he was widely viewed as a symbol of the local agricultural community’s wartime resilience. During the first three-and-a-half years of Russia’s invasion, Hordiienko was credited with shooting down dozens of Russian drones and helping de-mine thousands of hectares of farmland. On September 5 last year, he was killed in a Russian drone strike.

Hordiienko’s death was part of a broader Kremlin campaign to methodically target and destroy Ukraine’s agricultural industry. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, at least fifteen farmers have been killed in the Kherson region alone.

Meanwhile, vast quantities of farmland remain inaccessible due to mining or have sustained damage as a result of fires caused by Russian military actions. Ukrainian agricultural workers face a daily threat of drone, artillery, or missile strikes. Some farmers have responded to the danger by taking measures to defend themselves, their land, and their livestock, such as investing in drone monitoring equipment and hiring military veterans.

Over the past year, Russian attacks on Ukraine’s agricultural sector have escalated alarmingly. According to research conducted by the University of Strasbourg, the University of Maryland, and NASA’s Harvest program, the number of farmland fires identified in Ukrainian-controlled areas of the Kherson region during 2025 rose by 87.5 percent.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The Kherson farming community’s wartime experience is mirrored throughout Ukraine, particularly in areas close to the front lines of the invasion. By attacking agricultural infrastructure, Russia seeks to undermine Ukraine’s food security, just as it targets the country’s energy infrastructure to deprive Ukraine’s civilian population of access to electricity and heating.

The implications of Russia’s war on Ukrainian farmers are international in scope. Known historically as the breadbasket of Europe, Ukraine is home to around one quarter of the world’s black soil, the most fertile farmland on the planet. This makes Ukraine a potential agricultural superpower and a key contributor to global food security. Ukrainian farmers are among the leading exporters of foodstuffs to the European Union, with Ukrainian produce also playing a prominent role in aid programs to counter hunger throughout the developing world.

Russia’s invasion has had a devastating impact on Ukrainian agricultural output. In addition to mined fields, burned crops, and bombed facilities, large numbers of Ukrainian farms are currently in Kremlin-controlled regions, leading to seized harvests.

Kherson region farmers received a further blow in summer 2023 when a suspected Russian sabotage operation destroyed the Kakhovka Dam in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine. This act of ecocide undermined one of Europe’s largest irrigation systems, leaving hundreds of thousands of hectares without access to water. The impact on the environment was catastrophic, leading to drought conditions, failed crops, and the loss of farmland.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Despite the unprecedented challenges posed by Russia’s ongoing invasion, Kherson’s farmers continue to work. In 2025, they managed to harvest a remarkable quantity of the watermelons that serve as the region’s unofficial calling card. Other key Kherson crops include wheat and potatoes.

Since 2022, domestic and international support programs have proved instrumental in bolstering the resilience of the Kherson agricultural industry. Initiatives in recent years have included subsidies for farmers and technical assistance focused on areas such as irrigation, with the goal of helping farmers adapt to the new wartime realities.

Kherson agricultural businesses are also responding to the changing conditions. Due to water scarcity and rising temperatures, some farms have reduced planting areas and turned to cultivating crops that utilize soil moisture more efficiently. Research is also underway to develop additional drought-resistant crops better suited to the current environment.

Further international support for Ukrainian farmers will be critically important during 2026. Ukraine’s agricultural industry is one of the cornerstones of the national economy and a major exporter to global markets. By targeting farmers and their land, Russia aims to make Ukraine unlivable and break the country’s resistance. This strategy poses a significant threat to international food security and must be addressed.

Oleksandr Tolokonnikov is Deputy Head of the Kherson Regional Military Administration.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The current emphasis on UGVs is part of a broader technological transformation taking place on the battlefields of Ukraine. This generational shift in military tech is redefining how modern wars are fought.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, homegrown innovation has played a critical role in Ukraine’s defense. Early in the war, Ukrainian troops deployed cheap commercial drones to conduct reconnaissance. These platforms were soon being adapted to carry explosives, dramatically expanding their combat role. By the second year of the war, Ukraine had developed a powerful domestic drone industry capable of producing millions of units per year while rapidly adapting to the ever-changing requirements of the battlefield.

A similar process has also been underway at sea, with Ukraine deploying domestically produced naval drones to sink or damage more than a dozen Russian warships. This has forced Putin to withdraw the remainder of the Black Sea Fleet from occupied Crimea to Russia itself. Recent successes have included the downing of Russian helicopters over the Black Sea using naval drones armed with missiles, and an audacious strike on a Russian submarine by an underwater Ukrainian drone.

By late 2023, drones were dominating the skies over the Ukrainian battlefield, making it extremely dangerous to use vehicles or armor close to the front lines. In response to this changing dynamic, Ukrainian forces began experimenting with wheeled and tracked land drones to handle logistical tasks such as the delivery of food and ammunition to front line positions and the evacuation of wounded troops.

Over the past year, Russia’s expanding use of fiber-optic drones and tactical focus on disrupting Ukrainian supply lines has further underlined the importance of UGVs. Fiber-optic drones have expanded the kill zone deep into the Ukrainian rear, complicating the task of resupplying combat units and leading to shortages that weaken Ukraine’s defenses. Robotic systems help counter this threat.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Remote controlled land drones offer a range of practical advantages. They are more difficult to jam electronically than aerial drones, and are far harder to spot than trucks or cars. These benefits are making them increasingly indispensable for the Ukrainian military. In November 2025, the BBC reported that up to 90 percent of all supplies to Ukrainian front line positions around Pokrovsk were being delivered by UGVs.

In addition to logistical functions, the Ukrainian military is also pioneering the use of land drones in combat roles. It is easy to see why this is appealing. After all, Ukrainian commanders are being asked to defend a front line stretching more than one thousand kilometers with limited numbers of troops against a far larger and better equipped enemy.

Experts caution that while UGVs can serve as a key element of Ukraine’s defenses, they are not a realistic alternative to boots on the ground. Former Ukrainian commander in chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi has acknowledged that robotic systems are already making it possible to remove personnel from the front lines and reduce casualties, but stressed that current technology remains insufficient to replace humans at scale.

Despite the advances of the past four years, Ukraine’s expanding robot army remains incapable of carrying out many military functions that require infantry. When small groups of Russian troops infiltrate Ukrainian positions and push into urban areas, for example, soldiers are needed to clear and hold terrain. Advocates of drone warfare need to recognize these limitations when making the case for greater reliance on unmanned systems.

UGVs will likely prove vital for Ukraine in 2026, but they are not wonder weapons and cannot serve as a miracle cure for Kyiv’s manpower challenges. Instead, Ukraine’s robot army should be viewed as an important part of the country’s constantly evolving defenses that can help save lives while raising the cost of Russia’s invasion.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Delcy Rodríguez’s untenable balancing act

Iria Puyosa — Thu, 08 Jan 2026 20:32:51 +0000

The United States’ extraction of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from his bunker on January 3 triggered an explosion of activity across Venezuelan social media. Across Instagram, TikTok, and WhatsApp status updates, millions of Venezuelans shared jubilant reactions to images of the former dictator in custody. Venezuelan diaspora communities from Buenos Aires to Madrid posted celebratory videos, while domestic users circumvented internet restrictions to express relief and hope.

The regime’s communication apparatus—typically one of its most formidable weapons—collapsed during the crucial first fifteen hours following the operation. Targeted strikes on antennas disrupted the radio communications of the security forces, while an electricity outage impacted the area around the Fuerte Tiuna Army Base. However, internet and phone communications continued to function normally. State TV and radio stations were broadcasting prerecorded programming rather than providing critical news coverage. Chavismo took refuge on Telegram channels and groups.

When government communications finally resumed, conflicting statements revealed chaos within the regime. Late on January 3, former Vice President Delcy Rodríguez proclaimed Maduro “the only president of Venezuela” and demanded his release while simultaneously assuming the role of acting president. In contrast, US President Donald Trump claimed that she was cooperating with his administration and was willing to fulfill all his requests regarding the US takeover of the Venezuelan oil industry. This dissonance highlighted the regime’s turmoil, torn between defiant rhetoric for domestic audiences and pliant negotiations with Washington.

The regime’s double game

Hours after Maduro’s removal, María Corina Machado, the leader of Venezuela’s democratic opposition movement, whose candidate won 67 percent of the vote according to tallies from the stolen 2024 election, declared on social media “Venezuelans, the HOUR OF FREEDOM has arrived!” However, despite her overwhelming popular legitimacy and moral authority, she operates under the constraints of surveillance and repression. The opposition’s mobilization capacity remains uncertain, as the Maduro regime’s systematic repression has crushed the country’s civil society.

For her part, Rodríguez confronts an unprecedented challenge for a Venezuelan leader: She must satisfy Washington’s demands while maintaining sufficient Chavista coalition support to prevent an internal fracture or a military coup. The Trump administration demands sufficient cooperation to enable US oil company operations, likely including transparent property contracts and regulatory stability—precisely the institutional environment that Chavismo systematically dismantled. Rodríguez making such an agreement with Trump would alienate the regime’s hardliners, who would view her accommodation as a betrayal. Thus, Rodríguez may be unable to guarantee the stability required for the business operations Trump wants to run in Venezuela.

Her public contradictions reflect this impossible position. In her first televised addresses as interim president, she demanded Maduro’s immediate release to demonstrate loyalty to domestic audiences. Less than twenty-four hours later, however, she declared it a priority to move toward a “balanced and respectful” economic cooperation between the United States and Venezuela.

This double game cannot persist indefinitely. Rodríguez must choose between accommodating Trump’s demands or preserving Chavista unity. Trump’s threat that if Rodríguez “doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro” makes clear that there will be consequences of noncompliance. Purging the hardliners may be Rodríguez’s best option.

Navigating the geopolitical minefield

Perhaps Rodríguez’s most complex challenge is managing Venezuela’s deep entanglements with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba while simultaneously partnering with the Trump administration. This is especially the case after the Trump administration demanded that Venezuela immediately cut ties and cease intelligence cooperation with Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba. These relationships represent more than diplomatic alignments—they constitute binding financial obligations, operational dependencies, and strategic commitments that cannot simply be abandoned without triggering massive economic and security consequences.

China presents the most significant financial exposure. Venezuela owes Beijing around twenty billion dollars in loans. These debts are secured through oil-for-loan arrangements that require repayment through crude deliveries, with China currently absorbing more than half of Venezuela’s oil exports (approximately 746,000 barrels per day in November 2025).

Beyond petroleum, Chinese state enterprises control critical Venezuelan infrastructure. Huawei built and maintains control over Venezuela’s national fiber-optic backbone. China Electronics Import & Export Corporation built and operates the VEN911 surveillance system. ZTE Corporation designed the Homeland Card system and operationalized the Patria System database used for social control. These companies don’t simply provide services—they embed operational control within Venezuela’s digital infrastructure, creating dependencies that cannot be severed without system collapse. Expelling Chinese technology companies would require the complete reconstruction of Venezuela’s telecommunications and surveillance systems.

Russia’s Strategic Partnership Treaty with Venezuela, signed in May 2025, commits Caracas to comprehensive cooperation with Moscow across the hydrocarbons, military technology, and strategic sectors. Russia is Venezuela’s primary supplier of naphtha and diluents—essential additives for processing Venezuela’s heavy crude. These Russian commitments create immediate conflicts with a potential US partnership, as the Trump administration’s demands make clear. The energy deal announced by the Trump administration on January 7 indicates that US diluent will be sent to Venezuela, meaning that Russia will have to withdraw from that market.

Iran provides Venezuela’s most operationally sensitive international cooperation—drone technology production at El Libertador Air Base, where Iranian personnel set up operations. On December 30, 2025, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on Empresa Aeronautica Nacional SA, the Venezuelan company operating in a joint venture with Iranian companies at drone manufacturing facilities in Venezuela. This military-technical cooperation directly threatens US interests and almost certainly constitutes a nonnegotiable red line for Washington.

Cutting ties with Cuba would resent the deepest ideological and operational challenge for the regime. Cuban intelligence advisors remain embedded throughout Venezuelan security services despite the neutralization of Maduro’s personal protection unit. These advisors provide counterintelligence expertise, interrogation training, and repression coordination—exactly the capabilities Rodríguez needs to maintain internal control against potential coup attempts. Cuba’s own survival depends on Venezuelan oil shipments, with Havana receiving subsidized petroleum. Severing Cuban intelligence cooperation would affect operational expertise within the security forces, potentially triggering a military fracture. Yet Washington has demanded the immediate severance of Venezuela’s ties to Cuban intelligence. Moreover, on January 3, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a warning to the Cuban leadership: “If I lived in Havana and was part of the government, I’d be at least a little concerned.” He also emphasized that Cuba would no longer receive oil from Venezuela.

Democracy deferred

Each day of ambiguity increases pressure from all directions, making Rodríguez’s balancing act increasingly untenable. There are three competing scenarios: First, Rodríguez could successfully navigate between Washington and Chavismo. Second, hardliners could resist accommodation with the United States, triggering Trump’s threatened “second wave” operation. Third, a rebellion could replace Chavista leadership, opening the door to a transition.

Amid this uncertain picture, Venezuelan civil society, having demonstrated extraordinary resilience through the October 2023 primary elections and the July 2024 presidential campaign despite systematic repression, now confronts a different challenge. It must fight to remain relevant amid a power transition dominated by US economic interests and Chavista factional negotiations. In the days following Maduro’s capture, a clear priority has emerged for Venezuelan civil society: the total liberation of all the regime’s political prisoners, who currently number nearly one thousand. Only then will Venezuela’s transition to democracy truly begin.

The post Delcy Rodríguez’s untenable balancing act appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bayoumi in Foreign Policy on Trump’s lack of Arctic strategy

Atlantic Council — Thu, 08 Jan 2026 20:00:00 +0000

On January 8, Imran Bayoumi, associate director of the GeoStrategy Initiative, published an article in Foreign Policy titled “Trump’s Greenland Threats Paper Over a Lack of Arctic Strategy,” arguing that instead of threatening Greenland, the US should work to increase Arctic security burden sharing.

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The post Bayoumi in Foreign Policy on Trump’s lack of Arctic strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iraq’s pathway to stability relies on transfers of power

Yerevan Saeed — Thu, 08 Jan 2026 16:46:04 +0000

In Iraq, stability and progress rely on leadership changes rather than leaders holding onto power.

On December 29, Iraq’s newly elected parliament met for the first time since the top court confirmed the November 11 election results. The session started the process of forming a new government in a parliament where no single party has a majority. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Sudani, who wants a second term, won the most seats with forty-six out of 329. However, in Iraq’s political system, winning the most seats does not guarantee the top job. Instead, the next prime minister is chosen through coalition deals among the main Shia factions. Whether Sudani gets another term is still uncertain, but these coalition talks will shape not only the next cabinet but also Iraq’s direction during future challenges.

In Washington, many believe that Sudani is different from Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition and the only prime minister who has previously served two terms in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. This assumption is both comforting and misleading. Sudani is often seen as more focused on technical issues and less divisive, leading a country that seems more stable than before. This could suggest that the status quo is the safest choice, as Sudani will likely continue efforts to work with Washington on critical issues of reform and militia disarmament in the next four years.

Former Iraqi Prime Ministers Adel Abdul Mahdi and Nouri al-Maliki stand at a polling station inside Al-Rasheed Hotel during the parliamentary election in Baghdad, Iraq, November 11, 2025. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani

But this perspective conflates personal leadership qualities with deeper structural problems that have haunted Iraq historically. Iraq’s political system has weak checks and balances, and the state is seen as a source of rewards by the political elite. In this kind of political landscape, one leader staying in power too long can turn temporary authority into lasting control. Even capable leaders can weaken institutions if they stay for a second term.

The main issue for the country’s stability is not whether Sudani is like al-Maliki, but whether Iraq’s political system allows real competition. For true contestability, losing groups must believe they can return to power through talks and elections, and rivals should keep competing within the system instead of looking for power elsewhere. In Iraq, this kind of competition is important for security, not just for democracy.

SIGN UP FOR THIS WEEK IN THE MIDEAST NEWSLETTER

The structural risks of a second term

Since the overthrow of the former Iraqi regime in 2003, Iraq’s politics have been competitive but lack strong limits. The political elite have utilized ministries and agencies not just for policy but also to manage coalitions by handing out jobs, contracts, and security roles to keep alliances together. All former prime ministers have been guilty of turning the state into a system of political favors, but they have differed in how far they pushed it. Prime ministers such as Haider al-Abadi, Adel Abdulmahdi, and Mustafa al-Kadhimi were not aggressive enough and lost power. Still, they left the state more stable than their predecessors.

In comparison, leaders who treated the state as spoils of war and built strong patronage networks, such as al-Maliki, served longer.

Iraqi prime ministers are often perceived as practical in their first terms, because they take office through a quota-sharing bargain that parcels out ministries and senior posts across blocs. This limits a premier’s control over a bureaucracy shaped by party patronage. This is visible at the point of government formation. For example, former Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi was sworn in in October 2018 with only a partial cabinet after parties deadlocked over key portfolios, and Mustafa al-Kadhimi began in May 2020 with several ministries still vacant as blocs continued to bargain over nominees.

Under those constraints, first-term premiers tend to lower immediate friction among rival power centers and prioritize deals, including Baghdad-Erbil arrangements such as budget-oil agreements. They also try to contain armed factions through a mix of formal incorporation and selective pressure. For example, the 2016 law that placed the Popular Mobilization Forces on a state footing to Kadhimi’s June 2020 raid on a Kata’ib Hezbollah site was followed days later by the release of most detainees after militia pushback.

In contrast, a second term changes the incentives by making it more rewarding to hold onto power. Leaders expecting to stay longer often put loyal people in top jobs, use government contracts to protect themselves, weaken oversight bodies, and use audits or investigations more against their opponents than their allies. Sudani’s government began moving in this direction toward the end of its first term, including by directing a federal oversight committee to scrutinize the Kurdistan Regional Government’s revenues and spending. In 2025, similar audit claims were often cited to justify delaying or withholding the Kurdistan region’s federal budget transfers.

This is the second-term trap in Iraq: It does not always lead straight to authoritarianism but slowly turns appointments, contracts, and enforcement tools into a system that limits political change and weakens institutions. This process often happens quietly and is often explained as being efficient or stable by outsiders who may not see how serious it is.

How state capture unfolds

In Iraq, administrative capture usually happens gradually through legal, political, and economic steps, rather than through open announcements.

This process often begins with key appointments in areas such as the interior and intelligence agencies, which control force; as well as finance and planning ministries, which manage spending; and justice positions, which oversee investigations. It continues with hard-to-audit procurement practices, such as emergency approvals, unclear contracts, secret spending, and the use of state-linked groups to move money. Over time, oversight bodies and courts may start enforcing rules selectively, targeting opponents more while letting allies off the hook, especially when these institutions are open to political pressure.

The main effect of administrative capture is on how the state functions, not just its reputation. It weakens the state’s ability to handle crises by distorting information and valuing loyalty over skill. Intelligence becomes less open, leadership roles become more political, and contracts are awarded for favors rather than for readiness. This creates a false sense of strength at the top level but breeds public distrust by hiding real problems. As people lose trust, the state’s legitimacy and its ability to respond effectively during crises like insurgencies, militia violence, or protests are greatly reduced.

Iraq has gone through this before, though it is often forgotten during quieter times. In 2014, military units that looked strong on paper fell apart when faced with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Reports blamed this on corruption, poor leadership, political appointments, and sectarian splits—problems that happen when security forces serve politics instead of acting as professional institutions. What seems stable can quickly fall apart in a crisis.

This is the main lesson from al-Maliki’s second term in office, which can be defined as the slipping slope toward the end of Iraq as one unified country. The problem was not just one leader’s style but the failure of institutions to stop power from becoming too personalized once someone stayed in office too long.

Supporters of Sudani point out his focus on service, his governance style, and the alleged deliveries to the Iraqis. Even his critics often admit he handles competing pressures with discipline.

However, in Iraq, a leader’s personal style cannot overcome deeper systemic pressures for long, especially when seeking a second term. Sudani’s support comes from the Shiite Coordination Framework, which brings together many groups with different interests, including some close to Iran. This coalition is more about bargaining than unity, so individual goals often take a back seat to group dynamics.

If Sudani wins a second term, he is likely to use the state to advance his personal power in the absence of real checks and balances, a concern reflected by the Shia Coordination Framework’s veto of his staying in power. Even if he secures a second term, his coalition partners could also impose strict demands and conditions on him, expecting that Sudani would use his power to make appointments that strengthen their networks, financial benefits, and use enforcement to help his allies and further limit rivals. The same practical skills that help manage coalitions, such as avoiding conflict and keeping support, can also make administrative capture worse by slowly tying state institutions to political groups.

Contestability as a stabilizing force

Since 2014, Iraq has faced instability, with mass protests, political deadlock, and repeated crises of legitimacy. Still, things have experienced somewhat incremental improvements since then because prime ministers have not been able to see their power as permanent. Even during messy transitions, the belief that no leader stays forever has kept politics open and allowed for change.

This openness changes how political groups act. When they think losing an election means they can still bargain later, they are more likely to take part in elections, talks, and building coalitions, and less likely to use force. But if it looks as though leaders cannot be replaced, rivals try to block decisions, build armed groups outside the system, and see politics as a fight for survival. In a country where armed groups exist alongside the government, this can slowly, then suddenly, destroy stability.

From this point of view, the real question for US policymakers is not about the personal qualities of Iraq’s next prime minister but whether the political system is open enough to stop the state from becoming a tool for narrow group interests.

What should the United States do?

The United States has limited influence in Iraqi politics, and being too direct can backfire by increasing nationalism, helping spoilers, or making it look as though the United States is picking leaders. So, any good US strategy should be careful and focused, aiming to support strong institutions and political change without backing any one leader.

Although it’s understandable that Washington seeks stability in Iraq after years of upheaval, its strategy should prioritize institutional processes over individual leaders to achieve that end. Iraq’s history demonstrates that apparent calm can coincide with institutional erosion, and the consequences of such hollowing become evident during subsequent crises.

The key question is not whether Sudani is like al-Maliki, but whether a second term would reduce competition and weaken institutions. Keeping the same leader can help stability only if there is real oversight and a chance for political change. Without these, stability is a credit borrowed on time until the next crisis happens.

Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Saeed is the Barzani scholar-in-residence in the Department of Politics, Governance & Economics at American University’s School of International Service, where he also serves as director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace.

The post Iraq’s pathway to stability relies on transfers of power appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bayoumi quoted in CBC News on Trump’s approach to Greenland

Atlantic Council — Thu, 08 Jan 2026 15:07:51 +0000

On January 8, Imran Bayoumi, associate director of the GeoStrategy Initiative, was quoted in a CBC News article titled “With Trump’s Venezuela move and Greenland threats, are Canadians vulnerable?” discussing Trump’s renewed focus on the Western hemisphere. He argues that US threats of military action against Greenland are unproductive, urging for bolstered cooperation without threats.

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The post Bayoumi quoted in CBC News on Trump’s approach to Greenland appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig interviewed in the New Yorker on military action in Venezuela

Atlantic Council — Thu, 08 Jan 2026 04:00:00 +0000

On January 7, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed in a The New Yorker article titled “The Former Trump Skeptics Getting Behind His War in Venezuela.” He contends that President Trump demonstrated the credibility of US threats through the use of military force, while distinguishing between targeted, limited applications of force and long-term wars.

I think the U.S. has been too cautious regarding the use of force, especially since Iraq and Afghanistan, because I think we’ve taken the lesson that this stuff never works, when, in fact, sometimes military force is the best option.

Matthew Kroenig

The post Kroenig interviewed in the New Yorker on military action in Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Gray in National Interest on US Indo-Pacific strategy

Atlantic Council — Thu, 08 Jan 2026 02:00:00 +0000

On January 7, Alexander B. Gray, a GeoStrategy Initiative nonresident senior fellow, wrote an article in National Interest titled “How the UK Is Undermining US Indo-Pacific Security,” discussing the UK transfer sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The post Gray in National Interest on US Indo-Pacific strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Trump’s quest for Greenland could be NATO’s darkest hour

Anna Wieslander — Wed, 07 Jan 2026 21:27:57 +0000

STOCKHOLM—After a bumpy start with the new Trump administration in 2025, NATO enters 2026 facing what could become the worst crisis of its existence. “We need Greenland from the standpoint of national security,” US President Donald Trump said on Sunday, ignoring the warnings of Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen that the United States should stop threatening the Kingdom of Denmark or it might lead to the end of NATO.

Following the US intervention in Venezuela and the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro on Saturday, the wife of Trump’s close adviser Stephen Miller, Katie Miller, a Republican podcaster, posted on social media a map of Greenland covered by the American flag and accompanied by one word in capital letters: “SOON.” Sparking harsh reactions in Europe, the remarkable post was followed by Stephen Miller himself, who stated that Greenland should be part of the United States and that no one would militarily challenge a US takeover.

For NATO, this means the worst possible start to the year. The possibility that the United States, the leading member of the Alliance, would use its might to annex part of another ally’s territory is almost beyond imagination and a nightmare for NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. As expressed in the first paragraph of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance rests on the principles of the United Nations Charter that international disputes are settled by peaceful means, and that the parties refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the charter.

Should the darkest hour come and the United States uses military force to annex Greenland, the essence of Article 5 and collective defense within NATO would lose its meaning.

Denmark is a founding member of the Alliance, and it has been a loyal ally since 1949. In Afghanistan, Denmark fought alongside the United States in the tougher mission areas and suffered the most casualties in relation to its population of all NATO allies, apart from the United States.

There is nothing new about Greenland’s importance to US national security. An autonomous part of the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland has hosted a US military base since the 1950s for exactly that reason. A 1951 treaty between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark allows for increased US presence on Greenland if requested. But that is not what Trump is looking for, as the harsh dialogue between Copenhagen and Washington over the past year has revealed. The Trump administration argues that Greenland is part of the Western Hemisphere, and as such it should belong to the United States, which Greenland clearly opposes. This extraordinary US stance, in flagrant disrespect of international law, has caused the Danish defense intelligence service to flag the United States as a concern to Danish national security.

More broadly, the Trump administration’s stance risks dissolving the transatlantic community and putting an end to the most successful military alliance in history.

Trump has nurtured the idea of US ownership of Greenland for a long time. In his first term, he suggested a US purchase of the island on several occasions. When reelected, Trump renewed his interest, stating that “the United States of America feels that the ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity.” This time, he did not rule out the use of military force to get it. A few months later, when Rutte visited the White House, Trump suggested that NATO could help him get Greenland, a request that Rutte declined.

Trump has defended his stance, saying there are “Chinese and Russian ships everywhere” near Greenland and that Denmark cannot protect it. Former National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has emphasized the need for the United States to access Greenland’s vast natural resources. But since Denmark has signaled that the United States is welcome to increase US troop numbers on Greenland should it so wish, and Greenland has announced that it is open for business if US companies are interested, neither of these arguments make sense.

Perhaps importantly, there is a parallel interest in Greenland stemming from the tech giants with close connections to the Trump administration. As reported by Reuters and The Guardian, a circle of US tech entrepreneurs and venture capital figures is promoting Greenland as a potential site for so-called “freedom cities” and large-scale extraction and infrastructure projects. These ideas are framed through libertarian concepts of minimal corporate regulation and ambitions spanning artificial intelligence, space launches, and micronuclear energy. Several of these actors are among Trump’s largest campaign donors and investors, including investors linked to mining operations in Greenland, fossil fuels, and cryptocurrency ventures. Collectively, this cohort reportedly contributed more than $240 million to his 2024 campaign and potentially stand to benefit from a US takeover of the island.

As the United States starts implementing the “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, first by intervening in Venezuela and then quickly threatening Cuba, Colombia, Mexico, and Greenland, Europe is witnessing its strongest ally voluntarily retreat from global leadership to excel in regional dominance. “This is OUR hemisphere”, the State Department declared in an X posting on Monday to underline the launch of its new strategy, presumably sending a message to Russia and China. However, from a NATO perspective, where does this leave allies such as Canada and Denmark? Are they targets of this message as well?

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen arriving for a meeting in Paris on January 6, 2026. (Eric Tschaen/Pool/ABACAPRESS.COM via Reuters Connect)

Copenhagen certainly feels that way. In the past year, Denmark has substantially increased its military support in the Arctic. In January 2025, it committed 14.6 billion kroner ($2.05 billion) to Arctic defense, followed by an additional 27.4 billion kroner ($2.7 billion) later in the year. Denmark has also invested in its relationship with Greenland, including a formal apology for government abuses against Inuit women involving forced birth control in the 1960s and 1970s. On Monday, Greenland’s prime minister, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, downplayed concerns of a military takeover and repeated to the Trump administration that Greenland is not for sale. Nor, he said, are the people of Greenland interested in voluntarily becoming part of the United States.

The Trump administration’s latest escalating rhetoric about seizing Greenland has sparked intense activity in European capitals in support of Greenland and Denmark. Statements clarifying that Greenland belonged to the Greenlanders came quickly from the Nordic and Baltic capitals, and then British Prime Minister Keir Starmer followed suit, before he was joined in a statement on Tuesday by France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Denmark. NATO ally Canada has been explicit in its support as well, and Ottawa is opening a consulate in Greenland to strengthen relations further.

For NATO, Rutte’s ambition to keep the issue off the table in the Alliance is getting increasingly difficult. Rather, he is cautiously joining the diplomatic efforts to prevent a US intervention. On Tuesday, he said that NATO “collectively . . . has to make sure that the Arctic stays safe.” He added, “We all agree that the Russians and Chinese are more and more active in that area.”

Meanwhile NATO officials continue their important work to strengthen the role of the Alliance in Arctic security through increased surveillance, patrolling, exercises, and training. This work embodies the Alliance’s collective efforts to ensure security while addressing the concerns of underinvestment expressed by the Trump administration. Allies should promptly increase these efforts even further.

So far, Denmark has rejected an offer from France to send troops to Greenland as a signal of European solidarity, likely to avoid provoking the United States. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has also signaled a preference for negotiations to US lawmakers, indicating that the military threat is primarily being used to force Denmark to sell Greenland.

Regardless, diplomacy seems like the most reasonable, albeit challenging, option. Those European countries that have been able to establish good communication channels with the Trump administration, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Finland, should side with Denmark and lead efforts to settle the crisis, in a similar manner as Europe was able to support Ukraine in the peace process after Trump’s Alaska summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Rutte, another voice that has good relations with Trump, needs to engage further, as well.

The argument should be that the survival of NATO is at stake if the United States intervenes to seize Greenland, and that such a development would be contrary to US national interests. For example, the Trump administration’s own National Security Strategy (NSS) emphasizes that it is a US interest to maintain strategic stability with Russia. For that, the United States needs its European bases. Proximity matters, as the operation this past summer against Iran’s nuclear facilities clearly illustrated. Furthermore, the NSS outlines how the United States depends on Europe to succeed with its economic agenda elsewhere.

The US Congress recently went further and conditioned a range of measures in its latest defense bill to preserve NATO and US engagement in Europe. Engaging with members of Congress in Washington, DC, and with the delegations soon visiting the World Economic Forum in Davos and the Munich Security Conference is therefore crucial, as well.

Should the darkest hour come and the United States uses military force to annex Greenland, the essence of Article 5 and collective defense within NATO would lose its meaning. As Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Espen Barth Eide recently put it: “The idea of NATO will be broken if the US takes Greenland.” It would be perfectly clear to Russia, China, and other adversaries that credible extended deterrence no longer exists for Europe or Canada, and that the United States has lost its closest and most powerful allies.

The post Trump’s quest for Greenland could be NATO’s darkest hour appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig on DW News on US oil tanker seizures in the Caribbean

Atlantic Council — Wed, 07 Jan 2026 17:00:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On January 7, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed on DW News about the US seizure of a Russian flagged oil tanker carrying Venezuelan oil. He contends that the move signaled US resolve in quarantining the Venezuelan regime and adopting a firmer approach toward Russia in the Western hemisphere.

It is impressive that [President Trump] is enforcing this quarantine against Venezuela and not letting these Russian and Venezuelan tricks of trying to reflag stand in his way.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig on DW News on US oil tanker seizures in the Caribbean appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What to watch as anti-regime protests engulf Iran

Nate Swanson — Wed, 07 Jan 2026 16:28:21 +0000

WASHINGTON—The Iranian regime appears to be at its weakest point in its nearly half century in power. For the past two weeks, Iranians throughout the country have taken to the streets in protest over Iran’s deepening economic crises, stirring up memories of the Mahsa Amini protests of 2022-2023 and the Green Movement demonstrations of 2009-2010. This is compounded by a record level of inflation, a potentially existential water crisis, and an open admission from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian that his government is incapable of meeting the needs of its own people. Moreover, these protests follow a series of strategic setbacks for the regime, including Israel’s near destruction of Iran’s foreign proxies, the Assad regime’s fall in Syria in December 2024, and the devastation of the twelve-day war in June 2025.

Yet, this confluence of factors has been partially overshadowed by US President Donald Trump and his increasingly interventionist administration. Trump’s social media post on January 2 offering lethal protection to Iranian protesters if the regime cracked down on them was shocking even before this week’s events in Venezuela. Although I initially saw Trump’s post as a rhetorical and cost-free gesture, it cannot be dismissed entirely considering that the Trump administration was willing to attack Venezuela and arrest former Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro earlier this month. Indeed, Trump’s threat could increase turnout at the protests. In theory, hesitant Iranians might be more likely to protest if they might have some form of US support.

As the protests continue, it is worth following several important indicators that may determine how they differ from past mass movements in Iran, what trajectory they may take, and what they might mean for the Islamic Republic’s future.

Mass protests are, of course, not new in Iran. They have played a critical role in shaping Iran’s modern political landscape, helping to bring the current regime to power in 1979 and consolidate its rule. In the 1990s, protests evolved to challenge the regime’s governance. The 1999 student protests and the 2009 Green Movement primarily focused on regime reform, with the latter adopting the slogan “Where is my vote?” Since the December 2019 Bloody Aban uprising, which began following an increase in fuel prices, there has been a significant shift in the tone and objective of protests. Initially sparked by social or economic issues, mass protests in Iran have morphed into broader and prolonged anti-regime demonstrations, with protesters increasingly chanting “Death to Khamenei!”

Here is what to watch as the current protests unfold:

1. The size of the protests in Tehran

The 2009 Green Movement protests challenged the rigged presidential election and, for the first time in Iran, used social media to draw millions to the street, mainly in Tehran. Iran ultimately employed brutal repression and detained opposition leaders to quell the movement. Subsequent protests have had a wider geographic scope and more aggressive platform—revolution, not reform—but have not drawn the same volume of people to the streets. Absent massive, sustained protests in Tehran, it is difficult to envision the regime falling or making major changes.

2. Opposition unity and a viable alternative

There is no elected leader that the opposition fully supports who could take power immediately after a potential transition. Perhaps the imprisoned former official Mostafa Tajzadeh or the deposed Shah’s eldest son, Reza Pahlavi, could become a transitional leader following the fall of the current government. Pahlavi has a devoted following among certain segments of the diaspora and appears to have name recognition inside Iran, given some videos coming out of the country. However, he is also a controversial figure, and his supporters were partially blamed for sabotaging attempts to unify the Iranian diaspora opposition in 2022. Infighting within the Iranian diaspora has continued during this round of protests, but one interesting development is the near-unanimous perspective from social media that Iran will never be the same. Maybe that is progress.

Nonetheless, the lack of a viable alternative has undermined past protests in Iran. There may be a thousand Iranian dissident activists who, given a chance, could emerge as respected statesmen, as labor leader Lech Wałęsa did in Poland at the end of the Cold War. But so far, the Iranian security apparatus has arrested, persecuted, and exiled all of the country’s potential transformational leaders.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei addresses recent protests in Iran on January 3, 2026, saying authorities are working to address economic concerns. (Iranian Supreme Leader’s office via ZUMA Press Wire and Reuters Connect.)

3. Regime fissures (and defections)

Iran has done a masterful job maintaining regime unity and avoiding high-profile defections. Regime survival is always the paramount consideration, perhaps partially because the country’s leaders don’t have anywhere to go. Russia would likely harbor certain elites, as it took in Bashar al-Assad after his flight from Syria. But the mid-level security officials implementing the crackdown would have no safe refuge. This is why the work my Atlantic Council colleagues at the Strategic Litigation Project are doing is so important. Exposing and holding officials responsible for crackdowns raises the costs of individual actions. This may contribute to additional regime fissures and security defections in this round of protests.

All of this is to say that despite working on Iran policy for nearly twenty years, it is not possible to predict how the ongoing protests will end. I see the same images and reports as everyone else, and I can ask individual Iranians for their assessment. But I don’t know whether this is the protest that brings down the regime, or whether the Islamic Republic will be able to successfully repress these protests as it has done before.

Regardless, the protests are important. They once again demonstrate the Iranian people’s courage, tenacity, and yearning for freedom. The protests also expose the Iranian government’s inability to meet the economic, social, and political demands of its people. They are a clear directive sent up from the streets and heard around the world that the status quo in Iran is not sustainable.

The post What to watch as anti-regime protests engulf Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine security guarantees are futile without increased pressure on Putin

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 07 Jan 2026 15:57:40 +0000

Kyiv’s allies hailed progress toward “robust” security guarantees for Ukraine on January 6 following a meeting in Paris attended by representatives of more than thirty countries who together make up the Coalition of the Willing.

As details of a possible security framework for postwar Ukraine continue to take shape, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a joint declaration committing to deploy troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace agreement between Moscow and Kyiv. Crucially, US officials attending the talks in France also voiced American backing for security guarantees, with the United States expected to play a supporting role that will focus on ceasefire monitoring.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy praised the “substantive discussions” and suggested that he was now more confident about the credibility of the security commitments being proposed by Ukraine’s partners. “Military officials from France, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine worked in detail on force deployment, numbers, specific types of weapons, and the components of the armed forces required and able to operate effectively. We already have these necessary details,” he commented.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

This was the latest in a series of meetings over the past year that have sought to define workable security guarantees for Ukraine as a key element of the US-led push to end Russia’s invasion. Since early 2025, Britain and France have been at the forefront of ongoing efforts to establish a Coalition of the Willing bringing together countries prepared to contribute to postwar security measures. The objective is to prevent a resumption of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The Paris Declaration signed on January 6 is a step in the right direction, but many key questions remain unanswered. The document does not provide the kind of NATO-style commitment to collective security that many believe is essential in order to deter Putin. Nor does it clarify the exact role of a potential European military contingent on Ukrainian territory, or define whether their mandate would include defending themselves in the event of a Russian attack. Instead, it contains vague references to “the use of military capabilities.” This language is hardly likely to convince the Kremlin, especially in light of the escalation fears that have dominated the Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The other obvious problem with the current peace plan is implementation. The signatories of the Paris Declaration all agree that the envisioned package of security guarantees for Ukraine can only be put in place once a ceasefire has been agreed. This will inevitably strengthen Moscow’s objections. Over the past year, Russia has repeatedly rejected ceasefire proposals while stressing its unwavering opposition to any Western military presence in Ukraine. That is exactly what the Coalition of the Willing is now proposing.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

As Ukraine’s partners discuss the technical aspects of security guarantees, the elephant in the room remains Russia’s lack of interest in peace. The Kremlin was not represented at talks in the French capital this week, just as it has been absent during a similar series of recent meetings between US, Ukrainian, and European officials.

While the Trump administration has sought to maintain a parallel dialogue with Moscow, there is no indication whatsoever that Russia shares the optimistic assessments being offered by Zelenskyy and other Western leaders. On the contrary, Putin and his Kremlin colleagues continue to signal that they have no intention of compromising and remain committed to the maximalist goals set out at the start of the invasion in February 2022.

Throughout the past year, Putin has been careful to avoid openly rejecting US peace proposals due to concerns over possible retaliatory sanctions. Nevertheless, his actions speak for themselves and underline his opposition to ending the war.

Just one day after Trump and Zelenskyy met in Florida in late December and announced significant progress toward a settlement, Putin called the US leader and accused Ukraine of launching an attack on his presidential residence. The news appeared to shock Trump and placed the entire peace process in jeopardy. However, it soon transpired that the incident had been hastily invented in a bid to discredit Ukraine and derail peace talks. Trump has since acknowledged that Putin’s resident was not targeted. “I don’t believe that strike happened,” he told reporters on January 4.

The Kremlin dictator’s apparent readiness to lie directly to Trump says much about his determination to disrupt peace efforts. The faked attack on Putin’s residence was the latest in a series of Russian steps over the past year to stall or otherwise obstruct negotiations. This has led to mounting claims that Putin is playing for time without having any intention of ending his invasion.

Putin’s rejection of a negotiated settlement should come as no surprise. His army is advancing in Ukraine and retains the upper hand in a war of attrition that strongly favors Russia. With the Ukrainian military suffering from increasingly acute manpower shortages and Kyiv’s allies showing growing signs of weakening resolve, Putin remains confident that he can achieve a decisive breakthrough in 2026.

Even if he did not believe that victory was on the horizon, Putin would be highly unlikely to risk a compromise peace involving limited territorial gains. After all, he is not fighting for land in Ukraine; he fighting for Ukraine itself.

Putin views the invasion of Ukraine in the broadest of possible historical contexts as a sacred mission to reverse the injustice of the Soviet collapse and revive the Russian Empire. The terms currently on offer would leave around 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and free to pursue further European integration. To Putin, that would not be a partial victory; it would be a catastrophic defeat.

In the coming weeks, Russia will almost certainly reject the latest peace framework agreed in Paris. How will the Coalition of the Willing respond to this setback? Unless they are willing to impose more costs on the Kremlin and bolster Ukraine’s ability to hurt Russia militarily, all talk of postwar security guarantees and reassurance forces will continue to ring hollow. If Western leaders are serious about ending the war in Ukraine and safeguarding European security, they must acknowledge that there is no alternative to increasing the pressure on Putin.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Listen Here

The post Wieslander on Swedish radio appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wieslander on Swedish TV

cagard — Wed, 07 Jan 2026 15:13:05 +0000

On Wednesday January 7th, Anna Wieslander, Director for Northern Europe, appeared on Swedish news program “Aktuellt” to give her thoughts on the United States’ shifting foreign policy priorities and their consequences for Europe.

Watch here

The post Wieslander on Swedish TV appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig interviewed on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation on Trump’s foreign policy

Atlantic Council — Wed, 07 Jan 2026 15:05:34 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On January 7, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation on recent developments in US foreign policy. He explains that Trump’s threats of military action in Greenland are a negotiating tactic, defends the decision to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, and argues that the administration will shift its focus to Cuba and its collaboration with the People’s Republic of China next.

Trump is not a typical politician. He’s a businessman, and I think we’ve seen over the past 10 years, his negotiating style is to ask for 100 when he wants 10.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig interviewed on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation on Trump’s foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why Maduro’s removal could ultimately benefit China

Melanie Hart — Wed, 07 Jan 2026 14:48:01 +0000

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration provided quite the welcome-to-2026 jolt with its ouster of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro. Many US analysts view the move as benefiting the United States at China’s expense, since Beijing had backed Maduro and his predecessor Hugo Chávez to gain access to Venezuela’s oil. But the reality is more complex.

That relationship wasn’t paying off as well as Beijing had hoped, but it was sticky—there was no easy way for Beijing to extricate itself from Venezuela’s cratering economy or the reputational damage it was incurring over its support for Maduro. So Chinese leaders were staying the course. Now, however, the Trump administration has put another option on the table: China can evade responsibility for anything that goes wrong in Venezuela, since Washington now owns that problem. Moreover, Beijing can portray itself as the more responsible partner to Venezuela’s neighbors, all while maintaining access to Venezuelan oil. That’s a pretty good outcome for Beijing.

Two big factors make this less of a win for the United States—and less of a loss for China—than many analysts realize.

An oil boom won’t come easy

First, there is a big difference between oil reserves and oil production. Venezuela does have large oil reserves. But bringing them to market is complex. Venezuelan oil is a heavy, sticky crude that is expensive to extract and requires specialized refining.

China has refineries set up to process it. But Venezuelan exports never reached the heights Beijing had hoped for. The Venezuelan military manages the nation’s state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., or PDVSA. That management has been less than stellar. Despite the nation’s immense reserves, Venezuela’s oil exports went into a nose-dive about a decade ago due to mismanagement in an era of declining oil prices. Those exports still haven’t recovered to previous highs. When China first began signing deals with Venezuela in the mid-2000s, the nation was producing around two million barrels of crude oil per day. Given the nation’s reserves, Beijing had high hopes for growth on that output. Instead, at year-end 2025, Venezuela’s strongest production was only around 900,000 barrels per day. That is nowhere near the big leagues. On Venezuela’s best day in 2025, for example, it produced less than one fourth of the crude oil coming out of China—and less than one fifth of the crude coming out of Texas. Oil accounts for around 18 percent of China’s energy consumption, and only 4-8 percent of that (depending on the day) comes from Venezuela.

To be sure, as long as it was sanctioned, Venezuelan oil was extra cheap, and Beijing was not going to walk away from cheap oil that it had already paid for via earlier loans to Caracas. But this relationship was nowhere near an energy supply game-changer for Beijing.

President Donald Trump appears to assume that US oil majors will walk in and turn this around. On January 3, he said, “We’re going to have our very large United States oil companies, the biggest anywhere in the world, go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure, the oil infrastructure, and start making money for the country.” But the nation’s oil sector is a mess. Restoring production to pre-Chávez levels is, at best, a one-to-two decade project. And China has already tried to do just that: It poured in billions of dollars and sent in its own oil companies (which are very good at operating in risky environments). Exports still declined.

There is a lot of confusion around exactly how much money Beijing has poured into Venezuela and exactly how much Venezuela has paid back via oil shipments. Those transactions are often nontransparent by design. The best estimates are that China provided around sixty billion dollars in official government-to-government loans, and around a hundred billion dollars in total when all Chinese investments in the nation are included. The thing is, Venezuela has just about paid that all back, because it paid in oil, and the oil kept flowing, albeit never at the levels Beijing was hoping for. The best estimates are that Venezuela currently owes Beijing around ten billion dollars to fifteen billion dollars in remaining oil shipments. Even if China gets nothing else, it is not exactly walking away empty handed, particularly given that much of that oil shipped at rock-bottom prices. It could be that Beijing is offloading a declining asset at an opportune time.

China may be dodging a quagmire

The second big factor that complicates this picture: Venezuela itself. The country’s future is uncertain, and its economy is heavily dependent on oil production, which is faltering. It is not yet clear who in Venezuela will have political legitimacy when the United States retreats. From a diplomatic perspective, until January 3 this was Beijing’s mess to deal with. China supported Maduro despite the fact that all evidence pointed to him losing the last election. That support was an albatross around Beijing’s neck across the region. China wants to be seen as Latin America’s preferred economic partner, but that argument is hard to make when your biggest debtor is barely functioning economically and lost support politically, as demonstrated when Maduro falsely claimed victory and hung on to power after losing the last election. The United States has taken this challenge out of China’s hands. Now, whatever goes wrong in Venezuela, China can blame it on Washington.

China also appears eager to use this incident to paint the United States as a disruptor and a bully, in keeping with its longstanding characterization of Washington as a hypocrite when it comes to the rules-based order. That carefully crafted narrative is designed to give Beijing a free pass when it violates international rules and norms, which it does on a regular basis.

On Monday, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “unilateral and bullying acts are dealing a serious blow to the international order.” China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency called the United States “the blatant violator” and published a cartoon image of Lady Liberty surrounded by burning oil cans, stomping on “international law” and “national sovereignty.” Beijing may view the narrative fodder it gains from the US move as well worth forfeiting the oil shipments it has not yet received from Venezuela.

For the most part, China has not spent any real political capital to push back against the US action. Instead, Beijing is keeping its close diplomatic ties to the regime and mostly letting things play out—while voicing complaints here and there—to see how it might benefit. Some Chinese observers appear to think the United States is walking into a quagmire that will keep Washington tied up (and out of China’s way) for decades.

Hu Xijin, a popular Chinese commentator who formerly served as editor-in-chief of the nationalistic Global Times and has more than twenty million followers on Weibo, is a case in point. He recently stated that “it’s very likely that Venezuela will be more expensive than Afghanistan” and “Trump’s arrest of Maduro is tantamount to making a promise that the United States will be responsible for Venezuela’s democratic prosperity to the end.” China should know just how expensive bailing out Venezuela will be, given that it already spent around one hundred billion dollars on that project.

Perhaps the worst case for Beijing is that it does not get any more oil out of Venezuela, but it successfully offloads a declining asset. Chinese leaders are likely thinking that they may get the oil anyway. Trump has stated that he plans to keep the oil flowing to Venezuela’s current buyers, including China. If that does occur, if the United States does step up to the plate to pour billions into Venezuela’s oil sector and a good portion of that oil goes to China, then this could be Beijing’s best chance at actually recouping the remaining balance on some of its earlier investments. That is not exactly a bad deal for China. But for Washington, it is not at all clear where this ends up, or how many billions this project will consume. Washington may find itself carrying the same albatross that China just offloaded.

The post Why Maduro’s removal could ultimately benefit China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Gray interviewed on RealClearPolitics podcast on Venezuela and Greenland

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 Jan 2026 17:07:31 +0000

On January 6, Alexander B. Gray, a GeoStrategy Initiative nonresident senior fellow, was interviewed on RealClearPolitics podcast about the futures of Venezuela and Greenland. He explains that, due to historical precedent and divisions within opposition groups, Venezuela will likely require a transitional government before elections take place. He also argues that as the Arctic emerges as a key strategic region, closer collaboration with Greenland is essential to US security interests.

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The post Gray interviewed on RealClearPolitics podcast on Venezuela and Greenland appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig featured in the New York Times on ousting Maduro

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 Jan 2026 15:13:10 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On January 6, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig wrote an article in the New York Times titled “Trump Was Right to Oust Maduro.” He argues that Maduro threatened vital US security interests, and that his removal from power creates opportunity for better governance in Venezuela.

If Mr. Trump had decided instead to simply back down and go home, the Venezuelan people would be left with a dangerous and incompetent leader, the U.S. military and the American government may have lost credibility and the opening for our adversaries to entrench themselves in our hemisphere could have widened.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig featured in the New York Times on ousting Maduro appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Gray interviewed on Times Radio on the Trump administration’s foreign policy

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 Jan 2026 02:35:00 +0000

On January 5, Alexander B. Gray, a GeoStrategy Initiative nonresident senior fellow, was interviewed on Times Radio about the Trump administration’s foreign policy. He explains that the Trump administration is prioritizing hemispheric defense, and, in the long term, deems European nations strong enough to confront a declining Russia.

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The post Gray interviewed on Times Radio on the Trump administration’s foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in Politico on US policy in Venezuela

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 Jan 2026 02:00:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On January 5, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in Politico’s “National Security Daily” on the Trump administration’s Venezuela policy. He explains that administration’s ambiguity is intentional and aimed at preventing fractures within the Republican party.

Given that what happens next is so ambiguous, people can maybe read their hopes and dreams into it.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Politico on US policy in Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Now comes the hard part: What Trump should do next to secure Venezuela’s democratic future

Jason Marczak — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 23:30:08 +0000

WASHINGTON—The big surprise in Saturday’s stealth operation to bring Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro to justice was not the success of the mission or the fact that US President Donald Trump approved the operation. The elite Delta Force commandos are some of the best trained in the world, and the overall precision of the mission demonstrated US military might yet again. For his part, Trump has wanted to see Maduro go dating back to his first term, when he led a coalition of countries recognizing an interim government.

Nor was it a surprise that the country has been relatively calm since Maduro’s exit. Venezuela is not a powder keg. And Venezuelans didn’t flood the streets in celebration for fear of reprisal from security forces and Chavista-aligned paramilitary forces known as colectivos. Instead, Venezuelans flocked to the supermarkets to stock up—actions that again cast light on the economic suffering of the people in a country with an annual inflation rate over 500 percent and where 90 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.

Rather, what surprised some observers was the big gamble the Trump administration is making by giving Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president and longtime Chavista loyalist, its blessing to run the country in the interim. Trump called her “gracious” in his press conference on Saturday. As for the leader of the Venezuelan opposition, Trump said María Corina Machado “doesn’t have the support within or the respect within the country.” There was no mention of the July 2024 election in which Machado was barred from running but then led the campaign of Edmundo González, who went on to win around 67 percent of the vote. This decision reinforced the strategic focus of phase one of the US mission.

How to explain this surprise? The administration is making what it sees as a strategic short-term bet on Rodríguez. Support remains strong for the Machado-led opposition with key US House Republicans forcefully voicing their support for her since the operation. Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed “tremendous admiration” for Machado on Sunday, but he refused to endorse her or explicitly speak about a transition to democracy. Thus far, it appears that the opposition’s path to power rests on competing in yet another election. Yet that effort is doomed to fail unless the next election is different from all the previous ones under Maduro.

Delcy Rodriguez being sworn in as the acting president of Venezuela on January 5, 2026. (Stringer/dpa via Reuters Connect)

Rubio’s answer on the prospect for a transition to democracy was that “these things take time. There’s a process.” According to article 234 of the Venezuelan constitution, Rodríguez—who was officially sworn in on Monday—can serve ninety days as acting president, followed by an additional ninety days if approved by the Chavista-controlled National Assembly. Then the Assembly can declare an absolute absence of the presidency, triggering elections within thirty days. So, expect elections to be called within six months, if the regime is following the letter of the constitution. But so far the Venezuelan Supreme Court has danced around the many constitutional provisions around Rodríguez’s appointment, saying it was due to “circumstances not explicitly provided for in the Constitution.” A similar tactic of seeking to bypass established timetables was also used over a decade ago when former leader Hugo Chávez was dying.

With all this ambiguity, when the time is ready, what can the United States do to ensure elections are actually free, fair, and transparent, and that all candidates (including Machado) can run?

Thus far, the administration has shown little interest for elections in its public statements. That makes sense in the short run. This is an operation with a focus on transactional pragmatic realism. But elections will eventually be necessary to give political certainty to not only the Venezuelan people but also the foreign investors Venezuela badly needs. At that time, US pressure will be needed so Venezuela does not risk a dangerous repeat of previous elections—contests held in name only, without any real chance for non-Chavista-aligned politicians to officially win and assume power.

Rubio was right that there is a process that needs to occur. Venezuela has not seen a free and fair election this century. Staging one will require a number of factors: allowing all candidates to run, permitting airtime in the media, guaranteeing the safety of candidates, ensuring that voters are not intimidated at the ballot box, verifying that votes are not manipulated, and, of course, counting the votes accurately. An election under these conditions would give a significant advantage to opposition forces, who have proved they can win even under adverse conditions.

Given the dismal state of the country, the immediate US agenda has focused on strategic rather than political priorities. In media interviews on Sunday, Rubio clarified Trump’s statement that the United States would “run” Venezuela by laying out the terms that the administration wants: an oil industry that benefits US interests and the Venezuelan people, an end to drug trafficking, the removal of the Colombian criminal groups known as the FARC and ELN, and a country that “no longer [cozies] up to Hezbollah and Iran in our own hemisphere.” So, economic interests, security priorities, and stamping out foreign influence—all priorities laid out in the new National Security Strategy. Rather than running the country in the manner of an occupation, Rubio said on Sunday: “What we are running is the direction that this is going to move moving forward, and that is we have leverage.”

Trump has repeatedly threatened continued US military action—even warning of harsher actions—if Rodríguez does not comply with US demands. But we have learned time and time again that the Venezuelan regime cannot be trusted. Words don’t matter; actions do. And domestically, Rodríguez will seek to avoid being seen as too closely aligned with US interests to ensure her continued support among regime loyalists. That was clear in her combative comments on Saturday, shortly after the operation. Most likely, she will seek to walk a political tightrope to avoid being—at least for now—in the United States’ crosshairs. That much was evident with her Sunday statement where she pledged to “extend an invitation to the U.S. government to work together on a cooperation agenda.”

The Trump administration thus needs to establish specific benchmarks—incremental steps and final results—that the regime needs to meet when it comes to the economy, security, and foreign influence. The United States must set a timeline for compliance—and refuse to tolerate any attempts by Rodríguez to delay.

In addition to eventual elections, the Trump administration should pressure the Venezuelan regime to show it does intend to cooperate. One place to start is releasing wrongfully detained Americans from Venezuelan jails and freeing all political prisoners. But it also means means making concrete progress on key economic and security priorities such as:

Resolving cases involving the oil assets expropriated by Hugo Chávez in 2007;
Advancing a new hydrocarbons framework that allows oil companies to be able to operate in Venezuela either without the national oil company PDVSA as a partner or with a foreign company as the majority partner;
Ensuring that foreign investments are respected;
Clamping down on armed groups in the country and their myriad illicit activities, rooting out the strong linkages between these groups and the regime as well as foreign adversaries; and
Cracking down on illicit narcotics flows.

This past weekend’s mission went entirely according to plan. But the United States is now forced to depend on the remnants of the Maduro regime for the next stage in the mission. That will be a much harder task. Ultimately, what’s needed in Venezuela is a partner government that allows for the freedom of its people, respects foreign investment, and that advances US and Venezuelan security and economic interests.

The post Now comes the hard part: What Trump should do next to secure Venezuela’s democratic future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Greenland is Europe’s strategic blind spot—and its responsibility

Justina Budginaite-Froehly — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 22:53:15 +0000

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration’s resolute handling of Venezuela—framed unapologetically in terms of strategic necessity—has once again revived an idea many Europeans hoped had been buried: that the United States should “take” Greenland.

European capitals reacted, again, in a familiar way: with statements of concern and invocations of international law. That reflex may be understandable. But it is also revealing. Because if Europe’s response to US power politics is limited to declaring what is not allowed, it should not be surprised when its voice carries little weight in the new era of transactional power politics.

Trump’s rhetoric about “taking” Greenland is neither new nor legally plausible. Greenland is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, embedded in NATO and protected by international law. There is no legitimate pathway for a Venezuela-style intervention in the Arctic. But legality alone does not create security. And Europe should be careful not to mistake moral clarity for strategic engagement.

The real lesson of Venezuela is that the Trump administration acts where it believes control is feasible, resistance manageable, and alternatives absent. If Europe wants to ensure that no outside power—not the United States, not Russia, not China—can credibly contemplate coercive leverage over Greenland, then it must focus less on protest and more on its own strategic steps.

Why Greenland matters

From Washington’s perspective, Greenland is a strategic asset. Its location astride the Greenland–Iceland–UK (GIUK) Gap makes it central to monitoring Russian—and, potentially, soon Chinese—submarines entering the Atlantic. Early-warning and missile-tracking radar systems stationed in Greenland feed directly into US homeland defense. Beyond that, Greenland is emerging as a critical node in satellite command and control, space domain awareness, and satellite tracking. Its geography allows for satellite ground stations and secure communications infrastructure that are increasingly vital as rivals develop counter-space and cyber capabilities.

That logic explains why in June 2025, the Trump administration shifted Greenland from US European Command to Northern Command. It reflects a broader view of the island as part of the emerging great-power contest in the Arctic—a contest in which Russia has already built a formidable Arctic military posture and China is positioning itself for long-term influence as a self-declared “near-Arctic state.” And Moscow and Beijing are increasingly cooperating on the development of the Northern Sea Route, which will allow for a shorter dual-use shipping route between Europe and Asia.

A new Arctic contest

Europe’s problem is not that Washington sees Greenland as a strategic asset. It is that Europe has largely failed to do so itself.

For decades, Greenland was treated as a political sensitivity rather than a strategic priority. That complacency is now dangerous. In an era of renewed power competition, territory that is weakly defended, lightly governed, or externally dependent invites pressure, regardless of legal status.

There are encouraging signs that this is beginning to change. European actors are investing in satellite communications infrastructure in Greenland to reduce overreliance on Norway’s Svalbard island and harden resilience against interference. Denmark is increasing Arctic defense spending and discussing the deployment of new capabilities in Greenland. These steps matter, but they remain too slow, too fragmented, and too cautious.

What Europe lacks is not awareness but resolve. If the objective is to make coercion impossible rather than merely illegal, then Europe must ensure that Greenland is visibly defended, deeply integrated into European security planning, and politically anchored in transatlantic cooperation.

Making Greenland unassailable

That means a sustained European presence capable of monitoring the GIUK gap, protecting critical and space infrastructure, and denying Russia and China the ability to encroach further on the Arctic region. This cannot be achieved through episodic engagement. It requires a calculated long-term commitment.

Paradoxically, this is also the most effective way to deal with the Trump administration. The US president is unlikely to be restrained by lectures on international law. But he does respond to strength, clarity, and facts on the ground. A Europe that treats Greenland as central to its own security, rather than as a liability to be explained away, can shift the Trump administration’s fixation on acquiring Greenland toward cooperating on Greenland’s security.

Greenland is not for sale. But neither should it be left exposed to a power vacuum. If Europe wants to ensure that no one can do to Greenland what the United States did in Venezuela, then it must stop relying on rules alone and start building the strategic reality that makes coercion unthinkable.

The post Greenland is Europe’s strategic blind spot—and its responsibility appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Trump Corollary is officially in effect

dhojnacki — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 21:04:58 +0000

WASHINGTON—The daring US operation that captured Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro and transported him to the United States to stand trial for his crimes signals a dramatic shift in US foreign policy, with implications far beyond Venezuela. The Trump administration’s decision to depose the Maduro regime is the embodiment of its recent National Security Strategy (NSS), which prioritized the defense of the US homeland and the Western Hemisphere.

While most National Security Strategies are quickly forgotten, both of Trump’s strategies have served as reliable guides to his approach to foreign affairs. His 2017 NSS announced a US focus on great-power competition, principally with China, and heralded an important shift of the United States’ attention after decades of Middle Eastern preoccupation. The president’s 2025 NSS, released in December, set about prioritizing US security interests globally and identified protection of US territory and the Western Hemisphere as the central tasks of US foreign policy. Importantly, the NSS also carved out a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, citing malign activity by “extra-hemispheric powers” as a serious threat to US national security.

As such, the recent Venezuela operation should be understood as of a piece with the president’s earlier focus on acquiring Greenland, his calls for resuming US control over the Panama Canal, and his interest in stemming the flow of narcotics trafficking and illegal migration in the hemisphere. In each instance, extra-hemispheric influence has played a significant role in galvanizing Washington’s concern: Chinese outfits own key facilities along the canal. Russia and China conduct military activity near Greenland and in the High North. And Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran hold long-standing influence in Caracas. With the Maduro capture, Washington is sending a powerful signal that it is taking the NSS seriously, and that it is prepared to act swiftly to enforce the Trump Corollary.

The Trump administration’s decision to depose the Maduro regime is the embodiment of its recent National Security Strategy.

Beijing’s ambitions in the Western Hemisphere have long been a concern for Washington, but recent trends are particularly alarming. In late December, reports emerged that China’s People’s Liberation Army was conducting war games simulating combat in the Western Hemisphere. This news came shortly after Beijing published an official strategy for Latin America that takes an increasingly belligerent tone in asserting its regional interests there. China actively supports the destabilizing Cuban regime, including by maintaining a surveillance post on the island just ninety miles from US territory. With Beijing increasing its efforts to extend coercive economic diplomacy across the hemisphere and its public interest in West African naval access fronting the Atlantic Ocean, the Trump Corollary seems poised to clash with China’s strategic posture.

The sheer number of potential flashpoints between the United States and great-power rivals such as China under the rubric of the Trump Corollary demonstrates an important point about the administration’s strategy: While the new NSS is primarily a document about narrowing and prioritizing US objectives globally, with a lesser focus on Europe and the Middle East, it is wholly committed to an expansive vision of US interests in the Western Hemisphere. This is likely to lead to near-term adjustments to US policy, with the goal of better operationalizing the Trump Corollary to address the hemispheric challenges facing the United States.

Here are three areas to watch in the coming months.

First, under the rubric of “hemispheric defense” that guided US security strategy in the hemisphere for decades, the Trump administration should expand the geographic definition of the hemisphere for the purpose of applying the Monroe Doctrine and the Trump Corollary. By stating unambiguously that the hemisphere is broadly defined as the Aleutian Islands to Greenland and the North American Arctic to Antarctica—with Central and South America and the Caribbean in between and the Pacific and Atlantic approaches to the hemisphere included—the administration could effectively place the region in lockdown, preventing encroachment by China, Russia, and Iran.

Second, to operationalize hemispheric defense going forward, the administration should expand the rotational and permanent deployment of US land, naval, Coast Guard, and air assets in the hemisphere. As the Trump administration works to reposition US forces from legacy bases in Europe and the Middle East, it could simultaneously expand or reopen US facilities in Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. It could also seek to establish or expand rotational or permanent access agreements with US partners such as El Salvador, Ecuador, the Dutch Caribbean islands of Aruba and Curaçao, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and others.

Beyond these countries, Washington could seek a more expansive agreement with Costa Rica, which lacks a permanent military and currently allows the US military access on a case-by-case basis. A new agreement with Costa Rica could look like the comprehensive defense arrangements the United States enjoys with Pacific Island partners such as the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Micronesia. Similarly, as the administration explores its options for a broader political solution to the president’s desire to acquire Greenland, the United States could request expanded access to the island under the 1951 defense agreement and begin prepositioning anti-submarine warfare and Arctic training assets there to counter Chinese and Russian malign activity in the High North.

Third, the administration can begin leveraging such force posture changes to actively deter malign activity and advance US interests in the hemisphere. Greater US forward presence in the region would, among other outcomes, help deter Chinese and Russian collaboration with the Cuban regime, which has spread chaos and destabilization across Latin America for decades. Expanding the US presence in Costa Rica and the Dutch Caribbean would help ensure access to the Panama Canal while the administration seeks broader solutions to Chinese influence. A stronger US Coast Guard and naval presence in the Caribbean would help combat narcotics trafficking and illegal migration that pose a direct threat to the US homeland. Further north, increasing US assets in Greenland would contribute to Arctic security.

While the administration’s actions in Venezuela have shocked the world and sent a strong message to US rivals in Beijing, Moscow, Havana, and Tehran, they are likely only the starting point for a longer-term and more comprehensive reappraisal of US core interests in the hemisphere and the means to achieve them. The Trump administration has a unique opportunity, built around its NSS and its audacious Venezuela operation, to reimagine the contours of US hemispheric defense for years to come.

The post The Trump Corollary is officially in effect appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The US capture of Maduro reveals Russia’s weakness

John E. Herbst — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 19:52:21 +0000

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration’s bold operation on January 3 meant the end of the Maduro dictatorship, but it was also another blow to Moscow’s political prestige. It is the second time since President Donald Trump returned to the White House that he demonstrated the United States could act against a Kremlin ally with impunity. When the United States delivered a massive blow to Iran’s nuclear program this past June, Putin could offer little effective support. The Russian president was reduced to bluster, just as he is now.

As US pressure on Venezuela began to build in the fall, Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro was hoping for tangible support from Moscow. According to The Washington Post, he wrote to Putin in October asking for drones, missiles, and radars. His request was not met.

Putin himself has not commented yet on the US operation in Venezuela, but Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov phoned acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez on Saturday to express “strong solidarity” with the government, and the Russian foreign ministry publicly demanded that the United States release Maduro. That’s it.

Limits on Russian capabilities explain much of this muted response. Russia may be a nuclear superpower, but its conventional military has limited ability to project power and, as its problem-plagued war on Ukraine has demonstrated, is characterized by clear weaknesses when fighting near home. Indeed, Putin’s aggression in Ukraine is his overwhelming priority, and it has stretched, if not exhausted, his military and greatly weakened Russia’s economy. Simply put, the Russian president does not have the resources for further foreign adventures, a fact noted by some of the Russian voenkory, or war bloggers on Telegram. That was evident even before Trump’s second term as Moscow watched in late 2024 as its half-century alliance with the Assad regime in Syria collapsed when Islamic rebels took control.

But these material limits are not the only factors driving Kremlin policy. There is also the question of Putin’s approach to managing Trump’s efforts to achieve a durable peace ending Russian aggression in Ukraine. Trump has said multiple times that in order to establish this peace, he would put major pressure on the side unwilling to make peace. Kyiv has said yes to numerous US proposals to end the fighting, and Moscow has rejected every one. But by skillful diplomacy with Trump and some of his subordinates, Moscow has avoided new US sanctions (with one large exception) and the transfer of more potent US weapons to Ukraine. This must be foremost on Putin’s mind, and he does not want to waste any capital with the US president on Venezuela. Trump himself gave Putin reason for caution when asked about the Russian president during his press conference on the Maduro snatch. Trump replied by expressing his displeasure with Putin for the ongoing killings in Ukraine.

While Putin will avoid doing anything to provoke Trump over Venezuela, the operation will likely weaken Russia’s war effort. Putin’s struggling economy rests on the income coming from its oil and gas sales—already under pressure thanks to Ukraine’s US-aided drone and missile strikes on its hydrocarbon installations. Trump has said he intends to put Venezuelan oil—still under tough sanctions—back on the market. While this may take some time, it will help him reach his goal of driving down oil prices for US (and therefore global) consumers. This will be another big hit to the Russian economy.

The post The US capture of Maduro reveals Russia’s weakness appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ellwood in Express on restoring National Service

Atlantic Council — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 18:13:18 +0000

On January 4, GeoStrategy Initiative distinguished fellow Tobias Ellwood authored an opinion piece in Express titled “The UK is woefully underprepared for global war – we must bring back National Service.” He explains that the United Kingdom has grown complacent and argues that restoring mandatory national service is essential amid intensifying strategic competition.

Fellow

Tobias Ellwood

Distinguished Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative

Politics & Diplomacy Security & Defense

The post Ellwood in Express on restoring National Service appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in Wall Street Journal on US operation in Venezuela

Atlantic Council — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 18:03:18 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On January 4, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Wall Street Journal article titled “A New Trump Game Plan Takes Shape: Strike and Coerce.” He evokes the Maduro regime’s ties to US adversaries and affirms the US military’s ability to operate in multiple theatres.

Ousting Maduro can help the U.S. by removing a Chinese and Russian foothold in the Western Hemisphere.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Wall Street Journal on US operation in Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in Bloomberg on Trump’s Venezuela strategy

Atlantic Council — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 17:44:33 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On January 4, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Bloomberg article titled “Trump Snatches Maduro But Leaves His Regime in Charge for Now.” He explains that the Trump administration is attempting to influence the Venezuelan vice president to secure outcomes favorable to the US.

Trump is “essentially trying to control the vice president and people around her through carrots and sticks to get the outcomes the United States wants.”

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Bloomberg on Trump’s Venezuela strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in Politico on the Trump administration’s Venezuela policy

Atlantic Council — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 17:08:28 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On January 3, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Politico article titled “The hawks are winning.” He argues that widespread support for military action in Venezuela was driven less by policy conviction than by an awareness of internal power dynamics, with officials mindful of where influence resides within the White House.

Reading the tea leaves of where the power is in the administration, you don’t want to get on the wrong side of Stephen Miller or others in the White House close to the president.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Politico on the Trump administration’s Venezuela policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig in C-SPAN on foreign policy in 2026

Atlantic Council — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 17:08:22 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On January 2, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed on C-SPAN’s “Washington Journal” about foreign policy challenges for 2026. He analyzes threats from the People’s Republic of China, speaks about protests in Iran, and discusses the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy.

I think China is the biggest challenge the United States is facing, and maybe has ever faced, because it is so much more capable than past rivals, even Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in C-SPAN on foreign policy in 2026 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kitsch Liao on Al Jazeera

Kitsch Liao — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 17:05:11 +0000

On December 18th, 2025, Global China Hub Associate Director Kitsch Liao spoke to Al Jazeera about Taiwan’s $1.11 billion arms purchase.

original source

The post Kitsch Liao on Al Jazeera appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Zoltán Fehér in Delfi

Zoltán Fehér — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 17:03:28 +0000

On October 9th, 2025, Global China Hub nonresident fellow Zoltán Fehér gave an interview to Latvian news portal Delfi titled “‘You can’t be our friend and fund a war that threatens us’ – researcher on EU-China relations”

Original source

The post Zoltán Fehér in Delfi appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The most significant question for Trump’s America in 2026: What sticks?

Frederick Kempe — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 12:00:00 +0000

Following the US military operation that captured Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro and flew him to New York to face narcoterrorism charges, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said this about Donald Trump: “This is a president of action . . . If he says he’s serious about something, he means it.”

As 2026 opens, the most significant question facing the United States and its global partners is not what Trump has accomplished thus far, up to and including the Maduro ouster. The year ahead will be about something more consequential: What sticks? What actions get lasting traction, and what historic legacy will this peripatetic man of action leave behind?

Today’s action is not always tomorrow’s legacy

The first year of Trump’s second term was tumultuous by his own design. It stretched presidential authority, challenged constitutional norms, unsettled many allies, drove global market volatility, and dominated news cycles with a relentlessness that none of the other forty-four US presidents ventured.

Trump’s first year back dramatically altered the weather, but 2026 will indicate whether Trumpism marks a climactic shift that permanently changes the nature of US leadership both domestically and abroad. What’s at stake isn’t just whether the United States, working alongside partners and allies, will build on its global leadership of the past eighty years. It’s what sort of America will celebrate the 250th anniversary of its independence.

Trump likes to show important visitors around the White House, comparing himself to the greats in the portraits that decorate its walls and wondering where he will rank among them. Where he may pay too little attention, write professors Sam Abrams and Jeremi Suri in a must-read Wall Street Journal op-ed, is to the fact that “Presidents are assessed by their legacy: institutions they create, coalitions they form and governing assumptions they stamp on America. By that standard, Mr. Trump’s second term remains unsettled at best.”

Here’s a sampling of what Trump’s leadership has brought the world in the past year: NATO allies agreed to a record increase in defense spending. Iranian despots suffered direct US attacks on three nuclear sites. Gaza has a peace plan (albeit a fragile one) endorsed by the United Nations Security Council. US tariff rates reached their highest level in a century. A new US National Security Strategy warned Europe of “civilizational erasure.” And the United States removed a Venezuelan dictator, while Russian despot Vladimir Putin continued his murderous war on Ukraine with relative impunity.

A scan of recent news, however, reveals Trump’s unfinished business: Trump has said the United States will “run” Venezuela, but details regarding what that means are few. Shortly before the new year, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy paid Trump a visit at Mar-a-Lago to ensure US peace efforts don’t reward Putin’s criminal revanchism. Around the same time, Chinese President Xi Jinping mobilized his naval, air, and missile forces around Taiwan, in a live-fire drill showing off Beijing’s growing ability to encircle the free and democratic island after the announcement of an eleven-billion-dollar US arms package to Taipei. And Iranian students joined expanding anti-regime protests, with Trump promising to protect them if shot upon (“We’re locked and loaded and ready to go”).

Trump is “the most ubiquitous president ever,” historian Douglas Brinkley recently noted. “He plays to win the day, every day.” Yet history remembers presidencies not by that measure, but rather by what outlasts them. If Trumpism proves more personal than institutional, then its effects may fade over time. If Trumpism embeds itself in how the United States defines its interests, exercises its leverage, and understands its obligations, then allies and adversaries alike will further correct course to adjust for a permanently altered America.

So will Trumpism endure or fade? There are signs pointing in both directions. Here’s what I’ll be watching over the next twelve months to sort the noise from the signal.

Venezuela and the Western Hemisphere

No US commander-in-chief has paid more attention to the daily choreography of leadership and the political theater of the presidency than Trump has. So it is fitting that he would launch the second year of his second term with his most audacious foreign policy decision yet—something The Washington Post editorial board called “one of the boldest moves a president has made in years”—though one executed as a domestic judicial matter based on a criminal indictment.

Before the 2003 Iraq War, then-US Secretary of State Colin Powell popularized the “Pottery Barn rule” that “if you break it, you own it”—a warning about the long-term costs and obligations of military intervention. Trump’s convictions against democracy promotion and nation-building suggest he’ll want to stabilize Venezuela and deliver on US interests without doing either of those things.

How he does that will do much to define US foreign policy in 2026. Can he deliver in Venezuela in a manner that advances the country’s freedom and stability without signaling to China and Russia an endorsement of “spheres of influence” that would encourage their own regional ambitions?

The early hours show how complicated the Venezuela effort will be. Trump appears to be relying on Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president who became the country’s de facto leader on Saturday, rather than turning to the opposition, which is widely recognized to have won Venezuela’s 2024 election before it was stolen by the Maduro regime. For her part, however, Rodríguez shot back, “Never again will we be slaves, never again will we be a colony of any empire. We’re ready to defend Venezuela.”

And what other actions might the Trump administration take to deliver on the vision set out in its National Security Strategy to restore preeminence in the Western Hemisphere through a “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine? Its stated aims, among others, are to prevent and discourage mass migration, ensure governments cooperate with the United States against transnational criminal activity, maintain a hemisphere “that remains free of hostile foreign incursion of ownership of key assets,” and protect “continued access to key strategic locations.”

Alliances, Ukraine, and Taiwan

Trump has strengthened and weakened US alliances simultaneously. He’s prompted allies to spend more on defense and accept more of their own security burdens, but he’s also left them hedging against US unpredictability. Meanwhile, Russia and China have emerged from 2025 more confident that they can achieve their geopolitical goals: in the case of Moscow, to expand its sphere of influence by reversing its setbacks after the Cold War, starting with Ukraine; and in the case of Beijing, to gain greater control over its own region with an emphasis on Taiwan and a bid to assume the mantle of global leadership.

Trump could take steps in 2026 that reinforce US alliances, or he could give autocratic adversaries even more reason to test US resolve. Through his interactions with Russian and Chinese leaders—Trump talks with Putin frequently and at length, and he is scheduled to meet with Xi at least twice in 2026—he could inadvertently encourage them to press for whatever gains are possible during his remaining three years in office, introducing a period of increased geopolitical volatility.

Trump inherited a global situation where a group of aggressors—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—have been working more closely together than any group of autocratic countries since Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan ahead of World War II. Trump’s advisers blame previous presidents for allowing the unnatural bond between China and Russia to deepen, and they still seem to hope that they can draw Moscow away from Beijing. Thus far, however, Trump has emboldened both Putin and Xi. Their countries’ military and intelligence coordination has deepened, allowing Russia’s war on Ukraine to continue.

Global trade, markets, and economics

In 2025, Trump transformed tariffs from a last resort to a preferred economic weapon with multiple aims: gaining trade leverage, raising federal revenues, incentivizing domestic manufacturing, and punishing miscellaneous misbehavior. Economic nationalism crossed from taboo to mainstream, and protectionism became modern mercantilism.

In a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed, titled “Prepare for More Tariffs in 2026,” the Atlantic Council’s Josh Lipsky argued that Trump is more likely to continue his current approach than to amend it, even if Supreme Court decisions expected early this year temporarily set him back. “The second year of the second Trump administration is likely to look much like the first in trade policy,” Lipsky wrote, laying out several reasons why.

Perhaps, but global markets and American voters will also have a say, and they are likely to push back. I’m less sanguine than others are that the inflationary aspects of Trump’s tariff approach and the market response will continue to be muted. In particular, look for signs of eroding US dollar dominance. (You can access our own Atlantic Council tracker on that matter here.)

No one quite knows when global investors and sovereigns will tire of financing US debt, which now stands at more than $38 trillion, or nearly 125 percent of US gross domestic product, with roughly $6 billion added every day. Even at current financing levels, the United States is paying more in interest on its debt than it spends on defense. Something must give—but how and when?

It’s true that the US stock market held up fine in 2025, with the S&P 500 up an impressive 16 percent. Still, that outcome far undershot the 32 percent gain for the MSCI All-Country World ex-US index, the widest such margin since the global financial crisis in 2009. The S&P 500 also trailed both the DAX (Germany) and the FTSE 100 (United Kingdom), in addition to many emerging market indices. In a front-page report in The Financial Times, journalist Emily Herbert wrote that this rare year of Wall Street underperformance came due to “worries about high valuations, a Chinese artificial intelligence breakthrough and Donald Trump’s radical economic policies.”

It’s true that even a Democratic president in 2029 is unlikely to roll back Trump’s tariffs dramatically, given that both parties currently lack a free-trade consensus. But it’s also unlikely that the trade system going into the future will be so driven by one individual and his preferences.

Watch to see whether Trump can continue to press US economic advantage in the coming year without greater economic or political blowback than he has experienced thus far. Will rising investments in artificial intelligence continue to buoy markets? Or will slowing growth, consumer concerns about affordability, and global worries about US debt levels weigh the economy down? Expect 2026 to be a year of continued economic and market volatility—but not necessarily the lasting, wholesale change of the international trading system some are forecasting, as other actors advance trade deals.

The president and his Republican Party

Perhaps the most important “What sticks?” question of 2026 is whether Trump will move toward more strategic consistency or instead double down on the improvisational approach that he believes served him so well in 2025.

His unpredictability, which his son Don Jr. praised in Doha late last year, wins him leverage at key moments, and he certainly caught Maduro off guard over the weekend. But there’s no indication that he has built a governing system or a sustainable national security strategy around that unpredictability. Durable legacies require repetition, delegation, and follow-through by a cadre of intellectual and ideological acolytes.

“Successful political movements outlive their founders,” Abrams and Suri wrote in the Wall Street Journal. “New Deal liberalism outlasted Roosevelt. Postwar conservatism survived Reagan. Trumpism appears to be dependent on Mr. Trump’s personal authority, media dominance and capacity for conflict.” The president, who is confronting actuarial tables as he turns eighty this year, could face a starkly different Congress a year from now. That means the next several months could present a major test of both Trump and Trumpism.

Watch in 2026 to see whether any Republican leaders translate Trump’s instincts into a more lasting doctrine—on alliances, on relations with autocratic adversaries, and on trade. Potential Republican presidential candidates such as Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Senator Ted Cruz of Texas will have to gauge whether Trumpism is a winning ideology for the future.

One recent cautionary sign for Trump acolytes was the decision by more than a dozen employees of the Heritage Foundation think tank to jump ship to the previously little-noticed Advancing American Freedom (AAF), which former US Vice President Mike Pence set up in 2021. “The debate over the direction of the post-Trump right is underway,” the Wall Street Journal editorial board wrote, with Pence explaining that what attracted the individuals to AAF was finding “a consistent, reliable home for Reagan conservatism.”

In the year ahead, I will be seeking to sort spectacle from substance regarding the actions and reactions of US adversaries and allies, global markets, and Trump himself. The president changed the political and geopolitical weather in 2025—dramatically but not irreversibly. Not every shock becomes a structure, and not every provocation determines an enduring policy change. When it comes to what sticks, the stakes are both global and generational.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post The most significant question for Trump’s America in 2026: What sticks? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Gray interviewed on Bloomberg about Trump’s Venezuela policy

Atlantic Council — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 03:40:00 +0000

Original SOurce

On January 4, Alexander B. Gray, a GeoStrategy Initiative nonresident senior fellow, was interviewed on Bloomberg about the decision to capture Nicolas Maduro. He explains that the Trump administration has redefined US core interests as inextricably linked to the Western hemisphere, and argues ousting Maduro eliminated a hostile regime and narrowed the strategic space for US adversaries.

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Jason Marczak: The US needs to remain committed to a democratic transition

The post Gray interviewed on Bloomberg about Trump’s Venezuela policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What to watch in a post-Maduro Venezuela

Atlantic Council — Sat, 03 Jan 2026 21:38:06 +0000

JUST IN

Nicolás Maduro is out. But who’s in? Early on Saturday morning, the US military removed the Venezuelan strongman from power, transporting him to New York to face narcoterrorism charges. President Donald Trump said the United States will now “run” Venezuela and that Maduro’s former vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, has assumed the presidency for now. What does it all mean for the United States, the Venezuelan people, and the country’s oil? Our experts have the preliminary answers.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Democracy+Tech Initiative and a native of Venezuela
Alexander B. Gray (@AlexGrayForOK): Nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and former deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff of the White House National Security Council
David Goldwyn (@Dlgoldwyn): Chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group and former US State Department special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs

Changing the regime

“This is the most consequential moment in recent Venezuelan history—and for the broader Latin American region,” Jason tells us. “This operation goes beyond a simple extradition: It is a regime-change effort.”
For now, Rodríguez—who was very much a part of the Maduro regime—is in power, though she “does not appear to have the backing of all factions within the ruling party,” Iria notes.
“Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability required for” the Venezuelan economic revival that Trump is calling for, Iria adds. “Chavismo no longer enjoys the widespread popular support it had two decades ago.”
Jason points out that Rodríguez is constitutionally obligated to call new elections within thirty days, but even that step would in effect come from the same regime that stole an election rightfully won by the opposition in 2024. Trump called for a “safe and judicious transition,” but Jason notes that “many entrenched actors are likely to resist meaningful change,” even though “real change is fundamental to US interests and to the Venezuelan people.”

Sign up to receive rapid insight in your inbox from Atlantic Council experts on global events as they unfold.

The Trump Corollary

Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy outlined a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, with a focus on securing the Western Hemisphere. This operation tells us the Trump Corollary “is officially in effect,” Alex says. “Washington has demonstrated a long-overdue commitment to hemispheric security.”
And US adversaries are watching. The operation “will be seen in Beijing and Moscow as an unambiguous sign of the Trump administration’s commitment to a security order compatible with American interests,” Alex explains.
The operation, Alex adds, “creates a once-in-a-generation opportunity for Washington to translate its security preferences into strategic reality” by “ensuring extra-hemispheric powers like China and Russia are excluded from meaningful influence in Caracas.”
Trump also sent a message to other leaders in the region. “Trump mentioned Colombia and Cuba as countries whose leaders should now know the consequences of not cooperating with the United States,” Jason points out.

Oil outcomes

Trump spoke of bringing back US oil companies that were booted out by Venezuela’s 1976 nationalization of the oil industry. But “few US companies are likely to return to the country until there is a reliable legal and fiscal regime and stable security situation,” David tells us. “Companies that have existing operations are much more likely to revive and expand them if the environment is secure.”
The United States has plenty of policy options at its disposal, David says. For example, the administration “could allow oil currently on tankers to be exported, expand licensing, and permit Venezuela to sell oil at market prices, all for the purpose of maximizing national revenue.”
But, David adds, “until there is clarity on sanctions and licensing and more information on who is actually managing the central bank and ministry of finance, the prospects for Venezuelan oil production and exports will remain uncertain.”

The post What to watch in a post-Maduro Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: The US just captured Maduro. What’s next for Venezuela and the region?

Atlantic Council experts — Sat, 03 Jan 2026 20:19:54 +0000

“We are reasserting American power.” That’s what US President Donald Trump said Saturday, hours after the US military launched a strike and raid on Venezuela that resulted in the capture of strongman Nicolás Maduro. The Venezuelan leader and his wife were moved to the USS Iwo Jima en route to New York, where Maduro has been indicted on multiple charges, including narcoterrorism. The US operation comes after months of pressure on the Venezuelan regime to halt drug trafficking and move the country toward democracy. “We are going to run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper, and judicious transition,” Trump said.

So, what’s next for Maduro, Venezuelans, and US efforts in the region? Below, Atlantic Council experts share their insights.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Matthew Kroenig: A win for regional security, the Venezuelan people, and the US military

Alexander B. Gray: This operation sends a signal to Beijing and Moscow

David Goldwyn: Opening up Venezuela’s energy industry will come down to the details

Celeste Kmiotek: The US strikes most likely fall afoul of international law

Iria Puyosa: Delcy Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability Trump wants

Geoff Ramsey: The mission is not accomplished until Venezuelans get free and fair elections

Nizar El Fakih: Multilateralism failed Venezuela. But it failed long before today.

Tressa Guenov: Success will require years-long US diplomatic and economic efforts in Venezuela

Kirsten Fontenrose: Watching Venezuela from Tehran

Thomas S. Warrick: Maduro’s ouster will cause shock waves in the Middle East

Alex Plitsas: Three scenarios for what could come next

The US needs to remain committed to a democratic transition

Many Venezuelans are hopeful that today marks the beginning of a new era. The removal of Nicolás Maduro from power is a reality that Venezuelans in the country and the nearly eight million forced to flee under his regime have long sought.

Here are three key takeaways from the operation:

First, this is the most consequential moment in recent Venezuelan history—and for the broader Latin American region. Trump’s Saturday announcement made it clear that this operation goes beyond a simple extradition: It is a regime-change effort. Maduro is now en route to New York City to face criminal charges, but the United States intends to “run the country” until “a safe and judicious transition” takes place. That means Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president, cannot simply take power and continue his policies. In assuming the presidency, she is constitutionally obligated to hold elections within thirty days. But remember, there was a prior election in July 2024 which opposition leader Edmundo González won, according to released vote tallies.

Second, the US military operation is the start—not the end—of a new level of direct US engagement in Venezuela. Trump confirmed that a team has been designated to run Venezuela, with key figures such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio engaging with Rodríguez. While US forces are expected to provide security around critical infrastructure, broader public security and the protection of citizens remain pressing challenges in a country plagued by gangs, paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and transnational cartels. Hundreds of political prisoners still remain locked up, with their fate of top importance.

Third, today’s actions are the first concrete deliverables of Trump’s new National Security Strategy with its heavy emphasis on the Western Hemisphere. And the president has made it clear that future US operations in the region are fair game as well. Trump mentioned Colombia and Cuba as countries whose leaders should now know the consequences of not cooperating with the United States.

Fourth, the United States now bears responsibility for the eventual outcome in Venezuela. The challenge will be ensuring a “safe and judicious transition” in a country where many entrenched actors are likely to resist meaningful change, but where real change is fundamental to US interests and to the Venezuelan people.

Some commentators are arguing that the strike is illegal under international law. I am not a legal expert, but it’s worth noting that even though heads of state do enjoy immunity from prosecution under international law, few world leaders recognize Maduro as a legitimate head of state. Since 2019, the Organization of American States, the premier multilateral body for the hemisphere, has refused to recognize Maduro as president following that year’s stolen elections.

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

A win for regional security, the Venezuelan people, and the US military

There are five winners of the successful US operation to remove Maduro from power in Venezuela:

US, regional, and global security. The world is better off without an anti-American dictator who traffics narcotics, prompts irregular migration flows, and provides a foothold to the “axis of aggressors” (China, Russia, and Iran) in the Western Hemisphere.
The Venezuelan people. They now have the opportunity for a better government and a freer and more prosperous future.
US military power. This shows that the US military is still the finest fighting force in the world and may help Washington find its confidence and get over its Iraq-Afghanistan hangover.
Special operations forces. They have been eager to show higher-level officials in Washington that they are still relevant after the war on terror—and indeed even more so now.
Trump’s foreign policy. This is a dramatic foreign policy victory, among the top three of the first year in Trump’s second term, alongside degrading Iran’s nuclear program and increasing NATO defense spending.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies.

This operation sends a signal to Beijing and Moscow

The “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, as outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy, is officially in effect. Just days after the Chinese People’s Liberation Army was reported to be war-gaming combat operations in the Western Hemisphere, and a new official Chinese strategy for Latin America refused to recognize the region as of special significance to US security, Washington has demonstrated a long-overdue commitment to hemispheric security.

The Trump administration’s removal of Maduro from power in Venezuela is not simply a message to antagonistic regimes in the hemisphere, like Cuba and Nicaragua; it is a global reestablishment of deterrence that will be seen in Beijing and Moscow as an unambiguous sign of the Trump administration’s commitment to a security order compatible with American interests.

Going forward, the administration has a unique opportunity to build upon the success of its pressure campaign against Maduro to reestablish overwhelming US strategic predominance in the hemisphere, including by tacitly shaping a post-Maduro settlement that ensures extra-hemispheric powers like China and Russia are excluded from meaningful influence in Caracas. The success of this operation creates a once-in-a-generation opportunity for Washington to translate its security preferences into strategic reality.

—Alexander B. Gray is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Gray most recently served as deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff of the White House National Security Council.

US President Donald Trump speaks from Palm Beach, Florida, following a US strike on Venezuela on January 3, 2026. (REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst)

Opening up Venezuela’s energy industry will come down to the details

From an energy perspective the key questions will be who governs the country, the timeline and nature of a transitional government, the security situation in the country at large and in the oil production sites and ports, and if the US government modulates the sanctions regime and the blockade to financially support a potential transitional government. At this writing, Trump has declared that the United States will run the country until the situation is stabilized, and he declined to endorse González. Trump also asserted that US oil companies would return to Venezuela.

It remains to be seen whether there will be resistance from loyalists of the regime and remaining members of Cuban intelligence. Few US companies are likely to return to the country until there is a reliable legal and fiscal regime and stable security situation. Companies that have existing operations are much more likely to revive and expand them if the environment is secure.

It is highly uncertain how the US administration will approach exports and management of those revenues. It could allow oil currently on tankers to be exported, expand licensing, and permit Venezuela to sell oil at market prices, all for the purpose of maximizing national revenue. It is also possible that those revenues would go into a blocked account for the benefit of a new Venezuela government.

But for now, we have no details about how these fiscal and legal arrangements will evolve. Until there is clarity on sanctions and licensing and more information on who is actually managing the central bank and ministry of finance, the prospects for Venezuelan oil production and exports will remain uncertain.

—David Goldwyn is president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC, an international energy advisory consultancy, and chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group.

The US strikes most likely fall afoul of international law

Maduro oversaw a brutal regime engaged in violent human rights violations against Venezuelan citizens. Regardless of this, the US strikes on Venezuela were illegal under international law.

The United Nations (UN) Charter forbids use of force against a state’s “territorial integrity or political independence,” with exceptions permitted for self-defense and Security Council authorizations. Self-defense requires that the force used be necessary and proportional, and that the threat be imminent. None of these conditions appear to have been met. As such, the attacks appear to fall under Article 3(a) of the UN General Assembly’s definition of the crime of aggression. This provision is customary, meaning it is binding and applies regardless of US arguments that the actions are legal under domestic law.

The use of force also marked the onset of an international armed conflict between the United States and Venezuela, triggering the applicability of international humanitarian law. While so far most targets appear to have been military, Trump threatened a second “and much larger” attack “if needed.” Trump’s announcement that the United States will “run” Venezuela and may deploy forces also raises alarms around potential occupation.

Finally, as sitting head of state, international law affords Maduro full personal immunity under domestic courts—including in the United States. Since 2019, the United States and other countries have not recognized Maduro as head of state, in response to widespread election fraud, and he is widely considered an illegitimate ruler. However, as argued by the French Cour de Cassation, this immunity should apply regardless of whether a state recognizes a head of state’s leadership—precisely to prevent politically motivated arrests.

While Maduro must be held accountable for the human rights violations he has inflicted, the United States’ unlawful actions must be condemned. Allowing such precedents to go unchallenged will further undermine respect for international law, state sovereignty, and civilian protections.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Delcy Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability Trump wants

The US decapitation operation against the autocratic regime that ruled Venezuela for over twenty-five years—first led by Hugo Chavez, then by Maduro—marks the beginning of the restoration of democracy in the country. The regime was unable to mount any effective defensive military actions. Its usually strong communication apparatus failed catastrophically during the first twelve hours following the US operation to take Maduro from his residence inside Fuerte Tiuna, the principal military base of the Venezuelan army. The military command-and-control chains were clearly disrupted.

Venezuelans are eager to reclaim their country and restore democracy. There is hope that González—who was rightfully elected president in 2024—will soon take the oath, and many trust that María Corina Machado will successfully lead the transition process, which may take months or even years. The second-in-command figure in the regime, Rodríguez, who was sworn in today to take Maduro’s place, does not appear to have the backing of all factions within the ruling party. Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability required for the business operations Trump emphasized several times during his remarks on the operation. Chavismo no longer enjoys the widespread popular support it had two decades ago.

The Venezuelan people who have fought nonviolently against a highly repressive regime for over two decades will continue their struggle until freedom and democracy are fully restored.

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Democracy+Tech Initiative. Puyosa was previously an associate professor at the College of Social Sciences at the Central University of Venezuela.

The mission is not accomplished until Venezuelans get free and fair elections

With Rodríguez appearing on state television Saturday afternoon and convening a “National Council in Defense of the Nation” made up of every heavyweight in the ruling party, it seems likely that she is indeed serving as the country’s de facto leader—for now.

While she claimed that Maduro remains “the only president,” called for his release, and said that Venezuela would never be “a colony of any empire,” she also noted that the Supreme Court will be reviewing a national emergency decree signed by Maduro as his last executive act. This points to further announcements to come, in which Rodríguez will almost certainly claim that she is now the country’s interim leader.

Whoever emerges on top of the power struggle in Caracas, it is fundamental that the United States use its considerable leverage to incentivize a roadmap for a transition. It is essential that the Venezuelan people are presented with a credible plan for free and fair elections, the release of political prisoners, and a path toward economic recovery. The United States can help pave this path by offering gradual, phased sanctions relief in exchange for verifiable progress toward democratization.

It is logical for the United States to advance its own energy, migration, and broader geopolitical interests in Venezuela, but US policymakers should not consider their mission accomplished until Venezuelans’ fundamental right to elect their own leaders is restored.

—Geoff Ramsey is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Multilateralism failed Venezuela. But it failed long before today.

Many today are emphasizing the importance of multilateralism and warning about its erosion as a result of the unilateral US actions in Venezuela. But the reality is different: Multilateralism in the face of the Venezuelan crisis did not fail today—it failed years ago.

That failure—resounding, stark, and undeniable—is measured in millions of exiles, many now undocumented or living in precarious conditions across dozens of countries, constituting one of the largest forced displacements in the world without a conventional war or internal armed conflict. It is measured in millions of families torn apart by a regime that systematically destroyed its own society: opposition parties dismantled, dissidents disappeared, deaths under custody, widespread torture, the mass closure of independent media, expropriations that crippled the productive economy (years before any international sanction), hyperinflation that impoverished millions of working families, and sustained repression.

Meanwhile, diplomacy and multilateral institutions proved unable to deliver a single effective negotiation process leading to an orderly, peaceful, and negotiated transition—despite years of appeals by millions of Venezuelans who voted, protested, and exhausted every available civic mechanism at enormous personal cost.

And international justice? The International Criminal Court, with an investigation open since 2021, has yet to issue a single indictment—despite extensive documentation of crimes against humanity by the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and hundreds of victims. Their testimonies provided detailed accounts of a sophisticated, systematic, and nationwide apparatus of repression designed to crush dissent that has been operating in the country for several years under this regime.

Looking ahead, a central concern among Venezuelans—both inside and outside the country—is whether stability will follow, and what political order will emerge from the vacuum left by Maduro, particularly given the competing factions within the former regime. What is clear is that Venezuelans expressed their will at the ballot box: In the July 2024 presidential election, the opposition—led by González and Machado—won decisively, a result the Maduro government refused to recognize, further deepening the crisis that culminated in today’s events.

Any sustainable transition will require that this legitimate leadership, with broad and demonstrable support inside Venezuela, be empowered to lead a democratic transition through a credible and legitimate process.

—Nizar El Fakih is a nonresident senior fellow with the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Success will require years-long US diplomatic and economic efforts in Venezuela

While it’s far too soon to know Venezuela’s ultimate disposition following today’s operations, we do know that Trump says that the United States will essentially “run” the country for now. Trump has prided himself on touching many conflicts around the world—from those between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Azerbaijan and Armenia to Gaza and Ukraine—quickly claiming several as resolved. But one thing the administration has yet to prove in nearly all cases, especially Venezuela, is whether it has the sustained attention span for the years-long diplomatic and economic efforts required to bring societies out of chaos and repression.

Even a short-term endeavor of running Venezuela will cost significant US military and taxpayer resources. It will also require real diplomatic finesse to ensure that the United States remains a credible leader in the region, which has now become the centerpiece of US national security strategy. Meanwhile, China will likely continue its lower-key but serious commitment to economic development in Latin America and elsewhere around the world.

Venezuela will be a test of Trump’s strategy for US dominance in the region and whether his collective peace and security efforts—from Caracas to Kyiv—can result in real strategic advantages for the United States. The alternative would be a stack of unfinished US projects that leave real lives affected in the wake.

—Tressa Guenov is the director for programs and operations and a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. She previously served as the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Watching Venezuela from Tehran

From a technical and military standpoint, the US operation in Venezuela signals to Iran that Washington is increasingly confident operating against Russian-derived, layered air-defense architectures without needing to dismantle them through a prolonged, overt suppression of enemy air defenses (or SEAD) campaign. Venezuela’s inventory—anchored by S-300VM, Buk-M2, and point defenses such as Pantsir-S1, supported by Russian and Chinese radars—closely resembles the architecture Iran fields around critical sites. Yet the US operation appears to have achieved its objectives without forcing visible air-defense engagement.

Available reporting suggests the US operation evaded detection and engagement by leaning on standoff effects; persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); electronic attack; and compressed timelines. Under such conditions, systems like Buk and Pantsir may never generate a usable firing solution, while high-value S-300-class assets become difficult to employ without sustained targets, clear attribution, and political authorization. The issue is not only theoretical capability, but whether layered defenses can meaningfully influence outcomes during brief, tightly sequenced operations.

This reinforces a broader pattern Iran will recognize. Russian air defenses have struggled to impose decisive effects in other theaters—including Syria, where Israeli strikes have repeatedly penetrated layered systems, and Ukraine, where Pantsir, Buk, and S-300 variants have suffered attrition under modern ISR-strike cycles.

Equally relevant is the diplomatic dimension. In Venezuela, as with Iran, US military action coincided with standing diplomatic offers—sanctions relief, normalization steps, and elements of proposed deals—kept on the table before and during the use of force. The combined signal to Tehran is that neither reliance on Russian air defenses nor the slow-rolling of US proposals necessarily alters the pace or structure of US action.

Recent US strikes in Nigeria send a reinforcing signal. There the United States acted without prolonged warning or phased escalation, using remote airstrikes supported by the Nigerian government. These operations underscore a reduced tolerance for drawn-out escalation dynamics and a preference for short-duration, outcome-oriented use of force.

For Iran, the relevance lies not in the specific targets or theaters, but in the demonstrated willingness of the United States to move decisively once thresholds are crossed.

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She was previously the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council.

Maduro’s ouster will cause shock waves in the Middle East

The success of Trump’s bold operation to remove Maduro will cause global shock waves, including in the Middle East. Saturday’s successful operation puts Trump’s “locked and loaded” message on Friday to Iran’s leaders in a different perspective. However, the Venezuelan operation took months of planning, and there are no signs that the United States has the capability, or the intention, to pull off something similar in Iran.

Still, as a demonstration of Trump’s willingness to back months of rhetoric against Maduro with dramatic—and effective—action, Saturday’s operation should concern Iran’s leaders. Those who know their history—and the Trump administration has some like Sebastian Gorka who do—will remember that in 1956 the United States failed to follow up on its encouragement of Hungarian protesters against Soviet rule. The Trump administration ought to be aware of the dangers of vague rhetoric that cannot be followed up with action. Trump’s words to Iran and the Middle East in the coming weeks need to be made with steely-eyed capability and intention.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

Three scenarios for what could come next

The US operation to capture Maduro and transfer him to stand trial in the United States on criminal charges dating back to 2020 marks a decisive inflection point for Venezuela. What follows will hinge less on Washington’s next move than on the calculations of the regime’s remaining power brokers, military commanders, intelligence chiefs, and political enablers who are now confronted with a stark choice: negotiate an orderly exit or risk annihilation alongside a collapsing system.

In the best-case scenario, Maduro’s arrest catalyzes elite defection. Faced with legal exposure, sanctions, and loss of patronage, regime underlings could seek guarantees for safe passage, limited amnesty, or third-country exile in exchange for transferring authority to the legitimately elected opposition. Such a negotiated handover would avert mass violence, stabilize institutions, and open a narrow but viable path toward economic recovery and international reintegration.

Another scenario is that the United States has been working secretly with elements of the Venezuelan government who will take over.

The worst-case scenario is far darker. If regime remnants reject negotiation and fragment, Venezuela could descend into a protracted guerrilla conflict. Armed colectivos, criminalized military units, and narco-linked factions could wage asymmetric warfare, turning parts of the country into contested zones and prolonging civilian suffering long after the regime’s formal collapse.

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The post Experts react: The US just captured Maduro. What’s next for Venezuela and the region? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Charai for The National Interest: Peace Through Strength in Venezuela—and the World

Atlantic Council — Sat, 03 Jan 2026 19:20:23 +0000

The post Charai for The National Interest: Peace Through Strength in Venezuela—and the World appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The evolution of Latvia’s defense and security policy in resilience building

Armands Astukevičs and Elīna Vrobļevska — Fri, 02 Jan 2026 21:35:29 +0000

Executive summary
Introduction
A comprehensive approach to defense and resilience
Key pillars of Latvian resilience
Challenges and future imperatives for resilience
Annex 1: Management structure
Annex 2: Framework of concepts, plans, laws, and regulations

Executive summary

Latvia has significantly evolved its defense and security policy, focusing on national resilience as a cornerstone of its statehood, as analyzed in LVARes: The Evolution of Latvia’s Defense and Security Policy in Resilience Building, a project of the Centre for East European Policy Studies and the Atlantic Council. This transformation is anchored in Latvia’s Comprehensive National Defense (CND) framework, a whole-of-society strategy that integrates civilian, military, and private-sector efforts to deter aggression and manage crises. Key to this approach are legal underpinnings from evolving state defense concepts and amendments to foundational laws like the National Security Law.

Pillars of this resilience include ensuring the continuity of essential services and critical infrastructure, with a shift from mere asset protection to guaranteeing operational functionality through public-private partnerships and an enhanced role for municipalities. Regular exercises like Namejs and Pilskalns test these preparations.

To counter hybrid threats, Latvia formally recognizes the information space as a defense domain, implementing multilayered strategies that combine government-led strategic communications, support for independent media, civil-society engagement against disinformation, and international cooperation, notably through hosting the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence. Societal resilience is further boosted by public-preparedness campaigns like “72 Hours: What to do in case of a crisis,” media literacy programs, and integrating national defense education, including psychological defense and nonviolent civil resistance, into curricula.

Significant reforms are modernizing Latvia’s crisis management, with the planned National Crisis Management Center (CMC) under the prime minister, centralizing coordination and decision-making. Civil-protection measures are strengthening as well, with new legislation for public shelters and updates to the State Civil Protection Plan.

International cooperation is indispensable, with NATO providing collective defense, the EU offering funding and policy coordination, and robust bilateral ties with the United States and regional cooperation with Baltic and Nordic partners. The LVARes project itself exemplifies Latvia’s proactive international engagement in studying national capabilities, raising awareness, and sharing best practices.

Challenges persist, including resource constraints, interagency coordination complexities, evolving threats, and the need to bolster societal cohesion. Future imperatives involve fully operationalizing the CMC, implementing the shelter program, sustained investment in capabilities, and deeper public engagement in CND. Strategic recommendations for policymakers emphasize CMC effectiveness, civil-protection investments, public-private partnerships, psychological resilience, volunteer engagement, and integrating nonviolent resistance. For international partners, continued support for Latvian capability development, amplifying LVARes findings, facilitating resilience benchmarking, and supporting cross-border exercises are crucial. Through these efforts, Latvia fortifies its security and contributes valuable lessons to the Euro-Atlantic community.

Introduction

The contemporary security environment is characterized by an array of complex and interconnected threats. These range from the potential for conventional military aggression to the more pervasive and persistent challenges of hybrid warfare, sophisticated information operations, and malicious cyber activities. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy and its full-scale war against Ukraine have significantly amplified these threats, underscoring the vulnerability of states in the region and the urgent need for robust national preparedness. Latvia’s position as a frontline state of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), sharing a direct border with the Russian Federation, has inherently shaped its national security posture and necessitated a continuous adaptation of its defense strategies, pushing for an essential shift in Latvia’s defense thinking.

The traditional focus on military defense, while still fundamental, is increasingly understood as insufficient on its own. Consequently, Latvia has progressively embraced a broader concept of national resilience encompassing not only military strength but also the resilience of its society, the continuity of government and essential services during crises, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the cultivation of psychological defense among its populace. This evolution reflects a growing understanding that national security in the twenty-first century is a whole-of-society endeavor.

Latvia’s pursuit of national resilience is not confined to a single strategy but is realized through a multifaceted approach that addresses various dimensions of security. These include ensuring the operational continuity of essential services and the resilience of critical infrastructure, actively countering hybrid threats in the information and cyber domains, fostering broad societal resilience through public preparedness and education, and acknowledging the potential role of nonviolent civil resistance. The aim of this report is to systematically analyze the evolution in Latvia’s defense and security policy, particularly its implementation of a comprehensive national defense framework, and to share the insights and lessons learned with allies, partners, and the broader public to enhance collective security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

A comprehensive approach to defense and resilience

Latvia’s approach to national defense has undergone a significant evolution, moving from a primary focus on conventional military capabilities and professional military service orientation toward a more encompassing strategy known as Comprehensive National Defense (CND). Adopted in 2018, the CND system is designed to ensure security and crisis preparedness across all sectors of the state and society, thereby enhancing Latvia’s overall deterrence posture and its resilience against armed conflicts or a wide spectrum of potential crises. The overarching aims of CND are the following:

Preparing the Latvian population to actively participate in the defense of their country.
Facilitating efficient and effective crisis management at the national level.
Ensuring the continuity and support of critical state functions, including government operations, energy supply, healthcare, and logistics, even under duress.

A fundamental and defining characteristic of Latvia’s CND is its “whole-of-society” approach, which recognizes that national defense and resilience are not the sole responsibility of the armed forces or government ministries but require the active involvement and cooperation of every element of society. This comprehensive vision entails the systematic integration of municipalities, the owners and managers of both public and private critical infrastructure (spanning sectors such as energy, communications, finance, and healthcare), nongovernmental organizations, the broader business community, and individual citizens into national defense planning and preparedness efforts.

A significant emphasis within this approach is placed on building and nurturing mutual trust and robust partnerships between public authorities at all levels and private-sector entities. These collaborative efforts are seen as essential for creating a networked civil and military defense system where each component is prepared and able to work in sync. The success of the CND model hinges on the ability to overcome traditional challenges and foster a shared sense of responsibility for national security.

The whole-of-society approach is further strengthened through the way the CND is managed and its legal basis, both of which are designed as a multitiered framework to ensure a whole-of-government and -societal approach to national resilience. The management structure (detailed in Annex 1) integrates political leadership, ministerial responsibilities, operational agencies, local governments, and societal actors to prepare for and respond effectively to a diverse spectrum of threats, ranging from military aggression to civil emergencies. Whereas the framework of strategic concepts, national plans, legal acts, and supporting regulations (a detailed list provided in Annex 2) ensure that CND is not merely a theoretical construct but a systematically planned and implemented national effort. Strategic concepts like the National Security Concept and the State Defense Concept, both approved by the parliament, articulate Latvia’s high-level strategic assessments, goals, and priorities in response to the evolving security environment, providing the overarching vision and direction for the development of the CND.

This approach also aligns with the direction set by NATO at its 2016 Warsaw Summit, where the Alliance adopted seven baseline requirements for national resilience. For the first time, NATO established clear conditions that member states’ civilian institutions must meet to support Article 4 and 5 military operations. These requirements include: continuity of government and critical services; resilient energy, food, and water supplies; the ability to manage uncontrolled population movements; resilient civil communication and transportation systems; and the capacity to handle mass casualties. In this regard, Latvia’s CND system goes beyond these NATO requirements by also incorporating societal resilience and the involvement of the private sector in defense operations and other aspects.

Alongside NATO’s framework, relevant EU-level initiatives provide significant complementary support for resilience. These include the EU’s crisis-management framework, particularly its Civil Protection Mechanism, and the Military Mobility initiative, which supports development of civilian infrastructure to facilitate the rapid movement of military forces across Europe. These efforts directly reinforce both NATO and national resilience objectives, providing practical tools and funding to enhance collective defense.

Beyond multilateral alliances, Latvia cultivates strong bilateral partnerships and engages actively in regional cooperation formats to enhance its security and resilience. The 2020 State Defense Concept emphasizes the strong military cooperation between Latvia and the United States, highlighting the long-standing and highly valued partnership between the Latvian National Armed Forces and the Michigan National Guard. The United States is widely regarded as a major strategic partner for Latvia’s security and independence.

The three Baltic states also work closely together to develop their collective security and defense capabilities. This cooperation includes joint efforts to strengthen their external borders, deepen collaboration in civil protection and crisis management, combat disinformation through shared intelligence and strategies, and enhance overall societal resilience. Joint military exercises are also a regular feature of this trilateral cooperation.

Nordic-Baltic cooperation provides another layer of security collaboration. Latvia’s comprehensive defense approach shares many similarities with the strategies adopted by Nordic countries, facilitating mutual learning and coordinated efforts. The Nordic and Baltic countries have also demonstrated solidarity through joint statements and coordinated actions, for example, in reaffirming their support for Ukraine.

Latvia’s multifaceted international engagement—spanning NATO, the EU, key bilateral relationships such as with the United States, and intensive regional cooperation—is not merely about receiving security assistance or aligning with external frameworks. It increasingly reflects a strategy of proactive contribution. As a frontline state that has rapidly developed its resilience concepts and capabilities in response to direct and evolving threats, Latvia is well-positioned to share valuable expertise and lessons learned.

Key pillars of Latvian resilience

Since the adoption of CND, Latvia has pursued a comprehensive approach to defense based on an understanding that every element of the government and population plays a part in creating a networked civil and military defense system—and recent lessons from Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression have further reinforced this understanding. This approach grew out of necessity: Latvia, a small country with limited strategic depth, neighbors Russia, a large, aggressive military power that has attacked countries in its so-called near abroad. Latvia’s approach, like those of its fellow Nordic-Baltic countries, is built on a straightforward idea that the country’s civil and military defense systems can achieve a greater deterrence and defense impact if they collaborate and if each part is prepared. Meanwhile, Latvia’s pursuit of national resilience is not confined to a single strategy but is realized through a multifaceted approach that addresses various dimensions of security.

While the CND concept encompasses eight dimensions, ranging from military development to psychological resilience, our report examines it through four perspectives: military, civil, societal, and governmental resilience. This approach allows for a cohesive, strategic evaluation of the dimensions of readiness without sacrificing the scope of the original concept.

Military resilience

Latvia’s military resilience is a central aspect of its national defense, resting on the fundamental pillars of domestic responsibility for developing its own capabilities and a robust collective defense provided by its allies.

Lessons learned from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine since 2014 have driven initiatives to ensure that Latvian institutions and society can respond effectively to any unconventional or hybrid threat scenarios. Changes to the National Security Law have empowered the National Armed Forces (NAF), from the lowest level up, with the authority to respond to any military threat, conventional or unconventional, even without immediate orders from the political leadership. The law explicitly states that armed resistance may not be prohibited in times of war or occupation and affirms that every citizen has the right to take up arms to resist an aggressor. This legal framework solidifies the principle of total defense, ensuring that the entire nation is prepared and authorized to contribute to the defense of the country.

To maintain this posture, Latvia has steadily increased its defense budget. By 2018, Latvia had met the NATO defense spending goal of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), which has significantly contributed to the development of military capabilities, including within the National Guard. Military resolve is evident in the budget’s rapid growth, which is projected to reach approximately 3.65 percent of GDP in 2025, with announcements indicating a further increase to 5 percent by 2026. This funding is crucial for keeping military modernization on track through the strategic procurement of advanced weapon systems. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Latvia has significantly increased investment in conventional war-fighting capabilities to enhance its deterrence posture. The commitment to acquiring advanced systems—such as High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers, IRIS-T air defense systems, and coastal defense missiles—sends a vital message that the country is serious about bolstering its defense. National resilience also necessitates forging a cohesive fighting force from diverse sources of manpower. Latvia is proactively addressing manpower challenges, most notably through the reintroduction of mandatory conscription in the form of the State Defense Service (SDS). Introduced in 2023, the SDS aims to increase recruitment and build a larger, well-trained reserve force. This policy of eleven-month mandatory service has shown early signs of success. Latvia plans to enlist four thousand new recruits annually by 2028 and, notably, 40 percent of the 2024 intake opted for professional careers after their mandatory service. Current military plans envision 31,000 troops by 2029, complemented by an equally large reserve contingent thereafter. However, this rapid expansion presents significant challenges. The primary obstacles include a lack of sufficient modern training infrastructure to accommodate the larger number of recruits, a shortage of qualified instructors to lead the training, and the immense organizational task of building a functional reserve system that can effectively manage and retrain thousands of new reservists annually after their active service ends. Successfully overcoming these hurdles is critical to ensuring the SDS translates into a genuine increase in combat-ready forces.

Comprehensive defense exercise “Nameis 2024,” National Armed Forces of Latvia, https://www.flickr.com/photos/latvijas_armija/54023090223/in/album-72177720320603776.

Advanced capabilities and increased manpower are only effective if they are maintained at a high state of readiness. This is achieved through a rigorous schedule of military exercises designed to test plans and ensure interoperability. The flagship event is the annual Comprehensive Defense Exercise “Namejs,” which tests the armed forces in joint operations at every level.

These exercises are crucial for more than just military units, serving as the primary mechanism for implementing the whole-of-society defense concept in practice. During Namejs, the NAF systematically drills its cooperation with the civilian sector. This includes collaborating with municipalities and state-owned companies to support military mobility and countermobility efforts, and working with private-sector entrepreneurs on resource mobilization. Similarly, through this whole-of-society approach, Latvia has demonstrated both ingenuity and cooperation. It is exemplified by efforts to formalize the roles of civilian groups in national defense, such as the involvement of hunters in the national defense system—a patriotic and armed segment of society that can be integrated with the National Guard and tasked with support assignments. As comprehensive defense evolves into a societal reality, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia.

Civil resilience

Civil resilience in Latvia focuses on the comprehensive preparedness of its civilian structures and population, encompassing robust civil-defense planning across all government levels, from national ministries to local municipalities. This emphasis recognizes the critical role of municipalities in fostering a society-wide culture of preparedness and resilience.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine beginning in 2014 and 2022 deeply reverberated across Latvian society, creating significant momentum for action. The latter created public demand that pushed local governments beyond mere declaratory contingency plans to proactively explain preparedness strategies to their constituents. Latvia has adopted the necessary legislative basis that mandates that Latvian municipalities ensure the continuity of essential services during crises or war, therefore actively participating in developing a society-wide culture of preparedness and resilience.

Pilskalns Exercises

The Pilskalns exercises stress-test the developed defense and crisis management plans, enhance knowledge, and inform participants about potential challenges during a military crisis at the municipal level. These exercises provide the opportunity to engage national and local institutions and the National Armed Forces to test their ability to communicate, mobilize resources, and manage evacuation in the event of a crisis.

This is primarily achieved through civil-defense plans, which are now mandatory for all municipalities. Developed in close cooperation with the National Armed Forces, these plans must be exercised at least annually. A prime example of this is the Pilskalns series of tactical exercises. While all municipalities are now mandated to develop such plans, some have been more proactive. For instance, Jelgava, Latvia’s fourth-largest city, established a municipal operation information center in 2011, preceding many other local governments. In peacetime, this center functions as a municipal hotline for damaged infrastructure, but in a crisis, it transforms into the municipal early warning system.

Another key aspect of civil resilience involves ensuring the continuity of essential services and protecting critical infrastructure. Latvia has strategically shifted its crisis-management thinking from solely focusing on infrastructure protection to prioritizing the uninterrupted delivery of essential services and functions. While this shift presents additional planning challenges, it stems from the understanding that critical infrastructure cannot operate in isolation from broader national defense factors; it is rendered ineffective without skilled personnel, operational processes, and supporting services vital for its functioning. Businesses are consequently required to develop robust continuity plans.

Latvian Mobile Telephone

Latvian Mobile Telephone (LMT) is one of the first companies in Latvia to establish its own National Guard subdivision, underscoring its role as a critical infrastructure provider. LMT is responsible for maintaining national connectivity, even in times of war, and actively develops innovative solutions for military use. Composed of the company’s own employees, the subdivision’s primary mission is to strengthen the security and defense of LMT’s critical infrastructure and essential services, defending against attacks aimed at destabilizing the country by targeting its critical infrastructure.

The Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the NAF retain a central role in comprehensive defense planning. This reflects both the fundamental need to integrate military and civilian planning factors closely within comprehensive defense systems and the traditionally high level of societal trust in the National Armed Forces. Consequently, even private industry’s preparedness plans are drafted in close cooperation with both the relevant sectoral ministry and the MoD. This collaborative approach ensures that the government is aware of civilian-sector resources, can provide expertise and experience, and can monitor how these plans integrate into the broader national resilience system and warfighting plans. Furthermore, industrial actors participate in joint exercises with their specific sectoral ministry and the MoD at least once every four years. An innovative development is the creation of specific National Guard units staffed by personnel from critical infrastructure entities, whose primary role is to defend critical infrastructure objects in case of military contingencies.

Latvian electricity company Sadales tīkls undergoing National Guard Training. Ministry of Defense of Latvia, https://www.sargs.lv/lv/latvija/2022-10-27/sadales-tikls-veido-zemessardzes-apaksvienibu-ar-merki-aizsargat-uznemuma.

The ability to ensure the flow of money for goods and services constitutes another critical service. Societal upheavals, crises, and wars often disrupt peacetime payment systems, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s experience. To address this, the Bank of Latvia (which is analogous to the US Federal Reserve) is developing crisis payment solutions, both cash and noncash, for a society with a high adoption rate for noncash transactions. For example, the Bank of Latvia is collaborating with major commercial banks to develop approved offline solutions, ensuring individuals can use their bank cards for basic necessities even if bank communications are down. Similarly, during a crisis or war, banks are required to maintain a predefined network of ATMs, with at least one ATM per municipal center, and have developed a map of critical ATMs that would operate in case of crisis.

Latvia also has proactively sought to improve the integrity of its communications systems. This involves ensuring that critical data—including sensitive healthcare, defense, security, and economic data—remains within Latvian territory and that critical information technology systems continue to function without interruption even if the connection to the global internet is disrupted. To achieve this, the government now mandates that national and municipal institutions, companies, and owners/managers of critical IT infrastructure prioritize using a single national internet exchange point, GLV-IX, a statewide and state-operated local internet ecosystem, for their data flows if the outer perimeter of electronic communications is compromised.

Finally, Latvia has actively addressed two common challenges in building preparedness: improving the communication of preparedness requirements and funding resilience efforts. Many national governments struggle with effectively communicating military crisis and war preparedness expectations to municipalities and private industries. While both disseminating information and issuing legislation are important, these efforts must be augmented by activities that encourage thoughtful planning, accurate understanding of requirements, and knowledge development. Indeed, Latvian municipalities have sometimes voiced concerns about insufficient resources for civil preparedness, arguing it should be a national responsibility. Similarly, even large, well-funded hospitals struggle to meet the three-month supply requirement for medicine and supplies, while smaller hospitals lack adequate funding altogether.

Latvia has sought to address these questions through legislative changes, clarifying responsibilities and tasks, and mandating regular exercises. Over time, continuous cooperation and the mandatory requirement of yearly exercises are expected to foster a better understanding of the overall defense system, individual roles within it, and mutual expectations among all parties involved. Regular exercise schedules significantly benefit Latvia’s preparedness across sectors by stress testing developed plans, building knowledge, and informing participants about potential organizational challenges during a military crisis or war. For example, the yearly state-wide comprehensive defense exercises Namejs involve municipalities, allied forces, and local companies playing out different scenarios alongside the National Armed Forces. On a local level, Pilskalns exercises, in use since 2020, test municipalities’ planning and practical response capabilities under wartime scenarios, involving national and local institutions, the NAF, and local companies. These exercises are crucial for stress testing plans, identifying gaps, and building practical experience among all involved parties. Ultimately, however, private enterprises are expected to fund their own preparedness planning and implementation activities.

Societal resilience

Societal resilience in Latvia is built on the principle that national security is a shared responsibility that extends to every citizen, empowering individuals with the practical knowledge and tools needed to withstand a crisis. The government has fostered a “culture of readiness” through regular information campaigns and hands-on materials that include tips to spot false information.

The most visible example of this is Latvia’s “72-hour preparedness guide,” a practical tool aimed at bolstering individual and, by extension, societal resilience. This campaign advises citizens on how to be self-sufficient for the first seventy-two hours of a crisis, a critical period before state emergency services may be able to provide widespread assistance. The booklet provides practical guidance on reliable information sources, identifying and countering disinformation, essential supplies to stock like water and food, preparing an emergency kit, and developing a family crisis action plan. This proactive approach is rooted in both general emergency-management principles and Latvia’s specific geopolitical and historical context. It not only promotes self-sufficiency that reduces the immediate burden on state resources, but also empowers citizens with concrete actions they can take, which reduces feelings of helplessness and fosters a sense of control and readiness. Public preparedness campaigns like this booklet encourage citizens to volunteer and self-organize, which are foundational elements for any form of collective resistance. The State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD) plays a vital role in this public preparedness effort by actively informing the population on safety measures. To significantly enhance these capabilities, Latvia fully implemented a national cell broadcast system in early 2025. This modern alert system allows the VUGD to instantly send critical warnings directly to all mobile phones within a specific geographic area during an emergency, functioning without requiring users to install an application. This technology provides an immediate and widespread communication layer, complementing existing tools like sirens and the “112 Latvija” mobile application, which is also promoted by the VUGD as a key resource for emergency information.

Youth Guard

The Latvian Youth Guard (Jaunsardze) is Latvia’s largest state-sponsored youth movement, operating under the Ministry of Defence to provide education in national defense. Its primary mission is to foster patriotism, civic consciousness, leadership skills, and physical fitness among young people aged ten to twenty-one. By providing voluntary training in military basics, first aid, and survival skills, the Jaunsardze strengthens the nation’s will to defend itself, serving as a vital component of Latvia’s comprehensive state defense system and a primary pathway for future service.

This culture of readiness is reinforced through long-term educational investments designed to foster an informed, critical, and defense-aware society. The national defense education program in schools aims to instill patriotism, civic responsibility, and basic preparedness skills, fostering an understanding among young people of their role in national defense. Media literacy training is a central component, being built into both school curricula and community programs.

These practical and educational efforts are underpinned by a broader national defense strategy that formally acknowledges psychological defense and nonviolent civil resistance as crucial components of CND. A noteworthy aspect of Latvia’s posture is the formal integration of nonviolent civil

resistance, where the 2020 State Defense Concept explicitly includes “nonviolent civil resistance against occupation forces” as a component of the societal dimension of “total defense.” This signifies a preparedness to resist aggression through a wide spectrum of means, not limited to armed conflict. This is, in large part, a direct response to Russia’s information manipulation and its treatment of the information space as a critical front. Securing an open media space and bolstering psychological resilience against manipulation is now a paramount security goal, involving the cultivation of critical thinking skills to withstand attempts to sow discord.

To defend this front, Latvia employs a multilayered approach. The state has bolstered strategic communication resources, with a dedicated unit under the State Chancellery that coordinates messaging and works to disarm foreign malign information activities. Quality journalism is supported by funding and policy, and authorities have banned most of the Russian propaganda channels. In 2021, Latvia became the first Baltic state to prosecute individuals for willfully spreading dangerous falsehoods as per the criminal law, though there have been few convictions due to legal ambiguity in Article 231 around the definition of “fake news.” This state-led approach is complemented by a vibrant ecosystem of nongovernmental organizations, academics, and volunteers—such as the “Baltic elves”—who actively debunk falsehoods. Investigative journalists, fact-checkers, and initiatives like the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence also work to expose disinformation and promote high standards in journalism.

At the community level, these principles are put into practice through societal and municipality-led initiatives. Continuing work started in the previous year, the Riga municipality has organized a cycle of seven practical civil-defense seminars across various city neighborhoods. During the workshops, residents learn about specific risks in their area, such as nearby high-risk objects and evacuation routes, as identified by the Riga city municipality. They also receive practical training on how to: adapt a basement into a safe shelter; properly assemble a seventy-two-hour emergency bag; and build mental resilience with psychological self-help techniques.

To address the wider Russian threat to Western society, Latvia is sharing what it is learning with its allies and partners. It hosts NATO’s Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, and it works with allies and partners to combat malign influence. Examples of this kind of cooperation are IREX (International Research and Exchanges Board), which conducts media training in the Baltic area, and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, which investigates disinformation and debunks narratives, educates media consumers, and has had staff based in Latvia since 2017.

Governmental resilience

Governmental resilience is the central pillar that ensures the state can continue to lead and function during a crisis, providing the necessary command, control, and coordination within the CND system. This is achieved through a robust legal framework, a clear institutional hierarchy, contingency and crisis-response planning, and a commitment to testing these plans through regular exercises to guarantee the continuity of government.

The crisis-management system of Latvia is multilayered. The State Civil Protection Plan clearly outlines the responsibilities and leading roles of all state institutions in case of state-level contingencies. The system is designed to be flexible; for example, the Ministry of Health has the leading role and responsibility for management of pandemics, as was the case with COVID-19, with all institutions (including the armed forces) supporting these efforts. Meanwhile, in the case of a military threat or war, civilian institutions have the role of supporting the armed forces and ensuring continuity of governance and essential services. At the practical level, the system envisions the establishment of the Civil Protection Operational Management Centre (abbreviated in Latvian as CAOVC), that is formed in case of state-level contingencies, including war. It would be led by the Ministry of the Interior and composed of delegated experts from across the government, tasking it with coordinating interinstitutional response, compiling a comprehensive situational picture, and providing support to the NAF.

This role is to be complemented by municipal-level responsibility through the establishment of municipal civil-protection commissions that are obliged to plan and execute response activities on a regional level, as well as coordinate with state-level efforts.

The “Kristaps” series involves the Cabinet of Ministers in simulating strategic decision-making, as well as NATO Crisis Management Exercises (CMX), while the operational comprehensive defense exercise Namejs includes tests of civil-military cooperation, the practical implementation of civil defense plans, and the coordination functions of the planned CAOVC.

Latvia’s current push to improve its crisis-management system and governmental resilience is a direct response to lessons learned from a series of major crises. The COVID-19 pandemic served as a stark, real-world test of cross-sectoral crisis management, exposing significant shortcomings in interministerial coordination, public communication, and the ability to manage state material reserves effectively. The 2021 hybrid attack and instrumentalization of migration organized by Belarus on the EU’s eastern border tested the state’s ability to coordinate a response between interior, defense, and foreign policy bodies under “gray zone” threat conditions that are, as another Atlantic Council report put it, diffuse and hard to attribute. Most significantly, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022 has provided an invaluable, albeit grim, case study in the requirements of modern national defense. It underscored the absolute necessity of a resilient government able to overcome the massive scale of civil-defense challenges and pervasive hybrid threats. These events collectively created a clear need for reevaluation and reform of the crisis-management system in Latvia, highlighting systemic challenges in achieving effective horizontal coordination across ministries.

To resolve these issues, Latvia is establishing a new centralized National Crisis Management Center (CMC). The concept for the CMC, approved by the government in early 2025, represents the keystone of the nation’s reformed resilience architecture. Its creation is a direct answer to the lessons learned from past crises, designed to provide the professional, permanent, and agile coordination that was previously lacking. Operating under the direct authority of the prime minister, the CMC is designed to provide a single, empowered hub for analysis, planning, and, crucially, to improve coordination in crisis management between key state institutions, especially in complex threat scenarios, and provide support to decision-makers and political leadership.

The core functions of the CMC will include: continuous monitoring of the situation and information gathering; identifying potential risks and threats; conducting analysis of information and data to assess these risks and threats; strategic planning and coordination of operational planning; coordinating the planning, logistics, and recovery of state-level civilian crisis-management resources, including state material reserves; and coordinating crisis-communication efforts. Meanwhile, in the specific context of a military crisis, the CMC will be responsible for coordinating the civilian sector’s response and ensuring seamless cooperation with the military sector.

In essence, this new structure, continuously validated through planning and exercises, aims to ensure the leadership and effective whole-of-government coordination deemed essential for navigating these complex security challenges.

Challenges and future imperatives for resilience

Latvia has been systematically working to integrate all societal elements into its national defense posture, particularly since 2014. This ongoing effort, while showing significant progress, presents a range of challenges and necessitates clear future developments to ensure sustained and enhanced security in a complex geopolitical landscape.

Latvia’s commendable strides in building a comprehensive national resilience model are met with several persistent and evolving challenges; therefore, for the continued evolution and strengthening of Latvian resilience it is crucial to address them in a timely manner:

Building and maintaining robust military defense capabilities. Maintaining momentum in military modernization programs and ensuring the capacity to sustain combat operations beyond an initial phase are crucial for credible deterrence and defense. This includes addressing the timeline for military buildup in relation to potential Russian force reconstitution. While Latvia’s defense spending is projected to reach 3.45 percent of GDP in 2025, with ambitions for 5 percent by 2026, efficient allocation across diverse needs—from military modernization to civil protection and societal programs—remains a complex undertaking. This financial strain also impacts critical infrastructure operators and municipalities tasked with new preparedness responsibilities. Therefore, continued investment in critical military capabilities, including air defense, coastal defense systems (like Naval Strike Missile systems), and long-range precision fires (HIMARS) should be pursued.
Expanding the National Armed Forces. Planned expansions of the NAF and the full implementation of the State Defense Service face manpower constraints, requiring substantial investment in training infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative recruitment policies. The current reserve system also requires significant overhaul. Latvia should continue the expansion of the NAF, overhaul the reserve system to effectively integrate SDS graduates, and implement both dedicated reservist training and early military education. Ensuring adequate infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative policies for recruitment and training is crucial.
Developing targeted strategies for critical areas. The development of industry-specific expertise for business and service continuity, particularly for critical infrastructure, can be a bottleneck. Cultivation of a deeper culture of shared responsibility with the private sector through targeted incentives, joint training programs, and secure information-sharing platforms should be continued. Additionally, mechanisms for improving intermunicipal coordination and resource sharing can alleviate the burden or strain associated with this issue. Latvia should also move beyond awareness campaigns to foster active participation, skill building, and a sense of ownership among the citizenry. Relatively low levels of public trust in certain state institutions can potentially hinder the full engagement of society in defense and resilience efforts. Actively integrating civilian agencies, businesses, and citizens into national resilience and defense planning through practical taskings and drills could help resolve this challenge. A primary challenge is also extending the intensity of preparedness from military threat scenarios to encompass nonmilitary crises across all civilian institutions. Intermunicipal coordination, particularly in resource sharing, needs strengthening. Consistent funding for new municipal responsibilities in civil defense is also a point of discussion, which the municipalities have on previous occasions cited as one of the reasons for their inability to build up civil defense capacities.
Interagency coordination and centralized leadership. Ensuring seamless collaboration and clear, consistent communication of preparedness requirements across all sectors and among numerous actors remains a continuous task. Latvia faces persistent interagency coordination complexities. While the spirit of comprehensive national defense promotes collaboration, the practicalities of aligning different ministries, agencies, and even different levels of government can be challenging. Each entity has its own priorities, budgets, and institutional cultures. The MoD, while a key actor, cannot guarantee or ensure the engagement and resource commitments of other ministries. Effective comprehensive national defense requires a process led by a centralized authority with the power to direct and synchronize efforts across government—ideally the prime minister’s office or a dedicated high-level body. This is especially true for distributing tasks effectively among ministries and bodies of equivalent hierarchical power. Therefore, the establishment of the new Crisis Management Center is a promising development that could further leadership in the implementation of comprehensive national defense and serve as a central actor for confronting crisis situations. However, its mandate, authority, and resourcing will be critical. It must be empowered to not just coordinate but also to direct and enforce; it also must avoid becoming yet another silo and instead act as a true hub for national crisis response and comprehensive national defense implementation. The assurance that the CMC is rapidly and effectively staffed, resourced, and empowered to coordinate across all government levels, municipalities, and the private sector is paramount. The CMC should also be tasked with leading institutionalized, regular, complex cross-sectoral crisis-management exercises. Engaging all nongovernmental organizations and local media more consistently in preparedness exercises and overcoming local political inertia are both ongoing efforts. Effective Comprehensive National Defense coordination across ministries, especially in horizontal tasking, presents difficulties.
Countering evolving threats in the information landscape. Democratic countries like Latvia must counter influence within political, ethical, moral, and legal constraints, while adversaries often operate without such limits, giving them an advantage in proactive narrative projection. Latvia must continuously adapt its resilience strategies to counter new and evolving hybrid threats, sophisticated disinformation techniques, and novel cyberattack methods. Sustaining and enhancing programs to equip the population to withstand long-term information influence operations and maintain morale during crises is crucial. Further exploration and integration of nonviolent resistance concepts into national defense training and public guidance could promote the adaptability of resilience in this area. Latvia’s main approach to countering malign activities in the information space has been blocking narratives rather than proactively projecting its own strategic messages. A shift in policy is also needed from primarily blocking disinformation to more proactive narrative projection by developing and disseminating national strategic narratives that reinforce democratic values and societal cohesion. Expanding media literacy and critical thinking education is still an option; so, too, is allocating more support to independent and local media. Collaboration with allies on resilience benchmarking particularly for critical services, countering hybrid threats, and protecting critical infrastructure could bring about collective benefits in resilience building.
Reviewing the conceptual framework of national defense. Latvia has made impressive progress in defining and implementing the CND concept. However, we believe that the evolution of its conceptual framework must continue to better adhere to the complexities of real-life challenges and diverse crisis situations. As time passes, a review of the initially laid out core principles is needed. A primary concern is preventing comprehensive national defense from becoming a catch-all concept. While its all-encompassing nature is a strength there is risk that its boundaries are too wide and therefore its core purpose can become diluted, leading to a diffusion of effort and resources. For instance, if every societal issue is framed as a comprehensive national defense matter, prioritization becomes difficult and the focus on core security and defense preparedness could be lost. Future work should aim to refine the operational scope of the comprehensive national defense, ensuring it remains a focused and effective framework while clearly delineating its relationship with broader societal well-being initiatives. We need to clearly define what falls within comprehensive national defense and what is supportive but distinct to maintain its strategic integrity.
Deepening societal engagement and cohesion. Latvia should continue its efforts to make its comprehensive defense concept a nationwide reality not just a government policy on paper. As comprehensive defense evolves into a social reality, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia. Although we have seen great examples of civil engagement from businesses in actively pursuing their role in the defense system, challenges remain with broad-based individual and community-level engagement. Latvia, for various historical and societal reasons, doesn’t always exhibit the strong deeply embedded community culture seen in some other nations. This can make reaching individuals and fostering grassroots resilience initiatives more challenging. Simply put, many individuals may not yet fully internalize their role or feel connected to a local preparedness network. Achieving genuine societal cohesion and developing the resilience of individuals within their respective communities must become a more pronounced strategic goal. This requires more than just information campaigns. It means investing in local leadership development, supporting community-based organizations, designing exercises that actively involve ordinary citizens in practical ways, and perhaps leveraging existing structures like schools, cultural centers, or even hobby groups to build networks of mutual support and preparedness. The aim should be to empower individuals and communities to self-mobilize for constructive action in crisis rather than relying solely on top-down directives.
Continued advocacy for enhanced support from NATO, the EU, the United States, and regional allies for Latvia’s capability development, military modernization, joint exercises, and resilience projects is crucial, as is maximizing the prepositioning of allied military equipment and stocks. The current strategic window, while Russian forces are degraded by the war in Ukraine, should be used to rapidly build up defense capacity and societal resilience, secure continued US commitment, generate a greater NATO forward presence, deepen regional integration, and refine reinforcement mechanisms. Other regional resilience priorities include transitioning the Baltic defense line from a concept to a concrete reality with fortified positions, leveraging natural terrain, and ensuring forces train to fight effectively from these prepared positions.

Editors: Armands Astukevičs, Elīna Vrobļevska.

Contributors: Mārcis Balodis, Hans Binnendijk, Marta Kepe, Beniamino Irdi.

Annex 1: Management structure

A. Strategy and policy level

President of Latvia and National Security Council (NSC): The president, as NAF supreme commander, chairs the NSC. The NSC, comprising top state officials and security heads, advises and coordinates on national security and defense, and offers recommendations to the Saeima (see below) and Cabinet.

Saeima (Parliament): Enacts national security, defense, and civil-protection laws; approves key strategic concepts (National Security Concept, State Defense Concept); and provides parliamentary oversight.

Key committees:

National Security Committee: Prepares national security policy documents for Saeima approval.
- Defense, Internal Affairs and Corruption Prevention Committee: Oversees relevant ministries, legislation, and budgets.
- Comprehensive National Defense Subcommittee: Monitors government implementation of Comprehensive National Defense (CND) elements within the National Security and State Defense Concepts.
- Other committees: May address specific CND implementation aspects as needed.

Cabinet of Ministers (CoM): The highest executive body, implementing national CND policy, approving strategic plans and regulations, allocating resources, and directing ministries.

Key bodies:

Crisis Management Centre (CMC): Concept approval in early 2025; planned to be fully operational when legislation has been passed. Envisioned as the central, national crisis-management coordinator (monitoring, analysis, strategic planning. Its potential role in leading overall CND coordination is under active discussion.
- Ministerial-Level Working Group for CND: Chaired by prime minister or lead minister. Ensures political alignment and high-level interministerial CND strategy coordination.

B. Planning and coordination level

State Secretary-Level Working Group for Comprehensive Defense (CND): Chaired by MoD state secretary. Coordinates CND plan development, harmonization, and monitoring across ministries at the senior-civil-servant level, translating Cabinet decisions into actionable plans.

Ministry of Defense (MoD): Lead institution for the State Defense Concept/Plan and CND concept development; responsible for military defense, NAF development, and civil-military cooperation planning.

Ministry of Interior (MoI): Lead institution for public order, internal security, and the State Civil Protection Plan; oversees the State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD), State Police, and Border Guard; coordinates the Civil Defense Operational Management Centre.

Line ministries (e.g., health, transport, economy): Develop and implement sector-specific resilience plans and CND measures, ensuring continuity of essential services and participating in relevant working groups and exercises.

Bank of Latvia: Ensures financial-sector resilience, including payment systems and cash circulation, in cooperation with commercial banks.

C. Implementation and operations (state level):

National Armed Forces Headquarters (NAF HQ): The NAF’s highest military headquarters and main operational command and control entity under the chief of defense; manages NAF operations, plans/executes joint operations (peacetime, crisis, war), and coordinates with civil authorities such as the Operational Control Centre of Civil Protection.

Operational Control Centre of Civil Protection: A state-level coordination body for major crises or military threats; integrates multiagency expert groups and works closely with NAF HQ to coordinate civil-military efforts.

State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD): Primary state agency for firefighting, rescue operations, and practical civil-protection measures; implements elements of the State Civil Protection Plan.

Other key state agencies and services (e.g., Emergency Medical Service, State Police, Border Guard): Implement crisis response and resilience measures according to their mandates and plans, participating in exercises and interagency coordination.

Municipal and private-sector actors:

Civil Defense Commissions (thirty-seven at municipal level): Develop and implement local civil defense plans; coordinate local resources and crisis response (including public notification, evacuation, basic services, shelters); cooperate with regional NAF units and state services.

Private sector/critical infrastructure operators: Develop and implement business continuity plans for essential service resilience; cooperate with state and municipal authorities; may be involved in resource mobilization.

Annex 2: Framework of concepts, plans, laws, and regulations

Project editors

Armands Astukevičs is a researcher at the Center for East European Policy Studies in Riga, Latvia. Currently, he is working on his doctoral dissertation on authoritarian regime resilience. He has a master’s degree in political science from University of Latvia. Astukevičs’ previous work experience includes policy analysis and planning in the Latvian Ministry of Defense, where he focused on crisis management and comprehensive national defense issues. His current research interests relate to topics on the defense and security policy of the Baltic states, national resilience and resistance to hybrid threats, and analysis of Russia’s foreign policy processes.

Elīna Vrobļevska is a researcher and deputy director at the Center for East European Policy Studies in Riga, Latvia. She has a doctoral degree in international relations from Rīga Stradiņš University, with her thesis on “Russia’s foreign policy identity ideas and their manifestation in foreign policy (2012–2022).” Vroblevska serves as a lecturer and researcher at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Rīga Stradiņš University. Her research interests include the analysis of Russia’s foreign policy narratives and their impact on political processes, the study of Russia’s foreign policy and the security challenges it poses, as well as the examination of Russia’s activities in the information space.

Contributing authors

Mārcis Balodis is a researcher and a member of the board of the Center for East European Policy Studies. His primary research focuses on Russia’s foreing and security policy as well as Russia’s use of hybrid warfare.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Marta Kepe is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a senior defense analyst at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization.

Beniamino Irdi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also the head of strategic and international affairs at Deloitte Legal Italy and founder and CEO of HighGround, a political risk consulting firm.

Explore the program

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

The post The evolution of Latvia’s defense and security policy in resilience building appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The art of war is undergoing a technological revolution in Ukraine

Oleg Dunda — Wed, 24 Dec 2025 23:52:17 +0000

Ukraine is currently at the epicenter of radical changes taking place in the way modern wars are fought. However, much of the world is still busy preparing for the wars of yesterday. European armies are only combat-ready on paper, while the invincibility of the United States military is based largely on past victories.

The current state of affairs is far from unprecedented. In early 1940, Polish officers tried to warn their French counterparts about Nazi Germany’s new blitzkrieg tactics but were ignored. France surrendered soon after. There is still time to adapt to the transformations that are now underway, but the clock is ticking.

One of the key lessons from the war in Ukraine is the evolving role of soldiers. People are now the most expensive, vulnerable, and difficult resource to replace on the battlefield. Meanwhile, many of the core weapons systems that dominated military doctrines in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are becoming less relevant. Tanks, artillery, and other traditional systems are simply too expensive and are unsuited to the challenges created by newer technologies.

Unmanned systems of all kinds have emerged since 2022 as a fundamental element of modern military doctrine. This is radically changing everything from the structure of armies to the role of the individual soldier. Remotely controlled equipment no longer needs a large crew to support it, while individual models are becoming more compact and maneuverable. As a result, the power of unmanned weapons systems is increasing exponentially, while production is expanding to industrial scale and becoming significantly cheaper.

More and more soldiers now serve as unmanned systems operators. Those who remain in more traditional roles perform tasks such as special operations, guard duties, or logistical functions. The war being waged by Ukraine has demonstrated that the modern battlefield features a kill zone up to 25 miles deep and spanning the entire front line. This zone is controlled by drones that destroy any infantry or equipment. Combat operations are increasingly conducted by drone operators located deep in the rear or in underground bunkers.

In these conditions of drone dominance over the battlefield, any attempts to stage major breakthroughs are doomed to failure. Instead of tank columns and artillery duels, offensive operations require maximum dispersal of forces and the greatest possible camouflage. The main task of troops is to gradually shift the kill zone deeper into the enemy’s rear.

Success depends upon the ability to rapidly produce large quantities of inexpensive combat drones and continually update their control systems. Initial tactics involving single drones and individual targets are already becoming a thing of a past. Instead, operators can now use artificial intelligence to control entire fleets featuring large numbers of drones deployed simultaneously. This approach allows a single soldier to manage kilometers of front line space rather than just a few hundred meters. The result is a reduction in the need for mass mobilization and an emphasis on the professionalism and technical skills of each operator manning the front.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Combat operations now boil down to two main scenarios: Either the collapse of an enemy who is not prepared for the new intensity of combat, or a positional struggle in the style of World War I. In a protracted positional war, it is crucial to ensure control over the kill zone and maintain sufficient supplies while depriving the enemy of similar capabilities. The protection of logistics networks and the infliction of maximum damage on the enemy’s rear areas is of decisive importance.

First and foremost, this means cutting off ground supply routes. To protect logistics, armies must develop fleets of maneuverable transport drones that are not dependent on road quality and can navigate minefields. Meanwhile, to ensure the steady supply of ammunition and spare parts to underground storage points along the front lines, a mobile air defense system featuring interceptor drones is necessary.

At the strategic level, key targets are now weapons factories, logistics centers, and command posts, which are often hidden deep in the rear or located inside underground bunkers close to the front lines. Destroying these high-value targets requires guided missiles or other air strike capabilities. Military planners are therefore faced with the challenge of moving away from expensive manned aircraft toward reusable strategic drones.

Testing of fully-fledged unmanned aircraft is already underway. The transition toward unmanned aviation will open up the mass deployment of guided aerial bombs, which are significantly cheaper than missiles. In addition, strategic drones will themselves be able to act as “aircraft carriers” for kamikaze drones.

The same principles apply equally to the maritime theater of operations. Ukrainian Sea Baby naval drones have already proven themselves by destroying numerous warships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and carrying out attacks on Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

To ensure their future national security, states must focus on the mass production of unmanned systems and their components. China currently accounts for the lion’s share of component parts. This is a challenge for any country that seeks to play a role in global affairs. China must be deprived of the strategic advantages it enjoys due to its status as the leading producer of components for unmanned systems.

Many NATO generals appear to think that recent technological advances are making war cheaper and creating a more level military playing field. This is a mistake. In reality, any reduction in the cost of weapons is more than offset by the need for increased quantities.

It is also important to stress that unmanned technologies alone are not enough. Another key factor is an army’s access to reliable digital communications similar to Starlink. Without this capability, it is impossible to coordinate combat operations, collect data, and maintain connections between individual units and command structures. It is no coincidence that China is already investing billions to address this issue.

The transformation currently underway in the military sphere also increases the role of cyber warfare. Disruption to logistics, power outages, and communications breakdowns can all provide the enemy with the opportunity to advance. A hacked cyber system can expose vital defenses or dramatically reduce the possibility of recovery.

Looking ahead, technological innovation in the military must be recognized as a national priority when allocating defense budgets. This applies to everything from unmanned systems to the development of artificial intelligence.

The most important revolution must take place within the minds of today’s military generals. A comprehensive rethink of existing military doctrines is currently needed. Armies must be completely re-equipped. It is time for the top brass to acknowledge that they should either change or give way to a new generation of military strategists.

Ukraine’s experience since 2022 has confirmed that in order to be successful in modern warfare, armies should model themselves on technological giants like Amazon and SpaceX. They must embrace flexible thinking and be capable of competing in terms of implementing new innovations.

In an era of accelerated military change, all countries face a simple choice of adapting or accepting the inevitability of defeat. The winners will be those who embrace the lessons from the technological revolution currently underway on the battlefields of Ukraine.

Oleg Dunda is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament from the Servant of the People party.

What distinguishes the current moment is not just the persistence of these conflicts, but the degree to which escalation in one theater is increasingly likely to trigger responses across others. With Washington focused on a military buildup in the Caribbean and negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, US policymakers should not take their eye off the prospect of a renewed crisis in the Middle East.

Iran, proxies, and the reconstitution of deterrence

Iran’s regional strategy has long relied on a layered deterrence model built around proxies, long-range fires, and ambiguity rather than direct state-to-state confrontation. This model seeks to impose cumulative costs on adversaries while insulating Iran from direct retaliation.

According to repeated assessments by the US Department of Defense and the United Nations, Iran maintains the largest and most diverse missile force in the Middle East and continues to invest in survivability, underground basing, and production capacity. These capabilities are complemented by Iran-aligned armed groups operating across Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

From Israel’s perspective, this proxy-based deterrence architecture is an existential threat. Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack fundamentally altered Israeli threat perception by demonstrating that Iran-aligned groups could inflict a strategic shock without triggering immediate regional war. Israeli officials have since made clear that they will not allow Iran to reestablish a deterrence environment that sets conditions for similar attacks in the future.

This dynamic significantly narrows Israel’s tolerance for Iranian rearmament and proxy consolidation, particularly when combined with explicit timelines it has set for Hezbollah on its northern border.

Hezbollah, Lebanon, and the limits of state authority

Among Iran-aligned groups, Hezbollah remains the most capable militarily. Independent assessments estimate that Hezbollah possesses tens of thousands of rockets and missiles, including increasingly accurate systems capable of striking deep into Israel.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended Israel’s 2006 war with Lebanon, requires the disarmament of nonstate armed groups in southern Lebanon and the extension of Lebanese state authority. Nearly two decades later, Hezbollah has explicitly refused to disarm, framing its arsenal as a necessary resistance force.

The Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces have acknowledged that they are unwilling or unable to forcibly disarm Hezbollah. Public statements by Lebanese officials and international reporting confirm that the state lacks the capacity and consensus to enforce Resolution 1701 without risking internal conflict.

This reality has increasingly shaped Israeli planning. Israeli officials have framed the issue not as Lebanon’s unwillingness to disarm Hezbollah but its inability to do so. They have also argued that continued Hezbollah entrenchment along the border is incompatible with long-term stability. Since the 2024 cease-fire was signed between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel has been sporadically striking targets in southern Lebanon, and Iran has attempted to resupply Hezbollah with funds and weapons, exacerbating tensions that could reach a tipping point.

Gaza, phase two, and the missing path to disarmament

In Gaza, Hamas remains an armed political actor despite sustained Israeli military operations and international mediation. Hamas has explicitly rejected disarmament as a condition for any cease-fire or post war arrangement.

The US proposal for phase two of the Gaza cease-fire envisions a transition from active combat to a sustainable security and governance arrangement. However, none of the regional or international actors that have expressed willingness to participate in a future international or Arab-led stabilization force in Gaza have committed to forcibly disarming Hamas.

Arab states have made clear in public and private statements that they will not assume responsibility for Gaza if it requires direct confrontation with Hamas. As a result, phase two currently lacks an enforcement mechanism capable of eliminating Hamas’s armed capacity, leaving Israel skeptical that any interim arrangement can prevent future attacks.

This gap reinforces Israeli concerns that de-escalation without disarmament merely postpones rather than resolves conflict.

Cascading triggers across theaters

The central risk facing the region is cascading escalation.

Israeli military action in Gaza could intensify pressure along the northern border with Lebanon. Escalation with Hezbollah could increase the likelihood of direct or indirect confrontation with Iran. Iranian or Israeli strikes could, in turn, prompt the Houthis to resume missile and drone attacks against Red Sea shipping or launch long-range systems toward Israel, as they have previously done in response to regional military action.

Simultaneously, escalation elsewhere has historically coincided with increased activity by Iran-aligned groups in Iraq, including rocket and drone attacks on US and coalition facilities.

These pathways are not theoretical. They reflect repeated patterns observed over the past decade, now compressed by explicit timelines, rearmament efforts, and eroding deterrence.

Policy and the challenge of a stable end state

US policy should help shape an end state in which Israel’s security is credibly guaranteed and regional actors believe that further escalation will not produce strategic gain.

This is an exceptionally difficult balance. Historically, Iran’s use of proxies to establish deterrence has rested on its ability to convince adversaries that attacks on Iranian interests will produce widespread retaliation throughout the region. Israel, particularly after October 7, is unwilling to accept that framework and is increasingly determined to dismantle it rather than manage it.

US policy should therefore focus on restoring deterrence rather than pursuing temporary de-escalation alone. This means reinforcing credible regional defense postures, protecting maritime commerce, and ensuring that Iran and its partners understand that further proxy escalation will impose direct and cumulative costs.

At the same time, policy should define enforceable security arrangements, not aspirational ones. Stabilization frameworks in Gaza or Lebanon that lack credible disarmament or enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to reassure Israel or deter future attacks.

Finally, the creation of escalation management mechanisms that preserve decision space during crises. These include crisis communication channels, regional military deconfliction, and diplomatic engagement designed to prevent miscalculation even when underlying conflicts remain unresolved.

The region is not yet in open war. But the convergence of unresolved conflicts, proxy-based deterrence, and explicit timelines for disarmament has sharply reduced the margin for error. Preventing escalation now requires addressing not only immediate triggers, but the deterrence structures that made them possible.

The post The Middle East is on the brink of a new crisis. Here’s where it could start. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Prioritizing Canada’s investment in Arctic infrastructure

Jason C. Moyer — Tue, 23 Dec 2025 20:16:33 +0000

Bottom lines up front

Canada’s new budget promises a “generational investment” in infrastructure, with significant funding earmarked for Arctic dual-use infrastructure.
These funds advance multiple goals set by the new government: improving its military presence in the north, accessing untapped critical mineral reserves, and offering new economic opportunities to Arctic communities.
Translating this funding into tangible projects and incorporating Canada’s climate goals into their development will be critical.

The Canadian government is making a “generational investment” in its infrastructure—including pipelines, ports, and roadways. Prime Minister Mark Carney’s first federal budget, unveiled in early November 2025, establishes Canada’s long-term prosperity as a driver for this investment and enables the new government to approach linked global challenges from a place of strength. Canada’s budget process differs from the US budget process, producing a more concrete plan with less room for deviation once the budget is set. The Canadian government budget outlines actual revenue and the government’s expenditure plans. Indeed, infrastructure investments combine two priorities in the current threat landscape: economic ambition and military necessity. To achieve the stated goals of doubling Canadian exports to non-US markets over the next decade and meeting the new defense spending pledge to which NATO allies committed at the Hague summit, Canada’s new budget begins a major effort to have infrastructure catch up to ambition.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in Canada’s Arctic, where infrastructure investment has sorely lagged. Canada’s vast and remote north is a challenging environment for building infrastructure. It is costly to build and to maintain, with prohibitively high initial costs and the “tyranny of distance” often deterring investment. Amid growing international interest in the Arctic, including pressure from the United States, Canada’s north can no longer be ignored, especially as Carney’s new nation-building agenda pushes for investment in infrastructure. Investing in Canada’s northern infrastructure addresses multiple necessities: It bolsters Canada’s military footprint in the Arctic; it contributes to NATO commitments on defense spending, particularly toward the goal of 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) spent on infrastructure; it strengthens the economic opportunities available to communities in the region; and it improves access to critical minerals.

The Canadian Arctic is facing a profound period of transformation. It is warming nearly four times faster than the rest of the globe, dramatically impacting attempts to build infrastructure in the region. Permafrost thaw, less sea ice, and rising sea levels are all challenges facing Canada’s north. Ultimately, this reality needs to be central to the development of infrastructure projects in the region. Canada seeks to become a “clean energy superpower” by supporting the development of low-emission energy projects such as nuclear reactors and low-carbon liquefied natural gas. The government is pushing for the development of carbon capture and storage technologies, as well as enhanced methane regulations. It is also affirming its commitment to the industrial carbon tax. The new federal budget’s approval by parliament was only possible with support from the Green Party. The environment must remain central to Carney’s plans for economic and infrastructure expansion in order to maintain support for his minority government.

One highlight of the new budget is the Arctic Infrastructure Fund. The government is proposing C$1 billion over four years for Transport Canada to invest in “major transportation projects in the north,” including “airports, seaports, all-season roads, and highways.” These infrastructure investments have both civilian and military uses. The Mackenzie Valley Highway is a prime example of the challenges facing major infrastructure projects in the region. The all-weather highway extension is designed to connect remote communities in the Northwest Territories. While this project’s origins date back to the 1960s, it is still several years from breaking ground. The Mackenzie Valley Highway alone is projected to cost C$1.65 billion, with the majority of the cost covered by the federal government. In this context, C$1 billion over four years—while an admirable start—is simply not enough to make a significant difference. To address infrastructure needs in Canada’s north, and to transform its portion of the Arctic so it is no longer the “soft underbelly” of the North American Arctic, this funding must be only the beginning of the Canadian government’s investments. As Carney’s large-scale projects continue to unfold, the Canadian Arctic will require more resources to meet civil and military infrastructure needs and effectively project power into the north.

In late 2025, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative hosted a workshop with government officials, academic experts, and participants from the public and private sectors of Canada, the United States, and Europe. The insights gathered from these conversations helped inform this issue brief, which assesses challenges, recommendations, and opportunities for Canada’s infrastructure in the Arctic.

Recommendations for the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces

Incorporate sustainability and climate security in Arctic infrastructure planning

Many of the Canadian government’s plans for infrastructure in the Arctic are dual use in nature, with the goal of increasing its military footprint in the region. Increased military or infrastructure presence in Canada’s north will invariably have environmental ramifications. Air- and sea-based military activities can generate excessive noise levels and air pollution, while military exercises can result in soil compaction and the destruction of vegetation. As Canada grows its infrastructure footprint in the north, it will need to include countermeasures to offset this damage—such as creating specific operational zones to protect ecosystems or paying to mitigate harm done to the environment.

Despite these challenges, Canada has extensive resources at its disposal, such as NATO’s new Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE), headquartered in Montreal. This center can coordinate best practices, act as a standard-setting body, and provide guidance for allies and partners to operate sustainably in the region. Drawing on lessons from the European Arctic and adapting them for the North American Arctic is one area in which this center of excellence can benefit dual-use infrastructure projects.

Another reason to ensure infrastructure in the Canadian Arctic meets environmental standards is to support Canada’s new Climate Competitiveness Strategy. By linking climate sustainability to economic growth, the Canadian government is building a competitive advantage at a time when other Group of Seven (G7) countries and the European Union are walking back pledges to meet green targets.

Include local communities’ expertise and experiences in infrastructure development

As investments in Canada’s Arctic infrastructure increase, environmental considerations are being taken into account—and the experiences and expertise of those living in Canada’s northernmost regions must also be integrated into planning. Indigenous and local communities are on the forefront of the challenges facing the region, from sinking roads and runways to access to healthcare. Calls to work with Indigenous and First Nation communities are integrated throughout the budget.

Starting in 2025–2026, the government is allocating C$40 million over two years to Indigenous Services Canada through the Strategic Partnerships Initiative “to support Indigenous capacity building and consultation on nation-building projects,” some of which will be in the Canadian Arctic. The Arctic Infrastructure Fund, with its C$1 billion over four years, is specifically tasked with advancing Indigenous economic reconciliation. The budget highlights that “dual-use infrastructure investments in the north will reliably meet both military and local needs, and the government recognizes that Inuit, First Nations, and other communities are best placed to identify community needs.” Spending on infrastructure in Canada’s north has military, economic, and local resilience factors. Ensuring local and Indigenous perspectives are integrated into all stages of infrastructure development—from the planning stages to design, groundbreaking, and finalization of projects—will be key to ensuring the investments successfully meet the needs of both the military and the local community. Investing in roadways, ports, and railways in the Arctic, in close alignment with the local community, will amplify whole-of-society resilience in ways not yet realized.

Recognize critical minerals’ potential as a driver of infrastructure development in the region.

The Canadian government’s decision to increase investment in infrastructure and its northern territories can be partially understood by the global race for rare earth materials heating up. At the G7 meeting in Alberta, the prime minister introduced the Critical Minerals Production Alliance—a Canadian-led initiative that leverages trusted international partnerships to enhance critical mineral supply chains for collective defense and advanced technology.

Canada is one of the top five producers of ten critical minerals, and minerals account for 5 percent of Canada’s nominal GDP. Its northern regions are home to significant deposits of iron ore, gold, diamonds, and rare earth elements. The Mary River Mine on Baffin Island is one of the world’s northernmost reserves of high-grade iron ore, producing millions of tons annually. Similarly, the Hope Bay and Meliadine gold mines contribute substantially to Canada’s mineral output. These resources are critical for economic development and for national security.

Another major priority identified in the new budget is the Port of Churchill Plus. A series of projects will upgrade the Port of Churchill—Canada’s only Arctic-region deepwater port for more than 106,000 miles of coastline—and expand trade corridors with an all-weather road, an upgraded rail line, a new energy corridor, and marine icebreaking capacity. The goal is for the Port of Churchill to become a major four-season and dual-use gateway for the region. Expanded export capacity in the north through Hudson Bay will contribute to increased and diversified trade with Europe and other partners, while more strongly linking Churchill to the rest of Canada.

While this push for access to critical minerals makes sense from an economic perspective, it has several notable roadblocks to overcome. First is the lack of processing and refinement capabilities in Canada, and in the West more broadly. China has exerted a global chokehold over rare earth materials globally, partly due to its technical expertise in the processing stage. Western companies have struggled to compete with China over environmental and regulatory concerns, which leads to the second point: Extraction of critical minerals has an environmental tradeoff. Canada’s economic expansionism and green ambitions will eventually collide—likely in the critical minerals space. In the ever-shifting global market for critical minerals, Canada cannot prioritize short-term economic gain over long-term environmental consequences.

As always, one of the core challenges facing infrastructure projects in Canada’s north lies in sustaining this momentum in the long term. The narrow passage of this budget by parliament demonstrates the challenges of minority government rule. Improving affordability for average Canadians was the main refrain of those who voted against the new budget—a challenge that will not go away in the short term. In the long term, Carney must break the chronic habit of previous governments promising on defense spending without following through. The budget also highlights upcoming sacrifices—C$60 billion in total spending cuts in the next five years—including a 10 percent cut to the public sector (amounting to roughly forty thousand jobs). Although the C$1 billion in funding through the Arctic Infrastructure Fund is a strong step forward, it will need considerably more funding to meet Canada’s ambitions in the region and must be supported by action.

About the author

Jason C. Moyer is a nonresident fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Explore the program