If the trends evident in 2025 persist into the year ahead, then Western Balkan countries may increasingly need to assume greater agency in shaping their own trajectories. What follows is an overview of key developments in the past year and the issues to watch in the year ahead in this important region.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

For Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2025 was in part about looking to the past, as leaders marked the thirtieth anniversary of the US-brokered Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the Bosnian War. There were several notable commemorations of the anniversary, including in Dayton at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Spring Session, as well as in Sarajevo and Washington. These events were marked by gratitude but also uncertainty over the country’s future. The agreement was never intended to be Bosnia and Herzegovina’s lasting constitutional framework, but it has served that function for the past three decades.

The past year also raised questions about the future, with the White House and Congress bringing a sense of uncertainty to this region by sending mixed and, at times, conflicting signals. Take, for example, the Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity Act, which was attached to the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act and signed into law in December. The act calls for sanctions on those who have “undertaken actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability or territorial integrity of any area or state in the Western Balkans.” But just weeks earlier, the US Treasury lifted sanctions on Milorad Dodik, Republika Srpska’s Kremlin-friendly former leader, as well as his associates, even though he has long threatened secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

More broadly, the 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS) cast doubt on the US commitment to Europe going forward. If the United States reduces its engagement and presence in Europe, then Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has relied on international support since the 1990s for its institutional stability and capacity for effective governance, could be affected. Furthermore, the NSS created more than slight anxiety in Europe with the veiled threat of US intervention in domestic European politics.

As it adjusts to any US changes in the year ahead, Bosnia and Herzegovina should also advance its own agenda. Sarajevo should, for example, aim to advance major constitutional reforms and demonstrate its ability to complete major infrastructure projects. One such project that will test Bosnia’s capacity for governance is a proposed US-Bosnia southern interconnector pipeline, which would reduce the country’s dependence on Russian energy by importing gas via Serbia, terminating in Croatia. The pipeline is perhaps the best near-term example of a project that, if properly structured, can strengthen Bosnia’s institutions and take account of ethnic minority concerns but not be beholden to their demands. 

Serbia

Serbia has been rocked by student protests since November 2024, when a railway station canopy collapsed in Novi Sad, killing sixteen people in what the protesters view as a preventable tragedy resulting from state corruption. Whether the protesters will be successful in their demand for early elections is uncertain, though President Aleksandar Vučić has publicly alluded to the possibility.

While the EU has long shown greater patience with Vučić than many in Serbia may have hoped, the bloc’s statements in 2025 were increasingly stern regarding Belgrade’s arguably antidemocratic handling of the protests. Expect this European concern to continue in 2026 should Vučić fail to meaningfully address these protests and their underlying causes. However, Washington’s perspective toward Belgrade may diverge from that of Brussels, as the Trump administration in September 2025 committed to a new US-Serbia strategic dialogue, which signals a willingness to find common ground and work together.

Another key issue to watch in 2026 is Serbia’s move to force Russian state oil company Gazprom to divest from the Naftna Industrja Srbje (NIS) refinery in Pančevo after it became the target of US energy sanctions on Russia in October 2025. Removing Gazprom’s control from NIS is critical for Serbia’s energy and security agenda. Failure to divest would allow Russia to continue its effective control of Serbian energy and keep Serbia in US and European crosshairs when it comes to energy sanctions. Washington gave Serbia until March 24 to find an alternate owner; Hungary’s MOL Group on January 19 reached a provisional agreement to buy Gazprom Neft’s majority stake.

Albania

Albania will likely continue to make headlines in 2026 as one of the frontrunners for EU accession alongside Montenegro, and hopes are high in Tirana that it could finish negotiations by 2027. Albania is also preparing to host the 2027 NATO Summit.

However, corruption scandals among Albania’s governing elite threaten to stall the country’s accession progress. Last year, Tirana Mayor Erion Veliaj was convicted of corruption and money laundering, and corruption charges against former Deputy Prime Minister Belinda Balluku led to her temporary removal from office. Further, the National Agency for Information Society (AKSHI), the government’s main digital and information technology body, is under investigation for allegedly rigging public tenders.

These developments underscore Albania’s corruption challenge and the deepening contest between the country’s anti-corruption institutions and its entrenched political and economic interests. While Prime Minister Edi Rama’s negotiations with the EU have been effective, these recent scandals will put his government under more pressure from Brussels and could potentially slow the country’s accession timeline.

Kosovo

Prime Minister Albin Kurti has presided over an increasingly calcified caretaker government and worsening relations with Washington. In September 2025, the United States suspended the US-Kosovo strategic dialogue, the key platform for US engagement with Pristina. According to the Trump administration, it suspended the dialogue for two reasons: First, Kurti’s government failed to make measurable progress toward creating an Association of Serb Municipalities in northern Kosovo, one of the terms of the 2023 EU-brokered Ohrid Agreement between Pristina and Belgrade. Second, Kurti has proved unable to form a governing coalition after his party’s electoral victory last February.

In the aftermath of snap parliamentary elections this past December, Kurti’s Vetevendosje party will still need the support of coalition partners to form a government, but his increased share of seats in the new parliament will make this easier than after the parliamentary election in February 2025. The upcoming presidential election in March of this year will be another opportunity to help end the political paralysis in Pristina. The incumbent president, Vjosa Osmani, who is known for her positive efforts to align and cooperate with the international community, is running for reelection.

Montenegro

In 2025, Montenegro drew closer to Europe, expanded economic development, and strengthened its security and defense posture. It closed multiple EU accession chapters, welcomed a European Investment Bank office, and contributed to NATO and European efforts to push back on Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Among Western Balkan countries, Montenegro is widely seen as the frontrunner for the next EU accession. While the European Commission’s reports on the Western Balkans in 2025 highlighted more challenges than cause for praise, Montenegro continues to advance structural reforms, increase investment opportunities, and modernize its military capabilities. The next EU Enlargement Package, expected in late 2026, will be another opportunity for Brussels to assess Podgorica’s progress.

Looking ahead, Montenegro will likely continue to project a European and regional leadership role. In June, it will host the EU-Western Balkans Summit, which focuses on EU enlargement and accession. And throughout 2026 Montenegro will chair the meetings and events for the Berlin Process, the German-led initiative advancing economic integration in the Western Balkans. Beginning in November, it will also chair the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, an influential post enabling Montenegro to set the Council of Europe agenda, promote initiatives, and provide leadership on sensitive political issues.

North Macedonia

North Macedonia made incremental, if limited, progress toward EU accession in 2025. According to the 2025 Enlargement Package report, North Macedonia made some gains in rule of law, public administration reform, and the functions of democratic institutions. However, Skopje continues to hold an understandably pessimistic view of the EU accession process as driven more by political leverage than technical sufficiency.

In 2019, the country implemented the Prespa Agreement, changing its official name to the “Republic of North Macedonia” in exchange for Greece dropping its threat to veto Skopje’s accession. But North Macedonia is still bound by a 2022 agreement levied by the French adding additional requirements to overcome Bulgarian concerns by amending its constitution to recognize the Bulgarian minority in the country.

The results of the municipal runoff elections in late 2025, including in Skopje, solidified the political momentum behind Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski. Given this momentum, Skopje is unlikely to make the unpopular changes to its constitution in the year ahead. While the political instability in Bulgarian does not help, as snap parliamentary elections will be held in early 2026 for the eighth time in five years, there is little prospect of significant changes or willingness to move on this issue in North Macedonia.

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Bottom lines up front

• Many Europeans view the Davos deal over Greenland as only a temporary reprieve from a crisis in transatlantic relations.
• Europe will now have to swiftly translate the lessons from the past few weeks into building greater resilience and sovereignty, if not strategic autonomy.
• Europeans will be well advised to do more contingency planning for how to resist economic coercion, even from their allies and partners.

WASHINGTON—Relief and exasperation may have been the initial reactions across European capitals as US President Donald Trump folded the cards on his Greenland gamble from Davos on Wednesday. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte excelled once again as the unrivaled Trump whisperer, helped by a combination of financial market jitters and an unexpectedly united Europe holding its ground. Rutte’s framework deal with Trump, however scarce the details, seemed to vindicate those arguing for Europe to “engage, not escalate” with the US president.

But a day after the news of the Arctic deal from the Alps, the mood among European policymakers is shifting away from mere relief. It was Trump who threatened to remember if he didn’t get his way on Greenland, but it is the Europeans who will remember this dispute even as Trump moves on. Few are celebrating the de-escalation because of how pointless and reckless they view this latest test of the Alliance’s credibility and cohesion. And because they know it’s likely only a temporary reprieve and hardly the last transatlantic crisis they can expect from this US administration. As a result, a quiet yet dogged determination is emerging to strengthen Europe’s ability to withstand US pressure in any future scenarios brought on by a US president who is seen as unpredictable, if not erratic. In a sign of the impression the last few days and weeks have left, European Union (EU) leaders still met at a special summit in Brussels on Thursday despite the immediate issue having been defused.

Trump’s speech in Davos made an impression on European decision makers. The US president appeared to be setting the terms for negotiations, forcing Europe to choose between acquiescing on his acquisition of Greenland and maintaining US support for NATO. While doing away with any potential military action, Trump outlined a nebulous rationale of US control of Greenland: No one else could supposedly defend it, and the United States needed it to protect against adversaries. He reminded Europeans of their dependencies on the United States from energy and trade to security and Ukraine. It all looked like an attempt to boost his leverage in any of these areas. But by the evening Davos time, Trump had struck a preliminary deal with Rutte.

Europeans will want to better understand the details of that agreement and what it means for Greenland, Denmark, and Europe. As long as military options and tariffs are off the table, Nuuk’s and Copenhagen’s sovereignty are respected, and the White House’s sharp rhetoric and threats subside, then NATO and EU capitals will hold back on their criticism for now. Some may even be going back to the pretense of transatlantic dialogue, cooperation, and partnership.

But beyond the diplomatic protocol and time bought, Trump’s ready willingness to engage in brinkmanship with the alliance, Europe’s economy, and personal relationships with key leaders will have a lasting impact. Trump’s approach toward Greenland has destroyed much of the domestic political space for those arguing that Europe has a weak hand and therefore few options but to engage, assuage, and accommodate Trump. That same argument, which led the EU to accept a lopsided trade deal with the United States this past summer in pursuit of “stability and predictability” in the relationship, has taken a major hit, even if few European leaders say this out loud for now.

There are clear lessons here for Europe. Over the past few days, European resolve had been building to stand tall and stay united. Markets took note of the potential costs of that cohesion, including retaliatory tariffs and a “Sell America” turn away from US assets. Europe fared better than many expected in raising the complexity for Trump in Greenland, including by swiftly deploying even just small numbers of troops to prepare joint exercises. Denmark proved resilient and built more effective rapport with Greenlanders over historically difficult relations and, together with Europe, it made important commitments to the territory and Arctic security.

Whatever time the de-escalation over this latest rift has bought Europe, it better use that reprieve effectively. It likely won’t be the last such episode under this president. Europe will have to swiftly translate the lessons from the past few weeks into building greater resilience and sovereignty, if not strategic autonomy. Efforts to strengthen defense capabilities, defense industrial capacity, and long-term support for Ukraine are well underway. But much like Europe’s initiatives at boosting its competitiveness, intensifying trade diversification, and deepening its capital markets, these efforts require greater speed, ambition, and follow-through.

Europeans will be well advised to do even more contingency planning on how to resist economic coercion, even from partners, and make unwieldy tools such as the Anti-Coercion Instrument more effective politically. Other areas to watch in the coming months are progress on new trade and critical raw materials deals or breakthroughs on long-standing initiatives such as the savings and investment union. Front and center for European decision makers’ thinking will be the problem described in Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Davos speech of a “rupture, not a transition” in the world order. Whether they can act on his remedies of “strength at home [and] diversifying abroad” remains to be seen. 

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Bottom lines up front

• Russia’s “shadow fleet” helps Moscow avoid sanctions and poses a threat to critical infrastructure, such as undersea cables.
• While the US has started stopping suspected oil tankers, European nations have been more restrained in their direct action against such vessels.
• Especially in the Baltic region, European nations should interpret UNCLOS’s provisions broadly and ramp up interdiction of suspected vessels.

WASHINGTON—For years, Russia has operated a so-called “shadow fleet” of sanctions-evading oil tankers, which have provided revenue for the Kremlin to continue its war against Ukraine. For nearly as long, Western maritime policy toward this fleet has been reactive, legalistic, and ultimately permissive. 

That changed late last year, when the Trump administration started taking bold action against the shadow fleet to enforce its blockade of Venezuelan oil exports. By targeting the vessels, logistics, and enablers of this opaque maritime network, the United States flipped the initiative. Instead of allowing Russia to exploit legal gray zones and Western restraint, Washington forced Moscow into a defensive crouch—raising costs, increasing uncertainty, and signaling that abuse of maritime norms would no longer be consequence-free.

This matters well beyond oil tankers. Strategic initiative is not about a single sanctions package or interdiction; it is about shaping the overall operating environment. By introducing ambiguity over what it will tolerate, the United States demonstrated that Russia’s shadow fleet is not an untouchable fact of life but a vulnerability. European states—especially the Baltic and Nordic states—should recognize that this is precisely the approach they should have applied long ago in the Baltic Sea.

Russia’s “shadow fleet” is a malign actor in the Baltics

Russia’s shadow fleet is an instrument of state power operating under civilian cover. In the Baltic Sea, its malign activity has taken several forms.

First, the tankers help Russia evade sanctions. Shadow tankers—often uninsured, aging, and operating under flags of convenience—have become essential to sustaining Russian energy exports in defiance of international restrictions. Their opaque ownership structures, frequent flag-hopping, and noncompliance with safety and reporting standards create systemic risks in one of the world’s most congested and environmentally sensitive maritime spaces.

Second, the shadow fleet poses a threat to undersea critical infrastructure. The Baltic Sea hosts a dense web of pipelines, power cables, and data links essential to European security and economic life. The presence of poorly regulated, state-directed vessels with unusual loitering patterns near such infrastructure has rightly raised alarm. Several pipelines and cables under the Baltic Sea, including the Balticconnector gas pipeline and Estlink 2 power cable connecting Estonia and Finland, as well as fiber-optic cables between Lithuania and Sweden, and between Finland and Germany, have been damaged between October 2023 and December 2024. Even when direct attribution is difficult, the pattern is unmistakable: Russia has both the capability and the incentive to use maritime assets to map, probe, and potentially sabotage critical seabed infrastructure.

Third, the shadow fleet increasingly functions as a platform for hybrid operations. There are growing concerns that shadow fleet vessels serve as launchpads, logistical nodes, or intelligence enablers for drone and electronic operations. Incidents involving unidentified drones near critical sites, including major airports near Copenhagen and Oslo, underscore how maritime proximity can be exploited to project disruptive capabilities ashore while maintaining deniability.

Taken together, the shadow fleet’s actions go well beyond commerce. They are committing acts of hybrid warfare at sea.

Europe’s self-imposed restraint

Europe has taken important initial steps to address Russia’s shadow fleet. To date, the European Union has imposed sanctions on hundreds of vessels, subjecting them to port access and servicing bans. Some European countries—Finland, Estonia, Germany, and France—have boarded some suspicious vessels in the past months but have claimed a lack of sufficient grounds under international maritime law to justify permanent seizure. Most recently, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that the French navy intercepted and boarded a sanctioned Russian-linked tanker in the Mediterranean, reiterating that such operations are necessary to enforce sanctions and disrupt the shadow fleet’s role in financing Russia’s war effort.

Despite these positive steps, European nations have been unable to stop the vast majority of shadow fleet vessels from transiting the Baltic Sea, even though it is known that Russia transports around 60 percent of its seaborne oil exports using this illicit sanctions-evasion network, with many of the tankers crossing the Baltic Sea. The primary justification for this reticence to apply stronger sanctions enforcement is often legal: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principle of freedom of navigation. These are important norms—but Europe has turned them into a strategic straitjacket.

UNCLOS was adopted in 1982, in a radically different security environment. It was designed for an era when maritime threats were largely military-to-military and when civilian vessels were not routinely weaponized as tools of sabotage, coercion, and deniable attack. Today’s maritime actors possess a vastly expanded toolkit: drones, cyber capabilities, seabed interference, and hybrid operations that deliberately exploit the protections afforded to civilian shipping. 

More importantly, the legal restraint is one-sided. Russia does not respect the spirit—or often the letter—of the rules Europe clings to. Shadow-fleet vessels routinely operate without proper insurance, obscure their ownership, falsify registries, and sail in conditions that would not be tolerated for legitimate commercial shipping. These practices alone raise serious questions about seaworthiness, environmental safety, and compliance with international law. Europe is not defending UNCLOS by tolerating such behavior; it is hollowing it out. A legal regime that is systematically abused by hostile actors cannot be treated as sacrosanct if it undermines the security of those who follow it in good faith.

Time to join the momentum

By moving decisively against the shadow fleet, the United States, having never ratified UNCLOS but operating largely in accordance with its provisions as customary international law, has established the very strategic ambiguity Europe has long advocated. The US seizure and boarding of the illicit tankers demonstrate that states can reassert deterrence in the hybrid domain when they are willing to broadly interpret UNCLOS’s provisions on boarding and seizing ships, thus defending the intent—not just the letter—of maritime law.

Baltic and Nordic countries are uniquely positioned to act. They possess exceptional maritime domain awareness, capable coast guards and navies, and dense legal and regulatory ecosystems. This enables them to broadly interpret UNCLOS’s legal authority to board and seize shadow fleet tankers, especially as they violate Article 92 of UNCLOS by engaging in flag-hopping and operating without proper insurance. Coordinated pressure can raise the operational and financial costs of shadow-fleet activity and make the Baltic Sea inhospitable to Russia’s illegal and dangerous maritime practices.

By stepping up its measures against shadow fleet vessels, Europe can seize this moment to make a substantive contribution to the reform and modernization of the UNCLOS framework. This does not mean abandoning UNCLOS but interpreting its provisions broadly to uphold the values underpinning it—above all, the obligation to ensure safety at sea. The convention was never designed for a world in which civilian vessels are routinely applied to dual-use purposes. Nor did it anticipate today’s vast networks of undersea critical infrastructure, now central to national security and economic resilience.

Strategic initiative in the hybrid domain is shifting. The United States has set a clear example of the operational possibilities at hand. In this changing environment, Europe should not hold itself hostage to regulations that adversaries openly flout and deliberately weaponize. This is a chance for Europe to act decisively by forcing Russia’s shadow fleet out of the Baltic Sea and helping to reshape the maritime legal order so that it responds to today’s challenges.

Energy Sanctions Dashboard

This dashboard focuses on US sanctions and restrictive measures placed on crude oil from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela—including the unintended consequences and the lessons learned.

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Today started with ice and ended with a thaw. Shortly after a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland—in which he made his case for why the United States should own the “big, beautiful piece of ice” that is Greenland—Donald Trump announced that he had reached a “framework of a future deal” on the issue. The breakthrough came after Trump met with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, and led to the US president dropping his tariff threats against European nations that had opposed the US acquisition of the semiautonomous Danish territory. According to Trump, the deal will concern potential US rights over Greenland’s minerals, as well as the island’s involvement in his administration’s proposed “Golden Dome” missile defense system. Below, our experts shed light on all the transatlantic tumult. 

• Josh Lipsky (@joshualipsky): Chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council, senior director of the GeoEconomics Center, and former International Monetary Fund advisor  
• Matthew Kroenig (@MatthewKroenig): Vice president and senior director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
• Tressa Guenov: Director for programs and operations and senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and former US principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs 
• Jörn Fleck (@JornFleck): Senior director of the Europe Center and former European Parliament staffer

Tariff troubles

• Now that Trump appears to have backed down from both his military and economic threats, “Europe is breathing a sigh of relief,” Josh reports from the World Economic Forum, but it’s one that “will be short-lived.”
• Don’t expect Europe to jump back in to last year’s US-EU trade deal, which Brussels paused in recent days. European leaders “feel like they’ve been burned by the volatility, paid a political price at home, and want commitments that next weekend they don’t wake up to new tariff threats,” Josh tells us. “Businesses, many of which said as much privately to the Trump administration this week in Davos, want the same” sort of commitments. 
• “Markets had their say” as well, Josh writes, noting that fears of a US-EU trade war drove up bond yields in recent days. That’s “the exact kind of pressure point that made Trump relent” in April 2025 when he paused his “Liberation Day” tariffs. “With mortgage rates shooting up” in response to the volatility, says Josh, “Trump showed that he can be especially sensitive to the bond markets.”

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NATO’s next steps

• “The idea that Trump would attack a NATO ally was always hard to imagine,” says Matt, who argues that “Trump’s threats were clearly part of his now-trademark style of building leverage to force a negotiation.”
• Matt now expects a future deal to include “increased military presence in Greenland from Denmark and other NATO allies and increased access and basing for the United States.”
• The “hard work” ahead for negotiators, he explains, will be “hammering out an agreement that addresses Trump’s legitimate security concerns while also respecting the sovereignty of NATO allies.”
• Matt identifies several cases that could provide “creative solutions,” including “the United Kingdom’s ‘sovereign base area’ in Cyprus, the bishop of Urgell and the president of France’s ‘shared sovereignty’ over Andorra, and the United States’ possession of a perpetual lease in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”

The bigger picture

• But even if a deal gets done, says Tressa, Trump’s pressure campaign against Europe over Greenland could have consequences for security issues that must be solved on both sides of the Atlantic: “A sustained atmosphere of crisis has the potential to detract from Trump’s own success in getting NATO countries to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense and, he hopes, buy American products.” She points out that “many of the countries that he threatened with tariffs are the ones who have stepped up defense spending the most.” 
• Jörn agrees on the lasting impact of “Trump’s willingness to engage in brinkmanship with the Alliance, Europe’s economy, and personal relationships with key leaders.” The approach “has destroyed much of the domestic political space in Europe for those arguing that Europe has a weak hand and therefore few options but to engage, assuage, and accommodate” the US president, “even if few European leaders will say this out loud for now.”  
• Still, while “Davos is sometimes criticized for a lot of talk but little action, this year no one can doubt the forum mattered,” Josh adds. “Having Trump meet in person with leaders—privately—is where the US-European alliance was, at least temporarily, put back on track.”

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Bottom lines up front

• No fewer than five important leadership positions in Guatemala—ranging from the courts to higher education—could get new leaders in 2026.
• These institutions form the country’s most important line of defense against cartels and organized crime.
• To safeguard US interests in the region, Washington should support an appointment process that reinforces Guatemala’s rule of law.

WASHINGTON—This year, Guatemala will undergo the most consequential institutional reset since its return to democracy in 1986. Five bodies that determine who gets prosecuted, who gets protected, who gets elected, and, ultimately, who governs the country will be renewed within a tight five-month window.

The attorney general, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the comptroller general, and the rector of the University of San Carlos (USAC) all come up for selection between February and August 2026—a timing so unusual that analysts have described it as a “planetary alignment.”

Most of the posts are selected by nominating commissions composed of delegates from universities, the Bar Association, and other sectoral representatives that send shortlists to Congress or the president. Others are chosen directly by the legislature or the executive. Although intended to promote merit-based selection, the system is highly vulnerable to manipulation: Its complex composition and the influence of already captured institutions leave commissions susceptible to intimidation, vote-buying, and procedural maneuvers.

This year’s appointments process is not a mere exercise in bureaucratic housekeeping, nor is it an ideological contest between left and right. These institutions form Guatemala’s most important line of defense against cartels and organized crime, help safeguard the rule of law, and ensure fair competition. With illicit interests already moving to influence the process, this is a battle over whether Guatemala’s institutions will serve the public and the wider region or remain instruments of criminal groups for the next decade.

This past weekend underscored just how high those stakes are. On January 18, Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo declared a thirty-day “state of siege” after suspected gang members killed seven police officers in Guatemala’s capital. These killings followed sieges by authorities aiming to end riots in three prisons, in which gang-affiliated inmates had taken nearly fifty hostages. Arévalo cautioned that entrenched “political-criminal mafias” created the conditions for such violence, reinforcing the need for clean and capable institutions.

Why these institutions matter—and what has gone wrong

For decades, Guatemala has faced entrenched corruption, with criminal networks penetrating deep into the state, fueling violence and migration. Hopes for change surged with the 2023 election of Arévalo, who won over 60 percent of the vote on an anti-corruption, reformist platform. 

Yet Arévalo’s ability to deliver has been severely constrained by a legislature and, most critically, a judicial system largely captured by the so-called pacto de corruptos, or corruption pact—a loose coalition of politicians, economic elites, and criminal groups. Through the control of key institutions, these actors have shielded allies from accountability and obstructed reform efforts. 

1. The Attorney General’s Office (MP)

The Attorney General’s Office, or Ministerio Público (MP), is the state’s principal weapon against gangs and transnational criminal organizations. Its performance directly shapes public security and regional stability.

Under Attorney General María Consuelo Porras, the MP has faced widespread criticism for obstruction, and she has been sanctioned by the United States, European Union (EU), and United Kingdom for corruption. Over 93 percent of criminal cases go unaddressed, including those involving organized crime, while the MP has aggressively pursued judges, political opponents, and anti-corruption figures.

A captured MP means one thing: Criminal organizations operate with state protection. The 2026 appointment will determine whether Guatemala continues to enable these networks or begins dismantling them.

2. The Constitutional Court (CC)

The Constitutional Court (CC) is Guatemala’s highest judicial authority. Its role is to ensure the rule of law, protect investors, and act as a backstop against executive or congressional overreach.

In the past five years, however, it has moved in the opposite direction. The CC has issued rulings that have been denounced for protecting corrupt officials, weakening accountability and prosecutions, and undermining electoral integrity. 

Co-opting the court is the ultimate prize for any criminal network: With compliant magistrates, illegal acts can be in effect legalized after the fact. 

3. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE)

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) runs Guatemala’s elections and certifies results. Its independence determines whether democratic competition, rather than political mafias, decide who governs.

Despite facing immense pressure from the corruption pact, the TSE validated Arévalo’s victory in 2023. However, the body was immediately targeted by the MP and CC, which suspended magistrates, raided electoral facilities, and sought to annul the election results. Such measures raise serious concerns about institutional stability ahead of the 2027 general elections. 

With many municipalities heavily influenced by criminal groups, a weakened TSE could further destabilize the country and region. 

4. The Comptroller General (CGC)

The comptroller general (CGC) is Guatemala’s financial watchdog. When independent, this office is one of the country’s most effective tools for preventing corruption. 

When captured, it becomes a tool for shielding allies and enabling illicit contracting schemes that directly undermine fiscal integrity and free market competition. Also, given that the law disqualifies any political candidate under investigation by the CGC, a co-opted comptroller’s office can—and has been—used to selectively target political competitors. 

5. Rector of the University of San Carlos (USAC)

The head of Guatemala’s only public university wields significant influence. The rector shapes USAC’s representation in multiple nominating commissions, but the role’s reach extends far beyond academia. The university holds seats in more than fifty-three state bodies—including important financial institutions.

Under the current rector, Walter Mazariegos, who is under US sanctions, the university has appointed aligned actors to influential bodies while sidelining independent academics and students who have mobilized against corruption and fraud at the institution. On January 19, Mazariegos was sworn in as head of the nominating commission for the TSE.

An independent rector is essential for ensuring that Guatemala’s judiciary is staffed by competent professionals rather than political operatives unwilling to confront organized crime.

What role the United States can play

Guatemala is central to US regional interests, as highlighted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s decision to include the country in his first foreign trip in early 2025. In recent years, Guatemala has become a major transit route for drugs and other illicit flows, while also serving both as a source of migrants and a transit country for hundreds of thousands more. If the institutions that are meant to address illicit activity and corruption remain captured, these trends will worsen, putting US national security at risk.

Guatemala is also one of the few countries in the region to recently sign a new trade deal with the Trump administration aimed at lowering tariffs and expanding investment and exports. However, reaching these objectives seems unattainable under a Guatemalan judiciary that favors certain interests at the expense of fair competition and foreign businesses. 

For the United States, Guatemala has historically been a “friend in the Hemisphere,” as it is framed in the 2025 National Security Strategy. Guatemala remains a strong partner on issues such as drug trafficking, port security, Chinese influence, and migration. It is now time for Guatemala’s judicial institutions to align with that partnership and work for hemispheric security and prosperity rather than enabling the criminal networks that undermine them.

Here are four steps the United States can take with Guatemala in 2026.

1. Deploy proactive, sustained diplomacy

The United States should directly engage Guatemala’s party leaders, congressional blocs, and judicial elites, as well as members of the nominating commissions. The message should be unambiguous: Manipulating this year’s appointments will have consequences.

Elements of Guatemala’s private sector have financed efforts to influence appointments, largely because the current system shields them from competition and accountability. They must also understand that supporting such efforts risks diplomatic isolation and sanctions, including trade penalties, fines, and the suspension of trade benefits under the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement.  

The US Embassy should be more vocal in calling out intimidation and providing protection or asylum when necessary. It must signal that candidates and commissioners facing threats will not be left alone and help foster reformist coalition-building. 

2. Expand targeted sanctions—and use them early

The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control has already sanctioned more than fifty Guatemalan actors for corruption and anti-democratic actions. However, given the immense consequences of judicial capture, US sanctions should be broadened to target business elites financing institutional capture, commissioners accepting bribes, judges enabling impunity, and political operators coordinating interference. 

Sanctions must go beyond travel bans to restrict access to banking systems and foreign assets. To be effective, these sanctions should be extended to immediate family members of the primary targets of sanctions, who are often used to circumvent restrictions.

Measures should be coordinated with partners such as the EU and especially Spain, where several sanctioned former Guatemalan officials have relocated.

3. Support observation and transparency efforts

Washington should support the EU and Organization of American States observation missions in Guatemala, as international presence can meaningfully deter manipulation across all stages of the nomination process. 

Additionally, the unusual complexity of the 2026 appointment cycle, coupled with the high probability of illicit influence, warrants investing in transparency. The State Department should provide short-term, targeted grants to local civil society organizations and legal watchdog groups to follow the process and flag concerns in real time.

4. Mobilize the US and Guatemalan private sectors

Guatemala has the largest economy in Central America, and over two hundred US and other foreign firms have active investments in the country. Washington should encourage US businesses to communicate clearly that judicial capture will jeopardize investment and redirect capital to more stable markets. The Guatemalan private sector should also be vocal in support of a clean election process and independent candidates. 

High stakes, high reward

This year’s appointments offer a rare chance to break Guatemala’s cycle of institutional capture. Some actors are deliberately reframing the nominations as an ideological contest between left and right, hoping to shield themselves and cause US hesitation. In reality, the stakes are institutional, not ideological: It is a choice between a justice system that upholds the law and one that continues to serve criminal interests.

With a reformist executive in place and five key bodies being renewed simultaneously, the window for change is real. For US policymakers, safeguarding US strategic interests in the region requires supporting a 2026 appointments process that reinforces Guatemala’s rule of law and, in doing so, strengthens security and prosperity across the Western Hemisphere.

The post What to watch in Guatemala’s year of institutional reset appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Klaus Schwab founded the World Economic Forum in 1971, a decade after the Atlantic Council’s own birth, with a post-World War II premise that held until recently: that greater security cooperation, economic interdependence, institutional cooperation, and shared rules could prevent another global catastrophe and advance more lasting peace and prosperity in a manner that also served US interests.

Trump travels to Switzerland this week as perhaps the most forceful skeptic of that internationalist assumption ever to occupy the Oval Office. He set the stage on Saturday by threatening new 10 percent tariffs on European nations that stood in the way of his heightened efforts to acquire the Danish territory of Greenland.

Trump has pledged to slap those tariffs on NATO allies Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Finland on February 1. If those countries don’t yield, Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform, he will jack up the tariffs to 25 percent—presumably atop the tariffs he has already put on Europe—on June 1 “until such time as a Deal is reached for the Complete and Total purchase of Greenland.”

For their part, European leaders are considering a number of possible economic counterstrikes. The Financial Times reports that the European Union (EU) is considering €93 billion of new tariffs, while the French are reportedly pushing for the first-ever use of Brussels’s “Anti-Coercion Instrument.” Known as ACI, it is regarded as the nuclear option in that it could put limits on foreign direct investment, restrict US suppliers’ access to the EU market (excluding them from public tenders), and place export and import restrictions on goods and services.

That turns Davos, whose theme this year is “A Spirit of Dialogue,” into the epicenter of the worst transatlantic economic conflict in memory. European leaders hope they can still reach yet another deal with Trump. That said, one senior allied official told me it is hard to imagine common ground given Trump’s “absolutist” position that the only outcome he will accept is Greenland becoming US property. Another European official described Trump to me as an aberrational bully willing to risk eighty years of accumulated transatlantic trust to achieve territorial ambitions.

A nineteenth-century president in a twenty-first-century world 

To better understand who they’re dealing with, a long-time friend of Trump’s suggested to me that European leaders should look less to the past eighty years and more to the time before the world wars. He calls Trump a nineteenth-century US president governing in a twenty-first-century world—a leader who combines the expansionism of US President James Polk, pushing to enlarge the United States’ territorial realm as part of a “Modern Manifest Destiny,” with the twenty-first-century nationalism of current counterparts like Russian President Vladimir Putin (whom the Kremlin claims has just been asked to join Trump’s Gaza peace board), China’s Xi Jinping, India’s Narendra Modi, and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

While it was journalist John L. O’Sullivan who coined the term “Manifest Destiny,” it was Polk who popularized and implemented the notion that the United States was divinely ordained to expand its realm and spread democracy, capitalism, and American values across the entire North American continent.

To refresh your history: Polk, the eleventh US president, presided over Texas’s formal entry into the United States on December 29, 1845, though President John Tyler and Congress had initiated the process before Polk took office. That helped trigger the Mexican-American war that resulted in Mexico’s ceding of the entire American southwest to the United States. After a negotiation fraught with the risk of war, Polk acquired the Oregon Territory from Great Britain in 1846, giving the United States land for the future states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, along with parts of Montana and Wyoming, while Britain kept Vancouver Island.

That history lesson won’t hearten the leaders of Denmark or its Europeans allies, who presumably believed the nineteenth century was, well, history. Polk’s era was an age not of global governance but of sovereign states, great power competition, mercantilism, and jealously guarded spheres of influence, followed by two world wars. Diplomacy was personal and transactional—just as Trump likes it. Leaders wielded commitments as conditional and trade as an instrument of power, as was the case this week when Trump upended trade deals he had negotiated with European states to open a new fight over Greenland.

What’s further capturing conversation in Davos is Trump’s military-judicial operation that brought Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro to New York to face criminal charges, part of a heightened focus on the Western Hemisphere through his “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine; his on-again, off-again threats to strike Iranian targets in response to Tehran’s killing of protesters; the US Department of Justice’s criminal investigation into Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell; and a series of domestic events that have made global headlines, most significantly the death of Renee Good in Minneapolis at the hands of an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent.

A world-historic figure—but in what sense?

Many in Trump’s electoral base charge that he’s paying far too much attention to global affairs at the expense of their own economic struggles. However, don’t expect Trump’s focus to shift—not even in a mid-term electoral year when the Republican hold on Congress is in doubt. Trump’s eye is on history, not congressional seats.

“The world, he thinks, is where a political figure makes his mark,” writes Wall Street Journal columnist Peggy Noonan. “He desires a big legacy, still wants to show Manhattan (not to be too reductive, but there’s still something in it) that the outer-borough kid you patronized became a world-historic figure.” If that’s true regarding Manhattan, it is even more so for Davos, given that it symbolizes for Trump the club of first-tier global business leaders to which he never previously belonged.

If Trump’s aim is to be a world-historic figure—and that’s increasingly beyond dispute early in his second term—then what’s most important to ask is: world-historic in what sense? For that reason alone, it will be worth listening closely to how Trump describes himself this week in Davos and comparing that to his previous three appearances.

In 2018, early in his first administration, he declared in Davos, “America first doesn’t mean America alone. When the United States grows, so does the world.” In 2020, ten months before his electoral defeat, he highlighted two trade deals he had just closed, one with China and the other with Mexico and Canada. “These agreements represent a new model of trade for the twenty-first century—agreements that are fair, reciprocal, and that prioritize the needs of workers and families.”

Then in 2025, three days after his second inauguration, he set a far feistier tone. Appearing remotely via video, Trump declared the beginning of “a golden age of America,” speaking of the most significant US election in 129 years, lambasting his predecessor President Joe Biden, and announcing a storm of executive orders to address a “calamity,” particularly regarding immigration, crime, and inflation. He said little about the tariffs that would follow. “They say that there’s a light shining all over the world since the election,” Trump told the Davos crowd.

The big question chasing Trump this week, as I asked earlier this year in this space, is: “What sticks?”

It’s still uncertain whether Trumpism will usher in a new and enduring ideology of some sort. US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt brought the world New Deal liberalism, an ideology that has remained until this day; US President Ronald Reagan ushered in an era of internationalist conservatism that won the Cold War alongside allies, and it still lingers. When American presidents break with the past and usher in new eras, those trends tend to stick.

Many argue that Trump’s emergence underscores and advances a new nationalist era, one of nineteenth-century tenets laced with twenty-first-century technologies and geographies, even though those who know him best say Trump is not a student of history himself.

If it’s a new nationalism that’s emerging, what brand of nationalism might that be? Autocratic or democratic? Isolationist or internationalist? Realist or imperialist? The range of possibilities is immense.

A new vocabulary

What has stuck over the past year—a shift that’s palpable in Davos—is the erosion of old certainties. Trump’s emphasis on tariffs, industrial policy, and economic security has redrawn global trade rules and attitudes. His skepticism about multilateral arrangements has forced allies and partners to question systems they’ve depended upon since World War II. Trump’s blunt focus on borders, energy dominance, and the Western Hemisphere has global partners rethinking their own concepts of geography and leverage.

Davos matters this week not in terms of whether Trump will convert his listeners to his worldview, but rather because the world has already begun to change around those gathering there. The Davos vocabulary of cooperation and convergence coexists now with the new language of fragmentation, national interest, and strategic autonomy.

When he appears at Davos this week, Trump arrives with the ambitions of a nineteenth-century president confronting leaders with a twentieth-century mindset inadequate to the uncertainties of a twenty-first-century world. At this inflection point, all three eras are colliding. There’s no settled script for what comes next.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post At Davos, Trump’s 19th-century instincts will collide with 21st-century uncertainty appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As of January 13, the Human Rights News Agency, a US-based human rights group, estimated that the death toll has climbed above two thousand since the start of the protests on December 28 last year. This is while the Iranian government, as it has done previously, enacted a complete internet blackout, where the entire nation continues to remain under the world’s largest digital prison.

“I saw snipers in our neighborhood—in all these years I’ve never seen such scenes,” said Sahar, a doctoral student in the Saadat Abad neighborhood in Tehran, in a brief phone conversation via Starlink satellite connection.

Her voice was more distraught than in our previous conversations earlier in the week. She also explained how, since Saturday, fewer people have been going on the streets. “At first, there were families, old, young, but now everyone’s terrified, given the bloodbath.”

So far, Tehran’s crackdown on the demonstrations appears to have turned into a bloodbath, in which the only victims appear to be ordinary Iranian people—those who for long have been paying the price of the brutality of the Islamic regime, topped with the global isolation resulting from decades of sanctions and pressure imposed by the United States and its allies.

Against this backdrop, US President Donald Trump may have a real opportunity to be an effective dealmaker with Iran. However, if he is serious about a durable, win-win outcome for both the United States and Iranians, there is only one asset worth betting on: the Iranian people.

Today, Iranian society is more unified against the Islamic Republic than at any point since 1979. Nearly three weeks into the latest nationwide protests, this time ignited not by a single spark but by the country’s wider economic freefall, Iranians have taken to the streets in extraordinary numbers.

Speaking shortly before the regime’s blackout began, Sepideh, an Iranian journalist who has been arrested multiple times and isn’t using her last name for security concerns, explained how she believes Iran is at one of the “most dangerous junctures” in its modern history.

“There is zero possibility of reform within this regime,” she told me. “But history also shows that the [United States], the UK, and Israel don’t prioritize the Iranian people either—only their own interests. This is what makes me afraid of what’s coming.”

Asked about Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last monarch, she says with a deep sigh that “he has some supporters because there is no strong domestic opposition, as those voices have been crushed domestically over the years. But I struggle to believe in someone backed by foreign powers, tied to monarchy, and unable to form a coalition.”

Some others express a more fatalistic openness, including Sahar, who—prior to the internet blackout—told me how many Iranians “believe anything after this regime will be better. We want a complete separation of religion and state. This deck of cards needs to be reshuffled.”

These voices capture the nuances within the Iranian society today—united in its rejection of the Islamic Republic, deeply wary of foreign agendas, and desperate to reclaim agency over their own future.

For the United States, meaningful support for the Iranian people requires resisting the impulse to frame their uprising through the language of takeover or intervention, and instead prioritizing concrete protections for civilians in light of the brutal repression inside Iran. This means keeping Iran connected to the world, shielding protesters and journalists from digital isolation, and ensuring that accountability efforts target perpetrators of violence rather than a population already trapped between domestic repression and coercion from abroad.

Furthermore, it means treating internet access as humanitarian aid—funding circumvention support, satellite connectivity where feasible, and protection for independent journalists. This can help to ensure that the regime cannot repeatedly convert blackouts into a weapon of mass impunity.

An open, empowered Iranian civil society would not be a liability to US interests; it would be one of Washington’s greatest assets.

If the goal is to empower Iranians rather than freeze them into permanent victimhood, economic engagement must run alongside pressure on the state. This does not mean enriching the regime or reopening a flood-gate of funds to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-backed entities. Rather, it means expanding lawful, carefully assessed, people-to-people commerce that bypasses state hijacking and manipulation.

This includes enabling small and medium-sized Iranian businesses, freelancers, and entrepreneurs to access global markets; lifting travel bans for Iranian students, artists, medics, scientists and civil society members while banning entry to government-affiliated individuals; widening licenses that allow US and European firms to provide cloud services, payment rails, logistics support, and professional tools directly to Iranian users; and supporting diaspora-led investment vehicles that fund Iranian startups, cooperatives, and cultural industries without routing capital through regime-controlled entities. Such engagement gives Iranians income, skills, and stake—converting isolation into leverage and dignity rather than dependency.

Despite decades of sanctions, Iran has cultivated one of the most educated populations in the region and a resilient tech ecosystem that mirrors Silicon Valley’s platforms under far harsher conditions. Iranian youth have built local equivalents of Amazon, Uber, YouTube, and DoorDash with little capital and almost no global access. With the right engagement, Iran could generate trillions in long-term value—benefiting not only Iranians but also US businesses and consumers. A reintegrated Iran, charged by its people, would open a new frontier in trade, education, technology, and culture.

Meanwhile, none of this negates Iran’s military capacity. After more than four decades of isolation, Iran recently went head-to-head with the world’s most powerful militaries. Even Israeli defense analysts were surprised by some of its capabilities—proof that such sophistication does not emerge from a broken society. Beneath the Islamic regime’s aggression lies decades of scientific and technological investment made by the Iranian people themselves, who—if empowered and allowed self-determination—could become Washington’s strongest allies in the region.

Trump’s rhetoric amplifies the contradictions Iranians already live with. His warnings to Tehran and expressions of solidarity have landed with equal parts validation and fear. For some protesters, his words signal that their struggle is finally seen as entwined with an uncertainty of what’s to come. For others, Washington’s bombast risks giving the regime a pretext to paint the Iranian people’s unified dissent as foreign-engineered. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s accusations that protesters act “to please Trump” reveal just how threatening even rhetorical pressure can be to a regime terrified of losing control—one that’s now at its weakest point than ever before.

Iranians understand the stakes. They have watched Russia and China extract economic leverage from their isolation, and they fear becoming yet another bargaining chip. As Behzad, an Iranian journalist who is going by his first name for security purposes, told me, “everyone wants a piece of Iran. Sometimes I wish we lived in a poorer, smaller country; so at least we could live freely—far from domestic corruption and foreign interference.”

Still, across class, gender, and belief, Iranians remain united in one demand: the dismantling of the current regime. They do not ask the United States for bombs or saviors. They ask for surgical, effective, and thought-through support that enables them to reclaim their own agency in the absence of the current regime.

If Trump is serious about peace, stability, and a lasting legacy, the path forward does not run through air strikes or transactional deals with a failing theocracy. It runs through the Iranian people who, if given the chance, could build one of the world’s most dynamic democracies and one of Washington’s most valuable partners.

Tara Kangarlou is an award-winning global affairs journalist, author, and humanitarian who has worked with news outlets such as NBC, CNN, CNN International, and Al Jazeera America. She is also the author of the bestselling book The Heartbeat of Iran, the founder of nonprofit Art of Hope, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, teaching on humanized storytelling and journalism.

The post Voices from Iran: As rejection of government reaches all-time high, Iranians also wary of foreign intervention appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There’s a high level of interest in what happens next. The US Justice Department is undertaking a criminal investigation into Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, following a year of sparring between Powell and US President Donald Trump over interest rates. On Sunday night, Powell went public with his response to “this unprecedented action.” He called questions about the costs of the Fed’s headquarters renovation and Powell’s testimony to Congress “pretexts” for the administration’s ongoing pressure campaign. “The threat of criminal charges is a consequence of the Federal Reserve setting interest rates based on our best assessment of what will serve the public, rather than following the preferences of the president,” he said. 

How will these developments affect US and global markets, and what future actions should we expect from the White House and the Fed? We turned to our chair of international economics to make sense of it all.

• Josh Lipsky (@joshualipsky): Chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council, senior director of the GeoEconomics Center, and former International Monetary Fund advisor  

The backstory

• The clash between president and Fed chair “was a shocking escalation,” Josh tells us. “Until now, Powell had done everything possible to avoid an outright confrontation. That is what made his comments last night so powerful.” 
• Trump would prefer lower interest rates to boost consumer spending, but the Powell-led Fed, Josh says, has “remained cautious [about reducing rates], wary of sticky inflation and the potential inflationary impact of tariffs.” 
• “What is particularly surprising is the timing” of the Powell probe, Josh says, since his term as chairman expires in May, and the Fed has been cutting rates gradually in recent months.  
• “Without having to fire the Fed chair, Trump was already getting the policy outcome he wanted—and would soon have the opportunity to appoint a new ally,” Josh tells us. Still, he predicts that neither the White House nor the Fed will back down. 

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The markets

• On Monday, US and global markets were basically flat. Josh thinks this is likely due to the relatively limited economic fallout from Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs and other major events such as the US strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.  
• “Markets are choosing to wait and see rather than overreact, and they have data from Trump’s first year that suggests this strategy has worked,” he explains. 
• But Josh says this dynamic “creates a strange tension: Markets believe they can constrain the president through negative reactions, and therefore often don’t react [to Trump’s economic actions]—while the president, seeing little immediate financial cost, believes he can continue to push forward.” 

The fallout

• Since Sunday’s announcement, two US Senate Republicans have pledged to block Trump’s Fed nominees until the case is resolved. Josh predicts it will be hard to confirm a new chair while the case is pending, so it’s possible Powell could continue as temporary chair past his scheduled departure—not the result Trump desires. 
• While all this drama is unfolding, the US Supreme Court will hear arguments this week on the case of Trump’s attempted firing of Fed governor Lisa Cook over allegations of mortgage fraud. And as soon as Wednesday, the court will decide the fate of many of Trump’s tariffs, potentially putting the president at odds with the Fed and the high court at the same time. 
• “Even Wall Street will not be able to ignore” the impact of a Supreme Court tariff decision, Josh tells us. “While markets are hoping that year two looks like year one, Trump is signaling—from Venezuela to the Federal Reserve—that this time is different.” 
• Global central bankers and finance ministers are watching with concern, Josh reports, given the Fed’s role as a “global model of an independent central bank” that makes decisions for the sake of economic health rather than as a result of political pressure.  
• “This is not academic,” Josh says. The Fed “has repeatedly stabilized both the US and global economy in moments of crisis,” and “independent central banks are proven to deliver stronger growth, more jobs, and better economic outcomes. Trillions of dollars and millions of jobs are at stake.” 

The post How will the Trump-Powell clash shake the global economy?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This is the fourth chapter in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s 2026 Atlas. The Atlas analyzes the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

Evolution of freedom

Singapore’s post-independence development strategy was clear and, for a long time, well suited to the country’s advantages and constraints. A free port under British colonial rule since 1819, Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965, which made continued outward orientation an existential necessity for the city-state’s survival. Developed-country trade liberalization encouraged offshore sourcing by multinationals, enabling Singapore’s government to build an export-oriented economy anchored in foreign direct investment. It prioritized manufacturing, later adding high-end services, and used targeted industrial policy to achieve its priorities. The strategy was reinforced by disciplined macroeconomic management, public investment in world-class infrastructure, and efficient public administration.

But what made the approach distinctive was not just openness to trade and investment—it was also the degree to which the state integrated regulatory, proprietorial, and allocative power. The government planned land use, owned most of the land base, channeled compulsory savings, and exercised strategic ownership through sovereign wealth funds and government-linked companies. This tight coupling of state and market produced order and speed and made full use of a global economic environment that favored openness. At the same time, however, it embedded government discretion at the center of daily life.

The economic engine was an extensive growth model, which expanded output by adding capital and labor to a fixed land base, rather than by sustained gains in total factor productivity. Singapore incentivized multinationals to produce in the country, scaled public investment, and—critically—liberalized foreign labor inflows to keep costs predictable. That choice made sense when the priority was to build a platform economy quickly. It is less convincing as a path to future prosperity. Heavy reliance on lower-wage foreign workers depresses incentives to automate, redesign jobs, and raise productivity. At the same time, large inflows of higher-skilled foreigners add to demand for scarce urban resources and amenities, especially housing, putting pressure on prices and widening social distance. Such social distance is seen where differences in income, opportunities, and daily living conditions deepen divides between groups. In such a system, the state can point to impressive aggregate outcomes while households at the lower end experience stagnant real wages and rising costs.

Institutionally, Singapore has combined strong commercial rule of law and administrative capability with persistently narrow political competition. Elections are regular and cleanly administered, but contestation is constrained. The playing field is shaped by districting changes implemented shortly before each election; official campaign periods that last just nine days; and a long tradition of filing defamation actions against critics, including for statements made during the hustings. Mainstream media is not fully independent—there is substantive state ownership and oversight—and online speech is governed by broad statutes that give the executive sweeping, fast-acting powers. Passage of POFMA (Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act) in 2019 and FICA (Foreign Interference [Countermeasures] Act) in 2021 was justified by the government as defenses against misinformation and foreign interference, but the measures have also generated uncertainty about what is out of bounds. In practice, the fear and reality of punishment lead risk-averse citizens and institutions to overcomply. The effect is anticipatory discipline, more than visible coercion, engendering a climate in which people self-censor and where policy debate narrows.

The legal environment reinforces this equilibrium. Singapore courts are efficient, free from corruption, and commercially reliable—central reasons investors locate there. But the same state that regulates also owns land, large companies, and the largest pools of domestic savings. Political appointments, the use of civil defamation in political contexts, and the fusion of political and administrative authority create ambiguity for anyone engaged in contentious public speech or organizing. For most commercial actors, rules are clear and enforcement swift; for citizens considering robust political contestation, the boundaries are less legible and the costs potentially high. That asymmetry lowers the expected return on civic initiative and removes information the state needs for timely course correction.

The tight state-economy nexus is particularly visible in land, housing, savings, and capital allocation. Because the government owns nearly all the land and leases public housing on 99-year terms, “market prices” are necessarily shaped by policy. The Central Provident Fund (CPF) holds employees’ mandatory savings (currently amounting to 37 percent of employee compensation) and links a very large share of it to housing purchases and other government-defined uses. The sovereign wealth funds Temasek and GIC intermediate large public assets and maintain strategic holdings in major enterprises, while government-linked companies dominate substantial portions of the corporate landscape. This architecture has delivered order, speed, and scale. It has also raised economy-wide prices, encouraged rent extraction through asset inflation, and tilted returns toward capital and land rather than labor. When the state is everywhere—as de facto landlord, employer, investor, banker, business partner, regulator, customer, supplier, and even competitor in the provision of goods and services beyond public goods—experimentation by private enterprise narrows, not by prohibition but by crowding out, and by the rational impulse to align with official priorities, especially when reliant on the state for incentives or sales.

These facts sit awkwardly with conventional measures of “economic freedom,” such as those produced by the Fraser Institute or Heritage Foundation, which reward contract enforcement, low tariffs, and investment openness, have historically placed Singapore at top positions in their indexes. The economic pillar of the Freedom Index, mainly based on these same external sources, consequently ranks Singapore as the eighth most economically free country among the 164 nations covered. Those measures capture real policy strengths, but rankings such as these cannot capture how a directed ecosystem works on the ground when the state chooses where investment is most desired, sets the volume and terms of labor inflows, prices land it largely controls, and deploys large public capital to back favored sectors. Under such conditions, entrepreneurship is not forbidden, but it is less central to the model than in economies where the state is smaller and competition wider. A rules-based marketplace can coexist with discretionary steering from above. The visible results—macro stability, fast approvals, coordination in areas the state prioritizes—are valuable. But hidden costs—muted productivity incentives, lower household consumption, and limited diffusion of capability—accrue slowly and become apparent only when the external environment turns unfriendly.

Some might argue that Singapore’s example indicates that political freedom is unnecessary for economic development. After gaining independence, the government justified expanded restrictions on labor, media, and freedom of association as necessary to ensure political stability and attract foreign direct investment (FDI). But these restrictions remain in place even as South Korea and Taiwan, formerly authoritarian regimes, showed that political liberalization and a more participatory system could reinforce and enhance, not undermine, stability as economies mature (see Figure 1). In Singapore, constraints on expression—including in academia—reduce the diversity and depth of policy discussions. When dissent is costly and information selectively released, the system hears less from those who see problems first: low-wage workers, squeezed middle-class families, independent researchers, and small firms facing rising costs. This is not an abstract normative concern but rather a practical handicap in a complex, rapidly changing economy.

Figure 1. Political liberalization did not slow economic growth in South Korea or Taiwan

Gross domestic product per capita (purchasing power parity-adjusted, in 2021 constant international dollars) was obtained from the IMF data portal. The Political Rights component has been extended back to 1980 using V-Dem data and the same methodology as in the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes.

Evolution of prosperity

Singapore’s achievements on headline income are undeniable. Gross domestic product per capita has tripled since 1990, placing the country among the richest in the world. The Prosperity Index also records the country’s high levels of life expectancy and educational attainment. Singapore joined the world’s most developed countries several decades ago. These are the peers with which it should be compared, not its lower-income regional neighbors, particularly since the Singapore model of growth is clearly distinct from that of other high-income nations. An extensive growth model powered by factor accumulation leaves characteristic fingerprints. Singapore runs large current-account surpluses (over 20 percent of GDP annually since 2005) and builds fiscal buffers (persistent large budget surpluses); public investment is high; private consumption is low by advanced-economy standards; and productivity growth has been episodic outside a few frontier activities. This is the logic by which the system operates: Singapore prioritizes external competitiveness, recycles surpluses into foreign assets, and leans on a managed exchange-rate regime to hold down imported inflation and to maintain credibility. The main questions behind the numbers are how broadly they translate to all social strata and whether the current model is sustainable in the long run.

The inequality component of the Prosperity Index gives a visual answer to the first question. Compared to the Nordic European countries, Singapore has a much higher level of income inequality (see Figure 2). Other distributional measures, such as an estimated 0.7 Gini coefficient in terms of wealth inequality, point to the same conclusion. What’s more, these numbers most likely underestimate the actual level of inequality in Singapore. Most OECD countries include all legal immigrants (permanent and temporary residents) when estimating inequality, but Singapore excludes non-permanent immigrants, though they account for 39 percent of the labor force and are concentrated at the lower end of the income distribution. The country’s official measures of inequality (a 2024 Gini coefficient of 0.435 before and 0.364 after taxes and transfers) also exclude non-labor income, more than half the total. The real inequality gap in Singapore, compared with other developed countries, is probably much wider than estimated, while Singaporeans’ share of national income has almost certainly shrunk since 2014, the last time this number was released. Socioeconomic inequality is a direct product of the Singapore model, which generates costs borne by households through higher local-currency prices, crowding out of small and medium enterprises, thin wage growth at the base, and a muted share of national income going to labor and citizens.

Figure 2. Income inequality is higher in Singapore than in Scandinavian countries

Labor-market design is central to these outcomes. Liberal foreign-worker inflows have long been used to match demand cycles, contain wage pressures, and deliver what has been referred to as “labor peace.” Over time, this has reduced the incentive for employers to automate or redesign low-productivity work. A dual structure persists. At one end, a sizeable segment of the economy depends on low-paying, physically demanding and risky jobs that do not lead to productivity ladders for residents. At the other end, inflows of professionals and executives meet genuine skills needs but also fuel demand for scarce urban resources and amenities, especially housing, raising costs and intensifying competition for positional goods and elite educational tracks. The structure widens the gap between those at the lower and upper ends of the economy without building domestic capability commensurate with the country’s income level.

Housing and savings amplify the distributional effects. Singapore links a very large share of forced savings to Housing and Development Board (HDB) purchases on 99-year leases, with 76 percent of the population (down from 85 percent) housed in these government-run properties. When home values rise, owners enjoy wealth effects; when leases age and policy signals shift, uncertainty grows for households that cannot easily diversify. Land prices—set in a market the state effectively controls—ripple through business costs and wages. The expectation of continuing asset inflation encourages rent-seeking over entrepreneurship and leads families to shoulder significant leverage. A model that relies on rising asset prices to sustain consumption in a city of high living costs is one that exposes households to policy-driven valuation risk. It also depresses fertility (the 0.97 total fertility rate is among the world’s lowest) by increasing the cost of raising children in an expensive, dense, competitive urban environment.

Singapore’s 37 percent labor share of national income has been low relative to its peers, while gross operating surplus and property-related incomes loom large, at 54 percent. Government-linked firms and multinationals dominate many input and output markets, crowding out smaller domestic enterprises. Private consumption’s share of GDP (36 percent in 2024, down from 49 percent in 2001) is strikingly low for an advanced economy. These features set Singapore apart from the most prosperous and inclusive societies, where thicker wage floors, broader diffusion of capability, and less reliance on asset inflation anchor the social contract.

Education and health present a complex picture. Attainment is high and standardized test scores in math and science rank among the world’s best. But in a relentlessly competitive school system, there are concerns that heavy reliance on private tuition (70 percent of students) contributes to unequal educational outcomes and diminished social mobility by giving an advantage to those whose families can afford the extra expenditure. Additionally, translating education into broad-based opportunity is uneven since the economic structure does not generate enough high-productivity, middle-income jobs for residents outside elite tracks. Without stronger productivity growth at the firm level—driven by job redesign, automation, and diffusion of best practice—credentials do not guarantee commensurate wages. On the health front, a technocratic system achieves strong population outcomes (in terms of average life expectancy) at relatively low public cost, but it deliberately shifts financial risk to households through compulsory savings and copayments. In a city with high living costs and thin wage growth at the base, that risk burden is felt keenly even when headline indicators look strong.

Externalities are increasingly salient. Sustaining growth through population increases and construction intensifies congestion and environmental stress in a tropical, high-density city increasingly beset by climate change (high temperatures, frequent floods, rising sea level). Industry clusters that anchor the export platform—energy-intensive manufacturing, petrochemicals, aviation-related services, data centers—carry emissions and transition risks that will be costlier to manage as climate policy tightens globally. Meanwhile, the shift to attracting family offices and private wealth poses reputational and security risks—from money-laundering and accusations of “Singapore-washing” (intermediating funds through Singapore to disguise their origin or destination) to international criminal syndicates and scammers who use Singapore as a hub for their illicit activities. The result of this shift is to concentrate purchasing power in neighborhoods and assets where residents already feel priced out, with only modest spillovers to domestic capability building and financial-market depth.

When the cost of dissent is high and data releases are selective, independent journalists, researchers, and civic groups struggle to map distributional outcomes in real time. That deprives policymakers of useful feedback, early warnings, and good ideas from outside the official complex. It also erodes trust. Citizens are more likely to accept difficult adjustments when they believe the system listens to their concerns and shares risk fairly. Today, too much downside is borne by households, which face rising prices and policy-shaped asset risks while being told that government largesse through periodic non-entitlement transfers will cushion the blow. Such discretionary transfers—conditional, temporary, inadequate, and uncertain—are inferior to market wages that rise with productivity and distort political preferences by making the citizenry beholden to the governing party. 

The path forward

Singapore will not succeed in the next decade by doing more of what worked in the last half-century. The world has changed. Globalization is retrenching, the international tolerance for mercantilist policies is narrowing, and great-power rivalry is intensifying with increased willingness to use economic pressure to exact political concessions. Regional competitors—from China to Vietnam and Indonesia—combine improving infrastructure and skills with labor costs Singapore cannot match. Subsidy races in major economies are reshaping value chains and contesting investment decisions with tools Singapore cannot or should not emulate at scale. The uncertain impact of technological disruption by artificial intelligence makes investment decisions difficult and complicates long-term planning. In this environment, doubling down on a model optimized for inflows of foreign labor and capital will yield diminishing returns and increasing vulnerabilities, while wasting scarce resources.

The first imperative is to move decisively from extensive to intensive growth. That means closely linking firm survival to productivity improvement. A credible path would temper reliance on lower-wage foreign labor in ways that raise the payoff from automation, process innovation, and job redesign—especially in service sectors where productivity lags and resident employment is concentrated. It will close some firms and raise costs for others in the short run, but without this shift, wages at the base will remain thin and inequality will worsen, no matter how many transfers the government can deploy. Complementary reforms should ensure that inflows of higher-skilled foreigners are aligned with building domestic capability rather than simply satisfying short-term demand and bidding up urban resource costs.

Second, the scale and use of surpluses and reserves should be revisited, especially as the sovereign wealth funds which invest reserves have underperformed. A stronger exchange rate and slower reserve accumulation would lower imported inflation and relieve cost-of-living pressures. A larger share of fiscal resources can be redirected from broad corporate inducements and opaque industrial bets toward social spending that reduces household risk without dulling work and investment incentives. None of this implies fiscal profligacy or acting imprudently. It reflects a recognition that the opportunity cost of very large buffers, in a rich and aging society, includes foregone domestic investment in human capital, diffusion of capability, and life-cycle security.

Third, land and housing policy must be reoriented to lower systemic costs and reduce dependence on asset inflation. More retirement savings should be decoupled from housing, the long-term treatment of aging leases clarified, and the state’s control of land used to dampen, not amplify, economy-wide price pressures. Greater transparency around land pricing and HDB cost structures would improve trust and policy effectiveness, and enable better planning of investment decisions by households and businesses. Lower land costs would cascade through wages and prices, reduce the attraction of rent-seeking, and shift capital toward productive enterprise. It would also promote family formation by lowering the cost and uncertainty associated with housing, childcare, and eldercare.

Fourth, the growth playbook should move from picking winners at scale to catalyzing broad-based experimentation by private actors. Singapore has spent heavily, over decades, on research parks and sectoral “bets” that delivered mixed results. In a world where value is increasingly created in ideas, services, and intangibles, the priority should be to lower entry barriers, democratize access to data and infrastructure, and crowd in private risk-taking outside state-linked incumbents. Public capital can be powerful when it is allocated with discipline: to back competitive markets, not sustained rents; to fund diffusion of capability, not trophy projects; and to hold itself accountable to transparent criteria and sunset clauses.

Fifth, the political-legal setting must evolve in tandem with the economy. Removing the conflation of government and ruling party interest with the public interest, strengthening checks and balances on the executive’s exercise of powers, normalizing robust debate, and making distributional data routinely available would lower the implicit tax on civic initiative and improve policy through better feedback. Complex societies govern better when they listen widely and when the rules are clear and contestable—as evidenced by other Asian countries that have shown that political liberalization can coexist with order and strengthen legitimacy. Confidence in performance should reduce, not increase, the state’s reliance on ambiguity and speed in controlling speech and association.

Geopolitics adds urgency. Singapore cannot count indefinitely on frictionless access to foreign capital, technology, and markets. Practices once tolerated may be penalized. If the country continues to rely primarily on incentive-led FDI and imported labor in a city with high costs and rising environmental constraints, it will confront sharper trade-offs: either slower growth with rising inequality and social tension, or continued growth with greater external exposure and domestic fragility. Neither is an optimal strategy for the future.

The better alternative is a new “social compact” that matches the high-income status Singapore has achieved. It would place productivity and diffusion of capability at the center of economic strategy; align immigration and industrial policy with those goals; share risk more fairly with households; and widen the channels through which citizens can speak, organize, and help solve problems. It would move society from discretionary benevolence toward institutionalized confidence that rules are predictable and fair. It would sustain high income without leaning on ever-rising asset prices, grow wages at the base faster than the cost of essentials, and ease the pressures that make everyday life feel precarious to many in one of the world’s richest cities.

Singapore possesses the administrative capacity, fiscal resources, and human talent to make this transition. The PAP government, which has ruled for 66 years, faces no short- or even medium-term threat to its overwhelming hegemony. It recognizes the external and domestic challenges the economy faces, expresses concern about social mobility and social cohesion amid a “foreign-local divide,” and is attempting to “listen more” (albeit through channels and processes it controls). The government has even acknowledged that the model that got the country to where it is today is not the model that will take it further, because the world will not arrange itself to suit the old playbook. What it has not done is change the playbook. Instead, it is ratcheting up growth acceleration by placing bigger bets on “industries of the future” while holding on to established ones as a hub for “leading global firms.” Recognizing that “not everything will succeed,” the government argues that “if just one or two do, they can transform our economy and carry Singapore to the next level.” It is not moving toward political and intellectual liberalization, insisting instead that maintaining “social harmony”—given economic openness, racial and religious diversity, divisive social media and geopolitical tensions—requires holding fast to the tight rules of the past.

If Singapore changes its playbook, its freedom profile will become less lopsided—still strong on commercial rule of law and execution but balanced by more open contestation and clearer legal protections for speech. Its prosperity will be more inclusive and sustainable. Without the change, the headline numbers may stay impressive for a while, but the trade-offs will sharpen, and the miracle will appear less as a model to emulate and more as a cautionary warning. In the long run, a city-state’s greatest asset is the capability and confidence of its people. Building institutions that allow competition in markets and ideas and that trust and empower ordinary citizens, rather than domestic and foreign elites, is the surest way to keep Singapore exceptional.

Linda Y.C. Lim, professor emerita of corporate strategy and international business at the Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, has studied the Singapore economy for 50 years, and published other research on international trade and investment, women in the labor force, and overseas Chinese business in Southeast Asia. She co-edits AcademiaSG, an academic blog promoting scholarship “of/for/by Singapore.” 

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Bottom lines up front

• The ongoing election staged by the ruling junta in Myanmar is structured less as a democratic exercise and more as a managed performance of legitimacy.
• The election represents a test for neighboring nations on how much to engage with the junta to legitimize its rule.
• Regardless of the outcome of the elections, Myanmar’s unraveling will continue to destabilize the region.

On January 11, Myanmar will conduct the second phase of its general election, which began in December and will continue in a third phase later this month. When completed, it will have been the first such election in Myanmar since the 2021 military coup there. But what the ruling junta touts as a return to democratic governance is, in reality, a carefully managed exercise in self‑preservation by the generals who seized power almost five years ago. The elections, staged amid civil war and repression, will neither restore genuine democracy in Myanmar nor stabilize its fractured society. Instead, the electoral charade threatens renewed regional instability with implications for Bangladesh, India, and South Asia as a whole.

A “sham” election

Already, human rights organizations and civil society groups have condemned the process as illegitimate and incapable of meeting democratic standards. Human Rights Watch characterized the election as a “sham,” while the International Crisis Group, the International Republican Institute, and regional monitors such as the Asian Network for Free Elections have raised alarms about the absence of conditions for a credible vote.

The organizations’ concerns are valid. Myanmar’s vote is being conducted amid ongoing civil war, mass displacement, and widespread violations of political freedoms. Major opposition parties are blocked from meaningful participation. For example, the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party is contesting widely, but the National League for Democracy (NLD)—the party of imprisoned opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi—remains banned from meaningful competition, with most of its leadership detained or barred from standing. Reports indicate that civilians feel coerced into voting out of fear rather than choice. Testimonies describe pressure to vote from local authorities, military-linked administrators, and security actors, creating a climate in which participation is seen less as civic exercise and more as fearful compliance.

The geographic scope of the vote itself reflects the imbalance at the heart of this process. Rather than a nationwide election, only a portion of Myanmar’s townships are included in the polling, with the rest excluded on the grounds of conflict, insecurity, or administrative decisions that conveniently remove opposition strongholds from participation. Out of the country’s 330 townships, polling is scheduled in just 274; in other words, 56 townships—and in some assessments, even more—will not vote at all because authorities have designated them too unstable. Almost entire regions—particularly in the states of Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Sagaing, and Karenni—remain cut out of the process, highlighting how the vote is structured less as a democratic exercise and more as a managed performance of legitimacy.

Bangladesh: Caught between crisis and containment

For Bangladesh—already host to more than a million Rohingya refugees and undergoing its own fraught political transition—the outcome offers little hope of resolution. The Rohingya crisis dates back several decades, with the biggest influx happening in 2017 because of mass expulsions from Rakhine State, which occurred under the NLD-led government that many Western observers once hailed as Myanmar’s democratic success story. Successive crises since then have exposed Dhaka’s limited leverage over Naypyidaw’s rulers, whether in military uniform or in civilian dress, and these elections are unlikely to change that calculus. The forced return of refugees without guarantees of safety and citizenship remains unrealistic under a Myanmar regime seeking legitimacy rather than reconciliation.

Continued violence in western Myanmar risks further displacement toward Cox’s Bazar, in southeastern Bangladesh. The border region has also seen shifts in control by armed groups, complicating trade and security cooperation and heightening anxiety in Dhaka about criminal networks and militant spillover. Prospects for stable, collaborative border governance remain dim.

Analysts characterize the current moment as a Rohingya stalemate, warning that the junta-driven polls offer “no meaningful pathway” for resolving the crisis and that any hope of voluntary, safe return remains illusory while the junta remains in place. Bangladesh already hosts more than a million Rohingya, while fresh fighting in Rakhine since 2024 has generated another surge of displacement, estimated at 150,000 people. Dhaka has rejected requests to send election observers, interpreting them as a bid to manufacture legitimacy. The interim Bangladeshi government, under pressure from domestic rights advocates, refuses to negotiate with Myanmar authorities who have no intention of allowing a safe and dignified return.

Security concerns compound this stalemate. The northern frontier is contested by the Arakan Army, Rohingya armed groups, and splinter factions, driving militarization. Bangladesh’s fence-building and patrol deployments respond to periodic cross‑border raids and trafficking networks, while nongovernmental organizations document camp‑level violence and extortion. In this context, even small escalations could trigger humanitarian emergencies and force Dhaka into defensive postures rather than constructive diplomacy.

India: Strategic ambivalence in the face of uncertainty

India’s stance reflects a tension between strategic interests and democratic principles. New Delhi shares a long, porous border with Myanmar’s restive northwest—an area where insurgent groups have long operated across boundaries and where any new wave of refugees, fighters, or illicit flows can inflame fears about the demographic balance in sensitive frontier states such as Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland. India’s priority is to prevent these pressures from spilling deeper into its territory, a task historically underpinned by security cooperation with the Myanmar military. Yet such cooperation is now a political liability given international condemnation of the junta.

At the same time, India has clear interests in counterbalancing China in Myanmar. Connectivity and energy projects under the Act East Policy—including highways and ports—depend on at least a minimal degree of order in Myanmar. The ongoing elections, marred by conflict and exclusion, do not provide that. New Delhi faces tough choices as it seeks to balance pragmatic ties with the junta even as doing so could enable Myanmar’s authoritarian consolidation, all while Chinese-backed infrastructure and security influence deepens along India’s eastern flank. India’s recent willingness to engage a wide spectrum of actors in the region—from Myanmar’s military to the Taliban government in Kabul, which New Delhi hosted for talks in October 2025—underscores how far it is prepared to stretch diplomatic orthodoxy to protect its strategic and connectivity interests.

This pragmatism reflects security pressures as well. Since the 2021 coup in Myanmar, New Delhi has documented increased flows of arms, refugees, and insurgents into India’s northeast, with groups such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang exploiting Myanmar’s political vacuum. Analysts warn that if the junta’s authority erodes further, Indian factions could seek sanctuary across the border or develop support channels through Bangladesh, threatening to upset the demographic balance in sensitive border states. Meanwhile, India’s signature projects—the Kaladan multi‑modal transit route and the India–Myanmar–Thailand highway—remain stalled by conflict, allowing China‑aligned infrastructure to gain relative momentum. Even as India dispatches observers and calls for an “inclusive poll,” critics argue that if India aligns too closely with the junta, it would cause a future resistance‑led government to tilt more toward Beijing. The dilemma is clear: Stability is indispensable for India’s Act East calculus, but stability anchored in repression could prove strategically self‑defeating.

The regional stakes

Myanmar’s electoral theater unfolds against a backdrop of great‑power competition. China sees the process as a means to safeguard strategic corridors linking Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. For China, it is a dual‑track strategy—formal engagement with the junta, informal management of militias—ensuring continued influence regardless of electoral credibility. Beijing wants elections above all for the promise of order: Even a tightly controlled, unfair vote is preferable, from its perspective, to open-ended civil war that threatens pipelines, ports, and overland trade routes. Chinese officials have leaned on some ethnic armed organizations to enter talks with the junta, with activists alleging that elements of this pressure campaign have veered into coercive tactics. These actions underscore the lengths to which Beijing is prepared to go to secure border stability, energy corridors, and uninterrupted trade.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has sent inconsistent messages on Myanmar’s election. Publicly, the bloc signals unease and maintains a measure of diplomatic distance, showing little appetite for a strong multilateral stance. Privately, however, several member states have opened bilateral channels with Naypyidaw—through security cooperation, commercial agreements, and selective political engagement—effectively diluting ASEAN’s collective leverage. Malaysia has taken a more critical line, warning that partial elections “achieve nothing without peace,” while Vietnam has broken with the broader consensus by sending observers and portraying the polls as a possible starting point for stability.

In sum, the election functions less as a transition than as a diplomatic sorting mechanism, clarifying who will tolerate the junta for strategic gain and who will condition engagement on democratic legitimacy.

False dawn, real dangers

Myanmar’s ongoing elections do not mark a step toward democratic recovery; they mark the consolidation of an authoritarian holding pattern whose shockwaves extend far beyond Myanmar’s borders. What is unfolding is not a transition but a recalibration of power, engineered through selective participation, territorial exclusion, and coerced consent. If anything is clear for South Asia, it is that Myanmar’s unraveling is no longer contained within its borders. Elections may freeze formal politics, but the conflict itself continues to move—across borders, through refugee flows, supply routes, insurgent networks, and competing infrastructure projects.

In the absence of a coordinated regional response that prioritizes accountability, humanitarian protection, and a political settlement rooted in more than military control, this democratic crisis will only become harder to manage.

The post Neither free nor fair: What Myanmar’s ‘sham’ elections mean for the country and its neighbors appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Following the recent US operation in Venezuela, the Trump administration has revived the idea of the United States taking Greenland, and it has not ruled out using US military force to do so.
• The Danish prime minister has responded by suggesting such a move by the United States could lead to the end of NATO, the most successful alliance in history.
• A collapse of NATO over Greenland would be contrary to US national interests as defined in the Trump administration’s own recently published National Security Strategy.

STOCKHOLM—After a bumpy start with the new Trump administration in 2025, NATO enters 2026 facing what could become the worst crisis of its existence. “We need Greenland from the standpoint of national security,” US President Donald Trump said on Sunday, ignoring the warnings of Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen that the United States should stop threatening the Kingdom of Denmark or it might lead to the end of NATO.

Following the US intervention in Venezuela and the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro on Saturday, the wife of Trump’s close adviser Stephen Miller, Katie Miller, a Republican podcaster, posted on social media a map of Greenland covered by the American flag and accompanied by one word in capital letters: “SOON.” Sparking harsh reactions in Europe, the remarkable post was followed by Stephen Miller himself, who stated that Greenland should be part of the United States and that no one would militarily challenge a US takeover.

For NATO, this means the worst possible start to the year. The possibility that the United States, the leading member of the Alliance, would use its might to annex part of another ally’s territory is almost beyond imagination and a nightmare for NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. As expressed in the first paragraph of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance rests on the principles of the United Nations Charter that international disputes are settled by peaceful means, and that the parties refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the charter.

Denmark is a founding member of the Alliance, and it has been a loyal ally since 1949. In Afghanistan, Denmark fought alongside the United States in the tougher mission areas and suffered the most casualties in relation to its population of all NATO allies, apart from the United States.

There is nothing new about Greenland’s importance to US national security. An autonomous part of the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland has hosted a US military base since the 1950s for exactly that reason. A 1951 treaty between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark allows for increased US presence on Greenland if requested. But that is not what Trump is looking for, as the harsh dialogue between Copenhagen and Washington over the past year has revealed. The Trump administration argues that Greenland is part of the Western Hemisphere, and as such it should belong to the United States, which Greenland clearly opposes. This extraordinary US stance, in flagrant disrespect of international law, has caused the Danish defense intelligence service to flag the United States as a concern to Danish national security.

More broadly, the Trump administration’s stance risks dissolving the transatlantic community and putting an end to the most successful military alliance in history.

Trump has nurtured the idea of US ownership of Greenland for a long time. In his first term, he suggested a US purchase of the island on several occasions. When reelected, Trump renewed his interest, stating that “the United States of America feels that the ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity.” This time, he did not rule out the use of military force to get it. A few months later, when Rutte visited the White House, Trump suggested that NATO could help him get Greenland, a request that Rutte declined.

Trump has defended his stance, saying there are “Chinese and Russian ships everywhere” near Greenland and that Denmark cannot protect it. Former National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has emphasized the need for the United States to access Greenland’s vast natural resources. But since Denmark has signaled that the United States is welcome to increase US troop numbers on Greenland should it so wish, and Greenland has announced that it is open for business if US companies are interested, neither of these arguments make sense.

Perhaps importantly, there is a parallel interest in Greenland stemming from the tech giants with close connections to the Trump administration. As reported by Reuters and The Guardian, a circle of US tech entrepreneurs and venture capital figures is promoting Greenland as a potential site for so-called “freedom cities” and large-scale extraction and infrastructure projects. These ideas are framed through libertarian concepts of minimal corporate regulation and ambitions spanning artificial intelligence, space launches, and micronuclear energy. Several of these actors are among Trump’s largest campaign donors and investors, including investors linked to mining operations in Greenland, fossil fuels, and cryptocurrency ventures. Collectively, this cohort reportedly contributed more than $240 million to his 2024 campaign and potentially stand to benefit from a US takeover of the island.

As the United States starts implementing the “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, first by intervening in Venezuela and then quickly threatening Cuba, Colombia, Mexico, and Greenland, Europe is witnessing its strongest ally voluntarily retreat from global leadership to excel in regional dominance. “This is OUR hemisphere”, the State Department declared in an X posting on Monday to underline the launch of its new strategy, presumably sending a message to Russia and China. However, from a NATO perspective, where does this leave allies such as Canada and Denmark? Are they targets of this message as well?

Copenhagen certainly feels that way. In the past year, Denmark has substantially increased its military support in the Arctic. In January 2025, it committed 14.6 billion kroner ($2.05 billion) to Arctic defense, followed by an additional 27.4 billion kroner ($2.7 billion) later in the year. Denmark has also invested in its relationship with Greenland, including a formal apology for government abuses against Inuit women involving forced birth control in the 1960s and 1970s. On Monday, Greenland’s prime minister, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, downplayed concerns of a military takeover and repeated to the Trump administration that Greenland is not for sale. Nor, he said, are the people of Greenland interested in voluntarily becoming part of the United States.

The Trump administration’s latest escalating rhetoric about seizing Greenland has sparked intense activity in European capitals in support of Greenland and Denmark. Statements clarifying that Greenland belonged to the Greenlanders came quickly from the Nordic and Baltic capitals, and then British Prime Minister Keir Starmer followed suit, before he was joined in a statement on Tuesday by France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Denmark. NATO ally Canada has been explicit in its support as well, and Ottawa is opening a consulate in Greenland to strengthen relations further.

For NATO, Rutte’s ambition to keep the issue off the table in the Alliance is getting increasingly difficult. Rather, he is cautiously joining the diplomatic efforts to prevent a US intervention. On Tuesday, he said that NATO “collectively . . . has to make sure that the Arctic stays safe.” He added, “We all agree that the Russians and Chinese are more and more active in that area.”

Meanwhile NATO officials continue their important work to strengthen the role of the Alliance in Arctic security through increased surveillance, patrolling, exercises, and training. This work embodies the Alliance’s collective efforts to ensure security while addressing the concerns of underinvestment expressed by the Trump administration. Allies should promptly increase these efforts even further.

So far, Denmark has rejected an offer from France to send troops to Greenland as a signal of European solidarity, likely to avoid provoking the United States. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has also signaled a preference for negotiations to US lawmakers, indicating that the military threat is primarily being used to force Denmark to sell Greenland.

Regardless, diplomacy seems like the most reasonable, albeit challenging, option. Those European countries that have been able to establish good communication channels with the Trump administration, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Finland, should side with Denmark and lead efforts to settle the crisis, in a similar manner as Europe was able to support Ukraine in the peace process after Trump’s Alaska summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Rutte, another voice that has good relations with Trump, needs to engage further, as well.

The argument should be that the survival of NATO is at stake if the United States intervenes to seize Greenland, and that such a development would be contrary to US national interests. For example, the Trump administration’s own National Security Strategy (NSS) emphasizes that it is a US interest to maintain strategic stability with Russia. For that, the United States needs its European bases. Proximity matters, as the operation this past summer against Iran’s nuclear facilities clearly illustrated. Furthermore, the NSS outlines how the United States depends on Europe to succeed with its economic agenda elsewhere.

The US Congress recently went further and conditioned a range of measures in its latest defense bill to preserve NATO and US engagement in Europe. Engaging with members of Congress in Washington, DC, and with the delegations soon visiting the World Economic Forum in Davos and the Munich Security Conference is therefore crucial, as well.

Should the darkest hour come and the United States uses military force to annex Greenland, the essence of Article 5 and collective defense within NATO would lose its meaning. As Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Espen Barth Eide recently put it: “The idea of NATO will be broken if the US takes Greenland.” It would be perfectly clear to Russia, China, and other adversaries that credible extended deterrence no longer exists for Europe or Canada, and that the United States has lost its closest and most powerful allies.

The post Trump’s quest for Greenland could be NATO’s darkest hour appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The recent US capture of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro is consistent with the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy.
• While the new strategy is primarily about narrowing and prioritizing US objectives globally, it is also committed to an expansive vision of US interests in the Western Hemisphere.
• The White House should next expand its concept of “hemispheric defense” and increase its military presence, further reducing Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in the hemisphere.

WASHINGTON—The daring US operation that captured Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro and transported him to the United States to stand trial for his crimes signals a dramatic shift in US foreign policy, with implications far beyond Venezuela. The Trump administration’s decision to depose the Maduro regime is the embodiment of its recent National Security Strategy (NSS), which prioritized the defense of the US homeland and the Western Hemisphere.

While most National Security Strategies are quickly forgotten, both of Trump’s strategies have served as reliable guides to his approach to foreign affairs. His 2017 NSS announced a US focus on great-power competition, principally with China, and heralded an important shift of the United States’ attention after decades of Middle Eastern preoccupation. The president’s 2025 NSS, released in December, set about prioritizing US security interests globally and identified protection of US territory and the Western Hemisphere as the central tasks of US foreign policy. Importantly, the NSS also carved out a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, citing malign activity by “extra-hemispheric powers” as a serious threat to US national security.

As such, the recent Venezuela operation should be understood as of a piece with the president’s earlier focus on acquiring Greenland, his calls for resuming US control over the Panama Canal, and his interest in stemming the flow of narcotics trafficking and illegal migration in the hemisphere. In each instance, extra-hemispheric influence has played a significant role in galvanizing Washington’s concern: Chinese outfits own key facilities along the canal. Russia and China conduct military activity near Greenland and in the High North. And Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran hold long-standing influence in Caracas. With the Maduro capture, Washington is sending a powerful signal that it is taking the NSS seriously, and that it is prepared to act swiftly to enforce the Trump Corollary.

Beijing’s ambitions in the Western Hemisphere have long been a concern for Washington, but recent trends are particularly alarming. In late December, reports emerged that China’s People’s Liberation Army was conducting war games simulating combat in the Western Hemisphere. This news came shortly after Beijing published an official strategy for Latin America that takes an increasingly belligerent tone in asserting its regional interests there. China actively supports the destabilizing Cuban regime, including by maintaining a surveillance post on the island just ninety miles from US territory. With Beijing increasing its efforts to extend coercive economic diplomacy across the hemisphere and its public interest in West African naval access fronting the Atlantic Ocean, the Trump Corollary seems poised to clash with China’s strategic posture.

The sheer number of potential flashpoints between the United States and great-power rivals such as China under the rubric of the Trump Corollary demonstrates an important point about the administration’s strategy: While the new NSS is primarily a document about narrowing and prioritizing US objectives globally, with a lesser focus on Europe and the Middle East, it is wholly committed to an expansive vision of US interests in the Western Hemisphere. This is likely to lead to near-term adjustments to US policy, with the goal of better operationalizing the Trump Corollary to address the hemispheric challenges facing the United States.

Here are three areas to watch in the coming months.

First, under the rubric of “hemispheric defense” that guided US security strategy in the hemisphere for decades, the Trump administration should expand the geographic definition of the hemisphere for the purpose of applying the Monroe Doctrine and the Trump Corollary. By stating unambiguously that the hemisphere is broadly defined as the Aleutian Islands to Greenland and the North American Arctic to Antarctica—with Central and South America and the Caribbean in between and the Pacific and Atlantic approaches to the hemisphere included—the administration could effectively place the region in lockdown, preventing encroachment by China, Russia, and Iran.

Second, to operationalize hemispheric defense going forward, the administration should expand the rotational and permanent deployment of US land, naval, Coast Guard, and air assets in the hemisphere. As the Trump administration works to reposition US forces from legacy bases in Europe and the Middle East, it could simultaneously expand or reopen US facilities in Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. It could also seek to establish or expand rotational or permanent access agreements with US partners such as El Salvador, Ecuador, the Dutch Caribbean islands of Aruba and Curaçao, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and others.

Beyond these countries, Washington could seek a more expansive agreement with Costa Rica, which lacks a permanent military and currently allows the US military access on a case-by-case basis. A new agreement with Costa Rica could look like the comprehensive defense arrangements the United States enjoys with Pacific Island partners such as the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Micronesia. Similarly, as the administration explores its options for a broader political solution to the president’s desire to acquire Greenland, the United States could request expanded access to the island under the 1951 defense agreement and begin prepositioning anti-submarine warfare and Arctic training assets there to counter Chinese and Russian malign activity in the High North.

Third, the administration can begin leveraging such force posture changes to actively deter malign activity and advance US interests in the hemisphere. Greater US forward presence in the region would, among other outcomes, help deter Chinese and Russian collaboration with the Cuban regime, which has spread chaos and destabilization across Latin America for decades. Expanding the US presence in Costa Rica and the Dutch Caribbean would help ensure access to the Panama Canal while the administration seeks broader solutions to Chinese influence. A stronger US Coast Guard and naval presence in the Caribbean would help combat narcotics trafficking and illegal migration that pose a direct threat to the US homeland. Further north, increasing US assets in Greenland would contribute to Arctic security.

While the administration’s actions in Venezuela have shocked the world and sent a strong message to US rivals in Beijing, Moscow, Havana, and Tehran, they are likely only the starting point for a longer-term and more comprehensive reappraisal of US core interests in the hemisphere and the means to achieve them. The Trump administration has a unique opportunity, built around its NSS and its audacious Venezuela operation, to reimagine the contours of US hemispheric defense for years to come.

The post The Trump Corollary is officially in effect appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 4, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Bloomberg article titled “Trump Snatches Maduro But Leaves His Regime in Charge for Now.” He explains that the Trump administration is attempting to influence the Venezuelan vice president to secure outcomes favorable to the US.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Bloomberg on Trump’s Venezuela strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This is the third chapter in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s 2026 Atlas, which analyzes the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

Evolution of freedom

Serbia’s freedom trajectory since 1995, according to the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, falls into three distinct periods. The first is the dismal 1990s, defined by war, sanctions, and international isolation; institutions hollowed out, and the political sphere narrowed to the point of collapse. The second begins with the fall of Slobodan Milošević in 2000 and runs to roughly 2011, when the country reopened to the world and took the first steps toward European integration. The third starts around 2012, when the political environment tightened again and the gains of the previous decade began to erode. This pattern is visible in the Freedom Index: a sharp improvement after 2000, followed by a gradual downturn driven overwhelmingly by the political subindex after 2012.

The post-2000 rebound was immediate and dramatic in terms of politics and economics, but the rule of law took a more gradual turn. The political opening—competitive elections, wider latitude for civil society and media, and normalization of international relations—was the most visible change. Serbia signed bilateral investment treaties and free-trade agreements with neighbors and, in 2008, concluded a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union. Even though domestic politics remained turbulent—Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was assassinated in 2003, nationalism continued as a potent force, and Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence sparked a backlash—the trajectory differed markedly from the 1990s. European integration acted as the anchor that pulled politics and policy toward a more open equilibrium.

In 2010, the balance of incentives changed. After the global financial crisis, the EU’s enlargement energy waned; for the Western Balkans, accession increasingly looked theoretical rather than imminent. Without a credible “carrot and stick,” the reform push slowed across the region, while in Serbia, the political environment hardened against EU integration. The timing aligns with the ascent of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the rise of Aleksandar Vučić—first as prime minister in 2014 and later as president—under whom power centralized and media pluralism came under pressure. International observers like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) became increasingly critical of the country’s internal dynamics. Civic activism—still very present—operated in a tighter space.

Over the past thirteen years, the cumulative effect has been systemic: Corruption has eroded the rule of law and turned key institutions into instruments of incumbency. Elections remain formally competitive but are marked by recurrent irregularities that leave little chance for alternation. Ruling party-aligned media dominate the information space, public advertising is allocated opaquely, and the security services have targeted civil society organizations on dubious grounds. The result is a shrinking political arena in which checks and balances are increasingly performative rather than constraining.

Media pluralism has faced sustained pressure. Journalists and associations report smear campaigns, threats, and pervasive self-censorship, while access to advertising and public funds tracks political alignment. Civil society is larger and more professional than two decades ago, but its operating space has narrowed—foreign funding is stigmatized, senior officials attack prominent NGOs, and procedural burdens sap time and resources. The situation is not one of outright closure, but the cumulative friction is real.

Within the political subindex, the steepest, most persistent deterioration is in political rights—freedom of association and expression—while the elections and legislative-constraints components also weaken. The contour is recognizable: After the 2000 break, political rights jump, remain broadly stable until the early 2010s, and then trace a clear decline that, while significant, does not return to 1990s levels. Elections remain formally competitive, but the tilt in media access and state resources has grown; the legislative constraints on the executive ebb as power concentrates in the presidency.

The legal subindex tells a different story: It starts at a low point, followed by early reforms and then stasis. The first post-Milošević years saw the establishment of baseline prosecutorial and judicial reforms, but two hard problems persisted: a lack of genuine independence from the executive and the capacity to process cases in a timely, professional way. Both remain binding constraints. Serbia’s legal profile improves off its post-conflict trough and then plateaus, reflecting institutions that function day-to-day but buckle at the most sensitive interfaces with politics. The causes are structural: Building effective, impartial courts is far harder and slower than opening political space, and where EU conditionality is weak or distant, momentum lags.

The legal upswing in the 2000s reflected real change—new courts, stronger constitutional guarantees, prosecutorial reforms, and a framework closer to European norms—and informality fell as tax bases modernized and customs enforcement improved. But judicial independence and effectiveness remained the weak links: External pressure, slow case resolution, selective enforcement in high-profile economic cases, and gaps in accountability and conflicts-of-interest rules kept trust low. Those frictions continue to drag on the economy.

Within the legal subindex, Serbia’s early-2000s bump is consistent with a shift from conflict to basic legal normalcy—laws regularized, courts reopened, and administration stabilized—with only minor oscillations later. The 2019–20 dip likely reflects the major protests triggered by the murder of opposition politician Oliver Ivanović in 2018, which led many opposition parties to boycott the 2020 elections. It also reflects setbacks in judicial reform and popular distrust in legal institutions. Constitutional amendments were eventually adopted in 2022, a move that modestly improved formal judicial independence even though implementation remains contested. 

The economic subindex improves steadily from the early 2000s until the pandemic, then levels off. Its composition helps explain why. Women’s economic freedom—largely driven by statutory changes captured in the World Bank’s Women, Business and the Law global report—rises markedly in the mid-2000s. Investment freedom and trade freedom also strengthen as Serbia deepens its commercial integration with the EU and broadens ties with Russia, China, Turkey, and others. Regulatory reform—streamlined procedures, clearer company law, and liberalized capital flows—improved the investment climate, while the accession process nudged alignment on services and market-access rules. New firms entered and integrated into regional supply chains in manufacturing and agribusiness, even as legacy incumbents persisted in some sectors. This is the one domain where policy has been consistently outward-oriented over the past quarter-century, even as rule-of-law reforms slowed. In effect, Serbia decoupled economic integration from institutional convergence: It became a more open, investor-friendly production platform without moving in tandem on media freedom or judicial independence. However, challenges remain in economic freedom. Property-rights enforcement and contract execution remain below EU norms—a deterrence for smaller investors. State-owned enterprises still play an outsized role in some sectors, obstructing competition and investment freedom. The use of incentives, particularly for some foreign investors, while bringing in new capital can also distort the level playing field.

The most recent political developments underscore both the resilience of civil society and the limits of the current equilibrium. Since late 2024, large student-led protests—sparked by a fatal building collapse in the city of Novi Sad and subsequent corruption allegations in the construction industry—have broadened into a sustained challenge to the status quo. The student-led movement remains within institutional politics: It aims to contest and win elections and then reform from within. Whether it can do so without direct confrontation depends on the state’s willingness to ensure a level playing field—and on the response of powerful external patrons. In the Freedom Index, the immediate consequences fall on the political subindex, but the stakes are larger: Progress in the legal subindex will require credible insulation of the judiciary from political interference, and professional policing—areas that have lagged for a decade.

Evolution of prosperity

Serbia’s prosperity profile reflects the same three phases, but the translation from freedom to outcomes is neither automatic nor linear. In the early 2000s, as political freedoms opened and the economy reconnected to Europe, income per capita rose and the country began to narrow the gap with the regional average. Then the 2008–09 financial crisis hit Serbia, though not as hard as in many EU member states—partly because Serbia was outside the euro area and partly because of its diversified trade and investment partners. The pandemic-era shock was similar: Growth dipped but recovered quickly relative to Western Europe, helped by early access to vaccines from China and less severe energy-price pass-through due to ties with Russia. The Prosperity Index’s income component captures this series of interruptions rather than collapse.

The country’s resilience is tied to its growth model. For roughly a decade, net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have run at about 6–7 percent of GDP, with sources increasingly diversified beyond the EU. China has become a leading investor, while Serbia has also plugged into German value chains in mid-tier manufacturing. The model is not high-tech sophistication; rather, it is steady insertion into European (and to a degree global) production networks. As long as political stability held, the arrangement delivered: jobs in export-oriented plants, a stronger tradables base, and sustained convergence. The current uncertainty—whether stability can continue without institutional reform—is therefore not an abstract governance concern but a direct question about the durability of the prosperity path.

Prosperity has more dimensions than income, and Serbia’s experience across them is uneven. Health is the sharpest outlier in the pandemic period: While output fell less than in Western Europe, excess mortality was higher, reflecting more permissive lockdowns, thinner safety nets, and health-system limits. Over the long run, health outcomes have improved, but there is still a persistent gap with richer European systems; out-of-pocket costs are high by regional standards, and hospital infrastructure trails the EU core.

Education follows a less pronounced trajectory. The baseline is decent legacy human capital—Serbia inherits strong math and engineering traditions from Yugoslavia—but the system struggles with funding and modernization. The Prosperity Index’s education component rises gradually with cohort attainment and expected years of schooling, but there is no step change akin to the post-2000 political jump. The bottlenecks are familiar: teacher pay and training, infrastructure in secondary and vocational streams, and alignment with the needs of an export-oriented manufacturing base.

On income inequality, Serbia’s path in the 2000s and early 2010s conforms to a modest Kuznets-style worsening—where inequality rises during the early stages of development—as growth resumed and labor markets restructured. That was followed by a period of relative stability and, by the mid-2010s, Serbia’s Gini index was among the higher readings in Europe, reflecting how early market liberalization often rewards upper deciles first while redistribution and competition policy lag. Today’s level is close to the mid-1990s baseline, underscoring how incomplete rule-of-law reform constrains broad-based gains. Here again, the structure of growth matters: FDI-led manufacturing and construction have provided employment and some formalization, but the gains are uneven across regions and skill levels. When investment cools—because confidence dips or political risk rises—the distributional strain is quickest to reappear at the margins.

The environment and the treatment of minorities complete the picture. In environmental quality, the legacy of coal-heavy energy and industrial emissions weighs on air quality, especially in urban centers, even as gradual gains in household energy and vehicle standards help. The Prosperity Index’s environment component records a slow improvement that is vulnerable to policy drift and external shocks. The politics of a green transition are visible in the Jadar lithium project near Loznica. Touted as a strategic growth opportunity and opposed over groundwater risks, land loss, and opacity, the mining project has swung from license revocation in 2022 to partial reinstatement in 2024, reigniting protests. The episode captures the broader dilemma: aligning investment with credible environmental standards and local consent.

On minority access, the record is mixed: Legal protections exist and the worst 1990s legacies have receded, but equal access to services and opportunities depends on local administration and enforcement capacity—precisely the legal-institutional levers that have lagged. Post-2000 reforms—constitutional protections, cultural councils, and local representation—moved minority rights closer to regional norms, especially for Hungarians, Bosniaks, and Roma, but progress has stalled since 2011. Formal guarantees remain, but politicization, uneven municipal implementation, and hostile media narratives in tense electoral periods have limited real access to services and opportunities.

The interaction between freedom and prosperity is clearest in three places. First, the post-2012 slide in political rights bleeds into the economy by weakening predictability: When media scrutiny and legislative checks soften, policy becomes more discretionary, which eventually shows up as softer investment freedom and a more erratic economic policy. Second, the state capacity problems in legal matters—especially judicial independence and effectiveness—translate into higher transaction costs, slower dispute resolution, and a bias toward insiders; these are prosperity-sapping frictions, even in an open-trade, FDI-friendly regime. Third, women’s economic freedom raises the ceiling on growth by widening the labor pool and entrepreneurial base; Serbia’s mid-2000s improvement on statutory gender equality has been a quiet contributor to its industrial catch-up. The Prosperity Index registers all three channels, but the pace and breadth of gains depend on whether the political and legal pillars reinforce or undercut one another.

Finally, recent domestic politics inject new uncertainty into what had become a well-understood model. The student-led protests that began in late 2024 have matured into a more organized political movement seeking early elections and a reform mandate. It is clear that this crisis will not simply fade away. Any escalation will pose serious questions for both Serbia’s democratic trajectory and the wider Western Balkans, where progress on rule of law, civic rights, and European integration remains fragile.

Investors are studying these signals closely. Already, foreign direct investment has fallen sharply: in the first five months of 2025, net FDI inflows amounted to roughly €631 million, compared with about €1.943 billion in the same period the year before—a drop of around 67.5 percent. If the political outcome is a genuine leveling of the electoral playing field and a credible push on rule-of-law reforms, Serbia’s prosperity path could re-accelerate—foreign capital is mobile and already present at scale. But if confrontation mounts, early elections are denied, and external patrons from China and Russia harden their positions, the risk is a prolonged standstill with wider regional repercussions.

The Prosperity Index is a lagging indicator here, but its income and inequality components will tell the tale in the next few readings.

The path forward

Serbia’s way forward is not mysterious, but it will be hard. The growth model that delivered catch-up—trade openness, diversified investment partners, and insertion into European value chains—remains viable. But it is probably not going to deliver the same amount of growth in an increasingly fragmented global economy facing higher tariffs and a global slowdown in FDI. And preserving it now requires political and legal reforms that were postponed when the EU accession horizon receded. The central insight of the last decade is that while economic integration can be decoupled from institutional convergence for a time, it cannot be decoupled indefinitely. The Freedom Index already shows the cost of delay in the political subindex, and the longer the legal subindex lags, the more the prosperity gains will flatten.

The immediate priority is political. Elections must be not only formally competitive but substantively fair, with balanced media access and a clean separation between state resources and party campaigning. Legislative oversight should recover ground lost to executive centralization; if the presidency remains dominant, courts and parliament cannot perform their checking functions. Serbia’s civil society has shown it can mobilize against overreach; the question is whether that energy can produce institutional change without confrontation. A credible commitment to level competition would register quickly in the political subindex—especially in elections and political rights—and, with a short lag, in investment sentiment.

The second priority is legal. Serbia needs a judiciary that is both insulated and empowered. Independence requires appointment and promotion systems that minimize political leverage; effectiveness requires resources and management that accelerate case processing and professionalize court administration. The legal subindex’s components offer a checklist: Clarify laws and reduce contradictions; strengthen judicial independence and effectiveness; improve bureaucratic quality while tightening corruption control; maintain security without eroding civil liberties; and treat informality not as a statistical curiosity but as evidence of high transaction costs that can be lowered. Even modest improvements would be catalytic: When firms expect fair, timely adjudication, they invest more and formalize faster, amplifying the earlier economic gains due to trade and investment liberalization.

Sound economic policy should aim to keep what works and fix what jeopardizes it. The external stance—openness to EU markets, continued diversification of partners, and predictable treatment of foreign investors—has served Serbia well. But stability established by way of muted scrutiny is running out of road. A rules-first approach to fiscal policy, procurement, and state-firm relations would lower the risk premium without forcing a retreat from the country’s pragmatic geoeconomic posture. In this sense, the economic subindex’s strongest components—trade, investment, and women’s economic freedoms—are the baseline to protect, while property-rights enforcement and corruption control are the levers for raising the ceiling.

Prosperity policy should target slow variables that pay off across cycles. Health outcomes require steady investment in primary care, hospital equipment, and public-health capacity; the pandemic showed how quickly gaps widen when systems are overrun. Education needs a dual track: modernized general schooling and a serious vocational stream matched to the country’s role in regional value chains. Inequality is best tackled by sustaining labor-intensive FDI while pushing more value added into local supply chains; when more of the “last mile” of production happens domestically, wage gains spread. Environmental quality will improve when energy policy tilts toward cleaner sources and when industrial standards rise; here, alignment with EU norms is both feasible and, over time, growth-enhancing. The Prosperity Index components—health, education, inequality, environment, minorities—will move together if legal quality does its part.

Geopolitics will keep testing Serbia’s pragmatism. The country’s relative nonalignment among major powers has so far produced diversified capital and insurance against shocks. The risk is that a domestic political crisis or external confrontation would force sharper choices. The safest way to preserve room for maneuvering is institutional: Fairer elections, stronger oversight, professional courts, and trustworthy administration lower the temperature at home and raise trust abroad. Investors do not require perfection; they require predictability. The Freedom Index’s political and legal pillars are proxies for that predictability, and progress there will determine whether the Prosperity Index resumes its upward slope or plateaus.

Reenergizing the EU accession track would have effects well beyond Serbia’s borders. Because Belgrade sits at the center of the region’s unresolved files—above all, relations with Kosovo and the major constitutional and territorial agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina—building Serbian stability would lower regional tensions. A visible move from Belgrade to a more committed EU path would lower the political risk premium, unlock stalled dossiers, and revive the demonstration effect that powered reforms in earlier enlargement waves. The spillovers would be tangible—more predictable rules, faster dispute resolution, clearer procurement—and would draw in investment that binds the region more securely to European value chains. In short, if Serbia moves, the region moves; if Serbia stalls, momentum will move elsewhere in the region.

A recommitment to Serbia’s EU integration is possible. The region offers examples of rapid legal improvements when potential EU accession is real and monitored; Serbia’s own economy shows how quickly openness pays when credibility is present. What has been decoupled can be recoupled: political pluralism that is not merely formal, legal institutions that function without fear or favor, and an economy that remains as open and diversified as the past decade but under rules that are clearer and more evenly enforced. If that alignment is restored, the next readings should show the familiar pattern in reverse: first, stabilization of political rights and elections; next, a nudge up in legal quality; then, renewed momentum in investment and trade freedom—followed by broader prosperity gains that are felt not only in GDP charts but in health clinics, classrooms, and paychecks.

Richard Grieveson is deputy director at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies and a member of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group. He coordinates wiiw’s analysis and forecasting of Central, East and Southeast Europe. In addition he works on European policy analysis, European integration, EU enlargement, economic history, and political economy.

He holds degrees from the universities of Cambridge, Vienna, and Birkbeck. Previously he worked as director in the Emerging Europe Sovereigns team at Fitch Ratings and regional manager in the Europe team at the Economist Intelligence Unit.

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2026 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Against a global backdrop of uncertainty, fragmentation, and shifting priorities, we invited leading economists and scholars to dive deep into the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries around the world. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

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The post Serbia’s future depends on rebuilding rule of law and EU credibility appeared first on Atlantic Council.

All of this unfolded against the backdrop of a new administration in Washington that has been unafraid to shake up decades of US diplomatic conventions.

As 2025 comes to a close, our senior analysts at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs unpack the most prominent trends and topics they are tracking for the new year.

Khalid Azim: Three trends shaping the economic landscape

Gissou Nia: Demands for justice—and protests driven by the thirsty

Karim Mezran: North Africa is a rising priority for US policy

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Key questions remain for Palestinians

Victoria J. Taylor: Iraq must maintain unprecedented stability

Daniel B. Shapiro: A political transition in Iran approaches

Nathanael Swanson: Will the Israel-Iran cease-fire hold?

Jonathan Panikoff: A duality of possible trajectories

Three trends shaping the economic landscape

Three major macro trends will shape the Middle East and North Africa in 2026, each carrying profound implications for the region’s economic trajectory.

1. The pressure of lower energy prices
As energy revenues soften, governments across the region will be forced to make more disciplined, risk-adjusted investment decisions. The era of abundant fiscal cushions is shifting toward one that requires sharper prioritization, operational efficiency, and a clearer sense of expected returns. This will test policymakers’ ability to allocate capital effectively and to reduce long-standing subsidies and support for entrenched constituencies. These choices become even more consequential as a growing cohort of young people demand economic opportunity, purpose, and social mobility.

2. Rising debt and the cost of ambition
Fiscal tightening will coincide with an accelerating need for investment. Across the Gulf, governments are committing billions to data centers, artificial intelligence ecosystems, new power generation, and other foundational infrastructure. These projects will increasingly be financed through borrowing, especially as the current account deficit grows. The result will be higher debt levels and rising debt-servicing costs. Countries that clearly articulate their economic value proposition and demonstrate credible reform will have a competitive advantage in the capital markets. Those that do not may face steeper financing costs and slower momentum in their diversification strategies.

3. Vision 2030 ten year anniversary: A regional bellwether
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 has already reshaped the kingdom’s economic and social landscape through diversification, investment in future industries, and the creation of a more open and optimistic society. The plan’s tenth anniversary in 2026 marks a critical milestone, not only for the kingdom but for the region. The next decade will be defined not by the wealth beneath the ground, but by the wealth of human talent above it. How effectively the kingdom transitions from resource-driven growth to human capital-driven growth will influence the MENA region’s competitiveness for a generation.

Khalid Azim is the director of the MENA Futures Lab at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

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Saudi Arabia’s next horizon: Building human capital beyond Vision 2030

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Riyadh still needs to take fully support small and medium-sized enterprises—the true engines of job creation.

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Demands for justice—and protests driven by the thirsty

In 2026, expect to see more widespread protest movements for change across the Middle East and North Africa fueled by climate change and authoritarian mismanagement. Analysis of global protest movements in 2025 focused heavily on the young age of the protesters. While youth demographics have gained relevance as new communication tools have emerged over the last decades (in 2011, it was Twitter organizing the youth in the “Arab Spring”; in 2025, it’s the gaming app Discord organizing Morocco’s “Gen Z” protests), the evergreen undercurrent is frustration with corruption and elites. Resources have become scarcer due to global warming and authoritarian mismanagement, and the globe has become increasingly and overtly transactional as it shuns diplomacy in favor of kinetic means and “might is right” politics. The Middle East and North Africa are profoundly impacted by both these negative trends. With water running out in Tehran and water instability around the Nile Basin and the Tigris and Euphrates River, expect the next wave of regional protests to be driven not just by the youth, but by the thirsty.

Regional victim and survivor-centric demands for justice will also continue to grow in 2026 in countries that are emerging from conflict, experiencing government transitions, or where restive populations wish to usher in a change of rule. There is no clearer example than in Syria, where Assad’s exit one year ago opened the space for a new Syria and where a previously exiled network of Syrian lawyers, researchers, and advocates now work on transitional justice processes from inside their own country. In Iran, where the population is publicly demanding regime change, victims of protest violence, executions, and custodial deaths have organized powerful advocacy groups to demand that international processes deliver justice where domestic courts are unable and unwilling to do the job. And across the region, while many governments have been complicit in the violence in Gaza, the Arab street stands at odds with those governments and instead has demanded—alongside much of the world—that the perpetrators of the violence in Gaza be held to account.

Gissou Nia is the director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

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Dec 8, 2025

States shouldn’t waste the chance to establish a Syria Victims Fund

By Kate Springs, Celeste Kmiotek

A centralized fund would better support victims of international law violations in Syria, who face unique challenges.

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North Africa is a rising priority for US policy

North Africa is poised to move closer to the center of US regional policy for 2026. The past year of quiet US engagement, including the work of US President Donald Trump’s Senior Advisor Massad Boulos, is beginning to reduce tensions and open political space. Algeria and Morocco are edging towards some degree of a detente, creating space for practical steps on the Western Sahara file.

Additionally, Libya may see modest but meaningful progress. Headway on an agreement between the divided governments on a unified development funding mechanism may reduce parallel spending and put less pressure on the dinar, as well as release the funds for long-awaited reconstruction and modernization projects. The decision to include Libyan units from both east and west in AFRICOM’s Flintlock 2026 special operations forces exercise suggests an incremental movement on military unification in Libya, an area where US diplomacy with key partners has grown more active.

Egypt will remain an integral partner as Washington tries to deal with situations in Gaza, states located on the Red Sea, and Sudan. At the same time, renewed attention to commercial diplomacy signals a shift toward advancing US business interests across North Africa.

Taken together, these dynamics make the region harder to overlook and suggest that 2026 may be the year North Africa becomes a sustained policy priority in Washington.

Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Oct 3, 2025

US, Italy, and Turkey alignment could push the needle in Libya

By Frank Talbot and Karim Mezran

The US, Italy and Turkey can—through balanced diplomacy—reinforce the economic opportunities presented by institutional unification in Libya.

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Key questions remain for Palestinians

This was a tectonic year of realignments for the Palestinian people, as well as their heavily divided and largely powerless leadership. Next year is likely to be equally important and trend-setting—and four major threads have emerged that could shape its trajectory.

For Palestinians and what’s next for Gaza, the top four trends to look for in 2026 are the following:

1. The Trump administration’s commitment to the Palestinian issue and its willingness to engage the Palestinian Authority, which remains subject to US sanctions and restrictions. Will elements of a comprehensive peace deal between Palestinians and Israelis, like the one that Trump proposed during his first term, return?
2. What becomes of the Gaza cease-fire that the United States and international players are hoping to cement into a lasting peace deal that transforms the coastal enclave? The year 2026 is either going to be one in which Hamas is disarmed and fundamentally changed—or it will be one in which the Palestinian terror group continues to dominate Gaza’s affairs and prevent substantive change to revitalize the decimated Strip after two years of devastating warfare.
3. The prospect of Saudi-Israeli normalization—which could unlock immense potential for the kingdom, the Palestinians, Israel’s regional integration, and a regional anti-Iran coalition—is enormous. The year 2026 will set the tone for whether Saudi Arabia proceeds with integration based on its often-stated requirement for Palestinian statehood, or if this ends up in further stalemate and stagnation.
4. The fourth critically significant trend to watch is the impact the Gaza war and Israel will have on influencing voters in the upcoming midterm elections. As with the Trump election, this issue increasingly played a role in rallying US voters to the ballot box, including the high-profile race to elect New York City Mayor-Elect Zohran Mamdani. The year 2026 will reveal whether this trend persists or if it is a fad that passes once the Gaza war comes to a more permanent end.

Ultimately, 2026 will either mark the end of the Gaza war and the initiation of reconstruction and hope in the Strip—or it will perpetuate a state of stagnation and stalemate, risking a return to fighting, devastation, and more tragic deaths.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is the director of Realign For Palestine at the Atlantic Council.

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MENASource

Nov 10, 2025

A little-discussed point in Trump’s Gaza plan could be an opportunity to build interfaith understanding

By Peter Mandaville

Peace efforts don’t need more gleaming Abrahamic baubles, they need a genuine commitment to supporting grassroots religious peacebuilding.

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Iraq must maintain unprecedented stability

Amid continued regional turmoil, Iraq ended 2025 in a period of relative stability and security, avoiding being drawn into the Twelve Day War between Israel, Iran, and the United States—and holding successful parliamentary elections. The challenge for Iraqi political leaders in 2026 will not only be to maintain this unprecedented stability, but also to navigate Trump administration pressure to rein in Iran-aligned militias and avoid being pulled into the broader US maximum pressure campaign against Iran. Iraq is also likely to continue its efforts to appeal to the Trump administration through investment, pitching new energy deals to US companies, but it is not yet clear whether these efforts will be successful.

With Iranian influence in the region at an all-time low, Iraqi leaders have an opportunity to forge a more independent foreign policy that prioritizes continued partnership with the United States and differentiates Iraqi from Iranian interests. Core to this effort will be progress toward Iraq’s regional integration and strengthened political and economic ties to the Gulf and other regional partners such as Jordan and Egypt. In the face of Iraqi efforts to challenge the militias and strengthen partnerships with the United States and the Gulf, 2026 may bring attempts by Iran and Iran-aligned militias to act as spoilers who obstruct Iraq’s progress and imperil Iraq’s stability. Iraq’s next prime minister has an opportunity to transform the country.

The next year will be critical in determining whether the Iraqi government can seize the opportunity and whether the United States and other regional partners will support it in doing so.

Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East program.

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Dispatches

Dec 10, 2025

Dispatch from Iraq: The biggest challenge awaiting the country’s next prime minister

By Victoria J. Taylor 

A recent visit to Iraq following parliamentary elections reveals a growing divide between the political elite and the people.

Elections Iraq

A political transition in Iran approaches

Political transitions are hard to predict, but there is no doubt Iran is approaching one. With a frail, unpopular, eighty-six-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei nearing his actuarial and conceivably political limits, 2026 could be the year.

Any transition has the potential to unleash dramatic changes in Iran, across the region, and in relations with the United States. The potential positive implications of new Iranian leadership and a change of approach are massive: relief from brutal suppression for the Iranian people, new possibilities in nuclear diplomacy and toward normalization with the United States, broadened detente with Iran’s Arab neighbors, and an end to the arming of violent terrorist proxies across the region that have squandered hundreds of billions of dollars of Iranian resources—driven by an ideological crusade to destroy Israel—while the Iranian people endure manmade water and electricity shortages. The beneficial effects would be felt from Iran to Lebanon to Gaza to Yemen and beyond.

None of this is preordained or automatic. A transition could cement a new generation of the Islamic Republic’s clerical leadership, bring to power an even more hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or devolve into chaos and civil war with massively destabilizing effects. What Washington should engage in through 2026 is transition planning—not in order to cause a regime change, which must be left to the Iranian people, but to be prepared to provide support for the Iranian people, resources and expertise, potential sanctions relief, and coordination with international partners to assist in steering a transition when it comes toward one of the better possible outcomes. The United States has moved smartly in 2025 to support a stable Syrian transition, and while the jury is still out on long-term stability there, there has been significant progress. An even more consequential transition awaits in Iran. Washington must not be caught flat-footed.

Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Will the Israel-Iran cease-fire hold?

Following the Twelve Day War in June, Iran retains large quantities of highly enriched uranium and advanced centrifuges, without oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency. At the same time, while Iran’s missile program and support for nonstate proxies were diminished, Iran is rebuilding its capabilities and still threatens US, Israeli, and regional security.

After initially declaring Iran’s nuclear program obliterated, Trump has also repeatedly called for resumed negotiations and a new nuclear deal with Tehran. Although still nominally implementing the US “maximum pressure” campaign, Trump also made a high-profile gesture by inviting Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to the Gaza Peace Summit in October.

For its part, Iran appears to remain in a largely reactionary posture. It is attempting to rebuild its missile and defense capabilities but is not currently enriching uranium or advancing its nuclear program (that we know of). Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says Iran is open to talks at the United Nations, but also foolishly rejected the Cairo invitation. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has responded by reminding the world of the Iranian missile threat and increasingly targeting Iranian proxies. There is no written cease-fire in place, and continued peace is partially reliant on Trump holding Netanyahu back. As Israeli elections approach, will Trump’s “complete and total ceasefire” hold? Will Iran do something that gives the Israeli’s an excuse or opportunity to re-engage Iran militarily? Or will Iran give negotiations another chance? Either way, 2026 should make for a pivotal year for Iran.

Nathanael Swanson is a resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

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New Atlanticist

Nov 17, 2025

As elections loom, can Netanyahu balance Trump, Mohammed bin Salman, and his political future?

By Daniel B. Shapiro

The Israeli prime minister’s preferred path to survive a treacherous election will be to show Israeli voters that he is advancing their country’s regional integration and staying within the US president’s embrace.

Israel Middle East

A duality of possible trajectories

2026 is a year of potential opportunity—and potential peril—for the Middle East.

Gulf states are determined to advance their political, economic, and security autonomy. Syria and Lebanon could either emerge as models of forward movement from instability or revert to sectarian strife and conflict. Pockets of normalcy could continue to advance in Iraq as exists today in parts of Baghdad and other cities, or it could descend back into political stasis and conflict. Israel could find itself more secure in the region by continuing to undertake kinetic strikes, or it could choose the path of less violence by completing meaningful security and cease-fire agreements with its neighbors. Choose the wrong option, however, and Israel could find itself more vulnerable to threats on its borders, not less. Palestinians could find space to grieve and begin to rebuild after two years of devastation—or face continued violence from West Bank settlers and a renewed war in Gaza, as well as some intra-Palestinian conflict. Jordan and Egypt will continue to muddle through their economic challenges and associated domestic social and political pressures, or this will be the year that they face collapse, and the world will look back and say the warning signs were there, we just missed them. 

Most of the region has an opportunity at this moment in which it can seize and advance its desire for greater autonomy, global influence, and further integration. The Middle East can envision a calmer, more prosperous region driven by technological opportunity across sectors, including by leveraging artificial intelligence and US-exported advanced chips, while taking advantage of the economic integration pathways that are being developed, such as IMEC.

But the duality of possible trajectories laid out above reflects that in the Middle East, more often than not, positive opportunities are interrupted by internal or exogenous factors that regional capitals have to manage in a manner they did not expect. How the region grapples with the enduring and emerging risks of 2026 will determine whether it can prosper as a whole or whether only some will thrive while many continue to struggle. But if those regional countries that are advancing economically, politically, socially, and in their security only look inwards and do not seek to stabilize their neighbors facing social and physical insecurity, they will risk the latter impeding their development, as well. And then 2026 will once again be a year of missed regional opportunities instead of progress.

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

The post What will 2026 bring for the Middle East and North Africa? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

States and international organizations—including the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Gulf Cooperation Council, among others—have a vital role to play in Syria’s reconstruction and recovery, including for the hundreds of thousands of Syrians who suffered detention, torture, and abuse. But states have been responding to the conflict since its start in 2011 by initiating legal actions related to international law violations occurring in Syria. These included prosecuting companies for providing material support to terrorist organizations in Syria and imposing fines for breaching sanctions imposed in response to the conflict in Syria. From these settlements and judgments, states collected or seized significant sums—over $600 million in one instance. While the ongoing harms suffered by Syrians underpinned these cases, states have generally directed the recovered funds to their own treasuries, even as Syrians continue to desperately need international assistance to move on from over a decade of conflict.

States always had the opportunity to divert these funds to victims and survivors within Syria, but doing so while the Assad regime controlled vast portions of the country would have been complicated. Now, as states settle into their relationship with the interim government in Damascus, they should redirect the penalties they’ve collected to the underlying victims who were directly harmed. This support should be facilitated through an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund—a mechanism for states to transfer Syria-linked funds collected from monetary judgements to a central location to better support victims of international law violations in Syria. The Strategic Litigation Project and a working group of Syrian civil society representatives have been advocating for such a fund for the past several years.

Urgent needs in Syria remain

For victims and survivors of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other human rights violations in Syria, the fall of the Assad regime marked a turning point in Syria’s history and an end to fifty-three years of state-enforced repression. It also presented significant opportunities—namely, increased access by international organizations and observers to those in need of assistance in previously inaccessible areas of the country. Both international and domestic human rights defenders and humanitarian workers have already begun administering legal and medical aid to victims and survivors living in former regime-controlled areas, and investigators have begun cataloging former detention sites and exhuming mass graves to identify the bodies recovered. Regime records are helping identify the fate of those missing.

However, the country still faces dire needs across all sectors to recover from the past decades of conflict and repression. States, international organizations, and civil society moved swiftly to support Syria after Assad fell —including lifting sanctions and providing millions in aid—but a year of aid remains insufficient in the face of decades of grievous harm, especially in light of US foreign aid cuts. While many Syrians across the country face similar humanitarian needs—such as a lack of medical, legal, or education support, the danger of unexploded ordinances, and general reconstruction in many areas devastated by the conflict—victim and survivor communities across Syria face unique challenges.

Thousands of regime detainees (who were often arbitrarily detained and subject to torture and other violations) freed from Assad’s brutal prison system—such as Sednaya prison, which has been referred to by Syrians as a “human slaughterhouse”—now need assistance in rebuilding their lives. These freed detainees, and other survivors of the hundreds of thousands of Syrians subject to regime detention, torture, and other abuses, require specialized medical care. Survivors and families of the over 500,000 Syrians believed to have been killed and of the over 100,000 believed to have been forcibly disappeared additionally require specialized psychosocial, legal, and other related aid.

Opportunities for asset collection

As Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces moved toward the Syrian capital in December 2024 in a rapid offensive across the country, regime officials—including financial administrators, leaders of state security forces, and Assad himself—fled the country in droves. Many are known or believed to have relocated their valuables and portable assets out of Syria or to have fled to the jurisdictions where they had stashed their wealth before Assad fell. Investigators should now follow the trails of evidence left behind to identify and collect these private assets.

Experts such as those at intelligence firm Alaco have indicated their long-held belief that the Assad family’s and associates’ wealth—largely accumulated through drug trafficking, corruption, and market manipulation—is in tax havens abroad. Many high-ranking government, military, and business officials connected to the regime fled to Russia to escape rebel forces. Others simply disappeared, along with millions of dollars collected through corruption and money laundering. Financial Times investigators have already uncovered troves of documents and intelligence related not only to the years of illicit wealth accumulation and the financing of human rights abuses but also to where Assad and his associates may have moved their ill-gotten wealth as they fled.

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MENASource

Dec 7, 2025

One year after Assad’s fall, here’s what’s needed to advance justice for Syrians

By Elise Baker and Ahmad Helmi

The second year of a post-Assad Syria requires structural reform, victim-centered leadership, and international reinforcement.

Democratic Transitions International Norms

According to reporting from Reuters, as opposition forces closed in on Damascus, Assad transported significant wealth to the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—including at least fifty thousand dollars in cash, as well as documents, laptops, and artwork. Reuters reported that the assets moved to the UAE reportedly included financial records, real estate, and partnerships, and details of cash transfers, offshore companies, and accounts.

Documents and intelligence recovered by HTS forces after the fall of the regime additionally revealed previously unknown dealings between prominent Syrian businessmen and the Syrian state, including millions poured into the infamous Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, known for committing severe human rights abuses and stealing from the civilian population during the war.

States should now dedicate resources to identifying ill-gotten assets in their jurisdictions, pursuing legal processes to seize the funds, and repurposing them for disbursement to the Syria Victims Fund. Pursuing these actions prevents private actors from profiting off atrocities and creates an easy and sustainable pathway for states to support Syrian victims and survivors.  

While assets moved to authoritarian states such as Russia may be difficult to recover, international investigators should dedicate resources to analyzing recently revealed information and recovering this ill-gotten wealth from states with asset recovery frameworks in place. Legal teams have in the past successfully secured asset freezes linked to the Assad family’s misconduct in Syria—for example, the collection by a Spanish court in 2017 of the assets of Rifat al-Assad, the uncle of Bashar al-Assad.

The need for a Syria Victims Fund

The Syrian interim government is developing a state-led transitional justice plan  through the recently established National Commission for Transitional Justice and the National Commission for the Missing. This is welcome news, and the interim government must continue its efforts to work with Syrian civil society, victims and survivors, and others to create a comprehensive and representative plan. However, the urgent needs for victim communities in Syria necessitate an immediate response, and the Syria Victims Fund can fill this gap.

It must be noted that the Syria Victims Fund would not take the place of reparations, which will come through transitional justice processes. As has taken place in other post-conflict countries, such as Colombia, the Gambia, and Guatemala, reparations have the potential to restore victims’ dignity, acknowledge the harms which took place, and help victims to rebuild their lives—though only with input from survivors and affected populations can reparations programs be truly sustainable and restorative.

Instead, the Syria Victims Fund could draw on prior examples of repurposing seized funds, such as the BOTA Foundation in Kazakhstan. It could repurpose funds that morally belong to Syrian victims and survivors—in that they were seized in legal processes related to serious violations of international law in Syria—to provide interim reparative measures to victims, therefore equipping survivors with resources to seek the care that they want or need. The Syria Victims Fund’s efforts—such as working with victim communities and identifying needs—can also help facilitate transitional justice processes, such as by mapping violations or creating victim registries.

The creation of a Syria Victims Fund can help facilitate repair and recovery for Syrian victims, one year after the fall of the Assad regime. States shouldn’t waste this opportunity.

Kate Springs is a program assistant in the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. Previously, she was a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project. Her work focuses on corporate accountability and addressing the financial aspects of atrocities such as the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, as well as legal efforts to hold the Islamic Republic of Iran to account for its domestic, transnational, and transboundary crimes.

The post States shouldn’t waste the chance to establish a Syria Victims Fund appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This is the first chapter in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s 2026 Atlas, which analyzes the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

Evolution of freedom

Ghana’s signature achievement since the mid-1990s is the consolidation of civic and political freedoms and a competitive political order in which citizens, journalists, and civic organizations routinely hold leaders to account. The durability of this achievement is not a result of elite benevolence or political will but the product of a dense, independent civil society and a remarkably resilient independent media ecosystem. When governments test the boundaries of civic space, the response is often swift and organized; this social infrastructure is the primary reason Ghana’s civic and political freedoms have remained consistently strong for more than two decades. This context is reflected in the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes’ political subindex for Ghana, which sits well above the economic and legal subindices. In recent years, it sits in the low-to-mid 70s out of a maximum score of 100, a pattern that aligns with lived realities. In the most recent Afrobarometer survey, conducted in 2024, an overwhelming majority of Ghanaians (85 percent) reported that they did not fear political violence or intimidation during the last national elections, a strong testament to the electoral freedoms that Ghanaians enjoy. Moreover, a majority (52 percent) expressed trust in civil society organizations, ahead of religious leaders (who are trusted by 49 percent). Only the military (trusted by 65 percent) ranks ahead of civil society organizations in Ghana.¹

The historical roots of this civic vigilance matter. From the anti-colonial mobilization led by Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first post-independence president, and mass professional and student associations to later generations of advocacy groups and think tanks, Ghanaians have long treated resistance to state overreach as a civic obligation.

As formal unions of lawyers, teachers, students, and medical professionals gave way to contemporary civil society and independent media organizations and research networks—among them, the Media Foundation for West Africa, the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition, the Ghana Integrity Initiative, the Ghana Center for Democratic Development, and many others, including subnational advocacy groups—the core impulse has remained the same: to protect and defend civic space, demand procedural fairness, and insist that those in power remain answerable to the public. This explains why the social reaction to efforts to undermine political freedoms is often met with resistance and why Ghana’s political openings have not been easily reversed.

Electoral integrity is a useful illustration of how these social checks operate. While the courts can usually be swayed by partisan crosscurrents when individual political actors are charged with corruption or other acts of impropriety, the dynamic is often different with election disputes. The vigilance of civil society and independent media organizations in monitoring and independently collating election results at the polling-station level often helps to provide credible evidence when electoral disputes arise. The volume and quality of that evidence strengthen adjudication, making it harder for judicial bias to gain traction and increasing the credibility of outcomes, even in contentious contests.² This distinction is important: While the administration of justice in ordinary (nonpolitical) cases is broadly reliable, the politicization of corruption cases can distort judicial behavior; election cases, by contrast, have benefitted from robust, external scrutiny that fortifies the work of the courts.

This juxtaposition points to the core challenge in Ghana’s performance on legal freedom: The judiciary’s structural vulnerability to executive influence, particularly through appointments to the High Court and Supreme Court. Observers can—and do—sort judges into partisan “buckets,” a perception that inevitably erodes confidence in the system’s neutrality. Survey data clearly show a deterioration of citizens’ trust in the judicial system in the last fifteen years, falling by 20 percentage points since 2011.³ Yet outside of high-stakes political cases, the courts tend to function competently and deliver justice with regularity.

Recent movement in the legal subindex has been mildly positive, driven in part by improvements in informality and, to a lesser degree, by steadier security conditions after the turbulence of the early 2000s. On informality, the government’s digitalization initiatives, including the introduction of national (and tax) identification (the Ghana Card) and a digital address system, have helped to identify and increasingly formalize informal businesses. Other initiatives, such as the institution of fee-free secondary education, opened opportunities for young Ghanaians to further their education instead of entering the informal economy. The National Youth Employment Program, although relatively less successful, helped to draw young entrepreneurs into more formalized activities. Finally, a surge of capital investments into construction, alongside an expansion in mining activities, has created demand for artisans, contractors, and allied tradespeople who transact in more formal ways than the street-level microenterprise typical in developing economies. The result is a measurable reduction in the prevalence of informality, a trend visible within the relevant component of the legal subindex.

The gradual strengthening of security owes more to internal stability than to a benign regional environment. Ghana’s northern border with Burkina Faso and proximity to Nigeria’s insurgency-affected areas create constant risks, and yet Ghana has avoided the cascade of instability that has afflicted parts of the Sahel. That relative steadiness, together with the normal functioning of everyday justice for nonpolitical cases, helps explain why legal freedom is trending slightly upward despite persistent concerns about executive sway over judicial appointments and decisions.

Corruption control within the justice sector is another area to watch. Across administrations, chief justices have consistently placed anti-corruption at the center of their institutional reform agendas, and recent executive appeals to rebuild public trust in the courts suggest continued political salience. However, these public commitments have not always translated into tangible reforms or outcomes. Public perception of judicial corruption remains high: According to the 2024 Afrobarometer survey, more than 40 percent of Ghanaians believe that “most or all judges and magistrates” are corrupt.⁴ The growing trend of presidents appointing loyalists to the Supreme Court has only reinforced these perceptions, contributing to Ghana’s relatively weak performance on the legal subindex. The ongoing constitutional review presents an opportunity to reform judicial appointments and promotions, tighten avenues for corruption, and strengthen judicial independence.

Ghana’s strong performance on elections, civil liberties, and political rights within the political subindex is tempered by weaker scores on legislative constraints on the executive, highlighting concerns about the effectiveness of institutional checks in practice. However, civil society remains uncompromising in defending democratic norms, including contesting attempts to erode these checks. The resulting equilibrium is not perfect—nor is it immutable—but it has proven remarkably resilient over the past generation.

Economic freedoms have followed their own trajectory, with a notable increase from the mid-2000s into the first half of the 2010s, a period that coincided with the broader “Africa Rising” narrative. This period was characterized by strong improvements in governance and economic growth, rising incomes, and a growing middle class. Consolidation of Ghana’s return to constitutional democracy commenced in the year 2000 with the transfer of power from the ruling party to an opposition party, which further boosted optimism in the country’s political and economic outlook. The new political leadership signaled a clear focus on improving the economy, and market openness and property-rights enforcement seemed to find firmer footing. Former President John Kufuor is remembered in this context for emphasizing macroeconomic health and business-climate improvements that many citizens experienced in their daily lives. The results of committed political leadership and effective economic management are reflected in the economic subindex and the other components such as investment freedom and property rights, starting in the mid-2000s.

The subsequent downturn around 2015 is worth noting. Rising debt-service pressures, coupled with a large budget deficit and high inflation culminated in Ghana going in for an IMF program; a similar pattern occurred around 2023-24 as reflected in the downward trend of the economic subindex. These patterns signal the fragility of gains when fiscal anchors are not backed by disciplined fiscal decisions—such as politically motivated increases in public spending during election years and subsidies on utilities and petroleum products, among others—and when investment freedom and property-rights expectations face credibility questions. These observations underscore that Ghana’s enviable political freedoms do not automatically translate into disciplined fiscal management or sustained economic openness. The freedom metrics capture this: The political subindex remains high, while the economic and legal dimensions fluctuate with policy choices that either reinforce or erode market institutions and democratic norms.

Trade freedom tells a more erratic story. Ghana’s trade policy framework has generally been open by regional standards, but the component’s volatility reflects the broader health of the economy and investors’ read on the policy environment. In periods of economic stress, policy consistency suffers, and openness on paper does not translate into confidence in practice. The trends in the data thus track not only tariff schedules and non-tariff measures but also the credibility of macroeconomic management, which is often punctuated in election years.

The trajectory of women’s economic freedom stands out as a major structural improvement. Around 2004, there was a steep rise in the economic subindex driven in part by a cluster of women’s empowerment policies of the Kufuor administration: free maternal health services, including postnatal care services that reduced a key barrier to women’s labor-market participation, and explicit efforts to expand women’s access to finance and enterprise support. Those initiatives may have helped to boost women’s economic autonomy and anchor a higher plateau that persisted in the years that followed. The component’s level has stagnated since about 2008 and hence leaves some room for improvement—but the rapid change around 2004 is unmistakable. Recent Afrobarometer survey data for Ghana show strong popular support for women to have equal rights to work as men. However, more than a quarter of Ghanaians (26 percent) identify employers’ preference for hiring men as the top barrier to women’s advancement, ahead of childcare (17 percent) and skills gaps (16 percent).⁵

Where do remaining constraints lie? First, land ownership: In Ghana,  community and family lands are predominantly controlled by male heads; women’s ownership and collateralization of land remain very limited. Given the economic value of land, women remain at a significant disadvantage that dampens entrepreneurship, constrains access to credit, and restricts intergenerational wealth transfer for women. Second, intrahousehold decision-making: In many households, women’s ability to take paid work outside the home remains mediated by male authority. These social and legal frictions are the kinds of de facto constraints that keep the Women’s Economic Freedom component below its potential despite the formal policy gains that started in the mid-2000s.

Evolution of prosperity

Ghana’s prosperity trajectory since the mid-2000s mirrors, in broad outline, the “Africa Rising” era: a period of macroeconomic optimism, improved governance, favorable terms of trade, and political stability across much of the continent. Between 2005 and the mid-2010s, the Prosperity Index registered a strong and upward trend, reflecting the robust growth in incomes and steady improvements in social indicators, even as inequality widened in the classic early-development pattern. Ghana rode this wave and, for several years, significantly outpaced the sub-Saharan Africa average.

The story of the income component is familiar but still striking in its local particulars. A large discovery of offshore oil in the late 2000s added a new driver to a commodity basket already weighted toward gold and cocoa. In the mid-2000s, when global commodity prices were favorable, Ghana’s growth accelerated sharply; in 2011, Ghana recorded a double-digit real GDP growth rate (about 11 percent), up from about 8 percent the year prior. Oil windfalls amplified these gains, though they also heightened exposure to volatility and raised questions about how resource-linked revenues were managed.⁶ The income component of the Prosperity Index captures this rise and the subsequent plateau, which has persisted over the last decade. Reversals are visible too, mainly coinciding with the two IMF interventions mentioned earlier, driven in large part by fiscal indiscipline during election years.

The inequality component of the Prosperity Index shows a rapid deterioration, especially from the year 2000. But the composition of Ghana’s inequality is complex. It is not simply a rural-urban story; it is also generational. Large cohorts of better-educated youth, especially those under thirty-five, struggle to find formal employment at scale, while older cohorts, who are relatively less educated, hold on to existing jobs.⁷ The consequence is an age-skewed labor market that expands inequality even as education levels rise. On the rural side, extensive reliance on small-holder agriculture—more than 40 percent of the population is engaged in subsistence farming—keeps cash incomes low. Climate variability has compounded these pressures, with shifts in rainfall and temperature patterns outpacing the seed and crop research needed to adapt. The Index’s inequality line captures the macro pattern, and the underlying micro-mechanisms are the youth (un)employment crunch and the persistent productivity trap of smallholder agriculture.

Environment and health are relative bright spots. The national push to switch households from charcoal and wood to liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for cooking—especially the 2013 rural LGP promotion program—may have helped to reduce indoor air pollution and, with it, the number of respiratory and related illnesses. Additionally, the government’s 2021 Green Ghana initiative to plant five million trees nationwide to combat desertification signaled a strong commitment to environmental issues in the country.⁸ The behavioral transition and practical action on desertification probably account for the Prosperity Index’s environment component alongside CO₂ and other measures. On the health side, Ghana’s COVID-19 response benefitted from institutional memory and capacity developed during earlier West African epidemics. Ebola never crossed into Ghana, thanks in part to the region’s experience dealing with health epidemics. When COVID-19 broke out, pandemic protocols were quickly activated and enforced, which resulted in comparatively low infection rates and deaths and a health system that proved more resilient than many expected.

Education presents a more mixed picture. Policy volatility in the secondary cycle—oscillating between three- and four-year models—created confusion and capacity mismatches just as youth cohorts ballooned. Free, compulsory basic education expanded access, but in many districts infrastructure and staffing could not keep pace, producing “shift systems” and, in some cases, causing students to drop out before completing upper-secondary education. Because the Prosperity Index’s education component bundles mean years of schooling with expected attainment, the friction from policy oscillation and demographic pressure is visible at a level that remains middling despite long-run improvements.

Finally, informality also intersects with prosperity through the labor market. The government’s digitalization programs—the introduction of the Ghana Card, which links to individual tax identification numbers, as well as the digital address system—have expanded formalization of the national economy. Moreover, governments’ special initiatives to increase youth employment and a boon in the construction and mining sectors have pulled workers into the formal sector. These interventions should, in principle, raise tax revenues and improve public service availability and access over time. The hard question is durability: Formalization built on cyclical or enclave sectors may not last if investment slows or governance costs mount. The Prosperity Index cannot answer that question by itself, but its pattern—modest gains in prosperity with uneven distributional effects and vulnerability to macro slippage—point to areas where reforms might matter most.

The path forward

The economic, social, and political outlook of Ghana’s next decade will depend largely on the steadiness with which it improves core institutions and transforms its civic strength into predictable, broad-based gains. Moreover, aligning reforms to citizens’ stated priorities—jobs, public services, and integrity—can increase traction.⁹ The political foundations are relatively strong; the next important step is ensuring that the transparency and accountability mechanisms that guard the conduct of elections also insulate the justice system from partisan distortion in high-stakes cases. Judicial appointments will remain politically salient, but the deeper imperative is to tighten the system’s incentives so that corruption cases are decided on evidence rather than allegiance. Civil society and media can help—by maintaining the evidentiary standard that has worked in election disputes—but ultimately the judiciary must build a reputation for political impartiality that is strong enough to withstand executive pressure. The ongoing constitutional review offers a chance to implement a judicial reform agenda that delivers on this objective.

Economic management is the second pillar. The political business cycles are familiar by now: A new government comes to power and starts out with prudent fiscal management that boosts confidence and attracts investment, often resulting in an increase in the economic subindex. Then comes election time and fiscal indiscipline—such as excessive borrowing and indiscriminate public spending with weak fiscal oversight—erode confidence and investment freedom, triggering adjustment and decline. Breaking this cycle requires more than fiscal rules on paper; it requires political commitment to enforce them consistently and minimize politically motivated borrowing and spending. The 2015 and 2024 IMF programs are markers of what happens when that discipline falters. In the coming years, the goal should be to make investment freedom boring—i.e., stable, predictable, and insulated from the electoral business cycle.

On economic freedom, two structural agendas stand out. The first is women’s economic freedom. The 2004 leap tied to women-centered policies shows how targeted policy can permanently raise the ceiling of economic progress. The unfinished business is in property rights, especially land ownership. In areas where family land remains the norm and titles are controlled by male heads, women’s ability to own, mortgage, and leverage land is curtailed. Reform here is politically delicate, embedded in social norms and local authority structures, but the economic payoff could be enormous: more women-owned firms, better access to credit, and fairer intergenerational asset accumulation. The women’s freedom component of the Index offers a clear benchmark; moving from the mid-seventies to the high eighties would require not just programs but enforceable property rights.

The second is youth (un)employment. Inequality in Ghana increasingly wears a generational face;a cohort of better-educated young people cannot find formal, stable jobs in sufficient numbers. Policy tools here must focus on easing business entry, expansion in labor-absorbing sectors, and modernizing agricultural value chains so that rural youth are not confined to subsistence farming. Climate-smart research and extension services, reliable input markets, and storage and transport infrastructure can help farmers move up the value ladder—and should be paired with vocational pathways aligned to construction, light manufacturing, and services. Such an agenda could help to address the twin problems of rural low productivity and urban underemployment.

Strengthened legal freedom and rule of law can support both agendas if reforms focus on clarity of the law and the quality of bureaucracy. Where statutes are clear, predictable, and enforced uniformly, the transaction costs that push firms into informality will fall; where frontline administration is competent and corruption risks are contained, formalization becomes a benefit rather than a burden. Ghana’s recent sector-led formalization has demonstrated that workers and firms will choose formal channels when the opportunity set changes. The task now is to make those choices systemic: digital one-stop services for business registration and tax collection; credible and quick adjudication for commercial disputes; and incentives for small firms to formalize without fear of retroactive penalties.

Regional (in)security will remain a concerning external variable. Instability in parts of the Sahel and the enduring threat of violent extremism in neighboring regions create risks that Ghana has to grapple with. The country’s success to date reflects internal discipline and professional security services, but the calculus can change quickly as alliances and external funding priorities shift. Ghana’s democratic resilience—anchored in a vigilant civil society and robust private media—makes it better placed than many to navigate these shocks without sacrificing core freedoms. The imperative is to ensure that security responses remain proportionate and bounded by law, so that security gains are not purchased at the cost of civil and political liberties that have been the bedrock of Ghana’s democratic success story.

Geoeconomic partnerships will also shape the opportunity set for Ghana. Specifically, infrastructure that lowers freight costs—an inland port located up north with rail connectivity, for instance—has immediate appeal, and Ghana would do well by investing in this area. Engagements with Chinese state and private investors are often judged domestically on whether they deliver such tangible benefits; they are not, by themselves, read as threats to democratic credentials. The test for the next decade is to structure these partnerships transparently, align them with national priorities, and avoid governance concessions that have complicated infrastructure deals elsewhere. If done well, they can help stabilize economic policy by supporting trade freedom in practice, not just on paper, and by attracting private investment that widens formal employment.

The prosperity side of the ledger will hinge on two slow-moving but decisive social investments. The first is education system reliability. When secondary school terms oscillate, cohort planning collapses; when seating capacity lags enrollment, “shift systems” lead to lost learning and early exits. The policy objective must prioritize stability: a curriculum and cycle length that survives political alternation, infrastructure that grows with cohorts, and targeted support to keep marginal students—especially rural girls—through upper secondary. If achieved, educational attainment will move steadily upward, with compounding effects on income and inequality.

The second is health and environment. Ghana’s clean cooking fuel and afforestation initiatives demonstrate how coordinated public messaging and practical access can drive large-scale shifts in household behavior—which often yield immediate and tangible benefits. Extending this logic—through cleaner fuels, safer urban air, adaptive health systems, and expanded green coverage—can enhance environmental quality, improve health outcomes, and free up resources otherwise consumed by preventable disease burdens.

Finally, the country’s political economy will continue to be shaped by how it manages its natural resource wealth. When mineral and oil revenues supplant tax collection, citizens have fewer reasons to monitor spending, governments face fewer incentives to be transparent, public resource leakages rise, and the discipline that keeps debt manageable erodes. A forward-looking reform would therefore tackle the credible fiscal rules that bind during booms, transparent revenue management that makes it costly to divert funds, and a tax system that is simple enough to comply with and fair enough to legitimize. The expanded government digitalization programs offer sound foundations to make this possible. If Ghana can lock in these basics while preserving the civic and media freedoms that have distinguished it for three decades, legal and economic institutions will catch up and converge with political freedom, and prosperity gains will follow.

Ghana’s comparative advantage is … the lived practice of accountability that precedes and outlasts any single administration.

Civil society and media have proven that they can guard the franchise; the task before us is to extend that guardianship to the legal system’s most politically sensitive corners and to the fiscal choices that unlock prosperity and avoid the familiar cycle of fiscal indiscipline, crisis, and repair. If managed well, the evidence should be visible where it matters most: a steadier investment freedom line, a women’s economic freedom score that rises again rather than plateaus, an inequality curve that bends as youth employment expands, and a legal freedom profile that reflects not just order in the streets but fairness in the courtroom. That is the trajectory Ghana can reasonably aim for in the decade ahead, and it is within reach.

about the author

Joseph Asunka is the CEO of Afrobarometer, a pan-African survey research organization that conducts public attitude surveys on governance and social issues across the continent. His research interests are in governance, democracy, and political economy of development. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of California at Los Angeles.

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1    Center for Democratic Development, Afrobarometer Round 10 Survey in Ghana, 2024, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Ghana-summary-of-results-Afrobarometer-R10-22april25.pdf (see pages 30, 32, and 33 of the summary of results tables).

2    For causal evidence that domestic observers in Ghana’s 2012 elections reduced fraud and violence at monitored stations and altered parties’ manipulation strategies, see Joseph Asunka et al.,  “Electoral Fraud or Violence: The Effect of Observers on Party Manipulation Strategies,” British Journal of Political Science 49, no. 1 (2019): 129–51.

3    See the Afrobarometer report on public trust in institutions here: https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/AD891-PAP20-Africans-trust-in-key-institutions-and-leaders-is-weakening-Afrobarometer-31oct24.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

4    Center for Democratic Development, “Ghanaians Decry Widespread Corruption, Afrobarometer Survey Shows,” news release, February 14, 2025, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/R10-News-release-Ghanaians-decry-widespread-corruption-Afrobarometer-14feb25.pdf.

5    Ghana Round 10 Summary of Results, April 22, 2025, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Ghana-summary-of-results-Afrobarometer-R10-22april25.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

6    According to an Afrobarometer survey in 2022, 85 percent of Ghanaians support tighter regulations of natural resource extraction. See Center for Democratic Development, “Ghanaians Call for Tighter Regulation of Natural Resource Extraction,” news release, November 8, 2022, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/R9-News-release-Ghanaians-call-for-tighter-regulation-of-natural-resource-extraction-Afrobarometer-bh-7november22.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

7    Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny, Shannon van Wyk-Khosa, and Joseph Asunka, “Africa’s Youth: More Educated, Less Employed, Still Unheard in Policy and Development,” Afrobarometer, November 15, 2023, https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/AD734-PAP3-Africas-youth-More-educated-less-employed-still-unheard-Afrobarometer-13nov23.pdf.

8    Elorm Ntumy, “Green Ghana Day: A Chance to Turn the Tide on Deforestation,” UN Capital Development Fund, 2021, https://www.uncdf.org/article/6857/green-ghana-day.

9    See Joseph Asunka and E. Gyimah-Boadi, “People-Centered Development: Why the Policy Priorities and Lived Experiences of African Citizens Should Matter for National Development Policy,” Foresight Africa 2025–2030, May 13, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/people-centered-development-why-the-policy-priorities-and-lived-experiences-of-african-citizens-should-matter-for-national-development-policy/.

The post Delivering justice and jobs is the real test of Ghana’s storied democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-stronger-safer-and-more-prosperous-hemisphere-the-case-for-investing-in-democracy-in-the-americas/ Thu, 04 Dec 2025 14:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=891352 This issue brief is the fourth in the Freedom and Prosperity Center's "Future of democracy assistance" series, which analyzes the many complex challenges to democracy around the world—and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

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Bottom lines up front

• Democratic backsliding, transnational organized crime, and authoritarian influence are driving insecurity and migration across Latin America and the Caribbean.
• At the same time, weak rule of law and entrenched kleptocratic networks are stifling economic growth and enabling criminal organizations.
• To push back, the US must shift to a broader investment-driven foreign policy that mobilizes public-private partnerships and supports democratic actors.

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This issue brief is part of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “The future of democracy assistance” series, which analyzes the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Introduction

After decades of democratic and economic progress, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is now losing ground. Between 1995 and 2016, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes recorded steady gains—a more than eight-point rise in prosperity and a more than three-point rise in freedom—that lifted millions out of poverty, deepened the region’s integration into the global economy, and strengthened democratic institutions. Over the past decade, however, this momentum has stalled, and in many countries reversed. Across the region, insecurity has surged, authoritarianism has deepened, and corruption has stifled development, with consequences that reach far beyond its borders.

This reversal is fueling two interconnected crises reshaping the Western Hemisphere: migration and insecurity. Over the past decade, migration—both within the region and toward the United States—has surged. Authoritarian rule in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, along with the collapse of Haiti, has driven mass exoduses, while gang violence spurs migration from Central America and hundreds of thousands more have left other countries in search of safety and economic opportunity. Transit states such as Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Panama face mounting strain on public services, while the United States confronts unprecedented pressure at its southern border.

Regional security is also deteriorating as gangs and transnational criminal networks expand their operations. Mexican cartels dominate the production and trafficking of fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, and other illicit drugs across Latin America and into the United States. The effects of their trade have been devastating, with tens of thousands of overdose deaths annually, particularly in the United States and Canada. Other groups, such as Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua, extend beyond narcotics, driving homicides, corruption, and violent competition over trafficking routes across the region.

Beneath these crises lies a deeper erosion of governance and democracy—one that the United States should support its allies in confronting. Weak rule of law and systemic corruption stifle economic growth and enable criminal networks to thrive. Authoritarian regimes in the region fuel migration, crime, and cross-border instability, while external powers—most notably China—exploit governance gaps through opaque infrastructure projects and debt diplomacy, deepening authoritarian influence. Together, these forces erode state capacity, destabilize the region, and pose a direct challenge to US security and economic prosperity.

Stable, transparent governance in LAC reduces migration pressures, disrupts criminal networks, and creates economic opportunities that benefit both US and Latin American citizens. As the United States reassesses its foreign assistance strategy, democracy assistance can be enacted as a strategic investment to make the hemisphere—including the United States—stronger, safer, and more prosperous. We identify three core issues that pose the greatest challenges but promise the greatest rewards if addressed, and provide recommendations to streamline assistance, expand its scope, and engage business and local actors as funders and partners.

Ultimately, democracy assistance in the region remains one of the most cost-effective investments to advance shared security and prosperity.

Regional challenges to democracy and governance

LAC is confronting a convergence of three interlinked challenges that erode governance, destabilize societies, and undermine US security and economic interests. Each reinforces the others and fuels the migration and crime that strain the region. The United States should therefore prioritize addressing these challenges through targeted foreign assistance and investment.

Transnational organized crime and insecurity

Transnational organized crime (TOC) has evolved into one of the most destabilizing forces in LAC. Once localized, criminal groups have grown into sophisticated, multinational networks that traffic drugs, weapons, and people across borders while infiltrating political systems. These networks now operate across nearly every corner of the region, both benefiting from and contributing to weak rule of law and institutional resilience.

Gangs and TOC actors are among the main drivers of insecurity in the region. Although the region comprises less than 10 percent of the world’s population, it accounts for roughly one-third of global homicides. Central America maintains high levels of insecurity, while countries such as Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru have experienced sharp increases in violent crime as cartels and gangs battle for control of trafficking routes, urban neighborhoods, and illicit economies. The costs are profound: Latin American Public Opinion Project data show that intentions to emigrate are significantly higher among individuals exposed to crime, while nearly one-third of private sector firms in Latin America cite crime as a major obstacle to doing business, with direct losses averaging 7 percent of sales. Insecurity is not only displacing communities but also undermining prosperity and eroding trust in governments.

The drug trade remains one of the most profitable and damaging arms of TOC. Mexican cartels—particularly the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel—are the hemisphere’s principal suppliers of fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin. Their operations extend beyond Mexico and the United States, reaching deep into Colombia, Ecuador, Central America, and increasingly Canada. In 2024, US Customs and Border Protection seized over 27,000 pounds of fentanyl at the southern border—up from 14,700 pounds in 2022. The human toll is staggering: Fentanyl overdoses now kill more than seventy thousand people annually in the United States.

TOC represents not only a law enforcement problem but also a profound institutional and governance challenge. These groups thrive in contexts marked by weak institutions, porous borders, and entrenched impunity. Venezuela’s institutional collapse, for example, directly enabled the rapid growth of the Tren de Aragua gang from one prison to over ten countries. Once established, criminal networks act as corrosive forces—penetrating police forces, judicial systems, militaries, local governments, and even segments of the private sector. Their influence extends into the electoral arena as well: In Mexico’s recent elections, criminal actors not only financed campaigns for local candidates but also threatened and assassinated others, further distorting political competition and undermining democratic accountability. Left unchecked, TOC erodes public trust, distorts markets, and makes effective governance nearly impossible, fueling a self-reinforcing cycle of violence, displacement, and state fragility.

Case study: Ecuador’s fight against insecurity

The once relatively stable country of Ecuador has become a battleground among Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in recent years, with authorities estimating that 70 percent of the world’s cocaine passes through its ports. As Ecuador has emerged as a vital transit country, Mexican DTOs have partnered with local crime syndicates to deepen their control in the country, buying the influence of politicians, judges, and security officials. The main actors vying for control of drug shipment routes include the Sinaloa Cartel, its rival the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, and their affiliated local crime syndicates. These structures tax and protect cocaine flows moving from border regions toward export terminals, targeting trucking firms, port and warehouse staff, and local authorities.

Ecuador’s security crisis, however, is not simply a matter of state versus gangs, but of deep institutional infiltration. The landmark Metástasis investigation (2023-25) exposed how judges, prosecutors, police officers, politicians, a former head of the prison authority, and other high-ranking officials systematically protected or advanced the interests of organized crime for years. In exchange for cash, gold, luxury cars, and other benefits, officials allegedly released gang leaders, altered prison conditions, and sabotaged investigations.

Despite these challenges, Ecuador’s government—reelected in 2025 with a mandate to confront organized crime—has pledged to continue the fight. Yet its experience highlights a critical lesson: Defeating gangs and cartels cannot be achieved solely through crackdowns or arrests; it also requires rebuilding institutions.

In many countries, governments have proven unable or unwilling to meaningfully confront TOC. Others have stepped up efforts to target these groups through mano dura policies or intensified security operations that, while capable of disrupting trafficking routes, cannot by themselves dismantle transnational criminal networks. Addressing the governance gaps that allow these organizations to thrive is therefore crucial. In this context, US leadership remains essential. Given the cross-border nature of these networks, lasting, viable solutions demand a coordinated regional response. By leveraging its diplomatic influence, security partnerships, military capabilities, and development tools—including technical assistance, institutional support, and investment incentives—the United States can help foster cross-border cooperation, strengthen judicial and prosecutorial capacity, and reinforce institutions to shield them from criminal infiltration. Paired with diplomatic and intelligence support, democracy assistance can play a critical role in disrupting organized crime, safeguarding US security interests, and creating the conditions for more prosperous and resilient communities across the hemisphere.

Rule of law and economic development

Declining rule of law has become an increasingly urgent concern in LAC, as regional indicators have steadily worsened in recent years and several countries have registered some of the steepest declines worldwide. This deterioration both enables transnational organized crime and authoritarianism and imposes enormous costs on national economies. Research by the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center shows that the rule of law is the single most influential factor for long-term economic growth and societal well-being. Liberalizing markets is not enough: Legal clarity, judicial independence, and accountability are the foundations of effective governance and thriving economies. This is particularly relevant in Latin America, where corruption remains the region’s Achilles’ heel—undermining public spending, fueling fiscal deficits, and weakening financial oversight. Across the region, higher corruption levels are consistently associated with lower gross domestic product per capita and reduced foreign direct investment, costing countries and investors billions in lost growth and opportunity

A particularly distorting force in the region’s economy is the prevalence of kleptocratic networks. These are not isolated acts of graft, but coordinated, systematic efforts to capture state resources and extract rents for political and economic gain. Such networks often comprise coalitions of corrupt political elites, complicit business actors, and criminal organizations. They co-opt the judiciary and prosecutors, while silencing investigations and oversight bodies. Their actions stifle competition, discourage entrepreneurship, and produce unfair monopolies that sideline foreign investors, while draining public coffers of resources needed for development.

The scale of these operations can be staggering. In Venezuela, over the past two decades, ruling party figures and business allies have been suspected of siphoning off as much as $30 billion in public funds through transnational schemes involving front companies, illicit contracts, and offshore accounts. This systemic kleptocracy has not only enriched elites but also accelerated Venezuela’s economic collapse, fueling one of the worst migration crises in the region, including to the United States. In Peru, the Club de la Construcción scandal revealed how an informal cartel of major construction companies colluded to divide up public works contracts in exchange for bribes to officials in the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The scheme operated for more than a decade, was worth billions in inflated contracts, and sidelined honest competitors while draining infrastructure budgets.

Case study: The Dominican Republic’s success story

The Dominican Republic illustrates how strengthening the rule of law can improve governance and unlock economic opportunity. Since President Luis Abinader took office in 2020, the government has carried out anti-corruption reforms. The administration appointed an independent attorney general and empowered the public ministry to investigate and prosecute high-level corruption cases. The government has also advanced transparency and digitalization reforms to make interactions with public agencies—especially in procurement—more open, efficient, and resistant to abuse. In addition, the country has aligned with key recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force, including by passing a revamped Anti-money Laundering and Illicit Finance Law, which has constrained kleptocratic networks and organized crime.

These measures have begun to restore trust in public institutions. Procurement processes are now more transparent and competitive––with twenty thousand new suppliers registered—while new safeguards better protect against corruption. Since 2020, the Dominican Republic’s score on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index has improved by eight points. Investor confidence has followed: Foreign direct investment reached record highs in 2024, while trade with the United States expanded sharply. US goods exports to the Dominican Republic grew to $13 billion that year, producing a $5.5 billion trade surplus for the United States.

Some of the region’s largest corruption scandals have been uncovered by investigative journalists and independent prosecutors. Yet in many cases, impunity prevails, and little progress is made toward prevention or sustained accountability. Strong judicial institutions, effective anti-corruption reforms, and governance are essential for stability and growth. Predictable, rules-based environments make countries far better partners for both domestic and US businesses—creating jobs, expanding markets, and strengthening local economies. Such efforts can also reduce migration pressures, as corruption has been shown to drive both legal and irregular migration. As with TOC, for the United States, supporting rule-of-law reforms is therefore a strategic investment in building a more prosperous, democratic, and secure hemisphere.

Countering authoritarian influence

LAC is home to several resilient democracies that remain close US allies and important trading partners. Yet the region also contains some of the world’s most entrenched dictatorships—Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—which pose direct threats to stability. Between these extremes lie eight nations that Freedom House classifies as “partly free,” many of which experienced additional democratic declines in 2025. Countering democratic backsliding and protecting the global order is not a values-based mission; it is essential to safeguarding US security, economic interests, and the long-term prosperity of the Western Hemisphere.

The region’s authoritarian regimes illustrate the stakes. Economic collapse and repression have forced 7.7 million Venezuelans, 500,000 Cubans, and tens of thousands of Nicaraguans to flee over the past decade. These governments also generate acute security risks. Nicaragua has positioned itself as a conduit for extra-regional migration, inviting travelers from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean to enter visa free and transit toward the US border. The Daniel Ortega regime has further been linked to targeted harassment and even assassinations of dissidents abroad, including the 2025 killing in Costa Rica of Roberto Samcam Ruiz, a retired Army major and government critic.

Similarly, the consolidation of Venezuela’s dictatorship has transformed the country into a hub for criminal organizations, including Colombian paramilitary groups and Tren de Aragua. The Nicolás Maduro regime has hosted the Wagner Group while continuing to rely on Russian military advisors, Iranian oil technicians, and Chinese surveillance systems to tighten internal control and repress dissent. Members of the regime have been linked to drug trafficking––most notably through the illicit military network Cartel de los Soles––and, in late 2024, Maduro threatened to invade neighboring Guyana.

At the same time, external authoritarian powers—especially China—are expanding their footprints, particularly in “partly free” states where institutional checks are weak. China exploits governance gaps through surveillance technology, opaque infrastructure deals, and strategic investments in critical sectors—often at the expense of US influence and market access. Over the past decade, China invested $73 billion in Latin America’s raw materials sector, including refineries and processing plants for coal, lithium, copper, natural gas, oil, and uranium. In Peru, Chinese firms paid $3 billion to acquire two major electricity suppliers, giving them what experts describe as near-monopoly control over the country’s power distribution and edging out competitors. Beijing also provides critical technology to regional authoritarian governments and at-risk democracies. In Bolivia, the government deployed Huawei’s “Safe Cities” surveillance systems, raising concerns about mass data collection, particularly during elections.

Case study: The cost of partnering with authoritarian regimes

Under President Rafael Correa, Ecuador—alongside Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez—pursued closer ties with foreign authoritarian powers, betting heavily on Chinese financing and infrastructure. A centerpiece of this strategy was the $2.7 billion Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric project, awarded under opaque terms to Chinese firms, primarily Sinohydro, as part of an $11 billion package of oil-backed loans and infrastructure deals.

The project soon became a symbol of the risks of such arrangements. The dam has been plagued by structural flaws, including more than seventeen thousand cracks, severe environmental damage, and corruption allegations implicating senior officials. State agencies attempted to downplay or conceal the problems, but by 2024 the facility had ceased functioning altogether. Experts estimated that repairing the damage could cost tens of millions of dollars, erasing much of the project’s intended economic benefit. Beyond its technical failures, Coca Codo Sinclair left Ecuador financially vulnerable. In 2022, the government was forced into arbitration and subsequently renegotiated more than $4 billion in debt with Beijing, further compromising its fiscal position and weakening investor confidence. The episode illustrates how opaque partnerships with authoritarian powers can undermine democratic accountability and damage economic stability.

These developments underscore the importance of countering authoritarianism in LAC as both a security and economic priority for the United States and the region. Betting on democratic renewal in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela is critical to restoring stability in the hemisphere. At the same time, it is equally important to strengthen “at-risk” democracies to prevent further backsliding. Targeted investments in political party development, anti-corruption reforms, and transparency measures can bolster resilience in these states and reduce the appeal of authoritarian alternatives. Pushing back against China’s growing economic and geopolitical influence in the hemisphere is also essential. By leveraging diplomatic and trade tools, the United States can position itself as a credible alternative to China—particularly by mobilizing investment, fostering public-private partnerships, and advancing governance reforms that strengthen transparency and accountability. Doing so is vital for freedom and security in the region and creates opportunities for business and investment.

Recommendations

Insecurity, weak rule of law, and authoritarianism represent growing threats to freedom and prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. As outlined above, TOC, entrenched corruption, and authoritarian regimes impose heavy economic costs on LAC and undermine democratic governance. At the same time, these forces drive mass migration, placing immense strain on transit and destination countries. Tackling these challenges is a strategic win-win: It can enhance US security and economic interests while advancing stability and prosperity in the region.

As the United States reassesses its foreign policy and democracy assistance strategy in LAC, it should make use of its full range of diplomatic, security, trade, and investment mechanisms—including targeted democracy assistance—to address these challenges.

Move beyond grants to expand the toolkit

The proposed shift toward an investment- and trade-driven foreign policy can go hand-in-hand with democracy assistance and reform. The United States can mobilize financial and diplomatic tools to expand investment as an alternative to Chinese influence, while incentivizing governance, transparency, and accountability reforms that strengthen the region’s resilience against the challenges outlined above.

• Leverage the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to provide an alternative to Chinese financing and invest in projects that strengthen democratic resilience through economic modernization, digitalization, and high-quality infrastructure—particularly in areas vulnerable to authoritarian influence. As Congress prepares to revisit the DFC’s authorizing legislation, it should ensure the agency has long-term funding to deploy its range of tools—including debt financing, equity investments, and political risk insurance—across the region.
• Work with Congress to pass the Americas Act to establish regional trade, investment, and people-to-people partnerships with like-minded nations, fostering long-term private sector development. Use this framework to advance transparency and institutional autonomy reforms—particularly through the proposed Americas Institute for Digital Governance and Transnational Criminal Investigative Units—to ensure partner countries strengthen anti-corruption prevention, detection, and prosecution.
• Use regional forums—such as the Summit of the Americas—to advocate for governance, security, transparency, and accountability reforms to strengthen the resilience of democratic allies and counter authoritarian regimes. The United States should link political reform benchmarks to investment incentives, offering “carrots” for change through regional development commitments.

Ensure democracy assistance makes business sense

A safer and more democratic Western Hemisphere directly benefits economic development and business. The United States should position its domestic and the Latin American private sectors as active partners in strengthening democratic resilience, not just as passive beneficiaries of stability.

• Revive and operationalize America Creceto incentivize and promote reform-linked investments, infrastructure projects, and job creation across the region to counter Chinese influence and advance US interests while bolstering political will through the DFC. Participation should be tied to clear benchmarks on transparency, labor rights, and legal predictability.
• Forge public-private partnerships that co-finance civic education, anti-corruption initiatives, and local development projects, particularly in high-risk areas vulnerable to TOC recruitment and migration.
• Mobilize Latin America’s business elites—among the greatest beneficiaries of economic and democratic collaboration with the United States—to push for and co-fund democracy and governance programs in their home countries. Leading companies, philanthropic foundations, and chambers of commerce should be engaged as active partners in advancing reforms.
• Strengthen and engage with regional initiatives like the Alliance for Development in Democracy—championed by Costa Rica, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador—that integrate the private sector into democratic reform and good governance agendas.

Deploy whole-of-government tools

While the State Department plays a central role in US democracy assistance, the scale and interconnected nature of the region’s challenges—spanning security, rule of law, and authoritarian influence—demand a coordinated, whole-of-government approach.

• Leverage the Pentagon’s Defense Institution Building program to strengthen law enforcement reform, bolster rule-of-law resilience, and build institutional capacity to counter transnational crime and human trafficking.
• Provide technical assistance and legal expertise through the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to help countries develop national frameworks that protect transparency, law enforcement, and sovereignty in investment decisions.
• Double down on rule-of-law reforms and projects, particularly those targeting organized crime and corruption. Support vetted law enforcement units, independent anti-corruption actors, and judicial reform initiatives through US, private sector, and multilateral funding channels, including the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Open Government Partnership.
• Protect the key pillars of democratic institutions from co-optation by TOC, kleptocratic, or authoritarian actors. This must include courts, election management bodies, political parties, and critical government agencies such as those overseeing infrastructure, development, procurement, and public prosecution. Emphasis should be placed on institutional independence, combating and preventing corruption, and ensuring sustainable financing to strengthen resilience.
• Apply targeted sanctions, Global Magnitsky measures, and trade conditionality to dismantle kleptocratic networks, prosecute corrupt actors, and reward credible reformers.
• Advocate for and support the implementation of global security and anti-corruption standards—including recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force and its LAC branch, GAFILAT (Grupo de Acción Financiera de Latinoamérica), on money laundering, organized crime, and illicit finance—to disrupt TOC and kleptocratic funding networks while fostering safer and more competitive business environments.

Scale the power of local networks

Regional local actors—both within and outside of government—are often the most credible and resilient defenders of democratic governance. The United States should deepen its engagement with these networks while identifying and empowering new partners.

• Partner with trusted community institutions—including religious organizations, civic leaders, businesses, and grassroots groups—on programs that prevent gang recruitment, reduce crime, and promote integrity in high-risk areas.
• Strengthen governance mechanisms to build sustainable local capacity to counter corruption and transnational organized crime.
• Expand the partner ecosystem to include diaspora networks and local community groups, leveraging their resources, expertise, and transnational connections to reinforce democratic resilience.

Push back on regional and external authoritarian influence

Bipartisan US support for organized opposition in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela has been a cornerstone of regional democracy policy and should be sustained and expanded. At the same time, Washington should back democratic movements and reformers across the hemisphere where authoritarian influence is taking hold.

• Sustain support for dissidents and democratic movements in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela to prepare the ground for eventual political transitions.
• Invest in independent media.
• Support the next generation of democratic leaders through fellowships, trainings, and political party development, prioritizing authoritarian and high-risk states.
• Collaborate with electoral commissions, legislatures, and political parties with an emphasis on internal democracy, campaign transparency, and long-term institutionalization.
• Assist governments in auditing and renegotiating opaque infrastructure or digital agreements—particularly those with authoritarian powers—that undermine sovereignty, transparency, and public accountability.

The recommendations offered here provide a roadmap to confront the region’s most pressing security and prosperity threats by pairing diplomacy, trade, and investment tools with targeted democracy support. By leveraging the United States’ entrepreneurial capacity and its ability to mobilize multinational and public-private partnerships, reforms can be made more attractive, sustainable, and impactful. This is not charity—it is a strategic investment that advances both US and LAC interests.

At relatively low cost, democracy assistance strengthens governance and open markets in ways that directly serve US security and economic priorities. It helps dismantle transnational criminal organizations, kleptocratic networks, and corruption, while countering the growing influence of authoritarian regimes inside and outside the region. These efforts reduce the flow of illicit drugs and irregular migration, create more reliable markets for businesses, and build stronger partnerships with governments that share democratic values. The outcome is clear: a stronger, safer, and more prosperous hemisphere.

about the authors

Antonio Garrastazu serves as the senior director for Latin America and the Caribbean at the International Republican Institute (IRI). Prior to this role, he led IRI’s Center for Global Impact and from 2011 to 2018 was resident country director for Central America, Haiti, and Mexico. Garrastazu has worked in academe, the private sector, and government, serving in the Florida Office of Tourism, Trade and Economic Development under Governor Jeb Bush. He holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of Florida, and a master’s and PhD in international studies from the University of Miami. 

Henrique Arevalo Poincot is a visiting fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. A strategy and communications specialist with expertise spanning Europe and Latin America, Arevalo Poincot is pursuing his master’s degree in democracy and governance at Georgetown University.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-costa-rica-in-a-political-crisis/ Wed, 03 Dec 2025 17:05:03 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=891495 The country finds itself in an exceptional—yet constitutionally permitted—confrontation between its executive branch and its independent electoral authority.

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]]> Costa Rica has long prided itself on democratic stability and a strong rule of law. But the nation of some five million people now finds itself in an exceptional—yet constitutionally permitted—confrontation between its executive branch and its independent electoral authority, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). 

The situation—a second vote in fewer than five months on whether to strip the president’s immunity—caught the attention of a sitting US Congress member as well as former and current heads of state in the region. Judging by their statements, it’s clear that there is confusion about what exactly is happening. Is Costa Rica really in crisis? Is an institutional coup underway?  

A decisive vote in Costa Rica’s Legislative Assembly will take place by December 18, before deputies head out on vacation, on whether to lift President Rodrigo Chaves’s immunity so prosecutors can pursue alleged electoral-law violations. 

US efforts to strengthen democratic resilience in its own neighborhood must be accompanied by support for processes and procedures—not specific players.

Less than a week into the formal campaign period, on October 7, the TSE asked the Legislative Assembly to lift Chaves’s immunity so it can pursue alleged violations related to political belligerence and interference, including participation in campaign-related activities. While it is true that many of the complaints put forth for consideration of the TSE are from leaders of opposition parties, the TSE unanimously accepted fifteen out of twenty-four as admissible for “unwarranted interference.”  

This request to lift Chaves’s immunity is not the first such instance. In July, the Costa Rican Supreme Court requested the national assembly lift the president’s immunity in a corruption case tied to a communications contract financed by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration. In September, lawmakers fell short of the two-thirds supermajority needed to strip Chaves’s immunity in the corruption case. That vote, regarding a sitting president, was a first in Costa Rican history. Now, considering stripping the president’s immunity twice in one calendar year is even more remarkable.  

But it is important to note two things. First, none of these moves constitutes an impeachment: lifting immunity (desafuero) merely opens the door to investigation and a trial while the president remains in office. Second, under Costa Rican law, Chaves is not eligible for consecutive reelection, so to extrapolate that the TSE request for the assembly to consider the removal of the fuero is an institutional coup of some sort is a stretch.  

Soon after the Costa Rica ambassador spoke with US Representative Mario Díaz-Balart (R-FL-26), the congressman toned down his stance on the country’s political situation. Meanwhile, the process in Costa Rica rolls ahead, with a vote on the fuero expected by December 18. Will the deputies at the asamblea entertain a second vote on Chaves’s immunity? The president already appeared before the national assembly’s special three-member commission (two members of the opposition and one “officialist” member) on November 14. Chaves left that hearing before it concluded.  

Should the two-thirds majority be reached this time, it will be uncharted territory for the “Switzerland of Central America.” A successful vote would authorize prosecutors and the attorney general’s office to open a case through criminal proceedings. Importantly, it would not amount to impeachment, nor would it remove the president. The courts, rather than politics at the asamblea, would determine whether charges advance. The presidency will continue to function, and the electoral calendar will continue to advance, as well. And regardless of the outcome, the term-limited Chaves will leave office and a new government will be inaugurated come May 8, 2026. 

Costa Rica’s confrontation is, so far, a stress test of checks and balances operating within its constitution and electoral laws. 

For Washington, the attention to Costa Rica reflects the recognition that Central American stability matters for the world’s largest economy. US efforts to strengthen democratic resilience in its own neighborhood must be accompanied by support for processes and procedures—not specific players. Doing so effectively would help advance US interests in the hemisphere.  

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María Fernanda Bozmoski is director, impact and operations and lead for Central America at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the center’s work on Mexico and Central America and supports the director with the center’s operations. 

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-peace-plan-must-not-include-amnesty-for-russian-war-crimes/ Tue, 02 Dec 2025 18:50:39 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=891563 US President Donald Trump's 28-point peace plan for Ukraine includes an amnesty for war crimes that critics say will only strengthen Putin's sense of impunity and set the stage for more Russian aggression, writes Ivan Horodyskyy.

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]]> The recent Hollywood movie “Nuremberg” provided a timely reminder of the role played by Soviet consent in the creation and legitimacy of the International Military Tribunal established to prosecute Nazi leaders after World War II. The broad outlines of the tribunal had been agreed before the end of the war during the February 1945 Yalta Conference, with both Churchill and Roosevelt noting Stalin’s readiness to support the initiative.

The Soviet leader’s stance should probably not have come as such a surprise. His apparent enthusiasm for prosecuting Germany’s wartime leadership was not a reflection of faith in international justice or the rule of law, but due to his own personal experience with show trials during the 1930s. For Stalin, the trial of the Nazis was another political performance with a preordained outcome.

Several generations later, the Kremlin’s attitude appears to have changed little. Russian President Vladimir Putin stands accused of imprisoning his domestic opponents on politically motivated charges, but regards any attempt to hold Russia legally accountable for the invasion of Ukraine as unacceptable. This includes the efforts of Ukraine and its allies to create a Special Tribunal for the crime of aggression, and extends to investigations conducted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

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One of the most striking provisions in US President Donald Trump’s recently unveiled 28-point Ukraine peace plan was a full amnesty for all parties for their actions during the war in Ukraine and an agreement not to make any claims or consider any complaints in future. While Trump’s initial plan has already been subject to multiple revisions, the idea of a blanket amnesty has sparked alarm and outrage among Ukrainians, with critics viewing it as a move to pardon all Russians responsible for war crimes in Ukraine.

The Trump peace plan first emerged just days after a Russian missile strike on a residential building in Ternopil that killed more than thirty people including seven children. Many Ukrainians recalled this attack following the publication of Trump’s plan, noting that it served to highlight the injustice of offering an amnesty for the vast quantity of crimes committed since the start of the full-scale invasion almost four years ago.

Some have also pointed out that failure to prosecute war crimes in Ukraine could have disastrous implications for the future of global security. “It would ruin international law and create a precedent that would encourage other authoritarian leaders to think that you can invade a country, kill people and erase their identity, and you will be rewarded with new territories,” commented Ukrainian Nobel prize winner Oleksandra Matviichuk.

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Addressing Russian war crimes in Ukraine is not only a matter of providing justice for victims. It is also essential in order to prevent further Kremlin aggression. While the legitimacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal continues to provoke discussion, few would argue that it provided important lessons for Germany and sent an unambiguous message that international aggression ends in defeat and accountability.

Russian society has never experienced anything comparable to Nuremberg. They was no accountability for the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968, or the invasion of Afghanistan. Since the fall of the USSR, there have been no systematic investigations into crimes committed during Russia’s Chechen wars, the 2008 invasion of Georgia, or the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

This absence of accountability has fueled a sense of impunity in the Kremlin and throughout Russian society that has been instrumental in creating the political climate for the current attack on Ukraine. Unless addressed, this historically rooted sense of Russian impunity will inevitably fuel further aggression.  

Advocates of the US-led peace initiative have suggested that the priority now should be securing peace rather than seeking justice. In reality, however, the two goals are interlinked. It is delusional to think that any future treaty obligations or declarations of non-aggression from Russia’s leaders can be trusted, especially if they are not held to account for the crimes of the past four years. 

It is important to recognize that many of the 28 points featured in the United States plan are realistic and could serve as the basis for a viable peace settlement. At the same time, it is also abundantly clear that the proposed amnesty for war crimes will only embolden the Kremlin. If adopted, it would encourage Russia to continue the invasion of Ukraine or escalate elsewhere in the Baltic region, the southern Caucasus, or Central Asia. That is clearly not in the interests of the United States, Europe, or the wider international community.

It is therefore vital to thoroughly investigate all war crimes committed in Ukraine and establish the facts in a manner that challenges Russia’s sense of impunity and allows for the rehabilitation of victims. The Nuremberg Tribunal did not succeed in ending wars of aggression, but it did establish a precedent of legal responsibility. If we now forego this principle of accountability entirely, progress toward a safer world will not be possible.

Ivan Horodyskyy is an associate professor of the School of Public Management at the Ukrainian Catholic University.

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/el-fasher-is-only-the-latest-wake-up-call-to-the-genocide-unfolding-in-sudan/ Tue, 25 Nov 2025 18:46:14 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=890375 Sudan’s civil war has become one of the world’s deadliest crises—and the massacre in El Fasher exposes a genocide unfolding in plain sight. As regional powers fuel the war, millions face famine, displacement, and systematic violence.

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]]> Last week, US President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that Sudan “has become the most violent place on Earth” and that he and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had talked about the United States using its influence to “bring an immediate halt to what is taking place in Sudan.”

Such a statement comes after unproductive attempts by Washington to mediate the conflict. It also isn’t clear how the president would bring a halt to the situation, since both sides in the fighting are supported by US partners. But Trump is waking up to the reality of what is happening in Sudan—and he’s not the only one.

On October 27 this year, two and a half years into the Sudanese civil war, the international community seemed to finally grasp that a genocide was unfolding in front of its eyes. After enduring an eighteen-month blockade marked by relentless drone strikes, the city of El Fasher, the final major urban center in Sudan’s North Darfur state outside the grip of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), was overrun. The RSF is the paramilitary faction that has been at war with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) since April 2023.

Once the group pushed into El Fasher, reports and footage circulating across social media and television revealed widespread killings of civilians. Around 1,500 people were killed and some ninety thousand displaced, with another fifty thousand fleeing violence in the neighboring North and South Kordofan provinces, according to the Sudan Doctors Network and the United Nations.

El Fasher had long been one of the most violent fronts in the devastating conflict between Sudan’s national army and the RSF. In April, the paramilitary group had intensified its offensive on the city, shortly after being driven out of the capital, Khartoum.

The world’s most serious humanitarian crisis

For years, the genocide unfolding in Sudan barely registered on the world’s radar. The international community remained more focused on crises in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine. But the fighting and killing in Sudan never stopped.

In a country in tatters, where there is no systematic record of the dead, casualty estimates vary. Some sources suggest that the number hovers somewhere around 150,000. However, human rights organizations believe that the real toll of the civil war is likely much higher. The conflict has displaced about fourteen million people out of a population of fifty-one million. Half of them are refugees in neighboring countries. As of April 2025, twenty-five million Sudanese were facing acute famine—and according to Doctors Without Borders, over 70 percent of children under the age of five were acutely malnourished. Among those who fled El Fasher, 35 percent suffered from “severe acute malnutrition.”

With severe damage to its hospitals and water supply, Sudan now faces one of the world’s gravest humanitarian crises—one that some experts say even eclipses the emergencies in Gaza and Ukraine. Still, El Fasher is not the first, but merely the latest genocidal campaign in the country.

Naming the genocide

Engaging in war crimes and crimes against humanity, RSF soldiers have carried out child abductions, mass rape, sexual slavery, and village burnings for years, mostly in Darfur in western Sudan. Even as far back as 2001, the predecessor of the RSF—a militia known as the Janjaweed—repeatedly looted homes and engaged in gang rape in the region. Between 2003 and 2008, the group killed hundreds of thousands of non-Arab civilians. The campaign displaced around three million people and was described as a “genocide” by US President Joe Biden just before leaving the White House and as a “ethnic cleansing” by international observers. Against this background, Darfur is not a newly emerging hotspot. Home to several long-persecuted non-Arab tribes—Fur, Masalit, Berti, and Zaghawa—it is, in fact, again becoming one.  

The Zaghawa, who are the majority group in El Fasher, rallied to the army in late 2023 after the RSF committed massacres against the Masalit and other non-Arab communities in the city of El Geneina in West Darfur. In a report released in May 2024, Human Rights Watch documented these killings as ethnic cleansing. The report cited the testimony of a seventeen-year-old boy who described the murder of twelve children and five adults from several families: “Two members of the RSF… tore the children from their parents and, as the parents began to scream, two other members of the RSF shot and killed the parents. Then they piled the children up and shot them. They threw their bodies into the river, along with their belongings.”

African apathy—and cynical regional powers

With its paltry communiqués, a powerless African Union has, for two years, contented itself with calling for an end to the fighting or expressing its concern about the humanitarian crisis, without ever sending a single African head of state to the front lines in Khartoum or to visit the victims of the El Geneina massacre.

In a press release marking two years of conflict, Amnesty International noted that “the world has only contributed 6.6% of the funds needed to address the humanitarian catastrophe raging in the country.” Observers usually recommend enforcement of the arms embargo, increased emergency humanitarian aid, and justice for the victims. However, there is one issue on which the United Nations Security Council and the mediators remain discreetly, if not embarrassingly, silent: the armed support that the belligerents receive from regional powers.

Egypt, Iran, Turkey, China, the UAE, and even Russia and Ukraine have all turned their attention to Sudan, siding either with the SAF or the RSF. Drones, gold, military intelligence, and mercenaries are all being used to intensify the violence of the war, while the meddling regional powers deny any involvement. Motivations for their involvement include securing the Nile’s waters, controlling the eight hundred kilometers of Sudanese Red Sea coastline, and the mineral resources of eastern Sudan. Sudan has also accused Chad and Kenya of being parties to the conflict. At the London Sudan Conference on April 15, the second anniversary of the outbreak of the civil war, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef reiterated these allegations.

Clearly, the complex web of geostrategic interests in the region makes any mediation difficult, with Sudan even considering taking action against the UAE before the International Court of Justice for supplying the RSF with weapons.

The people as a solution

As it stands, Sudan is trapped in a dangerous regional power play and is threatened with partition. Should the country fall apart, this would not only destabilize the African continent but also endanger the exceptional Sudanese cultural heritage.

Any solution in Sudan must run through its civil society and, ultimately, its people. They are strong in part because of—and shown by—their history. With eight borders and a geostrategic position between the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, Sudan is a crossroads of African cultures, religions, and civilizations. The country still bears a name that means “land of the Blacks,” despite the attempts to erase its African roots carried out by the Islamist regime of long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir. Sudan, which rivaled ancient Egypt, eventually conquered and ruled the Egyptian throne, becoming the twenty-fifth dynasty of pharaohs. All this happened a long time ago, under Black African leadership, before Christians and Muslim Arabs expanded their influence in the country.  

This history and legacy help explain the political resilience of the Sudanese people and the dynamism of Sudan’s civil society. Bashir’s ousting in 2019 would not have been possible without democratic resistance, embodied by civic organizations such as the Sudanese Professionals Association, the nonviolent Forces of Freedom and Change coalition, and the grassroots Girifna movement.

Today, as in the past, the Sudanese people—rather than an apathetic international community or meddling regional powers—could once again be the decisive force for change. Empowering civil society and grassroots organizations should therefore be the starting point for any diplomatic initiative.

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Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-sheikh-hasina-has-been-sentenced-to-death-in-absentia-what-does-this-mean-for-bangladeshs-future/ Mon, 17 Nov 2025 22:19:26 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=888595 A tribunal in Dhaka has sentenced the former Bangladeshi prime minister for her role in the government’s deadly crackdown in July 2024.

The post Experts react: Sheikh Hasina has been sentenced to death in absentia. What does this mean for Bangladesh’s future? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Monday, the International Crimes Tribunal based in Dhaka sentenced former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to death for her role in the government’s deadly crackdown on student-led protests in July 2024. Having fled to India last year, Hasina was sentenced in absentia. So, what impact will the decision have on Bangladeshis’ efforts to turn the page on Hasina’s fifteen-year rule? Below, our experts share their verdict on the sentencing and what should follow it.

Click to jump to an expert analysis: 

Rudabeh Shahid: Hasina’s death sentence will further polarize Bangladesh

Michael Kugelman: With Hasina in exile in India, New Delhi faces a tough choice

Wahiduzzaman Noor: A verdict meant to deliver justice, but the trial and aftermath raise difficult questions

M. Osman Siddique: Bangladesh deserves stability, unity, and responsible leadership

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Hasina’s death sentence will further polarize Bangladesh 

Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal sentencing Hasina to death marks a deeply polarizing moment in the country’s violent political trajectory. While the verdict focuses on her alleged responsibility for last July’s violent crackdown on student protesters, the impartiality of the International Crimes Tribunal itself has long been questioned, particularly because earlier decades of convictions disproportionately targeted Jamaat-e-Islami leaders under previous administrations. This history means the court’s decisions are inevitably filtered through layers of political memory and mistrust. 

A powerful irony now shadows public reactions to the sentencing. A decade ago, thousands of Bangladeshi millennials gathered at Dhaka’s Shahbagh, dancing and chanting in support of death sentences handed down to Jamaat-e-Islami leaders. Today, many members of Bangladesh’s Gen Z are celebrating Hasina’s death sentence. These two moments are united by public demands for accountability, yet each reveals how dramatically the political tide can shift. It is important to note that many are celebrating not necessarily because they support capital punishment, but because they lost close friends during the July protests, a movement that toppled Hasina’s government and reshaped the national mood. 

India is unlikely to extradite Hasina. New Delhi has already signaled reservations about due process and will almost certainly argue that the trial does not meet the standards required for a fair proceeding. This introduces a new tension into Bangladesh-India relations at a sensitive moment. 

Domestically, the path to elections is far from straightforward. Holding national polls without the Awami League—the former ruling party under Hasina whose leaders have promised escalating resistance—risks producing a one-sided electoral landscape. With the Awami League effectively banned, the verdict may harden polarization rather than ease it. 

Hasina’s death sentence has now split Bangladeshis into two camps: those who argue this is the only path toward accountability after years of authoritarianism, and those who insist that the death penalty undermines justice and that national reconciliation is essential. 

Only time can tell which vision will define Bangladesh’s future. Nevertheless, if the country’s history is any guide, plot twists are guaranteed. 

—Rudabeh Shahid is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and a visiting assistant professor of government at Wesleyan University.

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With Hasina in exile in India, New Delhi faces a tough choice

This verdict puts India in a major bind. It will now face unprecedented pressure to extradite Hasina. However, Hasina is one of India’s closest friends; she and her family have long had close ties with the Indian ruling party and opposition alike, and New Delhi has no intention of betraying her. But if it continues to decline to turn Hasina over, India could squander an opportunity to patch up ties with the new administration that emerges from Bangladesh’s election, which is scheduled for next February. India has had many concerns about the changes in Bangladesh since Hasina’s ouster, including increased space for political and religious actors that are not fond of India. But it also has strong interests—from trade and connectivity to border security—that are best served with a friendly, or at least workable, relationship with Dhaka. 

For New Delhi, the middle ground option is best: Work out an arrangement where Hasina can be relocated to a third country—likely an authoritarian state where her security would be ensured and access to her could be controlled. There’s been ample speculation since Hasina’s ouster about where she could end up, from Belarus to somewhere in the Gulf. But the question is if there will be any takers for such a high-maintenance charge. 

Hasina may be a special guest of New Delhi’s, but she may now be wearing out her welcome—especially with India looking to explore opportunities for rapprochement with Dhaka as the Bangladesh election draws closer. 

—Michael Kugelman is a South Asia analyst and the writer of Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.

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A verdict meant to deliver justice, but the trial and aftermath raise difficult questions

The verdict against Hasina for crimes against humanity is an important moment for the family members of those who were killed during the protests that led to her ouster. For many, this is an acknowledgment of their grief and justice for their loss. Yet, the judicial process surrounding the trial also raised difficult questions. Several tribunal appointments have been criticized as politically motivated. The interim government amended the International Crime Tribunals Act of 1973 through administrative order to expand its scope and prosecute Hasina. The tribunal has also refused to appoint her legal representation. Amnesty International staunchly criticized the trial for its unprecedented speed, the fact that it was held in absentia, and concerns over its fairness that may complicate public trust in the outcome.

Hasina’s sentence makes her the first prime minister of Bangladesh to receive a capital conviction. Her political future remains uncertain: she remains exiled in India and any path home seems narrower. Yet she continues to command unwavering loyalty from her political party, the Awami League, and is likely to lead the party from India. India’s primary reaction, however, has been very cautious. New Delhi, thus far, has shown no intention to extradite Hasina; now the imposition of capital punishment in a trial conducted in absentia eliminates any realistic prospect that India will extradite her.

Inside Bangladesh, reactions to the verdict vary widely. Some groups that opposed the previous government view the decision as long overdue. Others worry that it may inflame an already polarized environment. The Awami League still holds a sizable, loyal base of supporters. Episodes of political violence resurfaced in the days preceding the verdict, which suggests that tensions could escalate rather than ease. With the parliamentary election only three months away, and the Awami League barred from the election, the risk of renewed unrest is difficult to dismiss.

—Wahiduzzaman Noor is a Bangladeshi national security professional and former diplomat at the Embassy of Bangladesh in Washington, DC, with expertise in South Asian affairs, Indo-Pacific security, and counterterrorism.

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Bangladesh deserves stability, unity, and responsible leadership

The verdict concerning Hasina is a very significant development. My hope is that Bangladesh navigates this with restraint, respect for the rule of law, and a commitment to national harmony.  

It is absolutely essential that the legal process remain transparent and that peace and security are maintained for all citizens. 

Whatever the prevalent political views are, justice must be fair, and society must remain peaceful. Bangladesh deserves stability, unity, and responsible leadership from all sides during this moment.

—M. Osman Siddique is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. He previously served as the US ambassador to the Republic of Fiji with concurrent accreditations to the Kingdom of Tonga, the Republic of Nauru, and the government of Tuvalu from 1999 to 2001.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/zelenskyy-faces-the-biggest-corruption-scandal-of-his-presidency/ Mon, 17 Nov 2025 15:58:20 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=888467 Amid Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukraine in now facing the largest corruption scandal of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s presidency over alleged kickbacks in the graft-prone energy sector, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

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]]>

Editor’s note: This article was updated on November 17 to include Herman Halushchenko’s response to the corruption investigation.

Amid Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukraine is now facing the largest corruption scandal of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s presidency. It is a scandal with the potential to reshape the country’s politics. The intrigue, which involves alleged kickbacks in the graft-prone energy sector laundered through Russian-linked channels by close associates of President Zelenskyy, may prove as big a test of his leadership as the war itself.

On November 10, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) exposed an alleged $110 million corruption scheme at state-owned nuclear company Energoatom. The charges are supported by a fifteen-month wiretap and over seventy searches carried out as part of a major investigation called Operation Midas.

According to NABU officials, the investigation uncovered a criminal enterprise run by Timur Mindich, a film producer and a former business partner of Zelenskyy. Additional suspects include former Minister of Energy and recently appointed Minister of Justice Herman Halushchenko; former Naftogaz CEO and Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Chernyshov; former Minister of Defense and current National Security and Defense Council member Rustem Umerov; and Ihor Myroniuk, former deputy head of the State Property Fund and former advisor to Halushchenko.

Mindich fled Ukraine the day before his premises were raided and is reportedly now in Israel. Both Chernyshov and Mindich have long had ties with Zelenskyy, who co-founded the latter’s production company in 2003. Thus far, formal charges have been filed against eight of those implicated. Halushchenko has said he would defend himself against the accusations.

The alleged theft took the form of 10-15 percent inflated prices for infrastructure project contracts, which contractors were forced to pay in order to avoid losing their supplier status. The kickback scheme reportedly included security measures for the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant. The Ministry of Energy is suspected of facilitating the scam.

The stolen funds were allegedly laundered through an office linked to fugitive ex-Ukrainian MP and now Russian Senator Andrii Derkach before being extracted from Ukraine. Derkach has been sanctioned since 2021 and was stripped of his Ukrainian citizenship in 2023.

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While the investigation is still underway, the scandal is already proving extremely damaging to Zelenskyy and his entire administration. The alleged involvement of a former Ukrainian MP turned Russian fugitive in the middle of the Kremlin’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine may be the most scandalous aspect of the accusations.

Meanwhile, Zelenskyy’s long contact with many of the accused and their high-level appointments has raised the political stakes for the President. This has led to speculation over whether the scandal could topple Zelenskyy and cost Ukraine the war.

The investigation comes in the wake of a recent standoff between Zelenskyy and his administration with Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. In July 2025, a law proposed by Zelenskyy’s political party was passed by the Ukrainian parliament stripping NABU and other anti-corruption institutions of their independence.

This led to vocal condemnation from Ukraine’s civil society and the international community, including the largest street protests since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Days later, Zelenskyy reconsidered and signed a law that restored and guaranteed the independence of the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

That guarantee has now been tested and proven credible. While the sheer number of criminal investigations and indictments targeting prominent Ukrainian officials has raised concerns about possible political prosecutions by NABU, the apparent success of Operation Midas and its exposure of alleged corruption on the part of some of the most powerful people in Ukraine would seem to confirm the agency’s independence and its efficacy.

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Zelenskyy appears to recognize the dangers of the situation and has begun responding to the crisis. The Cabinet of Ministers is looking at sanctions against Mindich and businessman Oleksandr Tsukerman, who was also implicated in the scandal. The Ukrainian leader has already forced the resignations of Halushchenko and newly appointed Minister of Energy Svitlana Hrynchuk.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko has announced a comprehensive audit of all state-owned companies, especially in the energy and defense sectors. Anastasia Radina, head of the parliament’s anti-corruption committee, has called for a parliamentary inquiry into the transfer of funds to Russia.

These steps are significant but are unlikely to prove adequate. The stakes are extremely high, not just for Zelenskyy’s political future, but for Ukraine’s conduct of the war. European leaders answer to their citizens, many of whom might now be wondering why they are sending massive aid to Ukraine if large sums are being siphoned off by privileged insiders. In the US, while Trump is slowly moving in the right direction with recent sanctions on Russia, there are still influential figures in his orbit who are looking for ways to end all American support for Ukraine’s defense against Kremlin aggression.

This means that Zelenskyy must turn his attention to the crisis energetically. A good next step would be for him to speak up on the issue publicly and strongly, much as he did in the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Zelenskyy might start by acknowledging, as former US President Harry Truman did when he said the buck stops with him, that as President of Ukraine, he is ultimately responsible for failures in his government. He should recognize the magnitude of the scandal and the underlying problem of corruption, while explaining how he intends to take the lead in fixing it. This means bringing to justice, in accordance with the law, all those responsible, no matter who they are and where they are. He can do this by vowing to empower NABU and other relevant state institutions fully.

Zelenskyy could frame the scandal as proof that despite clear progress made by Ukraine in dealing with corruption, much more remains to be done. He could demonstrate his openness by inviting advice from Ukrainian civil society and the country’s international partners. This current crisis has clearly demonstrated the dangers of relying on just a small circle at Bankova to get things done.

Such a speech should not be a one off. It should be the start of a dialogue with the Ukrainian public, much like Zelenskyy’s masterful wartime communications. This dialogue should include regular updates on efforts to bring those responsible for this theft to justice, and news about steps to strengthen state institutions against the scourge of corruption. Zelenskyy has the skills to take this on. Now is the time to do it.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

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Russia’s ‘human safari’ in southern Ukraine is a warning to the world

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Russia’s escalating campaign of drone attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine’s Kherson region highlights the destructive power of modern drone technologies, writes Oleksandr Tolokonnikov.

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UkraineAlert Nov 4, 2025

EU praises Ukraine’s progress but warns Zelenskyy over corruption

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s bid to join the EU received a boost this week with the release of a report praising the country’s progress toward future membership, but EU officials also warned President Zelenskyy about the dangers of backsliding on anti-corruption reforms, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Since 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly used nuclear threats to deter Western support for Ukraine, but this scare tactic risks exposing Russia’s inability to project strength via more conventional means, writes Stephen Blank.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-supreme-court-might-slow-trumps-strategy-but-he-still-has-other-tariff-options/ Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:58 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=886649 If the administration’s primary objective is to preserve tariff revenue and counter unfair practices, sections 301, 232, or 122 remain viable alternatives.

The post The Supreme Court might slow Trump’s strategy. But he still has other tariff options. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Wednesday saw high drama in the highest court in the land, with oral arguments at the US Supreme Court over whether President Donald Trump is authorized to invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose sweeping tariffs on nearly all US imports. 

If the tariffs—including measures targeting Mexico, Canada, and China over fentanyl imports—are upheld, it would confirm the executive branch’s unprecedented reach over economic policy. But if the court rejects the administration’s measures, the decision would limit the White House’s ability to move rapidly on some of its core strategic objectives.

Before the Supreme Court issues its verdict, it’s worth stepping back to assess the broader issues at play: What alternatives could the administration pursue if the court strikes down its use of IEEPA—and why has Trump relied on an aggressive tariff policy in the first place?

Alternative legal pathways exist—but they come with limitations

Even without IEEPA, the administration could rely on other legal instruments to replicate the intensity and scope of the current tariff environment. One alternative is Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. However, like all legislation explicitly granting the executive branch authority to levy tariffs or duties, Section 301 comes with constraints—particularly with regard to speed and applicability. Section 301 gives the US Trade Representative the authority to investigate and respond to foreign trade practices that violate trade agreements or disadvantage US commerce. After an investigation is complete, and if it affirms a trade partner’s unfair practices, the White House may impose tariffs on a range of products from that trading partner. However, it must first review petitions, hold public hearings, and issue findings before providing recommendations. In the past, this process has usually taken at least nine months. Unlike IEEPA, Section 301 duties cannot be applied instantly or without a comprehensive assessment.

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 faces similar constraints in speed and scope. It gives the Commerce Department the authority to investigate whether the quantity or circumstances of specific imports pose national security risks, or could in the future. If such a risk is identified, the president can respond by imposing tariffs or quotas. Unlike Section 301, Section 232 authorizes tariffs on specific products from all US trading partners. While Section 232 involves fewer procedural steps than Section 301, it is limited in scope to products with national security implications. Notably, this limitation is flexible, as “national security” is broadly defined.

Meanwhile, Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 gives the president the authority to address significant balance-of-payments deficits through imposing temporary import tariffs of up to 15 percent. These tariffs can remain in place for 150 days unless extended by Congress. Actions must be applied on a nondiscriminatory basis to maintain the existing distribution of trade. However, the president can target specific countries by exempting others. Section 122 has never been used to levy tariffs and is clearly constrained in both duty level and the duration of measures.

Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 allows the president to impose additional duties on countries engaging in discriminatory trade practices against the United States. These practices must uniquely disadvantage US exporters and not be universally applied. If applicable, the president may impose tariffs of up to 50 percent of the imported product’s value—and persistent discrimination may allow the blocking of all imports from the offending country. Section 338 has also never been invoked and is limited to responses to unfair trade practices.

Generating revenue and countering trade imbalances without IEEPA

It is worth remembering that Trump has wielded tariffs for four distinct purposes: to generate revenue, balance nontariff barriers imposed by trading partners, punish adversaries for practices often unrelated to trade, and serve as a negotiation tool. If the Supreme Court rules against Trump’s claim of unilateral power to impose tariffs, these objectives would be jeopardized, but not unachievable.

A majority of the additional tariff revenue collected, for instance, would theoretically need to be refunded to importers, potentially as a future credit. One alternative the administration could use to raise revenue in 2026 would be leveraging Section 301 to impose tariffs on major US trading partners such as China, Canada and Mexico (for goods not compliant with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement), and the European Union.

However, Section 301 cannot be used to generate revenue, only to counter unfair trade practices. Without linking tariffs to addressing unfair trade, these measures could be vulnerable to legal challenges if the Supreme Court rules that revenue-generating tariffs must originate in Congress. The White House initiated a Section 301 investigation on China in October and could pursue new investigations against other major trading partners. The graph below illustrates the US import value potentially exposed to Section 301 tariffs for the United States’ top ten trading partners if applying current IEEPA tariff rates. The White House clearly does not need global tariffs to raise revenue.

The administration could also expand Section 232 tariffs—as it is already likely to do on pharmaceuticals, critical minerals, and semiconductors. Thanks to the broad definition of national security, the White House has already expanded the lists of products subject to Section 232 tariffs to include many derivative products, such as bathroom vanities, which do not present obvious national security concerns. The value of US imports exposed to the Section 232 tariffs added just in Trump’s second term are already comparable to that of the IEEPA tariffs, suggesting that the revenue collected could also be comparable. 

To compensate for the 10 percent global baseline tariff, the administration could use Section 122 to levy up to a 15 percent baseline tariff on all economies with large and sustained trade deficits. This approach, however, rests on a weaker legal foundation than Sections 232 and 301 and would likely face court challenges.

Overall, the administration has sufficient tools at its disposal to achieve comparable tariff revenue in coming years, even if invoking IEEPA is no longer an option. 

Targeting unfair trade through Section 301 and sanctions

When it comes to using tariffs as a punitive tool for grievances, the administration has applied this tactic mostly to trade unrelated to IEEPA. For example, a 40 percent tariff was imposed on imports from Brazil due to “policies, practices, and actions of the Government of Brazil” threatening US national security, foreign policy, and economic interests. The United States also added a 25 percent tariff on imports from India because of its continued imports of Russian oil. This strategy is likely to falter without IEEPA, which allows tariffs to be applied instantaneously.

Using Section 301 could potentially replace this strategy with regard to country-focused actions, but it requires a comprehensive review and must address unfair trade practices. For countries such as Brazil, with which the United States maintains a trade surplus, defending such tariffs legally may be more difficult, although investigations are already underway. Moreover, the administration could also rely on traditional national security tools, such as sanctions, instead of tariffs.

The tariff regime may hold, but negotiating power could wane

Meanwhile, the administration’s use of tariffs as a negotiation tool would be substantially weakened without IEEPA. After all, even after deals are agreed upon, enforcement is critical. As US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer wrote in the New York Times, “the new U.S. approach is to closely monitor implementation of the deals and swiftly reimpose a higher tariff rate for noncompliance if needed.” The emphasis is on “swiftly reimpose.”

If the administration must rely on Section 301 or Section 232 to target economies or key industries, the penalty for noncompliance would be much slower than with IEEPA. Section 122 or 338 could be experimented with, but countries may perceive these alternatives as less credible, especially if the Supreme Court has already ruled against the administration regarding IEEPA. 

If the administration’s primary objective is to preserve tariff revenue and counter unfair practices, sections 301, 232, or 122 remain viable alternatives. While slower and more constrained, these tools can replicate the current tariff regime. However, if the goal is to secure new trade agreements or enforce compliance, the absence of IEEPA is likely to diminish both credibility and speed, weakening the administration’s negotiating power.

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Sophia Busch is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/representative-adam-smith-on-the-ndaa-venezuela-and-the-united-states-role-in-the-world/ Fri, 07 Nov 2025 17:08:42 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=886472 The congressman discussed the National Defense Authorization Act and the Trump administration’s attacks on alleged drug-smuggling boats in the Caribbean and Pacific.

The post Representative Adam Smith on the NDAA, Venezuela, and the United States’ role in the world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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“I don’t think simply committing this large number of assets—hundreds of millions, probably billions of dollars by the time it’s done—to blow up some drug boats in international waters in Latin America is going to make an appreciable difference” in the fight against drug trafficking, said Representative Adam Smith (D-WA), the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Thursday. 

The event, part of the Atlantic Council’s Commanders Series, came amid uncertainty over whether the Trump administration’s campaign of attacks on boats that it claims are trafficking drugs will escalate into an effort to overthrow Venezuelan autocrat Nicolás Maduro.

Based on a briefing he received from the State Department and Department of Defense on Wednesday, Smith said he thinks that “the administration does not want to go to war with Venezuela.” But, Smith added, US President Donald Trump sometimes “very quickly” changes his mind. “So who knows?”

Thursday’s event also came amid the longest US government shutdown in history, with the House out of session even as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the next fiscal year has yet to be passed, a situation Smith called “unbelievably disruptive.”

Read below for more highlights from this conversation with Smith, which was moderated by Fox News Chief National Security Correspondent Jennifer Griffin. 

The NDAA

• “The NDAA itself is moving forward,” Smith said of the annual bill, noting that different versions have been passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and now the two versions need to be reconciled.
• One of Smith’s priorities for the bill is acquisition reform: “My position is we’ve had the risk wrong for a long time” on defense acquisition policy, said Smith. “We’ve been only focused” on the risk of corruption in the procurement process “as opposed to the risk of not moving fast enough,” he said. One way to speed up acquisition, he said, is “consolidating the decision makers” in the process “instead of having to go through nine or ten different layers.”
• Smith also said he wants to “have procurement people stay in their job longer.” Constant turnover in procurement roles, he said, “doesn’t really help with corruption. It just means that the person doesn’t know the system as well when they’re working on it.”

US strikes on boats in the Caribbean and Pacific

• Transnational drug-trafficking gangs in the Western Hemisphere are “a problem for our national security” and “a problem for Latin America,” Smith said. “You’ve got budding narco-states down there. They’re having a harder and harder time dealing with that. We need to be engaged and involved in that.”
• However, Smith was critical of the Trump administration’s campaign of attacks on alleged drug-trafficking boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific. “It seems very problematic to me that we have decided that drug dealing will now have the death penalty attached to it,” with “no process whatsoever.”
• “They’re certainly bad policy in my view,” Smith said of the strikes.

US military presence abroad

• “I think one of the mistakes that we have made is to assume that our global presence is just a cost that isn’t benefiting us,” Smith said of US troop deployments abroad. 
• Citing threats posed by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorist organizations, Smith said that to pull US troops back from allied countries now and “ignore” these dangers “places us at risk.”
• Smith took issue with the Trump administration’s decision to draw down its forces in Romania and noted that there is “bipartisan, bicameral support” in the House and Senate armed services committees “to maintain our presence in Europe and defend them.”
• “If any of you have been to Romania, the Baltics, Poland,” said Smith, addressing the crowd, “they want a lot of things, but the one thing they want more than anything is us,” meaning a US military presence. “They don’t believe Russia wants to come in and kill a bunch of US troops. So a little bit of presence can give us a maximum amount of deterrence, and we’re going to fight that out in the defense bill.”

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Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-expert-conversation-whats-trumps-endgame-in-venezuela/ Thu, 06 Nov 2025 21:20:39 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=886225 We spoke to Matthew Kroenig and Jason Marczak to shed light on the US campaign of attacks on alleged drug boats and lay out what's next.

The post The expert conversation: What’s Trump’s endgame in Venezuela? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> US President Donald Trump has steadily accelerated his campaign of attacks on alleged drug boats in the Caribbean and Pacific Ocean, while building up US military forces in the region. Aside from the anti-drug mission, the US president and his allies have indicated that they intend to force out Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro, though the administration reportedly told Congress this week that it doesn’t have the legal justifications for strikes inside the country right now.

To shed light on what’s going on and what to expect next, we spoke earlier this week with Matt Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and Jason Marczak, vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. This expert conversation has been lightly edited and condensed below.

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Matt, you host a show called “So What’s the Strategy?” What do you think US strategy in the region is right now?

Matt Kroenig

If there is a strategy, it’s not clear to me. Maybe there is, but it just hasn’t been articulated. A good strategy starts with clear goals. So, what is it that they’re trying to achieve? It seems like there are at least two possibilities—and, of course, it could be both.

One is that this is about removing Maduro from power, and that could make sense. Maduro has obviously been an anti-American dictator, not good for Venezuela or the United States. Option two is that this is about border security and stopping narco-trafficking.

So, what are the major steps to achieve these goals? The military buildup has been the most prominent recent element. Is this just about striking drug boats? Seems like it’s more than that. If it’s about removing Maduro, then is the hope that he’ll self-deport? Senators Rick Scott and Lindsey Graham were on the Sunday shows last week with similar talking points about how Maduro should just go to Russia or China. Or is it possibly preparing for strikes on the mainland, maybe against Maduro himself? The United States has had a long-standing policy against assassinating foreign leaders, but Trump doesn’t seem to mind breaking norms.

Jason, how do you hear that from a regional standpoint?

Jason Marczak

The president has said that his top goal is stopping the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. And in the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago in particular has been quite supportive of the strikes on the alleged drug-carrying vessels.

I think it’s also a signal to other countries in the region and around the world of how serious this administration is on security and stopping the flow of drugs. There have been other countries in the hemisphere where the administration has been putting pressure to do more to stop the flow of drugs into the United States, such as Colombia with the sanctioning of President Gustavo Petro and the decertification of Colombia as cooperating with the United States on drug-control strategy.

At the same time, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has been very clear on this from his days as a senator. The secretary wants to see the dictator Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela out of power. Given [Rubio’s] Cuban ancestry, it’s very personal to him as well—the rise of dictators and what that means for the people and the erosion of civil liberties that we’ve seen across Venezuela hits home for Rubio. As the president mentioned on 60 Minutes, he does want to see Maduro go. He does see his days as numbered. The question is, to what extent will the United States go to actually advance the removal of Maduro?

I do expect there to be limited strikes at some point on Venezuelan territory, linked to the illicit drug trade.

At the same time, Maduro is seen across the region as a cancer. The erosion of the Venezuelan economy, the erosion of civil rights, the erosion of political freedoms—that has led to the largest mass-migration crisis that this hemisphere has seen. And the implications of that are not just migrants coming to the US southern border. There are migrants coming to parts of the region that have never seen such numbers of migrants—Chile, for example.

Lastly, there are a number of indications that the Western Hemisphere will figure more prominently in [the Trump administration’s forthcoming] National Defense Strategy (NDS) than in previous defense strategies. And security and stability in our hemisphere requires Nicolás Maduro not being in the Miraflores Palace in Venezuela; he creates instability across the broader region.

Matt, this is your wheelhouse. Is this Caribbean buildup a soft launch of that strategy?

Matt Kroenig

Every national defense strategy essentially starts by saying the homeland is the most important. And I think that’s true for any country and any leader. What I’m hearing is that this NDS will start by saying the homeland and the Western Hemisphere are priority number one, but then the Indo-Pacific and China are number two, and so on.

But you do already see more of a focus on the Western Hemisphere than in past administrations, and clearly, with this military buildup, we haven’t seen anything like this in many years.

Coming back to something that Jason said, there are different camps within this administration who may see this issue differently. Jason is absolutely right that Rubio has long been calling for the removal of Maduro, and he’s obviously empowered as secretary of state and national security advisor. There are probably others in the administration, more in the MAGA restraint camp, who are more worried about border security and the flow of drugs but are probably opposed to military conflict against Venezuela directly. This is a group that’s been criticizing US policy toward Iraq and Afghanistan over the years for failed military intervention. So for now, the camps are aligned in favor of greater pressure against Venezuela, but I doubt that there’s a coherent strategy that they’ve all signed off on.

This military buildup comes as Trump just returned from Asia, where he presided over a peace agreement between Cambodia and Thailand. He frequently talks up his role as a peacemaker. Are we seeing a foreign policy doctrine emerge at this point from Trump?

Matt Kroenig

Well, he’s always used the term “peace through strength,” and I think both parts of that phrase are important. It’s peace through deterrence. He is skeptical of long, drawn-out military campaigns like [those in] Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Ukraine, but is willing to use short, sharp, decisive force. We saw the strikes against Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in the first term. We saw the strikes against Iran’s nuclear program this summer.

And so, for him, strikes against drug infrastructure in Venezuela, as Jason just alluded to, or maybe even against Maduro or regime targets themselves, is not inconsistent with this idea of peace through strength. What I would not expect to see, though, is some kind of Panama or Grenada situation of a full-scale, boots-on-the-ground, regime-change operation. It’s hard for me to see the Trump-Vance administration going for that kind of military action.

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Jason Marczak

I fully agree with Matt, and this is consistent with everything that I’ve been hearing as well. There’s a high potential that we’re going to see limited strikes in Venezuela but, again, no commitment of any type of US forces in a way that would put American troops in harm’s way. Although [it’s] outdated, Venezuela does have an air-defense system. The Russians were tweeting the other day that they’re willing to come and assist the Venezuelans as needed, although I doubt that Russia has any capacity to do so at this point. But the question is: For Trump, does Maduro actually need to be removed from power for him to claim success?

And related to that question: How tight is Maduro’s grip on power? What would it take to force him out?

Jason Marczak

There have been a number of different attempts at overthrowing Maduro over the years, and they are squashed pretty quickly. For one, you have Cuban agents who are embedded across the Venezuelan military and can quickly report any rebellious activities. And over the last twenty-five years, Venezuelan officials have also ensured that there is minimal communication among different military units to make it more difficult for a mass uprising. The most notable attempt to remove Maduro was five years ago—termed Operation Gideon—but the former Venezuelan troops never made it past the shores.

One of the ways that Maduro maintains that grip over the military is through the illicit activities that enrich the regime and thereby enrich the generals. So if we are able to significantly degrade Venezuela’s ability to engage in illicit activities—whether it’s drug trafficking, gold mining, arms trafficking, human smuggling, you name it—then Maduro has less resources to be able to pay off his generals, and that can hopefully lead to a desire from the armed forces to find a different path than one that’s dependent upon Maduro.

The context in Venezuela is really important as well. Unlike other countries where the US has intervened in order to topple a dictator without a clear democratic successor, there are clear leaders in waiting. There was a presidential election a year ago, in which Edmundo González, according to all voting sheets that have been made public, was elected as president. And he’s currently living in exile. María Corina Machado, who won the Nobel Peace Prize, is there in Venezuela fighting for the government that was actually elected a year ago. Venezuela also has its own vast critical resources and oil reserves to provide key economic resources, and there is a regional desire to help to promote stability [in the country].

Now, Maduro has supposedly offered to leave power. The administration has said that those offers have been rejected. But what we would need to avoid, in the case of Maduro leaving power, is that another one of his henchmen just assumes the presidency. There is robust support for the democratic opposition in Venezuela, but it’s about making it clear to the Venezuelan military as well that their future rests on respecting a transition that adheres to democratic principles.

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Matt Kroenig

Jason was talking about other contexts. I’ve worked on US policy toward Iran for more than twenty years, and we have seen uprisings against the regime there, but the reality has been that the regime has been willing to kill to stay in power. That could also be a critical issue in Venezuela. As long as the security forces are willing to kill innocent civilians to keep Maduro or his successors in power, the US ability to engineer regime change from afar is limited.

Just Maduro himself leaving is probably not enough to get the goals that the Trump administration is looking for.

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Jason Marczak

Picking up on Matt’s point, in the hopeful event that Maduro leaves, it needs to be made abundantly clear to the Venezuelan military the severe consequences of killing to remain in power. Most of these forces are not loyal to Nicolás Maduro. Many are either scared of being thrown in jail if they go against Maduro or are directly benefiting from the illicit financial resources that Maduro procures and then doles out to military officials. If those resources are drying up, well, do you want to take additional action to perpetuate a regime that’s falling? Or do you want to be on the right side of history?

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Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

The post The expert conversation: What’s Trump’s endgame in Venezuela? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/fastthinking/how-might-the-supreme-court-reshape-trumps-tariffs/ Wed, 05 Nov 2025 22:24:36 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=886079 The Supreme Court expressed skepticism of the Trump administration’s sweeping tariff authority during oral arguments on Wednesday.

The post How might the Supreme Court reshape Trump’s tariffs?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]>

JUST IN

Nine justices, one global economy-shaking case. The Supreme Court expressed skepticism of the Trump administration’s authority to use tariffs under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) during oral arguments on Wednesday. The outcome of the case, which will be announced in the coming months, will have wide-ranging ramifications for the tariffs US President Donald Trump has enacted so far and his ability to levy them unilaterally in the future. How are the justices likely to rule? And what will their ruling mean for global trade? Our geoeconomics experts provide their arguments below.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

• Stephanie Connor: Contributor at the GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative, partner at Holland & Knight LLP, and a former senior official with the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
• Josh Lipsky (@joshualipsky): Chair of international economics and senior director of the GeoEconomics Center, and former International Monetary Fund advisor 
• L. Daniel Mullaney: Nonresident senior fellow with the Europe Center and GeoEconomics Center, and former assistant US trade representative

What is the case about? 

• The Trump administration’s solicitor general faced “tough questioning” from the justices, Stephanie tells us, on whether IEEPA “authorizes the president to impose tariffs, a form of taxation generally reserved for Congress under Article I of the US Constitution.” 
• The justices, says Josh, were “concerned about the limits” of the “sweeping power” of tariff authority under IEEPA and “how it could be used by future presidents to justify any kind of tax if a president deemed a situation to be an ‘emergency.’” 
• This skepticism, says Dan, is “primarily because of tariffs’ revenue function,” since Article I states that Congress has the exclusive power to raise revenue.  The Trump administration’s “arguments that the IEEPA tariffs were ‘regulatory’ tariffs, and not ‘taxes,’” says Dan, “fell relatively flat.”

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What did we learn from the oral arguments? 

• What stood out most to Josh was “how aware the justices were of the practical and foreign policy implications of their decision.” The justices, Josh points out, brought up issues and policies their decision will impact, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and Trump’s tariffs on India and Brazil. “This is a court very aware of the geopolitics they may be about to disrupt with their decision.” 
• The justices, says Stephanie, “did not take the bait” when it came to the larger question of whether a president’s emergency declarations are subject to judicial review, showing “considerable deference to the executive branch on such determinations.” So “whichever way the justices decide this case, the decision is unlikely to call into question” the president’s authority to determine a national emergency, she says.
• Discussion of the potential refunds of tariffs if the court sides with the plaintiffs was “limited,” says Dan, “aside from Justice Amy Coney Barrett suggesting that it would be a ‘mess.’”
• Dan also finds it “significant” that all four of the “swing justices”—John Roberts, Brett Kavanaugh, Neil Gorsuch, and Barrett—had skeptical questions for the Trump administration. Only two of them would need to side with the court’s three liberal justices to overturn the tariffs. “It seems more likely than not that this could be a 5-4 or 6-3 decision,” he adds. 

What’s next?

• Even if the Supreme Court rejects or limits the president’s authority to levy tariffs under IEEPA, Dan points out that “the administration has many tools available to continue imposing tariffs on the grounds of national security, unfair trade practices, balance of payments, or discrimination against the United States.” 
• Nevertheless, says Dan, “losing the extreme flexibility that the administration has claimed under IEEPA would make it harder to move quite as quickly” to enact tariffs as it has in the past few months. 
• “The whole world was listening and thinking what it means for them,” Josh tells us of today’s oral arguments. “For both companies and countries, the answer is more uncertainty: When will the court rule? How will it rule? What back-up tariffs get put into place? When does that happen?” Being left with these unanswered questions, he adds, is a “challenging way to run a global economy.” 
• “This is not academic,” says Josh. “There are hundreds of billions of dollars on the line and the president’s trade agenda may hinge on the outcome.”

Trump Tariff Tracker

The second Trump administration has embarked on a novel and aggressive tariff policy to address a range of economic and national security concerns. This tracker monitors the evolution of these tariffs and provides expert context on the economic conditions driving their creation—along with their real-world impact.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/eu-praises-ukraines-progress-but-warns-zelenskyy-over-corruption/ Tue, 04 Nov 2025 22:01:55 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=885763 Ukraine’s bid to join the EU received a boost this week with the release of a report praising the country’s progress toward future membership, but EU officials also warned President Zelenskyy about the dangers of backsliding on anti-corruption reforms, writes Peter Dickinson.

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]]> Ukraine’s bid to join the European Union received a boost this week with the release of an annual assessment praising the war-torn country’s progress toward future membership. The European Commission’s yearly overview of potential future EU members identified Ukraine as one of the best performers among ten candidate countries, acknowledging advances made by Kyiv in a number of reform areas including public administration, democratic institutions, rule of law, and the rights of national minorities. “Despite Russia’s unrelenting war of aggression, Ukraine remains strongly committed to its EU accession path, having successfully completed the screening process and advanced on key reforms,” the report noted.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed this positive appraisal of his country’s efforts and said the European Commission report confirmed that Ukraine “is confidently moving toward EU membership.” It was not all good news for the Ukrainian leader, however. EU officials also raised concerns over Zelenskyy’s domestic policies amid mounting allegations of backsliding in Kyiv on core anti-corruption reforms that are widely regarded as vital for Ukraine’s further European integration. “Recent negative trends, including pressure on the specialized anti-corruption agencies and civil society, must be decisively reversed,” the annual accession review underlined.

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As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The criticism currently being leveled at the Ukrainian authorities in Brussels is not entirely unexpected. In July 2025, Zelenskyy stunned Ukraine’s Western allies and sparked domestic outrage by backing a controversial parliamentary bill that was widely interpreted as an attempt to end the independence of the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

The scandal provoked Ukraine’s largest street protests since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, with thousands of Ukrainians braving possible Russian bombardment to rally in cities across the country against Zelenskyy’s apparent power grab. Kyiv’s partners were also quick to voice their alarm and signal that the move could put future international support for the Ukrainian war effort at risk.

Faced with overwhelming opposition at home and anger in key foreign capitals, Zelenskyy quickly backed down and reversed efforts to assert control over Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. Nevertheless, this week’s European Commission Enlargement Report has highlighted the lingering damage done by this brief and entirely self-inflicted crisis to the Ukrainian leader’s credibility.

Nor is this the only fly in the ointment. In addition to his headline-grabbing summer 2025 U-turn over Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms, Zelenskyy is also facing accusations from political opponents and civil society representatives of using lawfare to silence critics and consolidate power in his own hands. This is not a good look for a man who has sought to position himself as one of the leaders of the democratic world.

Zelenskyy has pushed back hard against his critics. He has pointed to Ukraine’s unprecedented success in meeting EU accession targets amid extremely challenging wartime conditions, while underlining the scale of his country’s anti-corruption reforms. “We have implemented the widest, the broadest anti-corruption infrastructure in Europe. I don’t know about any country that has as many anti-corruption authorities,” he commented in response to this week’s report. “We are doing everything possible.”

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For the time being, any disquiet over Zelenskyy’s anti-corruption credentials is unlikely to derail Ukraine’s EU membership momentum. While there is no agreement on how soon Ukraine can expect to join, the country’s eventual accession is now viewed in most European capitals as crucial for the continent’s future stability and security.

Ukrainian aspirations to join the EU first began to take shape in the wake of the country’s 2004 Orange Revolution, leading to years of meandering negotiations over a possible Association Agreement between Kyiv and Brussels. When this document was finally ready to be signed in 2013, Russia intervened and pressured the Ukrainian authorities to reject the deal. This led directly to a second Ukrainian revolution and the fall of the country’s pro-Kremlin government.

With Moscow’s efforts to thwart Ukraine’s European integration rapidly unraveling, Russian President Vladimir Putin chose to escalate and launched the invasion of Crimea in February 2014. This watershed moment marked the start of Russian armed aggression against Ukraine. Following the seizure of the Crimean peninsula, Moscow established Kremlin-controlled “separatist republics” in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. When this limited Russian military intervention failed to derail Ukraine’s EU ambitions, Putin raised the stakes further with the full-scale invasion of 2022.

As Russian aggression has escalated, Ukrainian public support for EU membership has increased and opposition has withered away. An issue that once divided Ukrainians fairly evenly now unites the nation. This is hardly surprising. For millions of Ukrainians, the quest to join the EU has become synonymous with the country’s civilizational choice of European democracy over Russian autocracy.

Zelenskyy would be well advised to keep this in mind as he seeks to balance domestic political considerations with Ukraine’s EU aspirations and the urgent need to maintain international support for the war effort. Ukrainians have made staggering sacrifices along the road toward EU membership and will not take kindly to anyone who places this progress in jeopardy. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s EU integration currently enjoys strong public and political support across Europe, but backsliding on core values could still undermine Kyiv’s case and provide fuel for Russia as it seeks to discredit Ukraine and prevent the country’s historic exit from the Kremlin orbit.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 28, 2025

UN report: Russia targets civilians in systematic bid to depopulate Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Russia is deliberately targeting Ukrainian civilians in a deadly drone strike campaign that aims to depopulate large parts of the country and constitutes a crime against humanity, according to a new United Nations report, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Oct 31, 2025

Europe finally moves to ban Russian gas but potential loopholes remain

By Aura Sabadus

The EU has recently moved to impose a full ban on Russian gas imports by 2028. After years of using energy exports to blackmail Europe and fund the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow is finally facing the loss of its last European costumers, writes Aura Sabadus.

Conflict Energy Markets & Governance

UkraineAlert Oct 23, 2025

Russia’s ‘human safari’ in southern Ukraine is a warning to the world

By Oleksandr Tolokonnikov

Russia’s escalating campaign of drone attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine’s Kherson region highlights the destructive power of modern drone technologies, writes Oleksandr Tolokonnikov.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/balkans-debrief/the-hague-vs-kla-leaders-justice-or-tragedy-a-debrief-with-james-rubin/ Wed, 29 Oct 2025 18:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=885059 Ilva Tare, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, speakers with James Rubin about the Hashim Thaci war crimes trial in The Hague.

The post The Hague vs. KLA leaders: Justice or tragedy? | A Debrief with James Rubin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]>

Twenty-five years after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the men once hailed as heroes now stand accused of war crimes at The Hague.

Former US Assistant Secretary of State James Rubin joins Ilva Tare, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, on #BalkansDebrief to reflect on his testimony before the Special Chambers, where former President Hashim Thaçi and other Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) leaders face charges of crimes against humanity.

This conversation revisits a story that shaped a nation and continues to test the conscience of international justice.

Rubin reflects on:

• His personal friendship with Hashim Thaçi and hopes for the court’s verdict;
• What a conviction could mean for Kosovo’s democracy and its ties with the EU; and
• The enduring responsibility of the international community to uphold justice while preserving peace.

“A conviction of Hashim Thaçi would leave a terrible scar on the international legal system and a tragedy for those who fought and died for freedom.” – James Rubin.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The demonstrators are not only protesting the new president, who has been accused of corruption and sexual assault. The protests are the political manifestation of something deeper: the steady advance of organized crime into everyday life and the collapse of public confidence in the Peruvian state’s ability to protect its citizens. As Peru approaches its April 2026 elections, the moment holds both promise for democratic renewal and risk of democratic collapse.

As Peruvians prepare to head to the polls, the insecurity crisis will be top of mind. Over the past three years, Peru has experienced an unprecedented rise in organized criminal activity. Between 2019 and 2024, reported extortions increased sixfold, and this year every third Peruvian reported knowing a victim of extortion, many of whom are small business owners. Homicides, too, have doubled since 2019. And in January of this year alone, there were 203 percent more homicides than in January 2017. What was once seen as a problem of border towns or drug corridors has become the daily reality of small and medium-sized businesses—the country’s true economic engine.

In cities such as Trujillo and Chiclayo, bus operators and construction firms now pay weekly “quotas” to criminal groups. In Lima’s districts, even market vendors receive extortion calls demanding transfers through digital wallets. Many of these workers belong to Peru’s vast informal sector, which employs nearly seven out of ten Peruvians and forms the social base that has now turned against the political establishment and is demanding solutions. When extortion payments and successive killings became commonplace, strikes and street protests followed against a government perceived as absent or complicit.

This explosion of criminality is the predictable outcome of a decade in which Peru’s institutions have been eaten away by self-interested politicians, resulting in political instability. Beginning in 2016, a Congress dominated by the fujimorismo movement began to abuse its oversight powers, engaging in what legal scholars term “constitutional hardball”—exploiting procedural rules to turn impeachment into a tool for political leverage rather than accountability, as seen during the impeachments of Boluarte and former President Martín Vizcarra.

The country was also undergoing the aftermath of Operation Car Wash, a far-reaching set of investigations originating in Brazil, during which Peruvian prosecutors launched aggressive corruption probes against Peru’s pre-2016 political class. The probes ended with four former Peruvian presidents convicted of corruption. Former President Alan García, who was accused of bribery, committed suicide as police entered his house to apprehend him. Former ministers, presidential contenders, business leaders, and mayors across Peru were swept up in corruption probes, effectively purging the political elite that had once promised to renew the country after the fall of Alberto Fujimori’s regime in 2000.

Unfortunately for the country, what emerged after the Operation Car Wash probes was not a cleaner class of leaders but a more fragmented, parochial, and self-interested one—far easier for organized crime to penetrate. Peru’s Congress, now one of the least trusted institutions in the hemisphere, has often acted as a shield for illicit interests. In recent years, lawmakers have quietly advanced legislation that has reduced penalties for certain crimes, weakened controls on political financing, and obstructed efforts to vet local authorities for corruption. Behind these moves lies a new generation of politicians, many of whom are under criminal investigation for corruption and other offenses. With institutions hollowed out, prosecutors underfunded, and police leadership constantly reshuffled, criminal economies have flourished.

Peru is now less than six months away from national elections, and the outlook is uncertain. After a decade of political chaos, citizens are exhausted and cynical, and the party system is in ruins. The danger is clear: When democracy cannot guarantee security or stability, it loses its moral and practical legitimacy.

The moment could go either way. On one hand, the democratic reflex remains: Peruvians still take to the streets, still reject corruption, and still demand that a competent state guarantee basic services. If leveraged the right way, these demands could be channeled by a democratic and reformist leader willing to rebuild Peru’s institutional arrangements and salvage its democracy.

On the other hand, the ground for populism has never been more fertile. Candidates who promise “order at any cost” will likely find a receptive audience among voters who feel abandoned by their government and terrorized by crime. Promising results in the fight against crime, an opportunistic leader may yet destroy what’s left of Peruvian democracy.

Peru’s crisis is no longer just about corruption or governance. It is about the basic survival of the rule of law. The October protests should not be seen as another episode in the country’s cyclical instability but as a warning that the old model—political chaos insulated from economic collapse—has possibly reached its breaking point. Unless the next government restores both security and institutional credibility, Peru’s democracy risks becoming not merely ungovernable, but unrecognizable.

Martin Cassinelli, who was born in Peru, is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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On October 6, an arbitration panel was selected in US-based Park Avenue Capital LLC’s arbitration against Moldova, to be adjudicated by the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which hears disputes between foreign investors and sovereign states arising under international investment treaties. The case is about Moldova’s nonrenewal of a contract between state-owned MoldData and Park Avenue Capital LLC, via its healthcare business MaxMD. At stake, in addition to a large claim of damages, is use of the “.md” web domain, which is widely used in Moldova. The company first tried to start arbitration pursuant to the contract’s terms, but Moldova blocked it, so it has turned to treaty-based arbitration; Moldova is a party to the ICSID Convention.

There’s more. This summer, Moldova lost a case valued at €997 million ($1.16 billion) in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) brought by Slovenian-owned agribusiness company Seksimp Group SRL. Here, the foreign investor learned that it had been successfully sued in Moldovan courts without ever being informed of the case, and that its entire holdings in Moldova had been sold at auction without its knowledge. Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Justice of Moldova rejected Seksimp Group SRL’s appeals. In a May 15 judgement, the ECHR disagreed and ruled unanimously that Moldova violated the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Meanwhile, a decision is pending in an arbitration suit by Liechtenstein-based RTI Rotalin Gaz Trading AG against Moldova, also at the ICSID. The company alleges de facto partial expropriation of its natural gas distribution business, which was the only competitor to Russia’s state-owned Gazprom in the Moldovan market. The government has so far refused to pay its half of the arbitration costs as prescribed in the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), to which Moldova is a party. At the same time, the government has continued to pursue collection of the fine in local courts despite the ICSID issuing an injunction blocking its enforcement. Moldova also revoked the company’s gas supply license and slapped a $2.9 million fine, the largest in the country’s history, on the company for making profits in early 2023—after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine drove gas prices up in Europe—that the government deemed excessive. Although the arbitration is actually about natural gas distribution tariffs and return of investments made almost twenty years ago, the government contends that Rotalin broke Moldovan law by overcharging customers and then refusing to supply gas below cost during the country’s state of emergency following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  

The years prior to 2025 are similarly checkered. For an inexhaustive sampling: In 2023, ICSID awarded $2.1 million in damages or reinstatement of the investor’s duty-free business for Moldova’s violation of a bilateral trade treaty with France. Moldova refused to pay, triggering new suits in the United States seeking enforcement of the award, which is now up to $50 million. In 2013, a tribunal ruled for the investor in a $46 million suit brought under the ECT by a power company after a state-owned entity defaulted on a contract, which continues to be fought in parallel proceedings in the US District Court in Washington, DC and the French Court of Cassation. In 2007, the ECHR found Moldova had violated the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in a case brought by US and Bahamian company Bimer SA for the illegal closure of its business. Moldova has racked up similar losses in other international courts and arbitration tribunals, and the country’s habitual unwillingness to honor the judgments often results in follow-on enforcement proceedings.

The most obvious and immediate consequence of such a history of investment disputes is the difficulty faced by Moldova in attracting foreign capital—money desperately needed to help the country stabilize against the ever-present threat of Russia. As much as 8 percent or more of Moldova’s gross domestic product is foreign assistance, and almost 13 percent is from remittances. This leaves Europe’s poorest country vulnerable to political vacillation and more likely to suffer from brain drain just when it needs local talent most. Developing reliable domestic economic sectors is critical, but this is a challenge when foreign investors remain justifiably wary of Moldova’s notorious corruption and rule of law problems. The country’s 2024 score in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index was just forty-three out of one hundred, giving it a ranking of seventy-sixth out of 180 countries. 

Equally concerning is the impact that the lawsuits and Moldova’s reluctance to adhere to its investment treaty obligations and to tribunals’ judgments could have on its chances of being admitted into the European Union (EU). Both substantive and measurable anti-corruption and rule-of-law improvements are a requirement under the Copenhagen Criteria, which govern EU accession. Although Moldova has made noted progress in recent years, there remains a long road ahead. The country still ranks only sixty-fourth out of 142 on the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index and forty-eighth out of 190 on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index. 

Relatedly, if Moldova doesn’t honor the results of the various ongoing arbitration proceedings arising under treaties to which it is a party, its defaults could affect its credit rating—and, in turn, its chances of EU accession. Moldova currently has a B-average among the leading rating agencies, meaning it is below investment-grade with a higher-than-average risk of default.

Credit ratings are not themselves a Copenhagen criterion, but the European Union learned the hard way during the 2008-2010 eurozone crisis that admitting new EU members without adequately stable monetary and economic situations could bring trouble. Accordingly, the criteria require an EU hopeful to have a “functioning market economy” and “the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces.” These in turn require, among other attributes, a good business environment, adequate human and financial capital, a prominent role for small and medium-sized enterprises, and general economic resilience. Assessments are done by the European Commission, but all twenty-seven EU member states have to ultimately agree on accession. Enough investor lawsuits or defaults, or a credit rating downgrade, or even just a worse reputation, could be an obstacle to Moldova’s EU candidacy. The political reality that Russia-sympathetic Hungary and Slovakia wield a veto may well mean that those opposed to Moldova’s accession will jump on any excuse to block it.

Adding Europe’s poorest and most energy-insecure country, and the one most beset by Russian meddling—second to Ukraine, of course—to the EU was always going to be a hard sell. Wealthier EU member states still grumble about having bailed out Greece three times between 2010 and 2015 to the tune of $330 billion. If Moldova wants to improve its odds and capitalize on its postelection momentum, then it would be wise to embrace investors rather than burn them. Both its economy and political future would be brighter as a result. 

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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In June 2024, coordinated suicide attacks in Nigeria’s Borno State struck a wedding, a hospital, and a funeral within hours, killing more than thirty people and wounding over one hundred. Months later, militants overran a garrison in Chad, killing more than forty soldiers, demonstrating the insurgency’s ability to operate across borders.

In 2025, violence has escalated further. Bombings and improvised explosive devices tore through markets and roads in Borno: one July attack killed more than ten people, while another at a fish market claimed at least twelve lives. Analysts warn that Boko Haram and its offshoot, the Islamic State West Africa Province, may be undertaking a broader tactical reset—including renewed use of armed drones and roadside mines.

Fatalities near record highs

Across the basin, fatalities tied to militant Islamist groups hover near record highs. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies estimates nearly four thousand deaths over the past year, with new hotspots in Cameroon’s Far North. Humanitarian needs remain staggering, even as displacement has dipped slightly: as of May 2025, more than 2.9 million people were still displaced across the basin.

One pattern has proven consistent over time: military force alone cannot defeat a movement fueled by governance failures, economic exclusion, and security-force abuses. To their credit, regional governments have been recalibrating their responses.

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has demonstrated that joint, intelligence-driven operations can exact real costs on militants. In 2024, Operation Lake Sanity II destroyed camps in the region, neutralizing dozens of fighters, while coordinating air and ground actions across sectors—precisely the kind of cross‑border pressure the insurgents fear most.

The African Union’s Peace and Security Council has sought to align these operations with the Lake Chad Basin Commission’s Regional Stabilization Strategy. At the same time, the UNDP-managed Regional Stabilization Facility launched a four-year phase to fund rapid, visible rehabilitation in liberated hubs.

Yet the basin’s security architecture is fragile. In April, Niger’s junta announced its withdrawal from the MNJTF to focus resources on protecting oil infrastructure. Whether a formal withdrawal has taken place remains unclear, but this episode illustrates how diplomatic tensions, national politics, and energy priorities can disrupt longtime cross-border routines.

The resource paradox

Security is only one half of the ledger. The other is an economic paradox: the Lake Chad countries are rich in hydrocarbons and minerals, yet governance weaknesses hinder their wealth from being transformed into opportunity or legitimacy.

Nigeria holds Africa’s largest natural‑gas reserves and is a top oil producer, but years of underinvestment, theft, and opaque contracting have eroded both its economic impact and public confidence. Cameroon is pushing to revive upstream and downstream activities—including a long-planned overhaul of its national oil refining company (SONARA)—while eyes turn to gas-to-power and storage investments that could anchor industrial growth if policy risks are managed carefully.

Niger, known for its high‑grade uranium, has also become an oil exporter through a nearly two-thousand‑kilometer pipeline to Benin. Despite diplomatic spats and sabotage last year, shipments resumed in August 2024, and the corridor now sits at the intersection of energy and politics. Chad, for its part, remains tied to the Chad–Cameroon export system that once carried the promise of a model corridor for development—and the cautionary tale of how social safeguards can fray without sustained transparency.

Why hasn’t all this resource potential translated into security and shared prosperity? Because governance is failing.

Governance failures feed insecurity

The latest Transparency International index scores Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger among the world’s most challenging environments for transparent governance and accountable public spending. Sector‑specific governance is equally uneven.

On paper, Nigeria’s 2021 Petroleum Industry Act offers a pathway to streamline the industry and share benefits with host communities. However, the broader oil-and-gas governance score remains classified as “weak,” with licensing transparency a persistent issue that discourages responsible investment. In practice, corruption and predation squander revenue and fuel insecurity, reinforcing insurgent claims that the state extracts resources while communities are left to suffer.

At the rural margins, citizens face corruption and insurgent “taxation,” which erodes trust and cooperation. Addressing this issue requires linking security, governance, and economic recovery through targeted operations paired with rapid stabilization: repairing infrastructure, restoring services, supporting livelihoods, and building accountable community security forces integrated into professional policing.

What real stabilization requires

Stabilization efforts should align with the Lake Chad Basin Commission’s strategy and be scaled through UNDP funding to turn military gains into trust. Resource development must adhere to strict transparency, requiring community consent, open contracts, shared revenues for local infrastructure, and genuine job creation. The Africa Mining Vision offers a framework for equitable, community-driven benefits—and it should become the standard for foreign‑backed deals in the basin.

Foreign partners should welcome this clarity. Partnerships—whether for offshore oil blocks, uranium concessions, or pipeline rights—must transfer technology, build local supply chains, and co‑finance community assets. This governance‑first approach serves both as development policy and a security strategy: when contracts are transparent, new pipelines fund local clinics and roads, and jobs are allocated to qualified locals, militants lose their recruiting fuel.

Trust as the ultimate security

Leaders must ground counterinsurgency in transparent, mutually beneficial economic deals. Despite persistent violence, governments have demonstrated their ability to coordinate effectively, and communities have proven resilient, with markets and farms sustaining life amid conflict.

The region’s resource base is real: oil and gas in Nigeria and Cameroon, uranium and oil in Niger, and a regional pipeline network that could become a development corridor—rather than a grievance machine—if managed effectively. The decision is ultimately political. Double down on short-term force and opaque resource deals, and violence will continue to adapt while the development window narrows. Or tackle the roots of conflict and build a transparent partnership that puts citizens first.

Only the latter can transform Lake Chad’s natural wealth into durable security—and offers the potential to outpace an insurgency that has finally learned to survive.

Stabilizing the Lake Chad Basin is fundamentally about trust. Building trust—through state protection, transparent contracts, and fair partnerships—is the only way to turn the basin’s crisis into an opportunity. If regional leaders commit now, alongside citizens who can hold them accountable, they can match insurgents’ adaptability and steer the region toward peace and prosperity.

Jude Mutah is a policy expert with extensive experience in Africa and holds a doctorate in Public Administration from the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Baltimore. He has worked with the United States Institute of Peace and the National Endowment for Democracy.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post The Lake Chad Basin could power growth instead of conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Did a political representative of a guerrilla army have command responsibility for alleged crimes committed by its members during the Kosovo war? This is the central question an international trial panel will soon have to answer in the case against Hashim Thaçi, Kosovo’s former wartime leader turned politician—as prime minister and later president.

Since November 2020, Thaçi has been in detention at the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, a hybrid Kosovar–international court in The Hague, alongside three other members of the Kosovo Liberation Army’s (KLA) General Staff. Their trial began in April 2023, and the prosecution took two years, concluding in April of this year.

The indictment against Thaçi and the three others alleges that during 1998-1999—while the KLA waged a rural insurgency against the Yugoslav army and police, whose top leadership was found guilty of massacres and the ethnic cleansing of at least 700,000 Albanians—the KLA engaged in a number of illegal detentions, disappearances, mistreatment, and murders of civilians seen as political rivals and collaborators, both Albanian and Serb. The prosecution brought 125 witnesses and 155 participating victims, and it argued that members of the KLA General Staff, including Thaçi as the then head of its political directorate, bear responsibility as part of a “joint criminal enterprise.”

On September 15, the defense opened its case, announcing just fifteen witnesses—mostly senior Western officials with direct knowledge of events. The strategy is not to deny the alleged crimes, which do not implicate Thaçi directly. Instead, the defense is arguing that the KLA lacked a proper command structure and that Thaçi, often outside Kosovo and serving in a political role, had no authority over operations.

A question of control

The first defense witness carried the weight of the US government of that era. James P. Rubin, former assistant secretary of state, testified for three days, accompanied by current State Department officials as observers. He rejected the prosecution’s portrayal of Thaçi’s power at the time and disputed the notion that the KLA had anything resembling a “military structure.” According to Rubin, this was one reason why the United States refused to arm the KLA even while it was bombing Slobodan Milosevic’s Yugoslavia.

Rubin was well placed to know. Tasked by then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to work with Thaçi during peace talks in France (February–March 1999) and later to secure KLA demilitarization after NATO’s intervention, he said that Thaçi’s signatory role reflected representation, not authority. Having spent time with Thaçi both in France and for three days in a KLA mountain hideout, Rubin testified that the then twenty-nine-year-old “had superiors from whom he had to get approval,” and he was “more of a public face to present to the West.”

Rubin’s testimony was reinforced by Paul Williams, an international law expert who advised Kosovo’s delegation. Williams said that Thaçi faced “extraordinary pressure from local commanders” not to sign the peace accords, and that he had to travel back to Kosovo to seek their approval. On September 22, John Stewart Duncan, then a British adviser to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe who drafted and negotiated the KLA’s demilitarization deal, further corroborated this portrayal of the KLA’s command structure, adding that the guerilla army’s real power rested with regional commanders.

Media reports suggest that more high-ranking Western officials—from the United States, NATO, the United Kingdom, and France—will testify in the coming days. The defense is expected to conclude by mid-November, with a ruling anticipated around March of next year.

Implications for Kosovo, the region, and beyond

The outcome of the case will likely have political implications for Kosovo and the Balkans, as well as for the United States. Washington’s reputation is involved because Thaçi, as Rubin noted in his testimony, worked closely with successive US administrations to lead Kosovo toward peace and independence and promote ethnic reconciliation. For two decades, he was essentially seen as Washington’s man. 

Thaçi is also being tried in a court sponsored by the United States and the European Union (EU), and the court’s chief prosecutor and presiding judge in the case are both American. This reflects a longstanding US commitment—starting with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993—to pair Balkan peace deals with justice and accountability for war crimes.

Finally, the case has elements of a domestic US political drama which—regardless of objective reality—has altered perceptions about the integrity of the process in a Balkans region that is already prone to viewing war-crimes tribunals as politically controlled by Western powers. Thaçi’s indictment in 2020 was controversially announced while he was en route to the White House to meet with US President Donald Trump to sign a peace deal with Serbia. The announcement came from Jack Smith, then chief prosecutor of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and later special prosecutor against Trump, which fueled speculation among Trump’s allies in Washington about possible domestic US political motivations behind the case.

Rubin’s testimony also frequently shifted from KLA command-and-control dynamics to these broader political issues. He accused the prosecution of distorting justice, calling the tribunal “an example of international justice that has gotten out of control.” On Thaçi’s indictment, he said that “politics had interfered in the rule of law” and sought to alter the Kosovo war narrative. Drawing on his Kosovo experience and his recent stint as the head of the State Department’s Global Engagement Center under former President Joe Biden, Rubin also expressed his belief that many allegations against KLA leaders stemmed from Russian and Serbian propaganda.

Rubin’s political narratives inside the courtroom and the decision of Western governments to allow officials to support the defense have created a perception in Kosovo, particularly among Thaçi’s supporters, that an acquittal may be on the way. So much so that an opposite outcome would likely fuel a sense of betrayal and skepticism toward the West, which has been steadily on the rise in Kosovo even before Thaçi’s indictment. 

Yet if he is acquitted, Thaçi’s return to Kosovo would almost certainly shake up the political scene, which has been mired in deadlock due to an inability to form a government. It also comes at a time when caretaker Prime Minister Albin Kurti is increasingly at odds with Washington and Brussels over what US and EU officials see as destabilizing moves regarding relations with Serbia and the rights of Kosovo Serbs.

It remains unclear what political role Thaçi might play if an acquittal comes in the spring, but snap elections are looming. Yet Thaçi’s return would very likely boost Kurti’s rival camp, whatever his role may be. That camp has favored closer cooperation with the West and has shown a greater willingness to pursue a final settlement with Serbia. 

An acquittal would also likely please Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama, a vocal supporter of Thaçi’s defense who sees him as the preferred ethnic-Albanian partner across the border. Rama’s relations with Kurti have arguably deteriorated beyond repair. At the same time, an acquittal would likely anger Belgrade, which has supplied the prosecution with evidence against Thaçi and would likely use an acquittal to reinforce its standard narrative of Western bias against Serbs.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

The post What the looming verdict in Thaçi war crimes trial could mean for Kosovo, the Balkans, and beyond appeared first on Atlantic Council.

More than 1000 political prisoners remain behind bars in Belarus, including other Viasna staff and volunteers such as Ales Bialiatski, Uladzimir Labkovich, Valiantsin Stefanovic, and Nasta Loika. Viasna volunteer service coordinator Marfa Rabkova was arrested two weeks before Chapiuk and is also still in prison. The UN Special Rapporteur monitoring human rights in Belarus has consistently called on the Belarusian authorities to cease the persecution of human rights defenders and others in retaliation for their legitimate exercise of civil and political rights.

This month marks five years since Chapiuk was imprisoned. From exile, Chapiuk spoke to Human Rights House Foundation to discuss life after prison in a new country and reflect on the realities facing his colleagues still behind bars. When asked about life following his release, Chapiuk says the impact of prison is only truly understood once a person is free. “Everything surfaces, the whole experience of imprisonment. It’s like the body finally feels it can release everything that’s been piling up.”

Freedom, Chapiuk argues, brings a painful clarity to what has been taken away. “Six months, one year, then three; those numbers felt oddly insignificant because you were always surrounded by people who had served longer. Once you’re free, you realize how long that time really is.”

Chapiuk remains deeply concerned for his friends and colleagues who are still unjustly imprisoned, such as Marfa Rabkova. “Masha has missed so much over this period, left so much behind. There are health problems, too. I think it will feel even heavier when she’s released.”

The longer you’ve been inside, says Chapiuk, the harder it is to adjust to the new realities of freedom. “You step out into a world you last saw during COVID. People in masks. Now there’s a war. Belarus feels emptier. Technology has leapt ahead and you’re supposed to just jump right back in.” The arrival of artificial intelligence especially struck him. “In prison, we heard rumors. Once free, I was amazed at how cohesive and powerful these tools are.”

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Chapiuk says that political prisoners in Belarus now face restricted access to books and education. “When I arrived in 2023, inmates could still apply for secondary education. Months later, the authorities cut it off entirely, especially for those of us on the extremism list. Then they started confiscating foreign language books, even personal ones.”

The confiscation of books is used as a form of punishment. “People tried hiding their own books but staff still found and confiscated them. The mindset in the system is that prisoners must suffer constantly. And since political prisoners tend to value books and education, the system decided to eliminate those.”

While discussing what life might have been like if he had not been arrested in 2020, Chapiuk is adamant that there really was no alternative. “Historically in Belarus, after civic activity, repression follows. I expected something to happen after the 2020 protests, but not the scale. Given the situation in Belarus, I’d likely have ended up either imprisoned or forced into exile anyway.”

On the subject of exile, we discuss Chapiuk’s decision to leave Belarus after his release. Faced with constant harassment and the likelihood of rearrest, he felt that fleeing Belarus was the only option. “The police presence in Belarus is constant. Former prisoners are subjected to mandatory check-ins twice a month, weekly lectures, and home visits, often late at night with flashlights in your face.”

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In early 2022, news of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine reached Belarusian inmates via state media. “Only later did I learn the truth about occupied cities and mass casualties. There was constant fear that Belarus would be dragged in and that we prisoners would be used as cannon fodder,” Chapiuk recalls. He says that even the prison guards seemed unsettled, secretly following independent news sources and perhaps worrying about what role they might be forced to play should Belarus enter the war.

International attention has become a complex issue for Belarusian political prisoners in recent years. Relatives of prisoners often ask human rights organizations not to make posts marking detention anniversaries or birthdays, as such attention can lead to reprisals inside prison. At the same time, Chapiuk argues that media coverage can make a difference. “After reports of abuse, inspectors arrive at colonies or jails. Prisons often hide people in punishment cells, but overall, high-profile prisoners are sometimes mistreated less to avoid trouble.”

Chapiuk emphasizes the importance of keeping the health of political prisoners high on the agenda. “The more medical units are checked, the more violations are documented, the better for inmates in the long run. Prison healthcare is terrible everywhere.”

Letters were once a lifeline for political prisoners in Belarus but are now heavily censored, says Chapiuk. Nevertheless, he urges people not to give up and to continue writing. “Even if letters don’t reach us, the authorities see the activity. It shows we’re not forgotten.”

The families of political prisoners also face pressure and can be targeted by the Belarusian authorities. Chapiuk recalls the case of one co-defendant’s mother who was given a prison sentence for simply sharing information about her son. “The state has built a second ring of repression to cut off information flows.”

Chapiuk is deeply troubled by the idea that the suffering of Belarusians will be forgotten and that no one will be held accountable for the years of abuse, despite the extensive documentation of human rights violations by Belarusian civil society. Recent prisoner releases have given him hope, despite the fact that these releases have often been followed by forced exile. “It would be better if people were freed earlier, not just at the end of their terms. But still, each release matters. It means someone can finally live freely again and feel what freedom really is.”

Craig Jackson is senior communications officer at the Human Rights House Foundation.

Further reading

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Putin had hoped to demilitarize and decapitate the Ukrainian state, but his self-defeating invasion has inadvertently created the militarily powerful and fiercely independent Ukraine he feared most of all, writes Peter Dickinson.

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NATO must urgently learn from Ukraine’s unique experience of Russian drone warfare as the alliance seeks to address the growing threats posed by Putin’s drone swarms, writes David Kirichenko.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Europe for the win. Moldova’s ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won a parliamentary majority in Sunday’s national elections, in an outcome widely viewed as affirming the country’s pro-European Union (EU) direction under President Maia Sandu. The elections followed a campaign marked by efforts from the Kremlin to undermine the PAS and aid pro-Russian candidates. What’s next for Moldova’s EU accession path? And how will Russia and Moldova’s pro-Kremlin elements respond to this geopolitical setback? Our experts provide their insights below.

• John E Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine  
• Victoria Olari (@Olari_Victoria): Research associate for Moldova at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab 
• Alex Șerban: Senior advisor for the Atlantic Council’s Romania Office and nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative

A ‘historic’ outcome 

• With the PAS outperforming pre-election polls, “the impact of this election will be historic,” says John, who recently visited the capital Chișinău. Given Sandu’s “rock solid” commitment to reforms, her party “should be able to pass the legislation needed to deliver EU membership,” he says. 
• “The outcome is unequivocal” as a signal of the country’s pro-Western direction, says Victoria. “PAS not only dominated among the diaspora, as in the presidential elections, but also placed first in most districts across the country, giving it broad legitimacy,” she says, adding that other pro-European parties also will enter parliament, a sign that the “overwhelming share” of Moldovans want a European future. 
• Alex notes that, in addition to Russian meddling, the PAS also overcame domestic challenges: “Despite unpopular economic measures and criticism over slow rule-of-law reforms, voters again endorsed the European path.”

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The Kremlin falls short 

• Because of the ruling party’s orientation toward Europe and away from Russia, “Moscow not only backed multiple parties in the election but used its full bag of dirty tricks to try to block a victory for the PAS,” says John.  
• The pro-Russian parties’ electoral defeat was a “a sharp rebuke to Moscow’s influence operations,” Victoria tells us. She points to evidence of Russia spending hundreds of millions of dollars; disinformation spreading across TikTok, Facebook, and Telegram; accusations of electoral corruption; and intensifying cyberattacks. Despite all this, “Russia failed to sway the Moldovan vote,” she writes. 
• Another one of the Kremlin’s efforts to sway the vote was calling for mass protests if the PAS won. This plan, “has already been launched,” says John. Igor Dodon, leader of the pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc, “did not wait for the first returns to come in to publicly declare that he had actually won the elections.” He led a demonstration outside the parliament building on Monday, which reportedly drew about one hundred protesters.

What’s next? 

• Leaders across the continent were quick to congratulate the PAS on its victory and express their support for Moldova’s embrace of Europe, Alex tells us. This included expressions of support from Romania’s government, EU officials, and a joint message from the French, German, and Polish governments that “signaled EU resolve to anchor Moldova in Europe’s political and security architecture,” says Alex. 
• But challenges remain for the leadership of a country that remains politically divided and vulnerable to Russian interference, Alex notes. “Moscow is unlikely to abandon efforts to stir instability,” particularly in the separatist regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia, he says. 
• “Any missteps” from the PAS government, says Alex, “whether from weak institutions or stalled reforms, could reignite political turbulence and turn the clock back on popular support.”

The post Moldova’s pro-EU ruling party won despite Russian interference. Now what?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Trump’s initial social media post mentioned the designation of the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua (TDA) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. It also included the assertion that the TDA is under the control of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro, allegations of the TDA’s responsibility for illegal acts, and the claim that the ship was headed toward the United States. (Yet US Secretary of State Marco Rubio later indicated that its destination was likely Trinidad or another Caribbean country, and it was reported on September 10 that the ship altered its course—seemingly turning around—before the strike.) Trump’s post also claimed that the individuals were “terrorists killed in action.” Rubio later said Trump intended to send a message to cartels by destroying the ship rather than interdicting it.

On September 4, Trump sent a letter to Charles Grassley, the president pro tempore of the Senate, informing the Senate of the “military action.” He made the report “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” and he said that the strike was made under his Article II constitutional authority. The letter indicated that “[e]xtraordinarily violent drug trafficking cartels” have “complex structures with […] financial means and paramilitary capabilities,” and that “some states in the region” are unable or unwilling to address the “continuing threat . . . emanating from their territories.” He therefore claimed that this was a use of military force in self-defense.

This strike comes after Trump signed a directive in July authorizing lethal force against certain Latin American drug cartels that his administration has designated as terrorist organizations, though the directive has not been made public. It is hardly the first time the US military has launched strikes on alleged members of a non-state armed group designated as a foreign terrorist organization. However, every attack by the US military outside US territory must be assessed individually under international law according to the legal frameworks that apply, the status of the targets, the means (e.g., weapons and military equipment) used to carry out the attack, the manner in which they are employed, and the context of and justifications for the attack, among other considerations.  

Because there are several outstanding questions on the specifics of the attack—including whether there is proof that the boat was carrying drugs—a legal analysis is complicated and implicates a number of legal frameworks. Here are five areas of law that are relevant to consider in this case, and the accompanying questions that arise.

1. Maritime law: Although the United States is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), US policy is to act “in a manner consistent with its provisions relating to traditional uses of oceans.” Assuming the strike did occur in international waters, as Trump claimed, Article 88 of UNCLOS reserves the high seas for peaceful purposes. While maritime law does authorize certain enforcement operations, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has held that force is meant to be a last resort. Rubio said Trump had the option to interdict the ship and instead chose to destroy it. Rubio’s comments, and the September 10 report that the ship changed its course and was hit multiple times before it sank, suggest that US military personnel could have safely interdicted the ship. If so, force was not necessary. In that vein, Mark Nevitt, a retired commander with the Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps, has observed that the Coast Guard is the United States’ primary maritime law enforcement agency, and that it has the authority “to search, seize property, and arrest persons suspected of violating US law upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction.” For use of force, the Coast Guard follows “strict rules” relying on warning and disabling shots. Those rules do not appear to have been followed in this case.

2. Use of force (jus ad bellum): Article 2(4) of the UN Charter requires that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The main exception to this prohibition falls under Article 51, which allows the exercise of the right of self-defense. Some states view Article 51 as allowing use of force against a non-state armed group on the territory of a second state if that second state is “unwilling or unable” to address the armed group. Trump’s September 4 letter invoked both self-defense and the “unwilling or unable” test. However, the targeted ship does not appear to have been flying under a state’s flag, nor did the attack occur in territorial waters of any state. Because this action apparently fell outside any state or territory and was against a non-state actor, it would seem to fall outside this particular legal framework. Nevertheless, while no country has claimed the individuals killed, the strike could (though not necessarily) be considered an armed attack on the country of which the individuals are nationals. In that case, the strike does not seem to have met the imminence, necessity, and proportionality requirements under Article 51. Notably, any use of force under Article 51 requires a report to the UN Security Council, which the United States does not appear to have issued so far. 

3. International Humanitarian Law (IHL): IHL would only apply if the United States is in an armed conflict. Trump’s September 4 letter invoked the War Powers Resolution and used language seemingly indicating that the administration believes the United States is involved in an armed conflict against “[e]xtraordinarily violent drug cartels.” However, the existence of an armed conflict—triggering the relevance of IHL—is assessed under international law, based on the factual circumstances, according to specific criteria. 

Under IHL, there are two types of armed conflicts. A non-international armed conflict involves one or more non-state armed groups and may additionally involve state forces. An international armed conflict involves at least two states. For the United States to be considered engaged in a non-international armed conflict with a non-state armed group, the armed group would have to be sufficiently organized and the violence sufficiently intense. In this case, it appears unlikely that the conditions have been met. If Venezuela had effective control over the TDA’s actions, then the United States and Venezuela could be in an international armed conflict. When invoking the Alien Enemies Act, Trump asserted that the TDA operated “at the direction, clandestine or otherwise, of the Maduro regime,” but a memo declassified in May indicated that US intelligence agencies do not believe the Venezuelan government is controlling the TDA. So it also appears highly unlikely that the conditions for an international armed conflict are present. 

But given the administration’s rhetoric and the fact that subsequent US military operations could result in an armed conflict—if, for example, the United States uses force against the TDA in Venezuela without Venezuela’s consent, and/or if both the TDA evolves to meet the organizational requirement and the violence with the United States intensifies—it is still worth briefly assessing the September 2 strike under IHL to determine whether similar future strikes might be legal. 

If there were an armed conflict between the United States and a non-state armed group and IHL applied, and if the US targeted a boat of individuals for the same reported reason—that is, the individuals were alleged to be involved in drug trafficking—it still would most likely be unlawful. Such individuals would likely not be lawful targets under international law, barring evidence that they were combatants or directly participating in hostilities. Likewise, if the boat does not have a military function, a strike would not be a militarily necessity nor would it be proportional to any military advantage anticipated. Indeed, even if the individuals were part of the non-state armed group party to the armed conflict, if they were not taking direct part in hostilities against the United States, a strike in this situation could be considered a war crime of murder under the US War Crimes Act and international law. 

4. International Human Rights Law (IHRL): The United States is a signatory to human rights treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 6 of the covenant establishes that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of their life, and Article 4 specifies that states cannot make derogations (that is, formal exemptions) related to this right, even in times of public emergency. As noted by former US State Department Attorney-Adviser Brian Finucane, the US Department of Defense Operational Law Handbook views the prohibition of murder under IHRL as a peremptory rule under customary international law, meaning a rule “so fundamental and universally accepted that [it does] not permit any derogation, even by treaty.” Assessed according to these criteria, this strike appears to have been an extrajudicial killing in violation of IHRL and Department of Defense provisions.

5. Domestic law: Finucane also notes that Executive Order 12333 prohibits assassinations by anyone employed by the US government or working on its behalf. Finucane cites executive branch legal doctrine as defining assassination as including “the targeted killing of individuals,” and notes potential exceptions for self-defense or for lethal force consistent with IHL. Rubio’s statement that Trump chose to destroy rather than interdict the ships, and the ship’s reported course reversal, imply that US military personnel could have safely interdicted the ship. Assuming that was the case, lethal force was not necessary for self-defense. The attack therefore appears to violate the US prohibition on assassinations, as well as other US laws.

Ultimately, the strike—and the language used by administration officials about the strike—paint a troubling picture regarding how the United States will approach the TDA and related groups. While it is of course important to hold transnational criminal organizations like the TDA accountable through judicial processes, lethal force is, according to guidance from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), meant to be “a measure of last resort.” Consider the case of former Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, who presided over a policy of extrajudicial killings of drug suspects and now finds himself in International Criminal Court (ICC) custody subject to an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity. 

Given the current facts, the ICC is unable to exercise jurisdiction over this strike. For it to have jurisdiction over any attacks going forward, there would need to be a confirmed armed conflict and/or widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian population—or evidence of other categories of crimes under the Rome Statute—among other requirements. For now, any legal accountability for the boat strike would most likely involve processes under domestic law—whether under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or in civilian courts. The domestic courts of the victims may also have jurisdiction.

As Nevitt noted, this “preemptive lethal strike against an alleged drug boat continues the White House’s effort to blur the lines between law enforcement and the U.S. military’s missions and authorities.” Going forward, certain situations—imminent threat of attack against the United States, UN Security Council authorization, or the consent of the state where US strikes would occur—could mean that US military force outside US territory would be lawful. In the context of an international armed conflict, military operations would be lawful so long as they complied with IHL. 

However, absent these situations, from a legal perspective, the actions of the TDA and other transnational criminal organizations should be a matter of law enforcement. As such, lethal force is reserved only for when, as per the ICRC, it is “strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.”

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

The post Was Trump’s strike on an alleged Venezuelan drug boat legal? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s uncompromising stance reflects his commitment to extinguishing the threat posed by a free and democratic Ukraine. The Russian leader was driven to invade primarily because he saw an independent Ukraine slowly but steadily building the institutions of a functioning democracy right on Russia’s border. This represented an existential challenge to Putin’s own regime, an autocracy fueled by systemic corruption and dependent on repression.

Faced with Russia’s determination to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation, Ukrainians could be tempted to delay the fight against corruption at home in order to first defeat Russia. In reality, however, this is a false choice. Ukraine has been locked in a struggle against both Russian imperial aggression and domestic corruption for more than a decade. From the 2014 Revolution of Dignity to the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022, Ukrainians have been battling not only to defend their land, but to build a country that belongs to its citizens rather than oligarchs and autocrats. The fight against Russia and the fight against corruption are two fronts of the same war.

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Recent events in Ukraine underscore just how wrong Putin is to question the nation’s fundamental commitment to democracy. Over several days in July, thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets in cities across the country, braving the threat of Russian missiles and drones to demonstrate against their leaders. They were not protesting wartime hardships or economic woes, though both are deeply felt. These protests were driven by a more fundamental desire to safeguard the country’s anti-corruption institutions against efforts to turn back the clock and undo the progress achieved since the Revolution of Dignity.

These recent protests were sparked by a government move to strip Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies of their independence. The Ukrainian authorities may have been attempting to use wartime exigencies to bring anti-corruption bodies under their control and prevent the possible prosecution of high-level officials. If so, this was a major miscalculation. Within hours of a parliamentary vote placing key anti-corruption institutions under the authority of the prosecutor general, Ukraine’s first major protests since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion were underway.

International stakeholders including the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, and Ukraine’s G7 partners also reacted swiftly. The EU publicly demanded the full reversal of the legislative changes, stressing that independent anti-corruption institutions are a prerequisite for Ukraine’s EU accession. To exert concrete pressure, Brussels suspended €1.5 billion in macro-financial assistance that was already in the pipeline for Ukraine.

The IMF echoed these concerns, indicating that Ukraine’s compliance with anti-corruption commitments was essential for ongoing financial support. Similarly, G7 officials issued a statement urging the Ukrainian authorities to protect the autonomy of anti-corruption bodies, warning that continued support from international partners depended on upholding the rule of law.

Bolstered by this international support, Ukraine’s civil society won the day. Zelenskyy moved quickly to reverse course, proposing new legislation that reinstated the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies. The lesson was clear: There can be no trade-offs for Ukraine when it comes to combating corruption, just as there is no room for half measures in the fight against Russia.

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Ukraine’s July 2025 protests reaffirmed a commitment to grassroots democracy that has defined the country’s post-Soviet experience. During the Revolution of Dignity, millions of Ukrainians rallied not merely to remove an unpopular president who was viewed as a surrogate of Russia, but to demand a system of government where institutions work for the public good rather than the benefit of the few. This has served as a vision for the country’s future ever since. Even now, amid the largest European invasion since World War II, Ukrainians continue to demand accountability while working to create a truly democratic society rooted in the rule of law.

Ukraine’s courage, ingenuity, and resolve in the war against Russia draw heavily from the sense of empowerment that sprang from landmark events like the Revolution of Dignity and subsequent democratic reforms such as the decentralization of power. This has helped give Ukrainians more confidence in their ability to shape their communities and their country, fostering solidarity and promoting engagement in public life.

Greater Ukrainian agency has translated into remarkable resilience on the battlefield and beyond. Local initiatives, volunteer networks, and territorial defense units have all thrived because the Ukrainian authorities ceded space for society to organize itself. When power flows from the ground up, a nation becomes so much more than the territory it defends. This has helped make Ukraine capable of fighting back against a far larger adversary.

Ukrainian society’s lack of tolerance for corruption is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the defense sector, where the stakes could not be higher. As Ukraine fights for its very existence, citizens and soldiers alike have demonstrated zero patience for anyone accused of exploiting the war for private gain. Wartime corruption scandals related to military procurement have provoked widespread outrage across the country. The public response has often been swift and unrelenting with investigations launched, resignations demanded, and reforms accelerated.

Despite the success of this summer’s protest movement, the battle to protect Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture is far from over. As Ukraine moves forward, its commitment to safeguarding the autonomy and integrity of anti-corruption organs will be tested by adversaries who are as persistent as they are resourceful. In parallel to the ongoing Russian invasion, Moscow will continue to push the message that Zelenskyy’s government is illegitimate, while also promoting perceptions of Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt.

Putin’s fear of Ukraine’s emerging democracy is the root cause of the war. Unlike Russia’s traditionally authoritarian and highly centralized system of government, Ukrainian democracy pulses with the will of the people. It is a highly dynamic and decentralized political culture that derives its strength from the grassroots level. Time and again, Ukrainians have reminded Zelenskyy and his predecessors that true power lies not at the highest levels of government in Kyiv, but with the Ukrainian people. The anti-corruption reforms of the past decade manifest this reality. They have set an example that resonates far beyond Ukraine’s borders and helps generate strong international backing for the country.

As peace negotiations continue to unfold and Ukraine’s partners seek a security formula to prevent further Russian aggression, the fight against corruption will fortify Ukrainian sovereignty. Each advance in transparency and the rule of law strengthens Ukraine’s standing, both at home and abroad, while exposing the malign intent of Russia’s disinformation. In the end, Ukraine’s freedom will not be secured solely by military victories, but also by a new social contract under which every Ukrainian knows that no one is above the law.

Matthew Murray is an Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. He is the former Chair of the Selection Commission for the Head of the US National Agency for Corruption Prevention, and former Deputy Assistant US Secretary of Commerce for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Fighting corruption strengthens Ukraine in the war against Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The global maritime order is an impressive but delicate construct. It depends on countries’ and companies’ willingness to abide by rules established through international treaties, even though violating them incurs only minor punishment, if any. In recent years, a growing number of countries have begun to publicly and repeatedly violate maritime rules. This poses the urgent question of who should protect the maritime order. The maritime sector—which is, by definition, dependent on the maritime order—can agree to create new rules, and such rules will likely become necessary. Clearly, corporate governance of the high seas cannot replace intergovernmental governance but, through smaller measures, the maritime domain’s different sectors can help prevent further deterioration of the maritime order.

A brief maritime history

“I am indeed lord of the world, but the Law is the lord of the sea. This matter must be decided by the maritime law of the Rhodians, provided that no law of ours is opposed to it.” This is how Emperor Justinian quotes, in 533, the first-century Emperor Antoninus on the matter of plunder following a shipwreck.¹ The island nation of Rhodes, a maritime leader, had pioneered maritime rules later adopted by the Romans. Subsequent generations of rulers in Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Italian city-states developed their own maritime rules, but these rules, naturally, covered only the waters the countries considered theirs.  

In 1609, the Dutch legal scholar Hugo Grotius advanced the new concept of the free seas: The oceans should be considered international territory, open to ships from all the world’s nations.² The world’s nations, however, were not interested in establishing free sees, and danger continued to plague seafaring. The most successful trading nations were those that could protect their own shipping on the high seas. From the 1690s, Great Britain massively expanded its merchant shipping by investing significantly in the Royal Navy.³ This model proved exceptionally successful, but it was also costly. 

Indeed, by the beginning of the 1900s, it was clear to both the United Kingdom and other countries that individually protecting one’s merchant fleet was unsustainable and governments needed to agree on a basic set of rules to make the high seas somewhat safer for merchant shipping. The treaties, rules, and conventions that followed have allowed maritime operations to expand at a phenomenal rate. These are the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), adopted in 1914; the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), adopted in 1969; the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLRED), adopted in 1972; the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), adopted in 1973; the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), adopted in 1979; and, of course, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was adopted in 1982 and is considered the constitution of the oceans.⁴ The members of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Labor Organization have adopted further rules, such as the International Safety Management Code, which de facto requires that shipping companies have a licence.⁵ 

In addition, the shipping industry has introduced its own rules to further increase safety for those involved, and it regularly provides input to intergovernmental bodies. “There are many kinds of technical input: how the industry works, what kind of rules will work to ensure that the measures being planned are sensible and effective,” noted Svein Ringbakken, managing director of the maritime war-risk insurer DNK.⁶ “Governments and intergovernmental bodies don’t always have full insight into how things work, so on particular issues they consult industry. And within national delegations and international organizations like Intertanko, the International Chamber of Shipping and so on, industry representatives are regularly asked to provide input because they know the situation on the ground.” The undersea infrastructure, fishing, and oil and gas sectors—other key ocean operators—operate in the same manner. For example, the International Cable Protection Committee represents nearly all owners of undersea cables and issues rules for members to follow. 

These generations-long efforts made the oceans safer than ever before. In 2024, an estimated 403 seafarers died in connection with their work, including ninety-one men overboard. No comprehensive records exist from a century earlier, but anecdotal evidence suggests seafarer deaths around that time were tragically common.⁷ However, that trend toward more intergovernmental agreements and more safety on the high seas is reversing. 

‘Broken windows’ on the seas

As noted in previous reports by the Atlantic Council’s Maritime Threats initiative, compliance with maritime rules has decreased markedly in recent years and continues to do so. Russia’s use of the shadow fleet is only the latest example of a country violating maritime rules.⁸ (Exporting oil sanctioned by some countries does not violate maritime rules, but not using port state control to detain ships with multiple defects does. Port state control (PSC) “is the inspection of foreign ships in national ports to verify that the condition of the ship and its equipment comply with the requirements of international regulations and that the ship is manned and operated in compliance with these rules.”)⁹ Iran’s indirect support of the Houthis’ attacks on shipping in the Red Sea is another troubling development for the global maritime order, as is China’s maritime harassment of civilian vessels in the South China Sea. Beijing’s construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, and its unilateral declaration of a “no-sail zone” in a part of the Yellow Sea where China’s exclusive economic zone overlaps with that of South Korea, are further examples of recent activities that undermine the global maritime order.¹⁰   

Like broken windows in a neighborhood, unaddressed maritime rule violations encourage further rule violations. As noted in a previous Maritime Threats report, proliferating rule violations risk creating two parallel maritime systems: one in which internationally agreed-upon rules apply and are obeyed by authorities and companies, and another one in which they no longer apply.¹¹ The latter is also a world in which companies can save costs. For example, maintenance and repairs obligated by PSC inspections involve expenses, as does crew welfare. Operating in a minimum-rule environment will, however, cost them in the long run. 

That makes thwarting this trend a crucial task. The question is for whom. No nation can, on its own, shore up the maritime order; on the contrary, doing so must involve the rest of global maritime community acting collectively. This has been done before. When pirates plagued the waters off the Horn of Africa in the late 2000s, nations from around the world (including the United States, European Union (EU) countries, and China) successfully formed anti-piracy initiatives. Rooting out maritime violations by major nations is naturally a much more challenging undertaking, one that is made even more difficult by the fact that the United States—the default custodian of the global maritime order—has not ratified UNCLOS.  

In addition, to adopt measures such as greenhouse gas reduction agreements, the community of nations will likely need the support of China and other nations known to violate maritime rules. When the IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee met in London in April 2025 to negotiate and vote on an agreement to reduce the shipping sector’s greenhouse gas emissions, China voted in favor of the agreement, as did the EU’s member states, the United Kingdom, and a host of other nations, while the United States voted against it.¹² A few days later, the United States unilaterally announced that it would allow seabed mining in international waters.¹³ The International Seabed Authority, an independent United Nations organ, does not (yet) permit seabed mining, and its secretary general has said that “any unilateral action would constitute a violation of international law and directly undermine the fundamental principles of multilateralism, the peaceful use of the oceans and the collective governance framework established under UNCLOS.”¹⁴ 

In parallel with these developments, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted Western governments (including the Joe Biden administration) to conclude that the maritime industry could be deployed to try forcing Russia to end the war. In December 2022, Western governments imposed a price cap of $60 per barrel on Russian oil. They considered the sanction especially potent because it didn’t just bar shipping companies based in the sanctioning countries from transporting the oil; it also barred Western protection and indemnity (P&I) insurers—which insure 90 percent of ocean-going tonnage—from insuring shipments above the cap.¹⁵ Because P&I coverage is required for all merchant vessels, the governments reasoned that Russa would not be able to sell its crude above the price cap and, thus, would be unable to raise large amounts of revenue to use in its war against Ukraine. The maritime insurance industry would shore up the rules-based international order where Western governments could not. The plan failed because Russia turned to the shadow fleet, undermining the maritime order in a way Western governments had assumed it would not.  

In a geopolitically flavored maritime development of a different kind, in April 2025 the US government issued a final notice in its 301 Investigation on “China’s Targeting the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance.” The government announced actions that “will impose significant new port service fees on vessels that are owned or operated by China-linked entities, most vessels that were built in China but that are owned and operated by non-Chinese entities, and all foreign-built vehicle carriers.”¹⁶ Line Falkenberg Ollestad, an adviser at the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association, said that “puts the maritime sector in the middle of geopolitical rivalry. This is an industry that makes its decisions based on business efficiency, not geopolitical considerations. Now those worlds are colliding.”¹⁷ 

She added: “Shipbuilding has become a new geopolitical hot topic. It’s unsurprising considering that countries have begun taking supply chains much more seriously, but frequently policymakers struggle to understand how the maritime industry works. The maritime industry is very adaptable, but the prime objective will always be to be as efficient as possible, which is why we have cost-effective global shipping. Striking that balance will be a core task for the maritime industry over the next decade.”¹⁸ 

This state of affairs, in which geopolitical tensions co-exist with commercial links established during more harmonious times, exposes the maritime sector to a range of geopolitically linked risks and pressures (as detailed in previous Maritime Threats reports).¹⁹ The situation also has a less obvious upshot. With governments increasingly unable to reach international agreements, the maritime sector might have a better chance to reach global agreements. The maritime sector—which includes not just shipping but also ports, undersea infrastructure, and maritime insurance—might, in fact, be the world’s best chance at shoring up the crumbling maritime order precisely because it focuses on efficiency, which requires the high seas to be safe for commerce.  

The obvious question is how. Companies would naturally not be willing or able to negotiate sweeping conventions like UNCLOS, but they have potential to address more limited matters. For example, should IMO member states fail to adopt the greenhouse gas reduction agreement passed by the Environment Protection Committee, the shipping industry could conceivably agree on greenhouse gas emission rules without governmental involvement. To be sure, plenty of shipping companies have no interest in tackling climate change, but most know that their industry must bring down its share of global carbon-dioxide (CO2) emissions. “The shipping industry is split on the issue,” Ringbakken said. “In northern Europe, shipping companies are mostly on board with CO2 reductions, while elsewhere there’s less support, but by and large decarbonization of the shipping industry is moving ahead. Some of the largest companies are taking the lead, and leading customers are demanding CO2 reduction too.”²⁰ Indeed, if European and other countries that are serious about CO2 reduction were to adopt stricter emission rules for ships calling at their ports, the global shipping industry would likely act pragmatically and adopt sector-wide rules.  

Could the oceans’ different industries—shipping, undersea infrastructure, and other maritime operations such as oil extraction—also negotiate and adopt other measures to ensure the high seas remain safe during a period in which the world’s nations are unlikely to reach any agreements? In other words, could the oceans’ practitioners become back-up protectors of the maritime order, the actors who step in when natural protectors—key nation-states—signal that they are not going to protect it? “When it comes to the risk of piracy, the maritime sector already has industry-wide standards,” Falkenberg Ollestad said.²¹ “On more complex issues, it becomes more difficult, but what the industry does agree on is the importance of navigational freedom. If countries were to begin challenging that, you could see the global shipping industry join forces to try to protect it.” Long before such a point is reached, the maritime industry’s different sectors could collectively adopt more standards and agreements on less complex issues such as greenhouse gas emissions or safer scrapping of vessels. 

Whether corporate intervention to protect the maritime order would be a desirable development is debatable, but this matters less than the fact that it might become inevitable. The global maritime order is only viable if a critical mass of actors honor it and introduce new measures that plug existing holes. As practitioners on the high seas, shipping companies, undersea-infrastructure companies, oil and gas companies, and others have an obvious interest in maintaining the maritime order.  

It would, of course, also be a risky development, as companies would be acting in a capacity otherwise mostly reserved for governments. Matters such as the definition of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones will, of course, always remain a matter reserved for nation states, as will interventions against rule breakers. By creating additional rules and standards, the maritime industry would build on the private sector’s well-established practice of creating industry-specific rules and standards beyond those contained in intergovernmental agreements. For example, the cable industry itself has established rules and procedures for the installation and repairs of undersea cables. 

Should the maritime order deteriorate to the point at which freedom of navigation is challenged—not just in a limited number of waters like the Red Sea but more widely—the global shipping industry could, for example, negotiate industry-wide rules to protect merchant vessels from attacks or collectively reroute from waters where freedom of navigation is not guaranteed. If the shipping industry were to collectively inform the Houthis that shipping through the Red Sea will be suspended unless the Houthis cease their attacks, this would send a powerful message because the Red Sea’s coastal states depend on at least some ships calling at their ports. 

One area that needs urgent attention is the security of undersea infrastructure: data cables, power cables, and pipelines. While NATO and Taiwanese authorities have increased their patrolling of undersea infrastructure following a string of suspicious cable incidents, governments will not be able to deter every potential saboteur. Data-cable owners could, for example, agree to take over each other’s traffic in situations where several cables have been damaged. (Cable owners typically install cables in pairs, with the twin cable taking over the damaged cable’s traffic in case of damage, but there is no arrangement covering traffic in cases where both cables are damaged.)  

This would naturally involve working with competitors; indeed, given intergovernmental authorities’ current weakness, companies’ efforts would be most productive if coordinated by industry bodies. The satellite industry offers a partial example collaboration in a similar vein. Satellite companies mutually report incidents via an industry-wide body, the satellite equivalent of drivers receiving warning of accidents ahead. They do so on the basis of trust, as each report goes to their competitors, and the service is crucial because it allows the satellite industry to operate as safely as possible. 

From companies’ perspectives, shoring up the maritime order would indisputably be an additional and unwanted burden. But because no one depends more on a functioning maritime order than the maritime industry itself, the maritime domain’s different sectors might find that taking on this additional task is preferable to watching the maritime order deteriorate further. 

Conclusion

The global maritime order is one the world’s most important intergovernmental achievements, and it is indispensable for the functioning of modern economies. However, like other parts of the rules-based international order, it is under severe strain, not least because major nations actively undermine it. Because the maritime industry is directly affected by the deterioration of the maritime order—as demonstrated, for example, by the continued growth of the shadow fleet—it is in the industry’s interest to protect the maritime order where governments can no longer reach agreements.

Fellow

Elisabeth Braw

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Resilience & Society

Threats to the global maritime order

Learn more about the Atlantic Council’s project Threats to the global maritime order: Protecting the freedom of the seas.

Report Jan 23, 2025

From Russia’s shadow fleet to China’s maritime claims: The freedom of the seas is under threat

By Elisabeth Braw

This report analyzes the deterioration of the global maritime order, focusing on rule violations in areas including maritime border alteration, harassment of civilian vessels, and disturbance of navigational tools

China Europe & Eurasia

Report Dec 6, 2024

The threats posed by the global shadow fleet—and how to stop it

By Elisabeth Braw

Since 2022 the number of aging ships whose ownership, insurance status, and safety is unknown has exploded, prompted by Russia’s reliance on this “dark fleet” to ship its oil in defiance of Western sanctions. What can be done about this environmental, economic, and safety threat on the high seas?

China Europe & Eurasia

Report Aug 9, 2024

What attacks on shipping mean for the global maritime order

By Elisabeth Braw

This report discusses the history of attacks on shipping, the rules implemented to keep shipping safe, and the new and serious threats posed by the Houthis and other actors. It also discusses steps Western governments and the shipping industry can take to reduce the harm posed by such attacks.

Europe & Eurasia Maritime Security

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

Learn more

The post Private industry should step up to protect the global maritime order appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How much progress has Sharaa’s administration made in its aims to revive the economy, centralize the government, and ensure the country’s security? Several of our Middle East experts recently visited Damascus, and they share their on-the-ground insights below. 

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Ibrahim Al-Assil: The mood is cautious but forward-looking

Jonathan Panikoff: Sharaa’s most urgent challenge is unifying the country’s religious and ethnic minorities 

Alex Plitsas: Syria should join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS

Gershom Sacks: Transforming Syria into a positive force

The mood is cautious but forward-looking

Landing in Damascus to examine the transition and engage with local actors and government officials, the city felt both determined and precarious. Ministries gutted by years of war and sanctions are being rebuilt almost from the ground up. Technocrats and private-sector veterans have stepped forward to “volunteer for the state,” working long hours with scarce resources to restore basic services and credibility. Yet the picture is more complex, and the challenges go well beyond a hollowed-out bureaucracy: fragile legitimacy, violent domestic episodes, and intricate regional dynamics present deep and serious obstacles. 

The officials we spoke with underscored the stakes: stability, they said, is essential to containing the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and preventing Syria’s fragmentation, yet it remains undermined by foreign powers backing different factions. Negotiations with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces remain tense as the government seeks full integration. On the Kurdish side, distrust of Damascus’s willingness to share power and guarantee security runs deep, and Israeli strikes further heighten a sense of vulnerability. Even as Syrian officials emphasize inclusivity, the conversations in the streets reveal lingering divisions, with minorities voicing fear for their future after this year’s bloodshed in the coastal region and Sweida. 

Economic efforts reflect this tension between ambition and constraint. The Ministry of Economy is courting investors, drafting an investment map, and pursuing both microfinance and capacity-building initiatives alongside mega-projects. Officials candidly acknowledge the enduring effects of sanctions while touting asset recovery and public-private partnerships. Yet transparency concerns, repeatedly raised by investors and entrepreneurs, remain a significant obstacle to attracting sustainable investment. 

The mood is cautious but forward-looking. Syria’s transition is neither orderly nor secure, but it represents a rare window where institutional rebuilding and political recalibration are actively underway, carrying opportunities and risks in equal measure. 

—Ibrahim Al-Assil is the Syria Project lead for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Sharaa’s most urgent challenge is unifying the country’s religious and ethnic minorities

Last December, I watched from Doha as the Syrian regime fell. I could not have imagined then that less than a year later I’d be in Damascus with Atlantic Council colleagues meeting with ministers of the Sharaa government. The joy of Assad fleeing Syria remains palpable across the population. And there is a challenging but real pathway for Syria to emerge from its current economic ruin, political instability, and ongoing security threats, including from ISIS.  

But the euphoria over Assad’s demise has given way to the sobering realities associated with rebuilding a deeply fractured state. The most urgent challenge facing Sharaa’s government is how to unify Syria’s diverse and varying minority groups. 

Damascus must meaningfully integrate and bring together the many factions and portions of the populations not inclined to be part of a broader Syrian state fabric—especially one that is centralized and run by Sharaa and his former compatriots from the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Druze in the south, Alawites in the west, Kurds in the northeast, and Christians throughout the country—these are among the minorities ranging from skeptical to hostile of the new Syrian government, unconvinced that the government will truly protect their rights and ensure them an equal voice. 

Damascus will need to either cajole them to accept a centralized government or begrudgingly accede to a more federated model. Time is not on the government’s side. The longer the situation lingers without resolution, the greater the likelihood of sustained sectarian violence—which would undermine Sharaa’s goal to turn the page on Syria’s civil war and reintegrate the country into the broader Arab and global communities.  

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle East Program. 

Syria should join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS

I was in Damascus last week and met with senior Syrian ministers. During my visit, I witnessed firsthand a secular culture where minority sects openly practiced their faiths, communities coexisted peacefully, and women were treated with dignity—free to dress as they chose without elements of forced religious observance. This environment of tolerance is an important foundation upon which the new Syrian government can build as it seeks legitimacy at home and abroad. 

What Syria should do next is join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, a nearly ninety-member strong group committed to combating the terrorist organization. By joining the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, Syria could help reinforce a commitment to pluralism by decisively confronting extremist elements that threaten its stability. ISIS cells remain active in parts of the country, undermining security and preventing displaced Syrians from returning home. Cooperation with the coalition would bring access to intelligence, training, and coordination that could hasten ISIS’s defeat. 

Stability is also essential for the future of Syria’s economy. Without improved security, foreign direct investment will not flow into the country at the scale required for meaningful reconstruction. A credible counterterrorism partnership would not enhance the country’s safety while signaling to investors that Syria is ready to re-engage economically. 

Moreover, coalition membership could increase trust with Israel by demonstrating that Damascus is serious about countering groups that destabilize the region, while also opening the door to greater partnership with the United States. At the same time, collaboration against ISIS alongside the Druze community and Syrian Democratic Forces would strengthen the government’s hand in pursuing peaceful unification and inclusive governance. 

What I witnessed in Damascus left me cautiously optimistic. By embracing coalition membership, Syria could demonstrate its secular and tolerant character, restore stability, attract investment, build regional trust, and unite its people under a shared vision for the future. 

—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs’ Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and leads the Initiative’s Counterterrorism Project. 

Transforming Syria into a positive force

Syria under Sharaa has an opportunity to transform the Middle East, if he and the West can seize it. The new government has expressed a desire for regional peace and security and alignment with the West on core issues. It wants to prevent Iran from using Syria as a platform for chaos, dismantle Hezbollah’s supply networks, and challenge remaining ISIS cells. It is pursuing a security agreement with Israel that could bring calm to its southern border and one day, under the right conditions, normalized relations. This new Syria is within reach but requires both bold leadership and for the West to establish itself as Syria’s preferred partner to help increase the odds of Sharaa’s success.   

To increase these odds, the United States and its partners—and Israel, once a security deal is reached—should take steps to increase security, military, and counterterrorism cooperation. Sharaa will need help countering threats that could drive instability, in particular ISIS activities and ongoing coordination between Iran and Hezbollah. This would reinforce Syria’s internal security, prevent broader instability in the Levant, especially in Lebanon, and bolster Sharaa’s legitimacy as he seeks to reunite the country. Perhaps most important, this would give an opportunity for the West to build trust, deconflict, and test Syria’s security apparatus as it anchors its interests in Damascus. 

At the same time, Syria’s economy is in desperate need of investment. The West should invest in industries that would help Syria rebuild, including cement, transportation, logistics, and finance. Syria’s partners should look to help sectors that can support the country’s prosperity, such as power plants, renewable energy, desalination, petrochemicals, and advanced technologies. These investments could provide unique opportunities for US companies and support the Syrian economy. The Trump administration’s decision in June to lift sanctions is a good first step, but it’s incumbent on the West to shape this cooperation and anchor its interests in Damascus.  

This future is only possible if Syria can establish trust in the international community, better integrate and protect minority communities, and prevent the troubling scenes from Sweida in July from happening again. Damascus should find an appropriate formula for governing the Druze, Kurds, and Alawites, and finalize the security deal with Israel, including the humanitarian corridor into Sweida. Israel should give Sharaa some room to maneuver to finalize the deal by avoiding attacks on regime targets, such as the Ministry of Defense in July and Syrian military personnel. Sharaa and the West have an opportunity to transform Syria into a positive force, with an opening for near-term cooperation and future normalization with Israel. Policymakers should seize this moment while conditions are ripe. 

—Gershom Sacks is the deputy director of the N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and the Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation dedicated to strengthening cooperation between the United States, Israel, and Arab and Muslim countries.

The post Dispatches from Damascus: The state of Syria’s postwar transition nine months after Assad’s fall appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It is worth looking in more detail at what the Colombian leader has said and why so many in the international community are alarmed.

1. What has Petro proposed for the March 2026 election ballot?

Petro has said he wants Colombians to decide whether to convene a constituent assembly, a body that would be tasked with rewriting the constitution. He wants to put this question to voters in Colombia’s March 2026 legislative elections. In a social media post in late June, he announced that “a ballot will be provided” to voters in those elections to ask whether to call a National Constituent Assembly. Under Colombia’s 1991 Constitution, however, calling a referendum on constitutional reform first requires a law passed by Congress. The president alone does not have the authority to propose a constitutional reform directly. Instead, Congress must give the green light to proceed with a vote.

2. What is Petro’s rationale for proposing this?

Petro has argued that Congress and the courts have repeatedly blocked core elements of his reform programs, and therefore a direct popular mandate is necessary to bring about meaningful change. He is calling for a “popular constituent process” in a way that could subvert the separation of powers. In March, for instance, he sought to pass a labor reform via referendum after it was defeated in the legislature; a high court then suspended his decree, which paved the way for his recent moves for the March 2026 election. In recent speeches, Petro has invoked the notion that his government reflects the will of the people, surpassing what he describes as a political system dominated by political elites. In March, he said that “the National Constituent Assembly must transform the institutions so that they obey the people’s mandate for peace and justice.” In doing so, he is implying that institutional resistance justifies extraordinary action, even if it is outside the conventional bounds of the rule of law.

3. What obstacles does Petro’s proposal face?

The first obstacle that Petro is facing is simple: The numbers don’t work in his favor. Petro’s Pacto Historico coalition lost control of the Senate in April 2024 and it also has a minority in the House, which is why the president’s flagship reforms have hit a wall. Getting an enabling law to trigger a constitutional referendum seems like it is a nonstarter in Congress.

Even if Congress advanced a bill, the Constitutional Court—which has been an important check on Petro’s authority—would review both the process and substance of the reform to ensure its legality. And even then, assuming it checks all the boxes, the reform would need to win a majority of votes cast, with at least ten percent or more of the voters participating in the referendum, for it to move forward. Given high polarization and the fact that Petro’s approval rating is only around 37 percent, there is plenty of opportunity for the opposition to organize a boycott or street protests against such a vote.

4. What does this reveal about the overall state of Colombia’s democracy?

Ultimately, this is a stress test for Colombia’s institutions. So far, the checks and balances in the country have been holding. But if Petro tries to force through a reform, then it could place a real strain on them. There has been growing concern from Petro’s critics that he may even seek to advance a reform allowing him to run for reelection, as Alfredo Saade, Petro’s former chief of staff, has persistently made statements suggesting that he supports the president remaining in office beyond his term. (Since 2015, the sitting president has been barred from running for reelection.) This has created worry among civil society, the judiciary, the political opposition, and international observers alike.

Petro came to power in August 2022 promising change, but his administration has been slow to deliver. His unclear foreign policy, poor economic management, and the resurgence of insecurity since the failure of his total peace approach in mid-2024, have stirred painful memories of Colombia’s darker past.

Petro’s new ballot adventure is likely to be challenged in the courts, and it will probably be denied by Congress if his party tries to sponsor a bill calling for an extraordinary vote to request the need for a constituent assembly. But the real risk is that during the time the president is campaigning for his new ballot, political polarization could increase to a dangerous degree. As the assassination of Uribe demonstrated, Colombia’s stability cannot be taken for granted. Political polarization has grown to the point where there is no control over the language used by political leaders to disqualify their opponents. Petro’s followers, for example, regularly label their opponents as far-right extremists and fascists, while some critics of Petro have called him a communist, exacerbating the political polarization in the country.

5. How should the US view the possibility of greater political polarization in Colombia?

For the United States, a nation with a deep and long-standing interest in Colombia’s stability and prosperity, the strategic risks are evident and immediate. The extent of Colombia’s polarization is potentially damaging to hemispheric economic security, trade, investment, and democratic norms.

Since 2002, the US relationship with Colombia has been a rare point of bipartisan consensus in Washington. From Plan Colombia to support for the peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as FARC, in 2016, the bilateral relationship has focused on security cooperation, drug interdiction, trade, and regional stability with deep support from both Republican and Democrat politicians. There was also bipartisan buy in for the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, which has made Colombia a top destination for US investment, particularly in the energy, agricultural, and service sectors.

Political instability could deter investment, affect the rule of law, and disrupt vital supply chains. In today’s climate of global competition, the United States cannot afford to lose one of its most trusted partners in the hemisphere, especially when the Petro administration has flirted with closer ties to China.

Given the stakes, the most prudent US approach is to make clear the importance of Colombia’s rule of law while continuing high-level engagement. US policymakers can and should reinforce the importance of Colombia’s judicial independence, independent election administration, and peaceful, transparent electoral competition.

Enrique Millán-Mejía is a senior fellow for economic development at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. He previously served as senior trade and investment diplomat for the government of Colombia to the United States between 2014 and 2021.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow for Colombia and Venezuela at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Take Colombia’s risk of democratic backsliding under Petro seriously appeared first on Atlantic Council.

First, the Federal Reserve. On Monday night, Trump attempted to fire Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook based on an allegation of mortgage fraud. If successful, it would be the first time in the 112-year history of the Federal Reserve that a governor had been fired. Cook was appointed to the Fed by President Joe Biden in 2022. Her Senate-confirmed term isn’t scheduled to end until 2038. The predicate for her firing came from the Trump-appointed director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, Bill Pulte, who seems to have pulled her mortgage paperwork prior to her time at the Fed. In a letter to the US attorney general dated August 15, Pulte claimed Cook listed two different properties as her primary residence. US Department of Justice attorney Ed Martin followed up by writing to Fed Chair Jerome Powell: “I encourage you to remove Ms. Cook from your Board. Do it today before it is too late!”

Powell declined to respond, and Trump went through with the attempted firing. Cook quickly replied that she would not step down and that the president did not have the legal authority to fire her. The next step will be to see what Powell does. He sidestepped the issue of central bank independence during his final speech at the Jackson Hole Symposium last week, likely hoping the summer battles were behind him. Now he has to decide whether to allow Cook to continue to serve as a governor while the case goes through the judicial system. Most likely, Cook will be granted an injunction—but whether she can continue to show up to work, especially heading into the next Fed interest rate decision in two weeks, is up to Powell. Since there has never been an attempted firing of a Fed governor, Powell is creating the precedent here.

Of course, even if Powell allows Cook to serve while the case moves forward, that only temporarily addresses the issue. Ultimately the Supreme Court will have to rule on whether the president can fire a federal reserve governor under these circumstances. In May, the Supreme Court created a special carve-out for the Fed, saying that while the president can fire the leadership of most independent agencies, the Federal Reserve is uniquely structured and occupies a standalone place in US history, and therefore the president can only fire a Fed official “for cause.” The question that will come before the court is whether a so-far unproven allegation about mortgage applications done before her service at the Fed actually constitutes “for cause.” If the court allows the firing to go forward, it would increase Trump’s control over the Fed—and put every other Fed governor on notice. It would be a dangerous break from the independence of central banking that helped the dollar become the world’s reserve currency and stabilized both the US and global economy throughout recessions, depressions, and financial crises. Ultimately, as similar situations in emerging markets have taught us, a central bank that is not independent leads to higher inflation and faltering economies.

The Fed decision comes on top of what is already the biggest economic case expected to come before the court in years—whether the president is allowed to use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to put tariffs on allies and adversaries alike. Many of Trump’s tariffs so far in his second term, including the reciprocal tariffs issued on “Liberation Day” and since modified in July, rely on the IEEPA. In order to use the 1977 law to issue tariffs, the president had to declare a national emergency. 

Trump Tariff Tracker

The second Trump administration has embarked on a novel and aggressive tariff policy to address a range of economic and national security concerns. This tracker monitors the evolution of these tariffs and provides expert context on the economic conditions driving their creation—along with their real-world impact.

The primary national emergency claimed by the president is the trade deficit, which raises several legal issues. First, IEEPA never mentions tariffs and has historically been used for sanctions. So the courts are now debating whether the powers of IEEPA can be extended to trade in the way Trump is trying. The second and related question is whether tariffing is a power reserved to Congress under Article I, and whether the president has overstepped his authority. The third question is, does the national emergency cited here meet the intention of the law—is a chronic trade deficit actually a national emergency? Fourth, even if there is a national emergency, are tariffs the appropriate remedy? The president has also cited fentanyl trafficking as the justification for tariffs on Canada and Mexico, and the courts have questioned how tariffs would address that concern. There are several cases right now making their way through the system, but it seems clear that the Supreme Court will have to weigh in on one of them soon. So far, the lower courts have been very skeptical of Trump’s legal authorities here, and a unanimous ruling by the Court of International Trade in May said the president cannot use IEEPA in this way.

Countries around the world are, understandably, paying close attention to the decision. However, even if the Supreme Court rules against Trump, there are other authorities—as we’ve documented in our Trump Tariff Tracker—he could fall back on. While those would be challenged in court as well, the reality is that higher tariff rates globally are likely here to stay. Still, a ruling in Trump’s favor would further embolden his trade war and give him an unlimited trade tool to threaten countries for the remainder of his term—not to mention his successors.

The Supreme Court’s history with economic issues goes back to the founding of the country. In 1819, in McColloch v. Maryland, the court ruled that the creation of a National Bank was constitutional, despite the objections of President Andrew Jackson. It was Justice Louis Brandeis who, in 1908, through his brief in Muller v. Oregon first incorporated demographic data in a case about women’s working hours. But on international economics, the Supreme Court has always been more wary to wade into territory where justices, as they fully admit, lack expertise and like to defer to the executive.

Now, the president has forced their hand by stretching the limits of that deference. The entire global economy is watching and waiting for the first Monday in October, when the justices return from their long summer break. 

Josh Lipsky is chair, international economics at the Atlantic Council and the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The post Trump’s economic agenda is set to collide with the Supreme Court appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Rule of law is the strongest driver of prosperity 
• The rule of law is an enabler of political and economic reforms
• Case in point: Rwanda and Nigeria show two diverging paths
• A decade of global decline in rule of law
• Case in point: Chile reverses the trend
• What comes next?

What drives long-term prosperity and where should reform begin? Data suggest that the rule of law consistently emerges as the most influential factor—outperforming economic and political freedom—in driving prosperity, not only enabling economic growth but also reinforcing political and market reforms.  

Institutions are critical to development, yet they remain notoriously difficult to define and measure. Concepts like democracy, rule of law, or market economy are interpreted differently across different contexts, and scholarly debates frequently get mired in theory rather than grounded analysis. 

To cut through this complexity, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center takes a pragmatic and functional approach. Instead of debating abstract definitions, we focus on how core institutional domains operate in practice, and how they shape a country’s trajectory. 

The Freedom Index developed by the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center offers a clear framework to do just that. It rests on the idea that a country’s institutional foundation is made up of three interrelated domains: political, legal, and economic. These domains can be empirically assessed through the degree of freedom they confer on individuals and enterprises. 

Each pillar of the Index captures a distinct facet of institutional quality:  

• the political subindex evaluates how executive authority is attained and constrained; 
• the legal subindex examines the rule of law, that is, the adherence to laws by both citizens and public officials; and  
• the economic subindex assesses the extent to which markets, rather than the state, allocate resources.  

Each is given equal weight to constitute the Freedom Index.  

What sets the Freedom Index apart is its methodological clarity and empirical breadth. It translates complex institutional arrangements into measurable components, generating scores for 164 countries from 1995 to 2024. This allows a deeper examination of how each pillar—economic, political, and legal—functions in practice and influences a country’s long-term development and prosperity. 

The Freedom and Prosperity Center’s research aims to investigate the relative impact of different institutional pillars and how they interact over time. While the rule of law emerges as the most influential factor, durable prosperity depends on the strength and interplay of all three institutional pillars—political, legal, and economic. The data simply offer indications of where reform efforts should begin, especially in contexts where progress must be sequenced or prioritized.   

Rule of law is the strongest driver of prosperity 

What do the most prosperous countries have in common? The data are clear: The rule of law is the strongest institutional driver of prosperity. It outperforms both political and economic freedom as a predictor of a country’s overall wellbeing. 

Table 1. Rule of law shows the strongest correlation with overall prosperity 

The rule of law then appears pivotal for building a stable, just, and prosperous society. It ensures that everyone, including and especially those in power, is subject to and accountable under the law. By having a robust and trusted rule of law, citizens have a framework so that when disputes occur, they know the system will ensure adequate protections. This not only ensures individual’s rights are protected by the law but also fosters economic development. Having environment where the rule of law is predictable and stable encourages more investment, innovation, and durable growth. 

Its impact goes beyond economic growth. Across most dimensions of prosperity—such as income levels, life expectancy, and the treatment of minorities—the rule of law exerts the strongest and most consistent influence, and stands out as the dominant factor overall. 

Figure 1. The rule of law shows the strongest correlation to most indicators of prosperity 

The rule of law is an enabler of political and economic reforms 

The rule of law might not only support prosperity but also underpin progress in other institutional domains. When we examine pairwise correlations between the rule of law, economic freedom, and political freedom, we find that both economic and political freedom correlate most strongly with the legal foundation provided by the rule of law. This indicates that the rule of law may serve as an enabler of democratic governance and market reforms.  

Table 2. The rule of law correlates strongly with economic and political freedom 

Case in point: Rwanda and Nigeria show two diverging paths 

In 1995, Rwanda and Nigeria had nearly identical scores on the Freedom Index score, which averages countries’ performance across the three pillars: the rule of law, economic freedom, and political freedom. Over the next three decades, both countries made substantial progress, reaching similar overall levels by 2024.  

However, the composition of their gains differed significantly. Rwanda’s improvement was driven by steady advances in the rule of law and economic freedom, while levels of political freedom remained largely unchanged. In contrast, Nigeria’s rise was largely the result of a sharp increase in political freedom following its transition from a military autocracy to a civilian-led democracy in 1999, with limited and inconsistent progress in legal and economic institutions. 

Figure 2. Rwanda focused on rule of law and market reforms, whereas Nigeria led with political liberalization 

These divergent experiences reflect two distinct models of institutional development. Rwanda followed a path that prioritized stability, legal order, and economic liberalization, while limiting political pluralism. This approach resembles the pre-democratic phases of South Korea and Spain, where legal and economic modernization preceded political opening. Nigeria, by contrast, pursued a “democratization first” model, mirroring the trajectory of many Latin American countries during the third wave of democratization at the end of the last century, where political liberalization outpaced improvements in state capacity and market openness. 

While Rwanda’s case is of course unique because of the 1994 genocide, the continued restrictions on political freedom may be holding back its full potential. In the aftermath of 1994’s events, the country focused on restoring security, rebuilding legal institutions, and reconstructing the economic landscape. These efforts have produced impressive gains in prosperity. The outcome is measurable: Between 1995 and 2024, Rwanda’s Prosperity Index score increased by 19 points (out of 100), while Nigeria’s rose by almost 13 points.   

However, despite these successes, Rwanda has yet to make the leap to full democratization, unlike South Korea and Spain, which transitioned to democracy and reaped long-term economic dividends. Rwanda’s gains were more stable and broad-based, but its long-term trajectory may depend on whether it embraces the political freedom reforms that historically accompany and reinforce sustained prosperity. In fact, according to our 2025 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes: How political freedom drives growth, democratizing countries see an average 8.8 percent boost in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over twenty years compared to those that remain authoritarian. 

Nigeria offers a striking example of  political liberalization that has not been matched by corresponding advances in legal and economic institutional reforms. Following Nigeria’s transition to democratic governance in 1999, the country has seen significant improvement in the early years. However, in the past ten years, the country has seen a decline in political freedom, though the level remains higher than in 1999. Much of the improvement has encountered challenges, as improvement of political freedom has not been accompanied by continuous process in economic liberalization and building strong rule of law system.  

Economic liberalization has been inconsistent and sector-specific. While sectors such as telecommunications and banking have undergone meaningful reforms, erratic trade policies, and persistent uncertainty in the oil sector have hindered the development of a balanced market economy.  

Meanwhile, legal institutions continue to underperform, hampered by corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and insecurity. For nearly three decades, Nigeria’s score on bureaucracy and corruption has remained below the regional average, ranking 133 out of 164 countries. Politically motivated violence and instability, measured in our security component, are even more troubling, with Nigeria ranking 151 out of 164. Weak rule of law and politicized institutions have enabled rent-seeking elites to control the political landscape, carving out electoral integrity and public trust. 

Nigeria has made undeniable progress in political freedom, but without stable market frameworks and a robust legal foundation, the country’s overall development trajectory remains constrained. 

A decade of global decline in rule of law

Despite its critical role, the rule of law has been in global decline for more than a decade.  Rule of law scores have dropped for eleven consecutive years, bringing the world to a seventeen-year low.  

This trend affects all five legal components: clarity of the law, judicial independence and effectiveness, security, informality, and bureaucracy and corruption. Among them, clarity of the law has seen the steepest drop. 

Strikingly, the steepest declines occurred in OECD countries (members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), those with the highest incomes and strongest historical rule of law traditions. While their absolute scores remain higher than non-OECD countries, the rate of deterioration is greater. 

Figure 3. OECD countries have seen a steeper decline in four of the five components of rule of law  

Clarity of the law has seen the sharpest decline among all components in both OECD and non-OECD groups, with a drop of 6.6 points in OECD countries and 2.7 points in non-OECD countries. However, when examining individual countries instead of group averages, the decline is more uneven in non-OECD countries. The top decliners among non-OECD countries have seen steeper individual drops. In contrast, although the average decline is greater among OECD countries, their top decliners in the group did not fall as drastically.  

Among the OECD countries, the United Kingdom (-18.20), South Korea (-18), Canada (-17.70), Mexico (-16.80), and France (-14.60) saw the biggest decline in the factors that make up the “clarity of the law” measure. Among the non-OECD countries, top decliners include Nicaragua (-35.60), Afghanistan (-33.50), El Salvador (-26.30), Myanmar (-24.60), and Benin (-24.50).  

Clarity of the law measures whether legal systems are consistent, public, non-contradictory, and predictably enforced. A decline indicates that countries are enacting laws that are less consistent within their legal systems. This also suggests that laws are applied more unevenly and less predictably due to the inconsistent nature of the change.   

Case in point: Chile reverses the trend

Chile’s recent experience illustrates both the risks of institutional decline and the potential for recovery through public mobilization and legal reform. The period of social unrest from 2019 to 2022 (known in Chile as the estallido social, the “social outburst”) saw widespread protests over the cost of living, inequal access to education and healthcare, and perceived institutional shortcomings. In response, the government imposed states of emergency, restricted freedom of movement and assembly, and faced criticism for police violence. This period coincided with a significant drop in Chile’s “clarity of the law” score, reflecting public uncertainty over legal norms, emergency measures, and the consistency of law enforcement. 

Amid these challenges, Chile undertook substantial efforts to address institutional weaknesses. At the end of 2019, political parties signed the “Agreement for Peace and a New Constitution” (Acuerdo por la Paz Social y la Nueva Constitución). It marked the official political commitment to begin a constitutional reform process to rebuild public trust and update legal frameworks. Although the new constitutional proposals were ultimately rejected in two referenda (2022 and 2023), the process itself broadened public engagement and debate on rule of law issues. Complementing these efforts, Chile enacted a major Economic Crimes Law in 2023, introducing stronger measures for corporate accountability and anti-corruption enforcement. 

Figure 4. Chile’s rule of law (legal subindex) fell sharply in 2019 but has since improved, driven by constitutional and legal reforms 

As a result of these initiatives, Chile has seen recovery in key aspects of the rule of law, particularly regarding legal clarity and accountability. The country demonstrates that targeted legal reforms and sustained civil society engagement can help stabilize institutional performance after a period of decline. Yet, ongoing political polarization and debates over institutional legitimacy remain, highlighting that recovery is often incremental rather than absolute. Chile’s case underscores both the vulnerabilities and resilience of rule of law institutions in the face of social and political upheaval. 

What comes next?

The thirtieth year of the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes presents an urgent signal: The rule of law, foundational to prosperity and stability, is at its lowest point in nearly two decades. The data point to an uncomfortable reality: Even the most established democracies are not immune to institutional erosion, as setbacks to the rule of law could be seen worldwide.

This decline is not merely a legal or academic concern.

As these findings show, rule-of-law deterioration undercuts the effectiveness of political and economic reforms, stalling development and undermining the prospects for shared prosperity. 

Yet that decline is not inevitable or irreversible. With sustained public pressure, civil society mobilization, and strategic government action, countries can recover lost ground and rebuild legal institutions, even after deep crises or periods of instability. Reform is rarely linear, and gains can be fragile, but targeted interventions have demonstrated real impact. 

To reverse the downward trend and lay the groundwork for renewed prosperity, the following priorities are essential. 

For governments: 

• Make rule-of-law reform a strategic priority, not just a technocratic fix. Legal clarity, equal application of the law, and independent enforcement should be core to all reform agendas. 
• Invest in judicial independence and capacity, including transparent appointments, adequate resources, and training to resist political interference. 
• Combat informality and corruption by making formal participation more accessible, leveraging digital tools, and streamlining bureaucratic processes. 
• Build legitimacy and trust by engaging citizens in legal and constitutional reforms, and by strengthening accountability mechanisms for public officials. 

For donors and international financial institutions: 

• Link aid and concessional finance to measurable improvements in rule of law and judicial effectiveness, rather than just outputs or legislative changes. 
• Prioritize partnerships with countries that appreciate the importance of rule of law reforms for their own benefit.  
• Support local civil society and independent media to foster public demand for legal reforms and hold institutions accountable. 
• Prioritize justice sector and anti-corruption programming as core elements of economic development support, not afterthoughts. 

For the private sector and investors: 

• Champion transparency in contracts and dispute resolution to build market confidence. 
• Collaborate with governments and reformers to develop and promote best practices in regulatory governance, compliance, and legal predictability. 
• Advocate for stable and predictable legal environments, recognizing that long-term returns depend on the health of underlying institutions. 

Ultimately, unlocking prosperity requires more than piecemeal reforms or technical fixes. It demands a strategic and coordinated effort to strengthen all pillars of institutional quality—political, legal, and economic—with special attention to the enabling power of the rule of law. By learning from three decades of global data and country experiences, policymakers and stakeholders can sequence reforms, prioritize the most impactful interventions, and build resilience against future shocks.  

Political liberalization can act as a powerful catalyst for progress, especially when it helps correct institutional deficits. At the same time, the impact of democracy on growth is not automatic or immediate; it depends on timing, national conditions, and the broader institutional environment. This underscores a central insight of the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes: that freedom, when exercised in its full political, legal, and economic dimensions—is not just a moral imperative, but a pragmatic path to shared prosperity.

The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our award-winning site to explore twenty-nine years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

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Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee

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Freedom and Prosperity Center

East Asia Rule of Law

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Joseph Lemoine

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Freedom and Prosperity Center

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Report Jun 23, 2025

2025 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes: How political freedom drives growth

By Ignacio Campomanes, Nina Dannaoui-Johnson, Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee, Joseph Lemoine

As the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes show political freedom declining worldwide for the twelfth straight year, new data analysis shows its importance for lasting prosperity: Though authoritarians promise economic rewards, democratizing countries gain an 8.8 percent GDP per capita boost over twenty years than their autocratic peers. With democracy on the ropes, what else can the Indexes tell us?

China Civil Society

Report Jun 25, 2024

The path to prosperity: The 2024 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

By Ignacio Campomanes, Nina Dannaoui-Johnson, Joseph Lemoine, Dan Negrea

In this “year of election,” freedom continues to decline globally. Political rights, judicial independence, and checks and balances are eroding. Prosperity growth has slowed, particularly in developing countries. The data underscores a strong link between freedom and prosperity, highlighting the need for data-driven policy reforms.

Democratic Transitions Freedom and Prosperity

Dec 11, 2024

2025 Atlas: Freedom and prosperity around the world

2024 has seen escalating global crises, shifting alliances, and over half of the world’s population voting in national elections. In this Atlas, twenty leading economists, scholars, and diplomats analyze the state of freedom and prosperity in sixteen countries around the world, looking back not only on a consequential year but across twenty-nine years of data on markets, rights, and the rule of law.

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2025 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes launch

Experts examine the latest trends in global freedom and prosperity and highlight the work of changemakers fighting to promote democracy in launching the 2025 Indexes.

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The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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The post Why the rule of law is the key to prosperity: Lessons from thirty years of data  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This apparent readiness to change borders by force and abandon one of the central principles of international law is extremely short-sighted and risks undermining norms established at great cost over many decades of conflict and confrontation. Ignoring the lessons of the past in this manner would profoundly weaken the world order and set the stage for future wars. Unless the current course is corrected, any temporary relief from Russian aggression will be more than offset by the grave damage done to global security.

Nobody in Ukraine would question the need to end the current war. The Ukrainian population has experienced barely imaginable suffering for more than three and a half years amid the largest European invasion since World War II. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians have been killed. More than ten million have been forced to flee their homes. Dozens of Ukrainian towns and cities have been reduced to rubble.

Despite the unprecedented horror and trauma of Russia’s ongoing invasion, most Ukrainians recognize that limited territorial concessions will not bring a lasting peace. They note that Moscow’s so-called peace terms represent a thinly veiled demand for Kyiv’s capitulation, and understand perfectly well that Moscow’s goal is to destroy Ukraine as a state and Ukrainians as a nation. Indeed, this process of national erasure is already well underway in the approximately 20 percent of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that very few Ukrainians believe offering Putin more land will somehow end the bloodshed.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Unless Russia’s invasion is stopped, the consequences will clearly be catastrophic for Ukraine. However, Ukrainians will not be the only victims. In reality, Putin’s imperial ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine. Since 2022, he has repeatedly justified the invasion of Ukraine by framing it as a campaign to reclaim “historically Russian lands.” This definition could equally be applied to more than a dozen other independent states that were once ruled by Russia. Putin’s ultimate objective is to restore the Russian Empire and establish a new world order dominated by a handful of great powers.

Russian victory in Ukraine would embolden Putin and validate his entire revisionist imperial agenda. A triumphant Kremlin would then seek to maintain the geopolitical momentum generated in Ukraine and capitalize on the demoralization of the democratic world. Possible initial targets for the next phase of Russian aggression would include Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and the countries of Central Asia.

The likelihood would also increase of active Russian moves against nearby NATO member states such as Poland, Finland, or the Baltic nations. This could take the form of a conventional invasion or a hybrid assault similar to the 2014 seizure of Crimea. Either way, Moscow’s intention would be to test NATO’s core commitment to collective security. At that point, the United States would be faced with the choice of entering into a war with Russia or backing down and leaving the future of the entire NATO alliance in question.

In addition to encouraging further Kremlin aggression, Russian success in Ukraine would also bury the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Putin’s use of nuclear blackmail over the past three years to intimidate the West and deter support for Ukraine has proved highly effective and has sent an unambiguous message that non-nuclear nations can be bullied by nuclear powers. Unless the Kremlin’s nuclear saber-rattling is addressed, more and more countries will feel they have no choice but to establish their own nuclear arsenals as the only credible security guarantee.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

A Russian victory over Ukraine would serve as a green light for authoritarian rulers around the world. China, Iran, North Korea, and many others would all draw the same conclusion that the West has grown too weak to defend its own core values or the broader standards of international law that have shaped global security since World War II. Instead, the laws of the geopolitical jungle would now apply, with territorial conquest back on the table.

In this dangerous and unstable new international environment, the United States could soon find itself confronted with simultaneous security challenges on a variety of geographical fronts ranging from Europe and Asia to the Middle East. Key allies like Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan would be more vulnerable than ever.

Meanwhile, global trust in the United States would be significantly undermined by the fall of Ukraine. This would make it far more challenging for Washington to maintain existing strategic partnerships. In all likelihood, many formerly pro-Western countries throughout the Global South would look to pivot toward new alliances with China and Russia.

There is nothing inevitable about this descent into an era of insecurity and international aggression. It is still possible for the West to avert such an outcome by backing the defense of Ukraine and preventing Russia’s invasion from succeeding. Crucially, Ukrainians are not asking their Western partners to fight for them. All they require is sufficient military aid to regain the battlefield initiative and bring the war home to Russia, along with effective Western measures to restrict the financing of Putin’s war machine.

Pressuring Ukraine to accept a Kremlin-friendly settlement may succeed in pausing the current war, but it will not bring a lasting peace. On the contrary, it will legitimize policies of expansionist aggression and set the stage for international instability on a far larger scale. The world will become a much more dangerous place and the cost of stopping Putin’s Russia will only rise.

Pavlo Zhovnirenko is Chairman of the Board at the Center for Strategic Studies in Kyiv.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 14, 2025

A Western-funded drone surge could end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

By Mark Boris Andrijanič

Ukraine has the technology, talent, and industrial potential to prevail in the war with Russia, but currently lacks the funding to scale drone production to the necessary levels, writes Mark Boris Andrijanič.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Aug 11, 2025

Alaska Summit: Trump must press Putin over future Ukrainian security

By John E. Herbst

Trump-Putin Alaska Summit: If Moscow insists on the acceptance of Russian control over Ukrainian land for a ceasefire, it must accept strong measures to bolster Ukrainian security as well, writes John E. Herbst.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert Jul 30, 2025

A Ukraine without Ukrainians: Putin is erasing Europe’s largest nation

By Peter Dickinson

Russia is systematically erasing all traces of Ukrainian national identity throughout occupied Ukraine as Vladimir Putin pursues an extreme form of eliminationist imperialism in the heart of twenty-first century Europe, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Sacrificing Ukraine will only increase the cost of stopping Putin’s Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The scandal surrounding efforts to subordinate Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies to the politically-appointed Prosecutor General was part of a broader trend that has sparked concerns over potential backsliding in the country’s reform agenda. Additional factors include the failure to appoint a new head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, investigations targeting prominent anti-corruption activists, and alleged attempts to undermine the work of other key institutions like the High Qualification Commission of Judges.

The recent wave of nationwide protests in defense of the country’s anti-corruption reforms served as a timely reminder that Ukraine’s democratic instincts remain strong, even amid the horrors of Russia’s invasion and the escalating bombardment of Ukrainian cities. The message to the government was clear: Ukrainian society is determined to defend the democratic progress secured over the past eleven years since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. This includes safeguarding the independence and integrity of the watchdog institutions established in the wake of the revolution.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The readiness of Ukrainians to rally in support of the country’s anti-corruption reforms undermines efforts by detractors to portray today’s Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt and unworthy of international support. In reality, Ukrainians are more committed than ever to the democratic values that have shaped Ukraine’s national journey throughout the turbulent past few decades.

Meanwhile, the anti-corruption bodies established since the 2014 revolution are evidently effective enough to target senior figures close to Ukraine’s political leadership. They have also won the respect of the country’s vibrant civil society and are regarded as an important element of Ukraine’s reform agenda by much of the population.

It should come as no surprise that so many ordinary Ukrainians view the fight against corruption as crucial for the country’s future. After all, efforts to improve the rule of law are widely recognized as central to Ukraine’s European ambitions.

Over the past decade, anti-corruption reforms have helped the country achieve a series of key breakthroughs along the path toward EU integration such as visa-free travel, candidate country status, and the start of official membership negotiations. Ukrainians are well aware of the need to maintain this momentum, and remain ready to pressure the government on anti-corruption issues if necessary.

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Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Since the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine’s reform progress has been closely monitored and fiercely guarded by Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian public combines a strong sense of justice with a readiness to act in order to preserve fundamental rights. They are backed by a seasoned and self-confident civil society sector, along with an independent media ecosystem that refuses to be silenced.

Over the past decade, Ukraine’s ability to adopt and implement reforms has often depended on a combination of this grassroots domestic pressure together with conditions set by Ukraine’s international partners. These two factors remain vital in order to keep the country on a pathway toward greater Euro-Atlantic integration.

Some skeptics have suggested that the fight against corruption is a luxury that Ukraine cannot afford while the country defends itself against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Such thinking is shortsighted. Faced with a far larger and wealthier enemy like Russia, Ukraine must make every single penny count.

In peacetime, corruption can undermine the business climate and hinder the country’s development. The stakes are far higher in wartime, with corruption posing a threat to Ukraine’s national security. It is therefore crucial to increase scrutiny and reduce any graft to an absolute minimum. Meanwhile, the long-overdue reform of specific sectors such as the state customs service and tax administration can generate important new revenues that will provide a timely boost to the Ukrainian war effort.

The success of Ukraine’s recent protest movement is encouraging and underlines the country’s status as a resilient young democracy. At the same time, it is too early to declare victory.

In the coming weeks, Ukrainian civil society and the country’s international partners will expect to see a new head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine appointed, along with the appointment of four Constitutional Court judges who have passed the international screening process. Efforts to pressure civic activists and the country’s independent media must also stop.

Speaking on August 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a point of attacking Ukraine’s anti-graft agencies. He obviously recognizes that strong anti-corruption institutions serve as important pillars of Ukraine’s long-term resilience and represent an obstacle to Russia’s plans for the conquest and subjugation of country. The Kremlin dictator’s comments should be seen as further confirmation that Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms are more vital than ever in the current wartime conditions.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 24, 2025

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Conflict Defense Industry

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms are more vital than ever during wartime appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Thousands took to the streets in cities across Ukraine on Tuesday after parliament passed legislation limiting the independence of anti-graft agencies established following the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. The protests, which were the first to take place in the country since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, gained momentum on Wednesday.

In an apparent reversal of his initial position, Zelenskyy has now announced that he has approved a new draft bill restoring all powers to the country’s anti-corruption organizations and largely safeguarding their freedom to conduct investigations without government oversight. The new legislation has been submitted to the Ukrainian Parliament, with anti-corruption officials backing the government U-turn and urging swift passage of the bill next week.

There may yet be many more twists and turns in the scandal surrounding Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies, but at this stage it certainly seems that the protesters have achieved a significant victory. Crucially, they have also highlighted the enduring strength of Ukraine’s democratic instincts and underlined the country’s continued commitment to basic freedoms at a time when the realities of war make elections impossible.

The Ukrainian authorities were unable to stage scheduled presidential and parliamentary elections in 2024 due to martial law restrictions and a wide range of security and logistical obstacles related to Russia’s ongoing invasion. With more than six million Ukrainians living as refugees in the EU and millions more currently under Russian occupation, a large percentage of the electorate would be unable to participate in any vote. Russia’s record of targeting Ukrainian civilians means that those who remain inside the country could not attend election campaign events or gather at polling stations in safety.

Despite widespread consensus among Ukraine’s opposition, civil society, and the country’s international partners over the practical barriers to organizing elections in wartime Ukraine, the Kremlin has sought to exploit the issue in order to question Zelenskyy’s legitimacy and brand him a dictator. Earlier this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin even floated the idea of placing Ukraine under temporary United Nations administration.

In reality, however, Putin is well aware of independent Ukraine’s strong democratic credentials. Indeed, it was the consolidation of the country’s fledgling democracy that helped persuade the Kremlin dictator to begin his military intervention in 2014, before convincing him of the need to launch his full-scale invasion eight years later.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Like millions of his fellow Russians, Putin has never come to terms with the loss of Ukraine and continues to view the country as part of Russia’s historical heartlands. He is therefore deeply hostile to independent Ukraine’s embrace of a democratic European identity, which he regards as an existential threat to his own increasingly authoritarian regime. The emergence of a democratic Ukraine is seen by Putin and other Kremlin leaders as a potential catalyst for the next phase in a Russian imperial retreat that began in the late twentieth century with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

Putin has been obsessed with the idea of extinguishing Ukrainian democracy ever since Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, which he personally helped spark by attempting to rig the country’s presidential election. In the immediate aftermath of the flawed vote, millions of Ukrainians flooded into Kyiv and succeeded in forcing a rerun, leading to the victory of opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko.

This was to prove the breakthrough moment for Ukrainian democracy. Between the Orange Revolution and the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost eighteen years later, Ukraine held a total of eight presidential and parliamentary elections, all of which were rated free and fair by independent international observers. Meanwhile, Putin’s Russia continued to move steadily in the opposite direction.

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The Ukrainian population’s staunch defense of their democratic freedoms has consistently been a source of confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv. When pro-Kremlin Ukrainian politician Viktor Yanukovych was elected president in 2010 and attempted to reverse the country’s democratic gains, Ukrainians rose up once more and staged a second pro-democracy revolution. Within days of this successful uprising, Putin began the invasion of Ukraine with the seizure of Crimea.

For millions of Ukrainians, the country’s democratic choice remains one of the core values at stake in the current war. This sentiment has featured prominently during the present wave of protests, with many participants noting that Ukrainian soldiers are currently risking their lives for the freedoms that Zelenskyy himself appeared to be threatening with his undemocratic attack on the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

Former Ukrainian First Lady Kateryna Yushchenko, whose husband Viktor led the Orange Revolution, underlined the continuity between this week’s wartime protests and the country’s two pro-democracy revolutions of the post-Soviet era. “Ukrainians went to the streets today for the same reason they did in the 2004 Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. They want a European future, not a Russian one,” she commented.

Amid the horror and trauma of the largest European war since World War II, the readiness of so many ordinary Ukrainians to protest against threats to their hard-won freedoms speaks volumes about their determination to safeguard a democratic future. They understand that this is what so many of their compatriots are fighting for, and they are determined that these sacrifices will not be in vain. Indeed, it was striking to see many men and women in military uniform among the protesters. This is surely a sign of things to come in Ukrainian politics.

Putin has spent much of the past two decades attempting to corrupt Ukraine’s politicians and discredit the country’s democratic institutions, but he cannot convince the Ukrainian people to abandon the freedoms they have already tasted. This is why he is now so determined to erase Ukrainian statehood altogether. It is also a key reason why his invasion will likely end in failure.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Wartime protests prove Ukraine’s democratic instincts are still strong appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Seven months later, Syrians who are still elated with “the liberation of Syria” have become very assertive in the public space, strengthened as being part of the dominant group in the Syrian society, largely aligned with the new power in place and eager to benefit from it. In addition to HTS’s support base in the Idlib governate’s conservative society, these Syrians belong mostly to the moderate to conservative Sunni community, especially members of the lower and middle classes. These groups made up the backbone of the civilian and armed opposition to the Assad regime during the 2011 revolution and ensuing war, and they consider themselves to be the winners in the new Syria. This may be reinforced by the current regional dynamic characterized with the rise of the strong Sunni leaders, like Saudi Arbia’s Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, coupled with the collapse of what used to be the Shia crescent led by Iran.

While a “winner takes all” approach is common to many post-conflict contexts, it is especially dangerous in the fragmented Syrian society, where Assad instrumentalized religious identities to fuel the war. An emboldened group may trigger tensions with other communities, leading to a new conflict. In order to avoid the complete supremacy of Sunnis supportive of HTS’s leadership in Syria’s new order and to foster social cohesion, it is crucial to implement a comprehensive reconciliation process and to adopt power-sharing mechanisms guaranteeing religious, ethnic, gender and political inclusiveness.

Reversal after decades of marginalization

Throughout the country, Sunni Syrians who the Assad regime had for years oppressed have expressed  pride in belonging to the majority that is back in power. In the absence of reliable statistics, the European Union Agency for Asylum estimates that Sunnis accounted for around 65 to 75 percent of the pre-war population. From 1970 until last December, the country was ruled by Hafez al-Assad and then his son Bashar, who belong to the minority Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shia Islam representing between 10 and 13 percent of Syria’s pre-war population.

But Syrians cannot be reduced to a community affiliation.

Many purely define themselves as their country’s citizens, rejecting religious and ethnic differentiation, as one of the slogans of the revolution, “the Syrians are one”, illustrated. Yet, over the past decades, the Assad regime instrumentalized sects to consolidate its power, concentrated in the hands of close Alawite and a loyalist circle, with Alawites dominating the army, the security apparatus, and the administration. The Assad regime also relied on part of the Sunni elite, especially businessmen, as well as some Sunni tribes, and Christian religious leaders, who all benefited from their loyalty to the regime.

Today, my understanding based on my reporting on the ground is that those who consider themselves as the post-Assad winners now have a president they can relate to—even for those who overcame initial suspicion about his jihadist past—and they don’t feel marginalized anymore. Overall, Sunnis feel more optimistic about the future of the country and more positive about the changes it is going through than other communities, according to a public-opinion poll conducted on behalf of The Economist in March.

The Assad regime’s marginalization and oppression of the conservative Sunni lower and middle class was a driving force in the March 2011 revolution, which erupted amid a lack of access to economic opportunities or jobs for the group, and a significant migration from rural areas to impoverished suburbs amid financial and agricultural hardship. Throughout the war, the regime grew increasingly sectarian, relying on Alawite militias, Hezbollah and Iran. The regime disproportionately targeted and persecuted the Sunni community that rose against it, including sieges and constant bombings.  Therefore, the seizure of power by HTS amounts to a revenge over the defeated regime for those who suffered years of oppression, with many who I have spoken with believing that they deserve rewards in the new Syria. The new government has delegated almost all important official positions —including all positions in the security sector—to members of the Sunni community, especially members of the Idlib network.

Another indicator of the Sunni winners’ assertiveness is the extent to which their conservative traditions are becoming dominant in the public sphere. For example, in early June, a decision of the Ministry of Tourism required women to wear full-body covering swimwear on public beaches and swimming pools. While this decision triggered a public outcry, prompting the Minister to backtrack, it sent a clear signal regarding clothing and behavior in the public space.

Risk of destabilization of the fragile transition

The ascendency of the Sunnis who consider themselves to be the winners presents a danger in a country where the former regime instrumentilized sectarian identities to fuel the conflict, and it opens the way for revenge on those who benefitted from the oppressive Assad regime. The attack against Christians worshippers in a Damascus church in late June demonstrates that enemies of the transition consider the sectarian issue as the weak point of the authorities. Although the authorities have consistently repeated messages of unity and cohesion, members of various religious and ethnic groups have felt unsafe and some have felt left aside.

Tens of thousands of members of the former regime’s army, who used to employ a significant number of Alawites, have been laid off shortly after Assad’s fall. Recruits for the new army have so far come almost exclusively from the Sunni community raising concerns regarding the possibility of a Sunni-only army. Alawites have not attempted to join recruitment for the new army as the mistrust is too deep on both sides, with reports of religious speeches in army recruitment centers that would antagonize non-Sunni individuals.

Based on conversations through my reporting in Homs city, some Sunni residents feel emboldened enough to say that Alawites are not welcome and should leave. With kidnappings and killings routinely targeting members of their community, some Alawites have fled their homes and some have gone abroad. Alawites have deserted a number of previously mixed villages between Homs and Hama cities.

Although it is unclear how permanent this move is, the perspective of a redrawing of the demographic map of Syria is deeply concerning, as the former regime altered the  demographic makeup of various areas through expropriation during the war.

The authorities mainly view sectarian tensions through a security lense. Damascus frames the massacre that erupted early March in coastal areas, for example, as fighting back against a coup attempt from remnants of the Assad regime. Although that bout of violence started with attacks from Assad loyalists, fighters aligned with the government subsequently killed several hundreds of Alawite civilians. This violent episode raised the alarm on the risk of further deterioration, as killing and kidnappings of Alawites continue, according to my local sources.

Regional context

What happened in neighboring Iraq provides a textbook example of the chaos that a “winner takes all” approach may trigger. In 2003, the US military intervention overthrew Saddam Hussein, putting an end to a Sunni-minority rule. Based on a controversial power-sharing agreement, a Shia-majority government took over and Shia groups have dominated Iraq’s politics, security forces and administration since. The awakening of the Shia identity, coupled with the Sunni marginalization, led to a sectarianization of Iraq after 2003, which was exacerbated by the flaws of the power sharing mechanism. It turned into a civil war in 2006-2008, from which the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham emerged. The Iraqi experience illustrates how the domination of one community destabilizes the post-conflict phase and triggers a backlash. Syrians are mindful of the Iraqi experience and want to avoid a fate similar to their neighbor’s. 

The internal Syrian trend of Sunni assertiveness could fit into a parallel regional dynamic, potentially mutually reinforcing each other. These past months, portraits of the late Iraqi leader have emerged on banners at demonstrations and in shops next to famous soccer players and singers. It illustrates a sense of renewed pride that some members of the Sunni community feel. This coincides with the rise of the influence of Sunni strongmen like Saudi Arbia’s Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who have commanded an expanding regional influence over the last decade. Additionally, Israel’s multi-front war since the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks has also significantly weakened Iran and its proxies, helping to facilitate a crumbling of the Shia crescent. This context has opened space for powerful leaders who intend to shape the direction of the region and establish a Sunni leadership.

Reconciliation and power sharing

To guarantee a peaceful transition, it is crucial to resist a “winner takes all” approach and to ensure inclusion of all ethnic and religious groups, women, and political views—including liberal Sunnis—in the new Syria.

At the political level, it is crucial that all groups are able to meaningfully participate in decision-making and to contribute to shaping the reconstruction of the country. Even though the interim government that was appointed in late March includes an Alawite, a Christian woman, a Kurd, and a Druze among the ministers, key executive powers, among ministers and in the administration, remain in the hands of HTS affiliates. HTS and its affiliates’s domination in Syria’s new political life carries a risk of marginalization of other stakeholders.

Instead, a geographic approach, guaranteeing the representation of each district of every governorate, could help to facilitate the necessary inclusion of all Syria’s communities, including ones concentrated in specific areas. The discussions these past months with Kurdish and Druze representatives about the integration of their areas under a centralized system controlled by Damascus illustrates the difficulty to find a governance model that balances power sharing, inclusion of all communities and unity of the country. While political inclusion is key, it is equally important that all Syrians are included in the reconstruction, benefit from economic opportunities and are able to join institutions.

The clashes between government security forces, Sunni Bedouin fighters, and militants from the Druze sect that erupted mid-July in the southern province of Swaida are the latest exemple of how the difficulty of the interim government to ensure the safety of all communities and their political inclusion in the new Syria undermines the transition. The fact that part of the Druze community questions Damascus’ authority and that Druze factions have not joined the national security forces has caused instability.

To further defend against the risk of sectarian conflict— an extensive transitional justice and reconciliation process is the only way to prevent the “winners” from seeking revenge, and to restore a degree of social cohesion.  For the tens of thousands of Syrians victims to be able to have a sense of closure, harms that they suffered from should be acknowledged and perpetrators should be identified. In addition, a comprehensive transitional justice process is essential to bring redress and guarantee accountability for crimes commited during the Syrian war. Such a process should go beyond criminal justice and target crimes committed by all sides through reconciliation committees and initiatives. This may also include truth and reconciliation initiatives, as other countries have resorted to at the end of war. Ultimately, members of the Alawite community who did not commit crimes should not be associated with the former Assad regime’s atrocities.

A fact-finding committee’s recent report on the massacres carried out in coastal areas in March will present a test regarding accountability. The report identified 298 suspects, whose names have been referred to the public prosecutor. Transparent prosecutions are necessary to show that individuals affiliated with the winners are not above the law.

A genuine transitional justice and reconciliation process addressing the crimes committed during the war by all parties will quell the desire of revenge and will appease sectarian tensions. In addition, meaningful inclusion of all the components of the Syrian society will mitigate grievances leading to a backlash against the new authorities, and will rather increase the chances of the transition’s success. Syrians now have the opportunity to put an end to years of sectarianism and build a shared identity, paving the way to durable peace.

Marie Forestier is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. She is also currently a consultant for the European Institute of Peace and the co-director of the Syria Strategy Project.

The post In a sectarian Syria, the winners should refrain from taking all appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 21, law enforcement agencies raided the offices of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and declared investigations into fifteen NABU employees, allegedly as part of an ongoing effort to prosecute traffic violations. This sort of harassment on obscure charges has plagued other investigative agencies and individuals, but rarely was it used against institutions like NABU, which was created in 2014 as an independent body to tackle high-level government corruption. While NABU has had its problems, Ukrainian and Western experts widely acknowledge it as one of the country’s most important post-Maidan reform projects.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Unfortunately, this was no petty shake down. Law enforcement—led by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Prosecutor General’s Office—announced that the centerpiece of its investigation was charges of treason against a pro-Russian member of parliament who allegedly worked with NABU detectives to influence investigations at the behest of Russian intelligence services. The SBU, whose leadership is chosen by the president of Ukraine, named two of NABU’s top detectives as having connections to Fedor Khyrstenko, the lawmaker charged with acting in Kremlin interests against Ukraine. They also alleged the detectives helped Ukrainian oligarchs flee the country to avoid criminal charges.

Western partners in Kyiv swiftly urged the Zelenskyy administration to end its harassment of NABU. Undeterred by such warnings, reports surfaced that Zelenskyy’s National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) was planning “amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code” in an effort to ensure “the purity of the work of law enforcement … and remove opportunities for corruption.” Observers feared this portended further obstruction of NABU’s work.

Those fears were confirmed on July 22, when the NSDC asked the Ukrainian parliament to introduce a draft law that would put NABU and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)—the independent prosecutorial counterpart to NABU—under the control of the Prosecutor General’s Office. In effect, this would make them subordinate to the Office of the President and likely end their ability to investigate state corruption independent of influence from the government.

The parliament quickly passed the law thanks to support from Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party and with key votes from the remaining pro-Russian parties. Zelenskyy hastily signed the bill into law, despite widespread domestic and international calls not to do so.

But the fiasco has already succeeded in mobilizing Ukraine’s famously civic-minded public. Protests, while still relatively small in number, broke out in Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, and Dnipro just hours after parliamentarians passed the bill.

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Ukraine’s government and law enforcement agencies insist these moves are an effort to root out Russian influence in NABU and SAPO to prevent the agencies from being co-opted against the Ukrainian state. But civil society experts and journalists are not convinced. Many suggest the attempted purges are payback for NABU pursuing charges of illicit enrichment and abuse of office against former deputy prime minister Oleksiy Chernyshov, a key ally for the Office of the President. Ironically, it was Zelenskyy himself who brought back criminal liability for illicit enrichment back in 2019 during his original anti-corruption drive.

Others see the moves as part of a broader effort to crack down on corruption investigations. On July 11, armed police raided the home of Vitaliy Shabunin, co-founder of the nonprofit Anti-Corruption Action Center, and detained him on suspicion of evading military service. Critics say the charges are politically motivated.

The harassment of independent anti-corruption agencies throws Ukraine’s European Union (EU) membership bid into doubt. EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos declared that the independence of NABU and SAPO was “essential” for Ukraine’s EU path. “Rule of Law remains in the very center of EU accession negotiations,” she commented. Already forced to fight for a war its existence, Ukraine has “no room for error” in securing its democracy and European future, others noted.

Ukraine also risks alienating its most important partners in defending itself from Russian aggression. The Ukrainian government, civil society, and the country’s Western partners have had to vigorously fight Russian-amplified narratives portraying Ukraine as a hopelessly corrupt country unworthy of military aid. Willfully tearing down the anti-corruption institutions created after Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity risks giving credence to voices that wish Ukraine harm.

Just two short weeks ago, Kyiv officials were courting Western investment for post-war reconstruction at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome. Already uncertain about entering a potentially unstable security and political environment, many international businesses will balk at entering a market governed by fiat.

The best outcome for Ukraine would be for Zelenskyy to decline to sign the bill into law and refocus on pushing invading Russian forces out of the country. NABU, SAPO, and other watchdog organizations have helped make Ukraine more resilient amid the existential danger of the Russian war. Zelenskyy has proven to be a superb leader of a nation made stronger by its institutions that hold power to account—leadership qualities urgently needed now to halt this series of counterproductive moves.

Andrew D’Anieri is the associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Find him on X at @andrew_danieri.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 29, 2025

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine rocked by first wartime protests amid attacks on anti-corruption agencies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Reports poured in: friends and family killed in their homes, doctors shot en route to hospitals, neighborhoods shelled and looted. The attacking forces ravaged a house I considered my second home. The pain was unbearable, shattering my belief in a future Syria where citizens are safe and institutions know their limits. Fourteen years of agony, thought to have finally achieved a reprieve after the December ousting of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, surged back. I found myself asking again: Is Syria’s tragedy rooted in state violence or sectarian civil war? And how did this happen again after Assad’s fall?

US officials described the events as “a rivalry” between Druze and Bedouins. That simplification mirrored Damascus’s version: a state stepping in to contain intercommunal strife. But this framing strips the crisis of its historical and political context. The truth is, Swaida’s suffering stems from its peripheral status and long-standing marginalization.

A distinct and marginalized region

As a Druze-majority, marginal province, Swaida was chronically underdeveloped. Its autonomy grew after 2014, when locals refused to be conscripted to fight their own people. In 2018, Swaida suffered a devastating Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) attack, which resulted in the community’s need for protection and armament, leading to the formation of many armed groups. In 2023, Swaida further distanced itself from Damascus, when Druze leader Sheikh al-Hajari endorsed a civic uprising calling for regime change from Assad, leading to his rise as a political figure addressed by US officials, overshadowing the other two Druze religious leaders, Sheikhs Jarbouh and Hennawi.

These dynamics fostered a distinct socio-political status for Swaida—outside of full Damascus control—with local armed groups, mainly directed at deterring extremists, and a political structure strongly influenced by al-Hajari in the absence of an alternative political process. But when Assad fell abruptly in late 2024 and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), once labeled extremist over its ties to al-Qaeda, took control, the opposition and transitional authorities failed to offer a path to re-merge these two political structures. A rushed attempt at state-building led instead to exclusion, mistrust, and instability—especially for minorities like the Druze, who bore arms mainly to deter extreme Islamist groups like HTS. 

Ironically, Damascus under Assad had framed al-Hajari a traitor for alleged Israeli ties—a charge that persisted after the regime’s fall.

These allegations tap into the Druze community’s complex role in Israel. Tribal and familial ties among Druze across Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan remain strong, and these bonds were often activated by humanitarian or security threats during the fourteen years of war.

In 2023, Israeli deterrence helped shield Swaida from regime attacks. Now, under new leadership, Syria’s transitional government has echoed the same rhetoric used by the Assad regime to delegitimize Swaida’s resistance. Yet, no Israeli weapons or forces were found in Swaida—only leftover Syrian army arms.

Syria in transition, Swaida lagging behind

Rather than addressing grievances, the transitional government took a unilateral approach, sidelining all local elites, including Swaida’s leadership, and failing to include diverse voices. Al-Hajari’s calls for decentralization, secularism, and democratic representation clashed with the new authorities’ centralized, Islamist-tinged vision. These demands, however, were criticized by government supporters as they came from a religious leader who enjoys power in his community.

The popular slogan among government supporters—“those who liberated decide”—alienated communities like Swaida, validating al-Hajari’s position. Fearing aggression, al-Hajari used international protection as a deterrent against Assad’s aggression in 2023. Those inside Swaida who favored engagement with Damascus had a marginal political weight, which made them shy away from confrontation, fearing community fragmentation, a survival instinct for minorities. Tensions deepened between Druze factions.

Coast massacres and sectarian tensions

The early transition saw massacres of Alawites on the coast, reportedly incited by members of the Transitional Government. These atrocities confirmed minority fears and validated al-Hajari’s warnings. While some factions were criticized for agreeing to join state institutions, al-Hajari’s resistance to disarmament gained traction.

In April 2025, a fabricated audio clip of a Druze Sheikh insulting Prophet Muhammad triggered protests and chants appearing to endorse ethnic cleansing, if not genocide.. Attacks followed against Druze in Jaramana and other areas. Later, an Israeli airstrike halted a regime offensive near Sehnaya, where extremist groups had targeted Druze civilians.

A Bedouin ambush against a Druze convoy of fighters to rescue the Druze in Sehnaya, with massive mobilization of Bedouins from different fronts, escalated the violence. Given the overwhelming numbers, al-Hajari called for international protection, which some saw as a plea for Israeli intervention. Meanwhile, negotiations with Damascus yielded an agreement on joint security; however, this agreement rapidly collapsed when state media framed the talks as a government win, prompting al-Hajari’s withdrawal.

The Bedouin-Druze flashpoint

Bedouins and Druze have coexisted in Swaida since the 1800s—at times in peace, at times in conflict. Most clashes stem from pastoralist-agrarian tensions. But in Swaida, these often evolved into sectarian strife, easily weaponized for mobilization.

Frequently, if armed clashes between Druze and Bedouins erupted inside Swaida, the Bedouins would retaliate outside Swaida, targeting Druze vehicles and blocking roads to Damascus—a critical lifeline for Swaida. These tactics were used by the Ottomans, the Assad regime, and now they are occurring again under the new government. Similarly, when Druze are attacked in clashes outside Swaida, the Druze often retaliate against Bedouins inside Swaida.

On July 13th, a Bedouin group kidnapped a man and took his car. In retaliation, an armed group linked to the owner detained Bedouins in Swaida’s suburbs. The situation escalated: retaliatory kidnappings, property seizures, then shelling from Bedouin groups, which killed eight people, including a child. Druze fighters mobilized. Mediation led to the release of the hostages by July 14.

Despite that resolution, on July 15, the ministries of interior and defense announced plans to forcibly enter Swaida to “restore peace.” Many interpreted this as a signal of Israeli approval, believing the Syrian government would not risk a direct retaliatory strike by Israel otherwise. The government’s offensive began from Daraa, targeting western Swaida. Resistance followed—not only from al-Hajari’s groups but also from Rejal El Karama, who supported integration with the state but were not consulted and opposed the incursion.

A video showing Druze fighters humiliating government forces—including handcuffing and verbally abusing them—prompted further army mobilization. Later videos appeared to show the government forces being executed. The incident intensified the government fighters’ resolve, and the Druze’s basic defenses were quickly overrun. Government forces entered al-Mazra’a, a key village, without resistance. Still, reports of looting and burning houses emerged.

As the offensive pushed forward, shelling hit residential areas, with reports of significant casualties and destruction of properties. To minimize casualties, identical statements from al-Hajari and Jarbouh welcomed state forces; however, violence continued. Videos surfaced showing fighters without uniforms, foreign accents, homes ablaze, and the public humiliation of elderly civilians. Al-Hajari said the government coerced him into the statement to prevent further bloodshed, but after continued attacks, he called for mass mobilization.

Numerous Facebook videos showed killings, looting, and shelling. Druze ambushes intensified, and al-Hajari again called for international protection. Israeli airstrikes soon followed, targeting heavy weaponry and demanding a full army withdrawal. The violence triggered a broader popular uprising beyond organized armed groups, forcing many regime forces to retreat.

On July 16, Damascus launched a massive counteroffensive with drones, shelling, and heavy troop deployments. Reports poured in of families slaughtered, homes looted, and neighborhoods devastated. Israeli strikes then hit Swaida and Damascus, including the defense ministry and presidential palace.

Damascus sought an exit and secured a deal with Jarbouh, recognizing the state while preserving local forces. However, al-Hajari refused the terms. That night, President Ahmed al-Sharaa gave a speech characterizing the events as a domestic issue, blaming Israel, and announced a withdrawal of government forces from the region, delegating security to local actors.

The possibility of unleashing civil war

After the withdrawal of government forces last week, Druze Facebook feeds poured with videos and pictures of mass atrocities, including field executions, mass slaughter of families, live decapitations, forcing people to jump from balconies, torturing, looting, and destruction of properties. Social media became a wildfire of videos showing sectarian killings that were used to construct an extremely distorted media narrative, reducing the events to Druze killing and kidnapping Bedouins. A social media campaign dehumanizing the Druze provided a pretext for genocide. The magnitude of savagery sent shocks in the community, instigating limited but serious calls for revenge.

One discussion I had with a key source in Shahba indicated that, driven by these horrors, retaliatory atrocities against a Bedouin community in Shahba included mass killing and looting. Local Shahba armed groups responded by protecting about one thousand women and children in their homes from the threat of break-ins, looting, and violence. The women and children were then moved to a local mosque that was making arrangements for their safe release from the territory.

Mass mobilization of tribal communities across Syria yielded tens of thousands in subsequent waves. Hundreds of civilians died in each wave. Video, filmed by the attackers in the past days, showed more brutal decapitations. Syrian towns along the way supported the attackers to kill Druze using an Islamic doctrine “that whoever equipped an attacker, as if he attacked, himself.”

Hundreds of college students in Aleppo received life threats. Demonstrations by Syrian students to expel Druze students emerged from universities. Druze boycott campaigns erupted, resulting in a cut in food supplies. A universal power outage and interrupted fuel paralyzed the town. Electricity-dependent water was stopped. Despite the US-backed cease-fire, Bedouin attacks continued, burning villages, with field reports indicating the destruction of infrastructure. Field reports from key sources indicate that more than twenty villages were burned, with no information made available by Syrian authorities on the status of their residents. A mediator of ongoing negotiations indicated that ninety-seven Druze women are missing, which delayed the release of the Bedouin community in Shahba. The fighting and killing continue.

The future is dark

The Swaida debacle is a political struggle to force an exclusive regime on a community that doesn’t trust it. Instead of trust building, hate speech was a policy, and ethnic cleansing is the outcome. The Druze-Bedouin conflict was not the cause, but a tool, and the outcome is a Sunni-Druze civil war.

When speaking to many locals of Swaida, Druze, and Christians in the diaspora, a common narrative persists: “How did we trust these people before?” There is complete mistrust in, and grievances against, the facade of state forces. The obstructed roads to Swaida and severed relationship to the hostile surrounding leave no choice but to have a humanitarian cross-border relationship with Jordan. The vision of a centralized, unified state is now considered delusional by many.

As someone who has been working on local governance models, I struggle to imagine any viable long-term solution. For now, an isolated, aid-dependent canton seems to be the only interim path, waiting for violence to stop and the new realities to shape the final outcomes.

Majd AlGhatrif is an Associate Professor and Director of the Syria Peace Project at Johns Hopkins University. He serves as a governance and health systems consultant to the Swiss government and the European Union, advising on the restructuring of the health sector in Syria. He is also a board member and the Founding President of the Swaida American Society.

The post Why the violence in my hometown, Swaida, goes beyond ‘rivalry.’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While the conference featured plenty of optimism, strong messaging, and ambitious plans, one key conclusion was that rebuilding Ukraine requires more than political support and good intentions. It demands concrete action, especially from the private sector.

This year’s URC in Italy made clear that the international community is paying close attention to Ukraine, with record numbers of attendees and standing room only for panels covering everything from defense tech to green energy. However, while interest is abundant, actual investment on the ground in wartime Ukraine remains scarce. 

Turning attention into action is now one of the key tasks facing Ukraine. Dozens of business leaders expressed curiosity and goodwill in Rome, but few have yet taken the crucial next steps toward market entry. As the prospects of an imminent peace deal continue to fade, it is vital to replace this hesitancy with long-term strategic thinking.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Despite the ongoing Russian invasion, investing in Ukraine is both possible and rational. Several sectors of the Ukrainian economy are already demonstrating strong performance and rapid development. The list includes defense technologies, agriculture and food processing, construction materials, and logistics infrastructure.

While large-scale investment is limited, a number of major international corporations have invested significant amounts since 2022. Many others continue to operate in the country profitably. The message to the international business community should be that waiting for the right time is a mistake. Those who act today will reap the benefits tomorrow.    

One key incentive to invest in wartime Ukraine is the possibility of gaining early access to a major future EU market. European governments and companies were prominent at the recovery conference, illustrating the fact that Ukraine’s EU integration path remains very much open and serves as an important strategic anchor.

For businesses, this means that investing now in Ukraine secures a potentially privileged position during what promises to be the next big growth phase of the European single market. Companies that seize this opportunity will be able to shape the standards, infrastructure, and networks of the future. 

The private sector has a crucial role to play in Ukraine’s recovery. Kyiv cannot rely solely on humanitarian aid or budgetary support from partner nations. Enabling businesses to operate successfully in Ukraine is one of the most effective ways to boost the country’s revival and ensure sustainable growth.

With this in mind, governments seeking to support Ukraine should focus on empowering their own companies to enter the Ukrainian market. This approach delivers a win-win outcome: Ukraine benefits from jobs, taxes, and resilience, with investors gaining early access to a high-potential future EU market. 

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Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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While there are plenty of businesses interested in Ukraine, they need help managing risk. Many investors remain unsure about the various different public guarantees and insurance schemes that are currently available. Ukraine would benefit from the creation of a unified and well-communicated de-risking architecture involving international financial institutions and national governments.

One under-discussed physical barrier to investment is mobility. Many international executives are unable to visit Ukraine personally due to travel restrictions imposed by their home countries or head offices. While security is always paramount, some of these policies may be excessive. Addressing the practical issue of travel restrictions could end up unlocking essential operational capacity for global firms.

Access to reliable and up-to-date information is also vital. Many potential investors view Ukraine exclusively through the lens of war and risk, while remaining largely unaware of the rapidly evolving business climate. Greater awareness of recent transparency efforts, regulatory reforms, and investment success stories in wartime Ukraine would increase confidence and generate additional interest.

Since 2022, public funding and international solidarity have helped carry Ukraine through some of the darkest moments in modern European history. Moving to the next stage in national recovery will require entrepreneurial leadership.

In order to achieve this, Ukraine must ensure a transparent and level playing field for businesses. Anyone preparing to enter the Ukrainian market must have full confidence that their investments will be secure and their rights protected. Meanwhile, international companies need to move beyond expressions of support and commit to building operations, creating value, and taking risks.

These efforts will be futile without credible security guarantees, of course. Ukraine’s attractiveness ultimately depends on establishing a defined and enforceable framework for a secure future that will safeguard the country against further Russian aggression. This will remain the top priority for Ukraine’s partners and the wider international community.    

At the same time, support for Ukraine’s recovery must extend far beyond the battlefield. The 2025 Ukraine Recovery Conference demonstrated that the country has the political backing, civic leadership, and business potential to emerge stronger than ever. This potential is encouraging but it is not enough. The time for action and investment is now. 

Victor Liakh is CEO of the East Europe Foundation. Anna Derevyanko is Executive Director of the European Business Association, one of the largest business unions in Ukraine uniting more than 900 companies. Since 2022, she has also served as CEO of Global Business for Ukraine, an organization aimed at uniting international businesses in support of Ukraine.

Further reading

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A Western-funded drone surge could end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

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Ukraine has the technology, talent, and industrial potential to prevail in the war with Russia, but currently lacks the funding to scale drone production to the necessary levels, writes Mark Boris Andrijanič.

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Ukraine Recovery Conference: Europe underlines long-term commitment

By Edward Verona

The 2025 Ukraine Recovery Conference, which took place in Rome on July 10-11, has provided a clear demonstration of continued European commitment to Ukraine, writes Edward Verona.

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Putin is winning the drone war as Russia overwhelms Ukraine’s defenses

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Russia is now winning the drone war against Ukraine thanks to a massive increase in domestic drone production and a series of technological upgrades, writes Maksym Beznosiuk. This is enabling Putin to dramatically escalate the bombardment of Ukrainian cities.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Wartime Ukraine must translate international attention into investment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• The daughters
• The Russian Jared Kushner
• The cousin
• The business prince
• The FSB prince
• The heirs
• The bodyguard
• The young deputy prime ministers
• The coach
• The future
• About the author

President Vladimir Putin is initiating a generational shift in Russia’s leadership.

According to Kremlin insiders, during his current presidential term Putin plans to retire some of his most influential and longest-serving allies, many of whom are well into their seventies. Putin himself, at age seventy-two, has no intention of stepping down. He sees himself as entirely irreplaceable. But he is gradually replacing other key figures with members of a younger generation, as the older officials age, fall ill, and become less effective. This transition began last year.

It is hardly surprising that a significant portion of this new generation coming to power consists of the children of current top officials and Putin’s closest friends—or even his own relatives. In this sense, Russia increasingly resembles a feudal state, in which power is inherited at all levels. The children of the bureaucratic aristocracy are all, in one way or another, striving for government careers and positions of influence.

This report examines the rising generation of the Russian elite and what this shift means for Russia’s future. It is based on extensive interviews with dozens of current and former Russian officials who spoke on condition of anonymity in order to discuss the inner workings of the Kremlin power elite without fear of reprisals.

The daughters

The first people to watch closely are Vladimir Putin’s daughters, known publicly in Russia as Maria Vorontsova and Katerina Tikhonova. On one hand, Putin has always kept them out of the public eye and never openly acknowledges their relationship. When a BBC correspondent at a press conference asked Putin about Vorontsova and Tikhonova, he tried to distance himself, referring to them dismissively as “these women.” Yet there is no doubt that they are indeed his daughters with his former wife, Lyudmila Putina, having changed their last names for the sake of secrecy. Their identities, however, are a poorly kept secret even to foreign governments; the United States sanctioned both of them following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

For now, neither daughter seems poised to take high-ranking government positions, but their influence is undoubtedly growing. At the very least, both Vorontsova and Tikhonova have become major centers of power in the business world, attracting ambitious young officials eager to secure their favor.

Last year, forty-year-old Vorontsova, Putin’s eldest daughter, gave her first major interview. She mostly discussed science (she is an endocrinologist by training and owns one of Russia’s largest medical businesses, which is heavily funded by Putin’s friends). She also touched on cultural topics, mentioning that one of her favorite books is Brave New World by Aldous Huxley, a dystopian classic about the moral decay of the West—quite a choice for the daughter of the Kremlin dictator.

Also last year, both Vorontsova and Tikhonova made their first public appearances at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. This signaled clearly that Putin’s daughters are ready for public life. They no longer want to remain hidden in their father’s shadow. They have ambitions of their own.

In early February 2025, a bizarre rumor spread through Russian propaganda Telegram channels. Vorontsova had allegedly gone to the frontlines in Ukraine, where she treated thousands of wounded soldiers. Some even claimed she had been injured.

Of course, there is no evidence to suggest that this is anything but pure fiction, a product of regional propagandists trying to impress their superiors. But the mere existence of such a rumor appeared to affirm what Vorontsova and Tikhonova had signaled months before: Putin’s daughters are no longer the country’s most guarded secret. It might only be a matter of time before they step onto the political stage.

For her part, thirty-eight-year-old Tikhonova is far more active and influential than her older sister. She heads Innopraktika, a scientific foundation generously sponsored by Putin’s inner circle. Over the past year, she has become an increasingly powerful player within the Kremlin’s corridors of power.

She appears to have cultivated a circle of high-ranking officials and businessmen whose career success owes, in part, to their close ties with the president’s daughter. By granting them access to Putin, she increases their political weight. One of Tikhonova’s protégés has already become one of the most talked-about figures of 2025: Kirill Dmitriev, the head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, who was recently appointed as the president’s special envoy for international investment and economic cooperation. Obviously, this is only the first step for the ambitious Dmitriev. Speculation has it that he ultimately aims for the position of foreign minister.

The Russian Jared Kushner

Kirill Dmitriev became a star on February 18 when Russia and the United States held their first high-level talks in years in Riyadh. According to sources close to the Kremlin, it was Dmitriev who helped organize the meeting—together with his longtime acquaintance Jared Kushner, US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law.

His presence at the negotiating table surprised many; after all, he had never been involved in diplomacy before. Seated beside him were Russia’s seventy-five-year-old Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Putin’s seventy-eight-year-old foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov—both Soviet-era diplomats known for their lack of initiative and deep fear of their superiors. Dmitriev, at fifty, represents a different breed of Kremlin insider.

Dmitriev’s background is remarkable. Born in 1975 in Kyiv, the capital of what was then the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, he moved to the United States as a teenager. He attended Stanford University, worked at Goldman Sachs and McKinsey, and later earned a master of business administration degree from Harvard Business School. He then moved to Russia, where he worked for the US-Russia Investment Fund before heading an investment fund tied to Victor Pinchuk, the son-in-law of former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma.

His official biography does not mention any time in Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, but various sources insist that Dmitriev was affiliated with it.

Dmitriev made the most important investment of his life in the 2000s: He married Natalia Popova, who had ties to Tikhonova. According to a Kremlin insider, Dmitriev did everything possible to ensure that his wife became Tikhonova’s closest friend—her “second self.” Today, Popova serves as Tikhonova’s deputy at the Innopraktika foundation, while Dmitriev sits on its board of trustees. Their families are deeply intertwined.

In 2011, Dmitriev was appointed head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF)—essentially, the Putin family’s financial stronghold.

In recent years, due to numerous Western sanctions against Russia, the RDIF has mainly focused on establishing connections with countries of the Global South, so Dmitriev has forged strong ties with Saudi Arabian officials. In 2019, he was even awarded the Order of Abdulaziz Al Saud, second class. His business dealings in Riyadh led him to connect with Kushner, who has since become his key US contact.

It was Dmitriev and Kushner who arranged a phone call in February between Putin and Trump and later, as noted above, selected Saudi Arabia as the venue for the first US-Russia negotiations. But Dmitriev seems to have bigger ambitions than merely holding the phone while Putin speaks with Trump.

He has long been working to raise his own profile. In 2020, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, he aggressively promoted Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine worldwide, giving countless interviews and claiming that Russia could save the world from the virus.

Dmitriev’s influence is clearly on the rise. However, despite the speculation, the position of foreign minister will likely remain out of his reach. Too many heavyweight contenders have been vying for it for too long.

The cousin

Vladimir Putin’s family extends beyond his daughters. The biggest rising star of 2024 was his first cousin once removed, Anna Tsivileva—arguably the most powerful woman in Russian politics today.

Her father, Yevgeny Putin, passed away in early March 2024 at the age of ninety-one. But Tsivileva’s rise to power began long before that. In 2012, she and her husband, former military officer Sergey Tsivilev, acquired a major stake in a coal company, Kolmar. The details of the purchase remain unclear; some speculate it was simply a wedding gift from the president’s inner circle. Thanks to this acquisition, the Tsivilevs became multimillionaires in just a few years. And in 2018, Sergey was appointed governor of Kemerovo, one of Russia’s wealthiest regions in terms of natural resources.

In business circles, Tsivileva made a name for herself well before her husband became governor. According to those familiar with her, she began building her own financial-industrial empire about a decade ago, leveraging her direct access to the president. Initially, her role was secondary; she was a junior partner to Gennady Timchenko, one of Putin’s closest oligarchs. The Tsivilevs’ 2012 acquisition of a significant stake in Kolmar, allegedly as a gift from Putin via Timchenko, illustrates their close relationship with both men. But over time, Tsivileva has emerged as a formidable figure in her own right.

Tsivileva actively lobbied for her husband’s career advancement. Still, being the first lady of a major coal-mining region, while prestigious, was hardly the limit of her ambitions. Shortly after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Russian president signed a decree creating the state-backed Defenders of the Fatherland foundation, tasked with overseeing all support for former soldiers, officers, and mercenaries who had fought in Ukraine. It was immediately clear that this would become the richest “charity” in the country, controlling all budget allocations for veterans and their families. Tsivileva was appointed to lead it.

In May 2024, as Putin prepared for his next presidential term, he dismissed Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, along with his entire team. Shoigu’s replacement was Andrei Belousov, a former economic adviser to Putin (and reportedly a close associate of Tikhonova). Meanwhile, the new deputy defense minister responsible for logistics and supply was none other than Tsivileva.

The appointment made clear just how much Putin trusts Tsivileva. He considers her so competent that he handed her a key role in one of his most critical ministries.

To top it off, Tsivileva’s husband also received a promotion; he is now Russia’s minister of energy. After his appointment, jokes started circulating in Moscow that it was only a matter of time before Vorontsova became minister of health and Tikhonova was put in charge of science and education.

Tsivileva, however, seems to have her eyes set on an even bigger role. Insiders suggest she is positioning herself for the post of deputy prime minister for social policy, a position currently held by Tatyana Golikova. There is speculation that Golikova, who is seen as a representative of the “systemic liberals,” could soon be purged from the government.

That said, not all of Putin’s relatives share this ambition. Tsivileva’s brother, Mikhail Putin, serves as deputy chairman of Gazprom’s management board. According to sources, he is quite content with the wealth he has amassed at Gazprom and has no interest in taking on a more public role.

The business prince

One of the biggest power struggles in the Kremlin in 2024 concerned the career of Boris Kovalchuk, the son of Vladimir Putin’s closest friend, Yury Kovalchuk. For years, Yury Kovalchuk was considered the second-most-powerful person in Russia after Putin himself. They are likeminded allies and spent the 2020 lockdown together discussing history and geopolitics. According to sources, that was when they concluded that a war against Ukraine was both necessary and inevitable.

Unlike most of Putin’s inner circle, Kovalchuk has never held a government position; he’s just a businessman. That said, he owns nearly all major non-state media in Russia, including Channel One. For a long time, he was seen as the country’s most influential oligarch, largely because he was the patron of Sergei Kiriyenko, the Kremlin’s domestic policy chief. But in the spring of last year, he decided it was time for his son to climb higher.

Boris Kovalchuk, now forty-seven, had been the chief executive officer of Inter RAO, Russia’s largest state-owned energy company, since 2009. But his father wanted him to take over one of Russia’s top state corporations, either Rosneft or Gazprom, and believed he had earned such a dizzying promotion.

Putin disagreed.

Instead of handing Boris Kovalchuk the crown jewel of Russian state assets, Putin first sent him to the presidential administration as a minor bureaucrat for just two months. Then he appointed him head of the Accounts Chamber, Russia’s state audit office.

The Accounts Chamber is an important institution. It audits all state-owned corporations. But it has long been considered a retirement post for seasoned officials at the end of their careers. For a young “prince” expecting to inherit a corporate empire, the appointment was a bitter disappointment. And for Yury Kovalchuk, once regarded as the Kremlin’s ultimate power broker, it was nearly a humiliation.

Still, this fits into the broader trend of Putin gradually sidelining the old guard. So far, Boris Kovalchuk appears to have made no impact in his new role.

The FSB prince

For years, Nikolai Patrushev was one of the most crucial figures in Russian power circles. As a former Federal Security Service (FSB) director and later secretary of the Security Council, he was widely considered the overseer of Russia’s intelligence agencies.

Patrushev also played an outsized role in shaping Russia’s foreign policy. He regularly published articles in the Russian press outlining the Kremlin’s worldview. His 2023 piece in Razvedchik magazine was effectively a manifesto of modern Russian anti-Americanism. Titled “The Collapse of Parasitic Empires,” it argued that Russia must lead the Global South in a struggle against US colonialism.

But last year, even Patrushev needed to trade his own demotion for his son’s career advancement.

At forty-seven, Dmitry Patrushev is the same age as Boris Kovalchuk, but he is by far the most senior of Russia’s rising “princes.” Like his father, he graduated from the FSB Academy. By the age of twenty-nine, he had already become a senior vice president at VTB, one of Russia’s largest banks. He later headed another major financial institution, Rosselkhozbank, before being appointed minister of agriculture in 2018.

In early 2024, Nikolai Patrushev lobbied hard for his son to become prime minister. However, under the Russian Constitution, the prime minister is the second-most powerful person in the country and automatically assumes the presidency if anything happens to Putin. According to Kremlin insiders, Putin is not yet ready to name an heir—especially not from one of the major ruling clans. He is simply unwilling to entrust his fate to the Patrushev family.

In the end, Dmitry Patrushev was appointed deputy prime minister in May 2024, and he was able to install his own loyalist as the new minister of agriculture. This was a modest promotion, but a promotion nonetheless. Meanwhile, Nikolai Patrushev was reassigned to the humiliating position of presidential aide for shipbuilding—a form of forced retirement.

The message to the old guard is clear: This is the fate that awaits all Kremlin veterans.

The heirs

Appointing the children of his closest allies to top positions has long been a sacred tradition for Putin. Nepotism has never been a cause for embarrassment in modern Russia. There was even a Soviet-era joke.

“Can a general’s son become a marshal?”
“No, because marshals have children too.”

It seems that a whole army of little princes has been waiting for years for their marshal parents to vacate their chairs.

Among the most notable are the sons of former Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, who headed the Russian government from 2004 to 2007. After serving as prime minister, Fradkov was put in charge of the Foreign Intelligence Service, but by 2016 was sent into retirement as director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, a Kremlin-connected think tank. His sons, however, remain near the top of the game. Pavel Fradkov is now one of the newly appointed deputy ministers of defense, alongside Tsivileva. Meanwhile, his brother Peter Fradkov runs Promsvyazbank, the state bank responsible for financing Russia’s defense contracts. His name is also frequently mentioned as a contender for a key position in the government’s economic bloc should the long-expected purge of the systemic liberals finally take place.

Vladimir Kiriyenko, the son of Kremlin domestic policy chief Sergei Kiriyenko, heads VK, Russia’s leading information technology conglomerate. It owns VKontakte—the Russian equivalent of Facebook—and is attempting to build a domestic alternative to YouTube.

Still, the careers of many of these “golden children” are only as stable as their parents’ influence. Not all manage to cling to power once their fathers retire. For example, Sergey Ivanov Jr., son of former Defense Minister and Kremlin Chief of Staff Sergey Ivanov, ran Alrosa, Russia’s state diamond monopoly, until 2023. Then he was abruptly dismissed without any new position to cushion his fall.

However, not all members of this new generation are “nepo babies.” Some have climbed the ranks through a different—and sometimes more difficult—path.

The bodyguard

The biggest star among the younger generation of Russian bureaucrats is Aleksey Dyumin.

A former Putin bodyguard, he has been considered a potential successor to the president for nearly a decade. Last year, Putin appointed him to the key leadership position of secretary of the State Council.

Dyumin is known as one of Putin’s most trusted confidants. Once, while he was still working for the Federal Protective Service, Dyumin was reportedly guarding the entrance to the president’s residence in Valdai when he received a radio message: A bear was approaching the house where Putin was sleeping. And indeed, a large brown bear soon appeared right at the entrance. Dyumin decided to scare the animal away and fired a shot at its feet. The predator took fright and ran off.

The gunshots woke Putin, who demanded an explanation. After hearing Dyumin’s story, he praised his bodyguard for not killing the bear. Dyumin later recounted the episode to journalists. Since then, he has been known as the man who saved Putin from a bear.

Beyond his work as a bodyguard, Dyumin has had a rather curious career path. He was Putin’s personal adjutant. Then in 2014, as the head of the so-called Special Operations Forces (a unit within the Ministry of Defense), he was responsible for the occupation of Crimea. As deputy minister of defense, he oversaw the creation of Wagner Private Military Company.

In 2016, Dyumin was appointed governor of Tula Oblast, a region not far from Moscow that has long been home to several major arms-manufacturing enterprises.

Dyumin served as governor for nearly eight years, gaining a reputation as an effective administrator. It is worth noting that he was not the only bodyguard to be promoted. But unlike others, he actually proved himself and reached significant heights.

Sources suggest that Dyumin played a key role in the negotiations between Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Kremlin during Prigozhin’s infamous June 24, 2023 mutiny. Notably, it was on the territory of Tula Oblast—Dyumin’s region—where Prigozhin’s forces, en route to Moscow, suddenly turned around and withdrew. It was also well known that Dyumin was highly critical of Shoigu, then the defense minister.

Last year, many expected Dyumin to succeed Shoigu as minister of defense. But Putin decided otherwise. Instead of giving him that post, he brought Dyumin into the Kremlin as his aide, effectively making him a shadow defense minister working directly alongside Putin. Putin does not like to drastically strengthen any one of his close associates; he prefers to maintain a balance and observe how his subordinates compete for influence. If Putin had appointed Dyumin as minister of defense, it would effectively mean that he had designated Dyumin as his successor—and the president has no desire to create that impression.

The upshot is that it’s still unclear whether Dyumin or Belousov, the current defense minister, holds more power.

The young deputy prime ministers

Fifty-six-year-old Denis Manturov is at the height of his power. The first deputy prime minister is responsible for ensuring that the entire government is dedicated to the war effort. “Everything for the front, everything for victory” is his directive.

It is likely that he will remain in the ruling elite for some time. Manturov is the right-hand man of Sergei Chemezov, the head of Rostec, which controls the entire Russian military-industrial complex.

Chemezov—a former colleague of Putin’s from their Dresden days—is currently the most powerful figure in Russia’s economy. However, at seventy-two, he is expected to retire sooner than Putin despite being his contemporary. Manturov, as the most experienced and trusted official, is positioned to inherit his empire.

Another key figure is fifty-six-year-old Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko. He entered the political elite through the 2014 Sochi Olympics, where he led the organizing committee and impressed Putin with his managerial skills. He is now seen as the most likely successor to Sergei Kiriyenko, the deputy head of the presidential administration overseeing domestic politics.

Sources have long speculated that Kiriyenko might be reassigned to oversee the occupied Ukrainian territories, likely with the rank of deputy prime minister. This move is expected to happen once active military operations in Ukraine wind down—something the Kremlin anticipates in the coming months. When that moment arrives, a reshuffle could follow. Chernyshenko would move into the presidential administration, while Kiriyenko would take his place in the government.

Sources say Putin has no particular complaints about Kiriyenko’s work. On the contrary, Kiriyenko has successfully managed political challenges, including multiple Russian elections and a constitutional referendum enabling Putin to remain in power until at least 2036. However, Kiriyenko has also led the Kremlin’s program for cultivating new leaders, which has produced a new generation of officials from whom Putin now selects key administrators. During his years overseeing domestic policy in the Kremlin, he created an entire system of competitions through which almost all young Russian officials have passed. First, there was the Leaders of Russia competition. Then the School of Governors was added, followed by the School of Mayors. Finally, after the invasion of Ukraine, a military-patriotic competition for bureaucrats called Time of Heroes was introduced.

As these new leaders grow in number, so does Kiriyenko’s influence. But the unchecked rise of any one player goes against Putin’s personnel strategy. Kiriyenko will likely be reassigned to a more challenging territory to ensure that he doesn’t become too powerful.

Meanwhile, Kiriyenko’s protégés are increasingly populating the elite. Putin surely remembers Joseph Stalin’s famous slogan, “Cadres decide everything.” If Kiriyenko remains the Kremlin’s chief recruiter, he could become a serious contender in any future succession race—something it seems Putin is not yet ready to allow.

The coach

The rise of Russia’s new elite often comes with moments of unintentional comedy. Among the country’s powerful family clans, one stands out as the clearest example that there are no limits for “nepo babies” in Russia. This is the Rotenberg family.

Arkady Rotenberg is one of Putin’s closest friends. Like Kovalchuk, he holds no official government position, yet he is one of Russia’s largest state contractors in construction. His company built the bridge connecting Crimea to Russia (which has been attacked repeatedly since 2023) and is responsible for numerous projects in occupied Ukrainian territories.

Rotenberg and his brother Boris have known Putin since childhood; they trained in judo together as teenagers. This remains the foundation of their power. Unlike those of other clans, the Rotenbergs’ children have yet to display any political ambitions and none are seeking government positions. However, Arkady’s nephew, Roman Rotenberg, has found his own path through hockey.

Roman Rotenberg, now forty-four, spent his childhood in Finland and later in England. But after the family’s close friend Putin came to power, he returned to Russia. At thirty, he was appointed vice president of the dominant SKA hockey club. Within three years, he became vice president of the Russian Hockey Federation.

To professional hockey players, it was clear that Rotenberg was more of an enthusiastic fan than a real expert. After a game in 2018, he publicly criticized coach Oleg Znarok—who had just led the Russian national team to an Olympic gold medal. Znarok’s response was immediate and unfiltered: “You’re gonna teach me? Who the **** are you? Get the **** out of here, kid! Teaching me how to play hockey?”

Znarok was promptly fired.

In 2022, Rotenberg appointed himself head coach of SKA and then made himself head coach of the national team as well. Sports journalists were stunned—he had no coaching experience whatsoever. But no one dared say it aloud. On television, commentators are forced to say exactly what Rotenberg wants to hear.

Rotenberg’s story appears to be a perfect symbol of Putin’s Russia: For the “princes,” nothing is off-limits. And because Russia has been banned from international competitions like the Olympics, there is no real opportunity for him to humiliate himself on the world stage.

The future

Lately, elites in Moscow have been placing bets on which elderly bureaucrat will step down first. The frontrunner for retirement is believed to be Alexander Bastrykin, Putin’s former university classmate and the head of the Investigative Committee—Russia’s equivalent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

There is also speculation that Shoigu may lose his position. For the past year, he has officially served as the secretary of the Security Council, but he was notably absent from the US-Russia negotiations in Riyadh, where his presence would have been expected. Two more likely retirees are Lavrov, the foreign minister, and Ushakov, the foreign affairs adviser. Both are well into their seventies, but Putin has kept them around in recent years because, with no diplomatic successes to be had, experienced diplomats were not particularly needed. Now, however, the situation is changing. The prospect of improving relations with the United States has reemerged, which means Putin might need new diplomats.

Russia’s state-owned corporations are also led by aging officials approaching retirement. The head of Transneft, Nikolay Tokarev, is seventy-four, while Rosneft’s Igor Sechin and Gazprom’s Alexei Miller are sixty-four and sixty-three, respectively.

Meanwhile, fifty-eight-year-old Roscosmos chief Yuri Borisov was recently dismissed without a new position lined up. He was replaced by thirty-nine-year-old Deputy Transport Minister Dmitry Bakanov, who has been tasked with creating a Russian equivalent of Starlink and attempting to establish communication with Starlink founder (and former Trump adviser) Elon Musk—something previous heads of Russia’s space program had clearly failed to do.

The ongoing generational shift will, of course, change the face of Russia. The new officials, who were very young when the Soviet Union collapsed, differ from the previous generation in that they lack Soviet psychology and a Soviet background.

On one hand, many members of this next generation of Russian leaders tend to idealize the Soviet Union and dream of restoring imperial power. On the other hand, they are full-fledged capitalists, and most of them clearly do not want another Cold War or international isolation for Russia.

They are the children of a cynical generation, convinced that business can—and should—be done with everyone: China, Iran, Europe, the United States, and even Ukraine.

In many ways, Putin’s personnel policy resembles the dynamics in the final years of Cuban dictator Fidel Castro’s rule. Castro also tried to cultivate a new generation of Komsomol-style loyalists—and, in some ways, succeeded. The politicians he nurtured, young enough to be his grandchildren, turned out to be even more orthodox and staunchly conservative than the generation of officials who were old enough to be his sons.

But when the decisive moment came, Castro still chose to hand power to his own brother, Raúl.

Putin has no brother, and he trusts no one. That’s why he is focused on grooming a new, younger, and thoroughly indoctrinated generation—one that he is confident will carry on his legacy.

Portions of this report are drawn from Zygar’s prior work on his Substack, The Last Pioneer

Mikhail Zygar is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He is a journalist, writer, and filmmaker, and the founding editor-in-chief of Russia’s only independent news television channel, Dozhd (TVRain).

Under Zygar’s leadership, Dozhd provided an alternative to Kremlin-controlled federal television channels by focusing on news content and giving a platform to opposition voices. The channel’s coverage of politically sensitive issues, like the Moscow street protests in 2011 and 2012 as well as the conflict in Ukraine, has been dramatically different from the official coverage by Russia’s national television stations. In 2014, Zygar received the CPJ International Press Freedom Award.

Zygar’s bestseller All the Kremlin’s Men (2015) is based on an unprecedented series of interviews with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle, presenting a radically different view of power and politics in Russia. Time named it “one of nine books to understand Russia.” His book The Empire Must Die (2017) portrays the years leading up to the Russian revolution and the vivid drama of Russia’s brief and exotic experiment with civil society before it was swept away by the Communist Revolution. It was named a Kirkus Reviews Best Nonfiction Book of the Year. His latest book, War and Punishment: Putin, Zelensky, and the Path to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, was published in 2023 and was featured on the New Yorker’s list of the best books of the year.

In February 2022, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Zygar authored a petition against the invasion cosigned by Russia’s most prominent writers, artists, and scholars. In March 2022, he organized the only interview of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for the independent Russian media. He has also started his own Substack, where he writes regularly.

In 2023, Zygar moved to New York. He’s now a press freedom fellow at the City University of New York’s Craig Newmark School of Journalism and is a visiting professor at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs.

Zygar is openly gay and is married to African-Russian journalist Jean Michel Shcherbak.

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1. What do we know about the Taliban leaders targeted by the ICC? 

Akhundzada has been supreme leader of the Taliban since 2016. A reclusive figure, he has maintained a low public profile, rarely appearing in media and seldom leaving his stronghold in southern Afghanistan. He joined the Taliban in 1994 and quickly ascended its ranks, serving in various judicial and religious roles. During the Taliban’s initial rule (1996–2001), he was appointed chief justice of the Sharia Courts, where he reinforced the Taliban’s repressive policies toward women and the broader population of Afghanistan. Since the Taliban’s renewed takeover of the country in August 2021, despite his limited public appearances, Akhundzada has issued more than one hundred decrees and edicts concerning the status of women and girls that systematically curtail their fundamental rights, institutionalizing a system of gender apartheid. Among the Taliban leaders, Akhundzada is infamous for his strict interpretation of Islamic law, leading to stringent policies, including the banning of girls’ education beyond sixth grade and the reintroduction of public executions and floggings. 

Haqqani is affiliated with the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqania, a powerful Deobandi madrassa in Pakistan, (not to be confused with the Haqqani Network, the military faction of the Taliban). He led the Taliban’s negotiating team during the Doha peace talks in 2019-2021 and is among the Taliban’s highest-ranking religious figures. He shares similar religious views as Akhundzada and has played a key role in drafting and interpreting the Taliban’s legal and judicial policies based on a strict interpretation of Sharia law. He has been influential in shaping ideological and legal decisions of the Taliban group, particularly those affecting the rights of women and girls.  

—Azadah Raz Mohammad is a legal advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project. She has worked on humanitarian and human rights–related projects in close collaboration with the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and the Afghan Ministry of Justice, among others. 

2. What is the practical impact of these warrants for the Taliban?

The ICC’s announcement comes at a time when the international community has slowly started to normalize and accept the Taliban’s draconian regime. The request for arrest warrants is an important reminder to the international community about its obligation under international law conventions to tackle impunity and not to recognize the Taliban, whose members have been deemed criminal actors, as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. In addition, to fulfill its mandate, the ICC is dependent on the cooperation of its member states to implement the arrest warrants once they are issued. Members of the international community should assist the court in arresting the alleged perpetrators and fulfill their obligations under the Rome Statute so that justice can be served.  

The arrest warrants are a good start, but the ICC should do more—expeditiously pursue charges against more senior Taliban leaders, expand the scope of charges to include the full panoply of crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Afghanistan since 2003 (when it became a state party to the Rome Statute), including the concept of gender apartheid. 

—Azadah Raz Mohammad 

3. What impact will this have for women and girls in Afghanistan right now?

As we near the fourth anniversary of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, the arrest warrants offer a glimmer of hope after empty assurances, rhetorical condemnations, and elusive justice. It’s a first step to holding the Taliban to account, validating the tireless efforts of the women and girls of Afghanistan to document, resist, and dismantle the Taliban’s systematic gender-based oppression. The immediate impact isn’t just symbolic solidarity. The finding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the crime against humanity of persecution is being perpetrated paves the way not just to potential individual criminal liability for Taliban leaders, but also the responsibility of other states, including in facilitating asylum and resettlement (as already determined by the European Court of Justice). 

The women and girls of Afghanistan are not the only ones impacted. The Pre-Trial Chamber recognized a broad scope of victims, including LGBTQI+ persons. This is a watershed moment in international criminal law: the first time that an international tribunal has confirmed that gender persecution encompasses the protection of sexual orientation and nonconforming gender identities.  

—Alyssa Yamamoto is a senior legal and policy advisor to the Strategic Litigation Project. She previously served as legal advisor to the United Nations special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism. 

4. What’s next for the ICC case? 

The next step is to wait for Akhundzada and Haqqani to turn themselves in to The Hague, or for a cooperating state to do so. Once the accused have made an initial appearance, then a confirmation of charges hearing would follow. The confirmation of charges document is ICC parlance for an indictment, and the hearing is a pretrial step that resembles a “mini-trial” before the trial. Should charges be confirmed against any of the accused, they would then appear for trial.  

The key question is whether these arrest warrants can actually be enforced, given that Taliban leaders voluntarily turning themselves over is highly unlikely and their international travel ranges from limited to nonexistent. But politics can change and what was once viewed as impossible can quickly become possible. The handover of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on crimes against humanity charges to the court earlier this year is a prime example of how shifting political winds can present opportunities to secure defendants in dockets.  

While some courts of an international character or trying international crimes have held trials in absentia—which is how the Special Tribunal for Lebanon could try Hezbollah operatives or France could try a Mauritanian military officer for torture—the International Criminal Court requires physical presence at trial (with limited exceptions for virtual participation from disruptive defendants). However, the Appeals Chamber at the ICC recently upheld a Pre-Trial Chamber ruling that charges could be confirmed against notorious Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony even in his absence, and that the Rome Statute animating the ICC can do so where an accused has “fled or cannot be found.” Given that Akhundzada rarely leaves his stronghold in southern Afghanistan and his whereabouts are elusive, that may be an option that would at some point allow victims’ participation in court, should all other avenues of securing his presence in The Hague be exhausted. 

—Gissou Nia is the director of the Strategic Litigation Project. She previously worked on war crimes and crimes against humanity trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court. 

5. What’s next for activists and the international community? 

Amid worrying movements towards legitimization and normalization of relations with the Taliban, activists should use the arrest warrants as both a guardrail and a galvanizing tool. The international community should unite in support for the arrest warrants, including their enforcement. But this is just one piece of the puzzle. The international community must also pursue the full panoply of justice avenues available to hold the Taliban to account, including universal jurisdiction cases, the potential International Court of Justice case, and ongoing efforts to accurately reflect in international law the totality of gendered harms being perpetrated, namely through codification of gender apartheid as a crime against humanity.  

As the Pre-Trial Chamber has rightly articulated, at stake are “not only direct acts of violence, but also systemic and institutionalized forms of harm, including the imposition of discriminatory societal norms.” This is the crux of the Taliban’s existential project of domination that must be expressly named and squarely addressed in all justice and accountability efforts going forward. 

—Alyssa Yamamoto 

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Since the beginning of 2025, US-led efforts to broker a compromise peace deal have focused primarily on talk of territorial concessions and geopolitical alignments. However, the plight of the Crimean Tatars is a reminder that steps to safeguard human rights must play a key role in any future settlement.

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Since the Russian takeover of Crimea, the peninsula’s sizable Crimean Tatar population has been collectively and systematically persecuted for their perceived opposition to the occupation. For the Crimean Tatars, this mirrors the pain of past experiences with Russian imperialism. Following the Russian conquest of Crimea in the late eighteenth century, the native Crimean Tatar population was subjected to decades of harsh policies by the Russian imperial authorities, leading to a mass exodus.

Worse was to follow. In February 1944, the Soviet authorities carried out the deportation of the entire Crimean Tatar population to Central Asia. More than 200,000 people were forced to abandon their ancestral homeland overnight, with tens of thousands dying in a brutal deportation process and during the initial years of exile.

The deportation of the Crimean Tatars is one of the Soviet Union’s most notorious crimes against humanity. Ukrainian parliamentarians recently appealed to the international community to recognize the deportation as an act of genocide.

In the twilight years of the Soviet era, the Crimean Tatars were finally allowed to begin returning to their homeland. This process gained momentum following Ukrainian independence, with Crimean Tatars accounting for around 15 percent of the peninsula’s more than two million population on the eve of the 2014 Russian invasion.

The current wave of persecution targeting the Crimean Tatar population of Crimea began during the early days of the Russian occupation, with reports soon emerging of Crimean Tatars being threatened, kidnapped, and killed. The body of Crimean Tatar activist Reshat Ametov was discovered on March 15, 2014. He is widely seen as the first victim of the Russian occupation.

Since 2014, hundreds of Crimean Tatars have been arrested on what human rights activists say are falsified charges. Members of the community are currently thought to represent more than half of Crimea’s political prisoners. In 2016, the self-governing body of the Crimean Tatar community, the Mejlis, was officially outlawed and branded an “extremist organization.” Russian raids and detentions in Crimean Tatar districts have become a grim feature of everyday life during more than a decade of occupation.

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In addition to facing restrictions on their human rights and political freedoms, Crimean Tatars living under Russian occupation are also currently limited in their ability to honor their culture or express their identity. Indeed, they are not even permitted to stage public memorial events commemorating the victims of the Soviet era deportation. Meanwhile, Crimean Tatar heritage is being erased across the peninsula.

Crimean Mufti Ayder Rustemov is one of many from the Crimean Tatar community who view the current policies of the Putin regime as a continuation of earlier attempts to suppress the indigenous population and russify Crimea. “The goal of Russia has not changed, only the form has changed,” he commented in May 2025.