For years, Zelenskyy had kept the Belarusian democratic opposition at arm’s length as part of Ukrainian efforts to avoid angering Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka and pushing him further toward the Kremlin. That approach has brought few benefits. Ukraine now appears to have recognized that a new strategy to bilateral relations may be more appropriate.

Sunday’s meeting did not come as a complete surprise. Days earlier in Davos, Zelenskyy had identified Belarus’s 2020 pro-democracy protests as a turning point for the region and a missed opportunity for Europe. The Ukrainian leader argued that the democratic world made a mistake by failing to support nationwide protests in Belarus. As a result, the country now poses a threat to all Europe and serves as a forward base for Russia’s hybrid war against the West.

During his recent visit to Lithuania, Zelenskyy addressed the Belarusian population directly and expressed his support for their European future. He also met with recently released Belarusian political prisoners and paid tribute to Belarusian volunteers serving alongside Ukrainian forces in the fight against Russia’s invasion.

Ukrainian officials have recently made clear that Lukashenka and his regime must be held accountable for complicity in Russia’s aggression. Meanwhile, in a further indication that Ukraine is moving toward more systemic engagement with the Belarusian democratic opposition, plans have emerged to potentially appoint a special envoy and host Tsikhanouskaya in Kyiv.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Some analysts believe this recent change in tone toward Belarus may reflect the growing influence of former Ukrainian spymaster Kyrylo Budanov, who was recently appointed as President Zelenskyy’s new chief of staff. Budanov has long been involved in contacts with the Belarusian side and helped facilitate the transfer of released political prisoners to Ukraine in December 2025.

Kyiv’s apparent pivot may also reflect the fact that Russia’s military footprint in Belarus continues to grow. Ukrainian officials claim Russia uses Belarus to conduct drone attacks on Ukraine and evade air defenses. Lukashenka recently announced the deployment of nuclear-capable Russian Oreshnik missiles to Belarus, which Zelenskyy described as a threat to both Ukraine and the European Union.

Meanwhile, Russia’s integration of the Belarusian military industrial complex continues, with up to 80 percent of Belarusian enterprises reportedly now engaged in production for Russia’s military needs. Belarus is accused of supplying ammunition, providing repair services for Russian equipment, and channeling sanctioned technology to Russian defense companies.

Lukashenka is understandably eager to distance himself from any direct ties to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the available evidence indicates that his regime is becoming more deeply embedded in the Kremlin war effort. This is the reality confronting the Ukrainian authorities. As long as Belarus remains firmly under Kremlin control, it will continue to pose a serious security threat along Ukraine’s northern border.

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Europe should be paying particular attention to indications of a new Ukrainian approach to Belarus. As US foreign policy priorities shift, responsibility for managing relations between Belarus and the West will increasingly fall on the European Union. EU officials must decide between freezing the Belarus issue or recognizing the country as a strategic challenge that requires European leadership.

Belarus has most recently made headlines due to a series of prisoner releases tied to partial US sanctions relief. The humanitarian impact of these deals should not be underestimated, but it is also important to underline that more than one thousand Belarusian political prisoners remain incarcerated. Some skeptics have argued that without a broader strategy, reducing sanctions pressure on Minsk in exchange for prisoner releases risks strengthening the current regime and reinforcing an oppressive system that imprisons political opponents.

This presents opportunities for Europe to demonstrate its ability to take the lead on the international stage. While the US seeks practical short-term results such as the release of political prisoners, Europe can push for more systemic change and democratic transition in Belarus. In this context, sanctions should be seen as a tool to undermine authoritarian rule rather than locking in the current status quo. This can be achieved by closing existing loopholes while targeting the revenue streams and logistical networks that sustain the Lukashenka regime and support the Russian war machine.

In the current geopolitical climate, any talk of a neutral Belarus is delusional. Lukashenka will not turn away from his patrons in the Kremlin voluntarily. If European policymakers wish to see genuine change in Belarus, they will need to demonstrate a readiness to increase the pressure on Minsk. The enticing prospect of future European integration can play a crucial role in these efforts.

Belarus now occupies a strategic position in Europe’s rapidly shifting security landscape. The country remains deeply involved in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and also represents a key challenge for European leaders as they seek to prove that the continent is capable of defending itself in an era when US support can no longer be taken for granted. The Ukrainian authorities clearly feel the time is right for a more proactive approach to Belarus. The question now is whether Europe will follow suit.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jan 15, 2026

Veterans can shape the future of Ukrainian democracy

By Vasyl Sehin

The participation of military veterans in Ukraine’s political life has the potential to dramatically strengthen Ukrainian democracy and safeguard the country’s historic transition from centuries of Russian autocracy, writes Vasyl Sehin.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Jan 27, 2026

Unable to win on the battlefield, Putin escalates war on Ukrainian civilians

By Peter Dickinson

A war crime of staggering proportions is currently unfolding in full public view across Ukraine as Russia methodically bombs the country’s utilities in a calculated bid to freeze millions of civilians in their own homes and spark a humanitarian catastrophe, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Jan 15, 2026

Ukraine’s enhanced fortifications are increasing the cost of Putin’s invasion

By David Kirichenko

As Ukraine focuses on preventing further Russian advances, Kyiv is investing in a major upgrade of the country’s defenses. This has resulted in what The Economist recently described as a “massive fortification system” covering much of the Ukrainian battlefield, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine changes tone on Belarus and engages exiled opposition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• No fewer than five important leadership positions in Guatemala—ranging from the courts to higher education—could get new leaders in 2026.
• These institutions form the country’s most important line of defense against cartels and organized crime.
• To safeguard US interests in the region, Washington should support an appointment process that reinforces Guatemala’s rule of law.

WASHINGTON—This year, Guatemala will undergo the most consequential institutional reset since its return to democracy in 1986. Five bodies that determine who gets prosecuted, who gets protected, who gets elected, and, ultimately, who governs the country will be renewed within a tight five-month window.

The attorney general, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the comptroller general, and the rector of the University of San Carlos (USAC) all come up for selection between February and August 2026—a timing so unusual that analysts have described it as a “planetary alignment.”

Most of the posts are selected by nominating commissions composed of delegates from universities, the Bar Association, and other sectoral representatives that send shortlists to Congress or the president. Others are chosen directly by the legislature or the executive. Although intended to promote merit-based selection, the system is highly vulnerable to manipulation: Its complex composition and the influence of already captured institutions leave commissions susceptible to intimidation, vote-buying, and procedural maneuvers.

This year’s appointments process is not a mere exercise in bureaucratic housekeeping, nor is it an ideological contest between left and right. These institutions form Guatemala’s most important line of defense against cartels and organized crime, help safeguard the rule of law, and ensure fair competition. With illicit interests already moving to influence the process, this is a battle over whether Guatemala’s institutions will serve the public and the wider region or remain instruments of criminal groups for the next decade.

This past weekend underscored just how high those stakes are. On January 18, Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo declared a thirty-day “state of siege” after suspected gang members killed seven police officers in Guatemala’s capital. These killings followed sieges by authorities aiming to end riots in three prisons, in which gang-affiliated inmates had taken nearly fifty hostages. Arévalo cautioned that entrenched “political-criminal mafias” created the conditions for such violence, reinforcing the need for clean and capable institutions.

Why these institutions matter—and what has gone wrong

For decades, Guatemala has faced entrenched corruption, with criminal networks penetrating deep into the state, fueling violence and migration. Hopes for change surged with the 2023 election of Arévalo, who won over 60 percent of the vote on an anti-corruption, reformist platform. 

Yet Arévalo’s ability to deliver has been severely constrained by a legislature and, most critically, a judicial system largely captured by the so-called pacto de corruptos, or corruption pact—a loose coalition of politicians, economic elites, and criminal groups. Through the control of key institutions, these actors have shielded allies from accountability and obstructed reform efforts. 

1. The Attorney General’s Office (MP)

The Attorney General’s Office, or Ministerio Público (MP), is the state’s principal weapon against gangs and transnational criminal organizations. Its performance directly shapes public security and regional stability.

Under Attorney General María Consuelo Porras, the MP has faced widespread criticism for obstruction, and she has been sanctioned by the United States, European Union (EU), and United Kingdom for corruption. Over 93 percent of criminal cases go unaddressed, including those involving organized crime, while the MP has aggressively pursued judges, political opponents, and anti-corruption figures.

A captured MP means one thing: Criminal organizations operate with state protection. The 2026 appointment will determine whether Guatemala continues to enable these networks or begins dismantling them.

2. The Constitutional Court (CC)

The Constitutional Court (CC) is Guatemala’s highest judicial authority. Its role is to ensure the rule of law, protect investors, and act as a backstop against executive or congressional overreach.

In the past five years, however, it has moved in the opposite direction. The CC has issued rulings that have been denounced for protecting corrupt officials, weakening accountability and prosecutions, and undermining electoral integrity. 

Co-opting the court is the ultimate prize for any criminal network: With compliant magistrates, illegal acts can be in effect legalized after the fact. 

3. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE)

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) runs Guatemala’s elections and certifies results. Its independence determines whether democratic competition, rather than political mafias, decide who governs.

Despite facing immense pressure from the corruption pact, the TSE validated Arévalo’s victory in 2023. However, the body was immediately targeted by the MP and CC, which suspended magistrates, raided electoral facilities, and sought to annul the election results. Such measures raise serious concerns about institutional stability ahead of the 2027 general elections. 

With many municipalities heavily influenced by criminal groups, a weakened TSE could further destabilize the country and region. 

4. The Comptroller General (CGC)

The comptroller general (CGC) is Guatemala’s financial watchdog. When independent, this office is one of the country’s most effective tools for preventing corruption. 

When captured, it becomes a tool for shielding allies and enabling illicit contracting schemes that directly undermine fiscal integrity and free market competition. Also, given that the law disqualifies any political candidate under investigation by the CGC, a co-opted comptroller’s office can—and has been—used to selectively target political competitors. 

5. Rector of the University of San Carlos (USAC)

The head of Guatemala’s only public university wields significant influence. The rector shapes USAC’s representation in multiple nominating commissions, but the role’s reach extends far beyond academia. The university holds seats in more than fifty-three state bodies—including important financial institutions.

Under the current rector, Walter Mazariegos, who is under US sanctions, the university has appointed aligned actors to influential bodies while sidelining independent academics and students who have mobilized against corruption and fraud at the institution. On January 19, Mazariegos was sworn in as head of the nominating commission for the TSE.

An independent rector is essential for ensuring that Guatemala’s judiciary is staffed by competent professionals rather than political operatives unwilling to confront organized crime.

What role the United States can play

Guatemala is central to US regional interests, as highlighted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s decision to include the country in his first foreign trip in early 2025. In recent years, Guatemala has become a major transit route for drugs and other illicit flows, while also serving both as a source of migrants and a transit country for hundreds of thousands more. If the institutions that are meant to address illicit activity and corruption remain captured, these trends will worsen, putting US national security at risk.

Guatemala is also one of the few countries in the region to recently sign a new trade deal with the Trump administration aimed at lowering tariffs and expanding investment and exports. However, reaching these objectives seems unattainable under a Guatemalan judiciary that favors certain interests at the expense of fair competition and foreign businesses. 

For the United States, Guatemala has historically been a “friend in the Hemisphere,” as it is framed in the 2025 National Security Strategy. Guatemala remains a strong partner on issues such as drug trafficking, port security, Chinese influence, and migration. It is now time for Guatemala’s judicial institutions to align with that partnership and work for hemispheric security and prosperity rather than enabling the criminal networks that undermine them.

Here are four steps the United States can take with Guatemala in 2026.

1. Deploy proactive, sustained diplomacy

The United States should directly engage Guatemala’s party leaders, congressional blocs, and judicial elites, as well as members of the nominating commissions. The message should be unambiguous: Manipulating this year’s appointments will have consequences.

Elements of Guatemala’s private sector have financed efforts to influence appointments, largely because the current system shields them from competition and accountability. They must also understand that supporting such efforts risks diplomatic isolation and sanctions, including trade penalties, fines, and the suspension of trade benefits under the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement.  

The US Embassy should be more vocal in calling out intimidation and providing protection or asylum when necessary. It must signal that candidates and commissioners facing threats will not be left alone and help foster reformist coalition-building. 

2. Expand targeted sanctions—and use them early

The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control has already sanctioned more than fifty Guatemalan actors for corruption and anti-democratic actions. However, given the immense consequences of judicial capture, US sanctions should be broadened to target business elites financing institutional capture, commissioners accepting bribes, judges enabling impunity, and political operators coordinating interference. 

Sanctions must go beyond travel bans to restrict access to banking systems and foreign assets. To be effective, these sanctions should be extended to immediate family members of the primary targets of sanctions, who are often used to circumvent restrictions.

Measures should be coordinated with partners such as the EU and especially Spain, where several sanctioned former Guatemalan officials have relocated.

3. Support observation and transparency efforts

Washington should support the EU and Organization of American States observation missions in Guatemala, as international presence can meaningfully deter manipulation across all stages of the nomination process. 

Additionally, the unusual complexity of the 2026 appointment cycle, coupled with the high probability of illicit influence, warrants investing in transparency. The State Department should provide short-term, targeted grants to local civil society organizations and legal watchdog groups to follow the process and flag concerns in real time.

4. Mobilize the US and Guatemalan private sectors

Guatemala has the largest economy in Central America, and over two hundred US and other foreign firms have active investments in the country. Washington should encourage US businesses to communicate clearly that judicial capture will jeopardize investment and redirect capital to more stable markets. The Guatemalan private sector should also be vocal in support of a clean election process and independent candidates. 

High stakes, high reward

This year’s appointments offer a rare chance to break Guatemala’s cycle of institutional capture. Some actors are deliberately reframing the nominations as an ideological contest between left and right, hoping to shield themselves and cause US hesitation. In reality, the stakes are institutional, not ideological: It is a choice between a justice system that upholds the law and one that continues to serve criminal interests.

With a reformist executive in place and five key bodies being renewed simultaneously, the window for change is real. For US policymakers, safeguarding US strategic interests in the region requires supporting a 2026 appointments process that reinforces Guatemala’s rule of law and, in doing so, strengthens security and prosperity across the Western Hemisphere.

The post What to watch in Guatemala’s year of institutional reset appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As of January 13, the Human Rights News Agency, a US-based human rights group, estimated that the death toll has climbed above two thousand since the start of the protests on December 28 last year. This is while the Iranian government, as it has done previously, enacted a complete internet blackout, where the entire nation continues to remain under the world’s largest digital prison.

“I saw snipers in our neighborhood—in all these years I’ve never seen such scenes,” said Sahar, a doctoral student in the Saadat Abad neighborhood in Tehran, in a brief phone conversation via Starlink satellite connection.

Her voice was more distraught than in our previous conversations earlier in the week. She also explained how, since Saturday, fewer people have been going on the streets. “At first, there were families, old, young, but now everyone’s terrified, given the bloodbath.”

So far, Tehran’s crackdown on the demonstrations appears to have turned into a bloodbath, in which the only victims appear to be ordinary Iranian people—those who for long have been paying the price of the brutality of the Islamic regime, topped with the global isolation resulting from decades of sanctions and pressure imposed by the United States and its allies.

Against this backdrop, US President Donald Trump may have a real opportunity to be an effective dealmaker with Iran. However, if he is serious about a durable, win-win outcome for both the United States and Iranians, there is only one asset worth betting on: the Iranian people.

Today, Iranian society is more unified against the Islamic Republic than at any point since 1979. Nearly three weeks into the latest nationwide protests, this time ignited not by a single spark but by the country’s wider economic freefall, Iranians have taken to the streets in extraordinary numbers.

Speaking shortly before the regime’s blackout began, Sepideh, an Iranian journalist who has been arrested multiple times and isn’t using her last name for security concerns, explained how she believes Iran is at one of the “most dangerous junctures” in its modern history.

“There is zero possibility of reform within this regime,” she told me. “But history also shows that the [United States], the UK, and Israel don’t prioritize the Iranian people either—only their own interests. This is what makes me afraid of what’s coming.”

Asked about Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last monarch, she says with a deep sigh that “he has some supporters because there is no strong domestic opposition, as those voices have been crushed domestically over the years. But I struggle to believe in someone backed by foreign powers, tied to monarchy, and unable to form a coalition.”

Some others express a more fatalistic openness, including Sahar, who—prior to the internet blackout—told me how many Iranians “believe anything after this regime will be better. We want a complete separation of religion and state. This deck of cards needs to be reshuffled.”

These voices capture the nuances within the Iranian society today—united in its rejection of the Islamic Republic, deeply wary of foreign agendas, and desperate to reclaim agency over their own future.

For the United States, meaningful support for the Iranian people requires resisting the impulse to frame their uprising through the language of takeover or intervention, and instead prioritizing concrete protections for civilians in light of the brutal repression inside Iran. This means keeping Iran connected to the world, shielding protesters and journalists from digital isolation, and ensuring that accountability efforts target perpetrators of violence rather than a population already trapped between domestic repression and coercion from abroad.

Furthermore, it means treating internet access as humanitarian aid—funding circumvention support, satellite connectivity where feasible, and protection for independent journalists. This can help to ensure that the regime cannot repeatedly convert blackouts into a weapon of mass impunity.

An open, empowered Iranian civil society would not be a liability to US interests; it would be one of Washington’s greatest assets.

If the goal is to empower Iranians rather than freeze them into permanent victimhood, economic engagement must run alongside pressure on the state. This does not mean enriching the regime or reopening a flood-gate of funds to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-backed entities. Rather, it means expanding lawful, carefully assessed, people-to-people commerce that bypasses state hijacking and manipulation.

This includes enabling small and medium-sized Iranian businesses, freelancers, and entrepreneurs to access global markets; lifting travel bans for Iranian students, artists, medics, scientists and civil society members while banning entry to government-affiliated individuals; widening licenses that allow US and European firms to provide cloud services, payment rails, logistics support, and professional tools directly to Iranian users; and supporting diaspora-led investment vehicles that fund Iranian startups, cooperatives, and cultural industries without routing capital through regime-controlled entities. Such engagement gives Iranians income, skills, and stake—converting isolation into leverage and dignity rather than dependency.

Despite decades of sanctions, Iran has cultivated one of the most educated populations in the region and a resilient tech ecosystem that mirrors Silicon Valley’s platforms under far harsher conditions. Iranian youth have built local equivalents of Amazon, Uber, YouTube, and DoorDash with little capital and almost no global access. With the right engagement, Iran could generate trillions in long-term value—benefiting not only Iranians but also US businesses and consumers. A reintegrated Iran, charged by its people, would open a new frontier in trade, education, technology, and culture.

Meanwhile, none of this negates Iran’s military capacity. After more than four decades of isolation, Iran recently went head-to-head with the world’s most powerful militaries. Even Israeli defense analysts were surprised by some of its capabilities—proof that such sophistication does not emerge from a broken society. Beneath the Islamic regime’s aggression lies decades of scientific and technological investment made by the Iranian people themselves, who—if empowered and allowed self-determination—could become Washington’s strongest allies in the region.

Trump’s rhetoric amplifies the contradictions Iranians already live with. His warnings to Tehran and expressions of solidarity have landed with equal parts validation and fear. For some protesters, his words signal that their struggle is finally seen as entwined with an uncertainty of what’s to come. For others, Washington’s bombast risks giving the regime a pretext to paint the Iranian people’s unified dissent as foreign-engineered. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s accusations that protesters act “to please Trump” reveal just how threatening even rhetorical pressure can be to a regime terrified of losing control—one that’s now at its weakest point than ever before.

Iranians understand the stakes. They have watched Russia and China extract economic leverage from their isolation, and they fear becoming yet another bargaining chip. As Behzad, an Iranian journalist who is going by his first name for security purposes, told me, “everyone wants a piece of Iran. Sometimes I wish we lived in a poorer, smaller country; so at least we could live freely—far from domestic corruption and foreign interference.”

Still, across class, gender, and belief, Iranians remain united in one demand: the dismantling of the current regime. They do not ask the United States for bombs or saviors. They ask for surgical, effective, and thought-through support that enables them to reclaim their own agency in the absence of the current regime.

If Trump is serious about peace, stability, and a lasting legacy, the path forward does not run through air strikes or transactional deals with a failing theocracy. It runs through the Iranian people who, if given the chance, could build one of the world’s most dynamic democracies and one of Washington’s most valuable partners.

Tara Kangarlou is an award-winning global affairs journalist, author, and humanitarian who has worked with news outlets such as NBC, CNN, CNN International, and Al Jazeera America. She is also the author of the bestselling book The Heartbeat of Iran, the founder of nonprofit Art of Hope, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, teaching on humanized storytelling and journalism.

The post Voices from Iran: As rejection of government reaches all-time high, Iranians also wary of foreign intervention appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 4, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Bloomberg article titled “Trump Snatches Maduro But Leaves His Regime in Charge for Now.” He explains that the Trump administration is attempting to influence the Venezuelan vice president to secure outcomes favorable to the US.

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Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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The post Kroenig quoted in Bloomberg on Trump’s Venezuela strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This is the third chapter in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s 2026 Atlas, which analyzes the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

Evolution of freedom

Serbia’s freedom trajectory since 1995, according to the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, falls into three distinct periods. The first is the dismal 1990s, defined by war, sanctions, and international isolation; institutions hollowed out, and the political sphere narrowed to the point of collapse. The second begins with the fall of Slobodan Milošević in 2000 and runs to roughly 2011, when the country reopened to the world and took the first steps toward European integration. The third starts around 2012, when the political environment tightened again and the gains of the previous decade began to erode. This pattern is visible in the Freedom Index: a sharp improvement after 2000, followed by a gradual downturn driven overwhelmingly by the political subindex after 2012.

The post-2000 rebound was immediate and dramatic in terms of politics and economics, but the rule of law took a more gradual turn. The political opening—competitive elections, wider latitude for civil society and media, and normalization of international relations—was the most visible change. Serbia signed bilateral investment treaties and free-trade agreements with neighbors and, in 2008, concluded a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union. Even though domestic politics remained turbulent—Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was assassinated in 2003, nationalism continued as a potent force, and Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence sparked a backlash—the trajectory differed markedly from the 1990s. European integration acted as the anchor that pulled politics and policy toward a more open equilibrium.

In 2010, the balance of incentives changed. After the global financial crisis, the EU’s enlargement energy waned; for the Western Balkans, accession increasingly looked theoretical rather than imminent. Without a credible “carrot and stick,” the reform push slowed across the region, while in Serbia, the political environment hardened against EU integration. The timing aligns with the ascent of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the rise of Aleksandar Vučić—first as prime minister in 2014 and later as president—under whom power centralized and media pluralism came under pressure. International observers like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) became increasingly critical of the country’s internal dynamics. Civic activism—still very present—operated in a tighter space.

Over the past thirteen years, the cumulative effect has been systemic: Corruption has eroded the rule of law and turned key institutions into instruments of incumbency. Elections remain formally competitive but are marked by recurrent irregularities that leave little chance for alternation. Ruling party-aligned media dominate the information space, public advertising is allocated opaquely, and the security services have targeted civil society organizations on dubious grounds. The result is a shrinking political arena in which checks and balances are increasingly performative rather than constraining.

Media pluralism has faced sustained pressure. Journalists and associations report smear campaigns, threats, and pervasive self-censorship, while access to advertising and public funds tracks political alignment. Civil society is larger and more professional than two decades ago, but its operating space has narrowed—foreign funding is stigmatized, senior officials attack prominent NGOs, and procedural burdens sap time and resources. The situation is not one of outright closure, but the cumulative friction is real.

Within the political subindex, the steepest, most persistent deterioration is in political rights—freedom of association and expression—while the elections and legislative-constraints components also weaken. The contour is recognizable: After the 2000 break, political rights jump, remain broadly stable until the early 2010s, and then trace a clear decline that, while significant, does not return to 1990s levels. Elections remain formally competitive, but the tilt in media access and state resources has grown; the legislative constraints on the executive ebb as power concentrates in the presidency.

The legal subindex tells a different story: It starts at a low point, followed by early reforms and then stasis. The first post-Milošević years saw the establishment of baseline prosecutorial and judicial reforms, but two hard problems persisted: a lack of genuine independence from the executive and the capacity to process cases in a timely, professional way. Both remain binding constraints. Serbia’s legal profile improves off its post-conflict trough and then plateaus, reflecting institutions that function day-to-day but buckle at the most sensitive interfaces with politics. The causes are structural: Building effective, impartial courts is far harder and slower than opening political space, and where EU conditionality is weak or distant, momentum lags.

The legal upswing in the 2000s reflected real change—new courts, stronger constitutional guarantees, prosecutorial reforms, and a framework closer to European norms—and informality fell as tax bases modernized and customs enforcement improved. But judicial independence and effectiveness remained the weak links: External pressure, slow case resolution, selective enforcement in high-profile economic cases, and gaps in accountability and conflicts-of-interest rules kept trust low. Those frictions continue to drag on the economy.

Within the legal subindex, Serbia’s early-2000s bump is consistent with a shift from conflict to basic legal normalcy—laws regularized, courts reopened, and administration stabilized—with only minor oscillations later. The 2019–20 dip likely reflects the major protests triggered by the murder of opposition politician Oliver Ivanović in 2018, which led many opposition parties to boycott the 2020 elections. It also reflects setbacks in judicial reform and popular distrust in legal institutions. Constitutional amendments were eventually adopted in 2022, a move that modestly improved formal judicial independence even though implementation remains contested. 

The economic subindex improves steadily from the early 2000s until the pandemic, then levels off. Its composition helps explain why. Women’s economic freedom—largely driven by statutory changes captured in the World Bank’s Women, Business and the Law global report—rises markedly in the mid-2000s. Investment freedom and trade freedom also strengthen as Serbia deepens its commercial integration with the EU and broadens ties with Russia, China, Turkey, and others. Regulatory reform—streamlined procedures, clearer company law, and liberalized capital flows—improved the investment climate, while the accession process nudged alignment on services and market-access rules. New firms entered and integrated into regional supply chains in manufacturing and agribusiness, even as legacy incumbents persisted in some sectors. This is the one domain where policy has been consistently outward-oriented over the past quarter-century, even as rule-of-law reforms slowed. In effect, Serbia decoupled economic integration from institutional convergence: It became a more open, investor-friendly production platform without moving in tandem on media freedom or judicial independence. However, challenges remain in economic freedom. Property-rights enforcement and contract execution remain below EU norms—a deterrence for smaller investors. State-owned enterprises still play an outsized role in some sectors, obstructing competition and investment freedom. The use of incentives, particularly for some foreign investors, while bringing in new capital can also distort the level playing field.

The most recent political developments underscore both the resilience of civil society and the limits of the current equilibrium. Since late 2024, large student-led protests—sparked by a fatal building collapse in the city of Novi Sad and subsequent corruption allegations in the construction industry—have broadened into a sustained challenge to the status quo. The student-led movement remains within institutional politics: It aims to contest and win elections and then reform from within. Whether it can do so without direct confrontation depends on the state’s willingness to ensure a level playing field—and on the response of powerful external patrons. In the Freedom Index, the immediate consequences fall on the political subindex, but the stakes are larger: Progress in the legal subindex will require credible insulation of the judiciary from political interference, and professional policing—areas that have lagged for a decade.

Evolution of prosperity

Serbia’s prosperity profile reflects the same three phases, but the translation from freedom to outcomes is neither automatic nor linear. In the early 2000s, as political freedoms opened and the economy reconnected to Europe, income per capita rose and the country began to narrow the gap with the regional average. Then the 2008–09 financial crisis hit Serbia, though not as hard as in many EU member states—partly because Serbia was outside the euro area and partly because of its diversified trade and investment partners. The pandemic-era shock was similar: Growth dipped but recovered quickly relative to Western Europe, helped by early access to vaccines from China and less severe energy-price pass-through due to ties with Russia. The Prosperity Index’s income component captures this series of interruptions rather than collapse.

The country’s resilience is tied to its growth model. For roughly a decade, net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have run at about 6–7 percent of GDP, with sources increasingly diversified beyond the EU. China has become a leading investor, while Serbia has also plugged into German value chains in mid-tier manufacturing. The model is not high-tech sophistication; rather, it is steady insertion into European (and to a degree global) production networks. As long as political stability held, the arrangement delivered: jobs in export-oriented plants, a stronger tradables base, and sustained convergence. The current uncertainty—whether stability can continue without institutional reform—is therefore not an abstract governance concern but a direct question about the durability of the prosperity path.

Prosperity has more dimensions than income, and Serbia’s experience across them is uneven. Health is the sharpest outlier in the pandemic period: While output fell less than in Western Europe, excess mortality was higher, reflecting more permissive lockdowns, thinner safety nets, and health-system limits. Over the long run, health outcomes have improved, but there is still a persistent gap with richer European systems; out-of-pocket costs are high by regional standards, and hospital infrastructure trails the EU core.

Education follows a less pronounced trajectory. The baseline is decent legacy human capital—Serbia inherits strong math and engineering traditions from Yugoslavia—but the system struggles with funding and modernization. The Prosperity Index’s education component rises gradually with cohort attainment and expected years of schooling, but there is no step change akin to the post-2000 political jump. The bottlenecks are familiar: teacher pay and training, infrastructure in secondary and vocational streams, and alignment with the needs of an export-oriented manufacturing base.

On income inequality, Serbia’s path in the 2000s and early 2010s conforms to a modest Kuznets-style worsening—where inequality rises during the early stages of development—as growth resumed and labor markets restructured. That was followed by a period of relative stability and, by the mid-2010s, Serbia’s Gini index was among the higher readings in Europe, reflecting how early market liberalization often rewards upper deciles first while redistribution and competition policy lag. Today’s level is close to the mid-1990s baseline, underscoring how incomplete rule-of-law reform constrains broad-based gains. Here again, the structure of growth matters: FDI-led manufacturing and construction have provided employment and some formalization, but the gains are uneven across regions and skill levels. When investment cools—because confidence dips or political risk rises—the distributional strain is quickest to reappear at the margins.

The environment and the treatment of minorities complete the picture. In environmental quality, the legacy of coal-heavy energy and industrial emissions weighs on air quality, especially in urban centers, even as gradual gains in household energy and vehicle standards help. The Prosperity Index’s environment component records a slow improvement that is vulnerable to policy drift and external shocks. The politics of a green transition are visible in the Jadar lithium project near Loznica. Touted as a strategic growth opportunity and opposed over groundwater risks, land loss, and opacity, the mining project has swung from license revocation in 2022 to partial reinstatement in 2024, reigniting protests. The episode captures the broader dilemma: aligning investment with credible environmental standards and local consent.

On minority access, the record is mixed: Legal protections exist and the worst 1990s legacies have receded, but equal access to services and opportunities depends on local administration and enforcement capacity—precisely the legal-institutional levers that have lagged. Post-2000 reforms—constitutional protections, cultural councils, and local representation—moved minority rights closer to regional norms, especially for Hungarians, Bosniaks, and Roma, but progress has stalled since 2011. Formal guarantees remain, but politicization, uneven municipal implementation, and hostile media narratives in tense electoral periods have limited real access to services and opportunities.

The interaction between freedom and prosperity is clearest in three places. First, the post-2012 slide in political rights bleeds into the economy by weakening predictability: When media scrutiny and legislative checks soften, policy becomes more discretionary, which eventually shows up as softer investment freedom and a more erratic economic policy. Second, the state capacity problems in legal matters—especially judicial independence and effectiveness—translate into higher transaction costs, slower dispute resolution, and a bias toward insiders; these are prosperity-sapping frictions, even in an open-trade, FDI-friendly regime. Third, women’s economic freedom raises the ceiling on growth by widening the labor pool and entrepreneurial base; Serbia’s mid-2000s improvement on statutory gender equality has been a quiet contributor to its industrial catch-up. The Prosperity Index registers all three channels, but the pace and breadth of gains depend on whether the political and legal pillars reinforce or undercut one another.

Finally, recent domestic politics inject new uncertainty into what had become a well-understood model. The student-led protests that began in late 2024 have matured into a more organized political movement seeking early elections and a reform mandate. It is clear that this crisis will not simply fade away. Any escalation will pose serious questions for both Serbia’s democratic trajectory and the wider Western Balkans, where progress on rule of law, civic rights, and European integration remains fragile.

Investors are studying these signals closely. Already, foreign direct investment has fallen sharply: in the first five months of 2025, net FDI inflows amounted to roughly €631 million, compared with about €1.943 billion in the same period the year before—a drop of around 67.5 percent. If the political outcome is a genuine leveling of the electoral playing field and a credible push on rule-of-law reforms, Serbia’s prosperity path could re-accelerate—foreign capital is mobile and already present at scale. But if confrontation mounts, early elections are denied, and external patrons from China and Russia harden their positions, the risk is a prolonged standstill with wider regional repercussions.

The Prosperity Index is a lagging indicator here, but its income and inequality components will tell the tale in the next few readings.

The path forward

Serbia’s way forward is not mysterious, but it will be hard. The growth model that delivered catch-up—trade openness, diversified investment partners, and insertion into European value chains—remains viable. But it is probably not going to deliver the same amount of growth in an increasingly fragmented global economy facing higher tariffs and a global slowdown in FDI. And preserving it now requires political and legal reforms that were postponed when the EU accession horizon receded. The central insight of the last decade is that while economic integration can be decoupled from institutional convergence for a time, it cannot be decoupled indefinitely. The Freedom Index already shows the cost of delay in the political subindex, and the longer the legal subindex lags, the more the prosperity gains will flatten.

The immediate priority is political. Elections must be not only formally competitive but substantively fair, with balanced media access and a clean separation between state resources and party campaigning. Legislative oversight should recover ground lost to executive centralization; if the presidency remains dominant, courts and parliament cannot perform their checking functions. Serbia’s civil society has shown it can mobilize against overreach; the question is whether that energy can produce institutional change without confrontation. A credible commitment to level competition would register quickly in the political subindex—especially in elections and political rights—and, with a short lag, in investment sentiment.

The second priority is legal. Serbia needs a judiciary that is both insulated and empowered. Independence requires appointment and promotion systems that minimize political leverage; effectiveness requires resources and management that accelerate case processing and professionalize court administration. The legal subindex’s components offer a checklist: Clarify laws and reduce contradictions; strengthen judicial independence and effectiveness; improve bureaucratic quality while tightening corruption control; maintain security without eroding civil liberties; and treat informality not as a statistical curiosity but as evidence of high transaction costs that can be lowered. Even modest improvements would be catalytic: When firms expect fair, timely adjudication, they invest more and formalize faster, amplifying the earlier economic gains due to trade and investment liberalization.

Sound economic policy should aim to keep what works and fix what jeopardizes it. The external stance—openness to EU markets, continued diversification of partners, and predictable treatment of foreign investors—has served Serbia well. But stability established by way of muted scrutiny is running out of road. A rules-first approach to fiscal policy, procurement, and state-firm relations would lower the risk premium without forcing a retreat from the country’s pragmatic geoeconomic posture. In this sense, the economic subindex’s strongest components—trade, investment, and women’s economic freedoms—are the baseline to protect, while property-rights enforcement and corruption control are the levers for raising the ceiling.

Prosperity policy should target slow variables that pay off across cycles. Health outcomes require steady investment in primary care, hospital equipment, and public-health capacity; the pandemic showed how quickly gaps widen when systems are overrun. Education needs a dual track: modernized general schooling and a serious vocational stream matched to the country’s role in regional value chains. Inequality is best tackled by sustaining labor-intensive FDI while pushing more value added into local supply chains; when more of the “last mile” of production happens domestically, wage gains spread. Environmental quality will improve when energy policy tilts toward cleaner sources and when industrial standards rise; here, alignment with EU norms is both feasible and, over time, growth-enhancing. The Prosperity Index components—health, education, inequality, environment, minorities—will move together if legal quality does its part.

Geopolitics will keep testing Serbia’s pragmatism. The country’s relative nonalignment among major powers has so far produced diversified capital and insurance against shocks. The risk is that a domestic political crisis or external confrontation would force sharper choices. The safest way to preserve room for maneuvering is institutional: Fairer elections, stronger oversight, professional courts, and trustworthy administration lower the temperature at home and raise trust abroad. Investors do not require perfection; they require predictability. The Freedom Index’s political and legal pillars are proxies for that predictability, and progress there will determine whether the Prosperity Index resumes its upward slope or plateaus.

Reenergizing the EU accession track would have effects well beyond Serbia’s borders. Because Belgrade sits at the center of the region’s unresolved files—above all, relations with Kosovo and the major constitutional and territorial agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina—building Serbian stability would lower regional tensions. A visible move from Belgrade to a more committed EU path would lower the political risk premium, unlock stalled dossiers, and revive the demonstration effect that powered reforms in earlier enlargement waves. The spillovers would be tangible—more predictable rules, faster dispute resolution, clearer procurement—and would draw in investment that binds the region more securely to European value chains. In short, if Serbia moves, the region moves; if Serbia stalls, momentum will move elsewhere in the region.

A recommitment to Serbia’s EU integration is possible. The region offers examples of rapid legal improvements when potential EU accession is real and monitored; Serbia’s own economy shows how quickly openness pays when credibility is present. What has been decoupled can be recoupled: political pluralism that is not merely formal, legal institutions that function without fear or favor, and an economy that remains as open and diversified as the past decade but under rules that are clearer and more evenly enforced. If that alignment is restored, the next readings should show the familiar pattern in reverse: first, stabilization of political rights and elections; next, a nudge up in legal quality; then, renewed momentum in investment and trade freedom—followed by broader prosperity gains that are felt not only in GDP charts but in health clinics, classrooms, and paychecks.

Richard Grieveson is deputy director at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies and a member of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group. He coordinates wiiw’s analysis and forecasting of Central, East and Southeast Europe. In addition he works on European policy analysis, European integration, EU enlargement, economic history, and political economy.

He holds degrees from the universities of Cambridge, Vienna, and Birkbeck. Previously he worked as director in the Emerging Europe Sovereigns team at Fitch Ratings and regional manager in the Europe team at the Economist Intelligence Unit.

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Many political and security leaders remain unconvinced that employment should be its own goal or that employment is central to immediate security. While US President Donald Trump’s twenty-point peace plan for Gaza refers to employment in broad terms, it is only referenced as an outcome of investments and large-scale development, but employment is not viewed as a goal in and of itself.

For example, point number ten states that “many thoughtful investment proposals . . . will be considered to synthesize the security and governance frameworks to attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for the future of Gaza.”

Gaza cannot function without guaranteed pathways to work. To disarm Hamas, there must be a fiscal strategy alongside effective street-level security. Most critically, the best way to undermine Hamas’s power on the ground is to employ the people Hamas pays today. Security requires a fiscal plan; in Gaza, Hamas controls labor, resources, and opportunity, eliminating competition. To break this chokehold, Gaza requires deliberate intervention to generate employment across sectors.

Hamas and Gaza’s employment crisis

Before the launch of war in 2023, Gaza already faced some of the worst labor conditions in the region. Hamas-led public sector employment accounted for nearly one-third of all those working in the Strip, according to the Ramallah-based Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. In 2017, the average monthly household expenditure in Gaza was 934 dinars, or roughly $1,300. Meanwhile, Hamas is paying young fighters up to three hundred dollars per month, according to Wall Street Journal reporting citing Israeli officials—an amount that pays for a crucial portion of those expenses. Additionally, the patronage network system of Hamas meant that those in the militant group’s networks were able to access aid, resources, and other market goods in a way that those unaffiliated could not, something that has continued throughout the war as well.

This meant that the few available jobs or reliable opportunities inside Gaza were disproportionately Hamas-affiliated—whether related to civil service or fighting. Against this backdrop, youth unemployment reached as high as 70 percent in Gaza, and overall unemployment reached 80 percent.

Today, close to 70 percent of Gaza’s population is homeless or displaced, with no clarity on when they will return to stable housing. This has made the need for new employment even more urgent.

When more than a million people have no work, no prospects, and no timeline for rebuilding their lives, the outcome is predictable: Many will return to the only functioning economic structure available, which is dominated by the Hamas-led network. Gaza’s geographic isolation exacerbates this, as the majority of Gazans have never left the Strip. Without jobs, mobility, or legitimate income, dependency becomes permanent.

If Hamas were no longer the leading source of employment, its patronage networks would weaken, reducing its control over communities’ access to salaries, goods, and services. Peacebuilding experience shows that employment changes daily incentives. People with families, stability, and predictable income see militancy as a high-cost and less rational choice.

Ignoring the central variable

The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) belief that it has sufficient institutional capacity to rehabilitate Gaza, as its prime minister wrote recently in its economic plan, is troubling to most long-term analysts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Almost every major Arab country and Western ally has made it clear through numerous UN resolutions and diplomatic statements (including most recently in Trump’s twenty-point plan and the New York declaration by Saudi Arabia and France) that the PA requires significant reformation before it can take on control of Gaza.

In the PA’s recently released economic plans, unemployment is treated only as a minor humanitarian issue, rather than a development factor or as a central determinant of whether a cease-fire can hold or Gaza returns to terrorism and war. Specifically, the plan suggests providing $4.2 billion in cash assistance for food, supplies, minor reconstruction, and housing support. Yet, the plan’s development of employment schemes and workforce participation receives only $500 million—far short of what is required for serious job creation.

To underscore just how ill-prepared PA thinking is regarding employment outcomes, to match the current income provided by Hamas employment, the plan would need several billion dollars annually to enable workers to earn the same as they do now from Hamas coffers, as either civil servants or fighters. Yet the PA plan, similar to the Trump plan, does not explicitly focus on the details of making new workforce access available or on pursuing long-term job creation through strategic development, nor does it seek to put significant resources towards the goal of earned income. Instead, it commits Gaza to being an aid-dependent economy, in which international investors are expected to operate without a reliable labor force. This is a direct path back to patronage, dependency, and long-term instability.

Employment as a human rights and security imperative

In my book, What Role for Human Rights in Peacebuilding, I argued that peacebuilding has traditionally overemphasized political rights, institution-building, and security-sector reform while relegating economic, social, and cultural rights to a secondary status. Yet, human rights are interconnected and cannot be pursued as separate goals. Political participation cannot be realized when people are uneducated, unhealthy, unhoused, or unemployed. Civil and political rights must be linked to economic, social, and cultural rights for transitions to be viable.

The models often employed in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process do not address foundational gaps in economic, social, and cultural rights, especially in the area of long-term employment. Unless international leadership takes seriously the central role employment plays in deradicalization and stabilization, Gaza’s reconstruction will replicate past failures. Employment is a framework for disarmament, but only when sustained for the long term—not when limited to temporary per diem labor, food-for-work schemes, or short-term projects.

A sustainable employment paradigm must be put at the center of Gaza’s next phase. Many Gazans will explain, when asked, that many of the flanks of Hamas fighters are not driven by ideology but by predictable payrolls and access to goods for Hamas-affiliated families. Without a competing legal economy, Hamas will always have recruits.

Gaza needs macroeconomic and microeconomic development schemes that create market infrastructure capable of supporting the entire workforce. Education, vocational training, private-sector investment, and targeted upskilling can all generate meaningful employment. In Gaza, ignoring this is not simply poor economics. It is a direct security risk. This requires understanding the actual size of Gaza’s labor force, reasonable income targets, and priority sectors where workers can quickly enter employment with existing or modestly enhanced skills. Both public- and private-sector models will be required, with private-sector growth as the long-term engine of prosperity.

A full-employment-oriented mandate is not extreme government intervention, nor is it a call for the PA to dominate the labor market; rather, it should be defined as a strategy for long-term private-sector growth, carried out in partnership with and supported by public actors.

Impact on Palestinian sovereignty

Palestinian self-sovereignty requires economic independence and access to the world. One of the strongest inoculations against Hamas is broad access to markets and opportunities. Some of this will require long-term planning and sector-specific analysis, but many aspects are straightforward. For example, if private firms and the international community could employ Gazans to rebuild at even a slightly higher wage than Hamas salaries, stable employment could ultimately extend to swaths of the population, with Gazans able to support their families without using dollars tied to the militant group.

Sectors such as environmental rehabilitation, food production, education, medical care, infrastructure, and vocational services all require new labor. If a transitional authority seeks to meet the moment, it should invest heavily in private-sector job creation so that disarmament, deradicalization, and reintegration can begin.

Gaza’s next phase must recognize what weakens Hamas’s grip: economic independence and freedom of movement. Employment severs Hamas’s patronage networks by providing a reliable income not tied to armed actors. It rewires daily incentives, making militancy too costly for most people. The appeal of armed groups declines as economic opportunity expands.

Gaza’s future depends on far more than security forces or humanitarian aid. It depends on whether people see a path out of the rubble that is grounded in economic self-sovereignty, dignity, and the possibility of success. If security and political leaders ignore this reality, they will guarantee that the next war comes even while the debris of this one remains.

Melanie Robbins is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Realign For Palestine project.

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This issue brief is part of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “The future of democracy assistance” series, which analyzes the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Introduction

The political landscape in Africa defies generalization. Despite setbacks and challenges, democratic progress continues in Ghana, Malawi, and Senegal, among other countries. Next to these bright spots, military juntas have deepened their grip on multiple West African and Sahelian governments, long-standing authoritarian regimes remain in Rwanda, Uganda, and other countries, and conflict and war continues to upend lives and threaten the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan. Numerous other countries are best described as hybrid regimes, combining democratic and authoritarian forms of governance and producing inconsistent outcomes for their citizens in terms of delivering public goods, securing basic rights, and promoting economic growth.

Against this backdrop, the United States is recasting its relationship with African governments and their constituencies. Department of State officials describe “trade, not aid” as the foundation of US policy in Africa. In doing so, they have named expanded access to critical minerals and energy resources, alongside the development of new markets for US exports, as signature priorities for the Trump administration on the continent. This shift has brought cascading effects on African nations. As the region with the largest historic inflow of US foreign assistance, deep and sudden cuts to the aid budgets of the US Department of State and the closure of the US Agency for International Development have disproportionately affected African countries.[2]

Previous US administrations—including the first Trump administration—promoted democratic governance and stability in Africa using a combination of diplomatic and development tools. In fiscal year 2023, for example, the US government spent more than $338 million on democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) programming in Africa. Even more was spent in the final year of the first Trump administration, when DRG spending in Africa stood at more than $415 million.

Today, the outlook is very different. In addition to eliminating most democracy assistance to the continent in the early round of aid cuts, the administration has sought to defund the National Endowment for Democracy and proposed the elimination of nearly all DRG funds in its 2026 budget. Meanwhile, it has shifted away from criticizing foreign governments on democratic and human rights grounds.

Regardless of the direction of US government policy, recent history shows that both African societies and US national interests are best served by stable, democratic, and accountable systems of governance, which have proved more effective at delivering peace, expanding socioeconomic opportunity, and fostering market economies that attract domestic and international investment. Given this reality, the “dealmaking” intended to drive the administration’s foreign policy will find its greatest long-term success in countries with stronger and more democratic institutions.

This brief makes recommendations for how and why US stakeholders should work with democratic partners in Africa to seek democracy and stability-related outcomes. It includes specific recommendations directed at the US government for using democracy assistance as a tool to advance key African and American priorities. Recognizing that the near-term reality of reduced funding for US government democracy assistance will generate new shortfalls and challenges, this brief also identifies opportunities for other American institutions, namely private philanthropy and the private sector, to partner with key democratic actors and advance DRG practice in Africa.

Why prioritize democracy, good governance, and stability?

There are numerous practical reasons for the US government and constituencies to prefer and encourage democracy, good governance, and stability in Africa. Most importantly, it is what African publics want. Survey respondents on the continent consistently report a preference for democratic systems of government over all other options. The 2021–23 Afrobarometer survey found that, across thirty-nine surveyed countries, 66 percent of respondents prefer democracy over any other kind of government, while 78 percent oppose one-party rule and 66 percent oppose military rule. Despite some erosion in overall support for democracy over the past decade, popular support for democratic governance remains resilient in the face of social and economic headwinds and global momentum for authoritarian governments.

Despite challenges, democratic and institutionally stable regimes have yielded economic, political, and social benefits. The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes show that globally, while gains often take time to accrue, democratizing countries see an average bump of 8.8 percent in gross national product per capita over a twenty-year period compared to their autocratic peers. Meanwhile, institutional instability and fragility remain especially damaging to socioeconomic well-being. Countries with the highest levels of fragility as defined by the Fragile States Index have seen slow or significantly negative economic growth, conflict, and recurrent humanitarian crises. Insecurity and crisis, in turn, create unstable markets, disrupt supply chains, and erode long-term investment for US industries.

From an American perspective, African countries with stable and democratic institutions have been reliable economic, political, and security partners. They are more inclined to establish and strengthen rules-based economic and political systems that protect US and other investors. In regions like the Sahel, as elaborated on below, democratic governments serve as key political and security allies, while undemocratic and especially unstable countries have invited foreign interference by geopolitical rivals and create risks related to radicalization.

Institutional stability will only become more important as the US government and corporations push to expand trade relations and close deals in capital-intensive sectors like mining. Moving forward, the limiting factor on investments that generate returns for African and American economies alike is not the ability of the US government to sign deals today, but its ability to encourage stable economic and political conditions that protect those investments in the years to come.

Priorities for democracy assistance

A sensible US foreign policy interested in achieving meaningful social, political, and economic gains for African partner societies and US stakeholders alike would make diverse investments in stable, democratic, and accountable governance on the continent. We identify three broad priorities that could power an effective democracy assistance strategy:

1. Invest in countries on a democratic pathway.
2. Ally with citizens, including in backsliding democracies and autocracies.
3. Prioritize stabilization and local institutions that enable peace and security.

These priorities and the specific investments listed below are not meant to be comprehensive, but rather indicative of what a balanced and sufficiently ambitious US democracy assistance strategy could entail. The priorities could be applied across a wide set of countries and regions, or focus on specific geographies where the US government has direct economic and security interests, such as large population centers and economies like Nigeria and Kenya, or strategic regions like the Great Lakes, Horn of Africa, and Sahel. Recognizing that the US government is poised to reduce its investments in critical areas of intervention, we identify specific opportunities for private philanthropy and the private sector to play a leadership role in delivering and reenvisioning elements of a democracy assistance package moving forward.

Priority 1: Invest in countries on a democratic pathway

Reinforcing the economic, political, and security gains to democratic stability in Africa, the United States should continue to invest in the success of aspiring and longer-standing democracies on the continent. Democratic governments are better at protecting the rights and well-being of their citizens while creating hospitable conditions for secure, long-term investments and trade relations. Key democratic governments on the continent have set reform agendas with the potential to benefit their citizens and serve near- and long-term American economic and political interests. Furthermore, multiple democratic countries represent anchor security partners for the United States and critical bulwarks against instability, radicalization, and foreign interference in volatile regions such as the Sahel.

Take Senegal, for example. Senegal provides a case study for how a country that has made long-term democratic progress—and that overcame threats to its 2024 presidential election—is prioritizing economic and governance reforms that are responsive to the stated interests of its citizens. Like other recently elected governments on the continent, Senegal’s administration has prioritized anti-corruption, structural economic reforms, and poverty reduction, among other signature initiatives. Senegal’s President Bassirou Diomaye Faye led this effort by declaring his assets during the election and, once in office, announcing audits of the oil, gas, and mining sectors. The administration similarly proposed multiple transparency laws and released previously unpublished reports from anti-corruption institutions.

The extent and success of reform efforts in Senegal remains to be seen, but they have the potential to strengthen its citizens’ socioeconomic security and overall market economy. Alongside Ghana, Senegal remains a long-standing democratic partner in a region where the proliferation of military-led governments has put US security interests and assets at risk, as evidenced by the recent closure of US military bases in Niger. The U.S., therefore, has a direct stake in the success of governance-strengthening efforts in countries like Senegal.

The US government and other entities should make strategic investments in countries on a democratic pathway, like Senegal, to achieve results in high-priority areas of reform and strengthen key institutions, including in sectors of mutual interest to the US stakeholders and partner governments.

• Prioritize support for reforms that are championed by government partners. External technical and financial assistance is most effective when supporting reform and governance-strengthening initiatives that are owned and led by government partners. Indeed, political commitment alongside bureaucratic capacity are among the interrelated factors contributing to the success or failure of reform. In countries seeking to entrench democratic and economic reforms, the US government can work with partner governments that see their political futures as tied to the success of reforms across a range of economic and social sectors, such as public health, transportation, and financial services where key benefits accrue to US constituencies. The US government can aid these reform efforts by providing technical assistance, technology transfers, and direct financial support, concentrating on sectors where the US has a strategic interest.
• Continue social and capital investments in democratizing countries. The US government has used vehicles such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to invest in economic and social sectors in countries meeting basic governance benchmarks. This has included, for example, using cofinancing models to support upgrades of the energy sector in Senegal and the transport sector in Malawi. The MCC’s investment-led, government-to-government approach is suited to countries on a stable and democratic trajectory, where US and partner country investments are more likely to be secure. While its future remains uncertain, the MCC and institutions like the Development Finance Corporation can help democratizing countries generate capital for high-priority, high-impact sectors that can contribute to economic growth and social welfare. Looking forward, the US government can maintain investments in strategically important countries like Cote d’Ivoire and Zambia. It can also use its investments to crowd in funding to sectors of mutual interest for African and American businesses and other stakeholders.

The role of other actors: Private philanthropy must maintain support for free and fair electoral systems

The integrity of electoral institutions and, ultimately, the conduct of elections has an outsize influence on the trajectory on democratic consolidation. The US government has decades of experience supporting political parties, strengthening the infrastructure for independent election monitoring, and strengthening electoral management bodies (EMBs), which research shows is critically important to democratic trajectories, including re-democratization. Meanwhile, the current Department of State has backed away from electoral assistance programs and issued directives restricting embassies from criticizing foreign elections.

Given trends in US government policy, private philanthropy can help preserve US leadership in international electoral support. While the philanthropic sector cannot replace US government election funding—which included $48.9 million in support for unanticipated events like snap elections across twenty-eight African countries between 2022 and 2024—it can make high-impact investments that help preserve and build on democratic gains. These investments could include, for example, prioritizing targeted support for EMBs and the electoral monitoring capacities in countries working to consolidate their democratic progress.

Priority 2: Ally with citizens, including in backsliding democracies and autocracies

In pursuing a dealmaking-focused foreign policy, it will be tempting for the US government and private sector to “deal” primarily or exclusively with power-wielding political and economic elites. Doing so risks putting the United States at odds with African publics who express a preference for democracy and accountable governance, while potentially promoting corruption and distorting markets key to fair competition for US and other businesses.

Many African societies have tended to hold positive views of the United States and find resonance with its economic and political values. Recent research from Pew found that the some of the highest US approval ratings from foreign publics come from surveyed African countries. These findings mirror older Afrobarometer data showing that preference for the US development model outcompetes China’s by 11 percentage points across surveyed countries. This research suggests that views of the United States are influenced by its perceived commitments to democratic and free-market development approaches.

An effective foreign policy focused on long-term US interests must grapple with the reality that the political and socioeconomic interests of African citizens are not always served by their leaders. Many regimes tilt the electoral system in their favor, effectively silencing their electorates. Across a range of countries, civil society and human rights leaders face political repression for exercising their fundamental political rights. And too many large-scale investments in extractives and other sectors—including investments led by transactional Chinese state and corporate entities—have undermined the human rights and failed to serve the interests of local communities.

Allying with African citizenries does not mean forgoing economic and political dealmaking. Across regime types, citizens want to see expanded economic opportunity, social welfare gains, and security. Failure to prioritize the economic and political needs and interests of African societies, however, would put the United States on the wrong side of many of the youngest populations in the world, jeopardizing hard-won admiration on the continent. Democracy assistance offers practical tools for supporting and protecting key constituencies.

• Invest in strengthened economic governance and business climates. African publics and the US government and corporations have a shared interest in strengthening business sectors that enable fair, rules-based market competition. The US government should invest in strengthened economic governance through targeted support to government and nongovernment actors, potentially focusing on sectors with heightened exposure for the United States. This could, for example, include supporting efforts to reduce child labor and forced labor from supply chains, thereby addressing significant human rights violations and leveling the economic playing field for US corporations that must adhere to international labor standards. Where there is state commitment to reform, the US government can support technical assistance to lawmakers and regulatory bodies to put in place and implement legal, policy, and regulatory frameworks that meet international standards. It can also support chambers of commerce, industry associations, and civil society organizations to promote transparent and accountable business practices and advance market-oriented reforms.
• Prioritize anti-corruption and accountability. Support for anti-corruption efforts by committed government and citizen actors offers a clear opportunity for the US government to stand with African publics. In countries as varied as Gabon, Gambia, Liberia, and South Africa, more than 70 percent of Afrobarometer respondents report that corruption increased “somewhat/a lot” in the past year.” Corruption concerns have helped fueled democratic transitions in countries such as Ghana and Senegal, as well as large-scale protests in Kenya, Madagascar, and South Africa, among others. The US government could assist governments committed to anti-corruption efforts to advance e-governance that has been shown effective at reducing opportunities for corruption. The United States should also support civil society and independent media to conduct investigations, analyze public data, and advocate for public transparency and accountability, including to address regional challenges like cross-border illicit financial flows that harm US economic interests.

The role of other actors: Private philanthropy should prioritize emergency assistance to civil society and human rights institutions

With the near-term decline of the US government’s support to civil society in Africa and globally, private philanthropy is best placed to shore up critical gaps while shifting the terms of assistance for civic institutions. In particular, private foundations can prioritize funding for emergency assistance aimed at protecting individuals and organizations facing acute risks of political repression. The annual value of US government human rights programming in Africa was $21.6 million in fiscal year 2022, of which emergency assistance activities was only a part. The sums involved for sustaining core emergency assistance categories are within the capabilities of individual or coalitions of leading US philanthropies.

Private foundations can also adopt regional or global approaches to directly funding and supporting local civic institutions. This could include developing programs that facilitate horizontal relationships, learning, and mutual assistance among civic actors from Africa, the United States, and other regions grappling with common struggles related to conflict, democracy, and accountable governance in their societies.

Priority 3: Prioritize stabilization and local institutions that enable peace and security

Instability and conflict remain critical challenges across key regions and countries in Africa. The Fragile States Index shows that four out of the five most fragile countries (and sixteen out of the most fragile twenty-five countries) globally are in sub-Saharan Africa. Recent years have seen a rapid expansion in the scope and intensity of conflict in the region. This includes conflicts fueled or amplified by extremist groups in the Sahel, West Africa, and coastal East Africa. It also includes civil conflicts in Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan, among other countries. The human and economic costs of conflict are vast. In 2023, the number of displaced persons in Africa approached 35 million, representing nearly half of the total number of displaced persons globally.

In the DRC and broader Great Lakes region of Africa, the Trump administration has shown a willingness to use its political capital to seek an end to a long-standing and worsening conflict that threatens its trade and investment interests. In late June 2025, the US government announced a peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda governments aimed at halting the conflict between state authorities and the March 23 Movement (M23) rebels. Questions remain about the ultimate effectiveness of the settlement given that M23 and other rebel groups are not direct parties to the agreement. The US government, however, has expressed commitment to its implementation, which it sees as necessary for enhanced American access to critical minerals, including cobalt, copper, and tantalum. As in other countries with active conflicts, the US government has cut important aid programs to the DRC that invest in the social infrastructure and critical institutions necessary for supporting and sustaining peace deals. The long-term durability of any peace, however, depends on empowered individual and institutional structures that can deliver foundational levels of governance, and social and economic benefits that can reinforce stability.

• Maintain support to networks of peacebuilders at the local, regional, and national levels. Integrated networks of formal and informal peacebuilding institutions and individual activists are critical to monitoring, responding to, mitigating, and managing conflict, especially at the local level. Local peacebuilding committees and related structures have a track record of enabling community-level peace outcomes and social cohesion in countries like Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Kenya. Similarly, mutual aid groups are playing a key role in responding to the impacts of conflict in contemporary Sudan. The US government should prioritize cost-effective investments in the peace institutions and structures that monitor and strengthen peace settlements, especially in countries and regions where it invests in negotiation.
• Prioritize stabilization and repairing local institutions. Where it pursues diplomatic solutions to conflict, the US government can help secure gains by investing in interventions that produce stability. The DRC shows how daunting the challenge of stabilization can be, with more than 2 million Congolese having faced displacement from the M23-driven conflict between January and June 2024 alone. Effective stabilization efforts require prioritizing humanitarian responses to meet the basic needs of families and communities experiencing displacement, return, and other traumas. It also must include supporting the reestablishment of local civil society and state institutions that can help deliver services, manage public goods, and resolve disputes.

The role of other actors: The private sector should foster multisector investments in peace and security

The long-term ability of private sector companies to operate and recoup investments in conflict-affected communities depends on durable peace and security. Direct investments in peace dividends (i.e., socioeconomic returns to peace) can help reinforce reductions in conflict. US and other private sector companies are optimally positioned to strengthen their local business environments by making social and economic investments that help communities and regions benefit from periods of relative calm while strengthening overall socioeconomic well-being. This can include making investments in local infrastructure, public goods, and service delivery capacities. Private sector actors, especially within the extractives sector, can also build on frameworks like the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and commit to business and human rights practices that reinforce good governance and security.

Committing to and growing who leads democracy assistance

During its first ten months in office, the Trump administration has removed long-standing infrastructure and funding for delivering democracy assistance globally, including in Africa. The near- and long-term interests of African societies and key US stakeholders, however, are bolstered by the advancement of democratic, accountable, and stable governance on the continent. Not only is a robust democracy assistance strategy in Africa in line with long-standing US values that underpin America’s reputation and image on the continent, but it is also instrumental to stated objectives of the current administration, such as expanding fair access to strong foreign markets and securing priority peace agreements.

Regardless of its ultimate policy, the US government is, at least for the time being, stepping back from traditional aspects of DRG programming. In this context, other institutional actors can do more. Private philanthropy and the private sector cannot replace US government democracy assistance, but they can make targeted, evidence-based, and cost-effective investments that protect important areas of intervention, such as emergency assistance for human rights defenders, institutional support for EMBs, and pro-peace investments in conflict-affected communities. These and other types of investments are affordable, and when well executed, they can positively influence the trajectories of individual democratic actors, institutions, and partner countries.

Private foundations are especially well positioned to pursue DRG investments while prioritizing direct support to African-based institutions. This can include forging mutual relationships among democratic actors grappling with common 21st-century democratic challenges in Africa, the United States, and beyond, to seed the sector with stronger horizontal ties and novel partnership approaches and new strategies for the future.

Mason Ingram is vice president for governance at Pact, a nongovernmental organization that carries out development work around in the world in partnership with private sector organizations government agencies, including with USAID until the agency’s closure in 2025. Pact continues to receive funding from the US Department of State. Ingram has more than 15 years of experience designing, advising, and managing international development programs, with a focus on civil society and governance programming.

Alysson Oakley is vice president for learning, evaluation, and impact at Pact. Oakley also teaches courses on program design and evaluation of democracy assistance and conflict resolution interventions at Georgetown University. Oakley holds a PhD from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and a bachelor of arts degree from Brown University.

Jack Higgins is a research assistant and MA candidate at Georgetown University’s College of Arts and Sciences.

The authors are grateful for consultations provided by experts on democratic governance in Africa, including Dr. Babra Ontibile Bhebe (executive director, Election Resource Centre), Bafana Khumalo (co-executive director, Sonke Gender Justice), Omolara Balogun (head, policy influencing and advocacy, West African Civil Society Centre), Jean-Michel Dufils (retired senior governance research expert and program manager), and Jon Temin (visiting fellow, SNF Agora Institute). 

The future of democracy assistance

This paper series provides an in-depth look at the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

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Jun 15, 2023

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The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post Democracy and stability in Africa: Why US leadership still matters appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This issue brief is part of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “The future of democracy assistance” series, which analyzes the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Introduction

After decades of democratic and economic progress, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is now losing ground. Between 1995 and 2016, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes recorded steady gains—a more than eight-point rise in prosperity and a more than three-point rise in freedom—that lifted millions out of poverty, deepened the region’s integration into the global economy, and strengthened democratic institutions. Over the past decade, however, this momentum has stalled, and in many countries reversed. Across the region, insecurity has surged, authoritarianism has deepened, and corruption has stifled development, with consequences that reach far beyond its borders.

This reversal is fueling two interconnected crises reshaping the Western Hemisphere: migration and insecurity. Over the past decade, migration—both within the region and toward the United States—has surged. Authoritarian rule in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, along with the collapse of Haiti, has driven mass exoduses, while gang violence spurs migration from Central America and hundreds of thousands more have left other countries in search of safety and economic opportunity. Transit states such as Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Panama face mounting strain on public services, while the United States confronts unprecedented pressure at its southern border.

Regional security is also deteriorating as gangs and transnational criminal networks expand their operations. Mexican cartels dominate the production and trafficking of fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, and other illicit drugs across Latin America and into the United States. The effects of their trade have been devastating, with tens of thousands of overdose deaths annually, particularly in the United States and Canada. Other groups, such as Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua, extend beyond narcotics, driving homicides, corruption, and violent competition over trafficking routes across the region.

Beneath these crises lies a deeper erosion of governance and democracy—one that the United States should support its allies in confronting. Weak rule of law and systemic corruption stifle economic growth and enable criminal networks to thrive. Authoritarian regimes in the region fuel migration, crime, and cross-border instability, while external powers—most notably China—exploit governance gaps through opaque infrastructure projects and debt diplomacy, deepening authoritarian influence. Together, these forces erode state capacity, destabilize the region, and pose a direct challenge to US security and economic prosperity.

Stable, transparent governance in LAC reduces migration pressures, disrupts criminal networks, and creates economic opportunities that benefit both US and Latin American citizens. As the United States reassesses its foreign assistance strategy, democracy assistance can be enacted as a strategic investment to make the hemisphere—including the United States—stronger, safer, and more prosperous. We identify three core issues that pose the greatest challenges but promise the greatest rewards if addressed, and provide recommendations to streamline assistance, expand its scope, and engage business and local actors as funders and partners.

Ultimately, democracy assistance in the region remains one of the most cost-effective investments to advance shared security and prosperity.

Regional challenges to democracy and governance

LAC is confronting a convergence of three interlinked challenges that erode governance, destabilize societies, and undermine US security and economic interests. Each reinforces the others and fuels the migration and crime that strain the region. The United States should therefore prioritize addressing these challenges through targeted foreign assistance and investment.

Transnational organized crime and insecurity

Transnational organized crime (TOC) has evolved into one of the most destabilizing forces in LAC. Once localized, criminal groups have grown into sophisticated, multinational networks that traffic drugs, weapons, and people across borders while infiltrating political systems. These networks now operate across nearly every corner of the region, both benefiting from and contributing to weak rule of law and institutional resilience.

Gangs and TOC actors are among the main drivers of insecurity in the region. Although the region comprises less than 10 percent of the world’s population, it accounts for roughly one-third of global homicides. Central America maintains high levels of insecurity, while countries such as Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru have experienced sharp increases in violent crime as cartels and gangs battle for control of trafficking routes, urban neighborhoods, and illicit economies. The costs are profound: Latin American Public Opinion Project data show that intentions to emigrate are significantly higher among individuals exposed to crime, while nearly one-third of private sector firms in Latin America cite crime as a major obstacle to doing business, with direct losses averaging 7 percent of sales. Insecurity is not only displacing communities but also undermining prosperity and eroding trust in governments.

The drug trade remains one of the most profitable and damaging arms of TOC. Mexican cartels—particularly the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel—are the hemisphere’s principal suppliers of fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin. Their operations extend beyond Mexico and the United States, reaching deep into Colombia, Ecuador, Central America, and increasingly Canada. In 2024, US Customs and Border Protection seized over 27,000 pounds of fentanyl at the southern border—up from 14,700 pounds in 2022. The human toll is staggering: Fentanyl overdoses now kill more than seventy thousand people annually in the United States.

TOC represents not only a law enforcement problem but also a profound institutional and governance challenge. These groups thrive in contexts marked by weak institutions, porous borders, and entrenched impunity. Venezuela’s institutional collapse, for example, directly enabled the rapid growth of the Tren de Aragua gang from one prison to over ten countries. Once established, criminal networks act as corrosive forces—penetrating police forces, judicial systems, militaries, local governments, and even segments of the private sector. Their influence extends into the electoral arena as well: In Mexico’s recent elections, criminal actors not only financed campaigns for local candidates but also threatened and assassinated others, further distorting political competition and undermining democratic accountability. Left unchecked, TOC erodes public trust, distorts markets, and makes effective governance nearly impossible, fueling a self-reinforcing cycle of violence, displacement, and state fragility.

In many countries, governments have proven unable or unwilling to meaningfully confront TOC. Others have stepped up efforts to target these groups through mano dura policies or intensified security operations that, while capable of disrupting trafficking routes, cannot by themselves dismantle transnational criminal networks. Addressing the governance gaps that allow these organizations to thrive is therefore crucial. In this context, US leadership remains essential. Given the cross-border nature of these networks, lasting, viable solutions demand a coordinated regional response. By leveraging its diplomatic influence, security partnerships, military capabilities, and development tools—including technical assistance, institutional support, and investment incentives—the United States can help foster cross-border cooperation, strengthen judicial and prosecutorial capacity, and reinforce institutions to shield them from criminal infiltration. Paired with diplomatic and intelligence support, democracy assistance can play a critical role in disrupting organized crime, safeguarding US security interests, and creating the conditions for more prosperous and resilient communities across the hemisphere.

Rule of law and economic development

Declining rule of law has become an increasingly urgent concern in LAC, as regional indicators have steadily worsened in recent years and several countries have registered some of the steepest declines worldwide. This deterioration both enables transnational organized crime and authoritarianism and imposes enormous costs on national economies. Research by the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center shows that the rule of law is the single most influential factor for long-term economic growth and societal well-being. Liberalizing markets is not enough: Legal clarity, judicial independence, and accountability are the foundations of effective governance and thriving economies. This is particularly relevant in Latin America, where corruption remains the region’s Achilles’ heel—undermining public spending, fueling fiscal deficits, and weakening financial oversight. Across the region, higher corruption levels are consistently associated with lower gross domestic product per capita and reduced foreign direct investment, costing countries and investors billions in lost growth and opportunity

A particularly distorting force in the region’s economy is the prevalence of kleptocratic networks. These are not isolated acts of graft, but coordinated, systematic efforts to capture state resources and extract rents for political and economic gain. Such networks often comprise coalitions of corrupt political elites, complicit business actors, and criminal organizations. They co-opt the judiciary and prosecutors, while silencing investigations and oversight bodies. Their actions stifle competition, discourage entrepreneurship, and produce unfair monopolies that sideline foreign investors, while draining public coffers of resources needed for development.

The scale of these operations can be staggering. In Venezuela, over the past two decades, ruling party figures and business allies have been suspected of siphoning off as much as $30 billion in public funds through transnational schemes involving front companies, illicit contracts, and offshore accounts. This systemic kleptocracy has not only enriched elites but also accelerated Venezuela’s economic collapse, fueling one of the worst migration crises in the region, including to the United States. In Peru, the Club de la Construcción scandal revealed how an informal cartel of major construction companies colluded to divide up public works contracts in exchange for bribes to officials in the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The scheme operated for more than a decade, was worth billions in inflated contracts, and sidelined honest competitors while draining infrastructure budgets.

Some of the region’s largest corruption scandals have been uncovered by investigative journalists and independent prosecutors. Yet in many cases, impunity prevails, and little progress is made toward prevention or sustained accountability. Strong judicial institutions, effective anti-corruption reforms, and governance are essential for stability and growth. Predictable, rules-based environments make countries far better partners for both domestic and US businesses—creating jobs, expanding markets, and strengthening local economies. Such efforts can also reduce migration pressures, as corruption has been shown to drive both legal and irregular migration. As with TOC, for the United States, supporting rule-of-law reforms is therefore a strategic investment in building a more prosperous, democratic, and secure hemisphere.

Countering authoritarian influence

LAC is home to several resilient democracies that remain close US allies and important trading partners. Yet the region also contains some of the world’s most entrenched dictatorships—Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—which pose direct threats to stability. Between these extremes lie eight nations that Freedom House classifies as “partly free,” many of which experienced additional democratic declines in 2025. Countering democratic backsliding and protecting the global order is not a values-based mission; it is essential to safeguarding US security, economic interests, and the long-term prosperity of the Western Hemisphere.

The region’s authoritarian regimes illustrate the stakes. Economic collapse and repression have forced 7.7 million Venezuelans, 500,000 Cubans, and tens of thousands of Nicaraguans to flee over the past decade. These governments also generate acute security risks. Nicaragua has positioned itself as a conduit for extra-regional migration, inviting travelers from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean to enter visa free and transit toward the US border. The Daniel Ortega regime has further been linked to targeted harassment and even assassinations of dissidents abroad, including the 2025 killing in Costa Rica of Roberto Samcam Ruiz, a retired Army major and government critic.

Similarly, the consolidation of Venezuela’s dictatorship has transformed the country into a hub for criminal organizations, including Colombian paramilitary groups and Tren de Aragua. The Nicolás Maduro regime has hosted the Wagner Group while continuing to rely on Russian military advisors, Iranian oil technicians, and Chinese surveillance systems to tighten internal control and repress dissent. Members of the regime have been linked to drug trafficking––most notably through the illicit military network Cartel de los Soles––and, in late 2024, Maduro threatened to invade neighboring Guyana.

At the same time, external authoritarian powers—especially China—are expanding their footprints, particularly in “partly free” states where institutional checks are weak. China exploits governance gaps through surveillance technology, opaque infrastructure deals, and strategic investments in critical sectors—often at the expense of US influence and market access. Over the past decade, China invested $73 billion in Latin America’s raw materials sector, including refineries and processing plants for coal, lithium, copper, natural gas, oil, and uranium. In Peru, Chinese firms paid $3 billion to acquire two major electricity suppliers, giving them what experts describe as near-monopoly control over the country’s power distribution and edging out competitors. Beijing also provides critical technology to regional authoritarian governments and at-risk democracies. In Bolivia, the government deployed Huawei’s “Safe Cities” surveillance systems, raising concerns about mass data collection, particularly during elections.

These developments underscore the importance of countering authoritarianism in LAC as both a security and economic priority for the United States and the region. Betting on democratic renewal in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela is critical to restoring stability in the hemisphere. At the same time, it is equally important to strengthen “at-risk” democracies to prevent further backsliding. Targeted investments in political party development, anti-corruption reforms, and transparency measures can bolster resilience in these states and reduce the appeal of authoritarian alternatives. Pushing back against China’s growing economic and geopolitical influence in the hemisphere is also essential. By leveraging diplomatic and trade tools, the United States can position itself as a credible alternative to China—particularly by mobilizing investment, fostering public-private partnerships, and advancing governance reforms that strengthen transparency and accountability. Doing so is vital for freedom and security in the region and creates opportunities for business and investment.

Recommendations

Insecurity, weak rule of law, and authoritarianism represent growing threats to freedom and prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. As outlined above, TOC, entrenched corruption, and authoritarian regimes impose heavy economic costs on LAC and undermine democratic governance. At the same time, these forces drive mass migration, placing immense strain on transit and destination countries. Tackling these challenges is a strategic win-win: It can enhance US security and economic interests while advancing stability and prosperity in the region.

As the United States reassesses its foreign policy and democracy assistance strategy in LAC, it should make use of its full range of diplomatic, security, trade, and investment mechanisms—including targeted democracy assistance—to address these challenges.

Move beyond grants to expand the toolkit

The proposed shift toward an investment- and trade-driven foreign policy can go hand-in-hand with democracy assistance and reform. The United States can mobilize financial and diplomatic tools to expand investment as an alternative to Chinese influence, while incentivizing governance, transparency, and accountability reforms that strengthen the region’s resilience against the challenges outlined above.

• Leverage the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to provide an alternative to Chinese financing and invest in projects that strengthen democratic resilience through economic modernization, digitalization, and high-quality infrastructure—particularly in areas vulnerable to authoritarian influence. As Congress prepares to revisit the DFC’s authorizing legislation, it should ensure the agency has long-term funding to deploy its range of tools—including debt financing, equity investments, and political risk insurance—across the region.
• Work with Congress to pass the Americas Act to establish regional trade, investment, and people-to-people partnerships with like-minded nations, fostering long-term private sector development. Use this framework to advance transparency and institutional autonomy reforms—particularly through the proposed Americas Institute for Digital Governance and Transnational Criminal Investigative Units—to ensure partner countries strengthen anti-corruption prevention, detection, and prosecution.
• Use regional forums—such as the Summit of the Americas—to advocate for governance, security, transparency, and accountability reforms to strengthen the resilience of democratic allies and counter authoritarian regimes. The United States should link political reform benchmarks to investment incentives, offering “carrots” for change through regional development commitments.

Ensure democracy assistance makes business sense

A safer and more democratic Western Hemisphere directly benefits economic development and business. The United States should position its domestic and the Latin American private sectors as active partners in strengthening democratic resilience, not just as passive beneficiaries of stability.

• Revive and operationalize America Creceto incentivize and promote reform-linked investments, infrastructure projects, and job creation across the region to counter Chinese influence and advance US interests while bolstering political will through the DFC. Participation should be tied to clear benchmarks on transparency, labor rights, and legal predictability.
• Forge public-private partnerships that co-finance civic education, anti-corruption initiatives, and local development projects, particularly in high-risk areas vulnerable to TOC recruitment and migration.
• Mobilize Latin America’s business elites—among the greatest beneficiaries of economic and democratic collaboration with the United States—to push for and co-fund democracy and governance programs in their home countries. Leading companies, philanthropic foundations, and chambers of commerce should be engaged as active partners in advancing reforms.
• Strengthen and engage with regional initiatives like the Alliance for Development in Democracy—championed by Costa Rica, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador—that integrate the private sector into democratic reform and good governance agendas.

Deploy whole-of-government tools

While the State Department plays a central role in US democracy assistance, the scale and interconnected nature of the region’s challenges—spanning security, rule of law, and authoritarian influence—demand a coordinated, whole-of-government approach.

• Leverage the Pentagon’s Defense Institution Building program to strengthen law enforcement reform, bolster rule-of-law resilience, and build institutional capacity to counter transnational crime and human trafficking.
• Provide technical assistance and legal expertise through the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to help countries develop national frameworks that protect transparency, law enforcement, and sovereignty in investment decisions.
• Double down on rule-of-law reforms and projects, particularly those targeting organized crime and corruption. Support vetted law enforcement units, independent anti-corruption actors, and judicial reform initiatives through US, private sector, and multilateral funding channels, including the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Open Government Partnership.
• Protect the key pillars of democratic institutions from co-optation by TOC, kleptocratic, or authoritarian actors. This must include courts, election management bodies, political parties, and critical government agencies such as those overseeing infrastructure, development, procurement, and public prosecution. Emphasis should be placed on institutional independence, combating and preventing corruption, and ensuring sustainable financing to strengthen resilience.
• Apply targeted sanctions, Global Magnitsky measures, and trade conditionality to dismantle kleptocratic networks, prosecute corrupt actors, and reward credible reformers.
• Advocate for and support the implementation of global security and anti-corruption standards—including recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force and its LAC branch, GAFILAT (Grupo de Acción Financiera de Latinoamérica), on money laundering, organized crime, and illicit finance—to disrupt TOC and kleptocratic funding networks while fostering safer and more competitive business environments.

Scale the power of local networks

Regional local actors—both within and outside of government—are often the most credible and resilient defenders of democratic governance. The United States should deepen its engagement with these networks while identifying and empowering new partners.

• Partner with trusted community institutions—including religious organizations, civic leaders, businesses, and grassroots groups—on programs that prevent gang recruitment, reduce crime, and promote integrity in high-risk areas.
• Strengthen governance mechanisms to build sustainable local capacity to counter corruption and transnational organized crime.
• Expand the partner ecosystem to include diaspora networks and local community groups, leveraging their resources, expertise, and transnational connections to reinforce democratic resilience.

Push back on regional and external authoritarian influence

Bipartisan US support for organized opposition in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela has been a cornerstone of regional democracy policy and should be sustained and expanded. At the same time, Washington should back democratic movements and reformers across the hemisphere where authoritarian influence is taking hold.

• Sustain support for dissidents and democratic movements in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela to prepare the ground for eventual political transitions.
• Invest in independent media.
• Support the next generation of democratic leaders through fellowships, trainings, and political party development, prioritizing authoritarian and high-risk states.
• Collaborate with electoral commissions, legislatures, and political parties with an emphasis on internal democracy, campaign transparency, and long-term institutionalization.
• Assist governments in auditing and renegotiating opaque infrastructure or digital agreements—particularly those with authoritarian powers—that undermine sovereignty, transparency, and public accountability.

The recommendations offered here provide a roadmap to confront the region’s most pressing security and prosperity threats by pairing diplomacy, trade, and investment tools with targeted democracy support. By leveraging the United States’ entrepreneurial capacity and its ability to mobilize multinational and public-private partnerships, reforms can be made more attractive, sustainable, and impactful. This is not charity—it is a strategic investment that advances both US and LAC interests.

At relatively low cost, democracy assistance strengthens governance and open markets in ways that directly serve US security and economic priorities. It helps dismantle transnational criminal organizations, kleptocratic networks, and corruption, while countering the growing influence of authoritarian regimes inside and outside the region. These efforts reduce the flow of illicit drugs and irregular migration, create more reliable markets for businesses, and build stronger partnerships with governments that share democratic values. The outcome is clear: a stronger, safer, and more prosperous hemisphere.

Antonio Garrastazu serves as the senior director for Latin America and the Caribbean at the International Republican Institute (IRI). Prior to this role, he led IRI’s Center for Global Impact and from 2011 to 2018 was resident country director for Central America, Haiti, and Mexico. Garrastazu has worked in academe, the private sector, and government, serving in the Florida Office of Tourism, Trade and Economic Development under Governor Jeb Bush. He holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of Florida, and a master’s and PhD in international studies from the University of Miami. 

Henrique Arevalo Poincot is a visiting fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. A strategy and communications specialist with expertise spanning Europe and Latin America, Arevalo Poincot is pursuing his master’s degree in democracy and governance at Georgetown University.

The future of democracy assistance

This paper series provides an in-depth look at the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post A stronger, safer, and more prosperous hemisphere: The case for investing in democracy in the Americas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Editor’s note: This article was updated on November 17 to include Herman Halushchenko’s response to the corruption investigation.

Amid Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukraine is now facing the largest corruption scandal of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s presidency. It is a scandal with the potential to reshape the country’s politics. The intrigue, which involves alleged kickbacks in the graft-prone energy sector laundered through Russian-linked channels by close associates of President Zelenskyy, may prove as big a test of his leadership as the war itself.

On November 10, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) exposed an alleged $110 million corruption scheme at state-owned nuclear company Energoatom. The charges are supported by a fifteen-month wiretap and over seventy searches carried out as part of a major investigation called Operation Midas.

According to NABU officials, the investigation uncovered a criminal enterprise run by Timur Mindich, a film producer and a former business partner of Zelenskyy. Additional suspects include former Minister of Energy and recently appointed Minister of Justice Herman Halushchenko; former Naftogaz CEO and Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Chernyshov; former Minister of Defense and current National Security and Defense Council member Rustem Umerov; and Ihor Myroniuk, former deputy head of the State Property Fund and former advisor to Halushchenko.

Mindich fled Ukraine the day before his premises were raided and is reportedly now in Israel. Both Chernyshov and Mindich have long had ties with Zelenskyy, who co-founded the latter’s production company in 2003. Thus far, formal charges have been filed against eight of those implicated. Halushchenko has said he would defend himself against the accusations.

The alleged theft took the form of 10-15 percent inflated prices for infrastructure project contracts, which contractors were forced to pay in order to avoid losing their supplier status. The kickback scheme reportedly included security measures for the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant. The Ministry of Energy is suspected of facilitating the scam.

The stolen funds were allegedly laundered through an office linked to fugitive ex-Ukrainian MP and now Russian Senator Andrii Derkach before being extracted from Ukraine. Derkach has been sanctioned since 2021 and was stripped of his Ukrainian citizenship in 2023.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

While the investigation is still underway, the scandal is already proving extremely damaging to Zelenskyy and his entire administration. The alleged involvement of a former Ukrainian MP turned Russian fugitive in the middle of the Kremlin’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine may be the most scandalous aspect of the accusations.

Meanwhile, Zelenskyy’s long contact with many of the accused and their high-level appointments has raised the political stakes for the President. This has led to speculation over whether the scandal could topple Zelenskyy and cost Ukraine the war.

The investigation comes in the wake of a recent standoff between Zelenskyy and his administration with Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. In July 2025, a law proposed by Zelenskyy’s political party was passed by the Ukrainian parliament stripping NABU and other anti-corruption institutions of their independence.

This led to vocal condemnation from Ukraine’s civil society and the international community, including the largest street protests since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Days later, Zelenskyy reconsidered and signed a law that restored and guaranteed the independence of the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

That guarantee has now been tested and proven credible. While the sheer number of criminal investigations and indictments targeting prominent Ukrainian officials has raised concerns about possible political prosecutions by NABU, the apparent success of Operation Midas and its exposure of alleged corruption on the part of some of the most powerful people in Ukraine would seem to confirm the agency’s independence and its efficacy.

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Zelenskyy appears to recognize the dangers of the situation and has begun responding to the crisis. The Cabinet of Ministers is looking at sanctions against Mindich and businessman Oleksandr Tsukerman, who was also implicated in the scandal. The Ukrainian leader has already forced the resignations of Halushchenko and newly appointed Minister of Energy Svitlana Hrynchuk.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko has announced a comprehensive audit of all state-owned companies, especially in the energy and defense sectors. Anastasia Radina, head of the parliament’s anti-corruption committee, has called for a parliamentary inquiry into the transfer of funds to Russia.

These steps are significant but are unlikely to prove adequate. The stakes are extremely high, not just for Zelenskyy’s political future, but for Ukraine’s conduct of the war. European leaders answer to their citizens, many of whom might now be wondering why they are sending massive aid to Ukraine if large sums are being siphoned off by privileged insiders. In the US, while Trump is slowly moving in the right direction with recent sanctions on Russia, there are still influential figures in his orbit who are looking for ways to end all American support for Ukraine’s defense against Kremlin aggression.

This means that Zelenskyy must turn his attention to the crisis energetically. A good next step would be for him to speak up on the issue publicly and strongly, much as he did in the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Zelenskyy might start by acknowledging, as former US President Harry Truman did when he said the buck stops with him, that as President of Ukraine, he is ultimately responsible for failures in his government. He should recognize the magnitude of the scandal and the underlying problem of corruption, while explaining how he intends to take the lead in fixing it. This means bringing to justice, in accordance with the law, all those responsible, no matter who they are and where they are. He can do this by vowing to empower NABU and other relevant state institutions fully.

Zelenskyy could frame the scandal as proof that despite clear progress made by Ukraine in dealing with corruption, much more remains to be done. He could demonstrate his openness by inviting advice from Ukrainian civil society and the country’s international partners. This current crisis has clearly demonstrated the dangers of relying on just a small circle at Bankova to get things done.

Such a speech should not be a one off. It should be the start of a dialogue with the Ukrainian public, much like Zelenskyy’s masterful wartime communications. This dialogue should include regular updates on efforts to bring those responsible for this theft to justice, and news about steps to strengthen state institutions against the scourge of corruption. Zelenskyy has the skills to take this on. Now is the time to do it.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 23, 2025

Russia’s ‘human safari’ in southern Ukraine is a warning to the world

By Oleksandr Tolokonnikov

Russia’s escalating campaign of drone attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine’s Kherson region highlights the destructive power of modern drone technologies, writes Oleksandr Tolokonnikov.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Nov 4, 2025

EU praises Ukraine’s progress but warns Zelenskyy over corruption

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s bid to join the EU received a boost this week with the release of a report praising the country’s progress toward future membership, but EU officials also warned President Zelenskyy about the dangers of backsliding on anti-corruption reforms, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Corruption

UkraineAlert Nov 6, 2025

Vladimir Putin’s endless nuclear threats are a sign of Russian weakness

By Stephen Blank

Since 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly used nuclear threats to deter Western support for Ukraine, but this scare tactic risks exposing Russia’s inability to project strength via more conventional means, writes Stephen Blank.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Zelenskyy faces the biggest corruption scandal of his presidency appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 7, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig published an article in Foreign Policy titled “Trump Should Oust Maduro.” In the article, Kroenig lays out how President Trump could remove President Maduro from power without using military force.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in Foreign Policy on ousting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Victoria J. Taylor: His coalition may have won, but Sudani faces stiff opposition to a second term

Omar Al-Nidawi: A higher turnout than expected, especially in predominantly Sunni and Kurdish provinces

Safwan Al-Amin: What to watch from the Iraqi Higher Electoral Commission

Yerevan Saeed: The KDP remains the dominant party in the Kurdistan region

Rend Al-Rahim: The elections consolidated the grip of Iraq’s traditional parties

His coalition may have won, but Sudani faces stiff opposition to a second term

While Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development bloc did very well throughout southern Iraq, translating his high approval into votes, he still appears to have fallen short of the overwhelming victory he likely needed to guarantee a second term as prime minister. In the weeks ahead of the election, Sudani launched a public relations offensive in the Western press. He published an op-ed in the New York Post and gave interviews to Bloomberg and Newsweek aimed at securing US and international support for a second term, making a pitch for his “Iraq first” agenda. 

However, the days of decisive US engagement in the government formation process are likely over. For Sudani to secure a second term, he will have to do so the old-fashioned way by building a coalition. Although popular among the public, Sudani does not have ready alliances among the other major Shia parties and coalitions. The two largest Shia blocs after Sudani’s are former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition and the Al-Sadiqoun Bloc (which is affiliated with the US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq) both of which oppose giving Sudani a second term.

—Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

A higher turnout than expected, especially in predominantly Sunni and Kurdish provinces

Contrary to what many Iraq watchers expected, myself included, the initial results—if accurate—suggest that more Iraqis were motivated to vote this time. Turnout reached almost 56 percent of registered voters, according to Iraq’s electoral commission, a notable jump from 43 percent in 2021. However, part of this increase is tempered by the fact that there were 700,000 fewer registered voters than in 2021, even though nearly four million Iraqis have reached voting age since then. In other words, while the voter pool shrank, the absolute number of ballots cast actually grew.

Another striking development is the geographic variation in turnout. Whereas participation in 2021 was uniformly low across all provinces, Tuesday’s vote revealed new patterns: Turnout was significantly higher in predominantly Kurdish and Sunni provinces than in Shia-majority areas. This divide was also evident within Baghdad, between the mostly Sunni western and Shia eastern banks of the Tigris. In 2021, the gap between the provinces with the highest and lowest turnout—Duhok and Baghdad—was more than 20 percent; this time, it widened to a 36 percent gap between the highest turnout in Duhok and the lowest in Sudani’s home province of Maysan.

With party platforms largely devoid of real policy proposals, were the shifts driven mainly by more effective mobilization through tribal and patronage networks? Or were they primarily driven by a more genuine sense of stability and renewed hope among voters? A deeper analysis will be needed to explain these shifts.

—Omar Al-Nidawi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Al-Nidawi is also the director of programs at the Enabling Peace in Iraq Center, where he co-develops and leads research and field initiatives focused on governance, peacebuilding, and climate action in Iraq.

What to watch from the Iraqi Higher Electoral Commission

At this point, the only official information released by the Iraqi Higher Electoral Commission (IHEC) relates to voter turnout. IHEC put voter participation at around 56 percent. What is noteworthy is that IHEC only counted those who obtained or renewed voter registration cards as eligible voters, and did not count those who failed to so or intentionally boycotted as eligible voters.

This participation level is still higher than most had expected given that there was a strong boycott campaign led by al-Sadr as well as other smaller political movements. Initial leaked results show that the established parties maintained most of their seats, with Sudani’s coalition being the new big entrant. The smaller liberal parties appear to have lost momentum. Most of this is by design and a result of the electoral system the main parties reverted to when they amended the election law in 2023. We should also keep an eye on the potential post-results exclusion of candidates by IHEC, which could potentially change the results.

—Safwan Al-Amin is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

The KDP remains the dominant party in the Kurdistan region

Preliminary election results reaffirm the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP’s) political dominance in the Kurdistan region. It garnered more than one million votes and secured twenty-seven seats while its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) received roughly half as many votes but still increased its share of seats from seventeen to eighteen. When compared to last year’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) election, the PUK’s votes declined in areas under KRG jurisdiction, while the KDP’s increased. Outside KRG-controlled territory, the PUK won four seats in Kirkuk while the KDP emerged as the leading party in votes and seats in Nineveh province. This will further challenge the PUK’s influence in areas beyond the KRG’s authority. In addition, five minority-quota candidates backed by the KDP across Iraq also won seats, further strengthening the party’s leverage at the federal level.

New actors also made gains. Halwest won five seats, while New Generation, which previously held nine seats, dropped to four. The two main Islamist parties maintained their previous share seats of four and one seats respectively. Despite these shifts, the broader electoral map in the Kurdistan Region remains largely intact. Most changes in seat distribution occurred among smaller, antiestablishment parties within the PUK’s traditional areas of influence. The PUK had aimed to win back voters and reclaim seats in these strongholds, many of which it has gradually lost over the past fifteen years to emerging parties. Instead, a familiar pattern persisted: Voters in PUK-dominated areas continue to be more inclined than others to experiment with and switch to new political forces.

These results are likely to embolden the KDP to hold firm on its terms for forming the new KRG cabinet. This, in turn, could affect government formation in Baghdad, given that the KDP is now among the top three blocs in terms of seats at the federal level and can wield significant influence over the Iraqi presidency, a post traditionally held by the PUK since 2003. At the same time, negotiations over the new federal government in Baghdad could make the pie larger for the KDP and PUK, enabling them to reach compromises on key issues and ministerial portfolios that might facilitate the formation of a government in the KRG. The central question is whether the PUK will accept a government in Erbil that reflects its actual votes and seats or continue to insist on a fifty-fifty power-sharing arrangement based on territorial control.

—Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Saeed is the Barzani scholar-in-residence in the Department of Politics, Governance & Economics at American University’s School of International Service, where he also serves as director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace.

The elections consolidated the grip of Iraq’s traditional parties

No clear winner emerged from the November 11 parliamentary elections. The forty-five seats gained by Sudani’s bloc did not represent the landslide his supporters had hoped for. Nevertheless, this was a significant improvement on the two seats his party occupies in the outgoing parliament. The KDP and Mohamed al-Halbousi’s Taqaddum coalition also made gains. Sadiqoun, the political arm of the Asaib Ahl Al-Haqq militia expanded its presence in Parliament, as well. The big losers were smaller parties, independents, and liberal/secular candidates, who didn’t stand a chance under the 2023 changes to the election law and the massive sums spent by the big parties and candidates. Another loser is Muqtada al-Sadr, whose call for a boycott clearly went unheeded, and who has been marginalized by the elections and needs to find new relevance. Despite popular calls for change, the elections brought no new blood but consolidated the grip of the traditional parties.

The next phase is the process of forming a government. Sudani’s postelection address sounded like an acceptance speech, but it is far from certain that he will serve a second term as prime minister. Negotiations to create the largest parliamentary bloc will be contentious. A grand alliance of Sudani’s bloc with the KDP and Taqaddum, such as was attempted by al-Sadr in 2021, is now even more far-fetched. Instead, the Shia Coordination Framework coalition is likely to declare itself the largest parliamentary bloc and claim the right to nominate the new prime minister, and many members of this bloc are adamantly opposed to Sudani. While the Shia Coordination Framework can nominate, the high number of seats won by the KDP and Taqaddum will give the latter two blocs a powerful countervailing voice over the nomination. Iranian and US influence will also be elements in the nomination process. In previous Iraqi government formation cycles, there was tacit agreement between Washington and Tehran. But the Trump administration, with its confrontational posture toward Iran, will likely make such an agreement difficult to reach, thus prolonging the government formation process.

—Rend Al-Rahim is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

The post Experts react: How will Iraq’s parliamentary election shape the country’s politics? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed this positive appraisal of his country’s efforts and said the European Commission report confirmed that Ukraine “is confidently moving toward EU membership.” It was not all good news for the Ukrainian leader, however. EU officials also raised concerns over Zelenskyy’s domestic policies amid mounting allegations of backsliding in Kyiv on core anti-corruption reforms that are widely regarded as vital for Ukraine’s further European integration. “Recent negative trends, including pressure on the specialized anti-corruption agencies and civil society, must be decisively reversed,” the annual accession review underlined.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The criticism currently being leveled at the Ukrainian authorities in Brussels is not entirely unexpected. In July 2025, Zelenskyy stunned Ukraine’s Western allies and sparked domestic outrage by backing a controversial parliamentary bill that was widely interpreted as an attempt to end the independence of the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

The scandal provoked Ukraine’s largest street protests since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, with thousands of Ukrainians braving possible Russian bombardment to rally in cities across the country against Zelenskyy’s apparent power grab. Kyiv’s partners were also quick to voice their alarm and signal that the move could put future international support for the Ukrainian war effort at risk.

Faced with overwhelming opposition at home and anger in key foreign capitals, Zelenskyy quickly backed down and reversed efforts to assert control over Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. Nevertheless, this week’s European Commission Enlargement Report has highlighted the lingering damage done by this brief and entirely self-inflicted crisis to the Ukrainian leader’s credibility.

Nor is this the only fly in the ointment. In addition to his headline-grabbing summer 2025 U-turn over Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms, Zelenskyy is also facing accusations from political opponents and civil society representatives of using lawfare to silence critics and consolidate power in his own hands. This is not a good look for a man who has sought to position himself as one of the leaders of the democratic world.

Zelenskyy has pushed back hard against his critics. He has pointed to Ukraine’s unprecedented success in meeting EU accession targets amid extremely challenging wartime conditions, while underlining the scale of his country’s anti-corruption reforms. “We have implemented the widest, the broadest anti-corruption infrastructure in Europe. I don’t know about any country that has as many anti-corruption authorities,” he commented in response to this week’s report. “We are doing everything possible.”

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For the time being, any disquiet over Zelenskyy’s anti-corruption credentials is unlikely to derail Ukraine’s EU membership momentum. While there is no agreement on how soon Ukraine can expect to join, the country’s eventual accession is now viewed in most European capitals as crucial for the continent’s future stability and security.

Ukrainian aspirations to join the EU first began to take shape in the wake of the country’s 2004 Orange Revolution, leading to years of meandering negotiations over a possible Association Agreement between Kyiv and Brussels. When this document was finally ready to be signed in 2013, Russia intervened and pressured the Ukrainian authorities to reject the deal. This led directly to a second Ukrainian revolution and the fall of the country’s pro-Kremlin government.

With Moscow’s efforts to thwart Ukraine’s European integration rapidly unraveling, Russian President Vladimir Putin chose to escalate and launched the invasion of Crimea in February 2014. This watershed moment marked the start of Russian armed aggression against Ukraine. Following the seizure of the Crimean peninsula, Moscow established Kremlin-controlled “separatist republics” in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. When this limited Russian military intervention failed to derail Ukraine’s EU ambitions, Putin raised the stakes further with the full-scale invasion of 2022.

As Russian aggression has escalated, Ukrainian public support for EU membership has increased and opposition has withered away. An issue that once divided Ukrainians fairly evenly now unites the nation. This is hardly surprising. For millions of Ukrainians, the quest to join the EU has become synonymous with the country’s civilizational choice of European democracy over Russian autocracy.

Zelenskyy would be well advised to keep this in mind as he seeks to balance domestic political considerations with Ukraine’s EU aspirations and the urgent need to maintain international support for the war effort. Ukrainians have made staggering sacrifices along the road toward EU membership and will not take kindly to anyone who places this progress in jeopardy. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s EU integration currently enjoys strong public and political support across Europe, but backsliding on core values could still undermine Kyiv’s case and provide fuel for Russia as it seeks to discredit Ukraine and prevent the country’s historic exit from the Kremlin orbit.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 28, 2025

UN report: Russia targets civilians in systematic bid to depopulate Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Russia is deliberately targeting Ukrainian civilians in a deadly drone strike campaign that aims to depopulate large parts of the country and constitutes a crime against humanity, according to a new United Nations report, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Oct 31, 2025

Europe finally moves to ban Russian gas but potential loopholes remain

By Aura Sabadus

The EU has recently moved to impose a full ban on Russian gas imports by 2028. After years of using energy exports to blackmail Europe and fund the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow is finally facing the loss of its last European costumers, writes Aura Sabadus.

Conflict Energy Markets & Governance

UkraineAlert Oct 23, 2025

Russia’s ‘human safari’ in southern Ukraine is a warning to the world

By Oleksandr Tolokonnikov

Russia’s escalating campaign of drone attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine’s Kherson region highlights the destructive power of modern drone technologies, writes Oleksandr Tolokonnikov.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post EU praises Ukraine’s progress but warns Zelenskyy over corruption appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This issue brief is part of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “The future of democracy assistance” series, which analyzes the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Introduction: A region undergoing transformation

Since the third wave of democratization—the global surge of democratic transitions beginning in the mid-1970s—Europe has often been regarded as a leader in the field of liberal democracy. In its 2024 Democracy Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks Western Europe as the highest-scoring region worldwide, with an average of 8.38—making it the only region to record a net improvement in democratic performance during the latest annual cycle. However, this snapshot only captures part of Europe’s democratic story and can be misleading, given the complex challenges confronting many of its subregions.

Over the past fifteen years, Europe has endured a “polycrisis”—including the eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine war—all of which have strained democratic institutions and weakened public cohesion.

Europe faces two primary authoritarian adversaries: Russia, which employs election interference, military aggression, and other forms of destabilization, and China, which wields influence through commercial trade deals, loans, and strategic alliances. Together, these pressures accelerate democratic backsliding across the continent.

In the Western Balkans, these dynamics are magnified by elite corruption, foreign interference, and internal political conflict—factors that block long-term democratic progress and stall European Union (EU) integration. The nations in this region face a constant balancing act between the West and its authoritarian rivals in Moscow and Beijing, striving to grow their economies while potentially jeopardizing security and stability. Without increased US support, the Western Balkans could become a serious vulnerability for the EU, with implications for the security and sovereignty of both NATO and the broader West.

The need for a revitalized, regionalized US democracy assistance approach 

Electoral manipulation, the erosion of the rule of law, and authoritarian instability undermine US-European trade, weaken security alliances, and open the door to Russian and Chinese influence. Moscow and Beijing—through disinformation, political infiltration, and economic leverage—have made the Western Balkans a particular focus. Both employ tailored strategies to exploit the weaknesses of the nations in the region—particularly with respect to their election processes, security mechanisms, and political divisions.

Given these circumstances, US democracy assistance in the Western Balkans is vital. Situated between the EU, NATO, and the eastern spheres of influence of Russia and China, the region occupies a critical geopolitical junction. Economically, the Balkans function as a transport hub for maritime trade, energy pipelines, and migrant flows, making it a flash point for European stability.

Today, the region faces intense pressure from the competing economic and political influence of China, Russia, Iran, and other rivals. Left unchecked, the Balkans could serve as a staging ground for authoritarian powers to entrench their hold on Europe. Current developments in the region underscore that this threat is no longer hypothetical:

1. Serbia’s deepening ties to Moscow and Beijing—evident in its energy dependence, military cooperation, and expanding digital-surveillance infrastructure—pose direct threats to transatlantic interests.
2. Russia’s sway over Republika Srpska obstructs Bosnia and Herzegovina’s path toward NATO and EU integration, while promoting constitutional instability that undermines national unity.
3. Montenegro and North Macedonia, though NATO members, are increasingly vulnerable to hybrid threats from Russia and China, owing to weak institutions and growing political fragmentation.

To be effective, US democracy assistance must reflect the varying dynamics across the Balkans, from balancing Western ties with Russian and Chinese incentives to navigating complex internal conflicts amidst deteriorating democratic institutions. These challenges require programs that improve governance accountability and address frozen inter-state conflicts by working with legitimate political parties and local actors. Revitalized, region-specific democracy assistance is necessary to protect US interests and reinforce European democratic security. Supporting democratic development abroad strengthens US security, prosperity, and global influence, while delaying this support further endangers the United States and its allies through long-term instability and conflict.

In the Western Balkans, democracy is facing internal and external pressure

Today, the six countries comprising the Western Balkans are classified as hybrid regimes, reflecting the region’s persistent democratic decline and institutional fragility. Future democracy assistance must counter the persistent influence of Russia and China, which exploit energy and economic dependence to shift the Balkans away from EU integration.

Serbia

Serbia has wavered between pro-Western gestures and deepening ties with Russia and China—exemplified by its decision to provide military support to Ukraine while refusing to impose sanctions on Russia. According to the V-Dem annual reports, Serbia has experienced rapid democratic decay since the early 2000s under the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Over the past decades, the ruling party has entrenched its control over the judiciary and the media, undermining democratic checks and electoral competition.

The December 2023 snap elections revealed widespread manipulation, including group voting, falsified voter registration, and targeted attacks on election observers. The government’s growing alignment with Moscow and Beijing, including recent acquisitions of surveillance technology and energy deals with China, threatens Serbia’s European trajectory and regional stability. These developments not only signal the absence of free and fair elections but also invite authoritarian influence on NATO’s southeastern flank.

Since 2024, students have organized mass mobilizations to protest widespread corruption. These demonstrations are likely to continue, emphasizing the need for US support in fostering pluralism and protecting political contestation.

The unresolved conflict between Kosovo and Serbia continues to fuel internal unrest, violence, and protests. Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence has deepened resentment between populations, restricted access to public services in northern Kosovo, and undermined democratic norms.  While the United States and most EU member states support Kosovo’s sovereignty, Serbia is backed by authoritarian powers, including Russia, China, and Iran. This continued denial, along with Serbia’s support for parallel structures in Serb-majority areas, remains a major barrier to Kosovo’s integration into the EU, the UN, and other international institutions.

Kosovo

In Kosovo, internal ethnic tensions and stalled dialogue with Serbia continue to destabilize governance. The May 2024 clashes, which included violence against NATO forces, highlight the fragility of peace in the region. Currently, Kosovo and Serbia share responsibility for public services in northern Kosovo: Serbia supplies education and health care, while Kosovo oversees law enforcement and the court system. This arrangement, however, has left the Serbian minority vulnerable. Prime Minister Albin Kurti deployed heavily armed police across the region, evicted Serbian institutions, banned the use of Serbian currency, and took other provocative actions, prompting roughly 10 percent of Kosovo’s Serbs to leave the country over the past year.

Politically, while Kurti’s Self-Determination Movement won the largest share of votes in the 2025 parliamentary elections, his inability to secure a majority or form a coalition with major opposition parties has stalled democratic reforms.  The prime minister’s hardline stance toward the Serb minority, which appears aimed at consolidating domestic support, has drawn criticism from both Western partners and opposition groups. In response, the United States and the EU suspended financial assistance to pressure Kurti to re-engage with inclusive governance and align with international norms. The resulting political dissonance continues to complicate coalition-building and delay key democratic initiatives aimed at reducing internal ethnic tensions, underscoring the need for external assistance.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Governance remains stagnant in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to an outdated power-sharing arrangement and ethnically fragmented leadership resistant to meaningful reform. The stalled EU accession process and the exclusion of civil society from decision-making have undermined democratic momentum and weakened citizen trust. With political elites increasingly insulated from accountability, institutional resilience is eroding, and democratic contestation faces the risk of further collapse without stronger international support and grassroots mobilization.

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s democratic decline has been sharper than in other Balkan states. In Republika Srpska—a political entity that emerged from the violent breakup of Yugoslavia—Bosnian Serb President Milorad Dodik has worked to suppress public contestation, recriminalize defamation, and align the territory with the Kremlin’s anti-Western agenda. Dodik’s admiration for Vladimir Putin has facilitated growing Russian influence, undermining independent media and silencing opposition voices. In return, Dodik has received Russian political backing and propaganda support.

While Dodik’s mandate was revoked in late August following an appeals court verdict sentencing him to a one-year prison term, his influence has already entrenched ties to Russia and fueled intense contestation of central institutions. These authoritarian shifts are part of a broader ethno-nationalist strategy that heightens vulnerability to state capture and weakens institutional pluralism.

To reinforce the court’s decision, the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina has called early presidential elections in Republika Srpska. Scheduled for November 23, 2025, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and other international entities have voiced support, emphasizing the need for free, constitutional, and democratic elections and a peaceful transfer of power.

North Macedonia

Democratic governance in North Macedonia continues to be undermined by low public trust in judicial institutions, media polarization, and widespread corruption. Citizens perceive the judiciary as politicized and ineffective, even as landmark trials against former officials have concluded. Efforts to digitize courts and increase transparency remain promising but insufficient without broader structural reform. Corruption remains deeply entrenched in procurement processes and political appointments, while anti-corruption agencies are underfunded and lack prosecutorial power. Meanwhile, ethnic and political divisions continue to block electoral reform and erode public confidence in representative democracy. While civil society remains relatively active, government hostility toward critical NGOs signals a shrinking space for civic participation.

North Macedonia’s democratic trajectory has been weakened by increasing political polarization, institutional paralysis, and unresolved identity conflicts with EU members. Since 2022, the opposition party VMRO-DPMNE and the far-left party Levica have obstructed parliamentary proceedings to push for early elections, delaying key judicial appointments and agency confirmations. These deadlocks have stalled the Constitutional Court’s functionality, leaving only four of the required nine judges seated and risking a constitutional crisis. Similarly, state agencies such as the Judicial Council, the public broadcaster board, and antidiscrimination commissions remain vacant due to legislative obstruction, undermining government capacity and the rule of law.

These divisions intensified following the 2022 EU-facilitated “French proposal,” which aimed to resolve Bulgaria’s veto over North Macedonia’s accession negotiations. While the deal unblocked the EU path, it required controversial constitutional amendments recognizing the Bulgarian minority. The ruling Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) coalition accepted the compromise, triggering mass protests, fueling nationalist backlash, and galvanizing Eurosceptic sentiment. The opposition launched multiple failed referendums and accused the government of “high treason,” stalling consensus on reforms necessary for EU integration. While the government’s acceptance of the proposal allowed accession talks to begin, it also deepened identity politics and weakened democratic cohesion.

Montenegro

Montenegro’s 2020 elections marked a critical turning point, ending the Democratic Party of Socialists’ (DPS) rule and opening the door to democratic renewal. The new coalition government, led in part by United Reform Action’s (URA) Dritan Abazović, entered with a reformist mandate centered on EU integration and anti-corruption. However, ideological fragmentation and a limited majority produced political instability and stalled reform efforts. Today, judicial appointments remain politicized, anti-corruption efforts are faltering, and deep-rooted patronage networks resist institutional change. The coalition’s collapse in 2022 and the formation of a minority government with DPS support highlighted the fragility of Montenegro’s democratic transition.

Amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU expedited Montenegro’s accession process as a geopolitical priority. While the country remains a top candidate for EU membership by 2028, this acceleration has come at the expense of EU democratic standards. Despite progress, media politicization, weak judicial independence, and institutional capture persist.  The EU’s lenient conditionality—prioritizing regional stability over reform—risks reinforcing superficial compliance. US democracy assistance should focus on strengthening the rule of law, protecting independent media, and supporting civil society to ensure Montenegro’s accession reflects genuine democratic consolidation rather than merely geopolitical expediency.

Albania

Albania’s democratic system is historically fragile and deeply conflicted. Prime Minister Edi Rama and the Socialist Party (SP) hold a strong majority, having secured a fourth consecutive term in the 2025 parliamentary elections with 52.2 percent of the vote. Although the country’s elections are competitive and professionally administered, they take place in a polarized environment marked by allegations of vote-buying and the use of public funds in underprivileged areas to influence outcomes. The SP’s practices undermine pluralism and weaken local governments, which often struggle to provide basic services.

The main opposition, fragmented between factions of the Democratic Party, has failed to meaningfully challenge the government, resulting in diminished parliamentary oversight. This dysfunction culminated in violence in late 2023, after which the government passed restrictive laws curbing opposition activities.

Civil society contributes to national debates, but its impact is often limited due to underfunding, exclusion from policymaking, and occasional co-optation by partisan interests. The media landscape remains largely independent and frequently holds public officials accountable; however, ownership is concentrated in the hands of politically connected elites who leverage their platforms to influence parties and government actors. These insufficient accountability mechanisms have fueled disinformation and deepened public distrust—a vulnerability that Russia could exploit.

Despite these challenges, Albania has a strong foundation of civil society and independent media. The country needs comprehensive support that strengthens civic participation, protects independent journalists, and establishes equitable funding mechanisms for municipal governments.

Reaffirming ties with the EU

The EU recently met with Western Balkan leaders to conceptualize a Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. The meeting included pre-financing payments under the Reform and Growth Facility for North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia, and further incentivized Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina to pursue reforms.

Emerging deals included new flagship investments in clean energy, initiatives to integrate the region into the EU Single Market, and measures to enhance digital connectivity. Each of these steps outlines technical areas of alignment between the EU and the Balkans, yet questions remain about the future of democracy in the region.

The Western Balkans remain caught between competing pressures: democratic deterioration, unresolved regional conflicts, and growing authoritarian influence. While the EU has invested heavily in the region’s integration, technical improvements alone cannot guarantee democratic development. Therefore, the United States must support the EU’s expansion efforts while emphasizing the importance of democracy. This requires a revitalized approach—one that engages political parties, energizes civil society, and rewards meaningful democratic reforms.

A revitalized approach to democracy assistance

US democracy assistance should embrace three pillars: people, the rule of law, and political processes. These pillars can be broken down into thematic priorities—anti-corruption measures, the protection of independent media and civil society, the empowerment of political parties and contestation, and other vital actions to revitalize democratic progress.

Fostering people-centered strategies

Democracy can only be sustained with inclusive policies that foster an informed, engaged, and educated public. In the face of authoritarian power—which has provoked mass protests and ethnic tensions, creating openings for Chinese and Russian influence—incorporating people-centered objectives is vital to mitigate internal conflict. The United States should therefore prioritize civic education, inter-ethnic dialogue channels, and youth engagement, especially in areas where political violence and protests are prevalent.

Application examples

In Kosovo, this strategy would involve programs fostering interethnic dialogue between Albanian and Serb youth in schools and community spaces. Assistance could also expand civic education initiatives in Serb-majority areas and empower youth-led organizations focused on reconciliation, rights awareness, and political participation. In addition, the United States should provide legal and technical assistance to civil society groups seeking to hold municipal leaders accountable, particularly in border regions.

The United States should counter concentrated executive power through media literacy training in Republika Srpska, stronger protections for journalists and civic actors, and forums to address misinformation and anti-Western rhetoric. Ensuring access to education and multiethnic safe spaces would help mitigate the long-term effects of President Dodik’s autocratic, pro-Kremlin legacy, and support intra-group dialogue in preparation for a democratic election.

Serbia’s student-led protests reflect a desire to challenge government corruption and demand public safety. The United States should support this mobilization by investing in youth-led civic initiatives, combining education with inclusive services for ethnic minorities. However, progress between Serbs and Albanians will remain challenging unless Serbia’s political leadership accepts internationally recognized borders. 

Public services and rights must be non-discriminatory and inclusive of all minority populations. The United States should also work with judicial institutions in the Western Balkans to ensure protection for citizens facing disparities.

Supporting the rule of law

Building an independent, non-discriminatory judicial system is vital for reducing conflict during peace negotiations and to prevent executive overreach. US democracy assistance can deploy resources and anti-corruption support in Montenegro to encourage neighboring nations to uphold democratic standards, thereby addressing entrenched ethnic divides and intra-state violence. 

Application examples

In Albania, this strategy would prioritize strengthening anti-corruption organizations to curb executive abuse and the unfair treatment of opposition parties and municipal institutions. Cooperating with the Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK)—which has successfully prosecuted high-level officials—should be expanded to include legal training, protective measures, and transatlantic cooperation opportunities. SPAK’s credibility offers a potential framework for broader rule-of-law assistance in North Macedonia, where transparency in public procurement and prosecutorial independence remain insufficient. Judicial reform in both countries must be accompanied by public awareness campaigns to build trust in institutions and deter political interference.

These themes should be applied to Montenegro, where politicized judicial appointments and weak enforcement mechanisms continue to undermine democratic transformation. As a likely future EU member, Montenegro must strengthen its political institutions, which in turn must be held accountable by independent courts and judges. Similarly, prioritizing Montenegro’s democratic and economic alignment would provide a model for other Balkan states pursuing EU integration.

Finally, in cases of severe ethnic tensions or disparities, the United States must ensure that judicial development promotes inclusive and non-discriminatory services for citizens. This will be vital in Kosovo and Serbia, where stalled dialogue efforts weaken public services and heighten conflict, as well as in other multiethnic states such as North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. Supporting judicial institutions will not only build public trust but also protect opposition parties from executive overreach and political repression.

Safeguarding political processes

Political parties have had inconsistent levels of impact in the Western Balkans. Fair competition and coalition-building are vital to strengthen democracy and counter state capture. US assistance should directly engage with political parties to improve inclusivity, policy development, and voter mobilization.

Application examples

Montenegro’s recent election of the United Reform Action (URA) demonstrates the promise of a democratically driven government. In line with this pillar, the United States should address political fragmentation by supporting cross-party dialogue mechanisms, while also creating space for civil society members to participate in policymaking.

Similar mechanisms can be applied to Kosovo, Albania, and North Macedonia, where opposition parties struggle with ideological fragmentation. Open debates, local council meetings, and forums featuring civil society organizations and political representatives would help align citizens’ priorities and party platforms. Technical training should also be extended to countries with ethnic divisions, such as Kosovo and Serbia, focusing on inclusive policymaking and youth engagement. 

Finally, in states facing autocratic takeover, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, this strategy would promote platforms that transcend ethno-nationalist lines and foster cooperation in coalition building. With many Western Balkan states reliant on opposition parties to revitalize democracy, US assistance must prioritize fair and inclusive political competition. By integrating political parties into assistance efforts rather than sidelining them, the United States can help restore the democratic dialogue necessary for government reform. People-centered mobilization, institutional reform, and the renewal of political processes must go hand in hand to ensure democratic resilience across the Western Balkans.

Strategic implications for the United States

A three-pillar strategy—centered on people, the rule of law, and political processes—provides a pragmatic and adaptive framework for revitalizing US democracy assistance in the Western Balkans. As the region struggles with authoritarian interference, ethnic conflict, political fragmentation, and democratic decay, sustained US engagement is critical to prevent long-term instability. Democracy assistance not only builds institutional resilience and civic participation but also protects strategic US interests by stabilizing NATO’s southeastern flank, advancing EU integration, and countering Russian and Chinese influence. To ensure long-term stability and democratic momentum in one of Europe’s most volatile regions, the United States must treat democracy assistance as a core component of its foreign policy and global leadership.

Stephen Nix is the senior director for Europe and Eurasia at the International Republican Institute.

Megan Tamisiea is a researcher with an MA in Democracy and Governance from Georgetown University.

The future of democracy assistance

This paper series provides an in-depth look at the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post Democracy at a crossroads: Rule of law and the case for US engagement in the Balkans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Serbia’s energy lifeline is now under US sanctions after 8 months of postponements. Washington has targeted NIS, Serbia’s main oil company, majority-owned by Russia’s Gazprom Neft, striking at the core of Belgrade’s energy system and its fragile balance between Moscow and Brussels.

With 80% of Serbia’s fuel supply flowing through NIS, the sanctions raise urgent questions:

• Will Russia sell its stake in Serbia’s oil giant?
• Could Western or regional buyers step in?
• And how will this reshape Belgrade’s geopolitical balancing act between East and West?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Europe Center Senior Fellow, speaks with Dr. Igor Novaković, Senior Associate at the International and Security Affairs Centre, ISAC Fund, to unpack what these sanctions mean for Serbia’s energy security, its economy, and its future in Europe’s political orbit.

From the refinery to the corridors of Brussels and Moscow, this is a story about power, dependency, and the price of neutrality in a region caught between competing global interests.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post Can Serbia survive US sanctions on Russian oil? | A Debrief with Igor Novaković appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This issue brief is part of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “The future of democracy assistance” series, which analyzes the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Introduction

How do democracies die? Not with a dramatic coup, but through quiet, intentional dismantling—rules bent just slightly, laws rewritten, oppositions discredited and then disarmed. This warning from political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt has proven prophetic across South and Southeast Asia, where the past decade has witnessed steady democratic erosion.

According to Freedom House’s 2025 assessments, nine countries across South and Southeast Asia registered net declines in political rights and civil liberties since 2015—including Cambodia, India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam—while others such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka saw modest improvements. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute also reports significant declines in the Electoral Democracy Index scores of several countries in the region in recent years. This trend underscores that even seemingly stable democracies can undergo serious erosion of their democratic institutions.

Yet the pattern is not uniform. From Indonesia’s institutional resilience to Myanmar’s military collapse, the region reflects not a single arc but a mosaic of democratic experiences—some unraveling, others resisting, many caught in an uneasy limbo. To make sense of these divergent patterns, this paper outlines four broad categories of country cases—not intended to simplify, but to reflect recurring traits: democracies that have held firm under pressure (resilient democracies); those that appear intact but are internally weakening (strained democracies); those whose institutions exist in name more than practice (fragile democracies); and those where the democratic practice has been openly dismantled (collapsed democracies).

With nearly 2.8 billion inhabitants, South and Southeast Asia are on the front line in the contest between liberal and authoritarian governance models. China’s state-led modernization offers an appealing, albeit illiberal template. Russia and other powers lend not just rhetorical support but operational tools to repress, manipulate, and surveil. The region’s democratic trajectory will carry implications far beyond its borders. As democracy is tested and redefined here, the terms of legitimacy, resistance, and political belonging across much of the world will be as well.

Resilient democracies

Despite facing similar pressures as their neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia have managed to preserve their democratic institutions through a combination of judicial independence, active civil society, and political cultures that still value competitive elections. Their resilience offers lessons for other countries grappling with authoritarian pressures.

Malaysia

Malaysia has demonstrated remarkable democratic resilience through successive political transitions, most significantly during the watershed 2018 elections that ended Barisan Nasional’s sixty-one-year grip on power.[i] Despite the political instability that followed—including the controversial “Sheraton Move” parliamentary reconfiguration and three changes in premiership between 2020 and 2022—constitutional processes prevailed, ultimately yielding a durable unity government under Anwar Ibrahim after the 2022 elections. This political settlement between former adversaries reflects a maturing democratic culture where coalition-building efforts trumped winner-takes-all politics. While Malaysia continues to navigate challenges including ethnic and religious polarization, endemic corruption networks, and institutional legacies from its semi-authoritarian past, its judiciary has increasingly asserted independence in landmark cases, most notably in upholding the conviction of former Prime Minister Najib Razak.[iii] Civil society organizations maintain active oversight of governance, even as authorities occasionally employ outdated sedition laws to restrict political expression. Malaysia’s capacity to weather multiple leadership crises while preserving core democratic institutions stands in sharp contrast to the authoritarian regression evident elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Indonesia

The fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998 ushered in democratic reforms in Indonesia, leading to multiple peaceful transfers of power. In February 2024, former General Prabowo Subianto, Suharto’s controversial ex-son-in-law, won the presidency in an election widely considered competitive, despite concerns over the outsized influence of his predecessor, Joko Widodo. Provincial and regional elections in November further demonstrated Indonesia’s commitment to regular electoral processes. While Indonesia largely operates within democratic rules, it continues to grapple with systemic corruption and restrictions on religious freedom. Although the constitution guarantees religious freedom, only six religions are officially recognized, and blasphemy laws are enforced, leaving religious minorities vulnerable to discrimination. These challenges reflect enduring tensions within the country’s democracy. Nevertheless, civil society continues to play an essential role in defending democratic norms. In recent months, rushed legislative processes and Subianto’s appointment of an active general to a civilian post prompted mass student protests demanding transparency, demonstrating continued public engagement and resistance in Indonesia.

Strained democracies

India and the Philippines reveal a troubling paradox: Even countries with deep democratic traditions can experience significant erosion while maintaining competitive elections. Their struggles show that democracy’s survival depends not just on electoral competition, but on protecting the institutions that make elections meaningful.

India

Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s election in 2014, India has experienced rising Hindu nationalism, communal tensions, and constraints on civil liberties, alongside a concentration of executive power and weakened checks and balances. Communal violence has increased rapidly; in 2024, there were fifty-nine communal riots, an 84 percent increase from 2023. Media freedom has deteriorated, with increased censorship of content critical of Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), such as a BBC documentary and films depicting the 2002 Gujarat riots. Independent journalism is under attack, and civil society groups have been targeted through funding cuts and mass shutdowns.

In the face of these threats, India’s democratic institutions have shown resilience. The 2024 general elections, which were peacefully conducted with over 640 million voters, were widely regarded as free and fair. Although Modi secured a third term, the BJP underperformed, losing sixty-three seats and failing to secure a parliamentary majority. While the BJP’s platform centered religious nationalism, voters prioritized local issues, reflecting the enduring strength of India’s electoral processes.

The Philippines

The Philippines has experienced significant political and human rights challenges in recent years. Under the populist and illiberal administration of former President Rodrigo Duterte, the country witnessed thousands of extrajudicial killings linked to a brutal drug war. Democratic institutions weakened rapidly, and critics in the judiciary were forced out as the Supreme Court began backing the executive. While the Philippines has a historically strong and diverse civil society, civic space and the media environment were suppressed through regulations, censorship, intimidation, and disinformation.

In 2022, Duterte was succeeded by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. Although human rights have improved slightly under the current president, over 840 extrajudicial killings have occurred since he took office. Duterte’s March 2025 arrest in Manila on an International Criminal Court warrant exacerbated the tense divide between Marcos Jr. and Vice President Sara Duterte ahead of the May midterm elections. While competitive, the elections exposed institutional vulnerabilities and were marked by aggressive disinformation campaigns, concerns about Chinese interference, and deep polarization. The government continues to bring unfounded cases against civil society groups, and “red-tagging” (i.e., accusing individuals and groups of communist sympathies) persists, exposing people to harassment and violence. Despite these threats, civil society remains active, criticizing injustices, advocating for reforms, and fighting for accountability.

Fragile democracies

Bangladesh and Pakistan remain caught between democratic aspirations and authoritarian realities. While their institutions remain weak and elections flawed, the persistence of civil society activism and public demands for accountability suggest that democratic possibilities have not been extinguished.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh is amid a pivotal political transition following the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. Hasina’s fifteen-year rule and the Awami League’s (AL) increasingly autocratic administration ended after mass student protests and were replaced by an unelected interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. Although Yunus has pledged democratic reforms and elections, his administration continues to exhibit some of the authoritarian tendencies seen under Hasina. AL supporters, who once dominated Bangladeshi politics and suppressed opposition, now face similar harassment under the interim government and its allies.

Despite the erosion of civil liberties and democratic institutions under the AL, Bangladesh’s economy averaged healthy annual growth of 6.5 percent. However, following the political instability in 2024, foreign investments plummeted, inflation rose, and gross domestic product  growth fell below 2 percent per annum. Meanwhile, the interim government has repeatedly postponed the promised elections, likely into 2026, raising concerns. Bangladesh’s democratic transition remains uncertain, with potential for either progression or regression. Opposition leaders have pushed for timely elections; this, along with economic and political reform, will be vital to sustaining the country’s democratic aspirations.

Pakistan

Pakistan’s persistent civil-military imbalance continues to hinder democratic prospects, with the military maintaining an outsized influence over the government. Judicial activism can act as a counterbalance, as Pakistan’s judiciary maintains remarkable independence despite the entrenchment of the military. Yet the assertiveness of the judiciary may also be a double-edged sword, increasing institutional competition and instability.

Although the majority voted against the military establishment during the 2024 elections, the military continues to act as a veto power. Recent attempts to manipulate election outcomes, such as the rejection of former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s nomination papers, stripping his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), of its electoral symbol, and manipulating vote counts, were reminiscent of military-engineered elections in the 1990s. However, the failure of these interventions in 2024 has revealed vulnerabilities in the military’s grip, signaling the persistence of democratic aspirations and potential shifts in power dynamics.

Collapsed democracies

Myanmar and Cambodia demonstrate how quickly democratic gains can be reversed when authoritarian forces consolidate power. External support from China and Russia has made these reversals more durable, showing that democracy’s enemies are increasingly coordinated across borders.

Myanmar

Myanmar’s democratic experiment ended abruptly with the February 2021 military coup, which deposed the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi and precipitated the country’s descent into widespread conflict. By early 2025, the junta’s territorial control had contracted dramatically, with large areas now governed by a patchwork of ethnic armed organizations and People’s Defense Forces aligned with the National Unity Government (NUG) operating from exile. The military has responded with escalating brutality—deploying airstrikes against civilian populations, systematically torturing political detainees, and implementing scorched-earth campaigns in areas of resistance—resulting in over 5,000 civilian deaths and forcing more than 2.5 million into displacement since the coup. Elections promised by the military have been repeatedly deferred, while Suu Kyi’s detention was extended for an additional two years in January 2025 through transparently politicized corruption charges. International engagement has fragmented along geopolitical lines, with Western nations strengthening sanctions and extending recognition to the NUG while China, Russia, and Thailand maintain pragmatic relations with the junta. Myanmar represents the region’s most catastrophic democratic collapse, transforming from an imperfect but functioning electoral democracy into a failing state characterized by civil conflict, economic implosion, and humanitarian catastrophe.

Cambodia

Cambodia’s democratic prospects continue to fade under the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), now led by Hun Manet, who succeeded his father, Hun Sen, after uncompetitive elections in July 2023. Cambodian elections have been widely recognized as rigged, with international observers documenting widespread irregularities, fraud, and vote tampering. The disqualification of the main opposition party, the Candlelight Party, over alleged registration issues effectively dismantled meaningful electoral competition. The regime has become increasingly repressive, targeting critics like environmental and human rights activists through arbitrary arrests and forced disappearances.

The CPP has also cracked down on independent media by revoking licenses and censoring critical media outlets. China’s growing influence in Cambodia has further entrenched the CPP’s authoritarian rule, as it provides economic support and political backing. As Cambodia’s largest investor, trading partner, and donor, China has been able to exert considerable sway over the administration’s policies, and Cambodia has aligned more closely with Beijing’s foreign policy interests. Without democratic alternatives to China’s influence and aid, this dynamic will leave little room for democratic renewal in Cambodia.

Cross-cutting challenges

Across South and Southeast Asia’s varied political systems, certain challenges repeatedly surface that make democratic governance more challenging regardless of a country’s context. Four of these challenges are particularly salient.

Digital authoritarianism and the rewiring of civic space: The early hopes that digital tools might democratize information have been overtaken by a more sobering reality. Across the region, states now wield surveillance, censorship, and algorithmic distortion not as exceptions but as deft instruments of coercive control. India has deployed surveillance of online speech; Cambodia has centralized digital infrastructure control; and the Philippines has blurred state messaging and disinformation. These tools are part of a broader architecture of control, quietly redefining the limits of dissent and the shape of public discourse.

China’s model and strategic recalibration: Beijing’s growing regional presence offers political elites a convenient alternative: stability without pluralism, growth without accountability, an undemocratic form of social contract. Chinese financing arrives without governance conditions and provides diplomatic cover against international scrutiny. Increasingly, the Chinese Communist Party also engages subnational actors—both governmental and nongovernmental—where scrutiny is weaker and institutional vulnerabilities are more pronounced. In Cambodia and Myanmar, this support has emboldened autocratic actors; in more open settings, it narrows strategic space for democratic engagement. Democracy assistance must contend with an emerging geopolitical reality that favors regime durability over democratic deepening.

Developmental absolutism and the erosion of political choice: Democratic rollback is increasingly justified through development discourse. Leaders frame electoral mandates as licenses for centralized control while dismissing institutional checks as inefficiencies. In India and Bangladesh, majoritarian governance is defended as a prerequisite for growth; in Thailand and Singapore, technocratic authority substitutes for political deliberation. The result is marginalization of political choice, overtaken conveniently by performance-based legitimacy.

‘Information disorder and the fragility of shared reality: Across the region, democratic discourse is being reshaped by disinformation; algorithmic self-fulfilling echo chambers; and digitally amplified hate, especially through WhatsApp. In Myanmar, online propaganda fueled ethnic violence; in India and the Philippines, deepfakes and coordinated misinformation campaigns distort elections. The fundamental problem is the collapse of shared language through which citizens might contest, interpret, or imagine their politics. Democratic institutions cannot function when the conditions for contestation of ideas have eroded.

Policy recommendations

US government support for democracy should be targeted and responsive to the different realities of the countries within each of these categories. For instance, countries experiencing democratic breakdown need different support than those still defending democratic space or those working to deepen democratic quality.

For resilient democracies: Deepening democratic quality

Democratic resilience, while encouraging, should not be mistaken for consolidation. In countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, support should move beyond preserving existing norms to actively strengthening democratic infrastructure. Fast-tracked visas for civil society leaders—across regime types—could facilitate regional mentorship networks through which democratic lessons diffuse more organically, especially when those lessons emerge from other Asian contexts rather than transatlantic ones. Bilateral trade agreements can be made contingent on demonstrable gains in press freedom and judicial independence. Cross-border investigative journalism, jointly supported by local and international media, can expose corruption networks that threaten institutional integrity.

For strained democracies: Defending democratic space

Where democratic institutions are under strain—as they evidently are in India and the Philippines—US government support must focus on preserving the civic space and avoiding normalization of authoritarian tactics. It should avoid high-level engagement with leaders who are actively involved in prosecuting journalists and/or silencing dissent, even if technical cooperation continues in parallel. Development aid can be redirected from compromised central agencies toward subnational governments that are overtly committed to democratic norms. Targeted sanctions against individuals involved in judicial capture or media repression can also send clear signals of accountability.

For fragile democracies: Building institutional resilience

In fragile democracies like Bangladesh and Pakistan, where institutions exist but often lack independence and/or depth, the priority should be to rebuild credibility. International financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund, should tie future programs to transparent constitutional processes that include the opposition’s participation. Funding for civil society-run parallel election observation/monitoring programs can strengthen integrity where official mechanisms fall short. Regional judicial networks can provide both technical assistance and normative pressure to bolster court independence and resist political interference.

For collapsed democracies: Supporting democratic resistance

Where constitutional order has collapsed—as in Myanmar and Cambodia—support must shift toward those still defending democratic legitimacy. Recognition and funding should be extended to exiled national unity governments and aligned civil society organizations that retain public trust. “Democracy visa” pathways can offer protection and continuity for endangered journalists and activists. Financial sanctions should be imposed on military units and regime-linked families responsible for repression, thus reinforcing pathways for international legal accountability.

Addressing cross-cutting challenges

Support secure communication tools and digital literacy to push back against growing digital authoritarianism. Offer faster, transparent infrastructure financing to counter China’s influence while underscoring the material benefits of democracy. Sponsor and fund research that links transparency to economic growth, and support business coalitions that champion the rule of law. Strengthen civic education and fact-checking efforts to resist disinformation and restore shared civic ground. Partner with regional democracies—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia—to jointly support democratic actors across South and Southeast Asia. Such coordination not only amplifies reach but also serves as a visible and forceful counterweight to China’s expanding illiberal influence.

Conclusion

The Cold War model of supporting elections and civil society organizations, while still important, cannot possibly address the sophisticated ways that elected leaders employ to dismantle democratic institutions from within. We need a differentiated approach that recognizes the distinct challenges facing countries at different points along the democratic spectrum while addressing the cross-cutting pressures that undermine democratic governance across the region. Democracy assistance must evolve beyond its traditional fixation on electoral processes. Instead of just funding election monitors and civil society training, donors should condition trade agreements on improvements in press freedom, invest in secure communication technologies for activists, and support independent judiciaries through targeted capacity-building programs. Without these foundations, electoral democracy remains symbolic. The future of democracy in South and Southeast Asia will not only shape national destinies. It will quietly, but decisively, alter how the world understands power, legitimacy, and the meaning of democratic resilience. This is where the United States must lead—not only with aid dollars, but also with the political will to make democratic governance a nonnegotiable component of its economic partnerships.

Prakhar Sharma is a public policy researcher with more than eighteen years of experience in democratic governance and fragile states. He completed his PhD in political science at Syracuse University. Sharma was a senior specialist at the International Republican Institute, and has advised US government institutions, multilateral organizations, and Afghan partners on conflict and state-building.

Gauri Kaushik holds a master’s degree from Georgetown University in democracy and governance, where she focused on democratic and security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. She has worked on democracy assistance and development programs at organizations including the National Democratic Institute and Democracy International.

The future of democracy assistance

This paper series provides an in-depth look at the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post South and Southeast Asia are on the front lines of the democracy-autocracy showdown appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The more notable development over the summer, however, centers on how both Rome and Ankara are shifting towards a model of engagement in Libya similar to that of the United States.

Despite the trilateral meeting between Meloni, Erdoğan, and Dbeibah, Italy and Turkey also engaged with eastern powerbrokers this summer. In June, Rome signaled its willingness to deal directly with the Haftar family’s opposition when Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi sat down with Saddam Haftar, the son of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar. In August, Turkey sent its intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin to Benghazi for talks with Khalifa Haftar and senior LNA officials. 

This increased emphasis on balanced outreach across Libya’s divide appears to be in coordination with the United States, which has also been active on the Libya file in recent months, steered by US Senior Advisor Massad Boulos. This was also on display over the summer, with Boulos’ July visit to Tripoli and Benghazi, where he met with Dbeibah and other GNU officials, as well as eastern powerbrokers, including Khalifa Haftar and his sons.

With this new convergence in strategy on Libya, Washington, Ankara, and Rome can—through sustained diplomacy with eastern and western factions—reinforce the economic opportunities presented by institutional unification and reform in Libya. 

Why Libya still matters

Libya is central to European interests and remains relevant to US priorities. It has the largest proven oil reserves in Africa, but it is also a source of instability in the southern Mediterranean and a key transit point on the irregular migration route to Europe. Since 2014, Libya has been divided between east and west with multiple stalled political transitions while remaining under the influence of armed groups, political elites, and external backers.

Washington has, in recent years, focused its Libyan policy on building stability, with a focus on encouraging steps toward security integration and preserving the independent and technocratic nature of key sovereign institutions like the National Oil Corporation and the Central Bank of Libya.

Spearheaded by Boulos, the United States has recently increased its emphasis on commercial engagement, prioritizing support to US businesses looking to enter the lucrative Libyan market.

Rome’s calculus looks different.  Italian politics are dominated by migration pressures, and Libya remains the focus of the central Mediterranean route.  At the same time, natural gas imports and energy projects are viewed in Rome as essential for Italy’s long-term economic security.

Ankara views Libya as both an economic and geopolitical stage. Its military presence and commercial contracts give it leverage, while recent outreach to eastern leaders suggests that Turkey wants to exert influence on both sides of the country’s divide.

Balanced engagement model

By September of this year, it was apparent that all three of these influential external actors were aligning on what had been the United States’ approach of balanced engagement across Libya’s divide. This strategy seems practical, given that no political or economic settlement in Libya is credible without eastern powerbrokers at the table.

Boulos’ meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in August included discussions on engagements in Libya and “joint efforts to deepen cooperation.” The US official’s visit to Rome in September further demonstrated this alignment of Turkish, US, and Italian strategies. Italy’s Foreign Minister, Antonio Tajani, hosted Boulos on September 3 for talks on stability and migration management, while also inviting him to the consequential Mediterranean or “MED” Dialogues, scheduled for October in Naples.

A week later, Washington confirmed that Boulos’ visit also facilitated meetings between senior officials from western and eastern Libya, where they were encouraged “to overcome divisions, to unify institutions, and to promote stability and peace.” Reportedly, these officials included Ibrahim Dbeibah, the nephew and influential advisor to Dbeibah, and Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the LNA. On September 12, Fidan and Tajani announced in Rome that Turkey and Italy had signed a cooperation agreement and would increase collaboration on promoting a stable and prosperous Libya conducive to investment.

In addition to emphasizing balance, Turkey, Italy, and the United States are increasingly linking commerce with security in their dealings with Libyan counterparts. Energy projects, infrastructure initiatives, and trade opportunities are now frequently linked to security cooperation and migration management. The logic appears to be that commercial activity can expand as progress is made on stabilizing the security sector and consolidating key government institutions. Although each country emphasizes different priorities, together they are converging on a framework that views economic engagement and institutional unification as mutually reinforcing steps toward stability in Libya.

The most interesting development of the summer has been the alignment of American, Italian, and Turkish strategy towards Libya around a balanced engagement model that the United States has been deploying in recent years. 

The challenge now is to ensure that this convergence addresses Libya’s deeper problems.  Widespread corruption and abuses by armed groups on both sides remain unchecked. If these issues are ignored, greater international activity in commerce and the security sector may reinforce dysfunction rather than resolve it.

What is clear is that despite Libya remaining relatively low on the priority list in Washington, US influence on Libyan policy remains real and visible. Most recently demonstrated by two very influential external actors adjusting their approach to Libya to align with Washington’s balanced model. In a fragmented and multipolar landscape, Libya offers a reminder that US diplomacy can still shape outcomes in meaningful ways.

Frank Talbot is a nonresident senior fellow with the North Africa Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafid Hariri Center & Middle East programs.  Previously, he served in the Department of State supporting stabilization initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa.

Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative and a resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council, focusing on the processes of change in North Africa. 

The post US, Italy, and Turkey alignment could push the needle in Libya appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Now, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime last year, Ankara sees an opening to elevate economic ties with Syria beyond prewar levels. For Turkey, this is not merely about trade—it is about leveraging economic integration to drive reconstruction, foster regional cooperation, and create conditions for refugee returns, while ensuring that Syria emerges as a bridge to the Arab world rather than a burden to it.

On the other hand, at the joint meeting in Damascus, which was also attended by author Ömer Özkızılcık, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa emphasized the strategic importance of the Turkey-Syria-Jordan trade and supply route. The opening of this route, which was agreed upon at the tripartite summit held in Amman in recent weeks, could revive the south-north trade flow that has been disrupted for a long time due to the civil war in Syria and the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Iraq. With goods and commodities collected by the Gulf via its ports passing through this route, Syria has the potential to become a vibrant trade hub again by taking on a transit role.

The Turkish economic rationale in Syria

In 2010, Turkey enjoyed strong political and economic relations with Syria. A landmark visa-free travel arrangement allowed citizens of both countries to cross the border using only their national identity cards. The outbreak of war, however, caused exports to collapse. Over time, as highlighted by the OEC’s trade metrics, Ankara managed to revive trade, primarily flowing to opposition-held areas under Turkish protection.

Now, Ankara’s prospects for investment and new economically attractive agreements are significant in Syria, particularly in reconstruction. Turkish construction companies are well positioned to profit, competing on a global scale only with Chinese firms. Yet, Damascus lacks the financial capital to fund major projects as it re-builds a new government and recovers from years of conflict in Syria, and Turkey itself has limited capacity to provide credits or funding given its domestic economic constraints. Recognizing this reality, Ankara seeks to enhance cooperation with Arab and European partners. For instance, Turkey along with its regional Arab partners, has pledged a total of $14 billion for infrastructure development in Syria. Arab and European states would supply financing, while Turkey contributes expertise and operational capacity—an arrangement designed to deliver benefits for all parties.

This economic rationale also aligns with Ankara’s broader geopolitical vision for Syria. Rather than creating a dependent proxy, Turkey aims for Damascus to function as an independent actor and a bridge to the Arab world. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan frames the situation with these words: “Syria is an independent country, and we are now faced with a new Syria. It is necessary to allow this Syria to design its own defense policy, its own foreign policy, and its own regional relations.” Ankara’s objective is not to shoulder Syria’s burdens alone, but to transform the country from a region of conflict into a region of cooperation.

Finally, Turkey views economic investment as a powerful tool to stabilize Syria’s transitional phase and to accelerate the return of refugees. Since December 8, nearly half a million Syrians have returned home from Turkey, illustrating the direct link Ankara sees between reconstruction, economic stability, and durable return.

Turkey’s economic footprint in Syria

Following the US and European Union decisions to lift sanctions on Syria in May 2025, Turkey has rapidly expanded its economic influence in post-Assad Syria. This expansion is evident in the surge in bilateral trade, strategic reconstruction projects, and large-scale joint ventures with Qatari and US partners.

Bilateral trade between Syria and Turkey reached $1.9 billion in the first seven months of 2025, compared with $2.6 billion for all of 2024. Turkish exports surged by 54 percent year-on-year to $2.2 billion, while Syrian imports stood at $437 million. Key exports included machinery, cement, and consumer goods, with machinery alone rising 244 percent. Turkish goods, often priced 30–40 percent lower than local products, are now dominant in Syrian markets.

Turkey and regional Arab partners have committed to allocating a total of $14 billion for infrastructure development in Syria, with a particular emphasis on the sectors of energy and transportation. In August 2025, the Kilis–Aleppo natural gas pipeline began operations, channeling Azerbaijani gas into Syria. Additionally, Turkey has committed to supplying nine-hundred megawatt (MW) of electricity by 2026. Meanwhile, a Qatar-led group that included Turkish firms committed $4 billion to rebuild Damascus International Airport.

Turkey and Syria established the Turkey–Syria Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETCO) in August 2025, along with several memorandums of understanding covering investment, governance, and administrative cooperation. Talks between Turkey and Syria for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) are underway, signaling long-term trade and investment integration. 

Turkish firms such as Kalyon, Cengiz, and TAV are aggressively pursuing Syria’s $400 billion reconstruction market. DenizBank plans to expand operations, while Sun Express eyes aviation opportunities. Turkish private sector initiative Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) Turkey-Syria Business Council Chairman İbrahim Fuat Özçörekçi said that Turkey aims to increase its medium-term trade volume with Syria to $10 billion. From this perspective, the Turkish private sector sees Syria as an untapped and accessible market. Proximity, cost advantages, and historical ties give Turkey a strategic edge.

Turkey’s partnerships with Qatar and the United States in Syria

The alliance between Turkey and Qatar has played a pivotal role in the reconstruction process in Syria. The free trade agreement between Turkey and Qatar came into force at the beginning of August. This marks an advancement in the collaboration between the two countries on joint projects in Syria. Turkish–Qatari consortium, with their regional Arab partners, pledged $14 billion in urban development and funding for 200,000 jobs, while joint ventures span power generation, real estate, and infrastructure. For instance, A Qatar-led consortium, including Turkish companies, signed a $4 billion deal in August 2025 to rebuild Damascus International Airport. 

In parallel with the agreement coming into force, smaller, regional Qatari companies began establishing logistics bases in southern Turkey, increasing their commercial ventures, particularly in Aleppo and its countryside.

A separate issue to be addressed is that of Turkish-US cooperation in Syria, a matter which is being facilitated by regional Arab partners. Turkey-US cooperation focuses on energy and security areas. To date, neither private nor public sources have indicated any direct economic cooperation between the United States and Turkey in Syria, apart from security mechanisms. The United States has provided technical expertise and political backing, with the US-Turkey Syria Working Group emphasizing economic stability and security. 

A landmark $7 billion power generation deal was signed in May 2025 with Qatar’s UCC Holding, US-based Power International, and Turkish companies Kalyon and Cengiz. The deal covers four combined-cycle gas plants totaling four-thousand MW and a one-thousand MW solar project, expected to meet over half of Syria’s electricity demands.

The way forward

As Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized at the Fourth Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April 2025, Turkey seeks to “generate peace and stability on the basis of a win-win understanding and the principle of regional ownership.” This vision of regional ownership resonates with Washington’s broader approach of encouraging partners to assume greater responsibility, a policy advanced under US President Donald Trump and echoed by several Gulf capitals. While Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have yet to embark on joint economic ventures with Turkey in Syria, both are expanding their investments there in pursuit of goals that mirror Ankara’s.

The convergence of Turkish and Gulf economic strategies in Syria presents an opportunity for Washington: it aligns regional actors behind shared objectives and reduces the burden on the United States, making it all the more important for the Trump administration to support and encourage continued regional engagement in Syria.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs analyst.

Levent Kemal is a freelance journalist, researcher and independent policy adviser based in Ankara.

The post Is a new era of Turkey-Syria economic engagement on the horizon? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To that end, some initial points ought to be registered: Iran is far from a monolithic country, a new Shah may not be a realistic or suitable solution, and efforts to reform or topple the current regime are as complex and diverse as Iran’s citizens and diaspora communities. What follows is a brief illustration of two key regions.

Related reading

MENASource

Sep 23, 2025

A geography of protest: Inside the rise of Iran’s minority factor

By Mohammed A. Salih

From the death of Mahsa Jina Amini to the Twelve Day War, the ethnic question has emerged as a significant dimension of Iran’s politics.

Civil Society Iran

Rojhelat

Rojhelat, which translates to ‘east’ in Kurdish, is commonly used to refer to Kurdish-inhabited areas in present-day Iran. While figures are inevitably estimates, Kurds assess the population as about twelve-million, and Kurdish discontent has been consistent for decades across Iranian government systems. Over the summer I spoke to several community activists and analysts living abroad; some wished to remain anonymous due to Iran’s history of transnational attacks.

Zhila Mostajer, spokesperson and co-founder of the Oslo-based Hengaw organization, told me, “American audiences and international institutions must understand discrimination and repression against nationalities and religious or cultural minorities in Iran. Human rights violations are not temporary trends but part of a structural and organized state policy.”

The Jin, Jiyan, Azadi (Kurdish for women, life, freedom) movement began in Kurdish-majority areas in 2022 after Jina Amini was killed in Tehran by the morality police, sparking massive outcry. For Kurds, Jina’s ethnicity was paramount, and many bristle when she is called Mahsa (her Persian name). A European-based activist explained to me:

“During the Jina protests, when we highlighted the harsh violence in Kurdish areas, Persian anti-regime activists told us to stop causing disunity. We were criticized for saying that Jina was killed because she was Kurdish. But in Iran, it is Kurds being shot or handed death sentences, far more than those from Tehran. We are not granted space to own our narrative, so violence is made invisible. We have been against this regime from the start. But Kurds must be allowed to represent themselves. It is a monologue, not a dialogue.”

Kurdish activists and civil society representatives expressed, first and foremost, heightened frustration with Iran’s diaspora anti-regime voices. Samira Ghaderi, a Kurdish-American attorney, said that “many Iranian monarchists demand commitment to a ‘unified Iran’ as a prerequisite for cooperation, but Kurds see this as a continuation of the centralized, nationalist model that has historically repressed them.”

“Without recognizing the Kurdish people’s right to meaningful autonomy, federalism or even confederalism, calls for territorial integrity will be seen as a tool of domination rather than unity,” she added.

All of the activists and analysts I spoke with want anti-regime activists to validate their complaints regarding the regime’s targeting of Kurds rather than stress Iranian unity.

Some referred to the current Pahlavi restoration movement as the ultranationalist, threatening vestiges of a former dictatorship, and a European activist was alarmed that Pahlavi claims the support of prospective Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) defectors. Minority diaspora communities appear frustrated and surprised by the friendly reception the Shah’s son has received from Western media and the international community, given the family’s history of corruption and dictatorial tendencies.

One activist noted that during and immediately after the Iran-Israel conflict, Kurds were holding their breath. Hengaw’s documentation illustrates that regime pressure against minorities sharply intensified after the war, for example through increases in Kurdish arrests and violent raids of Baha’i homes. Three Kurds were executed on June 25, and five Kurds were handed death sentences on vague charges on July 10 amid fear of widespread crackdowns. Schilan Kurdpoor, a German-based activist, pointed out that during and shortly after the Iran-Israel conflict, the IRGC flooded into Kurdish regions to prevent an uprising and imprison Jin, Jiyan, Azadi protesters.

It is not clear whether policy-makers in Israel or the United States weighed the consequences of this conflict in terms of heightened human rights abuses on marginalized populations in Iran. A British-based analyst told me that “Kurds, whether in Iraq, Iran, or Syria, see themselves as US and Western allies … I think leaving this regime in power is a catastrophic mistake.”

“While it has been badly crippled, it will recover over the next five to ten years thanks mostly to its oil revenue, and the West and Israel will have to deal with another major escalation, most likely with someone who comes after Ayatollah Khamenei,” he said.

Balochistan

While the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi movement began in Rojhelat, it quickly spread throughout Iran. In Balochistan, this roughly coincided with a local issue. A week before Amini’s murder, a fifteen-year old Balochi girl was taken to an interview with Ebrahim Khouchakzai, IRGC Police Commander in Chahabar. There had been a murder in her neighborhood, and she was summoned as a potential witness. After the interview, she told her parents that she was raped by Khouchakzai, and the family then sought community support. At Friday prayers in Rask, Imam Naghshbandi referred publicly to the alleged violation. He later stated that it was his duty to break the silence. This incident, together with the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi movement, spurred protests throughout Balochistan. The IRGC responded by firing live rounds at protesters—Balochis refer to this as bloody Friday. A Balochi Human Rights Group (BHRG) spokesperson noted that the IRGC barred doctors and nurses from providing treatment to protesters, and many died due to lack of medical care.

Prominent Balochi activist, Rahim Bandoui, told me: “The American public needs to know that Iran is not one nation. We do not have one language, one culture, or even one history.”

Bandoui recounts the historical privilege of Persian elite and twelver Shia adherents over all others in Iran, particularly following the 1921 coup and furthered through the Pahlavi dynasty. He explains, “all Iranian citizens became insiders or outsiders—and in particular Balochi, Kurds, and Arabs became outsiders. Balochis do not trust Persian government rule, and Persian governments have never trusted Balochi people.”

Balochistan first fell under Tehran’s control in the early 1800s, and successive Iranian administrations have refrained from meaningful investment in Balochi regions.

Bandoui is skeptical of a new [Pahlavi] Shah as a solution. “The problem is that he is not accepting Iran as a multi-ethnic, multinational country. We seek a federation or a confederation, nothing short of that. We want decentralization, and we doubt any oppressed minority nationalities in Iran will support him.”

While some estimates put the Balochi population as low as 2 percent of Iran’s population, others put the figure as high as 4.8 million. A BHRG spokesperson told me that hundreds of thousands of Balochis in Iran are denied government identification, complicating population estimates and preventing many from getting jobs, opening bank accounts, or traveling. The undocumented are especially vulnerable to abuse by government authorities, who allegedly confiscate their property with impunity.

On July 1, Iranian security forces reportedly stormed the small village of Gunich, ostensibly to round up Israeli agents. Several villagers were shot, at least two women were killed, a pregnant mother lost her baby, and protesters were arrested. But according to Bandoui, the Israel-Iran conflict is not the Balochi’s fight.

“The regime is always after excuses to attack or kill. But the fight between Israel and the Iranian regime has nothing to do with Kurds or Balochis. The regime spent all Iran’s wealth on its military weapons and on proxies like Hezbollah and Hamas, and always said ‘death to Israel’. They wanted this fight, they wanted the Shia crescent, and October 7 was done with their support. For Balochis, we care about the people inside Iran. This is not between Iranian people and Israeli people or between Islam and Judaism. This is between Khamenei and Israel.”

According to the BHRG spokesperson, the Iran-Israel conflict has only intensified what was already happening: arrests, executions, extrajudicial killings of Balochi fuel carriers, and imprisonment of undocumented Balochis and Afghan refugees.

Bandoui added that “Washington should better understand what is happening throughout Iran, not only in the Farsi-speaking areas. Women in Tehran may be fighting against the mandatory hijab, but in minority areas, it is a daily fight for survival.”

She also said that the regime has been so humiliated in the Iran-Israel war that in the aftermath it is trying to create havoc, pain, and fear to maintain control. Bandoui says that “this regime is now like an injured snake. And the ones who will suffer from this will be Kurds, Arabs, and most certainly, Balochis.”

Considerations for US policy

While the future of US-Iran relations is difficult to chart, given the unpredictable nature of decision-making in both countries, simplified and rosy assessments can lead to unintended and disastrous consequences.

When the United States toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, policy visions–conjectures–proved poor substitutes for what was required: nuanced understanding of the political priorities of various and often competing ethnic and sectarian communities and tribes. Washington will benefit from exposure to voices representing different communities in Iran, with their distinctive goals and orientations. The Iranian nuclear program may currently be top of mind for many external observers, but it is far from the only or even the leading concern for many of Iran’s citizens and diaspora community members.

David Sklar is a consultant specializing in the rights of minority communities in the Middle East and North Africa. He advises the Free Yezidi Foundation and worked at the National Democratic Institute.

The post Iran’s minorities and policy complexity: A look at two communities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This issue brief is part of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “The future of democracy assistance” series, which analyzes the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Introduction: A region undergoing transformation

Since the third wave of democratization—the global surge of democratic transitions beginning in the mid-1970s—Europe has often been regarded as a leader in liberal democracy. In its 2024 Democracy Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks Western Europe as the highest-scoring region worldwide, with a regional average of 8.38—making it the only territory to record a net improvement in democratic performance during the latest cycle. However, this snapshot only captures part of Europe’s democratic environment and can be misleading, given the complex challenges confronting other European subregions.

Over the past fifteen years, Europe has faced a “polycrisis”—including the eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine war—all of which have strained democratic institutions and weakened public cohesion.

Europe faces two primary authoritarian adversaries: Russia, which employs election interference, military aggression, and other forms of destabilization, and China, which wields influence through commercial trade deals, loans, and strategic alliances. Populism, polarization, and the erosion of public consensus on defending Ukraine further undermine democratic safeguards against authoritarian trends in Central and Eastern Europe. Election manipulation, economic coercion, and disinformation campaigns intensify this democratic backsliding. Without increased US support, the integrity of elections and the peaceful transfer of power are at risk, threatening the security and sovereignty of NATO and the European Union (EU).

The need for a revitalized, regionalized US
democracy assistance approach

Given these threats, US democracy assistance remains essential for Western security—but it must evolve. It should reflect regional dynamics and address both internal and external pressures, while also going beyond military force to build pathways for multilateral donors, private sector actors, and civil society networks to complement efforts when the United States can only provide limited support. The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), European Union institutions, transatlantic alliances, and independent media donors will be vital in safeguarding electoral integrity and civil society protections in countries where US influence is limited.

In Eastern Europe, this means combining military aid with soft-power tools, such as electoral assistance, rule of law measures, and civic education support. In Central Europe, these same priorities are crucial for ensuring free and fair elections, safeguarding political competition, and protecting voters.

A revitalized, context-specific plan for democracy assistance is necessary to protect US interests and reinforce European democratic security. Such a plan must prioritize three pillars: people, the rule of law, and political processes. These pillars encompass key objectives such as judicial independence, protection of civil society and journalists, election integrity, and other critical mechanisms for democratic growth.

Supporting democratic development abroad strengthens US security, prosperity, and influence, while also bolstering market diversification, NATO stability, and the United States’ status as a global power. To undervalue this soft-power tool is to risk long-term political instability, violence, and economic disparity for both the United States and its European allies.

The fight for democracy and sovereignty in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

Eastern Europe remains a primary focus of Russia’s military aggression. Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has strained regional resources, distorted democratic processes, and deepened divisions between pro-European and pro-Kremlin leaders. Amidst its violent imperialist policies, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine applied for EU candidacy in early 2022; the EU granted Moldova and Ukraine candidate status that June—but deferred Georgia’s status transition until December 2023—pending democracy-focused reforms.

Ukraine

Ukraine’s military successes against Russia illustrate the connection between democracy and sovereignty. Western donors have provided resources to improve Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts, judicial reforms, municipal support, and public transparency. This assistance has enabled Ukraine to significantly bolster its countermeasures against Russian hybrid tactics, including disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and direct military action.

Ukraine was granted EU candidate status in June 2022 and has continued implementing policies for future integration with the support of the €50 billion Ukraine Facility (2024-2027). While a presidential election remains contingent upon a negotiated settlement of the war, the nation’s ongoing transparency and anti-corruption policies are sustained by both leadership and public support, enabling consensus for sovereignty and democracy.

Ukraine’s alignment with Europe is also reflected in public opinion. As of 2025, 54 percent of European citizens polled support providing arms to Ukraine. Europeans generally continue to favor increased military assistance. However, public support for Ukraine has declined because of war fatigue, inconsistent US policy, disinformation, and nationalist positions on foreign aid and migration. It is therefore in the United States’ interest to provide consistent support for Ukraine while also encouraging increased European contributions. Doing so will help ensure that Ukraine’s sovereignty and democratic institutions are sustained while reducing Europe’s dependence on US support and strengthening prospects for long-term assistance.

Moldova

Moldova remains one of Russia’s top destabilization targets, vulnerable to both military escalation and hybrid threats. Democratic backsliding is largely driven by economic insecurity and weakened institutional trust. According to a recent Eurobarometer poll, 46 percent of Moldovans identify inflation and the cost of living as their top concern, and 63 percent say they do not trust the national government. Such vulnerabilities are routinely exploited by Russia through disinformation and vote manipulation.

Moldova’s 2024 presidential election highlighted the intersection of Russian influence and domestic corruption. Moldovan authorities allege that approximately $39 million was transferred from Russia by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor into thousands of local accounts to fund vote-buying, disinformation campaigns, and bribery of public officials. Despite these efforts, the election showed meaningful progress; election monitoring by the International Republican Institute (IRI) reported voter turnout reaching 1.7 million–a 10 percent increase from 2020. This trend coincided with improvements in voter mobilization, transparency, and polling oversight, demonstrating the potential for success through the collaboration of US democracy assistance, national governments, and civil society.

Moldova’s EU-oriented government has been instrumental in advancing its sovereignty and development as an EU candidate. However, with the fall 2025 parliamentary elections approaching, Russia is escalating efforts to empower oligarchic forces and polarize voters using economic pressures and disinformation campaigns. This situation requires sustained US democracy assistance—particularly in voter education, anti-corruption monitoring, and political party development.

Georgia

Georgia’s EU candidacy was delayed due to signs of democratic regression; the Georgian Dream party has since escalated these trends by moving closer to Moscow—weaponizing the Kremlin’s influence through energy dependence and economic ties as well as by using domestic tools for elite capture and political repression. Russia currently occupies 25 percent of Georgian territory, and its hybrid interference tactics increasingly undermine Georgia’s sovereignty and European Union integration.

The 2024 elections reflected this shift, marked by voter intimidation, regulatory flaws, and a misuse of state resources that disadvantaged opposition parties. These systemic flaws reinforce state capture and erode trust in democratic institutions. Recent IRI polling found that 54 percent of Georgians believe the country is on the wrong track, alongside a steady decline in the public’s belief that ordinary citizens can influence political decisions. 

While public disillusionment with the political system is growing, strong support for EU integration persists: approximately two-thirds of Georgians continue to support EU membership, even at the cost of cutting trade ties with Russia. However, this pro-democracy sentiment is increasingly at odds with the government’s efforts to restrict foreign-backed civic engagement. In May 2024, the Georgian Dream party passed a Kremlin-inspired “foreign agents” law, targeting NGOs and media outlets that receive foreign funding. The law labels these groups as entities that serve foreign interests, effectively criminalizing civil-society activity and directly undermining US and EU democracy assistance efforts.

This deliberate restriction of civic space underscores the urgent need for sustained US engagement. To remain effective, democracy assistance must adapt by emphasizing election monitoring, targeted civil society protection, and diplomatic pressure to revoke authoritarian legislation. Applying pressure on Georgia’s institutions while empowering civil society groups is not only an opportunity to support a willing, pro-Western society, but also essential to securing Europe’s eastern frontier.

Competing values and the question of European unity—Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland

Central Europe is increasingly vulnerable to democratic erosion, driven by both internal fragmentation and escalating Russian interference. The Kremlin has refined its soft-power strategies, targeting the region’s political institutions, public trust, and national cohesion through disinformation and narrative manipulation.

Poland

Poland’s democratic growth showcases the balance between security and democracy. While it is a member of the EU and NATO, along with a firm supporter of Ukrainian sovereignty, it has struggled to maintain protection for its independent media, electoral processes, and judiciary. The re-election of the Law and Justice Party (PiS), a right-wing nationalist party, marked a further prioritization of military spending and conservative migration policies. In the 2025 Eurobarometer polls, only 7 percent of participants stated that they considered threats to democracy as a priority for Poland, while 36 percent said rising prices, inflation, and the cost of living should be a top priority, and 26 percent cited security and defense as a top priority.

In the 2025 presidential election, Russia deployed “Operation Doppelgänger,” which involved more than ten thousand coordinated social media bot accounts designed to heighten fears regarding migration and security. Furthermore, Russian-influenced media outlets prioritized pro-Russian sentiment, such as that the war represented President Vladimir Putin’s ability to lead and serve as a strong politician. While this interference did not impact Poland’s election as drastically as Moldova or Georgia, Poland’s unity is vital for EU stability. A Eurosceptic Poland is a case that must be monitored and prioritized in democracy assistance efforts, especially amidst falling trust in its national government and a lack of investment in democracy programs.

Hungary

Hungary has disrupted EU decision-making throughout the Russia-Ukraine war. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—in power since 2010 and known for his nationalist and Kremlin-friendly policies—has institutionalized democratic backsliding, turning Hungary into the EU’s most overtly pro-Russian member state. His administration continues to suppress judicial independence, weaken checks on executive power, and suppress civil society. Orbán has fostered close ties with the Kremlin, echoing Russian anti-liberal narratives and openly challenging EU consensus on sanctions and Ukraine’s aid. Hungary now serves as a platform for Moscow’s ideological influence, undermining the EU’s decision-making process from within.

While Hungary’s government isolates itself from the EU, citizens continue to support EU alignment. In the most recent Eurobarometer polls, 69 percent of participants expressed attachment to the EU, and 81 percent expressed attachment to Europe. These pro-European sentiments are further reflected in public views towards Ukraine: 73 percent agree with the EU’s decision to welcome refugees and asylum seekers displaced by the Russia-Ukraine war, and 63 percent support humanitarian and financial assistance to Ukraine.

While democratic growth is extremely limited due to policies against NGOs and civil society rights, it is necessary to maintain education and political party empowerment to counteract anti-Europe narratives, which indirectly taint information in Poland, Slovakia, Georgia, and other vulnerable democracies. Recent European Parliament elections resulted in Fidesz, Orbán’s ruling party, recording its worst performance to date, marked by a shift towards the centrist and pro-European opposition movement Tisza. US democracy assistance must prioritize political parties such as Tisza and related mobilization efforts to prepare for the 2026 Hungarian National Parliament elections, which will both determine Hungary’s future role in the EU and its alignment with Russia.

Romania

Romania has experienced heightened Russian pressures due to instability from the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war. Both have weakened public opinion and eroded trust in government institutions and independent media. Since 2023, Russian information campaigns have targeted economic insecurity—which 40 percent of survey participants identified as Romania’s top policy issue—and leveraged the country’s anti-colonialist history to portray the West as a colonizer. As early as 2023, these narratives entered presidential campaigns and were amplified by Hungary and Poland. Furthermore, such messaging has encouraged the idea of a potential territorial acquisition in Ukraine if it were defeated. Similar external propaganda efforts are underway in Hungary and Poland.

Russian-backed cyber campaigns interfered in the 2024 elections, amplifying support for pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu. Sophisticated disinformation tactics polarized the electorate and eroded public confidence in democratic institutions. Romania’s earlier delay to sanction Russia and support Ukraine weakened regional solidarity. However, the recent election of centrist reformer Nicușor Dan signals an enduring commitment among Romanian voters to EU values and Western alignment that must be supported by the US and its European allies.

Slovakia

Slovakia, also a member of the EU, has historically maintained steady democratic growth. Recently, however, it has ceded to Russia’s influence under Prime Minister Robert Fico. Re-elected on a populist, anti-Ukraine platform, Fico has aligned with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in rejecting EU foreign-policy coordination. His government has weakened independent institutions, pressured journalists, and used state mechanisms to consolidate power. Fico’s alignment with Moscow’s authoritarian practices—including efforts to diminish judicial independence and press freedom—undermines both EU governance standards and NATO’s strategic posture on its eastern frontier.

While Slovakia’s citizens remain united in their support of the EU and continued security support cooperation against Russia, internal democratic backsliding makes meaningful action increasingly difficult. In Eurobarometer surveys, 65 percent of Slovak participants expressed distrust in the national government. Furthermore, although rising prices, inflation, and the cost of living remain the top domestic concerns—as seen amongst other nations in the region—Slovaks show a stronger desire for peace and stability than for greater economic opportunities.

Slovakia is extremely vulnerable to external influence and Russian interference. As polls show, citizens feel that the nation’s security and the continued stability of the EU are in jeopardy. Prioritizing public empowerment for future elections and maintaining the separation of powers will be critical to prevent further democratic decay.

The cases of Eastern and Central Europe highlight the evolving and region-specific threats to democracy across EU and non-EU nations. From external manipulation to internal erosion, each country faces unique challenges shaped by historical legacies, political elites, public sentiment, and geopolitical positioning. However, a common trend persists: democratic backsliding is not only a domestic governance issue but also a regional security concern that directly impacts the EU and NATO. To address these multidimensional threats, US democracy assistance must evolve into a proactive, structured approach that stabilizes democratic institutions before global crises escalate. The following three-pillar strategy—centered on people, the rule of law, and political processes—provides a long-term framework for sustained political engagement and targeted government reform.

A revitalized approach to democracy assistance

US democracy assistance should embrace three pillars: people, the rule of law, and political processes. These pillars can be broken down into thematic priorities—anti-corruption measures, protection of independent media, and strengthening institutional integrity—all of which increase national capacity for democratic reform and resilience.

Fostering people-centered strategies

Democracy can only be sustained with an informed, engaged, and mobilized citizenry. In the face of Moscow’s interference—which exploits economic instability and global propaganda networks—incorporating people-focused objectives is vital to strengthening the EU, NATO, and Europe as a whole.

Application examples

In Georgia, this strategy would involve expanding legal protections and resources for civil society organizations. Such measures would counteract increasingly repressive policies, including the foreign agents law, and reinforce governance accountability mechanisms. Expanded trade cooperation between the US and Georgia may further leverage diplomatic relations to incentivize greater Western alignment and reduce Russian influence and Chinese economic expansion

Moldova’s economic struggles present opportunities for deeper collaboration between civil society and democratic institutions. US democracy assistance should support citizen mobilization through civic training initiatives, structured government dialogue, and job creation programs, while also enhancing election monitoring, mobilization efforts, and public trust. Prioritizing civic education in low-income areas will help reduce susceptibility to economic coercion in future elections.

In Hungary and Slovakia, the current political climate demands continued support for opposition parties and grassroots media outlets to prepare for upcoming elections. Fidesz’s underwhelming performance in recent EU elections signals an opening for opposition gains, yet youth disengagement and state-controlled media capture under Orbán and Fico make preserving democratic processes increasingly challenging.

Educating and empowering citizens to participate in political processes and democratic initiatives not only strengthens civic engagement but also builds public trust in governance. However, these efforts can succeed only if legal systems remain independent and impartial, ensuring that civic efforts are protected amidst political dysfunctions. Accordingly, US assistance must focus on bolstering the rule of law to institutionalize democratic norms and ensure accountability.

Supporting the rule of law

Legal institutions are often the first to be dismantled in times of democratic backsliding or conflict. To prevent state capture and the enactment of illiberal laws, the United States must support transparent and independent judicial systems.

Application examples

Ukraine has prioritized government accountability and anti-corruption measures throughout the war. As the United States provides a large amount of Ukraine’s defense assistance, it may be more feasible to further leverage EU financial contributions to expand legal counsel training, strengthen judicial independence, and enhance judicial-vetting programs. Collaboration in this pillar could pair EU funding with US expertise, drawing on resources of the American Bar Association and other professional legal organizations.

Slovakia, Romania, and Moldova are experiencing heightened political vulnerability within their party systems, underscoring the need for judicial independence to safeguard the separation of powers. Comparable to reforms in Ukraine, this would involve legal training for reform-minded judges, prosecutors, and opposition lawmakers. In Moldova and Romania, strengthening the rule of law is essential to prevent oligarchic re-entrenchment in future election results and executive transitions. In Slovakia, such initiatives would counter expanded executive control and complement civil society efforts to monitor corruption and advocate for judicial independence.

Bolstering the rule of law ensures that election outcomes reflect the will of the people and uphold democratic integrity. However, to sustain electoral contestation and fairness, the United States must also invest in protecting democratic processes.

Safeguarding political processes

Democratic political processes involve free, fair, and competitive elections, supported by robust pluralism. To support future electoral integrity, the risks of manipulation and vote-rigging must be minimized through increased monitoring, civic mobilization, and independent media engagement.

Application examples

The upcoming parliamentary elections in Moldova and local elections in Georgia will be decisive for democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe. The IRI’s work in Moldova—from national polling and electoral monitoring to voter support—was successful in counteracting Russia’s vote-buying campaigns. Continued investment in coalition building, electoral risk assessment, and fieldwork in both countries will ensure that the people’s voices are truly heard and accurately represented in their political systems. Moldova’s upcoming parliamentary elections will be especially vulnerable to interference from Moscow-backed actors seeking to restore control through their previous oligarchic networks.

Romania and Poland require similar assistance to maintain electoral integrity. To maintain pro-European and pro-EU majorities, the United States should expand resources for local, independent media organizations to counter Russian disinformation operations—such as Operation Doppelgänger—and to raise public awareness of foreign propaganda tactics.

Strategic implications for the United States

A majority of countries in Eastern and Central Europe will hold national elections within the next two years. US democracy assistance must play an active role in supporting electoral integrity through monitoring, mobilization, and civic education. These efforts should be expansive and inclusive, with particular attention to diaspora communities and rural populations who are more vulnerable to disinformation and disenfranchisement. Without free and fair elections—followed by peaceful, democratic transfers of power—states will remain vulnerable to democratic backsliding, Russian influence, and anti-European and anti-Western narratives

A three-pillar strategy—centered on people, the rule of law, and political processes—provides a pragmatic and effective framework for revitalizing US democracy assistance across Eastern and Central Europe. By investing in democratic resilience, the United States strengthens civic institutions, accountable governance, and electoral credibility, while reinforcing its global leadership at a time of intensifying authoritarian threats. These efforts directly serve US strategic interests by bolstering transatlantic security, expanding economic partnerships, and countering both Russian aggression and China’s growing influence. The EU remains central to the West’s collective security, and sustained US engagement is essential to preserve the global democratic order and shape the future of international cooperation.

Stephen Nix is the senior director for Europe and Eurasia at the International Republican Institute.

Megan Tamisiea is a researcher with an M.A. in Democracy and Governance from Georgetown University.

The future of democracy assistance

This paper series provides an in-depth look at the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

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Jun 15, 2023

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The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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But focusing only on the political aspects of these crises misses the bigger picture: economic despair fueled this uprising, just as it did in Bangladesh in 2024 and Sri Lanka in 2022. Across these three South Asian countries, shaky economies, undermined by corruption, unemployment, remittance dependence, and policy missteps, have become the true fault lines of political instability.

This pattern suggests a region-wide crisis of governance linked to economic precarity. In Nepal, over 60 percent of the population is under thirty, and youth unemployment exceeds 20 percent. In Bangladesh, inflation surged to double digits while billions of dollars were allegedly siphoned abroad. In Sri Lanka, foreign reserves dropped to near zero, leaving the state unable to pay for basic imports. These are not just abstract statistics but economic realities that cut into the daily survival of ordinary people—rising food prices, queues for fuel, stagnant wages, and lost jobs. No political settlement, however carefully negotiated, can hold for long without addressing these economic grievances.

From macro crises to daily struggles

In all three countries, citizens reached a breaking point because economic conditions collapsed, both at the national and household levels. Sri Lanka provides the most dramatic example. Years of reliance on foreign borrowing and “white elephant” infrastructure projects—ports, airports, and highways that generated little revenue—left the country deeply indebted. In 2019, newly elected President Gotabaya Rajapaksa slashed taxes, costing the state $1.4 billion annually in lost revenue. When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, the tourism sector, which had contributed nearly 12 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), collapsed. Foreign exchange reserves dwindled, fuel and medicine imports stalled, and inflation spiked above 69 percent in 2022. An abrupt ban on chemical fertilizers shrank harvests by up to 40 percent, leaving farmers destitute. For ordinary Sri Lankans, this meant days without power, hours-long queues for petrol, and an inability to afford staple foods. Their frustration crystallized in the Aragalaya (Sinhala for “the struggle”) protests, which ultimately chased the Rajapaksas from power.

Bangladesh’s crisis unfolded differently but had similar roots. For years, the country celebrated its status as one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, powered by the ready-made garment sector (more than 80 percent of its exports) and remittances from overseas workers (around 7 percent of GDP). Yet by 2023–24, the sheen of growth had faded. Inflation reached 9 percent, unemployment persisted, and allegations of corruption exploded. Reports accused elites of laundering billions of dollars out of the country, even as millions struggled with the soaring cost of rice, onions, and cooking oil. Public discontent mounted as the government cracked down on dissent under draconian digital security laws. Student activists, long a significant part of Bangladesh’s political history, mobilized mass demonstrations. The military’s withdrawal of support from Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government in August 2024 sealed her fate, pushing her into exile.

Nepal’s uprising this month revealed a different kind of vulnerability: the fragility of a remittance-driven economy. Remittances contribute more than a quarter of Nepal’s GDP, masking the weakness of domestic job creation. Remittance dependence leaves Nepal and other South Asian countries uniquely vulnerable to external shocks; any downturn in Gulf economies or tightening of labor migration policies directly translates into lost income for many households. High youth unemployment and underemployment in the informal sector have left recent graduates disillusioned, as a weak education system, poor vocational training, and ineffective public employment services have left them mismatched to labor market needs. The government’s inability to diversify beyond remittances and tourism meant that when political instability hit, the economic fallout was catastrophic. Protests and riots have inflicted unprecedented economic damage, with losses worth an estimated at $22.5 billion—nearly half of Nepal’s GDP. The tourism sector, which should have been thriving during the festive season, was devastated as cancellations poured in. Investor confidence evaporated, and national growth projections are expected to fall below 1 percent. For Nepalis, this meant not just fewer jobs but also a sense that their future had been stolen.

From economic grievances to political collapse

What began as anger over inflation, joblessness, and shortages of food and goods became full-blown political crises because entrenched elites proved unable—or unwilling—to respond. In Sri Lanka, the Rajapaksa family had dominated politics since 2005, enriching themselves and their allies while hollowing out state institutions. Their failure to manage the crisis forced citizens from all walks of life into the streets—farmers, students, professionals, and trade unionists. In Bangladesh, Hasina had been in power since 2009, centralizing authority and silencing opposition. But once the economic base of her legitimacy cracked, protests led by Gen Zs spiraled into a nationwide revolt. Three parties rotated in and out of power in Nepal for over a decade without delivering jobs or stability. When Oli attempted to muzzle criticism by banning social media, he miscalculated: instead of silencing dissent, the ban fueled it. Like in Bangladesh, Gen Zs hit the streets of Kathmandu and other major cities in Nepal.

Gen Z and social media were crucial catalysts for mass protests in all three cases. In Sri Lanka, young activists transformed Colombo’s Galle Face Green into GotaGoGama, a protest commune complete with libraries, art exhibitions, and community kitchens. In Bangladesh, student groups organized nationwide strikes, using social media to document repression and rally support. In Nepal, social media accounts for 80 percent of internet usage, with Instagram videos and hashtags bypassing government censorship, turning online outrage into street-level mobilization. These movements were not exclusively youth-driven—farmers, trade unions, and retirees also joined—but younger generations’ energy, creativity, and digital savvy turned them into unstoppable forces. Their tactics—flash mobs, viral hashtags, and decentralized organization—made it harder for regimes to repress them.

The economics of instability

The fall of regimes in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal has underscored a fundamental truth: political stability cannot be separated from economic security. Sri Lanka’s foreign reserves and debt repayment crisis, Bangladesh’s corruption and inflation, and Nepal’s remittance trap all led to the same result: young people forcing entrenched elites from power. Leaders who ignore inflation, unemployment, and the everyday struggles of their citizens do so at their peril. The primary sufferers of the economic downturns are South Asia’s youth population, who are no longer willing to accept corruption as the cost of politics. Once dubbed a “demographic dividend,” this generation is increasingly a double-edged sword, demanding accountability and reform.

The international implications are profound. These countries sit at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, where India and China compete for influence. Instability in Dhaka, Colombo, or Kathmandu reverberates beyond borders, shaping regional geopolitics and economic flows. For example, there were similar youth protests last month in Indonesia. For policymakers in the United States, the lesson is clear: Supporting South Asia’s stability means going beyond election monitoring and diplomatic engagement. It requires confronting the economic roots of instability—unemployment, corruption, debt dependency, and overreliance on single sectors such as remittances, garments, or tourism. The region’s political crises won’t be settled with debates in parliamentary halls; they can only be resolved by lowering the price of food, creating jobs, and ensuring the daily survival of ordinary people.

Rudabeh Shahid is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and a visiting assistant professor of government at Wesleyan University.

Nischal Dhungel is a PhD candidate in economics at the University of Utah and a nonresident fellow at the Nepal Institute for Policy Research.

Shakthi De Silva is a visiting lecturer in international relations at several universities and institutes in Sri Lanka and a policy fellow at the Centre for Law and Security Studies (CLASS).

The post The economic roots of Nepal’s uprising—and what it means for the region appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Announced last year by former US President Joe Biden’s administration and the Iraqi government, the agreed timeline to end Operation Inherent Resolve’s (OIR) Iraq mission stipulates that coalition operations in neighboring Syria—where partners agree ISIS remains a serious threat—will continue, based out of Iraq.

This new frontier in the US-Iraq relationship presents numerous opportunities, challenges, and uncertainties. Read on for expert responses to ten pressing questions on this moment of change—and reflection—for Washington’s posture in the Middle East.

1. What does OIR’s end mean for the future of the US-Iraq security cooperation?

The shift to a peacetime, bilateral security framework—at Baghdad’s request—will be an important test for both the United States and Iraq. The greatest risk is a repeat of Washington’s neglect and Baghdad’s politicization of the security forces after 2011, which paved the way for the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS) rise. A further disadvantage is that the end of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) will leave US–Iraq relations at their lowest level of security engagement since 2014, just as a new administration takes office in Baghdad after the upcoming November elections. To avoid squandering both the hard-earned defeat of ISIS and Iraq’s fragile stability, Washington and Baghdad must commit to a durable partnership in important areas, such as intelligence sharing, procurement, training, and leadership development—rather than treating the end of OIR as a pretext for a security “divorce.”

—Omar Al-Nidawi is a Middle East analyst focusing on Iraqi political, security, and energy affairs. He is currently the Director of Programs at Enabling Peace in Iraq Center (EPIC).

In the agreement between the United States and Iraq announced last year, the end of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) included a commitment to transition security cooperation under OIR to a bilateral security relationship with Iraq. This transition allows for deepening security and defense cooperation between the two countries based on mutual areas of interest, including counterterrorism, cybersecurity, border security, exercises, and information sharing, to name a few. Through more focused bilateral cooperation and collaboration, the United States will have the opportunity to bring Iraq into some aspects of US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) broader theater engagement strategy, strengthening multilateral security cooperation with some of Iraq’s neighbors against regional threats, including the continuing defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A deepening of the US-Iraqi security partnership will also contribute to better cooperation and integration between Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. ISIS remains a regional and global threat, so building a long-term partnership with Iraqi and Kurdish security forces to take on an even greater role in the continuing defeat of ISIS should remain a key focus for the foreseeable future. Finally, a deeper security partnership opens the door to even greater engagement and influence over the Iraqi government’s security sector reform process and efforts to make the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) more accountable to the state. As US troops redeploy, it should be less about how many US troops remain in the country or where they are located. Instead, the future of the partnership should be based on what areas will be its focus and how bilateral security cooperation will be conducted under the work of the Iraq-US Higher Military Commission and a more formal annual Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue.

—Alina L. Romanowski is a distinguished fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. She most recently served as the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (2022-2024) and Kuwait (2020-2022).

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Conflict Defense Policy

2. How will the end of the OIR mission impact the US-Iraq relationship?

The end of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) is eight years overdue. The defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in 2017 accomplished two objectives: the elimination of the existential threat of the post-2000 Iraqi transition to democracy and the political system undertaking this transition, and the reconfiguration of Iraq’s military into a more confident security force that can protect the Iraqi people from a similar threat. Once these two main objectives were met, there remained no logic to keeping the wartime security infrastructure in place. From this point, the mission sent the wrong message to the Iraqis that the US military was in Iraq to stay indefinitely.

The successful negotiations and their implementation are positive steps forward. As they proceed with a new bilateral security arrangement, Iraq and the United States can maintain a credible level of deterrence to any possible domestic and external security threats to Iraq and the wider region. This simultaneously clears the way for more conducive cooperation on the bilateral relationship across a diverse range of sectors, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the US-Iraqi Strategic Framework Agreement.

The US invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, along with the nature of US foreign policy toward Iraq and the Middle East region at large, made the concept of a mutually beneficial US-Iraqi partnership very hard to present to the Iraqi people. Faithful implementation of this agreement will be very helpful in accomplishing this objective.

—Abbas Kadhim is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Previously, Kadhim led the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs until July 2025. He also previously held a senior government affairs position at the Iraqi Embassy in Washington, DC.

The end of the US-led mission against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is a significant turning point for US engagement in Iraq, providing an opportunity to reshape not only the US-Iraq security partnership but also the overall relationship with Iraq. For Iraq, the departure of US troops from federal Iraq is a reassertion of Iraqi sovereignty after more than two decades of foreign troop presence. The US military presence remains a domestic political flashpoint there, and normalizing this security partnership could reduce a source of friction. For the United States, it’s the conclusion of the first “forever war,” a military intervention that ultimately cost billions of dollars and thousands of Iraqi and American lives. This relationship remained anchored by the ongoing US military presence even as Iraq has continued to recede from the consciousness of the American public, and increasingly from American policymakers. Even as Iraq will remain important to advancing US national security interests in the Middle East, this is also a moment to create a more balanced partnership. US engagement should focus on broadening the bilateral relationship by promoting strengthened economic ties, including by promoting investment in Iraq’s still untapped energy sector. Promoting Iraq’s energy independence and prosperity will also ultimately contribute to a more stable and secure Iraq.

—Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East program. She served most recently as deputy assistant secretary for Iraq and Iran in the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, where she advised senior State Department leaders on Iraq and Iran in the aftermath of the Gaza conflict. 

3. What is the legacy of the US military mission in Iraq?

The legacy of the US military mission in Iraq is one of profound paradox. While it dismantled Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, set the foundation of a new political order, and enabled the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), it also produced enduring instability, sectarian fragmentation, and a dramatic shift in regional power dynamics. For Iraqis, the consequences diverged sharply. For many Sunnis, the fall of Hussein marked the collapse of their historic political dominance, ushering in marginalization, violence, and the rise of insurgency. For the Kurds, it was closer to a liberation narrative: the US mission enabled the consolidation of the Kurdistan Regional Government, fostering relative security, political autonomy, and economic growth. Among the Shia majority, initial optimism, rooted in newfound political representation, gradually gave way to disillusionment as governance faltered, corruption spread, and sectarian violence intensified.

From a geopolitical perspective, the US mission generated outcomes often described as counterproductive. The removal of the former Iraqi dictator paved the way for Tehran to expand its influence through political, economic, and paramilitary channels across Iraq and the wider Middle East.

The intervention’s human cost has been staggering. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians were killed, millions were displaced, and the country’s infrastructure sustained catastrophic damage. Beyond physical destruction, the war disrupted social cohesion, eroded trust in state institutions, and produced a generation scarred by conflict. For many observers, these humanitarian and developmental consequences represent the most enduring and tragic dimensions of the US mission.

This ending is widely regarded as a strategic setback for US interests and its regional allies, as it shifted the regional balance of power in ways that bolstered Iran’s position while straining Washington’s alliances. Analysts frequently point to Iraq as a cautionary tale of “geostrategic overreach,” where short-term military success undermined long-term strategic stability.

—Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Saeed is the Barzani scholar-in-residence in the Department of Politics, Governance & Economics at American University’s School of International Service, where he also serves as director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace.

The second US mission in Iraq, launched in 2014, played an indispensable role in liberating Iraq from the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and helping defeat the group in Syria. Without US intervention—and given the severe limitations of Iraqi forces—the war could have dragged on for years, with the potential to further intensify and spread sectarian violence. But while the mission’s military achievements are undeniable, it also illustrates the risks of alliances of necessity: they can sow the seeds of future conflict. The irony is stark—the same factions that desperately relied on US support against ISIS now celebrate Washington’s exit as a triumph over “the occupier.” Yet with no US troops left as “hostages” inside Iraq, what these groups spin as victory could in fact free Israel’s and the United States’ hands to target them—and Iraq more broadly—in a future confrontation with Iran.

—Omar Al-Nidawi

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Iraq Middle East

The legacy of the US mission in Iraq is complicated and fraught with different perspectives among both Americans and Iraqis. Bottom line, for our own strategic interests, the United States has stood by the Iraqis more than any other country and worked to bring stability to Iraq on multiple occasions. We share the tragic loss of life, the hardship of defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and the challenges of bringing good governance, rule of law, and functioning institutions after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Not all Iraqis share a positive view of the United States, but a majority understand that a strong US-Iraqi partnership, not just in security areas, is critical to Iraq’s future development and sovereignty and the region’s stability.

—Alina L. Romanowski

4. Is this a withdrawal, or a transition?

Whether this is a withdrawal or a transition will depend on the details. US President Donald Trump’s administration has yet to announce how Washington’s troop presence will change, including whether US troops will remain in federal Iraq, how many, and where they will be located.

The answers to these questions have direct bearing on the future of US-Iraqi security cooperation and whether the United States will continue to be a strategic military partner for the Iraqi Security Forces. Even with a reduction in the US troop presence, the United States could manage an effective transition from the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or D-ISIS Coalition, to a bilateral military relationship that retains core operational capabilities for counterterrorism cooperation. However, a more complete withdrawal of US troops and a narrowly scoped program of security cooperation would dramatically reduce US influence in Iraq and provide an opening for Iran to exploit.
—Victoria J. Taylor

5. How will the end of the OIR mission impact US security interests with respect to Iran and extremism?

While US participation in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) was critical to fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), it was provocative to Iran, which would prefer that Washington not be stationed, or play any role, in Iraq (or anywhere else in the Middle East). So, we find ourselves at an interesting moment. Both ISIS and Iran are down, but not out.

While ISIS’s operational capabilities in Iraq continue to decrease, its global presence will make its defeat difficult. Should a future Iraqi government adopt policies that alienate Sunni Iraqis, then you will again have conditions for the same kind of resurgence we saw in 2014. Thus, it will be in our interests to have a close enough relationship with Baghdad to encourage more inclusive policies, while also enabling cooperation to monitor and contain ISIS.

For Iran’s part, Israeli and US strikes against it have made it less attractive as a partner, which has likely played a role in its Iraqi proxy’s seeming unwillingness to engage Israel, despite their rhetoric. At the same time, it has increased Tehran’s sense of urgency regarding limiting US-Iraq relations and any US military presence. Therefore, we can expect any improvement in relations to be met with a response intended to constrain the US presence and prevent the expansion of economic and other relations critical for Iraq’s continued trajectory toward stability. Ultimately, Iraq has an interest in maintaining relations with both the United States and Iran. Doing is and will continue to be a tricky balancing act, where neither partner is likely to be happy with the outcome. But ultimately, I don’t think its interests change: defeat terrorism, avoid regional conflict, and play a stabilizing role in the region.

—C. Anthony Pfaff is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the research professor for the Military Profession and Ethic at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College in Carlisle, PA.

Much will depend on whether the United States’ and Iraq’s next government treat the post-Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) relationship with the seriousness it requires. If, as expected, the November elections produce a government more thoroughly dominated by Coordination Framework factions—with moderates like Haider al-Abadi absent—then ties will likely be tenuous at best. In that case, the loss of US “eyes and ears” in Iraq will create a more permissive environment for Iran to expand its influence and rebuild regional power projection, compensating for setbacks to Hezbollah and the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Such moves would heighten the risk of Iraq being drawn into the next regional conflagration, with major implications for Middle East stability, global energy security, and the threat of terrorism.

—Omar Al-Nidawi

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6. How will the end of the OIR mission impact US security interests in Syria?

The end of the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission would significantly weaken US security interests in Syria. OIR has been the backbone of intelligence sharing and coordinated strikes that have kept the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) contained. If the mission concludes without an alternative framework, ISIS cells in the Badia and along porous borders could regenerate, threatening regional stability and US partners.

Strategically, losing Erbil as the platform for Syrian operations after 2026 would force a shift to Kuwait, reducing proximity, agility, and credibility. The legal basis for US operations, currently tied to Iraq’s 2014 United Nations letter, is also fragile—if Baghdad revokes it, Washington would lack a clear international mandate. A Syrian request to join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS could provide a new legal foundation, sustain coalition presence, and even broaden European participation.

Beyond counterterrorism, OIR’s end would erode US leverage vis-à-vis Russia and Iran inside Syria. For the United States, maintaining a credible counter-ISIS mission is not just about defeating ISIS; it’s about preserving influence, ensuring allies’ security, and preventing a vacuum that adversaries could exploit to undermine both regional stability and Syria’s fragile transition.

—Ibrahim Al-Assil is the Syria Project lead for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Al-Assil is also a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Harvard’s Middle East Initiative at the Belfer Center.

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By Shermine Serbest

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Iraq Middle East

The end of the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission in Iraq occurs against the backdrop of the political transition in Syria, with the potential for instability in Syria to create an opening for an Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) resurgence. The US military presence in Iraq remains the core logistical platform not only for ISIS operations in Iraq, but also in Syria. While a reduction in the US military presence in federal Iraq is likely to diminish counter-ISIS capabilities there, the September 2026 deadline to end the logistical platform in Iraq for OIR’s Syria operations will create a starker security challenge should the United States choose to continue its military presence in Syria. More broadly, the US security partnership with Iraq continues to be a counterweight to Iranian influence in Iraq. The scale and scope of the future US security relationship with Iraq is also of concern to other regional partners who would like to see a stable Iraq, with the Gulf, Jordan, and Israel all closely watching the next steps.

—Victoria J. Taylor

The continuation of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq to support the counter-Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) operations in Syria until the end of 2026 will provide a key area for US-Iraq bilateral security cooperation and involvement in the regional dialogue about the direction of the new Syrian government. What happens in Syria can affect Iraq and the region’s stability. Iraq’s Prime Minister and its security forces are concerned about the security situation in Syria, including the movement of non-state actors, terrorists, and drug trafficking across the Syrian-Iraqi border. As OIR winds down, security issues across that border and in Syria will offer another critical area to strengthen bilateral cooperation.

—Alina L. Romanowski

7. How can the United States ensure that the end of the OIR mission does not result in diminished US influence?

The United States will need to stay closely engaged in building a security partnership that supports US interests in the region and shapes Iraqi decision-making. While Washington and Baghdad would like to see increased economic investments in Iraq, many issues remain contentious, including the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces’ (PMF) institutionalization, corruption, oil smuggling, Iranian influence, armed non-state actors, and terrorist groups undermining Iraq’s sovereignty. These and other issues will complicate continued US military cooperation. Without a US security partnership, prospects for additional US economic investment in Iraq will diminish considerably. The recent visit of the new Central Command Commander, Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, shortly after taking up his new position, sends a signal to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and his military leadership—as well as to the region—that an active US-Iraq security partnership and engagement remains important to the United States. Now, it’s up to the Iraqis to make that happen.

—Alina L. Romanowski

8. How have Sunni attitudes shifted on the US military presence and how does the Sunni community view the departure of US forces?

Sunni Arab attitudes toward the United States began shifting positively well before Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)—during the mission’s Surge and Awakening, when many realized that working with the United States was the best way to defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq and to check the power of Shia hardliners in Baghdad. That pragmatic view persisted through the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Today, with ISIS defeated and Iraqi politics increasingly transactional, Sunni leaders may feel less dependent on the United States as a buffer. Still, Sunni communities remain vulnerable: whether the threat is an ISIS resurgence from Syria, a regional war, or renewed sectarian conflict, they often bear very heavy costs when Iraq enters another crisis.

—Omar Al-Nidawi

9. How do the Shia political elite view the end of the OIR mission and the future of the US-Iraq partnership?

Iraqi Shia leaders view this moment with mixed feelings. On the one hand, the end of the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission serves their pro-Iran inclinations and interests. Tehran is increasingly becoming their strategic partner and protector, and their top priority is to remain in power. Iran already has clear deliverables in helping them to maintain that hold—during the post-2021 election saga, Tehran helped Shia leaders defeat the Sadrist challenge. On the other hand, they worry about losing the United States because of their reliance on Iran. It is very difficult for them to find a comfortable balance between Washington and Tehran, particularly given the shrinking room for maneuver they face as a result of the current US–Iran confrontation.

—Akeel Abbas is a DC-based academic and journalist. His research and publications deal with national and religious identities, as well as modernity and democratization in the Middle East.

10. What impact does OIR’s end have on Kurdish interests, and how will this reshape dynamics between Erbil and Baghdad?

The first real test of Iraq’s federal structure and the acceptance of the Kurdistan Region as a federal autonomous region will come after September 2026, when the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission will conclude. If Washington opts for a complete pullout after 2026, Kurdish interests will undoubtedly face significant setbacks. No doubt that for Iraqi Kurds, the US military presence has long served as a security umbrella against Baghdad, and a strategic guarantor of Kurdish autonomy. The absence of US forces would tilt the balance of power decisively toward Baghdad, eroding Kurdish leverage. Historically, this imbalance has had destabilizing consequences. The 2011 US withdrawal created a political vacuum in which the Shia-led government marginalized Sunni politicians, fueling grievances that culminated in the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Kurdish leaders fear a similar trajectory today, in which Baghdad could take harsher measures to curtail Kurdish autonomy and consolidate centralized authority.

The departure of OIR will therefore reshape Erbil-Baghdad dynamics by removing a key external stabilizer. For the Kurds, US forces have been more than a military presence; they have been an anchor of security, stability, and leverage. Whether the post-OIR era mirrors the post-2011 instability or instead ushers in a more pragmatic Baghdad will depend on the central government’s willingness to avoid repeating past mistakes. Will Baghdad return to authoritarian centralization that could exacerbate ethnic and sectarian divisions? Or will it enact constitutional accommodations and acknowledge that durable stability requires a respect for constitutional frameworks? The stakes extend well beyond Kurdish autonomy: the outcome will influence Iraq’s internal cohesion and the broader balance of power in the Middle East.

— Yerevan Saeed

The post Ten questions (and expert answers) on Operation Inherent Resolve’s end in Iraq appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On the day the leaflets were found, I was in western Hama in the Christian town of Suqaylabiyah, meeting with government officials and priests. When asked about the leaflets, the head of the town’s Eastern Orthodox community, Father Dimitri, laughed, discounting them as a weak attempt by pro-Assad Alawite insurgents from the villages around Safita to capitalize on the fresh fears after the attack in Damascus.

Father Dimitri then pulled out his phone and called one of the priests in Safita whose church had been targeted.

“How is the situation, Father? What happened?” he asked.

Like Dimitri, the Safita priest quickly dismissed the leaflets as a pro-Assad trick, insisting everything remained stable within the city.

Despite this bravado, the conditions of Christian communities across the country remain varied, and the opinions of religious and community leaders deeply mixed. In May and July, I visited Christian towns across western Syria, where I heard about their concerns for the future and their relationships with neighboring Sunni and Alawite communities. Responses spanned the entire spectrum, from complete rejection to passionate support for the new government.

The Sunni Angle

Suqaylabiyah was once known for its powerful Russian-backed pro-Assad militias. But the militia leaders are now widely believed to live in Moscow, having fled the country days before Assad himself.

With the militias gone, the new religious and civilian leaders in Suqalyabiyah cooperate closely with new Damascus-appointed officials. Here, a young Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) officer, Fayez Latouf, serves as the head of the broader administrative district. Within the town itself, a long-time Christian Free Syrian Army commander, Amjad Haddad, serves as the mayor. The town’s main commercial street remains open well after midnight with young people sitting at cafes, drinking tea and alcohol.

When asked about the cultural freedoms of the town’s Christian population, one young woman explained to me that when Latouf first arrived, he considered limiting the town’s bars, but that the community simply went to him and stood their ground, demanding that he respect their culture and rights. According to both the woman and Father Dimitri, Fayez has since been extremely cooperative with the Christian social and religious leadership, fostering a safe environment in the city.

Father Dimitri believes Haddad is a significant reason for the speed with which his town accepted the new government and engaged in close cooperation with the new local authorities.

“We are lucky to have Amjad among us to explain how the Sunnis are and ease our initial fears,” he explains, citing Haddad’s more than ten years fighting alongside Sunni revolutionaries. When Haddad returned to Suqaylabiyah, he played a key trust-building role between the community and the new authorities.

Familiarity with Sunnis, or the lack thereof, appears to be an important factor in how Christians perceive the new government. In the city of Latakia, Christians and Sunnis have lived together for centuries. This historic proximity has resulted in close relationships between the two religious groups, even among otherwise deeply conservative Sunni fighters.

Ali Hamada, for example, returned to his home in Latakia on December 8 of last year, twelve years after being exiled. He has been a long-time supporter of HTS, but upon his return, he quickly established an armed neighborhood watch group consisting of Christians and Sunnis protecting each other’s holy places during their respective holidays. In my conversation with him, Hamada is very open in his sectarian disdain of Alawites and Shia, but talks at length about the important social and religious ties between Sunnis and Christians.

One Christian activist in the city, Tony Daniel, echoes these sentiments. A political activist and ex-Assad detainee, Tony works with multi-sect civil society groups in the city and its countryside that aim to connect locals to the government and vice versa.

“Christian Syrians were a tool by the Assads,” he explains. “Most of us left Syria under the Assads, but many Christians are now afraid of this government because Assad told everyone that if Muslims take over, they will oppress you.”

This fear was a major obstacle that Tony and other activists worked on in those first weeks after December 8. He cites the new government’s quick engagement with Christian leaders across the country and their ability to ensure safe Easter celebrations as important milestones.

“The government protects us and we pray and dress how we want,” Tony says.

But, he adds, “Christians are afraid of the constitution now.”

While Tony does not believe the new government will persecute Christians, he cites the lack of democratic safeguards in the March constitutional declaration as a significant problem. “When I see and hear [al-Sharaa] talk, it is beautiful words, I trust [al-Sharaa] and most of the government, but when I see this constitution and the way some militias act it is not the same.”

Based on my visit to these areas, this lack of trust in the new government is much more pronounced in the Christian communities that are more isolated from Sunnis. The towns of Mashta Hilou and Wadi Ayoun, located just east of Safita and surrounded by Alawite villages themselves, are prime examples of this dynamic. Here, Christian priests and civil society activists are much more cautious about the new government and fear that Sunni religious figures are taking too much power.

“We get our news from social media,” explains a doctor and influential community leader in Mashta Hilou in May. “This has caused a lot of frustration within our community and the spread of false news.”

He cites a lack of clarity on new laws and an increase in petty crime, all resulting in a deepening distrust of local security officials. This animosity has only grown as the officials responsible for Mashta Hilou continue to sideline Christian civil society organizations, hardening the barriers between the government and locals.

This dynamic stands in stark contrast to Suqaylabiyah and Latakia, where local officials have engaged extensively with Christians and, as a result, have assuaged many of their fears. Without this, those in Mashta Hilou are left to draw their own conclusions.

“I see what ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham] did to Christians in Iraq,” says the doctor, “and so I make an assumption given Sharaa’s background, and the lack of implementation of his promises.” Misinformation and false claims on Facebook about new government policies rooted in Islamic law have all fueled a belief that Damascus will soon impose Sharia law upon the country.

As one priest in Mashta Hilou puts it, “if Sharia Law is implemented, then Christians will be immediately discriminated against.” Like the doctor, the priest also cites al-Sharaa’s “history in ISIS” as a cause for concern. Al-Sharaa was originally a member of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the predecessor of ISIS, but he explicitly rejected merging his Syrian group with ISIS in 2013.  

“We are more comfortable around Alawites,” the priest admits, “because even though they were raised on shabiha [Syrian term for pro-Assad thugs] behavior, they are not religious.”

The behavior of some religious extremists among the government’s rank and file fuels these concerns. Several Christians on the coast cited instances of harassment by soldiers for wearing a cross, or wounded fighters who refused to be treated by female nurses.

The head priest of Wadi Ayoun says much the same—otherwise quelled fears “renewed” after March 6.

However, the decrease in violence in the region since March and the reopening of roads to other parts of Tartous and Homs have helped reduce local fears once again.

“The government must ensure our genuine safety,” the priest says, “protect everyone’s rights and create a civil state.”

Unclear security threats

Until the June 22 attack in Damascus, these security fears were largely rooted in distrust over the new government’s militant Islamist background and the violations being committed against Alawites. These fears were generally more common in communities with poorly performing local officials or those that were isolated from other Sunnis. Even amid their hesitations and criticisms of the new government, everyone interviewed in Mashta Hilou and Wadi Ayoun in May admitted that the security situation was very good at present.

Yet, minor incidents have occurred occasionally across the country, underlying the threat posed by armed extremist Sunnis operating outside of the government. On December 18, armed men shot at a church in Hama. Five days later, a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah was burned by a foreign fighter. On February 17, a group of youth destroyed crosses in a cemetery in rural Homs. On April 6, assailants attempted to burn down a church in Damascus. On May 17, the car of a Christian family in Hama city was burned, and threatening leaflets were left in the area. On June 8, a church in Homs city was shot at.

But it was the June 22 terror attack in Damascus that truly shook Syria’s Christians. Even a month later, Suqaylabiyah’s Father Dimitri admitted that his congregation is only now beginning to return to Sunday services. “We have reached a very good place in this area and deal with the government and security forces easily, thanks to their engagement with our religious and civilian leaders.” Nonetheless, the Father says that the bombing caused widespread anger and fear in the town that he and other leaders are still struggling to address.

For some Christians, the Damascus bombing played no role in their opinions—they had already given up on the new government. When asked about local governance, a couple who live in a small village just outside Tartous city engaged in a multi-hour tirade against the new authorities, blaming them for everything from the lack of functioning water lines to what they perceived as an “Islamification of coastal Sunnis, citing some Sunni friends’ adoption of the hijab.

While they deny that any Christians have been harassed in their area, they are terrified that this calm will change at any moment. At the same time, their village has rejected any General Security deployment within it, and they claim that even if there were Christian security members, “they would still be instructed to harass us.”

Complex dynamics in Idlib

Perhaps the most complex Christian dynamics exist in Idlib, where the small number of Christian families remaining in six villages along the governorate’s western edge have had a complicated, evolving relationship with the new authorities. These villages were first freed from the regime in late 2012 by neighboring Free Syrian Army factions, whose leaders quickly engaged in dialogues with the local priests. Yet the situation deteriorated over the ensuing years, with criminal FSA-affiliated and Islamist gangs robbing and kidnapping locals amid regime airstrikes. In 2014, ISIS briefly captured the region from the Syrian opposition. According to one local priest, the terror group quickly put an end to the random crimes through their excessively violent punishment of thieves, but also heavily limited their religious freedoms. Crosses were not allowed to be displayed, church bells could not be rung, and women were required to wear headscarves.

None of this changed when ISIS was evicted in 2015 and Jabhat al-Nusra—the predecessor to HTS—took charge. It would not be until 2018 when the HTS-affiliated Syrian Salvation Government was formed that HTS leaders began to address these years of violations. By now, most of the people in the six villages had fled to Europe or regime-held areas, and a variety of foreign and Syrian fighters had seized most houses and lands. Al-Sharaa’s chief religious official, Sheikh Abdul Rahman Atoun, who now serves as the head of Syria’s Supreme Fatwa Council, began to personally engage with Father Hanna Jalouf, who was later named Bishop and vicar of Aleppo by the Vatican.

Years of dialogue saw the gradual return of homes and property first to those Christians who still resided in Idlib, and then to caretakers within the community for the property of those who had fled. In late 2022, Atoun finally issued a fatwa legalizing public religious practices for Christians. By this point, HTS had greatly improved security in the area, eliminating violent threats against Christians. As Jalouf told me in a meeting in Idlib that year, significant progress had been made in their inter-faith relations, with some property disputes being the only remaining issues.

By July 2025, these property disputes were still not fully resolved. Almost all homes in five of the villages have been returned, but in one village, Yacoubiyah, many homes are still occupied. Meanwhile, in the three Christian villages on the edge of the Hama plains, most of the farmland remains under the control of the Uyghur foreign fighter group Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).

As with the Christian communities elsewhere, priests and locals in these villages paint a complicated picture of their current situation.

“There is a huge difference in the amount of freedom here and other parts of Syria,” says one elderly woman in Judayda as she described their more socially oppressive environment.

“Only two foreign families remain in our village—without permission, or paying rent. They have not caused issues, but no Christian will go close to them out of fear. Last week, a woman and her husband were walking on the street without a headscarf, and someone from the [foreign] family spat in their face. It was just a family member, not a fighter.”

In Qunaya, the village’s priest emphasizes the danger these foreign fighters pose to the community.

“We don’t speak with these families occupying our houses,” he said in July. “We just work through the government, as we did before December.”

He says all the farmland in this area has been returned to the Christian families, and believes the authorities will soon return the last stolen homes. He adds that although the community has a good relationship with the officials in Idlib and Damascus, “it just takes time because they are trying to remove these people without using force.”

Despite this, both the priest and the woman from Judayda insist that the security situation in their areas is good, differentiating between the harassment from locals and the treatment of the authorities. “Here in Idlib we are very safe and don’t have these kinds of attacks targeting our churches,” they say, highlight the trust that has grown over the years between their community and HTS’s security services.

“After the attack in Damascus, we were mentally exhausted,” the woman says. “We were afraid of going to the churches, but we still went because the General Security is guarding them.”

Stuck in the middle

For some Christians, the violence that has persisted in the shadow of Assad destroyed any opportunity for their trust in the government. The March 6 insurgent uprising on the coast and the subsequent massacre of Alawite civilians by armed Sunnis and government forces shattered the cautious optimism in the brief period of relative peace following the fall of Assad.

One activist in the city of Baniyas had been optimistic for his country’s future, despite the sectarian challenges, before March 6. “No matter what, Syria is my country, I will send my children away for a better life, but I will never leave,” he said defiantly in February.

But the brutality of the March 6 massacres broke any confidence he had that Damascus could contain the sectarian violence left in Assad’s wake. “I don’t care anymore,” he said in May, “I am doing everything I can to leave this country.”

In other places, Christian leaders have taken on a mediation role, doing their best to lower tensions. In Suqaylabiyah and Latakia, for example, Christian priests and activists have begun serving as mediators for Alawites from the countryside, utilizing their close connections to local officials. In return, they try to show their Alawite neighbors that minorities can work with the new government, slowly building trust between the two sides.

One fact is clear: there is no one Syrian Christian experience. Like every Syrian community, some Christians are fearful, others optimistic, and some have lost all hope. While it is clear there is no systematic targeting of Christians by the new government at large, Damascus still has a long path towards earning the whole community’s trust.

Gregory Waters is a researcher at the Syrian Archive and an independent analyst whose research focuses on the development and reform of security institutions, local governance initiatives, and sectarian relations.

The post Dispatch from Syria’s Christian strongholds: A new government, a full political spectrum appeared first on Atlantic Council.

After more than nine months of peaceful, student-led marches, Serbia has been rocked by its most violent political confrontations in over a decade. Tear gas over Belgrade. Gunfire in Novi Sad. Dozens injured and detained.

At the heart is what many local and foreign observers call the worst crisis of President Aleksandar Vučić’s tenure.

Are we witnessing the turning point for Serbia’s democracy, or the start of something more dangerous?

Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, is joined on this episode of #BalkansDebrief by Professor Florian Bieber from the University of Graz and the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG), one of the leading experts on Serbia and Balkan politics.

The conversation unpacks what is driving the escalation, whether dialogue is still possible, and if these protests can truly change Serbia’s future.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post Will Serbia’s protests change its future? | A Debrief with Florian Bieber appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the Trump administration recalibrates its policy toward Caracas, Colombia continues to grapple with instability caused in part by neighboring Venezuela. The number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees journeying to Colombia has plateaued, but the country’s resources are strained and its security situation is worsening as armed groups and criminal organizations continue to use Venezuela as a haven beyond the reach of the Colombian military. Meanwhile, the United States has cut foreign aid and centered its Venezuela policy around prisoner releases, deportations, and curbing migration. Despite differences in priorities and political approaches, opportunities exist for the United States and Colombia to engage in mutually beneficial actions that promote domestic and regional stability.

This issue brief, based on multiple consultations with US-Colombia Advisory Group members following a private expert briefing in December 2024, outlines the shifting dynamics in US and Colombian policy towards Venezuela. It makes recommendations for stronger US-Colombia coordination to promote stability in Venezuela and the broader region through diplomatic channels, security and intelligence cooperation, regional migration policy, and integration and regularization of migrants in Colombia.

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she provides strategic direction to the center’s work on Venezuela and Colombia. She has supported the work of the Venezuela Solutions Group and the US-Colombia Advisory Group and has coordinated events with high-level policymakers, business leaders, and civil society members from across the Americas. Together with Geoff Ramsey, she leads the center’s work on individual sanctions in Venezuela and created the Venezuela Individual Sanctions Tracker.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Ramsey is a leading expert on US policy toward Venezuela and has traveled regularly to the country for the last decade. Before joining the Atlantic Council, Ramsey directed the Venezuela program at the Washington Office on Latin America where he led the organization’s research on Venezuela and worked to promote lasting political agreements aimed at restoring human rights, democratic institutions, and the rule of law.

The Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Advisory Group is a nonpartisan, binational, and multi-sectoral group committed to advancing a whole-of-society approach to addressing the most vital policy issues facing the US-Colombia relationship—with a recognition of the broader implications for bilateral interests across the region more broadly.

At its founding in 2017, the Advisory Group was co-chaired by Senators Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Ben Cardin (D-MD). Upon Blunt’s retirement, Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) assumed the honorary chairmanship alongside Cardin from 2023 until 2024.

Sep 29, 2021

US-Colombia Advisory Group

The Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Advisory Group, is a nonpartisan, binational, and multi-sectoral group committed to advancing a whole-of-society approach to addressing the most vital policy issues facing the US-Colombia relationship—with a recognition of the broader implications for bilateral interests across the region more broadly.

Issue Brief Jul 10, 2025

Two US policy options for Venezuela: Shaping reform vs. ‘maximum pressure’ toward regime collapse

By Venezuela Solutions Group

The White House faces a choice: Should it use sanctions leverage to try to extract concessions from Nicolas Maduro on energy security, migration, and democratic reforms? Or should it bet on a return to “maximum pressure” in the hopes of precipitating a transition in Caracas?

Democratic Transitions Energy & Environment

New Atlanticist Mar 26, 2025

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By Geoff Ramsey

US tariff threats against countries importing Venezuelan oil seem geared toward extracting concessions from strongman leader Nicolás Maduro.

Economy & Business Energy Markets & Governance

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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The post How the US and Colombia can tackle crime, migration, and fallout from Venezuela’s crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukrainians have a long record of rising up against non-democratic moves in times of need. This latest example mirrored much larger and equally successful protest movements in recent decades such as the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. The Ukrainian public are well aware that their hard-won democratic freedoms cannot be taken for granted.

The Ukrainian authorities would be wise to treat the recent protests as a serious indication of mounting public dissatisfaction with the current government. While Ukrainians have rallied behind Zelenskyy as the country’s wartime leader, this should not be confused with blanket approval for all his policies. Indeed, more protests cannot be ruled out. Next time, public anger might not be as easily appeased.

In any healthy democracy, elections are always the best pressure valve for public discontent. However, due to wartime security concerns, logistical obstacles, and martial law restrictions, elections are not currently possible in Ukraine. In 2024, the country postponed scheduled presidential and parliamentary ballots. More recently, Ukraine’s Central Election Commission confirmed that local elections would not go ahead later this year.

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The reasons for the lack of elections are clear and mandated by Ukraine’s Constitution. In fact, a consensus has crystallized that any public calls for wartime elections in Ukraine could help legitimize Russian efforts to portray the country as a dictatorship. However, there is no escaping the fact that the absence of elections hurts Ukraine’s credibility as an emerging democracy. This risks undermining international support for Ukraine and could potentially lead to a reduction in military aid.

While it has often been pointed out that Britain postponed all elections throughout World War II, many Americans have noted that the United States was able to hold both congressional and presidential elections during the nineteenth century American Civil War. Indeed, Abraham Lincoln’s main opponent was one of his own generals.

Ukrainian safety concerns amid the largest European invasion since World War II are obviously valid. At the same time, holding local votes in parts of Ukraine situated far from the front lines such as Uzhgorod, Lviv, and Chernivtsi could theoretically be possible with the necessary security measures in place.

With millions of voters currently living as refugees outside Ukraine and others displaced or serving in the military, voter turnout would almost certainly be significantly below the average for Ukrainian elections. This is regrettable but should not be decisive. After all, any free and fair election would help revive domestic and international confidence in Ukraine’s democratic credentials.

Of course, even local elections could not be safely staged in cities closer to the front lines like Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. The solution to this problem may lie in Ukraine’s sophisticated tech sector and the widespread adoption of digital tools throughout Ukrainian society.

Since 2022, Ukraine has earned an international reputation for battlefield innovation and now is recognized as a world leader in drone warfare. If this same spirit is applied to the country’s democracy, it could be possible to hold local or national elections while avoiding the risks associated with large groups of people gathering for campaign rallies and at polling stations.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Following his election as Ukraine’s sixth president in 2019, Volodymyr Zelenskyy established the Ministry of Digital Transformation and identified digitalization as one of his strategic priorities for Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian government then launched the Diia app as a key e-governance tool that makes it possible for Ukrainians to hold a wide range of official documents in digital format. By late 2024, the Diia app had over 21 million users, representing a majority of the Ukrainian electorate.

It is worth exploring whether the Diia app could serve as the basis for secure digital voting. If Diia is not suitable, other digital options should be identified and developed. This approach could address election security concerns while also preventing the disenfranchisement of the millions of Ukrainians currently living abroad or defending the country against Russia’s invasion.

Skeptics may argue that the Diia system or any other digital voting platform would be vulnerable to hacking. This would undoubtedly be the key issue to address before proceeding with digital elections. At the same time, it is important not to overstate the challenges this represents. Fraud is always possible in any election, but the transparency of digital tools may actually reduce the risk when compared to paper ballots. Indeed, Ukraine’s digitalization experience suggests that the introduction of digital platforms actually reduces the scope for abuses.

Ukrainians are not yet demanding elections, but there are signs that public distrust of the authorities is mounting and may soon reach alarming levels. At a time when national unity is so crucial for the country’s survival, this mood of frustration must be taken seriously.

With no end in sight to the Russian invasion, Ukraine cannot afford to postpone all elections indefinitely. It is therefore time to start the process of digitalizing Ukraine’s democracy and employing the same kind of innovative thinking that has proved so effective on the battlefield. The technologies to do so already exist. The Ukrainian government must now demonstrate that they also have the political will to find the right solutions.

Brian Mefford is a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has lived and worked in Ukraine since 1999.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 24, 2025

Ukraine is now an indispensable security partner for the US and Europe

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Digital democracy is the key to staging wartime elections in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The scandal surrounding efforts to subordinate Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies to the politically-appointed Prosecutor General was part of a broader trend that has sparked concerns over potential backsliding in the country’s reform agenda. Additional factors include the failure to appoint a new head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, investigations targeting prominent anti-corruption activists, and alleged attempts to undermine the work of other key institutions like the High Qualification Commission of Judges.

The recent wave of nationwide protests in defense of the country’s anti-corruption reforms served as a timely reminder that Ukraine’s democratic instincts remain strong, even amid the horrors of Russia’s invasion and the escalating bombardment of Ukrainian cities. The message to the government was clear: Ukrainian society is determined to defend the democratic progress secured over the past eleven years since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. This includes safeguarding the independence and integrity of the watchdog institutions established in the wake of the revolution.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The readiness of Ukrainians to rally in support of the country’s anti-corruption reforms undermines efforts by detractors to portray today’s Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt and unworthy of international support. In reality, Ukrainians are more committed than ever to the democratic values that have shaped Ukraine’s national journey throughout the turbulent past few decades.

Meanwhile, the anti-corruption bodies established since the 2014 revolution are evidently effective enough to target senior figures close to Ukraine’s political leadership. They have also won the respect of the country’s vibrant civil society and are regarded as an important element of Ukraine’s reform agenda by much of the population.

It should come as no surprise that so many ordinary Ukrainians view the fight against corruption as crucial for the country’s future. After all, efforts to improve the rule of law are widely recognized as central to Ukraine’s European ambitions.

Over the past decade, anti-corruption reforms have helped the country achieve a series of key breakthroughs along the path toward EU integration such as visa-free travel, candidate country status, and the start of official membership negotiations. Ukrainians are well aware of the need to maintain this momentum, and remain ready to pressure the government on anti-corruption issues if necessary.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, January 30, 2026 • 9:00 am ET

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Since the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine’s reform progress has been closely monitored and fiercely guarded by Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian public combines a strong sense of justice with a readiness to act in order to preserve fundamental rights. They are backed by a seasoned and self-confident civil society sector, along with an independent media ecosystem that refuses to be silenced.

Over the past decade, Ukraine’s ability to adopt and implement reforms has often depended on a combination of this grassroots domestic pressure together with conditions set by Ukraine’s international partners. These two factors remain vital in order to keep the country on a pathway toward greater Euro-Atlantic integration.

Some skeptics have suggested that the fight against corruption is a luxury that Ukraine cannot afford while the country defends itself against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Such thinking is shortsighted. Faced with a far larger and wealthier enemy like Russia, Ukraine must make every single penny count.

In peacetime, corruption can undermine the business climate and hinder the country’s development. The stakes are far higher in wartime, with corruption posing a threat to Ukraine’s national security. It is therefore crucial to increase scrutiny and reduce any graft to an absolute minimum. Meanwhile, the long-overdue reform of specific sectors such as the state customs service and tax administration can generate important new revenues that will provide a timely boost to the Ukrainian war effort.

The success of Ukraine’s recent protest movement is encouraging and underlines the country’s status as a resilient young democracy. At the same time, it is too early to declare victory.

In the coming weeks, Ukrainian civil society and the country’s international partners will expect to see a new head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine appointed, along with the appointment of four Constitutional Court judges who have passed the international screening process. Efforts to pressure civic activists and the country’s independent media must also stop.

Speaking on August 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a point of attacking Ukraine’s anti-graft agencies. He obviously recognizes that strong anti-corruption institutions serve as important pillars of Ukraine’s long-term resilience and represent an obstacle to Russia’s plans for the conquest and subjugation of country. The Kremlin dictator’s comments should be seen as further confirmation that Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms are more vital than ever in the current wartime conditions.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory.

Further reading

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Trump thought he could get a peace deal in Ukraine by offering Putin generous terms that amounted to a Russian victory. But Putin rejected Trump’s offer because he cannot accept anything less that Ukraine’s complete capitulation, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Ukraine has the technology, talent, and industrial potential to prevail in the war with Russia, but currently lacks the funding to scale drone production to the necessary levels, writes Mark Boris Andrijanič.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms are more vital than ever during wartime appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 21, law enforcement agencies raided the offices of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and declared investigations into fifteen NABU employees, allegedly as part of an ongoing effort to prosecute traffic violations. This sort of harassment on obscure charges has plagued other investigative agencies and individuals, but rarely was it used against institutions like NABU, which was created in 2014 as an independent body to tackle high-level government corruption. While NABU has had its problems, Ukrainian and Western experts widely acknowledge it as one of the country’s most important post-Maidan reform projects.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Unfortunately, this was no petty shake down. Law enforcement—led by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Prosecutor General’s Office—announced that the centerpiece of its investigation was charges of treason against a pro-Russian member of parliament who allegedly worked with NABU detectives to influence investigations at the behest of Russian intelligence services. The SBU, whose leadership is chosen by the president of Ukraine, named two of NABU’s top detectives as having connections to Fedor Khyrstenko, the lawmaker charged with acting in Kremlin interests against Ukraine. They also alleged the detectives helped Ukrainian oligarchs flee the country to avoid criminal charges.

Western partners in Kyiv swiftly urged the Zelenskyy administration to end its harassment of NABU. Undeterred by such warnings, reports surfaced that Zelenskyy’s National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) was planning “amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code” in an effort to ensure “the purity of the work of law enforcement … and remove opportunities for corruption.” Observers feared this portended further obstruction of NABU’s work.

Those fears were confirmed on July 22, when the NSDC asked the Ukrainian parliament to introduce a draft law that would put NABU and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)—the independent prosecutorial counterpart to NABU—under the control of the Prosecutor General’s Office. In effect, this would make them subordinate to the Office of the President and likely end their ability to investigate state corruption independent of influence from the government.

The parliament quickly passed the law thanks to support from Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party and with key votes from the remaining pro-Russian parties. Zelenskyy hastily signed the bill into law, despite widespread domestic and international calls not to do so.

But the fiasco has already succeeded in mobilizing Ukraine’s famously civic-minded public. Protests, while still relatively small in number, broke out in Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, and Dnipro just hours after parliamentarians passed the bill.

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Ukraine’s government and law enforcement agencies insist these moves are an effort to root out Russian influence in NABU and SAPO to prevent the agencies from being co-opted against the Ukrainian state. But civil society experts and journalists are not convinced. Many suggest the attempted purges are payback for NABU pursuing charges of illicit enrichment and abuse of office against former deputy prime minister Oleksiy Chernyshov, a key ally for the Office of the President. Ironically, it was Zelenskyy himself who brought back criminal liability for illicit enrichment back in 2019 during his original anti-corruption drive.

Others see the moves as part of a broader effort to crack down on corruption investigations. On July 11, armed police raided the home of Vitaliy Shabunin, co-founder of the nonprofit Anti-Corruption Action Center, and detained him on suspicion of evading military service. Critics say the charges are politically motivated.

The harassment of independent anti-corruption agencies throws Ukraine’s European Union (EU) membership bid into doubt. EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos declared that the independence of NABU and SAPO was “essential” for Ukraine’s EU path. “Rule of Law remains in the very center of EU accession negotiations,” she commented. Already forced to fight for a war its existence, Ukraine has “no room for error” in securing its democracy and European future, others noted.

Ukraine also risks alienating its most important partners in defending itself from Russian aggression. The Ukrainian government, civil society, and the country’s Western partners have had to vigorously fight Russian-amplified narratives portraying Ukraine as a hopelessly corrupt country unworthy of military aid. Willfully tearing down the anti-corruption institutions created after Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity risks giving credence to voices that wish Ukraine harm.

Just two short weeks ago, Kyiv officials were courting Western investment for post-war reconstruction at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome. Already uncertain about entering a potentially unstable security and political environment, many international businesses will balk at entering a market governed by fiat.

The best outcome for Ukraine would be for Zelenskyy to decline to sign the bill into law and refocus on pushing invading Russian forces out of the country. NABU, SAPO, and other watchdog organizations have helped make Ukraine more resilient amid the existential danger of the Russian war. Zelenskyy has proven to be a superb leader of a nation made stronger by its institutions that hold power to account—leadership qualities urgently needed now to halt this series of counterproductive moves.

Andrew D’Anieri is the associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Find him on X at @andrew_danieri.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 29, 2025

Judicial reform must be at the heart of Ukraine’s postwar recovery

By Oleksandr Vasiuk

Amid the horror and the trauma of Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukrainians now have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to achieve transformational change in the country’s justice system. We must not miss this chance, writes Ukrainian MP Oleksandr Vasiuk.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Mar 19, 2024

Ukraine’s partners should link wartime aid to continued reform progress

By Mykhailo Zhernakov, Nestor Barchuk

It is crucial for Ukraine’s international allies to link continued wartime financial assistance with the implementation of reforms, write Mykhailo Zhernakov and Nestor Barchuk.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Aug 22, 2024

Ukraine’s EU accession hinges on stronger defense and consolidated reforms

By Zachary Popovich

To achieve EU accession, Ukraine must strengthen its defense capabilities, execute administrative reforms within its judiciary, and implement a multi-sector approach to corruption, writes Zachary Popovich.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Ukraine rocked by first wartime protests amid attacks on anti-corruption agencies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Reports poured in: friends and family killed in their homes, doctors shot en route to hospitals, neighborhoods shelled and looted. The attacking forces ravaged a house I considered my second home. The pain was unbearable, shattering my belief in a future Syria where citizens are safe and institutions know their limits. Fourteen years of agony, thought to have finally achieved a reprieve after the December ousting of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, surged back. I found myself asking again: Is Syria’s tragedy rooted in state violence or sectarian civil war? And how did this happen again after Assad’s fall?

US officials described the events as “a rivalry” between Druze and Bedouins. That simplification mirrored Damascus’s version: a state stepping in to contain intercommunal strife. But this framing strips the crisis of its historical and political context. The truth is, Swaida’s suffering stems from its peripheral status and long-standing marginalization.

A distinct and marginalized region

As a Druze-majority, marginal province, Swaida was chronically underdeveloped. Its autonomy grew after 2014, when locals refused to be conscripted to fight their own people. In 2018, Swaida suffered a devastating Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) attack, which resulted in the community’s need for protection and armament, leading to the formation of many armed groups. In 2023, Swaida further distanced itself from Damascus, when Druze leader Sheikh al-Hajari endorsed a civic uprising calling for regime change from Assad, leading to his rise as a political figure addressed by US officials, overshadowing the other two Druze religious leaders, Sheikhs Jarbouh and Hennawi.

These dynamics fostered a distinct socio-political status for Swaida—outside of full Damascus control—with local armed groups, mainly directed at deterring extremists, and a political structure strongly influenced by al-Hajari in the absence of an alternative political process. But when Assad fell abruptly in late 2024 and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), once labeled extremist over its ties to al-Qaeda, took control, the opposition and transitional authorities failed to offer a path to re-merge these two political structures. A rushed attempt at state-building led instead to exclusion, mistrust, and instability—especially for minorities like the Druze, who bore arms mainly to deter extreme Islamist groups like HTS. 

Ironically, Damascus under Assad had framed al-Hajari a traitor for alleged Israeli ties—a charge that persisted after the regime’s fall.

These allegations tap into the Druze community’s complex role in Israel. Tribal and familial ties among Druze across Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan remain strong, and these bonds were often activated by humanitarian or security threats during the fourteen years of war.

In 2023, Israeli deterrence helped shield Swaida from regime attacks. Now, under new leadership, Syria’s transitional government has echoed the same rhetoric used by the Assad regime to delegitimize Swaida’s resistance. Yet, no Israeli weapons or forces were found in Swaida—only leftover Syrian army arms.

Syria in transition, Swaida lagging behind

Rather than addressing grievances, the transitional government took a unilateral approach, sidelining all local elites, including Swaida’s leadership, and failing to include diverse voices. Al-Hajari’s calls for decentralization, secularism, and democratic representation clashed with the new authorities’ centralized, Islamist-tinged vision. These demands, however, were criticized by government supporters as they came from a religious leader who enjoys power in his community.

The popular slogan among government supporters—“those who liberated decide”—alienated communities like Swaida, validating al-Hajari’s position. Fearing aggression, al-Hajari used international protection as a deterrent against Assad’s aggression in 2023. Those inside Swaida who favored engagement with Damascus had a marginal political weight, which made them shy away from confrontation, fearing community fragmentation, a survival instinct for minorities. Tensions deepened between Druze factions.

Coast massacres and sectarian tensions

The early transition saw massacres of Alawites on the coast, reportedly incited by members of the Transitional Government. These atrocities confirmed minority fears and validated al-Hajari’s warnings. While some factions were criticized for agreeing to join state institutions, al-Hajari’s resistance to disarmament gained traction.

In April 2025, a fabricated audio clip of a Druze Sheikh insulting Prophet Muhammad triggered protests and chants appearing to endorse ethnic cleansing, if not genocide.. Attacks followed against Druze in Jaramana and other areas. Later, an Israeli airstrike halted a regime offensive near Sehnaya, where extremist groups had targeted Druze civilians.

A Bedouin ambush against a Druze convoy of fighters to rescue the Druze in Sehnaya, with massive mobilization of Bedouins from different fronts, escalated the violence. Given the overwhelming numbers, al-Hajari called for international protection, which some saw as a plea for Israeli intervention. Meanwhile, negotiations with Damascus yielded an agreement on joint security; however, this agreement rapidly collapsed when state media framed the talks as a government win, prompting al-Hajari’s withdrawal.

The Bedouin-Druze flashpoint

Bedouins and Druze have coexisted in Swaida since the 1800s—at times in peace, at times in conflict. Most clashes stem from pastoralist-agrarian tensions. But in Swaida, these often evolved into sectarian strife, easily weaponized for mobilization.

Frequently, if armed clashes between Druze and Bedouins erupted inside Swaida, the Bedouins would retaliate outside Swaida, targeting Druze vehicles and blocking roads to Damascus—a critical lifeline for Swaida. These tactics were used by the Ottomans, the Assad regime, and now they are occurring again under the new government. Similarly, when Druze are attacked in clashes outside Swaida, the Druze often retaliate against Bedouins inside Swaida.

On July 13th, a Bedouin group kidnapped a man and took his car. In retaliation, an armed group linked to the owner detained Bedouins in Swaida’s suburbs. The situation escalated: retaliatory kidnappings, property seizures, then shelling from Bedouin groups, which killed eight people, including a child. Druze fighters mobilized. Mediation led to the release of the hostages by July 14.

Despite that resolution, on July 15, the ministries of interior and defense announced plans to forcibly enter Swaida to “restore peace.” Many interpreted this as a signal of Israeli approval, believing the Syrian government would not risk a direct retaliatory strike by Israel otherwise. The government’s offensive began from Daraa, targeting western Swaida. Resistance followed—not only from al-Hajari’s groups but also from Rejal El Karama, who supported integration with the state but were not consulted and opposed the incursion.

A video showing Druze fighters humiliating government forces—including handcuffing and verbally abusing them—prompted further army mobilization. Later videos appeared to show the government forces being executed. The incident intensified the government fighters’ resolve, and the Druze’s basic defenses were quickly overrun. Government forces entered al-Mazra’a, a key village, without resistance. Still, reports of looting and burning houses emerged.

As the offensive pushed forward, shelling hit residential areas, with reports of significant casualties and destruction of properties. To minimize casualties, identical statements from al-Hajari and Jarbouh welcomed state forces; however, violence continued. Videos surfaced showing fighters without uniforms, foreign accents, homes ablaze, and the public humiliation of elderly civilians. Al-Hajari said the government coerced him into the statement to prevent further bloodshed, but after continued attacks, he called for mass mobilization.

Numerous Facebook videos showed killings, looting, and shelling. Druze ambushes intensified, and al-Hajari again called for international protection. Israeli airstrikes soon followed, targeting heavy weaponry and demanding a full army withdrawal. The violence triggered a broader popular uprising beyond organized armed groups, forcing many regime forces to retreat.

On July 16, Damascus launched a massive counteroffensive with drones, shelling, and heavy troop deployments. Reports poured in of families slaughtered, homes looted, and neighborhoods devastated. Israeli strikes then hit Swaida and Damascus, including the defense ministry and presidential palace.

Damascus sought an exit and secured a deal with Jarbouh, recognizing the state while preserving local forces. However, al-Hajari refused the terms. That night, President Ahmed al-Sharaa gave a speech characterizing the events as a domestic issue, blaming Israel, and announced a withdrawal of government forces from the region, delegating security to local actors.

The possibility of unleashing civil war

After the withdrawal of government forces last week, Druze Facebook feeds poured with videos and pictures of mass atrocities, including field executions, mass slaughter of families, live decapitations, forcing people to jump from balconies, torturing, looting, and destruction of properties. Social media became a wildfire of videos showing sectarian killings that were used to construct an extremely distorted media narrative, reducing the events to Druze killing and kidnapping Bedouins. A social media campaign dehumanizing the Druze provided a pretext for genocide. The magnitude of savagery sent shocks in the community, instigating limited but serious calls for revenge.

One discussion I had with a key source in Shahba indicated that, driven by these horrors, retaliatory atrocities against a Bedouin community in Shahba included mass killing and looting. Local Shahba armed groups responded by protecting about one thousand women and children in their homes from the threat of break-ins, looting, and violence. The women and children were then moved to a local mosque that was making arrangements for their safe release from the territory.

Mass mobilization of tribal communities across Syria yielded tens of thousands in subsequent waves. Hundreds of civilians died in each wave. Video, filmed by the attackers in the past days, showed more brutal decapitations. Syrian towns along the way supported the attackers to kill Druze using an Islamic doctrine “that whoever equipped an attacker, as if he attacked, himself.”

Hundreds of college students in Aleppo received life threats. Demonstrations by Syrian students to expel Druze students emerged from universities. Druze boycott campaigns erupted, resulting in a cut in food supplies. A universal power outage and interrupted fuel paralyzed the town. Electricity-dependent water was stopped. Despite the US-backed cease-fire, Bedouin attacks continued, burning villages, with field reports indicating the destruction of infrastructure. Field reports from key sources indicate that more than twenty villages were burned, with no information made available by Syrian authorities on the status of their residents. A mediator of ongoing negotiations indicated that ninety-seven Druze women are missing, which delayed the release of the Bedouin community in Shahba. The fighting and killing continue.

The future is dark

The Swaida debacle is a political struggle to force an exclusive regime on a community that doesn’t trust it. Instead of trust building, hate speech was a policy, and ethnic cleansing is the outcome. The Druze-Bedouin conflict was not the cause, but a tool, and the outcome is a Sunni-Druze civil war.

When speaking to many locals of Swaida, Druze, and Christians in the diaspora, a common narrative persists: “How did we trust these people before?” There is complete mistrust in, and grievances against, the facade of state forces. The obstructed roads to Swaida and severed relationship to the hostile surrounding leave no choice but to have a humanitarian cross-border relationship with Jordan. The vision of a centralized, unified state is now considered delusional by many.

As someone who has been working on local governance models, I struggle to imagine any viable long-term solution. For now, an isolated, aid-dependent canton seems to be the only interim path, waiting for violence to stop and the new realities to shape the final outcomes.

Majd AlGhatrif is an Associate Professor and Director of the Syria Peace Project at Johns Hopkins University. He serves as a governance and health systems consultant to the Swiss government and the European Union, advising on the restructuring of the health sector in Syria. He is also a board member and the Founding President of the Swaida American Society.

The post Why the violence in my hometown, Swaida, goes beyond ‘rivalry.’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Last month, six of the nine permanent justices and three of the four alternates submitted their resignations, effectively rendering the court inoperative. The reasons for the resignation requests remain unclear, although some media outlets have suggested that they were in protest against the leadership of Chief Justice Jasim al-Ameiri, a career judge who was elevated to the position of Chief Justice in 2021 and has a reputation for issuing controversial decisions. Others have speculated that political pressure from the executive branch on a prospective ruling concerning the Khor Al-Abdullah treaty with Kuwait may have played a role.

Reports that al-Ameiri was at the center of the mass resignations appeared to have been validated. In recent days, the resigned justices returned to the court after al-Ameiri confirmed his early retirement due to medical reasons. Alternate Justice Munthir Ibrahim Hussein, a career judge formerly of the Court of Cassation, was nominated and confirmed as the Supreme Court’s new Chief Justice.

Regardless of the reasons behind the initial mass resignations, the ongoing uncertainty surrounding the Supreme Court is a serious concern.

The perception, possibly as a result of its eagerness to rule on highly political controversies, that the country’s constitutional court is just another institution that can be politically swayed undermines the very reason for its establishment—to be an impartial arbiter and the lynchpin of the constitutional and political order, not one of its players.

Since its reconstitution in 2021, the court has played an active and controversial role in shaping Iraq’s political landscape, often drawing criticism from across the political spectrum. Key rulings have included the certification of the disputed 2021 election results, the disqualification of presidential candidates in 2022, the imposition of a two-thirds quorum in parliament for electing the president, and a decision declaring the Kurdistan Region’s oil and gas law unconstitutional.

The court has also weighed in on issues such as budget allocations to the Kurdistan Region and forced the removal of Speaker of Parliament Muhammad al-Halbousi. The court’s September 2023 decision to invalidate the parliament’s ratification of the Iraq-Kuwait treaty concerning Khor Abdullah (the creek between Iraq and Kuwait) ignited a diplomatic crisis, at a time when the Iraqi government was seeking better relations with its Gulf neighbors. (The court was due to rule on a request by the prime minister and the president to reconsider its ruling on the issue.)

This flurry of activity marks a sharp contrast with the court’s prior iteration, whose most publicly significant ruling had been its 2010 decision on which political bloc had the right to nominate the Prime Minister following elections.

Why does this matter?

In the post-Iraq War order, the Supreme Court has arguably served as the only constitutional check on Iraq’s executive power. Successive governments have been formed through broad parliamentary coalitions, and they have been generally aligned with the legislature, leaving few institutional constraints on the executive. That check is especially important in a political system where respect for constitutional and democratic norms has often been lacking. In practical terms, the Supreme Court plays a pivotal role in parliamentary elections (Article 93(7) of the Iraqi Constitution). Election results must be certified by the court, and without such ratification, a newly elected parliament cannot convene, leaving the political system in a constitutional black hole.

While the Supreme Court’s assertiveness over the past few years has brought greater attention to its role, it has also provoked backlash. The court’s expansive approach to jurisdiction has at times placed it at odds with ordinary courts, which fall under the Supreme Judicial Council and are administratively distinct. Because Supreme Court decisions are final and not subject to appeal, the court determines its own jurisdiction without an external check, raising concerns about potential overreach. Critics have accused the Supreme Court of encroaching on political questions and, in some cases, lacking constitutional legitimacy due to its perceived partisan positions.

Problems with the Court

The circumstances that established the Court have also been a cause for its critics to question its legitimacy.

The first Supreme Court was established in 2005 under a law issued by the then-transitional government, prior to the enactment of the Iraqi Constitution. That constitution, which came into force later that year, outlined the framework for establishing a constitutional court in Articles 92–94, including the requirement that a two-thirds majority in parliament pass its enabling law. The rationale behind this supermajority was to ensure the court would have broad political legitimacy and be insulated from future interference by a simple parliamentary majority.

However, two decades on, those constitutional provisions have not been implemented. Instead, in 2021, months before the same year’s parliamentary elections, the 2005 law was amended with broad political consensus, including among factions now critical of the court. The amendment circumvented the constitutional requirements for establishing the Supreme Court while conferring upon it the full powers, word for word, envisioned by the same constitution. This legislative shortcut arguably undermines the court’s legitimacy because it ignores an express constitutional requirement.

At the time, the Supreme Judicial Council and other judicial authorities, as empowered by the amendment to the law, promptly nominated a new slate of justices, and the reconstituted Supreme Court resumed operations. This was seen as a positive step that enabled parliamentary elections to proceed, but the legal and constitutional foundations of the court remain contested.

The way forward

The current crisis underscores the urgent need for a truly independent and competent constitutional court in Iraq—one that can withstand political pressure and command broad public trust. At a minimum, that requires the establishment of a court that meets the constitutional requirements for its formation, thereby insulating the nomination of justices from the ordinary political horse-trading and clearly defining the court’s jurisdiction and interpretive philosophy. That effort should mimic a constitutional conference process and must engage actors outside the political sphere, including lawyers and judges, the academy, and the public at large, to reach a consensus about the role of the Supreme Court and its powers.

The task of establishing an independent supreme court remains extremely hard as the initial steps require consensus by political actors and trust in an institution that will have the power to define the constitutional framework of the state—those same actors have failed to reach broad consensus on less pressing matters.

In the meantime, while the court remains as is, political actors should give the court breathing room to decide on matters independently and without interference, and the court itself should show restraint when delving into political questions.

Constitutional interpretation is a specialized and interdisciplinary task that goes beyond conventional legal training. Justices must be capable of articulating their interpretive methods and applying them consistently. That is especially crucial at a time when Iraq is at a crossroads, facing fundamental questions about revenue sharing, natural resources, decentralization, federalism, civil rights, and international agreements. The country deserves a court that is both equipped and empowered to adjudicate those questions within a framework of constitutional fidelity and institutional legitimacy.

Safwan al-Amin is an international attorney and public policy advisor who counsels corporations and regional governments on legislative and regulatory matters.

The post Unpacking Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court chaos appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The role of security forces

Jordanian security forces’ support for Abdullah has played a key role in maintaining the king’s rule. Jeffrey Goldberg argued in The Atlantic that Jordan’s General Intelligence Department (GID) is the “most respected” Arab intelligence apparatus, winning accolades for its ability to thwart terror attacks.

Following his father and predecessor King Hussein’s directives, Abdullah has largely staffed the country’s military and intelligence apparatus with Jordanians of tribal descent, a leaked 2007 State Department cable revealed. Jordanians who originated from the Eastern side of the Jordan River are largely of tribal background and have long served as a pillar of Hashemite rule.

While Jordanians of Palestinian origin represent roughly half of the Hashemite Kingdom’s population, only a select few serve in key security roles. The 1970 Civil War, when thousands of Palestinians in Jordan’s army defected to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), reinforced to the monarchy that it was best to rely on Jordanians of tribal descent.

During one of the greatest threats to Abdullah’s rule, the 2021 Prince Hamzah sedition affair, Jordan’s security forces overwhelmingly stood with the king. In a sensitive mission, Abdullah dispatched Major General Yousef Huneiti—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—to inform Hamzah that his movements and communications were being restricted. When Hamzah later castigated Jordan’s ruling elite to separate himself from Abdullah, the overwhelming majority of the military and intelligence apparatus declined to side with the disgruntled prince, a necessary condition if Hamzah were to successfully carry out a coup. Three years later, Jordan’s security forces once again proved their loyalty by thwarting an Iranian-led plot to smuggle weapons to a Muslim Brotherhood cell in the kingdom with links to the Palestinian militant group Hamas. Unlike in neighboring Syria under Assad, the Jordanian military has prevented non-state militias from establishing autonomous zones in parts of the Hashemite Kingdom, ensuring that a full-fledged rebellion against Abdullah cannot be effectively launched.

In addition to combating terrorism, Abdullah’s security forces’ crackdown on local political activists has also contributed to his decades-long reign. The Hashemite regime has worked tirelessly to ensure that the Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s largest opposition party, does not have a fair chance to win power. In 2015, authorities jailed a leader of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood for criticizing Amman’s longtime ally, the United Arab Emirates. Last month, the Jordanian government announced a ban on the Muslim Brotherhood and shuttered the group’s offices accusing the Islamist group of plotting attacks involving rockets and drones inside the Hashemite Kingdom. (During last year’s parliamentary election, the Islamic Action Front, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm, won the most seats of any party.) Abdullah’s 2013 labeling of the Islamist group as a “masonic cult” and “wolves in sheep’s clothing” made clear that his security forces were not acting in a rogue manner in their pressure campaign. Jordanian authorities’ harassment of political parties was not limited to Islamist factions. In 2018, former Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher, a Christian, formed a secular party called the Civil Alliance to provide a progressive perspective in parliament. However, Jordan’s intelligence summoned activists and pressured them to stop participating in the party, leading to its collapse. (Muasher contended that Jordanian government officials were uninterested in the growth of independent political parties that would share in national decision-making.) Since no independent political party can thrive, Abdullah has continued to dominate Jordan’s political scene without allowing the formation of any genuine domestic challenge.

The Arab Spring

As the region erupted in anti-government, pro-democratic protests in 2011, Abdallah maintained a delicate balancing act inside Jordan.

Abdullah enjoyed structural advantages during the Arab Spring as a regional monarch. While four Arab presidents were toppled during the Arab Spring demonstrations, protestors did not overthrow a single king across the Middle East during these turbulent years.

Abdullah fired four prime ministers in less than two years, showing that he was attentive to public discontent over corruption and high unemployment even as the bulk of Jordan’s power remained in his hands. With Jordan’s premiers tasked with managing the country’s day-to-day economic and administrative challenges, Abdullah as king is considered above such low-level challenges. Muasher and political analyst Marina Ottaway wrote that Arab monarchs “enjoy an extraordinary degree of legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens.” Most citizens in countries led by Arab kings, Muasher contended, sought government reforms, not regime change.

Unlike in a presidential system, Jordanians have long understood that a relative of the monarch would replace the current king, instead of an outsider. The Hashemite king also serves as a unifying figure, offering protection to minority groups such as the Circassians. Monarchies are part of the “country’s DNA,” notes Russell Lucas, with armies and regime institutions intimately tied to the king. Furthermore, Abdullah also benefits from religious backing for his kingdom since he claims to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. Monarchies also seek to help each other during moments of distress, with Gulf states providing Jordan generous financial assistance during Abdullah’s reign. It is not in any Arab monarch’s interest for a fellow king to be booted from power due to street protests.

While the king has denied opposition activists the opportunity to advance genuine political change, Abdullah has maintained a delicate balancing act in his treatment of these protestors.

This exists in contrast to his Baathist neighbor to the north in Syria, where Assad used brute force to try and quell opposition to his leadership—killing tens of thousands of opposition members. Yet, such regime violence only attracted more hostility against his government and bombings by militant groups across Syria.

During the Arab Spring and in later smaller waves of unrest, Abdullah has also faced demonstrations and criticism of his rule. Thousands of Jordanians hit the streets in 2011, protesting government corruption and soaring food prices. Seven years later, Jordanians once again demonstrated against a proposed tax increase, which led to Prime Minister Hani al-Mulki’s ouster. The king, however, declined to use disproportionate force against his own people and avoided mass killings. Jordan’s security forces have jailed journalists for critical coverage throughout Abdullah’s term but have not executed reporters as done by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Such relative moderation—at least by regional standards—has reduced the public’s anger as well as the motivation of citizens to launch terror attacks against Abdullah’s forces.

Navigating modern threats to the monarchy

In December 2024, American Enterprise Institute analyst Michael Rubin suggested Abdullah may be a “dead man walking” after Assad’s fall. Rubin contended that just as in Syria, Islamists may topple the Hashemite ruler after the Pandora Papers revealed that Abdullah owned over $100 million in properties in England and the United States. Earlier that year, Curtis Ryan wrote that the Gaza war posed an “existential threat” for the Hashemite Kingdom as the country faced increased protests. It is true that Jordan faces serious challenges, including unemployment over 20 percent and hosting hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees. Yet, Abdullah has a wealth of experience managing both regional and domestic conflicts since rising to power over a quarter century ago. The Hashemite ruler survived the 2003 US invasion of neighboring Iraq, the Second Palestinian Intifada, the 2011 Arab Spring protests, and the Syrian civil war.

Western analysts would be wise not to issue hyperbolic prognoses over the king’s ability to maintain his rule. The Hashemite leader may not be successful in providing Jordanian citizens with economic opportunities, but Abdullah has mastered the skill of regime survival. 

Aaron Magid is a former Amman-based journalist and Jordan analyst whose articles about have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and Al-Monitor. His new biography on King Abdullah tackles his long rule over the Kingdom. Follow him on X: @AaronMagid.

The post Why King Abdullah’s rule in Jordan has endured despite turbulence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

July 1 will mark a dozen years since Croatia joined the the European Union (EU), the most recent country to do so. In the years after Croatia’s accession, the bloc’s eastern enlargement process stalled almost entirely. The EU’s enthusiasm for admitting new members waned, driven by rising anti-EU sentiment within member states and fears that further expansion could strain the bloc’s already burdened consensus-based decision-making. Meanwhile, democratic backsliding and disputes between candidate countries further undermined their cases for accession.

Then in 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine revived the geopolitical imperative for enlargement in Brussels by highlighting Europe’s vulnerability to “gray zones.” Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia swiftly advanced along their accession paths, and hopes were somewhat revived in the six countries of the Western Balkans.

While Montenegro is the most advanced in accession negotiations today, Albania is also capitalizing on this new enlargement momentum. On May 11, Albania held parliamentary elections in which the Socialist Party, led by Prime Minister Edi Rama, won its fourth consecutive mandate, promising EU membership by 2030. After gaining EU candidate status in 2013 and waiting over a decade for the next formal step, Albania and the EU have been on an unprecedented roll since October 2024. Over the span of several months, the EU opened four clusters of negotiation chapters with Albania—covering twenty-four out of thirty-three chapters—and may open the remaining ones by the end of June. The opening of chapters signals that Albania has met initial EU benchmarks in those policy areas and will now negotiate to close the chapters—which aim to align Albanian laws, institutions, and practices with EU law.

The prevailing narrative among EU leaders, including European Council President António Costa, is that Albania and Montenegro are now leading the race to become the EU’s next member states. Both Albanian and EU officials have set 2027 as the target year to conclude the technical accession talks, paving the way for a membership vote. In May, that ambitious goal received a boost from French President Emmanuel Macron—once a skeptic of enlargement—who called it “realistic” during a visit to Tirana.  

Albania is moving fast, but will face headwinds

Several factors explain why Albania and Montenegro are pulling ahead of everyone else. To begin with, both are NATO members and—unlike Russia-friendly Serbia—are fully aligned with the EU’s Common and Foreign Security Policy. Albania, in particular, is seen as a reliable pro-Western security anchor in a volatile region where ethnic Albanians dominate in neighboring Kosovo and are a politically significant bloc in NATO members North Macedonia and Montenegro. Unlike Kosovo, which remains unrecognized by five EU member states, and North Macedonia, which is blocked by Bulgaria over historical disputes, Albania faces no such bilateral hurdles to its accession path from EU members—aside from intermittent tensions with neighboring Greece over ethnic Greek property rights and maritime borders.

Yet perhaps the main driver of Albania’s recent progress has been its sweeping EU- and US-sponsored reforms in the justice sector. Over nearly a decade, Albania has overhauled its judicial institutions and established new bodies, such as the Special Structure Against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK). While corruption remains high, the reformed institutions have shaken the culture of impunity that has plagued the country since the fall of communism. High-profile indictments—ranging from former presidents and prime ministers to powerful mayors—have started to build a credible track record in the fight against corruption and are helping to restore public trust in the rule of law. Yet SPAK’s results need to be sustained, and political commitment to the rule of law will increasingly be tested the deeper that investigations go.

Albania’s democracy also remains fragile and polarized. While the most recent parliamentary elections improved on earlier contests from an administrative standpoint, the political playing field continues to be uneven in favor of the ruling party. Corruption, the stifling effect of politics on media freedoms, the strength of organized crime, and weak administrative capacity—all persistent problems—could hinder the adoption of EU standards. 

Most importantly, the geopolitical mood in European capitals could easily shift away from its current support for enlargement. While Rama has secured strong political backing from major countries such as France and Italy, it is not clear whether it will receive support from the new government in Germany, which is not striking equally enthusiastic tones. The German government’s coalition agreement ties enlargement to necessary internal EU institutional reforms, which means that the EU must first ensure it can operate effectively before allowing other countries in. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his Christian Democrats seem to favor intermediate integration models—such as having the Western Balkans join the European Economic Area, or layering the EU into concentric circles of states with varying degrees of integration.

What’s more, getting EU governments to support accession is one thing; getting the support of EU members’ parliaments to ratify accession is another. European public opinion remains wary of enlargement in several countries.

Race to the top

The prospect of Albania and Montenegro joining the EU ahead of their neighbors also raises pressing regional questions. With the rapid pace at which Albania is opening negotiation chapters, it has effectively leapfrogged over the region’s largest country, Serbia, whose accession talks have remained frozen since 2021.

For the Western Balkans, EU enlargement has functioned not only as a tool for political transformation but also for peacebuilding. The EU has long pursued a strategy of integrating the region as a group, using accession as leverage to foster regional stability, set up bilateral formats to resolve bilateral disputes—such as the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue on normalization of relations—and promote cooperation through initiatives like the Common Regional Market.

Critics may warn that Albania and Montenegro advancing alone could reinforce Serbia’s narrative of marginalization, fuel anti-EU sentiment, and undermine frameworks for regional cooperation—especially given Serbia’s pivotal role and the size of its population. But the long-standing Serbia-centric approach to enlargement—which posits that the region cannot move forward without accommodating Serbia due to its power and influence over other countries—has not worked. Rather, it has merely emboldened Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić to wield even greater de facto veto power and leverage over regional countries and their EU trajectory, even as he slips deeper into authoritarianism, sustains close ties with Russia, and has helped erode support for EU accession among Serbians.

The EU—and Serbia itself—might be better served by fostering a merit-based “race to the top” that either rewards or fails Montenegro and Albania depending on how they deliver on reforms. Demonstrating that EU enlargement remains a real and attainable goal could create the kind of positive societal pressure the region has desperately needed and could incentivize other EU candidate countries to seize this historic window of opportunity by embracing an agenda of reforms.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.  

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

The post Are Albania and Montenegro on the fast track to EU membership? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In this eye-opening episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, speaks with Augustin Palokaj, a top Brussels-based correspondent and expert on EU-Balkans relations.

As the EU renews its enlargement agenda, why are only Albania and Montenegro making real progress with the negotiations, while others like North Macedonia and Kosovo remain stalled? The conversation explores the current momentum and persistent frustrations in the Western Balkans’ EU accession process. And what role can, or should, the United States play in the region, especially in the Kosovo-Serbia unfinished dialogue?

What needs to change for the Balkan countries and for Brussels? How is the success of enlargement measured by real reforms or political statements, and why are some candidate countries growing frustrated about the process?

Whether you are a policymaker, analyst, student or regional observer, this episode offers rare insights into the internal EU conversations that shape the Balkan region.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post What is Brussels’ mood on Balkans EU enlargement? | A Debrief with Augustin Palokaj appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Charai in The National Interest: Governance Is Not a Start-Up Pitch appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine is currently fighting for national survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Once this battle is won, the most important challenge facing the country will be judicial reform. If Ukraine is to emerge in the postwar years as a stable and prosperous European democracy, the process of recovery and renewal must be based on the firm foundations of a strong justice system. This is not a mere slogan; it is an absolute necessity.

Judicial reform is the key to the country’s entire future economic development. Investors will not come to Ukraine if contracts cannot be enforced or if property rights can be bought and sold through corruption. That is the message Ukraine’s international partners have been repeating consistently for many years. With the massive task of postwar rebuilding looming on the horizon, this message is now arguably truer than ever.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Once the war ends, Ukraine can expect to receive unprecedented international support as foreign governments seek to participate in what promises to be Europe’s largest reconstruction initiative since the years following World War II. While donor funding from partner countries is likely to be very significant, this will not be nearly enough to cover the estimated rebuilding price tag of around half a trillion US dollars. Instead, much of this money must come from the private sector. However, unless Ukraine has a transparent, reliable, and efficient justice system, private capital will stay away.

If Ukraine hopes to become a success story, it needs courts that can settle disputes fairly, whatever the issue. If legal cases are tainted by bias or drag on for years, this will serve as a major red flag to all potential investors. For this reason, Ukraine’s courts should be recognized as a key element of the country’s infrastructure that is every bit as vital to national recovery as roads or power lines. After all, the justice system serves as the legal framework that makes it possible to build everything else.

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Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine has made real progress in recent years toward meaningful judicial reform. This has included the reform of key institutions like the High Court of Justice, along with the launch of new processes to improve the selection of Constitutional Court judges. It is now crucial to build on this momentum.

Judicial reform must be deep, deliberate, and closely tied to Ukraine’s European future. With this in mind, it is important to maintain the current dialogue with the Venice Commission and use its recommendations to shape genuine change. One of the most effective tools to help achieve this change is the participation of international experts. Their role is not to control the process, but rather to help ensure fairness, transparency, and accountability.

As Ukraine looks to create the conditions for national reconstruction, one judicial reform initiative currently being backed by the Ukrainian parliament is the creation of specialized courts to handle issues like land rights and construction disputes. These courts could help speed up vital cases and take pressure off the existing judicial system.

Work is also continuing toward greater digitalization within the justice system, from electronic courts to online case tracking. Much more can be done in this direction. Other tech savvy countries such as Estonia and Singapore are currently leading the way in digital justice. Ukraine can build something just as bold using tools like blockchain and AI. The expanded use of technology can improve the efficiency of Ukraine’s courts, while also boosting trust levels and leading to greater transparency.

Creating a fully functioning and internationally credible justice system is the necessary starting point for everything else Ukrainians want to achieve, from economic strength and prosperity to the rule of law and a greater sense of national security. It can encourage investors to bet on Ukraine, and can help persuade Ukrainians currently living abroad to return home. Ultimately, judicial reform can serve as a national anchor confirming Ukraine’s place in the heart of Europe.

Amid the horror and the trauma of Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukrainians now have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to achieve transformational change in the country’s justice system. We must not miss this chance.

Oleksandr Vasiuk is a member of the Ukrainian parliament for the Servant of the People party and head of the Ukraine-USA Strategic Partnership cross-party association.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 8, 2025

Russia’s coming summer offensive could be deadliest of the entire war

By Mykola Bielieskov

As the US-led peace initiative continues to falter, the unfolding summer campaigning season in Ukraine promises to be among the bloodiest of the entire war, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert May 21, 2025

Putin aims to destroy Ukraine and has zero interest in a compromise peace

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s ongoing campaign to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation is taking place in front of the watching world and makes a complete mockery of US-led efforts to broker some kind of compromise peace, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 13, 2025

Drone superpower: Ukrainian wartime innovation offers lessons for NATO

By David Kirichenko

Today’s Ukraine is now a drone superpower with an innovative domestic defense industry that can provide its NATO allies with important lessons in the realities of twenty-first century warfare, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Judicial reform must be at the heart of Ukraine’s postwar recovery appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The European Union (EU) Growth Plan for the Western Balkans aims to integrate the region into the EU single market, enhance regional cooperation, implement significant governance and rule of law reforms, and boost EU financial support. In doing so, the EU seeks to foster economic development, political stability, and security in the region amid rising geopolitical tensions, while accelerating the Western Balkans’ EU accession process.

The Growth Plan holds substantial potential to reinvigorate the enlargement process and counter the stagnation felt by both the EU and the region. Strong points include:

• Tangible benefits before full accession: Providing stronger incentives for reform.
• Active involvement of regional governments: Increasing buy-in from local leaders, who must submit their own reform agendas.
• Enhanced economic integration, greater access to the EU market, increased EU funding, and reforms to governance and the rule of law: Stimulating investment, promoting economic growth, and raising living standards.

These improvements would bring the Western Balkans closer to the economic success seen in the Central and Eastern European countries in the EU over the past two decades. Moreover, fostering deeper regional cooperation will not only deliver an economic boost but also contribute to political normalization. If successful, the plan will bolster the EU’s political influence in the region, countering the impact of external actors and encouraging much-needed nearshoring investment from EU firms.

However, the plan faces several challenges:

• Enforceability: Although conditionality is rigorous, with disbursement of funds tied to strict conditions to prevent misuse, there are concerns regarding its enforceability. The European Court of Auditors has already raised reservations.
• Quantity: Additionally, the financial support offered is significantly lower than what EU member states in Southeast Europe receive. The reforms required for fund access and single market integration are substantial and will demand significant political will and institutional capacity—both of which have been lacking in the region at times over the past two decades.

The success of the growth plan will largely depend on its implementation. The EU must ensure rigorous enforcement of conditionality, reward positive reform steps, and increase funding for countries making progress. Civil society in the Western Balkans should be engaged as much as possible to foster broader support and transparency. The EU should also leverage the plan to align with its broader geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, particularly in strengthening its strategic autonomy. Additionally, the Growth Plan should be fully integrated with the EU’s competitiveness, green, and digital transition agendas. For their part, Western Balkans leaders should seize the increased agency provided by the plan. They must take ownership of the reforms they propose, participate actively in EU meetings, and design their reform agendas to deliver better living standards and deeper EU integration for their populations.

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Valbona Zeneli

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Albanian Corruption

Dimitar Bechev
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Europe Center, Atlantic Council
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe

Isabelle Ioannides
Nonresident Senior Research Fellow
Hellenic Foundation for Foreign and European Policy (ELIAMEP)

Richard Grieveson
Deputy Director
Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies

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Working on a new transatlantic approach toward the Western Balkans

By Maja Piscevic, Ilva Tare

The United States and the European Union must work together, and play to their own respective strengths, to prioritize democratic and economic growth and alignment with the West.

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North Macedonia: A reform agenda on the path to EU integration

By Aleksej Demjanski, Biljana Ivanovska, Branimir Jovanović, Sara Milenkovska, Lura Pollozhani, and Malinka Ristevska Jordanova

Five experts from the region map out a reform agenda for North Macedonia’s newly elected government to pursue greater democratic progress and eventual European integration.

Elections Europe & Eurasia

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Getting back on track: Unlocking Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic and development perspective

By Agon Maliqi

Report exploring the path forward for Kosovo’s integration into transatlantic institutions and the geopolitical and economic challenges and opportunities facing the country.

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post The European Union Growth Plan for the Western Balkans: A reality test for EU enlargement appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The new Syrian leadership and its supporters have pushed for sanctions relief to help rebuild from the rubble of more than a decade of civil war—accompanied by promises of establishing a more free and tolerant Syria. But skepticism remains regarding al-Sharaa’s past links to al-Qaeda and communal massacres against minority groups that have taken place since he came to power.  

How will the removal of US sanctions affect Syria’s economy and future US-Syria relations? And what are the wider implications for the region? Our experts offer their insights below.  

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Qutaiba Idlbi: This is an opportunity to secure a long-term US strategic victory in the region 

Kirsten Fontenrose: Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

Daniel B. Shapiro: Trump is making a smart gamble, Congress should back him up

Sarah Zaaimi: A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding

Thomas S. Warrick: Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders

Amany Qaddour: Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

Alan Pino: A clear signal to Iran

Kimberly Donovan: Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Celeste Kmiotek: Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable

Maia Nikoladze: This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK 

Ömer Özkizilcik: This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Sinan Hatahet: Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Diana Rayes: A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere   

Elise Baker: Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

Lize de Kruijf: Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria 

This is an opportunity to secure a long-term US strategic victory in the region

Trump’s decision to lift US sanctions on Syria is a pivotal shift that could define his legacy in the Middle East. The move signals an opportunity to secure a long-term US victory in Syria by stabilizing the region, countering rivals such as Russia and China, and opening economic opportunities for US businesses. 

Trump has long portrayed himself as a dealmaker, and his record on Syria supports that image. Unlike the Obama and Biden administrations, Trump responded decisively to al-Assad’s chemical weapon attacks in 2017 and 2018, launched airstrikes to deter further atrocities, and cooperated with Turkey in 2020 to halt the Assad regime’s and Russia’s assault on Idlib. He also signed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which crippled the Assad regime financially, leading to its fall last December. Now, however, those same sanctions are undermining the prospects of Syria’s new post-Assad regime government, which is attempting to rebuild and distance itself from Iranian and Russian influence. 

The current sanctions are weakening a new government that seeks US and Gulf support. If these sanctions were to stay in place, Syria’s economy would remain in free fall, making it increasingly reliant on Russia, China, and Iran. This would open the door to renewed extremism, regional instability, and the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Lifting sanctions will allow US companies to compete with Chinese firms for contracts in Syria’s expected $400 billion reconstruction effort. It will also enable Trump to leverage Gulf funding, create jobs in both Syria and the United States, and demonstrate Washington’s role as a stabilizing force. A prosperous Syria would reduce refugee flows, weaken Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and eliminate Syria as a threat to Israel—a country with which the new Syrian leadership seeks peaceful relations. 

The new Syrian government is not without flaws, but it has made pragmatic moves. It started reintegrating territories with the Syrian Democratic Forces, cracked down on drug trafficking, made efforts aimed at protecting minorities, and distanced itself from Hezbollah and Iranian forces. These steps show a willingness to cooperate with the West and align with its goal of regional stability. If Trump follows through, he could secure a rare bipartisan win, outmaneuver Russia, and reshape the future of Syria in a way that serves US interests and regional peace. 

—Qutaiba Idlbi is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs where he leads the Council’s work on Syria. 

Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

I am hearing that the lifting of US sanctions on Syria took some members of Trump’s own administration by surprise. Since January, Syria has been a counterterrorism file, not a political one. Al-Sharaa received a list of milestones from the US administration this spring, and meeting these would have meant a gradual rollback of sanctions. So this sudden lifting must feel like a new lease on life for the Syrian ruler.

But this sudden decision to lift sanctions should not be interpreted as a sign that the United States is making Syria a priority. In fact, it indicates the opposite. Both Saudi leader Mohammad bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have had to promise Trump that they will hold al-Sharaa accountable and will shoulder the burden of reconstruction. The United States has never colonized or invaded Syria, and the United States committed a lot of manpower and funding into supporting opposition to al-Assad under the first Trump administration. It is hard to make an argument that the United States has any obligation to fund Syria’s reconstruction. That responsibility will fall to those who pressed Trump to lift sanctions. 

Going forward, there are three things to watch:   

One, watch for Saudi Arabia’s deal with al-Sharaa. He will owe them big time for making this happen. (Erdogan will argue that he is owed as well, having greased the skids on a phone call with Trump just before his meetings in Riyadh.) Expect Saudi Arabia to require that foreign fighters be ejected from senior government roles and demand that Iran is kept out of Syria. Look for Saudi companies to be granted the contracts to undertake reconstruction projects in Syria, an easy give for al-Sharaa and a no-brainer in this situation. 

Two, for Europe especially, watch Russia. Moscow may find it easier to establish its interests in Syria now. Saudi Arabia and Israel will see a Russian presence as a way of counterbalancing Turkey’s influence in Syria.

Three, watch for shifts in Iran’s foreign policy. Syria is now proof that Trump will in fact lift sanctions under certain conditions—if your leadership promises to change its stripes and favored foreign partners vouch for you. Expect to see a charm offensive by Tehran.

— Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Previously, she was the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council during the first Trump administration, leading the development of US policy toward nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan.

Trump is making a smart gamble

Trump’s announcement that he will provide sanctions relief to Syria is a gamble, but it is the right one. The collapse of the Assad regime, whose brutality, misrule, and collaboration with malevolent regional actors destroyed Syria, has given long-suffering Syrians a chance to build a different future. 

The road to recovery will not be an easy one. Many are rightly suspicious of Syria’s new acting president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and others in his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham movement, due to their violent jihadist past. As one cannot look inside another’s soul, it is unknown if they have truly shed their extremist ideology amid a rebranding since coming to power in December. 

What can be judged are actions. So far, al-Sharaa has said and done many of things Western and Arab nations have called for. He is making efforts to be inclusive, including appointing women and minorities into his cabinet. He says strict Sharia law will not be imposed. He has begun negotiations with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces on their peaceful integration into Syrian national institutions. He claims to want Syria to pose no threat to any of its neighbors, including Israel, and he wants to keep Iran from re-establishing influence in Syria. He is aligning himself with moderate Arab states and US partners like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 

These words and actions must be tested and verified over time. But to have any chance to succeed in stabilizing Syria, the new government needs resources to make the economy function. Reconstruction and resettlement of refugees, not to mention restoring services disrupted by years of civil war, will be expensive. Without a significant measure of US sanctions relief, none of this is possible. It would nearly guarantee Syria’s descent back into chaos and provide fertile ground for extremists. 

Congress should work with Trump on crafting sanctions relief such that, if necessary, sanctions can be restored. But Trump is right to seize this opportunity. 

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. From 2022 to 2023, he was the Director of the N7 Initiative. He has previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and as US ambassador to Israel.

A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding 

Lifting sanctions presents a tremendous opportunity to revitalize the Syrian economy and provide a genuine chance for the al-Sharaa government to implement the vision for social unity it has advocated since December. However, the United States should make sure not to give carte blanche to the new Syrian regime and lose all of its leverage over a ruler who has only recently self-reformed from a dangerous radical ideology, especially when it comes to managing ethnic and religious diversity. 

Al-Sharaa has publicly and repeatedly pledged to build a nation for all Syrians, regardless of their identities. He also appointed a Christian woman to his newly announced government and welcomed a delegation of Jewish religious officials to return for the first time since their synagogue was closed back in the 1990s. Still, his first five months in power have also been marked by violent confrontations with certain religious minorities and the ascension to power of foreign fighters with questionable pasts. Back in March, over one thousand Alawites were killed in a violent crackdown on the minority’s stronghold on the Syrian coast. Meanwhile, the Druze remain divided, and many refuse to turn in their arms, fearing the escalation of sectarian tensions. 

Similarly, many other sects remain anxious about their future, including Christians and Twelver Shia, who saw the lowering of the Sayeda Zainab flag—a revered pilgrimage site on the outskirts of Damascus—as a sign of the prevalence of a monochrome orthodox version of Islam. Another worrying signal was the sweeping authority provided to the presidency in the new Syrian constitution, which also excluded mention of minority rights and societal diversity, making Islam the only supreme law of the land. 

Al-Sharaa and his entourage have a historic chance to start anew and build a plural and inclusive Syria for all its citizens. Until then, Washington and its allies should continue monitoring the state of minorities in this complex sociocultural context and signal to the new lords of the land that lifting sanctions is a provisional chance and not an unconditional license to lead Damascus into another sectarian spiral.   

—Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, focusing on minorities and cultural hybridity. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications. 

Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders 

No one can say that Trump does not listen to Arab leaders—clearly, he does. Arab leaders were united in telling Trump and his administration that the United States should lift sanctions against Syria to help move the country toward peace with all its neighbors. 

Officials in the Trump administration had different views on how to respond to al-Sharaa’s statements calling for peace with Syria’s neighbors and openness to the West. But no one expected Trump to announce the lifting of sanctions on this trip. As recently as April 25, a senior administration official said that the new Syrian government needed to combat terrorism, prevent Iran from regaining influence in Syria, expel foreign fighters from Syria’s government and security apparatus, destroy all chemical weapons, adopt nonaggression policies toward all neighboring countries, and clear up the fate of missing American Austin Tice. “We will consider sanctions relief, provided the interim authorities take demonstrable steps in the directions that I have articulated,” he said. “We want Syria to have a second chance.” 

On March 20, I and other US experts on the Middle East called for Syria to express interest in joining the Abraham Accords. I think that al-Sharaa’s April 19 offer to discuss joining the Abraham Accords did exactly what it needed to do: It broke through to get Trump’s attention. 

Trump is now willing to give Syria a second chance. Sanctions against terrorist groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which brought al-Sharaa to power (with support from Turkey), are likely to remain in place. Syria needs to make substantive progress on sidelining extremists within al-Sharaa’s ranks and engaging in serious talks (either direct or indirect) with Israel that could eventually lead to joining the Abraham Accords. Trump could change his mind tomorrow, but for now, it is clear Trump is listening. 

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security. 

Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

What a monumental shift for Syria—one of the most significant since the December fall of the Assad regime.  

Having just returned recently from the country, I could clearly see that the humanitarian situation has stagnated. The Trump administration’s massive US Agency for International Development (USAID) cuts—amid already dwindling funds for Syria—have had a catastrophic impact. The soul-crushing sight of destroyed buildings across the country as a result of the regime’s brutality was still visible in so many of the previously besieged areas like Douma and Harista of Eastern Ghouta. The Assad regime’s deprivation, oppression, and collective punishment of millions has left the country in a state of decay.  

In my view as a humanitarian and public health practitioner, sanctions have been one of the most critical hindrances to early recovery. Syria’s health sector is decimated after over a decade of destruction to critical civilian infrastructure like hospitals and clinics—not to mention schools and marketplaces— from aerial attacks by the regime and its allies.  

As long as sanctions are in place against the new government in Syria, the recovery of the country is impossible, and civilians will continue to the pay the price, just as they did under the Assad regime. Beyond the need for Syria’s early recovery and reconstruction from a physical infrastructure standpoint, the country needs to heal. This is an opportune moment to capitalize on this shift. The politicization of aid throughout the entirety of conflict has translated to the suffering of millions. Now is the time to move beyond that politicization of aid and recovery efforts and give Syrians the chance to start the healing process. Lifting sanctions will allow for that and bring Syria back from being a pariah state. 

—Amany Qaddour is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is also the director of the 501(c)(3) humanitarian nongovernmental organization Syria Relief & Development. 

A clear signal to Iran

Trump’s decision to lift economic sanctions on Syria provides a needed lifeline to Syria’s struggling economy, aligns Washington’s Syria policy with that of regional Arab powers, and pointedly signals a determination to prevent Iran from rebuilding its presence and influence in this key country. 

Popular unrest—including increasing criticism of al-Sharaa and his new government—has been growing in Syria over the poor economy and living conditions as the country attempts to recover from over a decade of civil war. The lifting of US sanctions opens the way for an infusion of regional and international aid, investment, and expertise to help the al-Sharaa government begin rebuilding the country and heading off the political instability that could otherwise arise. 

Removing sanctions also shows US support for efforts by Washington’s Arab partners in the Gulf, Egypt, and Jordan to reintegrate Syria into the moderate Arab fold after decades of alignment with Iran.  The controversy over the invitation of al-Sharaa to the Arab Summit in Baghdad because of his and his follower’s past ties to al-Qaeda makes clear that Syrian reintegration will need to proceed slowly, based on a demonstrated commitment to eschew all ties to terrorism and apply equal justice to all minorities in Syria. 

Finally, Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria puts down a marker that Washington is not only determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, but to check Iranian efforts to try to restore its badly weakened resistance axis aimed at threatening Israel and wider reigonal domination. 
 
—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. 

Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Trump’s announcement in Riyadh that the United States will end sanctions on Syria is a major foreign policy shift. Lifting sanctions on Syria is complicated and will require strategy to determine which sanctions to pull down and when, as well as what measures implement to enable the snap-back of sanctions should the situation in Syria deteriorate. 

Syria has been on the US state sponsor of terrorism list since 1979 and is subject to sanctions and export controls pursuant to numerous executive orders and legislation for a range of issues including human rights abuses, smuggling Iranian oil, and supporting terrorist groups. A further complicating factor is that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which overthrew the Assad regime, is leading the interim Syrian government. HTS, formerly known as al-Nusrah Front and once al-Qaeda’s arm in Syria, is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Canada, and other governments. HTS is also designated as a terrorist group by the United Nations (UN), a designation that all UN member states must comply with, including the United States. The UN designation of HTS and al-Sharaa include an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo. 

Trump’s announcement is a welcome shift in US foreign policy. The Syrian government and the Syrian people will need sanctions lifted to have a chance of rebuilding the country. This is a delicate and complicated situation on top of a complex sanctions regime. To move forward with this shift in foreign policy, as a next step, the United States will need to consider which sanctions it is willing to lift on Syria to meet specific goals and it will need to start engaging with the United Nations to consider if and how sanctions should be lifted on HTS. 

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served in the federal government for fifteen years, most recently as the acting associate director of the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s Intelligence Division. 

Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable 

Trump’s removal of sanctions on Syria is a welcome development. As many organizations have argued, while the sanctions were a tool meant to influence Bashar al-Assad and his regime, they instead became a tool “to punish the Syrian people and hinder reconstruction, humanitarian aid, and prospects of economic recovery.” 

However, from the information available, it is unclear how the United States will approach targeted sanctions designating individuals and entities for human rights abuses under executive orders related to Syria (as opposed to broad-based sectoral sanctions). While these designations, too, must be lifted when an individual no longer meets the relevant criteria, this does not mean that Washington should embrace impunity. Namely, the US must not allow al-Assad and his allies who have been designated for serious violations of human rights to walk away without consequences. While al-Assad may have fled Syria, he has yet to provide redress for a “horrifying catalogue of human rights violations that caused untold human suffering on a vast scale.” 

Lifting targeted sanctions could allow al-Assad, for example, to enter the United States, to access previously frozen US assets, and to engage in transactions involving the US dollar. Instead, Washington could pursue targeted designations under other relevant programs, such as the Global Magnitsky program for serious human rights abuse. The Trump administration could additionally use this moment as an opportunity to re-commit Washington to pursuing domestic criminal accountability for atrocities in Syria and other accountability avenues.  

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK

Trump’s announcement on lifting Syria sanctions is a surprising and welcome alignment of Washington’s sanctions strategy with that of the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom. European officials have been calling on Washington to remove sanctions on Syria because multinational companies and large banks will not enter the Syrian market as long as US secondary sanctions remain in place.  

While the specifics of the US sanctions removal plan are yet unknown, Washington should use the EU and UK sanctions-lifting playbook. In February, the European Council announced that the EU would lift sectoral sanctions on Syria’s energy and transport sectors, delist four Syrian banks, and ease restrictions on the Syrian central bank. However, EU sanctions against the Assad regime, the chemical weapons sector, and the illicit drug trade, as well as sectoral measures on arms trade and dual-use goods, will remain in place. Last month, the United Kingdom followed suit and lifted sanctions on the Syrian central bank and twenty-three other entities. Like the EU, the United Kingdom still maintains sanctions on members of the Assad regime and those involved in the illicit drug trade.  

Washington should replicate the EU’s and United Kingdom’s gradual approach to lifting sanctions. This means starting with the finance and energy sectors to create a favorable environment for multinational companies to enter the Syrian market. At the same time, the United States should promote the dollarization of the Syrian economy, provide financial assistance, and help the Syrian government establish regulatory oversight to prevent the diversion of funds from reconstruction efforts. 

—Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative within the GeoEconomics Center. 

This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Trump’s decision to lift all sanctions on Syria carries profound significance for the Syrian people. It offers them a genuine opportunity to rebuild their country and begin the process of recovery. While the sanctions were originally enacted with the intent of protecting civilians and deterring the Assad regime from further war crimes, over time—especially following al-Assad’s fall—they became a major hindrance, primarily harming ordinary Syrians. 

Yet, beyond its humanitarian implications, this move also marks a geopolitical win for the United States. By removing sanctions, Washington enables its allies to invest in Syria, preventing Damascus’s potential reliance on China and Russia, both of which could potentially circumvent sanctions to gain influence. This declaration by Trump should not merely be viewed as a lifting of punitive measures; it is also the first step toward formally recognizing the interim Syrian authorities as the legitimate government of Syria. 

Regionally, the end of sanctions represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey. As the principal supporters of the new Syrian government, both nations worked in tandem to persuade the Trump administration to shift its stance—initially marked by hesitation—toward greater engagement with Syria’s new leadership. Their coordinated diplomatic efforts played a pivotal role in shaping this policy reversal. 

This shared success could also pave the way for deeper regional collaboration between Riyadh and Ankara, highlighting the potential of US allies in the region when they act in concert. Syria is slowly but steadily turning from a regional conflict zone into a zone of regional cooperation. 

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based analyst of Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs. 

Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Washington’s decision to lift its sanctions on Syria emerges within a geopolitical context marked by unprecedented regional alignment around the newly formed Syrian government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. This government has uniquely achieved consensus among historically divergent regional powers, long characterized by strategic competition over regional hegemony. Al-Sharaa’s administration has been credited with fostering this consensus through a national vision, closely aligned with regional objectives aimed at overall stability, collective benefit, and cooperation, rather than the zero-sum dynamics that al-Assad used to impose on his direct and indirect neighborhood. 

However, two regional actors remain notably wary despite the broader regional consensus. Iran—an ally of the ousted Assad regime—views the consolidation of authority by the current government in Damascus as potentially adverse, perceiving it as a direct challenge to its strategic and security interests in the Levant. Israel, similarly, remains skeptical due to ongoing security concerns and its direct military involvement within Syrian territory. 

From a practical standpoint, lifting sanctions must be matched by corresponding bureaucratic agility. This includes swift administrative measures that enable Syrian public and private institutions to comply with international legal frameworks effectively. The cessation of sanctions should not only be a political gesture but also a procedural and institutional reality. To achieve this, regional governments alongside European and US counterparts, must proactively facilitate knowledge transfer, reduce procedural hurdles, and accelerate essential reforms. Such reforms represent a fundamental prerequisite to ensuring that the lifting of sanctions translates into tangible economic and political progress for Syria. 

—Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum. 

A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere

This policy shift has already brought what feels like a collective sigh of relief for a population weighed down by a humanitarian and development crisis. Today, the majority of Syrians live below the poverty line. More than 3.7 million children in Syria are out of school—including over half of school-age children. Only 57 percent of the country’s hospitals, including only 37 percent of primary health care facilities, are fully operational Despite widespread need, humanitarian aid is lacking—largely exacerbated the Trump administration’s now-dropped sanctions and its enduring foreign aid cuts.   

Sanctions relief is a critical first step in stabilizing essential systems, particularly the health sector, which the Syrian government has identified as a national priority. It will help restore access to essential medicines, supplies, and equipment. This shift will also unlock broader international investment, encouraging governments and private sector actors to reengage in Syria as a key regional player. Infrastructure firms, pharmaceutical companies, and development partners that have long been on standby now have an opportunity to support early recovery and rebuild systems that sustain daily life. 

This policy change is also seismic for Syrians who have been displaced for decades around the world. Supporting early recovery efforts through sanctions relief will enable safe and voluntary returns while contributing to broader regional stability, and countries hosting Syrian refugees should follow Trump’s lead.  

—Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is currently a postdoctoral associate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. 

Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

With the downfall of the Assad regime, sanctions imposed “to deprive the regime of the resources it needs to continue violence against civilians and to pressure the Syrian regime to allow for a democratic transition as the Syrian people demand” are no longer appropriate, and are in fact hindering much needed rebuilding and recovery in Syria. But lifting sanctions alone is not enough. 

Over the past fourteen years, the United States and other Western countries have been profiting from enforcing sanctions against Syria. Where companies and individuals have violated Syria sanctions, the United States and other countries have taken enforcement action, levying fines, penalties, and forfeitures in response. The proceeds are then directed to domestic purposes, with none of the recovery benefitting Syrians. 

Now is the time to change this policy. Syria is finally ready for rebuilding and recovery, refugees are returning, and victim and survivor communities are beginning to heal. In addition to lifting sanctions on Syria, the United States and other countries should direct the proceeds from their past and future sanctions enforcement to benefit the Syrian people and help victim and survivor communities recover. This can be done by listening to the calls from Syrian civil society and establishing an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund, which the European Parliament has endorsed. 

—Elise Baker is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project. She provides legal support to the project, which seeks to include legal tools in foreign policy, with a focus on prevention and accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human-rights violations, terrorism, and corruption offenses. 

Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria 

The United States lifting sanctions on Syria is a necessary first step, but it is not enough to unlock the meaningful foreign investment that Syria needs for its recovery and reconstruction. After years of conflict and isolation, Syria needs more than an open economy—it must rebuild trust and demonstrate long-term stability. Investors will not return simply because sanctions have been lifted—they need assurances of stability, legal protections, and clear signals from the international community. 

Private investors often follow the lead of governments and multilateral institutions. Countries that receive significant foreign aid post-conflict also tend to attract more private capital. Europe and the United Nations have begun developing a positive economic statecraft approach, pledging billions in grants and concessional loans to support Syria’s recovery. However, the United States has yet to commit financial support this year, citing expectations that others will shoulder the burden. This creates a leadership vacuum and leaves space for geopolitical rivals to step in. 

Countries including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, and China have already begun doing so, rapidly expanding their influence in Syria through investments in oil, gas, infrastructure, reconstruction projects, and paying off Syria’s World Bank debt. In exchange for financial support, they are gaining access to strategic sectors that will shape Syria’s future—and the broader dynamics of the region. If the United States is absent from Syria’s recovery, its risks ceding long-term influence to adversaries.  

Reconstruction is not only a humanitarian imperative—it is a strategic opportunity. The lifting of sanctions opens a door, but a coordinated positive economic statecraft response—including tools like World Bank risk guarantees and US development finance—is necessary to ensure Syria’s recovery aligns with broader international interests.

—Lize de Kruijf  is a project assistant with the Economic Statecraft Initiative.

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With Trump now scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia next month, the issue of normalization is certain to be on the agenda. There are three reasons why Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s principal decisionmaker, should make full Palestinian statehood part of the asking price for normalizing relations with Israel. First, many Saudis and other Arabs throughout the region may look askance at bin Salman if he were to be seen as ignoring the Palestinians’ plight. Second, if he pulls it off, he will have succeeded where other, more celebrated Arab leaders failed. And finally, the longer the issue remains unresolved, the more it will continue to impede progress on Saudi and regional priorities.

Then and now

Before the Gaza war began in October 2023, Riyadh may have been close to an agreement on official diplomatic relations with Israel without the precondition of a Palestinian state. But Israel’s punishing assault on the Gaza Strip, after Hamas’s rampage through southern Israel on October 7, 2023, seems to have changed Saudi thinking. Speaking at an Arab League summit last year, bin Salman called the Israeli military campaign in Gaza “genocide.” And in a speech in September, he indicated that Saudi Arabia would not establish relations with Israel without the creation of a Palestinian state.

Although Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has sought diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in an effort to develop contacts across the Muslim world, he remains staunchly opposed to a Palestinian state. In 2021, Netanyahu described the Abraham Accords—Israel’s normalization agreements with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Sudan, and Morocco—as enabling Israel to replace “the old and dangerous doctrine of territories in exchange for peace and brought peace in exchange for peace, without giving up a single inch.” 

Past failures

The term “pathway” to Palestinian statehood joins a variety of other phrases from past peace plans that included an unfulfilled Palestinian component. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat believed that he had secured “autonomy” for the Palestinians when he signed Cairo’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat believed he was gaining Palestinian “self-government” when he signed the 1993 Declaration of Principles. Jordanian King Hussein bin Talal agreed to the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty only after he was convinced the Palestinians had gained a “political horizon”—the derisory catchphrase of the Oslo process.

However, Palestinians’ autonomy, self-government, political horizon, independence, or peace with Israel never materialized; extremists on both sides undermined the deeply flawed Oslo process and subsequent negotiations. After 1994, further Israeli treaties with Arab countries did not materialize until the 2020 Abraham Accords, purchased for Israel by US concessions to the Arab signatories and conspicuously silent on the resolution of the Palestinian issue. Arab participants saw the Abraham Accords as a means to receive concrete US commitments.

When the UAE signed the first Abraham Accord in September 2020, it was primarily to gain participation in the US F-35 fighter program and access to US armed Reaper drones, over Israeli objections, as well as the understanding that Washington would prevent Israel from annexing portions of the West Bank, which Jerusalem was about to do. In exchange for their respective normalization deals with Israel, the United States recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara and removed Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Saudi considerations

Saudi Arabia is now setting its own price for an agreement. However, bin Salman should take note of two features of past Arab agreements with Israel. First, Israel has never entered into any agreement that explicitly called for Palestinian statehood. In fact, some pro-Israel observers in Washington are trying to identify a “rhetorical formula” that would satisfy Saudi demands without committing Israel to a Palestinian state. Second, the United States, despite its stated desire for a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, has never pressured Israel on Palestinian statehood, limiting itself to hollow rhetoric about supporting a two-state outcome.

Bin Salman reportedly told US leaders that he cares little for the Palestinians and does not want the issue to impede plans to diversify the Saudi economy or to discourage Iranian threats to his realm. However, the Gaza war—which has left over fifty thousand Palestinians dead, including tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians, televised in bloody detail by Al Jazeera, may have forced a change in bin Salman’s calculus about what is politically realistic. “Seventy percent of my population is younger than me,” the thirty-nine-year old crown prince reportedly told then US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in 2024. “For most of them, they never really knew much about the Palestinian issue. And so they’re being introduced to it for the first time through this conflict.” An Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) poll conducted in Saudi Arabia and published in February 2024 indicates that the share of the Saudi population opposed to normalization with Israel grew from 38 percent in 2022 to 68 percent in 2024.

The Trump administration may insist that Saudi Arabia relax its demand for a Palestinian state prior to a normalization deal, possibly by emphasizing other benefits bin Salman can expect. Also, the administration may, as Trump attempted in his first term, designate Palestinian municipal control of islands of Palestinian communities on the West Bank as a “state” and demand that bin Salman accept it as such.

But if bin Salman makes peace with Israel without a Palestinian state that most of his citizens believe to be credible, any Israeli action against the Palestinians, or other Arabs, will be his to justify. For example, in Gaza, apart from the high casualty numbers, massive infrastructure destruction, and the dislocation of 90 percent of the strip’s population, a United Nations Human Rights Commission report published last month states that sexual violence has become “standard operating procedure toward Palestinians” in the Gaza conflict and is “committed either under explicit orders or with implicit encouragement by Israel’s top civilian and military leadership.” This is the very leadership with which bin Salman would be reaching a normalization agreement.

Additionally, Israeli violence directed at West Bank Palestinians is growing. This has included assaults from Israeli settlers, the destruction of property, and expulsions, not to mention Israeli military offensives, in which Palestinian civilians are the inevitable victims. Bin Salman would also have to contend with Saudi public opinion regarding Israel’s capture of more Syrian territory, its strikes against Lebanese territory after a cease-fire has been concluded, and the increasing discussion of ethnic cleansing of Palestinians.

At present, bin Salman can comfortably join his people, regional Arabs, and the international community in condemning reported Israeli violations of the norms of war and peace. While other Arab regimes have survived peace with Israel, they did so despite the wishes of their populations, not because they made a convincing case for peace. The political risks of normalization are also exemplified by the assassination of Sadat by Islamic extremists, in part because of his perceived betrayal of Arab and Islamic causes in signing a peace agreement with Israel.

In last year’s ACRPS poll, the majority of respondents from countries whose governments have already signed agreements with Israel—including Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan—oppose their countries’ normalization with Israel. Other Arab countries such as Oman and Qatar, which have informal ties to Israel, continue to refuse normalization until Israel ends its occupation of Palestinian territories.

Bin Salman may be drawn to the idea that he can achieve something that past regional leaders like Sadat, Hussein, and Arafat, as well as current Arab leaders such as Muhammad bin Zayed of the UAE failed to accomplish. Demanding a Palestinian state may also be a means to distinguish himself from the Arab signatories of the other Abraham Accords, all of whom prioritized their respective national ambitions and did not press for progress on the Palestinian issue. Bin Salman must also consider the ability of regional malefactors such as Iran and radical Islamists to exploit the unresolved Palestinian issue to impede political, security, and economic progress for Saudi Arabia and the region. The ongoing Houthi campaign of attacks against Red Sea shipping, for example, would not be happening without the Gaza war, itself an extension of the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Costs and benefits

While Israel has legitimate security concerns, its continued occupation of Palestinian territories, its war in Gaza, and growing violence in the West Bank are creating a pronounced line in the sand between nations that have peace treaties with Israel and those withholding formal relations. While there are Arab governments on both sides of this line, their publics, including the Saudi people, are overwhelmingly opposed to normalization with Israel.

Bin Salman needs to weigh popular Saudi and other Arab views, as well as the regional instability that the continued Palestinian-Israeli conflict engenders, against any benefits he anticipates from a formal peace with Israel. Then, he needs to decide on which side the kingdom benefits most. If he were to settle for equivocal language about a “pathway,” as opposed to an actual state, the history of Arab-Israeli peacemaking suggests bin Salman would join Sadat, Arafat, Hussein, and others who failed to use their diplomatic leverage to press for Palestinian statehood.

Amir Asmar is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. 

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Understandably, many have focused on his policy and posture toward the state of Israel.

His final address on Easter Sunday was a capstone in a track record of advocacy for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, including strong and direct statements. “Dramatic and deplorable” is how he described the living conditions in Gaza. The brutal massacre of the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip by the Israeli Defense Forces, which came almost at the conclusion of his Pontificate, had quite publicly saddened and pained him in a deep way.

Pundits and commentators have been quick in pointing out the silence coming from the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since his death. President Isaac Herzog delivered a few comments, nice and positive, even if not particularly warm. The relationship between the first modern non-European Pope and the state of Israel has been contentious indeed.

The vocal standing behind the Palestinian plight—including multiple sermons on Gaza and near-daily calls with Gaza’s Christian leaders through the war—was the success of Franciscan values over a part of the Catholic Church which would have preferred a more nuanced, if not entirely favorable, position towards Israel.

Further, influential personalities like Monsignor Pierbattista Pizzaballa, the patriarch of Jerusalem, who offered himself in exchange for Hamas’s Israeli hostages in the aftermath of October 7, are a living testament to Pope Francis’ posture of opposition to the occupation of the Arab lands in Palestine.

But his legacy in the Middle East extends beyond Palestine. Bergoglio exerted influence in quite a few areas across the region.

Pope Francis exercised pressure on the European powers regarding the tragedy of the civil war in Syria and the horrors unleashed by the Islamic State. The concurrent efforts by the Church to protect and save as many members of the Church of the Levant as possible are noticeable and much appreciated—albeit not always successful.

In the wider Levant, his stance was coherently against the extremists of the Islamic State, the Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood and other similar organizations—whom he always saw as a danger to his vision of brotherly intent to take care of the world’s marginalized.

He was widely liked in the Emirates, with whom Pope Bergoglio understood the importance of positive relationships despite the abysmal record of the small emirates confederation in human rights and respect for pluralism. He understood the potential for success in diplomacy, negotiation, and public support that could arise for the Church if it sided with the Emiratis and their projection of growing global influence.

To summarize, Pope Francis’ policy in the Middle East and North Africa has been characterized by a wise combination of value-based policies and convenient stances, in line with the scope of the objectives the Pope set for his pastoral mission. 

However, the region is very diverse: ethnically, socially, culturally, and, obviously, religiously. This diversity—despite the frequent skirmishes and conflicts it has played a hand in sowing—has always been understood as the wealth of the region.  Trying to find a common denominator in reactions to Pope Francis’s policies, let alone the expectations of the new Pontiff, is difficult to define without risk of distorting the varied perspectives from the diverse threads of the region’s canopy.

It is possible to say that, at the popular level, the importance of the Catholic Pope is not as significant as in other parts of the world. After all, there are very few Catholics left in the Middle East.

Moving forward, answering the question of who constitutes the ruling elites of the Middle East—namely, those who hold political power and, in some cases, represent religious authority—is crucial to understanding regional expectations of the new Pope. 

For the region’s ruling elites, the Church’s spiritual component matters less, and its influence holds significance only as a political force. In this respect, the Church and its 2.2 billion followers become a heavyweight geopolitical actor, and as such, they treat it.

And there are indeed secular movements at play, particularly with respect to a growing conservatism among Catholics in Western world powers like the United States.

In the West, there is an ascent of right-wing movements that Pope Francis fiercely fought against, including populism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia.  But these emerging movements may be more in line with some of the region’s ruling powers.

Regional leaders, building on alliances with the new administration in Washington, for example, may indeed hope for the election of a conservative Pope, who could become an ally in maintaining and defending the values that Middle Eastern elites share with conservatives in the West.

Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council, focusing on the processes of change in North Africa. 

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Tariffs will not be the focus of this article, though they are rightly what nearly everyone is thinking about at the moment. The extensive tariff action taken by Trump this month spared the Gulf states from the highest new duties, but other Middle East and North African countries were hit with steep tariffs. The tariffs are likely to have two kinds of impacts. The first may take the form of collateral damage if there is reduced demand for oil due to a recession or slower global growth. The second impact could be on countries like Jordan, which may be hit with high tariffs it cannot absorb, and may potentially need to find new markets. For more analysis on the tariff impacts, check out insights from my Atlantic Council colleagues here.

Welcoming investment and business deals

President Trump’s transactional nature and desire for more investment in the United States play to the strengths of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The UAE has the fourth largest sovereign wealth fund in the world, behind Norway’s and two from China. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) is the world’s sixth-largest sovereign wealth fund. With these financial resources, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have the means to make major investments, or at least promise them.

In January, during his first phone call with Trump after the inauguration, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman pledged $600 billion in investments and trade over four years. Soon afterwards, Trump said: “I’ll be asking the Crown Prince, who’s a fantastic guy, to round it out to around 1 trillion.” It remains unclear whether the Saudis will increase their pledge, especially at a time when low oil prices are constraining domestic spending at the heart of Riyadh’s Vision 2030 economic diversification efforts. It is also unclear whether the $600 billion pledged will be used to purchase US weapons, invest further in US companies or entities, such as the Professional Golfers’ Association of America (PGA), or something else.

The UAE had a similar strategy when Sheikh Tahnoon, the UAE National Security Advisor and brother of UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, visited Washington in March. During the visit, the UAE announced a $1.4 trillion investment pledge over ten years. The statement of planned investments does not list the dollar amount per item and includes partnerships with US companies on Artificial Intelligence, data centers, energy, and critical minerals. Some of these deals were previously announced.

One intriguing UAE investment promise is a new aluminum smelter in the United States, which would be “the first in thirty-five years” and would “nearly double US domestic aluminum production.” The United States is the UAE’s top buyer of aluminum, and the UAE is the second-largest supplier of aluminum to the United States. The twenty-five percent tariffs Trump imposed on aluminum in March could be behind the UAE’s decision to consider investing in a US-based smelter to avoid paying these new taxes. In Guinea, the UAE owns and operates a bauxite mine, which provides the raw material for aluminum, so presumably the UAE would import raw materials into the United States for use in the smelter. Given the new Trump tariffs, it is unclear if the smelter would be economically viable and would be pursued.

A key trade and investment issue to watch is whether the Trump administration classifies Saudi Arabia and the UAE as Tier One countries when it comes to high-tech chip purchases, which would give them essentially unlimited access, according to rules the Biden administration announced in January. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are currently in the Tier Two category, so they have more access to chips than countries like China in the lowest tier, but their access is still constrained. This was an issue Sheikh Tahnoon raised during his March visit to Washington, and Microsoft, which has partnered with both Saudi and Emirati entities, has called on the Trump administration to give these countries more access to chips. There is likely to be more industry and foreign government pressure on this front, especially as more restrictions are placed on China.

Related to the issue of chips’ access is whether the UAE and Saudi Arabia will hedge their technology bets and try to continue partnerships with China on AI and other high-tech projects. Or, will they choose or be pressured to keep China out of supply chains, hardware, and software that Washington sees as a national security threat, perhaps in exchange for more access to cutting-edge US chips?

Conflict mediation

In his first term, Trump chose Saudi Arabia for his first official visit as commander-in-chief. That landmark visit in 2017 delivered a $110 billion arms deal, which experts noted primarily consisted of previously agreed-upon sales. Before announcing he would attend the funeral of Pope Francis as his first foreign trip this term, Trump had planned to visit the Kingdom first during a regional trip this spring. As he explained in March, “I am going to Saudi Arabia. Normally, you would go to the UK first…I said I will go if you put up a trillion dollars to American companies…They agreed to do that. So I am gonna be going there.”

But this time around, the visit to Saudi Arabia is not just about financial investment. Another sort of deal-making is also taking place.

Saudi Arabia has taken on a new international diplomacy role by hosting several rounds of direct US-Russia talks, as well as meetings with Ukraine, in an attempt to help achieve a ceasefire. Riyadh has also offered to host a Trump-Putin meeting.

Saudi Arabia is well-placed to play this role as its leadership has both the trust of Trump personally—via significant financial ties to Trump’s businesses and family—as well as a solid rapport with Russia since the Kingdom has been a “fence sitter,” refusing to participate in United States and Europe-led efforts to isolate Russia in punishment for its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Saudi Arabia has also given humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

The Saudi approach to Russia is part of its preference to hedge its bets and prevent being pigeonholed into the United States-led camp to the extent possible. This suits the Kingdom’s economic and security interests, as it keeps its options open. Hosting talks between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine also helps raise Saudi Arabia’s global profile and cast it in a positive light as a peacemaker.

It is telling that Trump likewise plans to visit Qatar and the UAE on his first foreign trip of his second term. The UAE, like Saudi Arabia, has the financial means to make significant foreign investment in the United States. The UAE is also playing a global mediation role: it recently passed a letter from Trump to Iran’s Supreme Leader pushing for negotiations within two months. As for Qatar, it continues to play a key role working with the United States and Israel to seek a negotiated ceasefire in Gaza.

Keeping a lid on national security risks

Trump does not want the United States to get involved in long, faraway wars. Neither do the majority of Americans. However, many past US presidents have been forced to focus on the Middle East, whether they wanted to or not. The following list of hot spots underscores the policy challenges the Trump administration faces. So far, Trump and his team are simultaneously using and threatening force to try to keep a lid on conflict.

Iran: As of this writing, the Trump administration has held two rounds of negotiations with the Iranians, with plans for more. However, within Trump’s senior team, there are competing views about whether Iran’s nuclear program should be completely dismantled (as US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio have called for) or subject to a “verification program” (as Trump’s top negotiator, Steve Witkoff, has said). Moreover, looming over the efforts to achieve a nuclear deal is the US president’s threat that if one is not achieved, there will “be bombing the likes of which they [the Iranians] have never seen before.” Which approach will win out: negotiations, or military action (with or without Israeli support)? Iran has signaled openness to indirect talks hosted by Oman but has also threatened to pursue nuclear weapons if attacked by the United States. So far, there is no talk of including the issue of Iran’s support for groups such as the Houthis and Hezbollah in the negotiations.

The Houthis: Will the Trump administration’s new military campaign succeed in ending the Houthis’ capability and desire to attack targets in the Red Sea? Or will this military operation drag on at great cost to the United States, yielding no change in Houthi behavior? The United States has used over two hundred million dollars in munitions in just three weeks, and some military planners are worried that the amount of weapons being used is cutting into supplies that could be needed for other global contingencies. The Houthis have survived several other military campaigns by the Saudis, Emiratis, and the United States over the years, and they enjoy significant asymmetric advantages such as cheap, two thousand dollar drones and geography that allows them to quickly disperse and hide in Yemen’s mountainous terrain, especially since many of their weapons are easy to move. On the other hand, if the US campaign begins to succeed or cause real pain to the Houthis, will they seek to pressure the United States by attacking Saudi Arabia or the UAE?

Israel-Gaza: Before coming into office, Trump and his team pushed hard for a ceasefire alongside former president Joe Biden’s outgoing administration, and they achieved one. However, there now seems to be less focus on ending the devastating conflict. Trump’s threat in February to Hamas to release the hostages or “all hell is going to break out” has, in practice, meant Israel restarting the war and blocking humanitarian aid from entering Gaza. Without an alternative to Hamas rule, the militant group may hang on and continue to fight as an insurgency, replenishing its ranks by recruiting desperate people. The Israeli Defense Forces could potentially be mired in Gaza for months if not years, and the remaining living hostages may die if there is no ceasefire. Some experts also warn that the IDF may face a morale crisis, with some reservists already refusing to serve because they do not support the war. Although the conflict in Gaza is not likely to spill over to other parts of the region, if the war grinds on over the short and medium term, this likely would prevent a normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which would thwart a key foreign policy achievement desired by the Trump administration.

Stefanie Hausheer Ali is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and a senior director at international affairs consulting firm Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC.

The information in this article represents the views and opinions of the author and does not necessarily represent the views or opinions of Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC. 

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For months, economists and analysts warned of this trajectory. Their forecasts were not based on abstract models but on daily observations: rising inflation, widening budget shortfalls, and the quiet disappearance of public oversight.

The Central Bank of Libya (CBL), long reticent, has now joined that chorus with a rare and public statement. Its warnings are stark: In 2024, the Government of National Unity spent over 109 billion Libyan dinars (LYD), while the parallel government in the east accrued more than forty-nine billion in off-budget obligations. Neither figure reflects coordination or restraint—just the actions of officials either ignorant of or indifferent to the consequences of unchecked spending.

Bracing for financial chaos

Both ledgers lay bare the scale of state capture and fiscal chaos. Alongside these warnings, the CBL also amended the official exchange rate, raising it to 5.48 LYD to the dollar while retaining its fifteen percent surcharge on foreign currency purchases. Framed as a technical adjustment, the move is a stopgap—an attempt to accommodate political excess within a shrinking monetary space. It underscores a deeper truth: Libya’s financial institutions are no longer guiding the economy. They are bracing against its unraveling.

Superficially, Libya still functions. Oil, at least in practice, is still exported. Salaries, though often late, are eventually deposited in the accounts of the country’s bloated public-sector employees.

But beneath the surface, the economy is disassembling. The black-market exchange rate has climbed to 7.8 LYD to the dollar within forty-eight hours of the CBL’s decree, a warranted vote of no confidence in Libya’s fiscal and monetary custodians. Institutions that once stabilized the system—through budgetary checks, revenue cycle audits, regulated foreign exchange, or centralized oversight—have been hollowed out or deactivated. What remains is an economy run on improvisation, backroom deals, and political convenience.

Looking back, the architecture of corruption has evolved in stages. First came the scramble for what Muammar Gaddafi had monopolized the allocation of: budget lines, salary schemes, and procurement deals. Later, transitional authorities waged fights over who wrote those allocations—to control the institutions and the budget pens. Today, that logic has culminated in the complete distortion of the allocation process itself. Libya’s economic crisis is no longer just about who benefits. It is about how benefit is manufactured.

An innovative system of corruption

Over the past several years, opaque and improvised mechanisms have steadily replaced formal revenue channels. At first, these workarounds were viewed as a tolerable compromise—a necessary price for preserving a fragile calm and avoiding renewed conflict. But what was once seen as a temporary accommodation has metastasized into a full-blown system of economic governance, one in which accountability is absent and discretion is unchecked. Crude-for-fuel barter deals, once framed as a pragmatic workaround, have become routine, sidestepping the national budget and brokered through opaque channels with no public oversight. They routinely bypass the national budget entirely and were often negotiated through informal brokers with transnational networks and no public scrutiny. Though the National Oil Corporation (NOC) has pledged to end crude-for-fuel swaps by March 2025, these deals are already being eclipsed by more elaborate and opaque arrangements—the latest evolution in Libya’s system of innovative corruption.

One of the most illustrative examples is Arkenu, a Benghazi-based company originally established for geological research but now repurposed as a vehicle for shadow oil exports. According to the United Nations Panel of Experts, Arkenu is operated by actors aligned with Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander Khalifa Haftar and serves as a financial conduit for eastern military and political interests. In 2024 alone, Arkenu independently exported approximately $460 million worth of crude oil under a GNU-approved deal, absent any transparent bidding, auditing, or publication of terms. As of 2025, it remains active—continuing to lift crude monthly from the National Oil Corporation—and sits at the center of an emerging system in which state-linked assets are repurposed to fund political actors outside formal channels.

The role of armed groups

Meanwhile, armed groups have entrenched themselves deeper into the infrastructure of Libya’s energy economy. In both east and west, militias have embedded themselves in utilities such as the General Electric Company of Libya (GECOL), where operational choices are influenced more by kleptocratic leverage than by institutional standards. Between 2022 and 2024, an estimated 1.125 million tons of diesel—allocated theoretically for power generation—were illicitly exported from Benghazi’s old harbor. These exports were facilitated through inflated supply requests issued via GECOL, the obstruction of audits, and threats of violence against oversight bodies.

The NOC, too, has been drawn into this vortex. Crony contracting has allowed politically connected firms to secure procurement deals and operational privileges, eroding the firewall between national resource management and elite patronage. This dynamic accelerated following the 2022 appointment of Farhat Bengdara as NOC chairman in a power-sharing arrangement between the GNU and eastern authorities. Though intended to ease executive tensions, the move entrenched political influence over the corporation’s operations. Bengdara’s abrupt resignation in early 2025 did not reverse this trajectory. Instead, his tenure left a lasting imprint: a politicized NOC, increasingly leveraged for factional gain rather than safeguarding Libya’s oil wealth.

This erosion of institutional neutrality has a fiscal analog in Libya’s monetary policy, where political imperatives now override sound economic management. At the core of the dysfunction lies the unchecked expansion of the money supply. Independent estimates suggest that the volume of money in circulation now exceeds 170 billion LYD—a level of liquidity that far outpaces productive output or revenue generation. But the deeper concern lies not in the quantity itself, but in how much of it has been manufactured ex nihilo.

Digital monetary creation—the injection of funds into the economy without any corresponding revenue or production—has become the fallback of a political order unwilling to curb spending or enforce discipline. The predictable result has been a cascading erosion of the LYD’s value, a surge in inflation, and a growing public mistrust in the state’s ability to steward its financial future. As foreign reserves shrink and black-market rates spike, Libya’s monetary system is no longer a stabilizing force; it is a mirror of its dysfunction. To call this mismanagement is too generous. This is structural predation, a system designed both to fail and extract. Public wealth is scarcely channeled into services or national development. It is captured, funneled through kleptocratic networks, and increasingly siphoned through untraceable contracts and offshore accounts.

Avenues of reform

Addressing this collapse requires more than fiscal prudence. It demands political realignment. Libya’s economic institutions must be recentered as sites of national governance, not tools of factional financing. The institutions that govern oil revenues, control disbursement, and oversee procurement must be protected, reformed, and in many cases rebuilt, not just with new laws, but with new incentives, protections, and public visibility.

A credible reform strategy must begin with mandatory public disclosure of all oil contracts, real-time publication of state spending, and a ban on off-budget arrangements. Procurement must be regulated through transparent, competitive systems. Revenue distribution must be guided by transparency, equity, and public oversight—not by decentralization for its own sake, nor by external stewardship. Reform must strengthen national institutions while ensuring that public funds reach intended sectors and communities through accountable, legally grounded mechanisms. These are not just technocratic ideals. They are prerequisites for legitimacy and recovery.

International actors—donors, multilateral institutions, and diplomatic envoys—must stop treating Libya’s economic collapse as a mere byproduct of its political fragmentation. Stability manufactured atop corruption is not stability at all. While much emphasis is placed on unifying the government, doing so without reforming its fiscal architecture would merely centralize corruption under a single executive. That may deliver temporary coherence, but it will not constitute progress. In fact, it risks consolidating the very networks that have driven economic ruin. Libya does need a single budget and a unified executive—but one subject to strict and enforceable guardrails on how public money is spent, disclosed, and audited. External engagement must support this principle. Anything less only subsidizes the continuation of state capture under a new administrative label.

Libya is not doomed to economic failure. But its current trajectory is unsustainable—not solely because the price of the oil barrel dropped, but because the political will to govern with integrity has long since evaporated. Recovery will require confrontation, not consensus. And it must begin with reclaiming the institutions that were designed to serve the public, not those who profit from its decline. Tinkering with technical levers like the exchange rate may buy time. But when such adjustments are used to sustain elite corruption rather than correct structural imbalances, they do not stabilize, they provoke. If this continues, the next phase of Libya’s crisis will not be quiet erosion. It will be public revolt.

Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council where he advises on US and European policies toward North Africa and the Sahel, focusing on Libya’s conflict.

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“The Secretary reiterated that the United States recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and supports Morocco’s serious, credible, and realistic Autonomy Proposal as the only basis for a just and lasting solution to the dispute,” reads the statement issued by the State Department after the visit. Nevertheless, one obstacle persists: Dismantling the obsolete and dysfunctional United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

This time, the United States went further by urging the parties to engage in discussions without delay, stating that Morocco’s Autonomy Plan is the only acceptable framework for dialogue. Rubio even stepped up to offer to facilitate the process, signaling that the only way out of this fifty-year colonial impasse may be outside the United Nations and its legacy of failure to secure a sustainable solution for the Sahraoui people.

A mission without a mandate

As its name stipulates, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara was initially established in 1991 by Security Council resolution 690 to prepare for a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. However, the mission failed to deliver on its mandate and only served to maintain a state of paralysis throughout the years. It is essential to clarify that while the MINURSO monitors the ceasefire, which still holds for nearly thirty-five years between Morocco and the Polisario Front separatists, it is in no way an active peacekeeping mission, and Morocco continues to administer de facto over 80 percent of the Western Saharan disputed territories since the Spanish exit in 1975. MINURSO staff remained spectators, even during the rare skirmishes that were reignited along the sand wall, when Morocco decided to retake the strategic Guerguerat crossing in November 2020 to open trade routes with Mauritania.

Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations Secretary-General envoy to Western Sahara, was set for defeat from the start. Since 2022, de Mistura has felt out of place in a fast-moving international context, shifting in favor of Morocco.

First, the United States recognized Rabat’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in conjunction with re-establishing diplomatic ties between Morocco and Israel in December 2020, knocking down the chessboard in a fragile geopolitical context where MINURSO had maintained the status quo between Morocco and Algeria.

Then came the coup de grace by the two former colonizers of Morocco and Western Sahara, who are at the source of the current superfluous borders, when Spain sided with Morocco in 2022. France followed in 2024, and over twenty-nine countries decided to open diplomatic representations in Western Sahara as a sign of support for the Moroccan stance.

The Italian diplomat himself indicated in October 2024 his intention to step down, alluding to his inability to mediate between a Morocco emboldened by overwhelming international support and an Algeria obstinate in supporting the mirage of Sahraoui self-determination until the very end. In his latest faux pas, Staffan de Mistura proposed the partition of Western Sahara, suggesting that the envoy and the MINURSO are neocolonial instruments from the past, wasting a sixty-one million dollar annual budget, funded in majority by the United States.

Another flagrant example of MINURSO’s irrelevance is how the disputed Western Sahara borders have been, for decades, uncharted territories for terrorist activities from al-Qaeda to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and, more recently, a fertile ground for Iranian and Russian influence. Besides gathering intel and filing situation reports, the Mission has done very little to address the flourishing drug and human trafficking business in the disputed territories, leaving this task to the Moroccan and Algerian military.

The diversion of humanitarian aid destined for Sahrawis in the camps in Tindouf, Algeria, also continues to raise concerns, especially with evidence showing that much of the aid is subject to corruption and reselling in open markets like Nouadhibou in Northern Mauritania.

The impracticality of a Sahraoui referendum

Several founding myths surround the Western Sahara file, making a referendum a preposterous and impractical solution—a reality that Western allies like the United States started grasping in recent years.

Contrary to other conflicts, where Indigenous people claim the right to self-determination based on their distinct cultural identity, the Saharaoui people are not native to North Africa. The Arab tribes of Beni Hassan, who trace their ancestry to the Yemeni tribe of Maqil, started moving westward to the Maghreb around the thirteenth century, invited by the Almohad empire of Morocco that needed to reinforce its rule by balancing the Amazigh tribe with the Arab warrior populations. If anything, the Hassani people were the ones who pushed the Indigenous Amazigh tribal confederation of Sanhaja out of the Sahara after the massacre of Char Bouba War in the seventeenth century.

The Hassani people today are transnational communities inhabiting large sections of Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, and Western Sahara—hence the impossibility of carrying out a census of who gets to participate in a referendum. To complicate things further for the MINURSO, the Alaouite sultan Moulay Ismail had established the “Guich System”, a feudal system where these very Hassani tribes were used to counter Amazigh rebellions in exchange for land up to the nineteenth century. The descendants of these fighters still live around the capital, Rabat, Marrakech, and Sidi Kacem, and still assert their Sahraoui roots.

In the Moroccan-administered portion of the territory, the central state had additionally provided generous incentives, including double salaries and subsidized gas and essential subsistence items, since the seventies for those willing to relocate to the Sahara, and two generations at least have been in the disputed land. Even in the five refugee camps in Algeria, where about 173,600 individuals still live, it is extremely hard to determine who is a Saharaoui and who came to Tindouf as a result of a multitude of other conflicts in the Sahel. Due to all these complexities, the MINORSO has consistently failed since its establishment to come up with voter lists that would be acceptable to all parties, thereby nullifying the prospects of a referendum and the relevance of a UN Mission entrusted to organize it.

What many Sahraoui people want

In a recent field study in July 2024 to Dakhla, Laayoun, and Boujdour, I covered nearly four hundred miles and spoke to dozens of civil society activists, journalists, officials, and ordinary Sahraoui people from my own tribesmen of Oulad Dlim. Most interviewees in the Moroccan-administered portion of Western Sahara (about 1.1 million inhabitants according to the September 2024 census) expressed extreme fatigue from five decades of conflict and a desire for normality and prosperity. They seemed more hopeful for a sustainable resolution through the Moroccan federal advanced regionalization plan proposed in 2006, which preserves their cultural identity and gives them sovereignty over local governance and natural resources under the Moroccan flag.

It was interesting to observe the shift in the Moroccan strategy toward the Sahara conflict, transcending the purely security approach under Driss al-Basri in the 1990s, beating and arresting demonstrators, to a vision focusing on regional development, a dynamic tourism sector, and the looming hope of the $1.2 billion Dakhla Atlantic harbor megaproject—the cornerstone of the kingdom’s Atlantic Initiative. This recent economic boom made some interlocutors confident in the future, although many stated that Morocco hasn’t provided any details of how the autonomy plan will work in practice and how much control they will have over their natural resources. It’s important to note that the research didn’t include Sahrawis in the camps, who may remain attached to self-determination after five decades on a different trajectory.

For the past thirty-four years, MINURSO has consistently deceived the Sahrawi people by failing to deliver on its mission, promoting a laissez-faire culture, and holding hundreds of thousands hostage to complicated geopolitical calculus. Now, the time is up, and the Sahrawi communities can no longer afford another fifty years of political stalemate. The parties to the conflict, along with US and trans-Atlantic allies, will need to defund, dismantle, and terminate it so the autonomy plan can start taking shape.

In The Revenge of Geography, Robert D. Kaplan said that “borders are not just lines on a map; they are a reflection of power dynamics,” and today’s dynamics are calling for greater accountability for UN programs like the MINURSO and for out-of-the-box decisive solutions under Trump’s leadership.

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, focusing on the Western Sahara conflict. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

The post Why it’s time to terminate the UN’s dysfunctional mission in Western Sahara appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Child marriage, and specifically the marriage of young girls to adult men, remains a long-standing problem in many parts of Iraq, even when forbidden under law. Tribal and religious leaders perform marriages outside the formal legal system, making it difficult for authorities to monitor or prevent child marriages. In areas stricken with poverty, conflict, and displacement, families are pushed to marry off their daughters as a means of economic survival or protection.

The original proposed text of the new amendments permitted the marriage of girls from the age of nine in certain circumstances, depending on religious interpretations, and granted religious authorities increased power over family matters, including marriage, divorce, and child custody. Proponents of those amendments, primarily conservative Shiite lawmakers, defended the changes as better aligning the law with Islamic principles and reducing Western influence on Iraqi culture.

Iraqi women’s rights activists protested that the amendments effectively “legalise child rape”, and constitute a dramatic rollback in the rights and protections previously guaranteed to women and children under Iraqi law. Their advocacy and pressure appear to have limited the amendments’ harm by retaining provisions for the minimum age of marriage, child custody, and polygamy.

Under the final text of amendments, which entered into force in February, Muslim couples concluding a marriage contract must elect whether the contract—which specifies right and obligations as regards marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance—is to be governed under the 1959 Personal Status Law or a Personal Status Code (mudawana), the latter to be developed by the Shia Ja’afari school of Islamic jurisprudence. For marriage contracts concluded and registered before the law’s effective date, either party may submit a request to the Personal Status Court to apply rulings of the Jaafari Shiite school of jurisprudence. If parties in a family dispute disagree on whether to apply the rulings of the Shiite Jaafari school in cases of divorce, the court will apply the choice of the husband.

The amendments also stipulate that the Shiite Endowment Scientific Council, with the assistance of judges and legal experts and in coordination with the State Council, shall develop a code of personal status based on the Jaafari Shiite school of jurisprudence, and submit it to the parliament within four months of the code’s effective date. This code must comply with existing provisions, including those of the 1959 Law, which sets the minimum age of marriage, with exceptions allowing marriage from the age of 15 with a judge’s permission and depending on the child’s “maturity and physical capacity.”

The Iraqi government issued a statement indicating that the amendments came at the request of the citizens represented by the Shiite component in the parliament. Baghdad also clarified that, under the new law, the rulings of the Shiite Jaafari school of jurisprudence apply exclusively to Shiite Iraqis and do not apply to the Sunni Muslims in Iraq.

While there have been some elements of relief that the Iraq parliament has pulled back from legalizing child marriage, the situation remains dynamic, with ongoing discussions concerning the implications of the amendments and the development of the new personal status code, applicable only to the Shia community.

Without enforcement of the law, the Iraqi government is continuing to fail in its duty to protect the rights of its most vulnerable citizens. Girl brides often have little power within their marriages and are less likely to complete their education or be employed, undermining their opportunities for personal and financial autonomy. If divorced or abandoned by their husbands, they have little to equip themselves with to escape cycles of poverty.

Many so-called early marriages constitute de facto forced marriages. Forced marriage is a violation in itself and is also the site of numerous other abuses, including sustained sexual and physical violence. For young girls, pregnancy and childbirth may come with numerous health consequences. According to the World Health Organization, pregnancy and childbirth complications are a leading cause of death among adolescent girls worldwide. Boys who are subjected to early and/or forced marriages are also harmed. Forced to become breadwinners in adolescence, boys suffer curtailed education and career prospects.

The attempts to roll back the rights of women and girls, and the Government’s empowerment of religious authorities to govern people’s personal affairs, underscore the urgent need to support Iraqi human rights activists, and women and children’s rights activists in particular. With Iraq receding from the international headlines and as US humanitarian aid cuts increase the fragility of human rights work, there is a danger that Iraq’s most vulnerable are being left behind.

Sareta Ashraph is a senior legal advisor for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. 

The post Legalizing child marriage in Iraq: Stepping back from the brink appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But despite a convenient loss of interest by Taliban rulers, who have been in power-consolidation mode ever since their Kabul takeover, the prospect for practical intra-Afghan talks is not dead. 

In fact, February saw a blitz of conferences from the highly diversified Afghan diaspora and more moderate voices representing Afghan civil society. There are also signs of renewed interest on the part of the United Nations in adopting a more comprehensive trust-building approach rather than single-item agendas as a precondition for wider engagement and recognition.

Paired with a new US administration at the helm, which appears willing to break from diplomatic norms to drive results—as recently seen in the case of back-channel facilitations leading to the release of two American detainees in Kabul—there is a renewed urgency in achieving a streamlined vision for a dialogue framework. 

The international community now has an opportunity to pursue a two-track policy of ad hoc engagement on issues that are of interest to key stakeholders, while supporting a UN-led effort to address key recommendations as part of Security Council resolutions 2721 and 2777.

A fractioned diaspora, emerging talks

A slew of Afghan dialogues have emerged in recent months. The focus of the talks is as expansive as the diverse range of perspectives participating in them, and they address devastating cuts in humanitarian funding, deteriorating economic and environmental conditions, new regime restrictions on female education, and a lack of recognition compounded by governance weaknesses.  

On the diaspora side, three factions emerge. One, those who oppose any type of engagement, under any circumstances, involving the Taliban. This group is subdivided into those who support a military option using force to bring about radical change, and those who favor sanctions and the isolation of the current regime. Two, those who favor nonviolent engagement, but with softer conditions or practical objectives that would bring about policy reform or modifications, but also minimize the economic impact felt by more than 90 percent of the population as a result of sanctions and aid cutoff. The range of expectations within this group varies from lifting bans on female education and work to improving governance and widening political participation. And three, Taliban supporters and defenders—in much smaller numbers—who see no harm and generally agree with the regime’s policies.

Several intra-Afghan initiatives took place in February across various Afghan and international centers. A “dialogue forum” held in Istanbul brought together a number of former officials as well as diaspora and Kabul-based civil society participants. They expected Taliban de facto government members or associates to attend the event, but none were present. Two other meetings took place in Qatar. Among them, the Afghanistan Future Thought Forum (AFTF), involving regime sympathizers, civil society and non-Taliban Afghans, held its 10th session in Doha, during which pressing issues such as the evolving regional and international scene, women and girls’ access to education and health, and livelihood and ecological challenges facing Afghans, were discussed.

Another gathering sponsored by the National Resistance Front was held in Vienna. At this gathering, anti-Taliban figures from the republic era and diaspora representatives discussed adopting a program to pursue armed resistance while simultaneously bringing like-minded fractious groupings under a single umbrella.

Two cross-continental structured dialogue groups, the Salaam Center for Dialogue based in the US and the Intra-Afghan Dialogue in Australia, are among active groups merging research and dialogue facilitation methods with external expertise aimed at studying root causes of conflict and bridging the divide between civil societies and other stakeholders inside and outside Afghanistan. Another group, the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, held a pro-democracy event in Madrid that included opposition figures and select foreign commentators focusing, mainly, on a post-Taliban future.

Other forms of sporadic interactive online chats involve former factional party members and remnants of 1980s and 1990s-era mujahideen groups, primarily based in Turkey, the Gulf States, and Western countries, and ad hoc groups of human rights and ethno-political advocates. Most of the former factional platforms are divided between the idea of fighting the Taliban and the desire to pursue power-sharing negotiations—an idea shunned by the ruling faction in Kabul.

While the primary objective of these gatherings is ostensibly to serve as discussion hubs, some act as ad hoc think tanks or advocacy movements. Notably, a few of these initiatives are for the first time trying to adopt a comprehensive approach to dialogue by bringing together individuals from diverse backgrounds, both men and women, from Afghanistan and beyond. None of these platforms claim explicit political affiliation with current or former governments, highlighting their independent or semi-impartial nature. Furthermore, the majority of these initiatives rely on external funding to meet their logistical needs, highlighting the importance of external support in sustaining these dialogues. 

Inside Afghanistan: Taliban posturing and limited dissent

Since their return to power, the resurgent Taliban have characterized the pre-August 2021 talks as suspended due to the collapse of the “republic”,  instead encouraging non-political talks within the country. They have at times tolerated a minimal level of Afghan participation on platforms that denounce violence and focus on soft political agendas, either on technical matters or as part of non-confrontational, civil society-led dialogues.

Intra-Taliban dissent—a potent subject—also has its own modalities and limitations, as recently demonstrated by the distancing of several high-ranking officials who are critical of policy strands on female education and more engagement. Despite a government-run commission set up to receive ex-officials who opt to return to the country, serious consultations on improving governance standards or using technocrats have yet to be formalized.

Suffice it to say that it is now evident that some Taliban favor female access to education and are not opposed to preliminary trust-building consultations with other Afghans, while another grouping – smaller yet influential – opposes lifting education curbs or any interaction that might lead to more serious talks on a participatory system or restructuring the existing governance model. 

Non-Taliban Afghans inside Afghanistan bring a diversity of views, too. While politically muted and non-provocative criticism of certain policies —particularly those concerning women’s access to education and employment, salaries and pensions, and economic hardship—is tolerated to some extent in public or in the media, the space for overt political dissent within the country has shrunk.

There are also reports of small-scale, non-political civil society interactions taking place in Afghanistan itself, yet media outlets underreport these.

Enduring challenges

A significant gap exists in the absence of an umbrella organization capable of bridging the two divergent paths of diplomatic and nonviolent engagement versus conflict. Partisanship in academia, the media, and advocacy movements highlights the complex interplay between research and activism.

The polarization of approaches and diversity of views has also made it more difficult for international intermediaries such as the UN to pursue a path that ties Afghan dialogues to intra-Afghan talks on governance and fundamental rights. 

Following the Security Council’s March debates on Afghanistan, the UN-sponsored Doha process plans to consider all issues dividing the current de facto Afghan regime and the international community as valid talking points for an Afghan roadmap as suggested in UN resolutions 2721 and 2777.

The UN process will need to make use of structured trust-building thematic engagement as a precursor to addressing legitimacy and normalization objectives. Some agenda-driven diaspora groups are opposed to UN efforts seeking consensus on a roadmap, while others see it as a credible option to negotiate on reforms and prevent further isolation and impoverishment of the country. 

Looking at the evolving intra-Afghan landscape, it’s apparent that the diversity of platforms, networks, and agendas that drive advocacy and dialogue processes face ideological, political, representation, structural, and funding challenges. Some also offer lessons-learned opportunities for addressing pressing issues, connecting diverse communities, and engaging in results-oriented exchanges that build trust and seek common ground. They are, nonetheless, valuable tools and incubators of thoughts and ideas at a time when both the international community and the Afghan population are looking for practical answers and solutions to the country’s five decades-long ordeal. How Washington, the UN, and especially, the de facto regime make use of the intra-Afghan opportunities will depend on political will and strategic foresight.

Omar Samad is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. He is also the founder and president of Silkroad Consulting, LLC. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Samad was a senior Afghan expert in residence with the Center for Conflict Management at the US Institute of Peace from January 2012 to January 2013. He also served as ambassador of Afghanistan to France from 2009 to 2011 and ambassador to Canada from 2004 to 2009.

The post In the thorny world of intra-Afghan talks, new challenges and opportunities emerge appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Öcalan’s call to disband the PKK came after two months of negotiations involving key players from Turkey, northeast Syria (NES), and the KRI. This has marked a watershed moment, signaling a willingness for dialogue not only within Kurdish ranks but also with Ankara. The political elite in the KRI has rallied behind Öcalan’s message, with prominent figures like Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), expressing optimism that this could catalyze a genuine peace process.

Among the immediate challenges is the Turkish government’s ongoing military operations against the PKK in the KRI and NES. While the PKK has declared a unilateral ceasefire, the situation remains precarious. The PKK insists that meaningful progress hinges on a face-to-face meeting with Öcalan, jeopardizing the ceasefire framework. This ambiguity reflects historical precedents of failed ceasefires that have left both the PKK, recognized by Turkey and some other countries as a terrorist organization, and Turkish forces skeptical of one another’s intentions. What will happen to Turkey’s expanded network of military bases?

Moreover, as political leaders in the KRI express their hope for a unified Kurdish front and the end of hostilities, the fate of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remains a critical factor, despite the new developments. On March 10, Mazloum Abdi and Interim President Ahmed Al Sharaa signed an agreement stipulating the integration of civil and military institutions in Northeast Syria within the institutions of the Syrian state, to be implemented by the end of 2025. The deal recognizes Kurds, who make up about 10 percent of the population, as an indigenous community of the Syrian state and guarantees them political and constitutional rights. The deal gives away around 30 percent of Kurdish-controlled areas at the borders with Iraq and Turkey under the control of the central government. The deal has given the power to the central government to gain its territorial control, political influence, and financial recovery, while granting Damascus access to the oil and gas revenues in NES.

While the agreement was welcomed by some of the international community and Syrians, still some Kurds, Assyrians, and Druze of Syria unwelcomed the development, fearing for their rights to be dismissed, the Kurdish disunity contradicts the ongoing meetings in Erbil to encourage a one-voice approach to dealing with the central government. The question now is to what extent this deal will help with stopping Turkish attacks in NES and foster the ceasefire deal between the PKK and Turkey regionally. Despite Öcalan’s plea, SDF commanders clearly distinguish their operations from those of the PKK, indicating that disarmament for them is contingent upon Turkey’s cessation of attacks against Kurdish positions in Syria. The intricate relationship between the PKK and SDF adds another layer of complexity to peace negotiations, particularly as the Turkish government often lumps both groups together in its security rhetoric.

The PKK’s future will depend on the results of key questions about disarmament logistics. How will fighters safely lay down their arms despite enduring volatility, particularly in places like the Qandil Mountains – PKK’s headquarters in the KRI? More crucially, what legal protections will be established to ensure that PKK fighters are not pursued or punished after they disarm? While the KRG expresses its desire for a peaceful transition, the absence of a comprehensive legal framework could serve as a formidable barrier to successfully executing peace agreements.

Simultaneously, the ongoing conflict in Sinjar presents further complications. The 2020 Sinjar Agreement aimed to restore stability and allow for the return of displaced residents, yet the presence of PKK fighters has triggered repeated military strikes by Turkey, complicating the implementation of this agreement. The assumption that a reduction in hostilities could allow for the PKK withdrawal from Sinjar to their bases in the Qandil Mountains illustrates the interconnectedness of local conflicts and broader peace processes—a delicate dance undermined by mistrust and geopolitical rivalries.

In conclusion, Abdullah Öcalan’s call for disarmament heralds an encouraging shift toward peace among Kurdish factions. Yet, the complexities of reintegrating PKK fighters, navigating the nuanced dynamics of the Syrian conflict, and addressing Turkish military activity pose significant hurdles. A successful transition to peace hinges on ongoing dialogue, the establishment of protective legal frameworks, and cooperative agreements that resonate with all parties, particularly Turkey, Iraq’s federal government, the KRG, and Syrian Kurdish groups. As the KRI rallies around a vision of stability, the success of this appeal will ultimately depend on the commitment of all involved to transcend historical grievances and forge a shared path towards peace.

Hanar Marouf is a 2020 Millennium fellow at the Atlantic Council and a political officer at the British Consulate General in Erbil, Iraq. She has a PhD in politics and international relations, focusing on Iran’s influence in the Middle East, particularly as it relates to the case of Iraq. She is an expert in Iraq’s politics regionally and internationally. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the position of the UK government.

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Under President Donald Trump, the United States has rapidly shifted its approach toward Russia and the war in Ukraine. This has many pockets of Europe scrambling to understand the local implications of this change and to adjust their postures accordingly. The Western Balkans—a part of the continent outside the European Union (EU) where the United States has a significant security and development footprint—is already feeling the effects and is bracing for more.

The Trump administration is not expected to focus intently on the Western Balkans anytime soon. Yet it is reasonable to expect that a divergence between the United States and the EU on broader questions of security and trade will be reflected in the region. This could make the Western Balkans into an area of competition rather than complementarity for Washington and Brussels.

Western policy fragmentation could reshape regional dynamics that until recently had been anchored around EU and NATO accession—twin goals that the United States and the EU have pushed for together. Regional leaders who are angry with Brussels, whatever their reasons, may use the “Trump card” to agitate the EU, which could fuel instability and potentially even arms races and conflict.

For now, questions over the future of NATO,  unsubstantiated reports that the US military will retreat from the Balkans, and speculation on how a settlement to end the war in Ukraine could change Europe’s borders are already fueling security dilemmas in the region. This is particularly the case in non-NATO countries, such as Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have interethnic tensions, border disputes with neighbors, and a reliance on NATO and the United States as guarantors of peace settlements.

Can Europe fill the gaps created by US disengagement and play a credible deterrent role in the Balkans at a time when it may also have to significantly step up its support for Ukraine? What would happen if, as part of its broader rapprochement with Russia, the United States went over Europe’s head and tried to resolve the Kosovo-Serbia dispute, which Brussels—much to the dismay of Washington—has failed to do for fourteen years? These are questions European policymakers need to start asking themselves.

But the uncertainty the United States’ policy shifts have caused in Europe could also turn out to be a blessing in disguise. The United States’ disengagement from the region could put further productive pressure on Europe to take care of its own security, fill the gaps in democracy promotion that Washington is leaving behind, and jolt EU enlargement from its current limping state.

Backlash against Brussels

US-EU discord is already deepening regional fragmentation, mostly in an anti-EU direction. Early signs of this were visible in last week’s United Nations General Assembly vote on Ukraine, which pit the EU against Russia and the United States.

While Serbia, the region’s hedging power, did vote in favor of the EU-sponsored resolution backing Ukraine, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić later backtracked and suggested that it was a mistake. North Macedonia—a country whose membership in the EU has been blocked by its neighbors—notably abstained. With Hungary the only EU country to abstain, the contours of a regional Kremlin-friendly Budapest-Belgrade-Skopje axis—hostile toward Brussels and able to paralyze decision making in the EU—are forming.

Countries along this axis understand the transactional nature of the Trump administration and are actively courting strategic US investments for further leverage. In other cases, like in Bosnia and Herzegovina—where Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik is ramping up his secessionist agenda—troublemakers are feeling emboldened to test the limits of the new geopolitical environment.

On the other side of the spectrum is the region’s most pro-US country, Kosovo, which finds itself in a strategic pickle, as its statehood and security rely on transatlantic unity. What’s more, the country’s decision making has been paralyzed in the aftermath of an inconclusive election in February, which could drag out the formation of a new government for weeks, if not months.

Kosovo is highly dependent on the United States for its security and has many grievances with the EU. Its statehood is still not recognized by five EU member states, which blocks any advancement to candidate status, and Pristina remains under EU restrictive measures due to how the outgoing government handled affairs in its Serb-majority north. At least one major part of Kosovo’s political spectrum is also angry at the EU for its treatment of Kosovo’s former leaders who are on trial for war crimes at The Hague—a grievance that some members of the Trump administration apparently share.

Whether Kosovo uses its “Trump card” in the context of a US-EU split depends largely on who forms the next government and what the Trump administration has to offer. For instance, a breakthrough in international recognition would be a compelling prospect. Yet, Kosovo also remains somewhat anxious about Trump’s cordial relations with Belgrade, while acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti, whose party came in first in the recent elections, had an infamously difficult history with the first Trump administration.

Albania and Montenegro seem to be more aligned with Brussels at the moment, as they have positioned themselves as regional frontrunners in the EU accession path and have both set the ambitious goal of joining the bloc in the next few years. Yet, this EU path is affected by another major shift in Washington’s foreign policy. EU accession is heavily centered on rule of law and democratic reforms, areas in which the United States has invested in the past few decades. The Trump administration’s decision to halt foreign aid through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has given such efforts a major hit. For example, in the past few years, Albania has made progress on tackling elite impunity through new rule of law bodies, which were built largely through US technical expertise and are now vulnerable.

The disruption in the operations of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)—a key pillar of US democracy promotion—is also shrinking the space for regional civil society. The Serbian government is now persecuting some of the leading pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations under the convenient pretext of “abusing USAID funds.”

How Europe can fill the gap in the Western Balkans

To prevent the further deterioration of the security situation and an authoritarian descent throughout the Western Balkans, Europe needs to step up and claim its role as an anchor of regional security and democracy. On security, that would require not just the usual French-German leadership within the EU, but also an active role for European NATO powers such as the United Kingdom and Turkey, both of which are invested in preserving the regional order and have troops on the ground in the Western Balkans. The upcoming visit to the region by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte is a welcome sign and should be followed by firm guarantees of deterrence.

On democracy, the EU already has the instruments in place to fund institutional reforms or support civil society—such as the continent’s NED equivalent, the European Endowment for Democracy. Now, it needs to use those instruments to fill the financial gaps left by the United States.

However, the real litmus test of Europe’s power will be its ability to resolve the lingering bilateral disputes in the Western Balkans and to finally push the region forward toward EU accession. Yet, these goals would be best served by an approach that tries to work together with Washington, rather than against it.

Competition over Western Balkans policy between the EU and the United States over the next four years would deepen the region’s fragmentation, undermining any attempts for an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. Europe also needs Washington engaged because there is a need to deter Russia from continuing to play a spoiler role in the Western Balkans through its regional allies, primarily Serbia. The current US-Russia dialogue seems broad in scope—Washington and Moscow recently discussed Middle East issues—and, with US-EU coordination, these talks could be used to serve joint Western interests in the Balkans.    

At the same time, there are actions the EU could take on its own that could incentivize regional actors to anchor around its goals. It could start, for example, by eliminating decision-making obstacles to its enlargement process that have allowed individual member states to stall and veto candidate countries’ membership bids over petty disputes. Much like in the case of Ukraine, Washington cannot be blamed for, nor expected to solve, problems of the EU’s own making.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.  

Note: Some Atlantic Council work funded by the US government has been halted as a result of the Trump administration’s Stop Work Orders issued under the executive order “Reevaluating and Realigning US Foreign Aid.”

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

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The Egyptian plan fulfills two central requirements: it excludes Hamas from governing Gaza and it takes off the table any thought that Gaza’s residents could be relocated. Instead, Gaza would be governed for six months by a technocratic council of Palestinians under the auspices, but presumably not the control, of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah. United Nations (UN) peacekeepers would be invited in by the PA to both Gaza and the West Bank. An international contact group would oversee the effort. Arab governments would contribute to Gaza’s physical reconstruction.

There are many reasons why Israel will not accept this plan in its present form. Israel has reason to be wary of putting unnamed Palestinians in charge of Gaza—though Arab capitals and Jerusalem could reach an agreement in secret negotiations over who would be on the council.

Israel will also never accept UN peacekeepers, given the UN’s disastrous experience in Lebanon and the risk that Israel’s security could be jeopardized by big-power gridlock or pro-Palestinian sentiment at the UN. Even apart from the UN’s debacle in Lebanon in failing to enforce Security Council resolution 1701, adopted in 2006, UN peacekeeping has a spotty record of success. The Trump administration and many Democrats will back up Israel’s refusal to entrust its security to a UN force.

There are other ways to square this circle. The United States has more experience than any other country in the world in organizing effective military coalitions. This includes the effort to liberate Kuwait in 1991, in which many Arab states participated, as well as peacekeeping coalitions in Bosnia and elsewhere. In the case of Gaza, this could take the form of US involvement that does not entail US boots on the ground, at no net financial cost to the United States. That means the United States could provide logistical support, airlift, intelligence, and command and staff functions to a force of Arab and European units, funded by financial contributions from Arab countries or others. (For example, seizing frozen Iranian assets to reimburse the United States and its allies for rebuilding Gaza would be appealing to US President Donald Trump.) Trump hinted at openness to some US role in his February 4 press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, even as the White House closed the door the next day by saying Trump had not committed to putting US boots on the ground in Gaza. There are indications that a plan that threads this needle exists in a safe somewhere in the Pentagon. Trump political appointees at the Department of Defense probably abhor the idea, but if this is the only way to secure a lasting Israeli peace with Gaza and Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize, there is a way to organize a peacekeeping force for Gaza without involving the UN.

But the central problem for the Netanyahu government is that it is not willing to commit to turning Gaza over to the PA and to setting up a Palestinian state. This gap can be bridged, but it will be the first serious test of the second Trump administration’s Middle East diplomacy and of the leaders in Arab capitals and Israel. Israel’s concerns over “de-radicalization” should not be dismissed. Egypt and other Arab states harbor their own grave concerns about Hamas and its Muslim Brotherhood roots. Talk of Palestinian unity cannot overlook the problem of Israeli concerns over the prospect of empowering Hamas and other advocates of a “one-state” Muslim Brotherhood solution, which makes Israelis do everything in their power to block a two-state solution.

Moreover, PA “reform” seems necessary but elusive. Israelis should not be asked to gamble their security on a reformed PA when Arab states have not been successful, so far, in forcing much-needed reforms on Ramallah. These are all serious problems, but the pressing need to begin Gaza’s physical and social reconstruction cannot wait for all these problems to be solved. An internationally led interim governance authority in charge of both security and reconstruction that brings in non-Hamas Palestinians is the only way to start this process.

The Egyptian proposal, like other proposals, is not going to be accepted immediately. But after years of Hamas’s disastrous rule, the Egyptian proposal could form the starting point for negotiations over a workable plan for postwar Gaza that will end both the security threat to Israel and the suffering of the people of Gaza.

Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. He previously served in the US Department of State on Middle East and international justice issues.

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Will 2012 turn out to have been the high-water mark of human liberty? This volume documents that the downward trend in freedom and democracy, which started then, has continued for another year in 2024. Yet this Atlas also reminds us that there is hope amidst this adverse aggregate trend. In much of the world, women’s economic freedom is higher today than it was thirty years ago. Western Europe’s freedom is either unchanged or greater than it was fifteen years ago. The Global South is steadily becoming more prosperous.

The decline in freedom documented in this volume is clear, but it is also not a massive shift. Average global freedom has moved from Montenegro to Malawi, not from Sweden to Laos. Yet we can no longer maintain a Whiggish faith that we are on an inexorable path toward freedom, democracy, and prosperity, or that history has ended. As the fires of war burn in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Sudan, we must ask what has gone wrong, and what we can do about it. Measurement is the first task, and that is why this overview of liberty around the world is important.

The first section of this Foreword discusses the changing nature of the threat to freedom, and presents one hypothesis about rising executive aggrandizement. There has been a significant decline in the prevalence of coups since the 1960s, which means that democratically elected leaders need fear the “man on horseback” much less than in the past. Yet as the threat of military takeovers has fallen, the prevalence of “executive aggrandizements,” in which duly elected leaders push their power beyond constitutional limits, has not. Indeed, elected executives may be more likely to take risks precisely because military coups have become less plausible.

I present a simple framework for thinking about the interplay between technology and executive aggrandizement. Executives are limited by their ability to control the public sector and by popular opposition. Technology can enable the coordination of popular anti-regime action, as was shown vividly in the Twitter Revolutions of the Arab Spring. The increased threat of popular uprising may put limits on some political leaders, but technology can also increase the executive’s ability to control the public sector by monitoring disloyalty or malfeasance. Artificial intelligence (AI) could improve the central government’s ability to detect corruption. If the state is initially weak, the positive impact of technology on popular opposition may lead to less dictatorship. However, if the state is strong, technology will instead reduce the limits on executive activity.

The second section of this Foreword argues that geopolitical changes can also help explain why executive aggrandizement has increased and coups have fallen. Western powers, which used to engineer coups as Cold War policy, now intervene to reverse them. Even more importantly, the influence of the West, which championed democracy in the years after the Cold War, has declined. The 1990s was an era of democratic triumph, in which the strength of liberal democracies was at its apogee. What could have been more appealing to the former Warsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe than to rush toward European integration and prosperity? Mexico’s leaders similarly saw great advantages in tying their country to the United States through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In both cases, democracy ended up being the price of free trade.

Yet the last quarter century has seen a relative decline in the Western champions of liberty. The United States lost military face in its failed occupations of both Iraq and Afghanistan, and economic face in the global financial crisis. The economic importance of the European Union (EU) has declined, while China’s economic heft has expanded enormously. China’s growth provides an example of non-democratic success, and its foreign aid reduces the advantage of courting Western donors who have a deeper demand for democratic reform.

In the final section of the Foreword, I discuss the interplay between economic and political freedom. While I do not believe that complete economic freedom is necessary for political freedom, I do believe that a political executive with control over parts of the economy can use that control to augment its own political power. There are risks in supporting activist industrial and trade policies that enable political leaders to reward their supporters and punish their opponents. It would be far better for democratic leaders to articulate the positive case for freedom, which can both enable economic growth and empower human happiness, than to seek to micromanage the economy.

The man on horseback vanishes while executive aggrandizement persists

Bermeo documents that more than one-third of democracies faced coups between 1960 and 1964, and 15 percent of democracies were toppled by coups between 1965 and 1969. In every five-year interval since 1985, fewer than 5 percent of democracies fell to a coup. In every five-year interval since 1995, fewer than 10 percent of democracies have even faced the threat of a coup. Yet, as this volume documents, the global level of freedom has been declining since 2012.

Executive aggrandizement, where the executive expands its authority beyond constitutional limits, can erode freedom without the fireworks of a coup. Yet it has proven difficult to document a global wave in such expansions of incumbent power. Nevertheless, there are important examples, especially those of China, Russia, and Venezuela, in which political executives have significantly increased their power. Vladimir Putin and Hugo Chávez represent the more standard case in which a democratically elected executive expands his power. In the case of China, the more dispersed control of party leaders has been replaced by the more centralized control of Xi Jinping.

In this section, I first discuss the interplay between coups and executive aggrandizement, using Argentina’s 1930 coup as an example. I then turn to a framework that is meant to suggest how technological change might have influenced the prevalence of coups, protests, and executive aggrandizement. I focus on domestic forces that influence freedom in this section, and in the next section, I will focus on the role of foreign influence.

Coup and executive aggrandizement

Few coups seem so consequential as the 1930 coup in Argentina, which ended seventy-five years of political stability and liberal government and ushered in fifty years of coups and dictatorships. Argentina’s remarkable Generation of 1837, which included Domingo Sarmiento and Juan Bautista Alberdi, crafted that country’s 1853 Constitution and presided over a period of increasing freedom, wealth, and education. Like Britain before 1867, nineteenth-century Argentina was better at protecting freedoms than at promoting broad, uninfluenced suffrage, but after 1912, the Sáenz Peña Law made male suffrage universal, secret, and mandatory.

The Radical Civic Union (UCR) rode to power on the basis of broad population support in 1916, and came into conflict with the more conservative National Autonomist Party (PAN), which had held power since the end of Sarmiento’s presidency in 1874. Their conflict ended in 1930, when a military coup replaced the elected President Hipólito Yrigoyen with Lieutenant General Uriburu. Alemán and Saiegh provide evidence against “the claim that demands for drastic redistribution led to democratic breakdown is not a convincing explanation for the 1930 coup.” Instead, they see the coup as a response to the fact that Yrigoyen “used his authority to exclude the political opposition and take away their remaining bases of power.”

Alemán and Saiegh emphasize that the legislative divisions were not determined by ideology or attitudes toward redistribution. Instead, divisions were heightened over power plays, such as the frequent Federal “interventions” in which Yrigoyen replaced provincial governments with politicians that were more to his liking. While these interventions were and are (the last one occurred in 2004) supposed to be responses to unusual and deeply problematic local circumstances, there were twenty interventions during Yrigoyen’s first term and fifteen of these were done without legislative approval. During Yrigoyen’s second term, “between 1928 and 1929, he took over by executive decree the provinces of San Juan, Mendoza, Corrientes and Santa Fe,” and he nationalized the petroleum industry, which was also “seen as a political power-grab.”

On August 9, 1930, the opposition published the Manifesto of the 44 which denounced Yrigoyen for aggrandizement of executive authority. Within the month, a coup had begun and by September 10, Uriburu had replaced Yrigoyen as President of Argentina. Six more coups would follow in 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, 1976, and 1981. Executive aggrandizement is a perpetual possibility, and, historically, the opponents of that aggrandizement often came from within the government, including from within the military.

Of course, there have been many cases of executive aggrandizement that have not met with opposition from the military. It took eleven years, and the realization that Hitler had led them into a military catastrophe, for any of the Wehrmacht’s leaders to fight against Hitler’s subversion of the Weimar Republic. Similarly, there have been many military coups that had little or nothing to do with executive aggrandizement, including Argentina’s 1943 coup, and the attempted coups in France in 1961, and Spain in 1981.

These two failed coups suggest that improvements in communications have reduced the ability of officers to command their soldiers to fight against political leaders. Improvements in information technology have made it easier for symbolically important legitimate leaders to communicate directly with the army, which can be effective because “military forces—especially perhaps conscript ones—are susceptible to numerous pressures from the civilian population and from civil institutions.”

During the weekend on April 22, 1961, a junta of French officers, hoping to keep Algeria an integral part of France, took control of Algiers. As Thomas writes, “de Gaulle’s military resources were unimpressive,” because “500,000 [soldiers] were in Algeria, whereas in France itself there were very few regular operational units.” Instead of fighting, on the evening of April 23, De Gaulle took to the radio.

The same voice that had travelled the airwaves in 1940 denouncing “the capitulation” to Nazi Germany in the name of “honor, common sense, and the higher interest of the Nation,” and inviting “all the French who want to remain free to listen to me and to follow me,” declared in 1961 that “I forbid every Frenchman, and in the first place every soldier, to carry out any order.” Even though the rebels controlled the Algiers stations, they could not stop ordinary citizens and soldiers from hearing De Gaulle on their transistor radios, and turning against the plot. The defeat of the coup has been called “la Victoire des Transistors.”

On the evening of February 23, 1981, armed agents of Spain’s Civil Guard, led by a Lieutenant Colonel, took control of the Congress of Deputies. In Valencia, General del Bosch rolled out his tanks and declared a state of emergency. Del Bosch had fought under Franco during the Spanish Civil War, and under German Command during World War II, and he wanted to stop Spain’s shift to liberal democracy. But at 1:14 a.m., King Juan Carlos appeared on television in the uniform of the Captain General of the Army and declared that “the Crown cannot tolerate in any form any act which tries to interfere with the constitution which has been approved by the Spanish people.” The coup promptly fizzled, and Spain’s democracy would survive.

In both France and Spain, coups were stopped by leaders who broadcast strong messages which fundamentally undermined their military subordinates. The framework in the next section will argue that improvements in communications technology more generally make it easier for leaders to stop rebellions from within. This is one hypothesis as to why the risks to freedom now come more from executive aggrandizement than from military coups.

Yet there are other reasons why the frequency of coups has declined, most notably the end of the Cold War and the changing behavior of Western powers. During the Cold War, American leaders often preferred a friendly military regime or monarchy to a hostile democratic one, and the US government supported coups from Tehran in 1953 to Chile in 1973. Since 1991, US-led regime change has meant overt invasion far more than covert coups. In 1994, the United States even acted to reinstate President Aristide of Haiti, who had been ousted by a coup in 1991.¹ I will return to the role of the West in promoting democracy in the next section, after first providing a framework for thinking about the interplay between technology and constraints on political leaders.

Technology and constraints on chief executives

The section considers two impacts of improved information technology on the limits facing elected executives or autocrats. Information can be used to organize protests, such as the mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square, Egypt, which brought down the Mubarak regime in 2011, and that places limits on executive action. But information technology can also be used to centralize control over the public sector, such as by granting leaders the ability to communicate directly with soldiers during a coup. I will not focus on other impacts of communications technology, such as enabling leaders like India’s Narendra Modi to bond with their voters by using radio broadcasts and social media.

All actions that an executive might want to take will create some opposition from both the private and public sectors. That opposition places limits on the actions of the executive. I assume that the executive will not risk actions that generate sufficient opposition from either the public sector, which might refuse to implement the action, or the private sector, which might break out into mass protests. If technology expands the range of actions that the executive can take, then the technology is authority-enhancing, but if it contracts the range of executive action, then it is authority-eroding.

The limits on an autocrat’s options are captured by the two solid lines in Figure 1. If the autocrat wants to limit their opposition from either sector to a fixed amount, then his or her options are limited to a rectangle that is below the solid blue line and to the left of the solid orange line. I will argue that recent changes in communications technology have given effective autocrats more power over their own bureaucracies, causing the blue line to rise, but made private opposition more effective by enabling organization, which shifts the orange line to the left.

While China’s surveillance of its own private citizens is frequently discussed in the Western media, the surveillance of public sector workers and the associated anti-corruption campaign has been far more central to Xi Jinping’s centralization of power. The bribery convictions of Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang in 2013 and 2015 eliminated two potential rivals early in Xi’s term as president of China. Moreover, because China has “vague and incomplete anti-corruption laws that leave more room for party control,” and “institutional arrangements that centralize control over local anti-corruption agencies,” the fight against corruption essentially gives national leadership the ability to discipline a large swath of the public sector.

Figure 1. The autocrat’s options and technological change

Complaints by ordinary citizens play a significant role in China’s anti-corruption campaign, and those complaints are often transmitted electronically. Pan and Chen report that “China has devoted substantial resources to monitoring the performance of lower-tier officials” including “telephone hotlines,” “government-managed websites where citizens can complain online,” and “web and mobile apps designed for individuals to complain to the government.” In order to reduce bribery, some Chinese “hospitals even put in place monitoring systems with facial recognition technology to identify unregistered medical representatives or unapproved visits.” Fan et al. document that computerizing value-added tax invoices “contributed to 27.1 percent of VAT revenues and 12.9 percent of total government revenues in the five subsequent years.” Beraja et al. examine artificial intelligence procurement across China and find that “autocrats benefit from AI: local unrest leads to greater government procurement of facial-recognition AI as a new technology of political control, and increased AI procurement indeed suppresses subsequent unrest.”

If laws are sufficiently fuzzy, then abundant electronic monitoring, supplemented by the complaints of random citizens, should make it possible to convict almost any public servant. That ability to convict provides a chief executive with enormous control over the public sector. Information technologies, such as the on-board computers carried by commercial truckers, have long been used by corporate chieftains to monitor their workers. There is every reason to believe that government leaders should be able to do the same, and that better technology will strengthen the hold of authoritarian leaders over public sector employees.

For that reason, Figure 1 depicts the blue line rising higher because of better monitoring technology. As the autocrat has an increasing ability to repress opposition within the public sector through better monitoring, they have a greater ability to undertake activities, from suppressing religious minorities to invading their neighbors, that might have been opposed by some public sector workers. This increased range of executive power provides one reason why information technology can lead to less individual freedom. This effect should be much stronger in countries with a more effective public sector.

Better technology can also give the public sector more ability to monitor their private citizens, but there is a countervailing force that I suspect is more important worldwide. Information technology also enables the coordination of citizens, especially through the sharing of information. Historically, cities have been hotbeds of regime change, partially because density enabled the coordination of opposition to the government. Information technology makes it easier to spread information both about why someone should protest and where a protest will occur.

In 2011, protests were coordinated on Twitter in Tunisia and Egypt and two autocrats were forced out of power. In 2022, Maria Litvina called for protests against the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Instagram. While she was arrested, thousands still took to the streets and protests in Russia have continued since then. While the Putin regime does not seem to be in danger, this activity still creates direct and indirect costs for the government, including the challenge of locking up thousands and potential embarrassment on the world stage.

In Figure 1, I chose to capture the ability of improved private coordination as empowering private protest against government, which increases the costs to governments of taking actions that generate private opposition, which shifts the orange line to the left. Consequently, it is unclear whether technology will reduce freedom, by strengthening executives’ controls over their bureaucracies, or increase freedom, by making citizen protest easier. In countries that have large and capable public sectors, such as those in East Asia, I suspect that technology will typically be freedom-reducing. In places where the public sector is weak, then technology seems more likely to encourage regime change, which may lead autocrats to be more cautious.

The core hypothesis put forth in this section is that technology has centralized authority within the government, which can reduce freedom for the rest of us. Direct communication between legitimate leaders and soldiers has reduced the threat of coups. Better monitoring of subordinates has reduced local corruption. The implication of this change is that the centralized authority of autocrats has increased. We now turn to a second hypothesis: that the decline in freedom is associated with the relative weakness of the West.

The decline of the West and the limits on autocracies

The 1990s were a strange time in world history. The Soviet Union was no more. Liberal democracies had triumphed, and they were much wealthier than their alternatives. They were role models for countries emerging from communism. Moreover, the Western democracies were successful enough that they could indulge in the luxury of encouraging others to embrace democracy.

Levitsky and Way emphasize the “international dimension of regime change” and especially the power of “linkage” or “the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of trade and investment, people, and communication) between particular countries and the United States, the European Union (EU), and Western-led multilateral institutions.” These ties led Latin American and Central European countries to democratize in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The two democratizing nations that Levitsky and Way highlight were strongly influenced by the EU and NAFTA. In Slovakia, Vladimír Mečiar “regained control of the government and rapidly sought to eliminate major sources of opposition” and “in the absence of extensive linkage to the West, Mečiar’s autocratic government might well have consolidated power.” But the appeal of access to EU was enormous, and “it employed conditionality in 1997 by rejecting Slovakia’s request to begin accession negotiations due to a failure to meet democratic criteria.” This rejection had political bite, and “Slovakia’s failure to move towards EU membership, for which the EU directly (and very publicly) blamed Mečiar, created a salient electoral issue that benefited the opposition.” In 1998, Slovakia rejected Mečiar and the country has been democratic since then.

The authoritarian PRI (Institutional Revolution Party) controlled Mexico from 1929 to 2000, but the technocratic leadership of the party during the 1990s saw the tremendous economic advantages that could come by enacting NAFTA. While “successive U.S. administrations backed the PRI governments and explicitly excluded democracy from NAFTA negotiations… NAFTA increased Mexico’s salience in the U.S. political arena,” and “as NAFTA negotiations began, the PRI was subjected to intense international scrutiny, including unprecedented media coverage of electoral scandals and US congressional hearings on Mexican human rights”. Mexico’s attempt to placate the United States meant that “by the late 1990s opposition forces had strengthened to the point where they could win national elections” and that “preventing such an outcome would have required large scale fraud or repression, which, given Mexico’s international position, would have been extremely costly.”

Both of these case studies suggest that EU and US influence encouraged democracy in the 1990s either through clear conditionality (as with Slovakia) or through the court of US public opinion (as with Mexico). The democratizing push reflected the Western victory in the Cold War. That victory meant that Western powers looked like role models, and that access to Western markets was enormously profitable. Unlike during the Cold War, when the United States was eager for allies of any political variety, in the 1990s, the West felt sufficiently secure that they could risk alienating countries by pushing democracy.

Indeed, the level of American confidence reached such heights that the United States waged wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq with a stated goal of regime change. When President Bush addressed the nation on October 7, 2001, he said our goal in invading Afghanistan was to “defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear.” Two years later, when announcing the invasion of Iraq, President Bush reiterated “we will bring freedom to others and we will prevail” and “we have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people.” I am not claiming that promoting democracy was the primary objective of either war, but just that a significant number of policymakers believed that it was reasonable to go to war to promote freedom elsewhere.

Those wars were two reasons for the decline in US influence since 2006. While the US military readily defeated the armed forces of both Iraq and Afghanistan, the US government failed to establish lasting democracies in either country. Moreover, the US management of both occupations appeared incompetent to many global observers. The disastrous collapse of an American housing bubble then brought economic suffering not only to the United States but to the world. The United States started to seem far less like a role model, and a less triumphant United States was less likely to take on the mission of democratizing the world.

Europe’s economic clout has also waned over the last thirty years. While the EU produced one-fourth of the world’s gross domestic product in 1990 (at purchasing power parity prices), it produced less than 15 percent of global output in 2024. After 2005, Turkey seemed poised to join the EU, but it never came to be, partially because many Turks opposed EU membership. One Turkish poll in 2013 reported that “while one third of those surveyed agreed Turkey should persevere with the goal of becoming an EU member, two-thirds of the public lean closer to the view that Turkey should not become a full member.” Given those views, it is unsurprising that President Erdoğan supported a political referendum that would entrench his presidential power despite the risk that such a move would alienate the EU.

Europe’s relative economic heft has diminished, partially because of the growth of China. Between 1990 and 2024, China’s share of the world economy rose from 3.6 percent to 19.05 percent. A strong and wealthy China provides an alternative, non-democratic role model, and access to Chinese aid and markets most certainly does not require democratizing reform. Shinn and Eisenman write that “China’s focus on state sovereignty and reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations have assisted its ability to develop cordial ties with Africa.” Democratic powers are far less dominant now than they were twenty years ago, and that can help explain why freedom has declined since 2012.

Economic freedom and political freedom

Declining belief in the value of economic freedom in the West may also contribute to declining political freedom both in the Western democracies and elsewhere. Milton Friedman famously saw a particularly tight link between economic and political freedom, writing that “capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom.” Similarly Hayek saw economic planning as leading down the “road to serfdom.” Critics of this perspective have pointed out that the Scandinavian social democracies seem to have enjoyed almost perfect political freedom, even when their economies looked decidedly non-capitalistic. They have also noted that East Asian economies with very limited political freedom have occasionally been hotbeds of capitalism.

Yet even if Friedman’s statement goes too far, there is an essential truth in his perspective. When the public sector has more discretion to interfere with the economy, then it will also have more ability to reward its supporters and punish its opponents. Hugo Chávez’s direct control over Venezuela’s petroleum enabled his domestic and foreign activities, including subsidizing friendly neighbors with cheap oil. Relief from regulation has been one of the most common sources of illicit public revenues throughout history, and those revenues can also be used to enhance political power.

But as the example of Scandinavia illustrates, not all economic interventions empower political executives. If the rules are decided collectively and enforced strictly, then they are not a source of power for the executive. If the rules are ad hoc and decided by the executive on the spot, then economic intervention can help consolidate political strength. In Chávez’s Venezuela or the Shah’s Iran, public oil revenues became a tool for tyranny. In Norway, they did not, partially because oil revenues go largely into a sovereign wealth fund that is managed by the politically independent Norges Bank.

Yet in recent years, political leaders in the United States and EU have championed economic policies, including industrial policy and tariffs, that are largely discretionary. If a politician seeks support from domestic producers of some product, then that politician can reward those producers either with subsidies, now called industrial policy, or with a selective tariff on that product. The politicization of US pre-World War II tariffs generates little hope that any future discretionary tariff policy will somehow be divorced from politics. Moreover, even if the United States limits its discretionary interventions, public support for these policies, from both parties, reinforces the idea that political leaders should have the right to favor some industries over others.

The case for economic freedom would be strong even if there was not a link between economic and political freedom. Yet, as long as economic policy Edward L. Glaeser interventions provide more scope for political leaders to reward and punish, then these interventions will also pose risks to political freedom. If the leaders of the West want to reverse the downward trend in freedom, then they should continue championing both political and economic liberty and continue to be engaged with the world.

Edward L. Glaeser is the Fred and Eleanor Glimp professor of economics at Harvard University, where he has taught microeconomics and urban economics since 1992. Glaeser previously directed the Taubman Center and the Rappaport Institute. He also leads the Urban Working Group at the National Bureau of Economic Research, co-leads the Cities Programme at the International Growth Centre, and is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Glaeser has written hundreds of papers on cities, political economy, and public economics. He received his PhD from the University of Chicago in 1992.

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