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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Members of Ukraine’s veteran community do not need to wait for elections to take up a role in public life. Many are already serving in local government or building civic organizations and veteran associations. Kateryna Yamshchykova is a veteran who became acting mayor of Poltava in 2023. “Opportunities already exist for everyone,” she reflected. “Did I really want the position of acting mayor? It was the last thing I wanted in my life, but I understood that this responsibility had to be taken on in order to build the country we are fighting for.”

This kind of local engagement can help veterans develop the skills they need to run as candidates in national elections after the war ends. Democratic participation, civic habits, and political responsibility cannot be developed overnight. Instead, early engagement can help bring about a stable postwar transition.

For established Ukrainian political parties, engagement with the country’s veteran community is already becoming increasingly necessary to maintain public support. This will likely lead to intensified internal competition as veterans seek leadership roles alongside longstanding party members.

Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK and former commander of the Ukrainian army, has warned that established political elites might see veterans as a threat to their position. If this happens, everyone in Ukraine stands to lose. Public trust in politicians would erode further, undermining the legitimacy of decisions that will be essential for European integration and postwar recovery.

A critical step toward the meaningful political participation of veterans is the development of a clear legal framework for Ukraine’s first postwar elections. This should ensure inclusive participation, clarify registration requirements for new political parties, and potentially impose stricter campaigning rules to protect electoral integrity.

Ukraine’s democracy is not on pause; it is being reshaped under fire. The emergence of veterans as political actors represents a profound structural change in Ukrainian society. In and of itself, this change is neither a threat to democracy nor a guarantee of positive change. Instead, it requires a deliberate and inclusive approach. If Ukraine succeeds in integrating veterans into civilian political life while preserving pluralism, accountability, and fair competition, it may emerge from the war with a more resilient democracy capable of sustaining inclusive recovery, reforms, and European integration.

Vasyl Sehin is the WFD Country Director in Ukraine.

The geographic scope of the vote itself reflects the imbalance at the heart of this process. Rather than a nationwide election, only a portion of Myanmar’s townships are included in the polling, with the rest excluded on the grounds of conflict, insecurity, or administrative decisions that conveniently remove opposition strongholds from participation. Out of the country’s 330 townships, polling is scheduled in just 274; in other words, 56 townships—and in some assessments, even more—will not vote at all because authorities have designated them too unstable. Almost entire regions—particularly in the states of Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Sagaing, and Karenni—remain cut out of the process, highlighting how the vote is structured less as a democratic exercise and more as a managed performance of legitimacy.

Bangladesh: Caught between crisis and containment

For Bangladesh—already host to more than a million Rohingya refugees and undergoing its own fraught political transition—the outcome offers little hope of resolution. The Rohingya crisis dates back several decades, with the biggest influx happening in 2017 because of mass expulsions from Rakhine State, which occurred under the NLD-led government that many Western observers once hailed as Myanmar’s democratic success story. Successive crises since then have exposed Dhaka’s limited leverage over Naypyidaw’s rulers, whether in military uniform or in civilian dress, and these elections are unlikely to change that calculus. The forced return of refugees without guarantees of safety and citizenship remains unrealistic under a Myanmar regime seeking legitimacy rather than reconciliation.

Continued violence in western Myanmar risks further displacement toward Cox’s Bazar, in southeastern Bangladesh. The border region has also seen shifts in control by armed groups, complicating trade and security cooperation and heightening anxiety in Dhaka about criminal networks and militant spillover. Prospects for stable, collaborative border governance remain dim.

Analysts characterize the current moment as a Rohingya stalemate, warning that the junta-driven polls offer “no meaningful pathway” for resolving the crisis and that any hope of voluntary, safe return remains illusory while the junta remains in place. Bangladesh already hosts more than a million Rohingya, while fresh fighting in Rakhine since 2024 has generated another surge of displacement, estimated at 150,000 people. Dhaka has rejected requests to send election observers, interpreting them as a bid to manufacture legitimacy. The interim Bangladeshi government, under pressure from domestic rights advocates, refuses to negotiate with Myanmar authorities who have no intention of allowing a safe and dignified return.

Security concerns compound this stalemate. The northern frontier is contested by the Arakan Army, Rohingya armed groups, and splinter factions, driving militarization. Bangladesh’s fence-building and patrol deployments respond to periodic cross‑border raids and trafficking networks, while nongovernmental organizations document camp‑level violence and extortion. In this context, even small escalations could trigger humanitarian emergencies and force Dhaka into defensive postures rather than constructive diplomacy.

India: Strategic ambivalence in the face of uncertainty

India’s stance reflects a tension between strategic interests and democratic principles. New Delhi shares a long, porous border with Myanmar’s restive northwest—an area where insurgent groups have long operated across boundaries and where any new wave of refugees, fighters, or illicit flows can inflame fears about the demographic balance in sensitive frontier states such as Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland. India’s priority is to prevent these pressures from spilling deeper into its territory, a task historically underpinned by security cooperation with the Myanmar military. Yet such cooperation is now a political liability given international condemnation of the junta.

At the same time, India has clear interests in counterbalancing China in Myanmar. Connectivity and energy projects under the Act East Policy—including highways and ports—depend on at least a minimal degree of order in Myanmar. The ongoing elections, marred by conflict and exclusion, do not provide that. New Delhi faces tough choices as it seeks to balance pragmatic ties with the junta even as doing so could enable Myanmar’s authoritarian consolidation, all while Chinese-backed infrastructure and security influence deepens along India’s eastern flank. India’s recent willingness to engage a wide spectrum of actors in the region—from Myanmar’s military to the Taliban government in Kabul, which New Delhi hosted for talks in October 2025—underscores how far it is prepared to stretch diplomatic orthodoxy to protect its strategic and connectivity interests.

This pragmatism reflects security pressures as well. Since the 2021 coup in Myanmar, New Delhi has documented increased flows of arms, refugees, and insurgents into India’s northeast, with groups such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang exploiting Myanmar’s political vacuum. Analysts warn that if the junta’s authority erodes further, Indian factions could seek sanctuary across the border or develop support channels through Bangladesh, threatening to upset the demographic balance in sensitive border states. Meanwhile, India’s signature projects—the Kaladan multi‑modal transit route and the India–Myanmar–Thailand highway—remain stalled by conflict, allowing China‑aligned infrastructure to gain relative momentum. Even as India dispatches observers and calls for an “inclusive poll,” critics argue that if India aligns too closely with the junta, it would cause a future resistance‑led government to tilt more toward Beijing. The dilemma is clear: Stability is indispensable for India’s Act East calculus, but stability anchored in repression could prove strategically self‑defeating.

The regional stakes

Myanmar’s electoral theater unfolds against a backdrop of great‑power competition. China sees the process as a means to safeguard strategic corridors linking Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. For China, it is a dual‑track strategy—formal engagement with the junta, informal management of militias—ensuring continued influence regardless of electoral credibility. Beijing wants elections above all for the promise of order: Even a tightly controlled, unfair vote is preferable, from its perspective, to open-ended civil war that threatens pipelines, ports, and overland trade routes. Chinese officials have leaned on some ethnic armed organizations to enter talks with the junta, with activists alleging that elements of this pressure campaign have veered into coercive tactics. These actions underscore the lengths to which Beijing is prepared to go to secure border stability, energy corridors, and uninterrupted trade.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has sent inconsistent messages on Myanmar’s election. Publicly, the bloc signals unease and maintains a measure of diplomatic distance, showing little appetite for a strong multilateral stance. Privately, however, several member states have opened bilateral channels with Naypyidaw—through security cooperation, commercial agreements, and selective political engagement—effectively diluting ASEAN’s collective leverage. Malaysia has taken a more critical line, warning that partial elections “achieve nothing without peace,” while Vietnam has broken with the broader consensus by sending observers and portraying the polls as a possible starting point for stability.

In sum, the election functions less as a transition than as a diplomatic sorting mechanism, clarifying who will tolerate the junta for strategic gain and who will condition engagement on democratic legitimacy.

False dawn, real dangers

Myanmar’s ongoing elections do not mark a step toward democratic recovery; they mark the consolidation of an authoritarian holding pattern whose shockwaves extend far beyond Myanmar’s borders. What is unfolding is not a transition but a recalibration of power, engineered through selective participation, territorial exclusion, and coerced consent. If anything is clear for South Asia, it is that Myanmar’s unraveling is no longer contained within its borders. Elections may freeze formal politics, but the conflict itself continues to move—across borders, through refugee flows, supply routes, insurgent networks, and competing infrastructure projects.

In the absence of a coordinated regional response that prioritizes accountability, humanitarian protection, and a political settlement rooted in more than military control, this democratic crisis will only become harder to manage.

The post Neither free nor fair: What Myanmar’s ‘sham’ elections mean for the country and its neighbors appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iraq’s pathway to stability relies on transfers of power

Yerevan Saeed — Thu, 08 Jan 2026 16:46:04 +0000

In Iraq, stability and progress rely on leadership changes rather than leaders holding onto power.

On December 29, Iraq’s newly elected parliament met for the first time since the top court confirmed the November 11 election results. The session started the process of forming a new government in a parliament where no single party has a majority. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Sudani, who wants a second term, won the most seats with forty-six out of 329. However, in Iraq’s political system, winning the most seats does not guarantee the top job. Instead, the next prime minister is chosen through coalition deals among the main Shia factions. Whether Sudani gets another term is still uncertain, but these coalition talks will shape not only the next cabinet but also Iraq’s direction during future challenges.

In Washington, many believe that Sudani is different from Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition and the only prime minister who has previously served two terms in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. This assumption is both comforting and misleading. Sudani is often seen as more focused on technical issues and less divisive, leading a country that seems more stable than before. This could suggest that the status quo is the safest choice, as Sudani will likely continue efforts to work with Washington on critical issues of reform and militia disarmament in the next four years.

Former Iraqi Prime Ministers Adel Abdul Mahdi and Nouri al-Maliki stand at a polling station inside Al-Rasheed Hotel during the parliamentary election in Baghdad, Iraq, November 11, 2025. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani

But this perspective conflates personal leadership qualities with deeper structural problems that have haunted Iraq historically. Iraq’s political system has weak checks and balances, and the state is seen as a source of rewards by the political elite. In this kind of political landscape, one leader staying in power too long can turn temporary authority into lasting control. Even capable leaders can weaken institutions if they stay for a second term.

The main issue for the country’s stability is not whether Sudani is like al-Maliki, but whether Iraq’s political system allows real competition. For true contestability, losing groups must believe they can return to power through talks and elections, and rivals should keep competing within the system instead of looking for power elsewhere. In Iraq, this kind of competition is important for security, not just for democracy.

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The structural risks of a second term

Since the overthrow of the former Iraqi regime in 2003, Iraq’s politics have been competitive but lack strong limits. The political elite have utilized ministries and agencies not just for policy but also to manage coalitions by handing out jobs, contracts, and security roles to keep alliances together. All former prime ministers have been guilty of turning the state into a system of political favors, but they have differed in how far they pushed it. Prime ministers such as Haider al-Abadi, Adel Abdulmahdi, and Mustafa al-Kadhimi were not aggressive enough and lost power. Still, they left the state more stable than their predecessors.

In comparison, leaders who treated the state as spoils of war and built strong patronage networks, such as al-Maliki, served longer.

Iraqi prime ministers are often perceived as practical in their first terms, because they take office through a quota-sharing bargain that parcels out ministries and senior posts across blocs. This limits a premier’s control over a bureaucracy shaped by party patronage. This is visible at the point of government formation. For example, former Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi was sworn in in October 2018 with only a partial cabinet after parties deadlocked over key portfolios, and Mustafa al-Kadhimi began in May 2020 with several ministries still vacant as blocs continued to bargain over nominees.

Under those constraints, first-term premiers tend to lower immediate friction among rival power centers and prioritize deals, including Baghdad-Erbil arrangements such as budget-oil agreements. They also try to contain armed factions through a mix of formal incorporation and selective pressure. For example, the 2016 law that placed the Popular Mobilization Forces on a state footing to Kadhimi’s June 2020 raid on a Kata’ib Hezbollah site was followed days later by the release of most detainees after militia pushback.

In contrast, a second term changes the incentives by making it more rewarding to hold onto power. Leaders expecting to stay longer often put loyal people in top jobs, use government contracts to protect themselves, weaken oversight bodies, and use audits or investigations more against their opponents than their allies. Sudani’s government began moving in this direction toward the end of its first term, including by directing a federal oversight committee to scrutinize the Kurdistan Regional Government’s revenues and spending. In 2025, similar audit claims were often cited to justify delaying or withholding the Kurdistan region’s federal budget transfers.

This is the second-term trap in Iraq: It does not always lead straight to authoritarianism but slowly turns appointments, contracts, and enforcement tools into a system that limits political change and weakens institutions. This process often happens quietly and is often explained as being efficient or stable by outsiders who may not see how serious it is.

How state capture unfolds

In Iraq, administrative capture usually happens gradually through legal, political, and economic steps, rather than through open announcements.

This process often begins with key appointments in areas such as the interior and intelligence agencies, which control force; as well as finance and planning ministries, which manage spending; and justice positions, which oversee investigations. It continues with hard-to-audit procurement practices, such as emergency approvals, unclear contracts, secret spending, and the use of state-linked groups to move money. Over time, oversight bodies and courts may start enforcing rules selectively, targeting opponents more while letting allies off the hook, especially when these institutions are open to political pressure.

The main effect of administrative capture is on how the state functions, not just its reputation. It weakens the state’s ability to handle crises by distorting information and valuing loyalty over skill. Intelligence becomes less open, leadership roles become more political, and contracts are awarded for favors rather than for readiness. This creates a false sense of strength at the top level but breeds public distrust by hiding real problems. As people lose trust, the state’s legitimacy and its ability to respond effectively during crises like insurgencies, militia violence, or protests are greatly reduced.

Iraq has gone through this before, though it is often forgotten during quieter times. In 2014, military units that looked strong on paper fell apart when faced with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Reports blamed this on corruption, poor leadership, political appointments, and sectarian splits—problems that happen when security forces serve politics instead of acting as professional institutions. What seems stable can quickly fall apart in a crisis.

This is the main lesson from al-Maliki’s second term in office, which can be defined as the slipping slope toward the end of Iraq as one unified country. The problem was not just one leader’s style but the failure of institutions to stop power from becoming too personalized once someone stayed in office too long.

Supporters of Sudani point out his focus on service, his governance style, and the alleged deliveries to the Iraqis. Even his critics often admit he handles competing pressures with discipline.

However, in Iraq, a leader’s personal style cannot overcome deeper systemic pressures for long, especially when seeking a second term. Sudani’s support comes from the Shiite Coordination Framework, which brings together many groups with different interests, including some close to Iran. This coalition is more about bargaining than unity, so individual goals often take a back seat to group dynamics.

If Sudani wins a second term, he is likely to use the state to advance his personal power in the absence of real checks and balances, a concern reflected by the Shia Coordination Framework’s veto of his staying in power. Even if he secures a second term, his coalition partners could also impose strict demands and conditions on him, expecting that Sudani would use his power to make appointments that strengthen their networks, financial benefits, and use enforcement to help his allies and further limit rivals. The same practical skills that help manage coalitions, such as avoiding conflict and keeping support, can also make administrative capture worse by slowly tying state institutions to political groups.

Contestability as a stabilizing force

Since 2014, Iraq has faced instability, with mass protests, political deadlock, and repeated crises of legitimacy. Still, things have experienced somewhat incremental improvements since then because prime ministers have not been able to see their power as permanent. Even during messy transitions, the belief that no leader stays forever has kept politics open and allowed for change.

This openness changes how political groups act. When they think losing an election means they can still bargain later, they are more likely to take part in elections, talks, and building coalitions, and less likely to use force. But if it looks as though leaders cannot be replaced, rivals try to block decisions, build armed groups outside the system, and see politics as a fight for survival. In a country where armed groups exist alongside the government, this can slowly, then suddenly, destroy stability.

From this point of view, the real question for US policymakers is not about the personal qualities of Iraq’s next prime minister but whether the political system is open enough to stop the state from becoming a tool for narrow group interests.

What should the United States do?

The United States has limited influence in Iraqi politics, and being too direct can backfire by increasing nationalism, helping spoilers, or making it look as though the United States is picking leaders. So, any good US strategy should be careful and focused, aiming to support strong institutions and political change without backing any one leader.

Although it’s understandable that Washington seeks stability in Iraq after years of upheaval, its strategy should prioritize institutional processes over individual leaders to achieve that end. Iraq’s history demonstrates that apparent calm can coincide with institutional erosion, and the consequences of such hollowing become evident during subsequent crises.

The key question is not whether Sudani is like al-Maliki, but whether a second term would reduce competition and weaken institutions. Keeping the same leader can help stability only if there is real oversight and a chance for political change. Without these, stability is a credit borrowed on time until the next crisis happens.

Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Saeed is the Barzani scholar-in-residence in the Department of Politics, Governance & Economics at American University’s School of International Service, where he also serves as director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace.

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Will Kurti’s 4th victory reshape Kosovo’s foreign relations? | A Debrief with Yll Sadiku

sjones — Tue, 30 Dec 2025 20:00:00 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Europe Center, speaks with Yll Sadiku, a Kosovo scholar at Harvard Law School, to unpack the political messages of Albin Kurti’s fourth consecutive electoral victory and what it could mean for Kosovo’s international standing.

How did Vetëvendosje’s performance break months of political deadlock in Kosovo? Why was this such an unexpected result? How will it affect Kosovo’s institutional dynamics, from the presidency and parliament to potential political crises?

Other questions to unpack after the election results include:

Washington’s position on normalization and the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities: Strategic partner or pressure point?
Brussels’ expectations: EU funds, reforms, and enlargement leverage?
Washington’s position on normalization and the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities: Strategic partner or pressure point?

Ilva Tare and Yll Sadiku assess whether this outcome marks a turning point for Kosovo’s foreign policy and whether Kurti’s mandate strengthens Pristina’s hand or tests it in talks with Serbia, the EU, and the United States, and whether Kosovo’s Western partners should engage differently with Kurti’s third government compared to the previous two.

ABOUT #BALKANSDEBRIEF

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

MEET THE #BALKANSDEBRIEF HOST

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

The post Will Kurti’s 4th victory reshape Kosovo’s foreign relations? | A Debrief with Yll Sadiku appeared first on Atlantic Council.

First hundred days: How Kast can accelerate US investment in Chile

Maite Gonzalez Latorre, Jason Marczak — Mon, 22 Dec 2025 21:12:03 +0000

Bottom lines up front

Chile elected José Antonio Kast president December 14, after a campaign centered on economic growth, security, and institutional stability.
Kast’s proposed security measures aim to restore the predictability of long-term investment needs.
To deepen economic ties with the US, in his first hundred days Kast could also expand workforce training and regional programs to ensure access to skilled talent across the country.

New president, new pressures

José Antonio Kast will head to La Moneda in March 2026. Chile’s president-elect won the second round of the election with 58.2 percent of the vote—winning by a margin of more than 16 percentage points. The day after the election, Kast met with outgoing President Gabriel Boric and emphasized afterward that he will advance a “government of national unity on priority issues: security, health, education, and housing.”

Kast will enter office with a slew of economic pressures in his inbox: slow growth, weak investment, stagnant productivity, high inequality, limited social mobility, and regional gaps. The labor market remains segmented, with low female participation and high informality. Along with these economic pressures, security and rising crime rates dominated the electoral campaign and addressing them will be central to Kast’s government plan.

In 2024, Chile’s economy showed signs of stable but uneven recovery, with moderate 2.6-percent gross domestic product (GDP) growth driven largely by mining, easing inflation, and falling poverty, while unemployment and informality remained elevated and investment growth lagged. Looking ahead to 2026, growth is expected to remain steady at 2.6 percent. Alongside a narrowing fiscal deficit and inflation stabilizing, this suggests a macroeconomic environment that is steady but still dependent on restoring investment momentum.

Chileans want to see changes and expect Kast to deliver some economic wins quickly. But the ability to do so goes hand in hand with addressing the increased rates of crime and violence. Kast’s campaign focused on the security of the country with proposals such as his Plan Implacable, which aims to “restore state authority and curb organized crime” through tougher penalties, more federal control over prisons, and stronger security operations, while also reasserting state authority in areas where criminal networks have expanded. This plan might be among the things on which Chileans want Kast to take action first. However, Kast and his administration need to balance what they want and what they can actually get done, especially regarding migration and deportation.

A challenging congress

The first one hundred days of the Kast administration will test the executive’s ability to move legislation that supports faster growth, rebuilds investor confidence that has been weakened by security concerns and political fragmentation, and signals a clearer economic direction.

That said, Kast takes office with a congress that leans right but does not give him full control. Right and far-right parties aligned with Kast hold seventy-six of the 155 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, with his second-round opponent Jeannette Jara’s left and far-left coalition of Unidad por Chile controlling sixty-one. The swing party of Franco Parisi, Partido de la Gente, holds fourteen seats.

Kast will need a simple majority to pass most legislation. But constitutional amendments and reforms of the electoral system would require two-thirds of votes in the congress. Kast’s coalition cannot reach either threshold on its own, and must work with partners to move any major bill forward. This makes the Partido de la Gente especially important. Because no bloc controls a majority, its fourteen deputies are in position to decide whether a proposal advances or fails. Its votes can tilt negotiations, shape the final text of legislation, and determine how governable the next term becomes.

Passing legislation through the lower house will be easier, but major legislation such as Kast’s proposed mass deportations will need broader support. The evenly split senate will require him to work with the traditional right as well as swing actors to move legislation. As such, Kast will be faced with increased pressure to deliver short-term results on crime and economic growth, signaling early whether his administration can translate public demand for order and stability into a more predictable environment for investment, something US investors typically look for before committing capital in Chile.

How Chile’s investment environment has shifted

Since the mid-1980s, Chile has implemented significant reforms that opened its economy and encouraged foreign investment. These included changes in the financial and social markets, such as Law No. 20.848 of 2015 establishing the framework for foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as other tax and labor reforms. However, social unrest in 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic, two failed constitutional reform attempts, and rising crime have affected investor confidence.

The trade relationship between Chile and the United States is one of the deepest and most strategic for our country. Since the Free Trade Agreement came into effect in 2004—which allowed 100 percent of bilateral trade to be duty-free by 2015—trade between the two countries has more than doubled, and Chilean exports to the US have grown steadily. Today, the United States is our second-largest export destination and also the second-largest foreign investor in Chile, reflecting a mutual trust built over time.

The opportunities to deepen this partnership are enormous: sustainable energy, critical minerals, green hydrogen, water and digital infrastructure, and advanced technologies. Chile contributes stability, legal certainty, and strategic resources; the United States brings innovation and capital. Strengthening this cooperation is key to driving investment, productivity, and new opportunities for both countries.

—Susana Jiménez Schuster, president, Confederation of Production and Trade (CPC)

The foundation for investment in Chile lies in democracy, rule of law, and a predictable regulatory environment. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has indicated that Chile’s growth might be reaching a ceiling, making continued reforms—such as streamlining permits, encouraging innovation, digitalizing paperwork, simplifying regulations, and removing bottlenecks—essential for reigniting momentum.

Chile has economic sectors with great potential that meet global demand for a wide range of goods and services, as well as developed markets and a stable institutional framework. Just as our country can offer attractive conditions to foreign investors, we can also provide knowledge and talent in those industries where we have developed a high level of know-how and expertise. Chile’s growth has been founded on strong collaboration, and free trade agreements with various economies around the world.

—Francisco Pérez Mackenna, board member, AmCham Chile

What makes Chile an attractive destination for US investors

Several conditions strengthen opportunities for US investment in Chile. Together they shape a more attractive environment for long-term investment is likely to be a priority for the incoming Kast government.

Chile is a key tech hub in Latin America. This is because of its stable economy, strong startup ecosystem, skilled workforce, advanced digital infrastructure, and government-backed innovation programs. Successful tech projects require a strong and solid workforce. According to CBRE’s Scoring Tech Talent 2025 report, Santiago has the third-highest tech talent pool in Latin America, with more than 143,000 professionals. This positions Chile as an attractive hub for companies to expand. That said, most initiatives are heavily concentrated in Santiago, emphasizing the need for additional training in both the northern and southern regions to ensure successful new project implementation.
US companies benefit from working with reliable local partners, in part because Chile has clear rules for contracts and strong institutions and because local firms usually have long experience navigating permitting, local procurement, cultural nuances, and sector-specific regulations. These conditions create an environment where these partnerships give foreign investors a dependable base of support on the ground.
Investors trust Chile because its infrastructure is strong, and its politics stay steady. In 2024, Chile received $15.3 billion in FDI, one of the highest inflows in recent years. A big share of that comes from reinvesting earnings, which shows that companies already in Chile are confident enough to expand. The government agency InvestChile closed 2024 with a portfolio of $56.2 billion in foreign-backed projects, with US companies investing the largest share at $20.5 billion. Major investments target clean energy: green hydrogen, mining, and infrastructure. These numbers show that foreign investors, especially those from the United States, believe in Chile’s long-term stability and the clarity of its rules. They see a country where projects can start quickly and scale up, thanks to predictable regulations and reliable systems. That confidence in both infrastructure and political stability strengthens the case for more investment.

The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)’s mandate prioritizes investments in markets that offer predictability, stability, and clear rules, conditions that have historically made countries like Chile attractive for engagement. The DFC, a US federal agency, was created under the 2018 Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, which merged the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) with USAID’s Development Credit Authority. Its core purpose is to mobilize private capital to advance US development and foreign policy objectives by leveraging financial tools such as loans, equity investments, guarantees, and political risk insurance to support private-sector-led solutions in markets where commercial finance is limited or unavailable.

In December 2025, Congress reauthorized and modernized the DFC through the FY 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), extending its authorization through 2031, and significantly expanding its scope and authorities. Under this reauthorization, the DFC’s investment cap (Maximum Contingent Liability) was raised to $205 billion, and the agency gained new tools, including a $5 billion equity revolving fund and increased equity investment authority. The legislation also broadened DFC’s ability to invest in more countries and sectors while placing limits on financing in the wealthiest countries, ensuring that no more than 10 percent of its portfolio may support high-income markets, with specified sector exceptions such as energy, critical minerals, and information and communications technology.

While Chile’s high-income status means that large-scale DFC engagement is still limited compared with developing markets, the agency can support selected projects in strategic areas, including clean energy, critical minerals, infrastructure, and technology, particularly where there is a clear economic or strategic rationale and consistent with the statutory constraints on participation in wealthy countries.

Addressing bottlenecks to further FDI in Chile

Following the presidential election, Chile enters a new political phase with renewed attention on how the next administration will translate campaign promises into policy. Chile continues to take steps to strengthen its investment environment, while facing persistent bottlenecks that shape foreign investor confidence and will influence the country’s economic direction in the months ahead.

Regulatory delays are a major concern and become impediments. Permitting and environmental review processes can take several years. However, the Framework Law on Sectoral Authorizations (Law 21.770)—better known as the Ley de Permisología, which creates the Framework Law on Sectoral Authorizations (LMAS)—was enacted and posted in September 2025. The goal is to update and speed up the permit process to encourage investment. The law creates a single digital portal called SUPER to manage permits simultaneously, introduces simplified procedures for low-risk projects, and establishes administrative silence. Streamlining and updating procedures are expected to drop processing times between 30 percent and 70 percent without lowering regulatory standards. This will also be a step forward for attracting foreign investment.
Policy uncertainty remains a concern for long-term investors. Over the past decade, shifts between governments of the right and left have created questions about the direction of future regulations. Relations between Santiago and Washington are expected to further deepen under a new administration. Kast will need to show that he can meet public expectations for stronger growth and higher investment. Here, it’s critical to balance the demands of [JF1] parties across the political spectrum as this congressional balancing act is what’s needed to advance legislation reassuring to investors. Although Chile has struggled lately to attract FDI, the United States remains its second-largest source, with a strong presence in energy, data centers, and mining.
The economy also plays a major role in the current political moment. Chile has experienced slow growth for several years and unemployment sits at about 9 percent. Investment remains stagnant, with inflation and high living costs shaping daily choices for many Chileans. Voters widely see the current government as falling short in addressing these issues. The national budget was also a central topic of conversation during the election. The legislative commission in charge of reviewing the annual budget recently rejected the proposal for 2026; Kast will now likely express his approach to next year’s spending plan in the short term. That said, his proposal of gradual elimination of property taxes on primary residences, starting with those on homeowners over sixty-five, would reduce government revenue, meaning the 2026 budget will need to account for this shortfall. The administration will need to balance funding public services and implementing the policy in a fiscally responsible way.
Security is another major risk. While Chile remains relatively safe in comparison to select other countries, crime has risen in recent years—including organized crime, drug trafficking, and violence in northern regions and Santiago. Researchers estimate crime costs the country nearly $8 billion annually, discouraging some foreign investment. Kast made public safety a core part of his platform through the previous mentioned Plan Implacable, which includes tougher penalties for organized crime, high-security prisons, expanded self-defense laws, protections for law enforcement and judicial actors, and targeted border security measures with his Plan Escudo Fronterizo.

American investment has been central to the growth of Chile’s strategic industries, while Chile’s stability, talent, and infrastructure have enabled US companies to scale across Latin America. Significant opportunities remain. Chile is the world’s largest copper producer and holds 25 percent of global lithium output, with growing mineral-processing capacity and emerging resources such as rare earths and cobalt. The country is also becoming a regional digital hub, supported by projects like Google’s Humboldt Cable and expanding data-center infrastructure. Upcoming port concessions and the need for energy storage solutions in a rapidly growing clean-energy system offer additional avenues for deeper US investment.

—Beatriz Herrera, investment commissioner for North America, Embassy of Chile

Sectors in Chile with investment potential

Information technology (IT): Chile’s IT sector is expanding rapidly, driven by high internet penetration, widespread mobile connectivity, and growing demand for digital services. Key emerging sectors include fifth-generation (5G) deployment, big-data analytics, and artificial intelligence (AI) integration, supported by initiatives such as Chile Digital 2035 and the National AI Policy. To accelerate growth, Chile can build on existing programs by expanding Chile Digital 2035 and Digital Talent for Chile, increasing investment in digital infrastructure, scaling training and education initiatives, and deepening public-private partnerships to ensure broader access to advanced IT solutions, close the skills gap, and achieve full digitalization of public services.
Critical minerals (copper and lithium): As the world’s largest copper producer, supplying 24 percent of global output, and home to 41 percent of lithium reserves, Chile is a strategic source of materials essential for clean technologies. These include electric vehicles, energy storage, and digital infrastructure. With public policies promoting sustainability and high environmental standards, Chile is positioning itself to attract investment that advances technological innovation, supports the global energy transition, and fosters inclusive economic growth. China currently dominates global demand for Chilean copper and lithium, but Kast could attract more Western-aligned investment by promoting legal certainty, officering incentives, and fostering partnerships with companies that meet high environmental and governmental standards.
Water management and drought mitigation: Chile is increasingly leveraging public-private partnerships to improve water management and climate resilience. Investments focus on both traditional infrastructure, such as dams, and natural solutions including reforestation and wetland restoration. There is demand for technologies that enhance water efficiency, like advanced treatment and recycling systems, data-driven water management tools, and construction waste reduction. Sustainable agricultural practices that conserve water and lower input costs also present promising opportunities. Water management could become a strategic priority for Kast, with the advancement of such projects allowing the administration to deliver visible results, balance regional needs, and contribute to Chile’s robust agriculture sector.
Seismic-resilient infrastructure: Situated on one of the most active fault lines in the world, Chile experiences frequent earthquakes, including several above magnitudes of eight. Critical infrastructure—such as ports, airports, and energy facilities—requires modern seismic design. There is strong demand for engineering and technology services in risk modeling, resilience planning, and early warning systems. Opportunities include digital twins, smart sensors, and integrated solutions to strengthen utilities, transportation networks, and urban development.

How can the new Kast administration help unlock Chile’s economic potential and attract investment?

Visit Washington before the March 11 inauguration. This would reinforce Chile’s shared interests in economic security and investment cooperation, present project pipelines aligned with DFC priorities and clarify Chile’s commitments in areas such as energy transition and trade. Early engagement would allow Chile to secure a proactive position in shaping US investment decisions, demonstrate commitment to close cooperation with the United States, and build political support in the US Congress and executive branch for stronger bilateral financing ties. When in Washington, use the visit to generate broader public interest in the importance of Chile as a strong US partner.
Identify emerging skills and priority growth sectors in Chile and encourage private-sector programs that link education directly to industry needs. Kast can do this by providing tax incentives and speeding up the processing of paperwork for companies involved in workforce training. Scholarships, vocational training, apprenticeships, and partnerships with universities that teach technical skills can help equip students and current workers with the skills required for mining, technology, energy, and other strategic industries.
Maintain continuity in key policies on permitting reforms. This applies to policies such as the Ley de Permisología, which aims to streamline and coordinate environmental and sectoral permitting across government agencies, and they should be expanded to ensure that the ministries and offices involved are actively collaborating with each other. If government entities are not coordinating—for example, in the processing of environment permits—the procedures for key sectors such as mining and technology will continue to be delayed. Demonstrating consistency will reinforce Chile’s reputation as a stable investment destination and encourage both new and reinvested capital.
Avoid over-centralizing these initiatives in Santiago. This can be done by collaborating with regional partners or established private-sector actors to develop and train local workforces. This could include local recruitment, training programs at regional universities, and ongoing partnerships between the government and private sector.

These measures strengthen security in ways that matter for investors by creating clearer rules, steadier institutions, and stronger local trust. When the government improves workforce training and expands formal job opportunities, it reduces pressures that fuel crime in regions tied to mining and energy. Better coordination on permits lowers chances of corruption or operational disruptions because companies face fewer conflicting decisions from different agencies. Together, these steps create a safer and more predictable environment for investors.

Conclusion

Chile remains a trusted and stable partner for the United States. Its democratic values, institutional strength, and openness to trade make it a strategic destination for US investment. But sustaining and expanding this partnership will require continued economic reforms and political engagement between both countries to ease processes for doing business, improve regulatory efficiency, enhance human capital, and foster political stability toward a robust, long-term strategic partnership. As Kast prepares to take office, he has an opportunity to set a foundation to ignite Chile’s economic growth and attract investment. And with the Western Hemisphere as a top priority for Washington, Chile has the potential to be an even more strategic partner to the United States.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors alone. Some of the investment opportunities discussed in this issue brief were informed by an October roundtable discussion on US-Chile investment relations, which included the participation of US and Chilean private-sector leaders, public-sector representatives, and multilateral organizations. The roundtable was organized in partnership with AmCham Chile and with the support of MetLife. Neither were involved in the production of this issue brief.

About the authors

Maite Gonzalez Latorre is program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center of the Atlantic Council.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center of the Atlantic Council

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Democracy and stability in Africa: Why US leadership still matters

Mason Ingram, Alysson Oakley, and Jack Higgins — Fri, 19 Dec 2025 00:47:44 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The United States is reevaluating democracy assistance in Africa at a time when democratic institutions, citizen aspirations, and regional stability depend on sustained support for accountable governance.
Strengthening democratic pathways, empowering citizens in democratic and authoritarian contexts, and investing in stabilization and local peacebuilding are essential to protecting African progress and advancing US interests.
Private philanthropy and the private sector must play a larger role in sustaining electoral integrity, supporting civil society, and fostering conditions that enable long-term democratic and economic gains.

This issue brief is part of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “The future of democracy assistance” series, which analyzes the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Introduction

The political landscape in Africa defies generalization. Despite setbacks and challenges, democratic progress continues in Ghana, Malawi, and Senegal, among other countries. Next to these bright spots, military juntas have deepened their grip on multiple West African and Sahelian governments, long-standing authoritarian regimes remain in Rwanda, Uganda, and other countries, and conflict and war continues to upend lives and threaten the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan. Numerous other countries are best described as hybrid regimes, combining democratic and authoritarian forms of governance and producing inconsistent outcomes for their citizens in terms of delivering public goods, securing basic rights, and promoting economic growth.

Against this backdrop, the United States is recasting its relationship with African governments and their constituencies. Department of State officials describe “trade, not aid” as the foundation of US policy in Africa. In doing so, they have named expanded access to critical minerals and energy resources, alongside the development of new markets for US exports, as signature priorities for the Trump administration on the continent. This shift has brought cascading effects on African nations. As the region with the largest historic inflow of US foreign assistance, deep and sudden cuts to the aid budgets of the US Department of State and the closure of the US Agency for International Development have disproportionately affected African countries.[2]

Previous US administrations—including the first Trump administration—promoted democratic governance and stability in Africa using a combination of diplomatic and development tools. In fiscal year 2023, for example, the US government spent more than $338 million on democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) programming in Africa. Even more was spent in the final year of the first Trump administration, when DRG spending in Africa stood at more than $415 million.

Today, the outlook is very different. In addition to eliminating most democracy assistance to the continent in the early round of aid cuts, the administration has sought to defund the National Endowment for Democracy and proposed the elimination of nearly all DRG funds in its 2026 budget. Meanwhile, it has shifted away from criticizing foreign governments on democratic and human rights grounds.

Regardless of the direction of US government policy, recent history shows that both African societies and US national interests are best served by stable, democratic, and accountable systems of governance, which have proved more effective at delivering peace, expanding socioeconomic opportunity, and fostering market economies that attract domestic and international investment. Given this reality, the “dealmaking” intended to drive the administration’s foreign policy will find its greatest long-term success in countries with stronger and more democratic institutions.

This brief makes recommendations for how and why US stakeholders should work with democratic partners in Africa to seek democracy and stability-related outcomes. It includes specific recommendations directed at the US government for using democracy assistance as a tool to advance key African and American priorities. Recognizing that the near-term reality of reduced funding for US government democracy assistance will generate new shortfalls and challenges, this brief also identifies opportunities for other American institutions, namely private philanthropy and the private sector, to partner with key democratic actors and advance DRG practice in Africa.

Why prioritize democracy, good governance, and stability?

There are numerous practical reasons for the US government and constituencies to prefer and encourage democracy, good governance, and stability in Africa. Most importantly, it is what African publics want. Survey respondents on the continent consistently report a preference for democratic systems of government over all other options. The 2021–23 Afrobarometer survey found that, across thirty-nine surveyed countries, 66 percent of respondents prefer democracy over any other kind of government, while 78 percent oppose one-party rule and 66 percent oppose military rule. Despite some erosion in overall support for democracy over the past decade, popular support for democratic governance remains resilient in the face of social and economic headwinds and global momentum for authoritarian governments.

Despite challenges, democratic and institutionally stable regimes have yielded economic, political, and social benefits. The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes show that globally, while gains often take time to accrue, democratizing countries see an average bump of 8.8 percent in gross national product per capita over a twenty-year period compared to their autocratic peers. Meanwhile, institutional instability and fragility remain especially damaging to socioeconomic well-being. Countries with the highest levels of fragility as defined by the Fragile States Index have seen slow or significantly negative economic growth, conflict, and recurrent humanitarian crises. Insecurity and crisis, in turn, create unstable markets, disrupt supply chains, and erode long-term investment for US industries.

From an American perspective, African countries with stable and democratic institutions have been reliable economic, political, and security partners. They are more inclined to establish and strengthen rules-based economic and political systems that protect US and other investors. In regions like the Sahel, as elaborated on below, democratic governments serve as key political and security allies, while undemocratic and especially unstable countries have invited foreign interference by geopolitical rivals and create risks related to radicalization.

Institutional stability will only become more important as the US government and corporations push to expand trade relations and close deals in capital-intensive sectors like mining. Moving forward, the limiting factor on investments that generate returns for African and American economies alike is not the ability of the US government to sign deals today, but its ability to encourage stable economic and political conditions that protect those investments in the years to come.

Priorities for democracy assistance

A sensible US foreign policy interested in achieving meaningful social, political, and economic gains for African partner societies and US stakeholders alike would make diverse investments in stable, democratic, and accountable governance on the continent. We identify three broad priorities that could power an effective democracy assistance strategy:

Invest in countries on a democratic pathway.
Ally with citizens, including in backsliding democracies and autocracies.
Prioritize stabilization and local institutions that enable peace and security.

These priorities and the specific investments listed below are not meant to be comprehensive, but rather indicative of what a balanced and sufficiently ambitious US democracy assistance strategy could entail. The priorities could be applied across a wide set of countries and regions, or focus on specific geographies where the US government has direct economic and security interests, such as large population centers and economies like Nigeria and Kenya, or strategic regions like the Great Lakes, Horn of Africa, and Sahel. Recognizing that the US government is poised to reduce its investments in critical areas of intervention, we identify specific opportunities for private philanthropy and the private sector to play a leadership role in delivering and reenvisioning elements of a democracy assistance package moving forward.

Priority 1: Invest in countries on a democratic pathway

Reinforcing the economic, political, and security gains to democratic stability in Africa, the United States should continue to invest in the success of aspiring and longer-standing democracies on the continent. Democratic governments are better at protecting the rights and well-being of their citizens while creating hospitable conditions for secure, long-term investments and trade relations. Key democratic governments on the continent have set reform agendas with the potential to benefit their citizens and serve near- and long-term American economic and political interests. Furthermore, multiple democratic countries represent anchor security partners for the United States and critical bulwarks against instability, radicalization, and foreign interference in volatile regions such as the Sahel.

Take Senegal, for example. Senegal provides a case study for how a country that has made long-term democratic progress—and that overcame threats to its 2024 presidential election—is prioritizing economic and governance reforms that are responsive to the stated interests of its citizens. Like other recently elected governments on the continent, Senegal’s administration has prioritized anti-corruption, structural economic reforms, and poverty reduction, among other signature initiatives. Senegal’s President Bassirou Diomaye Faye led this effort by declaring his assets during the election and, once in office, announcing audits of the oil, gas, and mining sectors. The administration similarly proposed multiple transparency laws and released previously unpublished reports from anti-corruption institutions.

The extent and success of reform efforts in Senegal remains to be seen, but they have the potential to strengthen its citizens’ socioeconomic security and overall market economy. Alongside Ghana, Senegal remains a long-standing democratic partner in a region where the proliferation of military-led governments has put US security interests and assets at risk, as evidenced by the recent closure of US military bases in Niger. The U.S., therefore, has a direct stake in the success of governance-strengthening efforts in countries like Senegal.

The US government and other entities should make strategic investments in countries on a democratic pathway, like Senegal, to achieve results in high-priority areas of reform and strengthen key institutions, including in sectors of mutual interest to the US stakeholders and partner governments.

Prioritize support for reforms that are championed by government partners. External technical and financial assistance is most effective when supporting reform and governance-strengthening initiatives that are owned and led by government partners. Indeed, political commitment alongside bureaucratic capacity are among the interrelated factors contributing to the success or failure of reform. In countries seeking to entrench democratic and economic reforms, the US government can work with partner governments that see their political futures as tied to the success of reforms across a range of economic and social sectors, such as public health, transportation, and financial services where key benefits accrue to US constituencies. The US government can aid these reform efforts by providing technical assistance, technology transfers, and direct financial support, concentrating on sectors where the US has a strategic interest.
Continue social and capital investments in democratizing countries. The US government has used vehicles such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to invest in economic and social sectors in countries meeting basic governance benchmarks. This has included, for example, using cofinancing models to support upgrades of the energy sector in Senegal and the transport sector in Malawi. The MCC’s investment-led, government-to-government approach is suited to countries on a stable and democratic trajectory, where US and partner country investments are more likely to be secure. While its future remains uncertain, the MCC and institutions like the Development Finance Corporation can help democratizing countries generate capital for high-priority, high-impact sectors that can contribute to economic growth and social welfare. Looking forward, the US government can maintain investments in strategically important countries like Cote d’Ivoire and Zambia. It can also use its investments to crowd in funding to sectors of mutual interest for African and American businesses and other stakeholders.

The role of other actors: Private philanthropy must maintain support for free and fair electoral systems

The integrity of electoral institutions and, ultimately, the conduct of elections has an outsize influence on the trajectory on democratic consolidation. The US government has decades of experience supporting political parties, strengthening the infrastructure for independent election monitoring, and strengthening electoral management bodies (EMBs), which research shows is critically important to democratic trajectories, including re-democratization. Meanwhile, the current Department of State has backed away from electoral assistance programs and issued directives restricting embassies from criticizing foreign elections.

Given trends in US government policy, private philanthropy can help preserve US leadership in international electoral support. While the philanthropic sector cannot replace US government election funding—which included $48.9 million in support for unanticipated events like snap elections across twenty-eight African countries between 2022 and 2024—it can make high-impact investments that help preserve and build on democratic gains. These investments could include, for example, prioritizing targeted support for EMBs and the electoral monitoring capacities in countries working to consolidate their democratic progress.

Priority 2: Ally with citizens, including in backsliding democracies and autocracies

In pursuing a dealmaking-focused foreign policy, it will be tempting for the US government and private sector to “deal” primarily or exclusively with power-wielding political and economic elites. Doing so risks putting the United States at odds with African publics who express a preference for democracy and accountable governance, while potentially promoting corruption and distorting markets key to fair competition for US and other businesses.

Many African societies have tended to hold positive views of the United States and find resonance with its economic and political values. Recent research from Pew found that the some of the highest US approval ratings from foreign publics come from surveyed African countries. These findings mirror older Afrobarometer data showing that preference for the US development model outcompetes China’s by 11 percentage points across surveyed countries. This research suggests that views of the United States are influenced by its perceived commitments to democratic and free-market development approaches.

An effective foreign policy focused on long-term US interests must grapple with the reality that the political and socioeconomic interests of African citizens are not always served by their leaders. Many regimes tilt the electoral system in their favor, effectively silencing their electorates. Across a range of countries, civil society and human rights leaders face political repression for exercising their fundamental political rights. And too many large-scale investments in extractives and other sectors—including investments led by transactional Chinese state and corporate entities—have undermined the human rights and failed to serve the interests of local communities.

Allying with African citizenries does not mean forgoing economic and political dealmaking. Across regime types, citizens want to see expanded economic opportunity, social welfare gains, and security. Failure to prioritize the economic and political needs and interests of African societies, however, would put the United States on the wrong side of many of the youngest populations in the world, jeopardizing hard-won admiration on the continent. Democracy assistance offers practical tools for supporting and protecting key constituencies.

Invest in strengthened economic governance and business climates. African publics and the US government and corporations have a shared interest in strengthening business sectors that enable fair, rules-based market competition. The US government should invest in strengthened economic governance through targeted support to government and nongovernment actors, potentially focusing on sectors with heightened exposure for the United States. This could, for example, include supporting efforts to reduce child labor and forced labor from supply chains, thereby addressing significant human rights violations and leveling the economic playing field for US corporations that must adhere to international labor standards. Where there is state commitment to reform, the US government can support technical assistance to lawmakers and regulatory bodies to put in place and implement legal, policy, and regulatory frameworks that meet international standards. It can also support chambers of commerce, industry associations, and civil society organizations to promote transparent and accountable business practices and advance market-oriented reforms.
Prioritize anti-corruption and accountability. Support for anti-corruption efforts by committed government and citizen actors offers a clear opportunity for the US government to stand with African publics. In countries as varied as Gabon, Gambia, Liberia, and South Africa, more than 70 percent of Afrobarometer respondents report that corruption increased “somewhat/a lot” in the past year.” Corruption concerns have helped fueled democratic transitions in countries such as Ghana and Senegal, as well as large-scale protests in Kenya, Madagascar, and South Africa, among others. The US government could assist governments committed to anti-corruption efforts to advance e-governance that has been shown effective at reducing opportunities for corruption. The United States should also support civil society and independent media to conduct investigations, analyze public data, and advocate for public transparency and accountability, including to address regional challenges like cross-border illicit financial flows that harm US economic interests.

The role of other actors: Private philanthropy should prioritize emergency assistance to civil society and human rights institutions

With the near-term decline of the US government’s support to civil society in Africa and globally, private philanthropy is best placed to shore up critical gaps while shifting the terms of assistance for civic institutions. In particular, private foundations can prioritize funding for emergency assistance aimed at protecting individuals and organizations facing acute risks of political repression. The annual value of US government human rights programming in Africa was $21.6 million in fiscal year 2022, of which emergency assistance activities was only a part. The sums involved for sustaining core emergency assistance categories are within the capabilities of individual or coalitions of leading US philanthropies.

Private foundations can also adopt regional or global approaches to directly funding and supporting local civic institutions. This could include developing programs that facilitate horizontal relationships, learning, and mutual assistance among civic actors from Africa, the United States, and other regions grappling with common struggles related to conflict, democracy, and accountable governance in their societies.

Priority 3: Prioritize stabilization and local institutions that enable peace and security

Instability and conflict remain critical challenges across key regions and countries in Africa. The Fragile States Index shows that four out of the five most fragile countries (and sixteen out of the most fragile twenty-five countries) globally are in sub-Saharan Africa. Recent years have seen a rapid expansion in the scope and intensity of conflict in the region. This includes conflicts fueled or amplified by extremist groups in the Sahel, West Africa, and coastal East Africa. It also includes civil conflicts in Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan, among other countries. The human and economic costs of conflict are vast. In 2023, the number of displaced persons in Africa approached 35 million, representing nearly half of the total number of displaced persons globally.

In the DRC and broader Great Lakes region of Africa, the Trump administration has shown a willingness to use its political capital to seek an end to a long-standing and worsening conflict that threatens its trade and investment interests. In late June 2025, the US government announced a peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda governments aimed at halting the conflict between state authorities and the March 23 Movement (M23) rebels. Questions remain about the ultimate effectiveness of the settlement given that M23 and other rebel groups are not direct parties to the agreement. The US government, however, has expressed commitment to its implementation, which it sees as necessary for enhanced American access to critical minerals, including cobalt, copper, and tantalum. As in other countries with active conflicts, the US government has cut important aid programs to the DRC that invest in the social infrastructure and critical institutions necessary for supporting and sustaining peace deals. The long-term durability of any peace, however, depends on empowered individual and institutional structures that can deliver foundational levels of governance, and social and economic benefits that can reinforce stability.

Maintain support to networks of peacebuilders at the local, regional, and national levels. Integrated networks of formal and informal peacebuilding institutions and individual activists are critical to monitoring, responding to, mitigating, and managing conflict, especially at the local level. Local peacebuilding committees and related structures have a track record of enabling community-level peace outcomes and social cohesion in countries like Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Kenya. Similarly, mutual aid groups are playing a key role in responding to the impacts of conflict in contemporary Sudan. The US government should prioritize cost-effective investments in the peace institutions and structures that monitor and strengthen peace settlements, especially in countries and regions where it invests in negotiation.
Prioritize stabilization and repairing local institutions. Where it pursues diplomatic solutions to conflict, the US government can help secure gains by investing in interventions that produce stability. The DRC shows how daunting the challenge of stabilization can be, with more than 2 million Congolese having faced displacement from the M23-driven conflict between January and June 2024 alone. Effective stabilization efforts require prioritizing humanitarian responses to meet the basic needs of families and communities experiencing displacement, return, and other traumas. It also must include supporting the reestablishment of local civil society and state institutions that can help deliver services, manage public goods, and resolve disputes.

The role of other actors: The private sector should foster multisector investments in peace and security

The long-term ability of private sector companies to operate and recoup investments in conflict-affected communities depends on durable peace and security. Direct investments in peace dividends (i.e., socioeconomic returns to peace) can help reinforce reductions in conflict. US and other private sector companies are optimally positioned to strengthen their local business environments by making social and economic investments that help communities and regions benefit from periods of relative calm while strengthening overall socioeconomic well-being. This can include making investments in local infrastructure, public goods, and service delivery capacities. Private sector actors, especially within the extractives sector, can also build on frameworks like the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and commit to business and human rights practices that reinforce good governance and security.

Committing to and growing who leads democracy assistance

During its first ten months in office, the Trump administration has removed long-standing infrastructure and funding for delivering democracy assistance globally, including in Africa. The near- and long-term interests of African societies and key US stakeholders, however, are bolstered by the advancement of democratic, accountable, and stable governance on the continent. Not only is a robust democracy assistance strategy in Africa in line with long-standing US values that underpin America’s reputation and image on the continent, but it is also instrumental to stated objectives of the current administration, such as expanding fair access to strong foreign markets and securing priority peace agreements.

Regardless of its ultimate policy, the US government is, at least for the time being, stepping back from traditional aspects of DRG programming. In this context, other institutional actors can do more. Private philanthropy and the private sector cannot replace US government democracy assistance, but they can make targeted, evidence-based, and cost-effective investments that protect important areas of intervention, such as emergency assistance for human rights defenders, institutional support for EMBs, and pro-peace investments in conflict-affected communities. These and other types of investments are affordable, and when well executed, they can positively influence the trajectories of individual democratic actors, institutions, and partner countries.

Private foundations are especially well positioned to pursue DRG investments while prioritizing direct support to African-based institutions. This can include forging mutual relationships among democratic actors grappling with common 21st-century democratic challenges in Africa, the United States, and beyond, to seed the sector with stronger horizontal ties and novel partnership approaches and new strategies for the future.

about the authors

Mason Ingram is vice president for governance at Pact, a nongovernmental organization that carries out development work around in the world in partnership with private sector organizations government agencies, including with USAID until the agency’s closure in 2025. Pact continues to receive funding from the US Department of State. Ingram has more than 15 years of experience designing, advising, and managing international development programs, with a focus on civil society and governance programming.

Alysson Oakley is vice president for learning, evaluation, and impact at Pact. Oakley also teaches courses on program design and evaluation of democracy assistance and conflict resolution interventions at Georgetown University. Oakley holds a PhD from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and a bachelor of arts degree from Brown University.

Jack Higgins is a research assistant and MA candidate at Georgetown University’s College of Arts and Sciences.

The authors are grateful for consultations provided by experts on democratic governance in Africa, including Dr. Babra Ontibile Bhebe (executive director, Election Resource Centre), Bafana Khumalo (co-executive director, Sonke Gender Justice), Omolara Balogun (head, policy influencing and advocacy, West African Civil Society Centre), Jean-Michel Dufils (retired senior governance research expert and program manager), and Jon Temin (visiting fellow, SNF Agora Institute).

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The only winner from Ukrainian wartime elections would be Putin

Yuriy Boyechko — Tue, 16 Dec 2025 19:34:10 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is once again facing pressure to hold wartime elections after US President Donald Trump accused the Ukrainian leader of using Russia’s invasion to postpone a vote and suggested it was now time for the country to go to the polls. Zelenskyy has responded to Trump’s recent comments by expressing his readiness to organize elections in the next two to three months, while calling on Ukraine’s Western partners to play a role in preparations. “I’m asking now, and I’m stating this openly, for the US to help me, perhaps together with our European colleagues, to ensure security for the elections,” he said on December 10.

Zelenskyy’s commitment to democratic principles is commendable, but he should nevertheless resist international pressure to rush into wartime elections. Attempting to hold a national vote at a time when the country is under relentless Russian bombardment and while millions of Ukrainians remain displaced by the war would not be a demonstration of democracy; it would be a strategic blunder that could hand a propaganda victory to Moscow.

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The issue of potential wartime elections in Ukraine has been raised on numerous occasions since spring 2024 when Zelenskyy’s presidential term officially ended, with Russia frequently referencing the absence of elections in Ukraine as part of efforts to undermine the legitimacy of the current Ukrainian authorities. These Kremlin claims of illegitimacy are inaccurate. The Ukrainian Constitution specifically forbids elections while martial law is in place, which has been the case in Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

This constitutional barrier to wartime elections is not a mere legal loophole or a convenient excuse. It is a foundational safeguard designed to ensure the continuity of governance during times of national crisis. Of course, it is possible to argue that the relevant legislation could be revised. But any attempt to change the Ukrainian Constitution would risk a constitutional crisis in the middle of a major war. It would divert the attention of Ukraine’s parliament, the country’s judicial system, and the public away from the war effort, with obvious potential for political infighting and domestic instability.

The constitutional arguments against a wartime election are convincing, but the main reason why Ukraine cannot go to the polls while the Russian invasion continues is because any such vote would fall far short of recognized democratic standards in terms of freedom, fairness, and representation. A truly democratic election requires a level playing field, security for participants, and the ability for all eligible citizens to cast their ballots. None of these conditions can be met in today’s Ukraine.

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Security problems alone should be enough to rule out the idea of a wartime ballot. With Russia bombing civilian targets across Ukraine on a daily basis, candidates would be unable to stage any public campaign gatherings in safety. Likewise, polling stations would become high-value targets for Russian drones and missiles, creating unacceptable risks for thousands of election workers and millions of voters.

The logistical challenges of a wartime vote would be similarly overwhelming. Millions of Ukrainians are currently located abroad as refugees in the European Union and elsewhere. Millions more are internally displaced inside Ukraine. This creates huge issues for voter registries, which would need to be completely revised and updated. Furthermore, the voices of Ukrainian citizens living under Russian occupation would be silenced entirely, disenfranchising a large portion of the overall electorate and further undermining the credibility of any vote.

If Zelenskyy chooses to proceed with a wartime election, the potential for domestic political destabilization would be huge. An election held under wartime conditions would inevitably be a flawed process, with millions unable to vote and security restrictions placing limits on meaningful campaigning opportunities. Regardless of the outcome, Russia would seize on these flaws in order to declare the results illegitimate, sow internal discord, and undermine the credibility of the Ukrainian government in the eyes of the international community. The resulting instability could prove a far greater threat to Ukraine’s survival than any perceived democratic deficit.

According to his country’s constitution, Zelenskyy is the legally elected leader of Ukraine and will remain so until conditions in the country allow for the relaxation of martial law restrictions and the organization of genuinely free and fair elections. This will only become possible once a comprehensive and verifiable ceasefire is in place. Until the bombs stop falling, the Ukrainian government’s priority must remain the defense of the nation.

Ukrainians are fighting to defend their democracy against Russian authoritarianism, but they are also in no rush to hold a wartime vote. Instead, opinion polls consistently demonstrate that most Ukrainians oppose the idea of any elections while active hostilities continue. When the right moment arrives, Ukrainians will be the first to demand their democratic rights and will insist on new elections. However, they understand that the right moment has not yet arrived.

Yuriy Boyechko is CEO of Hope For Ukraine.

Following Iraq’s election, the country’s political elite launched internal discussions—largely along sectarian lines—to form the next government. The prime minister’s Reconstruction and Development bloc won the most votes (1.3 million) and the most seats (forty-six) in last month’s elections. Sudani’s electoral success reflects his high approval ratings, with pollster Munqith Dagher pointing to surveys showing Sudani as the most popular politician in Iraq in the period since 2003. The fact that Sudani’s Furatayn Movement only won one seat—his own—in the 2021 election is a testament to both his political success in this election and the limited connection between the number of seats won and the selection of the prime minister.

Although the Shia political parties that make up the governing Coordination Framework ran on separate lists, the Framework quickly coalesced in the days following the election. Shia political leaders told us there was a firm consensus—with the notable exception of Sudani—that no prime minister should receive a second term and that the next prime minister would not be permitted to form his own political party.

Even as the Framework leaders continued to debate the merits of various prime ministerial candidates, the decision was already clear: Iraq’s next prime minister will, in effect, serve as a “general manager”—implementing the Framework’s policies, but not developing them.

Sunnis and Kurds are divided

If Sudani had any hope of forming a cross-sectarian alliance built on support from Kurdish and Sunni parties, the possibility appeared remote in the first days after the election. Sunni and Kurdish leaders largely shared the Shia position that Iraqi prime ministers should be limited to one term, with political leaders from across the spectrum pointing to former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s semi-authoritarian second term as a cautionary tale.

In the first days after the election, little appeared to unite the Sunnis, save for a general agreement among them that Mohamed Halbousi, the leader of the Taqadum party, should not be speaker of parliament again. On November 23, the Sunnis announced their own alliance, the National Political Council, designed to act as a quasi-Framework for the Sunnis and intended to demonstrate unity against the Shia bloc. But so far, this union remains untested.

Our meetings in Kurdistan served as a reminder that the region’s two main parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have yet to finalize key elements of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) more than a year after the October 2024 elections. Some politicians speculated that the Kurds could delay Baghdad’s government-formation process given the divisions between the two sides over which party would control key KRG ministries and whether the KDP would insist on holding the Iraqi presidency following a pattern of PUK control.

The sun sets over the Erbil Citadel in Kurdistan, Iraq, on November 19, 2025. (Atlantic Council)

Militias remain a powerful force

Politicians and parties aligned with militia groups gained ground in last month’s elections. Sadiqoun, the political wing of the US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, won twenty-seven seats, up from seven in the prior election. The militia-affiliated (but still undesignated) Badr Organization won eighteen seats, and a number of militia-affiliated candidates appeared on lists for mainstream political parties. By some counts, militia candidates now represent more than fifty seats in the parliament, demonstrating that these groups remain influential political actors.

In my discussions with many Iraqi politicos, I heard a clear acknowledgement that Iraq’s next prime minister would have to bring the militias under state control. At the same time, the militias’ growing political and economic power will pose a significant domestic political challenge to any effort to do so. It’s likely that US officials have quietly drawn a red line insisting that militia groups that Washington has designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations be excluded from the next government. If that’s the case, it will pose a political challenge for the Framework given the strong showing of militia-affiliated parties.

The United States still matters

Even if Iraq has largely fallen off Washington’s radar, Iraqis were eager to discuss the US-Iraq partnership. Kurds, Sunnis, and even Iraq’s Shia leaders, emphasized the importance of the US relationship and their desire to strengthen it.

While Iran’s influence in the country remains ever-present, the behind-the-scenes political maneuvering I witnessed was largely Iraqi-driven, apparently motivated more by domestic political considerations than by any external pressure. Shia political leaders reflected a consensus behind an Iraqi foreign policy that balanced a strong partnership with the United States with a longstanding historical relationship with Iran. Multiple Iraqi political leaders and analysts emphasized to me that the next prime minister would pursue continuity in Iraqi policy, including toward the United States.

The author and other members of the Atlantic Council delegation meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani in Baghdad on November 15, 2025. (Atlantic Council)

A growing gap between the public and elites

While Iraqi politicians may be deeply invested in the election results and government-formation process, that doesn’t mean the Iraqi public as a whole is. Many Iraqis I spoke with had already concluded that elections don’t matter all that much. Seasoned political analysts, civil-society activists, and young Iraqis expressed their disaffection with the political process, with some even admitting that they did not vote in last month’s elections and did not wish to legitimate Iraq’s political system.

A group of young Iraqis pointed to disappointment following the government’s repression of the 2019 Tishreen movement, when Iraqi youth went to the streets to demand fundamental political change, and the failure of independent candidates and political activists to effect any changes after they entered parliament in 2021. Instead, they asserted, some of these activists had been co-opted by the political system, joining the mainstream parties against which they had originally campaigned. In this year’s elections, the independent and civil-society candidates were largely wiped out.

Iraqi politicians of all stripes noted higher-than-anticipated voter turnout, but naysayers countered that this was the “billionaires’ election”—one where that turnout was more the result of unprecedented political spending than a surge in voter enthusiasm.

For many Iraqis, the fact that electoral outcomes have so little bearing on the process for forming governments is yet another reminder that the political system has few mechanisms for the average citizen to hold its leadership accountable.

The promise of a changed Iraq

Even so, I experienced the promise of a different Iraq. As I drove down so-called Route Irish, the road from Baghdad Airport to the Green Zone, it was easy to forget that this path was once infamous for being the site of frequent attacks on US convoys. Until just this year, the US State Department was still using Black Hawks to transport staff from the airport to the US Embassy. My delegation drove along the road peacefully in a normal car.

The author and Nibras Basitkey, associate director of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, walking down the historic al-Mutanabbi street in Baghdad on November 16, 2025. (Atlantic Council)

While in Baghdad, I walked down al-Mutanabbi street, the historic corridor filled with booksellers and cafés, rebuilt in recent years after a devastating car bomb in 2007 killed more than thirty people and destroyed this hub for Iraqi intellectuals. I roamed freely in Dohuk and Erbil, shopping in bazaars, walking around the Erbil Citadel, and sampling the local cuisine at restaurants.

Despite the many challenges ahead, I left Iraq asking myself, after two decades of conflict, whether the country has turned the corner. Often during my visit, I sensed an eagerness for change among Iraqis. Soon, the next government will have an opportunity to meet this moment. There is no shortage of pressing issues for it to address, from the militias and economic reforms to the ongoing water crisis. But perhaps the most important step of all will be for the government to begin narrowing the divide between the political elite and the people.

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Is Costa Rica in a political crisis?

María Fernanda Bozmoski — Wed, 03 Dec 2025 17:05:03 +0000

Costa Rica has long prided itself on democratic stability and a strong rule of law. But the nation of some five million people now finds itself in an exceptional—yet constitutionally permitted—confrontation between its executive branch and its independent electoral authority, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE).

The situation—a second vote in fewer than five months on whether to strip the president’s immunity—caught the attention of a sitting US Congress member as well as former and current heads of state in the region. Judging by their statements, it’s clear that there is confusion about what exactly is happening. Is Costa Rica really in crisis? Is an institutional coup underway?

A decisive vote in Costa Rica’s Legislative Assembly will take place by December 18, before deputies head out on vacation, on whether to lift President Rodrigo Chaves’s immunity so prosecutors can pursue alleged electoral-law violations.

US efforts to strengthen democratic resilience in its own neighborhood must be accompanied by support for processes and procedures—not specific players.

Less than a week into the formal campaign period, on October 7, the TSE asked the Legislative Assembly to lift Chaves’s immunity so it can pursue alleged violations related to political belligerence and interference, including participation in campaign-related activities. While it is true that many of the complaints put forth for consideration of the TSE are from leaders of opposition parties, the TSE unanimously accepted fifteen out of twenty-four as admissible for “unwarranted interference.”

This request to lift Chaves’s immunity is not the first such instance. In July, the Costa Rican Supreme Court requested the national assembly lift the president’s immunity in a corruption case tied to a communications contract financed by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration. In September, lawmakers fell short of the two-thirds supermajority needed to strip Chaves’s immunity in the corruption case. That vote, regarding a sitting president, was a first in Costa Rican history. Now, considering stripping the president’s immunity twice in one calendar year is even more remarkable.

But it is important to note two things. First, none of these moves constitutes an impeachment: lifting immunity (desafuero) merely opens the door to investigation and a trial while the president remains in office. Second, under Costa Rican law, Chaves is not eligible for consecutive reelection, so to extrapolate that the TSE request for the assembly to consider the removal of the fuero is an institutional coup of some sort is a stretch.

Soon after the Costa Rica ambassador spoke with US Representative Mario Díaz-Balart (R-FL-26), the congressman toned down his stance on the country’s political situation. Meanwhile, the process in Costa Rica rolls ahead, with a vote on the fuero expected by December 18. Will the deputies at the asamblea entertain a second vote on Chaves’s immunity? The president already appeared before the national assembly’s special three-member commission (two members of the opposition and one “officialist” member) on November 14. Chaves left that hearing before it concluded.

Should the two-thirds majority be reached this time, it will be uncharted territory for the “Switzerland of Central America.” A successful vote would authorize prosecutors and the attorney general’s office to open a case through criminal proceedings. Importantly, it would not amount to impeachment, nor would it remove the president. The courts, rather than politics at the asamblea, would determine whether charges advance. The presidency will continue to function, and the electoral calendar will continue to advance, as well. And regardless of the outcome, the term-limited Chaves will leave office and a new government will be inaugurated come May 8, 2026.

Costa Rica’s confrontation is, so far, a stress test of checks and balances operating within its constitution and electoral laws.

For Washington, the attention to Costa Rica reflects the recognition that Central American stability matters for the world’s largest economy. US efforts to strengthen democratic resilience in its own neighborhood must be accompanied by support for processes and procedures—not specific players. Doing so effectively would help advance US interests in the hemisphere.

María Fernanda Bozmoski is director, impact and operations and lead for Central America at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the center’s work on Mexico and Central America and supports the director with the center’s operations.

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Memo to the Secretary of State: In the upcoming Honduran elections, democracy and US interests are at stake

María Fernanda Bozmoski, Isabella Palacios, Jason Marczak — Mon, 24 Nov 2025 21:17:48 +0000

TO: Secretary of State Marco Rubio
FROM: María Fernanda Bozmoski, Isabella Palacios, and Jason Marczak
SUBJECT: In the upcoming Honduras election, the US must defend democracy and its economic interests
DATE: November 24, 2025

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What do world leaders need to know? Our “Memo to…” series has the answer with briefings on the world’s most pressing issues from our experts, drawing on their experience advising the highest levels of government.

Bottom line up front: On November 30, 2025, Honduras will hold one-round general elections in which the candidate with the most votes wins the presidency. As things stand, neither the credibility of the process nor an undisputed result is guaranteed, and any outcome is likely to trigger a contested election—a déjà vu of 2017’s post-electoral crisis. This time, however, the election carries significant stakes for the United States: it could affect US-Honduras security cooperation, reshape geopolitical competition following Honduras’ 2023 pivot to China, and test President Xiomara Castro’s push to expand military involvement beyond constitutional limits, including subordinating the armed forces directly to the presidency rather than the electoral authority. The United States should step up its monitoring of this election because the instability it could trigger would reverberate well beyond Honduras.

Background: An x-ray of Honduras

Over six million Hondurans will head to the polls on Sunday, November 30, to elect a new president, 128 members of Congress, 298 mayors, and twenty representatives to the Central American Parliament.

These are the broader domestic and geopolitical dynamics at play:

Electoral context

The general elections follow March’s chaotic primaries, during which logistical hurdles affected an estimated 1.3 million voters in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, out of the 5.8 million eligible voters nationwide. Many citizens had to cast their ballots the following day, and in some cases up to a week later, due to delays in opening polling centers or receiving voting materials. These disruptions triggered serious clashes within electoral institutions, including the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Electoral Justice Tribunal, and between them and other public bodies such as the armed forces and the attorney general’s office¹. These disputes ultimately delayed key steps in the electoral timeline, including the adjudication of the contract for the company that would transmit preliminary results (TREP) on election day.

In the months since, operational gaps have widened. The CNE delayed contracting satellite connectivity for remote voting sites. Then, a logistics contractor withdrew in early November—just days before the vote—citing delayed contract awards and lack of guarantees for election-night performance. With only twenty-two days remaining, the CNE launched a “fast track” procurement to replace both the connectivity and logistics functions, compressing timelines that typically require months of testing and coordination.

The Organization of American States, one of sixty-eight institutions set to observe the elections, has already deployed its mission and issued statements raising concerns about on-the-ground conditions for citizens to exercise their right to vote. The European Union (EU) was also invited to participate as an observer, with approximately 120 delegates stationed across the country. In total, there are roughly five hundred international observers on the ground. Worrisome, however, is that in a span of forty-eight hours, one of the national observing institutions quickly accredited over nine thousand additional delegates—many close to the ruling party.

Altogether, logistical challenges; a shift toward an increased role of the military in the elections—including directly asking the transportation company for the location of the GPS devices that will be used on election day—; the attorney general’s harassment of electoral authorities; institutional tensions; and the “express” accreditation of local observers have undermined confidence in the vote. This has opened the door for results to be questioned, regardless of the outcome, putting Honduras’ democratic stability and key US interests at risk.

Security in Honduras

Violence and extortion remain pervasive in Honduras. The country has the highest homicide rate in Central America, with an estimated 25.3 homicides per 100,000 in 2024. To fight drug traffickers and gangs, the current administration has repeatedly declared a “state of exception” since 2022, following the model of neighboring El Salvador. The latest extension of the emergency declaration was on November 12, for an additional forty-five days. However, the impact of this measure is unclear, as homicide rates in municipalities have only slightly decreased—both in areas where the measure is in place and where it is not.

Importantly, the country is a main node of cocaine transit toward the United States, and a former president, Juan Orlando Hernández, a central figure and ultimate winner of the contested 2017 election, is now serving a forty-five-year sentence for drug trafficking in the United States.

In an important reversal, and less than a month after the inauguration of the second Donald Trump administration, Honduras renewed an extradition treaty with the United States, which was on the brink of expiration. The Castro government had threatened cancellation, framing US extradition pressure as interference and coup-plotting. The renewed treaty now extends through the end of Castro’s term, but post-election instability could again put it at risk if a power vacuum emerges in Tegucigalpa.

US military presence

The Soto Cano Air Base (previously known as Palmerola) in Honduras has been home to the US Southern Command’s Joint Task Force-Bravo since 1983 and was originally established as a strategic hub during the Cold War. Soto Cano is the main platform for US military presence in Central America and one of only two major bases in the broader region, the other being Guantánamo. The base has the capacity to rapidly deploy counter-transnational crime missions, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response—including the recent deployment of personnel and supplies to Jamaica following Hurricane Melissa. Because Soto Cano is an important regional operational hub for the US military, political stability in Honduras is key to ensuring that US missions and broader security efforts can continue without disruption.

Migration cooperation

Honduras closely cooperates with the United States on migration. As part of this effort, the Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Requests agreement was signed in Washington on March 10, 2025, and entered into force in June. It allows the United States to send certain non-Honduran migrants to Honduras to seek protection there, rather than on US soil. The arrangement builds off a 2019 asylum cooperative agreement signed under the first Trump administration, which allows the United States to send asylum seekers to Honduras. Political stability will influence Honduras’ ability to continue these agreements effectively and affect broader regional migration flows.

Trade and investment between the US and Honduras

As a founding partner of the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), Honduras is closely linked to US markets. Bilateral trade totaled almost $13 billion in 2024, with a surplus in favor of the United States of $2.4 billion in 2024. Currently, more than two hundred US companies operate in the country, and foreign direct investment from the United States totaled $1.4 billion in 2024. However, investors continue to face challenges including regulatory uncertainty, unpredictable tax enforcement, unreliable and expensive electricity, and poor infrastructure—a challenge shared across most Central American countries.

Affronts to US investment in Honduras are not new, but have risen since the early days of the Castro administration, as exemplified by a bipartisan letter from Senator Bill Hagerty and then-Senator Ben Cardin in 2022, which raised the alarm bells. Legal uncertainty has increased under the current administration, following the Supreme Court’s September 2024 ruling declaring the 2013 creation of so-called Zones for Employment and Economic Development unconstitutional, raising concerns about the future of US investment in these zones. Just a month prior, in August 2024, Honduras exited the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a World Bank institution that provides specialized arbitration facilities to settle investment disputes. This means that, after the withdrawal, any private complaint against the state of Honduras is no longer subject to the ICSID’s jurisdiction, creating a big gap for US commercial interests. Honduras is the fourth state to exit the ICSID, after Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.

Since April, following the announcement of the Trump administration’s tariff strategy, Honduras has been subject to the baseline 10 percent reciprocal tariff. Unlike El Salvador and Guatemala, the country has not secured an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, which could reduce tariffs if non-tariff barriers—such as restrictions on US agricultural products, intellectual property protections, and digital trade—are addressed. Honduras has not yet initiated negotiations toward such an outcome and has shown no indication that it will do so before the Castro administration leaves office.

Ties with China

In March 2023, Honduras broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Soon after, it launched foreign trade agreement negotiations with China, implementing an “early harvest” trade deal in September 2024. This switch intended to open more commercial opportunities for Honduran commodities and secure Chinese financing for strategic infrastructure projects. However, the move has not significantly benefited Honduran exporters, particularly since Honduras’ once-thriving shrimp industry is now in crisis due to smaller purchase volumes and lower prices from China. In 2024, Honduras’ trade deficit with China reached $2.52 billion dollars. The country exported only $35.9 million, while imports from China totaled $2.55 billion. As of June, the deficit already stands at $1.41 billion. While exports are expected to rise this year, they remain far from matching imports from China.

Engagement with China has grown mainly in the energy sector, including Chinese participation in the Patuca II and III hydroelectric projects, and a letter of intent signed in May between Honduras’ Ministry of Energy and China’s Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization to advance technical cooperation and support additional Chinese energy investment in Honduras. This latest agreement appears to be a reactive or preemptive response from Beijing to make up for unmet expectations vis-à-vis Honduras. Candidates in the upcoming election have raised these perceptions, with only one of the three leading contenders indicating that she would maintain the course of Honduras-China relations going forward.

Three takeaways: Why this election matters to the US

A messy election aftermath could directly affect US security interests

The chaotic primaries and the months after have exposed concerning institutional weaknesses: delays in procurement (from the technologies to transmit preliminary results and ensure wide connectivity across the country to the transport of ballots), technical inefficiencies, competing legal interpretations, and interference from other bodies, coupled with little willingness to compromise for the stability of the election process. These events, and the emerging narrative that the TREP is unreliable for technical reasons—potentially planting the seeds of manipulation—are driven by the incumbent LIBRE party and have undermined public confidence in the electoral system. Ultimately, it might even discourage Hondurans from voting on November 30. If citizens have little trust in the electoral apparatus, what mandate will the next president govern with? A post-vote power vacuum could risk the stalling of joint US-Honduras operations and extraditions—a top priority of the current US administration—and could see the emergence of narratives against the extradition treaty, which LIBRE threatened to end in August 2024.
Shared US-Honduras economic priorities rely on electoral stability

With more than two hundred US companies operating in Honduras across the apparel, food and beverage, and business process outsourcing sectors—all of which depend on consistent rules, the CAFTA-DR framework, and the assurance of arbitration against non-compliant governments—a stable Honduras is essential to protecting already vulnerable US investments. If the country were to experience civil unrest after November 30, US supply chains and investor confidence would face disruptions. Even a brief period of instability could push the country’s risk up considerably, with internal actors committed to short-to-medium-term chaos until the international attention moves on to other crises.
The influence of nefarious actors in the region

Regardless of political affiliation and views, all three candidates have reinforced the importance of the United States as a critical partner for Honduras. Both opposition candidates have explicitly pledged to revert recognition to Taipei. Extra-regional players, including China, might exploit the uncertainty to press for quick wins and expand their influence. The United States should also watch for growing Russian influence, especially after Russia announced in April that it would open a diplomatic office in Tegucigalpa to advance bilateral cooperation and allow more direct communication. Closer ties to these actors could shift from transparent, rules-based processes to opaque deal-making.

Recommendations for US policy in the lead-up to the elections

Issue pre-election statements underscoring that the United States is closely watching the upcoming election, emphasizing transparency in the tally, uninterrupted operation of the TREP, and full access for accredited observers. Reinforce messages of swift action—including sanctions and visa revocations—against those who seek to undermine the integrity of the process.
Support democracy in Honduras and lead the international community in reminding the Honduran armed forces of their constitutional role in the electoral process: to protect the vote and remain neutral—without conducting a parallel or political vote.
Track electoral logistics closely, including the scheduled 9:00 pm announcement of preliminary results on November 30, which can be monitored by the US Embassy in Tegucigalpa in coordination with international observers. The EU Electoral Mission report, expected two days after the vote, will be important for determining next steps.
Nominate a US ambassador to Honduras before the next government takes office in January.
Send a high-level US diplomatic delegation to Tegucigalpa for the inauguration, potentially including the secretary of state and secretary of war, to show that the United States is closely monitoring developments that could affect its national security interests.

María Fernanda Bozmoski is director, impact and operations and Central America lead at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center at the Atlantic Council.

Isabella Palacios is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

1 The National electoral council and the Electoral Justice Tribunal are each composed of three “counselors” and “magistrates”, respectively- each belonging to one of the three big political parties that are disputing the Presidency – LIBRE, Partido Nacional, and Partido Liberal.

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Chile’s next president will either be from the far right or the far left. Washington should watch closely.

Maite Gonzalez Latorre — Mon, 17 Nov 2025 22:29:23 +0000

Chileans voted yesterday for a new president, and as expected, no candidate reached the 50 percent plus one needed to win outright. The country now moves to a December 14 runoff: On the right is José Antonio Kast, who won about 24 percent of the first round vote. On the left is Jeannette Jara, who took 26.8 percent of the vote. While they come from opposite ends of the political spectrum, both candidates represent more change than continuity for Chilean politics. No matter which candidate wins, expect a shift away from the status quo.

Who advanced and why it matters

Even though he placed second in the first round, the Republican party’s Kast goes into the runoff as the stronger of the two candidates. This is because the other right-wing first-round candidates took a combined 30 percent of the vote—a share that could largely go to Kast in the next round.

Having lost the second-round election in 2021 to current President Gabriel Boric, Kast returned this year with a message centered on security and a smaller state. Jara, the candidate from the governing Unidad por Chile coalition on the left, has been working to expand her reach by presenting herself as grounded in the working-class experience and ready to provide steady governance.

It’s worth looking at the candidates that didn’t make it into the second round, too. One of the biggest surprises was Evelyn Matthei, presidential candidate for the center-right Chile Vamos coalition. She was a front-runner early in the year but lost momentum as Kast rose in the polls. On Sunday, Matthei finished fifth, even though she was polling third in the final weeks. The so-called “voto oculto,” or “hidden vote” not reflected in polling that she needed to win, never materialized.

The fate of Franco Parisi was also notable. He captured almost one in five votes and reinforced his role as the country’s most unpredictable political force. Throughout the campaign, he rejected ideological labels and marketed himself as neither right nor left—“ni facho ni comunacho.” His voters tend to be skeptical of political institutions and have a reputation for focusing on short-term concerns and outcomes. Surveys already show around 40 percent of Parisi’s voters leaning toward Kast, about 20 percent toward Jara, and the rest undecided. Both finalists now need support from Parisi’s voters to win the runoff.

The last two standing

Here is what we know about the remaining candidates. Kast comes from the hard right, and throughout the campaign he has underscored his social conservatism and his goal of enacting major spending cuts. He has called for lower taxes for high earners, new investment incentives, mass deportations, and a security model inspired by Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele. Some commentators have compared Kast’s political approach to that of US President Donald Trump. His place in the runoff surprised few since he stayed near the top of the polls all year. After the first-round votes were announced, Matthei and Kaiser endorsed Kast. He now needs to convince center-right voters to unite behind him.

If Kast comes from firmly on the right, his opponent is situated at least as far on the opposite end of the political spectrum. Jara represents the Unity for Chile coalition and belongs to the Communist Party. She served as labor minister under Boric, and she worked in the Bachelet administration before that. At the same time, she has tried to set herself apart from the current government. Earlier this month, she criticized Boric for not greeting Argentinian President Javier Milei and said she would not have acted that way. She has also questioned the 2026 budget bill. She has highlighted pension reform, wage increases, and a shorter work week as her past achievements. Her security plan includes more resources for the police, biometric border controls, and new prison infrastructure. But she now faces a difficult path. She delivered one of the lowest results for the left in recent cycles. With other left-leaning candidates taking under 1.5 percent of the vote, she must win over Parisi’s supporters to stay competitive.

What drove voters and what comes next

This election cycle comes as Chile remains politically fragmented. The country has shifted between the right and the left for more than a decade, and the back and forth has made it difficult to build long-term policy. Like much of the Western Hemisphere, concern about security and migration continues to push voters toward tougher positions on those issues.

This election was also the first presidential vote with compulsory participation in decades. Compulsory voting was practiced from 1925 to 2012 and reintroduced for 2023. More than 13 million people cast ballots—almost double the usual turnout. That surge reshaped the map. Regions with the highest share of first-time mandatory voters showed the sharpest drops for Jara and strongest gains for Parisi. Many of these voters reject both major coalitions and use their votes to punish whoever is in power at the time.

Security drove much of the debate. Chile remains one of the safest countries in Latin America, but violence has increased in recent years. Groups such as Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua expanded into northern regions, such as Arica y Parinacota and Tarapacá. Kidnappings, extortion, and organized criminal activity have increased. Drug trafficking and migrant smuggling continue to push homicide rates higher. In Santiago, carjackings, home break-ins, and muggings have become more common. Researchers estimate that crime costs Chile nearly eight billion dollars each year.

The economy is also a central issue. Chile has faced slow growth for several years now, and unemployment remains at about 9 percent. Investment has stayed flat. Inflation and the high cost of living shape everyday decisions. Many voters see the current administration of President Gabriel Boric as underperforming on these issues and, it seems, punished Jara for her role as labor minister. One issue sure to feature prominently in the second round is the budget. The legislative commission formed to review the annual budget bill recently rejected the 2026 budget bill, and the two candidates will likely spar over spending plans for next year.

The finalists now offer two very different paths. Jara supports stronger social programs, more resources for the police, and new tools for policing the country’s borders. Kast favors closed borders, maximum security prisons, and military deployment in the neighborhoods most affected by violence. Chileans must now decide which approach they trust to deliver results.

What it means for the United States

Santiago’s relations with Washington will likely vary depending on who wins, but both candidates face pressure to revive growth and attract investment. While Chile has struggled to bring in foreign direct investment at the levels it once did, the United States is still the country’s second-largest source of foreign investment, much of it concentrated in energy, data centers, and mining. These three sectors are likely to continue to shape the US-Chile economic partnership.

If Kast wins, Chile will likely move closer to Washington on regional security and migration. Trump’s team has focused on border control and transnational crime, areas where Kast might want to cooperate with the United States. Kast supports market-focused policies and favors free trade. The combination of security cooperation, interest in attracting capital, and a new economic agenda could create space for new bilateral initiatives. Kast may also choose the United States as one of his first international destinations.

If Jara wins, relations with the United States would continue but with more caution. She rarely comments at length on foreign policy and focuses mostly on domestic priorities. She and Trump would likely disagree on several issues; still, she seems to understand the scale of Chile’s security challenges and may seek cooperation on border management and reducing organized crime. If she wins, investors will watch how she approaches productivity, permitting, and the rule of law. These issues rank highly for US companies operating in Chile. Chile now enters a decisive period. The runoff will shape the country’s security, economic recovery, and its role as a partner for the United States. Washington should watch closely.

Maite Gonzalez Latorre, who was born in Chile, is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Bayoumi in Foreign Policy on NYC Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani’s foreign policy

dfitzsimmons — Fri, 14 Nov 2025 18:00:21 +0000

Original Source

On November 5, Imran Bayoumi, associate director of the GeoStrategy Initiative, published an article in Foreign Policy titled “A Victorious Mamdani Will Be Forced Onto the International Stage.” In the article, Bayoumi argues that as Mayor, Mamdani will have to take a stand on certain foreign policy issues, and provides insight into how the Mayor-elect may handle them.

The international nature of New York City; his diverse, internationally connected voting base; and a growing proportion of the population that looks to local, not federal, leaders for action mean that Mamdani will be forced to pay attention to issues abroad no matter how tightly he tries to keep his focus domestic.

Imran Bayoumi

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

Associate Director

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Experts react: How will Iraq’s parliamentary election shape the country’s politics?

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 14 Nov 2025 16:12:42 +0000

The voting is over, but the maneuvering could go on for a while. In Iraq’s parliamentary elections on Tuesday, the bloc led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani won the most seats, but it will need the backing of other parties to form a government. Tuesday’s vote came amid pressure from the Trump administration to crack down on Iran-backed militias operating in the country and questions over whether Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s call to boycott the elections would depress turnout. Below, our experts examine what the elections mean for the future of Iraqi politics and Baghdad’s role in the region.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Victoria J. Taylor: His coalition may have won, but Sudani faces stiff opposition to a second term

Omar Al-Nidawi: A higher turnout than expected, especially in predominantly Sunni and Kurdish provinces

Safwan Al-Amin: What to watch from the Iraqi Higher Electoral Commission

Yerevan Saeed: The KDP remains the dominant party in the Kurdistan region

Rend Al-Rahim: The elections consolidated the grip of Iraq’s traditional parties

His coalition may have won, but Sudani faces stiff opposition to a second term

While Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development bloc did very well throughout southern Iraq, translating his high approval into votes, he still appears to have fallen short of the overwhelming victory he likely needed to guarantee a second term as prime minister. In the weeks ahead of the election, Sudani launched a public relations offensive in the Western press. He published an op-ed in the New York Post and gave interviews to Bloomberg and Newsweek aimed at securing US and international support for a second term, making a pitch for his “Iraq first” agenda.

However, the days of decisive US engagement in the government formation process are likely over. For Sudani to secure a second term, he will have to do so the old-fashioned way by building a coalition. Although popular among the public, Sudani does not have ready alliances among the other major Shia parties and coalitions. The two largest Shia blocs after Sudani’s are former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition and the Al-Sadiqoun Bloc (which is affiliated with the US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq) both of which oppose giving Sudani a second term.

—Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

A higher turnout than expected, especially in predominantly Sunni and Kurdish provinces

Contrary to what many Iraq watchers expected, myself included, the initial results—if accurate—suggest that more Iraqis were motivated to vote this time. Turnout reached almost 56 percent of registered voters, according to Iraq’s electoral commission, a notable jump from 43 percent in 2021. However, part of this increase is tempered by the fact that there were 700,000 fewer registered voters than in 2021, even though nearly four million Iraqis have reached voting age since then. In other words, while the voter pool shrank, the absolute number of ballots cast actually grew.

Another striking development is the geographic variation in turnout. Whereas participation in 2021 was uniformly low across all provinces, Tuesday’s vote revealed new patterns: Turnout was significantly higher in predominantly Kurdish and Sunni provinces than in Shia-majority areas. This divide was also evident within Baghdad, between the mostly Sunni western and Shia eastern banks of the Tigris. In 2021, the gap between the provinces with the highest and lowest turnout—Duhok and Baghdad—was more than 20 percent; this time, it widened to a 36 percent gap between the highest turnout in Duhok and the lowest in Sudani’s home province of Maysan.

With party platforms largely devoid of real policy proposals, were the shifts driven mainly by more effective mobilization through tribal and patronage networks? Or were they primarily driven by a more genuine sense of stability and renewed hope among voters? A deeper analysis will be needed to explain these shifts.

—Omar Al-Nidawi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Al-Nidawi is also the director of programs at the Enabling Peace in Iraq Center, where he co-develops and leads research and field initiatives focused on governance, peacebuilding, and climate action in Iraq.

What to watch from the Iraqi Higher Electoral Commission

At this point, the only official information released by the Iraqi Higher Electoral Commission (IHEC) relates to voter turnout. IHEC put voter participation at around 56 percent. What is noteworthy is that IHEC only counted those who obtained or renewed voter registration cards as eligible voters, and did not count those who failed to so or intentionally boycotted as eligible voters.

This participation level is still higher than most had expected given that there was a strong boycott campaign led by al-Sadr as well as other smaller political movements. Initial leaked results show that the established parties maintained most of their seats, with Sudani’s coalition being the new big entrant. The smaller liberal parties appear to have lost momentum. Most of this is by design and a result of the electoral system the main parties reverted to when they amended the election law in 2023. We should also keep an eye on the potential post-results exclusion of candidates by IHEC, which could potentially change the results.

—Safwan Al-Amin is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

The KDP remains the dominant party in the Kurdistan region

Preliminary election results reaffirm the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP’s) political dominance in the Kurdistan region. It garnered more than one million votes and secured twenty-seven seats while its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) received roughly half as many votes but still increased its share of seats from seventeen to eighteen. When compared to last year’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) election, the PUK’s votes declined in areas under KRG jurisdiction, while the KDP’s increased. Outside KRG-controlled territory, the PUK won four seats in Kirkuk while the KDP emerged as the leading party in votes and seats in Nineveh province. This will further challenge the PUK’s influence in areas beyond the KRG’s authority. In addition, five minority-quota candidates backed by the KDP across Iraq also won seats, further strengthening the party’s leverage at the federal level.

New actors also made gains. Halwest won five seats, while New Generation, which previously held nine seats, dropped to four. The two main Islamist parties maintained their previous share seats of four and one seats respectively. Despite these shifts, the broader electoral map in the Kurdistan Region remains largely intact. Most changes in seat distribution occurred among smaller, antiestablishment parties within the PUK’s traditional areas of influence. The PUK had aimed to win back voters and reclaim seats in these strongholds, many of which it has gradually lost over the past fifteen years to emerging parties. Instead, a familiar pattern persisted: Voters in PUK-dominated areas continue to be more inclined than others to experiment with and switch to new political forces.

These results are likely to embolden the KDP to hold firm on its terms for forming the new KRG cabinet. This, in turn, could affect government formation in Baghdad, given that the KDP is now among the top three blocs in terms of seats at the federal level and can wield significant influence over the Iraqi presidency, a post traditionally held by the PUK since 2003. At the same time, negotiations over the new federal government in Baghdad could make the pie larger for the KDP and PUK, enabling them to reach compromises on key issues and ministerial portfolios that might facilitate the formation of a government in the KRG. The central question is whether the PUK will accept a government in Erbil that reflects its actual votes and seats or continue to insist on a fifty-fifty power-sharing arrangement based on territorial control.

—Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Saeed is the Barzani scholar-in-residence in the Department of Politics, Governance & Economics at American University’s School of International Service, where he also serves as director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace.

The elections consolidated the grip of Iraq’s traditional parties

No clear winner emerged from the November 11 parliamentary elections. The forty-five seats gained by Sudani’s bloc did not represent the landslide his supporters had hoped for. Nevertheless, this was a significant improvement on the two seats his party occupies in the outgoing parliament. The KDP and Mohamed al-Halbousi’s Taqaddum coalition also made gains. Sadiqoun, the political arm of the Asaib Ahl Al-Haqq militia expanded its presence in Parliament, as well. The big losers were smaller parties, independents, and liberal/secular candidates, who didn’t stand a chance under the 2023 changes to the election law and the massive sums spent by the big parties and candidates. Another loser is Muqtada al-Sadr, whose call for a boycott clearly went unheeded, and who has been marginalized by the elections and needs to find new relevance. Despite popular calls for change, the elections brought no new blood but consolidated the grip of the traditional parties.

The next phase is the process of forming a government. Sudani’s postelection address sounded like an acceptance speech, but it is far from certain that he will serve a second term as prime minister. Negotiations to create the largest parliamentary bloc will be contentious. A grand alliance of Sudani’s bloc with the KDP and Taqaddum, such as was attempted by al-Sadr in 2021, is now even more far-fetched. Instead, the Shia Coordination Framework coalition is likely to declare itself the largest parliamentary bloc and claim the right to nominate the new prime minister, and many members of this bloc are adamantly opposed to Sudani. While the Shia Coordination Framework can nominate, the high number of seats won by the KDP and Taqaddum will give the latter two blocs a powerful countervailing voice over the nomination. Iranian and US influence will also be elements in the nomination process. In previous Iraqi government formation cycles, there was tacit agreement between Washington and Tehran. But the Trump administration, with its confrontational posture toward Iran, will likely make such an agreement difficult to reach, thus prolonging the government formation process.

—Rend Al-Rahim is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

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Is Kosovo heading toward another election crisis? | A Debrief with Adriatik Kelmendi

sjones — Tue, 11 Nov 2025 15:00:00 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Nine months after national elections, Kosovo remains without a fully functioning government and without an approved budget. The political deadlock has left institutions paralyzed, parliament unable to act, and citizens facing growing uncertainty.

Despite multiple attempts, no party has secured the 61-seat majority needed to form a government. President Vjosa Osmani has urged compromise, but as deadlines expire and alliances fracture, the country risks sliding toward another early election or even two rounds within months.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, speaks with Adriatik Kelmendi, analyst and host of Rubikon on Klan Kosova, to unpack:

Why Kosovo’s democracy is stuck in limbo;
The political rivalries behind the gridlock;
The constitutional deadlines that could trigger new elections;
The looming fiscal crisis without a new budget; and
Whether quiet diplomacy from international partners could finally break the stalemate.

“Kosovo is being governed on the basis of results from five years ago,” says Kelmendi. “Everyone’s counting votes — no one’s counting consequences,” says Kelmendi in this episode of #BalkansDebrief.

ABOUT #BALKANSDEBRIEF

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

MEET THE #BALKANSDEBRIEF HOST

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Ilva Tare

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

The post Is Kosovo heading toward another election crisis? | A Debrief with Adriatik Kelmendi appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Baghdad: Don’t confuse the calm around Iraq’s election with stability

Yerevan Saeed — Mon, 10 Nov 2025 17:44:37 +0000

BAGHDAD—Iraq approaches its sixth parliamentary election with few crises, little violence, and an elite consensus to keep the machinery of government turning. But this apparent quiet is not an indication of the country’s long-term stability. The essential features of Iraqi politics—informal decision-making that precedes formal ratification, the quota-based muhasasa that trades portfolios for loyalty, and factious security forces—remain unchanged.

The November 11 election will bring some change. The vote will likely redistribute parliamentary weight and speed government formation, especially with influential Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr out of the fray. Yet the election will not alter the fundamentals of power in Iraq. The country’s trajectory over the next year will be determined less by the ballot results and more by how leaders answer a few important post-election questions: Who will emerge in bargaining over government ministries? Can Baghdad and Erbil codify a predictable fiscal and hydrocarbon settlement after a government is formed? And can the state find solutions to four slow-burning stressors in Iraqi society—water and climate problems, migration-aggravated tension in cities, narcotics trafficking, and the over-centralization of power in the capital?

For outside partners, especially the United States, the best approach in the post-election period will be neither maximalist condition-setting nor strategic indifference. Instead, partners should exercise targeted leverage to use this moment of relative political calm to establish institutional rules.

The absence of an emergency is not stability

The first thing visitors notice today in Baghdad is the texture of daily life. The temperature of politics feels lower than in the searing years of crisis. While armored convoys can still be seen across Baghdad, there are fewer of them; blast walls are less suffocating; cabinet meetings happen as scheduled; the civil service, for all its patronage, goes to work. But the Iraqi parliament is the most dysfunctional institution.

It is tempting to call this stability, to confuse the absence of emergency with the presence of law and order. Yet the deeper structure of authority remains what it has been for much of the post-2003 era: Consequential decisions are negotiated outside of formal institutions, and they are only later packaged for parliamentary consumption; ministries are treated as instruments of partisan finance; and the state pays the salaries of some security forces that it does not actually command. What looks like stability is better understood as a negotiated political ceasefire among power brokers who have learned the costs of brinkmanship.

Two tensions define this moment. The first is the gap between form and substance. Iraq is faithful to the forms of constitutionalism—from elections to confirmation processes and budget laws—but the substance of authority is forged through leader-to-leader bargains, diwaniya conclaves, and coalition caucuses that operate before and beyond legal procedure. Policy is not developed through party platforms that translate votes into programs; it emerges from the calculation of who controls which portfolio and which revenue stream. Citizens see procedures but do not see oversight and accountability, and they rarely experience coherence. When outcomes become unpopular, political blame dissolves into the atmosphere of collective responsibility.

The second tension is the nature of the quiet itself. Much of it is grounded less in reform than in fatigue. The 2019 protest wave rearranged incentives across the political class but did not produce a durable organizational vehicle that could convert street energy into programmatic politics and reform. Those who rode the wave of this organic protest movement are now part of the political system they promised to challenge. Youth cohorts that once marched now juggle wage work, migration dreams, and a wary accommodation with a state that can deliver incremental services but not credible horizons. Elites, chastened by the violent feedback loops of the past, now prefer a managed equilibrium that keeps predation within tolerable bounds. That equilibrium is periodically disturbed by regional aftershocks—the war in Gaza, strikes on Iran-aligned groups, border incidents, developments in Syria—but it has thus far reasserted itself quickly. Quiet endures not because the fundamentals have been fixed, but because actors have priced the costs of further breaking them.

Iraq’s regional position has evolved in ways that sustain this equilibrium. The country is no longer a front-line battlespace for transnational jihadis or an ungoverned corridor for proxy war. Instead, it functions, perhaps surprisingly, as a venue for dialogue and economic competition, a place where otherwise hostile actors can exchange messages under Iraqi auspices. Baghdad’s role in past Iran–Saudi contacts mattered less for specific deliverables than for what it signaled about Iraq’s aspiration to be a platform rather than a battlefield. Recently, Baghdad has become a rendezvous for Iranian and Egyptian diplomats to work out a four-decade-long strained relationship. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil has long played the role of interlocutor between Turkey and the Gulf countries and even Turkey and France. Now it’s helping resolve the Kurdish question in Turkey. However, Iraq’s aspiration has limits. Legal prohibitions on engaging Israel and the risk of militia adventurism continue to constrain Baghdad’s diplomacy during the Gaza conflict, forcing Iraq’s top diplomat, Fuad Hussein, to calibrate between domestic law, regional passions, and the practical necessity of de-escalation. Still, the larger picture is one of rising but bounded Iraqi agency, in which the state can sometimes resist and can sometimes broker, but sometimes has to concede to keep the equilibrium intact.

Within that regional frame, Iranian influence has changed character more than it has receded. The networks remain, the allies are in place, and the access points in commerce and security persist, yet Tehran has exercised its leverage more quietly in recent months. I am told that Tehran has replaced its entire cohort of influence in Iraq with the same people who took on the Iraqi dossier after 2003. These new old people report not to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, but rather to the supreme leader’s office. Iraqis believe this is an indication that Iran is here to stay. Iran’s Iraqi partners read this as a tactical decision: The capacity to disrupt is undiminished, but the preference is to do so only if outcomes threaten red lines.

The state of Iraqi politics today

No issue better illustrates the blend of continuity and change than the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF is not a single actor, and treating it as such obfuscates more than it clarifies. It is more accurate to think of it in terms of four camps. The first is the pro-Iran camp, which includes factions that predate 2014 and whose ideology is explicitly transnational. Within this camp, there is a political wing that competes in elections and seeks to preserve military capacities as insurance. A nonparty wing, the Islamic Resistance, eschews the ballot, exerts influence through intimidation and extortion, and resists subordination to the commander-in-chief. The second camp consists of volunteers mobilized in 2014, when the army and police faltered against the Islamic State. These units typically have workable relations with the government and resent domination by the first camp. The third are Sadr-aligned elements, now largely invisible within PMF structures, reflecting the movement’s distance from formal politics for now. The fourth are tribal and local formations—Yazidi, Turkmen, and Assyrian among them—that have grown as instruments of local employment and control and that are broadly manageable within cabinet politics.

The governance dilemma is concentrated in the first camps’s nonparty wing. Here are men whose salaries are paid by the state, whose legal status is ambiguous in practice if not on paper, and whose chains of loyalty extend beyond the Iraqi state. The damage they do is not always explosive, but it is often corrosive. They alter the risk calculus for investors, undercut professional policing, and create a market for protection that blurs the line between politics and racketeering.

Against this backdrop, what will the November 11 election change? It will likely change mechanics and bargaining positions but not the rules of the game. This will be the least internationally monitored national vote in years. It’s an Iraqi-run process that many Iraqi elites view as a test of sovereignty. Political leaders cite biometric card uptake and new registrations to predict stronger turnout. Civil society is less sanguine, expecting apathy to persist. Either way, the process will go forward, and the result will likely be a recalibration. With Sadr abstaining, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s coalition is well placed to translate incumbency and a narrative about him improving public services into additional seats. Kurdish politics will play out as another round of bargaining between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); Sunni politics will likely involve consolidation by established figures and a chase by rivals. Within Shia politics, offshoots of the coordination framework will likely compete for the same slices of the electorate.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally in Najaf. (Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa via Reuters Connect)

But the decisive action comes after the vote. The muhasasa will endure, as it has through reformist rhetoric and technocratic experiments. This is not the product of bad faith alone; it is baked into a structural fact that no party contests every district, no bloc aspires credibly to a majoritarian program, and the memory of unilateralism is associated with violence and the entrenchment of enemies. In practice, the election sets the price, not the product. Ministry shares are apportioned by informal formulas, and the real haggling is over which portfolios change hands. Some swaps are effectively pre-baked. Sovereign posts follow convention: a Shia prime minister, a Kurdish president, a Sunni speaker. The defense ministry is typically in Sunni hands. It’s a balance enforced not by law but by the mutual fear of exclusion.

Under these conditions, the question of Sudani’s second term clarifies how power works in Iraq. The prime minister expects to gain a larger number of seats and might have earned credit among many Iraqis for helping to deliver steadier services, such as improved roads and electricity oversight. Still, the political class carries the lesson of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki into every formation: second terms are dangerous because they can become vehicles for centralizing power. Sudani is already under scrutiny for his statist view of government. Yet without a renewed premiership, Sudani’s coalition’s cohesion may erode as fast as it coalesced. His rivals, including al-Maliki, have little incentive to allow entrenchment. The likely outcome is not Sudani installed for another term, but rather a prime minister in the same mold as Sudani: balanced between Tehran and Washington, apparently technocratic, and above all not threatening to other leaders’ equities. The good news is that formation could be faster than the year-long stalemates of recent cycles, especially with Sadr outside the room and regional volatility discouraging a vacuum. The bad news is that a quickly formed cabinet may still be staffed according to partisan loyalty, with its technocrats appointed where optics demand, and its directors-general left to the centrifugal logic of patronage.

Kurdish politics will be important, as always, in who becomes the next Iraqi president and in the health of Baghdad–Erbil relations. The presidency will almost certainly remain Kurdish, but whether a KDP or PUK figure holds it will depend on another grand bargain among power brokers. The KDP has argued that seat strength grants it a right to nominate a president, while the PUK has asserted that institutional balance and territorial control justify one of its members in the post. Tehran would likely prefer a PUK figure, not least for the leverage over a Shia-led cabinet such an outcome could offer.

Sadr’s absence looms over all of this. In 2021, he won decisively, tried to form a majority government, failed, and withdrew. His logic is intelligible. By denying his imprimatur to a system he condemns, he preserves the outsider brand for a future return. The costs are real: cadres defect to other blocs; local networks atrophy; former members of parliament feel abandoned. But in the near term, his absence simplifies the arithmetic of coalition-building: He is unlikely to disrupt the vote or the formation. If a new protest wave emerges from below, he may join it rather than start it, but there are few signs that such a wave is imminent. In some sense, Sadr’s absence is the essence of this season’s quiet: fewer spoilers, more deals, less drama.

A falsifiable and straightforward test

The real test lies in whether elites use the post-election period as a window of opportunity to agree to codify rules where improvisation has failed for over two decades. Hydrocarbons and fiscal flows are the most obvious openings in the next cabinet. Targeted US pressure made possible recent progress on salary transfers to KRG civil servants and steps toward resuming oil flows through Ceyhan in Turkey. Optimists hope these steps can seed a hydrocarbon law with predictable revenue-sharing, auditability, and a dispute mechanism that prevents annual brinkmanship. Skeptics warn that once the polls close, the logic of coalition bargaining over the spoils of the next cabinet will take over, with oil and salaries again treated as chips on the table.

Therefore, the best analytical marker for the year ahead is falsifiable and straightforward: Does Iraq codify a formula that makes budgets and oil flows depoliticized and automatic rather than unplanned? If it does, then the country builds on its current political cease-fire toward long-term stability in one of its most volatile arenas. If it does not, then expect recurring political and financial crises that bleed confidence between Kurdistan and Iraq, with implications for the country’s overall political stability.

Four threats to Iraqis in the year ahead

Whoever leads Iraq next will face four slow-burning stressors threatening the country. The first is water and climate. Upstream controls by Turkey and Iran, salinization of southern waterways, and rising temperatures are erasing rural livelihoods. The result is internal migration into cities struggling to supply water, electricity, and waste management. In these conditions, a low water flow in the summer is not about statistics; it is an urban security problem. Adaptation is possible, including by switching crops away from water-intensive staples, reducing leakage in municipal networks, modernizing irrigation, and installing solar-powered pumps, among other steps. But Iraq must treat water as a national security priority with a single command node and a special budget to ensure social stability.

Compounding the first stressor is urban social friction. As rural families migrate, they bring traditions and customs into cities that often lead to urban conflict between tribes. The result is tribalization of urban strife, uneven policing, and spikes in crime that metastasize through neighborhoods in Basra and beyond. To address this problem, the government must help ensure steadier municipal investment, greater police professionalization, and the creation of economic alternatives. If the state cannot keep a neighborhood safe, then the neighborhood will default to its own explosive arrangements in a way that would be hard to control.

The third stressor is narcotics. Cheap synthetic drugs have spread with alarming speed in Iraq, creating new markets for cross-border trafficking that mix organized crime with militia finance and corrupt officials. Treating this purely as a security problem has predictable results: showy raids and little change in availability. The state needs a public-health approach with treatment capacity, prevention campaigns, and forensic labs that can map routes and build prosecutable cases. It also needs vetted task forces insulated from compromised units, and judges who can try cases without fear that their dockets will be traded in the next round of bargaining. Without that, drugs will become the next driver of instability, less visible than car bombs but no less lethal to the social fabric.

The fourth stressor is power centralization that goes against Iraq’s federal structure. Baghdad has pulled more authority to the center, straining relations with the provinces—especially the KRG. Comparisons with Kurdistan’s stronger services and projects have intensified pressure on the Shia political elite. Many say this has bred resentment in the prime minister’s office, which reads Erbil’s rise as a rebuke. Instead of scaling what works, the federal response has often been to slow Kurdistan—delaying budgets, instituting tariffs on Kurdish goods, tightening border controls, and limiting Kurdish companies’ foreign transactions. Iraq will advance faster when Baghdad treats Erbil’s gains as a shared national success, not something to obstruct.

The view from Washington

What, then, should outside partners do? It may be tempting for Iraq’s partners to demand sweeping political conditions that collapse under the weight of Iraq’s coalition math, or, in frustration, to disengage. But a better way is to capitalize on what has been working under the Trump administration’s practical approach.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (REUTERS/Suzanne Plunkett/Pool)

Without military engagement, the Trump administration has been able to leverage the underutilized weight of US diplomacy to block a few laws counter to US strategic interests and resolve some long-standing issues, while pressuring Baghdad to release Kurdistan’s share of the budget. At this moment, Washington has an opportunity to double down on these short-term gains and convert them into durable long-term solutions by backing a hydrocarbon legal framework—one that depoliticizes energy and budget from petty Iraqi politics, which often hold hostage the livelihood of ordinary Kurds while putting American commercial investments at risk.

Perhaps most important in the immediate future, the United States should refrain from backing any specific candidate for Iraq’s next prime minister. Iraq’s informal, consensus-driven process typically elevates the prime minister, and as a senior State Department official told me, “we are dealing with the system, not individuals.” It’s in the best interests of Washington and the Iraqi people to let the office change hands through that process, reducing the risks of authoritarianism and power consolidation that could disrupt the current political truce and the incremental improvements Iraq has achieved in recent years.

The coming election will redistribute bargaining chips and likely produce a government with less delay than in the past. But the challenge after the votes are counted is for Iraqi politicians to turn the political truce into fair rules—to reduce the distance between constitutional form and governing substance. Iraq thus far knows how to hold a vote and form a cabinet. It needs the patience and discipline to build institutions that cannot be bargained away at the next diwaniya.

As Sarhang Hamasaeed, the former director of Middle East Programs at the US Institute of Peace, recently summed up during the Iraq Research Leaders Forum in Baghdad, “Calmer is not stable.” It can, however, be the bridge to stability if Iraq’s political class and its friends choose to build on it.

Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and scholar-in-residence at the Department of Politics, Governance, and Economics at the American University School of International Service. He previously worked in Kurdistan and Iraq as a journalist and translator for top international outlets.

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Dispatch from Baghdad: Don’t confuse the calm around Iraq’s election with stability

Yerevan Saeed — Mon, 10 Nov 2025 17:44:00 +0000

The absence of an emergency is not stability

The state of Iraqi politics today

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally in Najaf. (Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa via Reuters Connect)

A falsifiable and straightforward test

Four threats to Iraqis in the year ahead

The view from Washington

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (REUTERS/Suzanne Plunkett/Pool)

The post Dispatch from Baghdad: Don’t confuse the calm around Iraq’s election with stability appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Tracking Iraq’s 2025 elections and coalition building

Victoria J. Taylor, Nibras Basitkey, and Daniah Jarrah — Sun, 09 Nov 2025 14:28:59 +0000

This post was updated on January 5.

Iraq held parliamentary elections on November 11, 2025. Two decades after the fall of Saddam Hussein, elections remain the formal mechanism of democracy in Iraq, but they have largely evolved into exercises in power redistribution among established political actors. The 2025 elections and the coalition-building process that follows will test whether Iraq’s political order can maintain equilibrium without meaningful reform or whether mounting disillusionment will push it toward deeper paralysis.

As the coalition-building unfolds, our experts are mapping what to expect next for Iraq’s governance and its people.

This post will be continue to be updated as developments take place.

Key points about the election

The Shia Coordination Framework (CF), a coalition of establishment Shia parties with strong institutional and militia networks, is expected to retain dominance. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s coalition is positioned as the frontrunner, but as in previous cycles, the premiership will likely be determined through post-election bargaining among CF leaders, Kurdish blocs, and Sunni coalitions. This process is reflective of Iraq’s political equilibrium, in which an informal elite pact trades reform for order and stability.

Campaigns are visible across Baghdad and the provinces, yet public enthusiasm is muted, with low turnout expected, underscoring the deep disconnect between citizens and the state. That turnout is projected to fall below the already–low 41 percent recorded in 2021. Persistent corruption, patronage, and coercive political financing have eroded trust in elections as paths to accountability. Party spending has reached record levels, making financial leverage and control over state employment decisive in mobilizing votes. The boycott by prominent Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Sadrist Movement, once the largest parliamentary bloc, further reduced competition and narrowed participation.

Elections Law No. 9, passed in 2020 to address demands of local protests, reverts to larger provincial constituencies, in the end favoring dominant parties and diminishing space for independents who gained traction in 2021. The outcome of these elections will shape Iraq’s balance of power more through elite negotiation than through popular mandate. For international observers and partners, particularly the United States, the main concern lies in whether the process reinforces stability or reignites factional contestation.

What to know about the electoral system

Iraq’s parliamentary elections are governed by the amended Election Law No. 9 of 2020, which reinstated proportional representation through a mathematical formula that divides votes by odd divisors (1.7, 3, 5, 7, and so on) to determine how many seats each political list receives. Each of Iraq’s eighteen provinces acts as a single voting district, and its seats in the 329-member parliament are distributed according to population. Once a list wins seats, they are given to the candidates on that list who earned the highest number of votes. Iraqi law requires that 25 percent of parliamentary seats, eighty-three in total, be reserved for women, and that nine seats be reserved for minorities such as Christians, Yazidis, Shabaks, Mandaeans, and Feyli Kurds. Vacant seats are filled by the next-highest vote-getter from the same list or community.

While supporters of the current law argue that it strengthens stability and party cohesion, critics contend that the return to larger districts and closed party lists weakens independent candidates and concentrates power among established elites.

Key political players and alliances

What the parliament has looked like over time

Election results

Note: This does not include smaller winning coalitions that are affiliated with the larger blocs listed above. For example, two separate coalitions in Anbar with a total of six seats are generally considered to be affiliated with Taqadum but have not been added to Taqadum’s tally.

What to expect for government formation

Iraq’s elections rarely produce an outright winner. Instead, coalitions and political negotiations determine who leads the country.

After the election, the parliament elects Iraq’s president, who then formally nominates the prime minister, who is chosen through post-election bargaining among the largest parliamentary blocs. The prime minister designate has thirty days to propose a cabinet and win a vote of confidence in parliament. Until that vote, which in recent years has taken many months of negotiation, the previous cabinet remains in place as a caretaker government, allowed only to manage day-to-day affairs and not to launch major policy changes.

Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Nibras Basitkey is the associate director of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Daniah Jarrah is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs.

What to expect in Iraq’s 2025 elections

A discussion examining Iraq’s upcoming elections, its likely outcomes, and its possible impact on Iraqi policy.

Elections Iraq Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

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Why China is here to stay in Iraq’s energy sector

Jared Levy and Ben Van Heuvelen — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 19:40:19 +0000

Even as Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has worked to increase US involvement in Iraq’s energy sector, his government has also expanded already-deep ties with Beijing by awarding new upstream projects to Chinese companies and increasing the scope of critical energy infrastructure projects financed by China.

China was already the biggest international player in Iraq’s upstream sector—operating several large oil fields across southern Iraq—before Chinese companies were awarded new oil and gas blocks under al-Sudani’s premiership. The only oil and gas contract auction held during al-Sudani’s administration—the May 2024 “Fifth+ and Sixth” licensing round—was dominated by a combination of Chinese national oil companies and privately held Chinese exploration and production (E&P) companies. Interest from large Western oil companies (supermajors) was tepid (only Shell placed a bid, and it was unsuccessful), and interest from US companies was virtually nonexistent. Beijing’s dominance of the bid round was so complete that the only non-Chinese company to land an asset was an Iraqi firm, KAR Group.

Chinese financing has also appeared to give Chinese companies an inside track to winning critical energy infrastructure projects. Under a program that was initiated well before al-Sudani’s government, in 2019, Iraq now directs about 150,000 barrels per day worth of oil revenues into an escrow account, which then functions as collateral to unlock loans via the state-owned firm Sinosure. In its early days, this vehicle was used to fund projects outside of the energy sector, but al-Sudani’s government has recently leveraged the Chinese financing program to push forward two pieces of critical energy-sector infrastructure:

A $2.6 billion pipeline project to bring treated seawater to giant oil fields for water injection, awarded to the China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation
A one-billion-dollar gas pipeline project linking an Anbar province gas field to power generation facilities, some of which are also built by Chinese companies.

Chinese financing is also likely to make or break an $18 billion integrated project that was awarded earlier this year to China’s Geo-Jade Petroleum for the upstream development of the Tuba oil field in the Iraqi city of Basra and the construction of an oil refinery, two power plants, a petrochemical plant, and a fertilizer plant.

China’s appeal to Iraq is obvious. On the upstream side, Chinese companies will accept commercial terms that Western majors and US E&Ps simply will not. Indeed, China’s success in Iraq’s 2024 oil and gas contract auction was less a function of any deliberate Iraqi strategy to favor Chinese companies than it was a reflection of the structure of the auction, in which the sole criterion for deciding a winning bid was a company’s willingness to accept a narrow profit margin. This structure put Chinese companies at an advantage, because vertically integrated Chinese national oil companies can make money on projects by assigning major contracting opportunities to their subsidiary entities. At the same time, small Chinese E&Ps can operate at a lower cost than their Western counterparts. Chinese companies can also access state financing with relative ease since Beijing sees a strong presence in Iraq’s upstream sector as a strategic priority for securing long-term crude supply.

Supermajors and US E&Ps have also found al-Sudani’s government eager to do business, even as these companies cannot compete with Chinese firms in open bid rounds. Al-Sudani’s administration inked major contracts with both TotalEnergies and BP after bilateral negotiations, and it is holding ongoing talks with both Chevron and ExxonMobil. Sudani’s government has also signed a memorandum of understanding with the privately owned US E&P company HKN Energy.

Al-Sudani’s government appears to see significant strategic value in courting supermajors and US E&Ps, even if the terms these companies demand are less advantageous for Iraq than those accepted by Chinese companies. Successive Iraqi governments have long been wary of creeping Chinese consolidation over Iraq’s upstream sector. For example, Iraq’s former oil minister, Ihsan Ismaael, told the Iraq Oil Report in 2021 that he rejected an effort by Lukoil to pursue an asset sale at West Qurna-2 to a Chinese company, because, “we need to keep the same balance of market share in the south.”

Additionally, a range of oil officials have told the authors that Iraqi oil officials often voice a preference for the technology and approach of supermajors. Meanwhile, increased US investment in Iraq’s energy sector is perceived by policymakers in Baghdad—based on our research and conversations with key leaders speaking on background—as a tool for mitigating the risk of sanctions enforcement against Iraqi entities by the US Treasury Department.

With Iraqi parliamentary elections looming, US and Chinese companies alike will be engaging a new government at some point in 2026. Even if there is a new prime minister at the helm, the next Iraqi government’s policy toward international energy investment is likely to be shaped by the same forces that have informed al-Sudani’s approach. Regardless of the specific makeup of the next Iraqi government, it is likely that Chinese firms will continue to enjoy an advantage—stemming from Iraq’s desire for favorable commercial terms and the relative ease of access to Chinese financing. At the same time, Iraq is also likely to continue soliciting megaprojects with supermajors due to their technical capacity and potential geopolitical value.

Jared Levy is the director of the Iraq Oil Report‘s research services division. He oversees a team of data collectors and analysts that provide private sector and government clients with a range of subscription products and bespoke research and briefing services. He previously ran the Iraq office of a market entry advisory company.

Ben Van Heuvelen is the editor-in-chief of the Iraq Oil Report. His work has also been published in the Washington Post, Bloomberg, the Atlantic, and Foreign Policy. He regularly briefs investors, diplomats, governments, and nongovernmental organizations on Iraq’s political and business environment. He previously worked as a research fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, DC.

The post Why China is here to stay in Iraq’s energy sector appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Twelve questions (and expert answers) on the Iraq elections

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 04 Nov 2025 19:55:35 +0000

Iraqis are set to go to the polls for parliamentary elections on November 11—the sixth election cycle since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and Baathist rule in 2003.

There are thousands of candidates running for 329 seats in parliament, at a consequential moment for the country. Iraqis face questions whose answers will shape governance in Baghdad and Erbil, the development of Iraq’s crucial energy sector and economy, and Iraqi security and sovereignty—all as the country continues to balance its relationships with the United States and Iran.

Our experts unpack all of this ahead of the landmark election.

1. What are the key issues for Iraqi voters, and what’s at stake this election cycle?

The Iraqi voter continues to cast their ballot primarily along sectarian and ethnic lines, with few instances of voters supporting candidates outside their own group. This persistent pattern highlights the enduring influence of sectarian and ethnic identity in shaping electoral behavior and political preferences inside Iraq.

Beyond identity-based voting, policy priorities vary significantly across Iraq’s provinces. According to a public opinion survey conducted by the Rewaq Baghdad Center for Public Policy, a center I founded and now lead, electricity was not among the top concerns for voters in the Kurdistan Region and Basra, while it remained a central issue in other provinces. In these areas, voters prioritized essential services such as infrastructure (roads and bridges), education, and healthcare.

These differences in priorities have influenced voter orientation. In provinces such as Wasit, Karbala, and Basra, many voters favored governor-affiliated political blocs, perceiving that local administrations had provided substantial services. Notably, the governor of Karbala is affiliated with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s coalition, which may enhance the coalition’s standing in that province.

Overall, it is projected that al-Sudani’s coalition could secure approximately sixty parliamentary seats, contingent on the extent to which he convinces voters that his government has effectively delivered public services during his tenure. In Baghdad, Shia political blocs are expected to lose around five seats, largely due to lower Shia voter turnout and a corresponding increase in Sunni voter participation.

—Abbas Anbori is the founder and president of the Baghdad Rewaq Center for Public Policy, based in Iraq. He began his professional career as the head of international relations at the Iraqi Council of Representatives. Since 2014, he has been serving as a political advisor to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Council.

The Iraqi parliament, at a glance: 2018 versus 2021

2. How likely is it that al-Sudani will return for a second term?

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani waves on stage during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025.

The likelihood of al-Sudani securing a second term appears highly unlikely, primarily due to the deep divisions within the Coordination Framework (CF)—the Shia political coalition that initially selected him for the premiership. Tensions among its constituent blocs have escalated significantly both in the pre-election period and during the campaigns, making consensus around his reappointment difficult to achieve.

While the CF remains the most influential factor in determining al-Sudani’s political future, it is not the only one. Two additional variables play an important role in shaping the post-election government formation process:

One is the international factor, particularly the positions of Iran and the United States, whose tacit approval—or at least lack of objection—often shapes the boundaries of acceptable political outcomes in Iraq.

The second is the role of the city of Najaf’s religious authority (the Marja‘iyya), which has historically exerted significant moral and political influence. However, it is unlikely that Najaf will play a decisive role in the selection process this time. That’s because its religious leadership’s approach this time has been to minimize involvement in political affairs to the lowest possible level.

The only plausible path for al-Sudani to retain the premiership would be if he and his Sunni and Kurdish allies managed to secure a two-thirds majority of parliamentary seats. This scenario appears highly improbable under current political conditions.

—Abbas Anbori

3. What is the Coordination Framework, and how has it impacted the trajectory of the government formation process?

The Coordination Framework (CF) is Iraq’s principal Shia political bloc, originally formed by Islamist parties seeking to counter Moqtada al-Sadr’s coalition, after Iraq’s disputed 2021 parliamentary elections. The CF has since become the leading power broker in Baghdad, responsible for installing al-Sudani as prime minister in 2022, and it dominates the State Administration Coalition that governs Iraq today. The CF this cycle has adopted a controlled fragmentation strategy: multiple lists to maximize votes under Iraq’s new electoral law, followed by a likely post-election reunification to choose the prime minister and divide cabinet posts. The maneuver reflects deep internal rivalries, yet enduring necessity—the Shia parties know they will have a plurality in parliament, and no government can be formed without them.

—Sajad Jiyad is an Iraqi political analyst based in Baghdad. He is a fellow at The Century Foundation. His main focus is on public policy and governance in Iraq, and he has published dozens of papers on Iraq. He is the author of God’s Man in Iraq.

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Oct 31, 2025

Inside the divides of Iraq’s Coordination Framework—and why they matter ahead of landmark elections

By Rend Al-Rahim

The November election will not necessarily determine who the next prime minister will be, but it will provide an opportunity to shift power dynamics within the fractious Shia bloc.

Elections Iraq

The CF is behaving as it usually does—competing for Shia votes separately and, post-election, congregating in one parliamentary bloc to maximize its bargaining power. At this stage, it seems to again face a common danger, the prime minister’s electoral list. This list is aiming high this time, seeking a crushing defeat of the CF’s separate lists in the hope of securing a second term for al-Sudani, something that the CF strongly rejects at this stage. If al-Sudani’s list does not secure enough seats to form a governing coalition with the winning Kurdish and Arab-Sunni lists without the CF, we will likely see al-Sudani’s “return to the fold,” allying himself with the CF.

—Akeel Abbas is a DC-based academic and journalist. His research and publications deal with national and religious identities, as well as modernity and democratization in the Middle East.

4. Who is Moqtada al-Sadr, and how will his followers impact the electoral process?

A poster of Iraqi Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in the Sadr City district of Baghdad. The text at the top left of the poster reads ‘The Solid Structure’. The text at the bottom right of the poster reads ‘Saraya al-Salam, operation command of holy Samarra’. Picture taken June 21, 2021. REUTERS/Ahmed Saad

Moqtada al-Sadr is a powerful Iraqi Shia cleric, and his National Shia Movement is likely to exert a profound influence on the elections through its ongoing boycott. Al-Sadr has effectively transformed electoral abstention from an individual act of protest into a collective position adopted across his movement, which remains the most potent mass-mobilizing force in central and southern Iraq.

Unlike in the 2018 and 2021 elections, as well as previous ones, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has thus far refrained from issuing a public call urging Iraqis to participate in the forthcoming polls. When prompted to comment this year, Sistani merely stated in a fatwa that voting should be determined “according to the citizen’s own conviction.” This lack of a public call to participate, in contrast to his interventions in previous elections, leaves Sadr’s boycott unchallenged by Najaf’s highest religious authority, thereby weakening the moral counterbalance of Sadrists’ political rivals.

Should Sadr maintain his boycott and Najaf refrain from issuing a statement, the signal to hesitant voters, particularly within the Shia electorate, will be unmistakable: The next parliament and government are likely to suffer from a legitimacy deficit. Such a perception would further erode public confidence in the next government’s capacity to provide stability and welfare amid intensifying financial strain.

—Tamer Badawi is an Iraq-focused analyst and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and the founder and editor of Iraq Nexus, a Substack platform offering in-depth analysis of Iraq’s media and security landscapes.

This is a difficult question because the Sadrists and their leader are unpredictable, and relish in the element of surprise. The primary Sadrist interest in this election is to see the rival CF—who not only deprived them of power but also killed Sadrists during the “Ashura Uprising” of 2022—fail electorally. They may contribute to this outcome by going to the polls, based on potential last-minute orders from al-Sadr or his aides to Sadrist constituencies to vote for the CF’s rivals. Those would mostly be from the liberal-minded al-Badeel and the prime minister’s lists, to ensure that the CF does not secure enough seats to have a credible say in post-election dealmaking.

—Akeel Abbas

5. How are Sunni political blocs positioning themselves, and can they overcome infighting to articulate a unified national agenda?

The main competition among Sunni leaders is shaping up among three key players: former Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi’s Taqaddum Party, Muthanna al-Samarraie’s Azm Coalition, and Khamis al-Khanjar’s Siyada Coalition. The contest for dominance in representing the Sunni Arab community—with the speakership of parliament as the ultimate prize—has been intense, often involving alliances with non-Sunni groups to gain leverage and outmaneuver Sunni rivals. This rivalry is driven largely by transactional politics and personal ambition rather than ideology or policy differences. As a result, the loyalty of winning members of parliament to their blocs is likely to be tenuous at best. Unlike their Shia counterparts, Iraq’s Sunni politicians lack a powerful external patron capable of moderating competition or curbing personal rivalries that undermine broader communal interests. Indeed, there is little evidence that the leading figures are even interested in developing a unified national agenda—perhaps because the inevitable next question would be this: Who gets to lead it?

—Omar Al-Nidawi is a Middle East analyst focusing on Iraqi political, security, and energy affairs. He is currently the director of programs at the Enabling Peace in Iraq Center.

6. To what extent does Iran shape Iraq’s political landscape?

Iran’s influence on Iraqi politics since 2003 has been a source of concern for many Iraqis, as well as for the United States and other countries in the Middle East.

Iran has been particularly able to shape Shia policies and decision-making. For example, Iran has had a major say in the selection of successive prime ministers and the formation of governments; it has influenced Iraq’s foreign policy—including relations with the United States and Arab countries, and has affected Iraq’s economic decisions, including in the energy sector.

However, this influence has been waning, especially over the past year. Several factors have contributed to the decline. Iran’s June war with Israel and the United States, its devastated economy, and the decimation of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon have all weakened Tehran’s ability to wield tools of power. Inside Iraq, several of the Iran-aligned Shia factions now have political and economic interests in the Iraqi state and are therefore less susceptible to Iranian pressure.

While Iran may be less able to dictate operational decisions in Iraq, ideological and political ties remain strong in factions of Iraqi politics, and Iran will continue to exert influence on a broad strategic level.

—Rend Al-Rahim is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. A leading expert on Iraqi politics and civic development, she served as Iraq’s first ambassador to the United States from 2003 to 2005.

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Oct 23, 2025

Why Washington’s anti-PMF moves are testing the Iraq partnership

By Mohammed A. Salih

The US campaign against the PMF groups will likely have significant implications for Iraq’s political process moving forward.

Iraq Middle East

7. How did last year’s failure to form the Kurdistan Regional Government impact Kurdish interests and electoral strategies in this election?

More than a year after the October 2024 election, the Kurdistan Region still has no new cabinet. The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) legitimacy, already under scrutiny from Baghdad and international partners, has eroded further.

Several factors converged. Chief among them is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s (PUK’s) refusal to join a government based on its vote or seat share. Instead, the PUK has argued that its territorial control and military weight should shape the cabinet, and the party has sought an empowered deputy prime minister with de facto veto authority. The PUK ran a sharply anti-Kurdish Democratic Party campaign and believes that message energized its base, earning the PUK twenty-three seats. The PUK is likely to have calculated that forming the KRG cabinet before Iraq’s federal elections could blunt that momentum, so it chose to delay, prioritizing partisan gains over institutional legitimacy in hopes of a payoff on November 11.

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Sep 30, 2025

Is the Baghdad-Erbil oil deal a blueprint for settlement—or a stopgap?

By Victoria J. Taylor , Yerevan Saeed

Whether the oil deal will be a tactical stopgap or a step towards permanent settlement will become known after the Iraq’s elections and the year’s end.

Energy Markets & Governance Geopolitics & Energy Security

The costs are mounting for the Kurdistan Region. Kurdish leverage in Baghdad is weakening. If the Kurdish Democratic Party performs well and presses a claim to the Iraqi presidency, Erbil’s cabinet talks and federal government formation could become even more complicated. Intra-Kurdish fragmentation not only delays governments in Erbil and Baghdad, but it also undercuts Kurdish national interests. Disunity has already diminished Kurdish bargaining power in post-election coalition talks and eroded the Kurds’ traditional “kingmaker” status. Even when Kurdish parties sit in government, their growing inability to collaborate has hindered progress on core files—the 2019 election law, budget transfers, and implementation of Article 140. Baghdad has exploited these divisions to pare back the region’s autonomy and, with no new cabinet and a sidelined parliament, it’s not inconceivable that Kurdish interests will be further subverted due to the Kurds’ own predicament.

—Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Saeed is the Barzani scholar-in-residence in the Department of Politics, Governance & Economics at American University’s School of International Service, where he also serves as director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace.

8. Who are the Tishreenis? Have youth protestors given up on the political system?

There is no simple way to define all Iraqis who participated in the Tishreen protests of 2019 to 2020.

The movement was highly diverse—ranging from staunch secularists and communists to loyal followers of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and everything in between. What united them then and continues to drive them today (albeit at a much-reduced level due to the violent response by government forces and militias) is a shared rejection of the corruption, injustice, and national weakness produced by the muhasasa system of ethno-sectarian and partisan power-sharing over the past two decades.

But although Tishreenis broadly share the same goals, they remain divided over how best to achieve them. Some are competing in the upcoming elections through alliances such as al-Badeel, whose members expect their coalition to win up to twenty seats in the 329-member parliament. However, many others remain disillusioned with electoral politics as a viable pathway to reform so long as militias dominate Iraq’s political landscape. Instead, they channel their activism into civil society work, climate action, and entrepreneurship. For those determined to remain in the political arena, such as al-Badeel, the real test will be whether they can avoid the same pitfalls that hampered the Tishreeni lawmakers elected in 2021—namely, weak cohesion and the absence of a clear, coordinated strategy.

—Omar Al-Nidawi

9. Will the independents repeat their impressive performance in the last election?

Barring an electoral surprise, it is unlikely that Iraq’s “independents” will perform as well as they did in 2021. The level of boycott among potential voters who support the independents appears to be higher in this election cycle. However, it is also likely that there will still be a clear, albeit small, representation for the independents in the Council of Representatives this election. The emergence of an electoral list from al-Badeel—a liberal-minded group—seems to be attracting anti-boycott independent voters angry at the CF’s effort to exclude from the race the most independent and anti-militia parliamentary representative, Sajad Salim. The CF’s desire to exclude him has, in fact, given him and his Independence Party much-needed visibility.

—Akeel Abbas

10. How is political violence shaping Iraq’s political environment?

The persistence of targeted assassinations underscores how political silencing in Iraq is reinforced by a pervasive culture of impunity. The recent assassination of Safaa al-Mashhadani, a Sunni electoral candidate and outspoken critic from the crucial Baghdad Belt, has sent shockwaves across Iraq.

Al-Mashhadani’s murder sends a stark warning to disenchanted citizens: Confronting Iraq’s entrenched power structures can carry a fatal price. Beyond fueling political apathy and sectarianism, the assassination affects specific Sunni political parties perceived by CF parties as emerging contenders in Baghdad, particularly at a moment when large segments of Shia voters continue to abstain from the polls.

—Tamer Badawi

11. Will a new government change the direction of Iraqi foreign policy?

A new Iraqi government is unlikely to fundamentally change the direction of Iraq’s foreign policy, but alterations in tone, emphasis, and alignment are probable. Iraq’s strategic posture—balancing between Washington and Tehran while seeking neutrality in regional conflicts—will remain largely intact, though the degree of independence and assertiveness could shift depending on who emerges as prime minister.

—Sajad Jiyad

12. Will the United States have a role in the post-election phase?

There are many reasons for the United States to continue its engagement with Iraq in the post-election phase, given the strategic security, political, and economic interests of both countries in the region and globally.

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Oct 2, 2024

After Operation Inherent Resolve: How to not mess up US-Iraq security relations again

By C. Anthony Pfaff

The importance of broadening US relations with Iraq beyond counter-terror operations cannot be overstated.

Conflict Defense Policy

The real question will be how the new prime minister and his government will engage with US President Donald Trump’s administration—including the newly appointed US special envoy to Iraq—to advance the US-Iraq strategic relationship, attract US and foreign investment in Iraq’s development, and address ongoing differences between Baghdad and Erbil. Washington has long made clear its regional interests to Iraqi leaders, as well as US expectations of Iraq’s role on important issues, including support for counterterrorism, limiting Iranian influence in Iraq and the region, and continued Iraqi support for international sanctions on Iran and terrorists.

The Trump administration will expect the new Iraqi government to make progress on integrating Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into existing state institutions and limiting PMF-aligned leaders to control of key ministries. Sustaining a constructive, strategic dialogue between Washington and Baghdad on security, political, and economic issues—no matter how uncomfortable and difficult—holds the best approach for advancing US security interests in Iraq and the region.

—Alina L. Romanowski is a distinguished fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. She most recently served as the US ambassador to Iraq (2022-2024) and Kuwait (2020-2022).

The post Twelve questions (and expert answers) on the Iraq elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Inside the divides of Iraq’s Coordination Framework—and why they matter ahead of landmark elections

Rend Al-Rahim — Fri, 31 Oct 2025 20:40:48 +0000

Iraq will soon hold its sixth round of parliamentary elections.

The most recent elections held in October 2021 brought many surprises in the wake of the 2019 protests: a new electoral law that seemed more equitable and representative, a sweeping victory for the mercurial Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and the emergence of independent Shia candidates. The coming elections on November 11 will be different: The election law has reverted to a previous model that favors larger parties, al-Sadr has declared a boycott, and the prospects of independent candidates are less bright. Some elements are constant: the elections will be run on ethno-sectarian lines, principally Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish, and of these the most significant will be the election of Shia candidates.

For Iraq’s majority Shia faction, al-Sadr’s boycott is poised to monopolize their vote within the Coordination Framework (CF)—an alliance of Shia parties, formed originally in 2021 to counter al-Sadr’s rising political power. All of them have a lesser or greater degree of dependence on Iran.

With Tehran’s help and support, the CF has held together as the single representative of the Shia despite internal differences, in stark contrast to the factionalism and disarray of Iraq’s Sunni parties. But political rivalries and incompatible interests have created significant fissures within the CF in the run-up to elections—ones that pose threats to Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and his bid to maintain power.

Shia politicians describe these elections as decisive and fateful—as indeed they do in every election season. While not necessarily fateful, these elections are important—given the surging waves of change spreading throughout the region and the need for Iraq to decide where to position itself in the new landscape taking shape.

The Shia electoral environment

Shia political parties are particularly concerned about turnout, since voter apathy is still pronounced among Shia voters. In the 2021 elections, the official turnout was 40 percent at the national level, but was lower in the central and southern provinces.

Voter skepticism signals absence of trust in the integrity and value of the electoral process, in the politicians running for election, and in the political system as a whole. Amid proliferating reports of vote-buying, many grassroots voices are calling for a boycott of the elections to signal their disapproval of a political system that produces no change of faces or political practices. Al-Sadr describes voting as an endorsement of a corrupt system. Optimists, on the other hand, argue that boycotting elections will only ensure a continuation of the status quo and that change, however slow, can only come through voting for better candidates.

Al-Sadr is the most prominent spokesman of the rejectionist camp: He has emphatically declared his decision to boycott the elections and denounced the political establishment as corrupt and unreformable. While he has forbidden his followers from running as candidates, it is less clear if al-Sadr has also prohibited voting. This is significant. It is estimated that al-Sadr can command hundreds of thousands of votes—and if Sadrists go to the polls, they can swing the elections in Baghdad and cities in the south. There have been unconfirmed reports that other Shia leaders have tried to woo al-Sadr, perhaps in an effort to gain the votes of his followers. However, there is no indication that these approaches have been fruitful.

Fissures within the Coordination Framework

Within the CF, there are many disagreements shaping the discourse this election cycle: over the government’s policy towards Syria, allegiance to Iran, an aborted law regarding the Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) that was strongly opposed by the United States, and, not least, the competing economic interests of the Shia factions. Three of the groups within the CF are also members of the PMF: the US-designated Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Kataib Hizballah (KH), as well as the Badr Corps.

But the major rift is the political rivalry between former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and al-Sudani. Neither of them has made any secret of his ambition to lead a post-election government. While the campaigns have focused on the competition between the various Shia factions, al-Sudani and al-Maliki represent the two rival poles. Observers predict that al-Sudani will win a plurality of Shia seats in parliament.

But al-Maliki and his “State of Law” coalition have harped on several themes to undermine al-Sudani’s tenure as prime minister, both implicitly and explicitly. They have raised alarm about a surreptitious return of Baathists to power through the elections, and hundreds of candidates bave been disqualified, rightly or wrongly, under the laws of de-Baathification. Opponents of al-Sudani have condemned the use of government resources in the campaign, indirectly accusing him of exploiting his office for electioneering. His detractors have also criticized the poor state of services after three years of the current government, al-Sudani’s relations with the new Sunni regime in Syria, and the warm relations between the prime minister and other Arab countries, which influential members of the CF view as hostile to Shia supremacy in Iraq. Al-Sudani’s conciliatory relationship with the Kurdish government has also come under criticism from his rivals in the CF.

Al-Sudani, for his part, has maintained an appearance of being above the fray. As prime minister, he has cultivated the high profile of incumbency and turbo-charged his public activities. He has accelerated construction projects underway in Baghdad and the governorates, cut ribbons for completed hospitals and schools, signed contracts and memorandums of understanding with major Western oil companies like BP and Exxon, traveled to regional countries including Oman and the United Arab Emirates, and negotiated a deal to resume oil exports from Kurdistan. He traveled to Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt to attend the Gaza Peace Summit, where he had a photo-op with US President Donald Trump.

As a measure of al-Sudani’s rising fortunes, several prominent candidates who previously ran with al-Maliki’s coalition have switched to al-Sudani’s “Reconstruction and Development” list.

Shia fears amid a Sunni landscape

Regional developments have also shaped the campaign of Shia parties. The waning of Iran’s military and financial capabilities, the Israeli military campaign’s decimation of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, and the rise of a Sunni regime in Syria have rattled Iraq’s Shia parties. They fear that they have lost a protective environment and that Shia rule in Iraq is threatened. Increasing US pressure through targeted sanctions on the PMF’s factions has raised the level of anxiety.

Therefore, in addition to the internal rivalries within the CF, the Shia political parties are especially sensitive about their continued dominance over the state. Low voting numbers among their constituency in Iraq’s center and south, set against high Sunni turnout, can, they fear, result in “unnaturally” high Sunni seats in parliament and increased influence. They believe this to be especially dangerous in Baghdad, a religiously diverse city that commands sixty-nine seats in parliament, where the Shia will be competing for votes not just against fellow Shia parties, but also against energized Sunni candidates. Shia spokesmen have warned of this danger, adopting a sectarian, alarmist rhetoric to exhort Shia voters to go to the polls. In a public speech that has gone viral, Sayed Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of the Hikma Movement, used the slogan “don’t lose it” to urge them to vote.

Although sympathetic commentators explained this as a call to preserve democracy and balance in state affairs, others in the media interpret the slogan as a call for the Shia to turn out in large numbers in order to preserve their majority in parliament. In a more provocative statement that has raised an uproar of condemnation by Sunnis and others, Jalal Eddin al-Saghir, an extremist Shia cleric, warned that if the Shia don’t vote, then “Abdel Zahra will be the servant of Omar,” the first being a typical Shia name and the second typically Sunni.

The elusive prize

The ultimate prize following elections is the leadership of the government. This is where matters become complicated. The selection of prime minister and the formation of the government has always been a fraught and prolonged process. After the elections of October 2021, for example, parliament took a year to confirm al-Sudani as prime minister.

Nothing in Iraq’s constitution says that the prime minister must be a Shia—nor that the president be Kurdish and the speaker of parliament Sunni. Nevertheless, since 2003, this has been the de facto practice. Since 2022, the CF, as the umbrella coalition of the Shia, has assumed the right of nomination and indeed nominated one of its own, al-Sudani, and secured a vote of confidence in parliament.

Al-Sudani wants a second term, but others in the CF want to unseat him, most notably al-Maliki and some factions of the PMF. For months, parties within the CF have been maneuvering and prepositioning to nominate their candidate. Al-Sudani’s electoral list is widely expected to do well in the elections—a candidate on his list even projected as many as seventy seats, which, if it materializes, will likely present a plurality of the Shia vote.

But even such a big win does not guarantee al-Sudani a second term. In 2022, he secured the nomination and the post with only two seats in parliament. To be successful, a candidate must have the support of a majority within the CF and be prepared to make concessions and promises to safeguard the interests of its members.

In turn, the CF also needs to choose a candidate who will not call down the wrath of the US sanctions regime or military threats, so palpably felt during the first Trump administration, while still securing Iranian approval. In a volatile and rapidly evolving regional environment, the CF will face a formidable challenge after the elections. Whatever the result of the elections, a surprise candidate may emerge.

The November election will not necessarily determine who the next prime minister will be, but it will provide an opportunity to shift power dynamics within the fractious Shia bloc. It will be an excellent indicator of the relative strength of the individual Shia parties that make up the CF and the clout each can wield in future decision-making. Since the Shia will continue to formulate policy and dominate decision-making, how this election shifts power dynamics within the CF will be a good signpost to political trends in Iraq for the new government’s four year term.

Rend Al-Rahim is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. A leading expert on Iraqi politics and civic development, she served as Iraq’s first ambassador to the United States from 2003 to 2005, following the fall of Saddam Hussein.

The post Inside the divides of Iraq’s Coordination Framework—and why they matter ahead of landmark elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Democracy at a crossroads: Rule of law and the case for US engagement in the Balkans

Stephen Nix and Megan Tamisiea — Wed, 29 Oct 2025 21:00:00 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The Western Balkans sit at a critical junction between NATO, the European Union (EU), and the eastern spheres of influence of Russia and China. Unchecked instability and democratic decline in the region would directly threaten European security and US interests.
US democracy assistance in countries such as Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and others must specifically address three pillars: fostering people-centered strategies, strengthening the rule of law, and safeguarding political processes.
While the EU has invested heavily in the Western Balkans, it cannot foster democratic development in the region alone. The United States should complement European efforts by engaging political parties, energizing civil society, and rewarding meaningful democratic reforms.

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Introduction: A region undergoing transformation

Since the third wave of democratization—the global surge of democratic transitions beginning in the mid-1970s—Europe has often been regarded as a leader in the field of liberal democracy. In its 2024 Democracy Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks Western Europe as the highest-scoring region worldwide, with an average of 8.38—making it the only region to record a net improvement in democratic performance during the latest annual cycle. However, this snapshot only captures part of Europe’s democratic story and can be misleading, given the complex challenges confronting many of its subregions.

Over the past fifteen years, Europe has endured a “polycrisis”—including the eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine war—all of which have strained democratic institutions and weakened public cohesion.

In the Western Balkans, these dynamics are magnified by elite corruption, foreign interference, and internal political conflict—factors that block long-term democratic progress and stall European Union (EU) integration. The nations in this region face a constant balancing act between the West and its authoritarian rivals in Moscow and Beijing, striving to grow their economies while potentially jeopardizing security and stability. Without increased US support, the Western Balkans could become a serious vulnerability for the EU, with implications for the security and sovereignty of both NATO and the broader West.

The need for a revitalized, regionalized US democracy assistance approach

Electoral manipulation, the erosion of the rule of law, and authoritarian instability undermine US-European trade, weaken security alliances, and open the door to Russian and Chinese influence. Moscow and Beijing—through disinformation, political infiltration, and economic leverage—have made the Western Balkans a particular focus. Both employ tailored strategies to exploit the weaknesses of the nations in the region—particularly with respect to their election processes, security mechanisms, and political divisions.

Given these circumstances, US democracy assistance in the Western Balkans is vital. Situated between the EU, NATO, and the eastern spheres of influence of Russia and China, the region occupies a critical geopolitical junction. Economically, the Balkans function as a transport hub for maritime trade, energy pipelines, and migrant flows, making it a flash point for European stability.

Today, the region faces intense pressure from the competing economic and political influence of China, Russia, Iran, and other rivals. Left unchecked, the Balkans could serve as a staging ground for authoritarian powers to entrench their hold on Europe. Current developments in the region underscore that this threat is no longer hypothetical:

Serbia’s deepening ties to Moscow and Beijing—evident in its energy dependence, military cooperation, and expanding digital-surveillance infrastructure—pose direct threats to transatlantic interests.
Russia’s sway over Republika Srpska obstructs Bosnia and Herzegovina’s path toward NATO and EU integration, while promoting constitutional instability that undermines national unity.
Montenegro and North Macedonia, though NATO members, are increasingly vulnerable to hybrid threats from Russia and China, owing to weak institutions and growing political fragmentation.

To be effective, US democracy assistance must reflect the varying dynamics across the Balkans, from balancing Western ties with Russian and Chinese incentives to navigating complex internal conflicts amidst deteriorating democratic institutions. These challenges require programs that improve governance accountability and address frozen inter-state conflicts by working with legitimate political parties and local actors. Revitalized, region-specific democracy assistance is necessary to protect US interests and reinforce European democratic security. Supporting democratic development abroad strengthens US security, prosperity, and global influence, while delaying this support further endangers the United States and its allies through long-term instability and conflict.

In the Western Balkans, democracy is facing internal and external pressure

Today, the six countries comprising the Western Balkans are classified as hybrid regimes, reflecting the region’s persistent democratic decline and institutional fragility. Future democracy assistance must counter the persistent influence of Russia and China, which exploit energy and economic dependence to shift the Balkans away from EU integration.

Serbia

Serbia has wavered between pro-Western gestures and deepening ties with Russia and China—exemplified by its decision to provide military support to Ukraine while refusing to impose sanctions on Russia. According to the V-Dem annual reports, Serbia has experienced rapid democratic decay since the early 2000s under the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Over the past decades, the ruling party has entrenched its control over the judiciary and the media, undermining democratic checks and electoral competition.

The December 2023 snap elections revealed widespread manipulation, including group voting, falsified voter registration, and targeted attacks on election observers. The government’s growing alignment with Moscow and Beijing, including recent acquisitions of surveillance technology and energy deals with China, threatens Serbia’s European trajectory and regional stability. These developments not only signal the absence of free and fair elections but also invite authoritarian influence on NATO’s southeastern flank.

Since 2024, students have organized mass mobilizations to protest widespread corruption. These demonstrations are likely to continue, emphasizing the need for US support in fostering pluralism and protecting political contestation.

The unresolved conflict between Kosovo and Serbia continues to fuel internal unrest, violence, and protests. Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence has deepened resentment between populations, restricted access to public services in northern Kosovo, and undermined democratic norms. While the United States and most EU member states support Kosovo’s sovereignty, Serbia is backed by authoritarian powers, including Russia, China, and Iran. This continued denial, along with Serbia’s support for parallel structures in Serb-majority areas, remains a major barrier to Kosovo’s integration into the EU, the UN, and other international institutions.

Kosovo

In Kosovo, internal ethnic tensions and stalled dialogue with Serbia continue to destabilize governance. The May 2024 clashes, which included violence against NATO forces, highlight the fragility of peace in the region. Currently, Kosovo and Serbia share responsibility for public services in northern Kosovo: Serbia supplies education and health care, while Kosovo oversees law enforcement and the court system. This arrangement, however, has left the Serbian minority vulnerable. Prime Minister Albin Kurti deployed heavily armed police across the region, evicted Serbian institutions, banned the use of Serbian currency, and took other provocative actions, prompting roughly 10 percent of Kosovo’s Serbs to leave the country over the past year.

Politically, while Kurti’s Self-Determination Movement won the largest share of votes in the 2025 parliamentary elections, his inability to secure a majority or form a coalition with major opposition parties has stalled democratic reforms. The prime minister’s hardline stance toward the Serb minority, which appears aimed at consolidating domestic support, has drawn criticism from both Western partners and opposition groups. In response, the United States and the EU suspended financial assistance to pressure Kurti to re-engage with inclusive governance and align with international norms. The resulting political dissonance continues to complicate coalition-building and delay key democratic initiatives aimed at reducing internal ethnic tensions, underscoring the need for external assistance.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Governance remains stagnant in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to an outdated power-sharing arrangement and ethnically fragmented leadership resistant to meaningful reform. The stalled EU accession process and the exclusion of civil society from decision-making have undermined democratic momentum and weakened citizen trust. With political elites increasingly insulated from accountability, institutional resilience is eroding, and democratic contestation faces the risk of further collapse without stronger international support and grassroots mobilization.

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s democratic decline has been sharper than in other Balkan states. In Republika Srpska—a political entity that emerged from the violent breakup of Yugoslavia—Bosnian Serb President Milorad Dodik has worked to suppress public contestation, recriminalize defamation, and align the territory with the Kremlin’s anti-Western agenda. Dodik’s admiration for Vladimir Putin has facilitated growing Russian influence, undermining independent media and silencing opposition voices. In return, Dodik has received Russian political backing and propaganda support.

While Dodik’s mandate was revoked in late August following an appeals court verdict sentencing him to a one-year prison term, his influence has already entrenched ties to Russia and fueled intense contestation of central institutions. These authoritarian shifts are part of a broader ethno-nationalist strategy that heightens vulnerability to state capture and weakens institutional pluralism.

To reinforce the court’s decision, the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina has called early presidential elections in Republika Srpska. Scheduled for November 23, 2025, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and other international entities have voiced support, emphasizing the need for free, constitutional, and democratic elections and a peaceful transfer of power.

North Macedonia

Democratic governance in North Macedonia continues to be undermined by low public trust in judicial institutions, media polarization, and widespread corruption. Citizens perceive the judiciary as politicized and ineffective, even as landmark trials against former officials have concluded. Efforts to digitize courts and increase transparency remain promising but insufficient without broader structural reform. Corruption remains deeply entrenched in procurement processes and political appointments, while anti-corruption agencies are underfunded and lack prosecutorial power. Meanwhile, ethnic and political divisions continue to block electoral reform and erode public confidence in representative democracy. While civil society remains relatively active, government hostility toward critical NGOs signals a shrinking space for civic participation.

North Macedonia’s democratic trajectory has been weakened by increasing political polarization, institutional paralysis, and unresolved identity conflicts with EU members. Since 2022, the opposition party VMRO-DPMNE and the far-left party Levica have obstructed parliamentary proceedings to push for early elections, delaying key judicial appointments and agency confirmations. These deadlocks have stalled the Constitutional Court’s functionality, leaving only four of the required nine judges seated and risking a constitutional crisis. Similarly, state agencies such as the Judicial Council, the public broadcaster board, and antidiscrimination commissions remain vacant due to legislative obstruction, undermining government capacity and the rule of law.

These divisions intensified following the 2022 EU-facilitated “French proposal,” which aimed to resolve Bulgaria’s veto over North Macedonia’s accession negotiations. While the deal unblocked the EU path, it required controversial constitutional amendments recognizing the Bulgarian minority. The ruling Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) coalition accepted the compromise, triggering mass protests, fueling nationalist backlash, and galvanizing Eurosceptic sentiment. The opposition launched multiple failed referendums and accused the government of “high treason,” stalling consensus on reforms necessary for EU integration. While the government’s acceptance of the proposal allowed accession talks to begin, it also deepened identity politics and weakened democratic cohesion.

Montenegro

Montenegro’s 2020 elections marked a critical turning point, ending the Democratic Party of Socialists’ (DPS) rule and opening the door to democratic renewal. The new coalition government, led in part by United Reform Action’s (URA) Dritan Abazović, entered with a reformist mandate centered on EU integration and anti-corruption. However, ideological fragmentation and a limited majority produced political instability and stalled reform efforts. Today, judicial appointments remain politicized, anti-corruption efforts are faltering, and deep-rooted patronage networks resist institutional change. The coalition’s collapse in 2022 and the formation of a minority government with DPS support highlighted the fragility of Montenegro’s democratic transition.

Amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU expedited Montenegro’s accession process as a geopolitical priority. While the country remains a top candidate for EU membership by 2028, this acceleration has come at the expense of EU democratic standards. Despite progress, media politicization, weak judicial independence, and institutional capture persist. The EU’s lenient conditionality—prioritizing regional stability over reform—risks reinforcing superficial compliance. US democracy assistance should focus on strengthening the rule of law, protecting independent media, and supporting civil society to ensure Montenegro’s accession reflects genuine democratic consolidation rather than merely geopolitical expediency.

Albania

Albania’s democratic system is historically fragile and deeply conflicted. Prime Minister Edi Rama and the Socialist Party (SP) hold a strong majority, having secured a fourth consecutive term in the 2025 parliamentary elections with 52.2 percent of the vote. Although the country’s elections are competitive and professionally administered, they take place in a polarized environment marked by allegations of vote-buying and the use of public funds in underprivileged areas to influence outcomes. The SP’s practices undermine pluralism and weaken local governments, which often struggle to provide basic services.

The main opposition, fragmented between factions of the Democratic Party, has failed to meaningfully challenge the government, resulting in diminished parliamentary oversight. This dysfunction culminated in violence in late 2023, after which the government passed restrictive laws curbing opposition activities.

Civil society contributes to national debates, but its impact is often limited due to underfunding, exclusion from policymaking, and occasional co-optation by partisan interests. The media landscape remains largely independent and frequently holds public officials accountable; however, ownership is concentrated in the hands of politically connected elites who leverage their platforms to influence parties and government actors. These insufficient accountability mechanisms have fueled disinformation and deepened public distrust—a vulnerability that Russia could exploit.

Despite these challenges, Albania has a strong foundation of civil society and independent media. The country needs comprehensive support that strengthens civic participation, protects independent journalists, and establishes equitable funding mechanisms for municipal governments.

Reaffirming ties with the EU

The EU recently met with Western Balkan leaders to conceptualize a Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. The meeting included pre-financing payments under the Reform and Growth Facility for North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia, and further incentivized Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina to pursue reforms.

Emerging deals included new flagship investments in clean energy, initiatives to integrate the region into the EU Single Market, and measures to enhance digital connectivity. Each of these steps outlines technical areas of alignment between the EU and the Balkans, yet questions remain about the future of democracy in the region.

The Western Balkans remain caught between competing pressures: democratic deterioration, unresolved regional conflicts, and growing authoritarian influence. While the EU has invested heavily in the region’s integration, technical improvements alone cannot guarantee democratic development. Therefore, the United States must support the EU’s expansion efforts while emphasizing the importance of democracy. This requires a revitalized approach—one that engages political parties, energizes civil society, and rewards meaningful democratic reforms.

A revitalized approach to democracy assistance

US democracy assistance should embrace three pillars: people, the rule of law, and political processes. These pillars can be broken down into thematic priorities—anti-corruption measures, the protection of independent media and civil society, the empowerment of political parties and contestation, and other vital actions to revitalize democratic progress.

Fostering people-centered strategies

Democracy can only be sustained with inclusive policies that foster an informed, engaged, and educated public. In the face of authoritarian power—which has provoked mass protests and ethnic tensions, creating openings for Chinese and Russian influence—incorporating people-centered objectives is vital to mitigate internal conflict. The United States should therefore prioritize civic education, inter-ethnic dialogue channels, and youth engagement, especially in areas where political violence and protests are prevalent.

Application examples

In Kosovo, this strategy would involve programs fostering interethnic dialogue between Albanian and Serb youth in schools and community spaces. Assistance could also expand civic education initiatives in Serb-majority areas and empower youth-led organizations focused on reconciliation, rights awareness, and political participation. In addition, the United States should provide legal and technical assistance to civil society groups seeking to hold municipal leaders accountable, particularly in border regions.

The United States should counter concentrated executive power through media literacy training in Republika Srpska, stronger protections for journalists and civic actors, and forums to address misinformation and anti-Western rhetoric. Ensuring access to education and multiethnic safe spaces would help mitigate the long-term effects of President Dodik’s autocratic, pro-Kremlin legacy, and support intra-group dialogue in preparation for a democratic election.

Serbia’s student-led protests reflect a desire to challenge government corruption and demand public safety. The United States should support this mobilization by investing in youth-led civic initiatives, combining education with inclusive services for ethnic minorities. However, progress between Serbs and Albanians will remain challenging unless Serbia’s political leadership accepts internationally recognized borders.

Public services and rights must be non-discriminatory and inclusive of all minority populations. The United States should also work with judicial institutions in the Western Balkans to ensure protection for citizens facing disparities.

Supporting the rule of law

Building an independent, non-discriminatory judicial system is vital for reducing conflict during peace negotiations and to prevent executive overreach. US democracy assistance can deploy resources and anti-corruption support in Montenegro to encourage neighboring nations to uphold democratic standards, thereby addressing entrenched ethnic divides and intra-state violence.

Application examples

In Albania, this strategy would prioritize strengthening anti-corruption organizations to curb executive abuse and the unfair treatment of opposition parties and municipal institutions. Cooperating with the Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK)—which has successfully prosecuted high-level officials—should be expanded to include legal training, protective measures, and transatlantic cooperation opportunities. SPAK’s credibility offers a potential framework for broader rule-of-law assistance in North Macedonia, where transparency in public procurement and prosecutorial independence remain insufficient. Judicial reform in both countries must be accompanied by public awareness campaigns to build trust in institutions and deter political interference.

These themes should be applied to Montenegro, where politicized judicial appointments and weak enforcement mechanisms continue to undermine democratic transformation. As a likely future EU member, Montenegro must strengthen its political institutions, which in turn must be held accountable by independent courts and judges. Similarly, prioritizing Montenegro’s democratic and economic alignment would provide a model for other Balkan states pursuing EU integration.

Finally, in cases of severe ethnic tensions or disparities, the United States must ensure that judicial development promotes inclusive and non-discriminatory services for citizens. This will be vital in Kosovo and Serbia, where stalled dialogue efforts weaken public services and heighten conflict, as well as in other multiethnic states such as North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. Supporting judicial institutions will not only build public trust but also protect opposition parties from executive overreach and political repression.

Safeguarding political processes

Political parties have had inconsistent levels of impact in the Western Balkans. Fair competition and coalition-building are vital to strengthen democracy and counter state capture. US assistance should directly engage with political parties to improve inclusivity, policy development, and voter mobilization.

Application examples

Montenegro’s recent election of the United Reform Action (URA) demonstrates the promise of a democratically driven government. In line with this pillar, the United States should address political fragmentation by supporting cross-party dialogue mechanisms, while also creating space for civil society members to participate in policymaking.

Similar mechanisms can be applied to Kosovo, Albania, and North Macedonia, where opposition parties struggle with ideological fragmentation. Open debates, local council meetings, and forums featuring civil society organizations and political representatives would help align citizens’ priorities and party platforms. Technical training should also be extended to countries with ethnic divisions, such as Kosovo and Serbia, focusing on inclusive policymaking and youth engagement.

Finally, in states facing autocratic takeover, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, this strategy would promote platforms that transcend ethno-nationalist lines and foster cooperation in coalition building. With many Western Balkan states reliant on opposition parties to revitalize democracy, US assistance must prioritize fair and inclusive political competition. By integrating political parties into assistance efforts rather than sidelining them, the United States can help restore the democratic dialogue necessary for government reform. People-centered mobilization, institutional reform, and the renewal of political processes must go hand in hand to ensure democratic resilience across the Western Balkans.

Strategic implications for the United States

A three-pillar strategy—centered on people, the rule of law, and political processes—provides a pragmatic and adaptive framework for revitalizing US democracy assistance in the Western Balkans. As the region struggles with authoritarian interference, ethnic conflict, political fragmentation, and democratic decay, sustained US engagement is critical to prevent long-term instability. Democracy assistance not only builds institutional resilience and civic participation but also protects strategic US interests by stabilizing NATO’s southeastern flank, advancing EU integration, and countering Russian and Chinese influence. To ensure long-term stability and democratic momentum in one of Europe’s most volatile regions, the United States must treat democracy assistance as a core component of its foreign policy and global leadership.

about the authors

Stephen Nix is the senior director for Europe and Eurasia at the International Republican Institute.

Megan Tamisiea is a researcher with an MA in Democracy and Governance from Georgetown University.

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Taylor joins Rudaw to discuss delays in KRG formation

Atlantic Council — Tue, 28 Oct 2025 19:34:03 +0000

original source

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Peru at a breaking point: How ten years of political chaos opened the door to organized crime

Martin Cassinelli — Mon, 27 Oct 2025 20:26:27 +0000

Peru has erupted once again. The assassination attempt against a cumbia band in Lima on October 8 triggered a tumultuous month for the country. On October 10, President Dina Boluarte was removed from office, and Congressman José Jerí was inaugurated as Peru’s eighth president in ten years. In the days that followed, Peruvians took to the streets in what have become the country’s largest protests in the past five years. Clashes with police have left at least one dead and dozens injured.

The demonstrators are not only protesting the new president, who has been accused of corruption and sexual assault. The protests are the political manifestation of something deeper: the steady advance of organized crime into everyday life and the collapse of public confidence in the Peruvian state’s ability to protect its citizens. As Peru approaches its April 2026 elections, the moment holds both promise for democratic renewal and risk of democratic collapse.

As Peruvians prepare to head to the polls, the insecurity crisis will be top of mind. Over the past three years, Peru has experienced an unprecedented rise in organized criminal activity. Between 2019 and 2024, reported extortions increased sixfold, and this year every third Peruvian reported knowing a victim of extortion, many of whom are small business owners. Homicides, too, have doubled since 2019. And in January of this year alone, there were 203 percent more homicides than in January 2017. What was once seen as a problem of border towns or drug corridors has become the daily reality of small and medium-sized businesses—the country’s true economic engine.

Peru’s crisis is no longer just about corruption or governance. It is about the basic survival of the rule of law.

In cities such as Trujillo and Chiclayo, bus operators and construction firms now pay weekly “quotas” to criminal groups. In Lima’s districts, even market vendors receive extortion calls demanding transfers through digital wallets. Many of these workers belong to Peru’s vast informal sector, which employs nearly seven out of ten Peruvians and forms the social base that has now turned against the political establishment and is demanding solutions. When extortion payments and successive killings became commonplace, strikes and street protests followed against a government perceived as absent or complicit.

This explosion of criminality is the predictable outcome of a decade in which Peru’s institutions have been eaten away by self-interested politicians, resulting in political instability. Beginning in 2016, a Congress dominated by the fujimorismo movement began to abuse its oversight powers, engaging in what legal scholars term “constitutional hardball”—exploiting procedural rules to turn impeachment into a tool for political leverage rather than accountability, as seen during the impeachments of Boluarte and former President Martín Vizcarra.

The country was also undergoing the aftermath of Operation Car Wash, a far-reaching set of investigations originating in Brazil, during which Peruvian prosecutors launched aggressive corruption probes against Peru’s pre-2016 political class. The probes ended with four former Peruvian presidents convicted of corruption. Former President Alan García, who was accused of bribery, committed suicide as police entered his house to apprehend him. Former ministers, presidential contenders, business leaders, and mayors across Peru were swept up in corruption probes, effectively purging the political elite that had once promised to renew the country after the fall of Alberto Fujimori’s regime in 2000.

Unfortunately for the country, what emerged after the Operation Car Wash probes was not a cleaner class of leaders but a more fragmented, parochial, and self-interested one—far easier for organized crime to penetrate. Peru’s Congress, now one of the least trusted institutions in the hemisphere, has often acted as a shield for illicit interests. In recent years, lawmakers have quietly advanced legislation that has reduced penalties for certain crimes, weakened controls on political financing, and obstructed efforts to vet local authorities for corruption. Behind these moves lies a new generation of politicians, many of whom are under criminal investigation for corruption and other offenses. With institutions hollowed out, prosecutors underfunded, and police leadership constantly reshuffled, criminal economies have flourished.

Peru is now less than six months away from national elections, and the outlook is uncertain. After a decade of political chaos, citizens are exhausted and cynical, and the party system is in ruins. The danger is clear: When democracy cannot guarantee security or stability, it loses its moral and practical legitimacy.

The moment could go either way. On one hand, the democratic reflex remains: Peruvians still take to the streets, still reject corruption, and still demand that a competent state guarantee basic services. If leveraged the right way, these demands could be channeled by a democratic and reformist leader willing to rebuild Peru’s institutional arrangements and salvage its democracy.

On the other hand, the ground for populism has never been more fertile. Candidates who promise “order at any cost” will likely find a receptive audience among voters who feel abandoned by their government and terrorized by crime. Promising results in the fight against crime, an opportunistic leader may yet destroy what’s left of Peruvian democracy.

Peru’s crisis is no longer just about corruption or governance. It is about the basic survival of the rule of law. The October protests should not be seen as another episode in the country’s cyclical instability but as a warning that the old model—political chaos insulated from economic collapse—has possibly reached its breaking point. Unless the next government restores both security and institutional credibility, Peru’s democracy risks becoming not merely ungovernable, but unrecognizable.

Martin Cassinelli, who was born in Peru, is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Milei just got a midterm boost. What’s next for Argentina?

Atlantic Council — Mon, 27 Oct 2025 14:25:00 +0000

GET UP TO SPEED

The vote is in, and with it a mandate. The party of Argentine President Javier Milei grew its share of seats in Congress in Sunday’s midterm elections, defying expectations and giving a boost to Milei’s aggressive economic reforms. The result comes on the heels of a major US intervention to prop up the shaky Argentine peso, which US President Donald Trump had tied to his backing of Milei’s chainsaw-wielding, inflation-fighting agenda. What’s next from Milei and the markets? Invest some time in our expert takes below.

Alejo Czerwonko: Member of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Advisory Council and the managing director and chief investment officer emerging markets Americas for UBS Global Wealth Management
Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Vice president and senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
Valentina Sader (@valentinasader): Deputy director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
Martin Mühleisen (@muhleisen): Nonresident senior fellow at the GeoEconomics Center and former International Monetary Fund official

Behind the results

Milei’s party, La Libertad Avanza (LLA), captured more than 40 percent of the vote, more than doubling its share of seats in Congress. “The scale of Milei’s victory sits at the most optimistic end of pre-election expectations,” Alejo tells us. “His party now holds the political capital needed to accelerate structural reforms.”
Jason notes that the “most surprising” result was LLA’s narrow win over the rival Peronist party in Buenos Aires Province, “where, less than two months ago, a 14-percentage-point loss in provincial elections rattled markets” and seemed to portend a poor midterm result for Milei.
One factor that “likely figured into the size of LLA’s victory,” Jason says, was the backing of the Trump administration, via a twenty-billion-dollar currency swap line and another twenty-billion-dollar loan instrument that could be used to purchase Argentine debt. Sunday’s results, Jason adds, “will give reassurances to the US administration of its backing of Milei’s economic reforms.”
But Jason points out “one notable and concerning sign” coming out of the elections. Voter turnout was only 67.9 percent, “the lowest since the county’s return to democracy,” Jason notes.  
Still, Valentina says Argentines gave Milei a vote of confidence: “This electoral outcome is a clear answer to those questioning the political viability of Milei’s plan and the willingness of the Argentine people to endure the pain of some of these reforms.”

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Market moves

Argentina’s bond markets had been wobbly in recent weeks as Milei’s political fortunes seemed to suffer. But now, Martin tells us, “Markets are likely to swing strongly in Argentina’s favor over the coming days, boosting the exchange rate and allowing the government to resume the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, and interest rates should also decline markedly.”
Alejo notes that “Argentina’s ‘country risk’—the spread its US dollar sovereign bonds pay over US Treasuries—was at distressed levels” before the election, with investors expecting a poor LLA performance. But “Argentine risk assets should now benefit from greater political stability, a renewed push for pro-market reforms, and robust support from the US.”

Milei’s checklist

So what will the next phase of Milei’s reforms look like? Alejo predicts “an ambitious deregulation agenda,” along with “labor, tax, and potentially social security reforms” and changes to Argentina’s foreign exchange policies.
While Argentina could allow for some meaningful depreciation in the days ahead, Martin expects the government to “still be hesitant to float the peso—meaning allow it to move with the market—for good, which would be necessary for the exchange rate to find a more stable long-term equilibrium.”
Martin notes that while LLA does not have an outright majority in Congress, it will have an easier time building legislative majorities for certain policy moves and blocking any big spending plans. He advises Milei to “use this political and economic window of opportunity” to advance the “structural transformation of the economy” and ensure that promises lead to results for growth and jobs.
“After all,” Martin says, “Argentina still has a long way to go to remove the vestiges of Peronism from its economy, starting with labor market rigidities and a large pension cost overhang.”
The midterm result suggests Milei has a strong chance of re-election in two years, which won’t be lost on lawmakers. “Success breeds success,” Martin says. “It is this dynamic that should work in Milei’s favor while he continues on his difficult and often painful reform path.”

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Your primer on the Dutch general elections

Atlantic Council experts — Sat, 25 Oct 2025 16:37:52 +0000

Dutch voters will head to the polls on October 29 for parliamentary elections after the previous coalition government headed by independent Prime Minister Dick Schoof collapsed in June. The far-right Freedom Party (PVV), led by Geert Wilders, is expected to remain the country’s largest party in Parliament, but shifting support could result in a moderate coalition returning to power.

Ahead of the vote, Atlantic Council experts provide their insights on the defining issues of the elections, the competing parties, and how the results will affect the Netherlands’ foreign policy as a member of the European Union (EU) and NATO.

How does voting work?

The Netherlands holds elections to fill its 150-seat House of Representatives, the primary legislative body of the country’s bicameral Parliament, every four years, unless an election is called earlier following a government collapse, as occurred this June. This year, voters can choose among twenty-seven parties, with any party securing at least 0.67 percent of the national vote guaranteed a seat in Parliament. Voters may also cast a preferential vote for an individual candidate on a party list. If a candidate receives at least 0.17 percent of the total vote, they earn a seat ahead of others on the list, regardless of their ranking. The Netherlands has a multiparty system in which no single party has ever received a majority of seats, so coalition governments consisting of several parties are common.

—Jack Muldoon is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

How did we get here?

Who is Geert Wilders?

Geert Wilders is a Dutch far-right politician who has led the Party for Freedom (PVV) since founding it in 2006.

He first entered Parliament in 1998 as a member of the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). He rose to prominence on the Dutch right after the 2004 murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, after which Wilders denounced Islam as a “fascist ideology.” That same year, Wilders left the VVD to form his own party centered on his opposition to Islam and immigration. The PVV has since proposed banning the Quran, closing all mosques, and freezing asylum applications. Until 2024, it also supported Dutch withdrawal from the European Union.

The PVV won nine seats in the 2006 election and surged to twenty-four seats in 2010, when it entered a confidence-and-supply agreement with the first cabinet of then Prime Minister Mark Rutte. After more than a decade in opposition, Wilders led the PVV to a surprise victory in 2023, winning thirty-seven seats and nearly a quarter of the national vote. Despite his party finishing first, Wilders withdrew his bid to become prime minister due to insufficient coalition support. Former intelligence chief Dick Schoof ultimately assumed the role, heading a coalition of the PVV, VVD, New Social Contract (NSC), and Farmer–Citizen Movement (BBB). Less than a year later, the PVV withdrew from the coalition over a dispute on asylum policy, triggering new elections.

The PVV’s 2025 campaign has been marked by controversy. In early August, Wilders faced criticism for posting an image on X that resembled 1930s propaganda, showing a woman’s face divided in two—one half labeled “PVV” and the other depicting a woman in a hijab labeled with the Dutch Labour Party (PdvA) logo. Anti-discrimination groups accused him of using “Nazi visual language,” a charge he has denied.

—Jack Muldoon

How is migration shaping Dutch politics?

Migration is the reason there have been two Dutch national elections in two years. Both of the last Dutch cabinets collapsed over this issue. According to Wilders, whose PVV party currently leads in the polls, the Netherlands’ number one problem is that it is being flooded by refugees. Yet the data tells a very different story.

Only 12 percent of all migrants that enter the Netherlands are asylum seekers. The vast majority are international students or workers. In 2024, roughly 85,000 migrant workers came to the Netherlands—more than triple the number in 2010. Most of these workers are employed in low-wage, labor-intensive sectors and often face poor living conditions.

The Netherlands faces a difficult choice. Its economy benefits from migrant labor and, with an aging population, that workforce has become essential to sustaining growth. If trends continue, the contribution of migrant labor to the Dutch economy— currently about 3 percent of GDP—is expected to rise to between 3.5 and 4.7 percent by 2030. Additionally, most of this migration takes place within the EU under the law on the free movement of people, making it difficult to restrict the inflow of workers. Yet the country lacks the infrastructure to ensure these workers receive fair wages, decent housing, and proper social protections. Tellingly, around 60 percent of homeless people in the Netherlands are or were migrant workers.

This is the true migration crisis, and it is a challenge the next Dutch government will have to confront head-on.

—Lize de Kruijf is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.

As the PVV continues to build momentum in the Netherlands, what does this signal for the far right across Europe?

Ahead of the October 29 snap election in the Netherlands, the PVV maintains a strong position since becoming the largest party in Parliament in 2023. The PVV’s success reflects broader anxieties about immigration, with the Netherlands hosting 2.9 million migrants (16.2 percent of the population) and facing a housing crisis that has been blamed on newcomers to the country.

But this isn’t a Dutch-specific story. Rather, this political trajectory mirrors a wider pattern unfolding throughout Europe. According to recent polling, Alternative for Germany (AfD), France’s National Rally, and Britain’s Reform UK are currently the most popular parties in their respective countries. This trend suggests that far-right parties can take Euroskeptic and anti-immigration stances and translate them into not just electoral legitimacy, but electoral success. This doesn’t, however, translate into an ability to govern. Far-right parties remain unreliable coalition partners, which Wilders’ 2025 withdrawal from government over immigration policy demonstrates. And in Germany, the “firewall” against the far right, which has prevented AfD from joining a governing coalition, holds. But right-wing populists continue to gain popularity, and that electoral strength continues to reshape mainstream politics. This has forced centrist parties rightward and normalized once-fringe positions on migration and national identity throughout Europe.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

How might the election redefine the Netherlands’ role in Europe’s economic and security order?

The Netherlands seems set to regain a stronger voice on the European scene after months of political paralysis since the government collapse. However, the shape of the next coalition will determine whether that voice is coherent or divided. The Dutch political system will likely remain quite fractured, but the Christian Democrats (CDA) could potentially return to power as it will likely be needed in any eventual coalition. If victorious, the CDA would likely anchor The Hague to Brussels and European politics. Built around the CDA, there might emerge a center-right or a center-left coalition. The former would potentially include the PVV, the liberal-democratic VVD (the party of former Prime Minister Mark Rutte), and JA21, a young center-right party. However, during the campaign, most parties ruled out cooperation with the PVV, which seems set to become the largest party. A CDA-based center-left coalition would likely include the left wing Green-Left-Labour party (GL-PvdA), headed by former European Commissioner Frans Timmermans, the progressive liberal-democratic D66, and probably at least one other party. However, even days before the vote, the outcome remains highly unpredictable.

Broader European and foreign policy issues have barely figured into the campaign. If the CDA returned to power, this would reinforce the Dutch relationship with the European Christian-Democratic network, which includes German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Nonetheless, as Dutch politics remain fractured, a CDA victory would not necessarily lead to greater European stability.

The Christian Democrats did signal openness to discuss Eurobonds, a longtime taboo for centrist and right-wing parties. Eurobonds would institute the issuing of common EU debt, which many see as an important means to finance the European defense buildup. A center-left coalition could spur Dutch forward movement on common debt. However, to a center-right coalition that includes the VVD, Eurobonds would remain a hard sell. The VVD remains opposed to issuing joint European debt even for financing Europe’s defense buildup, while the PVV no longer resists Eurobonds for defense spending. The VVD and the CDA have traditionally opposed Eurobonds, as they insist that fiscal reform and prudence is required in Europe, not more debt-financed fiscal flexibility. Much will depend on the individual who becomes finance minister, though all Dutch political parties subscribe to the need to strengthen European competitiveness, broadly embracing the recommendations of the Draghi report.

On security policy, a fundamental shift in the Dutch outlook from staunch Atlanticism to greater Europeanization can already be witnessed, for example in intelligence and defense cooperation. This structural change in Dutch foreign and security policy will most likely persist regardless of the outcome, but this shift would probably speed up under a center-left coalition. The Dutch remain strongly committed to NATO, and there are deep ties with the United States. However, the changing US role in world politics is forcing the Netherlands to readjust. Thus, if the CDA wins, expect a more Europeanist tone from The Hague, but few major foreign policy moves.

—Elmar Hellendoorn is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Who are the key parties to watch?

Party for Freedom (PVV)

Leader: Geert Wilders

European Parliament affiliation: Patriots for Europe (PfE)

The PVV leads the polls but is expected to lose some of the thirty-seven seats that it currently holds. The party’s campaign has focused on strict immigration reform, including a complete freeze on asylum claims, returning Syrians and male Ukrainian refugees to their home countries, and deploying the army for border control. It has blamed the housing crisis, the most potent issue in the election, on immigrants, and it plans to cut red tape to incentivize construction.

GroenLinks & Labour Party

Leader: Frans Timmermans

European Parliament affiliation: Socialists and Democrats (S&D) & Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)

GroenLinks-PvdA is an electoral alliance between the Netherlands’ preeminent environmentalist and center-left parties. Following its first-place finish in 2024’s European Parliament elections, the alliance is polling in second place in the upcoming Dutch parliamentary elections. The parties’ platform focuses on affordability and the stated goal of building 100,000 new homes per year, though they have not committed to guaranteeing this target. The coalition has also proposed introducing a cap on net migration to between 40,000 and 60,000 people a year.

Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)

Leader: Henri Bontenbal

European Parliament affiliation: European People’s Party (EPP)

Led by Henri Bontenbal, a relative newcomer in Dutch politics, the CDA has returned to prominence after years of political decline. The party has emphasized rebuilding trust and decency in politics, hoping that voters are seeking a return to normalcy. Its campaign platform includes promises to build new homes in “add-on neighborhoods,” create a “family-centered welfare state” with higher child benefits, and advance what it considers a middle-ground approach to migration and climate policy.

People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)

Leader: Dilan Yeşilgöz

European Parliament affiliation: Renew Europe (RE)

The party of Mark Rutte, the former prime minister and current NATO secretary general, the VVD is expected to lose seats this year as some voters feel it has tacked too far to the right. Its party platform has focused on lowering taxes for business owners, increasing financial benefits for workers, and increasing defense spending to 3.5 percent of gross domestic product.

Democrats 66 (D66)

Leader: Rob Jetten

European Parliament affiliation: Renew Europe (RE)

Led by former climate minister Rob Jetten, D66 has made strong gains in the polls in recent weeks. The party’s messaging has focused on tackling the housing crisis, with an ambitious plan to build ten new cities. One of these new cities, “IJstad,” is to be built on 9.65 square miles of land reclaimed from IJmeer lake between Amsterdam and Almere, contain 60,000 homes, and cost roughly €20 billion. It has also promised to phase out mortgage tax relief and use the revenue to lower income taxes.

Right Answer 2021 (JA21)

Leader: Joost Eerdmans

European Parliament affiliation: European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)

A populist spin-off party from the far-right Forum for Democracy (FvD) party, JA21 campaigns on reducing regulations, promoting entrepreneurship, and expanding direct democracy through binding referendums. JA21’s campaign promises include strict migration policies to ease demand for housing, increased funding for domestic security, and significant reductions to corporate taxes.

Campaign issues

Housing policy

Roughly half of Dutch voters view housing scarcity as the most important issue in the elections, as the country suffers from a shortage of 400,000 houses in a country of only 18 million people. Almost every party has made this issue a major part of their platform, but their approaches have differed greatly.

The PVV and JA21 have claimed that asylum seekers are the reason for the large shortages and have promised to increase housing supply by eliminating regulations that stifle construction. D66 leader Rob Jetten has committed to building 100,000 new homes a year, even as the outgoing government has consistently failed to meet this same target and is on track to build only 73,000 this year. CDA and VVD dropped their commitment to build 100,000 homes from their platforms, claiming that this promise would be impossible to keep. The CDA, GroenLinks-PvdA, and D66 have all pledged to phase out the mortgage interest deduction; meanwhile, the VVD has ruled out any changes to the benefit and said they won’t join a coalition with any party that plans to eliminate the deduction.

Immigration and asylum

Debates over immigration have dominated Dutch politics for years and played a large role in propelling the PVV to victory in 2023, but the issue has since lost some salience. Wilders has continued to call for a total halt to asylum-seekers entering the Netherlands, along with using the military to secure the border and closing recently opened centers for asylum seekers. VVD and JA21 have also taken hardline stances aimed at making the asylum process harder. Many other parties sought to moderate their positions on immigration, with the GL-PvdA seeking to cap net migration between 40,000 and 60,000 per year. GL-PvdA and D66 have also sought to protect labor migrants from exploitation.

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Milei’s economic plan meets its midterm test

Ignacio Albe — Thu, 23 Oct 2025 20:48:56 +0000

Argentina heads into its midterm legislative elections this Sunday with President Javier Milei’s economic program facing one of its most complex political and market challenges since he took office in December 2023. Despite praise for Milei in bringing inflation down, voters are concerned about a stalling economy, and markets are increasingly questioning the country’s current foreign exchange regime. At the same time, the United States has stepped in with a major swap line to provide liquidity to Argentina’s cash-strapped central bank.

At stake on Sunday is the government’s objective of securing at least one-third of the seats in both chambers of Congress, which would give the administration the ability to block veto-proof legislation on areas such as spending that could derail its economic plan. Given this complex environment, it’s worth a closer look at the state of Argentina’s economy in the run-up to the vote.

Assessing Argentina’s recovery

As I explained in an article I co-wrote in August, Argentina is emerging from a decade-long period of slow growth, during which the country experienced rampant inflation, capital flight, and a chronic inability to build its foreign exchange reserves. In December 2023, Milei came into office promising to steer the country away from that course. He began by slashing public spending, ending inflationary money creation, liberalizing the economy, and, most importantly for the current context, intervening in the country’s exchange rate.

The results were positive: The economy started to recover after an initial decline, investment began to move back in, and inflation fell from an annualized peak of almost 300 percent year-over-year in March 2024 to the current projection of 30 percent for 2025. Nevertheless, Argentina is confronting the side effects of its version of an “exchange rate-based stabilization program” with the resulting drag on growth.

These programs, in which a country props up its exchange rate as an anchor to curb inflation through foreign-exchange stability, tend to distort the economy by, for example, making exports more expensive and imports more affordable, harming the competitiveness of key sectors. Interest rates also tend to rise in these programs as governments offer higher returns on domestic-currency financial instruments to prevent selloffs. Argentina, with its valuation bands for the dollar set in April as part of its program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has been pursuing a light version of this approach, with direct and indirect mechanisms in place to keep the dollar within a slowly expanding range. Another collateral effect is that borrowing costs for businesses rise dampening growth. This has also been the case in recent months for Argentina, where rising borrowing costs, a deteriorating current account, and sectoral declines in areas such as industry and construction have flattened growth.

The economy is still expected to see strong growth this year. Just last week, the IMF estimated a real growth rate of 4.5 percent. But overall, the economy has stagnated, and public sentiment has worsened. Voters may be less concerned with inflation than they were, but they have become increasingly worried about growth. The government, however, has remained committed to its exchange policy, selling hundreds of millions of dollars in recent weeks to keep the value of the peso within the valuation bands. Such a selloff triggered alarms in September, as bondholders fretted over the loss of scarce reserves that the country needs to meet its mounting foreign debt obligations.

Here is where the exchange rate-based stabilization strategy kicked in, as the government had refused to buy dollars to accumulate reserves in recent months to prevent any pressure on the exchange rate. As a result, the central bank lacked the resources to meet a run on the peso and to reassure markets that dollar-denominated debt remained sustainable, fueling the crisis further.

The election, the swap, and the sustainability of public debt

Argentina has long experienced exchange rate volatility during elections as people seek to shelter their savings from uncertainty. The challenge is that, because the government decided to maintain relative control on the exchange rate into its second year, the country failed to accrue reserves and is now having to absorb the cost of exchange rate volatility with a limited toolkit. Although the US Treasury has now intervened directly by buying pesos to prop up the currency, this has so far failed to calm the market fully. Ultimately, it is likely that only the results of Sunday’s election will put an end to price uncertainty.

But another question has come up: Will Argentina be able to meet its upcoming debt obligations? That is where the discussion on the swap agreed with the US Treasury is headed, as the credit line, whose terms are secret, is increasingly discussed by both Argentina and the United States as a liquidity instrument for Argentina’s bond market. The country faces mounting debt repayment obligations in the coming years and, given that its net international reserves are still very limited, the US swap line has served as a mechanism to calm the markets.

Whether Argentina ends up activating the swap to repay creditors will depend on the government’s ability to rethink its exchange-rate policy and begin accruing reserves. If Argentina activates the swap and uses it to repay debt, then it will essentially exchange debt with creditors for new debt with the US Treasury. This new debt in turn would have its own consequent repayment risks if no reserve accumulation strategy is put in place, just as with the current concerns over the sustainability of debt to private creditors. It will also depend on the future direction of the market after the midterms, which may lead to different outcomes depending on a government victory or loss. If the government fails to secure a one-third minority and the opposition, led by the alliance of Fuerza Patria, wins the national vote, there will likely be more instability.

The day after the elections

On Monday, October 27, the markets will get their vote as they price in the results. At this point in Argentina, campaigning is over and all that the government can do is wait. In the meantime, while the US Treasury may intervene further in the peso market, the future of the US swap line will be decided in the weeks and months after that by the market’s willingness to provide Argentina with new credit to meet its external financing obligations.

Following the elections, the government will have an opportunity to move into a new phase of its economic plan, freeing the exchange rate and accruing reserves while working with allies in Argentina’s Congress to continue pushing reforms. It should move in this direction to fully free Argentina’s economy and to restart the engine of growth.

Ignacio Albe is a program assistant focusing on Argentina at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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How Moldova’s democracy succeeded against Russian interference

Olin L. Wethington — Thu, 23 Oct 2025 14:29:25 +0000

History is full of examples of small but determined forces valiantly fending off aggressors. The ancient Greco-Persian wars came to my mind in late September, when tiny Moldova used superior tactics, enlightened citizen-focused leadership, and the strong support of friends and allies to successfully resist intense Russian interference in historic parliamentary elections on September 28. This was a hard-fought, high-stakes election, in which competing parties believed that the future direction of Moldova—toward the European Union (EU) or Russia—was on the ballot. I witnessed this contest on the ground in Moldova as part of an international accredited election observation mission organized by the International Republican Institute, based in Washington, DC.

When the votes were counted, Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s governing Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), a pro-EU democratic party, won a majority of seats in parliament. With its win, the PAS defeated parties backed by Russia, which, according to Moldovan authorities, deployed intimidation tactics and an unprecedented number of resources in an attempt to disrupt Moldova’s democratic governance and halt its momentum toward EU accession. Russia’s alleged tactics included outright vote-buying, intense social media information warfare, cyberattacks, and training operatives to disrupt voting. Sandu publicly stated that Russia pumped hundreds of millions of euros—an enormous sum for a country of only 2.4 million people plus a voting diaspora of 300,000—into defeating her party.

Moldova’s September parliamentary elections had outsized geopolitical importance both because of the country’s strategic location and because of its success in strengthening ties with the West. Moldova lies along the eastern perimeter of NATO and the EU, and it borders Ukraine; its election management can be an example for its neighbor. Despite economic challenges, Russia’s substantial cutoff of gas supplies to Moldova, and Kremlin efforts to interfere in Moldova’s elections, Sandu has steadfastly maintained a pro-Europe, pro-Western political orientation.

To counter Russian interference, the PAS relied on a variety of tools and tactics—strategies that might work well in future elections for other parties and in other countries faced with a similar assault. These efforts were built around three goals:

Build trusting relationships. Since its founding in 2016, the PAS has worked to build citizens’ trust in government institutions and democratic processes. PAS leaders listened to Moldovans as they expressed a desire for peace and broad-based economic prosperity. At the same time, the PAS built long-term relationships with partners in Western democracies and learned from their training in political party development and campaign skills. The PAS also demonstrated its commitment to EU accession by holding a successful referendum in 2024 to enshrine the country’s EU aspirations in the Moldovan constitution. In a show of support, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited with Sandu in August to commemorate Moldovan Independence Day. Long-term US engagement across several presidential administrations was also a crucial component of the PAS’s success.

Eliminate systemic vulnerability. Since it first won a majority in parliament in July 2021, PAS has made important strides in addressing major vulnerabilities to the country. For example, Chișinău avoided a domestic energy crisis and potential political instability by moving quickly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to replace Russian gas with European energy, including new supplies from neighboring Romania. Moldova invested in cyber defense, including regulatory oversight of social media, to combat Russian disinformation. The country also cracked down on Russian efforts to foment instability ahead of the September parliamentary elections.

Prioritize shared prosperity. During the campaign, the PAS offered Moldovans a vision of a long-term viable economic alternative to dependence on the Russian economy. Critically, this future relies on EU accession and Moldova’s ultimate integration into the EU’s economic infrastructure including in trade in goods and energy, transportation, and telecommunications.

No one should doubt that Russia will continue, and even escalate, its hybrid efforts to hijack the democratic process in other countries. But Moldova’s September parliamentary elections hold lessons for the future of the country and that of its neighbors, including Ukraine.

Moldova’s recent experience demonstrates that countries committed to democracy and European alignment can triumph at the ballot box despite Russian tactics. Sustained, multilevel support from allies is vital to that success.

Last month, US President Donald Trump posted on social media that Ukraine is “in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form.” It should be added that Ukraine can also secure its democratic future, which is an important foundation for prosperity. When the war ends there will be elections in Ukraine, but even now, before the fighting stops, Kyiv should move to strengthen its democratic governance. Russia is likely to use many of the same tactics in Ukraine as it did this year in Moldova. And the elements of long-term democratic governance are unlikely to be built within the short period of a single political campaign.

Olin Wethington is a member of the International Republican Institute’s (IRI) Board of Directors and observed Moldova’s September 28, 2025, parliamentary elections as part of IRI’s accredited election observation mission.

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What Bolivia’s move to the center means for its economy, foreign policy, and security

Miguel Escoto — Tue, 21 Oct 2025 16:28:25 +0000

Bolivian politics underwent a massive shift on Sunday, as voters ended nearly two decades of left-wing rule by electing Rodrigo Paz Pereira of the Christian Democratic Party as president.

Primarily driven by a major economic crisis and distrust with the incumbent Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party, Bolivians have joined a regional shift away from leftist leadership. Yet, unlike the populist pendulum swings seen in neighboring Argentina and El Salvador, Bolivians appear to have chosen a more centrist and reformist path, rather than a far-right approach.

As Paz begins his five-year presidential term on November 8, expect to see shifts in the country’s approach to the economy, foreign policy, and security.

Who is Paz and why did he win?

Paz was born in exile in Spain. Son of former president Jaime Paz Zamora, he studied in Washington and was elected senator from Tarija, and later mayor of the city. Edman Lara, Paz’s running mate, also drew in support. A former police officer, he first made headlines in 2024 for calling out corruption within Bolivia’s law enforcement, leading to his removal.

Paz’s win comes after the incumbent MAS party lost the first-round elections on August 17. For the past two decades, MAS was one of South America’s most prominent parties under former President Evo Morales and then under incumbent President Luis Arce. But over time, Bolivians’ support for the party has waned as the country has dealt with economic crises and prominent MAS members have been implicated in scandals.

The rivalry between Arce and Morales fractured the MAS party, further damaging its electoral chances. Arce, suffering from some of the region’s lowest approval ratings, declined to run for reelection, claiming he didn’t want to further divide the vote and help a “right-wing candidate win.” His withdrawal ultimately contributed to the party’s collapse and Morales, who is term-limited from running for president again, motivated his followers to cast null votes to protest his absence from the ballot. In the first round, about 20 percent of votes were null. This signified somewhat diminished support for Morales, though the null ballots made up a much larger vote share than the MAS’s official candidate, Eduardo del Castillo.

The MAS party has also been hurt by scandals involving its members. For instance, in September, Felipe Cáceres, Bolivia’s former vice-minister of social defense and controlled substances under Morales, was detained after anti-narcotics authorities found a cocaine laboratory on his property. Cáceres’ arrest raised questions about potential links between Morales’s partners and connections to drug trafficking.

What might Paz mean for Bolivia’s economy?

Bolivia faces a major economic crisis and gas shortages that will require steady attention from the new administration. Annual inflation has reached 24 percent, and international reserves have plunged from around fifteen billion dollars in 2014 to under two billion dollars in 2024.

Paz’s campaign slogan was “capitalism for everyone,” promising to open markets while maintaining welfare programs. During the campaign, he spoke about his plans to secure US fuel supplies to stabilize the economy and appoint an envoy to strengthen US-Bolivia trade. He has met with US officials and oil and gas companies, arguing that these sources of supply would ease shortages that accelerated inflation and reduced production.

One issue to watch is lithium. Nearly 21 million metric tons of lithium reserves lie in the nation, giving Bolivia the opportunity to become a critical supplier in the global energy transition. The metal is also important for defense, technology, and telecommunications applications in global supply chains. Arce’s government signed several lithium deals with Chinese and Russian firms in the past two years, but progress has been slow and the terms of the contracts are opaque. Paz has said his administration would review these contracts, as well as enact a new law on lithium mining to improve environmental oversight and strengthen support for local workers. If done properly, it could open investment opportunities for Western and regional partners. These reforms may eventually help transform Bolivia from a state-run extractive economy to an important member of the clean energy supply chain.

How might Bolivia’s foreign policy change?

It is likely that a new diplomatic language will emerge from La Paz. In contrast to the outgoing MAS government’s support for the Maduro regime in Venezuela, Paz has said he would suspend, though not totally sever, ties with Caracas. For decades, Bolivia was one of Venezuela’s major political allies and this change could begin to reshape the political dynamics of the Latin American left. In addition, the United States may now have an opportunity to rebuild a partnership in the Andes to advance mutual commercial interests and fight against narcotrafficking.

As Bolivia is likely to strengthen ties with the United States and other South American countries such as Ecuador, Brazil, and Argentina, expect the country’s relations with Cuba and Iran to diminish. Nevertheless, the foreign ministry remains likely to prioritize pragmatism when it comes to trade and regional cooperation.

How might Bolivia’s approach to security change?

As Bolivia is a key transit route and supplier in the cocaine trade, the new administration may prioritize combating illicit markets by revitalizing intelligence sharing and cooperation with regional partners.

It’s expected that Paz will work to reduce crime by promoting rehabilitation and reintegration programs. He has also signaled that we would work to restore counternarcotics partnerships with the United States, an approach that Washington seems to welcome. On October 19, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the “United States stands ready to partner with Bolivia” on issues such as “combatting transnational criminal organizations to strengthen regional security.”

Although public trust in institutions is low, security is a top issue for Bolivians, and the new administration has an opportunity to make strides in this area. For years, the judiciary and law enforcement networks have undermined rule of law through politicization, but Paz’s administration could take steps to modernize the country’s justice system. Whether these initiatives succeed in combating corruption and promoting transparency will help determine whether Bolivia’s new chapter is structural shift or merely rhetorical one.

If Paz’s government can deliver greater economic resilience, institutional trust, and innovative foreign partnerships, Bolivia could emerge as an example of centrist stability in a region often viewed as turbulent. However, the new administration should take a slow and steady approach, as avoiding sudden shocks will be essential for Paz to maintain his mandate for reform.

Miguel Escoto is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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South and Southeast Asia are on the front lines of the democracy-autocracy showdown

Prakhar Sharma and Gauri Kaushik — Thu, 16 Oct 2025 22:15:54 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The region includes resilient, strained, fragile, and collapsed democracies—all benefit from democracy assistance that preserves civic space, delegitimizes authoritarian leaders, and protects free media across the region.
Key challenges include no-strings-attached Chinese financing, restrictions on political choice, and disinformation.
Protecting democratic institutions and practices can create governance stability and help the United States fortify important economic relationships.

download pdf

Introduction

How do democracies die? Not with a dramatic coup, but through quiet, intentional dismantling—rules bent just slightly, laws rewritten, oppositions discredited and then disarmed. This warning from political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt has proven prophetic across South and Southeast Asia, where the past decade has witnessed steady democratic erosion.

According to Freedom House’s 2025 assessments, nine countries across South and Southeast Asia registered net declines in political rights and civil liberties since 2015—including Cambodia, India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam—while others such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka saw modest improvements. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute also reports significant declines in the Electoral Democracy Index scores of several countries in the region in recent years. This trend underscores that even seemingly stable democracies can undergo serious erosion of their democratic institutions.

Yet the pattern is not uniform. From Indonesia’s institutional resilience to Myanmar’s military collapse, the region reflects not a single arc but a mosaic of democratic experiences—some unraveling, others resisting, many caught in an uneasy limbo. To make sense of these divergent patterns, this paper outlines four broad categories of country cases—not intended to simplify, but to reflect recurring traits: democracies that have held firm under pressure (resilient democracies); those that appear intact but are internally weakening (strained democracies); those whose institutions exist in name more than practice (fragile democracies); and those where the democratic practice has been openly dismantled (collapsed democracies).

With nearly 2.8 billion inhabitants, South and Southeast Asia are on the front line in the contest between liberal and authoritarian governance models. China’s state-led modernization offers an appealing, albeit illiberal template. Russia and other powers lend not just rhetorical support but operational tools to repress, manipulate, and surveil. The region’s democratic trajectory will carry implications far beyond its borders. As democracy is tested and redefined here, the terms of legitimacy, resistance, and political belonging across much of the world will be as well.

Resilient democracies

Despite facing similar pressures as their neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia have managed to preserve their democratic institutions through a combination of judicial independence, active civil society, and political cultures that still value competitive elections. Their resilience offers lessons for other countries grappling with authoritarian pressures.

Malaysia

Malaysia has demonstrated remarkable democratic resilience through successive political transitions, most significantly during the watershed 2018 elections that ended Barisan Nasional’s sixty-one-year grip on power.[i] Despite the political instability that followed—including the controversial “Sheraton Move” parliamentary reconfiguration and three changes in premiership between 2020 and 2022—constitutional processes prevailed, ultimately yielding a durable unity government under Anwar Ibrahim after the 2022 elections. This political settlement between former adversaries reflects a maturing democratic culture where coalition-building efforts trumped winner-takes-all politics. While Malaysia continues to navigate challenges including ethnic and religious polarization, endemic corruption networks, and institutional legacies from its semi-authoritarian past, its judiciary has increasingly asserted independence in landmark cases, most notably in upholding the conviction of former Prime Minister Najib Razak.[iii] Civil society organizations maintain active oversight of governance, even as authorities occasionally employ outdated sedition laws to restrict political expression. Malaysia’s capacity to weather multiple leadership crises while preserving core democratic institutions stands in sharp contrast to the authoritarian regression evident elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Indonesia

The fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998 ushered in democratic reforms in Indonesia, leading to multiple peaceful transfers of power. In February 2024, former General Prabowo Subianto, Suharto’s controversial ex-son-in-law, won the presidency in an election widely considered competitive, despite concerns over the outsized influence of his predecessor, Joko Widodo. Provincial and regional elections in November further demonstrated Indonesia’s commitment to regular electoral processes. While Indonesia largely operates within democratic rules, it continues to grapple with systemic corruption and restrictions on religious freedom. Although the constitution guarantees religious freedom, only six religions are officially recognized, and blasphemy laws are enforced, leaving religious minorities vulnerable to discrimination. These challenges reflect enduring tensions within the country’s democracy. Nevertheless, civil society continues to play an essential role in defending democratic norms. In recent months, rushed legislative processes and Subianto’s appointment of an active general to a civilian post prompted mass student protests demanding transparency, demonstrating continued public engagement and resistance in Indonesia.

Strained democracies

India and the Philippines reveal a troubling paradox: Even countries with deep democratic traditions can experience significant erosion while maintaining competitive elections. Their struggles show that democracy’s survival depends not just on electoral competition, but on protecting the institutions that make elections meaningful.

India

Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s election in 2014, India has experienced rising Hindu nationalism, communal tensions, and constraints on civil liberties, alongside a concentration of executive power and weakened checks and balances. Communal violence has increased rapidly; in 2024, there were fifty-nine communal riots, an 84 percent increase from 2023. Media freedom has deteriorated, with increased censorship of content critical of Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), such as a BBC documentary and films depicting the 2002 Gujarat riots. Independent journalism is under attack, and civil society groups have been targeted through funding cuts and mass shutdowns.

In the face of these threats, India’s democratic institutions have shown resilience. The 2024 general elections, which were peacefully conducted with over 640 million voters, were widely regarded as free and fair. Although Modi secured a third term, the BJP underperformed, losing sixty-three seats and failing to secure a parliamentary majority. While the BJP’s platform centered religious nationalism, voters prioritized local issues, reflecting the enduring strength of India’s electoral processes.

The Philippines

The Philippines has experienced significant political and human rights challenges in recent years. Under the populist and illiberal administration of former President Rodrigo Duterte, the country witnessed thousands of extrajudicial killings linked to a brutal drug war. Democratic institutions weakened rapidly, and critics in the judiciary were forced out as the Supreme Court began backing the executive. While the Philippines has a historically strong and diverse civil society, civic space and the media environment were suppressed through regulations, censorship, intimidation, and disinformation.

In 2022, Duterte was succeeded by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. Although human rights have improved slightly under the current president, over 840 extrajudicial killings have occurred since he took office. Duterte’s March 2025 arrest in Manila on an International Criminal Court warrant exacerbated the tense divide between Marcos Jr. and Vice President Sara Duterte ahead of the May midterm elections. While competitive, the elections exposed institutional vulnerabilities and were marked by aggressive disinformation campaigns, concerns about Chinese interference, and deep polarization. The government continues to bring unfounded cases against civil society groups, and “red-tagging” (i.e., accusing individuals and groups of communist sympathies) persists, exposing people to harassment and violence. Despite these threats, civil society remains active, criticizing injustices, advocating for reforms, and fighting for accountability.

Fragile democracies

Bangladesh and Pakistan remain caught between democratic aspirations and authoritarian realities. While their institutions remain weak and elections flawed, the persistence of civil society activism and public demands for accountability suggest that democratic possibilities have not been extinguished.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh is amid a pivotal political transition following the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. Hasina’s fifteen-year rule and the Awami League’s (AL) increasingly autocratic administration ended after mass student protests and were replaced by an unelected interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. Although Yunus has pledged democratic reforms and elections, his administration continues to exhibit some of the authoritarian tendencies seen under Hasina. AL supporters, who once dominated Bangladeshi politics and suppressed opposition, now face similar harassment under the interim government and its allies.

Despite the erosion of civil liberties and democratic institutions under the AL, Bangladesh’s economy averaged healthy annual growth of 6.5 percent. However, following the political instability in 2024, foreign investments plummeted, inflation rose, and gross domestic product growth fell below 2 percent per annum. Meanwhile, the interim government has repeatedly postponed the promised elections, likely into 2026, raising concerns. Bangladesh’s democratic transition remains uncertain, with potential for either progression or regression. Opposition leaders have pushed for timely elections; this, along with economic and political reform, will be vital to sustaining the country’s democratic aspirations.

Pakistan

Pakistan’s persistent civil-military imbalance continues to hinder democratic prospects, with the military maintaining an outsized influence over the government. Judicial activism can act as a counterbalance, as Pakistan’s judiciary maintains remarkable independence despite the entrenchment of the military. Yet the assertiveness of the judiciary may also be a double-edged sword, increasing institutional competition and instability.

Although the majority voted against the military establishment during the 2024 elections, the military continues to act as a veto power. Recent attempts to manipulate election outcomes, such as the rejection of former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s nomination papers, stripping his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), of its electoral symbol, and manipulating vote counts, were reminiscent of military-engineered elections in the 1990s. However, the failure of these interventions in 2024 has revealed vulnerabilities in the military’s grip, signaling the persistence of democratic aspirations and potential shifts in power dynamics.

Collapsed democracies

Myanmar and Cambodia demonstrate how quickly democratic gains can be reversed when authoritarian forces consolidate power. External support from China and Russia has made these reversals more durable, showing that democracy’s enemies are increasingly coordinated across borders.

Myanmar

Myanmar’s democratic experiment ended abruptly with the February 2021 military coup, which deposed the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi and precipitated the country’s descent into widespread conflict. By early 2025, the junta’s territorial control had contracted dramatically, with large areas now governed by a patchwork of ethnic armed organizations and People’s Defense Forces aligned with the National Unity Government (NUG) operating from exile. The military has responded with escalating brutality—deploying airstrikes against civilian populations, systematically torturing political detainees, and implementing scorched-earth campaigns in areas of resistance—resulting in over 5,000 civilian deaths and forcing more than 2.5 million into displacement since the coup. Elections promised by the military have been repeatedly deferred, while Suu Kyi’s detention was extended for an additional two years in January 2025 through transparently politicized corruption charges. International engagement has fragmented along geopolitical lines, with Western nations strengthening sanctions and extending recognition to the NUG while China, Russia, and Thailand maintain pragmatic relations with the junta. Myanmar represents the region’s most catastrophic democratic collapse, transforming from an imperfect but functioning electoral democracy into a failing state characterized by civil conflict, economic implosion, and humanitarian catastrophe.

Cambodia

Cambodia’s democratic prospects continue to fade under the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), now led by Hun Manet, who succeeded his father, Hun Sen, after uncompetitive elections in July 2023. Cambodian elections have been widely recognized as rigged, with international observers documenting widespread irregularities, fraud, and vote tampering. The disqualification of the main opposition party, the Candlelight Party, over alleged registration issues effectively dismantled meaningful electoral competition. The regime has become increasingly repressive, targeting critics like environmental and human rights activists through arbitrary arrests and forced disappearances.

The CPP has also cracked down on independent media by revoking licenses and censoring critical media outlets. China’s growing influence in Cambodia has further entrenched the CPP’s authoritarian rule, as it provides economic support and political backing. As Cambodia’s largest investor, trading partner, and donor, China has been able to exert considerable sway over the administration’s policies, and Cambodia has aligned more closely with Beijing’s foreign policy interests. Without democratic alternatives to China’s influence and aid, this dynamic will leave little room for democratic renewal in Cambodia.

Cross-cutting challenges

Across South and Southeast Asia’s varied political systems, certain challenges repeatedly surface that make democratic governance more challenging regardless of a country’s context. Four of these challenges are particularly salient.

Digital authoritarianism and the rewiring of civic space: The early hopes that digital tools might democratize information have been overtaken by a more sobering reality. Across the region, states now wield surveillance, censorship, and algorithmic distortion not as exceptions but as deft instruments of coercive control. India has deployed surveillance of online speech; Cambodia has centralized digital infrastructure control; and the Philippines has blurred state messaging and disinformation. These tools are part of a broader architecture of control, quietly redefining the limits of dissent and the shape of public discourse.

China’s model and strategic recalibration: Beijing’s growing regional presence offers political elites a convenient alternative: stability without pluralism, growth without accountability, an undemocratic form of social contract. Chinese financing arrives without governance conditions and provides diplomatic cover against international scrutiny. Increasingly, the Chinese Communist Party also engages subnational actors—both governmental and nongovernmental—where scrutiny is weaker and institutional vulnerabilities are more pronounced. In Cambodia and Myanmar, this support has emboldened autocratic actors; in more open settings, it narrows strategic space for democratic engagement. Democracy assistance must contend with an emerging geopolitical reality that favors regime durability over democratic deepening.

Developmental absolutism and the erosion of political choice: Democratic rollback is increasingly justified through development discourse. Leaders frame electoral mandates as licenses for centralized control while dismissing institutional checks as inefficiencies. In India and Bangladesh, majoritarian governance is defended as a prerequisite for growth; in Thailand and Singapore, technocratic authority substitutes for political deliberation. The result is marginalization of political choice, overtaken conveniently by performance-based legitimacy.

‘Information disorder and the fragility of shared reality: Across the region, democratic discourse is being reshaped by disinformation; algorithmic self-fulfilling echo chambers; and digitally amplified hate, especially through WhatsApp. In Myanmar, online propaganda fueled ethnic violence; in India and the Philippines, deepfakes and coordinated misinformation campaigns distort elections. The fundamental problem is the collapse of shared language through which citizens might contest, interpret, or imagine their politics. Democratic institutions cannot function when the conditions for contestation of ideas have eroded.

Policy recommendations

US government support for democracy should be targeted and responsive to the different realities of the countries within each of these categories. For instance, countries experiencing democratic breakdown need different support than those still defending democratic space or those working to deepen democratic quality.

For resilient democracies: Deepening democratic quality

Democratic resilience, while encouraging, should not be mistaken for consolidation. In countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, support should move beyond preserving existing norms to actively strengthening democratic infrastructure. Fast-tracked visas for civil society leaders—across regime types—could facilitate regional mentorship networks through which democratic lessons diffuse more organically, especially when those lessons emerge from other Asian contexts rather than transatlantic ones. Bilateral trade agreements can be made contingent on demonstrable gains in press freedom and judicial independence. Cross-border investigative journalism, jointly supported by local and international media, can expose corruption networks that threaten institutional integrity.

For strained democracies: Defending democratic space

Where democratic institutions are under strain—as they evidently are in India and the Philippines—US government support must focus on preserving the civic space and avoiding normalization of authoritarian tactics. It should avoid high-level engagement with leaders who are actively involved in prosecuting journalists and/or silencing dissent, even if technical cooperation continues in parallel. Development aid can be redirected from compromised central agencies toward subnational governments that are overtly committed to democratic norms. Targeted sanctions against individuals involved in judicial capture or media repression can also send clear signals of accountability.

For fragile democracies: Building institutional resilience

In fragile democracies like Bangladesh and Pakistan, where institutions exist but often lack independence and/or depth, the priority should be to rebuild credibility. International financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund, should tie future programs to transparent constitutional processes that include the opposition’s participation. Funding for civil society-run parallel election observation/monitoring programs can strengthen integrity where official mechanisms fall short. Regional judicial networks can provide both technical assistance and normative pressure to bolster court independence and resist political interference.

For collapsed democracies: Supporting democratic resistance

Where constitutional order has collapsed—as in Myanmar and Cambodia—support must shift toward those still defending democratic legitimacy. Recognition and funding should be extended to exiled national unity governments and aligned civil society organizations that retain public trust. “Democracy visa” pathways can offer protection and continuity for endangered journalists and activists. Financial sanctions should be imposed on military units and regime-linked families responsible for repression, thus reinforcing pathways for international legal accountability.

Addressing cross-cutting challenges

Support secure communication tools and digital literacy to push back against growing digital authoritarianism. Offer faster, transparent infrastructure financing to counter China’s influence while underscoring the material benefits of democracy. Sponsor and fund research that links transparency to economic growth, and support business coalitions that champion the rule of law. Strengthen civic education and fact-checking efforts to resist disinformation and restore shared civic ground. Partner with regional democracies—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia—to jointly support democratic actors across South and Southeast Asia. Such coordination not only amplifies reach but also serves as a visible and forceful counterweight to China’s expanding illiberal influence.

Conclusion

The Cold War model of supporting elections and civil society organizations, while still important, cannot possibly address the sophisticated ways that elected leaders employ to dismantle democratic institutions from within. We need a differentiated approach that recognizes the distinct challenges facing countries at different points along the democratic spectrum while addressing the cross-cutting pressures that undermine democratic governance across the region. Democracy assistance must evolve beyond its traditional fixation on electoral processes. Instead of just funding election monitors and civil society training, donors should condition trade agreements on improvements in press freedom, invest in secure communication technologies for activists, and support independent judiciaries through targeted capacity-building programs. Without these foundations, electoral democracy remains symbolic. The future of democracy in South and Southeast Asia will not only shape national destinies. It will quietly, but decisively, alter how the world understands power, legitimacy, and the meaning of democratic resilience. This is where the United States must lead—not only with aid dollars, but also with the political will to make democratic governance a nonnegotiable component of its economic partnerships.

about the authors

Prakhar Sharma is a public policy researcher with more than eighteen years of experience in democratic governance and fragile states. He completed his PhD in political science at Syracuse University. Sharma was a senior specialist at the International Republican Institute, and has advised US government institutions, multilateral organizations, and Afghan partners on conflict and state-building.

Gauri Kaushik holds a master’s degree from Georgetown University in democracy and governance, where she focused on democratic and security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. She has worked on democracy assistance and development programs at organizations including the National Democratic Institute and Democracy International.

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Putin’s Moldova election failure highlights Russia’s declining influence

Kateryna Odarchenko — Sat, 04 Oct 2025 21:46:36 +0000

Moldova’s recent parliamentary election was widely billed as a straight choice between rival European and Russian trajectories, with the Kremlin accused of unprecedented interference in a bid to sway the vote in Moscow’s favor.

On the eve of the election, many commentators believed a Russian success was possible. In fact, the final result was not even close. The pro-European party of Moldovan President Maia Sandu emerged as the clear winner, securing a decisive victory with a little over 50 percent of the vote. Meanwhile, the pro-Kremlin party led by former Moldovan president Igor Dodon was left far behind on 24 percent.

This strong result for Moldova’s pro-European camp represents a major setback for the Kremlin. Crucially, it underscores the challenges Putin faces as he seeks to influence elections and reassert Russian dominance over countries once ruled from the Kremlin at a time when the invasion of Ukraine has raised serious questions about Moscow’s ability to project power throughout its former empire.

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Russia is said to have invested heavily in the recent campaign to shape the outcome of Moldova’s election. This included everything from financial incentives to disinformation campaigns. A BBC investigation found evidence of a Russian-funded network that paid people to post fake news online and organize rigged polls showing inflated levels of support for pro-Kremlin parties.

Social media was a key battleground in the Kremlin’s efforts to interfere in the election. Information warfare watchdogs claim Russia recruited operatives locally and employed AI technologies to create large quantities of fake accounts and flood Moldovan social media platforms with disinformation attacking President Sandu and her political party.

The scale of Russia’s efforts caused considerable alarm in Chisinau. Days before the vote, Sandu accused the Kremlin of spending hundreds of millions of euros on an election interference campaign in order to buy votes and “intoxicate” the Molodvan electorate with misleading and often inflammatory online content.

The Moldovan authorities also uncovered evidence of illicit financing including undeclared cash flows and cryptocurrency schemes. Just two days before the vote, Moldova’s Central Electoral Commission barred one pro-Kremlin party from running following a court ruling over allegations of voter bribery, illegal party financing, and money laundering.

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Russia’s attempt to sway the elections in Moldova ultimately failed. The reasons for this failure are instructive. Moldova’s state institutions deserve credit for displaying impressive vigilance and resolve. This included enforcing election campaign financing laws, acting to counter disinformation, and communicating clearly with the electorate.

Moscow’s plans may also have been undermined by corruption among those entrusted with the task of interfering in the Moldovan election. Some of the Kremlin’s local partners allegedly pocketed cash themselves rather than paying for influence operations or using allocated funds to bribe potential voters.

The decisive role was played by the Moldovan electorate. Despite Russia’s extensive efforts to discredit the pro-European camp with all manner of lurid fakes and conspiracy theories, Sandu’s electoral platform of European integration, transparency, and reform received majority backing from the Moldovan public.

This overwhelming pro-European victory highlighted modern Russia’s lack of a coherent ideology or convincing counter-narrative. While Kremlin operatives are experts in the dark arts of negative campaigning, they struggle to offer anything that can compete with the undeniable appeal of democratic rights, higher living standards, and the rule of law.

Moldova’s election is a case study in the limits of Russian interference operations. Moscow invested considerable resources in the campaign, but was ultimately unable to overcome the country’s institutional safeguards or persuade enough Moldovan voters to turn against the ruling authorities.

The lessons from Moldova seem clear: Russian election interference operations represent a genuine and persistent threat to all democratic countries and need to be taken seriously. However, as the Moldovan experience has demonstrated, an informed electorate, resilient democratic systems, and vigilant law enforcement can blunt even large-scale Kremlin campaigns.

Moldova is now in a strong position to advance further along the path toward European integration. This is also good news for Ukraine, which would have faced the prospect of a possible new front in the war with Russia if pro-Kremlin forces had won control of the Moldovan parliament. For Moscow, meanwhile, the vote was one more indication that Russia is losing influence throughout the former Soviet Empire and is struggling to compete with the more compelling ideas of its democratic opponents.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

Elections for the Czech Republic’s Chamber of Deputies are held every four years. The Czech Republic employs a proportional representation system in which all two hundred deputies are elected on open lists in the country’s fourteen electoral regions. To be eligible for seats, a single party must earn 5 percent of the national vote, coalitions of two parties must earn 8 percent, and coalitions of three or more parties must earn 11 percent of the vote. Voting will take place over the course of two days: the mornings of Friday, October 3, and Saturday, October 4.

—Eva Mulholland is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Who is Andrej Babiš?

Babiš leads the populist party ANO. ANO has undergone ideological shifts over time, making it difficult to pinpoint the party as right-wing or left-wing. But it is currently aligned with the far-right, Euroskeptic, and nationalist Patriots for Europe group in the European Parliament. It is best characterized as antiestablishment, and the party’s platform often combines policies from both ends of the political spectrum. Babiš is a wealthy businessman turned politician who has been called “the Czech Donald Trump.” He has led ANO since 2011 and was first elected to Parliament in 2013, serving as first deputy prime minister and minister of finance. He then became prime minister after ANO decisively won the 2017 parliamentary elections with 30 percent of the vote on an anti-immigrant, anti-corruption, antiestablishment platform. Babiš has been implicated in numerous corruption scandals, including for the alleged misuse of EU subsidies related to his farm known as “Stork’s Nest,” and allegedly purchasing a French Riviera estate using offshore companies. Despite these scandals, Babiš remains popular and has led in the polls since the beginning of the campaign cycle.

—Eva Mulholland

How do Czechs view the incumbent government?

Polls suggest that the outgoing Czech prime minister, Petr Fiala, is one of Europe’s least popular leaders, failing to win the trust of a staggering 77 percent of Czechs. He has adopted some unpopular measures, such as hiking taxes and pursuing efforts at fiscal consolidation. His pro-Ukraine stance has also been weaponized against him by his political opponents at home. His low approval rating has been interpreted as more the result of failed political communication than the government’s actual performance. Fiala’s government has pursued policies of restraint at a time when many of his Central European counterparts have opted for expediency and bombast.

Abroad, Prague was among the most stalwart defenders of a pro-Western orientation in Central Europe and a dependable partner in NATO and the EU. At home, the administration aggressively pursued fiscal health and delivered on its promise of energy autonomy from Russia by ending its pipeline gas dependence on Moscow in January. Fiala’s administration also managed energy prices by providing targeted assistance to industry. This stands in contrast to the populist policies, such as household energy support, rolled out by the leaders of Slovakia and Hungary, which put the health of their economies on the line to win votes.

But this approach of prudent governance has failed to register with ordinary citizens, empowering ANO and fringe parties, including ones advocating for the Czech Republic to leave the EU, such as the Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party. Centrist leaders who deliver responsible policies often find themselves undone by their inability—or unwillingness—to seize the narrative, ceding ground to the emotional immediacy of populists and fringe parties to the detriment of hard-won democratic and economic advances.

—Sona Muzikarova is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

How did we get here?

What does this election mean for the Czech Republic’s Euro-Atlantic future?

The parliamentary elections pit the incumbent liberals/centrists against populist, inward-looking, and nationalist political parties. The populist and nationalist parties hold an edge, reflecting dissatisfaction with economic conditions and other domestic issues.

An ANO victory would mark another success by illiberal political forces in Europe. This does not mean that the Czech Republic would join Hungary as a supporter of Russia. For one thing, Petr Pavel, the Czech Republic’s pro-Ukraine, pro-Western president, has some agency over who gets a mandate to form the next government. Babiš has a reputation as sufficiently pragmatic (or cynical) to downplay his Ukraine-skeptic and NATO-skeptic views in the interest of taking power again. Moreover, knowledgeable Czech friends tell me that a grand coalition between ANO and Spolu, the centrist ruling coalition, is possible depending on the final results. Still, if an ANO-led government were to take power, the Czech Republic might no longer play an active role in supporting Ukraine, as it has until now.

Thirty-five years after overthrowing communism, politics in the Czech Republic has become like that in other European countries: restive, with room for parties on the far right and far left to grow. Their ability to do so, in the Czech Republic and elsewhere, reflects popular dissatisfaction with economic prospects and other domestic issues, despite astonishing economic growth in the country since 1989.

—Daniel Fried is the Atlantic Council’s Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow and a former US ambassador to Poland.

What are the parties to watch?

ANO

Leader: Andrej Babiš

European Parliament group: Patriots for Europe (co-founded by Babiš)

What is ANO? ANO represents a populist, Euroskeptic, and national conservative choice for Czech voters. Babiš has been critical of the current government on many fronts, particularly on its support for Ukraine and on immigration policies.

Campaign promises:

– Lower energy costs and nationalize ČEZ, the Czech Republic’s largest corporate supplier of energy

– Raise pensions, lower the retirement age, raise salaries, and cut corporate taxes

– Reevaluate the EU’s influence on Czech domestic and foreign policy

– Preserve Czech sovereignty and the Czech currency, the Koruna

Campaign platform:

– Participation in the EU and NATO, but with a focus on Czech national interests

– Defense of national sovereignty within the EU

Spolu Coalition (Civic Democrats, TOP 09, Christian Democrats)

Leader: Petr Fiala

European Parliament group: European People’s Party / European Conservatives and Reformists

What is Spolu? Spolu is the current ruling coalition, comprised of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), TOP 09, and KDU-ČSL. Fiala is one of the EU’s most unpopular leaders, with an approval rating of less than 30 percent.

Campaign promises:

– Raise Czech defense spending toward NATO’s new 5 percent target and continue support for Ukraine

– Reduce the national debt

– Reduce regulatory barriers for companies and provide support for entrepreneurs

Campaign platform:

– Ensuring a democratic future for the Czech Republic

– Maintaining Czech participation within the EU and NATO

– Resistance against populism and extremism within the Czech Republic and EU

Motorists for Themselves (Motoristé sobě)

Leader: Petr Macinka

European Parliament Group: Patriots for Europe

What is Motoristé sobě? Motoristé sobě adopts a right-wing populist, Euroskeptic platform. The party focuses on issues related to motorists, opposes green policies, and advocates national sovereignty.

Campaign promises:

– Opposition to a ban on combustion engines and the introduction of emissions restrictions

Campaign platform:

– Opposition to green policies and emissions permits

– Preservation of Czech sovereignty

– Skepticism of the EU

Czech Pirate Party

Leader: Zdeněk Hřib

European Parliament Group: Greens/European Free Alliance

What is the Czech Pirate Party? The Czech Pirate Party is a progressive, pro-European party. The party had formerly been the fifth member of the ruling coalition but left in 2024 after Fiala proposed the dismissal of Czech Pirate Party member and Regional Development and Digitization Minister Ivan Bartoš.

Campaign promises:

– Provision of affordable housing with a plan to construct 200,000 new homes

– Provide support for families through tax cuts and implementing higher parental allowances

– Ensure security through the EU and NATO

– Provide support for entrepreneurs and enact flexible employment rules

Campaign platform:

– Ensuring economic equality through tax reform

– Fighting corruption and extremism while integrating advanced technologies into public services

– Ensuring equitable healthcare access to people of all identities and socioeconomic statuses

Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD)

Leader: Tomio Okamura

European Parliament Group: European Sovereign Nations

What is Freedom and Direct Democracy? SPD is a far-right alliance between the Trikolóra, Svobodní, and PRO parties, centered around anti-immigration and Euroskeptic policies. Party leader Tomio Okamura is currently facing up to three years in prison on charges of incitement of hatred, after launching a controversial anti-immigration poster and billboard campaign in the run-up to regional elections.

Campaign promises:

– Prevent illegal immigration and oppose the EU Migration Pact

– Propose a referendum on leaving the EU and NATO

– Institute direct democracy, including by passing a law on referenda and recall elections

Campaign platform:

– Criticism of the current government, the Green Deal, financial aid to Ukraine, and the EU Migration Pact

– Opposition to Western institutions and policies

Stačilo!

Leader: Kateřina Konečná

European Parliament Group: Non-attached

What is Stačilo!? Stačilo! is a left-wing populist alliance between the Communist Party, ČSNS, SD-SN, Social Democrats, and others. The alliance has communist roots and adopts nationalist, Euroskeptic policies. Its platform opposes both the center-right government and ANO, promoting national sovereignty and social justice.

Campaign promises:

– Provision of healthcare for all, with a focus on support for the traditional family

-End economic dependence on the EU through the nationalization of strategic infrastructure, protecting the Czech currency, and creating a state-guaranteed pension system

– Leave NATO and the EU

– Cancel the purchase of F-35 fighter jets

Campaign platform:

– Opposition to Czech membership in NATO

– Rejection of reliance on the EU

Mayors and Independents (STAN)

Leader: Vít Rakušan

European Parliament Group: European People’s Party

What is Mayors and Independents? STAN is a centrist, pro-European party that has cooperated with the Spolu coalition to lead the Czech government. The party’s priorities include instituting greater local governance and increasing decentralization.

Campaign promises:

– Support entrepreneurship and innovation to strengthen the job market

– Ensure efficient public administration to provide affordable housing, improved public transportation, rural development, and an effective education system

– Ensure public safety through the protection of the environment, accessible healthcare, and security through Western institutions

Campaign platform:

– Ensure good quality of life for all Czechs, from big cities to the rural countryside

– Continue to collaborate with the West in the EU and NATO

What are the top issues for voters?

Immigration

Immigration policies are a major concern for Czech voters. A poll released in August found that about 50 percent of Czechs view the arrival of foreign nationals as a problem for the country, with nearly half of the respondents believing that migrants pose health risks and contribute to higher crime rates. Ukrainian refugees are a particularly divisive issue. The Czech Republic hosts the highest number of Ukrainian refugees per capita in the EU and the third-highest overall. While 52 percent of Czechs support granting asylum to Ukrainians, 58 percent believe the country has already accepted too many. Additionally, 40 percent of respondents said they tolerate Ukrainians but are weary of their presence, and 60 percent incorrectly believe that Ukrainians take more money from the state than they contribute.

The economy

After several difficult years, the Czech economy returned to growth in 2024, with real gross domestic product rising by 1.1 percent. Continued growth is expected at a rate of 1.9 percent in 2025. While domestic demand has been the main driver, the external environment remains uncertain, and net exports are projected to weigh negatively on growth. Headline inflation is forecast at 2.2 percent in 2025, down slightly from 2.4 percent in 2024.

Despite this relatively favorable outlook, in a poll released last November, only 20 percent of Czechs viewed the country’s economic prospects positively, while 45 percent described the situation as poor. According to the Spring 2025 Eurobarometer, rising prices, inflation, and the cost of living were the top concerns, cited by 34 percent of respondents as the most pressing issues. The overall economic situation (21 percent) and government debt (19 percent) followed as the next most important challenges.

Ukraine

While support for Ukraine remains relatively strong in the Czech Republic, continued support for Kyiv has been a major issue during this election cycle. In a poll released in February, 44 percent of respondents reported support for Ukraine. However, 67 percent were concerned that the conflict will continue for multiple years, and 55 percent were concerned that the conflict will expand into a war between Russia and NATO. Czechs are also subject to misinformation about Ukrainian refugees and the war effort. In a study conducted by the Central European Digital Media Observatory, 53 percent of respondents found it credible that Ukrainians had brought whooping cough into the Czech Republic and 39 percent found it credible that the commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces had called for an uprising against the Ukrainian government.

Jack Muldoon, a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, contributed to the graphics and background research for this article.

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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Moldova’s pro-EU ruling party won despite Russian interference. Now what?

Atlantic Council — Mon, 29 Sep 2025 16:49:03 +0000

JUST IN

Europe for the win. Moldova’s ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won a parliamentary majority in Sunday’s national elections, in an outcome widely viewed as affirming the country’s pro-European Union (EU) direction under President Maia Sandu. The elections followed a campaign marked by efforts from the Kremlin to undermine the PAS and aid pro-Russian candidates. What’s next for Moldova’s EU accession path? And how will Russia and Moldova’s pro-Kremlin elements respond to this geopolitical setback? Our experts provide their insights below.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

John E Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
Victoria Olari (@Olari_Victoria): Research associate for Moldova at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab
Alex Șerban: Senior advisor for the Atlantic Council’s Romania Office and nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative

A ‘historic’ outcome

With the PAS outperforming pre-election polls, “the impact of this election will be historic,” says John, who recently visited the capital Chișinău. Given Sandu’s “rock solid” commitment to reforms, her party “should be able to pass the legislation needed to deliver EU membership,” he says.
“The outcome is unequivocal” as a signal of the country’s pro-Western direction, says Victoria. “PAS not only dominated among the diaspora, as in the presidential elections, but also placed first in most districts across the country, giving it broad legitimacy,” she says, adding that other pro-European parties also will enter parliament, a sign that the “overwhelming share” of Moldovans want a European future.
Alex notes that, in addition to Russian meddling, the PAS also overcame domestic challenges: “Despite unpopular economic measures and criticism over slow rule-of-law reforms, voters again endorsed the European path.”

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The Kremlin falls short

Because of the ruling party’s orientation toward Europe and away from Russia, “Moscow not only backed multiple parties in the election but used its full bag of dirty tricks to try to block a victory for the PAS,” says John.
The pro-Russian parties’ electoral defeat was a “a sharp rebuke to Moscow’s influence operations,” Victoria tells us. She points to evidence of Russia spending hundreds of millions of dollars; disinformation spreading across TikTok, Facebook, and Telegram; accusations of electoral corruption; and intensifying cyberattacks. Despite all this, “Russia failed to sway the Moldovan vote,” she writes.
Another one of the Kremlin’s efforts to sway the vote was calling for mass protests if the PAS won. This plan, “has already been launched,” says John. Igor Dodon, leader of the pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc, “did not wait for the first returns to come in to publicly declare that he had actually won the elections.” He led a demonstration outside the parliament building on Monday, which reportedly drew about one hundred protesters.

What’s next?

Leaders across the continent were quick to congratulate the PAS on its victory and express their support for Moldova’s embrace of Europe, Alex tells us. This included expressions of support from Romania’s government, EU officials, and a joint message from the French, German, and Polish governments that “signaled EU resolve to anchor Moldova in Europe’s political and security architecture,” says Alex.
But challenges remain for the leadership of a country that remains politically divided and vulnerable to Russian interference, Alex notes. “Moscow is unlikely to abandon efforts to stir instability,” particularly in the separatist regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia, he says.
“Any missteps” from the PAS government, says Alex, “whether from weak institutions or stalled reforms, could reignite political turbulence and turn the clock back on popular support.”

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Dispatch from Chișinău: Will Russia’s political pincer move put Moldova’s EU hopes in jeopardy?

John E. Herbst — Fri, 26 Sep 2025 15:43:08 +0000

CHIȘINĂU—As this frontline country approaches a pivotal and closely contested election, I picked up a sense of cautious optimism here last week. Moldovans who see their future in Europe believe they will prevail, but Russia is deploying novel tactics to try to steer that future in Moscow’s direction. Washington would do well to engage in the fight.

I spent three days in Chișinău for a Board of Directors meeting of the Ukraine-Moldova American Enterprise Fund* and for meetings with senior Moldovan officials. The principal topic for discussion was Moldova’s September 28 parliamentary elections. The stakes are high because the reformist party of President Maia Sandu, the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), risks losing control of the parliament, which could put in jeopardy her goal of Moldova joining the European Union (EU) this decade. Moldova is currently in accession talks with the EU regarding the deep reforms required to join the organization. If parties less committed to reform take control of the parliament, then it could be difficult, if not impossible, to pass the legislation needed to secure EU membership.

That is why senior European officials such as French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited Chișinău in late August. They wanted to underscore for Moldovan voters that if they truly want the benefits of EU membership, then they need a parliament committed to reform. And that is why the Kremlin is working to ensure that PAS does not achieve a majority in the upcoming election.

To keep PAS from a majority, Moscow is backing two horses in this race. One is the Patriotic Electoral Bloc, an uneasy alliance of communists and socialists cobbled together by and largely loyal to the Kremlin. The second is the National Alternative Movement, which claims to favor joining the EU and is headed by the mayor of Chișinău, Ion Ceban. The actual commitment of the National Alternative Movement to EU membership is, however, far from clear. The Kremlin also backs this party in order to hive off the support of pro-EU Moldovans (a majority of the population) from PAS. Moscow’s support for these two parties is likely based on the calculation that while PAS may win a plurality of votes on September 28, the two largest opposition groups will together constitute a majority, making it unlikely they will work with PAS.

Old ways and new ways

Moscow’s interference in Moldova’s elections this year is just the latest of its more than twenty-year effort to impose its will on its neighbors by manipulating elections. Moscow does this deftly in evolving circumstances using both old and new tactics. Old tactics include providing massive funding for their political favorites—hundreds of millions of dollars, according to my Moldovan interlocutors. This money is used for campaign activities and vote buying. In the past, such activity has led to the disqualification of political parties and their leaders and even to indictments.

But Moscow is also quick to seize new opportunities to manipulate elections. For example, in recent Moldovan elections, pro-Kremlin actors have recruited online “ambassadors” to amplify anti-EU propaganda and offered a series of tiered financial incentives to do so. They have created vast networks of fake media outlets to circumvent Moldovan and EU sanctions and showered public figures with death threats to reduce voter turnout. They have even paid unwitting Western celebrities to produce anti-PAS and anti-Sandu content. In neighboring Romania, widespread fears of similar Russian interference led the government to nullify and redo its December 2024 presidential election.

Perhaps of even greater significance are the possibilities for election manipulation offered by artificial intelligence, which enables the creation of slickly packaged “news stories” that appear to be of Western origin, but which are in fact created by Kremlin-controlled bot farms. These farms are located not just in Russia, but also in African countries and in the target countries holding elections that Moscow would like to influence. This also appears to be the case in Moldova now.

In the run-up to the election

Moscow’s efforts are designed first to block PAS from winning a majority in the parliamentary election and, if that fails, to set the stage for demonstrations and public disorder to protest its victory. Recognizing the danger, Moldovan authorities conducted police raids across the country on September 22 that arrested seventy-four people suspected of preparing public disturbances.

The range of polls do not suggest that Sandu’s party will win the majority it seeks. But several of my Moldovan interlocutors expressed a cautious optimism about the upcoming vote, anticipating a major boost from diaspora voters in Europe and the United States. That’s what happened in the presidential election in 2024 that Sandu won. Past is not necessarily prologue, but many Moldovans remain enthusiastic about joining the EU, and that might be enough to keep the country on the path of reform.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

Note: Ambassador John Herbst’s visit to Moldova was sponsored by the Ukraine-Moldova American Enterprise Fund.

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Moldova accuses Russia of election interference ahead of key vote

Aidan Stretch — Mon, 22 Sep 2025 23:10:53 +0000

Moldova is raising the alarm over escalating Russian interference as the country approaches a crucial geopolitical crossroads. On September 28, Moldova’s pro-Western government will face a parliamentary election amid widespread allegations of Kremlin cyberattacks, propaganda, and various other Russian attempts to influence the outcome of the vote. If pro-European parties lose their majority, Moldova’s Western integration could stall.

The implications of an election victory for pro-Russian forces would extend far beyond Chisinau. Moldova shares a long border with Ukraine, while the two countries are currently on a joint EU accession track. A Kremlin-friendly government in Moldova could potentially derail EU integration for both nations, while also creating a significant new security threat on Ukraine’s southwestern frontier. The coming vote is therefore an important test of Russia’s ability to reassert its influence and a potential landmark moment for the wider region.

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Allegations of Russian interference have become a routine feature of Moldovan elections in recent years. During the country’s 2024 presidential election, the Kremlin reportedly spent $217 million funding Russian proxies, representing nearly 1 percent of Moldova’s GDP. Despite these efforts, incumbent Maia Sandu narrowly defeated pro-Russian candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo.

Russia is now accused of escalating its interference operations, with Moldovan President Sandu warning recently of an “unprecedented” Kremlin campaign that includes party financing, cyberattacks, and disinformation. These efforts reportedly expand beyond Moldova itself and are targeting the Moldovan diaspora, which played a key role in Sandu’s 2024 election win.

Moscow’s main goal is to boost support for pro-Russian parties including Stoianoglo’s Alternative Bloc and the Socialist-leaning Patriotic Bloc. There are also claims that the Kremlin’s plans extend beyond the ballot box. The Moldovan authorities reportedly detained dozens of suspects on Monday as part of an ongoing probe into an alleged Russian-backed plot to destabilize the country around this weekend’s pivotal parliamentary election.

Recent election forecasts position Sandu’s PAS party in first place but without sufficient support to govern alone. PAS is expected to receive around 25 percent of the vote, which would be enough to deliver a plurality but not an outright majority of seats. The most likely scenario at this stage of the campaign may be a coalition government led by PAS and featuring one or more of the pro-Russian parties. This would almost certainly undermine Moldova’s European integration.

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Kyiv will be watching the Moldovan vote closely. Ukraine’s 1,222 kilometer border with Moldova has been quiet since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago. However, this tranquility cannot be taken for granted. Moldova is home to Transnistria, a Kremlin-backed breakaway region that currently hosts around 1,500 Russian soldiers along with large supplies of Soviet-era military equipment.

According to Moldovan intelligence assessments, Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to reinforce Transnistria by sending an additional 10,000 troops. If a more Moscow-friendly government takes power in Moldova, this may become feasible. Ukraine would then be forced to divert precious military resources from other fronts to counter the mounting Russian threat coming from across the Moldovan border. In particular, a reinforced Russian troop presence in Transnistria would directly threaten nearby Odesa, Ukraine’s main port city and the country’s maritime lifeline to global markets.

The coming vote could also shape the European aspirations of Moldova and Ukraine. Both countries have been granted EU candidate status in recent years. Officials in Brussels have made clear that the two bids are linked and will be reluctant to advance one country without the other. A pro-Russian victory in Chisinau could therefore undermine Kyiv’s momentum while placing Moldovan EU ambitions in doubt. Moldova’s pro-Western politicians have stressed this potential outcome if they lose control of parliament.

For Russia, the Moldovan vote is an opportunity to push back against Western influence in the former Soviet Empire and demonstrate that the invasion of Ukraine has not deprived Moscow of its ability to dominate the region. At present, Putin is confronted with a mixed picture. Georgia’s Kremlin-friendly government has effectively stalled the country’s EU integration, while nearby Armenia has recently began the EU accession process.

While Russia’s objectives in Moldova appear obvious, there is less clarity regarding the Western position. In late 2024, Brussels committed nearly $2 billion in aid to bolster Moldova’s economic security and thwart Russian influence. This year, however, the United States has shuttered offices charged with combating Russian disinformation, while also slashing funding for democracy assistance programs in Eastern Europe.

This week’s Moldovan parliamentary election is part of the escalating confrontation between Russia and the West. A pro-Kremlin victory could significantly impact the war in Ukraine and undermine EU integration momentum in both Chisinau and Kyiv. Amid growing signs of disunity between Brussels and Washington, Putin may sense that he currently has a window of opportunity to secure a meaningful success in a country that is small in size but strategically important for the wider region.

Aidan Stretch is a freelance journalist living in Ukraine.

This issue brief is part of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “The future of democracy assistance” series, which analyzes the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Introduction: A region undergoing transformation

Since the third wave of democratization—the global surge of democratic transitions beginning in the mid-1970s—Europe has often been regarded as a leader in liberal democracy. In its 2024 Democracy Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks Western Europe as the highest-scoring region worldwide, with a regional average of 8.38—making it the only territory to record a net improvement in democratic performance during the latest cycle. However, this snapshot only captures part of Europe’s democratic environment and can be misleading, given the complex challenges confronting other European subregions.

Over the past fifteen years, Europe has faced a “polycrisis”—including the eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine war—all of which have strained democratic institutions and weakened public cohesion.

Europe faces two primary authoritarian adversaries: Russia, which employs election interference, military aggression, and other forms of destabilization, and China, which wields influence through commercial trade deals, loans, and strategic alliances. Populism, polarization, and the erosion of public consensus on defending Ukraine further undermine democratic safeguards against authoritarian trends in Central and Eastern Europe. Election manipulation, economic coercion, and disinformation campaigns intensify this democratic backsliding. Without increased US support, the integrity of elections and the peaceful transfer of power are at risk, threatening the security and sovereignty of NATO and the European Union (EU).

The need for a revitalized, regionalized US
democracy assistance approach

Given these threats, US democracy assistance remains essential for Western security—but it must evolve. It should reflect regional dynamics and address both internal and external pressures, while also going beyond military force to build pathways for multilateral donors, private sector actors, and civil society networks to complement efforts when the United States can only provide limited support. The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), European Union institutions, transatlantic alliances, and independent media donors will be vital in safeguarding electoral integrity and civil society protections in countries where US influence is limited.

In Eastern Europe, this means combining military aid with soft-power tools, such as electoral assistance, rule of law measures, and civic education support. In Central Europe, these same priorities are crucial for ensuring free and fair elections, safeguarding political competition, and protecting voters.

A revitalized, context-specific plan for democracy assistance is necessary to protect US interests and reinforce European democratic security. Such a plan must prioritize three pillars: people, the rule of law, and political processes. These pillars encompass key objectives such as judicial independence, protection of civil society and journalists, election integrity, and other critical mechanisms for democratic growth.

Supporting democratic development abroad strengthens US security, prosperity, and influence, while also bolstering market diversification, NATO stability, and the United States’ status as a global power. To undervalue this soft-power tool is to risk long-term political instability, violence, and economic disparity for both the United States and its European allies.

The fight for democracy and sovereignty in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

Eastern Europe remains a primary focus of Russia’s military aggression. Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has strained regional resources, distorted democratic processes, and deepened divisions between pro-European and pro-Kremlin leaders. Amidst its violent imperialist policies, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine applied for EU candidacy in early 2022; the EU granted Moldova and Ukraine candidate status that June—but deferred Georgia’s status transition until December 2023—pending democracy-focused reforms.

Ukraine

Ukraine’s military successes against Russia illustrate the connection between democracy and sovereignty. Western donors have provided resources to improve Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts, judicial reforms, municipal support, and public transparency. This assistance has enabled Ukraine to significantly bolster its countermeasures against Russian hybrid tactics, including disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and direct military action.

Ukraine was granted EU candidate status in June 2022 and has continued implementing policies for future integration with the support of the €50 billion Ukraine Facility (2024-2027). While a presidential election remains contingent upon a negotiated settlement of the war, the nation’s ongoing transparency and anti-corruption policies are sustained by both leadership and public support, enabling consensus for sovereignty and democracy.

Ukraine’s alignment with Europe is also reflected in public opinion. As of 2025, 54 percent of European citizens polled support providing arms to Ukraine. Europeans generally continue to favor increased military assistance. However, public support for Ukraine has declined because of war fatigue, inconsistent US policy, disinformation, and nationalist positions on foreign aid and migration. It is therefore in the United States’ interest to provide consistent support for Ukraine while also encouraging increased European contributions. Doing so will help ensure that Ukraine’s sovereignty and democratic institutions are sustained while reducing Europe’s dependence on US support and strengthening prospects for long-term assistance.

Moldova

Moldova remains one of Russia’s top destabilization targets, vulnerable to both military escalation and hybrid threats. Democratic backsliding is largely driven by economic insecurity and weakened institutional trust. According to a recent Eurobarometer poll, 46 percent of Moldovans identify inflation and the cost of living as their top concern, and 63 percent say they do not trust the national government. Such vulnerabilities are routinely exploited by Russia through disinformation and vote manipulation.

Moldova’s 2024 presidential election highlighted the intersection of Russian influence and domestic corruption. Moldovan authorities allege that approximately $39 million was transferred from Russia by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor into thousands of local accounts to fund vote-buying, disinformation campaigns, and bribery of public officials. Despite these efforts, the election showed meaningful progress; election monitoring by the International Republican Institute (IRI) reported voter turnout reaching 1.7 million–a 10 percent increase from 2020. This trend coincided with improvements in voter mobilization, transparency, and polling oversight, demonstrating the potential for success through the collaboration of US democracy assistance, national governments, and civil society.

Moldova’s EU-oriented government has been instrumental in advancing its sovereignty and development as an EU candidate. However, with the fall 2025 parliamentary elections approaching, Russia is escalating efforts to empower oligarchic forces and polarize voters using economic pressures and disinformation campaigns. This situation requires sustained US democracy assistance—particularly in voter education, anti-corruption monitoring, and political party development.

Georgia

Georgia’s EU candidacy was delayed due to signs of democratic regression; the Georgian Dream party has since escalated these trends by moving closer to Moscow—weaponizing the Kremlin’s influence through energy dependence and economic ties as well as by using domestic tools for elite capture and political repression. Russia currently occupies 25 percent of Georgian territory, and its hybrid interference tactics increasingly undermine Georgia’s sovereignty and European Union integration.

The 2024 elections reflected this shift, marked by voter intimidation, regulatory flaws, and a misuse of state resources that disadvantaged opposition parties. These systemic flaws reinforce state capture and erode trust in democratic institutions. Recent IRI polling found that 54 percent of Georgians believe the country is on the wrong track, alongside a steady decline in the public’s belief that ordinary citizens can influence political decisions.

While public disillusionment with the political system is growing, strong support for EU integration persists: approximately two-thirds of Georgians continue to support EU membership, even at the cost of cutting trade ties with Russia. However, this pro-democracy sentiment is increasingly at odds with the government’s efforts to restrict foreign-backed civic engagement. In May 2024, the Georgian Dream party passed a Kremlin-inspired “foreign agents” law, targeting NGOs and media outlets that receive foreign funding. The law labels these groups as entities that serve foreign interests, effectively criminalizing civil-society activity and directly undermining US and EU democracy assistance efforts.

This deliberate restriction of civic space underscores the urgent need for sustained US engagement. To remain effective, democracy assistance must adapt by emphasizing election monitoring, targeted civil society protection, and diplomatic pressure to revoke authoritarian legislation. Applying pressure on Georgia’s institutions while empowering civil society groups is not only an opportunity to support a willing, pro-Western society, but also essential to securing Europe’s eastern frontier.

Competing values and the question of European unity—Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland

Central Europe is increasingly vulnerable to democratic erosion, driven by both internal fragmentation and escalating Russian interference. The Kremlin has refined its soft-power strategies, targeting the region’s political institutions, public trust, and national cohesion through disinformation and narrative manipulation.

Poland

Poland’s democratic growth showcases the balance between security and democracy. While it is a member of the EU and NATO, along with a firm supporter of Ukrainian sovereignty, it has struggled to maintain protection for its independent media, electoral processes, and judiciary. The re-election of the Law and Justice Party (PiS), a right-wing nationalist party, marked a further prioritization of military spending and conservative migration policies. In the 2025 Eurobarometer polls, only 7 percent of participants stated that they considered threats to democracy as a priority for Poland, while 36 percent said rising prices, inflation, and the cost of living should be a top priority, and 26 percent cited security and defense as a top priority.

In the 2025 presidential election, Russia deployed “Operation Doppelgänger,” which involved more than ten thousand coordinated social media bot accounts designed to heighten fears regarding migration and security. Furthermore, Russian-influenced media outlets prioritized pro-Russian sentiment, such as that the war represented President Vladimir Putin’s ability to lead and serve as a strong politician. While this interference did not impact Poland’s election as drastically as Moldova or Georgia, Poland’s unity is vital for EU stability. A Eurosceptic Poland is a case that must be monitored and prioritized in democracy assistance efforts, especially amidst falling trust in its national government and a lack of investment in democracy programs.

Hungary

Hungary has disrupted EU decision-making throughout the Russia-Ukraine war. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—in power since 2010 and known for his nationalist and Kremlin-friendly policies—has institutionalized democratic backsliding, turning Hungary into the EU’s most overtly pro-Russian member state. His administration continues to suppress judicial independence, weaken checks on executive power, and suppress civil society. Orbán has fostered close ties with the Kremlin, echoing Russian anti-liberal narratives and openly challenging EU consensus on sanctions and Ukraine’s aid. Hungary now serves as a platform for Moscow’s ideological influence, undermining the EU’s decision-making process from within.

While Hungary’s government isolates itself from the EU, citizens continue to support EU alignment. In the most recent Eurobarometer polls, 69 percent of participants expressed attachment to the EU, and 81 percent expressed attachment to Europe. These pro-European sentiments are further reflected in public views towards Ukraine: 73 percent agree with the EU’s decision to welcome refugees and asylum seekers displaced by the Russia-Ukraine war, and 63 percent support humanitarian and financial assistance to Ukraine.

While democratic growth is extremely limited due to policies against NGOs and civil society rights, it is necessary to maintain education and political party empowerment to counteract anti-Europe narratives, which indirectly taint information in Poland, Slovakia, Georgia, and other vulnerable democracies. Recent European Parliament elections resulted in Fidesz, Orbán’s ruling party, recording its worst performance to date, marked by a shift towards the centrist and pro-European opposition movement Tisza. US democracy assistance must prioritize political parties such as Tisza and related mobilization efforts to prepare for the 2026 Hungarian National Parliament elections, which will both determine Hungary’s future role in the EU and its alignment with Russia.

Romania

Romania has experienced heightened Russian pressures due to instability from the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war. Both have weakened public opinion and eroded trust in government institutions and independent media. Since 2023, Russian information campaigns have targeted economic insecurity—which 40 percent of survey participants identified as Romania’s top policy issue—and leveraged the country’s anti-colonialist history to portray the West as a colonizer. As early as 2023, these narratives entered presidential campaigns and were amplified by Hungary and Poland. Furthermore, such messaging has encouraged the idea of a potential territorial acquisition in Ukraine if it were defeated. Similar external propaganda efforts are underway in Hungary and Poland.

Russian-backed cyber campaigns interfered in the 2024 elections, amplifying support for pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu. Sophisticated disinformation tactics polarized the electorate and eroded public confidence in democratic institutions. Romania’s earlier delay to sanction Russia and support Ukraine weakened regional solidarity. However, the recent election of centrist reformer Nicușor Dan signals an enduring commitment among Romanian voters to EU values and Western alignment that must be supported by the US and its European allies.

Slovakia

Slovakia, also a member of the EU, has historically maintained steady democratic growth. Recently, however, it has ceded to Russia’s influence under Prime Minister Robert Fico. Re-elected on a populist, anti-Ukraine platform, Fico has aligned with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in rejecting EU foreign-policy coordination. His government has weakened independent institutions, pressured journalists, and used state mechanisms to consolidate power. Fico’s alignment with Moscow’s authoritarian practices—including efforts to diminish judicial independence and press freedom—undermines both EU governance standards and NATO’s strategic posture on its eastern frontier.

While Slovakia’s citizens remain united in their support of the EU and continued security support cooperation against Russia, internal democratic backsliding makes meaningful action increasingly difficult. In Eurobarometer surveys, 65 percent of Slovak participants expressed distrust in the national government. Furthermore, although rising prices, inflation, and the cost of living remain the top domestic concerns—as seen amongst other nations in the region—Slovaks show a stronger desire for peace and stability than for greater economic opportunities.

Slovakia is extremely vulnerable to external influence and Russian interference. As polls show, citizens feel that the nation’s security and the continued stability of the EU are in jeopardy. Prioritizing public empowerment for future elections and maintaining the separation of powers will be critical to prevent further democratic decay.

The cases of Eastern and Central Europe highlight the evolving and region-specific threats to democracy across EU and non-EU nations. From external manipulation to internal erosion, each country faces unique challenges shaped by historical legacies, political elites, public sentiment, and geopolitical positioning. However, a common trend persists: democratic backsliding is not only a domestic governance issue but also a regional security concern that directly impacts the EU and NATO. To address these multidimensional threats, US democracy assistance must evolve into a proactive, structured approach that stabilizes democratic institutions before global crises escalate. The following three-pillar strategy—centered on people, the rule of law, and political processes—provides a long-term framework for sustained political engagement and targeted government reform.

A revitalized approach to democracy assistance

US democracy assistance should embrace three pillars: people, the rule of law, and political processes. These pillars can be broken down into thematic priorities—anti-corruption measures, protection of independent media, and strengthening institutional integrity—all of which increase national capacity for democratic reform and resilience.

Fostering people-centered strategies

Democracy can only be sustained with an informed, engaged, and mobilized citizenry. In the face of Moscow’s interference—which exploits economic instability and global propaganda networks—incorporating people-focused objectives is vital to strengthening the EU, NATO, and Europe as a whole.

Application examples

In Georgia, this strategy would involve expanding legal protections and resources for civil society organizations. Such measures would counteract increasingly repressive policies, including the foreign agents law, and reinforce governance accountability mechanisms. Expanded trade cooperation between the US and Georgia may further leverage diplomatic relations to incentivize greater Western alignment and reduce Russian influence and Chinese economic expansion

Moldova’s economic struggles present opportunities for deeper collaboration between civil society and democratic institutions. US democracy assistance should support citizen mobilization through civic training initiatives, structured government dialogue, and job creation programs, while also enhancing election monitoring, mobilization efforts, and public trust. Prioritizing civic education in low-income areas will help reduce susceptibility to economic coercion in future elections.

In Hungary and Slovakia, the current political climate demands continued support for opposition parties and grassroots media outlets to prepare for upcoming elections. Fidesz’s underwhelming performance in recent EU elections signals an opening for opposition gains, yet youth disengagement and state-controlled media capture under Orbán and Fico make preserving democratic processes increasingly challenging.

Educating and empowering citizens to participate in political processes and democratic initiatives not only strengthens civic engagement but also builds public trust in governance. However, these efforts can succeed only if legal systems remain independent and impartial, ensuring that civic efforts are protected amidst political dysfunctions. Accordingly, US assistance must focus on bolstering the rule of law to institutionalize democratic norms and ensure accountability.

Supporting the rule of law

Legal institutions are often the first to be dismantled in times of democratic backsliding or conflict. To prevent state capture and the enactment of illiberal laws, the United States must support transparent and independent judicial systems.

Application examples

Ukraine has prioritized government accountability and anti-corruption measures throughout the war. As the United States provides a large amount of Ukraine’s defense assistance, it may be more feasible to further leverage EU financial contributions to expand legal counsel training, strengthen judicial independence, and enhance judicial-vetting programs. Collaboration in this pillar could pair EU funding with US expertise, drawing on resources of the American Bar Association and other professional legal organizations.

Slovakia, Romania, and Moldova are experiencing heightened political vulnerability within their party systems, underscoring the need for judicial independence to safeguard the separation of powers. Comparable to reforms in Ukraine, this would involve legal training for reform-minded judges, prosecutors, and opposition lawmakers. In Moldova and Romania, strengthening the rule of law is essential to prevent oligarchic re-entrenchment in future election results and executive transitions. In Slovakia, such initiatives would counter expanded executive control and complement civil society efforts to monitor corruption and advocate for judicial independence.

Bolstering the rule of law ensures that election outcomes reflect the will of the people and uphold democratic integrity. However, to sustain electoral contestation and fairness, the United States must also invest in protecting democratic processes.

Safeguarding political processes

Democratic political processes involve free, fair, and competitive elections, supported by robust pluralism. To support future electoral integrity, the risks of manipulation and vote-rigging must be minimized through increased monitoring, civic mobilization, and independent media engagement.

Application examples

The upcoming parliamentary elections in Moldova and local elections in Georgia will be decisive for democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe. The IRI’s work in Moldova—from national polling and electoral monitoring to voter support—was successful in counteracting Russia’s vote-buying campaigns. Continued investment in coalition building, electoral risk assessment, and fieldwork in both countries will ensure that the people’s voices are truly heard and accurately represented in their political systems. Moldova’s upcoming parliamentary elections will be especially vulnerable to interference from Moscow-backed actors seeking to restore control through their previous oligarchic networks.

Romania and Poland require similar assistance to maintain electoral integrity. To maintain pro-European and pro-EU majorities, the United States should expand resources for local, independent media organizations to counter Russian disinformation operations—such as Operation Doppelgänger—and to raise public awareness of foreign propaganda tactics.

Strategic implications for the United States

A majority of countries in Eastern and Central Europe will hold national elections within the next two years. US democracy assistance must play an active role in supporting electoral integrity through monitoring, mobilization, and civic education. These efforts should be expansive and inclusive, with particular attention to diaspora communities and rural populations who are more vulnerable to disinformation and disenfranchisement. Without free and fair elections—followed by peaceful, democratic transfers of power—states will remain vulnerable to democratic backsliding, Russian influence, and anti-European and anti-Western narratives

A three-pillar strategy—centered on people, the rule of law, and political processes—provides a pragmatic and effective framework for revitalizing US democracy assistance across Eastern and Central Europe. By investing in democratic resilience, the United States strengthens civic institutions, accountable governance, and electoral credibility, while reinforcing its global leadership at a time of intensifying authoritarian threats. These efforts directly serve US strategic interests by bolstering transatlantic security, expanding economic partnerships, and countering both Russian aggression and China’s growing influence. The EU remains central to the West’s collective security, and sustained US engagement is essential to preserve the global democratic order and shape the future of international cooperation.

about the authors

Stephen Nix is the senior director for Europe and Eurasia at the International Republican Institute.

Megan Tamisiea is a researcher with an M.A. in Democracy and Governance from Georgetown University.

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In landmark Syria elections, women still face electoral hurdles

Marie Forestier — Wed, 17 Sep 2025 19:29:26 +0000

Syrians are about to complete a new and important step of the country’s transition after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime last year: the formation of a transitional legislative assembly. The indirect electoral process is expected to be completed by the end of September.

The stakes are high because during their two-and-a-half-year renewable mandate set by the Constitutional Declaration adopted in March, the new parliament members will be tasked with passing laws that will shape the reconstruction and the new direction of the country. Therefore, it is crucial that all the components of the Syrian society are represented. According to the electoral framework, there will be “at least 20 percent of women” in the total of all the electoral committees. This provision has revived the discussion about the need for increased women’s inclusion in decision-making in Syria.

Under Assad, women made up only 10 to 12 percent of the members of parliament between 2007 and 2022, according to a report by the Syrian non-governmental organization (NGO), Musawa. Women’s participation was even lower at the local level, where they accounted for 2 percent of the members of local and municipal councils in 2011, reaching 11 to 12 percent in 2022, the organization found.

Women cast their votes in the presidential election at a polling centre in Damascus, June 3, 2014. REUTERS/Khaled al-Hariri

Since the fall of Assad, progress regarding women’s political participation has been limited. The interim government includes only one woman Minister. The Preparation Committee for the National Dialogue and the Constitutional Drafting Committee—transitional bodies tasked with completing milestones of the transition—both included two women out of seven members (30 percent). However, women accounted for approximately 20 percent to 25 percent of the participants in the National Dialogue Conference held in Damascus in February 2025, according to my conversations with organizers and participants.

Traditions and conservative social norms have hindered Syrian women’s political participation, despite their involvement in the 2011 revolution and during the war. Based on my conversations with women activists throughout Syria last spring, the requirement of joining the former governing Ba’ath Party and the fear of being associated with the corruption of the regime also deterred women from participating in politics under Assad. Therefore, the current transition offers an opportunity for women, despite the resistance of conservative parts of Syrian society and the authorities themselves.

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Yet, the complicated mechanism designed for these indirect elections does not favor women’s inclusion. The Supreme Committee for the People’s Assembly Elections, which oversees the process, appointed Election Sub-Committees in each of the sixty-two electoral districts. Only 11 percent of the appointed members of the Election Sub-Committees are women (twenty out of 179). Election sub-committees are in charge of appointing a fifty-member Electoral Body for each seat allocated to the electoral district. On election day, approximately six thousand members of the Electoral Body will elect 120 members of parliament from their ranks. There are 140 seats open for the election, but the government has decided to postpone voting in Suweida, in parts of Raqqa and Hasakeh provinces, officially because of security concerns. In reality, the government does not control these parts of the country. In addition, the President will directly appoint a third of the assembly by selecting an additional seventy members.

Research shows that women are less likely to be elected in majoritarian systems, whereas they do better in proportional representation elections. Majoritarian systems, such as the Syrian People’s Assembly indirect election system, favor the dominant groups, including notables and community leaders, who are usually men.

For this indirect election, the first challenge for women is to be selected for the Electoral Body, which will be made up of one-third of notables (overwhelmingly men) and two-thirds of professionals and academics. Then, women need to put themselves forward as candidates among their peers of the Electoral Body. Last but not least, women have to win the majority of the votes of the members of the Electoral Body.

Therefore, it is very challenging for women to become members of the new assembly, even more so for women from minority groups. While the announcement of a 20 percent quota is a positive, albeit modest, step, the electoral decree specifies that it applies to “the total of all the electoral committees” and not to each Sub-committee and to each Electoral body. In order to enhance women’s participation in decision-making, Syrian civil society organizations have launched a campaign calling for a 30 percent quota for women in each committee involved in the electoral process, as well as in the People’s Assembly.

Syrian officials have privately said, according to a trusted secondary source who spoke to me on background, that President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s appointment of one-third of the members of the assembly will present an opportunity to fill gaps once the vote is completed. But this opaque and discretionary procedure cannot be a reliable solution to counter the barriers to women’s participation.

Across the wider Arab region, women represent an average of 17.7 percent of parliament membership. Several countries, including Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, have adopted electoral quotas or reserved seats for women, ranging from 14 percent to 50 percent. For instance, in 2019, the United Arab Emirates issued a decree providing for a 50 percent electoral quota for women, and it has since reached parity in its Parliament, whereas no women were sitting in the assembly in 2006.

As the indirect electoral process has started, the Syrian authorities and civil society could take several steps to increase women’s chances in this process. First, it is crucial to inform women about the election mechanism and encourage them to ask to join the Electoral bodies. Civil society organizations are leading the awareness effort, but it is challenging for them to reach all the districts, and they should be supported. Second, when the preliminary lists of members of the Electoral bodies are published, civil society activists should advocate to increase the number of women in the final list. Third, civil activists and women’s organizations should raise awareness among members of the Electoral bodies of the need for fair representation of women in the assembly.

The task is daunting in such a short time frame, but the stakes are high. Building a political system that guarantees the representation of all, including women from all communities, and equal rights, will significantly determine the success of the transition, as inclusion is the main way to ensure a durable peace.

Marie Forestier is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. She is also currently a consultant for the European Institute of Peace and the co-director of the Syria Strategy Project.

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What Guyanese President Irfaan Ali is likely to focus on in his second term

Wazim Mowla — Mon, 08 Sep 2025 17:33:46 +0000

On Sunday, Guyanese President Irfaan Ali was sworn in for a second term leading a country with one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. “The next five years will be the most consequential in our nation,” Ali said in a speech after being sworn in, adding that he would use his second term to “build more prosperity in every family and every home.”

The country overall has experienced a leap in prosperity in recent years. Between 2022 and 2024, Guyana’s economy grew at the mind-boggling rate of 46.9 percent on average per year, according to the International Monetary Fund. The country’s recent surge of economic growth is built on the back of the government’s management of Guyana’s oil resources and investment in nonenergy sectors, such as health, agriculture, construction, and hospitality. With the increased revenues from oil, Ali’s government has begun an overhaul of the country’s infrastructure, such as the soon-to-be-completed Demerara Harbour Bridge and the Eccles to Ogle Highway. Now, with five more years in office, Ali is likely to shift his approach to include a new phase of Guyana’s development, one primarily focused on building a resilient economy. Even with a booming economy, however, there will be challenges, from potential Venezuelan aggression to the need to take ownership as a growing regional leader in the Caribbean.

In speeches during the recent election campaign, Ali stressed that he would focus on three areas in a second term: (1) investing in human capital and tools for wealth creation for the average Guyanese; (2) capitalizing on natural gas resources to build out new industries, such as petrochemicals and data centers; and (3) continue investing and scaling nonenergy economic sectors.

All three of these areas align with Ali’s intent to ensure that the DNA of Guyana’s economy is innately resilient to the ebbs and flows of global markets while continuing to protect the country from the pitfalls that lead to the so-called “resource curse.” Building skills at home fosters entrepreneurship and small business growth while developing the petrochemical sector can help bring new jobs and manufacturing capabilities. Finally, nonenergy investment decreases economic vulnerabilities by making government revenues less dependent on oil and gas resources.

Fortunately, this time around, Ali’s government has more tools at its disposal.

First, Guyana’s foreign investment portfolio is growing. Major international companies across the energy, construction, health, and hospitality sectors have made significant investments in the past five years with substantial success. This should help de-risk concerns for international companies that are currently on the fence about investing in a country that is still a small market with an open-facing economy compared to its neighbors in Latin America.

Second, Guyana’s local private sector has matured quickly in a short period, now on track to compete with international firms that are bidding on infrastructure projects and the development of new financial instruments.

Third, Ali’s administration can capitalize on five years’ worth of diplomatic relationship-building with the United States, the United Kingdom, India, and countries in Africa. These states—whose leaders share strong ties with Ali—are likely to further encourage companies in their countries to accelerate the exploration of investment opportunities in Guyana.

Despite the bright road ahead, challenges still await Ali and his government.

Venezuela is the most immediate threat. Persistent saber-rattling from Venezuela’s autocratic leader Nicolás Maduro—in the form of naval incursions and encroachment on the land border with Guyana—is expected to continue and perhaps even intensify over the next few years. To date, Ali has worked within international institutions, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as well as with allies such as the United States, to contain the threat. Going forward, Ali may need to flex his diplomatic muscles, as flashpoints in the border controversy are likely to arise following next year’s ICJ ruling on the validity of the 1899 Arbitral Award, which settled the country’s border with Venezuela. If the ruling is unfavorable for Venezuela, then Ali may be required to again engage with Guyana’s international allies and regional neighbors to contain potential aggressive tactics from the Maduro regime.

Ali will also likely need to take on more responsibility as a Caribbean leader. Guyana already leads the region in its efforts to decrease the overall food import bill, but with the country’s wealth and international profile growing, Caribbean allies will look to Ali to play both mediator and anchor on a variety of issues. For example, the Caribbean’s response to the US naval deployment in the Southern Caribbean focused on counternarcotics operations will likely continue to come through Guyana, given the country’s proximity to the vessels and its border controversy with Venezuela. This could place Guyana at a friction point between the Trump administration and Caribbean leaders that call for the region to remain a “zone of peace.”

Even with these challenges, Guyana’s economy is on track to continue its rapid growth. The country’s next step is to bring the benefits of this growth to all the Guyanese people, including by making people and their skills the backbone of the economy. Moreover, the government will need to do this while navigating the regional and global responsibilities that have been cast Guyana’s way. If Ali can manage all these variables, then Guyana might see its next phase of growth as one that continues beyond the next five years and into the next few decades.

Wazim Mowla is the fellow and lead of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Take Colombia’s risk of democratic backsliding under Petro seriously

Enrique Millán-Mejía, Geoff Ramsey — Tue, 02 Sep 2025 19:08:15 +0000

In recent months, Colombian President Gustavo Petro has made a series of remarks that have alarmed constitutional experts and political analysts in the country. In effect, he has suggested that he would be willing to plunge the country into a constitutional crisis. This comes at a time when Colombia is reeling from the assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay, who died this month. This alarming act of violence hearkens back to the worst years of the country’s political crisis between 1989 and 1990, when three presidential candidates were killed.

It is worth looking in more detail at what the Colombian leader has said and why so many in the international community are alarmed.

1. What has Petro proposed for the March 2026 election ballot?

Petro has said he wants Colombians to decide whether to convene a constituent assembly, a body that would be tasked with rewriting the constitution. He wants to put this question to voters in Colombia’s March 2026 legislative elections. In a social media post in late June, he announced that “a ballot will be provided” to voters in those elections to ask whether to call a National Constituent Assembly. Under Colombia’s 1991 Constitution, however, calling a referendum on constitutional reform first requires a law passed by Congress. The president alone does not have the authority to propose a constitutional reform directly. Instead, Congress must give the green light to proceed with a vote.

2. What is Petro’s rationale for proposing this?

Petro has argued that Congress and the courts have repeatedly blocked core elements of his reform programs, and therefore a direct popular mandate is necessary to bring about meaningful change. He is calling for a “popular constituent process” in a way that could subvert the separation of powers. In March, for instance, he sought to pass a labor reform via referendum after it was defeated in the legislature; a high court then suspended his decree, which paved the way for his recent moves for the March 2026 election. In recent speeches, Petro has invoked the notion that his government reflects the will of the people, surpassing what he describes as a political system dominated by political elites. In March, he said that “the National Constituent Assembly must transform the institutions so that they obey the people’s mandate for peace and justice.” In doing so, he is implying that institutional resistance justifies extraordinary action, even if it is outside the conventional bounds of the rule of law.

3. What obstacles does Petro’s proposal face?

The first obstacle that Petro is facing is simple: The numbers don’t work in his favor. Petro’s Pacto Historico coalition lost control of the Senate in April 2024 and it also has a minority in the House, which is why the president’s flagship reforms have hit a wall. Getting an enabling law to trigger a constitutional referendum seems like it is a nonstarter in Congress.

Even if Congress advanced a bill, the Constitutional Court—which has been an important check on Petro’s authority—would review both the process and substance of the reform to ensure its legality. And even then, assuming it checks all the boxes, the reform would need to win a majority of votes cast, with at least ten percent or more of the voters participating in the referendum, for it to move forward. Given high polarization and the fact that Petro’s approval rating is only around 37 percent, there is plenty of opportunity for the opposition to organize a boycott or street protests against such a vote.

4. What does this reveal about the overall state of Colombia’s democracy?

Ultimately, this is a stress test for Colombia’s institutions. So far, the checks and balances in the country have been holding. But if Petro tries to force through a reform, then it could place a real strain on them. There has been growing concern from Petro’s critics that he may even seek to advance a reform allowing him to run for reelection, as Alfredo Saade, Petro’s former chief of staff, has persistently made statements suggesting that he supports the president remaining in office beyond his term. (Since 2015, the sitting president has been barred from running for reelection.) This has created worry among civil society, the judiciary, the political opposition, and international observers alike.

Petro came to power in August 2022 promising change, but his administration has been slow to deliver. His unclear foreign policy, poor economic management, and the resurgence of insecurity since the failure of his total peace approach in mid-2024, have stirred painful memories of Colombia’s darker past.

Petro’s new ballot adventure is likely to be challenged in the courts, and it will probably be denied by Congress if his party tries to sponsor a bill calling for an extraordinary vote to request the need for a constituent assembly. But the real risk is that during the time the president is campaigning for his new ballot, political polarization could increase to a dangerous degree. As the assassination of Uribe demonstrated, Colombia’s stability cannot be taken for granted. Political polarization has grown to the point where there is no control over the language used by political leaders to disqualify their opponents. Petro’s followers, for example, regularly label their opponents as far-right extremists and fascists, while some critics of Petro have called him a communist, exacerbating the political polarization in the country.

5. How should the US view the possibility of greater political polarization in Colombia?

For the United States, a nation with a deep and long-standing interest in Colombia’s stability and prosperity, the strategic risks are evident and immediate. The extent of Colombia’s polarization is potentially damaging to hemispheric economic security, trade, investment, and democratic norms.

Since 2002, the US relationship with Colombia has been a rare point of bipartisan consensus in Washington. From Plan Colombia to support for the peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as FARC, in 2016, the bilateral relationship has focused on security cooperation, drug interdiction, trade, and regional stability with deep support from both Republican and Democrat politicians. There was also bipartisan buy in for the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, which has made Colombia a top destination for US investment, particularly in the energy, agricultural, and service sectors.

Political instability could deter investment, affect the rule of law, and disrupt vital supply chains. In today’s climate of global competition, the United States cannot afford to lose one of its most trusted partners in the hemisphere, especially when the Petro administration has flirted with closer ties to China.

Given the stakes, the most prudent US approach is to make clear the importance of Colombia’s rule of law while continuing high-level engagement. US policymakers can and should reinforce the importance of Colombia’s judicial independence, independent election administration, and peaceful, transparent electoral competition.

Enrique Millán-Mejía is a senior fellow for economic development at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. He previously served as senior trade and investment diplomat for the government of Colombia to the United States between 2014 and 2021.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow for Colombia and Venezuela at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Russia attacks Zelenskyy’s legitimacy to derail US-led Ukraine peace talks

Serhii Savelii — Thu, 28 Aug 2025 20:37:16 +0000

As US-led efforts to end the war in Ukraine continue, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has indicated that the Kremlin does not recognize the legitimacy of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and would not accept his signature on any peace deal. “When we come to a stage when you have to sign documents, we would need a very clear understanding by everybody that the person who is signing is legitimate,” Lavrov told NBC News in an August 24 interview. “And according to the Ukrainian constitution, Mr. Zelenskyy is not at the moment.”

This is not the first time Russia has expressed such doubts. Moscow has made attacking Zelenskyy’s legitimacy a centerpiece of its disinformation playbook, with Russian President Vladimir Putin also claiming earlier this year that the Ukrainian leader “has no right to sign anything” in potential peace talks.

The Kremlin’s goal is transparent. Russia seeks to fracture Ukrainian society, weaken Western support, and complicate future negotiations. But Moscow’s efforts to portray Zelenskyy as illegitimate fall apart when weighed against Ukraine’s Constitution and the country’s established political practice, along with international precedents and legal tradition.

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Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 led directly to the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, making it impossible for the country to hold scheduled presidential elections in 2024. The terms of martial law and the Ukrainian Election Code both explicitly prohibit any elections in the current wartime conditions.

A nationwide vote under bombardment is neither legal nor feasible. Millions of Ukrainians are currently displaced within Ukraine or abroad. Voter lists cannot be updated reliably. Soldiers serving in the combat zone and Ukrainian civilians who at constant risk of airstrikes cannot safely cast ballots. A wartime election would disenfranchise millions and jeopardize the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities rather than safeguarding it.

This reality is widely accepted. Ukrainian political parties, civil society, and the public agree that elections should only resume when they can be free, fair, inclusive, and safe. Polling shows that most Ukrainians oppose elections during wartime. International partners echo this consensus and reject suggestions that Zelenskyy lacks legitimacy. The European Commission has affirmed that it has “no doubts the president of Ukraine is Volodymyr Zelenskyy.”

Ukraine’s Constitution directly addresses this situation. Article 103 sets a five-year presidential term, but Article 108 clarifies that the president remains in office “until the assumption of office by the newly elected president.” Authority does not simply expire on a calendar date. Instead, it continues until a successor is duly sworn in.

Precedent supports this reading. No Ukrainian president has ever served exactly five years, with terms varying according to election and inauguration schedules. As one drafter of the 1996 Ukrainian Constitution explained in The Economist, “Zelenskyy continues in power for as long as martial law applies. There is no political or legal crisis. Full stop.”

Crucially, checks and balances remain. Every extension of martial law in Ukraine requires parliamentary approval, providing Ukrainian lawmakers with ample opportunity to raise objections. Ukraine’s Constitutional Court can also review the legality of presidential continuity if petitioned by members of parliament, the Supreme Court, or the Ombudsman. In other words, Zelenskyy’s current authority is rooted not in personal decree but in a functioning democratic system.

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Why does the Kremlin keep pushing this line? By branding Zelenskyy “unconstitutional,” Russia hopes to derail any future peace process and weaken Western unity. Unfortunately for Moscow, there are clear signs that this strategy is failing. Ukrainians overwhelmingly recognize Zelenskyy as their lawful president, while international leaders consistently affirm his legitimacy.

Far from undermining Kyiv, the Kremlin’s narrative underscores its desperation and highlights Moscow’s obvious reluctance to engage in meaningful peace talks. This approach also inadvertently draws attention to the serious legitimacy issues around Russia’s own elections, which routinely fall well short of recognized international standards.

International norms support Ukraine’s position on wartime elections. The Council of Europe has affirmed that postponing elections in exceptional situations, such as a state of war, may be necessary to preserve constitutional order and allow citizens to express their will in a safe context. History also offers precedent, with Britain postponing scheduled parliamentary elections during both world wars.

Ukraine is currently following the same logic. By upholding constitutional continuity, maintaining democratic safeguards, and preparing for the moment when elections can be held freely, the Ukrainian government is strengthening rather than weakening its legitimacy.

Zelenskyy remains president not despite the Ukrainian Constitution, but because it guarantees continuity in extraordinary times. And when peace comes, Ukraine will be ready to prove once again at the ballot box that its democracy endures. This is in stark contrast to Russia, where an illegitimate ruler has remained in office for decades due to unconstitutional charades and manipulated elections.

Serhii Savelii is an independent Ukrainian election analyst.

A history of broken promises

After Lukashenka “won” the contested vote in 2020—which sparked massive protests fueled by allegations of fraud and repression—he made statements promising constitutional changes, including the redistribution of presidential powers. He also indicated that he would not run for office again, and he pledged to pave the way for his successor, declaring that constitutional reforms would reduce presidential powers and shift the country’s political system toward a parliamentary republic. This did not happen. Notably, it was Lukashenka himself who unilaterally expanded presidential powers, eliminating the two-term limit for the president from the Belarusian constitution in 2004.

In 2022, Lukashenka attempted a “plan B”: He amended the constitution to give the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly—a body designed to gather government officials, local leaders, and selected citizens to discuss and approve key policies—broad but vaguely defined powers, while granting himself personal immunity. This would have allowed him to step down from the presidency but retain real influence behind the scenes. On paper, he could still use this mechanism, but in practice the idea appears to have been shelved.

Fast forward to the 2025 presidential election, held in January: Lukashenka once again engineered a “victory,” claiming more than 86 percent of the vote. The absurdity of the situation was perhaps best captured by a Communist Party “spoiler candidate,” Siarhei Syrankou, who campaigned under the slogan: “I’m not running against Alyaksandr Lukashenka—I’m running with him.”

The succession question

Regardless of his ever-changing declarations, one thing is certain: Lukashenka, who is seventy years old, will not stay in power forever.

There are a few possible scenarios for his succession.

A common theory is that his youngest son, Nikolai, also known as Kolya, is being groomed for leadership. From a young age, Kolya has been a constant presence at high-profile events—attending military drills, observing official meetings, and even accompanying his father in his meeting with Pope Francis in 2016. In a recent interview, Lukashenka preemptively addressed questions about dynastic succession, insisting that Kolya, who is now twenty years old, would be “offended” by any suggestion that he might take over.

Still, Kolya’s image has been carefully curated. At times, pro-government Belarusian TikTok creators portrayed him as a “crush,” while Russian media dubbed him “the crush of all the Rus,” raising questions about whether this popularity is genuine or part of a broader public relations strategy to make him appear likable and relatable.

What truly matters, however, is not whether Lukashenka wants his son to take power, but whether Kolya could withstand rivals with stronger ambitions. Lukashenka might build some infrastructure around Kolya to support a future role for his youngest son, but that does not guarantee success.

Another potential candidate is Viktar Lukashenka, the president’s eldest son. Viktar rarely draws much attention as a contender for future president, but his senior positions and experience suggest that he has political ambitions. While most public and media focus remains on Kolya, Viktar holds key roles, having served as national security advisor to the president and a member of the Security Council, as well as holding an informal supervisory position over Belarus security forces. Currently, he serves as the head of the Belarusian Olympic Committee. Though this shift might appear like a career pivot, it is far from a retirement. He continues to be engaged in security-related activities, including providing special units to the Gulf sultanates to train their law enforcement agencies and participating in certain local operations conducted under the flags of Persian Gulf countries. In addition, he oversees diplomatic and trade relations with the United Arab Emirates and other countries in the region in various roles—sometimes as an official envoy, sometimes informally. For example, he has reportedly been involved in discussions about establishing a hub for Belarusian trade in Oman.

According to BelPol, an organization of Belarusian security officers who have defected to the democratic forces, Lukashenka primarily trusts three people: his eldest two sons and his longtime fixer Viktar Sheiman. Some earlier reports suggested that he listens to his press secretary Natalia Eismont, his youngest son Kolya, and his eldest son Viktar. According to sources with knowledge of the family whom I have spoken with, Lukashenka’s middle son, Dzmitry, is the least interested in politics among his family members. And when it comes to choosing whom to rely on, Lukashenka tends to lean more toward his longtime friend Sheiman than his son Viktar, perhaps reflecting some uncertainty about Viktar’s loyalty.

These hints from insiders are not verifiable, and they should therefore be considered with a pinch of doubt. While provisional, they nonetheless may prove useful to map against the actions Lukashenka does take going forward.

If any member of the family does succeed Lukashenka, Viktar seems to be the most plausible figure to watch, given the information on hand. But if no family member steps in—or if the Lukashenka family loses its grip on power—another possibility is that Belarus’s authoritarian elite orchestrates the transition. In Mafia-style systems like that of Belarus, power doesn’t change hands through elections but through elite bargaining. In the event of an elite-driven transition, it likely won’t matter much who the new figure is—whether it’s the prime minister or someone else from the nomenklatura—as long as they serve the existing power structure.

The Russia factor

The Kremlin will be monitoring this transition carefully, which could unfold along two main trajectories.

The first trajectory is that Moscow accepts Lukashenka’s chosen successor—whether that is one of the autocrat’s sons or a newcomer from the nomenklatura. In this scenario, Russia would essentially endorse the outcome of the Belarusian regime’s internal process, as long as the successor remains loyal to the Kremlin.

The second trajectory is more radical: The Kremlin could bypass Minsk’s internal arrangements and install its own candidate—someone explicitly pro-Russian and largely disconnected from Belarusian realities. That someone would have to hold Belarusian citizenship and go through a facade of the electoral process—or perhaps a brutal takeover along the lines of the one carried out by the “little green men” in Crimea.

Discussions about “closer integration” or even potential annexation often follow such scenarios, but these are largely parallel issues. Belarus is already deeply integrated with Russia, to the point that it is often unclear whether foreign policy decisions are made independently or under Kremlin pressure. Indeed, it is unclear whether the Russian military presence in Belarus reflects Lukashenka’s own security calculations or his inability to resist Moscow’s influence.

The fact that Belarus remains a formally independent state today—and hasn’t been annexed by Russia—is less a credit to Lukashenka and more a result of Kremlin calculations. The Belarusian army wouldn’t stand a chance against Russia, and the West would likely not respond harshly to the annexation of what is already a Kremlin satellite. At this point, it is more beneficial for Moscow to keep Belarus under control but maintain the appearance of independence.

Still, despite overwhelming Russian political influence, any openly pro-Russian figure would struggle to gain traction domestically in Belarus. The Kremlin has already tested the waters. In the past, Russia has reportedly attempted to cultivate support for pro-Russian political parties in Belarus, only to quietly abandon the idea, in part because support among Belarusians simply wasn’t there. What Belarusians want, consistently and clearly, is independence and neutrality—a sentiment that has shown up again and again in public opinion polls. Surveys conducted by different institutions in the past dozen years show that while a minority (usually less than 10 percent) does favor full political integration with Russia, a strong majority of Belarusians prefers friendly relations without unification.

The exiled opposition’s chances

This brings us to the opposition in exile. Lukashenka’s 2022 constitutional amendments stipulate that only candidates who have lived continuously in Belarus for the past twenty years may run for president—a rule designed to exclude exiled politicians from the race. Yet this is not an insurmountable obstacle. Belarusians could unite around an alternative candidate, someone who champions a democratic agenda rather than the regime’s plans. That candidate might be a leader already inside the country, perhaps someone currently out of the public eye or recently released from prison, or a new figure who emerges over time. Alternatively, Belarusians could rally around a protest candidate, as happened in the 2020 election when Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya stepped in during the election in 2020, after the other leading opposition candidates of that time, including her husband, were jailed.

The Kremlin looms large over Belarus’s future

Looking ahead, the experience of 2020 offers some important lessons. During the protests, there were signals that some officials within the regime supported change. Among the defectors and those condemning the regime’s violence were diplomats resigning in protest, security and law enforcement officers, and even former Prime Minister Sergei Rumas. These are the publicly known instances, and they alone do not indicate the existence of a critical mass within the regime willing or able to negotiate. Nevertheless, they suggest that the system is not monolithic, and the opposition could potentially negotiate power-sharing arrangements or guarantees if free and fair elections were allowed.

In other words, a democratic transition might be possible through an internal process involving parts of the existing system.

However, the biggest obstacle remains Moscow. In 2020, democratic forces attempted to establish contact with the Kremlin and promised constructive cooperation if Putin withdrew support from Lukashenka. But for Moscow, a democratic government in Belarus represents an unacceptable risk and a loss of control.

Many Belarusians openly dream of celebrating Lukashenka’s departure with champagne in the streets. Yet the crucial challenge for any democratic transition will remain the same: How to deal with Russia.

Katsiaryna Shmatsina is a Eurasia fellow at Lawfare, specializing in Belarus, Russia, and international security. She is a Belarusian-trained lawyer turned political analyst with over a decade of experience in Belarusian and European think tanks, serving as a researcher and, at times, as a political consultant for the Belarusian pro-democratic forces.

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What Bangladesh has achieved in the year since its revolution

M. Osman Siddique and Jon Danilowicz — Wed, 13 Aug 2025 18:15:59 +0000

Although a year has passed since former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was forced to flee the country in the face of a mass uprising, the spirit of Bangladesh’s July Revolution is still alive on the campus of Dhaka University. From the graffiti on the university walls to the eyewitness testimonials of students who helped overthrow her regime, a walk through the campus helps to put into context all that the country is still grappling with as it marks the one-year anniversary of Hasina’s ouster. Most importantly, it underscores the insistence of those who led the uprising that the former regime not be allowed to return to power.

On the one-year anniversary of Hasina’s departure on August 5, Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus announced that elections would be held in early February 2026, putting an end to much of the uncertainty about the length of the interim government’s tenure. Yunus also promulgated the July Declaration, enshrining the core principles that guided the July Revolution. The political parties also reached agreement on a July Charter laying out their shared commitment to reforms intended to prevent the rise of another authoritarian government. Taken together, the announcement of the election date and the agreements on the reform process have cleared the path for the return of electoral politics.

The interim government has much to celebrate as it marks its one-year anniversary. From the chaos that immediately followed Hasina’s departure, the interim government was able to restore the basic functioning of the state. This was no simple task given the degree to which the civil service and security forces had been politicized during the Awami League’s fifteen years in power. Even more importantly, the interim government’s economic team moved swiftly and decisively to head off an incipient collapse of the banking system, which had been looted by Hasina’s cronies. To their credit, Bangladesh’s international partners, including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, worked closely with the interim government to shore up the country’s shaky financial system.

The search for justice is complicated by the flight of many of the alleged perpetrators.

Leveraging the international network of Yunus, a Nobel Laureate and economist, the interim government assembled a broad international coalition to support its efforts to promote reforms and prepare to hold free and fair elections. Bangladesh has worked to repair relations with its traditional partners, including the United States, which had been strained during Hasina’s tenure. After months of engagement with the Trump administration, on July 31 the interim government secured a new framework agreement on trade with Washington, under which Bangladesh’s exports to the United States would be subject to a competitive 20 percent tariff. At the same time, Bangladesh has also enjoyed cordial relations with China, with Yunus meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping in March. However, the interim government’s relations with India have remained frosty, despite Yunus’s meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in April.

Perhaps the most difficult challenges the interim government has faced are ensuring accountability for the crimes committed during Hasina’s tenure and providing the regime’s victims with a degree of justice. These crimes are not limited to the horrors inflicted on protesters in July and August of 2024, which the United Nations has documented. They also include the many extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and other abuses that preceded the July uprising. The search for justice is complicated by the flight of many of the alleged perpetrators, who left the country in the chaos surrounding the regime’s fall. Hasina and many of her key lieutenants have been granted refuge in India, where they are able to meet freely despite the charges against them.

While Hasina remains in exile, the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), a Bangladeshi judicial institution established in 2009, has begun trials against her and others with command responsibility for her regime’s actions during July and August 2024. Meanwhile, the interim government has memorialized these abuses by establishing a museum on the grounds of Hasina’s former official residence in Dhaka. Many of the victims of the Hasina government continue to face material and psychological challenges, and resources to address these needs remain scarce. There are early efforts to establish a Truth and Healing Commission, which would seek to document the crimes committed during Hasina’s regime and allow for restitution to assist victims and their families.

Currently, there seems to be little appetite for reconciliation from either the victims or the perpetrators. The Awami League, the former ruling party under Hasina, remains banned pending the outcomes of the ICT trials, and the party will likely not be allowed to participate in the next elections. Human rights groups continue to raise concerns about Awami League members and supporters who are currently in custody, many of whom face charges that seemingly lack sufficient evidence to justify their detention. It will most likely fall to the next elected government to decide on the fate of these detainees as part of its wider approach to accountability, justice, and reconciliation.

While it is the eighth most populous country in the world, Bangladesh does not receive the attention it deserves, with very few experts in the United States or elsewhere paying close attention to developments there. Consequently, it is easy for those who wish to spread misinformation or disinformation to influence the narrative about the country. This has certainly been the case over the past year, as a narrative has emerged that post-Hasina Bangladesh has unleashed a genocide against the minority Hindu community, opened the door to Islamist extremism, and sold the country off to China. None of this is accurate, and it’s important to set the record straight as the country moves toward new elections.

Over Hasina’s fifteen years in power, Bangladesh increasingly shut itself off from the rest of the world. It denied visas to journalists, academics, and researchers, and it severely restricted freedom of speech. Now that the country has opened its doors once again, it is time for the world to pay closer attention to Bangladesh as it works to bolster its economy, pursue justice and accountability for the crimes of the Hasina regime, and reestablish democratic governance.

M. Osman Siddique is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. He previously served as the US ambassador to the Republic of Fiji with concurrent accreditations to the Kingdom of Tonga, the Republic of Nauru, and the Government of Tuvalu from 1999 to 2001.

Jon Danilowicz is a retired US Department of State foreign service officer, with extensive experience in South Asia, including service as deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Dhaka. He currently serves as the president of Right to Freedom, a Washington, DC- based human rights organization.

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Digital democracy is the key to staging wartime elections in Ukraine

Brian Mefford — Tue, 05 Aug 2025 21:14:19 +0000

Ukrainians underlined the strength of their democratic instincts in late July by taking to the streets and protesting new legislation that aimed to curtail the independence of the country’s anti-corruption institutions. The protesters made their point and achieved a significant victory, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reversing course just days after backing the controversial changes.

Ukrainians have a long record of rising up against non-democratic moves in times of need. This latest example mirrored much larger and equally successful protest movements in recent decades such as the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. The Ukrainian public are well aware that their hard-won democratic freedoms cannot be taken for granted.

The Ukrainian authorities would be wise to treat the recent protests as a serious indication of mounting public dissatisfaction with the current government. While Ukrainians have rallied behind Zelenskyy as the country’s wartime leader, this should not be confused with blanket approval for all his policies. Indeed, more protests cannot be ruled out. Next time, public anger might not be as easily appeased.

In any healthy democracy, elections are always the best pressure valve for public discontent. However, due to wartime security concerns, logistical obstacles, and martial law restrictions, elections are not currently possible in Ukraine. In 2024, the country postponed scheduled presidential and parliamentary ballots. More recently, Ukraine’s Central Election Commission confirmed that local elections would not go ahead later this year.

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The reasons for the lack of elections are clear and mandated by Ukraine’s Constitution. In fact, a consensus has crystallized that any public calls for wartime elections in Ukraine could help legitimize Russian efforts to portray the country as a dictatorship. However, there is no escaping the fact that the absence of elections hurts Ukraine’s credibility as an emerging democracy. This risks undermining international support for Ukraine and could potentially lead to a reduction in military aid.

While it has often been pointed out that Britain postponed all elections throughout World War II, many Americans have noted that the United States was able to hold both congressional and presidential elections during the nineteenth century American Civil War. Indeed, Abraham Lincoln’s main opponent was one of his own generals.

Ukrainian safety concerns amid the largest European invasion since World War II are obviously valid. At the same time, holding local votes in parts of Ukraine situated far from the front lines such as Uzhgorod, Lviv, and Chernivtsi could theoretically be possible with the necessary security measures in place.

With millions of voters currently living as refugees outside Ukraine and others displaced or serving in the military, voter turnout would almost certainly be significantly below the average for Ukrainian elections. This is regrettable but should not be decisive. After all, any free and fair election would help revive domestic and international confidence in Ukraine’s democratic credentials.

Of course, even local elections could not be safely staged in cities closer to the front lines like Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. The solution to this problem may lie in Ukraine’s sophisticated tech sector and the widespread adoption of digital tools throughout Ukrainian society.

Since 2022, Ukraine has earned an international reputation for battlefield innovation and now is recognized as a world leader in drone warfare. If this same spirit is applied to the country’s democracy, it could be possible to hold local or national elections while avoiding the risks associated with large groups of people gathering for campaign rallies and at polling stations.

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Following his election as Ukraine’s sixth president in 2019, Volodymyr Zelenskyy established the Ministry of Digital Transformation and identified digitalization as one of his strategic priorities for Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian government then launched the Diia app as a key e-governance tool that makes it possible for Ukrainians to hold a wide range of official documents in digital format. By late 2024, the Diia app had over 21 million users, representing a majority of the Ukrainian electorate.

It is worth exploring whether the Diia app could serve as the basis for secure digital voting. If Diia is not suitable, other digital options should be identified and developed. This approach could address election security concerns while also preventing the disenfranchisement of the millions of Ukrainians currently living abroad or defending the country against Russia’s invasion.

Skeptics may argue that the Diia system or any other digital voting platform would be vulnerable to hacking. This would undoubtedly be the key issue to address before proceeding with digital elections. At the same time, it is important not to overstate the challenges this represents. Fraud is always possible in any election, but the transparency of digital tools may actually reduce the risk when compared to paper ballots. Indeed, Ukraine’s digitalization experience suggests that the introduction of digital platforms actually reduces the scope for abuses.

Ukrainians are not yet demanding elections, but there are signs that public distrust of the authorities is mounting and may soon reach alarming levels. At a time when national unity is so crucial for the country’s survival, this mood of frustration must be taken seriously.

With no end in sight to the Russian invasion, Ukraine cannot afford to postpone all elections indefinitely. It is therefore time to start the process of digitalizing Ukraine’s democracy and employing the same kind of innovative thinking that has proved so effective on the battlefield. The technologies to do so already exist. The Ukrainian government must now demonstrate that they also have the political will to find the right solutions.

Brian Mefford is a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has lived and worked in Ukraine since 1999.

Anti-immigration views in Poland have been on the rise for several years. “Traditional” values are steadily recovering ground, particularly among the younger generation. And many citizens are less enthusiastic about Poland’s membership in the European Union. An April 2024 survey found that while a majority (77 percent) support Poland’s EU membership, this share experienced a 15 percentage point decline from 2022. Attitudes toward the roughly one million Ukrainian refugees living in Poland have cooled as well. In another poll, conducted in February, 75 percent of Poles opposed accepting migrants into the country.

Nawrocki’s foreign policy agenda will be shaped by bilateral relations with Ukraine and the United States, at least in the early stages of his tenure. In the Polish constitutional framework, the office of the president is jointly responsible for Poland’s security policy, along with the government. Consequently, from Nawrocki’s viewpoint, smooth cooperation and partnership with both Washington and Kyiv, especially in the military sphere, will be of paramount importance.

It would be unrealistic, though, to assume that Nawrocki’s personal bond with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will be as robust, as friendly, and as emotional as Duda’s. In the first phone call between the two leaders this past week, Nawrocki assured his counterpart that Poland’s support for Kyiv in the face of Russian aggression will remain unwavering. But he additionally expressed his expectation that Ukrainian authorities would finally address some historical issues that still constitute a stumbling block in bilateral relations. Nawrocki referred mostly to the Volhynia massacre in 1943, in which between 60,000 and 100,000 Poles were murdered by Ukrainian nationalists.

Nawrocki’s position perfectly encapsulates an old truth: In Poland you can be viscerally anti-Russian but not necessarily unconditionally pro-Ukrainian.

In parallel, as a Polish politician, you can be pro-American without being unconditionally pro-Trump—an equation many commentators in Western Europe are unable to grasp.

Since Trump’s election to a second term, Law and Justice leadership has seemed enamored of Trump’s peculiar kind of conservatism and his drive against cultural liberalism, or the “woke” agenda. Law and Justice members of parliament once famously chanted his name in the Polish parliament. “Make Poland Great Again” became a favorite call to arms of large chunks of the Polish right. Nevertheless, after a few months, the infatuation began to fade, essentially due to Trump’s disturbing remarks on the war in Ukraine and his lenient approach to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Even for the staunchest Polish Trump fans, any expressions of admiration for the Russian dictator would be plainly unpalatable.

Interestingly, the US president’s recent U-turn, including a hardening rhetoric and repeated threats aimed at Moscow, are a blessing for Nawrocki, who is himself subject to an arrest warrant issued by the Russian Federation. Trump has long had words of appreciation for Poland as a beacon in terms of military expenditures (now at a NATO-leading 4 percent of gross domestic product), as opposed to other European member states. Tellingly, however, the US president has never praised Poland’s unequivocal stance against Russia’s growing aggressiveness and neo-imperial ambitions. With Trump’s more assertive stance toward Russia in recent days, Nawrocki can now align his views with Trump’s, for the mutual benefit of both countries.

It is in US and Polish interests for Russia to be ultimately defeated. Nawrocki’s predecessor worked hard—with mixed results—to convince Trump that this is the right direction of travel. Under the new circumstances, Nawrocki’s efforts in this respect could prove more fruitful than Duda’s. Apparently, the US president already perceives the incoming Polish president as a fellow crusader in the global fight against wokeism. If Nawrocki also became a reliable ally in Trump’s struggle against Russian imperialism, this would be a most desirable (though slightly unexpected) turn of events.

Marek Magierowski is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the director of strategy for the Poland program at the Freedom Institute in Warsaw. He previously served as Poland’s ambassador to the United States and to Israel.

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Bangladesh’s revolution is at a crossroads. Open elections are the best way forward.

Wahiduzzaman Noor — Mon, 04 Aug 2025 20:22:35 +0000

A year ago, Bangladesh exhaled. Students and citizens, armed with nothing but courage, swept through Dhaka’s streets like a cleansing monsoon, washing away Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s fifteen-year reign. The world watched as a seemingly impossible revolution unfolded before its eyes.

Now that the monsoon has evaporated, citizens find their revolution pickpocketed while they were still celebrating. Extremists are emboldened, minorities are oppressed, political rivals are targeted, and the economy is wobbling. Bangladesh isn’t just faltering; it’s performing a painful autopsy on its own revolutionary aspirations. Without a free, fair, and inclusive election—soon—the nation teeters not at democracy’s threshold but at anarchy’s precipice.

Warning signs flared in the weeks after Hasina’s fall on August 5, 2024. Religious extremists demolished sculptures and artworks across the country. Soon after, As-Sahab, al-Qaeda’s official media wing, released a twelve-page message hailing the events as a victory for Muslims, praising the destruction of sculptures and portraying Bangladesh as the beacon of hope for the victory of Islam in the region. Then in March, Hizb ut-Tahrir, a terrorist organization designated in Bangladesh since 2009, paraded through Dhaka’s streets with its “March for Khilafah,” with advance publicity and without meaningful government interference.

These terrorists’ stunts did not happen in isolation. The interim government’s opening act was dropping charges against Jashim Uddin Rahmani, the top figure in al-Qaeda-affiliate Ansar al-Islam. More than fifteen thousand inmates, including top militants, walked free on expedited bail. In coordinated prison breaks across the country, ninety-eight convicted Islamic terrorists escaped the prison. Today, jihadi flags flutter on streets while authorities look away. Muhammad Yunus, chief adviser for the interim government, has assured that extremism will not resurface in Bangladesh, yet evidence suggests otherwise. His administration isn’t fighting terrorism; it’s offering terrorists a corner office with a view.

The July student-led uprising owed much of its power to women at the forefront, yet in this fundamentalist renaissance, they’re the first casualties. Women are harassed for how they dress, chastised for not covering up, and in some places outright forbidden from markets. Hatred against women hasn’t just increased, it’s been sanctified. In March, when locals nabbed a man for sexually harassing a Dhaka University student on her campus over her “improper” dress, Islamic radicals laid siege to the police station to free him. The fanatic mob live-streamed their assault, bailed him out, draped him in garlands, thrust Qurans into his hands, and anointed him a warrior of faith. They pried her details from police records and unleashed a torrent of threats that forced her to withdraw complaints—all while authorities watched and sat on their hands. In June, in at least two similar incidents, the assailants who publicly beat women walked free on bail and received heroic welcomes with victory parades.

The assault on Bangladesh’s pluralistic identity parallels women’s marginalization. Religious minorities have faced a renewed wave of violence since the interim government took power. The Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council has documented 2,442 attacks between August 2024 and June 2025. Even Muslim minorities are not spared. Dozens of Sufi shrines and Ahmadia mosques, traditionally targets of Islamic militants, have been razed. When confronted, Yunus offered a head-scratching defense: These were “political” attacks, not communal ones.

This defense is hardly exculpatory. If taken at face value, it suggests that minorities, traditionally supporters of the fallen regime (Awami League, or AL), now face targeted abandonment by a state indifferent to their plight. The government’s occasional interventions have decreased attacks, but they still persist at an alarming rate.

The interim government promised to restore the rule of law. To it, the previous regime’s darkest legacy was its penchant for enforced disappearances and custody killings. Yet Bangladesh now experiences an eerie déjà vu. In the first eleven months of this government, twenty-seven people have reportedly died in extrajudicial killings—seven more than 2023’s entire tally. The government recently decided to withdraw politically motivated cases filed under the AL government. Yet, more than 300,000 people now face murder and related charges after Hasina’s fall. Reports say these cases include fabricated accusations targeting journalists, human rights activists, celebrities—basically anyone who appeared close to the former government. The scales of justice haven’t been balanced; they’ve simply been tipped in the opposite direction. To ordinary Bangladeshis, this government has mastered the art of condemning yesterday’s injustice while refining tomorrow’s.

The law-and-order situation has deteriorated beyond recognition. Crime now pervades the country, while mobs move with impunity in the streets. Since the government took charge, Bangladesh has registered 179 mob killings. While some law-and-order breakdown is expected after such political upheaval, the magnitude suggests a deeper failure. The government insists that the police are not fully operational. Still reeling from their violent action during July’s clashes, law enforcement’s morale remains shattered. Yet remarkably, when the government rolled out “Operation Devil Hunt” this February to restore public order, this supposedly demoralized police force arrested around twenty thousand people—almost exclusively AL supporters, often on apparently fictitious cases. In May, the number ballooned to 48,400—likely the largest mass arrests in the nation’s history. This hardly resembles a demoralized force; instead, their morale appears selectively repurposed and weaponized.

Elections: The only way forward

Amid this carnival of chaos, only a free, fair, and inclusive election can pull Bangladesh back from the brink. The interim government consists of technocrats with little to no government experience. None are politicians, and they lack the political capital to act decisively. By contrast, an elected government with grassroots support can bring public trust, restore state authority, and act decisively. Just as important, an elected government can reestablish bureaucratic discipline and security chain-of-command, which has frayed under the current regime. The bureaucracy follows power, but it responds best to stability. With electoral incentives, a democratic government is more likely to deliver effective governance and plug the security vacuum that extremists now feed upon. Unlike the current regime, which operates over a dissolved parliament, a democratic government would be accountable to the public and parliament.

In a promising sign, Yunus declared that an election could be held in April 2026, and possibly as soon as February, pending sufficient progress on judicial and political reform. However, uncertainty still clouds the election. Suspicion has grown that the government has deliberately postponed elections to give the National Citizen Party (NCP), fashioned by the student leaders of the July 2024 uprising, and its Islamist allies time to transform street clout into electoral viability.

But delay only deepens the crisis. In the span of a year, the interim government could not deliver any meaningful reform. Each passing day is chipping away at Bangladesh’s stability while undemocratic forces tighten their grip. Much more delay, and Bangladesh may miss its final exit ramp before careening off democracy’s cliff entirely.

Beyond timing, the crucial question is who gets to participate: Should Hasina’s fallen party appear on the ballot?

The interim government banned all activities of AL and all its affiliates, citing national security concerns, after pressure from NCP and several Islamist parties. The election commission also suspended AL’s registration, effectively barring it from the next election. The government also accuses AL of not showing any remorse and stoking unrest that makes people angry.

Critics of the AL have ample ammunition—fifteen years of rule marked by progressively less competitive elections, systematic corruption, suppressing dissent, and a violent crackdown on the July protest that claimed over eight hundred lives.

Anger has its place, but democracy thrives on choice, not vengeance. Legal trials of AL leaders can—and should—coexist with the AL’s electoral participation. Allowing the party on ballots doesn’t equal absolution; instead, it ensures justice without collective punishment of supporters who weren’t culpable. Banning the political party that has won the most elections in Bangladesh’s history, played a role in its founding, and retains a significant voter base risks replicating authoritarian tactics that AL itself is often accused of. Such exclusion may effectively disenfranchise a significant segment of voters, undermine electoral legitimacy, push politics back into the streets, and set a dangerous precedent where each government purges its rivals.

Bangladesh’s lost revolution has reached its moment of truth. What began as a promising uprising now flirts dangerously with becoming exactly what it sought to overthrow—a system in which power, not principles, determines who gets to participate in democracy. The path forward is clear, if difficult: Hold elections soon, make them inclusive, let justice target individuals rather than parties, and allow Bangladeshis themselves to choose their future. Anything less would turn their democratic spring into an authoritarian winter, with a brief, illusory thaw in between.

Wahiduzzaman Noor is a Bangladeshi national security professional and former diplomat at the Embassy of Bangladesh in Washington, DC, with expertise in South Asian affairs, Indo-Pacific security, and counterterrorism.

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Wartime protests prove Ukraine’s democratic instincts are still strong

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 24 Jul 2025 21:52:58 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appeared to reverse course on Thursday over plans to curb the powers of the country’s anti-corruption agencies following widespread international criticism and two days of public protests.

Thousands took to the streets in cities across Ukraine on Tuesday after parliament passed legislation limiting the independence of anti-graft agencies established following the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. The protests, which were the first to take place in the country since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, gained momentum on Wednesday.

In an apparent reversal of his initial position, Zelenskyy has now announced that he has approved a new draft bill restoring all powers to the country’s anti-corruption organizations and largely safeguarding their freedom to conduct investigations without government oversight. The new legislation has been submitted to the Ukrainian Parliament, with anti-corruption officials backing the government U-turn and urging swift passage of the bill next week.

There may yet be many more twists and turns in the scandal surrounding Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies, but at this stage it certainly seems that the protesters have achieved a significant victory. Crucially, they have also highlighted the enduring strength of Ukraine’s democratic instincts and underlined the country’s continued commitment to basic freedoms at a time when the realities of war make elections impossible.

The Ukrainian authorities were unable to stage scheduled presidential and parliamentary elections in 2024 due to martial law restrictions and a wide range of security and logistical obstacles related to Russia’s ongoing invasion. With more than six million Ukrainians living as refugees in the EU and millions more currently under Russian occupation, a large percentage of the electorate would be unable to participate in any vote. Russia’s record of targeting Ukrainian civilians means that those who remain inside the country could not attend election campaign events or gather at polling stations in safety.

Despite widespread consensus among Ukraine’s opposition, civil society, and the country’s international partners over the practical barriers to organizing elections in wartime Ukraine, the Kremlin has sought to exploit the issue in order to question Zelenskyy’s legitimacy and brand him a dictator. Earlier this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin even floated the idea of placing Ukraine under temporary United Nations administration.

In reality, however, Putin is well aware of independent Ukraine’s strong democratic credentials. Indeed, it was the consolidation of the country’s fledgling democracy that helped persuade the Kremlin dictator to begin his military intervention in 2014, before convincing him of the need to launch his full-scale invasion eight years later.

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Like millions of his fellow Russians, Putin has never come to terms with the loss of Ukraine and continues to view the country as part of Russia’s historical heartlands. He is therefore deeply hostile to independent Ukraine’s embrace of a democratic European identity, which he regards as an existential threat to his own increasingly authoritarian regime. The emergence of a democratic Ukraine is seen by Putin and other Kremlin leaders as a potential catalyst for the next phase in a Russian imperial retreat that began in the late twentieth century with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

Putin has been obsessed with the idea of extinguishing Ukrainian democracy ever since Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, which he personally helped spark by attempting to rig the country’s presidential election. In the immediate aftermath of the flawed vote, millions of Ukrainians flooded into Kyiv and succeeded in forcing a rerun, leading to the victory of opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko.

This was to prove the breakthrough moment for Ukrainian democracy. Between the Orange Revolution and the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost eighteen years later, Ukraine held a total of eight presidential and parliamentary elections, all of which were rated free and fair by independent international observers. Meanwhile, Putin’s Russia continued to move steadily in the opposite direction.

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The Ukrainian population’s staunch defense of their democratic freedoms has consistently been a source of confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv. When pro-Kremlin Ukrainian politician Viktor Yanukovych was elected president in 2010 and attempted to reverse the country’s democratic gains, Ukrainians rose up once more and staged a second pro-democracy revolution. Within days of this successful uprising, Putin began the invasion of Ukraine with the seizure of Crimea.

For millions of Ukrainians, the country’s democratic choice remains one of the core values at stake in the current war. This sentiment has featured prominently during the present wave of protests, with many participants noting that Ukrainian soldiers are currently risking their lives for the freedoms that Zelenskyy himself appeared to be threatening with his undemocratic attack on the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

Former Ukrainian First Lady Kateryna Yushchenko, whose husband Viktor led the Orange Revolution, underlined the continuity between this week’s wartime protests and the country’s two pro-democracy revolutions of the post-Soviet era. “Ukrainians went to the streets today for the same reason they did in the 2004 Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. They want a European future, not a Russian one,” she commented.

Amid the horror and trauma of the largest European war since World War II, the readiness of so many ordinary Ukrainians to protest against threats to their hard-won freedoms speaks volumes about their determination to safeguard a democratic future. They understand that this is what so many of their compatriots are fighting for, and they are determined that these sacrifices will not be in vain. Indeed, it was striking to see many men and women in military uniform among the protesters. This is surely a sign of things to come in Ukrainian politics.

Putin has spent much of the past two decades attempting to corrupt Ukraine’s politicians and discredit the country’s democratic institutions, but he cannot convince the Ukrainian people to abandon the freedoms they have already tasted. This is why he is now so determined to erase Ukrainian statehood altogether. It is also a key reason why his invasion will likely end in failure.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Election outcomes

Following elections earlier this year in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the mixed results reveal that the contest between liberal democracy and populism remains far from settled.

Some of the populist right’s successes can be ascribed to anti-incumbent sentiment. In Romania, for example, centrist opposition candidate Nicușor Dan defeated George Simion, a right-wing opposition candidate and Euroskeptic who opposes military aid to Ukraine. But the narrow presidential contest between these two “outsiders” exposes a deeper vulnerability. Simion’s party has emerged as Romania’s second-largest political force, commanding significant influence in a parliament in which far-right legislators occupy a third of the seats. Even more worryingly, the electoral process itself proved chaotic. Simion reached the runoff only after the original first round was annulled amid allegations of Russian interference. Though he conceded defeat, Simion simultaneously contested the results, claiming improper French and Moldovan meddling—charges Romania’s Constitutional Court unanimously dismissed. Dan’s triumph preserves Romania’s westward orientation and is an important reaffirmation of the rule of law and its Euro-Atlantic alignment. Even so, the thin margin of his victory and the turmoil surrounding the election demonstrate that Romania’s democratic institutions remain vulnerable to outside threats.

In Poland, right-wing presidential candidate Karol Nawrocki’s narrow win over centrist Rafał Trzaskowski shows right-wing populism’s staying power and may prove consequential for European stability. Trzaskowski, who was backed by the centrist Civic Coalition, led the first round with 31.4 percent but ultimately fell short, dealing a severe blow to Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s pro-EU government and to Warsaw’s unified voice on European and transatlantic affairs. While Polish presidents have a mostly ceremonial function, they can veto legislation. This power could affect the governing coalition’s hopes to reverse years of what it and its supporters see as institutional capture, court politicization, and the damage from PiS’s systematic assault on democratic norms—efforts that triggered multiple EU rule-of-law proceedings. Many Poles are now concerned that Nawrocki’s presidency could derail that restoration project, with implications that might extend far beyond Poland’s borders to the heart of European governance itself.

Turning westward, recent political developments provide little solace. Portugal’s early general election in May delivered another minority government, as well as unprecedented support for the populist party Chega (Enough) that added to both the preexisting political instability and Europe’s far-right drift. Chega ran on a populist platform of antiestablishment rhetoric and anxieties over immigration, garnering 22.6 percent of the vote and placing it alongside the historically dominant center-left Socialist Party.

Earlier this year in Germany, the right-wing, ultra-nationalist Alternative for Germany (AfD) party came in second in federal elections, doubling its vote share from four years prior. It was the strongest showing for a far-right German party since World War II. Despite being battered by scandals and intelligence scrutiny, the AfD has continued to poll strongly on the back of anti-immigrant, Euroskeptic messaging, particularly in the former East Germany, where the party has found a foothold among young, disillusioned voters.

The strategic stakes

This pattern of populist advances may soon extend to Prague. Czechia, which has anchored Central Europe’s pro-Western and pro-Ukraine coalition in recent years, appears headed for a populist shift in October’s general elections. Former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš’s ANO party leads polling, alongside the right-wing Freedom and Direct Democracy, which has built its platform on Euroskepticism, anti-immigration sentiment, and explicit opposition to military aid for Ukraine.

The rightward drift in Poland and Czechia carries outsized significance because Warsaw and Prague have punched above their weight in EU politics, bridging Western capitals with the more politically fluid EU eastern flank. Both countries have been vocal, generous supporters of Ukraine and have advocated closer European defense cooperation. A populist turn in Prague—alongside familiar foot-dragging on sanctions and dialed-down commitments from Bratislava and Budapest—could unravel that posture. It could feed broader regional and continental ambivalence toward Kyiv at a vulnerable moment, when the burden of sustaining Ukraine’s defense is falling more squarely on Brussels.

Also at stake are the EU’s nascent ambitions for a credible defense capability, since proposals for common rearmament programs and joint procurement depend on the very cohesion that Europe’s populists seek to undermine. The foreign policy challenge is nuanced: Polish and Romanian nationalists support robust defense spending at home but remain skeptical about pooled sovereignty within the EU. Yet without alignment on planning, procurement, and command structures, rising national defense budgets do little to strengthen Europe’s collective readiness. Meanwhile, Germany’s AfD opposes both domestic and EU military buildups. If every major defense initiative must first survive such centrifugal forces of domestic politics among the bloc’s twenty-seven members—some actively sympathetic to Moscow—the promises of united European defense look increasingly hollow. As with Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni, populists sometimes govern more pragmatically than they campaign. But whether these leaders would uphold Europe’s commitments to Ukraine and collective defense remains to be seen.

Institutional defenses: More than just elections

There are many factors that account for the recent success of populist parties, but these trends run deeper than electoral outcomes. They reflect domestic narratives that exploit grievance and mistrust, as much as a failure to counter foreign efforts to manipulate European electorates. Europe’s centrists must work to take back the language of sovereignty and security from those who wield it to divide voters, and they should do so before these messages harden into conventional wisdom under the combined weight of internal discontent and external interference.

In practice, this means connecting European cooperation to kitchen-table concerns and leaning into language an ordinary citizen can understand and appreciate. This entails stressing how coordinated defense procurement delivers better equipment at lower cost to national armies and how energy partnerships reduce household bills. It also requires emphasizing how European frameworks amplify—rather than diminish—national power by enabling small EU countries to negotiate with large ones as equals, allows states to secure better trade and investment deals that create jobs, and help deter Russian aggression through collective strength that no single nation could muster alone.

To better defend against foreign information interference, the EU should double down on auditing social media platforms and how their algorithms prioritize and distribute political content under the Digital Services Act. The EU should also enforce penalties and suspend service when platforms are shown to facilitate hostile influence operations.

Even then, the information landscape in an open Europe remains porous, and the institutional responses will lag multiple steps behind malicious campaigns. But such measures could meaningfully reduce their scale and effectiveness while signaling the EU’s resolve to tackle them as a continent-wide security imperative requiring a sustained response that could eventually tip the balance decisively in favor of democratic discourse. Given the stakes, both for the state of the EU’s democracies and the need for Europe to unite on rearmament to deter Russia, Brussels must act now to defend its institutions.

Soňa Muzikárová is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post Populist gains are threatening Europe’s strategic coherence. Here’s how the EU can fight back. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How the war in Gaza diminished dreams of political reform in Egypt

Amr Salah Mohamed — Thu, 03 Jul 2025 19:41:16 +0000

In early 2023, Egypt’s deeply constrained public sphere showed tentative signs of political opening. Confronted with an economic crisis, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who has maintained tight control over the country since 2014, initiated a package of economic and political reforms. Pushed to the margins for years, opposition voices cautiously hoped that the 2023 presidential and August 2025 parliamentary elections might open limited new space of political participation for secular groups after years of political constraints. Then came the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack inside Israel.

With the launch of Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza, followed by escalation with Hezbollah and Iran, harrowing images from the strip, and fears of Palestinian displacement to Egypt—Egyptian anxiety is elevated, and the national debate has shifted from reform to national security. By the end of 2023, al-Sisi had secured a third term without a meaningful electoral contestation amid calls for national unity.

It’s clear that the post-October 7 era has not only devastated the Gaza strip, it has also influenced Egypt’s economy and domestic political dynamics—and the impacts extend beyond the ballot box. This includes deepening ideological fractures among Egypt’s intellectuals and secular opposition, further discrediting their democratic narrative while lending credibility to conspiracy theories, and restoring the battered image of Egypt’s military as the nation’s ultimate protector.

Displacement overshadows political reform

After years of mismanagement, Egypt faced an economic crisis between 2022 and early 2023. Inflation climbed to over 32 percent by March 2023, and foreign debt exceeded $160 billion. These pressures created a narrow opening for discussions about political and economic reform and the military’s expanding role in the Egyptian economy.

To mitigate domestic discontent and reassure international donors, al-Sisi announced a “National Dialogue,” launched in May 2023. The dialogue was officially framed as a platform to promote political reform and to gather input from the full political spectrum, except the banned Muslim Brotherhood, on the country’s economic and governance challenges. Moreover, the government released several secular political prisoners, allowed the return of some exiled dissidents, permitted media space for opposition, and lifted the asset freeze and travel ban imposed on many human rights defenders. The “State Ownership Policy Document,” issued and approved in December 2022, pledged a timeline to reduce the state’s dominance over key economic sectors.

These steps raised some hopes that the 2023 presidential and 2025 parliamentary elections would differ from previous ones, where al-Sisi won 97 percent of the vote and state allies dominated parliament. They also raised the expectation that the state would allow greater participation for secular opposition, tolerate more serious candidates to compete with al-Sisi, allow for the opposition to form independent electoral lists, or at least guarantee broader inclusion within state-approved electoral lists in the coming parliamentary election. Egypt’s drained intellectuals and opposition groups, still recovering from the failures of the post-2011 uprising hoped for a modest revival of political dynamism after years of exclusion under al-Sisi.

Yet, the outbreak of the Gaza war abruptly shifted the national discourse, and the debate of political reform quickly faded behind the war’s horrific scenes, along with debates over plans to displace Palestinians to Egypt and Jordan. Amid public anxiety, Egypt’s December 2023 presidential election passed largely unnoticed and without serious competition. Al-Sisi secured a third term with an overwhelming majority, with 89.6 percent this time, facing only nominal opposition, calling his victory a “rejection of the inhumane war in Gaza.”

Even the conviction and imprisonment of former Member of Parliament Ahmed Tantawi—who had sought to run for president—for possessing and distributing unauthorized election documents sparked far less public debate than expected. With parliamentary elections expected by within weeks, there is little meaningful discussion of electoral reform or the measures that guarantee free elections, especially after a new amendment to the election law was hastily passed in parliament. and approved by the president without serious public debate or political consensus with opposition. Many fear the parliamentary election will merely echo the presidential election’s non-competitive and tightly controlled nature.

Polarizing the polarized intellectuals

Since 2011, Egypt’s intellectuals have been divided along multiple fault lines—first between reformists and revolutionaries, then between Islamists and secularists. These divisions sharpened during the brief presidency of Mohamed Morsi, a senior Muslim Brotherhood figure, and deepened after his 2013 ouster, backed by many secular groups and the military. The ensuing economic deterioration, coupled with the shattered dream of democratization, have disillusioned most of the Egyptian intellectuals despite their differences.

More recently, however, mounting economic hardship and the failure of the post 2011-2013 political trajectories have begun to soften these ideological rifts, creating space for some intellectuals and opposition figures to reflect and publicly reassess a decade of political failures. Yet the conflict in the region has reopened old wounds, turning debates over the conflict into a new arena for polarization.

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Many Islamists, leftists, and Nasserist figures voiced strong support for both Hamas’s and Iran’s responses to the recent US-Israel strikes on Tehran’s nuclear facilities, framing Hamas and Iran as legitimate anti-colonial resistance forces. In contrast, many nationalists and liberal figures condemned Hamas, blaming it for derailing the Israeli peace process in the nineties and portraying the October 7 attack as reckless and damaging to the Palestinian cause. Nationalists and liberals have also accused Iran of destabilizing the region through its proxies and irresponsible actions.

Ultimately, what began as debates over Hamas’s strategy and its outcome soon escalated into media confrontations, accusations of treason, and ruptured ties within the intellectual class. In an already drained political landscape, the resurgence of these fractures deepened weakness within Egypt’s intellectuals and opposition.

Discrediting democracy and embracing conspiracy

The Gaza war’s impact went beyond political actors and debates, shaking the cultural foundations of Egypt’s reform movement. The inability of the Western-led international community to halt the scale of suffering in Gaza served as a second major blow to the liberal democratic narratives that were embraced by many Egyptian intellectuals since the 1990s, including the framing of democracy a prelude for development, peace, and progress.

In Egypt, perceived Western double standards deepened public skepticism towards democracy, increasingly seen not as a normative framework for foreign policies but as a tool of political pressure primarily serving Western interests. Many Egyptians were reminded of the US decision to freeze military aid to Egypt in 2013 over human rights concerns—after the Egyptian Army ousted Morsi. For some Egyptians, the human rights violations committed by their governments since 2013—which once drew US sanctions—now pale in comparison to the international accusations of genocide committed by Israel in Gaza, which the West met with outright support or passive silence. That inconsistency was also apparent in Washington’s decision to launch strikes on Iranian targets linked to its nuclear program, while continuing to support Israel—a state widely believed to possess a nuclear arsenal.

The agenda of Palestinian displacement abroad—once dismissed during the 1990s and 2000s as a conspiracy theory amplifying a fringe agenda in Israel—now appears real as Israel and the United States publicly pushed proposals to export the Gaza crisis into Egypt.

This is not the first instance in Egypt’s recent political history where Egypt’s versions of a liberal peace narrative have faced a popular reckoning. The first came when the 2011 Arab uprisings devolved into civil wars rather than democracy. And now, conspiracy theories that framed those uprisings as a Western plot to divide Arab countries and ensure Israel’s regional supremacy are experiencing a revival.

Amid these dynamics, the image of Egypt’s army and president—previously tarnished by widespread socioeconomic suffering—began to recover. The military has once again emerged as the ultimate protector with current and past traumas colliding: memories of the Sinai insurgency and post-June 2013 terrorist attacks, the enduring conflicts in neighboring Sudan and Gaza, and now Israel seizing control of the Rafah crossing. The Egyptian troop presence in Sinai, al-Sisi’s public rejection of US President Donald Trump’s plan to displace Palestinians from Gaza and his refusal to meet Trump at the White House, as well as widespread media calls to rally behind the state amid a national security threat all reinforce this image.

By strengthening the image of the army and the president, while weakening Egyptian dissidents through polarization and discrediting their democratic narrative, the Gaza war further enhanced the asymmetry between a strong, entrenched authority and a weak, fragmented opposition and intellectuals. This growing imbalance continues to block any meaningful change in power dynamics.

Al-Sisi’s security concerns

Despite al-Sisi’s renewed confidence in his restored image, and state media calls for national unity, his persistent security concerns remain.

The Palestinian cause has historically been a potent mobilizing force against the Egyptian authority, frequently harnessed by political Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, whose formal political role al-Sisi dismantled in 2013. Yet while the Brotherhood’s organizational presence has been curbed, its narrative over the conflict—alongside that of the broader “resistance camp”—may resonate with some of the Egyptian public, particularly among a younger generation that came of age during one of the most violent phases of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Many in this cohort are disillusioned with prospects for peace and increasingly receptive to boycott campaigns, championed by Muslim Brotherhood media, against Israel and the United States. They are also exposed to narratives framing the Egyptian regime as a complicit actor aligned with Western interests and Israel’s war in Gaza. The appeal of these narratives, coupled with rising sympathy for Hamas in the early months of the war and the resurgence of Islamism in neighboring Jordan—as seen in the September 2024 elections—has likely deepened al-Sisi’s anxieties. Although there is no immediate sign of large-scale pro-Palestine mobilization, due to the state’s zero-tolerance to demonstrations, these dynamics raise the risk of rekindling ideological currents viewing them as potential challenges to its stability.

Ultimately, the post-October 7 era has not only demolished Gaza. It also disrupted Egypt’s fragile political opening: deepening polarization, weakening opposition forces, and temporarily consolidating the public standing of the president and military amid heightened insecurity. The erosion of the foundations of democratic narratives, widening fractures among intellectuals, and the simmering threat of Islamist mobilization leave Egypt’s political opening increasingly elusive, with the country seemingly sliding back into political stagnation.

Whether Egypt can resist these turbulent crosscurrents—reshaped by the regional war—without sliding again into stagnation, or revive its reform ambitions, remains the defining challenge in the post-October 7 era—one that the parliamentary elections are likely to reveal.

Amr Salah Mohamed is a scholar and lecturer at the Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University, specializing in conflicts in the Middle East and Egyptian politics.

The post How the war in Gaza diminished dreams of political reform in Egypt appeared first on Atlantic Council.

2025 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes: How political freedom drives growth

Ignacio Campomanes, Nina Dannaoui-Johnson, Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee, Joseph Lemoine — Mon, 23 Jun 2025 20:00:58 +0000

2025 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes:
How political freedom drives growth

By Ignacio Campomanes, Nina Dannaoui-Johnson, Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee, and Joseph Lemoine

topline summary

jump to the full report

The dangerous authoritarian narrative
What do the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes measure?
The state of Freedom and Prosperity around the world
Is political freedom needed for growth and prosperity?
Is political freedom disconnected from economic growth?
Factors masking the democracy-growth nexus
A refined analysis of political freedom and economic growth
Democracy favors economic growth
Political freedom as a linchpin of prosperity

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The dangerous authoritarian narrative

A dangerous belief has taken root globally: that political freedom is not essential to prosperity and may even be an obstacle to economic growth.¹ This report demonstrates that this narrative is not supported by rigorous empirical evidence. On the contrary, the Indexes show that political freedom does lead to stronger long-term growth. In fact, the process of democratization alone provides an average 8.8 percent boost to gross domestic product (GDP) per capita after twenty years compared to its autocratic peers.

The deterioration of political freedom that began in 2012 remains an ongoing trend affecting countries across all regions and income levels. The continuing erosion of core political rights, such as freedom of expression and association, as well as the weakening of institutional checks on executive power, including judicial and legislative oversight, are alarming developments highlighted in this 2025 update of the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes.

The benefits of political liberalization take time to materialize. Policymakers must be persistent and patient before reaping the rewards of liberalization. And the same logic likely applies in reverse: Declines in political freedom may not have immediate economic consequences, but they carry long-term risks. Complacency in the face of democratic backsliding may ultimately jeopardize the prosperity of the next generation.

Although the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes currently capture this decline of freedom most clearly in the political dimension, the outlook for the rule of law and economic freedom is not much better. The erosion of democratic institutions and oversight mechanisms will likely contribute to declines in the rule of law and economic governance. Executives unchecked by legislatures or civil society are less likely to be held accountable for bureaucratic inefficiency or corruption, and more likely to pursue harmful economic policies.

The authoritarian narrative must be challenged with rigorous research and evidence-based analysis. History shows that it was free institutions—political, legal, and economic—that enabled today’s most developed countries to escape poverty and achieve remarkable prosperity over the past two hundred years. The Freedom and Prosperity Center remains committed to this mission, working alongside thousands of freedom advocates around the world to safeguard and advance the institutions that foster long-term prosperity.

What do the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes measure?

The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center was created with the mission to increase the well-being of people everywhere—and especially of the poor and marginalized in developing countries—through unbiased, data-based research on the relationship between freedom and prosperity. The cornerstone of this project is the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes: a rigorous effort to assess the evolution of freedom and prosperity around the world, going back three decades.

The two indexes are based on well-established theoretical definitions of the concepts of freedom and prosperity, matched with respected empirical measures produced by international institutions, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the V-Dem project, or Fraser Institute.²

The Freedom Index

We think of freedom comprehensively, as a combination of a political dimension (democracy and individual rights), a legal dimension (the rule of law), and an economic dimension (free-market economy). Therefore, the Freedom Index aggregates three subindexes (political, legal, and economic), each covering several components.

The Freedom Index is composed of three equally weighted subindexes: political, legal, and economic

The political subindex measures the extent to which governments and lawmakers are responsive to the demands of citizens and respect their individual rights and liberties. The more democratic the political system, and the more it allows for citizens to oppose and contest those in power, the more public policies are expected to reflect the preferences of a majority of the population. The political subindex has four components: (1) elections; (2) political rights; (3) civil liberties; and (4) legislative constraints on the executive.

The legal subindex measures the degree to which a country abides by the rule of law—that is, whether citizens and government officials are bound by and abide by the regulations and laws of the land. It thus reflects certainty, stability, and predictability. The legal subindex includes five components: : (1) clarity of the law; (2) judicial independence and effectiveness; (3) bureaucracy quality and corruption; (4) security; and (5) informality.

The economic subindex is designed to measure whether most economic activity in a country is guided by the principles of free and competitive markets. An economically free society enhances the incentives to work and invest. Businesses and individuals can also capture the gains of an efficient allocation of resources guided by the price mechanism, and fully exploit the economic potential of its population. The economic subindex comprises four components: (1) property rights; (2) trade freedom; (3) investment freedom; and (4) women’s economic freedom.

We scale each component so that all have the same range (0–100), and compute each subindex as the unweighted average of its components. Finally, we arrive at a Freedom Index score for each country for each year, again using the unweighted average of the three subindexes.

In order to offer an intuitive and simple representation of the differences in freedom across countries, we assign one of four freedom categories (High Freedom, Moderate Freedom, Low Freedom, and Lowest Freedom) to each country-year observation. To do so, we use the Freedom Index rank for each year, labeling the level of freedom of the first quartile of countries as “High Freedom” (those that rank 1–41), “Moderate Freedom” for those in the second quartile (ranking 42–82), “Low Freedom” the third quartile (ranking 83–123), and “Lowest Freedom” those in the bottom quartile (ranking 124–164).

The Prosperity Index

The Prosperity Index also takes a broad view, going beyond the measurement of pure material well-being and including additional social aspects that we see as necessary for the discussion of a “prosperous society.” The Prosperity Index has six components: (1) income; (2) health; (3) education; (4) inequality; (5) minorities; and (6) environment. The first three components capture individual flourishing, while the last three assess whether prosperity is shared and sustainable.

Income per capita is the most widely used indicator of prosperity in economic and social science research. A prosperous society is necessarily one that has escaped generalized poverty and misery, and that generates sustained economic growth. The expectation of a long and healthy life and the opportunity to acquire knowledge are also widely considered to be standard dimensions of a holistic view of human flourishing.

A prosperous society requires that material well-being is shared among citizens and not concentrated in a small group. The components of inequality and minorities are intended to capture the degree of inclusiveness in a country. We measure inequality in terms of income, which is also highly correlated with education and health inequality. The minorities component captures the absence of discrimination regarding access to public services and opportunities, based on ethnic, social class, language, gender, political affiliation, and other considerations.

Finally, prosperity needs to be sustainable in the long run, and thus we include in the Prosperity Index a measure of environmental quality. This component is an equally weighted average of three sub-components, which deal with the wide variation in countries’ stage of development. First, we assess the cleanliness of a country’s production processes using the ratio of carbon dioxide emissions to GDP per capita (both in logs). Second, we capture the consequences of environmental quality for human life, using the rate of deaths from air pollution. Third, we consider the fact that in the least developed countries citizens can be exposed to unclean environments on a daily basis, so we use access to clean cooking technologies at a household level as a proxy.

As we do for the Freedom Index, we assign one of four prosperity categories (High Prosperity, Moderate Prosperity, Low Prosperity, and Lowest Prosperity) to each country-year observation. To do so, we use the Prosperity Index rank for each year, labeling as “High Prosperity” the first quartile of countries (those that rank 1–41), “Moderate Prosperity” those in the second quartile (ranking 42–82), “Low Prosperity” the third quartile (ranking 83–123), and “Lowest Prosperity” those in the bottom quartile (ranking 124–164).

The state of Freedom and Prosperity around the world

Global freedom continues to decline

The Freedom Map (linked below) illustrates the global landscape of freedom in 2024, as measured by our three subindexes (political, legal, and economic). Freedom remains unevenly distributed across the world, with scores ranging from a high of 93.8 in Denmark to a low of 16.9 in Afghanistan. The persistent low scores for some countries over several years (sometimes decades) highlight persistent gaps in institutional capacities and economic freedom, particularly in fragile and authoritarian states.

Explore Freedom and Prosperity world map

The Indexes rank 164 countries around the world. Use our site to explore thirty years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the subindexes and indicators that comprise our Indexes.

Explore the indexes

Detailed Freedom Index scores and rankings for each country are available in Table 1. which also highlights changes in rank over the past year.

Because institutional reform is typically a slow and gradual process, the overall global distribution of freedom has remained quite stable over the past three decades. Western European countries continue to dominate the top of the Freedom Index, alongside Australia and New Zealand. Differences in scores among these countries are small, which helps explain seemingly large changes in rank, such as Finland dropping three positions or Germany falling five, even in the absence of major changes.

That said, it is noteworthy that both Canada (ranked 20th) and the United States (22nd) have lost ground relative to their European peers, falling four and three positions, respectively. Significant movements within the top quartile include Poland’s reversal of its recent democratic backsliding: It has gained eight positions in the 2025 Index and reentered the “High Freedom” category after eight years. In contrast, Slovakia’s performance is cause for concern, dropping eight positions following a nearly four-point decline in its Freedom score.

Among the middle two quartiles, categorized as “Moderate Freedom” and “Low Freedom,” we observe more dynamic shifts. On the positive side, the largest improvements were seen in Guatemala (up 26 positions), Vietnam (up 21), South Africa (up 13), and Jordan (up 12). The sharpest declines were recorded in Georgia (down 22 positions), Burkina Faso (down 17), and Mozambique (down 13).

Unfortunately, mobility within the “Lowest freedom” category remains limited. This group continues to include many countries from Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. China (ranked 143rd) and Russia (145th), despite being two of the world’s most populous and geopolitically significant nations, remain firmly entrenched in the lowest tier, showing little progress toward greater freedom.

Table 1. Freedom Index scores and ranking for 2024

Looking beyond the most recent scores, the Freedom Index’s thirty-year coverage allows us to uncover some interesting dynamics. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the Freedom Index and its three subindexes since 1995 at a global level. The most striking—and worrying—trend is the negative evolution of the political subindex over the past twelve years. Democratic regression started in 2013, well before the COVID-19 crisis, accelerated during the pandemic, and continues today. The global average score of the political subindex in 2024 is similar to that of 1999, erasing 25 years of progress.

Figure 3. Political subindex is now at the same level as in 1999—a twenty-five-year low

The erosion of political freedom in the past decade is a generalized trend that affects countries at all levels of development, and across all regions of the world. Most notably, both the political subindex and the legal subindex have declined by more than two points globally.

Figure 4 shows that the OECD countries (those with the highest levels of income in the world, most of them well-established democracies) have experienced a decline in all three subindexes since 2014. For this group, the sharpest declines in the political subindex have occurred in Turkey, Mexico, Greece, and Hungary, each losing more than ten points over the past decade. In the legal subindex, which assesses the rule of law, Canada and the United States rank as the fourth- and sixth-largest decliners, respectively. Their scores dropped significantly due to a marked deterioration in the “clarity of the law” component, which evaluates whether legal norms are clear, transparent, stable, and consistently enforced.

Figure 4. OECD scores have declined across all three freedom subindexes in the past decade

Declines in the political subindex are significant across all regions, as shown in Figure 5. with South and Central Asia experiencing the largest fall (-6.12 points on average), followed by Middle East and North Africa (-5.27) and Sub-Saharan Africa (-5.16). Similarly, legal freedom has fallen in all regions except for South and Central Asia, but it is important to keep in mind that this region still shows the worst average score in this subindex.

Figure 5. The democratic decline has continued to worsen across all regions

The erosion of political freedom has been the most salient and generalized trend in recent times. We can examine what has been driving this by looking at the evolution of the political subindex components. Figure 6 presents the percentage change of each component since the political subindex peak in 2012. All three have decreased in the last twelve years, although with slightly different timing and strength. Changes in the components measuring elections, civil liberties, and legislative constraints on the executive are relatively minor until 2019, but worsen significantly during the pandemic (2019–2021) and continue to decline well after the world came back to relative normality.

The deterioration of the political rights component has been sustained and very strong since 2012, accumulating a loss of more than 10 percent. It seems clear that the restrictions imposed during the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 crisis were only an accelerator of a process already incubated, as political regression started well before 2019, and continues up to this day.

Figure 6. All components of political freedom have declined since 2012

Until now, our analysis has focused on global and regional simple averages, where each country carries equal weight in the aggregate trends, regardless of its population size, geographic area, or GDP. Figure 7 examines how political freedom has evolved for the average individual worldwide. It compares the global development of the political subindex using a simple country average (blue) versus a population-weighted average (orange).

Figure 7. Population-weighted averages show lower political freedom scores and a sharper decline

Two related facts stand out. First, the level of political freedom experienced by the average citizen of the world is significantly lower than the country average would indicate. Second, its erosion over the past decade has been much steeper when we examine it through population-weighted averages. This is because countries with larger populations carry more weight in population-based averages, meaning their declines in political freedom impact the global trend far more than those in less-populous countries.

China is a big factor explaining the former, as it comprises more than 17 percent of the world population and has ranked among the bottom ten countries on the political subindex, and all its components, since 1995. India, the most populous country in the world, is the main driving factor of the latter, with a plummeting trend in political freedom since 2014 (-14 points). Significant declines in several other populous countries have also contributed to the steep downward trend, such as Russia (-14.5), Indonesia (-11.8), and Bangladesh (-9.8).

While the political and legal subindexes have declined since 2014, the economic subindex shows positive progress over the same period. In fact, two of its components, property rights protection and, most notably, women’s economic freedom, are the only areas of the entire Freedom Index to have improved globally since 2014 (see Figure 8). Women’s economic freedom, in particular, has risen by nearly seven points globally since 2014, and by almost twenty-three points since 1995.

Figure 8. Only women’s economic freedom presents significant improvement in the last decade

Virtually every country in the Index has experienced improvements in women’s participation in economic affairs in the past decade. It is encouraging to observe that some of the largest increases in this component have taken place in countries that had the lowest scores just ten years ago. The Gulf monarchies (especially the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain), together with some African countries such as Gabon and Democratic Republic of the Congo, present significant expansions in women’s rights. However, it is important to acknowledge that this measure is limited to economic rights only, and that further progress is needed if these countries are to catch up with the most advanced countries of Western Europe.

Explore Freedom and Prosperity world map

The Indexes rank 164 countries around the world. Use our site to explore thirty years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the subindexes and indicators that comprise our Indexes.

Explore the indexes

Rising global prosperity, but worsening treatment of minorities

The Prosperity Map (linked below) shows the situation of prosperity around the= world according to the six prosperity components (income, health, inequality, environment, minorities, education) in 2024. Detailed scores and rankings for each country can be found in Table 2. The general distribution of prosperity is similar to that of freedom, with the Western world topping the top quartile (“High Prosperity”), and Africa being the least prosperous region.

Table 2. Prosperity Index scores and ranking for 2024

Large movements in the ranking position of specific countries in a single year are almost impossible as the components of prosperity vary only gradually and in the long term. Nonetheless, we do observe clear trends when looking at the evolution of prosperity and its components since 1995 (Figure 9). Most striking is the dramatic improvement of education globally, increasing by more than twenty points. The apparent stagnation in the last two years is the product of a lack of data from our preferred source (the UN’s Human Development Index). The disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic are only lightly visible, but these do not seem to have obstructed the generalized positive trend toward increasing years of education across the globe, and especially in developing regions.

Other noticeable trends in the components of the Prosperity Index (Figure 9) include: A U-shape evolution of income inequality, which worsened from 1995 to 2005 but has improved since. Steady gains in health outcomes until 2019, followed by a sharp decline due to the COVID-19 pandemic and a partial recovery. Consistent improvement in environmental quality. And a visible decline in the treatment of minorities since 2019.

Overall, the big picture is clear: The world is becoming more prosperous. However, the specific driving forces of this process vary significantly between regions and levels of development.

Figure 9. Prosperity has improved across all components since 1995, but the treatment of minorities has worsened in the past decade

Figure 10 shows the 2024 score in the Prosperity Index for all seven regions of the world (the tip of each arrow), as well as the size and direction of change in each region’s score since 2014 (beginning of the arrow). The substantial differences in levels of prosperity between regions is by no means a novel finding, but it is always necessary to keep in mind these disparities when discussing how the different regions have evolved in recent years.

Figure 10. The Global South has been catching up in overall prosperity since 2014, but a significant gap remains (ten-year change on the Prosperity Index)

Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Central Asia are the most improved regions since 2014, with much of that performance attributable to substantial increases in the health, environment, and education scores. Nonetheless, it is also worth noticing that although decreases in the minorities component are generalized across the globe, the fall in South and Central Asia is the largest in the Global South. This trend may be attributable to the deterioration of political freedom in the region (see above).

Figure 11. The treatment of minorities has worsened across all regions in the past decade

North America is the only region in which overall prosperity has declined over the past decade, a trend that warrants several important caveats. First, as previously noted, North America still maintains a significant lead in overall prosperity compared to other regions, with the exception of Europe. This advantage holds across most components of the Prosperity Index. Second, the primary driver of the region’s decline is a drop in the minorities component of the Index. In both the United States and Canada (the region’s only two countries in our grouping, which places Mexico with Latin America and the Caribbean) this indicator has experienced a notable downturn in recent years. This decline is likely linked to more restrictive immigration policies, which may have reduced access to public services and economic opportunities for non-nationals and minority groups.

Is political freedom needed for growth and prosperity?

We now turn to a deeper question at the heart of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s mission:

What is the relationship between freedom and prosperity?

In other words:

Is freedom the surest path to long-term development and well-being?

Prosperity and overall freedom are closely associated

In the 2024 Freedom and Prosperity Report, we presented substantial evidence of a strong and consistent association between freedom and prosperity. Figure 12 provides an updated visual summary of this link, showing a clear positive correlation (0.71) between the two Indexes across all countries in 2024: Nations with greater freedom tend to enjoy higher levels of prosperity.

Last year’s report further supported this finding by examining changes over time rather than one-off snapshots—an approach that helps control for potential econometric concerns. Even then, the positive relationship held: Countries that improved most in their freedom scores since 1995 also experienced the largest gains in prosperity. In addition, we explored the long-term impact of a significant increase in freedom (a freedom “shock”) and again found substantial positive effects on prosperity.

Figure 12. There is a strong positive correlation (0.71) between the Freedom Index and Prosperity Index

Is political freedom disconnected from economic growth?

Having established a strong positive relationship between overall freedom and prosperity, we now take a closer look at the connection between each of the three freedom subindexes—political, legal, and economic—and the various components of the Prosperity Index (Table 3). While each of the freedom subindexes is positively correlated with all prosperity components, the strength of these relationships varies.

One clear pattern emerges: The legal subindex, which reflects the quality of the rule of law, shows the strongest correlation with nearly all prosperity components (with the exception of inequality). By contrast, the political subindex is the one least strongly correlated with nearly all prosperity components (with the exception of minorities).

Table 3. The legal subindex (rule of law) correlates most strongly with prosperity (2024)

Some might argue that this strong relationship is driven mainly by the wealthiest countries, such as those in Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which tend to score high in both freedom and prosperity. To test this, we re-ran the analysis, excluding these high-income OECD countries and focusing only on the remaining 126 non-OECD countries. The strength of the correlations decreased, but the relationships remained positive in nearly all cases. The one exception was for the inequality component, where the correlation was essentially zero. This can likely be explained by the Kuznets curve, a well-known economic theory that suggests inequality tends to rise in the early stages of development before falling as countries grow richer. Since non-OECD countries span a wide range of development stages, it is unsurprising that inequality patterns are inconsistent among them, weakening the overall correlation.

One of the standout findings from the global data—that the legal subindex relates much more strongly than the political subindex to prosperity—is also repeated in this non-OECD-country analysis. For example, the correlation between political freedom and GDP per capita is just 0.17—three times lower than the correlation for the legal subindex.

Figure 13 illustrates this divergence by plotting 2024 scores in the legal and political subindexes against income per capita for non-OECD countries. On the left graph (political subindex), several countries—including Gulf monarchies, Belarus, Russia, and China—score low on political freedom but still enjoy relatively high income levels. Conversely, we also see a number of countries with strong political freedom scores (above 75) that perform poorly in terms of income, clustered in the bottom right of the graph.

Figure 13. At first glance, political freedom alone is not strongly related to growth

These findings raise challenging questions: Should we conclude that political freedom is not important for economic growth, and only marginally related to broader prosperity? Should the international community focus solely on strengthening the rule of law in developing countries as the most effective way to boost income? And if political rights don’t appear to drive growth, should we be less concerned about the global democratic backsliding seen in recent years?

These may appear to be logical observations based on the data—but a deeper dive into the Indexes, and the explanatory factors behind them, reveals that they are also simplistic, and misleading.

Factors masking the democracy-growth nexus

The simple correlations do not account for several important factors that may obscure the true relationship between political freedom and economic growth. First, democratization is often a disruptive process, generating fundamental changes to a country’s institutional framework through the expansion of key political rights and civil liberties. In the short term, such political transformations can generate uncertainty and require significant adjustment from economic actors as they adapt to new rules, norms, and power dynamics.

Moreover, democratization is frequently triggered by economic crises. While such crises may help mobilize civil society and create momentum for reform, they also place a heavy burden on newly democratic governments. Political scientists have described this as the “tumultuous youth” of democracy, that is, a phase marked by instability and delayed returns. As a result, the time horizon used to assess the impact of democratization is crucial: The economic effects of increased political freedom may only become visible in the medium to long term.

Take the case of Gambia, one of the countries that has made the largest gains in political freedom over the past decade, following a major democratization process beginning in 2017. It is too early to fully assess the economic benefits of these reforms, especially considering the significant external shock of the COVID-19 pandemic between 2019 and 2021.

Another limitation of simple cross-sectional correlations is that they overlook the starting conditions under which countries undertake political reform. Some countries begin democratization with strong legal and economic institutions already in place, while others do not. The Freedom Index is particularly useful here, as it disentangles—and independently measures—the political, legal, and economic dimensions of freedom. For example, a country can achieve high performance on rule of law without being democratic, just as it is possible to have a vibrant democracy with weak rule of law. This raises an important question: To what extent do the rule of law and economic freedom shape the relationship between political liberalization and economic growth? Focusing on the relationship between political freedom and the rule of law, we can imagine two possible scenarios, depending on whether they function as substitutes or complements:

If substitutes: Political freedom could be especially beneficial in countries with weak rule of law, meaning improvements in either dimension could spark economic growth independently.
If complements: The benefits of democratization may depend on having a strong legal foundation already in place. In this case, only countries that democratize after establishing robust legal institutions would see significant economic gains, while those lacking such foundations may not.

Finally, when evaluating the effects of political freedom, it is critical to define the right comparison groups. The “treatment group” should consist of countries that have undergone substantial and lasting increases in political freedom—not those with marginal or temporary changes. At the same time, the “control group” must be carefully chosen to serve as a credible benchmark—countries that have remained politically unchanged but are similar to the “treatment” country in other relevant characteristics.

The next subsection outlines a more rigorous analysis of the political freedom-economic performance relationship, taking these methodological challenges into account.

A refined analysis of political freedom and economic growth

To better understand the relationship between political freedom and economic growth, we revert to our analysis of 126 non-OECD countries, now over the period 1995–2019. We intentionally end the period before the COVID-19 pandemic to avoid distortions caused by its unprecedented economic disruptions.

Since the political subindex is a continuous measure, we set a threshold score of fifty. Every country-year observation of fifty or above is classified as “democratic”, and any score below is “autocratic.” Acknowledging that this threshold is somewhat arbitrary, we also tested alternative cutoffs—forty-five, sixty, and the sample median (65.9)—to assess the robustness of our results. Varying the cutoff does not significantly affect the results. Based on the 50-point threshold, we are able to categorize countries into four distinct groups, based on their political trajectories over time:

Always Autocracies: Countries that remained below the fifty-point threshold throughout the entire period. This group includes twenty-five countries, such as China (Figure 14).
Democratizers: Countries that started below the threshold in 1995 but crossed above it by 2019, indicating a sustained shift toward democracy. This group includes twenty-one countries, such as Nigeria.
Autocratizers: Countries that started above the threshold in 1995 but fell below it by 2019, indicating democratic backsliding. There are nine countries in this group, such as Venezuela.
Always Democracies: Countries that remained above the threshold throughout the entire period. This is the largest group, with seventy-one countries, such as Botswana.

Figure 14. An “Always Autocracy”, a “Democratizer”, an “Autocratizer”, and an “Always Democracy.” Political subindex scores (1995–2019) for one exemplar country from each of the four types, grouped by political freedom trends

We then compare the group of Democratizers against the group of “Always Autocracies,” as this creates the clearest counterfactual: What happens when a country democratizes versus when it remains authoritarian? This comparison involves a total of forty-six countries: twenty-one “Democratizers” and twenty-five “Always Autocracies.”

To examine the long-term impact of democratization on economic performance, we use local linear projections as our main analytical tool. This method is well suited to address the concerns discussed in the previous subsection, especially regarding timing and variation across countries. In simple terms, the technique involves running a series of regressions that estimate how a democratization “shock” (i.e., a significant increase in political freedom) affects real GDP per capita over time. We project these effects for up to twenty years into the future, plotting the estimated impact for each year.

For each “Democratizer” country, we identify the year of democratization as the one with the largest single-year increase in the political subindex, for example, 1999 in the case of Nigeria. Local linear projections also allow for the inclusion of important control variables. Specifically, we include: (1) country fixed effects to account for time-invariant characteristics (such as geography or historical institutions) that might influence growth regardless of political regime; and (2) year fixed effects to control for global shocks or trends that could affect all countries in a given year (such as financial crises or commodity price shifts).

These controls help isolate the true effect of democratization from broader national or global events that could otherwise bias the analysis.

Democracy favors economic growth

Figure 15 shows the cumulative effect of democratization on GDP per capita over a twenty-year period, comparing countries that experienced a democratization shock or episode with those that remained autocratic. The results are clear: Democratization has a positive and substantial long-term impact on economic growth. On average, countries that democratize achieve GDP per capita levels 8.8 percent higher than their autocratic counterparts after two decades.

Figure 15 also supports our earlier insight about timing: The economic benefits of political liberalization do not appear immediately. On average, it takes around six to eight years for the growth dividends of democracy to become visible—and around ten to twelve years for those benefits to be fully realized.

Figure 15. Democratization generates a boost in GDP per capita of 8.8 percent (compared with countries that remained autocratic)

To explore the interaction between political freedom and the rule of law, we divided the democratization episodes into two categories:

High legal subindex score at time of democratization (above the median score)
Low legal subindex score at time of democratization (below the median)

We find that democratization leads to long-term economic gains in both groups, but the effect is more pronounced in countries with weaker legal institutions at the time of democratization. In those cases, GDP per capita had grown 12.3 percent after twenty years, measured against their autocratic counterparts. In contrast, for countries that democratized under relatively strong rule of law conditions, the gain was more modest, at 5.3 percent over the same period.

These findings suggest a degree of substitutability between political and legal freedom: Where the rule of law is weak, political liberalization plays a more critical role in unlocking growth potential.

Political freedom as a linchpin of prosperity

This thirtieth year of the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes presents a complex picture. Encouragingly, our Prosperity Index shows broad growth, though significant regional disparities and challenges persist. Conversely, political freedom and the rule of law are in decline across the board. Whether in OECD or non-OECD countries, or across regions, all are experiencing a downturn. Our political subindex, which measures the extent to which a nation upholds civil liberties, democratic legislature, and the political rights of its constituents, reveals the increasingly dire state of global democracy—sinking to its lowest point in twenty-five years.

While prosperity encompasses far more than just income, sustained economic growth remains a critical pillar of long-term well-being. Our analysis provides compelling evidence that democratization contributes meaningfully to long-term economic growth, even if its effects take time to materialize. Over twenty years, countries that democratize achieve per capita GDP that is 8.8 percent higher than their autocratic peers. While the rule of law emerges as a consistently strong predictor of prosperity, our analysis also shows that political freedom plays a vital and independent role, particularly in contexts where legal institutions are weak.

Political liberalization can act as a powerful catalyst for progress, especially when it helps correct institutional deficits. At the same time, the impact of democracy on growth is not automatic or immediate; it depends on timing, national conditions, and the broader institutional environment. This underscores a central insight of the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes: that freedom, when exercised in its full political, legal, and economic dimensions—is not just a moral imperative, but a pragmatic path to shared prosperity.

Read the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes methodology

The Indexes rank 164 countries around the world. Use our site to explore thirty years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the subindexes and indicators that comprise our Indexes.

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Authors

Expert bio

Ignacio Campomanes

Senior Advisor

Economy & Business English

Staff

Nina Dannaoui-Johnson

Deputy Director

Africa Human Rights

Staff

Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee

Assistant Director

Nonresident Senior Fellow

East Asia Rule of Law

Former staff

Joseph Lemoine

Africa Economy & Business

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Will Mortenson and Christine Hutchinson for their valuable contributions, and the team at Soapbox for their support with data visualization.

The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes are a creation of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. The center’s mission is to increase the well-being of people everywhere—and especially of the poor and marginalized in developing countries—through unbiased, data-based research on the relationship between freedom and prosperity.

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1 While the early literature on the relationship between political freedom and economic performance pointed to a null or even negative association (see, for example: Barro, R. J., “Democracy and growth,” Journal of Economic Growth 1 (1996): 1–27; or Gerring, J., Bond, P., Barndt, W. T., and Moreno, C., “Democracy and economic growth: A historical perspective,” World Politics 57(3) (2005): 323–364), recent research, based on significantly better data and econometric methods, finds strong positive effects of democracy on growth in the long run (see, for example: Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., and Robinson, J. A., “Democracy does cause growth,” Journal of Political Economy 127(1) (2019): 47–100; or Papaioannou, E. and Siourounis, G., Democratisation and growth. Economic Journal, 118(532) (2008): 1520–1551).

2 For a detailed explanation of the theoretical framework and construction of the Indexes see the “Methodology” section of the Freedom and Prosperity Report 2023.

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Addressing Georgia’s slide away from European integration

Matteo Mecacci — Thu, 19 Jun 2025 11:03:10 +0000

Relations between Georgia and the European Union have become increasingly strained over the last few years, as the Georgian government has taken steps that have placed the country’s longstanding commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration in doubt.

Tensions in the already polarized Georgian political and civic space grew sharply in 2024 when the governing Georgian Dream party adopted legislation targeting the country’s civil society. The Georgian government claimed this so-called Foreign Agents law was inspired by the US Foreign Agents Registration Act. However, critics argued that it closely resembled similar Russian legislation, with measures that included imposing a “foreign influence” label on all NGOs receiving funding from foreign partners, irrespective of their activities.

Since the first draft of Georgia’s Foreign Agents law was presented in 2023, it has faced widespread criticism from the international community. The ODIHR, the Venice Commission, the US State Department, and the European Commission have all found it contrary to international human rights standards. It should be noted that the Georgian authorities withdrew the initial draft in 2023, which played a key role in the EU Commission’s decision to grant Georgia EU candidate status. However, the legislation was subsequently adopted in 2024. Georgia’s EU candidate status has since been frozen.

The Foreign Agents initiative of 2024 was accompanied by an aggressive government campaign to discredit Georgia’s civil society and brand them as unpatriotic. While scrutiny and transparency are necessary elements of any vibrant democracy, the tone adopted by the Georgian authorities has sparked considerable alarm.

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The Foreign Agents law is one aspect of a broader geopolitical drama that has been underway in Georgia in recent years. This trend has accelerated since 2022 as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

On the international stage, the Georgian authorities have consistently condemned Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Georgia’s stance is understandable, as 20 percent of this small country of three million is still occupied by Moscow proxies following the 2008 Russian-Georgian War. In parallel, however, there has also been an escalation in the Georgian government’s anti-Western rhetoric. This has included claims that a so-called “Global War Party” is intent on dragging Georgia into a new war with Russia.

Political tensions escalated in late 2024 around the country’s parliamentary elections. The vote was marked by widespread allegations of electoral fraud from opposition forces, leading to months of ongoing street protests and a refusal by the opposition to take their seats in the new parliament.

This has resulted in a Georgian parliament that now functions without an opposition, and a Georgian government that is increasingly isolated from EU institutions and most individual EU member countries. Meanwhile, the Georgian authorities continue to adopt restrictive measures targeting the country’s political opposition and civil society activists, who now face heavy fines and intimidation amid increasing accusations of human rights violations.

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Is there any way to lower the political and social tensions in today’s Georgia? The path forward may be narrow, but it is worth pursuing.

The country is scheduled to hold local elections in October 2025. This will include voting in the capital Tbilisi, which will potentially have a significant impact on the national political landscape.

At present, some opposition parties are considering a general boycott of the coming vote. I would strongly urge them to participate. History shows that abandoning institutions to the ruling party rarely helps opposition movements to make their case or raise public awareness about their positions.

At the same time, the current authorities should resist the temptation to declare victory or create conditions that would push the opposition to stay away. While such an outcome may offer Georgian Dream a short-term advantage, it would do little to serve the long-term interests of Georgia and its citizens.

Instead, Georgia’s ruling party should demonstrate its readiness for renewed dialogue with the political opposition and with the country’s civil society. As a first step, the government could immediately invite credible international organizations to observe the local elections. Further steps could include signaling a willingness to scrap the Foreign Agents law and roll back recent restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly.

When it comes to staging elections and upholding democratic norms, the ruling party carries a special responsibility to engage with the opposition and wider society. While the Georgian government’s focus on maintaining peace with Russia may be understandable, the current authorities must not lose sight of the need to make peace at home as well. After all, governments represent all their citizens, not just those who voted for them.

Given that trust among Georgia’s different political forces is currently in short supply, the European Union should step up and declare its readiness to help facilitate dialogue. These efforts could focus on implementing ODIHR’s electoral recommendations to ensure the broadest and fairest possible participation in the upcoming vote.

As a gesture of trust and goodwill, the EU could offer to reverse the suspension of the visa-free regime for diplomats and officials that was introduced last year. This could be contingent on the Georgian government also taking steps to deescalate the current crisis.

It is important to recognize that previous efforts at dialogue have fallen short. It is also crucial to acknowledge that emotions are currently running high. Both Georgia and Europe could benefit from a more constructive approach to mending bilateral ties. If the Georgian authorities ultimately reject the idea of deescalation, this would at least provide the EU with greater clarity moving forward.

The people of Georgia continue to overwhelmingly support the country’s EU and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, as well as the reforms needed to build a free and prosperous society. It is our shared responsibility to exhaust every avenue to ensure we do not disappoint them.

Matteo Mecacci is the former director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

The prevailing narrative among EU leaders, including European Council President António Costa, is that Albania and Montenegro are now leading the race to become the EU’s next member states. Both Albanian and EU officials have set 2027 as the target year to conclude the technical accession talks, paving the way for a membership vote. In May, that ambitious goal received a boost from French President Emmanuel Macron—once a skeptic of enlargement—who called it “realistic” during a visit to Tirana.

Albania is moving fast, but will face headwinds

Several factors explain why Albania and Montenegro are pulling ahead of everyone else. To begin with, both are NATO members and—unlike Russia-friendly Serbia—are fully aligned with the EU’s Common and Foreign Security Policy. Albania, in particular, is seen as a reliable pro-Western security anchor in a volatile region where ethnic Albanians dominate in neighboring Kosovo and are a politically significant bloc in NATO members North Macedonia and Montenegro. Unlike Kosovo, which remains unrecognized by five EU member states, and North Macedonia, which is blocked by Bulgaria over historical disputes, Albania faces no such bilateral hurdles to its accession path from EU members—aside from intermittent tensions with neighboring Greece over ethnic Greek property rights and maritime borders.

Yet perhaps the main driver of Albania’s recent progress has been its sweeping EU- and US-sponsored reforms in the justice sector. Over nearly a decade, Albania has overhauled its judicial institutions and established new bodies, such as the Special Structure Against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK). While corruption remains high, the reformed institutions have shaken the culture of impunity that has plagued the country since the fall of communism. High-profile indictments—ranging from former presidents and prime ministers to powerful mayors—have started to build a credible track record in the fight against corruption and are helping to restore public trust in the rule of law. Yet SPAK’s results need to be sustained, and political commitment to the rule of law will increasingly be tested the deeper that investigations go.

Albania’s democracy also remains fragile and polarized. While the most recent parliamentary elections improved on earlier contests from an administrative standpoint, the political playing field continues to be uneven in favor of the ruling party. Corruption, the stifling effect of politics on media freedoms, the strength of organized crime, and weak administrative capacity—all persistent problems—could hinder the adoption of EU standards.

Most importantly, the geopolitical mood in European capitals could easily shift away from its current support for enlargement. While Rama has secured strong political backing from major countries such as France and Italy, it is not clear whether it will receive support from the new government in Germany, which is not striking equally enthusiastic tones. The German government’s coalition agreement ties enlargement to necessary internal EU institutional reforms, which means that the EU must first ensure it can operate effectively before allowing other countries in. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his Christian Democrats seem to favor intermediate integration models—such as having the Western Balkans join the European Economic Area, or layering the EU into concentric circles of states with varying degrees of integration.

What’s more, getting EU governments to support accession is one thing; getting the support of EU members’ parliaments to ratify accession is another. European public opinion remains wary of enlargement in several countries.

Race to the top

The prospect of Albania and Montenegro joining the EU ahead of their neighbors also raises pressing regional questions. With the rapid pace at which Albania is opening negotiation chapters, it has effectively leapfrogged over the region’s largest country, Serbia, whose accession talks have remained frozen since 2021.

For the Western Balkans, EU enlargement has functioned not only as a tool for political transformation but also for peacebuilding. The EU has long pursued a strategy of integrating the region as a group, using accession as leverage to foster regional stability, set up bilateral formats to resolve bilateral disputes—such as the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue on normalization of relations—and promote cooperation through initiatives like the Common Regional Market.

Critics may warn that Albania and Montenegro advancing alone could reinforce Serbia’s narrative of marginalization, fuel anti-EU sentiment, and undermine frameworks for regional cooperation—especially given Serbia’s pivotal role and the size of its population. But the long-standing Serbia-centric approach to enlargement—which posits that the region cannot move forward without accommodating Serbia due to its power and influence over other countries—has not worked. Rather, it has merely emboldened Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić to wield even greater de facto veto power and leverage over regional countries and their EU trajectory, even as he slips deeper into authoritarianism, sustains close ties with Russia, and has helped erode support for EU accession among Serbians.

The EU—and Serbia itself—might be better served by fostering a merit-based “race to the top” that either rewards or fails Montenegro and Albania depending on how they deliver on reforms. Demonstrating that EU enlargement remains a real and attainable goal could create the kind of positive societal pressure the region has desperately needed and could incentivize other EU candidate countries to seize this historic window of opportunity by embracing an agenda of reforms.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

The post Are Albania and Montenegro on the fast track to EU membership? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Modern Ukraine’s national journey can be traced on Kyiv’s central square

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 10 Jun 2025 21:18:16 +0000

Ancient Kyiv is drenched in more than a millennium of history and boasts a dizzying array of cathedrals, monasteries, and palaces dating back hundreds of years. However, the location most intricately associated with modern Ukraine’s national journey is far younger than any of these venerable landmarks and carried no particular spiritual significance until the very recent past.

Located in the geographical center of Kyiv, Independence Square is known to locals and foreign guests alike by its Ukrainian-language name, Maidan Nezalezhnosti, or simply Maidan. Over the past three decades, Maidan has undergone a dramatic transformation that has seen it emerge from Ukraine’s post-Soviet identity crisis via two popular uprisings to become the sacred ground zero of a nation forged in the crucible of revolution and war.

Today, Maidan is an obligatory point of pilgrimage on the itinerary of all visitors to the Ukrainian capital. People come to Maidan in order to honor those who have died in the fight against Russia’s invasion, or just to soak up the atmosphere of an iconic location that has witnessed some of the most consequential political events of the twenty-first century.

It was not always this way. When the modern square first began to take shape in the nineteenth century, it was a relative backwater in an elegant and aged city where the center of gravity remained firmly fixed elsewhere. Tellingly, when Ukrainian officials gathered in Kyiv on January 22, 1919, to publicly sign the unification act between the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, they chose to stage this historic event on Sophia Square rather than Maidan.

As Kyiv rose from the ashes following World War II, the square became more architecturally impressive and gained in logistical importance, but it continued to lack the aura attached to the city’s true heirlooms. Instead, Maidan remained a fairly identikit Soviet public space noted for its large fountains and even larger Lenin monument.

Maidan first became associated with political activism during the dying days of the Soviet Empire in 1990 when it hosted a two-week student protest dubbed the Revolution on Granite that played a significant part in Ukraine’s independence struggle. At the time, it was known as October Revolution Square. Maidan would receive its current name on August 26, 1991, two days after the Ukrainian declaration of independence, but it would be many years before the square began to earn its current reputation as a genuine symbol of Ukrainian statehood.

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During the first decade or so of Ukrainian independence, Maidan was anything but inspiring. The square remained largely empty, with no monuments or memorials to celebrate the newly independent state. Instead, the cult of communism was replaced by crass commercialism. On the spot once occupied by Lenin, a giant TV screen was installed broadcasting an eclectic mix of adverts, pop videos, cage fights, and catwalk shows. Taxi drivers would line up nearby and watch absentmindedly while waiting for new fares.

High above Maidan, the skyline was dominated by the Hotel Moscow. In 2001, the Ukrainian authorities finally decided that this branding was probably inappropriate for a country looking to shake off the shackles of empire, and the hotel name was duly changed from Moscow to Ukraine. Likewise, a colossal Soviet hammer and sickle was allowed to loom large over Maidan until 2003, when it was belatedly removed from the facade of the Trade Union building. The continued prominence of the Soviet crest made a mockery of Independence Square and spoke volumes about the often ambiguous attitudes toward Ukrainian statehood that characterized the early post-Soviet period.

The first big turning point in Maidan’s transformation came following Ukraine’s November 2004 presidential election. Amid massive public anger over a crude Kremlin-backed bid to steal the vote, huge crowds flooded into Kyiv from across the country and congregated on Maidan, establishing a tent city and a round-the-clock presence. This protest movement lasted for over two months and came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Millions of Ukrainians participated. They eventually succeeded in overturning the rigged election and forcing a rerun which was won by the opposition candidate, representing a watershed moment in modern Ukrainian history.

Maidan itself was synonymous with the Orange Revolution and occupied a central position in the mythology that grew up around it. From that moment on, Maidan became not just a place but also an event. To stage a Maidan meant to organize a grassroots protest and hold power to account. This was a particularly terrifying concept for the neighboring Russian authorities. Dread of a Moscow Maidan soon began to haunt the Kremlin, feeding Putin’s obsession with Ukraine and laying the foundations for the horrors that were to follow. The Russian propaganda machine promptly adopted Maidan as a buzzword signifying wicked foreign plots, and continues to use it two decades later without any need for further explanation.

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Nine years after the Orange Revolution, Maidan would be the scene of a second Ukrainian revolution. This time, the spark came when Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, pulled out of a long anticipated EU association agreement and unleashed the riot police against students who objected to this drastic geopolitical U-turn. Once again, millions of Ukrainians flocked to the capital and gathered on Maidan. This time, though, it would not be bloodless.

With strong backing from Russia, the Ukrainian authorities took a hard line approach to the protests, leading to weeks of running battles on Maidan and in the surrounding streets. The nadir came in late February 2014, when dozens of protesters were shot and killed in the city center. This Maidan massacre brought down the Yanukovych regime. With his support base evaporating, the disgraced Ukrainian president fled to Russia. Days later, Putin responded by invading Crimea. Russia’s war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood had begun.

The tragic events of February 2014 had a profound impact on Ukraine’s collective psyche and served to consecrate Maidan in the national imagination. Up until that point, the square had regularly hosted public holidays, pop concerts, and Christmas fairs. In the aftermath of the killings, such events were moved to other locations in the Ukrainian capital. Maidan itself would now be reserved for the most somber and significant occasions in the life of the nation, such as the funerals of soldiers, vigils for Ukrainians held captive in Russia, and memorials marking important Ukrainian anniversaries.

Since 2022, Maidan’s transformation has gained further momentum amid the shock and trauma of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, people began planting flags on the square in memory of fallen soldiers. This impromptu memorial has since expanded organically to become a sea of flags and portraits commemorating those who have lost their lives in the defense of Ukraine. It is an authentic grassroots tribute that is entirely in keeping with the spirit of Maidan.

As Russia’s invasion has unfolded, Maidan’s role as the principal site for wartime mourning and reverence has served to confirm the square’s position at the heart of modern Ukraine’s national story. There could hardly be a more fitting location. After all, Vladimir Putin launched the current war because he viewed the emergence of an independent Ukraine as an intolerable threat to his own authoritarian regime and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s long retreat from empire.

Maidan embodies Putin’s darkest fears. The Russian dictator’s goal remains the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation, but he is acutely aware that the country is slipping inexorably out of the Kremlin orbit. This is nowhere more evident than on Kyiv’s central square, which has become the ultimate symbol of Ukraine’s escape from empire and embrace of an independent identity.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The military coups and their aftermaths in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger have followed a similar pattern: They all occurred in poor and unprosperous countries; they were all followed by some sort of in-fighting or conflict within interim governments (and a second coup in the case of Burkina Faso); and the elections promised in all four countries have yet to take place.

By contrast, Gabon enjoys a comparatively enhanced level of national wealth and societal prosperity. With a population of just 2.3 million people and vast reserves of oil, gold, and manganese, Gabon boasts the second-highest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in continental Sub-Saharan Africa. It also has the third-highest prosperity score among the region’s countries in our Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, which measure prosperity levels across 164 countries by tracking income, health, inequality, environmental health, the treatment of minorities, and education. While Gabon suffers from a level of income inequality that rivals other countries in the region, on the whole, it is more prosperous than its West and Central African counterparts. Furthermore, while Gabon’s coup did give way to an interim military government, there was little to no post-coup conflict. And Gabon held democratic elections on April 12, 2025, that, while not without significant flaws, were nevertheless acclaimed by local, regional, and international observers as peaceful, lawful, and fair.

Gabon is more prosperous than its neighbors

Turning the page on the Bongo dynasty

In the weeks leading up the first election since the 2023 coup, Nguema’s picture could be seen plastered all over the capital city of Libreville. After serving as interim president for nineteen months, he was officially elected president on April 12, winning more than 90 percent of the vote. Both before and after the election, Nguema pledged to “restore dignity to the Gabonese people” and to root out the country’s corruption, which the legal subindex of our Freedom Index indicates is among the worst in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Despite these popular goals, the president has not been without his detractors. Such high vote shares are often indicative of corruption, and critics of Nguema note that he has long been a part of the corrupt political system he pledges to dismantle and that he broke his promise to relinquish power after deposing Bongo. In fact, Nguema is Bongo’s cousin and recently allowed Bongo and his wife to relocate to Angola despite them facing ongoing (but unspecified) corruption charges.

And although voter turnout was high and local observers were largely satisfied with the integrity of the election, Nguema’s most prominent opponent—former Prime Minister Alain Claude Bilie-By-Nze—accused Nguema of taking advantage of state resources to fund his campaign.

Furthermore, his interim government adopted a new constitution in 2024 that the Africa Center for Strategic Studies argues grants too much power to the executive and specifically favored Nguema. For example, the new constitution prevented a major political opponent from running in the election by banning candidates over seventy years of age. It also broke from past tradition by including a clause that allows military members to run in elections, extended the length of presidential terms to seven years, and eliminated the position of prime minister altogether. During Nguema’s time leading the interim government, he also suspended all political parties in a move that critics say gave him a distinct electoral advantage.

While Nguema was greeted with scenes of celebration after carrying out the 2023 coup and won an election victory indicative of overwhelming public support, it remains to be seen whether he is willing and able to instigate meaningful democratic reforms.

Yet, even if competition was restricted in this election, the very fact that it happened and that the Gabonese people were able to peacefully vote for someone other than a member of the Bongo family shows that there is an appetite for change and a willingness to engage in the most fundamental act of democracy.

In short, the years since the coup have provided both reason to believe that a more democratic future in Gabon is possible and reason to fear that Nguema is simply replacing the Bongo family’s form of autocracy with his own.

What the data tell us

The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes highlight a number of trends indicating that a country’s surest path to prosperity involves improving political and economic freedom, as well as the rule of law. Conversely, the data tell us that restricting freedom is a proven way to diminish societal well-being.

When a country experiences a freedom shock—meaning the one-year drop in its Freedom Index score is among the top 20 percent globally since 1995—its progress on prosperity tends to stall or even reverse as time goes on.

A country’s prosperity tends to stall or decline after experiencing a freedom shock

The drop in Gabon’s freedom score from 2022 to 2023 was among the most severe freedom shocks ever recorded—within the top 5 percent of one-year declines over the past thirty years. This decline was driven by a sharp dip in the country’s political freedom score, which was in turn driven by an even sharper fall in its elections score, which measures the extent to which political leaders are chosen in open, clean, and fair elections.

Gabon’s political freedom has declined sharply in recent years

Furthermore, out of the forty-six countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for which we have data, Gabon ranks thirtieth in the judicial independence and effectiveness indicator and thirty-eighth in the legislative constraints on the executive indicator.

Gabon’s judicial independence is below the regional average

Gabon’s executive has fewer legislative constraints than the regional average

It is important to recognize that these issues were fomented by the Bongo regime. However, the disempowered nature of the judiciary and legislature and the recent broad decline in political freedom show that Nguema must act quickly to reverse course before declines in freedom hinder Gabon’s long-term progress on prosperity. The country’s freedom score has changed very little in the time that Nguema has held power as interim president, with political freedom in further, albeit minimal, decline.

Despite Gabon’s impressive prosperity levels and per capita GDP in relation to its neighbors and to the broader Sub-Saharan Africa region, over one-third of the population currently lives in poverty. The Bongo family was known for gorging themselves on resource wealth while much of the population was left to suffer. Despite its high overall prosperity score, Gabon ranks in the bottom third of all Sub-Saharan African countries in the inequality component of the Prosperity Index. It has the fourth-highest unemployment rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, with over 20 percent of the total labor force—and 40 percent of young people—currently unemployed. If Nguema falls back on the autocratic habits of his predecessor and chooses personal wealth over the well-being of his country, any hope for democracy in Gabon that followed the 2023 coup will quickly die out.

The path to enduring freedom and prosperity

The data clearly show that establishing democracy as the political norm will help Gabon set itself apart from its neighbors and enhance national prosperity.

To create a strong and vibrant democracy, Nguema must first come to terms with the idea that his tenure as president is not indefinite. He must also commit himself to empowering core institutions of democracy such as the legislative branch and courts, and he must protect the societal freedoms that are fundamental to thriving democracies. This should include allowing political parties to exist and organize and lifting targeted age limits for presidential candidates.

By committing to competitive democracy and political freedom, Nguema can most effectively enhance prosperity and, in particular, reduce the inequality that has plagued Gabon for so long. It is too early to tell for sure whether Nguema has assumed the presidency with the intention of institutionalizing democracy and reducing inequality in Gabon or with the intention of ruling as an autocrat. What is certain is that the end of the Bongo regime—and the democratic impetus provided by the national election—provides Nguema with the opportunity to turn Gabon into the success story that West and Central Africa has been yearning for. For the good of the people who elected him, Nguema should do everything in his power to capitalize on it.

Will Mortenson is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Correction: This article was updated on June 4, 2025, to reflect the fact that Gabon is located in Central Africa, not West Africa.

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What Lebanon’s municipal election results mean for Hezbollah

David Daoud — Wed, 04 Jun 2025 13:37:06 +0000

Lebanon’s political machine is moving again.

In May, the Lebanese concluded country-wide municipal and mayoral elections—their first in nine years—on the heels of Joseph Aoun filling Beirut’s two-year presidential vacancy, and an uncharacteristically speedy appointment of a prime minister and cabinet.

Mere momentum should not be equated with long-term progress towards stabilization, particularly with respect to Hezbollah’s disarmament. The municipal election results did not demonstrate the prominent militant group’s outright dominance over Lebanon’s Shiites. However, Hezbollah nevertheless retains preponderant popularity among them and influence over their electoral and political choices. However, as Hezbollah dubbed them, these elections were a “promotional event” for the real prize: the May 2026 legislative elections. If the group can then expand upon its recent electoral success, and if Aoun’s interminable dialogue with Hezbollah over its arms ever becomes serious, then it can leverage its popular and political weight to steer those discussions toward an outcome allowing it to retain its arms.

Unpacking the results

Hezbollah boasts that its sweep of the municipal and mayoral elections in Beirut, Baalbek-Hermel, and south Lebanon was a virtually unmitigated “tsunami.”

At face value, the group’s claims are true. In south Lebanon’s Nabatieh and South Governorates, Hezbollah’s joint electoral list with the Amal Party, dubbed the “Development and Loyalty” list, ran unconstested and won 109 of 272 municipalities by default. In some municipalities, this victory was due to overwhelming local support for Amal and Hezbollah, and in others, to pressure from those parties forcing opponents to withdraw their candidacy or forgo running altogether.

The Amal-Hezbollah lists also took the overwhelming majority of the remaining municipalities, where the elections came down to a contest, with the exception of a handful of seats. But even there, the self-described Amal-Hezbollah Shiite Duo largely did not lose out to outright ideological opponents, apart from Amal’s loss of two municipal seats in Deir Al Zahrani to the Communist Party. Instead, in many cases, the group lost to familial or clan lists, otherwise seemingly neutral on the question of Hezbollah’s private arsenal.

In the Sidon District’s Zrarieh, for example, Development and Loyalty won only six of the fifteen contested seats against the opposition, development-focused “Build It Together” list. But opposition figure Riad al-Asaad—who has previously bemoaned American-led attempts to weaken Hezbollah as “an Israeli goal” and who backed Build It Together— insisted that “competition [with Hezbollah] isn’t over the choice of resistance, but development.”

These successes replicated earlier wins in the Baalbek-Hermel Governorate, which witnessed significantly higher voter turnout over the last municipal elections in 2016. Here, Development and Loyalty won all eighty municipalities—twenty-eight by default, twenty-nine through electoral contests, and twenty-two where independent pro-Hezbollah lists competed with each other. In many cases here as well, the Amal-Hezbollah list faced off against ostensible independents, but who were nevertheless ideologically aligned with Hezbollah, as in Bednayel, where Development and Loyalty confronted the explicitly pro-Hezbollah “Loyalty to the Resistance” list, or in Brital, where the Hezbollah-Amal backed “Brital Families” list faced openly pro-Hezbollah “Loyalty and Development” list.

For example, Hezbollah-backed candidates swept the municipal council after a hard-fought electoral battle in the city of Baalbek. But voting numbers painted a more complex picture: of 37,142 eligible voters—22,573 of whom are Shiites—a range of 11,674-12,199 voted for Development and Loyalty, while the political opposition list “My City Baalbek” garnered 5,258-5,802 votes. The latter only attracted four hundred to 790 Shiites, compared with 11,290 Shiites for Development and Loyalty, demonstrating the continued loyalty of Hezbollah’s sectarian base. Meanwhile, Hezbollah increased its inroads into Baalbek’s Sunni population, drawing close to 1500 of their votes, and widened its victory margin over My City Baalbek from the 2016 municipal elections.

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But these results, good as they are, were far from the unmitigated success that Hezbollah’s propaganda organs sought to spin. In a main Hezbollah stronghold like the city of Baalbek, the group should consider its victory margin too close for comfort, especially as voter turnout in the city itself, in sharp contrast to the District and Governorate level, stood at approximately 47.2 percent generally, and 53.51 percent among Shiites specifically. This was higher than 2016’s level of 44 percent turnout of 31,510 eligible voters. However, it was still low considering the group’s great efforts to encourage its base’s participation in an election painted as a referendum on Hezbollah’s arms and existence, occurring at a historical inflection point for Lebanon.

The electoral battles in the more populous South Lebanon and Nabatieh Governorates offered a starker warning to the group. These areas collectively witnessed similarly depressed voting levels—36.94 percent overall (43.17 percent in South Lebanon and 36.65 percent in Nabatieh) compared to 48.15 percent in 2016. Hezbollah’s results were also spottier at face value, with opposing lists, if not outright ideological opponents, making deeper inroads among the electorate despite ultimately failing to unseat the Hezbollah-Amal Duo.

The apathy factor

One plausible explanation is that Hezbollah has lost at least some of its ability to mobilize its loyal masses. This could stem, from, as some have alleged, growing Shiite discontent with the party, particularly over instigating the recent ruinous war with Israel—which could portend a massive backlash against Hezbollah coupled with sizable defections from its base’s ranks. But the materialization of this scenario depends on a complex set of currently absent factors, particularly the existence of a credible and unified Shiite opposition, with the means and ability to deliver on these people’s needs, and thus attract this alleged silent anti-Hezbollah majority.

It is more plausible that the depressed voter turnout had nothing to do with Hezbollah. After all, the silent—and allegedly anti-Hezbollah—majority of Lebanese southerners didn’t go out and vote for the group’s opponents either. They stayed home.

Therefore, rather than a silent vote against Hezbollah, their abstention seems to have stemmed from overall Lebanese political disillusionment and loss of hope in the system’s ability to bring about change, leading to complacency. In September of 2024, for example, Arab Barometer found 76 percent of all Lebanese “uninterested in politics,” while 45 percent described themselves as highly apathetic. Two years prior, 65 percent of Lebanese had even said they didn’t care if their country remained a democracy—more accurately, a procedural democracy—as long as it “can maintain order and stability.”

Political apathy isn’t ideal for Hezbollah. But a Shiite population as politically quiescent and disinterested as the rest of the Lebanese would not undermine the group’s political power, and is thus preferable to an actively hostile one. This, coupled with other factors, like fear of being caught in the midst of Israel’s ongoing military actions that escalated in the days preceding the election, and the difficulty of traveling to south Lebanon for voters displaced by the recent war, could have also impacted voter turnout.

Delayed disarmament

The municipal elections were the last in several significant, post-war milestones during which Hezbollah needed to demonstrate that it remains the primary political and social representative of Lebanese Shiites. But this victory is fragile, delaying, for now, he group’s disarmament, despite the calls for such action gaining increasing momentum. But delaying that prospect does not eliminate it altogether. That specter will continue to haunt Hezbollah unless and until it can expand its municipal election successes come 2026’s parliamentary plebiscite—sweeping all seats it contests while denying Shiite opposition figures any electoral victories, drive up the voting rate among its supporters, and broaden its share of the popular vote. It’s a tall order, but Hezbollah has long proven itself a learning organization, and it will use all the carrots and sticks at its disposal to achieve that result. Here, a combination of delivering on post-war reconstruction of predominantly Shiite areas damaged during the recent war with Israel, while cowing potential opponents with threats, legal action, and actual force, will prove critical to the group’s chances of success.

The question is, will its opponents likewise learn from their mistakes and failure to challenge the group’s Shiite hegemony at a time when they allege its sway over that sect is at its weakest ever—or will they once again rest on the laurels of their empty slogans and symbolic or imaginary triumphs, leaving the “Party of God” to once again be the victors?

David Daoud was a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and a research analyst on Hezbollah and Lebanon at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI).

The post What Lebanon’s municipal election results mean for Hezbollah appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: What does South Korean President Lee Jae-myung mean for Indo-Pacific security?

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 03 Jun 2025 20:30:30 +0000

No time for a victory party. Early Wednesday morning, Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung was named the winner of South Korea’s presidential election, and later the same day he will be sworn into office, without the typical two-month transition period. The election and immediate instatement follow a stretch of political upheaval in South Korea. In April, conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol was removed from office, after he declared a short-lived state of martial law in December 2024. So, will Lee’s leadership mean a calmer political future for the country? Looking at the wider region, how will the leadership shift from right to left affect South Korea’s policies toward the United States, North Korea, China, and Japan? Atlantic Council experts are on the job today answering these questions and more below.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Kayla Orta: Lee’s “pragmatic” approach comes as Seoul faces a more hostile security environment

Shawn Creamer: Military spending and shipbuilding are two areas of engagement with the Trump administration

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi: Lee seems poised to take a pragmatic and balanced approach to regional security

For Lee, the economy comes first, but expect foreign policy shifts nonetheless

To understand Lee’s foreign policy orientation, it is more useful to compare his positions with that of former President Moon Jae-in, rather than that of Yoon, his conservative predecessor.

Lee’s foreign policy will generally align with the Democratic Party’s traditional approach, promoting dialogue with North Korea and maintaining stable ties with China. But he is notably more pragmatic than Moon. While Moon emphasized peace and inter-Korean reconciliation, Lee advocates conditional dialogue with Pyongyang, taking a step-by-step approach toward denuclearization. His foreign policy advisers, Wi Sung-lac and Kim Hyun-chong, are known more as internationalists than nationalists, reinforcing Lee’s pragmatic stance.

Lee prioritizes economic issues, and he has repeatedly stated that economic recovery is his top priority. During the campaign, for example, he pledged to establish an “Emergency Economic Taskforce” if elected. Given this focus, Lee is unlikely to pursue major foreign policy initiatives at first, avoiding Moon’s active diplomacy among Washington, Pyongyang, and Beijing.

South Korea’s foreign policy shifts may instead stem from external developments, especially if US President Donald Trump reengages with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Lee would likely support a third Trump-Kim summit and would not oppose US troop reductions if Washington insists. While such moves could reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the short term, there is concern that North Korea might exploit weakened deterrence to launch limited attacks against South Korea whenever it sees fit, as occurred during the 2010 crises.

Taiwan issues will test Lee’s pragmatism. Under US pressure for support, he will likely exercise strategic ambiguity to the maximum—quietly discussing contingency plans with Washington while avoiding public commitments. He will neither support nor oppose United States Forces Korea’s strategic flexibility. At the same time, Lee is likely to emphasize South Korea’s acknowledgment of the “One China” policy to maintain balance in its relations with Beijing.

In sum, Lee’s foreign policy is marked by pragmatism and economic urgency, distinguishing him from Moon’s more ideological and nationalistic approach.

—Sungmin Cho, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Sungkyunkwan University.

Lee’s “pragmatic” approach comes as Seoul faces a more hostile security environment

Lee ran on the platform of a “pragmatic” foreign policy, but whether his administration will be able to rise above the nation’s entrenched partisan divides to strengthen South Korea’s geostrategic position within the Indo-Pacific region remains to be seen.

Six months to the day since Yoon declared martial law, South Korean citizens took to the voting booths to elect a new leader. Lee’s win over the People Power Party nominee Kim Moon-soo heralds another pendulum swing in South Korea’s political leadership. As the liberal party returns to the presidency, the battle to address South Korea’s domestic political turmoil is only just beginning, and the nation’s fierce partisan divide is likely to continue.

The political aftermath of Yoon’s call for martial law shocked the nation, weakening confidence in South Korea’s decades-long democratic institutions. The next South Korean president will have a challenging five-year term ahead to reestablish public confidence in the government at home while simultaneously addressing South Korea’s foreign policy concerns abroad.

North Korea’s ongoing weapons of mass destruction and missile programs—and its expanded security partnerships with Russia and China—present an immediate and existential threat to South Korea. Seoul faces a more hostile security environment today than it did under Moon, Lee’s liberal predecessor who leaned into diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang. Many in South Korea are increasingly concerned about North Korea’s “irreversible” nuclear arms buildup and more than 70 percent of polled citizens consistently call for South Korea’s own nuclear armament in the near future.

Amid growing regional insecurity, Seoul’s relationships with Washington and Tokyo will matter. Despite previous statements, Lee campaigned on continuing to strengthen South Korea–Japan relations, building upon his predecessor’s US–South Korea–Japan trilateral security cooperation to address the growing instability in the Indo-Pacific region. However, balancing proactive foreign policy and intensifying domestic demands, as previously seen, is not an easy task.

Overall, Lee’s “pragmatic” diplomacy may signal strategic policy investment in bridging the conservative-liberal political divide. Lee may yet step up foreign policy initiatives in South Korea’s interest, building upon his predecessor’s foreign policy agendas.

—Kayla T. Orta is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Military spending and shipbuilding are two areas of engagement with the Trump administration

Lee’s election as president of South Korea is an opportunity to restore domestic political stability and resurrect Seoul’s reputation on the international stage following the martial law declaration, impeachment, and court drama surrounding the removal of Yoon from office. Domestic stability is made possible more from the political unity of the executive and legislative branches of government under the progressive Democratic Party than from a popular mandate. Political unity will likely allow the South Korean government to break out of partisan gridlock and make gains on efficient and effective governance.

While Lee will have party unity, there is a sizable conservative opposition that maintains low degrees of trust in the more leftist elements of the Democratic Party, including the new president. Time will tell whether Lee governs more like the centrist candidate or the leftist opposition politician of his past.

If the past is representative of the future, Lee will progressively evolve toward the center on foreign policy over his five-year term, as his Democratic Party predecessor Moon did. Moon learned, despite a troubled relationship with Trump, that South Korean sovereignty was best served by close alignment with the United States rather than an arrangement that subordinates it to the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, Moon learned that a deal with the Kim regime in North Korea would not be worth the paper it was printed on. Regrettably for peace and security in Northeast Asia, the Korea-Japan relationship will likely remain cool under Lee for the duration of his term based on the entrenched views of the Democratic Party.

There is both risk and opportunity for Lee in South Korea’s alliance with the United States. Lee holds some strong cards if he plays them well.

South Korea already funds its defense at 2.8 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), and it has one of the most capable armed forces of all US allies. Lee should set in motion an increase in defense spending to above 3 percent of GDP in 2026 and chart a path for this to increase to at least 3.5 percent by 2030, demonstrating that South Korea is the US security partner of choice. Continued maturation of the Korean armed forces will also position South Korea to defend its interests in a very difficult neighborhood, while meeting alliance transformation benchmarks and increased Korean roles in combined defense.

Second, Korean manufacturing is extremely strong, particularly in shipbuilding. Lee should leverage Korean dominance in shipbuilding to help Trump rebuild the US Navy, giving Trump a political win and assisting the United States in maintaining its global extended deterrence commitments. South Korean advanced manufacturing capacity offers additional opportunity for the United States and European rearmament efforts. Lee can leverage this assistance to advance Korea’s global economic interests on more favorable terms.

There are also risks to the relationship with Washington, especially if Lee and Trump have a personality conflict. Lee will also find trouble with the US relationship if he seeks to deepen Korea’s relations with China or is overly antagonistic to Japan, the other major US ally in East Asia.

—Shawn Creamer is a nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, and Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Lee seems poised to take a pragmatic and balanced approach to regional security

Lee’s victory in Tuesday’s presidential election was expected, given his ability to court the centrist majority and the conservative camp’s feuds to field a united force. But while Lee’s election is a victory for the Democratic Party, his populist but realist orientation is likely to make him a different type of revisionist than his more ideological predecessor Moon. Still, given the controversies surrounding Lee, as well as uncertainties over his and the Democratic Party’s policies, the new administration will struggle to unite the deep divisions in South Korea.

On the foreign policy and security front, it is possible that the new administration will take a balanced and pragmatic approach rather than a revisionist one. During the campaign, Lee talked about peace on the Korean Peninsula and restoring the 2018 military agreement with Pyongyang—trademark positions of the progressives. At the same time, he recognized the importance of the alliance with the United States and trilateral coordination with Japan—priorities for the conservatives. Even though much of this balanced approach was certainly part of Lee’s election strategy, it also reflects the strong recognition within South Korea about the importance of US-Japan-South Korea trilateral security coordination; threats posed by North Korea, China, and Russia; and the limited prospects of improving inter-Korean relations.

While there are many uncertainties about the Lee administration, Tokyo and Washington should continue working with Seoul to ensure strong, resilient, and sustainable trilateral security cooperation, which is imperative for stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, an associate professor at Tokyo International University, and a senior adjunct fellow at Pacific Forum.

The post Experts react: What does South Korean President Lee Jae-myung mean for Indo-Pacific security? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: Conservative Karol Nawrocki is Poland’s next president. What does it mean for Poland, Europe, and the world?

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 16:56:09 +0000

The polls have spoken. Karol Nawrocki, a historian and former boxer backed by Poland’s conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, narrowly triumphed over Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski in Sunday’s presidential election. Nawrocki, whose candidacy was embraced by the Trump administration, will be the head of state opposite the centrist, pro-European head of government, Prime Minister Donald Tusk. With war still raging in next-door Ukraine and US-European relations under strain, what should the world expect from Nawrocki? We turned to our Poland experts for answers.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Daniel Fried: Nawrocki is well placed to encourage Trump to back Ukraine and European security

Aaron Korewa: Poland’s conservative nationalism is pro-American and pro-NATO

Marek Magierowski: Nawrocki’s politics defy hysterical labels

Danuta Hübner: Will the new president overcome Poland’s polarization?

Mark Scott: Social media was rampant in this election. But how much impact it had is unclear.

Nawrocki is well placed to encourage Trump to back Ukraine and European security

Some initial analysis may depict the Polish presidential election as a fight between democracy and autocracy, or between a pro-Trump and pro-European candidate. This seems exaggerated. The real challenge for Nawrocki will be deciding whether to find common ground with the Tusk government in the face of the threat from Russia and the need to work with the Trump administration on behalf of European and Ukrainian security.

There are substantive grounds for at least some cooperation across partisan lines in Poland to help Ukraine resist Russian aggression and, to this end, to work with key European allies, such as Britain, France, and Germany, as well as with the United States. Unlike the Hungarian nationalist leader Viktor Orbán, Polish nationalists and outgoing President Andrzej Duda generally support Ukraine and resolutely oppose Russian aggression. In early 2022, for example, PiS party leader Jarosław Kaczyński publicly broke with Orbán over the latter’s lack of support for Ukraine at the time. Poland’s current rapid military buildup began during the previous PiS government and continued under the Tusk coalition. Both political camps support NATO and strong relations with the United States.

The Trump administration backed Nawrocki during the election campaign. However unwise US official partisanship during an election might have been, this will give Nawrocki advantages as a perceived ideological ally making the case in Washington for continued US military presence in Poland and US support for NATO and Ukraine. Nawrocki may face challenges working with the European Union (EU), which is still a source of significant funding for Polish development and is trying to support military buildup in Europe, an objective Poles across the political spectrum tend to support. He will also have to contain the anti-German rhetoric common to much of the Polish nationalist right. Poland has had legitimate complaints about German policy toward Russia. But it has won those arguments, as many Germans themselves recognize; Nawrocki would do well to take the win and work with Germany to counter the Russian threat both countries face.

Many Poles were supportive of Ukraine in the initial phases of the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, providing extensive benefits to Ukrainian refugees and taking hundreds of thousands of them into their homes. While the presence of so many Ukrainian refugees has grown less popular over time, Polish support for Ukraine has remained steady. Still, influential Polish constituencies, such as farmers and some groups concerned with the difficult historical issues between Poles and Ukrainians, have been skeptical about the extent of Polish support for Ukraine. During the campaign, Nawrocki declared that he does not currently support Ukraine’s NATO accession. Now, Nawrocki will have to find a way to balance strategic and political imperatives on support for Ukraine.

As president, Nawrocki will have to balance his campaign rhetoric and partisan interests with broader national interests. He’s hardly the first winning candidate to have to do so.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Poland’s conservative nationalism is pro-American and pro-NATO

The Poles showed their dissatisfaction with the current government and the political establishment. Nawrocki was an outsider and that paid off. He managed to attract the voters who chose far-right candidates in the first round, while Trzaskowski did not manage to mobilize enough of the voters who supported Tusk’s coalition in October 2023.

For Europe, this could mean that Poland will become more inwardly focused. At the same time, Tusk has previously signaled that he believes beating populism requires addressing some of the issues that drive it. Expect Poland to take a turn for the right on matters such as migration and the European Green Deal.

Nawrocki was the only candidate who visited US President Donald Trump in the White House and received his endorsement. In late May, the Conservative Political Action Conference, known as CPAC, also held a rally in the southeastern town of Rzeszów that featured US Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem. Nawrocki’s people made conscious outreach to the US administration. In Poland, the movement that backs Nawrocki is very pro-American and pro-NATO, unlike several other parties in Europe that stand for conservative nationalism. The optimistic scenario is that as president, Nawrocki will establish a connection with Trump that will prevent any plans to withdraw US troops from Poland. At the same time, Tusk’s government will continue forging partnerships with other relevant European states, such as France and the Nordic and Baltic countries.

—Aaron Korewa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office which is part of the Europe Center.

Nawrocki’s politics defy hysterical labels

First and foremost, branding Nawrocki as “populist,” “hard-core Euroskeptic,” “far right,” “pro-Putin,” or “Trumpian” is preposterous. Polish politics is too complex to indulge in such simplistic terms.

Poland’s president-elect is probably as “pro-Kremlin” as his entire political camp, which, while in power, provided Ukraine with hundreds of tanks, aircraft, howitzers, and communication gear, while pressuring all European partners to ramp up sanctions against Russia.

Nawrocki is also as “Euroskeptic” as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, given the attitude of both politicians toward migration policies and EU climate regulations. And he is as “Trumpian” as his Finnish soon-to-be counterpart Alexander Stubb, who charmingly played a spot of golf with the US president a few weeks ago.

Nawrocki is doubtless a staunch conservative who adroitly capitalized on the nature of wide swaths of the Polish electorate, which, contrary to European trends, has remained—politically, socially, and emotionally—attached to the notion of freedom, sovereignty, tradition, and Christian values. The PiS-backed candidate has also largely banked on the rising unpopularity of Tusk’s government, especially among young voters (Nawrocki won the eighteen-to-twenty-nine-year-old cohort).

Another major factor in Nawrocki’s win was the aristocratic style and aloofness of his rival, Trzaskowski, who was unable to connect with the working class and Poland’s rural constituency. This stood in contrast to Nawrocki, the former boxer and son of a toolmaker and a bookbinder.

—Marek Magierowski is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the director of strategy for the Poland program at the Freedom Institute in Warsaw. He previously served as Poland’s ambassador to the United States and to Israel.

Will the new president overcome Poland’s polarization?

Poles know that their vote can change the course of the history of their country. And they have known from day one of this presidential campaign that this election matters deeply for our future. However, as, sadly, the campaign was about preventing the other side from coming to power, it is an open question whether the president we have just elected will understand what is good for Poles in these times of uncertainty. 

Will our new president spare no effort to overcome the deep polarization of the Polish people? A polarized society is easy to manipulate and an easy target for Russian disinformation. This is the biggest challenge for the new president—understanding the importance of building bridges between Poles. It is an extremely difficult task, especially in times when many political careers have been built for decades on societal divisions. And I worry that this president-elect comes from a political tradition with little propensity to seek compromise. The presidency is an important part of the Polish system of checks and balances, and the new president will need to support the government in building a democratic Poland where everyone can live.

Poles need a president who will understand that isolation has never done Poland any good, that the European Union is our place, and that it is crucial that Poland takes its share of responsibility for Europe. Will the new president support European efforts to build its defense capabilities and its security-based economic competitiveness? Will he work for peace on our continent? 

In addition, my hope is that the new president will work to keep the United States and Europe together. They need each other. 

—Danuta Hübner is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. She was Poland’s first-ever European commissioner, responsible first for trade, then with regional policy. She also established and oversaw the institutional structure to deliver Poland’s accession to the EU.

Social media was rampant in this election. But what impact did it have?

The narrow victory for Nawrocki in Poland’s presidential election is the latest example of why it’s hard to directly link any country’s electoral outcome with how voters engage with candidates, political operatives, and others across social media. There was a significant amount of hyper-partisan attacks across social media, from both sides, ahead of Sunday’s vote in the Central European country. There was also evidence—including via research from the Atlantic Council—that foreign governments attempted to sway voter outcomes.

But how successful these efforts were, as well as the ongoing interventions from social media companies to possibly reduce such content’s impact, are almost impossible to quantify. Given the tightly run race, small shifts in voters’ behavior—potentially spurred on by what people may have seen in their online feeds—could have played a role. But, at this stage, that is more a theory than confirmed reality.

The most recent Polish presidential election joins a growing list of both European and non-European elections in which social media and its impact on how people voted remain a black box. As much as EU policymakers have centered their attention on how the likes of TikTok and YouTube may have amplified anti-EU voices ahead of national elections, there has been a growing offline shift in public opinion across the bloc away from greater EU alignment that has nothing to do with the digital world.

At best, this weekend’s vote is another example of how, in the middle of 2025, these digital platforms are now part of every country’s election cycle. But social media’s impact on such a closely fought election is mostly unknown.

—Mark Scott is a senior resident fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab’s (DFRLab) Democracy + Tech Initiative within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

The post Experts react: Conservative Karol Nawrocki is Poland’s next president. What does it mean for Poland, Europe, and the world? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

New presidents and new nuclear developments test the United States–Republic of Korea alliance

Heather Kearney, Amanda Mortwedt Oh — Fri, 30 May 2025 22:26:48 +0000

Key takeaways

South Korea’s new President, who will be elected on June 3, will have to grapple with many South Koreans’ unease with relying on the United States’ nuclear arsenal for deterring North Korea.
The first and most important test the US-South Korea alliance under Trump and the incoming new South Korean president faces is the continuing growth of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.
South Korea’s establishment of a new strategic command outside of the combined US-ROK military structure highlights Seoul’s willingness and capability to take greater responsibility for deterring North Korea, but careful coordination will be required to ensure this strengthens rather than strains the alliance.

In the coming years, the US-South Korea (Republic of Korea, or ROK) alliance is likely to be tested in at least three fundamental ways: by a concerning growth in North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile weapons program; by changes to ROK defense capabilities and structures, including the establishment of ROK Strategic Command (ROKSTRATCOM); and by potential strategy and policy changes under new US and ROK political administrations.

Though the alliance may rise to the challenges of these tests to emerge stronger, these factors could potentially prevent the United States and the Republic of Korea from leveraging the mutual benefits that come from being integrated into a unified wartime command system and the long-standing ideal of a US-ROK bilateral agreement that emphasizes mutual defense. The United States will need to continue to adapt its approach, account for its ally’s perspectives, and plan for the inevitable change to the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

A second North Korean enrichment facility heightens security concerns in Seoul

The first test for the alliance is the continuing growth of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Current estimates suggest Pyongyang has enough fissile material to build up to 90 nuclear warheads, which generates compelling security concerns that could create tension among two longtime and staunch allies—the United States and the Republic of Korea. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has placed increasing importance on the regime’s nuclear weapons development in the last decade, portraying nuclear weapons as not only defensive but providing the means to win in conflict. In September 2022, North Korea promulgated a new law that laid out a much broader approach to the use of nuclear weapons, including their employment in various conditions.

In 2023, Kim updated Article 58 of the state’s constitution to “ensure the country’s right to existence and development, deter war and protect regional and global peace by rapidly developing nuclear weapons to a higher level.” In September 2024, North Korean state media released photos for the first time of a suspected second uranium enrichment facility and Kim called for a higher number of more capable centrifuges to boost his plans to “exponentially” increase nuclear warhead production. Further, 2025 marks the final year for Kim to achieve the military capability development goals laid out in his five-year plan.

Kim Jong Un touring a uranium enrichment facility at an undisclosed location. Photo released by Korean Central News Agency, September 2024.

North Korea has a nuclear dyad with land- and sea-based nuclear weapons, and it is developing new technologies, including hypersonic gliding flight warheads and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, consistent with Kim’s drive to rapidly develop nuclear weapons and the five-year plan. North Korea’s Strategic Forces have short-range, medium-range, intermediate-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), along with 200 road-mobile launchers. North Korea’s continued development of its rail-based ballistic system shows the regime’s efforts to diversify launch platforms, including various vehicles and ground launch pads and potentially submarines, and increase the survivability of its force. While Kim’s ability to strike the US homeland with North Korean ICBMs only grows with additional testing and the introduction and testing of its solid-fuel ICBM in 2023, the regime is also hard at work improving the efficacy of its precision-guided tactical nuclear weapons, which are designed to significantly damage South Korea and US forces on the peninsula, as well as create response challenges for the alliance.

In addition, North Korea is moving forward on its sea-based deterrent. It has ballistic missiles and what it terms ”strategic” (alluding to long range and nuclear capability) cruise missiles for both developmental, missile-firing submarines and underwater platforms. Its tactical nuclear attack submarine, the Hero Kim Kun Ok, is designed to launch tactical nuclear weapons from underwater. In January 2024, the regime tested its underwater unmanned nuclear weapon system, the Haeil-5-23, as a purported response to the trilateral US-ROK-Japan maritime exercise. In January 2025, the regime tested an underwater-to-surface strategic guided cruise missile while also vowing to respond to the United States with the “toughest counteraction.”

Ultimately, North Korea wants to halt US-ROK joint (and multinational) military exercises and to splinter an alliance of seventy-plus-years between the two nations. Its determined and bellicose approach has the potential to highlight the asymmetry of what’s at stake between the United States and the ROK and, if unchecked, sow fear and doubt into the fabric of the alliance.

Would South Korea go nuclear? A shift in ROK defense architecture

The second test of the alliance follows changes in the ROK’s defense architecture and capabilities, including the advent of the ROK Strategic Command (ROKSTRATCOM), which may increase potential areas for divergence among allies even as the changes show the ROK’s increasing capability and willingness to take greater responsibility for its own defense. ROKSTRATCOM’s establishment may be an opportunity rather than just a challenge and it is perhaps more a response to an increasingly serious threat from North Korea than a shortfall in the US-ROK alliance. It nevertheless highlights that South Koreans may not feel US extended deterrence guarantees are sufficient given the growing North Korean threat.

Plans to establish ROKSTRATCOM were underway for over two years by the time of the command’s official establishment on October 1, 2024, yet many Americans either did not pay attention or believe there was a need for such a command on the Korean Peninsula. After all, the United States, South Korea’s strongest ally, has been with the ROK since the Korean War began in 1950. The two countries also have a long-standing Mutual Defense Treaty, signed shortly after the Korean War Armistice. So, for some observers, South Korea’s need for such a command was questionable. The United States already commits to defending South Korea, most visibly with 28,500 military personnel present on the peninsula and contributing to the Combined Forces Command, US Forces Korea, and the United Nations Command. Regular joint exercises and strategic activities, such as a port visit of the USS Kentucky ballistic missile submarine to Busan, also bolster this presence.

The ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) marks its forty-sixth anniversary with a ceremony at Camp Humphreys, Pyeongtaek, November 7, 2024. Photo provided by United States Forces Korea.

Importantly, though, ROKSTRATCOM does not clearly fall under the combined alliance wartime command construct under a bi-national Combined Forces Command that has been in place since 1978. ROKSTRATCOM is instead an independent ROK-controlled command, currently led by ROK Air Force Lieutenant General Jin Young Seung, and it is still under development exactly how this new command will align and coordinate with CFC and other alliance constructs like the bilateral Military Committee.

Markus Garlauskas, Indo-Pacific Security Initiative director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, with Lt. Gen. Jin Young Seung, ROKSTRATCOM commander, at the ROKSTRATCOM headquarters in February 2025. Photo provided by the Atlantic Council

Operationally, ROKSTRATCOM resides under the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, serving as an integrator of ROK armed forces’ strategic weapons systems from each military branch. In July 2024, a former ROK minister of defense expressed the administration’s vision of the command:

The strategic command will be a unit that leads the development of nuclear and conventional integrated operational concepts and plans and combat development in new areas such as space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum in conjunction with the operation of the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG).

According to a news report citing the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, the command “would also give the orders to subordinate military assets to strike enemy targets or intercept hostile missiles as part of the Kill Chain strategy and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation [KMPR] plan.” (See the ministry’s 2022 white paper for more information about the kill chain strategy and the KMPR plan.)

It is more than just command and control that is changing, however. South Korea’s independent strike capabilities are increasing. South Korea unveiled its most powerful conventional weapon, the Hyunmoo-5, referring to it as an “ultra-high-power ballistic missile.” The high-yield Hyunmoo-5 appears to be intended as a ROKSTRATCOM capability, integral to reinforcing ROK messages of an “overwhelming response” to any North Korea nuclear attack. It remains to be seen, however, how the command will contribute these forces to a conflict on the Korean Peninsula—and this calls into question the previously relied upon unified command system.

The establishment of ROKSTRATCOM is a historic event and time will tell if capabilities breed intentions. It appears South Korea is not willing to take the option of having nuclear weapons off the table despite the US nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence commitments. As the ROK continues to grapple with its current and future defense challenges, the United States should take care to be an integral part of this ROK process, thereby ensuring a better understanding of the intentions of allies, enhancing the alliance, and deterring North Korea from strategic attack.

New presidents in Washington and Seoul portend policy changes

The third test involves expected changes by the new Trump administration to US policies and strategies affecting the alliance, along with potential adjustments by the imminent new South Korean administration to its approach toward the alliance and to defense issues more broadly. Coupled with divisive domestic politics in both the United States and South Korea, these developments could potentially open old wounds and create new points of contention within the alliance. As the new US administration begins to set its tone for foreign policy for the rest of its term, many South Koreans seem hopeful, but uncertain. Meanwhile, South Korean media reports and commentaries are examining the implications of rumored US force reductions in Korea and other potential changes to US policy and strategy affecting the alliance as either challenges or opportunities.

South Korea will soon have its own new president, after the martial law declaration by Yoon and his removal from office resulted in elections set for June 3. A new ROK president may well inject more uncertainty into the state of South Korean affairs, which could affect the alliance, as the country works to self-heal from Yoon’s surprising martial law announcement and the subsequent fallout.

Meanwhile, there are lingering questions about whether South Korea will eventually develop its own nuclear weapons. While many Americans empathize with South Korea’s undesirable position, its creation of ROKSTRATCOM and varied calls by ROK officials for nuclear weapons are concerning for US assurance efforts and, potentially, its nonproliferation policy. Would South Korea really go nuclear? Given the tense nuclear-armed neighborhood that surrounds the small country, and North Korea’s continued refusal to give up its nuclear weapons, many ask, “Why not?” Others, however, argue South Korea “cannot” or would “never” do so because it is a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, the NPT has a get-out-of-jail free card in Article X. According to a 2005 Arms Control Today article by the late arms control experts George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander:

Article X of the NPT provides a “right” to withdraw from the treaty if the withdrawing party “decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this [t]reaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” It also requires that a withdrawing state-party give three months’ notice.

South Korean public discussion of a nuclear latency capability and indigenous nuclear weapons has been growing, with some officials publicly expressing the desire to keep the option open or to actually build nuclear weapons. Most recently, the People Power Party presidential candidate, Kim Moon Soo, announced that, if elected, he would pursue a nuclear latency capability—meaning that South Korea would be much closer to being able to build nuclear weapons on short notice. This indicates South Korea’s unease with relying on the United States as the only nuclear weapons responder to a growing North Korean nuclear arsenal.

Conclusion

These new hurdles—a more capable and threatening nuclear North Korea; a shift in South Korea’s defense architecture, including a unilateral strategic command; and presidential-level political changes—will inevitably strain the alliance, but may also present opportunities. The US-ROK alliance has remained ironclad, with more than seven decades of experience and adaptation, underpinned by a commitment to each other’s mutual defense. Now it is up to both countries to learn from their past while developing new approaches to the changing status quo. No matter who wins the ROK presidential election, the continued strength of the US-ROK alliance matters in the face of threats confronting both the United States and South Korea. Early and in-depth engagement by Washington with the new South Korean president to begin charting a new course for the alliance will ensure the US-ROK alliance emerges even stronger and more equipped to enhance each country’s interests, as well as underpin stability in the region.

About the authors

Heather Kearney is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a senior Indo-Pacific analyst in the Joint Exercise, Training, and Assessments Directorate at United States Strategic Command. As a senior analyst for risk of strategic deterrence failure, she leads a team dedicated to assessing trends in the environment in order to inform strategic risk assessments.

Amanda Mortwedt Oh is a USSTRATCOM liaison officer in the Office of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Policy, Strategic Stability, in the Joint Staff J-5 Directorate. She focuses her research on Northeast Asia and strategic deterrence and was most recently a Fall 2024 Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Policy Fellow. She is the previous director of international outreach and development at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and has published several articles and reports on North Korea’s prison camps and human rights issues. She is also a lawyer in the US Army Reserve Judge Advocate General’s Corps.

Disclaimer: The views presented in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of US Strategic Command, the US Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

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Your primer on the Polish presidential election

Aaron Korewa — Thu, 29 May 2025 20:14:19 +0000

Poles will vote for their next president on June 1. Depending on the outcome, this election could kick off a period of political stability—or further cement a gridlock that could lead to the government collapsing.

In the October 2023 parliamentary elections, current Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s center-right Civic Coalition (KO) ended eight years of rule by the national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party and formed a broad government consisting of centrists, liberals, socialists, and greens.

However, Tusk does not command a three-fifths majority in the Sejm (the lower house of parliament), which is needed to override any potential presidential veto. President Andrzej Duda, formally from PiS, has delayed or blocked many of the prime minister’s domestic legislative reforms. But now, Duda’s two terms are up.

Two candidates will face off in a final round: Rafał Trzaskowski, the mayor of Warsaw from KO, and Karol Nawrocki, head of the Institute for National Remembrance, who is tied to PiS.

Ahead of the second round, Aaron Korewa, director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office, breaks down the race and the potential impacts on Poland’s foreign policy.

How has the race unfolded so far?

The Poles voted in the first round on May 18. Trzaskowski, who was long considered the clear favorite, only managed to get slightly ahead of Nawrocki, securing 31.4 percent against Nawrocki’s 29.5 percent. To complicate things for Trzaskowski, the two next places were taken by Sławomir Mentzen of the far-right Confederation party (14.8 percent) and the very far-right Grzegorz Braun (6.3 percent). Mentzen has expressed skepticism towards both the European Union (EU) and aid for Ukraine, whereas Braun openly takes pro-Kremlin and anti-Semitic positions. As no candidate reached over 50 percent, the race proceeded to a second round. Those who voted for Mentzen and Braun are generally believed to be more likely to vote for Nawrocki than Trzaskowski in the second round.

Voter turnout was high by Polish standards: 67.3 percent. Young voters mainly went for Mentzen or Adrian Zandberg, from the leftist Razem party. Poland, like the rest of the Western world, is seeing backlash against established parties and elites. PiS has for a long time been able to capitalize on such sentiments, but less so now that it held power recently and (technically) still holds the Presidential Palace.

In the initial stages of the campaign, foreign policy was rarely discussed. This is because unlike in most European countries, the two main rivals—KO and PiS—in many ways share the same positions on strong support for NATO and transatlantic ties; they also both oppose Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Poland became a leading champion of Ukraine’s cause under the PiS government led by former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. Since Tusk took over in 2023, this has largely continued. On the other hand, within Polish society, the initial outpouring of support for Ukraine and its people seen in 2022 has soured somewhat. That is mainly due to fatigue with the large number of refugees but also resentment that Ukraine has not moved fast enough to address historical issues such as the infamous Volhynia massacre of Polish civilians by Ukrainian nationalist partisan forces during World War II. The Confederation and the parties to its right seem to have been able to capitalize on this, which prompted Nawrocki to use anti-Ukraine rhetoric himself in the final stages of the first round.

US President Donald Trump did not become a central issue in the Polish election. This is likely because nearly all parties recognize the role strong transatlantic ties play for Poland’s national security—approximately ten thousand US troops are currently stationed in Poland. Nawrocki was the only candidate who traveled to Washington to meet Trump, and he claims to have received the US president’s endorsement, but this occurred around early May holidays in Poland when voters tend to tune out news. Thus, the effect on the result of the first round was probably limited.

How do the first-round outcomes set the stage for the second round?

In recent polls, Trzaskowski and Nawrocki are neck and neck. Despite the combined vote for the right being around 52 percent, there’s no guarantee that those who voted for Mentzen and Braun will automatically support Nawrocki. PiS has traditionally received support from elderly, religious, and rural voters. PiS is clearly on the right when it comes to social issues but also proposes government support programs for the poor and disadvantaged. The Confederation, on the other hand, is economically libertarian and has young, well-off men as their base. Braun’s electorate is largely made up of ultra-Catholics, but they may also stay at home if their candidate is not on the ballot.

Polls also show that many voters who supported the parties in Tusk’s coalition in the October 2023 parliamentary election skipped the first round in this presidential election, which is likely due to dissatisfaction with the government. In recent days, Trzaskowski has been successful in reaching out to other members of the Tusk coalition. On Sunday, he held a march in Warsaw that saw about 140,000 participants and several speeches by former presidential candidates from the left and liberal side. Nawrocki held a march in Warsaw the same day, but his was smaller and only featured speakers from PiS. Last Friday, Trzaskowski and Nawrocki faced off in a final debate, where Trzaskowski strived to expose Nawrocki’s lack of experience. Finally, each of the candidates appeared on Mentzen’s YouTube channel, where they were asked to sign an eight-point pledge to satisfy the demands of Mentzen’s voters. Nawrocki agreed to all the points, including one saying that he would not sign the law ratifying Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Trzaskowski disagreed on that and on other points, but did not attack Mentzen or his voters in doing so.

In the final stages of the campaign, Trzaskowski’s card is that he’s likely seen as more “presidential.” But he’s also closely tied to Tusk as the deputy head of KO, and if the final round becomes a referendum on the government, Trzaskowski would be in trouble. Yet a high voter turnout would likely favor him. From his messaging, Trzaskowski also seems to have picked up on the fact that voters list healthcare and secure borders as the most important issues.

Nawrocki has the “man of the people” image down and can ride on the current right-wing “wave,” but he is inexperienced and comes off as somewhat unnatural in front of cameras. He is a historian and a former boxer, but it recently surfaced that he also engaged in soccer hooliganism in the past, once a major problem in Poland. Nawrocki has recently played up that he would have a better relationship with Trump if elected. At the Conservative Political Action Conference in Poland this week, US Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem echoed this theme.

How will the outcome impact Poland’s foreign policy?

Whereas KO and PiS generally agree on NATO, transatlantic ties, and Russia, they sharply differ on the EU. KO is strongly pro-EU; before returning as prime minister, Tusk served as president of the European Council. Trzaskowski was a member of the European Parliament and a deputy foreign affairs minister responsible for EU affairs. PiS is not against Polish EU membership but is clearly Euroskeptic and pays lip service to muscular Polish nationalism that sees Brussels and Berlin (often intertwined) as threats to Polish sovereignty. A Trzaskowski win could play a part in Poland rising to a prominent position in the EU. A win for Nawrocki could disrupt it.

As for relations with the United States, Nawrocki has established a channel to Trump and is ideologically more in line with the “MAGA” wing of the Republican Party. But Trzaskowski has lived in the United States and has also established contacts with US politicians from across the aisle. He has made several appearances on US media outlets, most recently FOX Business.

Under Trzaskowski, Polish support for Ukraine will certainly continue. But it’s harder to say what will happen should Nawrocki win. PiS is not pro-Russia by any means, but Nawrocki has already used some anti-Ukraine rhetoric in his bid to attract the voters of Mentzen and Braun. In this scenario, expect no Polish blocking of Western aid to Ukraine but probably no leadership in expanding such aid either.

For foreign policy in general, Trzaskowski may bring domestic stability and an end to the political logjam of the past two years. A win for Nawrocki could mean more gridlock, forcing the Polish government to focus inward. There are even rumors that in this scenario, some of Tusk’s coalition partners may jump ship, prompting a new cycle of elections.

—Aaron Korewa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office, which is part of the Europe Center.

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Portugal’s shift to the right is accelerating. What does that mean for its future?

Andrew Bernard — Tue, 20 May 2025 16:47:38 +0000

Portugal is going through a historic rightward shift. Initial results from Sunday’s election have the center-right Democratic Alliance (AD) winning, but without an absolute majority, the center-left Socialist Party (PS) falling hard, and the far-right Chega party continuing its meteoric rise.

This means that for the first time in Portuguese democratic history, there is not a “center majority” between the center-right and center-left. With new power balances in play, Portugal’s politics may get even messier—with political paralysis the new norm, preventing necessary reforms in key sectors such as housing, healthcare, and defense.

This was the third election in three years for Portuguese voters. Among European Union (EU) nations, only Bulgaria has had more elections than Portugal over the past seven years—and election fatigue was evident in this campaign. What Portuguese voters really want is stability, but these results might make that dream harder to come by in the months and years ahead.

Winners and losers

AD, a center-right coalition between the Social Democratic Party and the CDS-People’s Party, won the March 2024 legislative elections by the slimmest of margins, taking the reins of government from PS for the first time since 2015. That election also marked the surge of the far-right Chega party—“Enough” in Portuguese—with a strong third-place showing. Although this fractured political landscape made governing difficult for AD, led by Prime Minister Luís Montenegro, it was still able to pass a budget and begin implementing its program as a minority government.

The 2025 election campaign was nearly identical to the 2024 cycle, with the same eight principal parties/coalitions on the ballot—all led by their same respective leaders. The Portuguese housing crisis and migration topped the list of voter concerns, followed by healthcare, pensions, and salaries. The war in Ukraine, transatlantic relations, and defense investment were not actively discussed during the campaign and the debates.

Three parties secured the majority of the 230 parliamentary seats, and they will drive the Portuguese political system for the near future.

AD won the election, but it fell short of an absolute majority. With eighty-nine seats (up from eighty in 2024), the election reinforces Montenegro’s belief that the country is asking for stability and the opportunity to govern with the normal full four-year mandate. But even if AD partners with smaller parties, it still will not have a majority to govern outright. Thus, AD is hoping the president will once again ask the center-right to form a minority government.

The Socialist Party was the big loser on Sunday, securing only fifty-eight seats (down from seventy-eight) and losing more than 360,000 votes from 2024. This is an epic fall for a party that has been a staple of Portuguese politics since the transition to democracy in the 1970s. In the next government, PS—even if aligned with small left-wing parties—will not be able to outright block government initiatives, leaving the role of kingmaker to Chega.

The far-right party was the biggest winner, as Chega secured fifty-eight seats (up from fifty), gaining more than 230,000 votes from the 2024 contest. Depending on the distribution of the last four seats, which are reserved for the votes of Portuguese citizens living outside the country, Chega could find itself in second place. (The distribution of these seats will be known by May 28.) In 2024, Chega won two of the four “emigrant” seats, with the other two split between PS and AD. A similar outcome this year would put Chega in the runner-up position. The election results show that the issues most central to Chega’s program—illegal migration and corruption—continue to resonate with the Portuguese electorate.

Political pitfalls ahead

Although AD won the most votes, there is no guarantee that President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa will immediately invite Montenegro and AD to form a government. That’s because the president is keen on stability, and he made it clear during the election that he wants any government he nominates to have its program accepted by Parliament.

In Portugal, the nominated prime minister has ten days to present its governance plan to Parliament. If no party or faction within the new Parliament votes to reject (or approve) the program, then the program passes automatically, and the nominated government inherits full executive authority. Should any party or faction reject the program, then it would go to a vote to the whole of Parliament.

In this case, an absolute majority would be needed to bring down the nominated government—forcing the president to nominate a different government configuration (as happened in 2015) or subject the country to another legislative election. But the Portuguese Constitution prohibits the legislature from being dissolved within the first six months of its mandate or during the final six months of a presidential term. Rebelo de Sousa will finish his second term in March 2026, with the next presidential election scheduled for January 2026. This means late spring 2026 could be the earliest opportunity for new elections. So if a nominated government is brought down, it would leave a long-term caretaker government—a situation the president wants to avoid. It is unlikely that Chega and the Socialists would join forces to block the installation of an AD minority government. Nonetheless, the president will do his due diligence behind the scenes before nominating Montenegro to be prime minister again.

Regardless of the composition of the new government, there is now an absolute majority on the right. Should AD and Chega find common ground on a particular issue—such as immigration—they will be able to enact policy without the left blocking proposals. With Chega possibly becoming the number two party in Parliament, it will be under more pressure to show it is more than just an anti-incumbent party and has the ability and gravitas to govern.

From Lisbon to Washington

It is still too early to see how any new Portuguese government will approach the current US administration, but it is unlikely that Portugal will change its approach of having the transatlantic relationship be one of the pillars of its foreign policy. Montenegro’s government was reserved and cautious on transatlantic relations during the early days of the new US administration. The prime minister refused to critique the United States for its stance on Gaza, while asking for “realism” and dialogue concerning tariffs. Yet, Montenegro allowed his defense minister to openly question US predictability as an ally when making public comments about the potential purchase of the US-built F-35 fighter jet.

Chega’s outsized role in the next Parliament, even if it does not become part of the government, may change this dynamic and push the executive toward reinforced ties with the United States. US President Donald Trump invited André Ventura, Chega’s leader, to attend the presidential inauguration in January, while Chega vowed to “privilege the transatlantic link” and prioritize its alliance with the United States as part of its 2025 election campaign foreign policy program. Montenegro has often critiqued Chega as unreliable, but he may have to adapt to the new reality of the Portuguese political landscape.

The NATO Summit looms on the horizon, and it is possible a new government begins its mandate only a week or two before the June 24-25 event in The Hague. Whoever represents Portugal as head of government will have the unenviable position of articulating a plan to increase defense investment, which is still well below the 2 percent of gross domestic product threshold set in the Alliance’s 2014 Wales pledge.

Defense spending is one area that the AD and Chega may find common ground. Chega proposed for Portugal to meet its 2 percent goal in 2026, three years earlier than AD’s 2029 goal, while PS did not quantify a target date in its electoral plan. It will take political will by Montenegro and AD to use this opportunity to move Portugal out of the shrinking list of NATO members still unable to fulfill the Wales pledge. This willpower has been historically absent in Portugal among all parties, a country benefiting from its geography and its distance from the Alliance’s eastern flank to under-prioritize defense spending while focusing on social programs.

With the composition and functioning of the new government in flux, Portugal could remain in an era of political paralysis for some time. How the future center-right government leads with a far-right primary opposition will determine if the country can break through its fractured political landscape and address the country’s challenges. Lisbon’s foreign policy could remain unsettled for some time given this reality. The big question remains whether the government will come together effectively enough to avoid yet another election in a year’s time.

Andrew Bernard is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Experts react: What message did Romanians send by electing Nicusor Dan?

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 19 May 2025 14:48:39 +0000

The math adds up. On Sunday, Nicusor Dan, the mayor of Bucharest and a former mathematics professor, was elected as the next Romanian president. With more than 53 percent of the vote, the pro–European Union (EU) Dan beat out right-wing candidate George Simion. Dan’s victory comes after the Romanian Constitutional Court’s controversial decision to annul the country’s November 2024 presidential election following allegations of Russian interference. Below, our experts count up the ways that the election’s outcome matters for Romania, for EU and NATO support for Ukraine, and for the future of Eastern Europe.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Daniel Fried: Dan ran a pro-Europe, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine campaign

Victoria Olari: The implications of Dan’s win will ripple across Eastern Europe

Anca Agachi: Romanians don’t want more of the same, so how will Dan be different?

Mark Scott: It was an election fought as much online as offline

Andrei Covatariu: After the election, can Romania’s energy diplomacy bridge Brussels and Washington?

Olga Khakova: Energy policy can help build the coalition and strengthen the country

Dan ran a pro-Europe, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine campaign

There are two lessons to take from Romania’s presidential elections. First, Romanians seemed turned off by the establishment parties that have traded off running the government for decades. The candidate of the ruling coalition didn’t make it past the first round; and Dan and Simion were both seen, Romanians tell me, as alternatives to the ruling coalition. Second, despite predictions (or fears), the preference for an outsider didn’t translate into a preference for a nationalist or anti-EU firebrand, which is how Simion ran his campaign. Dan, a mathematician by training, ran a campaign that was pro-Europe, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine.

Simion appeared to enjoy support from Russia, and plenty of stories are circulating of Russian information ops in his favor. He had maintained distance from Russian President Vladimir Putin (wise in Russo-skeptic Romania) and instead courted the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement in the United States, even visiting the United States during the campaign. But this did not translate into enough support at home.

Dan’s win is decisive, but it alone will not overcome the divisions in Romanian society. Romanians have voted for Europe and democracy, not nationalism, but they also seem to want change in the form of better governance. Dan will have a mandate but a big job ahead.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

The implications of Dan’s win will ripple across Eastern Europe

Romania’s presidential runoff turned into an intense race with significant stakes for the nation and the wider region. Dan won, an outcome expected mainly given the high voter turnout, offering him a strong democratic mandate.

From the early hours of election day, Simion’s ultra-nationalist camp signaled that they would not accept a loss. They took to social media with accusations of fraud and amplified fake news stories that mimicked legitimate outlets and falsely declared Simion the winner. Simion told his supporters not to trust the exit polls, claiming that political elites had manipulated the results behind the scenes. His team also accused foreign actors of interference, notably targeting Moldova’s president, Maia Sandu, for allegedly mobilizing Romanian voters in Moldova. This followed an unprecedented voter turnout there in the second round, partly spurred by Simion’s hostile rhetoric toward Moldova. The nationalist camp further alleged meddling by France, specifically accusing President Emmanuel Macron of election interference.

Despite these efforts, the election results left little room for dispute. Dan secured a mandate from Romanians. Simion conceded early Monday morning, marking the end of a tense and polarized campaign.

This election isn’t just about Romania. It’s a big deal for the region, too. A win for Dan will likely lock in Romania’s commitment to the EU and NATO, a vital move as Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to unsettle the region. This is critical, as Romania’s strategic position strengthens regional security and support for Kyiv. Additionally, it will likely bolster Moldova’s EU integration efforts under Sandu, fostering closer Romania-Moldova ties and countering Russian influence. On the other hand, a Simion victory would have likely emboldened far-right movements across Europe, disrupted regional unity, and undermined support for Ukraine, which Simion openly opposed.

Even with all the divisions, Romanian voters sent a loud message: they reject the old political elite. Both Dan and Simion positioned themselves as anti-system challengers, capitalizing on widespread frustration with corruption and governance failures. This call for change is real, and it’s going to continue to shape Romania’s future.

—Victoria Olari is a research associate for Moldova at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab).

Romanians don’t want more of the same, so how will Dan be different?

“Hope and patience.” This is what Dan, the now president-elect of Romania, asked for in his speech when the first exit polls were released.

Patience because his mandate will be an incredibly difficult one. Immediately, he will have to choose a prime minister and help establish a pro-European political coalition in the Romanian Parliament, one third of which is made up of far-right parties. He will need to help build trust in an economy that has the EU’s highest budget deficit compared to gross domestic product. And he will need to lead the country’s foreign policy at a time when the regional context for Romania has never been more dangerous given Russia’s continued war in Ukraine. In the long term, Dan will have to face down the unaddressed root causes of discontent that gave oxygen to far-right parties in the first place and brought Romania to the brink of disaster. The country is plagued by poverty, inequality, a failing public health system, corruption, and inefficient, unresponsive, and distrusted state institutions, as well as a forgotten diaspora. He will have to “rebuild a one Romania” together with a divided population.

But Dan was also right to ask for hope. In the election result Sunday, Romania decided it cannot go back, and Romanians have firmly made the choice to remain anchored in the Western, transatlantic community. Despite external pressures, disinformation campaigns, suspicions of Russian interference, and fears of a contested election result, Romanians made it clear that they are European. But the same voters who turned out in massive numbers for two anti-system candidates also made it clear that more of the same in Romanian politics is simply not acceptable. This is the hope and the opportunity Romania is facing—starting now.

—Anca Agachi is a nonresident fellow with Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She currently serves as a defense policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where she focuses on international security and defense issues.

It was an election fought as much online as offline

Faced with a barrage of false online information, potential foreign interference, and opaque practices by social media companies, Romania’s second-round presidential election held up to scrutiny—but only just. In the hours before Dan was elected, Simion took to X to proclaim himself as Romania’s new president, only to backtrack on that claim when the official tally gave Dan the final victory.

Pavel Durov, the chief executive of Telegram, the popular messaging service, also took to his platform and other social networks to accuse “a Western European government” of urging Telegram to “silence conservative voices in Romania.” The Russian tech boss subsequently named that country as France, though Paris denied any potential interference in the Eastern European country’s election.

More than any other recent European election, Romania’s vote has been riddled with potential digital attacks on local democratic institutions, including scores of cyberattacks that the country’s security forces suggested may have come from Russia. In response, Romanian officials and those from the European Commission have criticized social media companies for not doing enough to combat malign actors, both in and outside of the country.

Yet even hours after Dan was officially named as Romania’s next president, little, if any, evidence about the role these global platforms played in promoting election-related falsehoods has been made public. Local voters remain mostly in the dark about how social media—and potential bad actors—may have targeted them in this weekend’s election. That has left more questions than answers as policymakers, tech giants, and the public try to unpack how Dan successfully saw off Simion in an election that was fought as much online as offline.

—Mark Scott is senior resident fellow at the DFRLab’s Democracy + Tech Initiative within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

After the election, can Romania’s energy diplomacy bridge Brussels and Washington?

Romania avoided a political shock this weekend as pro-European candidate Dan defeated right-wing populist Simion. The result reassures Romania’s continued commitment to EU and transatlantic partnerships. Yet, after months of political turbulence and voter polarization, restoring macroeconomic stability now depends on forming a new government—no easy feat despite a pro-European majority in Romania’s Parliament.

The election outcome has implications for Romania’s strategic energy direction, too, even though energy and climate policy were not prominently featured in the campaign debates. Dan has pledged to keep Romania on its path of regional energy relevance, proven over the past few years, and to enhance the existing cooperation with the United States and the EU. His platform includes proposals to create a national energy champion, reduce Romania’s energy dependencies on authoritarian regimes, support strategic investment (including in data centers), and deepen ties with Moldova and Ukraine. His strong backing for EU enlargement further strengthens Romania’s geopolitical and energy role in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

At the same time, Romania—like other CEE states—faces a growing tension between the EU’s accelerated decarbonization push and the United States’ emphasis on “energy freedom,” as recently articulated by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright at the Three Seas Business Forum in Warsaw. This divergence presents both challenges and opportunities. The Romanian president can play a key role in expanding the win-set between Brussels and Washington through enhanced energy diplomacy—advancing nuclear partnerships (notably small modular nuclear reactors with US support), Black Sea gas development, cross-border infrastructure with Ukraine and Moldova, and clean generation scale-up. Romania also has the potential to become a clean technology manufacturing destination, supporting both EU goals and transatlantic alignment in a shifting geopolitical landscape.

By advancing projects that resonate in both Brussels and Washington, Romania can amplify its geopolitical weight in the energy space.

—Andrei Covatariu is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

Energy policy can help build the coalition and strengthen the country

This anti-establishment, anti-corruption vote presents a historic opportunity for the new Romanian leadership to use this mandate to build on previous positive energy reforms. The next Romanian government has a chance to engage with the population to forge a secure, resilient, and diversified energy strategy that can attract new deals and investments in the energy sector.

However, the close election results showcase that national concerns such as energy prices, reliability, and industrial competitiveness helped drive a significant percentage of voters to support the candidate with a nationalistic platform. The good news is that Romania can prioritize domestic issues through stronger partnerships and deeper regional integration: developing Black Sea resources, integrating electricity and gas interconnections with neighboring countries, and making progress on nuclear agreements with countries like the United States.

Romania has led on diversification from Russian energy sources and support for Ukraine and Moldova’s energy security. The new coalition can lead by example in fortifying the region from backsliding into Russian natural gas dependence, as seen in the growing Russian liquefied natural gas shipments to the EU.

Moreover, a strong energy agenda could also be a unifying platform for building the ruling coalition.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

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Why Romania chose centrism in the end

Atlantic Council — Mon, 19 May 2025 01:26:49 +0000

JUST IN

Dan’s the man. Bucharest Mayor Nicusor Dan won Sunday’s Romanian presidential election, a triumph for centrist, pro-European forces in a country that has been roiled by six months of electoral upheaval. “We need to build Romania together irrespective of who you voted for,” Dan told cheering supporters. His populist, far-right challenger, George Simion, claimed fraud and initially claimed victory, but conceded hours later. This election followed a canceled presidential race in December, when Romanian authorities determined that another populist, far-right candidate, Calin Georgescu, had violated campaign-finance rules and was the beneficiary of a dodgy social media campaign; he was later barred from running again. How did Dan triumph? What can we expect next for Romania and for the country’s relations with the world? We turned to our experts to parse the polls.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Victoria Olari (@Olari_Victoria): Research associate at the Digital Forensic Research Lab
Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser Family distinguished fellow and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe
Anca Agachi (@AncaAgachi): Nonresident fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative and defense policy analyst at the RAND Corporation

Why Dan won

Dan may be a centrist, but he was not the chosen candidate of Romania’s ruling coalition. “Romanian voters sent a loud message: They reject the old political elite,” Victoria says. “Both Dan and Simion positioned themselves as anti-system challengers, capitalizing on widespread frustration with corruption and governance failures.”
But at the same time, “the preference for an outsider didn’t translate into preference for a nationalist or anti-EU firebrand, which is how Simion ran his campaign,” Daniel tells us. Instead, voters picked a mathematician who “ran a campaign that was pro-Europe, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine.”

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The foreign factor

While Russia appeared to back Simion, Daniel points out that Simion “maintained distance from Russian President Vladimir Putin (wise in Russo-skeptic Romania).”
Instead, the populist candidate courted US President Donald Trump’s Make America Great Again movement, traveling to the Conservative Political Action Conference and appearing on Steve Bannon’s podcast. “But this did not translate into support at home,” Daniel notes.
Victoria points out that on Sunday, Simion’s supporters “flooded social media with accusations of fraud and amplified fake news stories that mimicked legitimate outlets and falsely declared Simion the winner.” Simion and his backers also accused the presidents of both Moldova and France of meddling in the election. “These actions risk deepening Romania’s societal polarization,” Victoria says.
But Simion did concede in the end, turning the focus to what Dan’s win will mean for the region. Victoria notes that Dan’s pro-Ukraine stance “strengthens regional security and support for Kyiv.” Dan’s victory will also boost neighboring Moldova’s integration efforts with the European Union, she adds, “fostering closer Romania-Moldova ties and countering Russian influence.”

Romania’s road ahead

While Romanians “made it clear” with their vote that “they are European,” Dan’s mandate will still be “an incredibly difficult one,” Anca cautions, as the newly elected president will need to choose a prime minister to form a pro-European political coalition in the parliament, where far-right parties hold one-third of the seats.
His immediate task will involve building trust in an economy with the highest budget deficit in the European Union (as a percentage of gross domestic product), while guiding foreign policy “at a time when the regional context for Romania has never been more dangerous, given Russia’s continued war in Ukraine,” Anca says.
To succeed in the long run, “Dan will have to face down the unaddressed root causes of discontent,” Anca says—such as poverty, corruption, and distrust of state institutions—“that gave oxygen to far-right parties in the first place and brought Romania to the brink of disaster.”

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What will Labor’s landslide mean for Australia’s foreign policy?

Peter J. Dean — Wed, 07 May 2025 21:28:02 +0000

CANBERRA—It’s been five months since US President Donald Trump was elected to a second term, but it felt at times as if he was a candidate in Australia’s election on May 3, as well. During the campaign, Trump cast a long shadow over both the progressive Labor Party Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and conservative Liberal-National Coalition Opposition leader Peter Dutton.

Labor’s resounding election victory is now being viewed as a mandate for the sensible center of Australian politics and a rejection of Trump-style politics in Australia. One Australian political commentator saw the results as rebuffing “bunyip Trumpism,” a reference to a mythical Aboriginal creature that inhabits waterholes, which is colloquially used to describe something that is seen as an imposter or pretender. But this election was a rejection of not just hard-right policies but also of the hard left. The Australian Greens Party ran a campaign on cost-of-living measures but also identity politics, Gaza, and anti-Israel sentiment. The party lost two of its previous four lower house seats, while Adam Bandt, the party leader, lost his seat. The party made no gains in the Senate, and its hopes of a “Greenslide” were demolished.

Labor now looks set to claim up to ninety of the 150 seats in the House of Representatives, as well as up to three additional senators. The conservative opposition looks set to be reduced to forty seats or less in the House.

But while Australian voters made clear their rejection of Trump, they still are remarkably pro-United States. The Albanese government will have to balance those two notions as it maps out its foreign policy in the months ahead.

How Labor won

Albanese is the first Australian prime minister to be re-elected since John Howard in 2004, and he is the first premier in one hundred years to increase their party’s majority after the first term. Albanese is now set to lead the largest Labor majority in history. The scale of Labor’s election win almost guarantees the party a thir d term in government in three years’ time. Meanwhile, the conservative coalition was defeated so soundly that even Dutton lost his parliamentary seat, leaving the conservative opposition leaderless and rudderless.

But this was not a pre-ordained outcome. From late 2024 through early this year, Dutton’s coalition was ahead in the opinion polls. Albanese and his government were seen to be struggling in the face of cost-of-living pressures and global uncertainty. Media outlets were calling the election a tight race, predicting a minority Labor government that would be dependent on a large cross bench of independents and Greens in the House of Representative and the Senate in order to govern.

But Dutton’s coalition made significant missteps in the five-week campaign, including several proposals reminiscent of Trump policies. Dutton failed to develop policies to win back seats lost at the last election to the center-right independents known as the Teals. He proposed unpopular policies on nuclear power, healthcare, and cost-of-living relief. Moreover, Dutton proposed massive cuts to public service jobs, which echoed the Trump administration’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). A key moment for the campaign was when Jacinta Nampijinpa Price, a controversial conservative senator, vowed to “make Australia great again,” and accused the media of being “Trump-obsessed.”

These nods to Trump policies and slogans did the conservative coalition no favors. Since the beginning of Trump’s second term, Lowy Institute polling has recorded that Australians’ trust in the United States to act responsibly in the world fell by 20 percent, with only 36 percent of the public expressing any level of trust. Almost two thirds of the public (64 percent) say they hold “not very much” trust (32 percent) or no trust “at all” (32 percent) in the United States to act responsibly. Australians widely disapprove of several aspects of Trump’s policy agenda, including his proposal for a Ukraine peace deal that would cede territory to Russia (74 percent) and using tariffs to pressure other countries (81 percent). A majority of Australians also oppose the United States withdrawing from the World Health Organization (76 percent) and exiting from international climate change agreements (74 percent).

What will Labor do with this mandate?

The results leave the Labor Government with a strong mandate domestically and internationally. Albanese will likely continue with his steady, incremental reform agenda at home and abroad, focused on stability and pragmatism. Foreign policy was a carefully crafted balance among deepening the alliance with the United States; engaging in regional minilateralism, focused on Southeast Asia, Pacific Island nations, and India; and deepening security relations with Japan, both bilaterally and trilaterally with the United States.

Albanese’s brand of pragmatism will continue to drive how he engages with Trump and the United States. His government has refused to respond with reciprocal tariffs on the United States and has focused on dealing with the US president on the basis of Australia’s advantages in critical minerals, the US trade surplus with Australia, and a broader commitment to international free trade. Support for the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) security partnership was bipartisan in the campaign. Defense spending is set to rise, even if modestly, and the alliance remains core to Australian strategy. One of the key features of Labor’s last terms in office were advances in US force posture in Australia and the alignment of strategic posture around denial and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, which will continue to be a core focus over the next three years.

In addition, key areas such as shipbuilding, nuclear-powered submarine production, defense industrial collaboration, and the manufacture of guided weapons are priorities both of the Labor government and the Trump administration. This provides a strong foundation for defense cooperation. However, Australia and the United States diverge on key issues around international trade and the rules-based international order. This means there will be points of friction, and the Albanese government should be expected to carefully and tactfully point out policy differences on these issues.

Crucially, Australian dislike of the Trump administration should not be mistaken for antipathy toward the United States. The same Lowy Institute poll that showed a rejection of Trump’s policies shows that the Australian public is rock-solid in its support of the United States. Eighty percent of Australians continue to support the alliance with the United States (only a 3 percent drop from 2024) and they are evenly split on Trump’s demand that allies spend more on defense.

Labor will continue to focus on the Indo-Pacific, working closely with the United States and its regional allies and partners. It will keep dealing cautiously with, and balancing against, China and doubling down on ties with Southeast Asia, Pacific Island nations, Japan, India, and South Korea. With Albanese ascendant, expect more of the steady hand of Australia’s center-left government over the next three years rather than any policy radicalism.

Peter J. Dean is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and director of foreign policy and defense at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney.

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Your primer on Albania’s parliamentary election

Ilva Tare, Agon Maliqi, and Valbona Zeneli — Wed, 07 May 2025 19:31:40 +0000

A prime minister seeking an unprecedented fourth term, a deeply entrenched opposition, and a crop of new parties angling for influence—Albania’s parliamentary election on May 11 comes amid deep domestic polarization. Voters will head to the polls at a strategically pivotal moment for the Western Balkan nation, which remains among the most staunchly pro-US countries in the region and is determined to press forward with its bid for European Union (EU) membership.

Ahead of the election, Europe Center experts break down the key issues, players, and trends to watch this weekend.

Who is Prime Minister Edi Rama—and who are his main challengers?

The Socialist Party (PS) and its popular leader Edi Rama are running for a fourth term in office, despite the wear and tear of years in power and a series of corruption-related controversies tied to their administration at various political and executive levels.

Rama’s main challenger is Sali Berisha, who has been the leader of Albania’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Party (PD), for the last three decades. He served as prime minister from 2005 to 2013—a position he last held twelve years ago. In the interim, he faced a three-year period of internal party conflict over his designation as “persona non grata” by the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as corruption investigations by the Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK).

Next to the eleven parties participating in this election, SPAK is a key actor to watch, as it is currently investigating high-level politicians across the political spectrum. Ilir Meta, the former president of the Freedom Party (PL)—the third largest party in the country based on the results of the 2021 parliamentary elections—is under arrest; Arben Ahmetaj, the former deputy prime minister, is on the run; Erion Veliaj, the mayor of Tirana, has been detained; and Sali Berisha, the main opposition leader, is under investigation.

Due to its handling of high-profile cases, SPAK is now the most trusted institution in Albania, and a majority of voters support its continued operation as an independent body, free from political interference. Meanwhile, opposition leaders such as Berisha have openly called for SPAK’s dismantlement and frequently accuse the agency of political bias.

It’s also worth noting that over the past year, three new political entities—the Coalition Shqipëria Bëhet (Albania is Being Made), the Mundësia (Opportunity) Party, and Lëvizja Bashkë (Together Movement)—have entered the race. Although these parties represent diverse ideological positions—spanning the center, right, and left—they share anti-establishment sentiments and appear to be emerging as a significant political force ahead of the vote.

—Ilva Tare is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Rama, the eccentric leader of the PS, has been a central figure in Albanian politics for nearly a quarter century, serving three terms as the mayor of the capital Tirana (2000-2011), and then another three as prime minister. He is now seeking an unprecedented fourth term while still presenting himself as a candidate of change. Although this narrative seems far-fetched, it might gain traction, largely because his main rival, Berisha, has been in politics even longer, serving as Albania’s first post-communist president and later as prime minister for two terms.

Albania’s highly polarized political scene is largely a duopoly between the PS and PD, where electoral victories have often been determined by the ability of the two parties’ strong-handed leaders to control “rebellious” factions on the margins. The PD’s last stint in power (2005-2013) came after a sizable split within the left. Now, it is the right wing that has splintered, creating a few smaller factions and leaving the opposition less competitive. A handful of small, new parties are competing and may secure a few seats—mostly in the capital, Tirana. They hope to gain decisive leverage if Rama, who is favored to win, fails to secure a majority to govern alone.

—Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Active in Albanian politics since 1998, starting as minister of culture, Rama has served as prime minister since 2013. While internationally recognized for his distinctive political style, his artistic background, and his focus on urban development, Rama’s three terms in office have been marked by a mix of modernization efforts and corruption scandals.

His main challenger is the center-right PD, the country’s primary opposition force, which has itself been mired in internal turmoil in recent years. Meanwhile, the former Socialist Movement for Integration, now known as the PL, has seen its influence wane, particularly after suffering heavy losses in the 2021 elections. Party leader and former President of Albania, Ilir Meta, remains in custody since his arrest in October 2024 on charges of corruption and money laundering. Yet he is still running for a seat in parliament on the open list of the Democratic Party’s “Alliance for Glorious Albania” coalition.

The novelty in these elections is the prominent role of SPAK, whose creation and operations have been strongly backed by the United States and the EU. SPAK’s mandate—to investigate corruption, electoral crime, vote-buying, abuse of public office, and ties between organized crime and politics—directly targets the longstanding problems that have weakened Albania’s electoral integrity.

—Valbona Zeneli is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

What political dynamics are shaping Albania’s 2025 parliamentary elections?

Prime Minister Edi Rama enters this election with a twelve-year track record, positioning himself and the PS as the only modernizing political force equipped to bring Albania’s lengthy transition from communism to a close through EU accession. However, Rama’s party carries the weight of his long tenure, which has been marred by major corruption scandals at various levels of governance, along with economic difficulties stemming from the rising cost of living and deepening income inequality. Albania also continues to grapple with emigration and a rapidly aging population.

According to national polls, the PS currently holds a lead with more than 40 percent of projected votes, followed by the PD with 30 percent, and smaller shares going to the new parties. Due to the highly fragmented opposition vote and the regional proportional electoral system—which includes a single preferential vote that can distort results if opposition parties fail to win seats in multiple districts—projections indicate that the PS could once again secure a majority of at least seventy-one seats in parliament. Rama hopes to surpass the party’s previous result of seventy-four seats and move closer to a qualified majority of eighty-four seats. For the first time, Albanians living abroad have been granted the opportunity to vote. So far, more than 245,000 vote-by-mail requests from eighty-five countries have been registered. It remains to be seen how many of these will turn into actual ballots. Diaspora votes will be counted at the district level.

—Ilva Tare

There are no significant ideological differences between the PS and the PD on either domestic issues or foreign affairs. Their competition largely hinges on the personalities of their leaders and their historical patronage networks. Both parties are seeking to motivate their base and convince a small pool of independent voters that they can govern more effectively. Incumbency and political control over resources favor Rama, but after three terms in office, the flip side is deep fatigue and disillusionment. These elections are essentially a referendum on how tired Albanians are of Rama’s long rule and how motivated PS voters are to turn out. Meanwhile, Berisha is seen as too polarizing beyond the PD base, and the right is fractured.

Rama’s rule has brought about some transformative change, with public and private investments reshaping infrastructure, particularly in urban and coastal areas. This has fueled an unprecedented tourism boom and solid economic growth. Yet a widespread corruption and oligarchic control have sent most of the spoils to the well-connected, while wages have struggled to keep up with inflation and a sharp spike in the cost of living. On the issue of corruption, Albania’s new rule of law bodies—backed by the EU and the United States and created during Rama’s rule—have been shaking up the political landscape. There have been a series of indictments across the political spectrum, implicating powerful leaders on both the left and the right (including members of Rama’s inner circle and his rivals Berisha and Meta). This has created a paradoxical situation in which Rama is attempting to brush over corruption scandals while simultaneously taking credit for establishing SPAK, the institution responsible for uncovering them. Both camps seem uncomfortable discussing corruption directly, so the campaign focus has mostly been on cost of living and who can increase salaries the most.

—Agon Maliqi

How will the outcome of the election shape Albania’s EU ambitions?

As part of his alleged push for positive reform in the country, Rama is pulling out all the stops to accelerate Albania’s accession to the EU, with the ambitious goal of concluding accession talks with Brussels by 2027. If reelected, Rama will seek to maintain Albania’s reputation as a front-runner for EU accession in the Western Balkans, alongside Montenegro.

Indeed, EU membership is the flagship promise of the PS in this election. According to Rama, US President Donald Trump’s victory has created a unique geopolitical opportunity for Albania, as it has heightened European concerns about US disengagement—prompting the EU to accelerate integration efforts in the Western Balkans. Rama argues that this moment aligns the EU’s political will to expand with Albania’s readiness to meet technical and political criteria through a preferential negotiation path. That said, EU integration has never been a politically divisive issue in Albania. The only real debate concerns the pace of the process and which political actor is best suited to deliver it. Looking ahead, Albania might try to make the most of the current geopolitical moment—but the EU’s decisions on enlargement are likely to remain highly unpredictable in the coming years.

—Ilva Tare

This election will serve as a litmus test of Albania’s democratic maturity and could either advance or hinder its EU accession. In the past, Albanian elections have been marred by issues such as vote-buying, opaque political party financing, and allegations of organized crime influencing voter mobilization in certain regions. If the integrity of the election process is once again questioned, it could trigger a new wave of political instability that may jeopardize the EU accession path.

The most significant development in Albania in recent years has been the tangible progress in reforming the justice sector—one of the key requirements for the EU. After nearly a decade of restructuring and overhauling judicial institutions and introducing the vetting of prosecutors and judges, SPAK has made great strides in dismantling the culture of impunity that has long pervaded the country’s political class since the fall of communism. SPAK’s increasing prominence is helping restore public trust in rule of law. Indictments of former and current political leaders—prime ministers to mayors—as well as ongoing investigations into powerful organized crime figures have been pivotal in advancing Albania’s EU accession process. These efforts have positioned Albania alongside Montenegro as a regional frontrunner in the accession race. Whether this momentum can be sustained, and whether SPAK and other institutions can continue to scale their efforts, remains to be seen.

—Agon Maliqi

These elections will be pivotal not only for Albania’s EU integration but also for the broader stability of the Western Balkans. After years in the EU’s waiting room, Albania has gained fresh momentum, spurred by the new geopolitical urgency surrounding enlargement.

Edi Rama has centered the PS campaign on securing EU membership before 2030, positioning his administration as the only force capable of delivering the necessary reforms. While EU integration is not a divisive issue in Albania, internal political rifts and the lack of bipartisan consensus on key reforms have posed significant obstacles. Ultimately, these elections carry deep implications, not just for who governs, but for whether Albania’s parliament can foster the cross-party cooperation needed to advance EU membership and strengthen liberal democracy.

Albania’s upcoming elections take place within days of the European Political Community (EPC) summit, which will occur in Tirana from May 16 to 17. At the summit, European leaders will address enlargement, security, and stability in the Western Balkans, placing Albania in the center of both regional and European attention.

—Valbona Zeneli

What is the role of the United States in the election and its campaign?

The influence of “Trump World” has become a striking feature of Albania’s 2025 campaign landscape. Both Prime Minister Edi Rama and opposition leader Sali Berisha are invoking the US president in their campaigns—albeit for different purposes. Rama, who has traditionally aligned with European social democrats, is now publicly praising Trump as “good for everyone” and presenting Albania’s EU accession hopes as aligned with a second Trump presidency, emphasizing the new geopolitical reality that it has brought about.

Meanwhile, Berisha—who is banned from entering the United States over corruption allegations—has embraced the Trump playbook. The PD has hired Trump’s former campaign manager Chris LaCivita and adopted the slogan “Make Albania Great,” signaling a strategic pivot toward nationalism, anti-elite rhetoric, and culture-war themes designed to energize a disillusioned electorate.

The result is an election in which Trump’s legacy—his methods, his advisors, and his message—resonates far beyond US borders, influencing not only campaign strategies but also how candidates position Albania within a rapidly shifting global order.

—Ilva Tare

The United States has featured prominently in the current campaign as both camps have sought to project an image of being on good terms with the new US administration while also seeking to influence decision-making in Washington, DC, in their favor. Berisha—who was sanctioned by the Biden administration on allegations of corruption, a serious obstacle for a political career in a pro-US country and NATO member—has touted the hiring of a Trump campaign manager as his own campaign aide. The PD has reportedly also engaged lobbyists to reverse the sanctions against Berisha, which it claims were the result of left-wing lobbying. Meanwhile, Rama’s government has given preferential strategic investor status to a private company owned by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner to develop a luxury resort on an Albanian island.

With many other priorities around the world, the United States appears largely disinterested in Albania—at least for now. Most importantly, voters in Albania also seem unlikely to be swayed by any of these moves by the political elite.

—Agon Maliqi

The United States is Albania’s most important strategic ally. While the US government maintains a neutral stance toward political parties in Albania, it has consistently supported democratic processes, institutional reforms, and anti-corruption efforts. Nevertheless, Albanian leaders often seek to leverage their US ties for personal or political gain, such as with the PD’s enlistment of Chris LaCivita as an advisor and its embrace of an anti-elite, nationalist “Make Albania Great” message—though so far, it has struggled to gain strong traction with voters.

—Valbona Zeneli

What Trump’s approach to Europe means for the Western Balkans

By Agon Maliqi

Shifts in US policy toward Europe could prompt the EU to step up on security for the Western Balkans and revive the enlargement process.

Freedom and Prosperity Political Reform

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Christopher Sands: The results show a Canada both united and divided

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Your primer on the Romanian presidential election

Daniel Fried and Alex Serban — Wed, 07 May 2025 11:53:51 +0000

It’s been a long road to this election for Romania. The country went to the polls to elect a new parliament on December 1, 2024, and a new president just five days later. While the parliamentary elections were carried out smoothly, irregularities in the presidential campaign sparked concern after far-right candidate Călin Georgescu climbed from an expected support of around 5 percent to 23 percent of the vote. Following a Romanian government investigation alleging that external actors had financed and used social media to tilt the election in Georgescu’s favor, the second round was canceled entirely and a second attempt of the first round was rescheduled for May 4. With the rescheduled election starting from scratch, the Romanian Constitutional Court decided to ban Georgescu from running again in May.

Sunday’s first round saw nationalist candidate George Simion win more than 40 percent of the vote, putting him in first place heading into the runoff. Following Simion’s victory, Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu resigned, triggering the National Bank of Romania to intervene and prevent the currency from weakening and highlighting an emerging period of instability.

Ahead of the second round on May 18, our experts are breaking down the race and its potential impacts on Romania’s foreign policy.

What happened in the first round on May 4?

Romania, like many European Union (EU) members, is undergoing a wave of populist backlash against established parties and elites, including the traditional ruling parties—the Social Democratic Party (PSD), National Liberal Party (PNL), and Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR)—which have formed the basis of governance over the past thirty-five years. Two parties (PSD and PNL) have been in a coalition since 2021, renewed this past December after the pro-Western parties led the vote and, together with a party of the ethnic-Hungarian minority, secured a slim majority of 53 percent to form a government.

In Romania this backlash has taken the form of populist nationalism, led primarily by a very active diaspora of over three million people who get much of their information via social media. Last year’s first round of elections saw the previously obscure Georgescu ride a TikTok campaign to first place. He proved an untenable figure due to his controversial background, including praising fascist leaders, not declaring campaign spending, and the use of a security detail comprised of mercenary/former military elements who were accused of inciting social unrest. This time around, the winner was Simion with 40 percent of the vote, running on a similar far-right populist nationalist platform—pro-US and pro-NATO, but with anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric—and also capturing the Georgescu electorate and message. Second place went to Nicusor Dan, the mayor of Bucharest, a pro-EU and reformist candidate who received 21 percent.

Simion has sought to align himself with the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement in the United States, making connections with influencers and media and showing up everywhere from the Conservative Political Action Conference to Steve Bannon’s podcast. Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Victor Ponta (in fourth place at 15 percent) also sought to align with MAGA by openly associating himself with US President Donald Trump and running a “Romania First” campaign. His electorate could be decisive for the final round.

These voters are driven by a combination of ideological support for nationalist political rhetoric and a strong anti-establishment streak that Romanians at home and abroad have twice brought to victory in parliamentary elections, with issues such as the lack of economic opportunities and shortcomings in the education and health systems moving the barometer of discontent. As such, no traditional party has made it into the second round in two consecutive presidential elections (December 2024 and May 2025).

—Alex Serban is a nonresident senior fellow in the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, based in Bucharest.

Simion’s strong result, like Georgescu’s, seems to have been a protest vote against the political establishment of centrist parties that has governed the country for many years. Romania’s economy has been growing steadily, due in part to the country’s EU membership, but public aggravation with corruption, problems with government services such as health and housing, and a simple desire for change have given rightist populists the edge. The candidate of the ruling political coalition, Crin Antonescu, came in third, behind Dan, who has positioned himself as a good governance reform centrist. Georgescu supported Simion. As a result of Antonescu’s poor showing that suggests popular rejection of the ruling coalition, Ciolacu has resigned, and his center-left Social Democratic Party is reportedly set to leave the coalition. Romania’s interim President Ilie Bolojan, in office only since February when his predecessor resigned in the wake of the annulled presidential vote, nominated Interior Minister Catalin Predoiu as a caretaker prime minister.

Simion is the favorite in the runoff but not a shoo-in. While Simion’s vote total was impressive, it is roughly matched by the combined totals of Dan and Antonescu. The second round could go either way as voters chose between two opposition politicians.

—Daniel Fried is the Atlantic Council’s Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow and a former US ambassador to Poland.

How do the outcomes set the stage for the second round?

Simion received 41 percent of the vote and Ponta 13 percent, which is a majority for the populist candidates, leading to speculation that Simion is nearly guaranteed to win the second round. Both candidates used pro-US messages, with Simion positioned as a Trump-like figure and supported by “Patriots for Europe” parties (including those of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and former Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki).

There are, however, a few signals that the race may be becoming much closer than the first round would indicate. With the elimination of Antonescu, the establishment parties’ votes are up for grabs as well as millions of undecided voters who may not have participated in the first round—the likes of whom helped swing the presidential elections for Traian Basescu in 2004 and Klaus Iohannis in 2019.

Instead, there is Dan, an independent who was twice elected mayor of Bucharest on a platform of anti-corruption and against political parties, who has fought back allegations of ties to controversial pro-Russian business and intelligence services.

So the vote is becoming a referendum on Simion and his views about Europe, as well as the candidates’ views on Russia. It is not clear if the anti-establishment vote will translate into support for Simion in the second round, since there is not a clear establishment choice on the ballot to vote against. Further complicating matters, a larger turnout is expected on May 18.

Another consideration is Romania’s history of massive urban and diaspora turnouts in second rounds when emotional issues drive dormant voters, as occurred in 2000 against Vadim Tudor’s extreme right candidacy under the Greater Romania Party and in 2014 against PSD’s attempts to constrain voting by the diaspora. This latter phenomenon saw Iohannis emerge from second place in the first round, where his 30 percent of the vote trailed Ponta’s 40 percent, to win the second round, 54 percent to 46 percent. Despite a poor organization and low charisma, Iohannis won the second round by mobilizing an additional four million votes, mostly from increased urban voting, driven largely by anti-PSD sentiment.

This time around, Dan held a sizeable lead over Simion in Bucharest in first-round voting, so there is the potential for Dan to turn out new voters in urban areas. Simion has a greater share of high-propensity voters. If turnout is similar to the first round, then he is the likely winner, but Dan has a higher ceiling and is better positioned to win if there is high turnout. Dan is hoping to take turnout from around 47 percent in the first round to 65 percent, as he aims to make the final round about Romania’s strategic orientation. Dan essentially wants to ask Romanians to choose between a pro-Western direction vs. an anti-Western one.

—Alex Serban

How might the second-round outcome impact Romania’s foreign policy?

Dan seems to be solidly pro-Western and pro-EU. His victory could give a second wind to the pro-democracy forces (of various stripes) that have led Romania since its chaotic, violent, but successful overthrow of communism in 1989 and drove hard toward the country’s successful accessions to NATO and the European Union.

Simion’s strategic orientation is less clear. He and his Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) party have been reaching out the MAGA movement in the United States. Simion has declared himself pro-US and has styled himself as a Trump-like “Romania First” candidate, conservative on cultural issues, skeptical of the EU and its liberal political culture, and reserved about support for Ukraine (including on the basis of Ukraine’s alleged mistreatment of its Romanian minority).

Whether as president Simion would push a strategic realignment away from the EU and NATO is not clear. Cultural conservativism plays well in Romania. There may be a political market in Romania for a nationalist defense of Romanian communities in Ukraine. As president, Simion would probably push both these ideas. However, Romania receives a lot of funding from the EU, a disincentive for any Romanian leader to go further than performative swipes at Brussels. A Romanian strategic turn toward Moscow would face strong obstacles: Romania’s history has left bitter memories of Russian imperialism and Soviet domination (and dismemberment) of Romania. Fears of being abandoned by the United States in the face of Kremlin ambitions seem present even among some in Simion’s AUR party.

Simion could of course turn toward Moscow, much as has his fellow rightist, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. An alignment with Orbán, however, whose Hungarian nationalism comes partly at Romania’s expense, might not be a political winner in Romania. Alternatively, Simion could draw from the successful tactics of Meloni, who is solidly rightist and well-tied to MAGA but also Atlanticist and pro-Ukrainian.

In that case, a President Simion would continue support for Ukraine but combine it with an effort to push issues related to Ukraine’s Romanian minority. Should the Trump administration finally set a policy of support for Ukraine—either in the form of a sustainable negotiated cease-fire or in response to continued Kremlin stonewalling—Romania, even with a Simion presidency, would be more likely to back this.

In short, a Dan presidency is more likely to be better integrated with the European mainstream and certainly a good strategic partner for the United States; a Simion presidency has its risks, especially if Simion goes full anti-Ukraine and pro-Kremlin. But it could also land in a rougher version of pro-Western and, potentially, even use its ties with MAGA to urge the Trump administration to hold the line against Kremlin aggression.

—Daniel Fried

A Simion presidency would pivot Romanian foreign policy toward “Romania First” and Euroskepticism, emulating Trump’s MAGA model. His anti-EU stance, viewing Russian President Vladimir Putin as non-threatening, could weaken ties with Brussels, risking the isolation of Romania akin to Orbán’s Hungary, including for EU funding. Despite repeatedly praising NATO’s role on the eastern flank, Simion’s opposition to Ukraine aid and call to “stop the war” may strain NATO cohesion and Romania’s role in the Black Sea. His pro-Americanism seeks stronger bilateral relations, but it may falter if US policy demands support for Ukraine and if the Department of Homeland Security’s recent suspension of Romania’s participation in the visa waiver program remains part of the Trump administration’s anti-immigration agenda.

A Dan presidency would solidify Romania’s pro-Western alignment. Leading a coalition of center-right, center-left, Hungarian, and progressive parties will consolidate Dan’s pro-EU agenda and strengthen ties with Brussels, ensuring Romania’s influence in EU decision making. His commitment to NATO and Ukraine aid would maintain Romania’s strategic role, supporting US-led initiatives and regional stability. Dan’s anti-corruption focus could enhance Romania’s credibility in Western institutions, attracting EU funds and investments. However, his reliance on an urban base may mean he struggles to unify rural voters, requiring deft coalition-building to counter nationalist sentiment. Dan’s victory would reinforce Romania’s role as a reliable NATO and EU partner, prioritizing democratic reforms and transatlantic unity.

—Alex Serban

Are there concerns about the election’s integrity after the first round?

Despite the absence of major public or press focus on election integrity, some security concerns persist from the first round.

Russian hacker group DDOSIA/NoName057 launched cyberattacks targeting government and candidate websites (e.g., Antonescu and Dan), though Romania’s Cybersecurity Directorate mitigated disruptions.

Simion alleged fraud involving deceased voters on electoral rolls, but these claims lack substantiation and have not gained traction in mainstream media or among the public.

Overall, there has been no significant evidence of systemic fraud or foreign manipulation, and—in contrast with the more personality-focused 2024 election—the local population appears focused on candidate platforms, with Simion’s nationalism and Dan’s pro-EU stance dominating the discourse.

Press coverage has emphasized electoral outcomes over integrity issues, reflecting confidence in institutional oversight following the reforms put in place following the December 2024 vote. However, ongoing campaign finance probes and disinformation risks warrant vigilance for the May 18 runoff to maintain Romania’s electoral stability.

—Alex Serban

Is Merz’s double-take chancellor vote a sign of things to come in Germany?

Jörn Fleck and Jurek Wille — Tue, 06 May 2025 19:59:39 +0000

After an Odyssean, two-decade journey, Friedrich Merz has arrived as Germany’s tenth chancellor. But instead of the expected Krönung, a coronation, members of the Bundestag gave him a shot across the bow on Tuesday. For the first time in modern German history, it took two rounds of voting to elect a chancellor. This, of course, is not fatal for Merz, but this short-lived saga shows that political instability in Europe’s largest economy and reluctant hegemon may not be over, despite Merz’s promises to the contrary. The next government is taking office weakened at a time when Germany and Europe can least afford it.

In the first vote, Merz missed the required support of 316 members of the Bundestag by just six votes, although the coalition of Merz’s Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD) theoretically holds a slim majority of 328 in parliament. In the second round, Merz received 325 votes. Dissent is not unusual among coalition parties, of course. Dozens of members of the Bundestag refused to vote for Chancellor Angela Merkel in years past, too. The current coalition, however, promised to restore Germany’s predictability and credibility in Europe, a promise that has taken some damage now.

It may be impossible to figure out why Merz lost those votes in the first round. Members of the Bundestag elect the chancellor in a secret ballot. The fact that he is a polarizing figure, however, was well known beforehand. Shortly after winning the snap elections in February, some in the SPD and even the CDU/CSU began to question whether Merz had what it takes to be chancellor. On the SPD’s side, many were annoyed by the personal attacks against outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz and the CDU’s anti-migration campaign. In particular, young, left-leaning members of the SPD’s Bundestag group may have felt sidelined by Lars Klingbeil, the SPD’s co-chairman and Merz’s designated vice chancellor, and some of them may have withheld their support for Merz in the first round.

This will not go unnoticed in Moscow, Beijing, or Washington.

The euphoria surrounding Merz was also muted in his own party. Some conservatives criticized Merz for doing an about face on central campaign promises, including his push for a massive special fund for infrastructure and debt brake reforms even before he entered office. Some moderate party members were apparently displeased by Merz’s populist style and fierce criticism of Merkel. Many felt he gave up too much ground on critical CDU issues in the coalition negotiations. The question is whether those members of parliament who voted against Merz in the first round simply meant to send a warning shot or whether the resistance is more deep-seated. If it is the latter, then it could destabilize the government every time controversial issues and complex compromise deals are up for a vote.

Germany’s incoming foreign minister, Johann Wadephul, described the day’s voting as “an obstacle, but not a catastrophe.” That is true, but the unexpected first-round defeat will affect how many Germans and foreign capitals view Merz and his coalition.

Merz promised to govern with professionalism and strength, to reassure markets, and assume the international leadership necessary for navigating current crises. On Monday, upon presenting the signed coalition agreement, Merz tried to project that strength, saying “this government is determined to move Germany forward through reforms and investments.” He added that Germany’s voice would be “heard in Europe and the world.” Instead, Tuesday’s vote and the dissension against Merz from his own ranks suggests Germany’s next leadership will continue to struggle with fragility, division, and indecisiveness. This will not go unnoticed in Moscow, Beijing, or Washington. Markets took note as well; the DAX 40 fell on news of the first vote, only to claw back most of its losses following the second vote.

The concern is that Tuesday’s votes may be a sign of things to come for the coalition’s ability to drive difficult reforms. More to the point, it raises questions of trust between the chancellor and his vice chancellor. Merz and Klingbeil displayed a united front in recent weeks, but they have shown that they are not in full control of their parliamentary groups. Both parties have already blamed each other publicly, and the coalition peace has become passé on day one, pointing to rocky years ahead.

At best, this is a blip, soon to be forgotten as Merz takes over the chancellorship. He will certainly try to frame it as such when he visits his counterparts in France and Poland on Wednesday. But at worst, an uncertain majority in parliament means Merz and the government risk becoming a lame duck immediately. This is bad news for Europe, which needs unity and strength to avoid paralysis on critical issues, including a potential transatlantic trade war and a much-needed European response to the war in Ukraine. Much will depend on Germany’s defense spending, its leadership in Europe, and its relationship with China.

One risk is clear: the next government will have the weakest mandate in modern history at a moment when strength is needed the most, and the instability of previous years could continue, to the detriment of Germany and Europe.

Merz should quickly move beyond Tuesday’s embarrassing start and keep his focus on what comes next. “The most important thing for me is that ten years from now, we are still a country that enjoys freedom and peace,” Merz said in his first interview as chancellor. “But freedom and peace are in danger,” he warned. His first priority, he added, would be to restore both. Merz also said that his government will move swiftly to address deep structural changes the economy is undergoing and restore its industrial power. But after Tuesday’s events, Merz must provide more concrete, ambitious measures to reassure markets and allies that he can govern with a more stable hand than his predecessor. Merz can reassert himself on foreign and security policy, on which the coalition agreement remained unexpectedly thin, with a joint Franco-German-Polish initiative in support of Ukraine, for example. A quick-action agenda for the first hundred days, driving forward the coalition’s, Leuchtturmprojekte, or key “lighthouse” initiatives, can restore confidence that German leadership is back under Merz. This way, it is not the start of the new government that is remembered but its subsequent successes.

Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Jurek Wille is a student of international relations at Johns Hopkins SAIS. Before joining SAIS, he worked for the German government.

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How Trump’s tariffs could reshape Australia’s strategic outlook

John T. Watts — Mon, 05 May 2025 20:01:26 +0000

ADELAIDE, Australia—“Running up the score.” This is a phrase I heard reverberate through the Australian media over the past month.

Perhaps surprisingly, “running up the score” did not originate from any of the candidates in the run-up to Australia’s May 3 election, which saw Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and his Labor Party score a comfortable victory. Instead, the phrase was a retort on April 8 by US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, who is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the new global tariff regime.

Asked by US Senator Mark Warner why the Trump administration’s tariffs apply to US ally Australia, despite a free trade agreement and a trade deficit, Greer said that the United States “should be running up the score on Australia.” The phrase embodies everything that many Australians now perceive as the new reality of the alliance with the United States: that it is no longer about “mateship,” shared sacrifice, and mutual fondness. Instead, the United States now sees Australia as simply another lackey to squeeze.

It is not the first time the relationship has been seen this way. Leave aside the romanticized image of US and Australian soldiers fighting alongside each other in every conflict since the 1916 Battle of Le Hamel. The reality is that the US-Australia relationship was predominately transactional until the 1950s, as is illustrated by the United States offering the creation of the Australia-New Zealand-United States security alliance, or ANZUS, in part to secure Australia’s military support for the Korean War.

Today, the US-Australia alliance is deep and multi-faceted. In fact, it is one of the most integrated US alliances in the world. The AUKUS partnership (also including the United Kingdom) and the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (also including Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) might be the most well-known. But there is a deep network of interdependencies that make this relationship vital to the national security of both countries.

But that doesn’t mean the United States is irreplaceable for Australia. Britain remained Australia’s security guarantor after federation in 1901, with Australia sending vast military support to British wars throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Not only were all facets of the Australian military built on the foundations of British doctrine, culture, and equipment. The two countries were also more economically, politically (still sharing a head of state), and culturally integrated than the United States is with Australia today.

Despite this, when Britain was unable to continue to support Australian security interests after the fall of Singapore in World War II, Australia made the pragmatic decision to pivot to the United States as its security partner of first choice.

If Australia were to pivot again today, then where might it turn?

I can tell you where Australians will not turn: China. The idea that China could realistically displace the United States as Australia’s primary security partner is delusional. It would take decades and billions—perhaps trillions—of dollars to transition Australia’s military equipment, doctrine, laws, and institutions for this to work. And it would still lack the shared history, language, and culture required to build the trust needed for a relationship approaching that of the one between Australia and the United States.

While there will always be segments of the population wanting Australia to pivot to China, no serious security analyst believes it is possible or beneficial. If they do, then perhaps their affiliations and financial arrangements should be examined.

However, there is a plethora of secondary military relationships Australia shares with like-minded nations that Canberra could elevate. Australia and Britain remain close, and in a post-Brexit world there may be mutual benefits to renewing increased engagement. Canada and Australia share many military and societal similarities. They are economically, geographically, and demographically comparable in size and nature. Australians and Canadians also share many cultural, political, and military values and systems, and there is already scope for increased cooperation. There has long been talk of an Australia-European Union Free Trade Agreement, and Australia worked hand in hand with NATO forces in Afghanistan. Not to mention that Australia already purchases a significant amount of military equipment from European countries, including many of Australia’s modern naval surface combatants. Moreover, Australia’s relationships and cooperation with Japan, South Korea, and Singapore grow apace, and there are even burgeoning links with Middle Eastern nations, such as the United Arab Emirates.

While Australia values the “interoperability” of utilizing US equipment, like many nations it has sourced equipment elsewhere due to cost, availability, and logistics considerations. None of these relationships alone could replace the role the United States plays, but a constellation of like-minded countries just might.

If US policies continue in the spirit of “running up the score” on allies, then they risk not just eroding US leadership, respect, and standing abroad. They potentially also weaken US relevancy—not in every aspect, but in important ones. Will tariffs erode the foundations of Australia’s alliance with the United States? No. At least not in isolation. But it is a piece of a puzzle that will raise questions in Australians’ minds—including in Albanese’s government—about who to focus their limited resources for cooperation with and who to rely on to source military equipment from.

John T. Watts is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Foreign policy was a hot topic in Canada’s election. Now it’s on Carney to make it last.

Imran Bayoumi, Maite Gonzalez Latorre — Thu, 01 May 2025 21:22:37 +0000

In a country where national security and defense have rarely been major topics on the campaign trail, Canada’s April 28 election was an outlier. Prime Minister Mark Carney of the Liberal Party and his main opponent, the Conservative Party’s Pierre Poilievre, spoke often and in detail during the campaign about Canada’s national security and defense. Both promised, for example, to review Canada’s F-35 program with the United States, to increase Canadian military presence in the Arctic, and to ramp up defense spending.

It’s easy to see where this campaign focus on defense came from: Canada faces a growing number of threats to its security. But now that the election is over, it is imperative that Carney find a way to translate talking points into action and invest in strengthening Canadian security. Last year, Canada spent less than 1.4 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. It should work to increase its spending to meet or exceed NATO’s target of allocating at least 2 percent of its GDP to defense. Moreover, the money should be spent wisely to support the capabilities, relationships, and regions that will be at the forefront of a changing world.

Carney’s plan to ramp up defense spending, released during the campaign, includes a pledge to increase spending by approximately $13 billion (USD) to meet the 2 percent NATO spending target over the next four years. The Liberals also pledged to buy new submarines, build or upgrade bases in the Arctic, and purchase new icebreakers.

With NATO allies expected to approve a higher target for defense spending at the upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague, Carney will have to move fast to pass a budget, sustain the momentum around foreign policy and defense that emerged during the campaign, and put Canada on the path to meeting its defense commitments.

The best way to do so is by focusing and investing in areas where Canada already has an advantage.

First, Carney should focus on Canada’s north. Strengthening Ottawa’s ability to defend and protect its Arctic can help demonstrate a lasting commitment to improving Canada’s national security and spur greater economic development across the region. During the campaign, the Liberal Party pledged hundreds of millions of dollars to boost Canada’s military presence in the Arctic and an additional five billion dollars to purchase an over-the-horizon radar system from Australia. The Conservatives announced plans to establish a permanent military base in the region, double the number of Canadian Rangers—who patrol the region—to four thousand, and commit to purchasing two new icebreakers. Both the Conservative and Liberal plans have strengths, and Carney should consider incorporating some of the opposition party’s ideas into his new government’s policies.

Second, Carney should expand Canada’s presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. The threat of China’s and Russia’s growing influence there and the rise of transnational criminal organizations demand a comprehensive Canadian response modeled after Ottawa’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. Canada should increase its naval presence in the Caribbean waters and along Pacific coastlines to counter illicit trafficking and foreign naval expansion. It should implement military capacity-building programs focused on disaster response and maritime security. To combat criminal organizations and foreign state interference, it should strengthen intelligence sharing with partners in the region. And it should establish cyber defense partnerships to protect critical regional infrastructure and democratic institutions from digital threats.

Canada offers unique advantages as a trusted actor in a region where US influence now faces challenges. The Tenth Summit of the Americas in the Dominican Republic, taking place in December of this year, presents an opportunity to unveil this strategy. By focusing on the Western Hemisphere as its immediate neighborhood, Canada can exercise regional leadership while advancing its foreign policy priorities.

Third, Carney will need to craft a new relationship with its southern neighbor.

“Our old relationship with the United States, a relationship based on steadily increasing integration, is over,” stated Carney on election night. He added, “the system of open global trade anchored by the United States, a system that Canada has relied on since the Second World War, a system that, while not perfect, has helped deliver prosperity for our country for decades, is over.”

While dramatic, Carney’s comments highlight a very real sentiment felt across Canada that has left Canadians and their leaders wondering what Ottawa’s future security partnerships will look like. This uncertainty has spurred Ottawa to deepen its partnerships with other countries, such as Australia, which recently sold an over-the-horizon radar system to Canada. Future partnerships with countries such as France and South Korea to share intelligence and purchase new platforms, respectively, are also promising.

At the same time, no matter the rhetoric, Canada will need to continue to work with the United States. The two nations still share a long border, close cultural and familial ties, and a shared responsibility to defend North America via the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). During Carney’s upcoming trip to Washington to meet with US President Donald Trump, listen for discussions on Canada’s potential participation in the US Golden Dome project, ways to advance North American energy security, and resolving disagreements over tariffs.

Carney and Poilievre were right to focus on national security and defense during the campaign. The hard part now is for Carney to put actions and resources behind his rhetoric. Doing so is essential as Canada faces a series of compounding threats to its security in an increasingly volatile world.

Imran Bayoumi is an associate director with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Maite Gonzalez Latorre is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Caribbean Initiative.

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What’s next for Trinidad and Tobago’s new prime minister?

Wazim Mowla and Dale Ramlakhan — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 23:38:34 +0000

Kamla Persad-Bissessar will be the next prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago following parliamentary elections on April 28. The landslide victory for Persad-Bissessar and her United National Congress reflects the state that Trinidad and Tobago has found itself in over the past few years. Declining natural gas production, spikes in homicide numbers and gang violence, and a dramatically changing geopolitical order all played their part on election day. Persad-Bissessar returns to the role of prime minister, having previously held the role between 2010 and 2015, but she has a tall mountain to climb this second time around. Reducing crime, bolstering energy security, and strengthening relations with the United States should be key features of Persad-Bissessar’s first one hundred days.

Persad-Bissessar will face significant challenges ahead. This past year was the deadliest in Trinidad and Tobago’s modern history, with a homicide rate of 45.7 per 100,000. That puts it at the fifth-highest in Latin America and the Caribbean. Growing gang violence and illegal small arms inflows from the United States and Venezuela are primary factors, even leading the then prime minister, Keith Rowley, to issue a state of emergency late last year.

Getting crime and violence under control must be a priority. The new government will have to address internal security concerns, such as gang activity, while protecting the country’s borders and informal ports of entry from illicit trafficking. A first step can be working with partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada to invest in maritime interdiction capabilities. This would build off of the $500 million memorandum of understanding signed between Trinidad and Tobago and the United States in 2024.

Next, declining natural gas production threatens Trinidad and Tobago’s energy security. Natural gas is the bedrock of the country’s economy. It provides low electricity costs for its citizens and, through its petrochemical industry, is responsible for more than 80 percent of the country’s export revenues. However, over the past fifteen years, Trinidad and Tobago has struggled to tap into new natural gas reserves. Few awards are given to bidders during offshore auctions—zero were awarded between 2015 and 2022—and there are limited financial incentives to encourage further exploration by oil and gas operators.

Here, there are two areas Persad-Bissessar can focus on. First, she can work to fast-track development of commercially viable natural gas fields through tax concessions and subsidies. Second, she can take steps to diversify the energy matrix by investing in renewables. Trinidad and Tobago is primed to be a renewable energy leader in green hydrogen, onshore and offshore wind, and utility-scale solar. The country has a large electricity grid and population relative to its Caribbean neighbors, meaning that investors can invest at scale in a country that already has a track record of developing power generation projects.

Finally, Persad-Bissessar will become prime minister as the international system is entering a new era. Small countries do not develop in a silo. Instead, they need international partnerships. Trinidad and Tobago should start by strengthening its relationship with the United States. To do that, Trinidad and Tobago should seek out financial and technical assistance through the US Department of Defense and US Southern Command, which will be essential to enhancing the country’s capacity to address gang activity and protect its ports from illegal arms inflows.

Therefore, Persad-Bissessar should consider making Washington, DC, her first foreign trip as prime minister. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent trip to the Caribbean is a signal that the region is unlikely to be an afterthought for the United States, at least in the near term. Persad-Bissessar has a unique opportunity to capitalize on this attention and use a diplomatic visit to shore up support from the United States, engage members of the US Congress, and present the country’s natural gas and renewable energy potential as investment destinations for US businesses.

Persad-Bissessar has a tough task ahead. Energy security, citizen safety, and strong international partnerships are a must, but these challenges cannot be tackled alone. An all-hands-on-deck approach that includes working closely with the private sector and nongovernmental organizations can help Persad-Bissessar build a more secure and prosperous future for Trinidad and Tobago.

Wazim Mowla is the fellow and lead of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Dale Ramlakhan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Caribbean Initiative.

The post What’s next for Trinidad and Tobago’s new prime minister? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Canada’s voters send a message to Washington—and the world

Atlantic Council — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 18:06:07 +0000

GET UP TO SPEED

It was a state-ment. Canadian voters returned the Liberal Party to power on Monday after a stunning political comeback fueled by tensions with the United States—including an election-day message from US President Donald Trump calling for Canada to become the “fifty-first state.” Prime Minister Mark Carney declared in his victory speech that the United States will never “own” Canada. “But we also must recognize the reality that our world has fundamentally changed.” Our Canada-watchers are here to diagram what this new world looks like as Carney prepares to form a government.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Christopher Sands (@USCanada_Sands): Adjunct lecturer and the director of the Hopkins Center for Canadian Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Imran Bayoumi (@BayoumiImran): Associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Maite Gonzalez Latorre: Program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Flag waving

The election was essentially a referendum on the Canada-US relationship, Chris tells us, as “a surge of nationalist sentiment swept the country, including in Quebec,” which historically has maintained its own identity.
Carney, who took over from Justin Trudeau in March, and the Liberal Party appear to have fallen short of a hoped-for majority of 172 seats. Meanwhile, the Conservative Party stumbled—with its leader Pierre Poilievre losing his own seat. “Carney outperformed expectations, but the appetite for change remains strong. Canadians are still divided on who should lead,” Chris says.
The Trump administration, Chris says, could view a minority government as “weak.” Therefore it could ratchet up “pressure on Canada to meet NATO’s 2 percent of gross domestic product defense spending target, strengthen border security, and unlock its critical minerals—goals first promised by Trudeau in 2019 with little progress.”

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Let’s make a deal

Given Ottawa’s ongoing tensions with Washington, Imran says we should expect Carney “to look beyond the traditional defense partnership with the United States and to forge new, smaller defense deals with a variety of nations.”
We got a few hints during Carney’s first overseas trip, when he went to Paris and London rather than Washington and said Canada was reconsidering its decision to purchase F-35 fighter jets from the United States. Imran also points to a radar deal with Australia, a potential submarine deal with South Korea, and a proposed closer partnership with Nordic countries.
Carney’s Ottawa will distance itself from Washington on defense, “except where needed,” Imran predicts, “such as on North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) modernization.”

Rocky Mountain low

Though Carney called for unity in his victory speech, that will be put to the test in the Conservative stronghold of Alberta, Maite notes, where the Liberals won just two ridings. “With blue-collar Albertans significantly impacted by US tariffs, Carney now faces a critical opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to all Canadians, not just Liberal supporters or Ontario residents.”
Carney and Trump-aligned Alberta Premier Danielle Smith, Maite points out, “have not started their relationship on solid footing.” But the Edmonton native Carney “may leverage his Alberta connections to build bridges with Smith and provincial voters.”
Alberta will also be the site of global intrigue in June, when Canada hosts Trump and other world leaders for the Group of Seven (G7) Summit in Kananaskis. That trip to the Canadian Rockies, followed by a flight to the Netherlands for the NATO Summit, represent “two defining tests” for Carney, Chris says: “How he performs will shape Canada’s standing abroad—and at home.”

The post Canada’s voters send a message to Washington—and the world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: What the Liberal Party’s win in Canada means for the world

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 15:16:52 +0000

Canadians are seeing red. Prime Minister Mark Carney will form a new government in Canada after his Liberal Party secured the most seats in parliament in Monday’s election, completing a remarkable political turnaround amid a simmering confrontation with the United States. The comeback win came as Carney—after taking over for Justin Trudeau in March—clashed with US President Donald Trump over tariff policy and Trump’s calls to add Canada as the “fifty-first state.” “Our old relationship with the United States, a relationship based on steadily increasing integration, is over,” Carney declared in his victory speech. What does the Liberals’ victory mean for trade, security, and diplomacy in North America and beyond? We put out the call to our experts for answers.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Diane Francis: The election was a referendum on joining the United States. Canadians rejected it.

Michael Bociurkiw: Canadians voted for a steady hand in turbulent times

Imran Bayoumi: Expect Carney to pursue defense deals with new partners

Maite Gonzalez Latorre: Conservative wins in Alberta reveal the political divide in Canada

Kimberly Donovan, Maia Nikoladze, and Lize de Kruijf: Next, Carney will need to strengthen coordination among Canada’s provinces

Reed Blakemore: Energy and infrastructure will be core to managing the US-Canada relationship

Mark Scott: Expect Carney to push ahead on AI and social media regulation

Layla Mashkoor: Meta’s news blackout in Canada creates a troubling precedent

The results show a Canada both united and divided

Canada’s April 28 federal election was a referendum on the country’s relationship with the United States. Both the governing Liberals and opposition Conservatives campaigned against pressure from the Trump administration—tariffs, border demands, and jabs about Canada as the “fifty-first state.” A surge of nationalist sentiment swept the country, including in Quebec. Canadians appeared more united than ever.

Yet the result was a divided verdict: a Liberal minority government, with 162 seats—ten short of a majority in the 343-seat House of Commons. It’s a gain from the 153 seats held before the election but not the majority Carney hoped for. Carney, elected as a member of parliament for the first time, will now be invited by the governor general to form a government.

Canada has elected only two majority governments since 2004. Minority governments typically govern by negotiating support vote by vote. The New Democratic Party’s poor showing in 2025 makes another formal “supply and confidence” agreement unlikely.

Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre lost his seat, and a party that led in polls for over a year failed to adjust its message after Trudeau’s exit. Carney outperformed expectations, but the appetite for change remains strong. Canadians are still divided on who should lead.

This result may be seen in Washington as weak. The Trump administration is expected to renew pressure on Canada to meet NATO’s 2 percent of gross domestic product defense spending target, strengthen border security, and unlock its critical minerals—goals first promised by Trudeau in 2019 with little progress.

June will bring two defining tests for Carney: hosting the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Kananaskis—Trump’s first visit to Canada in his second term—and attending the NATO summit in The Hague. How he performs will shape Canada’s standing abroad—and at home.

—Christopher Sands is an adjunct lecturer and the director of the Hopkins Center for Canadian Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

The election was a referendum on joining the United States. Canadians rejected it.

Canada’s political landscape shifted to a two-party system for the first time in years, giving the Liberals a slight advantage. But the man not even on the ballot, Trump, influenced the outcome more than did any of the Canadian party leaders. As such, the election of 2025 could be considered a referendum on joining the United States that was roundly rejected by Canadians.

Canadians fled into one of the two mainstream parties as Trump waded directly into the campaign. On election day, the US president broke the unwritten rule that US and Canadian leaders won’t interfere directly in elections in one another’s countries. Trump posted that Canadians should vote for him in order for Canada to become the fifty-first state.

It didn’t work.

—Diane Francis is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. She is a well-known journalist, author, broadcaster, and editor-at-large at the National Post.

Canadians voted for a steady hand in turbulent times

OTTAWA—Canadians have never had much appetite for dramatic change, especially in turbulent times—a fact underscored by yesterday’s election results and record turnout in advance polls. Voters appeared to be looking for a steady, capable hand in Carney, a former banker: someone with the backbone to confront Trump, who seems intent on turning Canada into a de facto fifty-first state, and the competence to undo nearly a decade of economic mismanagement under Trudeau.

Trump’s belligerence helped the Liberals erase a twenty-one-point deficit and avoid a return to the opposition benches. But in the final days of the campaign, domestic concerns reclaimed center stage—housing affordability, the inflation of food prices, a crumbling health system, immigration, and crime. A tragic vehicle attack at a Filipino festival in Vancouver on the campaign’s final day may have briefly boosted support for Poilievre, who campaigned on tough-on-crime policies. Nevertheless, Poilievre lost his Ottawa seat and now faces political purgatory.

Carney’s ability to enact his agenda will depend largely on how quickly he builds working relationships with opposition parties—notably the Bloc Québécois, which secured at least twenty-three seats. It also hinges on whether the Conservatives cooperate in a “Team Canada” approach or spend the next six months trying to bring down the government.

On the global stage, Carney must work to reestablish Canada as a respected middle power in a world where the rules-based order is unraveling. With the world’s largest Ukrainian diaspora outside Russia, the Liberals face pressure to maintain strong support for Kyiv—including calls to transfer twenty-three billion Canadian dollars in frozen Russian assets to help fund Ukraine’s war effort and reconstruction. Canada’s upcoming G7 summit offers Carney an opportunity to rally allies against returning $300 billion in frozen Russian central bank reserves to Moscow.

In style as well as substance, Carney marks a stark shift from his predecessor. Gone are the flashy socks, selfies, hobnobbing with Hollywood celebrities, and empty virtue signals. Though he has the charisma of an icicle in a Canadian winter, Carney brings confidence, competence, and a steady hand—the qualities Canadians seem to value most right now.

—Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Expect Carney to pursue defense deals with new partners

Both Carney and Poilievre made foreign policy and defense a central pillar of their campaigns, with both calling for increased investment in the Arctic and increased defense spending. For Carney to achieve this, expect him to look beyond the traditional defense partnership with the United States and to forge new, smaller, defense deals with a variety of nations.

In Carney’s first trip abroad as prime minister, he visited Paris and London, spurning the traditional initial stop in Washington, DC. On the trip, the prime minister said that Canada was reconsidering its commitment to purchase F-35 fighter jets from the United States, and he announced the framework for a new security and intelligence partnership with France.

As Canada faces an increasingly volatile world, expect Carney to continue to pursue deals and new partnerships like the decision to purchase the JORN over-the-horizon radar from Australia. Closer ties between Canada and South Korea are also possible, with a Korean delegation visiting Ottawa early in March to pitch Canada on the purchase of submarines. Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy white paper, released in December 2024, called for closer cooperation with the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), leveraging the security challenges and NATO membership shared by these nations.

With Carney declaring that Canada’s old relationship with the United States is “over,” expect the new government to look away from furthering closer defense ties with the United States, except where needed, such as on North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) modernization. Ottawa will instead be seeking to forge relationships with other countries that have a shared threat perception and possess valuable technology and insights that can strengthen Canada.

—Imran Bayoumi is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Conservative wins in Alberta reveal the political divide in Canada

Elbows up for Carney, but elbows down for Liberals in Alberta. This morning’s results confirmed Conservative dominance across the province, with the New Democratic Party managing to hold just one seat and the Liberals securing only two. The province has sent a large team of Conservative wins to Ottawa, though a handful of city ridings hosted tight races, highlighting Alberta’s persistent rural-urban divide.

While Conservatives and Liberals battled fiercely at the national level, Alberta presented a simpler equation: guaranteed Conservative victories with only potential New Democratic Party upsets in select ridings. Canadians clearly recognized this election’s importance with over seven million advance ballots cast nationwide, setting a record. Alberta saw turnout exceeding 63 percent, with Elections Canada counting 2,064,167 votes from 96 percent of polls out of 3,234,505 registered voters.

The election results have definitively answered whether Alberta voters would choose the New Democratic Party or the Liberals for provincial representation in competitive races against Conservatives. During his victory speech, Carney emphasized national unity: “Who’s ready to stand up for Canada with me? And who’s ready to build Canada strong?” With blue-collar Albertans significantly impacted by US tariffs, Carney now faces a critical opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to all Canadians, not just Liberal supporters or Ontario residents.

Alberta Premier Danielle Smith, who has aligned closely with Trump, and Carney have not started their relationship on solid footing. As an Edmonton native, however, Carney may leverage his Alberta connections to build bridges with Smith and provincial voters despite the overwhelming Conservative victory in the province.

—Maite Gonzalez Latorre is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Next, Carney will need to strengthen coordination among Canada’s provinces

With Canada’s federal election now behind us, Carney and his Liberal government face an important task: consolidating the country’s economic power to respond more effectively to global challenges.

Unlike the United States, where the federal government can regulate nearly all economic activity, Canada’s Constitution grants provinces broad authority. This fractured structure can hamper the federal government’s ability to respond swiftly and with a unified strategy to external economic pressures.

The recent US imposition of tariffs on Canadian goods highlighted this vulnerability. Instead of presenting a coordinated national response, Alberta, Canada’s largest oil-producing province, broke ranks with Ottawa. While Canadian oil is a critical energy source for US refineries, Alberta refused to support leveraging this as a bargaining tool. This divergence weakened Canada’s negotiating position and underscored how regional interests can undermine national cohesion.

The United States-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade agreement adds further complexity. Article 32.10 requires Canada to notify the United States and Mexico if it seeks a trade deal with a nonmarket economy—potentially allowing them to withdraw from the agreement. This restricts Canada’s trade flexibility and reinforces its dependence on US policy.

To secure its economic future, the next federal government must prioritize a more unified approach to economic governance. Strengthening coordination with the provinces is no longer optional—it is essential. Without it, Canada will remain a collection of competing regional interests, ill-equipped to respond to external pressures or shape its own global economic path. As the 2026 USMCA review approaches, Canada needs a clearer, united voice—not only to protect existing partnerships but to ensure it can build new ones. Strategic alignment—at home and abroad—is the only way forward.

—Kimberly Donovan is the Director of the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.
—Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.
—Lize de Kruijf is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.

For more on Canada’s need for economic consolidation, read the Economic Statecraft Initiative’s report:

Issue Brief

Mar 27, 2025

Canada needs an economic statecraft strategy to address its vulnerabilities

By Kimberly Donovan, Maia Nikoladze, Lize de Kruijf

To address threats from Russia and China and reduce trade overdependence on the United States, Canada’s federal government will need to consolidate economic power and devise an economic statecraft strategy that will leverage Canada’s economic tools to mitigate economic threats and vulnerabilities.

China Cybersecurity

Energy and infrastructure will be core to managing the US-Canada relationship

The Liberal Party’s victory is a profound change from just six months ago, when the Conservatives held a 20 percentage point lead in the polls. That the Liberal Party will now find a relatively simple pathway to building a majority coalition, while Poilievre lost his own seat in Parliament to a Liberal candidate, underscores how adverse the reaction in Canada has been to the Trump administration’s rhetoric around Canada’s sovereignty and to the disruption of US-Canadian economic integration through tariffs. Rather than a Conservative government in Ottawa that may have been philosophically aligned if not collaborative with its agenda, the White House will now have a Canadian counterpart with a clear mandate to assert its strength and independence while beginning a process of economic diversification.

But now the hard work begins, with energy and infrastructure playing a key role in the months ahead. Energy—specifically crude oil and electricity—is one of the foundational pieces of the US-Canada relationship. Tariff exemptions on Canadian crude reflect this reality, given their connection to refineries in the US Midwest and as a reliable, secure source of heavy crude. From oil and gas to minerals and electricity, expanding Canadian energy resources are a core part of managing US energy prices, and they are worthwhile contributions to the idea of American (or North American) Energy Dominance.

A Carney-led government will have to embrace this opportunity. During his campaign, Carney spoke about revisiting Canada’s carbon price regime, which was a major part of the Conservative platform and has to-date been an obstacle to unlocking investment in Canadian energy. However, Carney has committed to sustaining legislation on infrastructure impact assessments, which has been a pain point for energy companies to expand their own infrastructure. Those specific policy measures aside, Carney has largely communicated that his government will seek broad-based energy investment, including for critical minerals and next-generation nuclear.

The details of the Canadian energy agenda will be fulcrum issues for any of Ottawa’s ambitions to diversify energy exports away from the United States and toward global markets. Energy resources remain largely the jurisdiction of Canada’s individual provinces, and how Carney navigates a federal energy platform will be critical to building the cross-provincial partnerships necessary to reach new export markets. The negotiation of those partnerships has been a longstanding obstacle to east-west energy infrastructure in Canada. With that in mind, Carney’s diversification strategy is as much a function of internal diplomacy as it is external.

—Reed Blakemore is a director with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Expect Carney to push ahead on AI and social media regulation

In the build-up to this week’s election, there were widespread efforts across social media to undermine political candidates and Canada’s democratic institutions. Those tactics have now become a mainstay in many votes worldwide, and Canada was no exception. Ahead of the April 28 vote, local officials coordinated with outside researchers to flag potentially harmful online content. That included content by foreign actors, including some from the United States, seeking to influence how Canadians voted.

Yet despite these digital political messages, the online conversation around the election was dominated by offline events, especially Canada’s ongoing strained relationship with the United States. It is almost impossible to quantify the impact of online influence operations. But on the day after election day, it is hard to say such tactics played a meaningful role ahead of the Liberal Party’s victory because offline events—and not digital narratives—appear to have driven many voters’ choices.

In the weeks ahead, Ottawa will likely double down on tech policy issues that had stalled under Trudeau’s leadership. Efforts around artificial intelligence (AI) governance and greater checks on social media are likely as Carney sets out his policy objectives to reposition the country in the wake of its deteriorating relationship with the United States.

—Mark Scott is a senior resident fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab’s (DFRLab) Democracy + Tech Initiative within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

Meta’s news blackout in Canada creates a troubling precedent

During Canada’s short-lived thirty-five-day election cycle, candidates took their campaigns to cities, towns, and online platforms to win over voters. One distinguishing feature of Canada’s information ecosystem is the absence of news content on Facebook and Instagram, following Meta’s decision to block it in response to the Canadian Online News Act. This is particularly noteworthy as Facebook was reported to be the platform most used by Canadians.

Exacerbating the issue was Meta’s January 2025 decision to end its fact-checking programs, which played an important role in maintaining protective safeguards against information manipulation—safeguards that are even more necessary in the face of proliferating AI-enabled deceptions.

Canadian Meta users were left to navigate an uncertain landscape, one without adequate protections but rife with potential risks and deliberate harms. This creates a concerning precedent, suggesting that platform resistance may create information vulnerabilities that can be exploited during critical democratic processes.

As the tactics of information manipulation evolve, democratic societies must foster adaptable, evidence-based responses that protect electoral integrity and preserve the principles of open, free discourse. This requires ongoing innovation in both policy and technology to stay ahead of emerging threats while upholding the values of democracy.

—Layla Mashkoor is a deputy managing editor at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

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What Noboa’s reelection means for US-Ecuador ties

Isabel Chiriboga — Mon, 14 Apr 2025 19:49:40 +0000

In Sunday’s presidential election, the Ecuadorian people sent a clear signal of their hopes for economic stability, continuity, and closer alignment with Western allies in reelecting President Daniel Noboa. With 97 percent of the ballots counted and a voter turnout of 83 percent, Noboa and running mate Maria José Pinto secured more than 55 percent of the vote, an 11-percentage-point margin over challenger Luisa González, the heir to former President Rafael Correa’s populist legacy. González has refused to recognize the results and alleges that the results were fraudulent. However, her party has presented no concrete evidence to support this claim. Meanwhile, the National Electoral Council and international observers report no signs of widespread irregularities. Nevertheless, the claim fuels tensions in an already polarized electorate and could potentially result in social unrest.

In contrast with Noboa, González had signaled a drift from Western allies, including with statements that she would not recognize Edmundo González’s electoral win over dictator Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and with her party’s flirtation with removing the dollar as Ecuador’s currency. Noboa’s win, despite his policy-light campaign, embodies steadiness and predictability, two aspects that are key for international cooperation.

Ecuador desperately needs international cooperation with partners such as the United States to curb the country’s crime wave and spur economic growth. Here’s what to expect for US-Ecuador relations now that Noboa will maintain his post in Quito.

Mano dura—but backed by American muscle?

Security will be the foundation of any strengthened partnership for the future of Ecuador. Noboa’s government has been firmly rooted in a “mano dura” (iron fist) policy, declaring an internal armed conflict against twenty-two criminal gangs in January 2024 and classifying them as terrorist organizations. Many of these groups work directly with transnational drug cartels including Mexico’s Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generación, and even Albanian mafias; in addition. The intensifying operations of these groups has led to a spike in violence, including a staggering 1,300 homicides in just the first fifty days of 2025. Recurrent states of emergency and military deployments have become commonplace, especially in port cities such as Guayaquil, as the government fights to reclaim control of strategic trade routes. As the government has expanded its drug interdiction efforts, these criminal groups have diversified into other illicit markets including arms and human trafficking as well as illegal mining and logging to sustain their operations and increase their resilience.

Noboa is signaling a willingness to bring Ecuador’s security doctrine into alignment with Washington’s. He has done so by proposing the use of drones on borders and by requesting the assistance of US forces, reportedly preparing the port of Manta (which used to host a US air base, shut down by Correa in 2009) for their arrival. This commitment aligns well with US regional priorities. In the wake of rising transnational crime and drug trafficking across the hemisphere, the Trump administration—greatly concerned with border security and containing narcotrafficking—is keen to support governments willing to take action. Thus, Noboa’s openness to cooperation with the United States, particularly his willingness to integrate US intelligence and surveillance technology into domestic operations, could be met with interest.

Yet, the backdrop for Noboa’s second term will not lack of challenges. Ecuador remains stalled in a multidimensional crisis. The economy contracted in three out of four quarters in 2024, with the third posting a 1.5 percent decline in the gross domestic product. Ecuador had a $726 million fiscal deficit in the first quarter of 2025, marking the third largest deficit in a decade, and severe electricity shortages have caused blackouts of up to fourteen hours, further dampening economic prospects. Add to that the challenges of governing a polarized constituency—44.35 percent of whom voted for his opponent—and a country still traumatized by the assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio during the 2023 election.

But opportunity also knocks. While Ecuador’s country risk, as measured by the investment bank JP Morgan, reached a fifteen-month high of 1,900 points in the days ahead of the elections, Ecuadorian sovereign bond prices soared following Noboa’s win, indicating strong investor confidence. This is telling: markets, outside observers, and potential allies see Noboa as a stabilizing force. Despite a fragmented National Assembly—where the opposition party, Citizen Revolution, holds sixty-seven seats compared to the sixty-six held by Noboa’s party—the significant margin in the election results suggests that many voters who supported other candidates in the first round backed Noboa in the second. This may pave the way for political alliances and cooperation, enabling the passage of key security and pro-investment legislation. For Washington, that is an open door for broadened strategic cooperation at the economic, political, and military levels.

Teasing out trade

Trade will also be on Noboa’s agenda for cooperation with the United States. The Trump administration has imposed a 10 percent tariff on Ecuadorian goods; however, it is important to note that, unlike other countries in the region, such as Peru and Colombia, Ecuador does not have a free trade agreement with the United States. This means the 10 percent tariff will be added to existing tariffs on other products, while goods that previously entered duty-free will now face a 10 percent tariff. Ecuador currently holds a negative trade balance of $644.5 million with the United States, but Ecuador’s economic vulnerability makes the United States a vital partner. The US market takes a significant portion of Ecuador’s nonpetroleum exports, mainly agricultural products such as shrimp, cacao, bananas, and flowers. If tariffs increase on countries that compete in providing these products to the United States—such as Vietnam and Cambodia, which Trump planned to hit with much higher tariff rates before a recent ninety-day pause—Ecuadorian exporters could capitalize on their comparative advantage. Yet, Ecuador is still at a disadvantage on other products that face higher levies such as roses, broccoli, and tuna. Therefore, Ecuador will likely bring up trade as an essential component of cooperation—provided Washington and Quito can establish predictable, rules-based trade arrangements.

On this note, Noboa’s apparent alignment and closeness with the Trump administration is significant. At a time when US migration policy is tightening and the hemisphere is shifting toward more pragmatic leadership on this front, Noboa’s actions signal that the bilateral relationship will be built on strategic alignment rather than ideological affinity. While Noboa’s visit to Mar-a-Lago on March 29 (deemed “friendly”) was faulted in some circles, it earned Noboa political capital at home. The Trump meeting also put González at a disadvantage, given her coalition’s association with anti-US rhetoric, including Correa’s statements after the United States imposed visa bans on him, his vice president, and their immediate families for corruption. Noboa built a victorious coalition in large part with older voters, some of whom expressed fear about the unpredictability that accompanies populist choices.

What change will take

The list of tasks ahead for Noboa is significant: His administration will need to balance a $36 billion budget amid rising crime and violence, declining petroleum revenues, and rising debt payments. The promise of better security, economic reactivation, and infrastructure modernization cannot be fulfilled without outside support and financing from multilateral lenders and foreign investment, including the United States.

Furthermore, there is the risk that any long-term alignment with Washington in pursuit of improving security and the economy will not be able to withstand Ecuador’s volatile domestic political landscape. The composition of the National Assembly, depending on how alliances and seats shake out before inauguration day, will be key to determining the difficulties or opportunities Noboa will face. At the same time, he must demonstrate his ability to navigate an increasingly polarized environment. To succeed, he will need to strike a careful balance between domestic legitimacy and external engagement, backing up his rhetoric with consistent action.

Noboa’s presidency may not have started with a master plan, but his second term will begin with a unique set of geopolitical alignments. The question now is whether he can turn them into tangible gains for Ecuador. For the United States, this is a rare chance to engage with a willing, democratically elected government in a region beset by instability. For Ecuador, it is a chance not only to restore domestic stability but also to continue combating the security crisis with the United States as a partner.

In a region where friendships blow with the political winds, Ecuador under Noboa can chart a course of pragmatic collaboration and strategic partnership—if both sides are willing to make it work.

Isabel Chiriboga is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Russia’s endless ceasefire excuses are proof that Putin does not want peace

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 08 Apr 2025 20:08:45 +0000

Almost one month since Ukraine agreed to a US-led unconditional ceasefire, Russia has this week come up with yet another excuse to avoid following suit. Speaking in Moscow on April 7, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov claimed that while Russian President Vladimir Putin backs calls for a ceasefire, questions remain over the Ukrainian government’s alleged inability to control “a number of extremist and nationalist units that simply do not obey Kyiv.”

This latest excuse is a variation of the tired old trope about “Ukrainian Nazis” that has been used exhaustively by the Kremlin since 2014 to legitimize Russia’s escalating aggression against Ukraine. For more than a decade, Putin’s propagandists have been depicting Ukraine as a hotbed of far-right extremism as part of a disinformation campaign designed to dehumanize ordinary Ukrainians and prepare the ground for the wholesale erasure of Ukrainian national identity. It therefore comes as no surprise that Moscow is now citing this phantom fascist threat in order to rebuff calls for a ceasefire.

In reality, Ukrainian public support for far-right political parties is among the lowest in Europe. After years of failure at the ballot box, Ukraine’s nationalist parties formed a coalition ahead of the country’s last prewar parliamentary elections in 2019, but could only collectively muster 2.16 percent of the vote. That same year, Ukrainians also elected Russian-speaking Jewish comedian Volodymyr Zelenskyy as the country’s president. Zelenskyy’s Jewish heritage has helped highlight the absurdity of Russia’s “Nazi” narrative, forcing Kremlin officials to engage in increasingly ridiculous mental gymnastics. Most notoriously, during a 2022 interview with Italian television, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov sought to defend Moscow’s baseless claims by declaring that Adolf Hitler “also had Jewish blood.”

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In addition to invoking imaginary Ukrainian Nazis, the Kremlin has also sought to stall negotiations over a possible ceasefire by questioning the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government. Ukraine was scheduled to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in 2024, but the Ukrainian Constitution stipulates that elections cannot take place during martial law. Despite this constitutional barrier and numerous logistical obstacles to wartime elections in Ukraine, officials in Moscow have repeatedly called for a new national ballot while arguing that President Zelenskyy lacks the authority to conclude a peace deal.

Most recently, Putin went one step further by suggesting that Ukraine should be placed under some kind of external administration, with United Nations officials overseeing elections. This obvious attempt to derail peace talks proved too much even for US President Donald Trump, who reportedly responded by stating that he was “pissed off” with Putin. Trump then threatened to impose secondary tariffs on Russian oil exports if the Kremlin dictator refuses to make a deal ending the war in Ukraine.

Putin’s inflexible negotiating position further underlines his intention to continue the invasion of Ukraine. Kyiv has made a number of major concessions in recent months, including expressing its readiness to accept the temporary occupation of Ukrainian regions currently under Kremlin control. Rather than offering compromises of his own, Putin has insisted on the surrender of additional Ukrainian land that the invading Russian army has so far been unable to seize. He also demands an end to all foreign aid and the dramatic reduction of the Ukrainian army to a mere skeleton force. This would leave Ukraine partitioned, isolated, disarmed, and defenseless against further Russian aggression. No Ukrainian government could expect to remain in power for long if they accepted Putin’s maximalist terms. Indeed, it is unlikely that Ukraine itself would survive such a suicidal settlement.

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By now, it should be abundantly clear that Putin does not want peace. For more than two months, the Trump administration has tried to entice Moscow by pressuring Ukraine into concessions while offering the prospect of lucrative future cooperation between Russia and the United States, only to be met with endless excuses and stalling tactics. Although Putin remains reluctant to openly reject Trump’s peace overtures, his goal evidently remains the complete subjugation of Ukraine and the effective end of Ukrainian statehood.

Many Western leaders are now publicly criticizing Putin’s refusal to engage in meaningful peace talks. “It is urgent that Russia stops with the pretenses and stalling tactics and accepts an unconditional ceasefire,” French President Emmanuel Macron commented recently. The Trump White House is also apparently now finally running out of patience. While US officials have been keen to talk up progress in talks with their Russian counterparts, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated last week that Trump was not “going to fall into the trap of endless negotiations” with Moscow.

Trump’s initial attempt to broker a Ukraine peace deal by offering Putin an attractive off-ramp has failed. He must now decide whether he is prepared to employ sticks as well as carrots. At present, Putin has little interest in limited territorial concessions and remains committed to the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation. Crucially, he has been encouraged by Trump’s reluctance to maintain US support for the Ukrainian war effort. This has strengthened the Russian ruler’s conviction that he can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine.

In order to force a change of mood in Moscow, the United States must increase the costs of the invasion while undermining Russian hopes of military victory. This can be achieved by tougher sanctions measures targeting the Russian energy sector along with increased military aid that will allow the Ukrainian army to regain the battlefield initiative. Anything less will be interpreted by the Kremlin as a tacit green light to continue the invasion. If Trump is serious about persuading Putin to seek peace, he must first convince him that the alternative is defeat.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

As in neighboring Ecuador and Chile, the current crime wave has ground Peru to a halt. Between 2019 and 2024, reported extortions increased sixfold, and in 2025 every third Peruvian reports knowing a victim of extortion, many of whom are small business owners. Homicides, too, have doubled since 2019. And in January of this year alone, there were 203 percent more homicides than in January of 2017.

Behind these alarming figures hide strengthened transnational criminal organizations, such as the Tren de Aragua, as well as a myriad of other drug trafficking organizations, mafia syndicates, and gangs that alternately cooperate, collude, and compete for the control of illegal activities. While drug trafficking, homicides, and extortions are terrorizing Peru’s populous coastal cities, Peru’s Amazon has been ravaged by illegal gold mining, where illegal miners have made record profits as the value of gold has soared in international markets. In 2025, over 75 percent of Peruvians report being scared when leaving their homes.

While transnational criminal organizations are the actors behind the current crime wave, it is weak state capacity that has allowed the crime to permeate. The Peruvian sate’s capacity to respond has been impaired by political corruption, often influenced by criminal actors themselves. By 2024, 67 of 130 Congress members (a simple majority of Peru’s legislature) were under criminal investigation. When prosecutors charged Congress members of allegedly being part of criminal organizations, Congress passed a law narrowing the definition of “organized crime,” hindering investigations into corruption and extortion. President Dina Boluarte did not veto this bill, and it became law in August 2024. (Congress later reinstated extortion under the definition of organized crime but left many corruption offenses excluded.) Congress also passed a law in in September 2024 that placed a larger role of the police in criminal investigations, taking functions away from the Attorney General’s Office, which legal experts warned would weaken investigative efficiency. And Boluarte has weakened the Attorney General’s Office as she herself is being investigated for corruption. As a result, the state’s ability to prosecute crimes has been stymied by public officials seeking to blunt investigations against themselves.

Peruvians will vote next year amid a crisis that the state is incapable of protecting its citizens from. The parallels between the 2021 and 2026 elections are clear. In 2021, voters were enraged by Peru’s world-highest per capita COVID-19 death rate and a scandal in which political elites received vaccines before the public. Peruvians’ frustration propelled Castillo—then a little-known populist with no governing plan—to victory. After leading a government ridden with corruption, Castillo and his advisors sought to break the constitutional order with a “self-coup.” Peruvian democratic institutions held up and their attempt remained short-lived.

Now, heading into 2026, voters face a new crisis: a crime wave and a state failing to ensure public safety. This climate is fertile ground for populist promises of a mano dura, or “iron fist,” approach to combating crime. But any real solution must also tackle crime’s institutional roots. Candidates should promote a comprehensive political reform that reduces organized crime’s influence in the country’s political bodies. This reform should include steps that make running for office more difficult for those charged with corruption. In addition, the Attorney General’s Office should be depoliticized and promote a new cohort of competent, apolitical prosecutors and judges.

At the same time, the United States and other partner nations must recognize the risk that corruption poses to the survival of Peruvian democracy. The US State Department should designate Peruvian public officials engaged in corruption and prevent them from entering the United States, an action it took this month against former Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, who was convicted of corruption charges in Argentina. Equally critical is addressing other root causes of crime—poverty, inequality, and lack of education—which have made Peru’s youth vulnerable to recruitment by criminal gangs in the first place.

Politicians promising to be the “Peruvian Bukele” may garner attention. But leaving the institutional causes of crime unaddressed will only deepen Peru’s democratic crisis while doing little to curb crime.

Martin Cassinelli, a Peruvian native, is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center of the Atlantic Council.

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How Germany’s incoming government will work with Turkey

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy — Tue, 25 Mar 2025 13:23:19 +0000

Ahead of Germany’s parliamentary elections in February, Friedrich Merz, leader of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), emphasized Turkey’s strategic importance. In doing so, he called upon European countries to strengthen their foreign-policy cooperation with Turkey in response to mounting security challenges and potential shifts in US foreign policy. In addition, he committed to strengthening Turkey’s ties with the European Union, specifically on migration and Syrian security—while implicitly arguing that Turkey should have a “privileged” or “strategic” partnership with the EU, rather than full membership.

Now, with CDU/CSU having won the February parliamentary election, Merz is likely to become Germany’s next chancellor. Here is what to expect from a Merz-led Germany’s approach to ties with Turkey.

A more transactional approach

Expectations for the incoming German government, as the powerhouse of the EU, are considerable. These include sustaining military and financial support for Ukraine, addressing a shrinking German economy, and navigating the challenges of declining transatlantic reliability.

During his election campaign, Merz outlined a three-step plan for reshaping German foreign policy. First, he intends to restore Germany’s capacity to engage effectively in foreign, security, and European policy. Second, he aims to “win back” the trust of international partners and allies. Third, he seeks to establish clear strategic priorities. He has also appeared keen to reassert Germany’s influence within the EU. Many of these efforts will see the CDU/CSU leader forging partnerships not only with European allies but also with key regional players such as Turkey.

With Turkey’s significant role in NATO and its strategic location, Germany-Turkey relations under the likely German government are expected to remain pragmatic yet cooperative. Given prevailing geopolitical challenges and a clear shift toward realpolitik, Berlin is likely to maintain its transactional approach, prioritizing short-term strategic interests over long-term, value-based engagement. With this transactional approach, both Germany and Turkey may sideline normative concerns such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in favor of more immediate objectives related to three areas: security and defense, economic relations, and migration.

Yet on the other hand, Germany plays a pivotal role in shaping EU policy towards Turkey, so the new German government will face the challenge of balancing European Turkey policy with a future German approach to Turkey, whose foreign policy and domestic politics are increasingly diverging from European norms and values.

The highest priorities

One of the most pressing challenges for the next German government will be supporting Ukraine and strengthening Europe’s defense capabilities, particularly in light of growing concerns over US reliability. The controversial meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US President Donald Trump on February 28—followed by the subsequent withdrawal (and, later, reinstatement) of military support to Ukraine—has reinforced doubts about Washington’s commitment to European security. In response, Merz and his likely coalition partners proposed easing Germany’s infamous debt brake to allow for increased defense and infrastructure spending, and a plan which was approved by parliament last week. However, securing Europe’s long-term security will require more than just financial adjustments—it will necessitate strengthening strategic partnerships with both European and non-European allies.

Security cooperation between Germany and Turkey has long served as a stabilizing factor in the bilateral relationship, despite numerous tensions. During his electoral campaign, Merz emphasized his intention to reduce Europe’s reliance on external powers. This position could pave the way for deeper cooperation with Turkey in the defense and security sectors, given Turkey’s role within NATO and its broader regional security influence. As discussion on the future of NATO unfolds across European capitals, Turkey’s role in European security architecture has gained prominence. With its geostrategic position, military capabilities, and expanding defense industry, Turkey is increasingly seen as a significant actor in the reshaping European security framework.

In addition to its potential role in shaping the future of European security, Turkey is also viewed as a pivotal partner in ensuring regional security. Following the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, Turkey has taken on a central role in the country, while Russia and Iran’s influence has waned. In December 2024, Merz stated that Turkey will play a more prominent role in the Middle East and emphasized that Germany and the EU must engage closely with Turkey to support Syria’s economic recovery and promote regional stability.

Migration remains a crucial area of cooperation between Germany and Turkey. The issue became a contentious topic during the German elections, with Merz placing it at the top of his agenda following a series of deadly attacks allegedly involving immigrants. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), fueled by anger over immigration and refugees, secured second place in the election, while mainstream parties also adopted a more hardline stance on the issue. In an interview, Merz praised Turkey’s efforts in hosting millions of Syrian refugees as part of the 2016 EU-Turkey deal on irregular migration. This agreement included giving six billion euros to Turkey to help support the externalization of migration management, which is in line with EU and German interests.

Another cornerstone of German-Turkish relations is economic cooperation. Germany is one of Turkey’s most important trading partners and foreign investors, with investments reaching nearly $2.5 billion in 2022. In 2023, bilateral trade reached a record high of 55 billion euros. Beyond conventional sectors, Turkey and Germany have in recent years increased trade in new commercial areas, many linked to the energy transition. Eying green transformation and supply chains, Turkey aims to boost the bilateral trade up to $60 billion. German companies are increasingly involved in projects related to wind, solar, and hydroelectric power. Platforms such as the Joint Economic and Trade Commission and the Turkish-German Energy Partnership facilitate dialogue between the political and business actors in both countries. Given the search for more cooperation with Turkey on security-related issues, the defense industry can become an important sector in bilateral economic relations.

A stronger German focus on national interests, security, and leading the EU may reshape Germany-Turkey relations to be more transactional in the years ahead. But such an approach may not yield long-term success. The new German leadership should clarify its priorities and strike more of a balance—both pursuing shared interests and addressing diverging norms—in working with Turkey.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy is head of the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Ullman in the Hill on Trump’s reshaping of the Republican and Democratic parties

bgalicia — Wed, 12 Mar 2025 13:27:25 +0000

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On March 10, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed in the Hill that outlines how US President Donald Trump “disappeared” the traditional notions of the Republican and Democratic parties. He argues that President Trump “won a new working-class coalition” of historic Democratic voters while shifting traditional Republican ideals inside his own party.

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#AtlanticDebrief – What was at stake in the German federal election? | A debrief with Jörn Fleck

nlawler — Mon, 10 Mar 2025 21:54:16 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Germany headed to the polls on Sunday, February 23 for a federal election. Germany’s early election, after the former ruling coalition government collapsed in November 2024, comes at a critical time for Germany, Europe, and the transatlantic relationship. The next German government will have much to content with, including with shifting dynamics inside Germany, including the rise of the far-right AfD, and growing concerns over the durability of the United States’ commitment to Europe’s security. What are the key details to look for in the election? What are the challenges the next government will have to contend with?

On this edition of #AtlanticDebrief, Jorn Fleck, Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center speaks with Rachel Rizzo about the German federal election and German politics.

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Experts react: What Mark Carney means for the US-Canada relationship

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 10 Mar 2025 18:04:14 +0000

Mark his words. Mark Carney, the former governor of the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England, will become the next Canadian prime minister this week, after he was elected leader of the Liberal Party by a landslide on Sunday. In his victory speech, Carney had hockey skate–sharp words for Canada’s southern neighbor. “America is not Canada. And Canada never, ever will be part of America in any way, shape, or form,” Carney said in response to US President Donald Trump, who has threatened tariffs and floated the idea of Canada becoming the fifty-first US state. He added, “We didn’t ask for this fight, but Canadians are always ready when someone else drops the gloves.” So, what’s next for Carney, who takes office ahead of a required national election before October 20? And what’s next for the Washington-Ottawa relationship? Below, Atlantic Council experts answer these questions and more.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Josh Lipsky: Central bankers are no strangers to politics

Imran Bayoumi: Forget the border—Carney’s biggest security challenge is in the high north

Michael Bociurkiw: Canada—and the world—must now wait for the Carney-Poilievre face-off

Maite G. Latorre: Carney comes to power at a moment of growing Canadian patriotism

Stuart Jones: Canada may now look to Europe as tensions with the US grow

Central bankers are no strangers to politics

Think Carney’s experience leading two different Group of Seven (G7) central banks isn’t relevant for his new role? Think again. Carney wasn’t just any central banker—he was a central banker during multiple crises. First, he led the Bank of Canada during the global financial crisis and won praise from his colleagues for quick action on interest rates that helped Canada weather the storm. In fact, he did such a good job that he became the first non-Brit to lead the Bank of England. In that role, he had to lead the bank through Brexit—one of the biggest shocks the UK economy has experienced in decades.

All of this prepares him quite well to handle the toughest economic test he has ever faced—how to handle a trade war with a neighbor who seemingly has much more leverage. Carney has already highlighted how Canada will use US reliance on Canadian energy to try and even the playing field. Perhaps this is a negotiating tactic and he will seek to reset US-Canada ties following the frosty relationship between Trump and outgoing Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. But don’t expect a pure technocratic approach despite his CV. Remember, trade wars are also currency wars. The way a country’s currency appreciates or depreciates can have an enormous impact on who bears the costs of tariffs. And Carney is uniquely suited to lead his country in that kind of battle.

—Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Forget the border—Carney’s biggest security challenge is in the high north

While tariffs have put a spotlight on the US–Canada border, the biggest security challenge that Carney will have to deal with is instead hundreds of miles away in the Arctic.

Climate change is melting sea ice, making the Arctic more accessible, opening new shipping routes, and creating new opportunities for resource extraction. Canada’s relatively undeveloped Arctic makes the region an “attractive, strategic, and vulnerable destination,” for foreign adversaries according to the Canadian Security Intelligence Services, which notes that enemies will likely be interested in investing in infrastructure and resources to gain a foothold in Canada’s high north.

With an upcoming election, Carney should make strengthening Canada’s Arctic security a priority. For his part, Poilievre pledged a substantial increase in Canada’s military presence in the Arctic if the Conservatives are elected.

The Trudeau government announced last week an investment to build three Northern Operational Support Hubs, acting as a presence for the Canadian Armed Forces in the region. However, the development of these hubs will take place over twenty years, far too long a timeframe to meet a real and already present threat, and Carney would be well suited to expedite this timeline.

In aiming to boost Canada’s Arctic security, Carney should look south. Cooperation with the United States may seem fraught today, but in the long term it is essential for the security and stability of the North American Arctic.

The two nations’ continued close cooperation, alongside Finland, is essential to the success of the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact), which aims to build Arctic and polar icebreakers while sharing information and knowledge among the three nations.

Additionally, Carney should seek to clarify and advocate for Canada’s participation in Trump’s plan for the Golden Dome missile defense system. Canada’s role in the Golden Dome has never been clear, but Ottawa and Washington already work together via North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), with both nations planning to install modern over-the-horizon radar stations and seabed-based sensors in the Arctic to better detect cruise or ballistic missiles. Carney should look beyond advocating for just sensors and instead work to install interceptors to knock down incoming threats. Doing so would require Canada to reverse its 2005 decision against joining the US homeland Ballistic Missile Defense System, a politically bold move for Carney, but one that would enhance the security of the Arctic—and North America as a whole.

—Imran Bayoumi is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Canada—and the world—must now wait for the Carney-Poilievre face-off

The Canadian Liberal Party leadership race had a Ukrainian twist to it, with former finance minister and deputy prime minister, Chrystia Freeland, in the running—but she ended up with devastating results in the single digits.

What is amazing is that Carney managed to pull off such a stunning result for someone who has never held public office. The Ukrainian community in Canada, the largest outside Russia, pulled hard for Freeland in the hopes she would become, at least temporarily, the first Canadian of Ukrainian origin to hold the post of prime minister. However, it seems that she was hurt by being too closely tied to the policies of the politically toxic Trudeau. Her abysmal performance may exclude her from a prize seat at a vastly slimmed-down cabinet table in a Carney government. Another possible path for Freeland is to pursue a future career outside politics in a multilateral body such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Economic Forum, or elsewhere.

My prediction is that, in a national election, which has to happen by this fall, the opposition Conservative Party under Poilievre will become the new government but without the strong majority they had hoped for (the huge gap between the Liberals and Conservatives has been narrowed by the Trump trade war, with Trudeau’s Liberals gaining significant ground by positioning themselves as the team best suited to defend the country’s interests in an era of Trump’s whiplash foreign policy). Watching Carney for the first time addressing his followers, I sensed very little fire or emotion, and that could benefit Poilievre, who’s been criticized in the past for being too stiff on the hustings. He has since gained some mojo.

Last week, the leader of His Majesty’s Official Opposition made some sound remarks on Canadian foreign policy toward Ukraine, saying that the country should move quickly to help Europe wean itself off of Russian oil and gas (which, he correctly said, powers Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war machine) by building terminals on the east coast to ship liquefied natural gas (LNG) across the Atlantic. But whichever party is in power, cross-aisle support for aiding Ukraine will continue, albeit with a global influence that’s been vastly diminished under the Trudeau Liberals.

—Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Carney comes to power at a moment of growing Canadian patriotism

Like many Canadians, Carney once had dreams of being a hockey player. An Edmonton Oilers fan, he likely never imagined his path would lead him to politics. Yet, with a staggering 86 percent of the vote, he has emerged as the new Liberal leader. Notably, he is the first leader of the country to have never held elected office.

Carney, much like Trump, is not a career politician. And that might be exactly what Canada needs to move past the Trump era. “I know how the world works,” he remarked, signaling his understanding of the private sector and the global economy. With Washington no longer the Washington of the past and politics evolving rapidly, Canadians are hungry for change, and the Liberals seem to have recognized that.

Carney’s election is a strategic move by the Liberals. While he may not have political experience in the traditional sense, he certainly knows how to tackle crises and make tough decisions. As Carney said on Sunday, “We are facing the most significant crisis of our lives.”

At the same time, Canadians appear to be feeling more patriotic than ever, and they want a leader who can harness that energy. If he succeeds, then Carney could be the Liberals’ best shot at making the party competitive again. His time in power may be brief, depending on when he calls the elections, so his strategy will have to focus on quick but impactful wins to prove himself to Canadians. With the economy front and center, negotiating on US tariffs should be at the top of his agenda. The puck has been dropped, and Carney is stepping onto the ice. Now, it’s up to Canadians to decide if he’s the right player to lead the team.

—Maite G. Latorre is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Canada may now look to Europe as tensions with the US grow

Carney’s landslide victory over Freeland in the leadership race for Canada’s Liberal Party will be welcome news for Europe in the near term. Under Trudeau, the Liberals have advanced a steadfast alignment with the European Union (EU) prioritizing trade. The government did this through the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, or CETA, which eliminated 98 percent of tariffs between the two blocs since its provisional implementation in 2017. It has also focused on joint participation in research initiatives, such as Horizon Europe and with the “A7” in the Arctic, as well as on defense cooperation in NATO, exemplified by Canada’s leadership in Latvia’s Multinational Brigade. Should the Liberals win this year’s impending general election under Carney’s leadership, Canada will likely seek to continue this track record and further deepen ties with Europe.

In his acceptance speech on Sunday evening, Carney vowed to “create new trading relationships with reliable partners”—a clear jab at Trump, who was in many ways the central focus of the event in Ottawa and a common pain point for Europeans in recent weeks. Across the pond, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in a Sunday press conference in Brussels specifically named Canada as a “like-minded” ally to work with in today’s contentious geopolitics. Closer Canada-EU alignment in the face of the transatlantic crisis was already on display last week with Trudeau’s attendance at the emergency summit on Ukraine in London.

The question now is about the long term: when the next election will ultimately take place, which Conservatives are calling for as early as possible, and whether Carney can lead the Liberals to victory as its candidate against Poilievre. The Liberals are now enjoying a momentum which few could have foreseen given the state of national polls even just a few weeks ago. However, if Carney does win in the upcoming contest with Poilievre, it remains to be seen whether he can successfully expand CETA to offset Canada’s increasingly costly trade with the United States. So far, CETA has increased the value of Canada-EU trade in goods by 65 percent and in services by 73 percent. But the agreement remains unratified by ten EU countries, including the major economies of France, Italy, and Poland, and has faced protests across Europe in the past.

—Stuart Jones is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Will Merz step up Germany’s role in the Balkans? | A Debrief with Gerald Knaus

sjones — Fri, 07 Mar 2025 18:00:00 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Germany’s political landscape is shifting after the parliamentary elections on February 23—conservatives won, the far-right AfD surged, and foreign policy questions loom large over Berlin. What will the next leadership in Germany mean for the country’s approach to EU enlargement and, in particular, the Western Balkans?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Europe Center, sits down with Gerald Knaus, Chairman of the European Stability Initiative, a leading voice on EU engagement, to discuss why Germany must step up as Europe’s stabilizer. Knaus warns that the next four years are critical: Berlin must push for EU enlargement in the Balkans—no more delays, no vague goals. Without bold leadership, the region risks stagnation.

Knaus also highlights Merz’s recent foreign policy statements as the boldest from any European leader now and argues that Merz’s government could be the most consequential in Germany since Konrad Adenauer in 1949.

Will Germany step up as Europe’s stabilizer? As Europe faces a growing security crisis, will Germany push for a stronger NATO presence in the Balkans? Could a potential divide between the United States and the EU weaken efforts to stabilize the region? What one piece of advice would Gerald Knaus give to Germany’s new leadership regarding the Balkans?

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Mexico’s fork in the road: Rule of law or authoritarian shift?

Vanessa Rubio-Márquez — Fri, 07 Mar 2025 17:37:03 +0000

Introduction

Evolution of freedom

Evolution of prosperity

The path forward

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Introduction

2024 has brought a time of renewed upheaval in Mexico, six years after the election that fundamentally changed the political and economic systems of the country. Claudia Sheinbaum, standard-bearer for the incumbent Morena party, won the presidency in June 2024, the first ever woman to do so. The presidential and legislative elections were among the most decisive in Mexican history. With her victory comes a spate of questions about the political and economic future of the country, as she moves to cement the momentous political reforms her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO), set into motion. In such a time of transformation, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Index remains deeply illuminating.

Starting in the late 1980s, Mexico underwent a series of structural transformations that have significantly modified the nature of the state, the market, and their relationship in the country. At the tail end of the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s seventy-year single-party rule, public and international pressure brought about a democratic transformation that included the emergence of wide-ranging independent and technical institutions, with remits of electoral integrity, monetary policy, competition, statistics, transparency, and the specific regulation of markets. The state’s interventionist role in the economy was reduced, with an overarching privatization process that, among other things, touched banking, telecommunications, and infrastructure. More structural economic change came with free trade agreements and their upward pressure on competition in the private sector. Most notable among them was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which along with its 2018 successor the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) has shifted the economic matrix over three decades from significantly primary to mostly secondary and tertiary activity: Where oil-related products once represented almost 20 percent of exports in the early-mid 1990s, today they account for less than 5 percent; instead, manufacturing has climbed to approximately 90 percent of exports over the past decade. Several notable milestones have followed:

Technocratic rule prevailed for years and favored a relatively unfettered private market.
The ruling party lost in the 2000 presidential election—a first in seven decades—to a right-wing party.
The 2018 landslide election of a left-leaning populist prompted changes to the nature of the state-market relationship by strongly favoring the role of the state.
The concentration of power has accelerated since 2024, when the incumbent ruling party achieved a legislative supermajority (via a friendly legal interpretation) and full judicial control (through a constitutional amendment). The promise, at least on paper, is not only to give extraordinary weight to the state but also to give force to the market as an engine for growth and prosperity. The result of this experiment is yet to be known.

Taking a step back to examine the Mexican index from its beginning in 1995, we can see a notable difference between the freedom and prosperity indices. On the one hand, the Prosperity Index has shown a steady, though slow, rise over the past twenty-eight years from 55.4 to 65.8 (the COVID-19 crisis notwithstanding). On the other hand, the Freedom Index shows Mexico rated only slightly higher than in 1995, despite a significant period of improvement in the 2000s. We can see two distinct inflection points that form a kind of “plateau” of higher freedom scores, around the years 2000 and 2018. The former coincides with the election of Vicente Fox, of the National Action Party (PAN), to the presidency, enabled through democratic reforms in the 1980s (including the establishment of the precursor to today’s National Electoral Institute). His rise marked a momentous moment in Mexican politics as the first president from outside the PRI, which had previously enjoyed essentially single-party rule since 1929.

The second inflection point, in 2018, is particularly notable as it includes the effects of two countervailing forces on the Freedom Index. The first is the signing of the USMCA, which according to the index’s methodology resulted in a significant increase in economic freedoms. The second is the election of AMLO, who rose to power on a wave of antielite sentiment. Once in power he began implementing his unique brand of populist governance, combining a redistributive fiscal policy with democratic backsliding and power consolidation. These features have blended to create a notable downward trend in freedoms over a half a decade, as we will explore in detail below, though they also have contributed to the continued improvement in some of the prosperity indices.

Focusing on the past five years, the index shows the continuation of a trend that is rare in the region and elsewhere—the decoupling of freedom and prosperity. Mexico is one of the few cases in the last five years, together with Nicaragua and Chile, where prosperity has continued to increase while freedom has declined. This is contrary to the wider trend in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region, where both indices have declined.

In a marked shift from its categorization as “mostly free” in the 2023 index, Mexico is classified in the 2024 edition as a “low freedom” country, ranked 90 in the world—reflecting accumulated, significant antidemocratic shifts over the years of the AMLO presidency. Mexico continues to be “moderately prosperous,” though the changes underlying the reductions in freedom can be expected to damage prosperity as well, sooner rather than later.

Atlantic Council research suggests that, in general, the level of freedom in a country plays a significant causal role in its prosperity. The effect of a significant shift in freedoms is usually delayed by several years, taking up to two decades to manifest fully. In the case of the recent reductions in freedom in Mexico, the economic effects are likely to be felt much sooner. For example, as I will discuss below, judicial reforms are likely to pose an enormous challenge for the private sector and the renegotiation of the USMCA in the coming year, which could have severe economic ramifications for the country, as uncertainty affects investment climate. In the context of the current authoritarian shift in Mexican politics, this highlights the importance of steadfast, long-term public policy. That said, whether we continue to see this divergence going forward through the Sheinbaum presidency is yet to be seen.

Evolution of freedom

Mexico’s Freedom Index score has continued its decline, falling almost six points to 63.3 over the five years leading up to 2023. The score is characterized, after a decade of stop-start improvement, by a sharp fall since 2018, driven by declining political and legal freedoms. While Latin American countries have seen declining freedoms in this timeframe, Mexico’s slide is an outlier. Despite starting the period with a higher freedom score than the rest of the region, it has now slipped well below the average of 66.4, ranking eighteenth among the twenty-four nations in LAC, and the trendline continues to be negative. While economic freedom has been steady at around 76 after a notable drop in 2019, legal and political freedom scores have plunged since 2018. Mexico’s legal freedom score is 48.6, down from 54 in 2018; in fact, while the score has steadied in the past year, recent judicial developments (discussed below) suggest that we will see a severe drop next year. Political freedom has recorded an even more severe decline, dropping over ten points to 65.4 in 2023.

We can see several notable declines within the political subindex. Political rights have fallen steeply in the past five years. Mexico has dropped over twelve points and twenty-five places in the international rankings, and well down among the LAC countries in the nineteenth position. This score reflects the adversarial stance of the former AMLO government regarding criticism, opposition, public protest, and most significantly, the freedom of the press. The president presided over a militarized response to anti-femicide protests in Mexico City, for example, and he continued to constantly attack specific press representatives during his mandate. On one occasion in February 2024, he revealed the private phone number of a New York Times journalist during a live press conference; on another, he exposed private income and tax information of a Mexican one.

In another sign of democratic backsliding, the elections score has declined almost three points to 89.1. As president, AMLO often used his platform to campaign for members of his party as well as continuously attack political opponents from his privileged tribune, contrary to legal principles. The decline also reflects the fact that while the National Electoral Institute (INE) remains de jure independent, it has been subject to relentless political pressure and intervention, as well as severe funding cuts. The former president accused the institute of fraud and sought to centralize it under the executive. Furthermore, the legislature—controlled by the ruling party, Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional, or Morena—has continued to leave the Elections Tribunal without its required seven magistrates. Those threats and the loss of funding have yet to translate into a further deterioration of election integrity; nonetheless, it remains part of a worrying trend.

On a similar note, the most severe decline was in the legislative constraints on the executive score, which fell almost thirty points to 36.3 in 2023. This period coincided with AMLO’s sweeping election and legislative majorities (including a supermajority in the Chamber of Deputies), giving the administration a period of total legislative control until the supermajority was lost in 2021 (coinciding with a brief uptick in the constraints score). However, AMLO continued to undermine legislative independence: for example, forcing through legislation in violation of procedure. With Sheinbaum’s election victory in 2024 came not only the presidency but a questionable supermajority in the Congress of the Union. In fact, the ruling coalition now controls 73 percent of the Chamber of Deputies with 54 percent of the popular vote for the chamber, against a constitutional limit of 8 percent for the difference between representation and vote share. Despite initially falling one vote short in the Senate, a subsequent—questionable in its form—defection from the opposition has handed the coalition a supermajority across both bodies for the first time since the 1990s. Morena has also sought to remove additional constraints on executive power, for instance by following through on the elimination of several key autonomous agencies. These include the National Institute of Transparency Access to Information and Data Protection (INAI), an essential resource for government accountability; the Federal Economic Competition Commission, known as COFECE, which has a broad antitrust and competition remit; the National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), which is in charge of the evaluation of social programs and for poverty reduction strategy; the Federal Telecommunications Institute, the telecom regulator; and the Energy Regulatory Commission. The proposal was passed in November 2024, ostensibly to reduce costs, though the savings will amount to less than 0.05 percent of the federal budget. This follows years of AMLO hamstringing the agencies via unfilled appointments and budget cuts. Additionally, while Sheinbaum’s government made some changes to AMLO’s initial proposal to remain compliant with USMCA provisions, potentially compromised regulatory functions may yet violate the treaty if they end up favoring state-owned entities.

A similar dismantling on presidential checks and balances characterizes the decline in the legal subindex score. Apart from informality, which has been steady, every other legal indicator has fallen sharply since 2018, driving a twenty-one-place drop in global rankings for Mexico. Judicial independence has nose-dived to 50.4 from 62.2, reflecting an extended offensive from the Morena government against the national judiciary. AMLO appointed four justices to the Supreme Court of the Justice of the Nation, including a party insider with no judicial experience. He has repeatedly accused the court of treachery and corruption, encouraged public anger at the court’s president, threatened the pensions of judiciary workers, and slashed the court’s budget. Among the most contentious political issues of the past two years is a radical judicial overhaul, first proposed by AMLO but supported by, and eventually passed under, President Sheinbaum in late 2024. In a world first, the reform aims to require every judge in the system (over 17,000) to be elected by popular vote along with a reduction by two seats in the size of the Supreme Court. A significant portion of the candidates will be prescreened by the ruling Morena party. This presents severe dangers to the rule of law and independence in the judiciary, with judges exposed to the influence of political pressure and public sentiment on what should be a fully indifferent, impartial process. Legal interpretations will become unreliable as politicization in the judiciary results in inconsistent ad-hoc rulings. The role of the judiciary as a check on the executive and legislative will be greatly diminished, primarily by means of its ability to intervene against political parties and other political actors which will now control its judges’ candidacies. Despite the imminent need for significant improvement and the administration’s continuous attacks on and heavy-handed influencing of the court, it had remained de jure independent; but the recent judicial reform throws even that into question.

The ramifications of this fundamental reform, which undermines the capacity and oversight of the judiciary, will be manifold. This includes effects on the Mexican economy, as discussed below, but to start with, top-to-bottom elections set for June 2025 will cost $650 million. These expensive elections come in the context of one of budgets aiming at reducing the historically high fiscal deficit of 2024through severe fiscal consolidation in 2025.

The fight against corruption, which has been a key justification for Morena’s authoritarian measures like the judicial reform, has shown little signs of improvement over the past five years. On the contrary, some notable loci of corruption have only emerged during recent years. In one case, the director of the recently established Institute to Return Stolen Property to the People (INDEP) resigned after explosive revelations of theft within the agency. The agency was established to redistribute the value of assets seized from criminals to the Mexican people (though critics argued it simply renamed an existing agency with the same purpose); instead, “multimillion dollar corruption” has plagued its operations. Additionally, while seized assets were previously used solely to compensate victims of crime, the new agency has opaque authority to distribute funds as it pleases, including to other political priorities, increasing risks of cronyism on top of corruption.

The judicial reform is likely to exacerbate the problem by politicizing judicial officials in lower courts and opening them to the influence of political interests and even crime. Additionally, the elimination of key autonomous oversight agencies, as discussed above, is likely to lead to less transparency and accountability for two reasons. One is that by destroying the agencies and absorbing their functions into the executive branch, regulatory and antitrust capacity are likely to suffer significantly, likely allowing more cases of bad practice to fall through the cracks. Additionally, they would be less likely to scrutinize entities associated with the executive. Similarly, while in office AMLO also directed a growing share of economic power to the sole purview of the military, including seaports, airports, customs processing, and major pet infrastructure projects like Tren Maya (Maya Train) and the Trans-Isthmic Corridor. Removing the requirement of competitive bidding and procurement, along with limited outside oversight of militarized economic activity, raise additional transparency and accountability concerns.

Militarization was also a key component of AMLO’s approach to security. In this case, a relatively flat trendline may belie a regression in Mexico’s internal security situation; the former president’s conciliatory approach to cartel violence has failed to reduce their impunity; despite misleading assurances to the contrary, a government agency confirmed that more homicides occurred during AMLO’s time in office than any other Mexican president in history. He also reversed course on his support for Mexico’s “desaparecidos,” over 100,000 unsolved cases of criminal kidnapping. However, President Sheinbaum’s approach to security may prove to be a case of significantly distancing herself from the previous government. Instead of continuing AMLO’s “hugs, not bullets” strategy, she seems willing to rely more on action than inaction, and on counterintelligence and coordination to combat and deter unsustainable levels of violence. This enormous change will be legitimized (vis-à-vis AMLO) by the need to opt for a completely different approach when put between a rock and a hard place by the United States, threatened with a 25 percent blanket tariff if inaction and lack of cooperation occur in terms of tackling drug-trafficking organizations and migration.

Finally, the clarity of law has also suffered, with Mexico dropping twenty-seven places in global rankings and losing eleven points to reach a score of 37.6. This metric assesses whether Mexican laws are general, public, consistent, and predictably enforced. Indeed, all four of those characteristics were tested repeatedly by the previous administration, perhaps most notably in an anticompetitive electricity reform bill that was struck down by the Supreme Court in early 2024. Now that Morena has pushed through its judicial overhaul, it is likely that such distortions of the clarity of the law will have fewer checks going forward, whether through anticompetitive measures from the government or unpredictable enforcement by a judicial system in disarray. Further reduction in the clarity of the law has taken place via government abridgments of private property rights.

The economic subindex shows only a moderate decline of three points since 2018. However, within the average lies an interesting dynamic, with subindices moving in different directions. On one hand, trade freedom and investment freedom show a marked increase in 2018, following the ratification of the USMCA. Trade freedom especially benefited from the agreement, showing further improvement in 2020 once the agreement was ratified.

On the other hand, the property rights score has decreased dramatically following the 2018 election. Despite being an enshrined principle in the constitution, the previous administration took several notable actions to weaken the right to private property and fair treatment of that property by the government. In 2019, the government passed a law equating tax evasion with organized crime and assigned the corresponding punishment; among its outcomes is the ability to enforce mandatory pretrial detention without bail as well as asset forfeiture prior to a guilty verdict. While this was later overturned by the Supreme Court in 2022, citing unconstitutionality, such court-ordered rollbacks are less likely given the recent erosion of judicial independence. We can see the effect of this law on the sharp drop in the score in 2019. This follows from one of the broader themes of the past AMLO administration, which was active interventionism and an anticompetitive role for the state in a variety of sectors. For example, AMLO’s energy nationalism has resulted in more and more of the government’s fiscal eggs going into the basket of Pemex, the state-owned oil company, at the expense of private investment in both fossil fuel energy production as well as, critically, renewables. This is likely to be another area where President Sheinbaum distances herself from her mentor and predecessor as she recently presented an Energy Plan which included private-sector participation through mixed investment and the reprioritization of energy transition through renewable generation. It is yet to be seen, however, what the practical implementation of such a plan will be and how a much more doubtful private sector will respond to these recent policy shifts.

It is important to also mention that the government showed a particular tendency to infringe on property rights when pushing AMLO’s pet projects; for example, in May 2023 the government illegally seized a privately administered rail track, despite a legal contract granting the company its concession, to advance the Trans-Isthmic Corridor rail initiative. Additionally, in 2023, the government sent armed military, in contravention of court order, to seize the port assets of an American company in Playa del Carmen. In the final days of his presidency, AMLO issued a decree expropriating the entirety of that private land for a nature reserve. He has previously suggested using the rare deepwater port as a cruise dock; it is also the only port in the region capable of transporting the required raw materials for the Tren Maya, which has been subject to considerable environmental and economic criticism from opponents. Neither of those two incidents are reflected in the property rights score for the past two years, but they will affect foreign investment, particularly from the United States, and resulted in a sharp rebuke from the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While President Sheinbaum has taken a conciliatory tone with foreign investors so far, it remains to be seen how she will align further concentration of power with an environment of enablement and certainty for business development in Mexico.

By contrast, despite some concerning years when women’s marches were met with the use of force, the women’s economic freedom score has stayed flat at 88.8 and now offers reason for cautious optimism. President Sheinbaum plans to introduce several policies aimed at advancing women’s empowerment, including supplemental pensions for women aged sixty to sixty-four and an extension of parental leave. She also has proposed a National Care System aimed at supporting unpaid work (like childcare) that traditionally falls to women, though funding for the system has yet to be established.

Evolution of prosperity

Despite the dramatic backsliding in political, economic, and legal freedoms, Mexico has mostly resisted a similar decline in the Prosperity Index during the same period, rising six places in the global rankings. Despite a foundation of macroeconomic stability, overall growth has remained frustratingly low relative to its potential. Its score has tracked fairly closely with the regional level since 1995.

While Mexico’s global prosperity score rose above pre-COVID-19 levels in 2022, in contrast to the regional average, the income subindex shows the opposite: Mexico remains below its pre-COVID levels, while the region on average has surpassed them. This can be attributed to the government’s low levels of fiscal support (0.7 percent of gross domestic product) during the pandemic, which stands in stark contrast to others in the region such as Brazil, which spent close to 9 percent of GDP on its response. Even before COVID-19, the economic growth of Mexico suffered a significant deceleration. During the first year of AMLO’s government, the economy contracted by 0.1 percent and the compounded average growth of his term (excluding 2024) is less than 1 percent. The economy notably underperformed compared to the just-under 2 percent compounded annual growth seen over the three preceding administrations from 2001 to 2018.

There are also lagging indicators that suggest constraints on growth going forward. For example, while overall foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown in recent years (mostly due to profit reinvestment), new FDI inflows show a different story. Fresh FDI inflows via equity capital have plunged steeply from $15.3 billion in the first three quarters of 2022 to only $2.0 billion for the same period in 2024, based on the latest Mexican government data.

Despite sluggish income growth, Mexico has made significant strides in reducing inequality since 2018, moving up eleven places in the global rankings and five points to 57.7. This has been driven by AMLO’s social policy; for example, the minimum wage has nearly tripled since 2018 (by decree, rather than as a result of higher productivity and competition), and poverty has declined by 20 percent since 2020, in large part due to a costly and enormous rise in cash transfers. This creates further fiscal pressures at a time when the country is running its highest deficit in almost four decades, at 5.9 percent of GDP. Remittances have also virtually doubled from about $8 billion in the first quarter of 2019 to $14 billion in the first quarter of 2024. (International Monetary Fund research has shown that remittances have a downward effect on inequality in Mexico). It should be noted, however, that the rate of improvement in the inequality score has remained reasonably consistent since 2012.

On the environment, the index shows Mexico suffered only a slight decrease from 67.2 in 2018 to 67 in 2023. This reflects a flat trend, on average, for emissions, air pollution deaths, and access to clean cooking technology. In the case of Mexico, however, this obscures significant setbacks in environmental progress from a policy perspective. Mexico dropped seven places to 39 in the 2024 Climate Change Performance Index, which rated its climate policy as “low performance.” AMLO’s oil nationalism prioritized public investments in the floundering state-owned oil supermajor, pushing out competition and heavily disincentivizing investment in renewable energy and the wider green transition. Additionally, some of the administration’s pet projects, particularly the Tren Maya, have been criticized for environmental damage to sensitive ecosystems of the Yucatán peninsula. According to Global Forest Watch, primary forest loss saw a large increase in 2019 and 2020. This was likely due to the misguided Sembrando Vida (Sowing Life) policy, which aimed to address rural poverty and environmental degradation but resulted in large tracts of forest destroyed for timber or agriculture—despite many of the landowners having been compensated for protecting existing forest under the prior government’s policy regime. The data shows a marked improvement in 2021, suggesting the government acted to stymie Sembrando Vida’s negative externalities.

The path forward

Thus far, democratic backsliding has seemingly been either aligned with the will of the voters; a cost they are willing to pay for cash transfers, a renewed hope derived from populist rhetoric, or as punishment to previous governments. Or perhaps Mexicans simply don’t care or do not acknowledge – due to a lack of effective engagement and communication from previous governments – material benefit from a rather ethereal concept: democracy. AMLO’s presidency came with noticeable material improvements in many lives, as we can see with significant progress on poverty, inequality, remittances (though unrelated to his policies), and the minimum wage. Additionally, the political opposition is in total disarray, tainted with accusations of elitism and corruption—and without capacity to self-assess, regroup, and present a compelling alternative. AMLO, with his singular star power, and now Claudia Sheinbaum with more than 75 percent popularity (in January 2025), have effectively capitalized on their absence with an inclusive narrative of economic nationalism and executive strength.

On top of backsliding, the targeted problems of corruption, lack of security, and a culture of privilege remain largely unsolved. Additionally, the risks of continuing down the path of democratic retrenchment are immense and wide-ranging. The politicization of the judicial system risks an even deeper loss of public trust in the law as well as deeper entrenchment of a single hegemonic party, further reducing the viability of a basic democratic requirement: a strong opposition, which has also inflicted significant self-damage to be seen as an appealing and trustworthy political option.

In addition to driving a cycle of continuously shrinking freedoms, the existing approach may also struggle to generate an adequate growth engine required for improvements in economic vibrancy. The country is facing several headwinds in achieving its growth potential in the medium term. For one thing, returning the budget deficit to manageable levels—Sheinbaum has pledged to meet a 3.9 percent deficit target in 2025—will require fiscal trade-offs. It will require the president to confront her government’s relationship with Pemex, the roughly $100 billion elephant in the room. While her predecessor injected almost $100 billion into Pemex via direct financing and tax breaks, production declined and losses doubled to $8.1 billion in October 2024 compared to a year earlier. The company’s debt now stands at almost 6 percent of the entire country’s GDP and the government has pledged almost $7 billion more this year amid a rapidly tightening budgetary environment. The Pemex albatross will hang heavily on the sovereign balance sheet, as we are seeing already. Along with concerns about the constitutional reform, Pemex’s fiscal burden helped drive Moody’s latest downgrading of Mexico’s debt outlook from “stable” to “negative” in November 2024.

Additionally, Mexico’s macroeconomic scenario is highly dependent on foreign trade, particularly its integration with the United States and Canada via the USMCA. Exports accounted for over 40 percent of Mexico’s GDP in 2022, and over 80 percent of those exports went to the United States. Those who invest and trade with Mexico crave certainty, particularly in a context of transformative changes to international supply chains. However, current uncertainty is driven by two key factors, one domestic and one international. Domestically, dramatic policy change toward concentration of power, fewer checks and balances, and less competitive markets are likely to alarm international investors as well as curtail domestic economic activity. The latter factor concerns Mexico’s trade relationships within North America, especially the outcome of USMCA negotiations and their effect on nearshoring growth. Donald Trump, following his decisive electoral victory in the United States, has advocated for extreme trade protectionism, including against Mexican imports. While rhetoric must soon give way to actual policy implementation for the Trump administration, it remains to be seen if his most severe threats will be realized, such as the imposition of a 25 percent tariff on Mexican imports that would have likely been implemented the first day of February, had the Mexican president not engaged in a forty-five-minute call with Trump in which, among other things, she committed to the immediate deployment of 10,000 military forces in the northern border area of the country. The coming four years, but particularly this year, are expected to be quite uncertain as, according to mostly vague thresholds of cooperation on organized crime and migration, the main anchor of the Mexican economy (trade with the US) will become extremely volatile.

One thing is for sure: There will be uncertain and tense times ahead, beginning with the first months of the second Trump administration and continuing until an agreement for a revamped trade agreement is in place, most probably, one which considers a form of sectoral customs union. Mexico is the main US trading partner and source of imports. Mexico also is among the top trading partners of the majority of the fifty US states, so having a free trade agreement that anchors certainty and promotes competitiveness and productivity in North America is a matter of priority for the United States as well. That said, one should expect a great deal of rhetoric and threats to stand in the way before a consensus emerges. Mexico will have to stay focused and display a sophisticated and effective multilevel strategy to reduce uncertainty and enhance its position in the negotiating process. The most important aspect will be managing the effects of rhetoric on business sentiment and avoiding the implementation of drastic and costly measures for Mexicans and the country’s economy.

The drop in FDI noted above is a foreboding sign. Investors had been awaiting the outcomes of the Mexican judicial reform and the US election, among other factors, and now they watchfully wait to see the Trump administration’s actual policies. Meanwhile, so far, Mexico has seized less of the unique nearshoring opportunity than it should have from Asian competitors like India and Vietnam. To do so, it must still meet important nearshoring requirements such as improvements in infrastructure, energy reliability, and security.

In conclusion, the past several years of deepening democratic retrenchment have culminated in a seismic shift in Mexican politics. Despite continued improvements in poverty and inequality and steady, if low, income growth, these reductions in freedoms may soon threaten Mexico’s prosperity in the medium term. Most of the population has fluctuated between eagerness and indifference vis-à-vis these changes so far. If President Sheinbaum and Morena continue to consolidate power and reduce checks and balances, it may be too late to reverse course once the full effects are felt.

President Sheinbaum has made her choice on the political transformation of the country, moving toward more concentration of power in the executive and the cancellation of several checks and balances which, however imperfect and thus improvable, were there as both limit and anchor. Her second conundrum will be around the economic system, where a series of contradictions derived from the chosen course of action in the political sphere will play out. We have yet to see what can become of a new model and a new trend in the world: regimes with autocratic features or even full-blown autocracies that create the avenues, spaces, and conditions for the private sector to accommodate and flourish in an era of deglobalization and strategic ally shoring; post-truth politics and social media; and a more polarized and volatile ecosystem.

Note: The text of this report was finalized in February of 2025.

Vanessa Rubio-Márquez is professor in practice and associate dean for extended education at the London School of Economics’ (LSE) School of Public Policy. She is also a member of the Freedom and Prosperity Advisory Council at the Atlantic Council, an associate fellow at Chatham House, and a member of organizations such as the Mexican Council of International Affairs, the International Women’s Forum, Hispanas Organized for Political Equality, and LSE’s Latin America and the Caribbean Center. Previously, Rubio-Marquez had a twenty-five-year career in Mexico’s public sector, including serving as three-times deputy minister (Finance, Social Development, and Foreign Affairs) and senator.

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How Merz can leverage Germany’s green transition for growth and security

Carol Schaeffer — Fri, 28 Feb 2025 20:07:11 +0000

Friedrich Merz is poised to be Germany’s next chancellor, and coalition talks are already underway following the February 23 national election. Much of the talk in the past week has been about how the new German government will need to lead Europe’s push for security “independence”—a word Merz used in his election night speech—as the continent faces an uncertain future with the United States’ security guarantees. But another critical aspect of Europe’s long-term security is energy and climate diplomacy, which must not be overlooked and could be crucial in forming a solid ruling coalition.

Germany stands at a crossroads in its green transition. As political winds shift both in Berlin and beyond, the next government will need to decide whether to lean into the economic opportunities of clean energy or retreat in the face of short-term political obstacles.

Germany’s changing political landscape on climate

Political winds in Germany have indeed shifted. The environment was front and center in the September 2021 election that saw Olaf Scholz become chancellor. By mid-2022, the Greens were polling at 26 percent, rivaling the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democrats (CDU). But by 2023, backlash to a heat pump mandate—which in effect banned new oil and gas heating installations—contributed to decreasing support for Scholz’s government, with both the center-right CDU and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) capitalizing on the unpopularity of environmental policies.

In the run-up to the election, Merz’s CDU signaled that it would retreat from key climate measures. The party backs a “true European Energy Union” but seeks to gut core aspects of the European Green Deal. (Ironically, the European Green Deal is championed by European Commissioner and CDU member Ursula von der Leyen.) In Brussels, the CDU and its allies in the European People’s Party are leading the charge to roll back regulations.

At home, Merz has pledged to weaken European Union (EU) emissions limits for cars and reverse the planned 2035 ban on combustion engines, favoring German automakers over climate commitments. With the EU poised to negotiate a 90 percent emissions reduction target for 2040, Germany could soon shift from climate leader to climate roadblock.

The economic and political case for staying the course

Critics of the green transition paint it as too expensive and bureaucratic. But the reality is quite the opposite—clean energy is an economic engine. Investing in the green transition means new industries, new jobs, and long-term growth that far outweighs the initial costs.

This isn’t just political rhetoric; it’s quickly becoming economic consensus. Former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s September 2024 landmark report makes it clear: the only path to Europe’s long-term competitiveness is shifting away from fossil fuels. As the Draghi report illustrates, clean technology is no longer just an environmental necessity—it’s an economic imperative.

The International Energy Agency estimates that the global clean energy market will triple, to two trillion dollars by 2035. That’s one-third of the US federal budget and four times Germany’s. If Germany slows down now, it risks forfeiting a once-in-a-generation economic opportunity.

Merz also should not overlook the political advantages to be gained from incorporating strengthened green initiatives into his program. Coming in behind the SPD, the Greens were the fourth-largest party, gaining nearly 12 percent of the vote. Although Merz no longer necessarily needs the Greens to form a coalition, this is only because the Free Democrats (FDP) and Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) narrowly missed the 5 percent parliamentary threshold. Looking ahead, Merz may very well end up needing the Greens on his side. In addition, priorities for green initiatives are often shared among much of the electorate for both the SPD and Die Linke, or the Left Party, as well. Taking those priorities seriously could go a long way toward building approval among the 36 percent of the German electorate who voted for leftist parties.

Energy security and the geopolitical stakes

Beyond economics, energy independence is a growing security concern. To speak in broad terms, Germany has three options:

Buy natural gas from a hostile Russia or a United States that seems increasingly unreliable toward Europe
Continue relying on coal, a finite and highly polluting resource
Pioneer renewable energy and solidify its position as a global leader

With transatlantic security ties under strain and Europe forced to take more responsibility for its defense, energy security is now national security. A centralized investment in energy independence is Germany’s best bet for maintaining economic strength and strategic autonomy.

A blueprint for German leadership

Germany doesn’t need to go it alone—it needs to double down on partnerships and innovation. Key policies to strengthen its role in the global green economy include:

Using its influence in the EU to expand the bloc’s Net-Zero Industry Act to bring 40 percent of clean tech production back to Europe by 2030
Scaling up investments in critical minerals mining and refinement with partners such as Canada and Australia
Advancing green hydrogen projects, like those already underway in Namibia
Focusing on high-value, specialized clean tech (offshore wind, hydrogen, advanced battery chemistries) rather than trying to outcompete China in mass production

Europe’s strategic advantage

While Germany and the EU may not be able to displace China in climate supply chains, they can out-innovate Beijing in key sectors. The future of the transatlantic alliance could be built on a clean energy partnership, not just military cooperation.

By investing where there is inevitable demand, Germany can secure its place as a leader in the twenty-first-century economy—strengthening both Europe’s geopolitical standing and its relationship with the United States in the process.

The choice is clear: cutting back on green policies would be an economic and strategic mistake. The incoming German government can either seize the momentum or let others lead the way.

Carol Schaeffer is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a policy fellow with the Jain Family Institute, focusing on decarbonization, the energy transition, and European policy.

The post How Merz can leverage Germany’s green transition for growth and security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Senegal’s president must not miss the opportunity afforded by the country’s democratic spotlight

Hippolyte Fofack — Fri, 28 Feb 2025 14:47:56 +0000

French politician Jacques Chirac once said that democracy is a luxury Africa can ill afford. But last year, the people of Senegal made clear in a free and fair presidential election that democracy can prevail in Africa.

Almost a year since his election, President Bassirou Diomaye Faye now has a clear mandate to carry out reforms, following his party’s resounding victory in November’s legislative elections. He must now turn his focus to continuing along the democratic track, lifting the constraints associated with credit rationing and leveraging commodity-based industrialization, and setting Senegal up for robust economic growth and welfare improvements.

By the end of the presidential election early last year, outgoing President Macky Sall—who had attempted to postpone the election, a move that led to deadly protests—congratulated Faye, calling the elections the “victory of Senegalese democracy.” Such a victory is important for Senegal, as democracy (contrary to what Chirac suggested) is not a luxury but a necessity for national reconciliation, the legitimacy of national institutions, and, ultimately, shared prosperity.

The presidential election was a victory not only for Senegal’s democracy but for democracy globally, rekindling confidence internationally in a system of government that has come under strain in Africa, especially in West Africa, where military coups have surged. That boost in confidence comes as people in even Western democracies grow dissatisfied with how democracy works in their countries. For example, an Ipsos poll in 2023 conducted across seven Western countries (including France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) found that most respondents believed the economy is rigged to the advantage of the rich and powerful and that “radical change” is needed to improve the political system.

In that poll, 70 percent of American respondents and 73 percent of French respondents—whose countries are seeing rising political polarization—said they believe that the state of democracy has declined in their countries in recent years. Moreover, the 2024 Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index ranked both the United States and France as “flawed democracies.”

While massive amounts of campaign financing are considered a prerequisite (and perhaps the most important attribute) for winning an election, Senegal’s presidential election was a reminder that conviction and ideas still matter. Faye—who secured 54.28 percent of the vote as an independent after his party was banned—defeated candidates who had far more financial firepower and ample time to rally support on their campaign trails. Despite being released from prison just a little over a week before the presidential election, Faye’s message and program were in sync with people’s aspirations and garnered broad-based support at the ballot box.

Faye promised to improve the living conditions in Senegal. For too long, the country has contended with widespread poverty, especially in rural areas where as many as 57 percent of people are considered poor. Furthermore, Senegalese youth continue to face high unemployment. The informal economy—which is generally associated with low productivity and endemic poverty—has become a major piece of the economy, accounting for nearly 37 percent of Senegal’s gross domestic product (GDP). Recently, the rising cost of living and income inequality have exacerbated Senegal’s socioeconomic challenges. Inflation has proven particularly sticky and is eroding household purchasing power. Amid these challenges, increasing numbers of Senegalese migrants are risking their lives to sail the seas en route to Europe in search of better opportunities.

Faye has also promised to fight corruption, promote good governance, and strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions. For years, a “strongman” culture across Africa has enabled collusion between politicians and multinational companies, which has weakened agency and popular ownership of policies to undermine economic opportunity and exacerbate income inequality. This is especially the case in countries rich in natural resources, which are more vulnerable to corruption due to the significant revenues generated by resource exploitation, management, and trade.

Departing from the norm, Faye declared his assets in the lead-up to the presidential election. Upon becoming president, he announced he would conduct an audit of Senegal’s oil, gas, and mining sectors to rebalance them in the national interest. These moves establish baselines against which the people of Senegal can assess the president’s work toward tackling corruption and enhancing efficiency in the allocation of resources, with an ultimate goal of achieving more inclusive growth and shared prosperity in the country.

These are important steps in the right direction. Improving welfare for the Senegalese people requires a fundamental transformation of the economy. Expectations in Senegal are high following the discovery of major oil and gas reserves a few years ago. There are similarly high expectations for Africa as a whole. Despite its immense natural-resource wealth, the continent has, over the last several decades, become the world’s epicenter of poverty: Africa has the largest share of extreme poverty rates globally and is home to twenty-three of the world’s poorest twenty-eight countries.

This starkly contrasts with Nordic countries and the Gulf states, which have successfully leveraged their natural-resource wealth to boost prosperity in a span of a few decades. This contrast is partly due to the fact that rather than processing its own natural resources, Africa instead largely exports them overseas, increasing the prevalence of macroeconomic shocks and the risk of poor governance—both of which adversely affect the investment climate and heighten growth volatility.

But Senegal, arguably a latecomer to the hydrocarbon world, can learn from other African countries’ management (and mismanagement) of natural resources.

Considering the experience of the most successful oil-rich countries, Faye should look to alter the structure of value chains to retain more production and refining processes locally. If Senegal can nurture these industries, it will set up the country for commodity-based industrialization that expands employment opportunities, enhances technology transfer, and accelerates integration into the global economy. This will help Senegal avoid a deterioration in commodity terms of trade, which is fueling internal and external imbalances. Last October, Moody’s downgraded Senegal’s long-term credit rating, citing a significantly weaker fiscal and debt position.

There are mechanisms and conditions in Africa that would help Faye in localizing natural-resource production and refining processes. The African Continental Free Trade Area’s rules of origin (which prioritize made-in-Africa goods) should help catalyze the production of intermediate and manufactured goods and the development of robust regional value chains. The scale of the continental market should help Senegal offset the potential losses of international trade associated with expanding protectionist barriers in a geopolitically fractured world.

The rise of globally competitive African businesses necessitates large-scale, long-term investment, so reforming the banking system will also be important. Affordable patient capital is particularly critical in Senegal, where domestic credit to the private sector remains very low (31.3 percent of GDP, versus 126.8 percent in Norway) and overwhelmingly short term. According to a report by the Central Bank of West African States, more than 80 percent of loans issued in 2022 had a maturity within less than two years.

Faye has an opportunity to achieve the systemic change he promised. Democracy has provided a path to greater ownership of policies that equalize access to opportunities and raise living standards in Senegal and more generally across Africa, a continent rich in resources and where the people are no longer prepared to accept intergenerational poverty as an inevitability. But democracy must not be regarded as an end; it must be seen as a means to greater security and prosperity. Thus, Faye must actively use the opportunity provided by the rekindling flame of democracy to usher in a new era—one that yields huge democratic and economic dividends.

Hippolyte Fofack, a former chief economist at the African Export-Import Bank, is a fellow with the Sustainable Development Solutions Network at Columbia University, a research associate at Harvard University, a distinguished fellow at the Global Federation of Competitiveness Councils, and a fellow at the African Academy of Sciences.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Kabawat mentioned in Deutsche Welle Arabic on the Syrian National Dialogue

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:13:39 +0000

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Kabawat mentioned in Catholic Culture on the committee drafting Syria’s new constitution

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:13:37 +0000

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History’s clock is ticking (again) in Germany

Frederick Kempe — Mon, 24 Feb 2025 22:32:16 +0000

It’s hard to overstate the United States’ historic investment in Germany’s success—and its impact on Europe’s future.

Americans alongside allies defeated Imperial Germany in World War I and Nazi Germany in World War II, only thereafter to help rebuild and democratize West Germany, or the Federal Republic, laying the groundwork for its peaceful reunification in 1990 as both a NATO and European Union member.

It’s only with that as context that one hears the weight of likely next German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s election-night mention of the need for “independence” from Washington, even before the final vote results were in. It’s worth reading his full quote.

“My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA,” said Merz, one of the most authentic Atlanticists I’ve known. “I never thought I would have to say something like this on a television program. But after Donald Trump’s statements last week at the latest, it is clear that Americans, at least this part of the Americans, this administration, are largely indifferent to the fate of Europe.”

It’s also with an understanding of Germany’s centrality to European history over the past two centuries—both its worst and best parts—that one can fully digest Merz’s warning the day after the election that it is “five minutes to midnight” in Europe.

With that, Merz underscored the immediacy of the economic, security, and geopolitical challenges facing Germany and Europe.

Merz may be the most pro-business chancellor Germans have elected since World War II, but his Christian Democrats face the country’s near-zero growth with just 28.6 percent of the vote, their second worst outcome since the war. Their likely coalition partners, the Social Democrats, at 16.4 percent, scored their worst result since 1887, even worse than March 1933, when Adolf Hitler came to power.

The real winners this week were the far-right Alternative for Germany party, or AfD, which doubled its vote to 20.8 percent, and the far-left Die Linke, with 8.8 percent. With a third of all the votes in the Bundestag resting with the far right and the far left, they have the power to block the sort of constitutional changes Merz would need to spur the growth and defense spending Germany can only achieve through lifting its debt brake.

Are things as bad in the transatlantic relationship as Merz suggests?

One hopes not, and US President Donald Trump can change rhetoric and policy on a pfennig. However, it would be short-sighted for European leaders not to grasp the urgent need for greater self-reliance, particularly as the United States today voted against a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia on the third anniversary of its war of aggression on Ukraine—going against all the European allies and siding with Russia and its friends.

Is the clock ticking down as fast as Merz says on European security and economic threats?

Merz is a keen enough observer to know the severity of the situation. He’s also a good enough politician to realize that he’ll only have the leverage to address it if voters recognize the gathering dangers.

Most importantly, Merz knows that if he and his prospective coalition partners don’t act decisively now, those far-right and far-left numbers will grow, and German history shows us where that leads.

What Merz has identified is the historic moment. The coming months will determine how he rises to it.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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From Tunis to Baghdad: Can platform-based politics take root?

Carrie Schenkel and James Storen — Mon, 24 Feb 2025 19:30:13 +0000

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This paper is the fifth in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

The organization of political parties has served multiple distinct roles in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In many cases, regimes use them to create a light veneer of democratic legitimacy for authoritarianism; in other cases, parties exist to represent one identity group or are centered around a singular individual. In rare cases, but with a few successful examples, parties exist to represent an ideology. Rarer still, but key to the future democratic success of the region, are true platform-based parties. Vacuums of political leadership have developed due to the limited role parties play in shaping governance, representation, and public policy. In a rapidly changing region, the opportunity for effective, issues-based parties has never been more evident. Iran’s proxies in the region have been significantly weakened and the “Axis of Resistance” dismantled, presenting openings for new political leadership to emerge.

Political parties are not yet poised to meet the moment. In much of the region, long histories of implicit and explicit bans and one-party dominance have left political parties weak, unpopular, and ineffective. Extended periods of suppression and restriction—such as Jordan’s thirty-year party ban, Iraq’s decades of one-party rule under Saddam Hussein, and Tunisia’s twenty-three years of party bans during the Ben Ali era—have resulted in political parties that lack both organizational capacity and broad public appeal. Rather, they are fragmented, ideologically vague, and centered around individuals rather than coherent platforms.

The proliferation of political parties—more than 220 are currently registered in Tunisia, for example—has further undermined any sense of clear policy platforms and the ability to differentiate one party from another. Rather than reforming or uniting under existing frameworks, disillusioned members frequently break away to form new parties, stymieing coalition-building and the development of rooted, comprehensive party ideologies.

Disillusionment with traditional parties has led citizens to favor actors perceived as more directly serving their interests, such as Hezbollah—which positions itself as a resistance force against Israel—or Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties, which have gained trust through their provision of essential social services in Egypt, Jordan, and elsewhere. In an era defined by youth-led movements, digital activism, and persistent calls for democratization, these parties stand at a crossroads. Whether they act as agents of change or instruments of entrenched power remains a central question, shaping not only the future of governance within individual nations but also the trajectory of regional stability and development.

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Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 20 Feb 2025 23:43:38 +0000

As the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion draws close, the chorus of voices calling for new elections in Ukraine is growing louder and louder. Curiously, however, these calls are not coming from the Ukrainians themselves, but from the Kremlin and the Trump White House.

Since his inauguration one month ago, US President Donald Trump has begun echoing Russian demands for fresh Ukrainian elections. This week, he sparked outrage by branding Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a “dictator without elections.” These attacks have proved popular in Moscow but have fallen flat in Kyiv, with most Ukrainians rejecting the US leader’s claims and rallying behind Zelenskyy.

The debate over Ukrainian elections reflects the challenging wartime realities in the partially occupied country. Ukraine was scheduled to hold presidential and parliamentary votes in 2024 but was forced to postpone both ballots as the Ukrainian Constitution does not allow national elections during martial law, which was introduced in 2022 and remains in place. Zelenskyy has vowed to hold elections as soon as the security situation allows, but argues that it would be impossible to stage free and fair votes in the current circumstances.

The majority of Ukrainians appear to agree. Two of Zelenskyy’s main political rivals, Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, have publicly rejected the idea of wartime elections as impractical and illegitimate. Ukraine’s vibrant civil society has also voiced its opposition to the return of elections before a peace agreement has been signed. Meanwhile, a new opinion poll conducted in February 2025 found that 63 percent of Ukrainians are against holding any national votes until the war with Russia is over.

This lack of appetite for wartime elections is not the product of apathy or oppression. On the contrary, Ukrainians are fiercely proud of their country’s democratic credentials, which were hard-won during two separate pro-democracy revolutions in 2004 and 2014. On both occasions, millions of Ukrainians took part in massive protest movements opposing Russian-backed attempts to subvert the country’s emerging democracy and place Ukraine on a trajectory toward Kremlin-style authoritarianism. This grassroots embrace of democratic values has become central to modern Ukraine’s sense of national identity.

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For more than two decades, Ukraine’s burgeoning democratic culture has been one of the key triggers behind Moscow’s escalating campaign of aggression against the country. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s obsession with Ukraine can be traced back to the 2004 Orange Revolution, which was in part provoked by his botched intervention in the Ukrainian presidential election. This was to prove a watershed moment in relations between the two post-Soviet countries. Over the subsequent two decades, Ukraine has pursued a European democratic future, while Putin’s Russia has turned back toward the imperial past.

Putin’s fear of Ukrainian democracy is easy enough to understand. As a young KGB officer in East Germany, his formative political experience was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rapid collapse of the Soviet Empire as a wave of democratic uprisings swept across Eastern Europe. Ever since the Orange Revolution, Putin has been haunted by the idea that an increasingly democratic Ukraine could serve as a catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s imperial retreat and spark the breakup of the Russian Federation itself.

Mounting concern in Moscow over the possible impact of Ukraine’s democratic progress was a major contributing factor behind Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine in 2014. When the occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region failed to prevent the consolidation of Ukrainian democracy or derail the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration, Putin felt compelled to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

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Ukrainians would be the first to admit that their country’s democracy is still very much a work in progress that suffers from a wide range of imperfections including deeply entrenched institutional corruption and excessive oligarch influence. Temporary wartime security measures targeting Kremlin-linked political parties and institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church have also raised concerns. At the same time, Ukrainians are acutely aware that their country’s recent history of internationally recognized elections and strengthening democratic culture set them apart from their Russian neighbors.

The fight for democracy has in many ways defined Ukraine’s post-Soviet journey, but the vast majority of Ukrainians do not support the idea of holding elections in the current wartime conditions. This skepticism is understandable. More than ten million Ukrainians, representing around a quarter of the population, have been internally displaced by Russia’s invasion or forced to flee abroad as refugees. Millions more are currently living under Russian occupation. Without their participation, any vote would lack legitimacy. Likewise, around one million Ukrainian men and women are now serving in the armed forces. Attempting to provide safe voting conditions for them would be a logistical and security nightmare.

It would be similarly impossible to organize a credible election campaign. With the entire country subject to virtually daily Russian bombardment, large-scale campaign events and election rallies would be out of the question. It would be even more reckless to open thousands of polling stations on election day and invite attacks from Russian drones and missiles. Over the past three years, the Kremlin has repeatedly bombed Ukrainian civilians at train stations, funerals, and other public gatherings. There is little reason to believe election day crowds would not also be targeted. Even if a ceasefire was introduced well before the vote, the threat of renewed Russian air strikes would loom large over the entire campaign and deter public participation.

In addition to these practical impediments, attempting to stage an election campaign prior to the signing of a peace treaty would risk sowing division within Ukrainian society at a pivotal moment in the country’s history. Many believe this is the true reason for the Kremlin’s sudden and otherwise inexplicable enthusiasm for Ukrainian democracy. After all, Russia is the world leader in election interference. While Putin’s army has been unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, he may feel that he can still achieve his goal of dividing and subjugating the country via the ballot box. At the very least, if current Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy failed to win reelection, this would remove a very high-profile obstacle to a peace agreement in Russia’s favor.

Democracy is at the very heart of Ukraine’s current fight for national survival and is destined to remain one of the core values in postwar Ukraine. For now, though, most Ukrainians acknowledge that any attempt to stage elections would be impractical and irresponsible in the extreme. For this reason, there is currently no clamor whatsoever for elections within Ukrainian society. The current generation of Ukrainians have fought long and hard for their democratic rights, but they also recognize that the country must be at peace before credible elections can take place. It would be absurd to ignore their wishes and impose premature elections on Ukraine as part of a Kremlin-friendly peace process.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Who is Germany’s presumptive next chancellor, Friedrich Merz, and what is his track record?

Friedrich Merz emerged on the political stage in the 1990s, first as a member of the European Parliament until 1994, then as a Bundestag member until 2009. He briefly served as chairman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parliamentary group in 2000, but was sidelined under Merkel‘s leadership and pivoted to the private sector, working as a corporate lawyer and heading the supervisory board of the German branch of BlackRock until 2018. Throughout this period, he maintained his diplomatic influence—and his international and transatlantic ties—as chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, a non-profit association promoting German-American understanding and cooperation. Merz stepped back into the political fray in Berlin as a challenger for Merkel’s succession in 2018, only to be beaten by then-CDU leader Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. He was eventually selected to lead the CDU in 2022.

Given his track record, the presumptive next chancellor is likely to prioritize Germany’s fiscal discipline at home, with implementing strict budget cuts—for example, by restructuring the country’s “Bürgergeld”—while projecting German strength abroad to counterparts on the European and international stage. This approach was evident in a recent TV debate, in which he asserted with the other candidates: “We are not neutral. We do not stand in the middle. We are on the side of Ukraine and, with Ukraine, we defend the political order we have here.”

— Stuart Jones is a program assistant in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

What are the key issues for voters, and how does Russia’s war in Ukraine factor in?

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What has driven the rising support for the far-right AfD?

Over the last decade, the Overton window in Germany has shifted, just as it has in the United States. The AfD, founded in 2013, was once considered a fringe political party, but in recent years, it has gained significant traction. Today, it’s on the verge of its strongest national showing yet, likely coming in second behind the CDU/CSU. Part of this success stems from the fact that the AfD has adopted a playbook similar to that of the New Right in the United States. The messages it promotes to the German public prey on the same grievances: illegal immigration, government overreach, and culture wars, among others.

— Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Does the AfD stand a chance of joining the governing coalition?

No. All of the major parties in this election have been very clear about excluding the AfD from any coalition to form a government. The “remigration” plan, outlined in a secret Potsdam retreat of some AfD leaders in November 2023, sparked widespread anti-Nazi protests across Germany and led the country’s mainstream parties to distance themselves from the far-right outfit as far as possible. This sentiment largely remains intact in 2025. While the AfD continues to be considered taboo for its advocacy of a “master plan” for mass deportations of migrants and asylum-seekers, the CDU’s recent use of AfD votes to pass a non-binding resolution on stricter migration rules has caused political outrage and nationwide protests. Fears persist that a CDU-led government, even without the AfD in coalition, could still rely on the party’s support in the Bundestag.

— Stuart Jones

Although the “Brandmauer” will hold, meaning the AfD won’t be part of a governing coalition, it will be difficult to completely ignore a party that will likely secure over 20 percent of the German vote. That’s where the rubber hits the road: Will the next German chancellor and his coalition be able to reclaim key narratives from the AfD, or will the AfD be able to continue pulling German society further to the right?

— Rachel Rizzo

What should allies across Europe and the Atlantic watch out for?

The AfD, poised for a strong performance this year, will dominate international headlines. While the CDU remains the front-runner, the prospective rise of the far-right party—classified by Germany’s intelligence agency as an “extremist group”—would mark a historic shift in postwar Germany’s electoral balance. Outcomes at the extremes, including the AfD, leftwing parties like Die Linke and the Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), and the FDP, which is hovering around the 5 percent threshold, could yield enough seats to form a one-third blocking minority, scattering ambitions for much-needed fiscal reforms. Last-minute gains from Die Linke, combined with a significant share of undecided voters, will determine whether Berlin is headed for a two- or three-way coalition government.

Europe is looking to Berlin to regain its leadership role, overcoming divisions that are bleeding into Brussels’s policymaking at a critical time. Confronted with complicated domestic fiscal and EU budget negotiations, imminent trade negotiations with Washington, decisive defense support for Ukraine, and far-reaching reforms on Europe’s competitiveness, immigration, and tech regulations, the next German government will face critical decisions. High on the agenda, the future chancellor will have to reinvigorate Franco-German partnership, which is crucial for shaping the continent’s defense policy in light of dwindling US security commitments.

— Jacopo Pastorelli is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Germany’s economy has gone from engine to anchor. Here’s what the next chancellor faces.

By Piotr Arak

Revitalizing growth in Germany’s economy, which appears increasingly mired in stagnation, will demand urgent action from the next chancellor.

Economy & Business Elections

New Atlanticist Feb 4, 2025

The next German chancellor must lead from the front, not the middle, on European security

By Rachel Rizzo, James Batchik

From support for Ukraine to defense spending, German leaders would be wise to take the phrase Führung aus der Mitte permanently out of their vocabulary.

Elections Germany

New Atlanticist Dec 18, 2024

Scholz’s no-confidence vote isn’t the start of political dysfunction. It’s Germany’s way out of it.

By Jörn Fleck, Rachel Rizzo

One might assume that the German chancellor losing a vote of confidence this week signals political paralysis ahead, but look deeper.

Elections Germany

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Germany’s economy has gone from engine to anchor. Here’s what the next chancellor faces.

Piotr Arak — Wed, 19 Feb 2025 14:58:13 +0000

For decades, Germany has been the economic engine of Europe, boasting the largest economy in the European Union (EU) and ranking third globally by nominal gross domestic product (GDP). However, in recent years the nation’s economic trajectory has faltered. Following two consecutive years of contraction, Germany faces significant structural and political challenges that will demand the next chancellor’s immediate attention. With federal elections set for February 23, the stakes are high for Germany . . .

. . . and for Europe. “When Germany sneezes, Europe catches a cold.” This well-worn metaphor encapsulates Germany’s outsized influence on the EU’s economic and political landscape. The nation’s economic slowdown and political instability reverberate across the continent, threatening the cohesion and growth of the bloc’s members.

Understanding Germany’s current challenges is crucial to assessing the potential risks for the EU as a whole. Some of these challenges were pointed out by the former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi in his report last year on the future of European competitiveness.

Political uncertainty

Polls suggest a fragmented political landscape ahead of the February 23 elections. The center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and its Bavarian counterpart, the Christian Social Union (CSU) are leading with 30 percent. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) follows in second with 22 percent, while the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens, and smaller parties trail behind. While the AfD has been gaining support, it still appears unlikely that any of the established parties will form a coalition with it. If this holds after the election, then coalition negotiations are set to be particularly complex. One likely scenario is the “Kenya coalition” of the CDU/CSU, SPD, and Greens, so-called because of the party colors that mirror the black, red, and green of the Kenyan flag. Another is a “Germany coalition” of the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP.

The continuation of the “traffic light” coalition (SPD, Greens, and the Free Democratic Party) appears unlikely, strengthening expectations that CDU leader Friedrich Merz will assume the role of chancellor. A prominent Atlanticist and long-time opponent of former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Merz returned to politics after she left office in 2021. A former businessman, he has reshaped the CDU’s political direction, adopting more conservative positions on migration, a market-oriented approach to economic policies, and a more pragmatic stance on the energy transition.

Economic stagnation and structural issues

Germany’s most immediate problem is that its economic growth has stalled. The European Commission forecasts GDP growth of just 0.7 percent in 2025, marking the slowest pace among EU nations. Since 2017, the German economy has grown by a mere 1.6 percent, far below the EU average of 9.5 percent. Structural weaknesses, such as high energy costs, low public investment, and an overreliance on exports, have entrenched stagnation. Financial Times associate editor Wolfgang Münchau’s newest book, Kaput: The End of the German Miracle, underscores these imbalances. In it, he warns that Germany’s export-driven model and limited domestic investment have left it ill-prepared for future challenges.

Germany’s industrial base, once the backbone of its economy, is eroding. Prominent German companies are relocating some production abroad, citing lower costs and fewer bureaucratic hurdles. Industrial production has declined steadily, with 2024 output at just 90 percent of 2015 levels. In stark contrast, Poland’s industrial production grew to 152 percent of its 2015 level, reflecting a broader shift of manufacturing capabilities to Central and Eastern Europe.

Germany’s aging population poses significant challenges for its workforce and productivity. With a shrinking labor pool, industries face rising costs and pressure to automate. The unemployment rate in Germany remains low, at 5 percent, but industrial layoffs and restructuring are expected. While the Hartz labor market reforms of the early 2000s and the introduction of the euro in 1999 mitigated similar challenges, today’s environment demands significant public investment and policy innovation to sustain competitiveness. This time, devaluating and decreasing wage growth is not on the table.

High energy prices, driven in part by volatile gas markets, are undermining German competitiveness. Public investment remains inadequate, accounting for just 2.8 percent of GDP—below the EU average of 3.6 percent and far behind Poland (5.1 percent) and Sweden (5.2 percent). Bureaucratic obstacles and a cultural aversion to deficit spending continue to stymie large-scale projects that could drive innovation and increase sustainability.

In contrast to Germany, several Central and Eastern European nations—such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—have emerged as more dynamic competitors. These economies benefit from robust foreign investment and growing service sectors. Spain, too, has become a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment, outpacing Germany in growth and innovation.

Risk aversion and Chinese competition

Germany’s bureaucracy, often seen as a hallmark of precision and order, has increasingly become a barrier to innovation and economic dynamism. Complex regulatory frameworks and lengthy approval processes are stifling entrepreneurial initiatives, making it difficult for businesses to adapt swiftly to changing market conditions. The country’s aversion to risk, rooted in a cultural preference for stability and caution, further exacerbates this challenge.

Many German companies prioritize incremental improvements over bold, transformative projects, fearing failure and the potential regulatory repercussions. (Think, for example, about how it has been slow on the electric vehicle revolution.) This conservative mindset has hindered Germany’s ability to compete in fast-evolving sectors, such as technology and green energy, where agility and risk-taking are essential. Addressing these structural issues will require not only simplifying administrative processes but also fostering a cultural shift toward embracing innovation and calculated risks.

The growing dominance of Chinese automakers in the global electric vehicle (EV) market, in accordance with the “Made in China 2025” strategy, poses a significant threat to Germany’s automotive sector, a cornerstone of its economy. Chinese manufacturers, supported by substantial state subsidies and vertically integrated supply chains, have achieved cost efficiencies and technological advancements that are challenging Germany’s competitive edge.

Chinese automakers such as BYD and NIO are entering European markets with affordable and innovative EV models, outpacing German automakers in battery technology and production scalability. This competition is eroding the global market share of German automotive giants, such as Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz, which are grappling with high production costs, regulatory hurdles, and slow domestic EV adoption.

Data from the German Association of the Automotive Industry reveals that passenger car production in Germany declined by over 25 percent between 2017 and 2023. Given the industry’s contribution to exports, the competitive pressures from China threaten to further weaken its industrial base, with potential spillovers to its EU partners, which are reliant on German trade and investment.

Germany’s car production, which is a key export to the United States, is included in the tariff package prepared by the Trump administration, with a 25 percent tariff at the US border. Any potential economic hurdles for Germany could not only create political challenges but also lead to an economic crisis.

The path forward

The challenges facing Germany’s next chancellor are formidable, encompassing economic, political, and structural domains. Revitalizing growth in an economy that appears increasingly mired in stagnation demands urgent action. Central to this effort is the need to reconcile Germany’s traditional reliance on industrial exports with increased public investment. At the same time, navigating coalition dynamics will be critical, as the past several years have demonstrated a lack of meaningful progress.

On the economic front, Germany must reevaluate its energy policy. High energy prices, driven in large part by an overreliance on renewable energy sources without sufficient grid modernization and storage solutions, have burdened businesses and households alike. A robust industrial strategy is essential to bolster the competitiveness of Germany’s automotive manufacturing sector. Deregulation and streamlined bureaucracy are also urgently needed to inject greater dynamism into the German economy.

Failure to implement reforms risks exacerbating Germany’s economic problems, with repercussions that extend beyond its national borders. A weakened Germany would likely erode confidence in European markets, exacerbate economic disparities within the EU, and embolden Euroskeptic movements. Conversely, decisive leadership and transformative reforms could not only rejuvenate Germany’s economy but also reaffirm its role as a stabilizing force and leader within the European project. For the next chancellor, the stakes are nothing less than determining Europe’s future trajectory or overseeing the economic collapse of their country.

Piotr Arak is an assistant professor of economic sciences at the University of Warsaw and chief economist at VeloBank Poland.

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Georgia’s pro-Kremlin authorities intensify crackdown on opposition

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 18 Feb 2025 22:05:22 +0000

The Georgian authorities presented new legislation in early February that critics say will increase pressure on the country’s civil society and independent media while also placing additional restrictions on public gatherings. The move comes amid a wave of anti-government protests that began following Georgia’s disputed October 2024 parliamentary elections and escalated weeks later when the government took steps to suspend the country’s EU accession efforts.

The current crisis reflects widespread tensions in Georgian society, with the governing Georgian Dream party accused of attempting to turn the country away from decades of Euro-Atlantic integration and return to the Russian orbit. Government officials deny the charges, claiming instead that they seek to guard against undue Western influence while avoiding any involvement in the geopolitical confrontation over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Georgian Dream officials announced in early February that the party planned to draft legislation that would tighten restrictions on foreign-funded media outlets and establish a new code of journalistic ethics to be monitored by a government body. Similar legislative initiatives are being prepared targeting Georgian civil society organizations. Opponents have likened these steps to the draconian measures introduced by the Putin regime over the past twenty-five years to silence domestic opposition inside Russia.

With anti-government protests still taking place in cities across Georgia on an almost daily basis, the authorities have also recently introduced new laws limiting public gatherings and criminalizing minor protest actions such as placing stickers on public property. Since protests flared in late 2024, hundreds have been detained, with many reporting human rights abuses while in custody including beatings and torture.

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Critics say these latest steps serve as further confirmation of the Georgian government’s intention to establish a Kremlin-style authoritarian state. In early February, Transparency International Georgia executive director Eka Gigauri told the Associated Press that she believed the authorities were using the same tactics employed by the Putin regime against opponents. “There is nothing new in how they attack civic activists,” she said. “This was happening in Russia years ago.”

Similar sentiments have been expressed by international human rights watchdogs monitoring the current crisis. “The government is relentlessly taking the country into a repressive era that is uncharted for Georgia but all too familiar in authoritarian states,” commented Human Rights Watch Europe and Central Asia Director Hugh Williamson in January 2025.

In recent months, Georgia’s Western partners have become more vocal in their criticism of the country’s increasingly authoritarian policies and apparent turn toward Moscow. This Western response has included imposing sanctions against a number of Georgian officials including billionaire Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, who is widely seen as the country’s de facto leader and architect of Georgia’s current pro-Kremlin policies. On February 13, the European Parliament adopted a resolution questioning the legitimacy of the current Georgian authorities and calling for fresh elections in the coming months monitored by international observers.

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Meanwhile, relations with Russia continue to improve. Georgia has won favor in Moscow in recent years by refusing to participate in Western sanctions over the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Georgia has welcomed Russian businesses and has been accused of helping the Kremlin bypass international restrictions put in place in response to the war.

Members of the Georgian Dream party have positioned themselves as the only political force capable of establishing pragmatic relations with Russia. With around twenty percent of Georgia currently under Russian occupation, the threat of renewed Russian military aggression is a highly sensitive issue for Georgian society. In the run-up to Georgia’s October 2024 parliamentary election, Georgian Dream sparked controversy by using campaign posters contrasting peaceful Georgia with war-torn Ukraine as part of election messaging that sought to position the vote as a choice between war and peace.

With international attention now firmly fixed on developments in and around Ukraine, the political crisis in Georgia has slipped out of the headlines. However, this small nation in the southern Caucasus has a geopolitical significance that far outweighs its size. For the past two decades, Georgia has been widely seen in Western capitals as a post-Soviet success story, but the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations now hang in the balance. This represents a significant foreign policy challenge for the new Trump administration and for Europe.

Recent repressive measures indicate that the Georgian authorities are intent on escalating their clampdown against domestic opponents and strengthening ties with the Kremlin. If they succeed, it would represent a major victory for Vladimir Putin in the confrontation between the democratic world and an emerging alliance of authoritarian powers including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

Mercedes Sapuppo is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Is Kosovo Headed for Political Gridlock? | A Debrief with Jeff Hovenier

sjones — Thu, 13 Feb 2025 21:55:00 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Kosovo’s parliamentary elections on February 9 have painted a complex picture, as Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s Vetëvendosje remains the strongest party, but it has lost its absolute majority from 2021. So, why did voters back Kurti yet limit his power? Is this a sign of growing dissatisfaction in Kosovo, or perhaps a call for more political balance?

With coalition talks ahead, the big question iss whether Kurti can form a stable government or if opposition parties will seek to unite and form a mandate. Meanwhile, tensions with Serbia remain high, normalization talks are stalled, and Kosovo’s relationship with key Western allies—including the United States—has become increasingly strained.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, sits down with former U.S. Ambassador to Kosovo, Jeff Hovenier, to break down the election results, the possible governing scenarios, and what’s at stake for Kosovo’s democracy, regional stability, and international partnerships.

Drawing from his personal experience, Hovenier reflects on the challenges of navigating the often-tense relationship between Washington and Prime Minister Kurti’s government during his tenure.

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Your primer on Kosovo’s parliamentary election

Ilva Tare, Jonathan Moore, and Stuart Jones — Thu, 06 Feb 2025 17:02:43 +0000

After a four-year mandate in Pristina, Prime Minister Albin Kurti faces a test at the polls as Kosovars vote for a new parliament on February 9. With prominent opposition candidates in the running, the election will be a test of Kurti’s political momentum after his sweeping victory in 2021 and will take place against the backdrop of a contentious international landscape for the Western Balkans and the transatlantic community writ large.

Ahead of the election, the Europe Center is answering questions about the key candidates and issues at play.

What is the political context of this election?

Kosovo is gearing up for parliamentary elections on February 9, marking a big moment in its political history—the first time a government has completed a full term since Kosovo declared independence in 2008. Prime Minister Albin Kurti and his party Vetëvendosje (“Self-Determination Movement,” VV), who won a landslide victory in 2021 with 50.28 percent of the vote, are now seeking re-election in what’s shaping up to be a heated contest, as the opposition is determined to make significant gains.

Kurti is a bold and polarizing figure—hailed as a reformer and disruptor by those who want sweeping changes, yet criticized by others who claim his policy undermines progress toward positive regional relations. For many, he is a symbol of hope and progress; for others, his hardline stances, especially on domestic reforms and the stalled dialogue with Serbia, raise red flags. As voters head to the polls, Kurti’s leadership and vision remain at the center of Kosovo’s political debate, sparking questions about the country’s path forward.

Kosovo’s future depends heavily on its integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, with a new European Commission team and opportunities with the freshly appointed special representative for the normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Additionally, a potential shift in priorities of the new US administration adds another layer of uncertainty. As Kosovo navigates this evolving global landscape, its relationship with the United States will play a key role in shaping the country’s future aspirations.

—Ilva Tare is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Kosovo is often viewed as stagnant, and its attempts to build respect and diplomatic recognition on the international stage have been largely ineffective. Although Kurti is heading the longest-serving government since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, he has been repeatedly accused by opposition parties of delivering little, defying the international community, and complaining about Serbia while missing out on opportunities to build infrastructure and develop Kosovo economically. The results of this election will be a critical indicator of Kosovo’s future.

—Jonathan Moore is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Who is Albin Kurti—and who are his main challengers?

Kurti, the current prime minister and leader of VV has long maintained a strong stance on Kosovo’s sovereignty, frequently targeting Serbia’s influence in the region. He has labeled Serbia a “proxy of Russia” and accused Western powers of appeasing Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. His campaign continues to focus on anti-corruption, national independence, and a tough approach to Kosovo’s relationship with Serbia.

Kurti’s main challengers are the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), now led by Memli Krasniqi, who has nominated Bedri Hamza as their candidate for prime minister, and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Lumir Abdixhiku. The PDK, which won 17 percent of the vote in 2021, is focusing its campaign on economic reform and strengthening Kosovo’s international relationships. Bedri Hamza has emphasized the need for Kosovo to attract foreign investments and improve living standards, proposing pragmatic policies to stabilize the economy and create jobs. The LDK, which secured 13 percent in 2021, advocates for a more balanced approach to the dialogue with Serbia and calls for a reset in Kosovo’s diplomatic strategy. Abdixhiku’s campaign centers on restoring Kosovo’s credibility in international negotiations and rebuilding trust with the West. Both parties have criticized Kurti and his handling of the dialogue with Serbia in particular, which they argue has stalled Kosovo’s domestic and international progress. They emphasize their commitment to economic development, strengthening Kosovo’s international presence, and adopting a more constructive approach to relations with the European Union (EU) and the United States. Despite their criticism, recent polls indicate that while VV maintains a lead, the opposition parties are closing the gap. However, the result remains uncertain as election day approaches.

—Ilva Tare

Kurti entered the political stage as a firebrand, initially making his mark as a student protestor in the late 1990s. His left-leaning party VV gradually built its parliamentary presence starting in 2010. VV was founded on a reputation of refusing to compromise, even with Kosovo’s most important international partners. While Kosovo’s lack of progress toward EU standards may be more apparent outside the country, voters are increasingly aware that they are falling behind. At the same time, many Kosovars view Kurti’s political opposition as either compromised or outright corrupt. The three major opposition parties (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, or AAK; LDK; and PDK) share similar goals: they want to leverage US and European support to secure NATO and EU membership. However, their difficult histories and bitter rivalries on the local level have prevented them from uniting ahead of the election. There is much talk of joining efforts if VV fails to secure an outright majority, with the most successful of the three parties taking the lead in forming a new government. However, the outcome of such an effort is uncertain. Especially, as all of the three parties have leaders who are determined to succeed on their own. On top of that, it is also conceivable that Kurti could form a coalition with one of them to retain power.

—Jonathan Moore

What do the polls say about who is likely to win?

The question is in the air about what would happen if VV falls short of the 50 percent threshold required to govern with an outright majority. Even though some local media have speculated about a potential coalition between VV and the PDK, Deputy Prime Minister Besnik Bislimi has recently denied this possibility. The presidency, which will become vacant after Vjosa Osmani’s term ends next year, could become a key bargaining chip in such negotiations if they do take place with an opposition party. Kosovo’s ethnic Serbs make up about 2.3 percent of its 1.6 million population, though this figure is contested due to a census boycott by Serbs. The next government will need to face the issue of implementing the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM), which aims to address the concerns of Kosovo’s Serbian minority and is backed by both the EU and the United States. Additionally, Serbia is expected to deliver on the de facto recognition of Kosovo.

—Ilva Tare

As is often the case elsewhere in the region, polls in Kosovo have not been very accurate in the past, and VV’s victory in 2021 was unprecedented, with the three opposition parties performing poorly (PDK: 17 percent; LDK: 12.7 percent; AAK: 7.1 percent). Since then, both PDK and LDK have changed their leadership.

—Jonathan Moore

What are the biggest challenges Kosovo’s next government will face?

The United States must play a more prominent role in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue to address the region’s political complexities. It is unclear how the recent statement by Special Envoy Ric Grenell about Kurti and his government’s relationship with Washington may reflect future US policy toward the region. However, the EU’s inability to break the deadlock has stalled progress. With Serbia’s ongoing ties to Russia and Kosovo’s aspirations to solidify its sovereignty, the United States could leverage its influence to steer both parties toward a more pragmatic, long-term agreement. The shifting international landscape calls for a more balanced approach, emphasizing stronger transatlantic collaboration to foster stability and address unresolved issues between Kosovo and Serbia. A critical aspect of this dialogue is Serbia’s eventual recognition of Kosovo, which could also push the EU’s five non-recognizing members to reconsider their stance, thereby strengthening Kosovo’s international legitimacy. The ultimate goal remains the full normalization of relations, culminating in Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as an independent state and the country’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

—Ilva Tare

Kurti has built a reputation on refusing to compromise and takes pride in his unwillingness to normalize relations with Serbia. If the opposition comes to power, they are likely to seek closer ties with Washington and Brussels, but will struggle to make significant progress on normalization in the short term. They had the opportunity of implementing agreed-upon steps in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue when in power but chose not to, citing domestic political objections. Incentives to move the normalization Dialogue forward, particularly from the EU, would be important.

—Jonathan Moore

Youth brain drain is a major policy challenge across the Western Balkans, and the next government in Pristina must contend with it. One in four citizens has left the region, driven by low salaries, limited economic opportunities, political instability, and corruption. The World Bank’s latest report on the Western Balkans highlights that emigration from the healthcare sector, in particular, has resulted in over 20 percent of Kosovo’s young talent residing in other European countries. As Kosovo’s population continues to age, this will only intensify, presenting an even greater challenge for the incoming government.

—Stuart Jones is a program assistant in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

What obstacles does Kosovo face in achieving its foreign policy goals?

NATO and EU membership remain top priorities for Kosovo’s foreign policy, but both the current government and some of its predecessors have, at times, put the cart before the horse. Even though it has made significant diplomatic efforts to secure global recognition and membership in the Council of Europe, Kosovo remains outside the United Nations. NATO and EU members—some of which have yet to recognize Kosovo’s independence or establish diplomatic relations—continue to demand tangible steps toward “normalization” between Belgrade and Pristina, along with the implementation of past agreements. The timing of this election coincides with the appointment of Danish/EU diplomat Peter Sørensen to head the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, potentially shaping the course of future negotiations.

—Jonathan Moore

Kosovo’s path toward EU accession hinges on the outcome of these elections. If Kurti secures another majority mandate, the country could see more political brinkmanship between Kosovo and the EU, particularly if US President Donald Trump pivots away from traditional US support for the region’s Euro-Atlantic integration and Brussels remains divided on enlargement. On the latter, there are positive signs that under High Representative Kaja Kallas, enlargement will be a political priority, at least with regard to Ukraine and Moldova. Renewed enthusiasm for enlargement, spurred by these two countries, should in all logic be good news for the Western Balkans.

If VV is forced into a governing coalition with PDK or LDK, there is some hope that Kurti’s rhetoric could become more moderate, leading to greater openness to dialogue with regional and international partners. However, a PDK-LDK grand coalition excluding VV would likely lead to an unpredictable platform and an unstable mandate. With such widespread support, Kurti in opposition would be a nightmare for a PDK or LDK prime minister, similar to governments elsewhere in Europe, such as in France, Spain, and potentially Germany, where diverse political alliances struggle to maintain cohesion, sometimes at the expense of effective policymaking.

—Stuart Jones

Report

Dec 11, 2023

Getting back on track: Unlocking Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic and development perspective

By Agon Maliqi

Report exploring the path forward for Kosovo’s integration into transatlantic institutions and the geopolitical and economic challenges and opportunities facing the country.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Explore the Kazakhstan country scorecard

The post Your primer on Kosovo’s parliamentary election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Surrounded by superpowers, Kazakhstan walks a geopolitical tightrope

Nargis Kassenova — Wed, 05 Feb 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Evolution of freedom

Evolution of prosperity

The path forward

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Evolution of freedom

The Freedom Index shows two important features of the institutional development process that Kazakhstan has followed in the last three decades. On the one hand, the overall positive trend reflects the goal, maintained throughout the period, to integrate into the global community both politically and economically in order to foster the young country’s security and prosperity. All the strategies the country has adopted over the past thirty years consistently reflect its aspiration to have an open competitive economy and be a respected international actor. The latter implied becoming a functional democracy and complying with international human rights norms. On the other hand, while the government’s commitment to economic liberalization has been fairly consistent and genuine, its record in the areas of good governance, democratization, and human rights could be characterized as patchy at best. The divergent paths of the three freedom subindexes underscore the difference in commitment.

Fluctuations observed in the Freedom Index can be explained by changes in circumstances and policies. Kazakhstan received a strong initial impulse toward liberalization thanks to the late Soviet perestroika reforms and the Washington Consensus. However, by the end of the 1990s, this impulse was subdued by the consolidation of an authoritarian regime under the country’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. It was also challenged by the Asian financial crisis, which generated serious doubts about the benefits of unconstrained openness to financial and trade markets. In the early 2000s, oil revenues started to increase, and the government was clearly tempted to use the windfall to pursue interventionist and protectionist economic policies. Tensions between state-led development and free market orientations have been present ever since. Economic growth also allowed an enhancement of the social welfare system, which had been damaged by the economic crisis and neoliberal policies of the 1990s. Nazarbayev’s resignation in 2019 and comprehensive reforms laid out by president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in the wake of the dramatic unrest and crackdown in January 2022 created a positive dynamic reflected in the upward trend of the Index.

Looking at the three freedom subindexes gives a more detailed view of developments in Kazakhstan. The economic subindex is the main contributor to the overall positive trajectory of the aggregate Index. It has been on the ascent and above the region’s average, with the exception of a sudden ten-point decrease in the 2000–04 period. Trade and investment freedom plummeted at that point due to the adoption of new legislation regulating investment, taxes, and environmental requirements. The government grew more assertive in its relations with foreign investors, introduced local content requirements, and renegotiated contracts. But the subindex quickly recovered, and since then has shown a very clear positive trend, which was helped by Kazakhstan’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2015.

The relatively high score on women’s economic freedom is both a legacy of the Soviet modernization project and its emphasis on recruiting women into the labor force and a product of current circumstances. For many families, two incomes are needed to support a decent standard of living. A positive long-term consequence of the dramatic economic collapse of the late Soviet and early independence years is the high number of women entrepreneurs in Kazakhstan. At the time, many women quit their non-paying jobs and became shuttle traders, importing goods from China and Turkey and selling them in bazaars and small markets. This experience served as an incubator for women entrepreneurs in the country. The trend has been supported by the government and international donors, and nowadays, there is a relatively high share of female entrepreneurs running their own businesses.

The political subindex shows a sustained deterioration between 1999 and 2019, with a temporary improvement in 2006–10, and a steep rise since 2019. The relatively higher scores of the 1990s represent the ebbing of the liberalization wave started by Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in the mid-1980s. The super-presidential Constitution adopted in 1995 set Kazakhstan on the path of authoritarian consolidation. The trend is illustrated by the twenty-point fall in political rights of expression and association up until 2019. The situation with civil liberties during that period was better and more complex, as indicated by fluctuations on that component. The 2003, 2012, and 2016 dips are all linked to the adoption of new legislation (a 2003 law on extremism, a 2011 law on religious activities, and several legislative and legal amendments in 2016 targeting “extremism and terrorism”) which limited freedom of conscience in the name of security. However, unlike the almost linear deterioration of the political subindex, each dip was followed by a partial recovery, reflecting a certain degree of internalization of liberal values by the political elites.

The power transition in Kazakhstan, which started with Nazarbayev’s resignation in 2019 and ended with the “Bloody January” events in 2022, produced a critical juncture for the country. The first event did not change the balance of power— Nazarbayev, his family and associates remained in control, with Nazarbayev still designated “Leader of the Nation”—but it changed the mood in society. People felt that change was possible, and started demanding reforms. Tokayev and his team perceived and tried to respond to this growing demand. They developed policies around the concept of the “hearing state” and experimented with more open local elections. However, under the Nazarbayev/Tokayev duumvirate, the system—long used to a clear and rigid vertical of power—grew confused and ineffective. The citizens’ urge for change led to protests at the beginning of 2022 which, combined with what many observers see as an unsuccessful attempted coup by Nazarbayev loyalists, resulted in the “de-Nazarbayevization” of the system. Unexpectedly, President Tokayev transformed from an appointed successor into a reformist president. While the official goals of the political reforms he has been undertaking are democratization and liberalization, they seem to be primarily aimed at removing the excesses of the super-presidential political system and improving governance. The geopolitical context is a factor affecting the direction and depth of reforms. On the one hand, deepening relations with the West is even more important under the new circumstances, and therefore Western perceptions of the human rights situation in Kazakhstan matter. On the other, there are fears that political liberalization could destabilize and weaken the country, making it more vulnerable to external meddling.

The legal subindex reflects a very complex situation around the implementation of the rule of law in Kazakhstan. First, the improving quality and responsiveness of the bureaucratic apparatus is well captured by the data. The growing budget in the 2000s allowed the regime to invest in good governance, drawing on the understanding that the best way to reduce contestation and protests is to efficiently provide the population with public services through a well-functioning state. The focus has been on better training of civil servants and digitalization to improve efficiency and accountability (in line with the “hearing state” concept). Every public agency has social media accounts, and its performance assessment takes into account the public communication aspect.

Second, there is a clear lack of improvement— and even deterioration—in the judicial independence and effectiveness score. The subservience of the judicial branch to the president, introduced by the 1995 Constitution, and the systemic corruption, greatly hindered the development of the rule of law in Kazakhstan. Realizing that this reduces the country’s attractiveness to foreign investors, the government created a legal enclave, the Astana International Financial Center, in 2018. It features its own court and international arbitration center, providing a common law system and employing foreign judges. While this arrangement serves as a quick fix for investor-related issues, it makes the injustices facing the general citizenry even more apparent.

It is worth noting that President Tokayev initiated a judicial reform aimed at raising the qualifications of judges and legal personnel, “cleaning” the system of corruption, and improving processes and procedures. Over the next five years it will be possible to assess the implementation of that reform. One important positive development is the restoration of the Constitutional Court (the previous body was turned into a “toothless” Constitutional Council by the 1995 Constitution) and inviting highly professional and credible people to serve as judges.

Evolution of prosperity

Kazakhstan is a large exporter of crude oil, gold, iron ore, copper, aluminum, zinc, uranium, and other metals, bringing substantial revenues to the country. It also produces and sells high-quality durum wheat, an important commodity in international markets. Therefore, it is not surprising that its overall Prosperity Index score has been above the regional average. In addition, the government’s efforts to improve social welfare, drawing on the norms and experiences of the Soviet welfare state, also help Kazakhstan to score better in the education and minorities components of the Index.

Fluctuations of the inequality component show that economic growth does not necessarily translate into reductions in poverty and inequality, and that positive trends can be reversible. There are substantial spatial disparities in wealth and access to services between the regions and along the rural-urban divide. The two largest cities, Almaty and Astana, are better off, while the oil-producing regions of western Kazakhstan have both high income and high poverty rates and the agricultural and largely rural south ranks poorly on both counts. The government is trying to mend these regional inequalities by investing in infrastructure and changing budget allocations to incentivize regions to generate their own revenues through economic activities.

The education component of the Index places Kazakhstan within the best performers in the world. It can boast nearly universal enrollment in elementary and secondary education, and high enrollment in tertiary education. The scores, however, do not show the patchy quality of the education provided. The neoliberal reforms of the 1990s responsible for underfunding the sector and “streamlining” schools in rural areas, and the gradual dissipation of the Soviet education system, accompanied by the retirement of Soviet-trained teachers, resulted in growing inequality of access and decreasing quality of instruction in public schools. Standardized tests such as PISA show serious deficiencies in the education of Kazakhstani pupils compared to those of Western Europe or other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. During the Nazarbayev period, the government tried to improve education, which it viewed as a crucial component of economic growth and development, through internationalization and creation of “pockets of excellence,” most importantly the newly established Nazarbayev University and a cluster of Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools, attracting the most talented students with fully funded grants. Tokayev’s government has been working on improving the quality of public, and especially rural, education, by allocating more funding, raising the status and salary of teachers, and reforming teacher training institutions. It also promotes partnerships between established foreign universities and regional universities in Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan’s health component has fluctuated above and below the regional average. A steep increase in life expectancy in the 2000s reflects the improvement of the socioeconomic situation and bigger investments in the healthcare system, which enabled Kazakhstan to achieve a substantial decline in infant and maternal mortality, approaching the OECD average. As with the rest of the region, Kazakhstan experienced a decline in life expectancy as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The stronger negative effect of the pandemic in Kazakhstan compared to the rest of the region might be the outcome of better and more honest statistics. The country’s government was very active in handling the healthcare crisis during the pandemic and carried out a mass vaccination campaign once vaccines became available. The national Healthy Nation project currently being implemented aims to increase life expectancy from the current seventy-five years to seventy-seven within five years.

Kazakhstan has scored high in the minorities component. Its Constitution outlaws any discrimination “on the grounds of origin, social, official, or property status, sex, race, nationality, language, attitude to religion, convictions, place of residence or any other circumstance.” Managing interethnic relations has been the biggest challenge. In the early days of independence, the country’s leadership crafted an approach carefully balancing the interests of its multiple ethnic groups (especially Russians) with the need to develop a nation state around the Kazakh identity. Representatives of different ethnic groups compose the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, a special political body, chaired by the president of the country. Five members of the Assembly are elected to the Senate.

Finally, Kazakhstan scores above the regional average in the environment component. It is not a big carbon emitter, but this is largely due to the country’s small population of 20 million people, dwarfed by its large neighbors in the broader Eurasia region. Kazakhstan’s carbon intensity, that is the amount of carbon dioxide emitted per unit of energy, is high (0.33 kg per kilowatt-hour) and exceeds those of China (0.26 kg/kWh) and India (0.28 kg/kWh). The government has an ambitious decarbonization program, aiming to reach net zero by 2060.

The path forward

Kazakhstan finds itself at an inflection point. The January 2022 events put a sudden end to the Nazarbayev era, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine undermined the post-Soviet political and security order. The combined domestic and geopolitical shocks are causing concerns, fears, and anxieties about the present and the future. At the same time, they are creating space for change and new beginnings. Whether Kazakhstan can move toward more freedom and prosperity will be determined by choices made today and tomorrow, and shaped by the domestic dynamic of state-society relations and external incentives and pressures.

At present, Tokayev’s reform agenda points to further liberalization of the system. We can expect an improvement in the political subindex: modest improvements on the elections, political rights, and legislative constraints on the executive components; and more substantial improvements on the civil liberties component. The situation with religious freedoms might not improve, but will probably not deteriorate either, despite growing concerns about radical Islamism and terrorism. The legal subindex scores are likely to grow, particularly the judicial independence and effectiveness and bureaucracy and corruption components. There will also be improvement of prosperity scores due to active policies on women’s empowerment, inclusion of people with disabilities, and decarbonization efforts.

For the gradual liberalization agenda to work, on the domestic side, the state needs to maintain the will for reforms and capacity to implement them with a substantial degree of success, and society needs to be interested in reforms and exercise consistent pressure. If the relations between the two grow conflictual (fueled by inequalities and grievances), there is a risk that the reforms will be curtailed. There will be more clarity about the trajectory of Kazakhstan’s development by 2029, the year when president Tokayev’s single term comes to an end. It is important to keep in mind that there are anti-liberal as well as pro-liberal forces in Kazakhstan’s society. Growing social conservatism that accompanies Islamic revival could become a formidable challenge over the next ten years.

On the geopolitical side, the liberalization agenda needs to be incentivized and supported by the West. Such a partnership would be useful for both parties—but not easy for either. Kazakhstan wants deeper relations with the West in order to develop and not be overwhelmed by its giant neighbors, Russia and China. However, it needs to build those relationships gently, to avoid angering Moscow and annoying Beijing too much. For the United States, European countries, and others, the challenge is to engage in an effective manner, providing the right incentives. Unlike in the 1990s, the supremacy of the West is now being challenged, and new approaches and ways of dealing with countries like Kazakhstan are needed.

Taking into account internal and external factors, I can envisage three scenarios. The first, optimistic, scenario, “More freedom and prosperity,” hinges on the success of liberalization reforms and a benign external environment. Under this scenario, President Tokayev and his team are able to successfully implement some reforms, giving them more legitimacy, and Kazakhstani society keeps pushing for more liberalization. Tokayev ends his term in 2029, as defined by the Constitutional amendment, and there is a peaceful power transfer. Relations with the West are strong, Russia accepts the new situation, and China finds it useful for managing relations with Europe. Kazakhstan is not a liberal democracy, but it is on a promising path, gradually internalizing liberal values and norms.

The second scenario, “Prosperity at the expense of freedom,” implies limited reforms, skewed in favor of professional state and socioeconomic goals. The leadership decides that tightening control over society with the help of traditional and new (digital) surveillance means is a must, and there is no need to pay too much attention to what Western actors think and say on the matter. The aspiration is to be a functional authoritarian state, and that means accepting being a political and economic satellite of China, the new superpower.

The third scenario, “No freedom and no prosperity,” is a sad story of Kazakhstan imploding from internal tensions and/or destabilized from outside. The January 2022 events provided a glimpse of such destabilization. Transformation of a consolidated, personalized and corrupt authoritarian regime into a softer and better governed one is a way to prevent conflicts and improve the development trajectory of the country, but as with all modernizations, it can be unsettling and pregnant with risks. Russia, unhappy with Kazakhstan “drifting away,” decides to “bring it to heel” using hybrid war methods.

Nargis Kassenova is a senior fellow and director of the Program on Central Asia at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University. Kassenova’s research focuses on Central Asian politics and security, Eurasian geopolitics, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, governance in Central Asia, and the history of state-making in Central Asia.

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The next German chancellor must lead from the front, not the middle, on European security

Rachel Rizzo, James Batchik — Tue, 04 Feb 2025 21:19:15 +0000

Voters in Germany will head to the polls on February 23 at a precarious moment for the transatlantic alliance. US President Donald Trump is back in the White House, Germany’s economy continues to lag behind those of its peers, energy prices are high, and the war in Ukraine continues to rage. The next German government will have no shortage of issues to confront head on. Although a more forward-leaning security and defense posture might not be at the forefront of voters’ minds, the next chancellor should make this a priority given that it will in part determine the health of the US-German relationship for at least the next four years.

Indeed, if German leaders need an impetus for action, they should look no further than Washington. In the US capital, Berlin has been dealt a tough hand politically. For years, it has been targeted (mostly by the right) as the poster child of a bad ally. Last October, US Vice President JD Vance said that NATO’s problem is that Germany doesn’t spend enough. More recently, billionaire and Trump adviser Elon Musk’s bizarre support for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has led to a series of tweets in which he says they’re the only party that can save Germany. Beyond this, because of the transactional approach that the Trump administration will surely take toward Europe, the next German government simply won’t have the luxury of time to carve out a new role for itself within the European Union (EU), NATO, or as a “good” ally of the United States. It must instead lead, not just because of pressure from Washington, but for its own sake.

Where should the next government start?

First on the docket must be Ukraine. Kyiv needs more equipment to keep fighting, and fast; it is struggling on the battlefield, with Russia slowly but surely continuing to gain ground. Given Trump’s desire to bring about an end to the fighting, it’s unclear if Kyiv will see the same type of support from the United States that it saw during the Biden administration. In fact, it’s probably safe to say that it won’t. Europe must take a leading role for Ukraine’s long-term security, first with more financial, military, and humanitarian assistance, and second with talk around Europe’s engagement in the outcomes of negotiations.

Germany needs to be creative on negotiations as well. Trump will want to take on the role of “primary negotiator” in any talks that might take place, but if Germany isn’t willing to put real skin in the game, then it will risk being left out of critical decision making. Coming to the table without a real offer of support or trying to explain why certain actions just aren’t feasible in Germany will be seen as weak. It will simply feed into the administration’s rhetoric of “feckless Europeans.” In fact, German leaders would be wise to take the phrase Führung aus der Mitte, or “lead from the middle,” permanently out of their vocabulary.

Instead, the next German government will have to determine how to help secure Ukraine’s long-term security and enforce any peace, potentially by sending German troops to Ukraine and supporting other European forces in a meaningful capacity. If the option of “boots on the ground” becomes a reality, Germany must be there. It will be unacceptable for Berlin to sit on the sidelines.

The new government should immediately announce further military aid to Ukraine, including a new package that has so far failed to come from this government. This will help Ukraine in the short term, and it will help the West come to the table for potential negotiations from a place of strength rather than weakness.

The turning point: Take two

Beyond Ukraine, Berlin will also need to deliver on the faltering Zeitenwende. The sea change in Germany’s defense policy promised by Chancellor Olaf Scholz was a laudable initial effort that was applauded from Washington. But it quickly sputtered out and has failed to deliver in a way that experts hoped or expected. Sustained defense spending is on shaky ground once the one hundred billion euro “special fund” runs out in 2027. Procurement to refurbish Berlin’s military capabilities is too slow, and the lack of real political will at the highest levels has so far doomed attempts to breathe fresh life into the effort.

Germany’s defense transformation also struggles with the general public. While it’s true that leaders and analysts alike perhaps assigned a wider meaning to the Zeitenwende than Scholz anticipated, the current government had a major messaging problem in selling its ideas to a broad audience beyond the so-called “Berlin bubble.” Most of the country understands the threat Russia poses, and polls last year showed that Germans remain broadly supportive of Ukraine and for increased defense spending. But still, a recent poll found that 55 percent of the country opposed prioritizing defense spending over social spending.

However, politicians must not be tempted to hide behind public attitudes, especially in a country with a complex relationship with its military. Perhaps the most important lesson from the Zeitenwende is the power of political will. The public can be convinced with clear-eyed and consistent speeches, statements, and engagement that defense spending, arming Ukraine, and deterring Russian aggression on the European continent makes them safer.

Break it off?

But Germany needs more than just defense spending. Germany continues to confront the consequences of decades of absent or under-investment in various sectors within the country. According to the International Monetary Fund, “Over the medium term, Germany faces rising spending pressures from aging and defense, as well as a need to expand public investment in transport, energy, communications, and other infrastructure.”

To do this, Germany must figure out how to relax its fiscal rules to accommodate higher spending and more sustained long-term investment. The oft-cited “debt brake” should be first on the list. The debt brake was written into the German Constitution in 2009 by the Merkel government, and it requires that the country’s budget deficit does not exceed 0.35 percent of structural gross domestic product (GDP). This rule has helped Germany maintain a debt-to-GDP ratio around 60 percent, which is well below the eurozone average. At the same time, it has also reduced the government’s ability to invest in infrastructure and encourage economic growth.

Reforming the debt brake will be difficult. The next German parliament will need a two-thirds majority to reform the rules, which will be tough given that it’s unlikely any potential coalition will have this majority. There are some creative ways to get around this, but relaxing the debt brake rules should be a priority for everyone, as it will be key for Germany to unlock its potential during the Trump era and beyond.

On the defense side, the German Armed Forces need increased and ongoing investments into the production of ammunition and artillery shells, for example. The next government should also embrace institutional changes to shape more productive decision making. A national security council, for example, would go a long way in helping Germany streamline its defense decision making. Although this isn’t a new idea by any means, it hasn’t gotten the traction it deserves, as the idea is often dismissed as too difficult or unrealistic given how the German government works. But now is the time for Germany to challenge its own self-imposed limitations, for its own sake and not just to placate critics in Washington.

None of these efforts will be cheap, and German politicians will need to expend serious political capital selling these ideas. That effort will become even more difficult in areas where far-right and far-left politicians have spread anti-NATO and anti-EU messages throughout the population. But given the political realities facing the transatlantic partners, it’s beyond time Germany steps up and plays the leadership role everyone wants it to play. If not, it will be sidelined, seen as irrelevant, and this moment will have been squandered.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

James Batchik is an associate director with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Libya’s de facto partition demands a solution designed for it—not for outside contenders

Hani Shennib — Fri, 31 Jan 2025 20:09:15 +0000

While the West continues to fixate on elections in promoting democracy worldwide, many Libyans today have become resentful. They largely perceive the elections touted by the West as part of a strategy to legitimize a government that serves foreign interests rather than fulfilling Libyans’ needs for stability and institution building. They simply do not trust that elections conducted under current conditions—characterized by a lack of constitutional foundations, profound corruption, forceful arrests, and streets dominated by militias and warlords—can lead to fair outcomes.

Meanwhile, the West and its partners, caught up in defending democracy and human rights, feel guilt over their failure to stabilize Libya following an intervention that bizarrely morphed from a mission to protect a population from Muammar Gaddafi’s wrath into one of regime change. Consequently, the coalition has yet again turned to an inept United Nations (UN)to push for democratic change through elections. However, this goal has not materialized and is unlikely to do so in the near future.

Historically, other countries have approached resolving the situation in Libya with a mindset of “what’s in it for me?,” highlighting how national and regional interests shape attempts at change—particularly in the context of Libya. This was similarly true during UN discussions on how to address Italian colonies taken by the Allies post-World War II and the intense negotiations among the United States, European countries, and Russia regarding Libya’s fate in the late 1940s. Notably, strong views were expressed by Azzam Pasha (an Egyptian diplomat who was at the time the secretary general of the Arab League) regarding Egypt’s interests in Libya. Such discussions have an eerie similarity to today’s regional and international negotiations about Libya’s future.

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Currently, the motivations for international involvement in Libya are shaped by three main concerns: 1) Europe’s alarm over the massive scale of illegal migration flowing through porous Libyan borders and its significant security and socioeconomic implications; 2) unease about the potential downward spiral of sociopolitical conditions in North African and Sahel states, which could undermine the economic interests of major corporations in the region; and 3) worry that a chaotic and fragile state may allow terrorist entities to thrive and potentially spread, escalating security threats.

In the eyes of the international community, these concerns require dealing with a central authority in Libya, regardless of the authority’s perceived legitimacy or its true value to the Libyan people and their institution building. These factors have, in part, led to a series of poorly devised proposals and roadmaps put forth by the UN and endorsed by international actors, which have resulted in little progress and worsened the divisions currently observed in Libya today.

From my observations during my frequent visits to the country and my conversations with Libyan leaders, politicians, and academics, I have identified five reasons why previous efforts put forth by the international community to shape a modern state in Libya have failed.

First, there are historical roots of division that have not yet been addressed. This is one of the reasons why the numerous attempts by multiple representatives of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to engage Libyan actors in various stabilizing roadmaps over the last thirteen years have failed miserably. The last effort, expected to lead to elections in December 2022, went nowhere due to political wrangling between two executive bodies and two legislative ones located—by no coincidence—in the eastern and western parts of the country, reflecting the historical divisions between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. It is practically impossible to envision effective presidential and parliamentary elections occurring in the near future without acknowledging these historical roots of division.

Second, it is clear that political and security actors on the ground in both regions of Libya have exploited these divisions for their own political and financial benefit through alliances with benefactor militias, corrupt entrepreneurs, members of the nouveau riche, and cross-border smugglers. This blend of neo-militocracy and kleptocracy heavily influences political and security decisions in the executive, legislative, judicial, and security branches in Libya, ensuring that national and international distractions allow them to remain in power for the foreseeable future.

Third, after forty-two years of oppression and a dismissal of rights and democracy under Gaddafi, as well as additional fourteen years of poverty and insecurity following the collapse of state institutions in 2011, the populace is busy with surviving day by day and lacks the means necessary to express their discontent. This, along with a sense of defeat regarding their aspirations for a better life following the failed Arab Spring, renders it unlikely that any significant movement will arise from the streets of Libyan cities in the near future, creating grounds for the continuation of the status quo.

Fourth and most importantly, the emergence of more pressing global conflicts and a shift in the international community’s priorities over the past four years, particularly with a focus on Ukraine and Southeast Asia, has diminished the attention and resources devoted to Libya’s situation. That is the case despite the fact that the West is concerned about the exponential growth of Russian and Chinese influence in Libya and the African continent at large.

Last, it is clear that the populations of many developing countries, particularly in the Middle East and Africa (including Libya), perceive Western governments to have lost their moral compass and can no longer be trusted as custodians of democratic and humanitarian change. This perception has been exacerbated by the catastrophe that has befallen the Arab people of Gaza—which countries in the West either failed to prevent or openly supported. Thus, in the eyes of the Libyan people, the West’s ability to recommend, supervise, or contribute to any democratic or nation-building initiatives has become compromised. This observation reinforces a decade-long sentiment among Arabs that it is not uncommon for Western governments to support and deal with autocracies and militaries throughout the Arab world—from Algeria to Egypt to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States—contributing to their skepticism about elections and hopes for democratic change.

One of the few successes in Libya since 2020 (the year that marked the end of the civil war that divided the country into territories east and west of the city of Sirte), is that the line dividing the country has become more distinct. Today, Libya has two governments, effectively two legislative bodies, and two security entities controlling the political, economic, and daily operations in their respective regions. Ironically—despite initial unifying efforts to address the disastrous situation in the aftermath of Storm Daniel in 2023, which claimed nearly twelve thousand lives—grand reconstruction opportunities in the regions have instead led to further segmentation of decision making and project funding. Such mega-funding and the anticipated engagement of international corporations and governments has only further entrenched Libya’s split.

Thus, Libya is currently a de facto two-state entity. The elusive internationally recognized government based in Tripoli exists primarily to allow the international community and its corporations to advance their own interests, failing to address the complex realities on the ground in Libya. International players such as China, Russia, and others are moving within Libya with disregard to issues of migration or border security, and are more focused on strategic economic engagement with Africa. This further undermines European and US interests while taking advantage of the West’s inertia and lack of clear strategy and engagement in Libya.

Furthermore, Libyans have grown disillusioned with the role of the international community and the United Nations, and they no longer trust or see much value in UNSMIL. Libyans are now gradually accepting and adapting to the current de facto demarcation of the country, going along with this in almost every aspect of their daily functions. An unnatural symbiosis seems to be developing between the aspirations of the people of Cyrenaica for more regional governance—away from the centralist hegemony Tripolitania exercised since 1969—and the military autocracy led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. At the same time, the internationally recognized government in Libya’s west continues to struggle to maintain power under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah who (along with his cousin) was sanctioned for corruption by the Libyan interim government and continues to face allegations of corruption, which he denies. Recent street anger against Dbeibah, stemming from his government’s attempt at rapprochement with Israeli officials as well as an escalation of pressure from dissatisfied militia, could catalyze the collapse of the internationally recognized government. This, in turn, could prompt Dbeibah to resort to military skirmishes with the east to distract from public discontent and prolong his government’s lifespan.

This week, the UN secretary-general appointed Hanna Serwaa Tetteh, a seasoned Ghanaian diplomat, as the new head of UNSMIL, making her the tenth person to serve that position in thirteen years. The appointment came after much wrangling between the United States and Russia, again suggesting that foreign interests will likely continue to dominate conversations about resolutions for Libya.

Libya needs new ideas and a national and international will to reset a realistic path toward a modern state, premised on a recognition of its history and a mentality of “what’s in it” not just for the international community but, more importantly, for its own people, as well.

Hani Shennib is the founding president of the National Council on US-Libya Relations

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After the Monsoon Revolution, Bangladesh’s economy and government need major reforms

Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak — Tue, 28 Jan 2025 14:15:43 +0000

Evolution of freedom

Evolution of prosperity

The path forward

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Evolution of freedom

Movements in the Freedom Index suggest that the institutional environment of Bangladesh has experienced substantial volatility since the 1990s. After the democratic revolution of the early 1990s, the country had a period of credible elections with relatively peaceful alternation of power between the two main Bangladeshi political parties, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League. The Index shows a clear institutional deterioration during the 2000–08 period, coinciding with governance approaches by both major parties that appeared to intensify unhealthy political competition. In an environment with escalating corruption, the leadership and allies of both parties intensely focused on holding onto power at all costs, leading to increased political tensions. Widespread corruption by those in power became the norm, and both parties became increasingly eager to hold on to power by any means necessary. The main political tool employed by a marginalized opposition was to impede the functions of government. In particular, calling general strikes with increasing frequency (and of longer duration) became the political weapon of choice for the opposition, to signal their street-level organizational capabilities to the government and to citizens. The strategy was deployed to erode the dominance of the party in government, but it came at the expense of the citizenry because it disrupted economic activity and the freedom of movement. An extreme example was to call general strikes to coincide with important visits by foreign investors exploring investment opportunities. This was designed to weaken the government and undermine its ability to attract investment, and it came at a high cost to the country’s economic prospects.

Escalating corruption and this form of destructive political competition created a situation of increased political instability up to 2006, when scheduled elections could not be held, and a military-backed caretaker government remained in power for two years.¹ The deep fall in the political subindex driven by a more than forty-five-point decrease in the elections component reflects this episode. The election score rebounds when elections that were widely considered free and fair were held in 2008. The Awami League received a supermajority as citizens used the 2008 election to express their deep discontent with the heightened corruption and misgovernance under the pre-2006 BNP regime. But the subsequent Awami League government, led by Sheikh Hasina, squandered the opportunity for improving governance. Instead, governance trends indicated a shift toward more centralized authority, as evidenced by a sustained decline in political and civil liberties scores. Examples of these autocratic tendencies include the abolition of the caretaker government system, widespread persecution of opposition political leaders accused of war crimes, and the rapid deterioration of citizens’ civil rights based on security concerns after terrorist episodes and an attempted military coup in 2012. Repression of both political opponents and ordinary citizens, more severe restrictions on speech, and increased government corruption became the norm. The Awami League exacerbated the type of misgovernance that had led the BNP to be voted out of office. Despite these concerns, the Awami League maintained in power for fifteen years amidst reports of increased political repression of citizens.

Elections held during the last fifteen years have been characterized by boycotts by the major opposition party and were not free or fair, so the relatively high election score assigned to Bangladesh in the political subindex is not an accurate reflection of the poor quality of politics and governance during this era. Elections followed a regular schedule, but it is difficult to see them as meaningful. Beyond the opposition election boycotts, the atmosphere of political violence and deep erosion of individual rights dramatically limited the level of contestation in the electoral process. Bangladesh’s extremely low score on legislative constraints on the executive partly explains why it was so easy for the Awami League to create an autocracy so quickly.

The legal subindex further confirms the erosion of the system of checks and balances necessary in a functioning democracy, clearly showing a negative trend in the two components that deal with the legal framework of the country: clarity of the law and judicial independence and effectiveness. The two-year caretaker government during 2006–08, and constitutional changes made by the subsequent Awami League government generated a state of legal uncertainty and insecurity. The twenty-point drop in the level of judicial independence since 2010 reflects the autocratic government’s efforts to control the judiciary to safeguard its hold on power and to use it as a weapon to persecute the opposition.

The improvement of the security component of stricter measures that curtailed some civil liberties. Mass protests and strikes, which were popular in the early 2000s, were no longer permitted, which resulted in a reduction in open street clashes and insecurity. But this also reflects political repression, so this clearly imposed costs on citizens. The data obviously do not yet reflect the mass student protests that began in July 2024, which ultimately resulted in the ouster of the autocratic government.

Also notable is the sustained improvement in Bangladesh’s informality score after 2005. The government made a big push towards digitalization of public services, including in tax administration. Digitizing third-party information improves the government made a big push towards digitalization of public services, including in tax administration. Digitizing third-party information improves the government’s ability to collect taxes, particularly Value Added Tax, which in turn limits firms’ capacity to operate in an informal shadow economy. This fact could also explain the small progress in bureaucracy and corruption observed in the data from 2004 to 2016, but it is important to stress that the level of this component is still exceptionally low for Bangladesh, not only creating discontent with the government and the state apparatus, but obviously generating substantial economic costs and inefficiencies.

Finally, the economic subindex evolution is driven by the movements in two components, namely trade and investment freedoms. The improvement in trade freedom in the late 1990s is a product of the adjustment programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank around this period, which forced a liberalizing process in several economic sectors. The ten-point fall in this component in 2013 is likely the result of stricter labor and workplace regulations implemented after the Rana Plaza disaster, which led to workplace injuries and deaths for hundreds of garment factory workers. Garment buyers in Bangladesh’s export destination countries pushed for these regulations. The sharp collapse of investment freedom between 2005 and 2008 is definitely capturing the political uncertainty of those years, and the rapid recovery when finally a government was formed captures the initial enthusiasm once the crisis was resolved.

It is important to comment on the surprisingly low level of women’s economic freedom observed in the data. Bangladesh scores almost eighteen points below the regional average in 2023, and the indicator only shows a mild improvement between 2007 and 2011. I think this might be explained by the distinction between the legal definition of women’s economic freedom versus actual practice. The real situation of women in economic affairs is probably better in Bangladesh than one would infer by looking at the formal legislation. For example, the Bangladeshi female labor force participation rate (39.5 percent) is significantly higher than in many neighboring countries such as India (29.9 percent) and Pakistan (25.9% percent), and the average for South Asia (30percent).² The rapid expansion of the garment industry in the 1980s and 1990s created many new job opportunities, especially for women. That improved returns to education for girls, which led to greater investments in girls’ schooling. Bangladesh achieved the Millennium Development Goal of gender parity in educational enrollment by 1995, fifteen years ahead of schedule. Girls’ primary school enrollment has exceeded that of boys since then. As a by-product, early marriage and early motherhood have decreased dramatically. These improvements in women’s economic opportunities do not seem adequately captured by the legalistic approach embedded in the World Bank Women Business and the Law Index which determines the quantitative score on this component.

Evolution of prosperity

The positive evolution of the Prosperity Index fairly reflects the situation of the country in the last three decades. Despite the institutional volatility and bad governance, Bangladesh has outperformed most regional neighbors economically, and this has closed the prosperity gap, especially since 2014. Scholars have referred to this as “the Bangladesh paradox.” Early improvements in health and educational indicators created the preconditions for economic growth. Bangladesh’s health and educational achievements exceed what the country’s income per capita would predict. The country has made substantial progress in material wellbeing, and unlike some other countries in the region, has not suffered a major economic crisis in the last three decades.

The flat performance of the inequality component of the Index may reflect a lack of detailed data. Economic growth in the country has been obviously urban-biased, with increased activity in sectors such as construction and infrastructure that have benefited cities more than rural areas. Those sectors are also heavily prone to corruption and graft, leading to massive wealth accumulation at the high end of the income distribution.

The health and education components of the Index show that Bangladesh’s improvement has outpaced that of its regional comparators since 1995. While school enrollment has massively improved since 1995, a measure of average years of education does not adequately capture the quality of learning that happens in school. Learning and human capital remain important challenges for Bangladesh today. I suspect that a quality-weighted measure of education would not present as optimistic a picture.

Considerable progress has been made in the health sector, thanks to a determined commitment to ensure child vaccination and access to maternal and neonatal healthcare. A vibrant non-governmental organization sector in Bangladesh has played a positive role to deliver basic services. Again, the quality of healthcare remains poor, and there are emerging areas of concern such as worsening mental health—an issue that needs greater attention from policymakers.

I think the evolution of the environment score masks two opposing trends. Increased economic prosperity in rural areas expands access to cleaner burning cookstoves and other technologies that protect environmental health. Much of the population has remained rural, which probably drives the aggregate positive trend of the indicator. However, in urban areas, outdoor air quality has clearly worsened with increased manufacturing and construction activities (including emissions from brick kilns), and the attendant loss of green space. Increasing prosperity has also led to a proliferation of motorized vehicles and increased congestion, and a lack of urban planning has allowed the urban living environment to deteriorate. These detrimental effects are not adequately captured by the component.

The path forward

An autocratic government that had steadily consolidated its power was finally ousted by a student-led “Monsoon Revolution” during the summer of 2024. The revolution was diffuse and decentralized— with organic student protests that quickly spread throughout the country—and was not organized under the banner of any political party. As a result, the post-revolution political leadership and the way forward remain unclear. Dr. Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, took charge as “chief advisor to the caretaker government” at the behest of students. His international name recognition and stature make him a credible leader, and temporarily stabilized the political uncertainty. But as I write, the country’s political future remains uncertain.

Given the political instability and challenges that Bangladesh has faced, citizens are willing to give an unelected caretaker government some leeway and time to govern and reform political institutions. For the moment, all parties, the military, and civil society appear to have implicitly agreed and acknowledged that the caretaker government should remain in power for at least eighteen months, so that they have sufficient time to institute reforms. But important sources of uncertainty remain unresolved. First, the political parties, and especially the recently-ousted Awami League, may pursue strategies to regain influence, which could lead to political instability. Misinformation propagated by right-wing groups in India seems deliberately aimed at destabilizing Bangladesh by inflating fears of religious conflict. However, the impact of these efforts is not yet clear. Second, to maintain legitimacy, the caretaker administration will have to perform, since it does not derive legitimacy from any election. Governing a country with a population of 175 million is a complex undertaking. The bureaucracy and other government institutions, including public universities, were reportedly subject to political influence during the Awami League’s administration. This makes reform even more complex. Third, the power of Bangladeshi political parties has traditionally stemmed from grassroots and street-level organization, with a power hierarchy that extends into rural areas. The caretaker government and the students who led the July 2024 Monsoon Revolution do not have the same political infrastructure and organization.

Bangladesh is in uncharted territory. There is a lot of hope among average citizens that ousting a powerful autocratic government was a major achievement, and that the architects of that uprising can ensure better governance going forward, by instituting some fundamental reforms and not repeating the mistakes of the past. Whether those hopes of a nation can be successfully realized remains to be seen. Given how fundamental many reforms need to be, including a re-examination of several aspects of the country’s constitution, the path ahead is likely neither linear nor straightforward.

Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak is a professor of economics and management at Yale University and the founder of the Yale Research Initiative on Innovation and Scale (Y-RISE). Mobarak conducts field experiments in Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, and Nepal to investigate the adoption of welfare-enhancing innovations and behaviors, and the scaling of effective development interventions. His research has been covered by major global media outlets and published in journals across disciplines. He received a Carnegie fellowship in 2017 and was named in Vox’s inaugural list of “50 scientists working to build a better future.”

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1 The caretaker government system of Bangladesh was introduced in 1996 to ensure a fair and free electoral process. An unelected interim government appointed by the incumbent executive would be tasked with organizing an election within ninety days, and hand over power to the newly elected government within 120 days. The system was abolished in 2012.

2 ILO estimates for labor force participation rates for females as a share of total female population aged 15–64, obtained from the World
Bank data portal.

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European Parliament and United States condemn ‘sham’ Belarus vote

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 18:24:04 +0000

The European Parliament has condemned this weekend’s presidential election in Belarus as a “sham” designed to keep the country’s long-serving dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka in power. In a resolution adopted ahead of the January 26 vote, MEPs noted the absence of any credible opposition candidates and called for the strengthening of sanctions against Belarus.

Days earlier, the United States said the vote could not be free or fair due to the “repressive environment” in the country. “The United States joins many of our European allies in assessing that elections cannot be credible in an environment where censorship is ubiquitous and independent media outlets no longer exist,” commented US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

This international condemnation comes as no surprise. Since the early 1990s, seventy year old Lukashenka has been steadily concentrating power in his own hands. For more than three decades, he has fostered an authoritarian political culture in Belarus that closely echoes the Soviet past.

The political climate became particularly oppressive following Belarus’s last presidential election in 2020, which saw opposition candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya emerge from obscurity to mobilize a grassroots movement demanding change. When the authorities then rigged the vote in favor of Lukashenka, weeks of nationwide protests erupted that threatened to topple the regime.

Lukashenka was ultimately able to cling onto power in 2020 thanks to support from the Kremlin. In the wake of the protests, he launched a ruthless crackdown on all opposition, leading to thousands of arrests and reports of grave human rights abuses. Targets included civil society and the country’s last remaining independent media outlets. Hundreds of thousands fled Belarus to avoid possible persecution.

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The Belarusian dictator is clearly in no mood to repeat the mistakes of 2020, when his decision to allow a wildcard outsider onto the ballot backfired so disastrously. Ahead of Sunday’s vote, only the tamest of regime-approved opponents have been permitted to participate.

Lukashenka was so fearful of the upcoming election that he “completely cleansed the political field, leaving no room for alternative candidates,” commented Hanna Liubakova, a journalist from Belarus who has been forced to remain in exile since the 2020 protests. “The trauma of 2020 and deep distrust remain high,” she noted.

Tsikhanouskaya, the rival candidate in 2020 who now leads the Belarusian democratic opposition from exile, was similarly critical of the forthcoming vote. “The Belarus dictator’s so-called ‘election’ is nothing more than a sham,” she commented. “We won’t be fooled. All political prisoners must be freed and repressions must end.”

With Lukashenka guaranteed to win Sunday’s vote, the only remaining question is the margin of victory he chooses on this occasion. In 2020, he was officially credited with 81 percent, despite widespread claims that Tsikhanouskaya had actually garnered more votes. “The last intriguing moment in this sham election is how many votes Lukashenka will claim for himself,” commented Liubakova.

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