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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

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Europe should be paying particular attention to indications of a new Ukrainian approach to Belarus. As US foreign policy priorities shift, responsibility for managing relations between Belarus and the West will increasingly fall on the European Union. EU officials must decide between freezing the Belarus issue or recognizing the country as a strategic challenge that requires European leadership.

Belarus has most recently made headlines due to a series of prisoner releases tied to partial US sanctions relief. The humanitarian impact of these deals should not be underestimated, but it is also important to underline that more than one thousand Belarusian political prisoners remain incarcerated. Some skeptics have argued that without a broader strategy, reducing sanctions pressure on Minsk in exchange for prisoner releases risks strengthening the current regime and reinforcing an oppressive system that imprisons political opponents.

This presents opportunities for Europe to demonstrate its ability to take the lead on the international stage. While the US seeks practical short-term results such as the release of political prisoners, Europe can push for more systemic change and democratic transition in Belarus. In this context, sanctions should be seen as a tool to undermine authoritarian rule rather than locking in the current status quo. This can be achieved by closing existing loopholes while targeting the revenue streams and logistical networks that sustain the Lukashenka regime and support the Russian war machine.

In the current geopolitical climate, any talk of a neutral Belarus is delusional. Lukashenka will not turn away from his patrons in the Kremlin voluntarily. If European policymakers wish to see genuine change in Belarus, they will need to demonstrate a readiness to increase the pressure on Minsk. The enticing prospect of future European integration can play a crucial role in these efforts.

Belarus now occupies a strategic position in Europe’s rapidly shifting security landscape. The country remains deeply involved in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and also represents a key challenge for European leaders as they seek to prove that the continent is capable of defending itself in an era when US support can no longer be taken for granted. The Ukrainian authorities clearly feel the time is right for a more proactive approach to Belarus. The question now is whether Europe will follow suit.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

One resident of rural Jableh described the event to me a few days later with a proud smile on his face,“ I am fifty five years old, during my entire life any protest here was forced by the regime,” he said. “Yesterday was special, it was by our own free will, we said our demands and returned to our homes relaxed.”

The demonstrators had three demands: rejecting sectarianism, releasing the Alawi soldiers captured during the final weeks of Assad’s reign, and implementing federalism in the coast. The demonstrations were guarded against Sunni counter-protestors by the new government’s General Security Forces.

In the hours and days afterwards, many Alawi activists and residents of the coast—those who did and did not participate—spoke to me with pleasant surprise about the security forces’ professional conduct. Other commentators noted that it was the first time in Syria’s history the government had protected people criticizing it.

“So many were terrified of how the government would respond,” remarked a media activist from rural Jableh, “but we made our speeches and we were safe, and now the area feels relaxed for the first time.”

Several Alawi activists who had previously distrusted security forces told me that the day was a potential turning point in how they view local government forces.

“We trust the Ministry of Interior now, even if we don’t trust the government politically,” added the activist.

It was a stark change from the first months after Assad fell, when members of the nascent General Security forces were frequently accused of robbings and beatings, engaging in sectarian harassment, and at times executing Alawi civilians and ex-regime soldiers during raids on insurgents.

Their discipline in these most recent protests was a result of a year of reforms and institution building, reflecting broader developments across all Syrian ministries. This first year focused on rebuilding core state institutions, from security to basic administration.

Rebuilding government institutions

Outside of the public’s view, Syria’s new government spent much of its first year rebuilding the basic bureaucratic capacities of the state, which had been left gutted and derelict by the Assad regime. Regulatory agencies, courts, and basic services departments all needed to be repaired, staffed up, and streamlined. Critical but mundane state functions like water well licensing and civil registries took much of the year to rebuild. By the fall of 2025 many of these offices had begun functioning again, though often inundated with paperwork and requests from their communities.

In Homs, for example, the central court processes nearly two thousand cases a month involving administrative registrations such as property transfers, birth and death certificates, and marriage and divorce papers, a senior official told me in December. Of the twelve sub-courts across the Homs countryside, those in Palmyra and Qusayr remain non-functional due to physical damage while the courts in Talkalakh and Hassiyah are only partially functioning, having received only basic emergency repairs, according to the same official.

The massive task of (re)building the state forced the new authorities to adopt a pragmatic approach to employment. Most government employees today are the same people who were employed under the old regime. Even the Ministry of Interior (MoI) has retained non-Sunni administrative staff across several departments. Yet, every ministry still had to investigate and purge corrupt, regime-era employees or those who had criminal records, according to my discussions with officials from multiple ministries. Replacing these individuals with a qualified workforce has taken time. For the Ministry of Justice, it has been training a new batch of government judges and lawyers throughout the second half of 2025, with the first class slated to finish by early 2026.

Partial security reforms

These core state-building steps have begun to bear fruit in recent months. Governorate-level institutions have now expanded into the countrysides, and basic services like electricity have improved across both cities and the countryside (though to a lesser extent in the latter). Parallel to this, the new government had also undertaken the monumental task of creating new security and military forces. The MoI and Ministry of Defense (MoD) faced unique challenges and circumstances, each pursuing its own path and ultimately resulting in divergent outcomes. The MoI, responsible for civil policing and internal security, had to rapidly expand its forces while immediately dealing with the triple threat of ongoing Islamic State attacks, inter-communal and vigilante violence, and a growing ex-regime insurgency. The MoD, on the other hand, has had to merge dozens of armed factions with a long history of competition and violations against civilians into a single army.

Security reforms have been centered around internal accountability and coordination mechanisms. For example, Damascus formed the Military Police and Military Intelligence to monitor, investigate, and arrest security members implicated in crimes, and created additional command layers to strengthen command and control. Despite these structural improvements, Syrian opinions of the two security branches remain mixed. One year on, the MoI is generally viewed as responsive and professional, based on my months of fieldwork. Nearly every one of the activists and civilians that I have worked with over the past year have spoken about the improved professionalism and the positive engagement by most local MoI officials. Nonetheless, many remain unsure if this improvement is structural or simply, “a response to American pressure.”

Yet the army is widely distrusted due to its role in the March coastal massacres and July Sweida massacres. While its conduct has markedly improved during the fighting against the SDF in Aleppo and the northeast, many Syrians still distrust army units, especially compared to the MoI. Most army units have been pulled away from civilian areas, yet the presence of small bases on the outskirts of some rural areas remains a major complaint.

One man in southern Tartous governorate put concisely a feeling many have expressed to me in recent months: “Please just replace the army with general security checkpoints.”

Key goals in 2026

The first year of liberation saw the foundation laid for a new Syrian state. The two most important projects were the aforementioned security reforms and al-Sharaa’s tireless campaign to reconnect the country with the international community. Hundreds of diplomatic meetings in Damascus and international visits have succeeded in removing the final major sanctions against Syria and its leaders. Now, the country’s new government must prioritize three key domestic files: the economy, the constitution, and civil peace.

In September, I attended a meeting with al-Sharaa in which the president emphasized the importance of providing jobs and economic security to the entire country. Al-Sharaa has repeatedly linked economic development to social stability, something echoed by most Syrians I have met. Damascus is now largely unfettered in this pursuit as it enters its second year post-Assad, but it must begin to make tangible progress on the ground where most Syrians feel there has been little to no economic improvement.

The second most common complaint I’ve heard from Syrians is the lack of a new constitution or transitional justice for regime-era criminals. These two developments are directly linked and will likely be the two biggest milestones of 2026. Serious transitional justice steps have been delayed by the lack of a new constitution, as the current regime-era constitution lacks the necessary legal codes for trying regime officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Therefore, the first test will come when al-Sharaa appoints the remaining one-third of the People’s Assembly, whose first two-thirds were elected by committees across the country in August. The People’s Assembly will then be tasked with drafting a new constitution. The composition of the al-Sharaa-appointed third and the contents of this constitution will be closely judged and must reflect a commitment to equal rights under a civil state. Once ratified, this new constitution will allow for the full transitional justice process to unfold.

Despite the significant structural improvements that have been within government institutions over the past year, major fault lines remain within the society. These divisions are more nuanced than simple sectarian divides and are unique to each locality. For this reason, a local approach to national dialogue and inter-communal peace is required. The improvements that have been made within the MoI must be joined by improvements in local dialogues, particularly in coastal and central Syria, led by civil society and influential locals with the support of local security officials. These can take the forms of civil peace committees, civil councils, or civil and humanitarian work that brings together members of diverse communities.

Local security and political leaders will play a key role in addressing the grave security threats and civil strife prevalent across many regions. But their efforts are limited at times by ineffective or oppressive local officials, who can be damaging to trust building. This year should be one of local dialogue, both within communities and between them, with an expanded effort from the central government in Damascus as well as Syrian and international non-governmental organizations to work on social cohesion and civil peace. This requires consistent government engagement with local civil society as well as tangible changes on the ground regarding economic and security concerns.

The government would be remiss to view these solely as state-building files. Syria faces ongoing internal and external security threats exacerbating a fragmented society reeling from sixty years of Assad regime crimes. These three files are the foundations of Syria’s near future. Damascus should support the work of local and national activists, whether in civil peace initiatives or humanitarian outreach, to strengthen its approach to the constitutional drafting process and to local civil peace. Syria’s new government may feel confident in the real progress it has made in rebuilding the state after one year of liberation, but it cannot underestimate the difficulty it faces in gaining the trust of the country in year two.

Gregory Waters is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and writes about Syria’s security institutions and social dynamics.

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Syria’s Kurds could be al-Sharaa’s partners in rebuilding. Why did Damascus assault them instead?

Amy Austin Holmes — Wed, 28 Jan 2026 23:26:29 +0000

Among the unsung success stories of Syria’s transition after the fall of Bashar al-Assad were two agreements between the interim government in Damascus and Syrian Kurds—rare examples of peaceful compromise in a year marked by sectarian killings of other minorities, including Alawites and Druze.

The March 10 agreement between Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi and interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa was intended to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian army. The Aleppo Agreement, signed in Syria’s second largest city in April, was the first practical implementation of the March 10 agreement, because it entailed the integration of local police forces: the Kurdish Asayish and Internal Security Forces linked to the interim government.

When I visited Aleppo several months after that agreement was signed, it was still largely holding. I interviewed Hefin Suleiman and Nouri Sheiko, the two Kurdish signatories of the agreement, as well as officials from the Aleppo governor’s office. Both sides were committed to continuing to work together.

I also met a dozen Kurdish and Arab women in the Sheik Maqsoud Women’s House. The new flag of the Syrian government was on display in their spacious office. They told me proudly how they had applied for—and received—official permission to operate as a non-governmental organization (NGO) from Minister of Social Affairs and Labor Hind Qabawat, who is also the only female minister in the cabinet of the interim government in Damascus. They were genuinely eager to work with her and were planning a conference for women all across Syria. These Kurdish women in Sheik Maqsoud were literally working with Damascus down to the minutiae of complying with their rules and regulations for NGO registration. They, too, appeared committed to the Aleppo Agreement.

The Kurdish Asayish and Arab Internal Security Forces were already operating shared check points in Aleppo. In October, the SDF has submitted a list of their commanders who could serve in the Ministry of Defense in Damascus, as part of integration talks. And in other parts of Syria, the SDF and certain units of the new Syrian army aligned with Damascus had already begun coordinated activities under US supervision, as I learned during fieldwork in Syria in December.

But on January 6, Damascus launched an assault on Aleppo.

Some 150,000 people were displaced just in two days of fighting, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. An estimated 1,200 Yezidi families were caught up in the fighting, some of whom were resisting what Iraqi Member of Parliament Murad Ismael described as a “brutal attack” by the factions of the Damascus authorities.

Why did al-Sharaa launch an assault on the very people with whom he had signed not one, but two agreements? What went wrong?

A stalemate in negotiations

Both agreements were due to quiet US diplomacy. It was hoped they would help reunify the fractured country after over a decade of conflict.

US mediation efforts have been led by Tom Barrack, who is dual hatted as the US ambassador to Turkey and also special envoy to Syria. The mediation was a tough job, but it had already achieved important progress. The two sides did not trust each other, having fought against each other in the past. Al-Sharaa is the former commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which evolved out of Jebhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda offshoot. In an earlier phase of the war, Jebhat al-Nusra had fought against Syrian Kurds in the Kurdish People’s Defense Units, or YPG (the predecessor of the SDF).

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shibani, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi and US special envoy for Syria Tom Barrack stand after signing an agreement to restore normalcy in the city of Sweida, in Damascus, Syria September 16, 2025. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

This distrust was only compounded after sectarian killings of Alawites in the coastal regions in March, and then another round of killing in the Druze stronghold of Sweida. A Reuters investigation of the massacres of Alawites found that the “chain of command led to Damascus.” A United Nations investigation into the events in Sweida is still ongoing.

Kurds had reason to be skeptical of the new authorities in Damascus. After assuming power in Damascus, al-Sharaa has promoted several rebel leaders into positions of power who have been sanctioned by the United States for serious human rights violations. They include two notorious warlords. Sayf Boulad Abu Bakr, who had been sanctioned for kidnapping Kurdish women and abusing prisoners, was promoted to commander of the Seventy-Sixth Division overseeing Aleppo. And Mohammed Hussein al-Jasim, known as Abu Amsha, was promoted to lead the Sixty-Second Division in Hama. The US Treasury estimated that his militia generated tens of millions of dollars a year through abduction and confiscation of property in Afrin, where Turkey maintains a large security presence.

But Kurds were under significant US pressure, and the Syrian Kurdish leadership is pragmatic.

Furthermore, Kurds in Aleppo had survived under siege and managed to preserve control of the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah neighborhoods throughout the civil war. Now Assad was gone and al-Sharaa had made verbal promises about Kurdish rights—although no constitutional guarantees until now. So in April the Kurds agreed to withdraw their military forces from Aleppo and only maintain police forces, which would also fully integrate with the Syrian government’s police forces.

In other words, they agreed to place their trust in Damascus, knowing they would have no military forces of their own once the SDF withdrew—knowing they would be surrounded on all sides. For years, the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration has controlled a vast oil-rich region in the northeast, but it is not geographically connected to Aleppo.

The Aleppo Agreement in April was celebrated as a success story by both sides.

The Aleppo offensive, hate speech, and disinformation

Leading up to and during the government’s offensive in Aleppo and eastern Syria in January, there was an alarming rise of anti-Kurdish hate speech and disinformation, as well as more subtle attempts to undermine the SDF.

For example, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Interior in Damascus, Nour al-Din Baba, referred to them as the “so-called SDF” in an interview with Al Jazeera in late December. In the initial days of the Aleppo offensive, false news was circulated claiming that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi had said that the SDF intended to “fully recapture all of Aleppo.” Verify Syria debunked this as disinformation. In reality, the SDF had agreed to withdraw and had never controlled all of Aleppo to begin with. Less than a week later, a video clip was circulated on social media claiming to feature a former officer of the Assad regime who was positioned alongside the SDF in Deir Hafer. Verify Syria documented that it was a fake video generated using AI techniques.

The armed groups who carried out the assault on Aleppo have made their own videos where they refer to Kurds as “sheep” or “pigs” and posted them on social media. In one particularly horrific video, which has since been verified, the corpse of a woman was thrown out of a building as men celebrated and chanted Allahu Akhbar. The Kurds identified the woman as having been a member of the Internal Security Forces—according to reports—the very police force created by the Aleppo Agreement.

The Aleppo violence is even more tragic because Damascus and the SDF were on the verge of a larger national agreement to integrate their forces.

According to reporting by Al Monitor, it was Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani who interrupted the last round of US-brokered talks on January 4 between the SDF and Damascus. After abruptly entering the room, he asked that US Brigadier General Kevin Lambert leave the meeting, and promised that the talks would resume on January 8.

But before talks could resume, Damascus launched its assault on Aleppo on January 6.

Moving forward

On January 10, Barrack called for a return to the March 10 and Aleppo agreements. Turkish Ambassador to Syria Nuh Yilmaz said he also welcomed the return to the Aleppo Agreement, which allows for local governance in the two Kurdish neighborhoods.

In the days that followed, al-Sharaa’s forces continued their offensive against SDF-held areas, capturing large parts of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, areas the SDF had held after defeating the Islamic State. On January 17, US Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper called on al-Sharaa’s forces to “cease any offensive actions.” But the offensive continued.

As al-Sharaa’s forces moved east, chaos ensued and numerous detention facilities housing Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) militants were opened. According to one report, at least four separate detention facilities were opened, which collectively held some 33,500 ISIS militants. It remains unclear how many have escaped.

Forces aligned with Damascus have also taken videos of themselves desecrating SDF cemeteries in Hasakah in the northeast, an area controlled by the SDF for many years.

Understanding the origins of the violence in Aleppo is critical. While each side blames the other for the escalation, a full investigation will be needed to establish the facts. But it is equally important to examine the underlying conditions that made this eruption possible.

The Aleppo Agreement was proof that both decentralization and integration could work in practice.

Damascus had agreed that the two Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo could continue to provide their own local security, could continue to offer Kurdish language instruction, and that women could continue to serve in the police—just not at shared checkpoints with men. Both sides agreed to all of this, illustrating that the two major power blocs could come to a peaceful compromise and coexist. This set an important precedent for how other contested regions of Syria could potentially be integrated.

But Turkey remains influential in these negotiations. As early as 2015, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had said he will “never allow” a Kurdish statelet in Syria. After the fall of the Assad regime, he has continued to publicly state his opposition to the continuation of Kurdish-led local governance or decentralization in Syria. Al-Sharaa’s desire to assert control over all Syrian territory appears to have aligned with Erdogan’s own opposition to Kurdish self-rule. Furthermore, Erdogan may believe that by dealing the SDF another blow, that he can extract greater concessions from the peace process with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The PKK is a US and EU designated terror organization. The SDF is dominated by the People’s Defense Units (YPG), which Turkey views as an offshoot of the PKK.

On January 16, al-Sharaa announced a presidential decree “affirming the rights of Syrian Kurds.” While this is an important step, it could also be easily revoked by another presidential decree. Meanwhile, al-Sharaa’s forces continued their offensive into Kurdish-held areas. On January 18, a four-day new cease-fire agreement was announced. It has since been extended by another 15 days. This new timeline is divorced from the new realities on the ground.

Rebuilding trust will be even harder than before, and will take time.

Proper vetting of the various armed factions will also take time. The Islamic State militant who killed three US troops in December was a member of the Syrian government’s security forces. Al-Sharaa should prioritize rooting out jihadists from within his own ranks, rather than attempting to seize more territory and subjugate minorities.

Instead of pressuring the SDF to integrate on a rushed timeline that carries serious risks, President Trump should pressure al-Sharaa to remove sanctioned warlords from his army and guarantee equal citizenship rights for all Syrians. Al-Sharaa must accomplish this through a constitutional guarantee, not a presidential decree that could be easily revoked.

Amy Austin Holmes is a research professor of international affairs and acting director of the Foreign Area Officers Program at George Washington University. Her work focuses on Washington’s global military posture, the NATO alliance, non-state actors, revolutions, military coups, and de-facto states. She is the author of three books, including most recently, “Statelet of Survivors: The Making of a Semi-Autonomous Region in Northeast Syria.”

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Veterans can shape the future of Ukrainian democracy

Vasyl Sehin — Thu, 15 Jan 2026 21:04:12 +0000

The participation of veterans in public and political life has the potential to transform Ukrainian democracy. If managed inclusively and responsibly, it can strengthen legitimacy and trust. However, this trend could also carry real risks if veterans are used by traditional political actors or inadequately prepared for their role in public life.

Ukrainian legislation does not allow for elections under the current martial law conditions. Beyond legal constraints, the practical obstacles to wartime elections are also overwhelming. Fair campaigning conditions and safety during voting cannot be guaranteed. Meanwhile, over ten million Ukrainians have been displaced by Russia’s invasion, with millions more currently serving in the military or trapped in Russian-occupied regions.

The impracticality of elections is broadly accepted by Ukrainian society and among the country’s European partners. They recognise that any premature vote would risk undermining the legitimacy of Ukraine’s institutions and eroding public trust at a moment when democratic resilience is essential. Tellingly, the idea of wartime elections is mainly promoted by Russia as part of Kremlin efforts to weaken Ukraine from within.

When conditions allow for free and fair Ukrainian elections to take place, a key issue will be the inclusion of those who are currently defending the country. According to a preliminary forecast by the Ministry of Veterans Affairs, after the war ends, the number of war veterans and their family members will reach five to six million people, or one in six Ukrainians.

Opinion polls indicate strong public trust in the Ukrainian military along with widespread support for the participation of veterans in Ukrainian politics. In contrast, Ukraine’s existing democratic and political institutions are among the least trusted entities in society. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that veteran involvement in politics could help counter this trust deficit and strengthen Ukrainian democracy.

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It is important to note that most Ukrainian veterans are not career military personnel. The vast majority of today’s Ukrainian soldiers joined the military voluntarily or were mobilized and expect to return to civilian life in peacetime. Veterans are also not a homogeneous group and do not represent a specific political agenda. They differ in views, values, and priorities, and should be understood as individuals seeking meaningful participation within legitimate democratic institutions.

Electing military personnel to public office is not without risk. Military experience does not automatically translate into political skill. Veterans transitioning from the battlefield to politics may face challenges in terms of essential political know-how such as policy coherence, negotiation tactics, coalition-building, and working within institutions. Without targeted support and a clear civilian framework, veterans risk being marginalized within political parties or exploited as symbolic figures without real influence.

Ukraine has previous practical experience of veterans entering politics, notably during the country’s 2014 parliamentary elections. One of the former military personnel elected on that occasion was Oksana Korchynska, who recalled at a recent Kyiv event how she “came from the front line, from Mariupol, two days before taking the oath of MP.”

Korchynska noted that in 2014, veterans were frequently included on electoral lists without being integrated into decision-making structures. While veterans enjoyed high public trust, their actual influence within parties and parliament has so far often been limited. This experience underscores a critical lesson: Political inclusion must be substantive, not symbolic. Veterans need pathways to real influence within parties and institutions, not mere visibility.

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Members of Ukraine’s veteran community do not need to wait for elections to take up a role in public life. Many are already serving in local government or building civic organizations and veteran associations. Kateryna Yamshchykova is a veteran who became acting mayor of Poltava in 2023. “Opportunities already exist for everyone,” she reflected. “Did I really want the position of acting mayor? It was the last thing I wanted in my life, but I understood that this responsibility had to be taken on in order to build the country we are fighting for.”

This kind of local engagement can help veterans develop the skills they need to run as candidates in national elections after the war ends. Democratic participation, civic habits, and political responsibility cannot be developed overnight. Instead, early engagement can help bring about a stable postwar transition.

For established Ukrainian political parties, engagement with the country’s veteran community is already becoming increasingly necessary to maintain public support. This will likely lead to intensified internal competition as veterans seek leadership roles alongside longstanding party members.

Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK and former commander of the Ukrainian army, has warned that established political elites might see veterans as a threat to their position. If this happens, everyone in Ukraine stands to lose. Public trust in politicians would erode further, undermining the legitimacy of decisions that will be essential for European integration and postwar recovery.

A critical step toward the meaningful political participation of veterans is the development of a clear legal framework for Ukraine’s first postwar elections. This should ensure inclusive participation, clarify registration requirements for new political parties, and potentially impose stricter campaigning rules to protect electoral integrity.

Ukraine’s democracy is not on pause; it is being reshaped under fire. The emergence of veterans as political actors represents a profound structural change in Ukrainian society. In and of itself, this change is neither a threat to democracy nor a guarantee of positive change. Instead, it requires a deliberate and inclusive approach. If Ukraine succeeds in integrating veterans into civilian political life while preserving pluralism, accountability, and fair competition, it may emerge from the war with a more resilient democracy capable of sustaining inclusive recovery, reforms, and European integration.

Vasyl Sehin is the WFD Country Director in Ukraine.

Our experts unpack why violence erupted, what it means for Kurdish and wider minority safety and integration under the new Syrian government, and how Washington is engaging.

1. What is the political and military background of this conflict?

On April 1, Damascus and the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG)-dominated SDF agreed on a localized integration arrangement covering the two SDF-held neighborhoods of Aleppo city. Despite the initial atmosphere of goodwill, SDF-affiliated Asayish forces that remained in these neighborhoods obstructed the implementation phase and refused to subordinate themselves to Aleppo’s Internal Security Forces, as stipulated in the agreement.

On multiple occasions, Asayish units attacked civilians and civilian infrastructure, triggering violent clashes. Throughout this period, Damascus repeatedly agreed to cease-fires in an effort to preserve negotiations over the broader March 10 integration agreement with the SDF. However, after the deadline of the integration deal expired, final US-mediated talks in Damascus failed, and Asayish forces again targeted civilian infrastructure, and the Syrian army opted to launch a limited military operation.

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

For the last fourteen years, the Kurds enjoyed de facto autonomy, and they currently control a large chunk of eastern and northeastern Syria. An agreement inked in March last year, which the Kurds reluctantly agreed to under immense external pressure, was meant to see the SDF and the Kurdish civilian institutions integrated into the Syrian state. It has effectively gone nowhere, with both sides blaming each other.

The fighting in Aleppo broke out just days after negotiations stalled again and came to an end after external forces, notably the United States, intervened, preventing a potentially greater bloodbath. Turkey stated it would take action—if needed—on behalf of the Syrian government, and Israel threw its weight in behind the Kurds.

—Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA).

2. What does the withdrawal of SDF-affiliated units mean for stability in Aleppo?

The withdrawal does bring with it a sigh of relief for the residents of Aleppo. But taking stock of the destruction, for those who lost loved ones, it’s hardly a win. The days-long fighting further ripped open one of the many fissures that the Syrian government says it has been trying to repair as it attempts to consolidate power under Damascus. The Kurdish population—who largely remain wary of President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government—might just prove to be the toughest to win over.

While an even worse scenario has been avoided for the time being, if anything, the fighting is evidence of how much more work lies ahead for Syria and how its path to “stability” will not necessarily be free of suffering.

—Arwa Damon

3. What does the dismantling of the Kurdish military presence in Aleppo mean for SDF status in Syria?

Civilians carry their bags and belongings as they flee following renewed clashes between the Syrian army and the Syrian Democratic Forces in Aleppo, Syria on January 8, 2026. Photo via REUTERS/Mahmoud Hassano.

Losing Aleppo weakens the SDF’s negotiating position significantly. Damascus will never support the SDF in retaining an autonomous military or administrative structure in the northeast, but al-Sharaa has repeatedly said that Kurdish language and cultural rights will be enshrined in the future constitution. The current government is already highly localized, and we will likely see the same model applied to the northeast with or without a peaceful integration of the SDF.

—Gregory Waters is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and writes about Syria’s security institutions and social dynamics.

4. How credible are government assurances of inclusion and rights protections to Kurdish communities?

The components of the new Syrian government have a mixed track record of treatment towards Kurds. The factions that came from Idlib, most notably Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, have no serious history of ethnic targeting of Kurds, while several Syrian National Army (SNA) factions, which now serve in parts of the new army, have been sanctioned for years for systematic abuses against Kurds in northern Aleppo. It is now up to Damascus to ensure these ex-SNA factions no longer abuse or exploit Kurdish communities.

—Gregory Waters

There were no reports of large-scale violations by government security forces during the fighting in the Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiye neighborhoods, unlike the abuses that occurred in coastal areas or in Swaida last year. This demonstrates progress in managing security operations in areas where diverse communities live. Another episode of violence and killings would be too costly politically for Damascus. In Aleppo, security forces have been overall mindful to show that they are able to protect the Kurdish community.

—Marie Forestier is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. She is also currently a consultant for the European Institute of Peace.

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5. What does the Aleppo violence imply for future negotiations with other armed groups?

The issue in Aleppo is distinct from more general political or ideological dissent in Syria because it involved an armed group that controls territory. However, the government’s slower, methodical approach to the dispute this week, mixing continued diplomatic outreach with military pressure, shows a more mature leadership in Damascus compared to how it approached similar dissent in Swaida in July.

—Gregory Waters

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The operation in Aleppo was not a response to dissent, but rather a consequence of the deadlock of negotiations. A significant part of the Syrian population would like to see Kurds and the northeastern region fully integrated into the new Syria. The positive outcome of the military operation in Aleppo—at least from the government’s perspective—and the way security forces managed it raise the question of a possible replication of a similar operation in other areas in the northeast.

—Marie Forestier

6. How does the confrontation fit into the broader Turkish-Israeli rivalry over Syria?

Israel and Turkey hold fundamentally opposing views on Syria. Ankara sees the evolving situation as an opportunity to promote stability through a strong and centralized Syrian state, while Israel views such an outcome as a strategic threat and prefers a weak and fragmented Syria.

During the clashes in Aleppo city, both countries once again positioned themselves on opposite sides. The intensity and limited duration of the fighting did not allow for direct or indirect intervention by either actor. Nevertheless, Turkey publicly signaled its readiness to support the Syrian army if requested, while Israel called on the international community to protect the Kurds. This contrast underscores Turkey’s greater capacity to intervene in northern Syria, as well as the constraints on Israel’s options.

In light of the outcome in Aleppo city, Turkey’s vision of a unified Syria appears to have scored a tactical victory. At the same time, the episode served as a reminder that Turkish-Israeli competition over Syria—rooted in irreconcilable strategic perspectives—will persist.

—Ömer Özkizilcik

7. Where does the United States stand in all of this?

The escalation highlights two key realities for US policy in Syria. First, US mediation efforts aimed at facilitating integration and supporting a unified Syrian state have failed. Washington repeatedly brought Damascus and the SDF to the negotiating table and attempted to steer the process in a constructive direction, yet no breakthrough was achieved.

Second, the crisis has created a new opportunity for the United States. The exposure of the SDF’s fragility in Aleppo city may increase its willingness to make concessions and accept Damascus’s terms. If Washington seeks to prevent a broader military escalation in northeastern Syria, it can once again convene talks and press the SDF to adopt a more pragmatic stance. Should the SDF demonstrate genuine willingness, the United States could play a constructive role in facilitating integration and rebuilding trust between the parties.

—Ömer Özkizilcik

Related reading

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Nov 21, 2025

Syria joining the anti-ISIS coalition is a westward pivot—with opportunities and risks

By Merissa Khurma and Giorgio Cafiero

The decision is a shift in the country’s alignment—from Russian and Iranian spheres of influence to one in NATO and GCC regional orbits.

Democratic Transitions Middle East

8. Did disagreements among SDF factions contribute to the violence?

The exact degree of internal disagreement within the SDF—and the extent of central command control over Asayish forces in Aleppo—remains contested. Nonetheless, it is evident that multiple decision-making centers are involved. Following the escalation, Damascus and the SDF agreed, under international mediation, to evacuate all Asayish forces from the contested neighborhoods. Some Asayish units, however, refused to comply and instead chose to fight.

According to Turkish intelligence sources cited in the media, this decision followed orders issued by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) cadres in Qandil, reportedly led by Bahoz Erdal. This suggests a rift between the Syrian branch of the PKK, which dominates the SDF, and the PKK’s central leadership in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq.

A second layer of fragmentation became visible on the battlefield itself. While the Syrian army initially pursued a limited operation, cohesion within the Asayish ranks collapsed, with many fighters deserting or laying down their weapons.

—Ömer Özkizilcik

The post Eight questions (and expert answers) on the SDF’s withdrawal from Syria’s Aleppo appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Delcy Rodríguez’s untenable balancing act

Iria Puyosa — Thu, 08 Jan 2026 20:32:51 +0000

The United States’ extraction of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from his bunker on January 3 triggered an explosion of activity across Venezuelan social media. Across Instagram, TikTok, and WhatsApp status updates, millions of Venezuelans shared jubilant reactions to images of the former dictator in custody. Venezuelan diaspora communities from Buenos Aires to Madrid posted celebratory videos, while domestic users circumvented internet restrictions to express relief and hope.

The regime’s communication apparatus—typically one of its most formidable weapons—collapsed during the crucial first fifteen hours following the operation. Targeted strikes on antennas disrupted the radio communications of the security forces, while an electricity outage impacted the area around the Fuerte Tiuna Army Base. However, internet and phone communications continued to function normally. State TV and radio stations were broadcasting prerecorded programming rather than providing critical news coverage. Chavismo took refuge on Telegram channels and groups.

When government communications finally resumed, conflicting statements revealed chaos within the regime. Late on January 3, former Vice President Delcy Rodríguez proclaimed Maduro “the only president of Venezuela” and demanded his release while simultaneously assuming the role of acting president. In contrast, US President Donald Trump claimed that she was cooperating with his administration and was willing to fulfill all his requests regarding the US takeover of the Venezuelan oil industry. This dissonance highlighted the regime’s turmoil, torn between defiant rhetoric for domestic audiences and pliant negotiations with Washington.

The regime’s double game

Hours after Maduro’s removal, María Corina Machado, the leader of Venezuela’s democratic opposition movement, whose candidate won 67 percent of the vote according to tallies from the stolen 2024 election, declared on social media “Venezuelans, the HOUR OF FREEDOM has arrived!” However, despite her overwhelming popular legitimacy and moral authority, she operates under the constraints of surveillance and repression. The opposition’s mobilization capacity remains uncertain, as the Maduro regime’s systematic repression has crushed the country’s civil society.

For her part, Rodríguez confronts an unprecedented challenge for a Venezuelan leader: She must satisfy Washington’s demands while maintaining sufficient Chavista coalition support to prevent an internal fracture or a military coup. The Trump administration demands sufficient cooperation to enable US oil company operations, likely including transparent property contracts and regulatory stability—precisely the institutional environment that Chavismo systematically dismantled. Rodríguez making such an agreement with Trump would alienate the regime’s hardliners, who would view her accommodation as a betrayal. Thus, Rodríguez may be unable to guarantee the stability required for the business operations Trump wants to run in Venezuela.

Her public contradictions reflect this impossible position. In her first televised addresses as interim president, she demanded Maduro’s immediate release to demonstrate loyalty to domestic audiences. Less than twenty-four hours later, however, she declared it a priority to move toward a “balanced and respectful” economic cooperation between the United States and Venezuela.

This double game cannot persist indefinitely. Rodríguez must choose between accommodating Trump’s demands or preserving Chavista unity. Trump’s threat that if Rodríguez “doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro” makes clear that there will be consequences of noncompliance. Purging the hardliners may be Rodríguez’s best option.

Navigating the geopolitical minefield

Perhaps Rodríguez’s most complex challenge is managing Venezuela’s deep entanglements with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba while simultaneously partnering with the Trump administration. This is especially the case after the Trump administration demanded that Venezuela immediately cut ties and cease intelligence cooperation with Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba. These relationships represent more than diplomatic alignments—they constitute binding financial obligations, operational dependencies, and strategic commitments that cannot simply be abandoned without triggering massive economic and security consequences.

China presents the most significant financial exposure. Venezuela owes Beijing around twenty billion dollars in loans. These debts are secured through oil-for-loan arrangements that require repayment through crude deliveries, with China currently absorbing more than half of Venezuela’s oil exports (approximately 746,000 barrels per day in November 2025).

Beyond petroleum, Chinese state enterprises control critical Venezuelan infrastructure. Huawei built and maintains control over Venezuela’s national fiber-optic backbone. China Electronics Import & Export Corporation built and operates the VEN911 surveillance system. ZTE Corporation designed the Homeland Card system and operationalized the Patria System database used for social control. These companies don’t simply provide services—they embed operational control within Venezuela’s digital infrastructure, creating dependencies that cannot be severed without system collapse. Expelling Chinese technology companies would require the complete reconstruction of Venezuela’s telecommunications and surveillance systems.

Russia’s Strategic Partnership Treaty with Venezuela, signed in May 2025, commits Caracas to comprehensive cooperation with Moscow across the hydrocarbons, military technology, and strategic sectors. Russia is Venezuela’s primary supplier of naphtha and diluents—essential additives for processing Venezuela’s heavy crude. These Russian commitments create immediate conflicts with a potential US partnership, as the Trump administration’s demands make clear. The energy deal announced by the Trump administration on January 7 indicates that US diluent will be sent to Venezuela, meaning that Russia will have to withdraw from that market.

Iran provides Venezuela’s most operationally sensitive international cooperation—drone technology production at El Libertador Air Base, where Iranian personnel set up operations. On December 30, 2025, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on Empresa Aeronautica Nacional SA, the Venezuelan company operating in a joint venture with Iranian companies at drone manufacturing facilities in Venezuela. This military-technical cooperation directly threatens US interests and almost certainly constitutes a nonnegotiable red line for Washington.

Cutting ties with Cuba would resent the deepest ideological and operational challenge for the regime. Cuban intelligence advisors remain embedded throughout Venezuelan security services despite the neutralization of Maduro’s personal protection unit. These advisors provide counterintelligence expertise, interrogation training, and repression coordination—exactly the capabilities Rodríguez needs to maintain internal control against potential coup attempts. Cuba’s own survival depends on Venezuelan oil shipments, with Havana receiving subsidized petroleum. Severing Cuban intelligence cooperation would affect operational expertise within the security forces, potentially triggering a military fracture. Yet Washington has demanded the immediate severance of Venezuela’s ties to Cuban intelligence. Moreover, on January 3, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a warning to the Cuban leadership: “If I lived in Havana and was part of the government, I’d be at least a little concerned.” He also emphasized that Cuba would no longer receive oil from Venezuela.

Democracy deferred

Each day of ambiguity increases pressure from all directions, making Rodríguez’s balancing act increasingly untenable. There are three competing scenarios: First, Rodríguez could successfully navigate between Washington and Chavismo. Second, hardliners could resist accommodation with the United States, triggering Trump’s threatened “second wave” operation. Third, a rebellion could replace Chavista leadership, opening the door to a transition.

Amid this uncertain picture, Venezuelan civil society, having demonstrated extraordinary resilience through the October 2023 primary elections and the July 2024 presidential campaign despite systematic repression, now confronts a different challenge. It must fight to remain relevant amid a power transition dominated by US economic interests and Chavista factional negotiations. In the days following Maduro’s capture, a clear priority has emerged for Venezuelan civil society: the total liberation of all the regime’s political prisoners, who currently number nearly one thousand. Only then will Venezuela’s transition to democracy truly begin.

The post Delcy Rodríguez’s untenable balancing act appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Now comes the hard part: What Trump should do next to secure Venezuela’s democratic future

Jason Marczak — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 23:30:08 +0000

WASHINGTON—The big surprise in Saturday’s stealth operation to bring Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro to justice was not the success of the mission or the fact that US President Donald Trump approved the operation. The elite Delta Force commandos are some of the best trained in the world, and the overall precision of the mission demonstrated US military might yet again. For his part, Trump has wanted to see Maduro go dating back to his first term, when he led a coalition of countries recognizing an interim government.

Nor was it a surprise that the country has been relatively calm since Maduro’s exit. Venezuela is not a powder keg. And Venezuelans didn’t flood the streets in celebration for fear of reprisal from security forces and Chavista-aligned paramilitary forces known as colectivos. Instead, Venezuelans flocked to the supermarkets to stock up—actions that again cast light on the economic suffering of the people in a country with an annual inflation rate over 500 percent and where 90 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.

Rather, what surprised some observers was the big gamble the Trump administration is making by giving Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president and longtime Chavista loyalist, its blessing to run the country in the interim. Trump called her “gracious” in his press conference on Saturday. As for the leader of the Venezuelan opposition, Trump said María Corina Machado “doesn’t have the support within or the respect within the country.” There was no mention of the July 2024 election in which Machado was barred from running but then led the campaign of Edmundo González, who went on to win around 67 percent of the vote. This decision reinforced the strategic focus of phase one of the US mission.

How to explain this surprise? The administration is making what it sees as a strategic short-term bet on Rodríguez. Support remains strong for the Machado-led opposition with key US House Republicans forcefully voicing their support for her since the operation. Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed “tremendous admiration” for Machado on Sunday, but he refused to endorse her or explicitly speak about a transition to democracy. Thus far, it appears that the opposition’s path to power rests on competing in yet another election. Yet that effort is doomed to fail unless the next election is different from all the previous ones under Maduro.

Delcy Rodriguez being sworn in as the acting president of Venezuela on January 5, 2026. (Stringer/dpa via Reuters Connect)

Rubio’s answer on the prospect for a transition to democracy was that “these things take time. There’s a process.” According to article 234 of the Venezuelan constitution, Rodríguez—who was officially sworn in on Monday—can serve ninety days as acting president, followed by an additional ninety days if approved by the Chavista-controlled National Assembly. Then the Assembly can declare an absolute absence of the presidency, triggering elections within thirty days. So, expect elections to be called within six months, if the regime is following the letter of the constitution. But so far the Venezuelan Supreme Court has danced around the many constitutional provisions around Rodríguez’s appointment, saying it was due to “circumstances not explicitly provided for in the Constitution.” A similar tactic of seeking to bypass established timetables was also used over a decade ago when former leader Hugo Chávez was dying.

With all this ambiguity, when the time is ready, what can the United States do to ensure elections are actually free, fair, and transparent, and that all candidates (including Machado) can run?

Thus far, the administration has shown little interest for elections in its public statements. That makes sense in the short run. This is an operation with a focus on transactional pragmatic realism. But elections will eventually be necessary to give political certainty to not only the Venezuelan people but also the foreign investors Venezuela badly needs. At that time, US pressure will be needed so Venezuela does not risk a dangerous repeat of previous elections—contests held in name only, without any real chance for non-Chavista-aligned politicians to officially win and assume power.

Rubio was right that there is a process that needs to occur. Venezuela has not seen a free and fair election this century. Staging one will require a number of factors: allowing all candidates to run, permitting airtime in the media, guaranteeing the safety of candidates, ensuring that voters are not intimidated at the ballot box, verifying that votes are not manipulated, and, of course, counting the votes accurately. An election under these conditions would give a significant advantage to opposition forces, who have proved they can win even under adverse conditions.

Given the dismal state of the country, the immediate US agenda has focused on strategic rather than political priorities. In media interviews on Sunday, Rubio clarified Trump’s statement that the United States would “run” Venezuela by laying out the terms that the administration wants: an oil industry that benefits US interests and the Venezuelan people, an end to drug trafficking, the removal of the Colombian criminal groups known as the FARC and ELN, and a country that “no longer [cozies] up to Hezbollah and Iran in our own hemisphere.” So, economic interests, security priorities, and stamping out foreign influence—all priorities laid out in the new National Security Strategy. Rather than running the country in the manner of an occupation, Rubio said on Sunday: “What we are running is the direction that this is going to move moving forward, and that is we have leverage.”

Trump has repeatedly threatened continued US military action—even warning of harsher actions—if Rodríguez does not comply with US demands. But we have learned time and time again that the Venezuelan regime cannot be trusted. Words don’t matter; actions do. And domestically, Rodríguez will seek to avoid being seen as too closely aligned with US interests to ensure her continued support among regime loyalists. That was clear in her combative comments on Saturday, shortly after the operation. Most likely, she will seek to walk a political tightrope to avoid being—at least for now—in the United States’ crosshairs. That much was evident with her Sunday statement where she pledged to “extend an invitation to the U.S. government to work together on a cooperation agenda.”

The Trump administration thus needs to establish specific benchmarks—incremental steps and final results—that the regime needs to meet when it comes to the economy, security, and foreign influence. The United States must set a timeline for compliance—and refuse to tolerate any attempts by Rodríguez to delay.

In addition to eventual elections, the Trump administration should pressure the Venezuelan regime to show it does intend to cooperate. One place to start is releasing wrongfully detained Americans from Venezuelan jails and freeing all political prisoners. But it also means means making concrete progress on key economic and security priorities such as:

Resolving cases involving the oil assets expropriated by Hugo Chávez in 2007;
Advancing a new hydrocarbons framework that allows oil companies to be able to operate in Venezuela either without the national oil company PDVSA as a partner or with a foreign company as the majority partner;
Ensuring that foreign investments are respected;
Clamping down on armed groups in the country and their myriad illicit activities, rooting out the strong linkages between these groups and the regime as well as foreign adversaries; and
Cracking down on illicit narcotics flows.

This past weekend’s mission went entirely according to plan. But the United States is now forced to depend on the remnants of the Maduro regime for the next stage in the mission. That will be a much harder task. Ultimately, what’s needed in Venezuela is a partner government that allows for the freedom of its people, respects foreign investment, and that advances US and Venezuelan security and economic interests.

The post Now comes the hard part: What Trump should do next to secure Venezuela’s democratic future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What to watch in a post-Maduro Venezuela

Atlantic Council — Sat, 03 Jan 2026 21:38:06 +0000

JUST IN

Nicolás Maduro is out. But who’s in? Early on Saturday morning, the US military removed the Venezuelan strongman from power, transporting him to New York to face narcoterrorism charges. President Donald Trump said the United States will now “run” Venezuela and that Maduro’s former vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, has assumed the presidency for now. What does it all mean for the United States, the Venezuelan people, and the country’s oil? Our experts have the preliminary answers.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Democracy+Tech Initiative and a native of Venezuela
Alexander B. Gray (@AlexGrayForOK): Nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and former deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff of the White House National Security Council
David Goldwyn (@Dlgoldwyn): Chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group and former US State Department special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs

Changing the regime

“This is the most consequential moment in recent Venezuelan history—and for the broader Latin American region,” Jason tells us. “This operation goes beyond a simple extradition: It is a regime-change effort.”
For now, Rodríguez—who was very much a part of the Maduro regime—is in power, though she “does not appear to have the backing of all factions within the ruling party,” Iria notes.
“Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability required for” the Venezuelan economic revival that Trump is calling for, Iria adds. “Chavismo no longer enjoys the widespread popular support it had two decades ago.”
Jason points out that Rodríguez is constitutionally obligated to call new elections within thirty days, but even that step would in effect come from the same regime that stole an election rightfully won by the opposition in 2024. Trump called for a “safe and judicious transition,” but Jason notes that “many entrenched actors are likely to resist meaningful change,” even though “real change is fundamental to US interests and to the Venezuelan people.”

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The Trump Corollary

Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy outlined a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, with a focus on securing the Western Hemisphere. This operation tells us the Trump Corollary “is officially in effect,” Alex says. “Washington has demonstrated a long-overdue commitment to hemispheric security.”
And US adversaries are watching. The operation “will be seen in Beijing and Moscow as an unambiguous sign of the Trump administration’s commitment to a security order compatible with American interests,” Alex explains.
The operation, Alex adds, “creates a once-in-a-generation opportunity for Washington to translate its security preferences into strategic reality” by “ensuring extra-hemispheric powers like China and Russia are excluded from meaningful influence in Caracas.”
Trump also sent a message to other leaders in the region. “Trump mentioned Colombia and Cuba as countries whose leaders should now know the consequences of not cooperating with the United States,” Jason points out.

Oil outcomes

Trump spoke of bringing back US oil companies that were booted out by Venezuela’s 1976 nationalization of the oil industry. But “few US companies are likely to return to the country until there is a reliable legal and fiscal regime and stable security situation,” David tells us. “Companies that have existing operations are much more likely to revive and expand them if the environment is secure.”
The United States has plenty of policy options at its disposal, David says. For example, the administration “could allow oil currently on tankers to be exported, expand licensing, and permit Venezuela to sell oil at market prices, all for the purpose of maximizing national revenue.”
But, David adds, “until there is clarity on sanctions and licensing and more information on who is actually managing the central bank and ministry of finance, the prospects for Venezuelan oil production and exports will remain uncertain.”

The post What to watch in a post-Maduro Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: The US just captured Maduro. What’s next for Venezuela and the region?

Atlantic Council experts — Sat, 03 Jan 2026 20:19:54 +0000

“We are reasserting American power.” That’s what US President Donald Trump said Saturday, hours after the US military launched a strike and raid on Venezuela that resulted in the capture of strongman Nicolás Maduro. The Venezuelan leader and his wife were moved to the USS Iwo Jima en route to New York, where Maduro has been indicted on multiple charges, including narcoterrorism. The US operation comes after months of pressure on the Venezuelan regime to halt drug trafficking and move the country toward democracy. “We are going to run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper, and judicious transition,” Trump said.

So, what’s next for Maduro, Venezuelans, and US efforts in the region? Below, Atlantic Council experts share their insights.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Matthew Kroenig: A win for regional security, the Venezuelan people, and the US military

Alexander B. Gray: This operation sends a signal to Beijing and Moscow

David Goldwyn: Opening up Venezuela’s energy industry will come down to the details

Celeste Kmiotek: The US strikes most likely fall afoul of international law

Iria Puyosa: Delcy Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability Trump wants

Geoff Ramsey: The mission is not accomplished until Venezuelans get free and fair elections

Nizar El Fakih: Multilateralism failed Venezuela. But it failed long before today.

Tressa Guenov: Success will require years-long US diplomatic and economic efforts in Venezuela

Kirsten Fontenrose: Watching Venezuela from Tehran

Thomas S. Warrick: Maduro’s ouster will cause shock waves in the Middle East

Alex Plitsas: Three scenarios for what could come next

The US needs to remain committed to a democratic transition

Many Venezuelans are hopeful that today marks the beginning of a new era. The removal of Nicolás Maduro from power is a reality that Venezuelans in the country and the nearly eight million forced to flee under his regime have long sought.

Here are three key takeaways from the operation:

First, this is the most consequential moment in recent Venezuelan history—and for the broader Latin American region. Trump’s Saturday announcement made it clear that this operation goes beyond a simple extradition: It is a regime-change effort. Maduro is now en route to New York City to face criminal charges, but the United States intends to “run the country” until “a safe and judicious transition” takes place. That means Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president, cannot simply take power and continue his policies. In assuming the presidency, she is constitutionally obligated to hold elections within thirty days. But remember, there was a prior election in July 2024 which opposition leader Edmundo González won, according to released vote tallies.

Second, the US military operation is the start—not the end—of a new level of direct US engagement in Venezuela. Trump confirmed that a team has been designated to run Venezuela, with key figures such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio engaging with Rodríguez. While US forces are expected to provide security around critical infrastructure, broader public security and the protection of citizens remain pressing challenges in a country plagued by gangs, paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and transnational cartels. Hundreds of political prisoners still remain locked up, with their fate of top importance.

Third, today’s actions are the first concrete deliverables of Trump’s new National Security Strategy with its heavy emphasis on the Western Hemisphere. And the president has made it clear that future US operations in the region are fair game as well. Trump mentioned Colombia and Cuba as countries whose leaders should now know the consequences of not cooperating with the United States.

Fourth, the United States now bears responsibility for the eventual outcome in Venezuela. The challenge will be ensuring a “safe and judicious transition” in a country where many entrenched actors are likely to resist meaningful change, but where real change is fundamental to US interests and to the Venezuelan people.

Some commentators are arguing that the strike is illegal under international law. I am not a legal expert, but it’s worth noting that even though heads of state do enjoy immunity from prosecution under international law, few world leaders recognize Maduro as a legitimate head of state. Since 2019, the Organization of American States, the premier multilateral body for the hemisphere, has refused to recognize Maduro as president following that year’s stolen elections.

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

A win for regional security, the Venezuelan people, and the US military

There are five winners of the successful US operation to remove Maduro from power in Venezuela:

US, regional, and global security. The world is better off without an anti-American dictator who traffics narcotics, prompts irregular migration flows, and provides a foothold to the “axis of aggressors” (China, Russia, and Iran) in the Western Hemisphere.
The Venezuelan people. They now have the opportunity for a better government and a freer and more prosperous future.
US military power. This shows that the US military is still the finest fighting force in the world and may help Washington find its confidence and get over its Iraq-Afghanistan hangover.
Special operations forces. They have been eager to show higher-level officials in Washington that they are still relevant after the war on terror—and indeed even more so now.
Trump’s foreign policy. This is a dramatic foreign policy victory, among the top three of the first year in Trump’s second term, alongside degrading Iran’s nuclear program and increasing NATO defense spending.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies.

This operation sends a signal to Beijing and Moscow

The “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, as outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy, is officially in effect. Just days after the Chinese People’s Liberation Army was reported to be war-gaming combat operations in the Western Hemisphere, and a new official Chinese strategy for Latin America refused to recognize the region as of special significance to US security, Washington has demonstrated a long-overdue commitment to hemispheric security.

The Trump administration’s removal of Maduro from power in Venezuela is not simply a message to antagonistic regimes in the hemisphere, like Cuba and Nicaragua; it is a global reestablishment of deterrence that will be seen in Beijing and Moscow as an unambiguous sign of the Trump administration’s commitment to a security order compatible with American interests.

Going forward, the administration has a unique opportunity to build upon the success of its pressure campaign against Maduro to reestablish overwhelming US strategic predominance in the hemisphere, including by tacitly shaping a post-Maduro settlement that ensures extra-hemispheric powers like China and Russia are excluded from meaningful influence in Caracas. The success of this operation creates a once-in-a-generation opportunity for Washington to translate its security preferences into strategic reality.

—Alexander B. Gray is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Gray most recently served as deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff of the White House National Security Council.

US President Donald Trump speaks from Palm Beach, Florida, following a US strike on Venezuela on January 3, 2026. (REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst)

Opening up Venezuela’s energy industry will come down to the details

From an energy perspective the key questions will be who governs the country, the timeline and nature of a transitional government, the security situation in the country at large and in the oil production sites and ports, and if the US government modulates the sanctions regime and the blockade to financially support a potential transitional government. At this writing, Trump has declared that the United States will run the country until the situation is stabilized, and he declined to endorse González. Trump also asserted that US oil companies would return to Venezuela.

It remains to be seen whether there will be resistance from loyalists of the regime and remaining members of Cuban intelligence. Few US companies are likely to return to the country until there is a reliable legal and fiscal regime and stable security situation. Companies that have existing operations are much more likely to revive and expand them if the environment is secure.

It is highly uncertain how the US administration will approach exports and management of those revenues. It could allow oil currently on tankers to be exported, expand licensing, and permit Venezuela to sell oil at market prices, all for the purpose of maximizing national revenue. It is also possible that those revenues would go into a blocked account for the benefit of a new Venezuela government.

But for now, we have no details about how these fiscal and legal arrangements will evolve. Until there is clarity on sanctions and licensing and more information on who is actually managing the central bank and ministry of finance, the prospects for Venezuelan oil production and exports will remain uncertain.

—David Goldwyn is president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC, an international energy advisory consultancy, and chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group.

The US strikes most likely fall afoul of international law

Maduro oversaw a brutal regime engaged in violent human rights violations against Venezuelan citizens. Regardless of this, the US strikes on Venezuela were illegal under international law.

The United Nations (UN) Charter forbids use of force against a state’s “territorial integrity or political independence,” with exceptions permitted for self-defense and Security Council authorizations. Self-defense requires that the force used be necessary and proportional, and that the threat be imminent. None of these conditions appear to have been met. As such, the attacks appear to fall under Article 3(a) of the UN General Assembly’s definition of the crime of aggression. This provision is customary, meaning it is binding and applies regardless of US arguments that the actions are legal under domestic law.

The use of force also marked the onset of an international armed conflict between the United States and Venezuela, triggering the applicability of international humanitarian law. While so far most targets appear to have been military, Trump threatened a second “and much larger” attack “if needed.” Trump’s announcement that the United States will “run” Venezuela and may deploy forces also raises alarms around potential occupation.

Finally, as sitting head of state, international law affords Maduro full personal immunity under domestic courts—including in the United States. Since 2019, the United States and other countries have not recognized Maduro as head of state, in response to widespread election fraud, and he is widely considered an illegitimate ruler. However, as argued by the French Cour de Cassation, this immunity should apply regardless of whether a state recognizes a head of state’s leadership—precisely to prevent politically motivated arrests.

While Maduro must be held accountable for the human rights violations he has inflicted, the United States’ unlawful actions must be condemned. Allowing such precedents to go unchallenged will further undermine respect for international law, state sovereignty, and civilian protections.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Delcy Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability Trump wants

The US decapitation operation against the autocratic regime that ruled Venezuela for over twenty-five years—first led by Hugo Chavez, then by Maduro—marks the beginning of the restoration of democracy in the country. The regime was unable to mount any effective defensive military actions. Its usually strong communication apparatus failed catastrophically during the first twelve hours following the US operation to take Maduro from his residence inside Fuerte Tiuna, the principal military base of the Venezuelan army. The military command-and-control chains were clearly disrupted.

Venezuelans are eager to reclaim their country and restore democracy. There is hope that González—who was rightfully elected president in 2024—will soon take the oath, and many trust that María Corina Machado will successfully lead the transition process, which may take months or even years. The second-in-command figure in the regime, Rodríguez, who was sworn in today to take Maduro’s place, does not appear to have the backing of all factions within the ruling party. Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability required for the business operations Trump emphasized several times during his remarks on the operation. Chavismo no longer enjoys the widespread popular support it had two decades ago.

The Venezuelan people who have fought nonviolently against a highly repressive regime for over two decades will continue their struggle until freedom and democracy are fully restored.

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Democracy+Tech Initiative. Puyosa was previously an associate professor at the College of Social Sciences at the Central University of Venezuela.

The mission is not accomplished until Venezuelans get free and fair elections

With Rodríguez appearing on state television Saturday afternoon and convening a “National Council in Defense of the Nation” made up of every heavyweight in the ruling party, it seems likely that she is indeed serving as the country’s de facto leader—for now.

While she claimed that Maduro remains “the only president,” called for his release, and said that Venezuela would never be “a colony of any empire,” she also noted that the Supreme Court will be reviewing a national emergency decree signed by Maduro as his last executive act. This points to further announcements to come, in which Rodríguez will almost certainly claim that she is now the country’s interim leader.

Whoever emerges on top of the power struggle in Caracas, it is fundamental that the United States use its considerable leverage to incentivize a roadmap for a transition. It is essential that the Venezuelan people are presented with a credible plan for free and fair elections, the release of political prisoners, and a path toward economic recovery. The United States can help pave this path by offering gradual, phased sanctions relief in exchange for verifiable progress toward democratization.

It is logical for the United States to advance its own energy, migration, and broader geopolitical interests in Venezuela, but US policymakers should not consider their mission accomplished until Venezuelans’ fundamental right to elect their own leaders is restored.

—Geoff Ramsey is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Multilateralism failed Venezuela. But it failed long before today.

Many today are emphasizing the importance of multilateralism and warning about its erosion as a result of the unilateral US actions in Venezuela. But the reality is different: Multilateralism in the face of the Venezuelan crisis did not fail today—it failed years ago.

That failure—resounding, stark, and undeniable—is measured in millions of exiles, many now undocumented or living in precarious conditions across dozens of countries, constituting one of the largest forced displacements in the world without a conventional war or internal armed conflict. It is measured in millions of families torn apart by a regime that systematically destroyed its own society: opposition parties dismantled, dissidents disappeared, deaths under custody, widespread torture, the mass closure of independent media, expropriations that crippled the productive economy (years before any international sanction), hyperinflation that impoverished millions of working families, and sustained repression.

Meanwhile, diplomacy and multilateral institutions proved unable to deliver a single effective negotiation process leading to an orderly, peaceful, and negotiated transition—despite years of appeals by millions of Venezuelans who voted, protested, and exhausted every available civic mechanism at enormous personal cost.

And international justice? The International Criminal Court, with an investigation open since 2021, has yet to issue a single indictment—despite extensive documentation of crimes against humanity by the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and hundreds of victims. Their testimonies provided detailed accounts of a sophisticated, systematic, and nationwide apparatus of repression designed to crush dissent that has been operating in the country for several years under this regime.

Looking ahead, a central concern among Venezuelans—both inside and outside the country—is whether stability will follow, and what political order will emerge from the vacuum left by Maduro, particularly given the competing factions within the former regime. What is clear is that Venezuelans expressed their will at the ballot box: In the July 2024 presidential election, the opposition—led by González and Machado—won decisively, a result the Maduro government refused to recognize, further deepening the crisis that culminated in today’s events.

Any sustainable transition will require that this legitimate leadership, with broad and demonstrable support inside Venezuela, be empowered to lead a democratic transition through a credible and legitimate process.

—Nizar El Fakih is a nonresident senior fellow with the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Success will require years-long US diplomatic and economic efforts in Venezuela

While it’s far too soon to know Venezuela’s ultimate disposition following today’s operations, we do know that Trump says that the United States will essentially “run” the country for now. Trump has prided himself on touching many conflicts around the world—from those between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Azerbaijan and Armenia to Gaza and Ukraine—quickly claiming several as resolved. But one thing the administration has yet to prove in nearly all cases, especially Venezuela, is whether it has the sustained attention span for the years-long diplomatic and economic efforts required to bring societies out of chaos and repression.

Even a short-term endeavor of running Venezuela will cost significant US military and taxpayer resources. It will also require real diplomatic finesse to ensure that the United States remains a credible leader in the region, which has now become the centerpiece of US national security strategy. Meanwhile, China will likely continue its lower-key but serious commitment to economic development in Latin America and elsewhere around the world.

Venezuela will be a test of Trump’s strategy for US dominance in the region and whether his collective peace and security efforts—from Caracas to Kyiv—can result in real strategic advantages for the United States. The alternative would be a stack of unfinished US projects that leave real lives affected in the wake.

—Tressa Guenov is the director for programs and operations and a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. She previously served as the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Watching Venezuela from Tehran

From a technical and military standpoint, the US operation in Venezuela signals to Iran that Washington is increasingly confident operating against Russian-derived, layered air-defense architectures without needing to dismantle them through a prolonged, overt suppression of enemy air defenses (or SEAD) campaign. Venezuela’s inventory—anchored by S-300VM, Buk-M2, and point defenses such as Pantsir-S1, supported by Russian and Chinese radars—closely resembles the architecture Iran fields around critical sites. Yet the US operation appears to have achieved its objectives without forcing visible air-defense engagement.

Available reporting suggests the US operation evaded detection and engagement by leaning on standoff effects; persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); electronic attack; and compressed timelines. Under such conditions, systems like Buk and Pantsir may never generate a usable firing solution, while high-value S-300-class assets become difficult to employ without sustained targets, clear attribution, and political authorization. The issue is not only theoretical capability, but whether layered defenses can meaningfully influence outcomes during brief, tightly sequenced operations.

This reinforces a broader pattern Iran will recognize. Russian air defenses have struggled to impose decisive effects in other theaters—including Syria, where Israeli strikes have repeatedly penetrated layered systems, and Ukraine, where Pantsir, Buk, and S-300 variants have suffered attrition under modern ISR-strike cycles.

Equally relevant is the diplomatic dimension. In Venezuela, as with Iran, US military action coincided with standing diplomatic offers—sanctions relief, normalization steps, and elements of proposed deals—kept on the table before and during the use of force. The combined signal to Tehran is that neither reliance on Russian air defenses nor the slow-rolling of US proposals necessarily alters the pace or structure of US action.

Recent US strikes in Nigeria send a reinforcing signal. There the United States acted without prolonged warning or phased escalation, using remote airstrikes supported by the Nigerian government. These operations underscore a reduced tolerance for drawn-out escalation dynamics and a preference for short-duration, outcome-oriented use of force.

For Iran, the relevance lies not in the specific targets or theaters, but in the demonstrated willingness of the United States to move decisively once thresholds are crossed.

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She was previously the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council.

Maduro’s ouster will cause shock waves in the Middle East

The success of Trump’s bold operation to remove Maduro will cause global shock waves, including in the Middle East. Saturday’s successful operation puts Trump’s “locked and loaded” message on Friday to Iran’s leaders in a different perspective. However, the Venezuelan operation took months of planning, and there are no signs that the United States has the capability, or the intention, to pull off something similar in Iran.

Still, as a demonstration of Trump’s willingness to back months of rhetoric against Maduro with dramatic—and effective—action, Saturday’s operation should concern Iran’s leaders. Those who know their history—and the Trump administration has some like Sebastian Gorka who do—will remember that in 1956 the United States failed to follow up on its encouragement of Hungarian protesters against Soviet rule. The Trump administration ought to be aware of the dangers of vague rhetoric that cannot be followed up with action. Trump’s words to Iran and the Middle East in the coming weeks need to be made with steely-eyed capability and intention.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

Three scenarios for what could come next

The US operation to capture Maduro and transfer him to stand trial in the United States on criminal charges dating back to 2020 marks a decisive inflection point for Venezuela. What follows will hinge less on Washington’s next move than on the calculations of the regime’s remaining power brokers, military commanders, intelligence chiefs, and political enablers who are now confronted with a stark choice: negotiate an orderly exit or risk annihilation alongside a collapsing system.

In the best-case scenario, Maduro’s arrest catalyzes elite defection. Faced with legal exposure, sanctions, and loss of patronage, regime underlings could seek guarantees for safe passage, limited amnesty, or third-country exile in exchange for transferring authority to the legitimately elected opposition. Such a negotiated handover would avert mass violence, stabilize institutions, and open a narrow but viable path toward economic recovery and international reintegration.

Another scenario is that the United States has been working secretly with elements of the Venezuelan government who will take over.

The worst-case scenario is far darker. If regime remnants reject negotiation and fragment, Venezuela could descend into a protracted guerrilla conflict. Armed colectivos, criminalized military units, and narco-linked factions could wage asymmetric warfare, turning parts of the country into contested zones and prolonging civilian suffering long after the regime’s formal collapse.

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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Charai for The National Interest: Peace Through Strength in Venezuela—and the World

Atlantic Council — Sat, 03 Jan 2026 19:20:23 +0000

Original Source

The post Charai for The National Interest: Peace Through Strength in Venezuela—and the World appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Democracy and stability in Africa: Why US leadership still matters

Mason Ingram, Alysson Oakley, and Jack Higgins — Fri, 19 Dec 2025 00:47:44 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The United States is reevaluating democracy assistance in Africa at a time when democratic institutions, citizen aspirations, and regional stability depend on sustained support for accountable governance.
Strengthening democratic pathways, empowering citizens in democratic and authoritarian contexts, and investing in stabilization and local peacebuilding are essential to protecting African progress and advancing US interests.
Private philanthropy and the private sector must play a larger role in sustaining electoral integrity, supporting civil society, and fostering conditions that enable long-term democratic and economic gains.

This issue brief is part of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “The future of democracy assistance” series, which analyzes the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Introduction

The political landscape in Africa defies generalization. Despite setbacks and challenges, democratic progress continues in Ghana, Malawi, and Senegal, among other countries. Next to these bright spots, military juntas have deepened their grip on multiple West African and Sahelian governments, long-standing authoritarian regimes remain in Rwanda, Uganda, and other countries, and conflict and war continues to upend lives and threaten the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan. Numerous other countries are best described as hybrid regimes, combining democratic and authoritarian forms of governance and producing inconsistent outcomes for their citizens in terms of delivering public goods, securing basic rights, and promoting economic growth.

Against this backdrop, the United States is recasting its relationship with African governments and their constituencies. Department of State officials describe “trade, not aid” as the foundation of US policy in Africa. In doing so, they have named expanded access to critical minerals and energy resources, alongside the development of new markets for US exports, as signature priorities for the Trump administration on the continent. This shift has brought cascading effects on African nations. As the region with the largest historic inflow of US foreign assistance, deep and sudden cuts to the aid budgets of the US Department of State and the closure of the US Agency for International Development have disproportionately affected African countries.[2]

Previous US administrations—including the first Trump administration—promoted democratic governance and stability in Africa using a combination of diplomatic and development tools. In fiscal year 2023, for example, the US government spent more than $338 million on democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) programming in Africa. Even more was spent in the final year of the first Trump administration, when DRG spending in Africa stood at more than $415 million.

Today, the outlook is very different. In addition to eliminating most democracy assistance to the continent in the early round of aid cuts, the administration has sought to defund the National Endowment for Democracy and proposed the elimination of nearly all DRG funds in its 2026 budget. Meanwhile, it has shifted away from criticizing foreign governments on democratic and human rights grounds.

Regardless of the direction of US government policy, recent history shows that both African societies and US national interests are best served by stable, democratic, and accountable systems of governance, which have proved more effective at delivering peace, expanding socioeconomic opportunity, and fostering market economies that attract domestic and international investment. Given this reality, the “dealmaking” intended to drive the administration’s foreign policy will find its greatest long-term success in countries with stronger and more democratic institutions.

This brief makes recommendations for how and why US stakeholders should work with democratic partners in Africa to seek democracy and stability-related outcomes. It includes specific recommendations directed at the US government for using democracy assistance as a tool to advance key African and American priorities. Recognizing that the near-term reality of reduced funding for US government democracy assistance will generate new shortfalls and challenges, this brief also identifies opportunities for other American institutions, namely private philanthropy and the private sector, to partner with key democratic actors and advance DRG practice in Africa.

Why prioritize democracy, good governance, and stability?

There are numerous practical reasons for the US government and constituencies to prefer and encourage democracy, good governance, and stability in Africa. Most importantly, it is what African publics want. Survey respondents on the continent consistently report a preference for democratic systems of government over all other options. The 2021–23 Afrobarometer survey found that, across thirty-nine surveyed countries, 66 percent of respondents prefer democracy over any other kind of government, while 78 percent oppose one-party rule and 66 percent oppose military rule. Despite some erosion in overall support for democracy over the past decade, popular support for democratic governance remains resilient in the face of social and economic headwinds and global momentum for authoritarian governments.

Despite challenges, democratic and institutionally stable regimes have yielded economic, political, and social benefits. The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes show that globally, while gains often take time to accrue, democratizing countries see an average bump of 8.8 percent in gross national product per capita over a twenty-year period compared to their autocratic peers. Meanwhile, institutional instability and fragility remain especially damaging to socioeconomic well-being. Countries with the highest levels of fragility as defined by the Fragile States Index have seen slow or significantly negative economic growth, conflict, and recurrent humanitarian crises. Insecurity and crisis, in turn, create unstable markets, disrupt supply chains, and erode long-term investment for US industries.

From an American perspective, African countries with stable and democratic institutions have been reliable economic, political, and security partners. They are more inclined to establish and strengthen rules-based economic and political systems that protect US and other investors. In regions like the Sahel, as elaborated on below, democratic governments serve as key political and security allies, while undemocratic and especially unstable countries have invited foreign interference by geopolitical rivals and create risks related to radicalization.

Institutional stability will only become more important as the US government and corporations push to expand trade relations and close deals in capital-intensive sectors like mining. Moving forward, the limiting factor on investments that generate returns for African and American economies alike is not the ability of the US government to sign deals today, but its ability to encourage stable economic and political conditions that protect those investments in the years to come.

Priorities for democracy assistance

A sensible US foreign policy interested in achieving meaningful social, political, and economic gains for African partner societies and US stakeholders alike would make diverse investments in stable, democratic, and accountable governance on the continent. We identify three broad priorities that could power an effective democracy assistance strategy:

Invest in countries on a democratic pathway.
Ally with citizens, including in backsliding democracies and autocracies.
Prioritize stabilization and local institutions that enable peace and security.

These priorities and the specific investments listed below are not meant to be comprehensive, but rather indicative of what a balanced and sufficiently ambitious US democracy assistance strategy could entail. The priorities could be applied across a wide set of countries and regions, or focus on specific geographies where the US government has direct economic and security interests, such as large population centers and economies like Nigeria and Kenya, or strategic regions like the Great Lakes, Horn of Africa, and Sahel. Recognizing that the US government is poised to reduce its investments in critical areas of intervention, we identify specific opportunities for private philanthropy and the private sector to play a leadership role in delivering and reenvisioning elements of a democracy assistance package moving forward.

Priority 1: Invest in countries on a democratic pathway

Reinforcing the economic, political, and security gains to democratic stability in Africa, the United States should continue to invest in the success of aspiring and longer-standing democracies on the continent. Democratic governments are better at protecting the rights and well-being of their citizens while creating hospitable conditions for secure, long-term investments and trade relations. Key democratic governments on the continent have set reform agendas with the potential to benefit their citizens and serve near- and long-term American economic and political interests. Furthermore, multiple democratic countries represent anchor security partners for the United States and critical bulwarks against instability, radicalization, and foreign interference in volatile regions such as the Sahel.

Take Senegal, for example. Senegal provides a case study for how a country that has made long-term democratic progress—and that overcame threats to its 2024 presidential election—is prioritizing economic and governance reforms that are responsive to the stated interests of its citizens. Like other recently elected governments on the continent, Senegal’s administration has prioritized anti-corruption, structural economic reforms, and poverty reduction, among other signature initiatives. Senegal’s President Bassirou Diomaye Faye led this effort by declaring his assets during the election and, once in office, announcing audits of the oil, gas, and mining sectors. The administration similarly proposed multiple transparency laws and released previously unpublished reports from anti-corruption institutions.

The extent and success of reform efforts in Senegal remains to be seen, but they have the potential to strengthen its citizens’ socioeconomic security and overall market economy. Alongside Ghana, Senegal remains a long-standing democratic partner in a region where the proliferation of military-led governments has put US security interests and assets at risk, as evidenced by the recent closure of US military bases in Niger. The U.S., therefore, has a direct stake in the success of governance-strengthening efforts in countries like Senegal.

The US government and other entities should make strategic investments in countries on a democratic pathway, like Senegal, to achieve results in high-priority areas of reform and strengthen key institutions, including in sectors of mutual interest to the US stakeholders and partner governments.

Prioritize support for reforms that are championed by government partners. External technical and financial assistance is most effective when supporting reform and governance-strengthening initiatives that are owned and led by government partners. Indeed, political commitment alongside bureaucratic capacity are among the interrelated factors contributing to the success or failure of reform. In countries seeking to entrench democratic and economic reforms, the US government can work with partner governments that see their political futures as tied to the success of reforms across a range of economic and social sectors, such as public health, transportation, and financial services where key benefits accrue to US constituencies. The US government can aid these reform efforts by providing technical assistance, technology transfers, and direct financial support, concentrating on sectors where the US has a strategic interest.
Continue social and capital investments in democratizing countries. The US government has used vehicles such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to invest in economic and social sectors in countries meeting basic governance benchmarks. This has included, for example, using cofinancing models to support upgrades of the energy sector in Senegal and the transport sector in Malawi. The MCC’s investment-led, government-to-government approach is suited to countries on a stable and democratic trajectory, where US and partner country investments are more likely to be secure. While its future remains uncertain, the MCC and institutions like the Development Finance Corporation can help democratizing countries generate capital for high-priority, high-impact sectors that can contribute to economic growth and social welfare. Looking forward, the US government can maintain investments in strategically important countries like Cote d’Ivoire and Zambia. It can also use its investments to crowd in funding to sectors of mutual interest for African and American businesses and other stakeholders.

The role of other actors: Private philanthropy must maintain support for free and fair electoral systems

The integrity of electoral institutions and, ultimately, the conduct of elections has an outsize influence on the trajectory on democratic consolidation. The US government has decades of experience supporting political parties, strengthening the infrastructure for independent election monitoring, and strengthening electoral management bodies (EMBs), which research shows is critically important to democratic trajectories, including re-democratization. Meanwhile, the current Department of State has backed away from electoral assistance programs and issued directives restricting embassies from criticizing foreign elections.

Given trends in US government policy, private philanthropy can help preserve US leadership in international electoral support. While the philanthropic sector cannot replace US government election funding—which included $48.9 million in support for unanticipated events like snap elections across twenty-eight African countries between 2022 and 2024—it can make high-impact investments that help preserve and build on democratic gains. These investments could include, for example, prioritizing targeted support for EMBs and the electoral monitoring capacities in countries working to consolidate their democratic progress.

Priority 2: Ally with citizens, including in backsliding democracies and autocracies

In pursuing a dealmaking-focused foreign policy, it will be tempting for the US government and private sector to “deal” primarily or exclusively with power-wielding political and economic elites. Doing so risks putting the United States at odds with African publics who express a preference for democracy and accountable governance, while potentially promoting corruption and distorting markets key to fair competition for US and other businesses.

Many African societies have tended to hold positive views of the United States and find resonance with its economic and political values. Recent research from Pew found that the some of the highest US approval ratings from foreign publics come from surveyed African countries. These findings mirror older Afrobarometer data showing that preference for the US development model outcompetes China’s by 11 percentage points across surveyed countries. This research suggests that views of the United States are influenced by its perceived commitments to democratic and free-market development approaches.

An effective foreign policy focused on long-term US interests must grapple with the reality that the political and socioeconomic interests of African citizens are not always served by their leaders. Many regimes tilt the electoral system in their favor, effectively silencing their electorates. Across a range of countries, civil society and human rights leaders face political repression for exercising their fundamental political rights. And too many large-scale investments in extractives and other sectors—including investments led by transactional Chinese state and corporate entities—have undermined the human rights and failed to serve the interests of local communities.

Allying with African citizenries does not mean forgoing economic and political dealmaking. Across regime types, citizens want to see expanded economic opportunity, social welfare gains, and security. Failure to prioritize the economic and political needs and interests of African societies, however, would put the United States on the wrong side of many of the youngest populations in the world, jeopardizing hard-won admiration on the continent. Democracy assistance offers practical tools for supporting and protecting key constituencies.

Invest in strengthened economic governance and business climates. African publics and the US government and corporations have a shared interest in strengthening business sectors that enable fair, rules-based market competition. The US government should invest in strengthened economic governance through targeted support to government and nongovernment actors, potentially focusing on sectors with heightened exposure for the United States. This could, for example, include supporting efforts to reduce child labor and forced labor from supply chains, thereby addressing significant human rights violations and leveling the economic playing field for US corporations that must adhere to international labor standards. Where there is state commitment to reform, the US government can support technical assistance to lawmakers and regulatory bodies to put in place and implement legal, policy, and regulatory frameworks that meet international standards. It can also support chambers of commerce, industry associations, and civil society organizations to promote transparent and accountable business practices and advance market-oriented reforms.
Prioritize anti-corruption and accountability. Support for anti-corruption efforts by committed government and citizen actors offers a clear opportunity for the US government to stand with African publics. In countries as varied as Gabon, Gambia, Liberia, and South Africa, more than 70 percent of Afrobarometer respondents report that corruption increased “somewhat/a lot” in the past year.” Corruption concerns have helped fueled democratic transitions in countries such as Ghana and Senegal, as well as large-scale protests in Kenya, Madagascar, and South Africa, among others. The US government could assist governments committed to anti-corruption efforts to advance e-governance that has been shown effective at reducing opportunities for corruption. The United States should also support civil society and independent media to conduct investigations, analyze public data, and advocate for public transparency and accountability, including to address regional challenges like cross-border illicit financial flows that harm US economic interests.

The role of other actors: Private philanthropy should prioritize emergency assistance to civil society and human rights institutions

With the near-term decline of the US government’s support to civil society in Africa and globally, private philanthropy is best placed to shore up critical gaps while shifting the terms of assistance for civic institutions. In particular, private foundations can prioritize funding for emergency assistance aimed at protecting individuals and organizations facing acute risks of political repression. The annual value of US government human rights programming in Africa was $21.6 million in fiscal year 2022, of which emergency assistance activities was only a part. The sums involved for sustaining core emergency assistance categories are within the capabilities of individual or coalitions of leading US philanthropies.

Private foundations can also adopt regional or global approaches to directly funding and supporting local civic institutions. This could include developing programs that facilitate horizontal relationships, learning, and mutual assistance among civic actors from Africa, the United States, and other regions grappling with common struggles related to conflict, democracy, and accountable governance in their societies.

Priority 3: Prioritize stabilization and local institutions that enable peace and security

Instability and conflict remain critical challenges across key regions and countries in Africa. The Fragile States Index shows that four out of the five most fragile countries (and sixteen out of the most fragile twenty-five countries) globally are in sub-Saharan Africa. Recent years have seen a rapid expansion in the scope and intensity of conflict in the region. This includes conflicts fueled or amplified by extremist groups in the Sahel, West Africa, and coastal East Africa. It also includes civil conflicts in Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan, among other countries. The human and economic costs of conflict are vast. In 2023, the number of displaced persons in Africa approached 35 million, representing nearly half of the total number of displaced persons globally.

In the DRC and broader Great Lakes region of Africa, the Trump administration has shown a willingness to use its political capital to seek an end to a long-standing and worsening conflict that threatens its trade and investment interests. In late June 2025, the US government announced a peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda governments aimed at halting the conflict between state authorities and the March 23 Movement (M23) rebels. Questions remain about the ultimate effectiveness of the settlement given that M23 and other rebel groups are not direct parties to the agreement. The US government, however, has expressed commitment to its implementation, which it sees as necessary for enhanced American access to critical minerals, including cobalt, copper, and tantalum. As in other countries with active conflicts, the US government has cut important aid programs to the DRC that invest in the social infrastructure and critical institutions necessary for supporting and sustaining peace deals. The long-term durability of any peace, however, depends on empowered individual and institutional structures that can deliver foundational levels of governance, and social and economic benefits that can reinforce stability.

Maintain support to networks of peacebuilders at the local, regional, and national levels. Integrated networks of formal and informal peacebuilding institutions and individual activists are critical to monitoring, responding to, mitigating, and managing conflict, especially at the local level. Local peacebuilding committees and related structures have a track record of enabling community-level peace outcomes and social cohesion in countries like Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Kenya. Similarly, mutual aid groups are playing a key role in responding to the impacts of conflict in contemporary Sudan. The US government should prioritize cost-effective investments in the peace institutions and structures that monitor and strengthen peace settlements, especially in countries and regions where it invests in negotiation.
Prioritize stabilization and repairing local institutions. Where it pursues diplomatic solutions to conflict, the US government can help secure gains by investing in interventions that produce stability. The DRC shows how daunting the challenge of stabilization can be, with more than 2 million Congolese having faced displacement from the M23-driven conflict between January and June 2024 alone. Effective stabilization efforts require prioritizing humanitarian responses to meet the basic needs of families and communities experiencing displacement, return, and other traumas. It also must include supporting the reestablishment of local civil society and state institutions that can help deliver services, manage public goods, and resolve disputes.

The role of other actors: The private sector should foster multisector investments in peace and security

The long-term ability of private sector companies to operate and recoup investments in conflict-affected communities depends on durable peace and security. Direct investments in peace dividends (i.e., socioeconomic returns to peace) can help reinforce reductions in conflict. US and other private sector companies are optimally positioned to strengthen their local business environments by making social and economic investments that help communities and regions benefit from periods of relative calm while strengthening overall socioeconomic well-being. This can include making investments in local infrastructure, public goods, and service delivery capacities. Private sector actors, especially within the extractives sector, can also build on frameworks like the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and commit to business and human rights practices that reinforce good governance and security.

Committing to and growing who leads democracy assistance

During its first ten months in office, the Trump administration has removed long-standing infrastructure and funding for delivering democracy assistance globally, including in Africa. The near- and long-term interests of African societies and key US stakeholders, however, are bolstered by the advancement of democratic, accountable, and stable governance on the continent. Not only is a robust democracy assistance strategy in Africa in line with long-standing US values that underpin America’s reputation and image on the continent, but it is also instrumental to stated objectives of the current administration, such as expanding fair access to strong foreign markets and securing priority peace agreements.

Regardless of its ultimate policy, the US government is, at least for the time being, stepping back from traditional aspects of DRG programming. In this context, other institutional actors can do more. Private philanthropy and the private sector cannot replace US government democracy assistance, but they can make targeted, evidence-based, and cost-effective investments that protect important areas of intervention, such as emergency assistance for human rights defenders, institutional support for EMBs, and pro-peace investments in conflict-affected communities. These and other types of investments are affordable, and when well executed, they can positively influence the trajectories of individual democratic actors, institutions, and partner countries.

Private foundations are especially well positioned to pursue DRG investments while prioritizing direct support to African-based institutions. This can include forging mutual relationships among democratic actors grappling with common 21st-century democratic challenges in Africa, the United States, and beyond, to seed the sector with stronger horizontal ties and novel partnership approaches and new strategies for the future.

about the authors

Mason Ingram is vice president for governance at Pact, a nongovernmental organization that carries out development work around in the world in partnership with private sector organizations government agencies, including with USAID until the agency’s closure in 2025. Pact continues to receive funding from the US Department of State. Ingram has more than 15 years of experience designing, advising, and managing international development programs, with a focus on civil society and governance programming.

Alysson Oakley is vice president for learning, evaluation, and impact at Pact. Oakley also teaches courses on program design and evaluation of democracy assistance and conflict resolution interventions at Georgetown University. Oakley holds a PhD from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and a bachelor of arts degree from Brown University.

Jack Higgins is a research assistant and MA candidate at Georgetown University’s College of Arts and Sciences.

The authors are grateful for consultations provided by experts on democratic governance in Africa, including Dr. Babra Ontibile Bhebe (executive director, Election Resource Centre), Bafana Khumalo (co-executive director, Sonke Gender Justice), Omolara Balogun (head, policy influencing and advocacy, West African Civil Society Centre), Jean-Michel Dufils (retired senior governance research expert and program manager), and Jon Temin (visiting fellow, SNF Agora Institute).

explore the program

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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Prisoner releases are welcome news but talk of a Belarus thaw is premature

Hanna Liubakova — Thu, 18 Dec 2025 22:02:36 +0000

The freeing of 123 political prisoners in Belarus last week, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Ales Bialiatski and 2020 protest leader Maria Kalesnikava, must be seen as a major humanitarian win. Lives have been saved and families have been reunited. However, this large-scale prisoner release should not be interpreted as an indication of more fundamental change. On the contrary, it is a calculated move by Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka to extract concessions from the West without abandoning his reliance on domestic repression.

Commenting on the releases, US Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale confirmed that Washington planned to lift sanctions on Belarusian fertilizer exports. He also suggested that all remaining Belarusian political prisoners could be freed in the coming months, potentially in a single group. This prompted some talk of a potential thaw, but it is premature to draw such conclusions. In reality, the Lukashenka regime remains as authoritarian as ever and is not reforming. Instead, it is bargaining.

When assessing the significance of the recent prisoner releases, it is important to maintain a sense of perspective. The 123 people freed in early December represent only a relatively small portion of the more than 1100 political prisoners currently being held in Belarus. Meanwhile, more names are regularly added to the list. During November 2025, human rights group Viasna identified 33 new political prisoners in Belarus.

The Lukashenka regime has clearly learned from similar agreements with the United States earlier this year, which also saw prisoners freed in exchange for sanctions relief. This is fueling a transactional approach to what should be primarily a human rights issue.

While this year’s prisoner releases demonstrate that sanctions relief can produce welcome results, any further reduction in sanctions pressure by the United States should be approached with caution. If prisoner releases are rewarded without any expectation of broader shifts away from authoritarian policies, repression itself becomes a bargaining tool. In such a scenario, there is a very real danger that political prisoners could become virtually inexhaustible bargaining chips for Lukashenka.

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In one if his first interviews following his release, Ales Bialiatski warned about the dangers of negotiating with Lukashenka without demanding wholesale change. He noted that releasing individual prisoners will not be enough to end repression in Belarus. The regime could easily exchange prisoners on a regular basis, he cautioned, freeing some and imprisoning others while asking for new concessions. Bialiatski’s insights should help inform international engagement with Belarus.

Looking ahead, the United States and European Union can play complementary roles in relations between Belarus and the democratic world. Washington’s sanctions tend to be intentionally more flexible. This makes it possible to offer targeted relief based on concrete humanitarian progress, while also allowing for an increase in pressure if Minsk backslides.

In contrast, European sanctions are more focused on systemic change. They are tied to ending policies of political persecution, embracing elements of democratic transition, and addressing Belarusian participation in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Any steps to weaken EU sanctions would reduce Europe’s ability to influence Minsk and rob Brussels of the tools to bring about more meaningful change.

Recent events have highlighted the lack of genuine progress toward constructive engagement between Belarus and the country’s European neighbors. Despite a number of goodwill gestures toward Belarus such as the reopening of EU border crossings, Minsk has continued to engage in provocative actions such as launching weather balloons into Lithuanian airspace.

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Lukashenka may have economic motives for seeking to secure sanctions relief in exchange for limited concessions. The Belarusian economy has benefited in recent years from a spike in wartime demand linked to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but this growth is now cooling. With less room to maneuver. the Belarusian dictator has good reason to engage in deals that can relieve the financial pressure.

He may also believe the time is right to reestablish his credentials on the geopolitical stage. As US-led negotiations to end Russia’s war against Ukraine continue, Lukashenka might see opportunities for a return to the mediator role he occupied during the initial stages of Russian aggression just over a decade ago. Many observers noted that during the latest prisoner releases, most of the freed detainees were sent to Ukraine rather than Lithuania, which has previously served as the main destination. This may have been an attempt to highlight ongoing cooperation between Kyiv and Minsk.

Greater engagement between the Lukashenka regime and the West could potentially be beneficial but a measured approach is essential. Future sanctions relief must be conditional and tied to verifiable steps such as the release of all political prisoners, an end to new politically motivated arrests, and the restoration of basic civic liberties. The rights of released prisoners must also be respected. This includes allowing them the option to remain in Belarus and providing them with full documentation.

Further steps to improve dialogue with Belarus should also be based on a realistic assessment of achievable goals. For example, it is wishful thinking to suggest that limited sanctions relief could somehow pull Minsk out of the Kremlin orbit. On the contrary, Lukashenka is now more dependent than ever on the Kremlin and will almost certainly never dare to distance himself from Russia, regardless of how skillfully sanctions are applied and relaxed.

What sanctions can do is constrain Lukashenka’s options and secure specific concessions. The ultimate objective should be an end to all human rights abuses and oppressive policies, rather than the targeted release of high-profile prisoners. Until that goal is within reach, the European Union in particular has a key part to play in maintaining pressure on Lukashenka.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Since the initial US seizure of the Skipper last week, Venezuelan crude exports have fallen sharply, effectively targeting Maduro’s main source of income. Venezuela relies entirely on tankers to export its oil, and disrupting the illegal trade that runs on these sanctioned tankers weakens Maduro’s grip on power. As of last week, more than thirty of the eighty ships in Venezuelan waters were under US sanctions.

Frankly, with the size of the US fleet amassed in the Caribbean, it was only a matter of time before this blockade began. It will be important to see which of these shadow vessels continue to try to reach Venezuelan shores and which vessels the United States determines it has the authority to seize. These ships are part of a large shadow shipping network designed to evade US sanctions and mask the destination of Venezuelan crude. This illegal trade network delivers oil primarily to China, and to a lesser extent Cuba, employing several tactics to disguise the origin, name, and shipping routes to evade US regulations.

The blockade of these sanctioned vessels provides an additional source of leverage for the United States. By cutting off a significant part of the regime’s income, the United States gains an additional chip to put on the table in discussions on ending Maduro’s dictatorship in Venezuela. This move elevates the Caribbean campaign from a counter-drug operation to one that is also cutting off the financial lifelines to Maduro, who the United States has designated as the leader of the Cartel de los Soles.

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

2. What is the likely impact on oil markets in the region and globally?

Venezuela exported a little over 780,000 barrels a day in October of this year, 100,000 of which came to the United States and the rest directly or indirectly going to China. It is highly uncertain whether all or only a portion of those exports will be impacted by the blockade.

The president referred to a blockade of “sanctioned vessels,” which could potentially exclude Chevron’s 100,000 barrels per day. A respected tanker tracking outfit suggested that only 40 percent of the vessels transporting Venezuelan crude are sanctioned.

The president also made reference in social media to Maduro and his government being labeled a foreign terrorist organization. We do not yet have designations or explanations from the Treasury or State Department. It is possible that any person or entity doing business with the Venezuelan government or its national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), could therefore be exposed to liability. In this case, nearly all of Venezuela’s exports (oil or otherwise) could be impacted.

So far, the oil market has shrugged its shoulders at the blockade. Brent crude was up 2.5 percent overnight, to sixty dollars a barrel, according to Bloomberg. That is a pretty modest impact. This could be the result of the market having already priced in the impact of higher levels of naval interdiction of Venezuelan oil exports, high levels of spare capacity, or weak winter oil demand. Ordinarily, one million barrels a day of displaced oil translates into about ten dollars on the oil price, so a complete blockade of all of Venezuela’s exports, if not replaced by increased by OPEC spare capacity or commercial reserves, would be in the range of five dollars to eight dollars a barrel. Everything will depend on how the blockade is enforced.

—David Goldwyn is president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC, an international energy advisory consultancy, and chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group.

3. What else could the United States do to put pressure on Maduro?

Venezuela relies on revenue from sanctioned oil exports to prop up the regime and the country’s economy. Venezuela continues to sell its sanctioned oil, predominantly to China, while accepting payment in digital assets, namely stablecoins, to circumvent US sanctions. To increase economic pressure on Venezuela, the administration should consider enforcing existing sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector, including PDVSA. Sanctions enforcement would include seizing crypto wallets and working with stablecoin issuers to seize or burn digital assets held by sanctioned Venezuelan entities. This would have an immediate impact on Maduro by taking out significant financial assets and it would be much more cost-effective for the United States and its naval forces.

Separately, as the United States increases pressure on Venezuela with a blockade, the administration should consider where the vessels will go next. As we have seen, the sanctioned tankers carrying Venezuelan oil have also carried Iranian oil. If ships cannot dock in Venezuelan ports, then the United States should anticipate where they will go instead and whose cargo they will carry, which could be Iran or Russia. The shadow fleet used by Venezuela, Iran, and Russia is a network, and to affect Venezuela, the United States needs to address the entirety of the fleet and its operators.

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served as acting associate director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) Intelligence Division, in the US Treasury Department.

4. What does the blockade mean for Russia’s shadow fleet?

The US move against Venezuelan oil exports may matter less for Venezuela itself than for Russia’s shadow fleet, because it signals a shift from symbolic sanctions toward more assertive enforcement against maritime sanctions evasion.

Russia today relies on a sprawling shadow fleet—aging tankers, opaque ownership structures, flag-hopping, ship-to-ship transfers, and weak or fictitious insurance—to keep oil flowing despite Western restrictions. What the Venezuela case demonstrates is that Washington is increasingly willing to treat sanctions evasion not just as a financial violation, but as a maritime security problem.

This matters because Russia’s shadow fleet is not isolated. Many of the same vessels, intermediaries, insurers, and ship-management networks service Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan crude interchangeably. Pressure applied in one region exposes vulnerabilities across the entire system. Even limited interdictions force tankers to go dark longer, take riskier routes, rely on fewer ports, and accept higher freight and insurance costs—raising the overall cost of Russian oil exports.

For Moscow, the immediate risk is not a sudden collapse in exports but growing friction and uncertainty. Each escalation increases the probability of seizures, port refusals, or secondary sanctions on service providers—factors that reduce the efficiency and scalability of Russia’s energy revenues over time.

There is also a deterrent effect. By demonstrating that shadow fleets are visible, traceable, and vulnerable, the United States raises the strategic risk premium for Russia’s oil trade—even if enforcement remains selective.

This dynamic is being reinforced in Washington on the policy front. A bipartisan group of US senators has introduced the Decreasing Russian Oil Profits (DROP) Act of 2025, which would authorize financial sanctions on foreign buyers of Russian petroleum products and seek to choke off a key source of Kremlin revenue. The proposal includes targeted measures to penalize entities anywhere in the world that continue to purchase Russian oil, with narrow exemptions tied to support for Ukraine, underscoring Congress’s intent to close loopholes in the sanctions regime and further isolate Moscow’s energy exports.

The key takeaway is this: Russia’s shadow fleet survives on the assumption of tolerance and ambiguity. The Venezuela action suggests that assumption is weakening. For a war economy dependent on energy revenues, that shift matters.

—Agnia Grigas, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center working on energy and geopolitical economy.

The post What Trump’s Venezuela oil blockade means for Maduro and the world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What will 2026 bring for the Middle East and North Africa?

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 16 Dec 2025 18:03:53 +0000

This year was a seismic one for the Middle East and North Africa. A new Syria emerged after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s Iran and Russia-backed regime. The Twelve Day War between Israel, Iran, and the United States erupted, threatening critical nuclear negotiations. Iraq completed landmark national elections, as Baghdad continues to build an enduring national stability.

All of this unfolded against the backdrop of a new administration in Washington that has been unafraid to shake up decades of US diplomatic conventions.

As 2025 comes to a close, our senior analysts at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs unpack the most prominent trends and topics they are tracking for the new year.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Gissou Nia: Demands for justice—and protests driven by the thirsty

Karim Mezran: North Africa is a rising priority for US policy

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Key questions remain for Palestinians

Victoria J. Taylor: Iraq must maintain unprecedented stability

Daniel B. Shapiro: A political transition in Iran approaches

Nathanael Swanson: Will the Israel-Iran cease-fire hold?

Jonathan Panikoff: A duality of possible trajectories

Three trends shaping the economic landscape

Three major macro trends will shape the Middle East and North Africa in 2026, each carrying profound implications for the region’s economic trajectory.

1. The pressure of lower energy prices
As energy revenues soften, governments across the region will be forced to make more disciplined, risk-adjusted investment decisions. The era of abundant fiscal cushions is shifting toward one that requires sharper prioritization, operational efficiency, and a clearer sense of expected returns. This will test policymakers’ ability to allocate capital effectively and to reduce long-standing subsidies and support for entrenched constituencies. These choices become even more consequential as a growing cohort of young people demand economic opportunity, purpose, and social mobility.

2. Rising debt and the cost of ambition
Fiscal tightening will coincide with an accelerating need for investment. Across the Gulf, governments are committing billions to data centers, artificial intelligence ecosystems, new power generation, and other foundational infrastructure. These projects will increasingly be financed through borrowing, especially as the current account deficit grows. The result will be higher debt levels and rising debt-servicing costs. Countries that clearly articulate their economic value proposition and demonstrate credible reform will have a competitive advantage in the capital markets. Those that do not may face steeper financing costs and slower momentum in their diversification strategies.

3. Vision 2030 ten year anniversary: A regional bellwether
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 has already reshaped the kingdom’s economic and social landscape through diversification, investment in future industries, and the creation of a more open and optimistic society. The plan’s tenth anniversary in 2026 marks a critical milestone, not only for the kingdom but for the region. The next decade will be defined not by the wealth beneath the ground, but by the wealth of human talent above it. How effectively the kingdom transitions from resource-driven growth to human capital-driven growth will influence the MENA region’s competitiveness for a generation.

Khalid Azim is the director of the MENA Futures Lab at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

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Demands for justice—and protests driven by the thirsty

In 2026, expect to see more widespread protest movements for change across the Middle East and North Africa fueled by climate change and authoritarian mismanagement. Analysis of global protest movements in 2025 focused heavily on the young age of the protesters. While youth demographics have gained relevance as new communication tools have emerged over the last decades (in 2011, it was Twitter organizing the youth in the “Arab Spring”; in 2025, it’s the gaming app Discord organizing Morocco’s “Gen Z” protests), the evergreen undercurrent is frustration with corruption and elites. Resources have become scarcer due to global warming and authoritarian mismanagement, and the globe has become increasingly and overtly transactional as it shuns diplomacy in favor of kinetic means and “might is right” politics. The Middle East and North Africa are profoundly impacted by both these negative trends. With water running out in Tehran and water instability around the Nile Basin and the Tigris and Euphrates River, expect the next wave of regional protests to be driven not just by the youth, but by the thirsty.

Regional victim and survivor-centric demands for justice will also continue to grow in 2026 in countries that are emerging from conflict, experiencing government transitions, or where restive populations wish to usher in a change of rule. There is no clearer example than in Syria, where Assad’s exit one year ago opened the space for a new Syria and where a previously exiled network of Syrian lawyers, researchers, and advocates now work on transitional justice processes from inside their own country. In Iran, where the population is publicly demanding regime change, victims of protest violence, executions, and custodial deaths have organized powerful advocacy groups to demand that international processes deliver justice where domestic courts are unable and unwilling to do the job. And across the region, while many governments have been complicit in the violence in Gaza, the Arab street stands at odds with those governments and instead has demanded—alongside much of the world—that the perpetrators of the violence in Gaza be held to account.

Gissou Nia is the director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

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North Africa is a rising priority for US policy

North Africa is poised to move closer to the center of US regional policy for 2026. The past year of quiet US engagement, including the work of US President Donald Trump’s Senior Advisor Massad Boulos, is beginning to reduce tensions and open political space. Algeria and Morocco are edging towards some degree of a detente, creating space for practical steps on the Western Sahara file.

Additionally, Libya may see modest but meaningful progress. Headway on an agreement between the divided governments on a unified development funding mechanism may reduce parallel spending and put less pressure on the dinar, as well as release the funds for long-awaited reconstruction and modernization projects. The decision to include Libyan units from both east and west in AFRICOM’s Flintlock 2026 special operations forces exercise suggests an incremental movement on military unification in Libya, an area where US diplomacy with key partners has grown more active.

Egypt will remain an integral partner as Washington tries to deal with situations in Gaza, states located on the Red Sea, and Sudan. At the same time, renewed attention to commercial diplomacy signals a shift toward advancing US business interests across North Africa.

Taken together, these dynamics make the region harder to overlook and suggest that 2026 may be the year North Africa becomes a sustained policy priority in Washington.

Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Key questions remain for Palestinians

This was a tectonic year of realignments for the Palestinian people, as well as their heavily divided and largely powerless leadership. Next year is likely to be equally important and trend-setting—and four major threads have emerged that could shape its trajectory.

For Palestinians and what’s next for Gaza, the top four trends to look for in 2026 are the following:

The Trump administration’s commitment to the Palestinian issue and its willingness to engage the Palestinian Authority, which remains subject to US sanctions and restrictions. Will elements of a comprehensive peace deal between Palestinians and Israelis, like the one that Trump proposed during his first term, return?
What becomes of the Gaza cease-fire that the United States and international players are hoping to cement into a lasting peace deal that transforms the coastal enclave? The year 2026 is either going to be one in which Hamas is disarmed and fundamentally changed—or it will be one in which the Palestinian terror group continues to dominate Gaza’s affairs and prevent substantive change to revitalize the decimated Strip after two years of devastating warfare.
The prospect of Saudi-Israeli normalization—which could unlock immense potential for the kingdom, the Palestinians, Israel’s regional integration, and a regional anti-Iran coalition—is enormous. The year 2026 will set the tone for whether Saudi Arabia proceeds with integration based on its often-stated requirement for Palestinian statehood, or if this ends up in further stalemate and stagnation.
The fourth critically significant trend to watch is the impact the Gaza war and Israel will have on influencing voters in the upcoming midterm elections. As with the Trump election, this issue increasingly played a role in rallying US voters to the ballot box, including the high-profile race to elect New York City Mayor-Elect Zohran Mamdani. The year 2026 will reveal whether this trend persists or if it is a fad that passes once the Gaza war comes to a more permanent end.

Ultimately, 2026 will either mark the end of the Gaza war and the initiation of reconstruction and hope in the Strip—or it will perpetuate a state of stagnation and stalemate, risking a return to fighting, devastation, and more tragic deaths.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is the director of Realign For Palestine at the Atlantic Council.

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Iraq must maintain unprecedented stability

Amid continued regional turmoil, Iraq ended 2025 in a period of relative stability and security, avoiding being drawn into the Twelve Day War between Israel, Iran, and the United States—and holding successful parliamentary elections. The challenge for Iraqi political leaders in 2026 will not only be to maintain this unprecedented stability, but also to navigate Trump administration pressure to rein in Iran-aligned militias and avoid being pulled into the broader US maximum pressure campaign against Iran. Iraq is also likely to continue its efforts to appeal to the Trump administration through investment, pitching new energy deals to US companies, but it is not yet clear whether these efforts will be successful.

With Iranian influence in the region at an all-time low, Iraqi leaders have an opportunity to forge a more independent foreign policy that prioritizes continued partnership with the United States and differentiates Iraqi from Iranian interests. Core to this effort will be progress toward Iraq’s regional integration and strengthened political and economic ties to the Gulf and other regional partners such as Jordan and Egypt. In the face of Iraqi efforts to challenge the militias and strengthen partnerships with the United States and the Gulf, 2026 may bring attempts by Iran and Iran-aligned militias to act as spoilers who obstruct Iraq’s progress and imperil Iraq’s stability. Iraq’s next prime minister has an opportunity to transform the country.

The next year will be critical in determining whether the Iraqi government can seize the opportunity and whether the United States and other regional partners will support it in doing so.

Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East program.

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A political transition in Iran approaches

Political transitions are hard to predict, but there is no doubt Iran is approaching one. With a frail, unpopular, eighty-six-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei nearing his actuarial and conceivably political limits, 2026 could be the year.

Any transition has the potential to unleash dramatic changes in Iran, across the region, and in relations with the United States. The potential positive implications of new Iranian leadership and a change of approach are massive: relief from brutal suppression for the Iranian people, new possibilities in nuclear diplomacy and toward normalization with the United States, broadened detente with Iran’s Arab neighbors, and an end to the arming of violent terrorist proxies across the region that have squandered hundreds of billions of dollars of Iranian resources—driven by an ideological crusade to destroy Israel—while the Iranian people endure manmade water and electricity shortages. The beneficial effects would be felt from Iran to Lebanon to Gaza to Yemen and beyond.

None of this is preordained or automatic. A transition could cement a new generation of the Islamic Republic’s clerical leadership, bring to power an even more hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or devolve into chaos and civil war with massively destabilizing effects. What Washington should engage in through 2026 is transition planning—not in order to cause a regime change, which must be left to the Iranian people, but to be prepared to provide support for the Iranian people, resources and expertise, potential sanctions relief, and coordination with international partners to assist in steering a transition when it comes toward one of the better possible outcomes. The United States has moved smartly in 2025 to support a stable Syrian transition, and while the jury is still out on long-term stability there, there has been significant progress. An even more consequential transition awaits in Iran. Washington must not be caught flat-footed.

Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Will the Israel-Iran cease-fire hold?

Following the Twelve Day War in June, Iran retains large quantities of highly enriched uranium and advanced centrifuges, without oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency. At the same time, while Iran’s missile program and support for nonstate proxies were diminished, Iran is rebuilding its capabilities and still threatens US, Israeli, and regional security.

After initially declaring Iran’s nuclear program obliterated, Trump has also repeatedly called for resumed negotiations and a new nuclear deal with Tehran. Although still nominally implementing the US “maximum pressure” campaign, Trump also made a high-profile gesture by inviting Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to the Gaza Peace Summit in October.

For its part, Iran appears to remain in a largely reactionary posture. It is attempting to rebuild its missile and defense capabilities but is not currently enriching uranium or advancing its nuclear program (that we know of). Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says Iran is open to talks at the United Nations, but also foolishly rejected the Cairo invitation. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has responded by reminding the world of the Iranian missile threat and increasingly targeting Iranian proxies. There is no written cease-fire in place, and continued peace is partially reliant on Trump holding Netanyahu back. As Israeli elections approach, will Trump’s “complete and total ceasefire” hold? Will Iran do something that gives the Israeli’s an excuse or opportunity to re-engage Iran militarily? Or will Iran give negotiations another chance? Either way, 2026 should make for a pivotal year for Iran.

Nathanael Swanson is a resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

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Nov 17, 2025

As elections loom, can Netanyahu balance Trump, Mohammed bin Salman, and his political future?

By Daniel B. Shapiro

The Israeli prime minister’s preferred path to survive a treacherous election will be to show Israeli voters that he is advancing their country’s regional integration and staying within the US president’s embrace.

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A duality of possible trajectories

2026 is a year of potential opportunity—and potential peril—for the Middle East.

Gulf states are determined to advance their political, economic, and security autonomy. Syria and Lebanon could either emerge as models of forward movement from instability or revert to sectarian strife and conflict. Pockets of normalcy could continue to advance in Iraq as exists today in parts of Baghdad and other cities, or it could descend back into political stasis and conflict. Israel could find itself more secure in the region by continuing to undertake kinetic strikes, or it could choose the path of less violence by completing meaningful security and cease-fire agreements with its neighbors. Choose the wrong option, however, and Israel could find itself more vulnerable to threats on its borders, not less. Palestinians could find space to grieve and begin to rebuild after two years of devastation—or face continued violence from West Bank settlers and a renewed war in Gaza, as well as some intra-Palestinian conflict. Jordan and Egypt will continue to muddle through their economic challenges and associated domestic social and political pressures, or this will be the year that they face collapse, and the world will look back and say the warning signs were there, we just missed them.

Most of the region has an opportunity at this moment in which it can seize and advance its desire for greater autonomy, global influence, and further integration. The Middle East can envision a calmer, more prosperous region driven by technological opportunity across sectors, including by leveraging artificial intelligence and US-exported advanced chips, while taking advantage of the economic integration pathways that are being developed, such as IMEC.

But the duality of possible trajectories laid out above reflects that in the Middle East, more often than not, positive opportunities are interrupted by internal or exogenous factors that regional capitals have to manage in a manner they did not expect. How the region grapples with the enduring and emerging risks of 2026 will determine whether it can prosper as a whole or whether only some will thrive while many continue to struggle. But if those regional countries that are advancing economically, politically, socially, and in their security only look inwards and do not seek to stabilize their neighbors facing social and physical insecurity, they will risk the latter impeding their development, as well. And then 2026 will once again be a year of missed regional opportunities instead of progress.

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

The post What will 2026 bring for the Middle East and North Africa? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

States shouldn’t waste the chance to establish a Syria Victims Fund

Kate Springs, Celeste Kmiotek — Mon, 08 Dec 2025 18:39:23 +0000

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in December 2024 created once-in-a-generation opportunities for the victims of all the actors in the conflict, not only to more easily pursue accountability for human rights violations but also to better assist those who suffered undue harm. While the transitional government’s plan for a comprehensive transitional justice process is still being developed, victim and survivor communities need immediate support.

States and international organizations—including the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Gulf Cooperation Council, among others—have a vital role to play in Syria’s reconstruction and recovery, including for the hundreds of thousands of Syrians who suffered detention, torture, and abuse. But states have been responding to the conflict since its start in 2011 by initiating legal actions related to international law violations occurring in Syria. These included prosecuting companies for providing material support to terrorist organizations in Syria and imposing fines for breaching sanctions imposed in response to the conflict in Syria. From these settlements and judgments, states collected or seized significant sums—over $600 million in one instance. While the ongoing harms suffered by Syrians underpinned these cases, states have generally directed the recovered funds to their own treasuries, even as Syrians continue to desperately need international assistance to move on from over a decade of conflict.

States always had the opportunity to divert these funds to victims and survivors within Syria, but doing so while the Assad regime controlled vast portions of the country would have been complicated. Now, as states settle into their relationship with the interim government in Damascus, they should redirect the penalties they’ve collected to the underlying victims who were directly harmed. This support should be facilitated through an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund—a mechanism for states to transfer Syria-linked funds collected from monetary judgements to a central location to better support victims of international law violations in Syria. The Strategic Litigation Project and a working group of Syrian civil society representatives have been advocating for such a fund for the past several years.

Urgent needs in Syria remain

For victims and survivors of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other human rights violations in Syria, the fall of the Assad regime marked a turning point in Syria’s history and an end to fifty-three years of state-enforced repression. It also presented significant opportunities—namely, increased access by international organizations and observers to those in need of assistance in previously inaccessible areas of the country. Both international and domestic human rights defenders and humanitarian workers have already begun administering legal and medical aid to victims and survivors living in former regime-controlled areas, and investigators have begun cataloging former detention sites and exhuming mass graves to identify the bodies recovered. Regime records are helping identify the fate of those missing.

However, the country still faces dire needs across all sectors to recover from the past decades of conflict and repression. States, international organizations, and civil society moved swiftly to support Syria after Assad fell —including lifting sanctions and providing millions in aid—but a year of aid remains insufficient in the face of decades of grievous harm, especially in light of US foreign aid cuts. While many Syrians across the country face similar humanitarian needs—such as a lack of medical, legal, or education support, the danger of unexploded ordinances, and general reconstruction in many areas devastated by the conflict—victim and survivor communities across Syria face unique challenges.

Thousands of regime detainees (who were often arbitrarily detained and subject to torture and other violations) freed from Assad’s brutal prison system—such as Sednaya prison, which has been referred to by Syrians as a “human slaughterhouse”—now need assistance in rebuilding their lives. These freed detainees, and other survivors of the hundreds of thousands of Syrians subject to regime detention, torture, and other abuses, require specialized medical care. Survivors and families of the over 500,000 Syrians believed to have been killed and of the over 100,000 believed to have been forcibly disappeared additionally require specialized psychosocial, legal, and other related aid.

Opportunities for asset collection

As Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces moved toward the Syrian capital in December 2024 in a rapid offensive across the country, regime officials—including financial administrators, leaders of state security forces, and Assad himself—fled the country in droves. Many are known or believed to have relocated their valuables and portable assets out of Syria or to have fled to the jurisdictions where they had stashed their wealth before Assad fell. Investigators should now follow the trails of evidence left behind to identify and collect these private assets.

Experts such as those at intelligence firm Alaco have indicated their long-held belief that the Assad family’s and associates’ wealth—largely accumulated through drug trafficking, corruption, and market manipulation—is in tax havens abroad. Many high-ranking government, military, and business officials connected to the regime fled to Russia to escape rebel forces. Others simply disappeared, along with millions of dollars collected through corruption and money laundering. Financial Times investigators have already uncovered troves of documents and intelligence related not only to the years of illicit wealth accumulation and the financing of human rights abuses but also to where Assad and his associates may have moved their ill-gotten wealth as they fled.

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Democratic Transitions International Norms

According to reporting from Reuters, as opposition forces closed in on Damascus, Assad transported significant wealth to the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—including at least fifty thousand dollars in cash, as well as documents, laptops, and artwork. Reuters reported that the assets moved to the UAE reportedly included financial records, real estate, and partnerships, and details of cash transfers, offshore companies, and accounts.

Documents and intelligence recovered by HTS forces after the fall of the regime additionally revealed previously unknown dealings between prominent Syrian businessmen and the Syrian state, including millions poured into the infamous Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, known for committing severe human rights abuses and stealing from the civilian population during the war.

States should now dedicate resources to identifying ill-gotten assets in their jurisdictions, pursuing legal processes to seize the funds, and repurposing them for disbursement to the Syria Victims Fund. Pursuing these actions prevents private actors from profiting off atrocities and creates an easy and sustainable pathway for states to support Syrian victims and survivors.

While assets moved to authoritarian states such as Russia may be difficult to recover, international investigators should dedicate resources to analyzing recently revealed information and recovering this ill-gotten wealth from states with asset recovery frameworks in place. Legal teams have in the past successfully secured asset freezes linked to the Assad family’s misconduct in Syria—for example, the collection by a Spanish court in 2017 of the assets of Rifat al-Assad, the uncle of Bashar al-Assad.

The need for a Syria Victims Fund

The Syrian interim government is developing a state-led transitional justice plan through the recently established National Commission for Transitional Justice and the National Commission for the Missing. This is welcome news, and the interim government must continue its efforts to work with Syrian civil society, victims and survivors, and others to create a comprehensive and representative plan. However, the urgent needs for victim communities in Syria necessitate an immediate response, and the Syria Victims Fund can fill this gap.

It must be noted that the Syria Victims Fund would not take the place of reparations, which will come through transitional justice processes. As has taken place in other post-conflict countries, such as Colombia, the Gambia, and Guatemala, reparations have the potential to restore victims’ dignity, acknowledge the harms which took place, and help victims to rebuild their lives—though only with input from survivors and affected populations can reparations programs be truly sustainable and restorative.

Instead, the Syria Victims Fund could draw on prior examples of repurposing seized funds, such as the BOTA Foundation in Kazakhstan. It could repurpose funds that morally belong to Syrian victims and survivors—in that they were seized in legal processes related to serious violations of international law in Syria—to provide interim reparative measures to victims, therefore equipping survivors with resources to seek the care that they want or need. The Syria Victims Fund’s efforts—such as working with victim communities and identifying needs—can also help facilitate transitional justice processes, such as by mapping violations or creating victim registries.

The creation of a Syria Victims Fund can help facilitate repair and recovery for Syrian victims, one year after the fall of the Assad regime. States shouldn’t waste this opportunity.

Kate Springs is a program assistant in the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. Previously, she was a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project. Her work focuses on corporate accountability and addressing the financial aspects of atrocities such as the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, as well as legal efforts to hold the Islamic Republic of Iran to account for its domestic, transnational, and transboundary crimes.

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One year after Assad’s fall, here’s what’s needed to advance justice for Syrians

Elise Baker and Ahmad Helmi — Sun, 07 Dec 2025 11:00:00 +0000

Just over a year ago, the prospect of justice for human rights violations by the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria was limited. Progress was measured through universal jurisdiction trials in Europe, occurring more than two thousand miles from Syria and focused almost exclusively on low and mid-level perpetrators, alongside sanctions on regime and affiliated actors. United Nations bodies continued to issue statements and reports, document violations, and support universal jurisdiction cases without access to Syria. Syrian civil society persisted for years with tremendous efforts preparing for transitional justice—if and when a transition may ever happen—as well as documentation and ways to creatively secure accountability through existing or new forums.

But the prospect of justice in Syria changed overnight on December 8, 2024. Assad fled his presidential palace and later Syria, flying to Russia as opposition fighters advanced on Damascus, liberating hundreds of political prisoners from Sednaya prison and other notorious detention centers along the way.

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Dec 7, 2025

Syria’s civil society must take center stage in reconstruction

By Tara Kangarlou and Merissa Khurma

One year since Bashar al-Assad’s fall, Syria stands to have the most potential to showcase how local ownership can accelerate reconstruction.

Civil Society Middle East

Over the past twelve months, there have been notable developments in Syria’s justice and accountability space. But progress has been conservative, likely due to a combination of factors. One such factor is the overwhelming nature of the task to secure justice for countless violations from over a decade of brutal war. Another is the Syrian transitional government’s need to build up from zero and its decision to centralize power within the ruling inner circle at the expense of civil society participation. An additional factor at play is a preference across many foreign governments to observe developments in Damascus before determining their level and modes of engagement.

In order to advance prospects of justice for Syrians after more than a decade of war, the second year of a post-Assad Syria requires structural reform, victim-centered leadership, and international reinforcement to prevent this opening from being squandered.

Justice developments in Syria since Assad’s fall

Syria has begun building out its national architecture of transitional justice. In May, transitional President Ahmad al-Sharaa issued Decree No. 20, establishing the National Commission for Transitional Justice with “financial and administrative independence.” Commissioners were appointed three months later, and they have begun meeting with civil society organizations, Syrians across the country and in the diaspora, and representatives from foreign governments, international bodies, and other post-conflict societies. However, the commission’s structure and internal regulations remain unclear, without a statute or terms of reference, and its scope of work is limited to Assad regime violations, excluding violations by other actors and those committed after December 8, 2024.

Syria’s Ministry of Justice has also begun investigating and building cases on Assad regime violations. The Ministry of Justice is investigating judges from the Assad-era Counter Terrorism Court and requesting complaints from citizens. These judges are responsible for presiding over tens of thousands of sham trials that imprisoned or sentenced to death detainees based on vague, trumped-up charges that considered the provision of medical aid and the documentation of human rights abuses, among other acts, to amount to terrorism. The Ministry of Justice has also, according to media reports, requested that Lebanon extradite former Assad regime officials accused of war crimes who fled Syria after the fall of the regime.

Finally, Syria has made progress addressing violations since December 8, 2024. The government established national committees to investigate two episodes of mass sectarian violence: in Alawite-majority coastal areas in March this year and in Druze-majority Sweida in July. The coastal committee was criticized for not releasing its report publicly and failing to acknowledge the government’s responsibility for the crimes. Nevertheless, the committee’s efforts have led to Syria’s first public trial in decades, of fourteen suspects in the March violence in coastal Syria.

Justice developments outside Syria since Assad’s fall

There have also been notable justice developments outside Syria over the past year. Foreign countries have continued pursuing universal jurisdiction trials that were in development before Assad’s fall, and Syrian civil society continues to file new complaints. After German and Swedish authorities carried out arrests in July 2024, parallel trials are now underway in both countries against Assad regime-allied suspects accused of violations in Yarmouk Camp, a district south of Damascus that regime-affiliated forces besieged and bombed during the war.

The United States is scheduled to begin the trial of former Assad regime official Samir al Sheikh in March 2026, after his arrest in July 2024 for immigration fraud, with torture charges added days after the fall of the Assad regime. In France, judicial authorities issued a new arrest warrant against Assad for his role in the 2013 chemical weapon attacks in Damascus suburbs, replacing a French warrant that was annulled in July this year due to his head of state immunity at the time it was issued in 2023. In late November, victims and survivors, supported by Syrian civil society organizations, filed a criminal complaint seeking an investigation into the role Danish maritime fuel company Dan-Bunkering may have played in war crimes and crimes against humanity in Syria by supplying jet fuel to Russian forces that was used in strikes against Syrians.

Foreign states have also launched new arrest warrants, charges, and indictments against high-level Assad regime figures since the fall of the regime. One day after Assad’s fall, US authorities unsealed war crimes charges against Jamil Hassan and Abdul Salam Mahmoud, two architects of Assad regime detention and torture practices, who in May 2024 were convicted in absentia of crimes against humanity in France, along with a third regime official. In November this year, France issued an extradition request to Lebanon for those three former Assad regime officials. This followed France’s September arrest warrant against Assad and six officials for their roles in the targeted killings of journalists in Homs in 2012 (which came one month before the chemical weapons arrest warrant was reissued in October). Finally, in mid-November, Austrian authorities indicted Assad regime official Brigadier General Khaled al-Halabi, who had reached Vienna with support from Israeli and Austrian intelligence, according to media reports citing Austrian intelligence agency memos.

Recommendations to advance justice for Syria

There has been notable progress on justice for Syria. Many of the developments discussed above—namely Syria’s National Commission for Transitional Justice, domestic investigations for Assad-era abuses and public trials, and multiple arrest warrants for Assad himself—were unimaginable just over a year ago. But the work of securing justice for Syria has only just begun, and more significant steps are needed from Syrian, foreign, and international actors.

As an overarching recommendation, Syria’s transitional justice process must center the calls from and preferences of Syrian victims, survivors, human rights defenders, activists, lawyers, and other civil society members who have dedicated more than a decade to pursuing justice for violations. Syria’s justice process should be Syrian-led, but that does not mean it should be led only by Syrian transitional government authorities. Syrian civil society has significant expertise, having led justice and accountability efforts for fourteen years, and the justice process must be designed to serve victims and survivors. It is certainly a welcome sign that victims, survivors, and human rights defenders have been appointed to posts in the National Commission for Transitional Justice, National Commission for Missing Persons, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But appointments alone are not enough; efforts must continue to ensure these individuals have influence in their posts, that they are not overpowered by more senior officials or executive authority, and that broader civil society expertise is incorporated within and outside formal structures.

Syrian authorities must undertake significant domestic reform to ensure future domestic accountability efforts will follow human rights standards. The Ministry of Justice, court system, and legal infrastructure helped to commit and enforce violations and corruption under the Assad regime. It will take years to rebuild these institutions and structures—to ensure they support victims rather than further victimize them, and to ensure transparency and legitimacy. Syrian law and procedure also requires significant reform: to abolish vague criminal charges that were weaponized against dissidents under the Assad regime; to adopt legislation criminalizing war crimes, crimes against humanity, enforced disappearance, and torture in line with international standards; to adopt procedures that will ensure victim and witness protection; and to abolish the death penalty, to name only a few. Given that Syrian government institutions have never untaken this work previously, it will also take years for national bodies to develop the specialized expertise required to investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other international crimes that are quite complex, and to amass the evidence required to prosecute these cases.

The new Syrian parliament should also adopt an inclusive law allowing for the prosecution of all criminals, regardless of perpetrator group, and committing to undertake all pillars of transitional justice. Syrian authorities should welcome support from specialized foreign and international experts, in addition to victims, survivors, and Syrian civil society actors who have been leading justice efforts for more than a decade. These individuals can advise on rebuilding and reforming national systems and support documentation and case-building—transitional authorities could benefit from more expertise on these tasks, especially from the expertise of international experts and Syrian civil society that have engaged on these tasks deeply. In the meantime, the Syrian authorities should grant victims’ associations and civil society organizations access to both prisons and trials, to monitor, improve transparency, help guarantee best practices, and ensure that torture and enforced disappearances do not occur again.

Finally, Syria’s transition and transitional justice process requires ongoing support and engagement from foreign and international actors. Such engagement and pressure has proven essential for post-conflict trials and transitional justice efforts in other contexts. Although foreign states’ priorities may be the stabilization and return of refugees, this agenda will be best achieved by supporting transitional justice and the rule of law. First, foreign states should continue to pursue universal jurisdiction trials, which are a necessary complement to domestic and international trials. The many perpetrators who fled Syria during the conflict or after Assad’s fall cannot evade justice simply because they left the country. Second, foreign states and international organizations should support Syrian transitional authorities in developing and rebuilding national institutions, systems, and expertise by offering trainings, expertise through secondments, and financial support. Third, foreign and international actors should push Syrian transitional authorities to take reforms or other actions to advance justice when progress stalls. Foreign and international actors should support Syrian victim, survivor, and broader civil society calls on the transitional authorities, using their influence to help ensure Syria’s transitional justice program is victim and survivor-centered. Fourth, foreign and international actors should continue to support the work of victim, survivor, and civil society organizations in documentation, case-building, and advocacy. A robust civil society will be essential to ensuring a just transition for Syria.

The Assad family controlled Syria for more than half a century. The task of securing justice for Assad-era violations is monumental. Syrian transitional authorities, civil society, and foreign and international actors must work together to have the best chance of success.

Elise Baker is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project. She provides legal support to the project, which seeks to include legal tools in foreign policy, with a focus on prevention and accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human-rights violations, terrorism, and corruption offenses.

Ahmad Helmi is a nonresident fellow at the Tahrir Institute and a founding manager of the Taafi Initiative, supporting survivors of enforced disappearances and torture. He has worked for justice and human rights in Syria for twelve years and survived three years of imprisonment and torture in Assad regime prisons.

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After Maduro

Jason Marczak — Fri, 05 Dec 2025 18:26:44 +0000

Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro now faces the greatest challenge to his grip on power since he took office over a dozen years ago. A carrier strike group led by the world’s largest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, arrived in the Caribbean more than two weeks ago along with long-range bombers, Marines, and other US assets deployed to the region as part of a mission officially aimed at combating narcotics trafficking. Previously dormant military bases in the region have been reactivated in a military buildup focused on narcotics, but with Maduro placed at the center of the effort due to his own ties to trafficking.

And the now-released National Security Strategy (NSS) clearly states the United States’ goals for the Western Hemisphere: “Enlist and Expand.” The latter goal includes ridding the hemisphere of a regime that advances priorities clearly in contrast to NSS objectives by providing safe haven for criminal groups, profiting from trafficking, and welcoming the influence of foreign adversaries. And as the United States seeks to secure access to critical supply chains, Venezuela presents an untapped opportunity.

Although US President Donald Trump has been evasive on what exactly his plans are for Maduro, it’s clear that the president is not authorizing the largest US naval deployment in the Caribbean in forty years—dubbed “Operation Southern Spear” by the Pentagon—only to counter small drug boats. It’s part of his NSS. Trump has recently spoken with Maduro, and reports indicate a possible deal being brokered for the dictator’s departure from the country.

But there have been rumors of Maduro’s downfall many times before. Hopefully, this time it comes to pass. Without Maduro, Venezuela and the hemisphere would rid itself of a cancer.

The opposition’s democratic blueprint

A democratic transition in Venezuela must begin with Maduro out of power, but it entails much more than that. It is imperative any opportunity for change is not usurped by many malevolent actors in Venezuela, including Maduro’s generals and high-ranking members of Venezuela’s intelligence agency, the Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional (SEBIN). Drug trafficking guerrilla groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), as well as armed pro-government paramilitary forces known as colectivos, are also a concern. Corruption lines every inch of Maduro’s regime, so much so that the US Department of State recently designated the Cartel de los Soles as a foreign terrorist organization. The Cartel de los Soles is the term used to describe the de-centralized military structure within Maduro-controlled armed forces that facilitate drug trafficking and other illicit activities for profit.

A democratic transition depends not only on the failure of these malign groups to derail the process, but also on the success of democratic forces that share similar interests to those laid out in Trump’s NSS. Here it’s worth looking back to July 28, 2024, the day of the Venezuelan presidential elections. Maduro, backed by friendly electoral authorities, stole the election and declared himself winner. In that election, opposition activists were able to gather more than 83 percent of the voting tallies and electoral records, demonstrating that Edmundo González Urrutia, candidate for the Plataforma Unitaria Democrática, had won around 67 percent of the vote. Since then, González has been forced to flee Venezuela, and opposition leader and 2025 Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado remains in hiding from Maduro’s regime in Venezuela.

Critically, opposition leaders still have the weight of their sweeping electoral win behind them. They have reiterated time and again a plan for a democratic transition when Maduro leaves power—a plan that includes economic revitalization and the rapid re-instating of civil liberties and human rights for Venezuelan citizens.

Machado herself has laid out her plans for Venezuela’s first hundred days post-Maduro. She has emphasized that before those hundred days are up, freedom of speech would be restored and new leadership would address the most pressing aspects of the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Further, the opposition has pledged to adopt reforms to curb food insecurity in the country. After immediate social needs are met and processes are in place to continue pulling Venezuelans out of malnutrition and other poor conditions, Machado has said she would enact her plan to begin revitalizing the economy. It’s an ambitious plan—after so many years of corruption and mismanagement under Maduro—but also one that will require continued US support in the days and months following a Maduro exit and a transition that would empower democratic forces.

“A trillion-dollar opportunity”

The Venezuelan opposition’s team of economists have laid out a plan for what Machado’s economic team calls a “trillion-dollar opportunity”—a free-market, liberalized Venezuela open to investors, including the United States.

In her plan, Machado notes Venezuela’s abundance of natural resources, ranging from the world’s largest oil reserves to vast deposits of gold, iron, and other minerals. She argues that a legacy of public investment since before former leader Hugo Chavez came to power and hollowed-out institutions because of Maduro’s dictatorship open a unique path to streamline reforms by removing bureaucratic obstacles and opening Venezuelan goods for international trade with partners around the globe. Machado drives home the point that because so many private-sector opportunities are unexplored in Venezuela, the country is sitting on a gold mine for those who invest in these sectors after Maduro’s grip on the country ends.

The opposition’s main reform programs, which include rule of law, security and defense, and an economic relaunch, provide the United States with a distinct opportunity to create a partnership with one of the most resource-rich and strategically located nations in South America. The positives of Venezuela becoming a friend and an ally of the United States would have been inconceivable in Washington’s policy circles just a few years ago. And such an outcome would significantly advance the NSS’s “expand” goal.

These reforms are an ambitious overhaul of the parasitic political system that has plagued Venezuela for decades. And even though it could take some time for full implementation, it’s an agenda that would amount to a new dawn for Venezuela.

Opposition leader María Corina Machado rides on the roof of a truck during a rally against the official election results that declared Nicolás Maduro the winner of the 2024 presidential election. (Jeampier Arguinzones/dpa via Reuters Connect)

Looking beyond Maduro’s Venezuela

Maduro is noxious—both to the people of Venezuela and the wider Latin American region. In the past decade, almost eight million Venezuelans have fled their homes as Maduro’s parasitic and clientelist regime has enriched itself on the backs of its people. The mass exodus as a result of Maduro’s policies has resulted in a domino effect of instability in the region, notably with the high influx of refugees, who have brought fragile institutions in countries such as Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile to a near breaking point. Moreover, catastrophic medical and food shortages have jeopardized the lives of millions of Venezuelans, while Maduro’s regime denied the existence of a crisis.

After Maduro stole the election from González in July 2024, his regime carried out a colossal campaign of violence and repression, forcibly disappearing, unlawfully imprisoning, and torturing citizens suspected of supporting the opposition and challenging the regime. Since the election, more than two thousand people have been detained for ties to the opposition, many of them with no contact to the outside world since their imprisonment.

At this pivotal moment for the Venezuelan people and the region, momentum must not be lost for Venezuela’s transition to democracy. Its democratically elected opposition has a plan for the first hundred hours, the first hundred days, the first year, and beyond. It’s time to see that plan in action.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Ukraine’s warning to the West: A bad peace will lead to a bigger war

Myroslava Gongadze — Thu, 04 Dec 2025 22:04:35 +0000

Almost every night last week, I woke up in Kyiv to the piercing sound of air raid sirens. Like countless other Ukrainians, I scrambled out of bed, grabbed a few essentials, and headed down to the bomb shelter.

Not everyone follows this routine. Some people, tired of the nightly bombardments, choose to sleep through air raid alarms, even if that means risking potential death. Many others, including the elderly and those with physical impediments, are unable to make their way downstairs every time the sirens sound. Each new Russian attack is a reminder of how precarious life has become in wartime Ukraine.

While civilians struggle to maintain a sense of normality, the reality on the front lines could hardly be more dramatic. Ukrainian troops are overstretched and desperately short of reinforcements, ammunition, and equipment. Inch by inch, the Russian army continues to grind forward, testing each vulnerability and exploiting every weakness.

Despite these incredible challenges, the Ukrainian military continues to adapt and innovate as it seeks to hold the line with new tools and evolving strategies. The will to resist remains unbroken, but the toll this struggle exacts on soldiers, their families, and the entire Ukrainian nation often feels unbearable.

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As Ukrainians fight for national survival on the battlefield, another struggle is also playing out against domestic corruption. Ukraine’s efforts to move toward a more accountable and democratic system of government are a key cause of Moscow’s escalating aggression, with Putin viewing Ukrainian democracy as an existential threat to Russian authoritarianism. Ukrainians understand that battling corruption is just as vital in this war as resisting Russia on the battlefield.

Ukrainian society has been attempting to combat corruption for decades. Exactly twenty-five years ago, the Kuchmagate scandal rocked Ukraine. This implicated then-president Leonid Kuchma in the murder of my husband Georgiy Gongadze, a prominent investigative journalist and the founder of the Ukrainska Pravda news site. On that occasion, the pathway to the truth began with a lone whistleblower from the presidential security team, who took huge risks to expose what he saw as grave misconduct.

A quarter of a century later, there are strong indications that Ukraine is making progress in the fight against corruption. In late November, one of Ukraine’s most powerful men, presidential administration head Andriy Yermak, resigned following a search of his home by the country’s anti-corruption authorities amid a rapidly unfolding scandal involving figures close to the very highest levels of power.

Once again, Ukrainska Pravda journalists were instrumental in breaking the story, but the differences between then and now are also striking. Back when my husband was murdered, there were no institutional checks in place and no raids on the homes of senior officials. Today, Ukraine has built institutions capable of pushing back and producing results.

Clearly, the ghosts of corruption still haunt Ukraine’s corridors of power, but impunity is giving way to accountability. This is exactly the transformation that many Ukrainians are fighting for, and one of the main reasons why Ukraine scares Putin so much.

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Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

After nearly four years of full-scale war, most Ukrainians want peace, but they also realize that peace will only be possible if accompanied by justice and security. For a generation, Ukrainians have fought for these goals. They know that simply stopping the shooting will not bring real peace, and are committed to ending the war in a way that will last.

From Kyiv to Lviv, I hear the same message from people who desperately want the war to be over but understand that a rushed peace could have disastrous consequences. “We have sheltered too long in the dark to accept a peace that isn’t just,” one woman commented. “Our sons and daughters are not only fighting to defend our land, but for the justice that must come after,” a taxi driver told me.

The world needs to understand that Russia’s invasion is already reshaping global security. Putin is not just seizing Ukrainian territory; he is trying to erase Ukraine as a nation and erode the entire international order. If the world lets this happen, a much larger war will no longer be a distant risk. It will become inevitable.

There is now a clear danger that Western leaders will support a hurried and unfair peace deal. This would send a dangerous message that aggression pays. Autocrats around the world would draw the obvious conclusion that they can change borders by force. This would undermine the foundational principles of international relations established in the post-World War II era. Europe cannot afford to set such a precedent.

With the Russian invasion entering a critical phase and Moscow’s hybrid war spreading across Europe, the time to act is now. Ukraine’s defense is Europe’s defense. The West must increase support and stop Putin before he goes even further. It is delusional to think that sacrificing Ukraine will satisfy Russia. Instead, a bad peace will only lead to a bigger war. The price of hesitation will be far higher than the cost of action.

Myroslava Gongadze is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior fellow at Friends of Europe.

Introduction

After decades of democratic and economic progress, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is now losing ground. Between 1995 and 2016, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes recorded steady gains—a more than eight-point rise in prosperity and a more than three-point rise in freedom—that lifted millions out of poverty, deepened the region’s integration into the global economy, and strengthened democratic institutions. Over the past decade, however, this momentum has stalled, and in many countries reversed. Across the region, insecurity has surged, authoritarianism has deepened, and corruption has stifled development, with consequences that reach far beyond its borders.

This reversal is fueling two interconnected crises reshaping the Western Hemisphere: migration and insecurity. Over the past decade, migration—both within the region and toward the United States—has surged. Authoritarian rule in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, along with the collapse of Haiti, has driven mass exoduses, while gang violence spurs migration from Central America and hundreds of thousands more have left other countries in search of safety and economic opportunity. Transit states such as Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Panama face mounting strain on public services, while the United States confronts unprecedented pressure at its southern border.

Regional security is also deteriorating as gangs and transnational criminal networks expand their operations. Mexican cartels dominate the production and trafficking of fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, and other illicit drugs across Latin America and into the United States. The effects of their trade have been devastating, with tens of thousands of overdose deaths annually, particularly in the United States and Canada. Other groups, such as Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua, extend beyond narcotics, driving homicides, corruption, and violent competition over trafficking routes across the region.

Beneath these crises lies a deeper erosion of governance and democracy—one that the United States should support its allies in confronting. Weak rule of law and systemic corruption stifle economic growth and enable criminal networks to thrive. Authoritarian regimes in the region fuel migration, crime, and cross-border instability, while external powers—most notably China—exploit governance gaps through opaque infrastructure projects and debt diplomacy, deepening authoritarian influence. Together, these forces erode state capacity, destabilize the region, and pose a direct challenge to US security and economic prosperity.

Stable, transparent governance in LAC reduces migration pressures, disrupts criminal networks, and creates economic opportunities that benefit both US and Latin American citizens. As the United States reassesses its foreign assistance strategy, democracy assistance can be enacted as a strategic investment to make the hemisphere—including the United States—stronger, safer, and more prosperous. We identify three core issues that pose the greatest challenges but promise the greatest rewards if addressed, and provide recommendations to streamline assistance, expand its scope, and engage business and local actors as funders and partners.

Ultimately, democracy assistance in the region remains one of the most cost-effective investments to advance shared security and prosperity.

Regional challenges to democracy and governance

LAC is confronting a convergence of three interlinked challenges that erode governance, destabilize societies, and undermine US security and economic interests. Each reinforces the others and fuels the migration and crime that strain the region. The United States should therefore prioritize addressing these challenges through targeted foreign assistance and investment.

Transnational organized crime and insecurity

Transnational organized crime (TOC) has evolved into one of the most destabilizing forces in LAC. Once localized, criminal groups have grown into sophisticated, multinational networks that traffic drugs, weapons, and people across borders while infiltrating political systems. These networks now operate across nearly every corner of the region, both benefiting from and contributing to weak rule of law and institutional resilience.

Gangs and TOC actors are among the main drivers of insecurity in the region. Although the region comprises less than 10 percent of the world’s population, it accounts for roughly one-third of global homicides. Central America maintains high levels of insecurity, while countries such as Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru have experienced sharp increases in violent crime as cartels and gangs battle for control of trafficking routes, urban neighborhoods, and illicit economies. The costs are profound: Latin American Public Opinion Project data show that intentions to emigrate are significantly higher among individuals exposed to crime, while nearly one-third of private sector firms in Latin America cite crime as a major obstacle to doing business, with direct losses averaging 7 percent of sales. Insecurity is not only displacing communities but also undermining prosperity and eroding trust in governments.

The drug trade remains one of the most profitable and damaging arms of TOC. Mexican cartels—particularly the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel—are the hemisphere’s principal suppliers of fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin. Their operations extend beyond Mexico and the United States, reaching deep into Colombia, Ecuador, Central America, and increasingly Canada. In 2024, US Customs and Border Protection seized over 27,000 pounds of fentanyl at the southern border—up from 14,700 pounds in 2022. The human toll is staggering: Fentanyl overdoses now kill more than seventy thousand people annually in the United States.

TOC represents not only a law enforcement problem but also a profound institutional and governance challenge. These groups thrive in contexts marked by weak institutions, porous borders, and entrenched impunity. Venezuela’s institutional collapse, for example, directly enabled the rapid growth of the Tren de Aragua gang from one prison to over ten countries. Once established, criminal networks act as corrosive forces—penetrating police forces, judicial systems, militaries, local governments, and even segments of the private sector. Their influence extends into the electoral arena as well: In Mexico’s recent elections, criminal actors not only financed campaigns for local candidates but also threatened and assassinated others, further distorting political competition and undermining democratic accountability. Left unchecked, TOC erodes public trust, distorts markets, and makes effective governance nearly impossible, fueling a self-reinforcing cycle of violence, displacement, and state fragility.

Case study: Ecuador’s fight against insecurity

The once relatively stable country of Ecuador has become a battleground among Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in recent years, with authorities estimating that 70 percent of the world’s cocaine passes through its ports. As Ecuador has emerged as a vital transit country, Mexican DTOs have partnered with local crime syndicates to deepen their control in the country, buying the influence of politicians, judges, and security officials. The main actors vying for control of drug shipment routes include the Sinaloa Cartel, its rival the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, and their affiliated local crime syndicates. These structures tax and protect cocaine flows moving from border regions toward export terminals, targeting trucking firms, port and warehouse staff, and local authorities.

Ecuador’s security crisis, however, is not simply a matter of state versus gangs, but of deep institutional infiltration. The landmark Metástasis investigation (2023-25) exposed how judges, prosecutors, police officers, politicians, a former head of the prison authority, and other high-ranking officials systematically protected or advanced the interests of organized crime for years. In exchange for cash, gold, luxury cars, and other benefits, officials allegedly released gang leaders, altered prison conditions, and sabotaged investigations.

Despite these challenges, Ecuador’s government—reelected in 2025 with a mandate to confront organized crime—has pledged to continue the fight. Yet its experience highlights a critical lesson: Defeating gangs and cartels cannot be achieved solely through crackdowns or arrests; it also requires rebuilding institutions.

In many countries, governments have proven unable or unwilling to meaningfully confront TOC. Others have stepped up efforts to target these groups through mano dura policies or intensified security operations that, while capable of disrupting trafficking routes, cannot by themselves dismantle transnational criminal networks. Addressing the governance gaps that allow these organizations to thrive is therefore crucial. In this context, US leadership remains essential. Given the cross-border nature of these networks, lasting, viable solutions demand a coordinated regional response. By leveraging its diplomatic influence, security partnerships, military capabilities, and development tools—including technical assistance, institutional support, and investment incentives—the United States can help foster cross-border cooperation, strengthen judicial and prosecutorial capacity, and reinforce institutions to shield them from criminal infiltration. Paired with diplomatic and intelligence support, democracy assistance can play a critical role in disrupting organized crime, safeguarding US security interests, and creating the conditions for more prosperous and resilient communities across the hemisphere.

Rule of law and economic development

Declining rule of law has become an increasingly urgent concern in LAC, as regional indicators have steadily worsened in recent years and several countries have registered some of the steepest declines worldwide. This deterioration both enables transnational organized crime and authoritarianism and imposes enormous costs on national economies. Research by the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center shows that the rule of law is the single most influential factor for long-term economic growth and societal well-being. Liberalizing markets is not enough: Legal clarity, judicial independence, and accountability are the foundations of effective governance and thriving economies. This is particularly relevant in Latin America, where corruption remains the region’s Achilles’ heel—undermining public spending, fueling fiscal deficits, and weakening financial oversight. Across the region, higher corruption levels are consistently associated with lower gross domestic product per capita and reduced foreign direct investment, costing countries and investors billions in lost growth and opportunity

A particularly distorting force in the region’s economy is the prevalence of kleptocratic networks. These are not isolated acts of graft, but coordinated, systematic efforts to capture state resources and extract rents for political and economic gain. Such networks often comprise coalitions of corrupt political elites, complicit business actors, and criminal organizations. They co-opt the judiciary and prosecutors, while silencing investigations and oversight bodies. Their actions stifle competition, discourage entrepreneurship, and produce unfair monopolies that sideline foreign investors, while draining public coffers of resources needed for development.

The scale of these operations can be staggering. In Venezuela, over the past two decades, ruling party figures and business allies have been suspected of siphoning off as much as $30 billion in public funds through transnational schemes involving front companies, illicit contracts, and offshore accounts. This systemic kleptocracy has not only enriched elites but also accelerated Venezuela’s economic collapse, fueling one of the worst migration crises in the region, including to the United States. In Peru, the Club de la Construcción scandal revealed how an informal cartel of major construction companies colluded to divide up public works contracts in exchange for bribes to officials in the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The scheme operated for more than a decade, was worth billions in inflated contracts, and sidelined honest competitors while draining infrastructure budgets.

Case study: The Dominican Republic’s success story

The Dominican Republic illustrates how strengthening the rule of law can improve governance and unlock economic opportunity. Since President Luis Abinader took office in 2020, the government has carried out anti-corruption reforms. The administration appointed an independent attorney general and empowered the public ministry to investigate and prosecute high-level corruption cases. The government has also advanced transparency and digitalization reforms to make interactions with public agencies—especially in procurement—more open, efficient, and resistant to abuse. In addition, the country has aligned with key recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force, including by passing a revamped Anti-money Laundering and Illicit Finance Law, which has constrained kleptocratic networks and organized crime.

These measures have begun to restore trust in public institutions. Procurement processes are now more transparent and competitive––with twenty thousand new suppliers registered—while new safeguards better protect against corruption. Since 2020, the Dominican Republic’s score on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index has improved by eight points. Investor confidence has followed: Foreign direct investment reached record highs in 2024, while trade with the United States expanded sharply. US goods exports to the Dominican Republic grew to $13 billion that year, producing a $5.5 billion trade surplus for the United States.

Some of the region’s largest corruption scandals have been uncovered by investigative journalists and independent prosecutors. Yet in many cases, impunity prevails, and little progress is made toward prevention or sustained accountability. Strong judicial institutions, effective anti-corruption reforms, and governance are essential for stability and growth. Predictable, rules-based environments make countries far better partners for both domestic and US businesses—creating jobs, expanding markets, and strengthening local economies. Such efforts can also reduce migration pressures, as corruption has been shown to drive both legal and irregular migration. As with TOC, for the United States, supporting rule-of-law reforms is therefore a strategic investment in building a more prosperous, democratic, and secure hemisphere.

Countering authoritarian influence

LAC is home to several resilient democracies that remain close US allies and important trading partners. Yet the region also contains some of the world’s most entrenched dictatorships—Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—which pose direct threats to stability. Between these extremes lie eight nations that Freedom House classifies as “partly free,” many of which experienced additional democratic declines in 2025. Countering democratic backsliding and protecting the global order is not a values-based mission; it is essential to safeguarding US security, economic interests, and the long-term prosperity of the Western Hemisphere.

The region’s authoritarian regimes illustrate the stakes. Economic collapse and repression have forced 7.7 million Venezuelans, 500,000 Cubans, and tens of thousands of Nicaraguans to flee over the past decade. These governments also generate acute security risks. Nicaragua has positioned itself as a conduit for extra-regional migration, inviting travelers from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean to enter visa free and transit toward the US border. The Daniel Ortega regime has further been linked to targeted harassment and even assassinations of dissidents abroad, including the 2025 killing in Costa Rica of Roberto Samcam Ruiz, a retired Army major and government critic.

Similarly, the consolidation of Venezuela’s dictatorship has transformed the country into a hub for criminal organizations, including Colombian paramilitary groups and Tren de Aragua. The Nicolás Maduro regime has hosted the Wagner Group while continuing to rely on Russian military advisors, Iranian oil technicians, and Chinese surveillance systems to tighten internal control and repress dissent. Members of the regime have been linked to drug trafficking––most notably through the illicit military network Cartel de los Soles––and, in late 2024, Maduro threatened to invade neighboring Guyana.

At the same time, external authoritarian powers—especially China—are expanding their footprints, particularly in “partly free” states where institutional checks are weak. China exploits governance gaps through surveillance technology, opaque infrastructure deals, and strategic investments in critical sectors—often at the expense of US influence and market access. Over the past decade, China invested $73 billion in Latin America’s raw materials sector, including refineries and processing plants for coal, lithium, copper, natural gas, oil, and uranium. In Peru, Chinese firms paid $3 billion to acquire two major electricity suppliers, giving them what experts describe as near-monopoly control over the country’s power distribution and edging out competitors. Beijing also provides critical technology to regional authoritarian governments and at-risk democracies. In Bolivia, the government deployed Huawei’s “Safe Cities” surveillance systems, raising concerns about mass data collection, particularly during elections.

Case study: The cost of partnering with authoritarian regimes

Under President Rafael Correa, Ecuador—alongside Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez—pursued closer ties with foreign authoritarian powers, betting heavily on Chinese financing and infrastructure. A centerpiece of this strategy was the $2.7 billion Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric project, awarded under opaque terms to Chinese firms, primarily Sinohydro, as part of an $11 billion package of oil-backed loans and infrastructure deals.

The project soon became a symbol of the risks of such arrangements. The dam has been plagued by structural flaws, including more than seventeen thousand cracks, severe environmental damage, and corruption allegations implicating senior officials. State agencies attempted to downplay or conceal the problems, but by 2024 the facility had ceased functioning altogether. Experts estimated that repairing the damage could cost tens of millions of dollars, erasing much of the project’s intended economic benefit. Beyond its technical failures, Coca Codo Sinclair left Ecuador financially vulnerable. In 2022, the government was forced into arbitration and subsequently renegotiated more than $4 billion in debt with Beijing, further compromising its fiscal position and weakening investor confidence. The episode illustrates how opaque partnerships with authoritarian powers can undermine democratic accountability and damage economic stability.

These developments underscore the importance of countering authoritarianism in LAC as both a security and economic priority for the United States and the region. Betting on democratic renewal in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela is critical to restoring stability in the hemisphere. At the same time, it is equally important to strengthen “at-risk” democracies to prevent further backsliding. Targeted investments in political party development, anti-corruption reforms, and transparency measures can bolster resilience in these states and reduce the appeal of authoritarian alternatives. Pushing back against China’s growing economic and geopolitical influence in the hemisphere is also essential. By leveraging diplomatic and trade tools, the United States can position itself as a credible alternative to China—particularly by mobilizing investment, fostering public-private partnerships, and advancing governance reforms that strengthen transparency and accountability. Doing so is vital for freedom and security in the region and creates opportunities for business and investment.

Recommendations

Insecurity, weak rule of law, and authoritarianism represent growing threats to freedom and prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. As outlined above, TOC, entrenched corruption, and authoritarian regimes impose heavy economic costs on LAC and undermine democratic governance. At the same time, these forces drive mass migration, placing immense strain on transit and destination countries. Tackling these challenges is a strategic win-win: It can enhance US security and economic interests while advancing stability and prosperity in the region.

As the United States reassesses its foreign policy and democracy assistance strategy in LAC, it should make use of its full range of diplomatic, security, trade, and investment mechanisms—including targeted democracy assistance—to address these challenges.

Move beyond grants to expand the toolkit

The proposed shift toward an investment- and trade-driven foreign policy can go hand-in-hand with democracy assistance and reform. The United States can mobilize financial and diplomatic tools to expand investment as an alternative to Chinese influence, while incentivizing governance, transparency, and accountability reforms that strengthen the region’s resilience against the challenges outlined above.

Leverage the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to provide an alternative to Chinese financing and invest in projects that strengthen democratic resilience through economic modernization, digitalization, and high-quality infrastructure—particularly in areas vulnerable to authoritarian influence. As Congress prepares to revisit the DFC’s authorizing legislation, it should ensure the agency has long-term funding to deploy its range of tools—including debt financing, equity investments, and political risk insurance—across the region.
Work with Congress to pass the Americas Act to establish regional trade, investment, and people-to-people partnerships with like-minded nations, fostering long-term private sector development. Use this framework to advance transparency and institutional autonomy reforms—particularly through the proposed Americas Institute for Digital Governance and Transnational Criminal Investigative Units—to ensure partner countries strengthen anti-corruption prevention, detection, and prosecution.
Use regional forums—such as the Summit of the Americas—to advocate for governance, security, transparency, and accountability reforms to strengthen the resilience of democratic allies and counter authoritarian regimes. The United States should link political reform benchmarks to investment incentives, offering “carrots” for change through regional development commitments.

Ensure democracy assistance makes business sense

A safer and more democratic Western Hemisphere directly benefits economic development and business. The United States should position its domestic and the Latin American private sectors as active partners in strengthening democratic resilience, not just as passive beneficiaries of stability.

Revive and operationalize America Creceto incentivize and promote reform-linked investments, infrastructure projects, and job creation across the region to counter Chinese influence and advance US interests while bolstering political will through the DFC. Participation should be tied to clear benchmarks on transparency, labor rights, and legal predictability.
Forge public-private partnerships that co-finance civic education, anti-corruption initiatives, and local development projects, particularly in high-risk areas vulnerable to TOC recruitment and migration.
Mobilize Latin America’s business elites—among the greatest beneficiaries of economic and democratic collaboration with the United States—to push for and co-fund democracy and governance programs in their home countries. Leading companies, philanthropic foundations, and chambers of commerce should be engaged as active partners in advancing reforms.
Strengthen and engage with regional initiatives like the Alliance for Development in Democracy—championed by Costa Rica, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador—that integrate the private sector into democratic reform and good governance agendas.

Deploy whole-of-government tools

While the State Department plays a central role in US democracy assistance, the scale and interconnected nature of the region’s challenges—spanning security, rule of law, and authoritarian influence—demand a coordinated, whole-of-government approach.

Leverage the Pentagon’s Defense Institution Building program to strengthen law enforcement reform, bolster rule-of-law resilience, and build institutional capacity to counter transnational crime and human trafficking.
Provide technical assistance and legal expertise through the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to help countries develop national frameworks that protect transparency, law enforcement, and sovereignty in investment decisions.
Double down on rule-of-law reforms and projects, particularly those targeting organized crime and corruption. Support vetted law enforcement units, independent anti-corruption actors, and judicial reform initiatives through US, private sector, and multilateral funding channels, including the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Open Government Partnership.
Protect the key pillars of democratic institutions from co-optation by TOC, kleptocratic, or authoritarian actors. This must include courts, election management bodies, political parties, and critical government agencies such as those overseeing infrastructure, development, procurement, and public prosecution. Emphasis should be placed on institutional independence, combating and preventing corruption, and ensuring sustainable financing to strengthen resilience.
Apply targeted sanctions, Global Magnitsky measures, and trade conditionality to dismantle kleptocratic networks, prosecute corrupt actors, and reward credible reformers.
Advocate for and support the implementation of global security and anti-corruption standards—including recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force and its LAC branch, GAFILAT (Grupo de Acción Financiera de Latinoamérica), on money laundering, organized crime, and illicit finance—to disrupt TOC and kleptocratic funding networks while fostering safer and more competitive business environments.

Scale the power of local networks

Regional local actors—both within and outside of government—are often the most credible and resilient defenders of democratic governance. The United States should deepen its engagement with these networks while identifying and empowering new partners.

Partner with trusted community institutions—including religious organizations, civic leaders, businesses, and grassroots groups—on programs that prevent gang recruitment, reduce crime, and promote integrity in high-risk areas.
Strengthen governance mechanisms to build sustainable local capacity to counter corruption and transnational organized crime.
Expand the partner ecosystem to include diaspora networks and local community groups, leveraging their resources, expertise, and transnational connections to reinforce democratic resilience.

Push back on regional and external authoritarian influence

Bipartisan US support for organized opposition in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela has been a cornerstone of regional democracy policy and should be sustained and expanded. At the same time, Washington should back democratic movements and reformers across the hemisphere where authoritarian influence is taking hold.

Sustain support for dissidents and democratic movements in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela to prepare the ground for eventual political transitions.
Invest in independent media.
Support the next generation of democratic leaders through fellowships, trainings, and political party development, prioritizing authoritarian and high-risk states.
Collaborate with electoral commissions, legislatures, and political parties with an emphasis on internal democracy, campaign transparency, and long-term institutionalization.
Assist governments in auditing and renegotiating opaque infrastructure or digital agreements—particularly those with authoritarian powers—that undermine sovereignty, transparency, and public accountability.

The recommendations offered here provide a roadmap to confront the region’s most pressing security and prosperity threats by pairing diplomacy, trade, and investment tools with targeted democracy support. By leveraging the United States’ entrepreneurial capacity and its ability to mobilize multinational and public-private partnerships, reforms can be made more attractive, sustainable, and impactful. This is not charity—it is a strategic investment that advances both US and LAC interests.

At relatively low cost, democracy assistance strengthens governance and open markets in ways that directly serve US security and economic priorities. It helps dismantle transnational criminal organizations, kleptocratic networks, and corruption, while countering the growing influence of authoritarian regimes inside and outside the region. These efforts reduce the flow of illicit drugs and irregular migration, create more reliable markets for businesses, and build stronger partnerships with governments that share democratic values. The outcome is clear: a stronger, safer, and more prosperous hemisphere.

about the authors

Antonio Garrastazu serves as the senior director for Latin America and the Caribbean at the International Republican Institute (IRI). Prior to this role, he led IRI’s Center for Global Impact and from 2011 to 2018 was resident country director for Central America, Haiti, and Mexico. Garrastazu has worked in academe, the private sector, and government, serving in the Florida Office of Tourism, Trade and Economic Development under Governor Jeb Bush. He holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of Florida, and a master’s and PhD in international studies from the University of Miami.

Henrique Arevalo Poincot is a visiting fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. A strategy and communications specialist with expertise spanning Europe and Latin America, Arevalo Poincot is pursuing his master’s degree in democracy and governance at Georgetown University.

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Syria joining the anti-ISIS coalition is a westward pivot—with opportunities and risks

Merissa Khurma and Giorgio Cafiero — Fri, 21 Nov 2025 16:11:15 +0000

On November 10, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa made a historic visit to Washington, becoming the first Syrian leader to meet a US president in the White House since the country’s independence nearly eight decades ago. The visit was the highlight of several policy decisions US President Donald Trump’s administration took this month to reinforce Washington’s commitment to supporting al-Sharaa in his bid to rehabilitate and rebuild Syria.

These key decisions include removing al-Sharaa from the Specially Designated Global Terrorist list, renewing the pause on Caesar Act sanctions to help spur investments, and allowing Syria to reopen its embassy in Washington to “exercise its diplomatic role with full freedom on US soil,” as Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted. Both are important and strategic gestures highlighting where the United States stands on Syria’s future.

Syria’s head of state did not come empty-handed to the White House meeting. One day after al-Sharaa’s visit, the US embassy in Damascus announced that Syria became the ninetieth member of the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS. This marks a significant shift in Syria’s regional and international alignment—from one that was deeply seated in the Russian and Iranian spheres of influence under Bashar al-Assad, to its current position in the regional orbits of NATO allies and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. While US-Syria coordination against ISIS began shortly after Assad’s fall, in close cooperation with neighboring countries including Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, this formal participation underscores Damascus’s readiness and commitment to strategically partner with the United States, enhance its own security, and advance Washington’s counterterrorism interests in the region.

Nevertheless, Syria joining the coalition presents multifaceted opportunities, as well as key challenges and inherent risks—especially considering al-Sharaa’s violent jihadist background as head of Jabhat al-Nusra, which was Syria’s al-Qaeda offshoot earlier on in the country’s civil war.

Regional endorsements and emerging opportunities

The opportunities include the potential for increased intelligence sharing between Damascus and Washington. It also means enhanced military coordination and deeper regional cooperation in the fight against ISIS and other extremist groups rebooting in Syria. The intelligence sharing includes foreign fighter flows and money tracing, as well as disinformation and misinformation campaigns, according to former US diplomats familiar with the coalition’s work.

Diplomats from both Jordan and Iraq reinforced that Syria joining the coalition is a constructive and positive step toward enhancing their own national security interests, while strengthening Amman’s and Baghdad’s relations with Damascus. This is an important priority, especially for Iraq, given al-Sharaa’s violent past in the country amid the US occupation beginning in 2003. According to the authors’ diplomatic sources, both countries shared intelligence about one of the two ISIS plots to assassinate al-Sharaa, which the Syrian government announced on the heels of his historic US visit.

GCC members welcomed Syria’s entry into the anti-ISIS coalition. From the Gulf Arab states’ perspective, ISIS resurfacing is always a challenge, so having Syria on board is key to reducing the threat posed by the terrorist group.

The GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have played a significant role in persuading the Trump administration to view al-Sharaa as a legitimate and reliable partner. For example, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s influence was a factor contributing to Trump deciding to lift sanctions on Syria earlier this year. Gulf Arab leaders broadly believe that Syria should be reintegrated into the regional and international fold rather than left isolated. Without sustained external support and cooperation, officials across the GCC worry that the Syrian state could be too weak to govern effectively—creating power vacuums, and worsening economic and humanitarian crises that extremist groups like ISIS could exploit. In this context, Syria’s decision to join the coalition aligns with the Gulf states’ view that deeper international engagement with Damascus is essential to addressing the country’s challenges, including the renewed threat posed by ISIS in Syria.

That enhanced security cooperation also encourages the reopening of trade and transit routes, benefiting the Syrian economy through increased investment pledges beyond those already secured from key GCC members—namely Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Further, coalition-related stabilization funds, channeled through the United Nations or regional bodies, could indirectly support reconstruction in areas previously liberated from ISIS if the right oversight mechanisms are in place. The coalition also oversees humanitarian and developmental assistance to the areas affected by ISIS.

Complexities, contradictions, and risks of partnership

There are also complexities tied to these opportunities. Partnering with a government that, to varying degrees, remains politically and ideologically contentious domestically in Syria presents potential pitfalls—especially given al-Sharaa’s past. This history drives a reluctance in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—the group most instrumental to fighting ISIS with the coalition—to integrate into the Syrian state. While some diplomats in Washington see this as an opportunity to nudge the SDF to accelerate its integration into the new Syria, other policy analysts believe Syria’s joining undermines the SDF’s role in the coalition. Nevertheless, from the perspective of key allies in the region, including GCC states, a unified Syria is key, and thus, working on SDF-Damascus integration should be prioritized.

Syrian Democratic Forces fighters ride atop military vehicles as they celebrate victory in Raqqa, Syria, on October 17, 2017. Photo by REUTERS/Erik De Castro.

Reactions from violent Islamist militias aligned with ISIS who see al-Sharaa as an “infidel” remain a significant risk: one that al-Sharaa is aware of. One preemptive and timely measure taken last week was the fatwa issued by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) mufti Abdullah Al Mheissni supporting Syria’s decision to join the coalition to beat ISIS, which he called Khawarij/Kharijites, or a group of heretics. The fatwa affirmed that the presence of the international coalition necessitates “organizing the situation and controlling matters to ensure unity of decision and sovereignty, until the new state’s conditions stabilize, and the threat of ISIS is not used as a pretext for greater interventions or infringement.”

Other key challenges include the enduring influence of certain pro-government militias in Syria, some of which appear to be ideologically tied to specific global terrorist organizations, as well as the relative fragility of Damascus’s political authority and the broader security landscape. Armed factions aligned with the Syrian Ministry of Defense, such as the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade and the Hamzat Division, were implicated in sectarian-motivated massacres of Alawites along Syria’s coast in March. Such actions may cast serious doubt on the wisdom of treating the new Damascus government as a trustworthy partner in the fight against a virulently sectarian Sunni extremist organization such as ISIS. Compounding these concerns is the reality that foreign jihadists from China, the Western Balkans, the North Caucasus, and other parts of the broader Islamic world now occupy roles within the Syrian state apparatus. Their backgrounds, affiliations, and ultimate loyalties remain opaque, further complicating the picture for al-Sharaa’s government.

It remains to be seen what Syria’s membership looks like in the coalition, which continues to operate without a formal charter, according to Jim Jeffrey, Washington’s former special presidential envoy to the coalition during the first Trump administration. As Jeffrey elaborated, active membership in the coalition includes two pillars: military and diplomacy. Most members designate a military representative to the coalition, which Syria has yet to name. Rotating foreign ministerial meetings make up the main function of the coalition’s diplomatic pillar, which Syria can most certainly participate in.

“For now,” Jeffrey noted, “Syria joining the coalition is largely symbolic as it is unlikely to contribute financially or provide troops.”

However, he adds, al-Sharaa and “his colleagues know something about fighting ISIS,” and can be constructive in future US-led operations against the terrorist group. According to our sources from the Gulf, Syria joining the coalition formalizes a relationship that began during the Assad years when HTS was the de facto government in Idlib, and it cooperated with the coalition at a time when HTS was successfully driving out al-Qaeda and ISIS elements in the province.

Ultimately, Syria’s entry into the coalition represents an opening for deeper cooperation with the United States and its regional partners. However, the challenges posed by sectarian militias and foreign fighters embedded within the state underscore how fragile and conditional this partnership could prove. Ultimately, the success of Syria’s membership in the coalition will depend not on symbolism alone, but on whether Damascus can demonstrate consistent, credible commitment to countering ISIS while stabilizing its fractured political and security institutions. Syria’s strategic partners in the region and globally should also support its efforts as it deepens its engagement with the coalition to eliminate the threat of terrorism once and for all.

Merissa Khurma is the founder and chief executive officer of AMENA Strategies, an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute, and nonresident fellow at the Baker Institute. She formerly headed the Middle East program at the Wilson Center.

Giorgio Cafiero is the chief executive officer of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He is also an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.

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Vladimir Putin fears entering Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 18 Nov 2025 21:47:02 +0000

The invasion unleashed by Vladimir Putin almost four years ago has often been called unprovoked, but nobody can say it was entirely unexpected. On the contrary, the full-scale invasion of 2022 was merely the latest and most extreme stage in a prolonged campaign of escalating Russian aggression aimed at preventing Ukraine from leaving the Kremlin orbit and resuming its place among the European community of nations.

During the early years of Putin’s reign, this campaign had focused primarily on massive interference in Ukrainian domestic affairs. Following Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity, the Russian dictator opted for a far more forceful combination of military and political intervention. When even this descent into open aggression failed to derail Kyiv’s westward trajectory, Putin sought to solve Russia’s Ukraine problem once and for all by launching the largest European invasion since World War II.

As the fifth year of the war looms on the horizon, there is very little to indicate that Putin’s hard line tactics are working. While Russia has managed to occupy around 20 percent of Ukraine, opinion in the remaining 80 percent of the country is now overwhelmingly hostile to Moscow and supportive of closer European ties. For the vast majority of people in Ukraine, the invasions of 2014 and 2022 represent watershed moments that have profoundly impacted their understanding of Ukrainian identity while radically reshaping attitudes toward Russia.

The transformation in Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation is being mirrored by changes taking place domestically as the country’s center of gravity shifts decisively from east to west. For the first decade or so of independence, Ukraine was politically and economically dominated by the industrial east, with major cities including Donetsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia serving as power bases for billionaire oligarch clans who shaped the Ukrainian national narrative and helped maintain high levels of Russian influence across the country. At the time, the comparatively quaint cities of central and western Ukraine lacked the wealth and general wherewithal to compete.

The first indication of a significant change in this dynamic was the 2004 Orange Revolution, which saw an unprecedented nationwide protest movement erupt over an attempt to falsify the country’s presidential election orchestrated by Kremlin-backed political forces rooted firmly in eastern Ukraine. This popular uprising represented a clear and unambiguous rejection of the idea that Ukraine was inextricably bound to Russia. A decade later, the onset of Russian military aggression would turbo-charge modern Ukraine’s historic turn toward the west.

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Since 2014, traditional east Ukrainian bastions of Russian influence such as Donetsk and Luhansk have been occupied by Kremlin forces and effectively cut off from the rest of Ukraine. More recently, the full-scale invasion has left the broader Donbas region devastated and depopulated, while the formerly preeminent metropolises of the east face an uncertain future as fortified front line cities under relentless Russian bombardment.

The situation in western Ukraine is strikingly different. Cities throughout the region are experiencing rapid growth thanks to an influx of families and businesses seeking to relocate away from the war zone. The experience of Lviv since 2022 illustrates this trend. The largest city in western Ukraine, Lviv’s population has expanded by around a quarter since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion to reach approximately one million. The Lviv real estate market has comfortably surpassed the regional capitals of eastern Ukraine and now rivals Kyiv itself. Likewise, Lviv is also second only to the Ukrainian capital in terms of new companies and investments.

Politically and diplomatically, Lviv is clearly in the ascendancy. Many Kyiv embassies partially relocated to the city in 2022 and continue to maintain a presence. Over the past three years, Lviv has hosted a number of high-level international events including presidential summits and gatherings of EU ministers. The rise of Lviv has been so striking that it has sparked rumors of jealousy among the establishment in Kyiv, with some suggesting that the potential reopening of Lviv International Airport has been deliberately sidelined in order to prevent the further eclipse of the Ukrainian capital.

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Whatever happens in the war, the shift in Ukraine’s national center of gravity toward the west of the country is unlikely to be reversed. In addition to the urgent impetus provided by Russia’s ongoing invasion, the emergence of western Ukraine is also being driven by the pull factor of EU integration. Over the past decade, Ukraine has secured visa-free EU travel and been granted official EU candidate status. This is transforming the investment climate in western Ukraine, which shares borders with four EU member states.

Large-scale infrastructure projects are already helping to cement western Ukraine’s status as the country’s most attractive region and gateway to the EU. Work on a 22km European-gauge railway line from the EU border to Uzhhorod was completed earlier this year, while construction of a far more ambitious Euro-gauge line connecting Lviv to the Polish border is scheduled to begin in 2026. As the EU accession process continues to gain momentum, these logistical links will only strengthen.

It remains unclear exactly when Ukraine will become a fully fledged EU member state, but there is a growing sense of confidence throughout the country that the once distant dream of EU membership is now finally within reach. For western Ukraine in particular, joining the European Union will complete the region’s historic journey from imperial outpost on the fringes of the Soviet Empire to economic engine nestled in the heart of the world’s largest single market.

All this is very bad news for Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin dictator’s Ukraine obsession reflects his fear that the consolidation of a democratic, European, and genuinely independent Ukraine could serve as a catalyst for the next phase in the long Russian retreat from empire that began almost four decades ago with the fall of the Berlin Wall. As Putin’s reign has progressed, his determination to prevent Ukraine’s geopolitical defection has only intensified, as has his readiness to sacrifice Russia’s more immediate national interests in pursuit of his anti-Ukrainian crusade. It is now increasingly obvious that his decision to invade Ukraine has backfired spectacularly, eroding centuries of Russian influence while accelerating the European integration he so bitterly opposes.

Unless Putin succeeds in dismantling Ukrainian statehood entirely and erasing the very idea of the Ukrainian nation, he must surely realize that the Ukraine of the postwar period is now destined to establish itself within the wider Western world while remaining implacably hostile to Russia. Rather than acknowledging this disastrous outcome, he will seek to continue the war indefinitely. If he stops now and accepts a compromise peace, Putin knows he will be doomed to enter Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Wahiduzzaman Noor: A verdict meant to deliver justice, but the trial and aftermath raise difficult questions

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Hasina’s death sentence will further polarize Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal sentencing Hasina to death marks a deeply polarizing moment in the country’s violent political trajectory. While the verdict focuses on her alleged responsibility for last July’s violent crackdown on student protesters, the impartiality of the International Crimes Tribunal itself has long been questioned, particularly because earlier decades of convictions disproportionately targeted Jamaat-e-Islami leaders under previous administrations. This history means the court’s decisions are inevitably filtered through layers of political memory and mistrust.

A powerful irony now shadows public reactions to the sentencing. A decade ago, thousands of Bangladeshi millennials gathered at Dhaka’s Shahbagh, dancing and chanting in support of death sentences handed down to Jamaat-e-Islami leaders. Today, many members of Bangladesh’s Gen Z are celebrating Hasina’s death sentence. These two moments are united by public demands for accountability, yet each reveals how dramatically the political tide can shift. It is important to note that many are celebrating not necessarily because they support capital punishment, but because they lost close friends during the July protests, a movement that toppled Hasina’s government and reshaped the national mood.

India is unlikely to extradite Hasina. New Delhi has already signaled reservations about due process and will almost certainly argue that the trial does not meet the standards required for a fair proceeding. This introduces a new tension into Bangladesh-India relations at a sensitive moment.

Domestically, the path to elections is far from straightforward. Holding national polls without the Awami League—the former ruling party under Hasina whose leaders have promised escalating resistance—risks producing a one-sided electoral landscape. With the Awami League effectively banned, the verdict may harden polarization rather than ease it.

Hasina’s death sentence has now split Bangladeshis into two camps: those who argue this is the only path toward accountability after years of authoritarianism, and those who insist that the death penalty undermines justice and that national reconciliation is essential.

Only time can tell which vision will define Bangladesh’s future. Nevertheless, if the country’s history is any guide, plot twists are guaranteed.

—Rudabeh Shahid is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and a visiting assistant professor of government at Wesleyan University.

With Hasina in exile in India, New Delhi faces a tough choice

This verdict puts India in a major bind. It will now face unprecedented pressure to extradite Hasina. However, Hasina is one of India’s closest friends; she and her family have long had close ties with the Indian ruling party and opposition alike, and New Delhi has no intention of betraying her. But if it continues to decline to turn Hasina over, India could squander an opportunity to patch up ties with the new administration that emerges from Bangladesh’s election, which is scheduled for next February. India has had many concerns about the changes in Bangladesh since Hasina’s ouster, including increased space for political and religious actors that are not fond of India. But it also has strong interests—from trade and connectivity to border security—that are best served with a friendly, or at least workable, relationship with Dhaka.

For New Delhi, the middle ground option is best: Work out an arrangement where Hasina can be relocated to a third country—likely an authoritarian state where her security would be ensured and access to her could be controlled. There’s been ample speculation since Hasina’s ouster about where she could end up, from Belarus to somewhere in the Gulf. But the question is if there will be any takers for such a high-maintenance charge.

Hasina may be a special guest of New Delhi’s, but she may now be wearing out her welcome—especially with India looking to explore opportunities for rapprochement with Dhaka as the Bangladesh election draws closer.

—Michael Kugelman is a South Asia analyst and the writer of Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.

A verdict meant to deliver justice, but the trial and aftermath raise difficult questions

The verdict against Hasina for crimes against humanity is an important moment for the family members of those who were killed during the protests that led to her ouster. For many, this is an acknowledgment of their grief and justice for their loss. Yet, the judicial process surrounding the trial also raised difficult questions. Several tribunal appointments have been criticized as politically motivated. The interim government amended the International Crime Tribunals Act of 1973 through administrative order to expand its scope and prosecute Hasina. The tribunal has also refused to appoint her legal representation. Amnesty International staunchly criticized the trial for its unprecedented speed, the fact that it was held in absentia, and concerns over its fairness that may complicate public trust in the outcome.

Hasina’s sentence makes her the first prime minister of Bangladesh to receive a capital conviction. Her political future remains uncertain: she remains exiled in India and any path home seems narrower. Yet she continues to command unwavering loyalty from her political party, the Awami League, and is likely to lead the party from India. India’s primary reaction, however, has been very cautious. New Delhi, thus far, has shown no intention to extradite Hasina; now the imposition of capital punishment in a trial conducted in absentia eliminates any realistic prospect that India will extradite her.

Inside Bangladesh, reactions to the verdict vary widely. Some groups that opposed the previous government view the decision as long overdue. Others worry that it may inflame an already polarized environment. The Awami League still holds a sizable, loyal base of supporters. Episodes of political violence resurfaced in the days preceding the verdict, which suggests that tensions could escalate rather than ease. With the parliamentary election only three months away, and the Awami League barred from the election, the risk of renewed unrest is difficult to dismiss.

—Wahiduzzaman Noor is a Bangladeshi national security professional and former diplomat at the Embassy of Bangladesh in Washington, DC, with expertise in South Asian affairs, Indo-Pacific security, and counterterrorism.

Bangladesh deserves stability, unity, and responsible leadership

The verdict concerning Hasina is a very significant development. My hope is that Bangladesh navigates this with restraint, respect for the rule of law, and a commitment to national harmony.

It is absolutely essential that the legal process remain transparent and that peace and security are maintained for all citizens.

Whatever the prevalent political views are, justice must be fair, and society must remain peaceful. Bangladesh deserves stability, unity, and responsible leadership from all sides during this moment.

—M. Osman Siddique is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. He previously served as the US ambassador to the Republic of Fiji with concurrent accreditations to the Kingdom of Tonga, the Republic of Nauru, and the government of Tuvalu from 1999 to 2001.

The post Experts react: Sheikh Hasina has been sentenced to death in absentia. What does this mean for Bangladesh’s future? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: How will Iraq’s parliamentary election shape the country’s politics?

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 14 Nov 2025 16:12:42 +0000

The voting is over, but the maneuvering could go on for a while. In Iraq’s parliamentary elections on Tuesday, the bloc led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani won the most seats, but it will need the backing of other parties to form a government. Tuesday’s vote came amid pressure from the Trump administration to crack down on Iran-backed militias operating in the country and questions over whether Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s call to boycott the elections would depress turnout. Below, our experts examine what the elections mean for the future of Iraqi politics and Baghdad’s role in the region.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Victoria J. Taylor: His coalition may have won, but Sudani faces stiff opposition to a second term

Omar Al-Nidawi: A higher turnout than expected, especially in predominantly Sunni and Kurdish provinces

Safwan Al-Amin: What to watch from the Iraqi Higher Electoral Commission

Yerevan Saeed: The KDP remains the dominant party in the Kurdistan region

Rend Al-Rahim: The elections consolidated the grip of Iraq’s traditional parties

His coalition may have won, but Sudani faces stiff opposition to a second term

While Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development bloc did very well throughout southern Iraq, translating his high approval into votes, he still appears to have fallen short of the overwhelming victory he likely needed to guarantee a second term as prime minister. In the weeks ahead of the election, Sudani launched a public relations offensive in the Western press. He published an op-ed in the New York Post and gave interviews to Bloomberg and Newsweek aimed at securing US and international support for a second term, making a pitch for his “Iraq first” agenda.

However, the days of decisive US engagement in the government formation process are likely over. For Sudani to secure a second term, he will have to do so the old-fashioned way by building a coalition. Although popular among the public, Sudani does not have ready alliances among the other major Shia parties and coalitions. The two largest Shia blocs after Sudani’s are former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition and the Al-Sadiqoun Bloc (which is affiliated with the US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq) both of which oppose giving Sudani a second term.

—Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

A higher turnout than expected, especially in predominantly Sunni and Kurdish provinces

Contrary to what many Iraq watchers expected, myself included, the initial results—if accurate—suggest that more Iraqis were motivated to vote this time. Turnout reached almost 56 percent of registered voters, according to Iraq’s electoral commission, a notable jump from 43 percent in 2021. However, part of this increase is tempered by the fact that there were 700,000 fewer registered voters than in 2021, even though nearly four million Iraqis have reached voting age since then. In other words, while the voter pool shrank, the absolute number of ballots cast actually grew.

Another striking development is the geographic variation in turnout. Whereas participation in 2021 was uniformly low across all provinces, Tuesday’s vote revealed new patterns: Turnout was significantly higher in predominantly Kurdish and Sunni provinces than in Shia-majority areas. This divide was also evident within Baghdad, between the mostly Sunni western and Shia eastern banks of the Tigris. In 2021, the gap between the provinces with the highest and lowest turnout—Duhok and Baghdad—was more than 20 percent; this time, it widened to a 36 percent gap between the highest turnout in Duhok and the lowest in Sudani’s home province of Maysan.

With party platforms largely devoid of real policy proposals, were the shifts driven mainly by more effective mobilization through tribal and patronage networks? Or were they primarily driven by a more genuine sense of stability and renewed hope among voters? A deeper analysis will be needed to explain these shifts.

—Omar Al-Nidawi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Al-Nidawi is also the director of programs at the Enabling Peace in Iraq Center, where he co-develops and leads research and field initiatives focused on governance, peacebuilding, and climate action in Iraq.

What to watch from the Iraqi Higher Electoral Commission

At this point, the only official information released by the Iraqi Higher Electoral Commission (IHEC) relates to voter turnout. IHEC put voter participation at around 56 percent. What is noteworthy is that IHEC only counted those who obtained or renewed voter registration cards as eligible voters, and did not count those who failed to so or intentionally boycotted as eligible voters.

This participation level is still higher than most had expected given that there was a strong boycott campaign led by al-Sadr as well as other smaller political movements. Initial leaked results show that the established parties maintained most of their seats, with Sudani’s coalition being the new big entrant. The smaller liberal parties appear to have lost momentum. Most of this is by design and a result of the electoral system the main parties reverted to when they amended the election law in 2023. We should also keep an eye on the potential post-results exclusion of candidates by IHEC, which could potentially change the results.

—Safwan Al-Amin is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

The KDP remains the dominant party in the Kurdistan region

Preliminary election results reaffirm the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP’s) political dominance in the Kurdistan region. It garnered more than one million votes and secured twenty-seven seats while its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) received roughly half as many votes but still increased its share of seats from seventeen to eighteen. When compared to last year’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) election, the PUK’s votes declined in areas under KRG jurisdiction, while the KDP’s increased. Outside KRG-controlled territory, the PUK won four seats in Kirkuk while the KDP emerged as the leading party in votes and seats in Nineveh province. This will further challenge the PUK’s influence in areas beyond the KRG’s authority. In addition, five minority-quota candidates backed by the KDP across Iraq also won seats, further strengthening the party’s leverage at the federal level.

New actors also made gains. Halwest won five seats, while New Generation, which previously held nine seats, dropped to four. The two main Islamist parties maintained their previous share seats of four and one seats respectively. Despite these shifts, the broader electoral map in the Kurdistan Region remains largely intact. Most changes in seat distribution occurred among smaller, antiestablishment parties within the PUK’s traditional areas of influence. The PUK had aimed to win back voters and reclaim seats in these strongholds, many of which it has gradually lost over the past fifteen years to emerging parties. Instead, a familiar pattern persisted: Voters in PUK-dominated areas continue to be more inclined than others to experiment with and switch to new political forces.

These results are likely to embolden the KDP to hold firm on its terms for forming the new KRG cabinet. This, in turn, could affect government formation in Baghdad, given that the KDP is now among the top three blocs in terms of seats at the federal level and can wield significant influence over the Iraqi presidency, a post traditionally held by the PUK since 2003. At the same time, negotiations over the new federal government in Baghdad could make the pie larger for the KDP and PUK, enabling them to reach compromises on key issues and ministerial portfolios that might facilitate the formation of a government in the KRG. The central question is whether the PUK will accept a government in Erbil that reflects its actual votes and seats or continue to insist on a fifty-fifty power-sharing arrangement based on territorial control.

—Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Saeed is the Barzani scholar-in-residence in the Department of Politics, Governance & Economics at American University’s School of International Service, where he also serves as director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace.

The elections consolidated the grip of Iraq’s traditional parties

No clear winner emerged from the November 11 parliamentary elections. The forty-five seats gained by Sudani’s bloc did not represent the landslide his supporters had hoped for. Nevertheless, this was a significant improvement on the two seats his party occupies in the outgoing parliament. The KDP and Mohamed al-Halbousi’s Taqaddum coalition also made gains. Sadiqoun, the political arm of the Asaib Ahl Al-Haqq militia expanded its presence in Parliament, as well. The big losers were smaller parties, independents, and liberal/secular candidates, who didn’t stand a chance under the 2023 changes to the election law and the massive sums spent by the big parties and candidates. Another loser is Muqtada al-Sadr, whose call for a boycott clearly went unheeded, and who has been marginalized by the elections and needs to find new relevance. Despite popular calls for change, the elections brought no new blood but consolidated the grip of the traditional parties.

The next phase is the process of forming a government. Sudani’s postelection address sounded like an acceptance speech, but it is far from certain that he will serve a second term as prime minister. Negotiations to create the largest parliamentary bloc will be contentious. A grand alliance of Sudani’s bloc with the KDP and Taqaddum, such as was attempted by al-Sadr in 2021, is now even more far-fetched. Instead, the Shia Coordination Framework coalition is likely to declare itself the largest parliamentary bloc and claim the right to nominate the new prime minister, and many members of this bloc are adamantly opposed to Sudani. While the Shia Coordination Framework can nominate, the high number of seats won by the KDP and Taqaddum will give the latter two blocs a powerful countervailing voice over the nomination. Iranian and US influence will also be elements in the nomination process. In previous Iraqi government formation cycles, there was tacit agreement between Washington and Tehran. But the Trump administration, with its confrontational posture toward Iran, will likely make such an agreement difficult to reach, thus prolonging the government formation process.

—Rend Al-Rahim is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

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Minsk in Moscow’s grip: How Russia subjugated Belarus without annexation

Hanna Liubakova — Thu, 13 Nov 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 challenged much of the common Western understanding of Russia. How can the world better understand Russia? What are the steps forward for Western policy? The Eurasia Center’s new “Russia Tomorrow” series seeks to reevaluate conceptions of Russia today and better prepare for its future tomorrow.

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Introduction
Sovereignty eroded: How Belarus became a Russian satellite
Military merger: From troublesome ally to armed outpost
From fence-sitter to foot soldier: How Belarus lost its foreign policy
Hostile takeover: Russia’s control of Belarus’s economy
Cultural hegemony: The appropriation of media and education
What Belarusians really want
Conclusion
About the author

For about five years, from 2015 to 2020, Belarus created an illusion that it was changing: a deceptive glimmer that suggested its leader, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, might steer his country away from Russia’s orbit and toward greater independence. In hindsight, this false dawn only masked the tightening grip of Moscow.

Two myths fueled misplaced optimism. First, there was a belief that Belarus could balance between the East and West through a multivector foreign policy. Second, there was a hope that Minsk’s limited reforms, release of some political prisoners, and especially its refusal to unconditionally back Moscow in the 2014 annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas signaled a liberalizing turn. Both illusions ultimately frayed during this period.

At first, Lukashenka positioned Belarus as a neutral host for peace talks on the Ukraine conflict—not a participant. The Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 fed Western hopes: Belarus as mediator, not accomplice. Lukashenka even rejected Russian demands for a new Russian airbase in Belarusian territory, wary of appearing too dependent.

A partial thaw followed. Some Belarusian political prisoners were released. The European Union (EU) lifted sanctions. Western officials applauded Lukashenka’s apparent pragmatism. Engagement resumed.

But beneath the surface, nothing fundamentally changed. The regime remained authoritarian and Soviet in ethos. The security apparatus stayed intact. Dissent was managed, not tolerated. And Moscow remained the indispensable lifeline—providing cheap energy, market access, and strategic cover.

By the end of the decade, the signs were unmistakable. Crackdowns against dissent intensified. Economic dependence on Moscow deepened. Russia’s regional aggression hardened. The scaffolding of sovereignty remained, but the core was hollow.

When mass protests erupted in 2020 and the West recoiled at the regime’s violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrators in 2020, Lukashenka had only one direction to turn. The illusion of neutrality collapsed. So did the myth of a buffer state. What had once looked like strategic balance was instead a drift toward absorption into Russia.

A rapid unraveling ensued. After the extreme crackdown on protesters came the forced landing of a Ryanair flight to detain a dissident journalist and the weaponization of migration at EU borders, both in 2021. Clearly, Lukashenka was no longer playing both sides. He had chosen one—and it was Moscow’s.

This report examines how Belarus moved close relations with Russia to full-scale integration under the Kremlin. From political alignment to economic subjugation. From linguistic erasure to cultural annexation. What looked like independence was dependency in disguise.

Yet beneath this transformation lies a deeper truth: Belarusians themselves have not chosen this path. Public opinion surveys consistently show opposition to war and to nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil. They reject the loss of sovereignty and the transformation of Belarus into a Russian-controlled satellite. The regime has chosen absorption. The people have not.

The following chapters trace Belarus’s evolution into a de facto Russian outpost: militarily, politically, diplomatically, economically, and culturally. They also outline strategic options for ensuring that Belarus’s future is not decided solely in Moscow.

Sovereignty eroded: How Belarus became a Russian satellite

Lukashenka’s proclaimed neutrality during Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine was always a fiction. Belarus remained a loyal authoritarian ally, making no meaningful reforms. Still, until 2020, Minsk maintained a degree of strategic flexibility, balancing deep ties with Moscow against limited outreach to the West and to China. Now, however, the question is no longer whether Belarus is drifting into Russia’s orbit but how much autonomy Lukashenka still retains.

From the start of his presidency in 1994, Lukashenka aligned himself with Moscow, consolidating domestic power by dismantling democratic institutions and suppressing dissent. He courted Russian elites and even positioned himself in the 1990s as a possible successor to President Boris Yeltsin, garnering the support of some nationalists in Russia. His ambition culminated in the 1999 Union State Treaty, a blueprint for deep integration: shared currency, joint institutions, and equal rights for citizens. But when Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, Lukashenka’s dreams of entering the Kremlin were dashed. Putin used that treaty to attempt to end Belarusian sovereignty.

As a result, for over two decades, Lukashenka stalled implementation of the Union State Treaty, using the illusion of progress to extract economic concessions from the Kremlin—especially cheap energy—while avoiding genuine integration.

That strategy started to unravel in the late 2010s. Frustrated by Minsk’s endless demands for cheaper energy prices, Moscow began tying economic support to political concessions. In 2019, the two sides drafted thirty-one road maps for integration. Lukashenka sought better economic terms; Moscow wanted alignment. When Belarusians protested, he let the demonstrations proceed: a signal to Putin that public backlash might limit his flexibility.

Everything changed after the fraudulent 2020 presidential election, in which Lukashenka claimed victory over popular opposition forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Mass protests left Lukashenka isolated and unrecognized by the West. Desperate, he turned fully to Moscow, and Putin seized the opportunity. In November 2021, Belarus and Russia formally endorsed twenty-eight Union State programs, reviving integration plans that aimed to harmonize legal systems, unify markets, and align policies in energy, finance, customs, and taxation. Though framed as cooperation, these measures eroded Belarusian sovereignty.

Implementation continues today with minimal transparency. Lukashenka maintains vague, noncommittal rhetoric, but the direction is clear: Moscow is embedding itself deeper into the Belarusian state. If enacted in full, these reforms would strip Belarus of real independence in key areas of governance.

The most sensitive areas—oil, gas, taxation, and customs—expose the imbalance. While the creation of a joint energy market remains stalled and more controversial steps like a single currency or union parliament have been deferred, integration is advancing quietly. A unified tax system is particularly telling. It includes a common policy, a supranational committee, and a Russian-designed digital platform with access to centralized taxpayer data. Lukashenka insists Belarus still makes its own decisions, but Moscow now has unprecedented access to its economic infrastructure.

The same dynamic plays out in customs. Lukashenka’s proposed joint customs group, framed as merely advisory, opens the door to deeper dependency. The more Russia shapes Belarus’s regulatory and administrative frameworks, the less independent Minsk becomes as bureaucracies are built to serve Moscow’s interests.

Technically, Belarus retains sovereignty—just as other members of Russia-led blocs do, including the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). These alliances offer the illusion of multilateralism, but are structured to preserve Russian dominance.

Russia’s intentions are not subtle. In a 2021 essay, Putin asserted that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians form a “triune Russian nation,” denying Belarus a distinct identity. Lukashenka has echoed this logic, repeatedly affirming Belarus’s eternal closeness to Russia. Yet he continues to resist full annexation. Maintaining the appearance of sovereignty helps him contain domestic resistance and preserve what limited international engagement remains. For now, Russia seems content with this arrangement: decisive control without the complications of formal annexation.

Most Belarusians support independence. But every concession, every road map, chips away at the country’s ability to determine its future. Lukashenka has traded that future to retain power. Belarus remains a state in name—but, increasingly, a satellite in function.

Military merger: From troublesome ally to armed outpost

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO’s eastern flank faced a new reality. Belarus opened its skies, railways, and military infrastructure to support Moscow’s assault.

What began as logistical support has since evolved into something far more permanent: the transformation of Belarus into a de facto military outpost of the Russian state. Behind the facade of sovereignty, Lukashenka’s regime has traded independence for protection, welcoming Russian troops, hardware, and even nuclear weapons onto Belarusian soil.

Before 2022, Russia’s permanent military presence in Belarus was limited to two Soviet-era facilities: the Hantsavichy missile warning station and the Vileyka naval communication center. Moscow sought to expand its footprint as early as 2013, aiming for permanent bases and deploying fighter jets. But Lukashenka resisted. Particularly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and armed intervention in the Donbas in early 2014, he avoided the optics of occupation, maintaining the appearance of a balancing act between the East and West.He hosted the Minsk peace talks, freed some political prisoners, courted Western engagement, and even refrained from recognizing Crimea’s annexation, while publicly mocking the Kremlin’s “Russian World” ideology.

That balancing act ended after the August 2020 fraudulent election and the mass protests that followed, when Lukashenka relied heavily on Moscow’s political and security support to stay in power. In early February 2022 Belarus held a constitutional referendum—under conditions of repression and with no genuine debate—that ended the country’s nuclear-free status. The timing was no coincidence: Within days, Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine. And Belarus was complicit from day one.

Since then, Belarus has allowed its territory and infrastructure to be used by Russian forces. Military and civilian airfields—including Homiel airport—have served as operational hubs for launching missile and drone attacks, conducting maintenance, and supporting logistics for Russian military operations against Ukraine.

But Belarus provided more than runways. Its integrated air defense systems, navigation networks, and flight control infrastructure supported Russian operations. The Mazyr Oil Refinery fueled the war machine. Belarusian railways became arteries of invasion, shuttling tanks, troops, and ammunition across the Ukrainian border.Belarusian roads, depots, and logistics hubs sustained the assault on Kyiv.

By December 2022, the depth of this integration became unmistakable. Putin announced that Belarusian SU-25 aircraft would be modified to carry nuclear weapons and that Russia’s Iskander-M missile systems—capable of carrying nuclear payloads—had been delivered to Belarus. Because the operational control remained with Russia, the symbolic shift was profound.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko take part in a signing ceremony following a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State of Russia and Belarus in Minsk, Belarus December 6, 2024. Sputnik/Gavriil Grigorov/Pool via REUTERS.

Meanwhile, Belarus’s defense industry quietly joined the war effort: repairing Russian tanks, modernizing aircraft, and supplying optical systems for missiles. Trains loaded with weapons and parts began moving in both directions, solidifying a more profound military-industrial interdependence.

Between February 2022 and March 2023, more than seven hundred missiles were launched from Belarus into Ukraine.However, as the front lines stabilized, Belarus’s role shifted from an active launchpad to a strategic rear base.

In October 2022, as Ukrainian counteroffensives gained ground, Minsk and Moscow activated the Regional Grouping of Forces (RGF), a bilateral military formation that provided legal cover for new Russian deployments. Around nine thousand Russian troops, along with hundreds of tanks and artillery systems, arrived in Belarus under a joint command. The RGF marked a turning point: ad hoc cooperation became institutionalized military integration.

By mid-2023, most Russian troops deployed under the RGF had withdrawn, likely due to manpower constraints elsewhere. But the infrastructure remained—ready for rapid reactivation.

In March 2023, Putin announced that Russia had reached an agreement with Belarus to station tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory, with the construction of a special storage facility to be completed by July. The establishment of a Russian military base complete with nuclear weapons would significantly increase Moscow’s leverage over Belarus and cement Putin’s grip on the country.

By early 2023, Belarusian crews had completed training on using the Iskander tactical missile system for potential nuclear strikes. However, independent monitors have found no visual evidence of actual nuclear weapon deployments in Belarus, casting doubt on whether Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric reflects the reality on the ground.

Throughout 2024, Belarus adopted a new military doctrine that codified deeper integration with Russia’s armed forces. For the first time, it explicitly allowed the deployment and potential use of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory—framed as a deterrent against external threats. In practice, the doctrine handed Moscow strategic leverage near NATO’s borders, while letting Lukashenka claim a protective nuclear umbrella at home. The price was a further erosion of Belarusian autonomy.

Even as Russian MiG-31K fighters armed with hypersonic Kinzhal missiles maintained their presence on Belarusian territory, keeping Ukraine’s air defenses on constant alert, the relationship was becoming institutionalized rather than episodic.

In December 2024, Russia and Belarus signed the Treaty on Security Guarantees under the Union State framework. The agreement enabled permanent Russian bases and deployments in Belarus and committed both sides to mutual defense—including in response to threats against “sovereignty” or “constitutional order.” It further folded Belarus into Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy.

As of mid-2025, roughly two thousand Russian military personnel remain in Belarus, including air defense units and aerospace forces. Russian operations continue from key locations, such as the Mazyr (Bokau) and Ziabrauka airfields.

New satellite imagery from May 2025 revealed expanded infrastructure at the Asipovichy base: new fencing, loading platforms, and air defenses—all consistent with preparations for storing and potentially deploying tactical nuclear weapons.

While Belarus has gestured toward de-escalation, suggesting it might scale back the Zapad-2025 joint exercises with Russia, these moves are largely symbolic and likely reflect Russia’s shifting priorities on the battlefield rather than a genuine reduction in military activity. In September, separate large-scale drills took place—both the Zapad-2025 exercises and joint CSTO operations—keeping the region on edge.

Meanwhile, Minsk confirmed plans to host the Oreshnik missile system; Russia has already used this system in strikes against Ukraine. For Lukashenka, this is both a pledge of loyalty to Putin and a way to remain strategically indispensable.

In less than three years, Belarus has transitioned from a reluctant ally to a satellite state. Lukashenka has surrendered control over the country’s military and security policy in exchange for Kremlin backing. The result: Belarus is now a forward base for Russian aggression—potentially with nuclear weapons.

This development reshapes NATO’s eastern frontier, attempts to legitimize the forward deployment of Russian nuclear assets, and dismantles the boundaries between sovereign ally and subjugated proxy. The implications are stark. A former buffer state has become a Russian military outpost. Belarus is on the front line of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the West.

From fence-sitter to foot soldier: How Belarus lost its foreign policy

After Lukashenka spent decades creating the illusion of maneuvering between the East and West to preserve regime autonomy, poof—it’s gone. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Belarus’s foreign policy has collapsed into a one-way street leading straight to Moscow.

Facing sweeping Western sanctions and mounting isolation, the Belarusian regime claims to be pivoting toward Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Officials describe this reorientation as a strategic reset, aimed at offsetting annual losses estimated at $16 billion to $18 billion due to sanctions. But the pivot is largely rhetorical. Minsk’s global engagement has narrowed to improvised alliances, symbolic gestures, and tactical outreach.

Lukashenka’s facade of neutrality—avoiding recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and refraining from endorsement of Kremlin claims over Abkhazia and South Ossetia—crumbled in 2021 when he acknowledged Crimea as Russian territory. By 2024, he was hosting bilateral meetings with Denis Pushilin, the Moscow-backed head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic.

At the United Nations, Belarus has become one of Moscow’s most reliable allies. On March 2, 2022, it was one of just five countries to vote against a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—alongside North Korea, Eritrea, Syria, and Russia itself. Diplomatic independence has all but evaporated.

Western sanctions have gutted Belarus’s traditional export markets. In 2019, Belarus exported goods valued at $8.5 billion to the EU. By 2024, that figure had dropped to just over $1 billion. Potash, oil products, and timber—key sources of revenue—have been hard-hit.

In response, Lukashenka launched an outreach campaign focused on the Global South. He visited Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, promising closer ties and “anti-colonial solidarity.” Yet these trips have produced little beyond vague memoranda and photo ops. The case of Zimbabwe is telling: Lukashenka offered tractors and equipment, and trade reached $25 million in 2021. More significant, however, are Belarusian elite links to Zimbabwe’s gold and lithium sectors, and growing military ties between the two regimes. These are not signs of diversification, but transactions rooted in authoritarian clientelism.

Nowhere is the asymmetry of Belarus’s foreign policy more visible than in its relationship with China. While Minsk promotes Beijing as a key partner, the reality is marked by caution, imbalance, and diminishing returns. Lukashenka’s fifteenth visit to Beijing, delayed until June 2025, was described in state media as “family style,” which sounds like a cozy familiarity but produced no major agreements.

Belarus remains a logistical node in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, but its value has declined amid the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions. In 2024, Lukashenka announced fifteen new “strategic” Chinese investment projects totaling three billion dollars, but much of this support is conditional and geared toward Chinese interests. The China-Belarus Industrial Park Great Stone lacks fresh momentum. With Western investors gone, it increasingly targets Russian and domestic firms.

Belarus’s 2024 accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was meant to signal a turn from the West. In practice, trade with China is lopsided. Belarus exports potash and foodstuffs, while importing higher-value Chinese machinery and electronics. Belarusian defense firms are incorporating Chinese components into optics used by Russian tanks. In July 2024, Chinese and Belarusian troops held joint drills near NATO’s borders. The two countries have also codeveloped the Polonez multiple-launch rocket system.

Even as formal economic cooperation stalls, Lukashenka remains politically useful to Beijing. His public support for China on the status of Taiwan and Hong Kong reinforces shared authoritarian alignment. As China expands its global reach, Belarus’s transit infrastructure may retain some relevance. But the broader partnership remains shallow. China is watching carefully, but is not investing heavily. Not yet.

With traditional diplomacy in ruins, Minsk has embraced a model of “shadow diplomacy,” a murky blend of military deals, sanctions evasion, and autocratic alignment. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as a key enabler. A UAE-based company acquired the Belarusian arm of Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank after it came under pressure to exit. Investigative journalists from the Belarusian Investigative Center and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project network have alleged Dubai’s involvement in laundering Belarusian assets through shell companies.

Ties with Iran have deepened. Since 2023, Minsk and Tehran have signed a string of defense agreements. A 2023 Kyiv Post article, citing unconfirmed reports and Western analysts, suggested Belarus may begin producing Iranian Shahed drones. During the 2024 military parade in Minsk, Belarus showcased its domestically produced “Geran” strike drones—closely resembling the Iranian Shahed-136 model widely used by Russia in Ukraine—marking their first public appearance. Defense ministers have met repeatedly, underscoring the growing military dimension of the partnership.

Meanwhile, Belarus is bypassing Western restrictions via new trade corridors. In 2024, the port of Makhachkala in Dagestan began handling Belarusian potash as part of the North-South Transport Corridor linking Russia and Iran.

Despite occasional overtures, such as Lukashenka’s claimed willingness to mediate peace or restore dialogue with Washington, the regime shows no signs of meaningful reform. Recent prisoner releases have been tokenistic, used as bargaining chips rather than a shift in policy.

Belarus’s foreign messaging now mirrors the Kremlin’s almost entirely. From Ukraine to NATO to US policy, Minsk speaks with Moscow’s voice. The country that once sought to straddle the East-West divide has become, decisively, a satellite of its eastern neighbor.

Hostile takeover: Russia’s control of Belarus’s economy

Since 2020, Belarus has undergone a profound economic shift: not toward growth or innovation, but into near-total dependence on Russia. What may look to some like recovery is, in fact, economic subjugation. Following a 4.7 percent decline in gross domestic product (GDP) in 2022 due to Western sanctions, the Belarusian economy rebounded by 4 percent in 2024, according to the World Bank. But this growth was driven to a large extent by Russian demand. Today, nearly every major Belarusian export, investment, and banking channel runs through Moscow. Belarusian factories feed Putin’s war machine, the Russian ruble dominates the Belarusian ruble, and tens of thousands of skilled workers have fled to EU countries. This is not a partnership—it’s an economic takeover. Russia no longer needs troops in Belarus to control it; it already controls the country through trade, credit, and industry.

State-owned enterprises have been systematically repurposed to support the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine. Electronics firms like Integral and JSC Planar, once producers of civilian components, now supply Russian weapons manufacturers. Backed by nearly $120 million in Russian investment, Integral produces microchips found in Russian cruise missiles. Legmash in Orsha, which once manufactured textile machinery, now produces components for the Grad multiple rocket launchers. StankoGomel builds machine tools for the Russian arms industry. Textile giant Mogotex signed a contract with Chechnya’s Erzu to produce military uniforms.

Even before the full-scale invasion, Belarus played a significant role in Russia’s military supply chains, but recent disclosures reveal a dramatic escalation. By early 2025, according to BelPol, a group of anti-regime former security officers, at least 287 Belarusian state enterprises have become involved in producing weapons, components, or munitions for Russia, with the real figure potentially approaching 500 when private firms are included. Belarusian factories now manufacture or supply everything from artillery shells and rocket parts to drones and electronics components, making the country a crucial node in the Russian military-industrial complex.

Belarus’s economy has long mirrored its authoritarian politics: centralized, state-controlled, and resistant to market reforms. Under Lukashenka, state-owned enterprises still account for more than half of GDP. This Soviet-style model prioritizes loyalty over innovation—a vulnerability Putin has exploited.

Today, up to 70 percent of Belarus’s exports flow to Russia. When including transit through Russian-controlled ports and railways, Moscow effectively controls more than 90 percent of Belarus’s outbound trade.

This near-total dependence extends beyond simple trade flows. With traditional European export routes blocked, Belarus has become locked into Russian transit corridors. In 2023, Belarusian exporters utilized twenty Russian ports, double the number from the previous year. Even goods destined for third countries must pass through Russia, inflating costs and shrinking profit margins. Key exports, such as potash and oil products, are especially vulnerable, with state-owned producer Belaruskali facing costly delays at Russian-controlled ports.

Moreover, Belarus’s fiscal survival depends almost entirely on Russian support. The country owes roughly eight billion dollars in intergovernmental loans to Russia, making it Moscow’s largest debtor. Last year, Russia granted a seven-year deferral on debt repayments—effectively writing a blank check to preserve Lukashenka’s loyalty.

The Belarusian ruble is informally pegged to a currency basket, half of which is the Russian ruble, meaning it rises and falls with Moscow’s economic fortunes, limiting Minsk’s ability to pursue an independent monetary policy.

Russian banks now handle an increasing share of Belarusian exports, while local financial institutions have been integrated into Russia’s payment and messaging systems. Western sanctions have forced Belarus to adopt Russian digital infrastructure—from tax administration tools to consumer payment platforms—further eroding what remains of its economic sovereignty.

In 2024, more than half of foreign direct investment in Belarus came from Russia. Under the banner of “import substitution” and joint ventures, Russian firms aren’t merely filling gaps left by departing Western companies, they’re systematically displacing Belarusian competitors in a quiet economic conquest.

For Belarusian manufacturers, access to the Russian market represents both a lifeline and a trap. The more dependent they become on Russian demand, the more vulnerable they are to Moscow’s political whims. In critical sectors, Russia has evolved from the largest customer to the sole customer, giving Putin effective veto power over Belarus’s industrial base.

This process is hollowing out Belarus’s economy from within. Domestic policies—such as price freezes and retaliatory sanctions—have only added strain. Prices are rising, and consumer choice is shrinking. When Lukashenka occasionally pushes back, such as blocking McDonald’s rebranding to Russia’s “Vkusno i Tochka” (which means “Tasty, Period”) and instead insisting on a Belarusian brand, these gestures prove meaningless against the broader trajectory of economic surrender.

Nowhere is Belarus’s decline more visible than in its once-thriving information technology (IT) sector, formerly a symbol of innovation and Western integration. The transformation has been devastating: IT exports plummeted 45 percent from $3.2 billion in 2021 to $1.8 billion in 2023, while the sector shed over 19,000 workers.

Russian investors, who previously comprised just 10 percent of foreign IT involvement, now account for nearly a third of the market. While these contracts offer short-term stability, they represent a strategic dead end: constraining growth potential, limiting global market access, and tying Belarus’s technological future to Russia’s isolated digital ecosystem.

The brain drain extends beyond IT. As Belarus’s most talented professionals flee westward, the country loses not just individual expertise but entire innovation networks that took decades to build. This hemorrhaging of human capital ensures Belarus’s long-term economic stagnation regardless of short-term Russian subsidies.

Cultural hegemony: The appropriation of media and education

Moscow is attempting to methodically redefine what it means to be Belarusian. Since the mass protests following the flawed election of August 2020, the Kremlin has fused its propaganda machine with Minsk’s state media, rewritten school curricula, and flooded the cultural sphere with programming promoting “brotherly unity.” The objective is unmistakable: erase the idea that Belarus can stand apart from Russia.

Russian cash and consultants now dictate prime-time narratives across Belarusian television. A joint history textbook portrays Belarus as a junior branch of Russian civilization, while concert stages and museums celebrate Kremlin-approved myths, silencing dissenting voices. This soft-power offensive, reinforced by Lukashenka’s brutal repression, amounts to a slow-motion annexation of memory and identity.

The transformation began in August 2020, when Belarusian state media workers walked off the job to protest the regime’s violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrators. Almost immediately, rumors spread that Russian journalists—particularly from Kremlin-backed outlets like RT—had replaced them. Lukashenka fueled the speculation by publicly thanking Russian media, while RT admitted only to “advising” local teams.

Soon after, state channels began parroting Moscow’s talking points. Anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric surged. When Russia launched its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Lukashenka was framed as a bystander, even as Belarusian territory was used as a launchpad for missile strikes and military operations.

Russia isn’t just influencing Belarusian media—it’s bankrolling it. In 2025, a new Union State joint media holding is set to launch with a budget of one billion Russian rubles (approximately eleven million dollars), headquartered in Moscow with a representative office in Minsk. The venture will encompass television, radio, and print outlets, marking a significant step toward media integration under Kremlin direction. In February, RT hosted a two-day “media school” at the Russian House in Minsk, an unmistakable effort to cultivate a new generation of regime-aligned Belarusian journalists.

Independent outlets, by contrast, are suffocating. Since 2020, the Information Ministry has blocked about eighteen thousand websites, branding nearly seven thousand as “extremist.” Dozens of newsrooms have fled abroad; those that remain work under constant threat. For most Belarusians, uncensored news is becoming increasingly scarce.

After the 2020 protests, the regime also sharply curtailed academic freedom. Student activism is met with expulsions, imprisonment, forced “repentance” videos, and mobile court trials held at universities. The government has intensified its ideological campaign, blaming “internet technologies” and foreign influence for corrupting students and responding with stricter controls on campus life.

This campaign extends into all areas of student life. In 2023, Belarus’s largest university banned Valentine’s Day, citing it as “too Western,” following a previous ban on Halloween for similar reasons. Since 2024, military training has been introduced into curricula, and even kindergartens now host military-themed events.

The state is also strangling educational choice. Licensing rules adopted in 2022 shut dozens of private schools and those that have survived face intrusive oversight. Belarusian-language teaching is in decline: Fewer than one in ten pupils study it, and no university offers a full Belarusian curriculum. In 1999, 86 percent of citizens identified Belarusian as their native language; by 2019, that figure had dropped to 61 percent and continued to fall.

At the same time, Belarusians are being steered toward Russian universities. State‑funded places for Belarusians at Russian universities jumped from 72 in 2019 to 1,300 in 2023—plus an unprecedented 30,000‑seat quota through the Rossotrudnichestvo exchange program. The Kremlin is grooming a generation whose professional networks and intellectual loyalties lie in the East, not the West.

Russia’s cultural dominance in Belarus has grown in parallel with its political and media influence. Joint exhibitions, concerts, and museum partnerships—especially those highlighting shared military history—further embed Belarus within Russia’s ideological orbit.

Events like the Slavianski Bazaar celebrate “Slavic unity,” but the content increasingly serves pro-Kremlin narratives. Russian artists who openly support Moscow’s foreign policy are welcomed, while Belarusian and Western performers and authors critical of the war in Ukraine or Lukashenka’s regime are banned.

Since 2020, independent Belarusian culture has been gutted. State funding has shifted toward Russian-backed projects, leaving little room for local voices. The result is a cultural landscape where Belarus’s distinct identity is increasingly blurred and, in many cases, erased.

What Belarusians really want

Most Belarusians aren’t choosing Russia’s path—they’re being dragged down it.

While the Kremlin tightens its grip on Belarus’s military, economy, and foreign policy, public opinion tells a very different story. Independent polling consistently shows that the Belarusian people reject war, oppose Russian nuclear deployments, and are uneasy about their country’s deepening dependence on Moscow.

Over 85 percent of Belarusians oppose sending troops to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and more than half disapprove of missile attacks launched from Belarusian soil. These numbers have remained remarkably stable over time, signaling deep and consistent anti-war sentiment that transcends political divisions. Belarusians want stability, but not if it means becoming a launchpad for Russian aggression.

Russian nuclear weapons represent another red line. Two-thirds of Belarusians oppose their deployment on Belarusian territory, though support has ticked up slightly since Moscow reportedly moved tactical nuclear weapons into the country in 2023. This resistance to militarization extends to broader security arrangements. Support for remaining in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization dropped from 63 percent in 2020 to 54 percent in 2023. When Russia invaded Ukraine, more Belarusians briefly preferred remaining outside any military bloc than staying in the CSTO—showing growing distrust of Russian-led alliances. These trends suggest Belarusians are not deeply attached to such alliances and may be open to neutrality or alternative security options.

Geopolitical preferences reveal a more complex picture. While half of Belarusians still back an alliance with Russia, 16 percent favor alignment with the EU, and 30 percent support neutrality. More telling, 57 percent believe Belarus should improve ties with the EU, with 37 percent specifically wanting stronger trade relationships.

Support for NATO remains low, between 6 percent and 11 percent, typically, but this reflects mistrust on all sides, limited access to open debate, and years of regime-driven anti-Western messaging rather than wholehearted embrace of Russia. Importantly, even among those who back integration with Russia, few envision a single state. Belarusians may accept cooperation, but not annexation.

Media access explains much of this complexity. Among those who rely on state-controlled media, 63 percent support closer ties with Russia and only 2 percent support EU integration. However, among consumers of independent media, the numbers flip: 44 percent support moving toward Europe, while just 11 percent back greater integration with Russia.

This data point carries profound implications for Western strategy. Propaganda works, but only when it monopolizes the conversation. Where independent journalism survives, even underground or in exile, it shapes opinions and maintains space for alternative futures. Belarusians who access independent information are more likely to oppose war, support Ukraine, and envision a sovereign development path.

The regime may have crushed street protests, but resistance persists through underground sabotage, cyber leaks, and digital dissent. These aren’t isolated acts of defiance; they signal a society that refuses to surrender its agency.

Belarusians are not ideologues. They are pragmatic. While geopolitical views are fragmented, public support for economic reforms is strong. Nearly 80 percent support fair competition between the public and private sectors. Most also want stock market development, tax cuts for small businesses, and less state interference.

That said, there are anxieties. Inflation, shrinking social safety nets, and the risk of economic shock are real concerns. Attitudes are nuanced: people support market mechanisms but fear short-term pain. Trust in the business elite is limited, but support for entrepreneurship is high.

The regime’s choices do not reflect the will of the Belarusian people. Most Belarusians oppose the war, reject nuclear deployments, and favor neutrality over dependence on Moscow. Despite repression and propaganda, quiet resistance persists: in attitudes, media habits, and daily acts of dissent. This gap between state and society is strategic. The regime is brittle; the people are not. Western policy must begin here: Belarus is not lost, and its future is still in play.

Conclusion

Belarus has not been formally annexed, but it has been absorbed. Militarily, politically, economically, and culturally, it has become a Russian outpost: a launchpad for aggression and repression alike. Yet this transformation is not complete, and it is not irreversible. The Belarusian regime survives through coercion and dependence, not legitimacy. Beneath the surface lies a society that still aspires to sovereignty, stability, and connection to the democratic world.

This report has shown how absorption happened, sector by sector—but also why it matters. A captive Belarus threatens NATO’s flank, enables Kremlin aggression, and offers a template for authoritarian consolidation elsewhere. For the United States and its allies, the time to act is now. Containing Russia, defending Europe, and supporting democracy all run through Minsk. The path to long-term regional security runs not only through Kyiv but also through a free and sovereign Belarus.

Belarus in the balance: Strategic recommendations for US and allied policy

The West can no longer afford to treat Belarus as a sideshow. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Belarus has become a critical platform for Kremlin aggression: militarily, economically, and ideologically. Restoring Belarusian sovereignty is now a strategic imperative for NATO’s eastern security and the broader defense of democratic values.

To counter Belarus’s deepening alignment with Russia, Western policymakers must adopt a four-part strategy: reframe Belarus as a frontline issue, enforce synchronized pressure, build democratic resilience, and prepare for regime rupture.

First, the United States must elevate Belarus as a national security priority. It should be fully integrated into NATO and EU threat assessments, treated alongside Ukraine and the Baltic states in strategic planning. Russian bases, nuclear deployments, and hybrid threats from Belarus are not theoretical: They are already altering Europe’s security landscape.

Second, sanctions must be expanded, enforced, and fully aligned with allies. Belarus is a central hub for sanctions evasion and war logistics, leveraging smuggling networks, trade rerouting, and Russian support. The United States, the EU, and the Group of Seven should synchronize measures against Belarus’s military-industrial complex, financial institutions, and dual-use sectors, extend secondary sanctions to enablers in China, Iran, and elsewhere, and close loopholes to raise the cost of Minsk’s subjugation to Moscow and deter further aggression.

Third, pressure must be matched by investment in Belarusian democratic infrastructure. This includes independent media, secure digital tools, exile education, and cultural preservation. These aren’t symbolic; they sustain the capacity for democratic self-rule and offer a credible alternative to Kremlin domination.

American leadership is vital. Appointing a US special envoy for the Belarusian democratic forces would centralize policy coordination and ensure Belarus stays on the transatlantic agenda. Belarusian democratic leaders must also be present in any future diplomatic process on postwar regional security. No high-level engagement with Lukashenka should resume until more than one thousand political prisoners are freed.

Thanks to US mediation, a number of Belarusian political prisoners and foreign nationals have been freed this year. This humanitarian track should continue. However, it is crucial not to legitimize Lukashenka or ease pressure prematurely. The United States must adopt long-term strategic thinking on Belarus. Ultimately, Western policy should be guided by the understanding that only a democratic Belarus can ensure lasting stability for the entire region.

Finally, contingency planning is essential. Lukashenka’s regime is fragile. The West must be prepared for scenarios ranging from internal collapse to Russian destabilization. Planning should cover political transition, humanitarian assistance, and infrastructure security. Clear public guarantees of post-Lukashenka support—from economic aid to security cooperation—could hasten regime erosion and incentivize elite defections.

Belarus’s future must be embedded in the broader strategy to end the war in Ukraine and roll back authoritarian influence. A free Belarus would deny Moscow a key launchpad, reduce NATO’s exposure, and weaken Russian and Chinese leverage in the region.

The window for action is narrowing. A coherent Western strategy that combines pressure with preparation can still tip the balance.

Read the full issue brief

About the author

Hanna Liubakova is a Belarusian journalist and political analyst. She is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and has reported on developments in Belarus for international outlets including the Washington Post, the Economist, and others.

Liubakova began her career at Belsat TV, the only independent Belarusian television channel, which has been banned by the regime in Minsk. She later worked for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) in Prague, Czechia, and is currently writing a book about Belarus.

Her reporting has earned multiple honors, including the Freedom of the Media Award from the Transatlantic Leadership Network and the One Young World Journalist of the Year Award. She was also a finalist for the European Press Prize. In retaliation for her work, the Lukashenka regime sentenced her in absentia to ten years in prison. She is wanted by authorities in Russia and across all Commonwealth of Independent States countries.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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Dispatch from Baghdad: Don’t confuse the calm around Iraq’s election with stability

Yerevan Saeed — Mon, 10 Nov 2025 17:44:00 +0000

BAGHDAD—Iraq approaches its sixth parliamentary election with few crises, little violence, and an elite consensus to keep the machinery of government turning. But this apparent quiet is not an indication of the country’s long-term stability. The essential features of Iraqi politics—informal decision-making that precedes formal ratification, the quota-based muhasasa that trades portfolios for loyalty, and factious security forces—remain unchanged.

The November 11 election will bring some change. The vote will likely redistribute parliamentary weight and speed government formation, especially with influential Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr out of the fray. Yet the election will not alter the fundamentals of power in Iraq. The country’s trajectory over the next year will be determined less by the ballot results and more by how leaders answer a few important post-election questions: Who will emerge in bargaining over government ministries? Can Baghdad and Erbil codify a predictable fiscal and hydrocarbon settlement after a government is formed? And can the state find solutions to four slow-burning stressors in Iraqi society—water and climate problems, migration-aggravated tension in cities, narcotics trafficking, and the over-centralization of power in the capital?

For outside partners, especially the United States, the best approach in the post-election period will be neither maximalist condition-setting nor strategic indifference. Instead, partners should exercise targeted leverage to use this moment of relative political calm to establish institutional rules.

The absence of an emergency is not stability

The first thing visitors notice today in Baghdad is the texture of daily life. The temperature of politics feels lower than in the searing years of crisis. While armored convoys can still be seen across Baghdad, there are fewer of them; blast walls are less suffocating; cabinet meetings happen as scheduled; the civil service, for all its patronage, goes to work. But the Iraqi parliament is the most dysfunctional institution.

It is tempting to call this stability, to confuse the absence of emergency with the presence of law and order. Yet the deeper structure of authority remains what it has been for much of the post-2003 era: Consequential decisions are negotiated outside of formal institutions, and they are only later packaged for parliamentary consumption; ministries are treated as instruments of partisan finance; and the state pays the salaries of some security forces that it does not actually command. What looks like stability is better understood as a negotiated political ceasefire among power brokers who have learned the costs of brinkmanship.

Two tensions define this moment. The first is the gap between form and substance. Iraq is faithful to the forms of constitutionalism—from elections to confirmation processes and budget laws—but the substance of authority is forged through leader-to-leader bargains, diwaniya conclaves, and coalition caucuses that operate before and beyond legal procedure. Policy is not developed through party platforms that translate votes into programs; it emerges from the calculation of who controls which portfolio and which revenue stream. Citizens see procedures but do not see oversight and accountability, and they rarely experience coherence. When outcomes become unpopular, political blame dissolves into the atmosphere of collective responsibility.

The second tension is the nature of the quiet itself. Much of it is grounded less in reform than in fatigue. The 2019 protest wave rearranged incentives across the political class but did not produce a durable organizational vehicle that could convert street energy into programmatic politics and reform. Those who rode the wave of this organic protest movement are now part of the political system they promised to challenge. Youth cohorts that once marched now juggle wage work, migration dreams, and a wary accommodation with a state that can deliver incremental services but not credible horizons. Elites, chastened by the violent feedback loops of the past, now prefer a managed equilibrium that keeps predation within tolerable bounds. That equilibrium is periodically disturbed by regional aftershocks—the war in Gaza, strikes on Iran-aligned groups, border incidents, developments in Syria—but it has thus far reasserted itself quickly. Quiet endures not because the fundamentals have been fixed, but because actors have priced the costs of further breaking them.

Iraq’s regional position has evolved in ways that sustain this equilibrium. The country is no longer a front-line battlespace for transnational jihadis or an ungoverned corridor for proxy war. Instead, it functions, perhaps surprisingly, as a venue for dialogue and economic competition, a place where otherwise hostile actors can exchange messages under Iraqi auspices. Baghdad’s role in past Iran–Saudi contacts mattered less for specific deliverables than for what it signaled about Iraq’s aspiration to be a platform rather than a battlefield. Recently, Baghdad has become a rendezvous for Iranian and Egyptian diplomats to work out a four-decade-long strained relationship. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil has long played the role of interlocutor between Turkey and the Gulf countries and even Turkey and France. Now it’s helping resolve the Kurdish question in Turkey. However, Iraq’s aspiration has limits. Legal prohibitions on engaging Israel and the risk of militia adventurism continue to constrain Baghdad’s diplomacy during the Gaza conflict, forcing Iraq’s top diplomat, Fuad Hussein, to calibrate between domestic law, regional passions, and the practical necessity of de-escalation. Still, the larger picture is one of rising but bounded Iraqi agency, in which the state can sometimes resist and can sometimes broker, but sometimes has to concede to keep the equilibrium intact.

Within that regional frame, Iranian influence has changed character more than it has receded. The networks remain, the allies are in place, and the access points in commerce and security persist, yet Tehran has exercised its leverage more quietly in recent months. I am told that Tehran has replaced its entire cohort of influence in Iraq with the same people who took on the Iraqi dossier after 2003. These new old people report not to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, but rather to the supreme leader’s office. Iraqis believe this is an indication that Iran is here to stay. Iran’s Iraqi partners read this as a tactical decision: The capacity to disrupt is undiminished, but the preference is to do so only if outcomes threaten red lines.

The state of Iraqi politics today

No issue better illustrates the blend of continuity and change than the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF is not a single actor, and treating it as such obfuscates more than it clarifies. It is more accurate to think of it in terms of four camps. The first is the pro-Iran camp, which includes factions that predate 2014 and whose ideology is explicitly transnational. Within this camp, there is a political wing that competes in elections and seeks to preserve military capacities as insurance. A nonparty wing, the Islamic Resistance, eschews the ballot, exerts influence through intimidation and extortion, and resists subordination to the commander-in-chief. The second camp consists of volunteers mobilized in 2014, when the army and police faltered against the Islamic State. These units typically have workable relations with the government and resent domination by the first camp. The third are Sadr-aligned elements, now largely invisible within PMF structures, reflecting the movement’s distance from formal politics for now. The fourth are tribal and local formations—Yazidi, Turkmen, and Assyrian among them—that have grown as instruments of local employment and control and that are broadly manageable within cabinet politics.

The governance dilemma is concentrated in the first camps’s nonparty wing. Here are men whose salaries are paid by the state, whose legal status is ambiguous in practice if not on paper, and whose chains of loyalty extend beyond the Iraqi state. The damage they do is not always explosive, but it is often corrosive. They alter the risk calculus for investors, undercut professional policing, and create a market for protection that blurs the line between politics and racketeering.

Against this backdrop, what will the November 11 election change? It will likely change mechanics and bargaining positions but not the rules of the game. This will be the least internationally monitored national vote in years. It’s an Iraqi-run process that many Iraqi elites view as a test of sovereignty. Political leaders cite biometric card uptake and new registrations to predict stronger turnout. Civil society is less sanguine, expecting apathy to persist. Either way, the process will go forward, and the result will likely be a recalibration. With Sadr abstaining, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s coalition is well placed to translate incumbency and a narrative about him improving public services into additional seats. Kurdish politics will play out as another round of bargaining between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); Sunni politics will likely involve consolidation by established figures and a chase by rivals. Within Shia politics, offshoots of the coordination framework will likely compete for the same slices of the electorate.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally in Najaf. (Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa via Reuters Connect)

But the decisive action comes after the vote. The muhasasa will endure, as it has through reformist rhetoric and technocratic experiments. This is not the product of bad faith alone; it is baked into a structural fact that no party contests every district, no bloc aspires credibly to a majoritarian program, and the memory of unilateralism is associated with violence and the entrenchment of enemies. In practice, the election sets the price, not the product. Ministry shares are apportioned by informal formulas, and the real haggling is over which portfolios change hands. Some swaps are effectively pre-baked. Sovereign posts follow convention: a Shia prime minister, a Kurdish president, a Sunni speaker. The defense ministry is typically in Sunni hands. It’s a balance enforced not by law but by the mutual fear of exclusion.

Under these conditions, the question of Sudani’s second term clarifies how power works in Iraq. The prime minister expects to gain a larger number of seats and might have earned credit among many Iraqis for helping to deliver steadier services, such as improved roads and electricity oversight. Still, the political class carries the lesson of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki into every formation: second terms are dangerous because they can become vehicles for centralizing power. Sudani is already under scrutiny for his statist view of government. Yet without a renewed premiership, Sudani’s coalition’s cohesion may erode as fast as it coalesced. His rivals, including al-Maliki, have little incentive to allow entrenchment. The likely outcome is not Sudani installed for another term, but rather a prime minister in the same mold as Sudani: balanced between Tehran and Washington, apparently technocratic, and above all not threatening to other leaders’ equities. The good news is that formation could be faster than the year-long stalemates of recent cycles, especially with Sadr outside the room and regional volatility discouraging a vacuum. The bad news is that a quickly formed cabinet may still be staffed according to partisan loyalty, with its technocrats appointed where optics demand, and its directors-general left to the centrifugal logic of patronage.

Kurdish politics will be important, as always, in who becomes the next Iraqi president and in the health of Baghdad–Erbil relations. The presidency will almost certainly remain Kurdish, but whether a KDP or PUK figure holds it will depend on another grand bargain among power brokers. The KDP has argued that seat strength grants it a right to nominate a president, while the PUK has asserted that institutional balance and territorial control justify one of its members in the post. Tehran would likely prefer a PUK figure, not least for the leverage over a Shia-led cabinet such an outcome could offer.

Sadr’s absence looms over all of this. In 2021, he won decisively, tried to form a majority government, failed, and withdrew. His logic is intelligible. By denying his imprimatur to a system he condemns, he preserves the outsider brand for a future return. The costs are real: cadres defect to other blocs; local networks atrophy; former members of parliament feel abandoned. But in the near term, his absence simplifies the arithmetic of coalition-building: He is unlikely to disrupt the vote or the formation. If a new protest wave emerges from below, he may join it rather than start it, but there are few signs that such a wave is imminent. In some sense, Sadr’s absence is the essence of this season’s quiet: fewer spoilers, more deals, less drama.

A falsifiable and straightforward test

The real test lies in whether elites use the post-election period as a window of opportunity to agree to codify rules where improvisation has failed for over two decades. Hydrocarbons and fiscal flows are the most obvious openings in the next cabinet. Targeted US pressure made possible recent progress on salary transfers to KRG civil servants and steps toward resuming oil flows through Ceyhan in Turkey. Optimists hope these steps can seed a hydrocarbon law with predictable revenue-sharing, auditability, and a dispute mechanism that prevents annual brinkmanship. Skeptics warn that once the polls close, the logic of coalition bargaining over the spoils of the next cabinet will take over, with oil and salaries again treated as chips on the table.

Therefore, the best analytical marker for the year ahead is falsifiable and straightforward: Does Iraq codify a formula that makes budgets and oil flows depoliticized and automatic rather than unplanned? If it does, then the country builds on its current political cease-fire toward long-term stability in one of its most volatile arenas. If it does not, then expect recurring political and financial crises that bleed confidence between Kurdistan and Iraq, with implications for the country’s overall political stability.

Four threats to Iraqis in the year ahead

Whoever leads Iraq next will face four slow-burning stressors threatening the country. The first is water and climate. Upstream controls by Turkey and Iran, salinization of southern waterways, and rising temperatures are erasing rural livelihoods. The result is internal migration into cities struggling to supply water, electricity, and waste management. In these conditions, a low water flow in the summer is not about statistics; it is an urban security problem. Adaptation is possible, including by switching crops away from water-intensive staples, reducing leakage in municipal networks, modernizing irrigation, and installing solar-powered pumps, among other steps. But Iraq must treat water as a national security priority with a single command node and a special budget to ensure social stability.

Compounding the first stressor is urban social friction. As rural families migrate, they bring traditions and customs into cities that often lead to urban conflict between tribes. The result is tribalization of urban strife, uneven policing, and spikes in crime that metastasize through neighborhoods in Basra and beyond. To address this problem, the government must help ensure steadier municipal investment, greater police professionalization, and the creation of economic alternatives. If the state cannot keep a neighborhood safe, then the neighborhood will default to its own explosive arrangements in a way that would be hard to control.

The third stressor is narcotics. Cheap synthetic drugs have spread with alarming speed in Iraq, creating new markets for cross-border trafficking that mix organized crime with militia finance and corrupt officials. Treating this purely as a security problem has predictable results: showy raids and little change in availability. The state needs a public-health approach with treatment capacity, prevention campaigns, and forensic labs that can map routes and build prosecutable cases. It also needs vetted task forces insulated from compromised units, and judges who can try cases without fear that their dockets will be traded in the next round of bargaining. Without that, drugs will become the next driver of instability, less visible than car bombs but no less lethal to the social fabric.

The fourth stressor is power centralization that goes against Iraq’s federal structure. Baghdad has pulled more authority to the center, straining relations with the provinces—especially the KRG. Comparisons with Kurdistan’s stronger services and projects have intensified pressure on the Shia political elite. Many say this has bred resentment in the prime minister’s office, which reads Erbil’s rise as a rebuke. Instead of scaling what works, the federal response has often been to slow Kurdistan—delaying budgets, instituting tariffs on Kurdish goods, tightening border controls, and limiting Kurdish companies’ foreign transactions. Iraq will advance faster when Baghdad treats Erbil’s gains as a shared national success, not something to obstruct.

The view from Washington

What, then, should outside partners do? It may be tempting for Iraq’s partners to demand sweeping political conditions that collapse under the weight of Iraq’s coalition math, or, in frustration, to disengage. But a better way is to capitalize on what has been working under the Trump administration’s practical approach.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (REUTERS/Suzanne Plunkett/Pool)

Without military engagement, the Trump administration has been able to leverage the underutilized weight of US diplomacy to block a few laws counter to US strategic interests and resolve some long-standing issues, while pressuring Baghdad to release Kurdistan’s share of the budget. At this moment, Washington has an opportunity to double down on these short-term gains and convert them into durable long-term solutions by backing a hydrocarbon legal framework—one that depoliticizes energy and budget from petty Iraqi politics, which often hold hostage the livelihood of ordinary Kurds while putting American commercial investments at risk.

Perhaps most important in the immediate future, the United States should refrain from backing any specific candidate for Iraq’s next prime minister. Iraq’s informal, consensus-driven process typically elevates the prime minister, and as a senior State Department official told me, “we are dealing with the system, not individuals.” It’s in the best interests of Washington and the Iraqi people to let the office change hands through that process, reducing the risks of authoritarianism and power consolidation that could disrupt the current political truce and the incremental improvements Iraq has achieved in recent years.

The coming election will redistribute bargaining chips and likely produce a government with less delay than in the past. But the challenge after the votes are counted is for Iraqi politicians to turn the political truce into fair rules—to reduce the distance between constitutional form and governing substance. Iraq thus far knows how to hold a vote and form a cabinet. It needs the patience and discipline to build institutions that cannot be bargained away at the next diwaniya.

As Sarhang Hamasaeed, the former director of Middle East Programs at the US Institute of Peace, recently summed up during the Iraq Research Leaders Forum in Baghdad, “Calmer is not stable.” It can, however, be the bridge to stability if Iraq’s political class and its friends choose to build on it.

The post Dispatch from Baghdad: Don’t confuse the calm around Iraq’s election with stability appeared first on Atlantic Council.

EU praises Ukraine’s progress but warns Zelenskyy over corruption

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 04 Nov 2025 22:01:55 +0000

Ukraine’s bid to join the European Union received a boost this week with the release of an annual assessment praising the war-torn country’s progress toward future membership. The European Commission’s yearly overview of potential future EU members identified Ukraine as one of the best performers among ten candidate countries, acknowledging advances made by Kyiv in a number of reform areas including public administration, democratic institutions, rule of law, and the rights of national minorities. “Despite Russia’s unrelenting war of aggression, Ukraine remains strongly committed to its EU accession path, having successfully completed the screening process and advanced on key reforms,” the report noted.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed this positive appraisal of his country’s efforts and said the European Commission report confirmed that Ukraine “is confidently moving toward EU membership.” It was not all good news for the Ukrainian leader, however. EU officials also raised concerns over Zelenskyy’s domestic policies amid mounting allegations of backsliding in Kyiv on core anti-corruption reforms that are widely regarded as vital for Ukraine’s further European integration. “Recent negative trends, including pressure on the specialized anti-corruption agencies and civil society, must be decisively reversed,” the annual accession review underlined.

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The criticism currently being leveled at the Ukrainian authorities in Brussels is not entirely unexpected. In July 2025, Zelenskyy stunned Ukraine’s Western allies and sparked domestic outrage by backing a controversial parliamentary bill that was widely interpreted as an attempt to end the independence of the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

The scandal provoked Ukraine’s largest street protests since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, with thousands of Ukrainians braving possible Russian bombardment to rally in cities across the country against Zelenskyy’s apparent power grab. Kyiv’s partners were also quick to voice their alarm and signal that the move could put future international support for the Ukrainian war effort at risk.

Faced with overwhelming opposition at home and anger in key foreign capitals, Zelenskyy quickly backed down and reversed efforts to assert control over Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. Nevertheless, this week’s European Commission Enlargement Report has highlighted the lingering damage done by this brief and entirely self-inflicted crisis to the Ukrainian leader’s credibility.

Nor is this the only fly in the ointment. In addition to his headline-grabbing summer 2025 U-turn over Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms, Zelenskyy is also facing accusations from political opponents and civil society representatives of using lawfare to silence critics and consolidate power in his own hands. This is not a good look for a man who has sought to position himself as one of the leaders of the democratic world.

Zelenskyy has pushed back hard against his critics. He has pointed to Ukraine’s unprecedented success in meeting EU accession targets amid extremely challenging wartime conditions, while underlining the scale of his country’s anti-corruption reforms. “We have implemented the widest, the broadest anti-corruption infrastructure in Europe. I don’t know about any country that has as many anti-corruption authorities,” he commented in response to this week’s report. “We are doing everything possible.”

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For the time being, any disquiet over Zelenskyy’s anti-corruption credentials is unlikely to derail Ukraine’s EU membership momentum. While there is no agreement on how soon Ukraine can expect to join, the country’s eventual accession is now viewed in most European capitals as crucial for the continent’s future stability and security.

Ukrainian aspirations to join the EU first began to take shape in the wake of the country’s 2004 Orange Revolution, leading to years of meandering negotiations over a possible Association Agreement between Kyiv and Brussels. When this document was finally ready to be signed in 2013, Russia intervened and pressured the Ukrainian authorities to reject the deal. This led directly to a second Ukrainian revolution and the fall of the country’s pro-Kremlin government.

With Moscow’s efforts to thwart Ukraine’s European integration rapidly unraveling, Russian President Vladimir Putin chose to escalate and launched the invasion of Crimea in February 2014. This watershed moment marked the start of Russian armed aggression against Ukraine. Following the seizure of the Crimean peninsula, Moscow established Kremlin-controlled “separatist republics” in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. When this limited Russian military intervention failed to derail Ukraine’s EU ambitions, Putin raised the stakes further with the full-scale invasion of 2022.

As Russian aggression has escalated, Ukrainian public support for EU membership has increased and opposition has withered away. An issue that once divided Ukrainians fairly evenly now unites the nation. This is hardly surprising. For millions of Ukrainians, the quest to join the EU has become synonymous with the country’s civilizational choice of European democracy over Russian autocracy.

Zelenskyy would be well advised to keep this in mind as he seeks to balance domestic political considerations with Ukraine’s EU aspirations and the urgent need to maintain international support for the war effort. Ukrainians have made staggering sacrifices along the road toward EU membership and will not take kindly to anyone who places this progress in jeopardy. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s EU integration currently enjoys strong public and political support across Europe, but backsliding on core values could still undermine Kyiv’s case and provide fuel for Russia as it seeks to discredit Ukraine and prevent the country’s historic exit from the Kremlin orbit.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Introduction: A region undergoing transformation

Since the third wave of democratization—the global surge of democratic transitions beginning in the mid-1970s—Europe has often been regarded as a leader in the field of liberal democracy. In its 2024 Democracy Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks Western Europe as the highest-scoring region worldwide, with an average of 8.38—making it the only region to record a net improvement in democratic performance during the latest annual cycle. However, this snapshot only captures part of Europe’s democratic story and can be misleading, given the complex challenges confronting many of its subregions.

Over the past fifteen years, Europe has endured a “polycrisis”—including the eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine war—all of which have strained democratic institutions and weakened public cohesion.

In the Western Balkans, these dynamics are magnified by elite corruption, foreign interference, and internal political conflict—factors that block long-term democratic progress and stall European Union (EU) integration. The nations in this region face a constant balancing act between the West and its authoritarian rivals in Moscow and Beijing, striving to grow their economies while potentially jeopardizing security and stability. Without increased US support, the Western Balkans could become a serious vulnerability for the EU, with implications for the security and sovereignty of both NATO and the broader West.

The need for a revitalized, regionalized US democracy assistance approach

Electoral manipulation, the erosion of the rule of law, and authoritarian instability undermine US-European trade, weaken security alliances, and open the door to Russian and Chinese influence. Moscow and Beijing—through disinformation, political infiltration, and economic leverage—have made the Western Balkans a particular focus. Both employ tailored strategies to exploit the weaknesses of the nations in the region—particularly with respect to their election processes, security mechanisms, and political divisions.

Given these circumstances, US democracy assistance in the Western Balkans is vital. Situated between the EU, NATO, and the eastern spheres of influence of Russia and China, the region occupies a critical geopolitical junction. Economically, the Balkans function as a transport hub for maritime trade, energy pipelines, and migrant flows, making it a flash point for European stability.

Today, the region faces intense pressure from the competing economic and political influence of China, Russia, Iran, and other rivals. Left unchecked, the Balkans could serve as a staging ground for authoritarian powers to entrench their hold on Europe. Current developments in the region underscore that this threat is no longer hypothetical:

Serbia’s deepening ties to Moscow and Beijing—evident in its energy dependence, military cooperation, and expanding digital-surveillance infrastructure—pose direct threats to transatlantic interests.
Russia’s sway over Republika Srpska obstructs Bosnia and Herzegovina’s path toward NATO and EU integration, while promoting constitutional instability that undermines national unity.
Montenegro and North Macedonia, though NATO members, are increasingly vulnerable to hybrid threats from Russia and China, owing to weak institutions and growing political fragmentation.

To be effective, US democracy assistance must reflect the varying dynamics across the Balkans, from balancing Western ties with Russian and Chinese incentives to navigating complex internal conflicts amidst deteriorating democratic institutions. These challenges require programs that improve governance accountability and address frozen inter-state conflicts by working with legitimate political parties and local actors. Revitalized, region-specific democracy assistance is necessary to protect US interests and reinforce European democratic security. Supporting democratic development abroad strengthens US security, prosperity, and global influence, while delaying this support further endangers the United States and its allies through long-term instability and conflict.

In the Western Balkans, democracy is facing internal and external pressure

Today, the six countries comprising the Western Balkans are classified as hybrid regimes, reflecting the region’s persistent democratic decline and institutional fragility. Future democracy assistance must counter the persistent influence of Russia and China, which exploit energy and economic dependence to shift the Balkans away from EU integration.

Serbia

Serbia has wavered between pro-Western gestures and deepening ties with Russia and China—exemplified by its decision to provide military support to Ukraine while refusing to impose sanctions on Russia. According to the V-Dem annual reports, Serbia has experienced rapid democratic decay since the early 2000s under the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Over the past decades, the ruling party has entrenched its control over the judiciary and the media, undermining democratic checks and electoral competition.

The December 2023 snap elections revealed widespread manipulation, including group voting, falsified voter registration, and targeted attacks on election observers. The government’s growing alignment with Moscow and Beijing, including recent acquisitions of surveillance technology and energy deals with China, threatens Serbia’s European trajectory and regional stability. These developments not only signal the absence of free and fair elections but also invite authoritarian influence on NATO’s southeastern flank.

Since 2024, students have organized mass mobilizations to protest widespread corruption. These demonstrations are likely to continue, emphasizing the need for US support in fostering pluralism and protecting political contestation.

The unresolved conflict between Kosovo and Serbia continues to fuel internal unrest, violence, and protests. Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence has deepened resentment between populations, restricted access to public services in northern Kosovo, and undermined democratic norms. While the United States and most EU member states support Kosovo’s sovereignty, Serbia is backed by authoritarian powers, including Russia, China, and Iran. This continued denial, along with Serbia’s support for parallel structures in Serb-majority areas, remains a major barrier to Kosovo’s integration into the EU, the UN, and other international institutions.

Kosovo

In Kosovo, internal ethnic tensions and stalled dialogue with Serbia continue to destabilize governance. The May 2024 clashes, which included violence against NATO forces, highlight the fragility of peace in the region. Currently, Kosovo and Serbia share responsibility for public services in northern Kosovo: Serbia supplies education and health care, while Kosovo oversees law enforcement and the court system. This arrangement, however, has left the Serbian minority vulnerable. Prime Minister Albin Kurti deployed heavily armed police across the region, evicted Serbian institutions, banned the use of Serbian currency, and took other provocative actions, prompting roughly 10 percent of Kosovo’s Serbs to leave the country over the past year.

Politically, while Kurti’s Self-Determination Movement won the largest share of votes in the 2025 parliamentary elections, his inability to secure a majority or form a coalition with major opposition parties has stalled democratic reforms. The prime minister’s hardline stance toward the Serb minority, which appears aimed at consolidating domestic support, has drawn criticism from both Western partners and opposition groups. In response, the United States and the EU suspended financial assistance to pressure Kurti to re-engage with inclusive governance and align with international norms. The resulting political dissonance continues to complicate coalition-building and delay key democratic initiatives aimed at reducing internal ethnic tensions, underscoring the need for external assistance.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Governance remains stagnant in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to an outdated power-sharing arrangement and ethnically fragmented leadership resistant to meaningful reform. The stalled EU accession process and the exclusion of civil society from decision-making have undermined democratic momentum and weakened citizen trust. With political elites increasingly insulated from accountability, institutional resilience is eroding, and democratic contestation faces the risk of further collapse without stronger international support and grassroots mobilization.

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s democratic decline has been sharper than in other Balkan states. In Republika Srpska—a political entity that emerged from the violent breakup of Yugoslavia—Bosnian Serb President Milorad Dodik has worked to suppress public contestation, recriminalize defamation, and align the territory with the Kremlin’s anti-Western agenda. Dodik’s admiration for Vladimir Putin has facilitated growing Russian influence, undermining independent media and silencing opposition voices. In return, Dodik has received Russian political backing and propaganda support.

While Dodik’s mandate was revoked in late August following an appeals court verdict sentencing him to a one-year prison term, his influence has already entrenched ties to Russia and fueled intense contestation of central institutions. These authoritarian shifts are part of a broader ethno-nationalist strategy that heightens vulnerability to state capture and weakens institutional pluralism.

To reinforce the court’s decision, the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina has called early presidential elections in Republika Srpska. Scheduled for November 23, 2025, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and other international entities have voiced support, emphasizing the need for free, constitutional, and democratic elections and a peaceful transfer of power.

North Macedonia

Democratic governance in North Macedonia continues to be undermined by low public trust in judicial institutions, media polarization, and widespread corruption. Citizens perceive the judiciary as politicized and ineffective, even as landmark trials against former officials have concluded. Efforts to digitize courts and increase transparency remain promising but insufficient without broader structural reform. Corruption remains deeply entrenched in procurement processes and political appointments, while anti-corruption agencies are underfunded and lack prosecutorial power. Meanwhile, ethnic and political divisions continue to block electoral reform and erode public confidence in representative democracy. While civil society remains relatively active, government hostility toward critical NGOs signals a shrinking space for civic participation.

North Macedonia’s democratic trajectory has been weakened by increasing political polarization, institutional paralysis, and unresolved identity conflicts with EU members. Since 2022, the opposition party VMRO-DPMNE and the far-left party Levica have obstructed parliamentary proceedings to push for early elections, delaying key judicial appointments and agency confirmations. These deadlocks have stalled the Constitutional Court’s functionality, leaving only four of the required nine judges seated and risking a constitutional crisis. Similarly, state agencies such as the Judicial Council, the public broadcaster board, and antidiscrimination commissions remain vacant due to legislative obstruction, undermining government capacity and the rule of law.

These divisions intensified following the 2022 EU-facilitated “French proposal,” which aimed to resolve Bulgaria’s veto over North Macedonia’s accession negotiations. While the deal unblocked the EU path, it required controversial constitutional amendments recognizing the Bulgarian minority. The ruling Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) coalition accepted the compromise, triggering mass protests, fueling nationalist backlash, and galvanizing Eurosceptic sentiment. The opposition launched multiple failed referendums and accused the government of “high treason,” stalling consensus on reforms necessary for EU integration. While the government’s acceptance of the proposal allowed accession talks to begin, it also deepened identity politics and weakened democratic cohesion.

Montenegro

Montenegro’s 2020 elections marked a critical turning point, ending the Democratic Party of Socialists’ (DPS) rule and opening the door to democratic renewal. The new coalition government, led in part by United Reform Action’s (URA) Dritan Abazović, entered with a reformist mandate centered on EU integration and anti-corruption. However, ideological fragmentation and a limited majority produced political instability and stalled reform efforts. Today, judicial appointments remain politicized, anti-corruption efforts are faltering, and deep-rooted patronage networks resist institutional change. The coalition’s collapse in 2022 and the formation of a minority government with DPS support highlighted the fragility of Montenegro’s democratic transition.

Amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU expedited Montenegro’s accession process as a geopolitical priority. While the country remains a top candidate for EU membership by 2028, this acceleration has come at the expense of EU democratic standards. Despite progress, media politicization, weak judicial independence, and institutional capture persist. The EU’s lenient conditionality—prioritizing regional stability over reform—risks reinforcing superficial compliance. US democracy assistance should focus on strengthening the rule of law, protecting independent media, and supporting civil society to ensure Montenegro’s accession reflects genuine democratic consolidation rather than merely geopolitical expediency.

Albania

Albania’s democratic system is historically fragile and deeply conflicted. Prime Minister Edi Rama and the Socialist Party (SP) hold a strong majority, having secured a fourth consecutive term in the 2025 parliamentary elections with 52.2 percent of the vote. Although the country’s elections are competitive and professionally administered, they take place in a polarized environment marked by allegations of vote-buying and the use of public funds in underprivileged areas to influence outcomes. The SP’s practices undermine pluralism and weaken local governments, which often struggle to provide basic services.

The main opposition, fragmented between factions of the Democratic Party, has failed to meaningfully challenge the government, resulting in diminished parliamentary oversight. This dysfunction culminated in violence in late 2023, after which the government passed restrictive laws curbing opposition activities.

Civil society contributes to national debates, but its impact is often limited due to underfunding, exclusion from policymaking, and occasional co-optation by partisan interests. The media landscape remains largely independent and frequently holds public officials accountable; however, ownership is concentrated in the hands of politically connected elites who leverage their platforms to influence parties and government actors. These insufficient accountability mechanisms have fueled disinformation and deepened public distrust—a vulnerability that Russia could exploit.

Despite these challenges, Albania has a strong foundation of civil society and independent media. The country needs comprehensive support that strengthens civic participation, protects independent journalists, and establishes equitable funding mechanisms for municipal governments.

Reaffirming ties with the EU

The EU recently met with Western Balkan leaders to conceptualize a Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. The meeting included pre-financing payments under the Reform and Growth Facility for North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia, and further incentivized Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina to pursue reforms.

Emerging deals included new flagship investments in clean energy, initiatives to integrate the region into the EU Single Market, and measures to enhance digital connectivity. Each of these steps outlines technical areas of alignment between the EU and the Balkans, yet questions remain about the future of democracy in the region.

The Western Balkans remain caught between competing pressures: democratic deterioration, unresolved regional conflicts, and growing authoritarian influence. While the EU has invested heavily in the region’s integration, technical improvements alone cannot guarantee democratic development. Therefore, the United States must support the EU’s expansion efforts while emphasizing the importance of democracy. This requires a revitalized approach—one that engages political parties, energizes civil society, and rewards meaningful democratic reforms.

A revitalized approach to democracy assistance

US democracy assistance should embrace three pillars: people, the rule of law, and political processes. These pillars can be broken down into thematic priorities—anti-corruption measures, the protection of independent media and civil society, the empowerment of political parties and contestation, and other vital actions to revitalize democratic progress.

Fostering people-centered strategies

Democracy can only be sustained with inclusive policies that foster an informed, engaged, and educated public. In the face of authoritarian power—which has provoked mass protests and ethnic tensions, creating openings for Chinese and Russian influence—incorporating people-centered objectives is vital to mitigate internal conflict. The United States should therefore prioritize civic education, inter-ethnic dialogue channels, and youth engagement, especially in areas where political violence and protests are prevalent.

Application examples

In Kosovo, this strategy would involve programs fostering interethnic dialogue between Albanian and Serb youth in schools and community spaces. Assistance could also expand civic education initiatives in Serb-majority areas and empower youth-led organizations focused on reconciliation, rights awareness, and political participation. In addition, the United States should provide legal and technical assistance to civil society groups seeking to hold municipal leaders accountable, particularly in border regions.

The United States should counter concentrated executive power through media literacy training in Republika Srpska, stronger protections for journalists and civic actors, and forums to address misinformation and anti-Western rhetoric. Ensuring access to education and multiethnic safe spaces would help mitigate the long-term effects of President Dodik’s autocratic, pro-Kremlin legacy, and support intra-group dialogue in preparation for a democratic election.

Serbia’s student-led protests reflect a desire to challenge government corruption and demand public safety. The United States should support this mobilization by investing in youth-led civic initiatives, combining education with inclusive services for ethnic minorities. However, progress between Serbs and Albanians will remain challenging unless Serbia’s political leadership accepts internationally recognized borders.

Public services and rights must be non-discriminatory and inclusive of all minority populations. The United States should also work with judicial institutions in the Western Balkans to ensure protection for citizens facing disparities.

Supporting the rule of law

Building an independent, non-discriminatory judicial system is vital for reducing conflict during peace negotiations and to prevent executive overreach. US democracy assistance can deploy resources and anti-corruption support in Montenegro to encourage neighboring nations to uphold democratic standards, thereby addressing entrenched ethnic divides and intra-state violence.

Application examples

In Albania, this strategy would prioritize strengthening anti-corruption organizations to curb executive abuse and the unfair treatment of opposition parties and municipal institutions. Cooperating with the Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK)—which has successfully prosecuted high-level officials—should be expanded to include legal training, protective measures, and transatlantic cooperation opportunities. SPAK’s credibility offers a potential framework for broader rule-of-law assistance in North Macedonia, where transparency in public procurement and prosecutorial independence remain insufficient. Judicial reform in both countries must be accompanied by public awareness campaigns to build trust in institutions and deter political interference.

These themes should be applied to Montenegro, where politicized judicial appointments and weak enforcement mechanisms continue to undermine democratic transformation. As a likely future EU member, Montenegro must strengthen its political institutions, which in turn must be held accountable by independent courts and judges. Similarly, prioritizing Montenegro’s democratic and economic alignment would provide a model for other Balkan states pursuing EU integration.

Finally, in cases of severe ethnic tensions or disparities, the United States must ensure that judicial development promotes inclusive and non-discriminatory services for citizens. This will be vital in Kosovo and Serbia, where stalled dialogue efforts weaken public services and heighten conflict, as well as in other multiethnic states such as North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. Supporting judicial institutions will not only build public trust but also protect opposition parties from executive overreach and political repression.

Safeguarding political processes

Political parties have had inconsistent levels of impact in the Western Balkans. Fair competition and coalition-building are vital to strengthen democracy and counter state capture. US assistance should directly engage with political parties to improve inclusivity, policy development, and voter mobilization.

Application examples

Montenegro’s recent election of the United Reform Action (URA) demonstrates the promise of a democratically driven government. In line with this pillar, the United States should address political fragmentation by supporting cross-party dialogue mechanisms, while also creating space for civil society members to participate in policymaking.

Similar mechanisms can be applied to Kosovo, Albania, and North Macedonia, where opposition parties struggle with ideological fragmentation. Open debates, local council meetings, and forums featuring civil society organizations and political representatives would help align citizens’ priorities and party platforms. Technical training should also be extended to countries with ethnic divisions, such as Kosovo and Serbia, focusing on inclusive policymaking and youth engagement.

Finally, in states facing autocratic takeover, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, this strategy would promote platforms that transcend ethno-nationalist lines and foster cooperation in coalition building. With many Western Balkan states reliant on opposition parties to revitalize democracy, US assistance must prioritize fair and inclusive political competition. By integrating political parties into assistance efforts rather than sidelining them, the United States can help restore the democratic dialogue necessary for government reform. People-centered mobilization, institutional reform, and the renewal of political processes must go hand in hand to ensure democratic resilience across the Western Balkans.

Strategic implications for the United States

A three-pillar strategy—centered on people, the rule of law, and political processes—provides a pragmatic and adaptive framework for revitalizing US democracy assistance in the Western Balkans. As the region struggles with authoritarian interference, ethnic conflict, political fragmentation, and democratic decay, sustained US engagement is critical to prevent long-term instability. Democracy assistance not only builds institutional resilience and civic participation but also protects strategic US interests by stabilizing NATO’s southeastern flank, advancing EU integration, and countering Russian and Chinese influence. To ensure long-term stability and democratic momentum in one of Europe’s most volatile regions, the United States must treat democracy assistance as a core component of its foreign policy and global leadership.

about the authors

Stephen Nix is the senior director for Europe and Eurasia at the International Republican Institute.

Megan Tamisiea is a researcher with an MA in Democracy and Governance from Georgetown University.

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The Hague vs. KLA leaders: Justice or tragedy? | A Debrief with James Rubin

sjones — Wed, 29 Oct 2025 18:00:00 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Twenty-five years after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the men once hailed as heroes now stand accused of war crimes at The Hague.

Former US Assistant Secretary of State James Rubin joins Ilva Tare, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, on #BalkansDebrief to reflect on his testimony before the Special Chambers, where former President Hashim Thaçi and other Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) leaders face charges of crimes against humanity.

This conversation revisits a story that shaped a nation and continues to test the conscience of international justice.

Rubin reflects on:

His personal friendship with Hashim Thaçi and hopes for the court’s verdict;
What a conviction could mean for Kosovo’s democracy and its ties with the EU; and
The enduring responsibility of the international community to uphold justice while preserving peace.

“A conviction of Hashim Thaçi would leave a terrible scar on the international legal system and a tragedy for those who fought and died for freedom.” – James Rubin.

ABOUT #BALKANSDEBRIEF

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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Taylor joins Rudaw to discuss delays in KRG formation

Atlantic Council — Tue, 28 Oct 2025 19:34:03 +0000

original source

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South and Southeast Asia are on the front lines of the democracy-autocracy showdown

Prakhar Sharma and Gauri Kaushik — Thu, 16 Oct 2025 22:15:54 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The region includes resilient, strained, fragile, and collapsed democracies—all benefit from democracy assistance that preserves civic space, delegitimizes authoritarian leaders, and protects free media across the region.
Key challenges include no-strings-attached Chinese financing, restrictions on political choice, and disinformation.
Protecting democratic institutions and practices can create governance stability and help the United States fortify important economic relationships.

Introduction

How do democracies die? Not with a dramatic coup, but through quiet, intentional dismantling—rules bent just slightly, laws rewritten, oppositions discredited and then disarmed. This warning from political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt has proven prophetic across South and Southeast Asia, where the past decade has witnessed steady democratic erosion.

According to Freedom House’s 2025 assessments, nine countries across South and Southeast Asia registered net declines in political rights and civil liberties since 2015—including Cambodia, India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam—while others such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka saw modest improvements. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute also reports significant declines in the Electoral Democracy Index scores of several countries in the region in recent years. This trend underscores that even seemingly stable democracies can undergo serious erosion of their democratic institutions.

Yet the pattern is not uniform. From Indonesia’s institutional resilience to Myanmar’s military collapse, the region reflects not a single arc but a mosaic of democratic experiences—some unraveling, others resisting, many caught in an uneasy limbo. To make sense of these divergent patterns, this paper outlines four broad categories of country cases—not intended to simplify, but to reflect recurring traits: democracies that have held firm under pressure (resilient democracies); those that appear intact but are internally weakening (strained democracies); those whose institutions exist in name more than practice (fragile democracies); and those where the democratic practice has been openly dismantled (collapsed democracies).

With nearly 2.8 billion inhabitants, South and Southeast Asia are on the front line in the contest between liberal and authoritarian governance models. China’s state-led modernization offers an appealing, albeit illiberal template. Russia and other powers lend not just rhetorical support but operational tools to repress, manipulate, and surveil. The region’s democratic trajectory will carry implications far beyond its borders. As democracy is tested and redefined here, the terms of legitimacy, resistance, and political belonging across much of the world will be as well.

Resilient democracies

Despite facing similar pressures as their neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia have managed to preserve their democratic institutions through a combination of judicial independence, active civil society, and political cultures that still value competitive elections. Their resilience offers lessons for other countries grappling with authoritarian pressures.

Malaysia

Malaysia has demonstrated remarkable democratic resilience through successive political transitions, most significantly during the watershed 2018 elections that ended Barisan Nasional’s sixty-one-year grip on power.[i] Despite the political instability that followed—including the controversial “Sheraton Move” parliamentary reconfiguration and three changes in premiership between 2020 and 2022—constitutional processes prevailed, ultimately yielding a durable unity government under Anwar Ibrahim after the 2022 elections. This political settlement between former adversaries reflects a maturing democratic culture where coalition-building efforts trumped winner-takes-all politics. While Malaysia continues to navigate challenges including ethnic and religious polarization, endemic corruption networks, and institutional legacies from its semi-authoritarian past, its judiciary has increasingly asserted independence in landmark cases, most notably in upholding the conviction of former Prime Minister Najib Razak.[iii] Civil society organizations maintain active oversight of governance, even as authorities occasionally employ outdated sedition laws to restrict political expression. Malaysia’s capacity to weather multiple leadership crises while preserving core democratic institutions stands in sharp contrast to the authoritarian regression evident elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Indonesia

The fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998 ushered in democratic reforms in Indonesia, leading to multiple peaceful transfers of power. In February 2024, former General Prabowo Subianto, Suharto’s controversial ex-son-in-law, won the presidency in an election widely considered competitive, despite concerns over the outsized influence of his predecessor, Joko Widodo. Provincial and regional elections in November further demonstrated Indonesia’s commitment to regular electoral processes. While Indonesia largely operates within democratic rules, it continues to grapple with systemic corruption and restrictions on religious freedom. Although the constitution guarantees religious freedom, only six religions are officially recognized, and blasphemy laws are enforced, leaving religious minorities vulnerable to discrimination. These challenges reflect enduring tensions within the country’s democracy. Nevertheless, civil society continues to play an essential role in defending democratic norms. In recent months, rushed legislative processes and Subianto’s appointment of an active general to a civilian post prompted mass student protests demanding transparency, demonstrating continued public engagement and resistance in Indonesia.

Strained democracies

India and the Philippines reveal a troubling paradox: Even countries with deep democratic traditions can experience significant erosion while maintaining competitive elections. Their struggles show that democracy’s survival depends not just on electoral competition, but on protecting the institutions that make elections meaningful.

India

Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s election in 2014, India has experienced rising Hindu nationalism, communal tensions, and constraints on civil liberties, alongside a concentration of executive power and weakened checks and balances. Communal violence has increased rapidly; in 2024, there were fifty-nine communal riots, an 84 percent increase from 2023. Media freedom has deteriorated, with increased censorship of content critical of Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), such as a BBC documentary and films depicting the 2002 Gujarat riots. Independent journalism is under attack, and civil society groups have been targeted through funding cuts and mass shutdowns.

In the face of these threats, India’s democratic institutions have shown resilience. The 2024 general elections, which were peacefully conducted with over 640 million voters, were widely regarded as free and fair. Although Modi secured a third term, the BJP underperformed, losing sixty-three seats and failing to secure a parliamentary majority. While the BJP’s platform centered religious nationalism, voters prioritized local issues, reflecting the enduring strength of India’s electoral processes.

The Philippines

The Philippines has experienced significant political and human rights challenges in recent years. Under the populist and illiberal administration of former President Rodrigo Duterte, the country witnessed thousands of extrajudicial killings linked to a brutal drug war. Democratic institutions weakened rapidly, and critics in the judiciary were forced out as the Supreme Court began backing the executive. While the Philippines has a historically strong and diverse civil society, civic space and the media environment were suppressed through regulations, censorship, intimidation, and disinformation.

In 2022, Duterte was succeeded by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. Although human rights have improved slightly under the current president, over 840 extrajudicial killings have occurred since he took office. Duterte’s March 2025 arrest in Manila on an International Criminal Court warrant exacerbated the tense divide between Marcos Jr. and Vice President Sara Duterte ahead of the May midterm elections. While competitive, the elections exposed institutional vulnerabilities and were marked by aggressive disinformation campaigns, concerns about Chinese interference, and deep polarization. The government continues to bring unfounded cases against civil society groups, and “red-tagging” (i.e., accusing individuals and groups of communist sympathies) persists, exposing people to harassment and violence. Despite these threats, civil society remains active, criticizing injustices, advocating for reforms, and fighting for accountability.

Fragile democracies

Bangladesh and Pakistan remain caught between democratic aspirations and authoritarian realities. While their institutions remain weak and elections flawed, the persistence of civil society activism and public demands for accountability suggest that democratic possibilities have not been extinguished.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh is amid a pivotal political transition following the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. Hasina’s fifteen-year rule and the Awami League’s (AL) increasingly autocratic administration ended after mass student protests and were replaced by an unelected interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. Although Yunus has pledged democratic reforms and elections, his administration continues to exhibit some of the authoritarian tendencies seen under Hasina. AL supporters, who once dominated Bangladeshi politics and suppressed opposition, now face similar harassment under the interim government and its allies.

Despite the erosion of civil liberties and democratic institutions under the AL, Bangladesh’s economy averaged healthy annual growth of 6.5 percent. However, following the political instability in 2024, foreign investments plummeted, inflation rose, and gross domestic product growth fell below 2 percent per annum. Meanwhile, the interim government has repeatedly postponed the promised elections, likely into 2026, raising concerns. Bangladesh’s democratic transition remains uncertain, with potential for either progression or regression. Opposition leaders have pushed for timely elections; this, along with economic and political reform, will be vital to sustaining the country’s democratic aspirations.

Pakistan

Pakistan’s persistent civil-military imbalance continues to hinder democratic prospects, with the military maintaining an outsized influence over the government. Judicial activism can act as a counterbalance, as Pakistan’s judiciary maintains remarkable independence despite the entrenchment of the military. Yet the assertiveness of the judiciary may also be a double-edged sword, increasing institutional competition and instability.

Although the majority voted against the military establishment during the 2024 elections, the military continues to act as a veto power. Recent attempts to manipulate election outcomes, such as the rejection of former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s nomination papers, stripping his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), of its electoral symbol, and manipulating vote counts, were reminiscent of military-engineered elections in the 1990s. However, the failure of these interventions in 2024 has revealed vulnerabilities in the military’s grip, signaling the persistence of democratic aspirations and potential shifts in power dynamics.

Collapsed democracies

Myanmar and Cambodia demonstrate how quickly democratic gains can be reversed when authoritarian forces consolidate power. External support from China and Russia has made these reversals more durable, showing that democracy’s enemies are increasingly coordinated across borders.

Myanmar

Myanmar’s democratic experiment ended abruptly with the February 2021 military coup, which deposed the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi and precipitated the country’s descent into widespread conflict. By early 2025, the junta’s territorial control had contracted dramatically, with large areas now governed by a patchwork of ethnic armed organizations and People’s Defense Forces aligned with the National Unity Government (NUG) operating from exile. The military has responded with escalating brutality—deploying airstrikes against civilian populations, systematically torturing political detainees, and implementing scorched-earth campaigns in areas of resistance—resulting in over 5,000 civilian deaths and forcing more than 2.5 million into displacement since the coup. Elections promised by the military have been repeatedly deferred, while Suu Kyi’s detention was extended for an additional two years in January 2025 through transparently politicized corruption charges. International engagement has fragmented along geopolitical lines, with Western nations strengthening sanctions and extending recognition to the NUG while China, Russia, and Thailand maintain pragmatic relations with the junta. Myanmar represents the region’s most catastrophic democratic collapse, transforming from an imperfect but functioning electoral democracy into a failing state characterized by civil conflict, economic implosion, and humanitarian catastrophe.

Cambodia

Cambodia’s democratic prospects continue to fade under the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), now led by Hun Manet, who succeeded his father, Hun Sen, after uncompetitive elections in July 2023. Cambodian elections have been widely recognized as rigged, with international observers documenting widespread irregularities, fraud, and vote tampering. The disqualification of the main opposition party, the Candlelight Party, over alleged registration issues effectively dismantled meaningful electoral competition. The regime has become increasingly repressive, targeting critics like environmental and human rights activists through arbitrary arrests and forced disappearances.

The CPP has also cracked down on independent media by revoking licenses and censoring critical media outlets. China’s growing influence in Cambodia has further entrenched the CPP’s authoritarian rule, as it provides economic support and political backing. As Cambodia’s largest investor, trading partner, and donor, China has been able to exert considerable sway over the administration’s policies, and Cambodia has aligned more closely with Beijing’s foreign policy interests. Without democratic alternatives to China’s influence and aid, this dynamic will leave little room for democratic renewal in Cambodia.

Cross-cutting challenges

Across South and Southeast Asia’s varied political systems, certain challenges repeatedly surface that make democratic governance more challenging regardless of a country’s context. Four of these challenges are particularly salient.

Digital authoritarianism and the rewiring of civic space: The early hopes that digital tools might democratize information have been overtaken by a more sobering reality. Across the region, states now wield surveillance, censorship, and algorithmic distortion not as exceptions but as deft instruments of coercive control. India has deployed surveillance of online speech; Cambodia has centralized digital infrastructure control; and the Philippines has blurred state messaging and disinformation. These tools are part of a broader architecture of control, quietly redefining the limits of dissent and the shape of public discourse.

China’s model and strategic recalibration: Beijing’s growing regional presence offers political elites a convenient alternative: stability without pluralism, growth without accountability, an undemocratic form of social contract. Chinese financing arrives without governance conditions and provides diplomatic cover against international scrutiny. Increasingly, the Chinese Communist Party also engages subnational actors—both governmental and nongovernmental—where scrutiny is weaker and institutional vulnerabilities are more pronounced. In Cambodia and Myanmar, this support has emboldened autocratic actors; in more open settings, it narrows strategic space for democratic engagement. Democracy assistance must contend with an emerging geopolitical reality that favors regime durability over democratic deepening.

Developmental absolutism and the erosion of political choice: Democratic rollback is increasingly justified through development discourse. Leaders frame electoral mandates as licenses for centralized control while dismissing institutional checks as inefficiencies. In India and Bangladesh, majoritarian governance is defended as a prerequisite for growth; in Thailand and Singapore, technocratic authority substitutes for political deliberation. The result is marginalization of political choice, overtaken conveniently by performance-based legitimacy.

‘Information disorder and the fragility of shared reality: Across the region, democratic discourse is being reshaped by disinformation; algorithmic self-fulfilling echo chambers; and digitally amplified hate, especially through WhatsApp. In Myanmar, online propaganda fueled ethnic violence; in India and the Philippines, deepfakes and coordinated misinformation campaigns distort elections. The fundamental problem is the collapse of shared language through which citizens might contest, interpret, or imagine their politics. Democratic institutions cannot function when the conditions for contestation of ideas have eroded.

Policy recommendations

US government support for democracy should be targeted and responsive to the different realities of the countries within each of these categories. For instance, countries experiencing democratic breakdown need different support than those still defending democratic space or those working to deepen democratic quality.

For resilient democracies: Deepening democratic quality

Democratic resilience, while encouraging, should not be mistaken for consolidation. In countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, support should move beyond preserving existing norms to actively strengthening democratic infrastructure. Fast-tracked visas for civil society leaders—across regime types—could facilitate regional mentorship networks through which democratic lessons diffuse more organically, especially when those lessons emerge from other Asian contexts rather than transatlantic ones. Bilateral trade agreements can be made contingent on demonstrable gains in press freedom and judicial independence. Cross-border investigative journalism, jointly supported by local and international media, can expose corruption networks that threaten institutional integrity.

For strained democracies: Defending democratic space

Where democratic institutions are under strain—as they evidently are in India and the Philippines—US government support must focus on preserving the civic space and avoiding normalization of authoritarian tactics. It should avoid high-level engagement with leaders who are actively involved in prosecuting journalists and/or silencing dissent, even if technical cooperation continues in parallel. Development aid can be redirected from compromised central agencies toward subnational governments that are overtly committed to democratic norms. Targeted sanctions against individuals involved in judicial capture or media repression can also send clear signals of accountability.

For fragile democracies: Building institutional resilience

In fragile democracies like Bangladesh and Pakistan, where institutions exist but often lack independence and/or depth, the priority should be to rebuild credibility. International financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund, should tie future programs to transparent constitutional processes that include the opposition’s participation. Funding for civil society-run parallel election observation/monitoring programs can strengthen integrity where official mechanisms fall short. Regional judicial networks can provide both technical assistance and normative pressure to bolster court independence and resist political interference.

For collapsed democracies: Supporting democratic resistance

Where constitutional order has collapsed—as in Myanmar and Cambodia—support must shift toward those still defending democratic legitimacy. Recognition and funding should be extended to exiled national unity governments and aligned civil society organizations that retain public trust. “Democracy visa” pathways can offer protection and continuity for endangered journalists and activists. Financial sanctions should be imposed on military units and regime-linked families responsible for repression, thus reinforcing pathways for international legal accountability.

Addressing cross-cutting challenges

Support secure communication tools and digital literacy to push back against growing digital authoritarianism. Offer faster, transparent infrastructure financing to counter China’s influence while underscoring the material benefits of democracy. Sponsor and fund research that links transparency to economic growth, and support business coalitions that champion the rule of law. Strengthen civic education and fact-checking efforts to resist disinformation and restore shared civic ground. Partner with regional democracies—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia—to jointly support democratic actors across South and Southeast Asia. Such coordination not only amplifies reach but also serves as a visible and forceful counterweight to China’s expanding illiberal influence.

Conclusion

The Cold War model of supporting elections and civil society organizations, while still important, cannot possibly address the sophisticated ways that elected leaders employ to dismantle democratic institutions from within. We need a differentiated approach that recognizes the distinct challenges facing countries at different points along the democratic spectrum while addressing the cross-cutting pressures that undermine democratic governance across the region. Democracy assistance must evolve beyond its traditional fixation on electoral processes. Instead of just funding election monitors and civil society training, donors should condition trade agreements on improvements in press freedom, invest in secure communication technologies for activists, and support independent judiciaries through targeted capacity-building programs. Without these foundations, electoral democracy remains symbolic. The future of democracy in South and Southeast Asia will not only shape national destinies. It will quietly, but decisively, alter how the world understands power, legitimacy, and the meaning of democratic resilience. This is where the United States must lead—not only with aid dollars, but also with the political will to make democratic governance a nonnegotiable component of its economic partnerships.

about the authors

Prakhar Sharma is a public policy researcher with more than eighteen years of experience in democratic governance and fragile states. He completed his PhD in political science at Syracuse University. Sharma was a senior specialist at the International Republican Institute, and has advised US government institutions, multilateral organizations, and Afghan partners on conflict and state-building.

Gauri Kaushik holds a master’s degree from Georgetown University in democracy and governance, where she focused on democratic and security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. She has worked on democracy assistance and development programs at organizations including the National Democratic Institute and Democracy International.

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Charai in Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: Jared Kushner: The Quiet Architect of Courage

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 Oct 2025 17:38:53 +0000

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Putin’s Moldova election failure highlights Russia’s declining influence

Kateryna Odarchenko — Sat, 04 Oct 2025 21:46:36 +0000

Moldova’s recent parliamentary election was widely billed as a straight choice between rival European and Russian trajectories, with the Kremlin accused of unprecedented interference in a bid to sway the vote in Moscow’s favor.

On the eve of the election, many commentators believed a Russian success was possible. In fact, the final result was not even close. The pro-European party of Moldovan President Maia Sandu emerged as the clear winner, securing a decisive victory with a little over 50 percent of the vote. Meanwhile, the pro-Kremlin party led by former Moldovan president Igor Dodon was left far behind on 24 percent.

This strong result for Moldova’s pro-European camp represents a major setback for the Kremlin. Crucially, it underscores the challenges Putin faces as he seeks to influence elections and reassert Russian dominance over countries once ruled from the Kremlin at a time when the invasion of Ukraine has raised serious questions about Moscow’s ability to project power throughout its former empire.

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Russia is said to have invested heavily in the recent campaign to shape the outcome of Moldova’s election. This included everything from financial incentives to disinformation campaigns. A BBC investigation found evidence of a Russian-funded network that paid people to post fake news online and organize rigged polls showing inflated levels of support for pro-Kremlin parties.

Social media was a key battleground in the Kremlin’s efforts to interfere in the election. Information warfare watchdogs claim Russia recruited operatives locally and employed AI technologies to create large quantities of fake accounts and flood Moldovan social media platforms with disinformation attacking President Sandu and her political party.

The scale of Russia’s efforts caused considerable alarm in Chisinau. Days before the vote, Sandu accused the Kremlin of spending hundreds of millions of euros on an election interference campaign in order to buy votes and “intoxicate” the Molodvan electorate with misleading and often inflammatory online content.

The Moldovan authorities also uncovered evidence of illicit financing including undeclared cash flows and cryptocurrency schemes. Just two days before the vote, Moldova’s Central Electoral Commission barred one pro-Kremlin party from running following a court ruling over allegations of voter bribery, illegal party financing, and money laundering.

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Russia’s attempt to sway the elections in Moldova ultimately failed. The reasons for this failure are instructive. Moldova’s state institutions deserve credit for displaying impressive vigilance and resolve. This included enforcing election campaign financing laws, acting to counter disinformation, and communicating clearly with the electorate.

Moscow’s plans may also have been undermined by corruption among those entrusted with the task of interfering in the Moldovan election. Some of the Kremlin’s local partners allegedly pocketed cash themselves rather than paying for influence operations or using allocated funds to bribe potential voters.

The decisive role was played by the Moldovan electorate. Despite Russia’s extensive efforts to discredit the pro-European camp with all manner of lurid fakes and conspiracy theories, Sandu’s electoral platform of European integration, transparency, and reform received majority backing from the Moldovan public.

This overwhelming pro-European victory highlighted modern Russia’s lack of a coherent ideology or convincing counter-narrative. While Kremlin operatives are experts in the dark arts of negative campaigning, they struggle to offer anything that can compete with the undeniable appeal of democratic rights, higher living standards, and the rule of law.

Moldova’s election is a case study in the limits of Russian interference operations. Moscow invested considerable resources in the campaign, but was ultimately unable to overcome the country’s institutional safeguards or persuade enough Moldovan voters to turn against the ruling authorities.

The lessons from Moldova seem clear: Russian election interference operations represent a genuine and persistent threat to all democratic countries and need to be taken seriously. However, as the Moldovan experience has demonstrated, an informed electorate, resilient democratic systems, and vigilant law enforcement can blunt even large-scale Kremlin campaigns.

Moldova is now in a strong position to advance further along the path toward European integration. This is also good news for Ukraine, which would have faced the prospect of a possible new front in the war with Russia if pro-Kremlin forces had won control of the Moldovan parliament. For Moscow, meanwhile, the vote was one more indication that Russia is losing influence throughout the former Soviet Empire and is struggling to compete with the more compelling ideas of its democratic opponents.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

This might look like progress at first glance, but the reality is less encouraging. For every Belarusian prisoner released, others are being jailed. Just days after the US delegation left Minsk in September, journalist Ihar Ilyash was sentenced to four years in prison. Since June, when former Belarusian opposition leader Siarhei Tsikhanouski and others were freed thanks to American efforts, 131 new political prisoners have been locked up, representing almost exactly double the total number released during the same period. Today, around 1,300 Belarusian political prisoners remain behind bars.

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It should come as no surprise to see Lukashenka imprisoning more people. After all, recent sanctions relief has given him an obvious incentive to manufacture more hostages, which he can then trade for further concessions during future negotiations.

The United States and Europe have been down this road before. Between 2015 and 2020, some Western sanctions against Belarus were lifted and high-level visits to Minsk resumed, while Lukashenka was courted as a potential mediator in efforts to resolve Russia’s undeclared war against Ukraine. This led to a series of symbolic gestures but no structural reforms. Ultimately, hopes of building bridges with Belarus collapsed in 2020 when Lukashenka responded to nationwide pro-democracy protests by launching a brutal crackdown.

Any serious effort to improve relations between Minsk and the democratic world must be grounded in a realistic appraisal of the Lukashenka regime. In the final analysis, Lukashenka will always choose Moscow over the West because his political survival depends on it. This has become abundantly clear since 2020, when the Kremlin intervened to help the Belarusian dictator crush protests. Two years later, Belarus served as a launchpad for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Today, Belarus reportedly hosts Russian tactical nuclear weapons and plays a supporting role in Moscow’s hybrid war against the West. Even when he appears to be acting independently, Lukashenka is careful not to directly cross the Kremlin. When Russian drones recently violated Polish airspace, including some that entered Poland via Belarusian territory, Minsk warned Warsaw of the threat but carefully avoided blaming Moscow.

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Advocates of renewed engagement with Minsk argue that efforts to punish Lukashenka have failed to prevent Belarus’s slide deeper into authoritarianism. But a premature thaw would now carry enormous costs. Relaxing sanctions and reopening trade would boost state-controlled Belarusian companies and revitalize the regime while demoralizing the democratic resistance at home and abroad. Crucially, it would also provide Russia with a potential sanctions loophole in the heart of Europe.

Addressing the challenges posed by an authoritarian Belarus is vital for European security. As long the Lukashenka dictatorship endures, NATO’s eastern flank will remain unstable and Ukraine will continue to face a major threat along the country’s northern border. Other authoritarian regimes are also watching the Western approach toward Belarus closely. If Lukashenka is able to secure benefits without compromising his own position, his fellow autocrats will draw the obvious conclusions and act accordingly.

Rejecting high-level engagement with Lukashenka does not mean abandoning Belarus. Instead, the current focus should be on seeking ways to support Belarusians directly while maintaining pressure on the regime. This could involve greater support for Belarusian civil society and independent journalism in exile, along with cultural and educational outreach that strengthens links between Belarusians and the wider European community. More scholarships should be made available, while access to visas and professional opportunities could also be significantly enhanced.

Rewarding Lukashenka without requiring any meaningful change in Belarus is not pragmatism. It is appeasement. This kind of short-term thinking will only serve to further entrench the current dictatorship. Instead, the message to Minsk must be one of Western unity and resolve, with a commitment to maintaining sanctions pressure on the regime while investing in a better future for ordinary Belarusians. Ultimately, Western policy toward Lukashenka must be shaped by recognition that only a democratic Belarus can bring lasting stability to the wider region.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Is a new era of Turkey-Syria economic engagement on the horizon?

Ömer Özkizilcik and Levent Kemal — Wed, 24 Sep 2025 13:45:12 +0000

In the years before Syria’s civil war, Ankara and Damascus cultivated an unprecedented level of political and economic cooperation, facilitating a surge in trade that saw Turkish exports to Syria peak at almost $1.7 billion, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. The Syrian conflict that launched in 2011 initially shattered those gains, but Turkey gradually rebuilt its commercial footprint, with exports reaching $2 billion in 2023, according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC).

Now, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime last year, Ankara sees an opening to elevate economic ties with Syria beyond prewar levels. For Turkey, this is not merely about trade—it is about leveraging economic integration to drive reconstruction, foster regional cooperation, and create conditions for refugee returns, while ensuring that Syria emerges as a bridge to the Arab world rather than a burden to it.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan holds a joint press conference with Syria interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Ankara on Febuary 4, 2025. (Turkish presidential press service via EYEPRESS)

On the other hand, at the joint meeting in Damascus, which was also attended by author Ömer Özkızılcık, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa emphasized the strategic importance of the Turkey-Syria-Jordan trade and supply route. The opening of this route, which was agreed upon at the tripartite summit held in Amman in recent weeks, could revive the south-north trade flow that has been disrupted for a long time due to the civil war in Syria and the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Iraq. With goods and commodities collected by the Gulf via its ports passing through this route, Syria has the potential to become a vibrant trade hub again by taking on a transit role.

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The Turkish economic rationale in Syria

In 2010, Turkey enjoyed strong political and economic relations with Syria. A landmark visa-free travel arrangement allowed citizens of both countries to cross the border using only their national identity cards. The outbreak of war, however, caused exports to collapse. Over time, as highlighted by the OEC’s trade metrics, Ankara managed to revive trade, primarily flowing to opposition-held areas under Turkish protection.

Now, Ankara’s prospects for investment and new economically attractive agreements are significant in Syria, particularly in reconstruction. Turkish construction companies are well positioned to profit, competing on a global scale only with Chinese firms. Yet, Damascus lacks the financial capital to fund major projects as it re-builds a new government and recovers from years of conflict in Syria, and Turkey itself has limited capacity to provide credits or funding given its domestic economic constraints. Recognizing this reality, Ankara seeks to enhance cooperation with Arab and European partners. For instance, Turkey along with its regional Arab partners, has pledged a total of $14 billion for infrastructure development in Syria. Arab and European states would supply financing, while Turkey contributes expertise and operational capacity—an arrangement designed to deliver benefits for all parties.

This economic rationale also aligns with Ankara’s broader geopolitical vision for Syria. Rather than creating a dependent proxy, Turkey aims for Damascus to function as an independent actor and a bridge to the Arab world. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan frames the situation with these words: “Syria is an independent country, and we are now faced with a new Syria. It is necessary to allow this Syria to design its own defense policy, its own foreign policy, and its own regional relations.” Ankara’s objective is not to shoulder Syria’s burdens alone, but to transform the country from a region of conflict into a region of cooperation.

Finally, Turkey views economic investment as a powerful tool to stabilize Syria’s transitional phase and to accelerate the return of refugees. Since December 8, nearly half a million Syrians have returned home from Turkey, illustrating the direct link Ankara sees between reconstruction, economic stability, and durable return.

Turkey’s economic footprint in Syria

Following the US and European Union decisions to lift sanctions on Syria in May 2025, Turkey has rapidly expanded its economic influence in post-Assad Syria. This expansion is evident in the surge in bilateral trade, strategic reconstruction projects, and large-scale joint ventures with Qatari and US partners.

Bilateral trade between Syria and Turkey reached $1.9 billion in the first seven months of 2025, compared with $2.6 billion for all of 2024. Turkish exports surged by 54 percent year-on-year to $2.2 billion, while Syrian imports stood at $437 million. Key exports included machinery, cement, and consumer goods, with machinery alone rising 244 percent. Turkish goods, often priced 30–40 percent lower than local products, are now dominant in Syrian markets.

Turkey and regional Arab partners have committed to allocating a total of $14 billion for infrastructure development in Syria, with a particular emphasis on the sectors of energy and transportation. In August 2025, the Kilis–Aleppo natural gas pipeline began operations, channeling Azerbaijani gas into Syria. Additionally, Turkey has committed to supplying nine-hundred megawatt (MW) of electricity by 2026. Meanwhile, a Qatar-led group that included Turkish firms committed $4 billion to rebuild Damascus International Airport.

Turkey and Syria established the Turkey–Syria Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETCO) in August 2025, along with several memorandums of understanding covering investment, governance, and administrative cooperation. Talks between Turkey and Syria for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) are underway, signaling long-term trade and investment integration.

Turkish firms such as Kalyon, Cengiz, and TAV are aggressively pursuing Syria’s $400 billion reconstruction market. DenizBank plans to expand operations, while Sun Express eyes aviation opportunities. Turkish private sector initiative Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) Turkey-Syria Business Council Chairman İbrahim Fuat Özçörekçi said that Turkey aims to increase its medium-term trade volume with Syria to $10 billion. From this perspective, the Turkish private sector sees Syria as an untapped and accessible market. Proximity, cost advantages, and historical ties give Turkey a strategic edge.

Turkey’s partnerships with Qatar and the United States in Syria

The alliance between Turkey and Qatar has played a pivotal role in the reconstruction process in Syria. The free trade agreement between Turkey and Qatar came into force at the beginning of August. This marks an advancement in the collaboration between the two countries on joint projects in Syria. Turkish–Qatari consortium, with their regional Arab partners, pledged $14 billion in urban development and funding for 200,000 jobs, while joint ventures span power generation, real estate, and infrastructure. For instance, A Qatar-led consortium, including Turkish companies, signed a $4 billion deal in August 2025 to rebuild Damascus International Airport.

In parallel with the agreement coming into force, smaller, regional Qatari companies began establishing logistics bases in southern Turkey, increasing their commercial ventures, particularly in Aleppo and its countryside.

A separate issue to be addressed is that of Turkish-US cooperation in Syria, a matter which is being facilitated by regional Arab partners. Turkey-US cooperation focuses on energy and security areas. To date, neither private nor public sources have indicated any direct economic cooperation between the United States and Turkey in Syria, apart from security mechanisms. The United States has provided technical expertise and political backing, with the US-Turkey Syria Working Group emphasizing economic stability and security.

A landmark $7 billion power generation deal was signed in May 2025 with Qatar’s UCC Holding, US-based Power International, and Turkish companies Kalyon and Cengiz. The deal covers four combined-cycle gas plants totaling four-thousand MW and a one-thousand MW solar project, expected to meet over half of Syria’s electricity demands.

The way forward

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shibani, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi and U.S. special envoy for Syria Tom Barrack stand after signing an agreement to restore normalcy in the city of Sweida, in Damascus, Syria September 16, 2025. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

As Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized at the Fourth Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April 2025, Turkey seeks to “generate peace and stability on the basis of a win-win understanding and the principle of regional ownership.” This vision of regional ownership resonates with Washington’s broader approach of encouraging partners to assume greater responsibility, a policy advanced under US President Donald Trump and echoed by several Gulf capitals. While Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have yet to embark on joint economic ventures with Turkey in Syria, both are expanding their investments there in pursuit of goals that mirror Ankara’s.

The convergence of Turkish and Gulf economic strategies in Syria presents an opportunity for Washington: it aligns regional actors behind shared objectives and reduces the burden on the United States, making it all the more important for the Trump administration to support and encourage continued regional engagement in Syria.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs analyst.

Levent Kemal is a freelance journalist, researcher and independent policy adviser based in Ankara.

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Moldova accuses Russia of election interference ahead of key vote

Aidan Stretch — Mon, 22 Sep 2025 23:10:53 +0000

Moldova is raising the alarm over escalating Russian interference as the country approaches a crucial geopolitical crossroads. On September 28, Moldova’s pro-Western government will face a parliamentary election amid widespread allegations of Kremlin cyberattacks, propaganda, and various other Russian attempts to influence the outcome of the vote. If pro-European parties lose their majority, Moldova’s Western integration could stall.

The implications of an election victory for pro-Russian forces would extend far beyond Chisinau. Moldova shares a long border with Ukraine, while the two countries are currently on a joint EU accession track. A Kremlin-friendly government in Moldova could potentially derail EU integration for both nations, while also creating a significant new security threat on Ukraine’s southwestern frontier. The coming vote is therefore an important test of Russia’s ability to reassert its influence and a potential landmark moment for the wider region.

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Allegations of Russian interference have become a routine feature of Moldovan elections in recent years. During the country’s 2024 presidential election, the Kremlin reportedly spent $217 million funding Russian proxies, representing nearly 1 percent of Moldova’s GDP. Despite these efforts, incumbent Maia Sandu narrowly defeated pro-Russian candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo.

Russia is now accused of escalating its interference operations, with Moldovan President Sandu warning recently of an “unprecedented” Kremlin campaign that includes party financing, cyberattacks, and disinformation. These efforts reportedly expand beyond Moldova itself and are targeting the Moldovan diaspora, which played a key role in Sandu’s 2024 election win.

Moscow’s main goal is to boost support for pro-Russian parties including Stoianoglo’s Alternative Bloc and the Socialist-leaning Patriotic Bloc. There are also claims that the Kremlin’s plans extend beyond the ballot box. The Moldovan authorities reportedly detained dozens of suspects on Monday as part of an ongoing probe into an alleged Russian-backed plot to destabilize the country around this weekend’s pivotal parliamentary election.

Recent election forecasts position Sandu’s PAS party in first place but without sufficient support to govern alone. PAS is expected to receive around 25 percent of the vote, which would be enough to deliver a plurality but not an outright majority of seats. The most likely scenario at this stage of the campaign may be a coalition government led by PAS and featuring one or more of the pro-Russian parties. This would almost certainly undermine Moldova’s European integration.

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Kyiv will be watching the Moldovan vote closely. Ukraine’s 1,222 kilometer border with Moldova has been quiet since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago. However, this tranquility cannot be taken for granted. Moldova is home to Transnistria, a Kremlin-backed breakaway region that currently hosts around 1,500 Russian soldiers along with large supplies of Soviet-era military equipment.

According to Moldovan intelligence assessments, Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to reinforce Transnistria by sending an additional 10,000 troops. If a more Moscow-friendly government takes power in Moldova, this may become feasible. Ukraine would then be forced to divert precious military resources from other fronts to counter the mounting Russian threat coming from across the Moldovan border. In particular, a reinforced Russian troop presence in Transnistria would directly threaten nearby Odesa, Ukraine’s main port city and the country’s maritime lifeline to global markets.

The coming vote could also shape the European aspirations of Moldova and Ukraine. Both countries have been granted EU candidate status in recent years. Officials in Brussels have made clear that the two bids are linked and will be reluctant to advance one country without the other. A pro-Russian victory in Chisinau could therefore undermine Kyiv’s momentum while placing Moldovan EU ambitions in doubt. Moldova’s pro-Western politicians have stressed this potential outcome if they lose control of parliament.

For Russia, the Moldovan vote is an opportunity to push back against Western influence in the former Soviet Empire and demonstrate that the invasion of Ukraine has not deprived Moscow of its ability to dominate the region. At present, Putin is confronted with a mixed picture. Georgia’s Kremlin-friendly government has effectively stalled the country’s EU integration, while nearby Armenia has recently began the EU accession process.

While Russia’s objectives in Moldova appear obvious, there is less clarity regarding the Western position. In late 2024, Brussels committed nearly $2 billion in aid to bolster Moldova’s economic security and thwart Russian influence. This year, however, the United States has shuttered offices charged with combating Russian disinformation, while also slashing funding for democracy assistance programs in Eastern Europe.

This week’s Moldovan parliamentary election is part of the escalating confrontation between Russia and the West. A pro-Kremlin victory could significantly impact the war in Ukraine and undermine EU integration momentum in both Chisinau and Kyiv. Amid growing signs of disunity between Brussels and Washington, Putin may sense that he currently has a window of opportunity to secure a meaningful success in a country that is small in size but strategically important for the wider region.

Aidan Stretch is a freelance journalist living in Ukraine.

This issue brief is part of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “The future of democracy assistance” series, which analyzes the many complex challenges to democracy around the world and highlights actionable policies that promote democratic governance.

Introduction: A region undergoing transformation

Since the third wave of democratization—the global surge of democratic transitions beginning in the mid-1970s—Europe has often been regarded as a leader in liberal democracy. In its 2024 Democracy Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks Western Europe as the highest-scoring region worldwide, with a regional average of 8.38—making it the only territory to record a net improvement in democratic performance during the latest cycle. However, this snapshot only captures part of Europe’s democratic environment and can be misleading, given the complex challenges confronting other European subregions.

Over the past fifteen years, Europe has faced a “polycrisis”—including the eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine war—all of which have strained democratic institutions and weakened public cohesion.

Europe faces two primary authoritarian adversaries: Russia, which employs election interference, military aggression, and other forms of destabilization, and China, which wields influence through commercial trade deals, loans, and strategic alliances. Populism, polarization, and the erosion of public consensus on defending Ukraine further undermine democratic safeguards against authoritarian trends in Central and Eastern Europe. Election manipulation, economic coercion, and disinformation campaigns intensify this democratic backsliding. Without increased US support, the integrity of elections and the peaceful transfer of power are at risk, threatening the security and sovereignty of NATO and the European Union (EU).

The need for a revitalized, regionalized US
democracy assistance approach

Given these threats, US democracy assistance remains essential for Western security—but it must evolve. It should reflect regional dynamics and address both internal and external pressures, while also going beyond military force to build pathways for multilateral donors, private sector actors, and civil society networks to complement efforts when the United States can only provide limited support. The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), European Union institutions, transatlantic alliances, and independent media donors will be vital in safeguarding electoral integrity and civil society protections in countries where US influence is limited.

In Eastern Europe, this means combining military aid with soft-power tools, such as electoral assistance, rule of law measures, and civic education support. In Central Europe, these same priorities are crucial for ensuring free and fair elections, safeguarding political competition, and protecting voters.

A revitalized, context-specific plan for democracy assistance is necessary to protect US interests and reinforce European democratic security. Such a plan must prioritize three pillars: people, the rule of law, and political processes. These pillars encompass key objectives such as judicial independence, protection of civil society and journalists, election integrity, and other critical mechanisms for democratic growth.

Supporting democratic development abroad strengthens US security, prosperity, and influence, while also bolstering market diversification, NATO stability, and the United States’ status as a global power. To undervalue this soft-power tool is to risk long-term political instability, violence, and economic disparity for both the United States and its European allies.

The fight for democracy and sovereignty in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

Eastern Europe remains a primary focus of Russia’s military aggression. Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has strained regional resources, distorted democratic processes, and deepened divisions between pro-European and pro-Kremlin leaders. Amidst its violent imperialist policies, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine applied for EU candidacy in early 2022; the EU granted Moldova and Ukraine candidate status that June—but deferred Georgia’s status transition until December 2023—pending democracy-focused reforms.

Ukraine

Ukraine’s military successes against Russia illustrate the connection between democracy and sovereignty. Western donors have provided resources to improve Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts, judicial reforms, municipal support, and public transparency. This assistance has enabled Ukraine to significantly bolster its countermeasures against Russian hybrid tactics, including disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and direct military action.

Ukraine was granted EU candidate status in June 2022 and has continued implementing policies for future integration with the support of the €50 billion Ukraine Facility (2024-2027). While a presidential election remains contingent upon a negotiated settlement of the war, the nation’s ongoing transparency and anti-corruption policies are sustained by both leadership and public support, enabling consensus for sovereignty and democracy.

Ukraine’s alignment with Europe is also reflected in public opinion. As of 2025, 54 percent of European citizens polled support providing arms to Ukraine. Europeans generally continue to favor increased military assistance. However, public support for Ukraine has declined because of war fatigue, inconsistent US policy, disinformation, and nationalist positions on foreign aid and migration. It is therefore in the United States’ interest to provide consistent support for Ukraine while also encouraging increased European contributions. Doing so will help ensure that Ukraine’s sovereignty and democratic institutions are sustained while reducing Europe’s dependence on US support and strengthening prospects for long-term assistance.

Moldova

Moldova remains one of Russia’s top destabilization targets, vulnerable to both military escalation and hybrid threats. Democratic backsliding is largely driven by economic insecurity and weakened institutional trust. According to a recent Eurobarometer poll, 46 percent of Moldovans identify inflation and the cost of living as their top concern, and 63 percent say they do not trust the national government. Such vulnerabilities are routinely exploited by Russia through disinformation and vote manipulation.

Moldova’s 2024 presidential election highlighted the intersection of Russian influence and domestic corruption. Moldovan authorities allege that approximately $39 million was transferred from Russia by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor into thousands of local accounts to fund vote-buying, disinformation campaigns, and bribery of public officials. Despite these efforts, the election showed meaningful progress; election monitoring by the International Republican Institute (IRI) reported voter turnout reaching 1.7 million–a 10 percent increase from 2020. This trend coincided with improvements in voter mobilization, transparency, and polling oversight, demonstrating the potential for success through the collaboration of US democracy assistance, national governments, and civil society.

Moldova’s EU-oriented government has been instrumental in advancing its sovereignty and development as an EU candidate. However, with the fall 2025 parliamentary elections approaching, Russia is escalating efforts to empower oligarchic forces and polarize voters using economic pressures and disinformation campaigns. This situation requires sustained US democracy assistance—particularly in voter education, anti-corruption monitoring, and political party development.

Georgia

Georgia’s EU candidacy was delayed due to signs of democratic regression; the Georgian Dream party has since escalated these trends by moving closer to Moscow—weaponizing the Kremlin’s influence through energy dependence and economic ties as well as by using domestic tools for elite capture and political repression. Russia currently occupies 25 percent of Georgian territory, and its hybrid interference tactics increasingly undermine Georgia’s sovereignty and European Union integration.

The 2024 elections reflected this shift, marked by voter intimidation, regulatory flaws, and a misuse of state resources that disadvantaged opposition parties. These systemic flaws reinforce state capture and erode trust in democratic institutions. Recent IRI polling found that 54 percent of Georgians believe the country is on the wrong track, alongside a steady decline in the public’s belief that ordinary citizens can influence political decisions.

While public disillusionment with the political system is growing, strong support for EU integration persists: approximately two-thirds of Georgians continue to support EU membership, even at the cost of cutting trade ties with Russia. However, this pro-democracy sentiment is increasingly at odds with the government’s efforts to restrict foreign-backed civic engagement. In May 2024, the Georgian Dream party passed a Kremlin-inspired “foreign agents” law, targeting NGOs and media outlets that receive foreign funding. The law labels these groups as entities that serve foreign interests, effectively criminalizing civil-society activity and directly undermining US and EU democracy assistance efforts.

This deliberate restriction of civic space underscores the urgent need for sustained US engagement. To remain effective, democracy assistance must adapt by emphasizing election monitoring, targeted civil society protection, and diplomatic pressure to revoke authoritarian legislation. Applying pressure on Georgia’s institutions while empowering civil society groups is not only an opportunity to support a willing, pro-Western society, but also essential to securing Europe’s eastern frontier.

Competing values and the question of European unity—Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland

Central Europe is increasingly vulnerable to democratic erosion, driven by both internal fragmentation and escalating Russian interference. The Kremlin has refined its soft-power strategies, targeting the region’s political institutions, public trust, and national cohesion through disinformation and narrative manipulation.

Poland

Poland’s democratic growth showcases the balance between security and democracy. While it is a member of the EU and NATO, along with a firm supporter of Ukrainian sovereignty, it has struggled to maintain protection for its independent media, electoral processes, and judiciary. The re-election of the Law and Justice Party (PiS), a right-wing nationalist party, marked a further prioritization of military spending and conservative migration policies. In the 2025 Eurobarometer polls, only 7 percent of participants stated that they considered threats to democracy as a priority for Poland, while 36 percent said rising prices, inflation, and the cost of living should be a top priority, and 26 percent cited security and defense as a top priority.

In the 2025 presidential election, Russia deployed “Operation Doppelgänger,” which involved more than ten thousand coordinated social media bot accounts designed to heighten fears regarding migration and security. Furthermore, Russian-influenced media outlets prioritized pro-Russian sentiment, such as that the war represented President Vladimir Putin’s ability to lead and serve as a strong politician. While this interference did not impact Poland’s election as drastically as Moldova or Georgia, Poland’s unity is vital for EU stability. A Eurosceptic Poland is a case that must be monitored and prioritized in democracy assistance efforts, especially amidst falling trust in its national government and a lack of investment in democracy programs.

Hungary

Hungary has disrupted EU decision-making throughout the Russia-Ukraine war. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—in power since 2010 and known for his nationalist and Kremlin-friendly policies—has institutionalized democratic backsliding, turning Hungary into the EU’s most overtly pro-Russian member state. His administration continues to suppress judicial independence, weaken checks on executive power, and suppress civil society. Orbán has fostered close ties with the Kremlin, echoing Russian anti-liberal narratives and openly challenging EU consensus on sanctions and Ukraine’s aid. Hungary now serves as a platform for Moscow’s ideological influence, undermining the EU’s decision-making process from within.

While Hungary’s government isolates itself from the EU, citizens continue to support EU alignment. In the most recent Eurobarometer polls, 69 percent of participants expressed attachment to the EU, and 81 percent expressed attachment to Europe. These pro-European sentiments are further reflected in public views towards Ukraine: 73 percent agree with the EU’s decision to welcome refugees and asylum seekers displaced by the Russia-Ukraine war, and 63 percent support humanitarian and financial assistance to Ukraine.

While democratic growth is extremely limited due to policies against NGOs and civil society rights, it is necessary to maintain education and political party empowerment to counteract anti-Europe narratives, which indirectly taint information in Poland, Slovakia, Georgia, and other vulnerable democracies. Recent European Parliament elections resulted in Fidesz, Orbán’s ruling party, recording its worst performance to date, marked by a shift towards the centrist and pro-European opposition movement Tisza. US democracy assistance must prioritize political parties such as Tisza and related mobilization efforts to prepare for the 2026 Hungarian National Parliament elections, which will both determine Hungary’s future role in the EU and its alignment with Russia.

Romania

Romania has experienced heightened Russian pressures due to instability from the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war. Both have weakened public opinion and eroded trust in government institutions and independent media. Since 2023, Russian information campaigns have targeted economic insecurity—which 40 percent of survey participants identified as Romania’s top policy issue—and leveraged the country’s anti-colonialist history to portray the West as a colonizer. As early as 2023, these narratives entered presidential campaigns and were amplified by Hungary and Poland. Furthermore, such messaging has encouraged the idea of a potential territorial acquisition in Ukraine if it were defeated. Similar external propaganda efforts are underway in Hungary and Poland.

Russian-backed cyber campaigns interfered in the 2024 elections, amplifying support for pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu. Sophisticated disinformation tactics polarized the electorate and eroded public confidence in democratic institutions. Romania’s earlier delay to sanction Russia and support Ukraine weakened regional solidarity. However, the recent election of centrist reformer Nicușor Dan signals an enduring commitment among Romanian voters to EU values and Western alignment that must be supported by the US and its European allies.

Slovakia

Slovakia, also a member of the EU, has historically maintained steady democratic growth. Recently, however, it has ceded to Russia’s influence under Prime Minister Robert Fico. Re-elected on a populist, anti-Ukraine platform, Fico has aligned with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in rejecting EU foreign-policy coordination. His government has weakened independent institutions, pressured journalists, and used state mechanisms to consolidate power. Fico’s alignment with Moscow’s authoritarian practices—including efforts to diminish judicial independence and press freedom—undermines both EU governance standards and NATO’s strategic posture on its eastern frontier.

While Slovakia’s citizens remain united in their support of the EU and continued security support cooperation against Russia, internal democratic backsliding makes meaningful action increasingly difficult. In Eurobarometer surveys, 65 percent of Slovak participants expressed distrust in the national government. Furthermore, although rising prices, inflation, and the cost of living remain the top domestic concerns—as seen amongst other nations in the region—Slovaks show a stronger desire for peace and stability than for greater economic opportunities.

Slovakia is extremely vulnerable to external influence and Russian interference. As polls show, citizens feel that the nation’s security and the continued stability of the EU are in jeopardy. Prioritizing public empowerment for future elections and maintaining the separation of powers will be critical to prevent further democratic decay.

The cases of Eastern and Central Europe highlight the evolving and region-specific threats to democracy across EU and non-EU nations. From external manipulation to internal erosion, each country faces unique challenges shaped by historical legacies, political elites, public sentiment, and geopolitical positioning. However, a common trend persists: democratic backsliding is not only a domestic governance issue but also a regional security concern that directly impacts the EU and NATO. To address these multidimensional threats, US democracy assistance must evolve into a proactive, structured approach that stabilizes democratic institutions before global crises escalate. The following three-pillar strategy—centered on people, the rule of law, and political processes—provides a long-term framework for sustained political engagement and targeted government reform.

A revitalized approach to democracy assistance

US democracy assistance should embrace three pillars: people, the rule of law, and political processes. These pillars can be broken down into thematic priorities—anti-corruption measures, protection of independent media, and strengthening institutional integrity—all of which increase national capacity for democratic reform and resilience.

Fostering people-centered strategies

Democracy can only be sustained with an informed, engaged, and mobilized citizenry. In the face of Moscow’s interference—which exploits economic instability and global propaganda networks—incorporating people-focused objectives is vital to strengthening the EU, NATO, and Europe as a whole.

Application examples

In Georgia, this strategy would involve expanding legal protections and resources for civil society organizations. Such measures would counteract increasingly repressive policies, including the foreign agents law, and reinforce governance accountability mechanisms. Expanded trade cooperation between the US and Georgia may further leverage diplomatic relations to incentivize greater Western alignment and reduce Russian influence and Chinese economic expansion

Moldova’s economic struggles present opportunities for deeper collaboration between civil society and democratic institutions. US democracy assistance should support citizen mobilization through civic training initiatives, structured government dialogue, and job creation programs, while also enhancing election monitoring, mobilization efforts, and public trust. Prioritizing civic education in low-income areas will help reduce susceptibility to economic coercion in future elections.

In Hungary and Slovakia, the current political climate demands continued support for opposition parties and grassroots media outlets to prepare for upcoming elections. Fidesz’s underwhelming performance in recent EU elections signals an opening for opposition gains, yet youth disengagement and state-controlled media capture under Orbán and Fico make preserving democratic processes increasingly challenging.

Educating and empowering citizens to participate in political processes and democratic initiatives not only strengthens civic engagement but also builds public trust in governance. However, these efforts can succeed only if legal systems remain independent and impartial, ensuring that civic efforts are protected amidst political dysfunctions. Accordingly, US assistance must focus on bolstering the rule of law to institutionalize democratic norms and ensure accountability.

Supporting the rule of law

Legal institutions are often the first to be dismantled in times of democratic backsliding or conflict. To prevent state capture and the enactment of illiberal laws, the United States must support transparent and independent judicial systems.

Application examples

Ukraine has prioritized government accountability and anti-corruption measures throughout the war. As the United States provides a large amount of Ukraine’s defense assistance, it may be more feasible to further leverage EU financial contributions to expand legal counsel training, strengthen judicial independence, and enhance judicial-vetting programs. Collaboration in this pillar could pair EU funding with US expertise, drawing on resources of the American Bar Association and other professional legal organizations.

Slovakia, Romania, and Moldova are experiencing heightened political vulnerability within their party systems, underscoring the need for judicial independence to safeguard the separation of powers. Comparable to reforms in Ukraine, this would involve legal training for reform-minded judges, prosecutors, and opposition lawmakers. In Moldova and Romania, strengthening the rule of law is essential to prevent oligarchic re-entrenchment in future election results and executive transitions. In Slovakia, such initiatives would counter expanded executive control and complement civil society efforts to monitor corruption and advocate for judicial independence.

Bolstering the rule of law ensures that election outcomes reflect the will of the people and uphold democratic integrity. However, to sustain electoral contestation and fairness, the United States must also invest in protecting democratic processes.

Safeguarding political processes

Democratic political processes involve free, fair, and competitive elections, supported by robust pluralism. To support future electoral integrity, the risks of manipulation and vote-rigging must be minimized through increased monitoring, civic mobilization, and independent media engagement.

Application examples

The upcoming parliamentary elections in Moldova and local elections in Georgia will be decisive for democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe. The IRI’s work in Moldova—from national polling and electoral monitoring to voter support—was successful in counteracting Russia’s vote-buying campaigns. Continued investment in coalition building, electoral risk assessment, and fieldwork in both countries will ensure that the people’s voices are truly heard and accurately represented in their political systems. Moldova’s upcoming parliamentary elections will be especially vulnerable to interference from Moscow-backed actors seeking to restore control through their previous oligarchic networks.

Romania and Poland require similar assistance to maintain electoral integrity. To maintain pro-European and pro-EU majorities, the United States should expand resources for local, independent media organizations to counter Russian disinformation operations—such as Operation Doppelgänger—and to raise public awareness of foreign propaganda tactics.

Strategic implications for the United States

A majority of countries in Eastern and Central Europe will hold national elections within the next two years. US democracy assistance must play an active role in supporting electoral integrity through monitoring, mobilization, and civic education. These efforts should be expansive and inclusive, with particular attention to diaspora communities and rural populations who are more vulnerable to disinformation and disenfranchisement. Without free and fair elections—followed by peaceful, democratic transfers of power—states will remain vulnerable to democratic backsliding, Russian influence, and anti-European and anti-Western narratives

A three-pillar strategy—centered on people, the rule of law, and political processes—provides a pragmatic and effective framework for revitalizing US democracy assistance across Eastern and Central Europe. By investing in democratic resilience, the United States strengthens civic institutions, accountable governance, and electoral credibility, while reinforcing its global leadership at a time of intensifying authoritarian threats. These efforts directly serve US strategic interests by bolstering transatlantic security, expanding economic partnerships, and countering both Russian aggression and China’s growing influence. The EU remains central to the West’s collective security, and sustained US engagement is essential to preserve the global democratic order and shape the future of international cooperation.

about the authors

Stephen Nix is the senior director for Europe and Eurasia at the International Republican Institute.

Megan Tamisiea is a researcher with an M.A. in Democracy and Governance from Georgetown University.

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The economic roots of Nepal’s uprising—and what it means for the region

Rudabeh Shahid, Nischal Dhungel, and Shakthi De Silva — Fri, 19 Sep 2025 19:11:10 +0000

Last week, Nepal became the third South Asian country in three years to see its government collapse under the weight of mass protests. On September 8, after the government banned twenty-six social media platforms, young Nepalis poured into Kathmandu’s streets, furious at what they saw as an attempt to silence criticism. The protests escalated, leaving more than seventy people dead and causing hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of damage. Analysts have rushed to dissect the political intrigue behind the resignation of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and the appointment of former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as interim leader.

But focusing only on the political aspects of these crises misses the bigger picture: economic despair fueled this uprising, just as it did in Bangladesh in 2024 and Sri Lanka in 2022. Across these three South Asian countries, shaky economies, undermined by corruption, unemployment, remittance dependence, and policy missteps, have become the true fault lines of political instability.

This pattern suggests a region-wide crisis of governance linked to economic precarity. In Nepal, over 60 percent of the population is under thirty, and youth unemployment exceeds 20 percent. In Bangladesh, inflation surged to double digits while billions of dollars were allegedly siphoned abroad. In Sri Lanka, foreign reserves dropped to near zero, leaving the state unable to pay for basic imports. These are not just abstract statistics but economic realities that cut into the daily survival of ordinary people—rising food prices, queues for fuel, stagnant wages, and lost jobs. No political settlement, however carefully negotiated, can hold for long without addressing these economic grievances.

From macro crises to daily struggles

In all three countries, citizens reached a breaking point because economic conditions collapsed, both at the national and household levels. Sri Lanka provides the most dramatic example. Years of reliance on foreign borrowing and “white elephant” infrastructure projects—ports, airports, and highways that generated little revenue—left the country deeply indebted. In 2019, newly elected President Gotabaya Rajapaksa slashed taxes, costing the state $1.4 billion annually in lost revenue. When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, the tourism sector, which had contributed nearly 12 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), collapsed. Foreign exchange reserves dwindled, fuel and medicine imports stalled, and inflation spiked above 69 percent in 2022. An abrupt ban on chemical fertilizers shrank harvests by up to 40 percent, leaving farmers destitute. For ordinary Sri Lankans, this meant days without power, hours-long queues for petrol, and an inability to afford staple foods. Their frustration crystallized in the Aragalaya (Sinhala for “the struggle”) protests, which ultimately chased the Rajapaksas from power.

Bangladesh’s crisis unfolded differently but had similar roots. For years, the country celebrated its status as one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, powered by the ready-made garment sector (more than 80 percent of its exports) and remittances from overseas workers (around 7 percent of GDP). Yet by 2023–24, the sheen of growth had faded. Inflation reached 9 percent, unemployment persisted, and allegations of corruption exploded. Reports accused elites of laundering billions of dollars out of the country, even as millions struggled with the soaring cost of rice, onions, and cooking oil. Public discontent mounted as the government cracked down on dissent under draconian digital security laws. Student activists, long a significant part of Bangladesh’s political history, mobilized mass demonstrations. The military’s withdrawal of support from Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government in August 2024 sealed her fate, pushing her into exile.

Nepal’s uprising this month revealed a different kind of vulnerability: the fragility of a remittance-driven economy. Remittances contribute more than a quarter of Nepal’s GDP, masking the weakness of domestic job creation. Remittance dependence leaves Nepal and other South Asian countries uniquely vulnerable to external shocks; any downturn in Gulf economies or tightening of labor migration policies directly translates into lost income for many households. High youth unemployment and underemployment in the informal sector have left recent graduates disillusioned, as a weak education system, poor vocational training, and ineffective public employment services have left them mismatched to labor market needs. The government’s inability to diversify beyond remittances and tourism meant that when political instability hit, the economic fallout was catastrophic. Protests and riots have inflicted unprecedented economic damage, with losses worth an estimated at $22.5 billion—nearly half of Nepal’s GDP. The tourism sector, which should have been thriving during the festive season, was devastated as cancellations poured in. Investor confidence evaporated, and national growth projections are expected to fall below 1 percent. For Nepalis, this meant not just fewer jobs but also a sense that their future had been stolen.

From economic grievances to political collapse

What began as anger over inflation, joblessness, and shortages of food and goods became full-blown political crises because entrenched elites proved unable—or unwilling—to respond. In Sri Lanka, the Rajapaksa family had dominated politics since 2005, enriching themselves and their allies while hollowing out state institutions. Their failure to manage the crisis forced citizens from all walks of life into the streets—farmers, students, professionals, and trade unionists. In Bangladesh, Hasina had been in power since 2009, centralizing authority and silencing opposition. But once the economic base of her legitimacy cracked, protests led by Gen Zs spiraled into a nationwide revolt. Three parties rotated in and out of power in Nepal for over a decade without delivering jobs or stability. When Oli attempted to muzzle criticism by banning social media, he miscalculated: instead of silencing dissent, the ban fueled it. Like in Bangladesh, Gen Zs hit the streets of Kathmandu and other major cities in Nepal.

Gen Z and social media were crucial catalysts for mass protests in all three cases. In Sri Lanka, young activists transformed Colombo’s Galle Face Green into GotaGoGama, a protest commune complete with libraries, art exhibitions, and community kitchens. In Bangladesh, student groups organized nationwide strikes, using social media to document repression and rally support. In Nepal, social media accounts for 80 percent of internet usage, with Instagram videos and hashtags bypassing government censorship, turning online outrage into street-level mobilization. These movements were not exclusively youth-driven—farmers, trade unions, and retirees also joined—but younger generations’ energy, creativity, and digital savvy turned them into unstoppable forces. Their tactics—flash mobs, viral hashtags, and decentralized organization—made it harder for regimes to repress them.

The economics of instability

The fall of regimes in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal has underscored a fundamental truth: political stability cannot be separated from economic security. Sri Lanka’s foreign reserves and debt repayment crisis, Bangladesh’s corruption and inflation, and Nepal’s remittance trap all led to the same result: young people forcing entrenched elites from power. Leaders who ignore inflation, unemployment, and the everyday struggles of their citizens do so at their peril. The primary sufferers of the economic downturns are South Asia’s youth population, who are no longer willing to accept corruption as the cost of politics. Once dubbed a “demographic dividend,” this generation is increasingly a double-edged sword, demanding accountability and reform.

The international implications are profound. These countries sit at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, where India and China compete for influence. Instability in Dhaka, Colombo, or Kathmandu reverberates beyond borders, shaping regional geopolitics and economic flows. For example, there were similar youth protests last month in Indonesia. For policymakers in the United States, the lesson is clear: Supporting South Asia’s stability means going beyond election monitoring and diplomatic engagement. It requires confronting the economic roots of instability—unemployment, corruption, debt dependency, and overreliance on single sectors such as remittances, garments, or tourism. The region’s political crises won’t be settled with debates in parliamentary halls; they can only be resolved by lowering the price of food, creating jobs, and ensuring the daily survival of ordinary people.

Rudabeh Shahid is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and a visiting assistant professor of government at Wesleyan University.

Nischal Dhungel is a PhD candidate in economics at the University of Utah and a nonresident fellow at the Nepal Institute for Policy Research.

Shakthi De Silva is a visiting lecturer in international relations at several universities and institutes in Sri Lanka and a policy fellow at the Centre for Law and Security Studies (CLASS).

The post The economic roots of Nepal’s uprising—and what it means for the region appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In landmark Syria elections, women still face electoral hurdles

Marie Forestier — Wed, 17 Sep 2025 19:29:26 +0000

Syrians are about to complete a new and important step of the country’s transition after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime last year: the formation of a transitional legislative assembly. The indirect electoral process is expected to be completed by the end of September.

The stakes are high because during their two-and-a-half-year renewable mandate set by the Constitutional Declaration adopted in March, the new parliament members will be tasked with passing laws that will shape the reconstruction and the new direction of the country. Therefore, it is crucial that all the components of the Syrian society are represented. According to the electoral framework, there will be “at least 20 percent of women” in the total of all the electoral committees. This provision has revived the discussion about the need for increased women’s inclusion in decision-making in Syria.

Under Assad, women made up only 10 to 12 percent of the members of parliament between 2007 and 2022, according to a report by the Syrian non-governmental organization (NGO), Musawa. Women’s participation was even lower at the local level, where they accounted for 2 percent of the members of local and municipal councils in 2011, reaching 11 to 12 percent in 2022, the organization found.

Women cast their votes in the presidential election at a polling centre in Damascus, June 3, 2014. REUTERS/Khaled al-Hariri

Since the fall of Assad, progress regarding women’s political participation has been limited. The interim government includes only one woman Minister. The Preparation Committee for the National Dialogue and the Constitutional Drafting Committee—transitional bodies tasked with completing milestones of the transition—both included two women out of seven members (30 percent). However, women accounted for approximately 20 percent to 25 percent of the participants in the National Dialogue Conference held in Damascus in February 2025, according to my conversations with organizers and participants.

Traditions and conservative social norms have hindered Syrian women’s political participation, despite their involvement in the 2011 revolution and during the war. Based on my conversations with women activists throughout Syria last spring, the requirement of joining the former governing Ba’ath Party and the fear of being associated with the corruption of the regime also deterred women from participating in politics under Assad. Therefore, the current transition offers an opportunity for women, despite the resistance of conservative parts of Syrian society and the authorities themselves.

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Yet, the complicated mechanism designed for these indirect elections does not favor women’s inclusion. The Supreme Committee for the People’s Assembly Elections, which oversees the process, appointed Election Sub-Committees in each of the sixty-two electoral districts. Only 11 percent of the appointed members of the Election Sub-Committees are women (twenty out of 179). Election sub-committees are in charge of appointing a fifty-member Electoral Body for each seat allocated to the electoral district. On election day, approximately six thousand members of the Electoral Body will elect 120 members of parliament from their ranks. There are 140 seats open for the election, but the government has decided to postpone voting in Suweida, in parts of Raqqa and Hasakeh provinces, officially because of security concerns. In reality, the government does not control these parts of the country. In addition, the President will directly appoint a third of the assembly by selecting an additional seventy members.

Research shows that women are less likely to be elected in majoritarian systems, whereas they do better in proportional representation elections. Majoritarian systems, such as the Syrian People’s Assembly indirect election system, favor the dominant groups, including notables and community leaders, who are usually men.

For this indirect election, the first challenge for women is to be selected for the Electoral Body, which will be made up of one-third of notables (overwhelmingly men) and two-thirds of professionals and academics. Then, women need to put themselves forward as candidates among their peers of the Electoral Body. Last but not least, women have to win the majority of the votes of the members of the Electoral Body.

Therefore, it is very challenging for women to become members of the new assembly, even more so for women from minority groups. While the announcement of a 20 percent quota is a positive, albeit modest, step, the electoral decree specifies that it applies to “the total of all the electoral committees” and not to each Sub-committee and to each Electoral body. In order to enhance women’s participation in decision-making, Syrian civil society organizations have launched a campaign calling for a 30 percent quota for women in each committee involved in the electoral process, as well as in the People’s Assembly.

Syrian officials have privately said, according to a trusted secondary source who spoke to me on background, that President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s appointment of one-third of the members of the assembly will present an opportunity to fill gaps once the vote is completed. But this opaque and discretionary procedure cannot be a reliable solution to counter the barriers to women’s participation.

Across the wider Arab region, women represent an average of 17.7 percent of parliament membership. Several countries, including Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, have adopted electoral quotas or reserved seats for women, ranging from 14 percent to 50 percent. For instance, in 2019, the United Arab Emirates issued a decree providing for a 50 percent electoral quota for women, and it has since reached parity in its Parliament, whereas no women were sitting in the assembly in 2006.

As the indirect electoral process has started, the Syrian authorities and civil society could take several steps to increase women’s chances in this process. First, it is crucial to inform women about the election mechanism and encourage them to ask to join the Electoral bodies. Civil society organizations are leading the awareness effort, but it is challenging for them to reach all the districts, and they should be supported. Second, when the preliminary lists of members of the Electoral bodies are published, civil society activists should advocate to increase the number of women in the final list. Third, civil activists and women’s organizations should raise awareness among members of the Electoral bodies of the need for fair representation of women in the assembly.

The task is daunting in such a short time frame, but the stakes are high. Building a political system that guarantees the representation of all, including women from all communities, and equal rights, will significantly determine the success of the transition, as inclusion is the main way to ensure a durable peace.

Marie Forestier is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. She is also currently a consultant for the European Institute of Peace and the co-director of the Syria Strategy Project.

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Europe needs a new approach to Belarus focused on practical outcomes

Valery Kavaleuski — Wed, 17 Sep 2025 18:28:22 +0000

More than five years since pro-democracy protests threatened to topple the regime of Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, relations between Belarus and the country’s European neighbors remain locked in a downward spiral that is only adding to the instability of the wider region.

When Lukashenka resorted to a brutal crackdown against protesters in 2020, the West responded with sanctions and withdrawal. The aim was to impose penalties on the Belarusian ruler and ensure his political and diplomatic isolation. Five years on, it is now abundantly clear that this has failed to prevent Belarus from sliding further into dictatorship.

Today, large numbers of Belarusian political prisoners remain behind bars amid a political climate that is more repressive than ever. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has capitalized on Lukashenka’s predicament to strengthen its grip on Belarus and involve the country in Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. Belarus is now not only a nation with a weakened civil society and undermined sovereignty that is moving further away from democracy; it has also become a threat to international security.

If Europe maintains its present policies, it is safe to assume that relations with Belarus will remain on the current trajectory. This may suit Lukashenka, who has managed to stabilize his rule and minimize the threat posed by his exiled opponents. It would certainly suit Russia, which has used the last five years to strengthen control over Belarus and weaponize the country against its European neighbors.

However, regional security would be further undermined, with broader Euro-Atlantic strategic interests also likely to suffer. This would be particularly unwelcome at a time when the democratic world already faces growing challenges from an emerging alliance of autocratic powers including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

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The Belarusian role in European security should not be underestimated. Following the watershed events of 2020, Lukashenka abandoned his earlier geopolitical balancing act and became a loyal supporter of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Belarus served as a crucial launchpad for the February 2022 full-scale invasion, and has since agreed to host Russian nuclear weapons. Moscow also uses the country as a proxy in its hybrid war against the European Union, including the weaponization of migrants along the Belarusian border with the EU.

It is important to stress that the current standoff between Belarus and Europe is complex and multifaceted, with a number of overlapping but distinct elements. These include European criticism of widespread human rights violations in Belarus and alarm over the country’s deepening military cooperation with the Kremlin. There are also broader concerns related to international migration and regional stability.

If European leaders want to make any meaningful progress on these issues, they will need to move away from the current explicitly confrontational stance and adopt an alternative approach that creates room to engage on matters of mutual interest. Sanctions will remain a necessary tool against those supporting the war in Ukraine, but this approach in general has already proven to have limited impact on Minsk. A more outcome-oriented strategy that envisages a revived diplomatic presence and pragmatic engagement would enable Europe to address its concerns while maintaining constructive pressure on the Lukashenka regime.

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The United States has recently demonstrated that it is possible to achieve progress with Belarus by focusing on a humanitarian agenda. US Special Envoy Keith Kellogg visited Minsk in June 2025 after months of preparations, resulting in the release of fourteen political prisoners. US President Donald Trump has directly discussed prisoner releases with Lukashenka, signaling a readiness to prioritize engagement over isolation in his approach to Belarus. A further US visit to Minsk in September led to the release of 52 prisoners in return for lifting sanctions on national aviation company Belavia.

An updated EU strategy toward Belarus should pursue reduced confrontation by focusing on a number of deliverables. The top priority must be saving lives by securing the release of more than 1000 political prisoners. This will require active diplomacy, measured communication, and a readiness to compromise. It will also be necessary to engage on practical matters such as finding a resolution to the migrant crisis on the Belarusian border with the EU, restoring severed air and rail transportation ties which have restricted mobility for Belarusians across Europe, and ending repressions in Belarus.

In parallel to any increased diplomatic engagement, the European Union and individual European nations could also consider expanding their involvement in social programs for Belarusians. A more people-oriented approach could help rebuild relationships by providing support for vulnerable Belarusians who have suffered as a result of cuts to foreign aid in recent years.

Security issues will inevitably be at the heart of any reset between Europe and Belarus. Lukashenka openly underscores his role as Vladimir Putin’s closest wartime ally and junior partner in Moscow’s confrontation with the West. While Europe currently has little chance of breaking up this unequal partnership, confidence-building measures could help to reduce mutual suspicions and pave the way for a more constructive dialogue addressing key security concerns.

Belarus is a strategically important European nation that no European leader can afford to ignore. The country’s descent into international isolationism and authoritarianism is a European problem that poses difficult questions for the EU in terms of border security and foreign policy credibility. Evidently, the positions adopted in 2020 have not produced the desired results. It is therefore time to consider new approaches and initiatives.

A smarter Belarus policy does not mean abandoning a critical and clear-eyed view of the country’s situation. Engagement does not equal appeasement. Instead, the goal should be an outcome-driven strategy that seeks practical and pragmatic solutions to specific problems while providing incentives for more fundamental shifts in Minsk. Ignoring Belarus or treating it as a lost cause will only amplify current geopolitical challenges while deepening the existing human rights problems in the country.

Valery Kavaleuski is head of the Euro-Atlantic Affairs Agency. He previously served as a Belarusian diplomat and as foreign relations lead to Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

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Recent events in Ukraine underscore just how wrong Putin is to question the nation’s fundamental commitment to democracy. Over several days in July, thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets in cities across the country, braving the threat of Russian missiles and drones to demonstrate against their leaders. They were not protesting wartime hardships or economic woes, though both are deeply felt. These protests were driven by a more fundamental desire to safeguard the country’s anti-corruption institutions against efforts to turn back the clock and undo the progress achieved since the Revolution of Dignity.

These recent protests were sparked by a government move to strip Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies of their independence. The Ukrainian authorities may have been attempting to use wartime exigencies to bring anti-corruption bodies under their control and prevent the possible prosecution of high-level officials. If so, this was a major miscalculation. Within hours of a parliamentary vote placing key anti-corruption institutions under the authority of the prosecutor general, Ukraine’s first major protests since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion were underway.

International stakeholders including the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, and Ukraine’s G7 partners also reacted swiftly. The EU publicly demanded the full reversal of the legislative changes, stressing that independent anti-corruption institutions are a prerequisite for Ukraine’s EU accession. To exert concrete pressure, Brussels suspended €1.5 billion in macro-financial assistance that was already in the pipeline for Ukraine.

The IMF echoed these concerns, indicating that Ukraine’s compliance with anti-corruption commitments was essential for ongoing financial support. Similarly, G7 officials issued a statement urging the Ukrainian authorities to protect the autonomy of anti-corruption bodies, warning that continued support from international partners depended on upholding the rule of law.

Bolstered by this international support, Ukraine’s civil society won the day. Zelenskyy moved quickly to reverse course, proposing new legislation that reinstated the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies. The lesson was clear: There can be no trade-offs for Ukraine when it comes to combating corruption, just as there is no room for half measures in the fight against Russia.

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Ukraine’s July 2025 protests reaffirmed a commitment to grassroots democracy that has defined the country’s post-Soviet experience. During the Revolution of Dignity, millions of Ukrainians rallied not merely to remove an unpopular president who was viewed as a surrogate of Russia, but to demand a system of government where institutions work for the public good rather than the benefit of the few. This has served as a vision for the country’s future ever since. Even now, amid the largest European invasion since World War II, Ukrainians continue to demand accountability while working to create a truly democratic society rooted in the rule of law.

Ukraine’s courage, ingenuity, and resolve in the war against Russia draw heavily from the sense of empowerment that sprang from landmark events like the Revolution of Dignity and subsequent democratic reforms such as the decentralization of power. This has helped give Ukrainians more confidence in their ability to shape their communities and their country, fostering solidarity and promoting engagement in public life.

Greater Ukrainian agency has translated into remarkable resilience on the battlefield and beyond. Local initiatives, volunteer networks, and territorial defense units have all thrived because the Ukrainian authorities ceded space for society to organize itself. When power flows from the ground up, a nation becomes so much more than the territory it defends. This has helped make Ukraine capable of fighting back against a far larger adversary.

Ukrainian society’s lack of tolerance for corruption is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the defense sector, where the stakes could not be higher. As Ukraine fights for its very existence, citizens and soldiers alike have demonstrated zero patience for anyone accused of exploiting the war for private gain. Wartime corruption scandals related to military procurement have provoked widespread outrage across the country. The public response has often been swift and unrelenting with investigations launched, resignations demanded, and reforms accelerated.

Despite the success of this summer’s protest movement, the battle to protect Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture is far from over. As Ukraine moves forward, its commitment to safeguarding the autonomy and integrity of anti-corruption organs will be tested by adversaries who are as persistent as they are resourceful. In parallel to the ongoing Russian invasion, Moscow will continue to push the message that Zelenskyy’s government is illegitimate, while also promoting perceptions of Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt.

Putin’s fear of Ukraine’s emerging democracy is the root cause of the war. Unlike Russia’s traditionally authoritarian and highly centralized system of government, Ukrainian democracy pulses with the will of the people. It is a highly dynamic and decentralized political culture that derives its strength from the grassroots level. Time and again, Ukrainians have reminded Zelenskyy and his predecessors that true power lies not at the highest levels of government in Kyiv, but with the Ukrainian people. The anti-corruption reforms of the past decade manifest this reality. They have set an example that resonates far beyond Ukraine’s borders and helps generate strong international backing for the country.

As peace negotiations continue to unfold and Ukraine’s partners seek a security formula to prevent further Russian aggression, the fight against corruption will fortify Ukrainian sovereignty. Each advance in transparency and the rule of law strengthens Ukraine’s standing, both at home and abroad, while exposing the malign intent of Russia’s disinformation. In the end, Ukraine’s freedom will not be secured solely by military victories, but also by a new social contract under which every Ukrainian knows that no one is above the law.

Matthew Murray is an Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. He is the former Chair of the Selection Commission for the Head of the US National Agency for Corruption Prevention, and former Deputy Assistant US Secretary of Commerce for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

The shift to a peacetime, bilateral security framework—at Baghdad’s request—will be an important test for both the United States and Iraq. The greatest risk is a repeat of Washington’s neglect and Baghdad’s politicization of the security forces after 2011, which paved the way for the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS) rise. A further disadvantage is that the end of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) will leave US–Iraq relations at their lowest level of security engagement since 2014, just as a new administration takes office in Baghdad after the upcoming November elections. To avoid squandering both the hard-earned defeat of ISIS and Iraq’s fragile stability, Washington and Baghdad must commit to a durable partnership in important areas, such as intelligence sharing, procurement, training, and leadership development—rather than treating the end of OIR as a pretext for a security “divorce.”

—Omar Al-Nidawi is a Middle East analyst focusing on Iraqi political, security, and energy affairs. He is currently the Director of Programs at Enabling Peace in Iraq Center (EPIC).

In the agreement between the United States and Iraq announced last year, the end of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) included a commitment to transition security cooperation under OIR to a bilateral security relationship with Iraq. This transition allows for deepening security and defense cooperation between the two countries based on mutual areas of interest, including counterterrorism, cybersecurity, border security, exercises, and information sharing, to name a few. Through more focused bilateral cooperation and collaboration, the United States will have the opportunity to bring Iraq into some aspects of US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) broader theater engagement strategy, strengthening multilateral security cooperation with some of Iraq’s neighbors against regional threats, including the continuing defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A deepening of the US-Iraqi security partnership will also contribute to better cooperation and integration between Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. ISIS remains a regional and global threat, so building a long-term partnership with Iraqi and Kurdish security forces to take on an even greater role in the continuing defeat of ISIS should remain a key focus for the foreseeable future. Finally, a deeper security partnership opens the door to even greater engagement and influence over the Iraqi government’s security sector reform process and efforts to make the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) more accountable to the state. As US troops redeploy, it should be less about how many US troops remain in the country or where they are located. Instead, the future of the partnership should be based on what areas will be its focus and how bilateral security cooperation will be conducted under the work of the Iraq-US Higher Military Commission and a more formal annual Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue.

—Alina L. Romanowski is a distinguished fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. She most recently served as the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (2022-2024) and Kuwait (2020-2022).

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2. How will the end of the OIR mission impact the US-Iraq relationship?

The end of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) is eight years overdue. The defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in 2017 accomplished two objectives: the elimination of the existential threat of the post-2000 Iraqi transition to democracy and the political system undertaking this transition, and the reconfiguration of Iraq’s military into a more confident security force that can protect the Iraqi people from a similar threat. Once these two main objectives were met, there remained no logic to keeping the wartime security infrastructure in place. From this point, the mission sent the wrong message to the Iraqis that the US military was in Iraq to stay indefinitely.

The successful negotiations and their implementation are positive steps forward. As they proceed with a new bilateral security arrangement, Iraq and the United States can maintain a credible level of deterrence to any possible domestic and external security threats to Iraq and the wider region. This simultaneously clears the way for more conducive cooperation on the bilateral relationship across a diverse range of sectors, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the US-Iraqi Strategic Framework Agreement.

The US invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, along with the nature of US foreign policy toward Iraq and the Middle East region at large, made the concept of a mutually beneficial US-Iraqi partnership very hard to present to the Iraqi people. Faithful implementation of this agreement will be very helpful in accomplishing this objective.

—Abbas Kadhim is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Previously, Kadhim led the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs until July 2025. He also previously held a senior government affairs position at the Iraqi Embassy in Washington, DC.

The wife and children of Mohannad Kamil visit their home, which was destroyed by a U.S. airstrike during the third day of the war two years ago in Baghdad, March 19, 2005. REUTERS/Faleh Kheiber RCS/JK

The end of the US-led mission against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is a significant turning point for US engagement in Iraq, providing an opportunity to reshape not only the US-Iraq security partnership but also the overall relationship with Iraq. For Iraq, the departure of US troops from federal Iraq is a reassertion of Iraqi sovereignty after more than two decades of foreign troop presence. The US military presence remains a domestic political flashpoint there, and normalizing this security partnership could reduce a source of friction. For the United States, it’s the conclusion of the first “forever war,” a military intervention that ultimately cost billions of dollars and thousands of Iraqi and American lives. This relationship remained anchored by the ongoing US military presence even as Iraq has continued to recede from the consciousness of the American public, and increasingly from American policymakers. Even as Iraq will remain important to advancing US national security interests in the Middle East, this is also a moment to create a more balanced partnership. US engagement should focus on broadening the bilateral relationship by promoting strengthened economic ties, including by promoting investment in Iraq’s still untapped energy sector. Promoting Iraq’s energy independence and prosperity will also ultimately contribute to a more stable and secure Iraq.

—Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East program. She served most recently as deputy assistant secretary for Iraq and Iran in the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, where she advised senior State Department leaders on Iraq and Iran in the aftermath of the Gaza conflict.

3. What is the legacy of the US military mission in Iraq?

The legacy of the US military mission in Iraq is one of profound paradox. While it dismantled Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, set the foundation of a new political order, and enabled the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), it also produced enduring instability, sectarian fragmentation, and a dramatic shift in regional power dynamics. For Iraqis, the consequences diverged sharply. For many Sunnis, the fall of Hussein marked the collapse of their historic political dominance, ushering in marginalization, violence, and the rise of insurgency. For the Kurds, it was closer to a liberation narrative: the US mission enabled the consolidation of the Kurdistan Regional Government, fostering relative security, political autonomy, and economic growth. Among the Shia majority, initial optimism, rooted in newfound political representation, gradually gave way to disillusionment as governance faltered, corruption spread, and sectarian violence intensified.

From a geopolitical perspective, the US mission generated outcomes often described as counterproductive. The removal of the former Iraqi dictator paved the way for Tehran to expand its influence through political, economic, and paramilitary channels across Iraq and the wider Middle East.

The intervention’s human cost has been staggering. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians were killed, millions were displaced, and the country’s infrastructure sustained catastrophic damage. Beyond physical destruction, the war disrupted social cohesion, eroded trust in state institutions, and produced a generation scarred by conflict. For many observers, these humanitarian and developmental consequences represent the most enduring and tragic dimensions of the US mission.

This ending is widely regarded as a strategic setback for US interests and its regional allies, as it shifted the regional balance of power in ways that bolstered Iran’s position while straining Washington’s alliances. Analysts frequently point to Iraq as a cautionary tale of “geostrategic overreach,” where short-term military success undermined long-term strategic stability.

—Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Saeed is the Barzani scholar-in-residence in the Department of Politics, Governance & Economics at American University’s School of International Service, where he also serves as director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace.

The second US mission in Iraq, launched in 2014, played an indispensable role in liberating Iraq from the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and helping defeat the group in Syria. Without US intervention—and given the severe limitations of Iraqi forces—the war could have dragged on for years, with the potential to further intensify and spread sectarian violence. But while the mission’s military achievements are undeniable, it also illustrates the risks of alliances of necessity: they can sow the seeds of future conflict. The irony is stark—the same factions that desperately relied on US support against ISIS now celebrate Washington’s exit as a triumph over “the occupier.” Yet with no US troops left as “hostages” inside Iraq, what these groups spin as victory could in fact free Israel’s and the United States’ hands to target them—and Iraq more broadly—in a future confrontation with Iran.

—Omar Al-Nidawi

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The legacy of the US mission in Iraq is complicated and fraught with different perspectives among both Americans and Iraqis. Bottom line, for our own strategic interests, the United States has stood by the Iraqis more than any other country and worked to bring stability to Iraq on multiple occasions. We share the tragic loss of life, the hardship of defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and the challenges of bringing good governance, rule of law, and functioning institutions after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Not all Iraqis share a positive view of the United States, but a majority understand that a strong US-Iraqi partnership, not just in security areas, is critical to Iraq’s future development and sovereignty and the region’s stability.

—Alina L. Romanowski

4. Is this a withdrawal, or a transition?

July 31, 2024 – Iraq – Field artillerymen from the New Jersey Army National Guard’s 3rd Battalion, 112th Field Artillery Regiment, 44th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, perform a live fire exercise with their counterparts from the Iraqi Division of Artillery’s 1st Brigade, in western Iraq, July 31, 2024. Credit Image: U.S. Army/ZUMA Press Wire

Whether this is a withdrawal or a transition will depend on the details. US President Donald Trump’s administration has yet to announce how Washington’s troop presence will change, including whether US troops will remain in federal Iraq, how many, and where they will be located.

The answers to these questions have direct bearing on the future of US-Iraqi security cooperation and whether the United States will continue to be a strategic military partner for the Iraqi Security Forces. Even with a reduction in the US troop presence, the United States could manage an effective transition from the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or D-ISIS Coalition, to a bilateral military relationship that retains core operational capabilities for counterterrorism cooperation. However, a more complete withdrawal of US troops and a narrowly scoped program of security cooperation would dramatically reduce US influence in Iraq and provide an opening for Iran to exploit.
—Victoria J. Taylor

5. How will the end of the OIR mission impact US security interests with respect to Iran and extremism?

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani visited the historic Al-Nuri Mosque, which dates back to the 12th century, reopened today after it was reconstructed by UNESCO under its “Revive the Spirit of Mosul” campaign, which aimed to restore the city’s monuments that were heavily damaged during the rule of the extremist Islamic State (IS). Credit: Ismael Adnan/dpa via Reuters Connect

While US participation in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) was critical to fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), it was provocative to Iran, which would prefer that Washington not be stationed, or play any role, in Iraq (or anywhere else in the Middle East). So, we find ourselves at an interesting moment. Both ISIS and Iran are down, but not out.

While ISIS’s operational capabilities in Iraq continue to decrease, its global presence will make its defeat difficult. Should a future Iraqi government adopt policies that alienate Sunni Iraqis, then you will again have conditions for the same kind of resurgence we saw in 2014. Thus, it will be in our interests to have a close enough relationship with Baghdad to encourage more inclusive policies, while also enabling cooperation to monitor and contain ISIS.

For Iran’s part, Israeli and US strikes against it have made it less attractive as a partner, which has likely played a role in its Iraqi proxy’s seeming unwillingness to engage Israel, despite their rhetoric. At the same time, it has increased Tehran’s sense of urgency regarding limiting US-Iraq relations and any US military presence. Therefore, we can expect any improvement in relations to be met with a response intended to constrain the US presence and prevent the expansion of economic and other relations critical for Iraq’s continued trajectory toward stability. Ultimately, Iraq has an interest in maintaining relations with both the United States and Iran. Doing is and will continue to be a tricky balancing act, where neither partner is likely to be happy with the outcome. But ultimately, I don’t think its interests change: defeat terrorism, avoid regional conflict, and play a stabilizing role in the region.

—C. Anthony Pfaff is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the research professor for the Military Profession and Ethic at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College in Carlisle, PA.

Much will depend on whether the United States’ and Iraq’s next government treat the post-Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) relationship with the seriousness it requires. If, as expected, the November elections produce a government more thoroughly dominated by Coordination Framework factions—with moderates like Haider al-Abadi absent—then ties will likely be tenuous at best. In that case, the loss of US “eyes and ears” in Iraq will create a more permissive environment for Iran to expand its influence and rebuild regional power projection, compensating for setbacks to Hezbollah and the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Such moves would heighten the risk of Iraq being drawn into the next regional conflagration, with major implications for Middle East stability, global energy security, and the threat of terrorism.

—Omar Al-Nidawi

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6. How will the end of the OIR mission impact US security interests in Syria?

The end of the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission would significantly weaken US security interests in Syria. OIR has been the backbone of intelligence sharing and coordinated strikes that have kept the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) contained. If the mission concludes without an alternative framework, ISIS cells in the Badia and along porous borders could regenerate, threatening regional stability and US partners.

Strategically, losing Erbil as the platform for Syrian operations after 2026 would force a shift to Kuwait, reducing proximity, agility, and credibility. The legal basis for US operations, currently tied to Iraq’s 2014 United Nations letter, is also fragile—if Baghdad revokes it, Washington would lack a clear international mandate. A Syrian request to join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS could provide a new legal foundation, sustain coalition presence, and even broaden European participation.

Beyond counterterrorism, OIR’s end would erode US leverage vis-à-vis Russia and Iran inside Syria. For the United States, maintaining a credible counter-ISIS mission is not just about defeating ISIS; it’s about preserving influence, ensuring allies’ security, and preventing a vacuum that adversaries could exploit to undermine both regional stability and Syria’s fragile transition.

—Ibrahim Al-Assil is the Syria Project lead for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Al-Assil is also a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Harvard’s Middle East Initiative at the Belfer Center.

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The end of the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission in Iraq occurs against the backdrop of the political transition in Syria, with the potential for instability in Syria to create an opening for an Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) resurgence. The US military presence in Iraq remains the core logistical platform not only for ISIS operations in Iraq, but also in Syria. While a reduction in the US military presence in federal Iraq is likely to diminish counter-ISIS capabilities there, the September 2026 deadline to end the logistical platform in Iraq for OIR’s Syria operations will create a starker security challenge should the United States choose to continue its military presence in Syria. More broadly, the US security partnership with Iraq continues to be a counterweight to Iranian influence in Iraq. The scale and scope of the future US security relationship with Iraq is also of concern to other regional partners who would like to see a stable Iraq, with the Gulf, Jordan, and Israel all closely watching the next steps.

—Victoria J. Taylor

The continuation of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq to support the counter-Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) operations in Syria until the end of 2026 will provide a key area for US-Iraq bilateral security cooperation and involvement in the regional dialogue about the direction of the new Syrian government. What happens in Syria can affect Iraq and the region’s stability. Iraq’s Prime Minister and its security forces are concerned about the security situation in Syria, including the movement of non-state actors, terrorists, and drug trafficking across the Syrian-Iraqi border. As OIR winds down, security issues across that border and in Syria will offer another critical area to strengthen bilateral cooperation.

—Alina L. Romanowski

7. How can the United States ensure that the end of the OIR mission does not result in diminished US influence?

The United States will need to stay closely engaged in building a security partnership that supports US interests in the region and shapes Iraqi decision-making. While Washington and Baghdad would like to see increased economic investments in Iraq, many issues remain contentious, including the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces’ (PMF) institutionalization, corruption, oil smuggling, Iranian influence, armed non-state actors, and terrorist groups undermining Iraq’s sovereignty. These and other issues will complicate continued US military cooperation. Without a US security partnership, prospects for additional US economic investment in Iraq will diminish considerably. The recent visit of the new Central Command Commander, Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, shortly after taking up his new position, sends a signal to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and his military leadership—as well as to the region—that an active US-Iraq security partnership and engagement remains important to the United States. Now, it’s up to the Iraqis to make that happen.

—Alina L. Romanowski

8. How have Sunni attitudes shifted on the US military presence and how does the Sunni community view the departure of US forces?

Sunni Arab attitudes toward the United States began shifting positively well before Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)—during the mission’s Surge and Awakening, when many realized that working with the United States was the best way to defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq and to check the power of Shia hardliners in Baghdad. That pragmatic view persisted through the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Today, with ISIS defeated and Iraqi politics increasingly transactional, Sunni leaders may feel less dependent on the United States as a buffer. Still, Sunni communities remain vulnerable: whether the threat is an ISIS resurgence from Syria, a regional war, or renewed sectarian conflict, they often bear very heavy costs when Iraq enters another crisis.

—Omar Al-Nidawi

9. How do the Shia political elite view the end of the OIR mission and the future of the US-Iraq partnership?

Iraqi Shia leaders view this moment with mixed feelings. On the one hand, the end of the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission serves their pro-Iran inclinations and interests. Tehran is increasingly becoming their strategic partner and protector, and their top priority is to remain in power. Iran already has clear deliverables in helping them to maintain that hold—during the post-2021 election saga, Tehran helped Shia leaders defeat the Sadrist challenge. On the other hand, they worry about losing the United States because of their reliance on Iran. It is very difficult for them to find a comfortable balance between Washington and Tehran, particularly given the shrinking room for maneuver they face as a result of the current US–Iran confrontation.

—Akeel Abbas is a DC-based academic and journalist. His research and publications deal with national and religious identities, as well as modernity and democratization in the Middle East.

10. What impact does OIR’s end have on Kurdish interests, and how will this reshape dynamics between Erbil and Baghdad?

A woman holds the flag of Kurdistan during the celebration of Nowruz Day, a festival marking the first day of spring and Persian New Year, in Akra, Iraq, March 20, 2025. REUTERS/Khalid Al-Mousily TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

The first real test of Iraq’s federal structure and the acceptance of the Kurdistan Region as a federal autonomous region will come after September 2026, when the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission will conclude. If Washington opts for a complete pullout after 2026, Kurdish interests will undoubtedly face significant setbacks. No doubt that for Iraqi Kurds, the US military presence has long served as a security umbrella against Baghdad, and a strategic guarantor of Kurdish autonomy. The absence of US forces would tilt the balance of power decisively toward Baghdad, eroding Kurdish leverage. Historically, this imbalance has had destabilizing consequences. The 2011 US withdrawal created a political vacuum in which the Shia-led government marginalized Sunni politicians, fueling grievances that culminated in the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Kurdish leaders fear a similar trajectory today, in which Baghdad could take harsher measures to curtail Kurdish autonomy and consolidate centralized authority.

The departure of OIR will therefore reshape Erbil-Baghdad dynamics by removing a key external stabilizer. For the Kurds, US forces have been more than a military presence; they have been an anchor of security, stability, and leverage. Whether the post-OIR era mirrors the post-2011 instability or instead ushers in a more pragmatic Baghdad will depend on the central government’s willingness to avoid repeating past mistakes. Will Baghdad return to authoritarian centralization that could exacerbate ethnic and sectarian divisions? Or will it enact constitutional accommodations and acknowledge that durable stability requires a respect for constitutional frameworks? The stakes extend well beyond Kurdish autonomy: the outcome will influence Iraq’s internal cohesion and the broader balance of power in the Middle East.

— Yerevan Saeed

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Georgia’s summer of repression puts US relations in doubt

Jessica De Mesa and Andrew D’Anieri — Wed, 03 Sep 2025 17:01:01 +0000

The Georgian Dream party has held power in Georgia since 2012 in large part by employing an array of authoritarian tactics, but the first seven months of 2025 may be its most repressive period yet. Led by pro-Kremlin billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgian Dream has tightened control in recent months, arresting political opponents and outlawing independent media, all while turning the country away from the United States and the European Union (EU) and toward Russia and China.

Georgian Dream declared itself the victor in last October’s parliamentary elections, despite significant evidence of voter fraud. In the weeks following the elections, thousands of Georgians took to the streets in Tbilisi and around the country in peaceful protests, braving water cannons, tear gas, and police beatings to demand new elections. The protests were given further impetus in November when party leadership announced that it would pause the country’s EU accession efforts until 2028.

Protests and democratic activism continued into spring of this year, but the crowds thinned out and their intensity waned. Georgian Dream took advantage of this superficial calm to push its most repressive initiatives forward. In June, the government’s expanded definition of a “foreign agent” went into effect, to include any individual or entity engaged in media or politics that receives money from abroad. The legislation also introduced steep criminal penalties for those charged under the law.

Georgia’s foreign agent law is based on a similar law in Russia and aims to achieve the same goal: suppress freedom of thought and expression to maintain political power. But it took Russia seven years to implement the same harsh penalties that Georgian Dream has instituted just one year after its initial foreign agent law was passed.

For the sake of Georgia’s security and prosperity, Georgian Dream needs to rethink its domestic repression and its approach to the West.

Georgia’s ruling party continued to crack down on political opposition throughout the month of June. On June 23, Georgian Dream’s media censorship intensified when parliament passed two new bills targeting freedom of speech and expression, and a third banning media coverage of court trials. These new bills make it more difficult for media to cover Georgian politics, and they threaten to turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamping body for Ivanishvili’s personal initiatives.

Just days later, the Georgian Dream government sentenced leaders of opposition parties to up to eight months in jail for refusing to testify in a parliamentary investigation into the previous government’s “alleged crimes.” These included jail terms for political opponents from different Georgian political parties on questionable charges: Nika Melia, Givi Targamadze, Giorgi Vashadze, and Zurab Japaridze. The opposition figures say the investigation itself is politically motivated. Having manipulated last fall’s election results, it appears Georgian Dream now seeks to remove its opponents from the political scene altogether.

As if to confirm the government’s pivot away from the West, in early June, the government announced that it was closing Tbilisi’s EU and NATO Information Centre, which had helped Georgian citizens better understand integration efforts with Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Georgian Dream officials have also taken the unusual approach of antagonizing the Trump administration, nominally in the hopes of improving relations with the United States. Outgoing US Ambassador to Georgia Robin Dunnigan laid out this puzzling dynamic in a July 3 interview, in which she revealed that Ivanishvili refused to meet with her. She detailed how the Georgian Dream government sent a “threatening, insulting” letter to President Donald Trump’s foreign policy team in a bizarre bid to get sanctions on Ivanishvili lifted. So blithely putting Georgia’s relations with one of the world’s great powers in jeopardy suggests Georgian Dream is not in fact acting in the interest of its people, but rather in that of Ivanishvili himself.

Clearly Georgian Dream’s actions are isolating it from the West, making better relations with the United States unlikely in the short term. Instead, it is embracing like-minded anti-Western partners. Georgia has not only mimicked Russian policies but is also strengthening economic ties with China, the United States’ top strategic competitor. Just this spring, the Georgian government signed an agreement with China to establish a deep-water port in Anaklia on the Black Sea. This project began as the “Anaklia Development Consortium” with joint US-Georgian buy-in, but the government canceled the contract in 2021 and this spring handed the development rights to a US-sanctioned Chinese company, sparking censure in the US Congress.

When Trump returned for his second term, Georgian Dream was optimistic that it could use conservative culture war issues to build a rapport with the US president, and that his administration would look past the party’s domestic repression. When this was proved wrong, the party doubled down on its pivot to China and Russia.

But mortgaging Georgia’s future to the whims of Russian military might and predatory Chinese loans holds risks for Georgian Dream’s grip on power. By pushing away Washington and Brussels, the government will have few places to turn if Moscow decides to move tanks beyond the twenty percent of Georgia it already occupies, or if the high economic and social costs of financing from Beijing begin to weigh down the economy.

For the sake of Georgia’s security and prosperity, Georgian Dream needs to rethink its domestic repression and its approach to the West. This can be done by releasing political prisoners, easing pressure on political opposition, ending the censorship and persecution of independent media, reopening EU and NATO dialogues, and demonstrating a willingness to work constructively with the United States.

Like the majority of the Georgian people, the United States and Europe do not wish to see Georgia coerced by Russian military might or led into a Chinese debt trap. But that is the future Georgian Dream is driving toward if it does not reverse course. The West can once again be a real partner for Georgia against predations from Moscow and Beijing, but only if Tbilisi takes steps soon to restore freedom of speech and political pluralism to the country.

Jessica De Mesa is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Office of Finance and Operations.

Andrew D’Anieri is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Find him on X at @andrew_danieri.

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Russia attacks Zelenskyy’s legitimacy to derail US-led Ukraine peace talks

Serhii Savelii — Thu, 28 Aug 2025 20:37:16 +0000

As US-led efforts to end the war in Ukraine continue, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has indicated that the Kremlin does not recognize the legitimacy of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and would not accept his signature on any peace deal. “When we come to a stage when you have to sign documents, we would need a very clear understanding by everybody that the person who is signing is legitimate,” Lavrov told NBC News in an August 24 interview. “And according to the Ukrainian constitution, Mr. Zelenskyy is not at the moment.”

This is not the first time Russia has expressed such doubts. Moscow has made attacking Zelenskyy’s legitimacy a centerpiece of its disinformation playbook, with Russian President Vladimir Putin also claiming earlier this year that the Ukrainian leader “has no right to sign anything” in potential peace talks.

The Kremlin’s goal is transparent. Russia seeks to fracture Ukrainian society, weaken Western support, and complicate future negotiations. But Moscow’s efforts to portray Zelenskyy as illegitimate fall apart when weighed against Ukraine’s Constitution and the country’s established political practice, along with international precedents and legal tradition.

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Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 led directly to the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, making it impossible for the country to hold scheduled presidential elections in 2024. The terms of martial law and the Ukrainian Election Code both explicitly prohibit any elections in the current wartime conditions.

A nationwide vote under bombardment is neither legal nor feasible. Millions of Ukrainians are currently displaced within Ukraine or abroad. Voter lists cannot be updated reliably. Soldiers serving in the combat zone and Ukrainian civilians who at constant risk of airstrikes cannot safely cast ballots. A wartime election would disenfranchise millions and jeopardize the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities rather than safeguarding it.

This reality is widely accepted. Ukrainian political parties, civil society, and the public agree that elections should only resume when they can be free, fair, inclusive, and safe. Polling shows that most Ukrainians oppose elections during wartime. International partners echo this consensus and reject suggestions that Zelenskyy lacks legitimacy. The European Commission has affirmed that it has “no doubts the president of Ukraine is Volodymyr Zelenskyy.”

Ukraine’s Constitution directly addresses this situation. Article 103 sets a five-year presidential term, but Article 108 clarifies that the president remains in office “until the assumption of office by the newly elected president.” Authority does not simply expire on a calendar date. Instead, it continues until a successor is duly sworn in.

Precedent supports this reading. No Ukrainian president has ever served exactly five years, with terms varying according to election and inauguration schedules. As one drafter of the 1996 Ukrainian Constitution explained in The Economist, “Zelenskyy continues in power for as long as martial law applies. There is no political or legal crisis. Full stop.”

Crucially, checks and balances remain. Every extension of martial law in Ukraine requires parliamentary approval, providing Ukrainian lawmakers with ample opportunity to raise objections. Ukraine’s Constitutional Court can also review the legality of presidential continuity if petitioned by members of parliament, the Supreme Court, or the Ombudsman. In other words, Zelenskyy’s current authority is rooted not in personal decree but in a functioning democratic system.

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Why does the Kremlin keep pushing this line? By branding Zelenskyy “unconstitutional,” Russia hopes to derail any future peace process and weaken Western unity. Unfortunately for Moscow, there are clear signs that this strategy is failing. Ukrainians overwhelmingly recognize Zelenskyy as their lawful president, while international leaders consistently affirm his legitimacy.

Far from undermining Kyiv, the Kremlin’s narrative underscores its desperation and highlights Moscow’s obvious reluctance to engage in meaningful peace talks. This approach also inadvertently draws attention to the serious legitimacy issues around Russia’s own elections, which routinely fall well short of recognized international standards.

International norms support Ukraine’s position on wartime elections. The Council of Europe has affirmed that postponing elections in exceptional situations, such as a state of war, may be necessary to preserve constitutional order and allow citizens to express their will in a safe context. History also offers precedent, with Britain postponing scheduled parliamentary elections during both world wars.

Ukraine is currently following the same logic. By upholding constitutional continuity, maintaining democratic safeguards, and preparing for the moment when elections can be held freely, the Ukrainian government is strengthening rather than weakening its legitimacy.

Zelenskyy remains president not despite the Ukrainian Constitution, but because it guarantees continuity in extraordinary times. And when peace comes, Ukraine will be ready to prove once again at the ballot box that its democracy endures. This is in stark contrast to Russia, where an illegitimate ruler has remained in office for decades due to unconstitutional charades and manipulated elections.

Serhii Savelii is an independent Ukrainian election analyst.

A history of broken promises

After Lukashenka “won” the contested vote in 2020—which sparked massive protests fueled by allegations of fraud and repression—he made statements promising constitutional changes, including the redistribution of presidential powers. He also indicated that he would not run for office again, and he pledged to pave the way for his successor, declaring that constitutional reforms would reduce presidential powers and shift the country’s political system toward a parliamentary republic. This did not happen. Notably, it was Lukashenka himself who unilaterally expanded presidential powers, eliminating the two-term limit for the president from the Belarusian constitution in 2004.

In 2022, Lukashenka attempted a “plan B”: He amended the constitution to give the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly—a body designed to gather government officials, local leaders, and selected citizens to discuss and approve key policies—broad but vaguely defined powers, while granting himself personal immunity. This would have allowed him to step down from the presidency but retain real influence behind the scenes. On paper, he could still use this mechanism, but in practice the idea appears to have been shelved.

Fast forward to the 2025 presidential election, held in January: Lukashenka once again engineered a “victory,” claiming more than 86 percent of the vote. The absurdity of the situation was perhaps best captured by a Communist Party “spoiler candidate,” Siarhei Syrankou, who campaigned under the slogan: “I’m not running against Alyaksandr Lukashenka—I’m running with him.”

The succession question

Regardless of his ever-changing declarations, one thing is certain: Lukashenka, who is seventy years old, will not stay in power forever.

There are a few possible scenarios for his succession.

A common theory is that his youngest son, Nikolai, also known as Kolya, is being groomed for leadership. From a young age, Kolya has been a constant presence at high-profile events—attending military drills, observing official meetings, and even accompanying his father in his meeting with Pope Francis in 2016. In a recent interview, Lukashenka preemptively addressed questions about dynastic succession, insisting that Kolya, who is now twenty years old, would be “offended” by any suggestion that he might take over.

Still, Kolya’s image has been carefully curated. At times, pro-government Belarusian TikTok creators portrayed him as a “crush,” while Russian media dubbed him “the crush of all the Rus,” raising questions about whether this popularity is genuine or part of a broader public relations strategy to make him appear likable and relatable.

What truly matters, however, is not whether Lukashenka wants his son to take power, but whether Kolya could withstand rivals with stronger ambitions. Lukashenka might build some infrastructure around Kolya to support a future role for his youngest son, but that does not guarantee success.

Another potential candidate is Viktar Lukashenka, the president’s eldest son. Viktar rarely draws much attention as a contender for future president, but his senior positions and experience suggest that he has political ambitions. While most public and media focus remains on Kolya, Viktar holds key roles, having served as national security advisor to the president and a member of the Security Council, as well as holding an informal supervisory position over Belarus security forces. Currently, he serves as the head of the Belarusian Olympic Committee. Though this shift might appear like a career pivot, it is far from a retirement. He continues to be engaged in security-related activities, including providing special units to the Gulf sultanates to train their law enforcement agencies and participating in certain local operations conducted under the flags of Persian Gulf countries. In addition, he oversees diplomatic and trade relations with the United Arab Emirates and other countries in the region in various roles—sometimes as an official envoy, sometimes informally. For example, he has reportedly been involved in discussions about establishing a hub for Belarusian trade in Oman.

According to BelPol, an organization of Belarusian security officers who have defected to the democratic forces, Lukashenka primarily trusts three people: his eldest two sons and his longtime fixer Viktar Sheiman. Some earlier reports suggested that he listens to his press secretary Natalia Eismont, his youngest son Kolya, and his eldest son Viktar. According to sources with knowledge of the family whom I have spoken with, Lukashenka’s middle son, Dzmitry, is the least interested in politics among his family members. And when it comes to choosing whom to rely on, Lukashenka tends to lean more toward his longtime friend Sheiman than his son Viktar, perhaps reflecting some uncertainty about Viktar’s loyalty.

These hints from insiders are not verifiable, and they should therefore be considered with a pinch of doubt. While provisional, they nonetheless may prove useful to map against the actions Lukashenka does take going forward.

If any member of the family does succeed Lukashenka, Viktar seems to be the most plausible figure to watch, given the information on hand. But if no family member steps in—or if the Lukashenka family loses its grip on power—another possibility is that Belarus’s authoritarian elite orchestrates the transition. In Mafia-style systems like that of Belarus, power doesn’t change hands through elections but through elite bargaining. In the event of an elite-driven transition, it likely won’t matter much who the new figure is—whether it’s the prime minister or someone else from the nomenklatura—as long as they serve the existing power structure.

The Russia factor

The Kremlin will be monitoring this transition carefully, which could unfold along two main trajectories.

The first trajectory is that Moscow accepts Lukashenka’s chosen successor—whether that is one of the autocrat’s sons or a newcomer from the nomenklatura. In this scenario, Russia would essentially endorse the outcome of the Belarusian regime’s internal process, as long as the successor remains loyal to the Kremlin.

The second trajectory is more radical: The Kremlin could bypass Minsk’s internal arrangements and install its own candidate—someone explicitly pro-Russian and largely disconnected from Belarusian realities. That someone would have to hold Belarusian citizenship and go through a facade of the electoral process—or perhaps a brutal takeover along the lines of the one carried out by the “little green men” in Crimea.

Discussions about “closer integration” or even potential annexation often follow such scenarios, but these are largely parallel issues. Belarus is already deeply integrated with Russia, to the point that it is often unclear whether foreign policy decisions are made independently or under Kremlin pressure. Indeed, it is unclear whether the Russian military presence in Belarus reflects Lukashenka’s own security calculations or his inability to resist Moscow’s influence.

The fact that Belarus remains a formally independent state today—and hasn’t been annexed by Russia—is less a credit to Lukashenka and more a result of Kremlin calculations. The Belarusian army wouldn’t stand a chance against Russia, and the West would likely not respond harshly to the annexation of what is already a Kremlin satellite. At this point, it is more beneficial for Moscow to keep Belarus under control but maintain the appearance of independence.

Still, despite overwhelming Russian political influence, any openly pro-Russian figure would struggle to gain traction domestically in Belarus. The Kremlin has already tested the waters. In the past, Russia has reportedly attempted to cultivate support for pro-Russian political parties in Belarus, only to quietly abandon the idea, in part because support among Belarusians simply wasn’t there. What Belarusians want, consistently and clearly, is independence and neutrality—a sentiment that has shown up again and again in public opinion polls. Surveys conducted by different institutions in the past dozen years show that while a minority (usually less than 10 percent) does favor full political integration with Russia, a strong majority of Belarusians prefers friendly relations without unification.

The exiled opposition’s chances

This brings us to the opposition in exile. Lukashenka’s 2022 constitutional amendments stipulate that only candidates who have lived continuously in Belarus for the past twenty years may run for president—a rule designed to exclude exiled politicians from the race. Yet this is not an insurmountable obstacle. Belarusians could unite around an alternative candidate, someone who champions a democratic agenda rather than the regime’s plans. That candidate might be a leader already inside the country, perhaps someone currently out of the public eye or recently released from prison, or a new figure who emerges over time. Alternatively, Belarusians could rally around a protest candidate, as happened in the 2020 election when Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya stepped in during the election in 2020, after the other leading opposition candidates of that time, including her husband, were jailed.

The Kremlin looms large over Belarus’s future

Looking ahead, the experience of 2020 offers some important lessons. During the protests, there were signals that some officials within the regime supported change. Among the defectors and those condemning the regime’s violence were diplomats resigning in protest, security and law enforcement officers, and even former Prime Minister Sergei Rumas. These are the publicly known instances, and they alone do not indicate the existence of a critical mass within the regime willing or able to negotiate. Nevertheless, they suggest that the system is not monolithic, and the opposition could potentially negotiate power-sharing arrangements or guarantees if free and fair elections were allowed.

In other words, a democratic transition might be possible through an internal process involving parts of the existing system.

However, the biggest obstacle remains Moscow. In 2020, democratic forces attempted to establish contact with the Kremlin and promised constructive cooperation if Putin withdrew support from Lukashenka. But for Moscow, a democratic government in Belarus represents an unacceptable risk and a loss of control.

Many Belarusians openly dream of celebrating Lukashenka’s departure with champagne in the streets. Yet the crucial challenge for any democratic transition will remain the same: How to deal with Russia.

Katsiaryna Shmatsina is a Eurasia fellow at Lawfare, specializing in Belarus, Russia, and international security. She is a Belarusian-trained lawyer turned political analyst with over a decade of experience in Belarusian and European think tanks, serving as a researcher and, at times, as a political consultant for the Belarusian pro-democratic forces.

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Dispatch from Syria’s Christian strongholds: A new government, a full political spectrum

Gregory Waters — Mon, 25 Aug 2025 18:58:37 +0000

On the morning of July 6, Christian parishioners in Syria’s small coastal city of Safita awoke to find death threats outside their churches. They were signed “Saraya Ansar Sunnah,” the same terrorist group that just two weeks earlier had claimed responsibility for the brutal suicide bombing of the Mar Elias Church in Damascus that killed 25 worshippers. The bombing brought the contentious state of Syria’s Christian community after the fall of Bashar al-Assad and ascendency of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former Islamist militant, to the foreground.

On the day the leaflets were found, I was in western Hama in the Christian town of Suqaylabiyah, meeting with government officials and priests. When asked about the leaflets, the head of the town’s Eastern Orthodox community, Father Dimitri, laughed, discounting them as a weak attempt by pro-Assad Alawite insurgents from the villages around Safita to capitalize on the fresh fears after the attack in Damascus.

Father Dimitri then pulled out his phone and called one of the priests in Safita whose church had been targeted.

“How is the situation, Father? What happened?” he asked.

Like Dimitri, the Safita priest quickly dismissed the leaflets as a pro-Assad trick, insisting everything remained stable within the city.

Despite this bravado, the conditions of Christian communities across the country remain varied, and the opinions of religious and community leaders deeply mixed. In May and July, I visited Christian towns across western Syria, where I heard about their concerns for the future and their relationships with neighboring Sunni and Alawite communities. Responses spanned the entire spectrum, from complete rejection to passionate support for the new government.

The Sunni Angle

Suqaylabiyah was once known for its powerful Russian-backed pro-Assad militias. But the militia leaders are now widely believed to live in Moscow, having fled the country days before Assad himself.

With the militias gone, the new religious and civilian leaders in Suqalyabiyah cooperate closely with new Damascus-appointed officials. Here, a young Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) officer, Fayez Latouf, serves as the head of the broader administrative district. Within the town itself, a long-time Christian Free Syrian Army commander, Amjad Haddad, serves as the mayor. The town’s main commercial street remains open well after midnight with young people sitting at cafes, drinking tea and alcohol.

When asked about the cultural freedoms of the town’s Christian population, one young woman explained to me that when Latouf first arrived, he considered limiting the town’s bars, but that the community simply went to him and stood their ground, demanding that he respect their culture and rights. According to both the woman and Father Dimitri, Fayez has since been extremely cooperative with the Christian social and religious leadership, fostering a safe environment in the city.

Father Dimitri believes Haddad is a significant reason for the speed with which his town accepted the new government and engaged in close cooperation with the new local authorities.

“We are lucky to have Amjad among us to explain how the Sunnis are and ease our initial fears,” he explains, citing Haddad’s more than ten years fighting alongside Sunni revolutionaries. When Haddad returned to Suqaylabiyah, he played a key trust-building role between the community and the new authorities.

Familiarity with Sunnis, or the lack thereof, appears to be an important factor in how Christians perceive the new government. In the city of Latakia, Christians and Sunnis have lived together for centuries. This historic proximity has resulted in close relationships between the two religious groups, even among otherwise deeply conservative Sunni fighters.

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Ali Hamada, for example, returned to his home in Latakia on December 8 of last year, twelve years after being exiled. He has been a long-time supporter of HTS, but upon his return, he quickly established an armed neighborhood watch group consisting of Christians and Sunnis protecting each other’s holy places during their respective holidays. In my conversation with him, Hamada is very open in his sectarian disdain of Alawites and Shia, but talks at length about the important social and religious ties between Sunnis and Christians.

One Christian activist in the city, Tony Daniel, echoes these sentiments. A political activist and ex-Assad detainee, Tony works with multi-sect civil society groups in the city and its countryside that aim to connect locals to the government and vice versa.

“Christian Syrians were a tool by the Assads,” he explains. “Most of us left Syria under the Assads, but many Christians are now afraid of this government because Assad told everyone that if Muslims take over, they will oppress you.”

This fear was a major obstacle that Tony and other activists worked on in those first weeks after December 8. He cites the new government’s quick engagement with Christian leaders across the country and their ability to ensure safe Easter celebrations as important milestones.

“The government protects us and we pray and dress how we want,” Tony says.

But, he adds, “Christians are afraid of the constitution now.”

While Tony does not believe the new government will persecute Christians, he cites the lack of democratic safeguards in the March constitutional declaration as a significant problem. “When I see and hear [al-Sharaa] talk, it is beautiful words, I trust [al-Sharaa] and most of the government, but when I see this constitution and the way some militias act it is not the same.”

Based on my visit to these areas, this lack of trust in the new government is much more pronounced in the Christian communities that are more isolated from Sunnis. The towns of Mashta Hilou and Wadi Ayoun, located just east of Safita and surrounded by Alawite villages themselves, are prime examples of this dynamic. Here, Christian priests and civil society activists are much more cautious about the new government and fear that Sunni religious figures are taking too much power.

“We get our news from social media,” explains a doctor and influential community leader in Mashta Hilou in May. “This has caused a lot of frustration within our community and the spread of false news.”

He cites a lack of clarity on new laws and an increase in petty crime, all resulting in a deepening distrust of local security officials. This animosity has only grown as the officials responsible for Mashta Hilou continue to sideline Christian civil society organizations, hardening the barriers between the government and locals.

This dynamic stands in stark contrast to Suqaylabiyah and Latakia, where local officials have engaged extensively with Christians and, as a result, have assuaged many of their fears. Without this, those in Mashta Hilou are left to draw their own conclusions.

“I see what ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham] did to Christians in Iraq,” says the doctor, “and so I make an assumption given Sharaa’s background, and the lack of implementation of his promises.” Misinformation and false claims on Facebook about new government policies rooted in Islamic law have all fueled a belief that Damascus will soon impose Sharia law upon the country.

Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa attends an interview with Reuters at the presidential palace, in Damascus, Syria, March 10, 2025. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

As one priest in Mashta Hilou puts it, “if Sharia Law is implemented, then Christians will be immediately discriminated against.” Like the doctor, the priest also cites al-Sharaa’s “history in ISIS” as a cause for concern. Al-Sharaa was originally a member of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the predecessor of ISIS, but he explicitly rejected merging his Syrian group with ISIS in 2013.

“We are more comfortable around Alawites,” the priest admits, “because even though they were raised on shabiha [Syrian term for pro-Assad thugs] behavior, they are not religious.”

The behavior of some religious extremists among the government’s rank and file fuels these concerns. Several Christians on the coast cited instances of harassment by soldiers for wearing a cross, or wounded fighters who refused to be treated by female nurses.

The head priest of Wadi Ayoun says much the same—otherwise quelled fears “renewed” after March 6.

However, the decrease in violence in the region since March and the reopening of roads to other parts of Tartous and Homs have helped reduce local fears once again.

“The government must ensure our genuine safety,” the priest says, “protect everyone’s rights and create a civil state.”

Unclear security threats

Until the June 22 attack in Damascus, these security fears were largely rooted in distrust over the new government’s militant Islamist background and the violations being committed against Alawites. These fears were generally more common in communities with poorly performing local officials or those that were isolated from other Sunnis. Even amid their hesitations and criticisms of the new government, everyone interviewed in Mashta Hilou and Wadi Ayoun in May admitted that the security situation was very good at present.

Yet, minor incidents have occurred occasionally across the country, underlying the threat posed by armed extremist Sunnis operating outside of the government. On December 18, armed men shot at a church in Hama. Five days later, a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah was burned by a foreign fighter. On February 17, a group of youth destroyed crosses in a cemetery in rural Homs. On April 6, assailants attempted to burn down a church in Damascus. On May 17, the car of a Christian family in Hama city was burned, and threatening leaflets were left in the area. On June 8, a church in Homs city was shot at.

Syrian security forces secure the area near St. Joseph Church at Bab-Sharqi neighbourhood, following the suicide bombing at the Mar Elias Church on Sunday, June 22, 2025, according to Syria’s health ministry, in Damascus, Syria, June 23, 2025. REUTERS/Firas Makdesi

But it was the June 22 terror attack in Damascus that truly shook Syria’s Christians. Even a month later, Suqaylabiyah’s Father Dimitri admitted that his congregation is only now beginning to return to Sunday services. “We have reached a very good place in this area and deal with the government and security forces easily, thanks to their engagement with our religious and civilian leaders.” Nonetheless, the Father says that the bombing caused widespread anger and fear in the town that he and other leaders are still struggling to address.

For some Christians, the Damascus bombing played no role in their opinions—they had already given up on the new government. When asked about local governance, a couple who live in a small village just outside Tartous city engaged in a multi-hour tirade against the new authorities, blaming them for everything from the lack of functioning water lines to what they perceived as an “Islamification of coastal Sunnis, citing some Sunni friends’ adoption of the hijab.

While they deny that any Christians have been harassed in their area, they are terrified that this calm will change at any moment. At the same time, their village has rejected any General Security deployment within it, and they claim that even if there were Christian security members, “they would still be instructed to harass us.”

Complex dynamics in Idlib

Perhaps the most complex Christian dynamics exist in Idlib, where the small number of Christian families remaining in six villages along the governorate’s western edge have had a complicated, evolving relationship with the new authorities. These villages were first freed from the regime in late 2012 by neighboring Free Syrian Army factions, whose leaders quickly engaged in dialogues with the local priests. Yet the situation deteriorated over the ensuing years, with criminal FSA-affiliated and Islamist gangs robbing and kidnapping locals amid regime airstrikes. In 2014, ISIS briefly captured the region from the Syrian opposition. According to one local priest, the terror group quickly put an end to the random crimes through their excessively violent punishment of thieves, but also heavily limited their religious freedoms. Crosses were not allowed to be displayed, church bells could not be rung, and women were required to wear headscarves.

None of this changed when ISIS was evicted in 2015 and Jabhat al-Nusra—the predecessor to HTS—took charge. It would not be until 2018 when the HTS-affiliated Syrian Salvation Government was formed that HTS leaders began to address these years of violations. By now, most of the people in the six villages had fled to Europe or regime-held areas, and a variety of foreign and Syrian fighters had seized most houses and lands. Al-Sharaa’s chief religious official, Sheikh Abdul Rahman Atoun, who now serves as the head of Syria’s Supreme Fatwa Council, began to personally engage with Father Hanna Jalouf, who was later named Bishop and vicar of Aleppo by the Vatican.

Years of dialogue saw the gradual return of homes and property first to those Christians who still resided in Idlib, and then to caretakers within the community for the property of those who had fled. In late 2022, Atoun finally issued a fatwa legalizing public religious practices for Christians. By this point, HTS had greatly improved security in the area, eliminating violent threats against Christians. As Jalouf told me in a meeting in Idlib that year, significant progress had been made in their inter-faith relations, with some property disputes being the only remaining issues.

By July 2025, these property disputes were still not fully resolved. Almost all homes in five of the villages have been returned, but in one village, Yacoubiyah, many homes are still occupied. Meanwhile, in the three Christian villages on the edge of the Hama plains, most of the farmland remains under the control of the Uyghur foreign fighter group Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).

As with the Christian communities elsewhere, priests and locals in these villages paint a complicated picture of their current situation.

“There is a huge difference in the amount of freedom here and other parts of Syria,” says one elderly woman in Judayda as she described their more socially oppressive environment.

“Only two foreign families remain in our village—without permission, or paying rent. They have not caused issues, but no Christian will go close to them out of fear. Last week, a woman and her husband were walking on the street without a headscarf, and someone from the [foreign] family spat in their face. It was just a family member, not a fighter.”

In Qunaya, the village’s priest emphasizes the danger these foreign fighters pose to the community.

“We don’t speak with these families occupying our houses,” he said in July. “We just work through the government, as we did before December.”

He says all the farmland in this area has been returned to the Christian families, and believes the authorities will soon return the last stolen homes. He adds that although the community has a good relationship with the officials in Idlib and Damascus, “it just takes time because they are trying to remove these people without using force.”

Despite this, both the priest and the woman from Judayda insist that the security situation in their areas is good, differentiating between the harassment from locals and the treatment of the authorities. “Here in Idlib we are very safe and don’t have these kinds of attacks targeting our churches,” they say, highlight the trust that has grown over the years between their community and HTS’s security services.

“After the attack in Damascus, we were mentally exhausted,” the woman says. “We were afraid of going to the churches, but we still went because the General Security is guarding them.”

Stuck in the middle

For some Christians, the violence that has persisted in the shadow of Assad destroyed any opportunity for their trust in the government. The March 6 insurgent uprising on the coast and the subsequent massacre of Alawite civilians by armed Sunnis and government forces shattered the cautious optimism in the brief period of relative peace following the fall of Assad.

One activist in the city of Baniyas had been optimistic for his country’s future, despite the sectarian challenges, before March 6. “No matter what, Syria is my country, I will send my children away for a better life, but I will never leave,” he said defiantly in February.

But the brutality of the March 6 massacres broke any confidence he had that Damascus could contain the sectarian violence left in Assad’s wake. “I don’t care anymore,” he said in May, “I am doing everything I can to leave this country.”

In other places, Christian leaders have taken on a mediation role, doing their best to lower tensions. In Suqaylabiyah and Latakia, for example, Christian priests and activists have begun serving as mediators for Alawites from the countryside, utilizing their close connections to local officials. In return, they try to show their Alawite neighbors that minorities can work with the new government, slowly building trust between the two sides.

One fact is clear: there is no one Syrian Christian experience. Like every Syrian community, some Christians are fearful, others optimistic, and some have lost all hope. While it is clear there is no systematic targeting of Christians by the new government at large, Damascus still has a long path towards earning the whole community’s trust.

Gregory Waters is a researcher at the Syrian Archive and an independent analyst whose research focuses on the development and reform of security institutions, local governance initiatives, and sectarian relations.

The post Dispatch from Syria’s Christian strongholds: A new government, a full political spectrum appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Alaska Summit: Trump wants a real estate deal. Putin wants an empire.

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 14 Aug 2025 20:50:02 +0000

As he prepared for this week’s meeting with Vladimir Putin in Alaska, US President Donald Trump appears to have sought inspiration from his earlier role as a New York real estate mogul. Ukraine and Russia will need to engage in “land swaps,” he said when news of the summit first broke. Since then, he has described Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine as “prime territory” while vowing to try and get some it back. “In real estate, we call it oceanfront property. That’s always the most valuable property,” he commented on August 11.

Trump’s real estate metaphors are part and parcel of his public persona and should not be taken at face value, of course. Nevertheless, his apparent belief that territorial concessions can bring peace suggests a fundamental misreading of Russia’s war aims. Trump may like to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a particularly acrimonious boundary dispute, but Putin most certainly does not share this view.

The Kremlin dictator isn’t fighting for mere land in Ukraine. He is fighting to extinguish Ukrainian independence altogether. Putin regards this as a decisive step toward reversing the verdict of 1991, reviving the Russian Empire, and establishing a new world order. Anyone who wishes to end the war in Ukraine must first reckon with the sheer scale of these imperial ambitions.

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Trump is far from alone in failing to grasp why Putin went to war. Even now, more than three and a half years since the outbreak of hostilities, many in the West still struggle to appreciate the dominant role played by historical grievances and unadulterated imperialism. In order to understand Moscow’s true motivations, it is vital to detach oneself from the Western perspective and view the invasion through the prism of modern Russian history.

For Putin and millions of his fellow Russians, today’s war is inextricably linked to the humiliations of the Soviet collapse. This fact is often lost on Western audiences, who are inclined to assume that most Russians welcomed the demise of the totalitarian USSR. In reality, the breakup of the Soviet Union was a immensely traumatic experience for the vast majority of the Russian population, who saw their country reduced almost overnight from global superpower to banana republic. Between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the Russian Empire in its Soviet form lost around one-third of its territory and almost two-thirds of its population, with the remainder plunged into desperate poverty. Rarely in history has an empire imploded so suddenly or completely.

As a KGB officer in East Germany, Putin had a front row seat for the early stages of this collapse. He was in Dresden when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, and would bitterly recall the imperial paralysis he encountered as Soviet power began to unravel. “Moscow is silent,” the young Putin was told as he sought instruction during those tumultuous days. This disaster has haunted the Russian ruler ever since, shaping his worldview and making him determined to ensure that Moscow would never be silent again.

The trauma of the Soviet collapse helps to explain Putin’s Ukraine obsession. Like many of his compatriots, Putin has always regarded Ukraine as part of Russia’s historical heartlands and has never truly accepted Ukrainian independence. This did not present any real problems during the early years of the post-Soviet era, as the newly independent Ukraine remained firmly locked within the Kremlin orbit. However, once Ukraine’s own nation-building journey began to gain momentum in the 2000s, the country’s efforts to embrace a democratic European identity placed it on a direct collision course with Putin’s own rapidly evolving imperial agenda.

The watershed moment came in 2004, when a Russian-backed plot to rig Ukraine’s presidential election and install a Kremlin-friendly candidate backfired and provoked massive street protests that came to be known as the Orange Revolution. With millions of Ukrainians rallying in defense of democracy, the authorities backed down and ordered a rerun of the vote, which was duly won by the pro-Western opposition candidate.

Among international audiences, Ukraine’s democratic breakthrough was viewed as a continuation of the freedom wave that had swept through Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall and transformed the region. Russia’s leaders were also painfully aware of the parallels between Ukraine’s revolution and the people power uprisings that had sparked the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The Orange Revolution had a particularly profound impact on Putin himself. He took the revolution personally, having inadvertently helped provoke the protests by traveling to Kyiv on the eve of the election to lecture the Ukrainian public on how to vote. Putin now became increasingly paranoid about the prospect of a similar people power uprising in Moscow and began accusing the West of attempting to foment “color revolutions” against him. Three months after the Orange Revolution, he made his new political position clear by delivering a landmark speech describing the fall of the USSR as a “geopolitical catastrophe.”

From this point on, Putin’s hostility to Ukraine would only grow. He saw the country’s democratic transformation as a direct threat to his own authoritarian regime. If left unchecked, Ukraine’s fledgling democracy could prove contagious and serve as a catalyst for the breakup of the Russian Federation itself. Having already witnessed the power of grassroots democratic uprisings in the late 1980s, Putin had no intention of risking a repeat. Instead, he became fixated with the idea of subverting Ukrainian democracy and reasserting Russian control over the country.

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Throughout the decade following the Orange Revolution, Putin sought to undermine Ukrainian independence via massive campaigns of political and economic interference. When Ukrainians defied the Kremlin and took to the streets once more in the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Putin responded by seizing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Much to his frustration, this limited military intervention failed to derail Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. On the contrary, it united Ukraine and dramatically strengthened Ukrainian national identity. Faced with the prospect of losing Ukraine altogether, Putin then took the fateful decision to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

Since 2022, Putin has provided ample evidence of his intention to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. In the 20 percent of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, all traces of Ukrainian identity are being ruthlessly erased amid a reign of terror involving mass arrests and deportations. A United Nations probe has concluded that Russia is guilty of committing crimes against humanity throughout the occupied regions of Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s eliminationist agenda in occupied Ukraine mirrors the rabidly anti-Ukrainian rhetoric that dominates contemporary Russian political discourse and shapes the country’s information space. Putin himself routinely insists that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), while many of his Kremlin colleagues openly question Ukraine’s right to exist.

Moscow’s uncompromising position during recent peace negotiations in Istanbul has further underlined Putin’s maximalist war aims and confirmed his refusal to coexist with a separate and sovereign Ukrainian state. Russia insists that postwar Ukraine must agree to be partitioned, demilitarized, and internationally isolated before a ceasefire can be implemented. It does not take much imagination to predict what Putin intends to do once rump Ukraine has been rendered defenseless in this manner.

Having positioned Ukraine as an intolerable “anti-Russia,” it is difficult to see how Putin can now settle for anything less than the end of Ukrainian statehood. Any negotiated settlement that safeguarded the survival of an independent Ukraine would be regarded in Moscow as a major defeat. This makes a complete mockery of US-led efforts to broker a compromise peace. After all, there can be no meaningful compromise between Russia’s genocidal objectives and Ukraine’s national survival.

On the eve of the Alaska summit, both Washington and Moscow appeared to be actively downplaying expectations. This is probably wise. The first bilateral meeting between the US and Russian leaders during the full-scale invasion Ukraine is clearly a significant event, but at this early stage in the negotiating process, Putin’s undiminished imperial aspirations leave little room for Trump’s fabled dealmaking skills.

Ultimately, if Trump wants to end the bloodshed in Ukraine, he must speak to Putin in the language of strength. The US leader undoubtedly has the tools to do so, but he has so far sought to avoid a direct confrontation with the Russian dictator. Unless that changes, the war will continue. Putin currently has no intention of abandoning an invasion that he views in sacred terms as an historic mission, and will not be persuaded by the promise of minor territorial concessions, even if what’s on offer happens to be “prime real estate.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The search for justice is complicated by the flight of many of the alleged perpetrators.

Leveraging the international network of Yunus, a Nobel Laureate and economist, the interim government assembled a broad international coalition to support its efforts to promote reforms and prepare to hold free and fair elections. Bangladesh has worked to repair relations with its traditional partners, including the United States, which had been strained during Hasina’s tenure. After months of engagement with the Trump administration, on July 31 the interim government secured a new framework agreement on trade with Washington, under which Bangladesh’s exports to the United States would be subject to a competitive 20 percent tariff. At the same time, Bangladesh has also enjoyed cordial relations with China, with Yunus meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping in March. However, the interim government’s relations with India have remained frosty, despite Yunus’s meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in April.

Perhaps the most difficult challenges the interim government has faced are ensuring accountability for the crimes committed during Hasina’s tenure and providing the regime’s victims with a degree of justice. These crimes are not limited to the horrors inflicted on protesters in July and August of 2024, which the United Nations has documented. They also include the many extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and other abuses that preceded the July uprising. The search for justice is complicated by the flight of many of the alleged perpetrators, who left the country in the chaos surrounding the regime’s fall. Hasina and many of her key lieutenants have been granted refuge in India, where they are able to meet freely despite the charges against them.

While Hasina remains in exile, the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), a Bangladeshi judicial institution established in 2009, has begun trials against her and others with command responsibility for her regime’s actions during July and August 2024. Meanwhile, the interim government has memorialized these abuses by establishing a museum on the grounds of Hasina’s former official residence in Dhaka. Many of the victims of the Hasina government continue to face material and psychological challenges, and resources to address these needs remain scarce. There are early efforts to establish a Truth and Healing Commission, which would seek to document the crimes committed during Hasina’s regime and allow for restitution to assist victims and their families.

Currently, there seems to be little appetite for reconciliation from either the victims or the perpetrators. The Awami League, the former ruling party under Hasina, remains banned pending the outcomes of the ICT trials, and the party will likely not be allowed to participate in the next elections. Human rights groups continue to raise concerns about Awami League members and supporters who are currently in custody, many of whom face charges that seemingly lack sufficient evidence to justify their detention. It will most likely fall to the next elected government to decide on the fate of these detainees as part of its wider approach to accountability, justice, and reconciliation.

While it is the eighth most populous country in the world, Bangladesh does not receive the attention it deserves, with very few experts in the United States or elsewhere paying close attention to developments there. Consequently, it is easy for those who wish to spread misinformation or disinformation to influence the narrative about the country. This has certainly been the case over the past year, as a narrative has emerged that post-Hasina Bangladesh has unleashed a genocide against the minority Hindu community, opened the door to Islamist extremism, and sold the country off to China. None of this is accurate, and it’s important to set the record straight as the country moves toward new elections.

Over Hasina’s fifteen years in power, Bangladesh increasingly shut itself off from the rest of the world. It denied visas to journalists, academics, and researchers, and it severely restricted freedom of speech. Now that the country has opened its doors once again, it is time for the world to pay closer attention to Bangladesh as it works to bolster its economy, pursue justice and accountability for the crimes of the Hasina regime, and reestablish democratic governance.

M. Osman Siddique is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. He previously served as the US ambassador to the Republic of Fiji with concurrent accreditations to the Kingdom of Tonga, the Republic of Nauru, and the Government of Tuvalu from 1999 to 2001.

Jon Danilowicz is a retired US Department of State foreign service officer, with extensive experience in South Asia, including service as deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Dhaka. He currently serves as the president of Right to Freedom, a Washington, DC- based human rights organization.

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There is a way forward for a two-state solution, if Palestinian leaders embrace the Abraham Accords

Ghaida Rinawie Zoabi — Tue, 12 Aug 2025 16:58:37 +0000

When the Abraham Accords were signed nearly five years ago, Palestinian leaders denounced the Accords as an abandonment of the Arab Peace Initiative, which conditions normalization with Israel on a just resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestinian Authority (PA) recalled its ambassador from Abu Dhabi in protest and turned down aid offers from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). But now, amid growing internal demand for reform of the PA, Palestinian leaders have an opportunity to leverage the Abraham Accords to promote positive reform and strengthen relations with regional partners.

A personal perspective

As a former Knesset member, I was one of the few Arab politicians in Israel to publicly support the Abraham Accords. I participated in official meetings with Emirati delegations and witnessed firsthand the potential for cultural and economic collaboration. These meetings highlighted the opportunity for Palestinian citizens of Israel to act as a bridge between the region’s people.

One such example was the 2020 pipeline deal between Israel’s EAPC and the UAE’s Med-Red company. Though the agreement faced domestic Israeli criticism, including opposition from Minister Tamar Zandberg, quiet diplomacy helped turn confrontation into conversation. I was able to leverage my relationships with stakeholders in both countries to encourage dialogue, with Zandberg meeting with the UAE ambassador in Israel in a constructive engagement.

While any future efforts to strengthen Palestinian engagement related to the Abraham Accords are sure to face significant challenges and criticism, I believe that over time, the practical benefits such engagement offers can overcome these challenges.

Pressure for PA reform

France and Saudi Arabia both recently renewed efforts to reform the PA, as part of a broader attempt to promote a two-state solution. Both French President Emmanuel Macron and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman understand that any political process that emerges from a Gaza cease-fire will require much more effective Palestinian leadership and are seeking to take steps now to get the PA closer to that point. Toward this end, Saudi Arabia and France declared a high-level conference at the United Nations (UN) headquarters. Ahead of the conference, Macron announced that France will recognize a State of Palestine at the UN General Assembly in September.

Also leading into the conference, PA President Mahmoud Abbas sent a letter to the French and Saudi governments that included a condemnation of the October 7 attacks, called on Hamas to release all hostages, and pledged to hold elections and advance reforms. Abbas also outlined an ambitious agenda aimed at promoting reforms in governance, economic transparency, and the empowerment of women and youth within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Central Council.

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He further detailed three significant initiatives: First, Abbas announced plans to abolish the existing law providing support to prisoners incarcerated in Israel and their families, replacing it with a social support mechanism based on families’ socioeconomic needs. His intention to place this mechanism under international supervision marks one of the most significant policy shifts in PLO history regarding prisoners’ families. Second, Abbas committed to revising school curricula to ensure it is “free from incitement according to the UNESCO standards” while also calling for reciprocity from Israel. Finally, he appointed longtime adviser Hussein al-Sheikh as the first-ever vice president of the PLO—a move interpreted as a step toward eventual succession for Abbas, who has been in office since 2005.

Together, these developments suggest a notable shift in governance in Ramallah and may signal the PA’s readiness for more productive international engagement. As the Arab members of the Abraham Accords continue to express their commitment to a two-state solution, constructive diplomacy with Palestinian leadership can serve as a meaningful trust-building measure even in the absence of a final-status agreement.

In addition to international pressure for reform, there are emerging signals from within Palestinian society suggesting a desire to explore new approaches, including as it pertains to the Abraham Accords. The Wall Street Journal featured an opinion article in June highlighting how Sheikh Wadee’ al-Jaabari and four other clan leaders from Hebron signed a letter in recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. They expressed an intent to break away from the PA, establish an independent emirate, and join the Abraham Accords. Though Palestinian tribes later publicly disavowed the statement and figures such as Jaabari have limited popular legitimacy, the incident points to undercurrents of frustration with the status quo. It underscores that this rapidly evolving geopolitical environment could create an opportunity for Palestinian leadership to reevaluate whether a resistance-first strategy has yielded meaningful gains or has instead contributed to further isolation.

Looking ahead

The Palestinian leadership now faces a choice. It can continue to reject future arrangements, or it can see the Abraham Accords as an opportunity for strengthening regional and diplomatic engagement, consistent with the reforms being promoted by both international partners and domestic actors. Viewing the Abraham Accords as a potential pathway, not an obstacle, could enable deeper and more constructive engagement. This may present a meaningful opportunity to advance the Palestinian national aspiration within the framework of a two-state solution. Time is of the essence. The current geopolitical landscape presents significant challenges for the Palestinian leadership. Israel is now led by a government that has been called the most right-wing administration in its history, and the full impact of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza has yet to unfold. Meanwhile, global attention is gradually shifting to other issues, away from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Recently, Lana Nusseibeh, the assistant minister for political affairs and special envoy of the UAE minister of foreign affairs, presented a broad Emirati vision to address what she described as “systemic failures” in the region. She emphasized the UAE’s support for establishing a “viable Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel.” In this context, Abraham Accords countries could play a meaningful role in encouraging the PA through political and economic incentives, within a regional and international framework, to pursue a gradual diplomatic track that could lead to formal engagement with the Accords.

To strengthen the PA’s regional engagement while supporting regional stability, regional leaders should consider the following policy recommendations:

Expand economic partnerships. Encouraging joint economic initiatives in areas such as agri-tech, water technology, tourism, and renewable energy can serve as trust-building measures. Ultimately, these projects would reduce Palestinian economic dependence on Israel and increase cooperation with Arab states that have normalized relations with Israel.
Establish a dedicated diplomatic unit for engagement with Abraham Accords countries. Establishing an official liaison office within the PA could help coordinate regional diplomatic efforts, expand bilateral relations, and ensure that Palestinian perspectives are raised in regional normalization discourse. This would support a more strategic and consistent approach to regional diplomacy.
Advocate for PA participation in regional multilateral forums related to the Accords. Abraham Accords countries, along with international partners such as the United States and European Union, could support the inclusion and representation of the PA in regional multilateral initiatives such as conferences on climate change, healthcare innovation, and digital infrastructure related to the Accords. This would advance a broader Palestinian participation in regional discourse around issues of shared interest and concern.
Resume negotiations related to normalization. Prior to October 7, 2023, the PA was actively engaged in discussions with Saudi Arabia over the “Palestinian component” of a Saudi–Israel normalization deal. That engagement reflected a constructive approach to expanding the Abraham Accords. With Saudi Arabia taking on a leading role in discussions on Palestinian governance and postwar reconstruction in Gaza, the PA should seize the opportunity to reengage Riyadh on its plans to normalize relations with Israel in an effort to shape its role in any future regional agreements. In 2023, significant efforts were underway to incorporate the PA into the Negev Forum. A ministerial meeting of the forum had been scheduled for October 2023, but the events of October 7 led to its postponement. In light of recent substantial geopolitical shifts in the region, there is renewed optimism that the activities of the Negev Forum will resume, with the inclusion of the PA as part of the process.
Establish Track II dialogue channels. Nongovernmental dialogue efforts involving Palestinians, Israelis, and Abraham Accords members, facilitated by academic institutions or think tanks, could serve to address sensitive issues within an informal dialogue process. This can serve as a platform for engagement around issues such as political perceptions, cultural misconceptions, or economic integration.

Despite what the constant headlines may imply, a two-state solution is not out of reach. By collaborating with regional partners and taking incremental steps within the framework of the Abraham Accords, the PA can move closer to realizing a Palestinian state.

Ghaida Rinawie Zoabi is a Palestinian-Israeli former politician who served in the Israeli Knesset from 2021 to 2023 as the first Arab woman deputy to parliament chair.

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How the US and Colombia can tackle crime, migration, and fallout from Venezuela’s crisis

Lucie Kneip, Geoff Ramsey — Wed, 06 Aug 2025 14:55:09 +0000

Bottom lines up front

While the United States seeks to prevent more migration from Venezuela, the strain of hosting 2.8 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees is putting Colombia on the back foot in its fight against transnational criminal groups.
Bilateral efforts to improve security cooperation, reduce irregular migration sustainably, and improve opportunities for Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Colombia can benefit both countries.
Colombia must balance between asserting regional leadership in managing the Venezuelan crisis—which requires a clear strategy—and keeping a communication channel open without legitimating Nicolas Maduro’s rule.

As the Trump administration recalibrates its policy toward Caracas, Colombia continues to grapple with instability caused in part by neighboring Venezuela. The number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees journeying to Colombia has plateaued, but the country’s resources are strained and its security situation is worsening as armed groups and criminal organizations continue to use Venezuela as a haven beyond the reach of the Colombian military. Meanwhile, the United States has cut foreign aid and centered its Venezuela policy around prisoner releases, deportations, and curbing migration. Despite differences in priorities and political approaches, opportunities exist for the United States and Colombia to engage in mutually beneficial actions that promote domestic and regional stability.

This issue brief, based on multiple consultations with US-Colombia Advisory Group members following a private expert briefing in December 2024, outlines the shifting dynamics in US and Colombian policy towards Venezuela. It makes recommendations for stronger US-Colombia coordination to promote stability in Venezuela and the broader region through diplomatic channels, security and intelligence cooperation, regional migration policy, and integration and regularization of migrants in Colombia.

View the full brief

About the authors

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she provides strategic direction to the center’s work on Venezuela and Colombia. She has supported the work of the Venezuela Solutions Group and the US-Colombia Advisory Group and has coordinated events with high-level policymakers, business leaders, and civil society members from across the Americas. Together with Geoff Ramsey, she leads the center’s work on individual sanctions in Venezuela and created the Venezuela Individual Sanctions Tracker.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Ramsey is a leading expert on US policy toward Venezuela and has traveled regularly to the country for the last decade. Before joining the Atlantic Council, Ramsey directed the Venezuela program at the Washington Office on Latin America where he led the organization’s research on Venezuela and worked to promote lasting political agreements aimed at restoring human rights, democratic institutions, and the rule of law.

About the US-Colombia Advisory Group

The Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Advisory Group is a nonpartisan, binational, and multi-sectoral group committed to advancing a whole-of-society approach to addressing the most vital policy issues facing the US-Colombia relationship—with a recognition of the broader implications for bilateral interests across the region more broadly.

At its founding in 2017, the Advisory Group was co-chaired by Senators Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Ben Cardin (D-MD). Upon Blunt’s retirement, Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) assumed the honorary chairmanship alongside Cardin from 2023 until 2024.

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The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Digital democracy is the key to staging wartime elections in Ukraine

Brian Mefford — Tue, 05 Aug 2025 21:14:19 +0000

Ukrainians underlined the strength of their democratic instincts in late July by taking to the streets and protesting new legislation that aimed to curtail the independence of the country’s anti-corruption institutions. The protesters made their point and achieved a significant victory, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reversing course just days after backing the controversial changes.

Ukrainians have a long record of rising up against non-democratic moves in times of need. This latest example mirrored much larger and equally successful protest movements in recent decades such as the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. The Ukrainian public are well aware that their hard-won democratic freedoms cannot be taken for granted.

The Ukrainian authorities would be wise to treat the recent protests as a serious indication of mounting public dissatisfaction with the current government. While Ukrainians have rallied behind Zelenskyy as the country’s wartime leader, this should not be confused with blanket approval for all his policies. Indeed, more protests cannot be ruled out. Next time, public anger might not be as easily appeased.

In any healthy democracy, elections are always the best pressure valve for public discontent. However, due to wartime security concerns, logistical obstacles, and martial law restrictions, elections are not currently possible in Ukraine. In 2024, the country postponed scheduled presidential and parliamentary ballots. More recently, Ukraine’s Central Election Commission confirmed that local elections would not go ahead later this year.

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The reasons for the lack of elections are clear and mandated by Ukraine’s Constitution. In fact, a consensus has crystallized that any public calls for wartime elections in Ukraine could help legitimize Russian efforts to portray the country as a dictatorship. However, there is no escaping the fact that the absence of elections hurts Ukraine’s credibility as an emerging democracy. This risks undermining international support for Ukraine and could potentially lead to a reduction in military aid.

While it has often been pointed out that Britain postponed all elections throughout World War II, many Americans have noted that the United States was able to hold both congressional and presidential elections during the nineteenth century American Civil War. Indeed, Abraham Lincoln’s main opponent was one of his own generals.

Ukrainian safety concerns amid the largest European invasion since World War II are obviously valid. At the same time, holding local votes in parts of Ukraine situated far from the front lines such as Uzhgorod, Lviv, and Chernivtsi could theoretically be possible with the necessary security measures in place.

With millions of voters currently living as refugees outside Ukraine and others displaced or serving in the military, voter turnout would almost certainly be significantly below the average for Ukrainian elections. This is regrettable but should not be decisive. After all, any free and fair election would help revive domestic and international confidence in Ukraine’s democratic credentials.

Of course, even local elections could not be safely staged in cities closer to the front lines like Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. The solution to this problem may lie in Ukraine’s sophisticated tech sector and the widespread adoption of digital tools throughout Ukrainian society.

Since 2022, Ukraine has earned an international reputation for battlefield innovation and now is recognized as a world leader in drone warfare. If this same spirit is applied to the country’s democracy, it could be possible to hold local or national elections while avoiding the risks associated with large groups of people gathering for campaign rallies and at polling stations.

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Following his election as Ukraine’s sixth president in 2019, Volodymyr Zelenskyy established the Ministry of Digital Transformation and identified digitalization as one of his strategic priorities for Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian government then launched the Diia app as a key e-governance tool that makes it possible for Ukrainians to hold a wide range of official documents in digital format. By late 2024, the Diia app had over 21 million users, representing a majority of the Ukrainian electorate.

It is worth exploring whether the Diia app could serve as the basis for secure digital voting. If Diia is not suitable, other digital options should be identified and developed. This approach could address election security concerns while also preventing the disenfranchisement of the millions of Ukrainians currently living abroad or defending the country against Russia’s invasion.

Skeptics may argue that the Diia system or any other digital voting platform would be vulnerable to hacking. This would undoubtedly be the key issue to address before proceeding with digital elections. At the same time, it is important not to overstate the challenges this represents. Fraud is always possible in any election, but the transparency of digital tools may actually reduce the risk when compared to paper ballots. Indeed, Ukraine’s digitalization experience suggests that the introduction of digital platforms actually reduces the scope for abuses.

Ukrainians are not yet demanding elections, but there are signs that public distrust of the authorities is mounting and may soon reach alarming levels. At a time when national unity is so crucial for the country’s survival, this mood of frustration must be taken seriously.

With no end in sight to the Russian invasion, Ukraine cannot afford to postpone all elections indefinitely. It is therefore time to start the process of digitalizing Ukraine’s democracy and employing the same kind of innovative thinking that has proved so effective on the battlefield. The technologies to do so already exist. The Ukrainian government must now demonstrate that they also have the political will to find the right solutions.

Brian Mefford is a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has lived and worked in Ukraine since 1999.

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The readiness of Ukrainians to rally in support of the country’s anti-corruption reforms undermines efforts by detractors to portray today’s Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt and unworthy of international support. In reality, Ukrainians are more committed than ever to the democratic values that have shaped Ukraine’s national journey throughout the turbulent past few decades.

Meanwhile, the anti-corruption bodies established since the 2014 revolution are evidently effective enough to target senior figures close to Ukraine’s political leadership. They have also won the respect of the country’s vibrant civil society and are regarded as an important element of Ukraine’s reform agenda by much of the population.

It should come as no surprise that so many ordinary Ukrainians view the fight against corruption as crucial for the country’s future. After all, efforts to improve the rule of law are widely recognized as central to Ukraine’s European ambitions.

Over the past decade, anti-corruption reforms have helped the country achieve a series of key breakthroughs along the path toward EU integration such as visa-free travel, candidate country status, and the start of official membership negotiations. Ukrainians are well aware of the need to maintain this momentum, and remain ready to pressure the government on anti-corruption issues if necessary.

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Since the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine’s reform progress has been closely monitored and fiercely guarded by Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian public combines a strong sense of justice with a readiness to act in order to preserve fundamental rights. They are backed by a seasoned and self-confident civil society sector, along with an independent media ecosystem that refuses to be silenced.

Over the past decade, Ukraine’s ability to adopt and implement reforms has often depended on a combination of this grassroots domestic pressure together with conditions set by Ukraine’s international partners. These two factors remain vital in order to keep the country on a pathway toward greater Euro-Atlantic integration.

Some skeptics have suggested that the fight against corruption is a luxury that Ukraine cannot afford while the country defends itself against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Such thinking is shortsighted. Faced with a far larger and wealthier enemy like Russia, Ukraine must make every single penny count.

In peacetime, corruption can undermine the business climate and hinder the country’s development. The stakes are far higher in wartime, with corruption posing a threat to Ukraine’s national security. It is therefore crucial to increase scrutiny and reduce any graft to an absolute minimum. Meanwhile, the long-overdue reform of specific sectors such as the state customs service and tax administration can generate important new revenues that will provide a timely boost to the Ukrainian war effort.

The success of Ukraine’s recent protest movement is encouraging and underlines the country’s status as a resilient young democracy. At the same time, it is too early to declare victory.

In the coming weeks, Ukrainian civil society and the country’s international partners will expect to see a new head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine appointed, along with the appointment of four Constitutional Court judges who have passed the international screening process. Efforts to pressure civic activists and the country’s independent media must also stop.

Speaking on August 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a point of attacking Ukraine’s anti-graft agencies. He obviously recognizes that strong anti-corruption institutions serve as important pillars of Ukraine’s long-term resilience and represent an obstacle to Russia’s plans for the conquest and subjugation of country. The Kremlin dictator’s comments should be seen as further confirmation that Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms are more vital than ever in the current wartime conditions.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory.

Ukraine’s democracy is the key to the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration

Alyona Getmanchuk — Wed, 30 Jul 2025 22:04:59 +0000

For decades, I’ve been working to promote and defend Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic path as part of the country’s vibrant civil society. When I first began advocating for potential Ukrainian NATO membership, I kept hearing that it is not just an army but an entire country that joins the alliance. This is why Ukraine’s membership bid extends beyond military interoperability to also encompass the far broader concept of democratic interoperability.

Since Ukraine’s integration into NATO has been politically stalled, the EU accession process has become the primary track helping Ukrainians to ensure their country’s democratic interoperability. This is especially true given that the European Union has traditionally been the main driving force for the transformation of the wider region.

Ukraine has experienced this firsthand. The most important reforms carried out in Kyiv over the past decade have almost all been tied to Ukraine’s EU integration. This has included the launch and development of the country’s independent anti-corruption infrastructure.

Attempting to advance toward European Union membership in the present conditions is exceptionally challenging. Ukraine is the first country ever to approach the democratic transformation necessary for EU accession while fighting a full-scale war. No other European nation has ever joined in such circumstances.

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While Ukraine currently faces a range of unique challenges, this cannot justify neglecting democratic principles. On the contrary, defending the democratic gains of recent decades is vital if further progress toward Euro-Atlantic integration is to be achieved.

Ukraine is home to one of the most dynamic and demanding civil societies in the world today. The country has staged two revolutions since regaining independence. Both were in support of Ukraine’s European and democratic path. Meanwhile, there have been no protest movements or grassroots campaigns in favor of authoritarian rule or alignment with Russia, even at times when public attitudes toward Moscow were very different.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s swift response to last week’s protests in defense of the country’s independent anti-corruption institutions shows that Ukraine’s democratic instincts are as strong as ever. The next big test for Ukrainian democracy will be Thursday’s parliamentary vote on a presidential bill that aims not only to ensure the independence of anti-corruption bodies, but also to make them more effective.

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Ukraine may not yet be an ideal democracy, but Ukrainians have clearly identified the democratic direction they want their country to move in. This is not because the EU demands it, but because it is the future the Ukrainian people wish for themselves and for their children.

Ukrainians understand that only a democratic Ukraine, fully integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures, can be truly safe from further Russian imperial aggression. By embracing democratic values, Ukraine moves decisively away from the Kremlin’s authoritarian alternative and can no longer be treated as a “mini-Russia.”

There is also growing awareness that while Ukraine currently deserves the support of its partners as the victim as unprecedented international aggression, continued assistance will depend on the extent to which the rule of law prevails and the principles of transparency and accountability are upheld.

The heroism and sacrifices of recent years have unquestionably consolidated Ukraine’s commitment to democratic values. The deaths of so many Ukrainians in the fight for a democratic European future weigh heavily on every single question related to the country’s adherence to democratic norms and practices. Understandably, families and friends who have lost loved ones will not allow their sacrifices to be in vain.

After defending their homeland against authoritarian Russia’s full-scale invasion for more than three and a half years, Ukrainians now firmly believe they have earned the right to be seen as the front line of the democratic world. They know that Putin’s imperial ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine, and see how other autocratic regimes like China, Iran, and North Korea are aiding the Russian war effort. Ukrainians feel they are fighting on behalf of all freedom-loving nations, which makes it even more important for them to preserve and strengthen their country’s democracy.

Alyona Getmanchuk is Head of the Mission of Ukraine to NATO-designate.

After Swaida: How Syria’s periphery is shaping its future

Ibrahim Al-Assil — Wed, 30 Jul 2025 17:32:36 +0000

DAMASCUS—The sectarian bloodshed that has erupted in Swaida is not just a local conflict, but a disruption of the geopolitical logic of a post-Bashar al-Assad regime Syria.

The clashes between Druze groups and government-aligned militias mark a deeper shift in both internal power dynamics and regional alignments. In mid-July, violence erupted across the Swaida province after armed groups linked to the Syrian government—many composed of Bedouin and tribal fighters—launched coordinated attacks on Druze areas. Some attackers reportedly filmed themselves as they opened fire on civilians, turning the assault into a display of impunity and provocation. What followed was the deadliest outbreak of violence the province has witnessed in years, leaving dozens dead and entire neighborhoods bearing the scars of conflict—bullet-ridden walls, burned-out villages and homes, and families mourning their losses in silence.

As Druze fighters pushed back, thousands of Bedouin civilians were displaced to nearby villages, and a fragile truce was eventually brokered. Yet beneath the fragile truce, the strategic calculations and social contract that once kept Swaida insulated from Syria’s wider conflict have begun to unravel, raising new questions about the province’s future role in the country’s fractured landscape.

Yet Swaida’s unraveling is not only a symptom of Syria’s internal disintegration, it is also a reflection of shifting regional strategies. Regional actors have not merely responded to the Swaida events; they have helped shape them. Israel’s expanding role in the south, Turkey’s strategic alignment with Damascus, and Saudi and Jordanian backing for centralized control reflect evolving geopolitical calculations. Swaida has crystallized the country’s fragmentation into zones of political and military autonomy, pushing Syria further toward a model of disconnected governance centers, shaped as much by foreign alliances as by local legitimacy, or the absence of it.

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Internally, Swaida’s unfolding crisis underscores how local power vacuums are reshaping Syria’s political geography. Unlike the coast—where President Ahmed al-Sharaa has, at least for now, maintained formal authority and prevented further unrest after a wave of sectarian massacres that targeted Alawites in March, after an anti-government ambush on government forces—Swaida has bucked the trend. Following Israeli airstrikes on Syrian forces in and around Swaida in defense of the Druze, alongside a direct strike on the Syrian army’s headquarters in central Damascus, the United States, Turkey, and several Arab countries brokered a truce between factions. It announced last week a halt to most of the fighting.

A view of the heavily damaged building of the Syrian General Staff Headquarters, after Israeli airstrikes on Damascus. Moawia Atrash/dpa via Reuters Connect.

The cease-fire, along with the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian government forces and widespread public outrage over recent killings, has elevated Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajri, the spiritual leader of Syria’s Druze community. Though previously a controversial figure who competed with other Druze religious authorities and led a politically divided community, al-Hajri has now emerged as its most popular voice. He is increasingly seen as the figure who secured Israeli protection and helped prevent the continuation of what many feared would become a massacre at the hands of tribal and government-aligned fighters, earning him hero status among large segments of the Druze population. In a dramatic departure from past caution, broad elements of the Syrian Druze community are now openly signaling a willingness to accept security guarantees from external actors, including Israel, underscoring the depth of the local shift in perception toward Damascus.

This new dynamic has lowered the likelihood of a Syrian-Israeli understanding that, until recently, many believed was within reach. At the same time, the shifting Druze perception of Israel has raised the prospect of a buffer zone emerging inside Syria between Israel and Damascus—further complicating the regime’s strategic calculus. Yet outside of Swaida, Syrian perceptions of Israel have also hardened. Many Syrians I spoke with now view Israel as a force seeking to dismantle the country and extinguish any hope for peace, reconciliation, or a path out of Syria’s long war.

The Swaida crisis has also laid bare the diverging interests of regional actors, each recalibrating their approach to Syria’s future. Israel, more than any other player, has directly shaped the dynamics on the ground. By targeting Syrian heavy weaponry in the south, warning Damascus against introducing new equipment, and siding with Druze armed groups, Israel is turning the notion of a buffer zone inside Syrian territory into a strategic reality. This approach reflects a broader Israeli strategy: keeping power in Syria contested, deterring centralization by actors it cannot control, and countering Iranian resurgence.

Jordan, by contrast, views Swaida’s potential autonomy as a serious security threat. Although the province borders Jordan, there is no formal crossing between the two. Amman remains alarmed by the emergence of an enclave it cannot trust, influence, or regulate—especially one that may align with Israel. Drug and weapons smuggling, already a source of tension, has further escalated concerns, particularly as tribal networks inside Jordan intersect with the conflict dynamics in southern Syria. Jordan has long preferred working with centralized states and has consistently opposed non-state actors and autonomous aspirations near its borders.

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has backed Damascus’s efforts to reassert control in Swaida, seeing the preservation of Syria’s territorial integrity as essential to regional stability by preventing Iran’s return to Syria and further chaos in the Levant. Like Turkey and Jordan, Riyadh opposes fragmentation—and has expressed frustration over Israel’s expanding role in the south, a rare moment of convergence between Saudi Arabia and its regional competitor, Turkey.

However, Saudi Arabia remains skeptical of Turkish influence over Damascus, a concern that has motivated Riyadh to increase its support for al-Sharaa in an effort to keep him anchored in the Arab fold. Riyadh certainly recognizes that intensified Israeli attacks on Damascus could drive the Syrian government closer to Ankara, potentially resulting in a growing Turkish military presence across Syria as a counterweight to Israeli pressure—an outcome Riyadh is eager to avoid. Their concern is not only about Syria falling further under Turkish influence, but also about the potential for a Turkish-Israeli confrontation that could further destabilize an already fragile regional landscape.

Nowhere is the strategic divergence in Syria more apparent than between Israel and Turkey. While both states remain deeply invested in shaping outcomes on the ground, their visions for Syria’s future are increasingly at odds.

Israel is working to keep power fragmented, viewing decentralization as a safeguard against centralization by Islamist groups or the rise of an unpredictable coalition that may renege on its commitments in the future. Israel’s approach in Swaida mirrors its broader strategy: empowering localized actors and containing nearby threats through military interventions.

Turkey, by contrast, has thrown its weight behind the central government in Damascus, offering diplomatic support and expanding economic cooperation. Ankara sees al‑Sharaa’s leadership as a bulwark against the US-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which Turkey views as an extension of the recently dismantled Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a group it designates as a terrorist organization. Ankara believes that a reinvigorated Syrian state—especially one it can influence—is the most effective way to suppress momentum for Kurdish autonomy, and reduce US support for Kurdish forces near its southern border. Turkey also fears that Kurdish factions in Syria may exploit the unrest in the south to mobilize politically and militarily, using the distraction to further their aspirations for self-rule.

While Israel and Turkey have cautiously reopened diplomatic channels with each other, Syria remains a core point of friction. The two sides differ not only on the legitimacy of al‑Sharaa’s rule but also on what political system is required in Syria to maintain stability and regional security. In effect, Israel is fostering fragmentation as a form of security, while Turkey seeks centralization as a path to a stable Syria that does not export Kurdish security challenges. This divergence is likely to deepen as both countries seek to shape the post-conflict order on their own terms.

For the Syrian government under al‑Sharaa, the Swaida crisis has both exposed its limitations and clarified its regional alignment. Control over Swaida remains, for now, a remote possibility. The regime lacks both the legitimacy and the military capacity to reassert itself in the south without triggering broader resistance. Instead, al‑Sharaa is leaning diplomatically on regional backers—particularly Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—to reinforce his claim to authority and present the state as the only viable guarantor of territorial integrity. His strategy avoids direct negotiation with emerging local leaders like al-Hajri, signaling a refusal to legitimize any actor operating outside formal institutions.

The sole exception remains the SDF, whose US backing necessitates special engagement. But even there, the government resists treating the SDF as a political equal, preferring to limit dialogue to matters of security coordination rather than constitutional or territorial reform. More broadly, al‑Sharaa’s diplomatic playbook prioritizes foreign capitals over domestic consensus—engaging Washington, Ankara, and Tel Aviv, while avoiding any internal conversation about Syria’s future governance. It is a strategy designed to preserve the façade of statehood, even as the state’s internal cohesion continues to erode.

What comes next in Syria will not be determined by battlefield victories or summit declarations, but by the evolving realities on the ground—and the willingness of regional and international actors to adapt to them. The Swaida crisis has marked the formal end of the binary conflict that once defined Syria and shaped events on the coast: regime versus opposition. In its place is a layered, decentralized reality shaped by shifting alliances, overlapping spheres of influence, and competing claims to legitimacy. Syria has emerged from Assad’s decades-long rule not as a single, governable entity, but as a fragmented landscape of semi-autonomous zones, foreign-brokered arrangements, and disconnected governance centers.

For the United States and others, the challenge now is to move beyond outdated frameworks that prioritize state cohesion over political viability. Legitimacy, local consent, and regional coordination—not force or formal recognition alone—will define the next phase of Syria’s transition. Stabilizing Syria will require a broader regional understanding, one that acknowledges the role of neighboring states in shaping outcomes and prevents escalation between them. With Israel increasingly asserting itself militarily inside Syria, the risk of a re-regionalized conflict is growing—a scenario that must be avoided. Whether the goal is stability, reconstruction, or conflict prevention, any serious policy must begin with the recognition that Syria’s center will not hold—and that its peripheries are where the country’s future is being decided.

Ibrahim Al-Assil is a resident senior fellow for the Syria Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is also a professorial lecturer at George Washington University’s Department of Political Science, where he teaches courses on comparative politics and great-power competition.

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Wartime protests prove Ukraine’s democratic instincts are still strong

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 24 Jul 2025 21:52:58 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appeared to reverse course on Thursday over plans to curb the powers of the country’s anti-corruption agencies following widespread international criticism and two days of public protests.

Thousands took to the streets in cities across Ukraine on Tuesday after parliament passed legislation limiting the independence of anti-graft agencies established following the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. The protests, which were the first to take place in the country since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, gained momentum on Wednesday.

In an apparent reversal of his initial position, Zelenskyy has now announced that he has approved a new draft bill restoring all powers to the country’s anti-corruption organizations and largely safeguarding their freedom to conduct investigations without government oversight. The new legislation has been submitted to the Ukrainian Parliament, with anti-corruption officials backing the government U-turn and urging swift passage of the bill next week.

There may yet be many more twists and turns in the scandal surrounding Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies, but at this stage it certainly seems that the protesters have achieved a significant victory. Crucially, they have also highlighted the enduring strength of Ukraine’s democratic instincts and underlined the country’s continued commitment to basic freedoms at a time when the realities of war make elections impossible.

The Ukrainian authorities were unable to stage scheduled presidential and parliamentary elections in 2024 due to martial law restrictions and a wide range of security and logistical obstacles related to Russia’s ongoing invasion. With more than six million Ukrainians living as refugees in the EU and millions more currently under Russian occupation, a large percentage of the electorate would be unable to participate in any vote. Russia’s record of targeting Ukrainian civilians means that those who remain inside the country could not attend election campaign events or gather at polling stations in safety.

Despite widespread consensus among Ukraine’s opposition, civil society, and the country’s international partners over the practical barriers to organizing elections in wartime Ukraine, the Kremlin has sought to exploit the issue in order to question Zelenskyy’s legitimacy and brand him a dictator. Earlier this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin even floated the idea of placing Ukraine under temporary United Nations administration.

In reality, however, Putin is well aware of independent Ukraine’s strong democratic credentials. Indeed, it was the consolidation of the country’s fledgling democracy that helped persuade the Kremlin dictator to begin his military intervention in 2014, before convincing him of the need to launch his full-scale invasion eight years later.

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Like millions of his fellow Russians, Putin has never come to terms with the loss of Ukraine and continues to view the country as part of Russia’s historical heartlands. He is therefore deeply hostile to independent Ukraine’s embrace of a democratic European identity, which he regards as an existential threat to his own increasingly authoritarian regime. The emergence of a democratic Ukraine is seen by Putin and other Kremlin leaders as a potential catalyst for the next phase in a Russian imperial retreat that began in the late twentieth century with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

Putin has been obsessed with the idea of extinguishing Ukrainian democracy ever since Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, which he personally helped spark by attempting to rig the country’s presidential election. In the immediate aftermath of the flawed vote, millions of Ukrainians flooded into Kyiv and succeeded in forcing a rerun, leading to the victory of opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko.

This was to prove the breakthrough moment for Ukrainian democracy. Between the Orange Revolution and the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost eighteen years later, Ukraine held a total of eight presidential and parliamentary elections, all of which were rated free and fair by independent international observers. Meanwhile, Putin’s Russia continued to move steadily in the opposite direction.

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The Ukrainian population’s staunch defense of their democratic freedoms has consistently been a source of confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv. When pro-Kremlin Ukrainian politician Viktor Yanukovych was elected president in 2010 and attempted to reverse the country’s democratic gains, Ukrainians rose up once more and staged a second pro-democracy revolution. Within days of this successful uprising, Putin began the invasion of Ukraine with the seizure of Crimea.

For millions of Ukrainians, the country’s democratic choice remains one of the core values at stake in the current war. This sentiment has featured prominently during the present wave of protests, with many participants noting that Ukrainian soldiers are currently risking their lives for the freedoms that Zelenskyy himself appeared to be threatening with his undemocratic attack on the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

Former Ukrainian First Lady Kateryna Yushchenko, whose husband Viktor led the Orange Revolution, underlined the continuity between this week’s wartime protests and the country’s two pro-democracy revolutions of the post-Soviet era. “Ukrainians went to the streets today for the same reason they did in the 2004 Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. They want a European future, not a Russian one,” she commented.

Amid the horror and trauma of the largest European war since World War II, the readiness of so many ordinary Ukrainians to protest against threats to their hard-won freedoms speaks volumes about their determination to safeguard a democratic future. They understand that this is what so many of their compatriots are fighting for, and they are determined that these sacrifices will not be in vain. Indeed, it was striking to see many men and women in military uniform among the protesters. This is surely a sign of things to come in Ukrainian politics.

Putin has spent much of the past two decades attempting to corrupt Ukraine’s politicians and discredit the country’s democratic institutions, but he cannot convince the Ukrainian people to abandon the freedoms they have already tasted. This is why he is now so determined to erase Ukrainian statehood altogether. It is also a key reason why his invasion will likely end in failure.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Reversal after decades of marginalization

Throughout the country, Sunni Syrians who the Assad regime had for years oppressed have expressed pride in belonging to the majority that is back in power. In the absence of reliable statistics, the European Union Agency for Asylum estimates that Sunnis accounted for around 65 to 75 percent of the pre-war population. From 1970 until last December, the country was ruled by Hafez al-Assad and then his son Bashar, who belong to the minority Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shia Islam representing between 10 and 13 percent of Syria’s pre-war population.

But Syrians cannot be reduced to a community affiliation.

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Many purely define themselves as their country’s citizens, rejecting religious and ethnic differentiation, as one of the slogans of the revolution, “the Syrians are one”, illustrated. Yet, over the past decades, the Assad regime instrumentalized sects to consolidate its power, concentrated in the hands of close Alawite and a loyalist circle, with Alawites dominating the army, the security apparatus, and the administration. The Assad regime also relied on part of the Sunni elite, especially businessmen, as well as some Sunni tribes, and Christian religious leaders, who all benefited from their loyalty to the regime.

Today, my understanding based on my reporting on the ground is that those who consider themselves as the post-Assad winners now have a president they can relate to—even for those who overcame initial suspicion about his jihadist past—and they don’t feel marginalized anymore. Overall, Sunnis feel more optimistic about the future of the country and more positive about the changes it is going through than other communities, according to a public-opinion poll conducted on behalf of The Economist in March.

The Assad regime’s marginalization and oppression of the conservative Sunni lower and middle class was a driving force in the March 2011 revolution, which erupted amid a lack of access to economic opportunities or jobs for the group, and a significant migration from rural areas to impoverished suburbs amid financial and agricultural hardship. Throughout the war, the regime grew increasingly sectarian, relying on Alawite militias, Hezbollah and Iran. The regime disproportionately targeted and persecuted the Sunni community that rose against it, including sieges and constant bombings. Therefore, the seizure of power by HTS amounts to a revenge over the defeated regime for those who suffered years of oppression, with many who I have spoken with believing that they deserve rewards in the new Syria. The new government has delegated almost all important official positions —including all positions in the security sector—to members of the Sunni community, especially members of the Idlib network.

Another indicator of the Sunni winners’ assertiveness is the extent to which their conservative traditions are becoming dominant in the public sphere. For example, in early June, a decision of the Ministry of Tourism required women to wear full-body covering swimwear on public beaches and swimming pools. While this decision triggered a public outcry, prompting the Minister to backtrack, it sent a clear signal regarding clothing and behavior in the public space.

Risk of destabilization of the fragile transition

The ascendency of the Sunnis who consider themselves to be the winners presents a danger in a country where the former regime instrumentilized sectarian identities to fuel the conflict, and it opens the way for revenge on those who benefitted from the oppressive Assad regime. The attack against Christians worshippers in a Damascus church in late June demonstrates that enemies of the transition consider the sectarian issue as the weak point of the authorities. Although the authorities have consistently repeated messages of unity and cohesion, members of various religious and ethnic groups have felt unsafe and some have felt left aside.

Tens of thousands of members of the former regime’s army, who used to employ a significant number of Alawites, have been laid off shortly after Assad’s fall. Recruits for the new army have so far come almost exclusively from the Sunni community raising concerns regarding the possibility of a Sunni-only army. Alawites have not attempted to join recruitment for the new army as the mistrust is too deep on both sides, with reports of religious speeches in army recruitment centers that would antagonize non-Sunni individuals.

Based on conversations through my reporting in Homs city, some Sunni residents feel emboldened enough to say that Alawites are not welcome and should leave. With kidnappings and killings routinely targeting members of their community, some Alawites have fled their homes and some have gone abroad. Alawites have deserted a number of previously mixed villages between Homs and Hama cities.

Although it is unclear how permanent this move is, the perspective of a redrawing of the demographic map of Syria is deeply concerning, as the former regime altered the demographic makeup of various areas through expropriation during the war.

The authorities mainly view sectarian tensions through a security lense. Damascus frames the massacre that erupted early March in coastal areas, for example, as fighting back against a coup attempt from remnants of the Assad regime. Although that bout of violence started with attacks from Assad loyalists, fighters aligned with the government subsequently killed several hundreds of Alawite civilians. This violent episode raised the alarm on the risk of further deterioration, as killing and kidnappings of Alawites continue, according to my local sources.

Regional context

What happened in neighboring Iraq provides a textbook example of the chaos that a “winner takes all” approach may trigger. In 2003, the US military intervention overthrew Saddam Hussein, putting an end to a Sunni-minority rule. Based on a controversial power-sharing agreement, a Shia-majority government took over and Shia groups have dominated Iraq’s politics, security forces and administration since. The awakening of the Shia identity, coupled with the Sunni marginalization, led to a sectarianization of Iraq after 2003, which was exacerbated by the flaws of the power sharing mechanism. It turned into a civil war in 2006-2008, from which the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham emerged. The Iraqi experience illustrates how the domination of one community destabilizes the post-conflict phase and triggers a backlash. Syrians are mindful of the Iraqi experience and want to avoid a fate similar to their neighbor’s.

The internal Syrian trend of Sunni assertiveness could fit into a parallel regional dynamic, potentially mutually reinforcing each other. These past months, portraits of the late Iraqi leader have emerged on banners at demonstrations and in shops next to famous soccer players and singers. It illustrates a sense of renewed pride that some members of the Sunni community feel. This coincides with the rise of the influence of Sunni strongmen like Saudi Arbia’s Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who have commanded an expanding regional influence over the last decade. Additionally, Israel’s multi-front war since the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks has also significantly weakened Iran and its proxies, helping to facilitate a crumbling of the Shia crescent. This context has opened space for powerful leaders who intend to shape the direction of the region and establish a Sunni leadership.

Reconciliation and power sharing

To guarantee a peaceful transition, it is crucial to resist a “winner takes all” approach and to ensure inclusion of all ethnic and religious groups, women, and political views—including liberal Sunnis—in the new Syria.

At the political level, it is crucial that all groups are able to meaningfully participate in decision-making and to contribute to shaping the reconstruction of the country. Even though the interim government that was appointed in late March includes an Alawite, a Christian woman, a Kurd, and a Druze among the ministers, key executive powers, among ministers and in the administration, remain in the hands of HTS affiliates. HTS and its affiliates’s domination in Syria’s new political life carries a risk of marginalization of other stakeholders.

Instead, a geographic approach, guaranteeing the representation of each district of every governorate, could help to facilitate the necessary inclusion of all Syria’s communities, including ones concentrated in specific areas. The discussions these past months with Kurdish and Druze representatives about the integration of their areas under a centralized system controlled by Damascus illustrates the difficulty to find a governance model that balances power sharing, inclusion of all communities and unity of the country. While political inclusion is key, it is equally important that all Syrians are included in the reconstruction, benefit from economic opportunities and are able to join institutions.

A person, injured in recent clashes in Syria’s Sweida province, is transported as casualties receive treatment at a field medical point, following renewed fighting between Bedouin fighters and Druze gunmen, despite an announced truce, in Deraa, Syria July 18, 2025. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

The clashes between government security forces, Sunni Bedouin fighters, and militants from the Druze sect that erupted mid-July in the southern province of Swaida are the latest exemple of how the difficulty of the interim government to ensure the safety of all communities and their political inclusion in the new Syria undermines the transition. The fact that part of the Druze community questions Damascus’ authority and that Druze factions have not joined the national security forces has caused instability.

To further defend against the risk of sectarian conflict— an extensive transitional justice and reconciliation process is the only way to prevent the “winners” from seeking revenge, and to restore a degree of social cohesion. For the tens of thousands of Syrians victims to be able to have a sense of closure, harms that they suffered from should be acknowledged and perpetrators should be identified. In addition, a comprehensive transitional justice process is essential to bring redress and guarantee accountability for crimes commited during the Syrian war. Such a process should go beyond criminal justice and target crimes committed by all sides through reconciliation committees and initiatives. This may also include truth and reconciliation initiatives, as other countries have resorted to at the end of war. Ultimately, members of the Alawite community who did not commit crimes should not be associated with the former Assad regime’s atrocities.

A fact-finding committee’s recent report on the massacres carried out in coastal areas in March will present a test regarding accountability. The report identified 298 suspects, whose names have been referred to the public prosecutor. Transparent prosecutions are necessary to show that individuals affiliated with the winners are not above the law.

A genuine transitional justice and reconciliation process addressing the crimes committed during the war by all parties will quell the desire of revenge and will appease sectarian tensions. In addition, meaningful inclusion of all the components of the Syrian society will mitigate grievances leading to a backlash against the new authorities, and will rather increase the chances of the transition’s success. Syrians now have the opportunity to put an end to years of sectarianism and build a shared identity, paving the way to durable peace.

Marie Forestier is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. She is also currently a consultant for the European Institute of Peace and the co-director of the Syria Strategy Project.

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Why the violence in my hometown, Swaida, goes beyond ‘rivalry.’

Majd AlGhatrif — Tue, 22 Jul 2025 19:37:00 +0000

I recently returned from a mission to Syria, going between Swaida, my birthplace, and the capital city, Damascus. When I left on June 22, I could not have known that I would never return to the Syria that I left just a month ago. Last week, I woke up to an outpouring of grief and disbelief from the Druze and Christian communities in Swaida, as sectarian violence ravaged my hometown, resulting in the killing of hundreds of people.

Reports poured in: friends and family killed in their homes, doctors shot en route to hospitals, neighborhoods shelled and looted. The attacking forces ravaged a house I considered my second home. The pain was unbearable, shattering my belief in a future Syria where citizens are safe and institutions know their limits. Fourteen years of agony, thought to have finally achieved a reprieve after the December ousting of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, surged back. I found myself asking again: Is Syria’s tragedy rooted in state violence or sectarian civil war? And how did this happen again after Assad’s fall?

US officials described the events as “a rivalry” between Druze and Bedouins. That simplification mirrored Damascus’s version: a state stepping in to contain intercommunal strife. But this framing strips the crisis of its historical and political context. The truth is, Swaida’s suffering stems from its peripheral status and long-standing marginalization.

A distinct and marginalized region

As a Druze-majority, marginal province, Swaida was chronically underdeveloped. Its autonomy grew after 2014, when locals refused to be conscripted to fight their own people. In 2018, Swaida suffered a devastating Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) attack, which resulted in the community’s need for protection and armament, leading to the formation of many armed groups. In 2023, Swaida further distanced itself from Damascus, when Druze leader Sheikh al-Hajari endorsed a civic uprising calling for regime change from Assad, leading to his rise as a political figure addressed by US officials, overshadowing the other two Druze religious leaders, Sheikhs Jarbouh and Hennawi.

These dynamics fostered a distinct socio-political status for Swaida—outside of full Damascus control—with local armed groups, mainly directed at deterring extremists, and a political structure strongly influenced by al-Hajari in the absence of an alternative political process. But when Assad fell abruptly in late 2024 and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), once labeled extremist over its ties to al-Qaeda, took control, the opposition and transitional authorities failed to offer a path to re-merge these two political structures. A rushed attempt at state-building led instead to exclusion, mistrust, and instability—especially for minorities like the Druze, who bore arms mainly to deter extreme Islamist groups like HTS.

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Ironically, Damascus under Assad had framed al-Hajari a traitor for alleged Israeli ties—a charge that persisted after the regime’s fall.

These allegations tap into the Druze community’s complex role in Israel. Tribal and familial ties among Druze across Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan remain strong, and these bonds were often activated by humanitarian or security threats during the fourteen years of war.

In 2023, Israeli deterrence helped shield Swaida from regime attacks. Now, under new leadership, Syria’s transitional government has echoed the same rhetoric used by the Assad regime to delegitimize Swaida’s resistance. Yet, no Israeli weapons or forces were found in Swaida—only leftover Syrian army arms.

Syria in transition, Swaida lagging behind

Rather than addressing grievances, the transitional government took a unilateral approach, sidelining all local elites, including Swaida’s leadership, and failing to include diverse voices. Al-Hajari’s calls for decentralization, secularism, and democratic representation clashed with the new authorities’ centralized, Islamist-tinged vision. These demands, however, were criticized by government supporters as they came from a religious leader who enjoys power in his community.

The popular slogan among government supporters—“those who liberated decide”—alienated communities like Swaida, validating al-Hajari’s position. Fearing aggression, al-Hajari used international protection as a deterrent against Assad’s aggression in 2023. Those inside Swaida who favored engagement with Damascus had a marginal political weight, which made them shy away from confrontation, fearing community fragmentation, a survival instinct for minorities. Tensions deepened between Druze factions.

Coast massacres and sectarian tensions

The early transition saw massacres of Alawites on the coast, reportedly incited by members of the Transitional Government. These atrocities confirmed minority fears and validated al-Hajari’s warnings. While some factions were criticized for agreeing to join state institutions, al-Hajari’s resistance to disarmament gained traction.

In April 2025, a fabricated audio clip of a Druze Sheikh insulting Prophet Muhammad triggered protests and chants appearing to endorse ethnic cleansing, if not genocide.. Attacks followed against Druze in Jaramana and other areas. Later, an Israeli airstrike halted a regime offensive near Sehnaya, where extremist groups had targeted Druze civilians.

A Bedouin ambush against a Druze convoy of fighters to rescue the Druze in Sehnaya, with massive mobilization of Bedouins from different fronts, escalated the violence. Given the overwhelming numbers, al-Hajari called for international protection, which some saw as a plea for Israeli intervention. Meanwhile, negotiations with Damascus yielded an agreement on joint security; however, this agreement rapidly collapsed when state media framed the talks as a government win, prompting al-Hajari’s withdrawal.

The Bedouin-Druze flashpoint

Bedouins and Druze have coexisted in Swaida since the 1800s—at times in peace, at times in conflict. Most clashes stem from pastoralist-agrarian tensions. But in Swaida, these often evolved into sectarian strife, easily weaponized for mobilization.

Frequently, if armed clashes between Druze and Bedouins erupted inside Swaida, the Bedouins would retaliate outside Swaida, targeting Druze vehicles and blocking roads to Damascus—a critical lifeline for Swaida. These tactics were used by the Ottomans, the Assad regime, and now they are occurring again under the new government. Similarly, when Druze are attacked in clashes outside Swaida, the Druze often retaliate against Bedouins inside Swaida.

On July 13th, a Bedouin group kidnapped a man and took his car. In retaliation, an armed group linked to the owner detained Bedouins in Swaida’s suburbs. The situation escalated: retaliatory kidnappings, property seizures, then shelling from Bedouin groups, which killed eight people, including a child. Druze fighters mobilized. Mediation led to the release of the hostages by July 14.

Despite that resolution, on July 15, the ministries of interior and defense announced plans to forcibly enter Swaida to “restore peace.” Many interpreted this as a signal of Israeli approval, believing the Syrian government would not risk a direct retaliatory strike by Israel otherwise. The government’s offensive began from Daraa, targeting western Swaida. Resistance followed—not only from al-Hajari’s groups but also from Rejal El Karama, who supported integration with the state but were not consulted and opposed the incursion.

A video showing Druze fighters humiliating government forces—including handcuffing and verbally abusing them—prompted further army mobilization. Later videos appeared to show the government forces being executed. The incident intensified the government fighters’ resolve, and the Druze’s basic defenses were quickly overrun. Government forces entered al-Mazra’a, a key village, without resistance. Still, reports of looting and burning houses emerged.

As the offensive pushed forward, shelling hit residential areas, with reports of significant casualties and destruction of properties. To minimize casualties, identical statements from al-Hajari and Jarbouh welcomed state forces; however, violence continued. Videos surfaced showing fighters without uniforms, foreign accents, homes ablaze, and the public humiliation of elderly civilians. Al-Hajari said the government coerced him into the statement to prevent further bloodshed, but after continued attacks, he called for mass mobilization.

Numerous Facebook videos showed killings, looting, and shelling. Druze ambushes intensified, and al-Hajari again called for international protection. Israeli airstrikes soon followed, targeting heavy weaponry and demanding a full army withdrawal. The violence triggered a broader popular uprising beyond organized armed groups, forcing many regime forces to retreat.

On July 16, Damascus launched a massive counteroffensive with drones, shelling, and heavy troop deployments. Reports poured in of families slaughtered, homes looted, and neighborhoods devastated. Israeli strikes then hit Swaida and Damascus, including the defense ministry and presidential palace.

Damascus sought an exit and secured a deal with Jarbouh, recognizing the state while preserving local forces. However, al-Hajari refused the terms. That night, President Ahmed al-Sharaa gave a speech characterizing the events as a domestic issue, blaming Israel, and announced a withdrawal of government forces from the region, delegating security to local actors.

The possibility of unleashing civil war

After the withdrawal of government forces last week, Druze Facebook feeds poured with videos and pictures of mass atrocities, including field executions, mass slaughter of families, live decapitations, forcing people to jump from balconies, torturing, looting, and destruction of properties. Social media became a wildfire of videos showing sectarian killings that were used to construct an extremely distorted media narrative, reducing the events to Druze killing and kidnapping Bedouins. A social media campaign dehumanizing the Druze provided a pretext for genocide. The magnitude of savagery sent shocks in the community, instigating limited but serious calls for revenge.

One discussion I had with a key source in Shahba indicated that, driven by these horrors, retaliatory atrocities against a Bedouin community in Shahba included mass killing and looting. Local Shahba armed groups responded by protecting about one thousand women and children in their homes from the threat of break-ins, looting, and violence. The women and children were then moved to a local mosque that was making arrangements for their safe release from the territory.

Mass mobilization of tribal communities across Syria yielded tens of thousands in subsequent waves. Hundreds of civilians died in each wave. Video, filmed by the attackers in the past days, showed more brutal decapitations. Syrian towns along the way supported the attackers to kill Druze using an Islamic doctrine “that whoever equipped an attacker, as if he attacked, himself.”

Hundreds of college students in Aleppo received life threats. Demonstrations by Syrian students to expel Druze students emerged from universities. Druze boycott campaigns erupted, resulting in a cut in food supplies. A universal power outage and interrupted fuel paralyzed the town. Electricity-dependent water was stopped. Despite the US-backed cease-fire, Bedouin attacks continued, burning villages, with field reports indicating the destruction of infrastructure. Field reports from key sources indicate that more than twenty villages were burned, with no information made available by Syrian authorities on the status of their residents. A mediator of ongoing negotiations indicated that ninety-seven Druze women are missing, which delayed the release of the Bedouin community in Shahba. The fighting and killing continue.

The future is dark

The Swaida debacle is a political struggle to force an exclusive regime on a community that doesn’t trust it. Instead of trust building, hate speech was a policy, and ethnic cleansing is the outcome. The Druze-Bedouin conflict was not the cause, but a tool, and the outcome is a Sunni-Druze civil war.

When speaking to many locals of Swaida, Druze, and Christians in the diaspora, a common narrative persists: “How did we trust these people before?” There is complete mistrust in, and grievances against, the facade of state forces. The obstructed roads to Swaida and severed relationship to the hostile surrounding leave no choice but to have a humanitarian cross-border relationship with Jordan. The vision of a centralized, unified state is now considered delusional by many.

As someone who has been working on local governance models, I struggle to imagine any viable long-term solution. For now, an isolated, aid-dependent canton seems to be the only interim path, waiting for violence to stop and the new realities to shape the final outcomes.

Majd AlGhatrif is an Associate Professor and Director of the Syria Peace Project at Johns Hopkins University. He serves as a governance and health systems consultant to the Swiss government and the European Union, advising on the restructuring of the health sector in Syria. He is also a board member and the Founding President of the Swaida American Society.

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Two US policy options for Venezuela: Shaping reform vs. ‘maximum pressure’ toward regime collapse

Venezuela Solutions Group — Thu, 10 Jul 2025 12:00:00 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The first Trump administration drafted a framework for encouraging a democratic transition in Venezuela; with a few updates, it represents one policy path the second Trump administration could take.
Nicolas Maduro’s recent promotion of a longtime rival may be a sign of how few friends he has left, raising the possibility that he may be more susceptible to the second option: a “maximum pressure” campaign.
Whether Washington opts for incentives or a hard line, the goal should be to keep presenting dilemmas that make a democratic transition more appealing than the status quo.

US policy toward Venezuela is at a crossroads, with a degree of uncertainty still hanging over the new administration’s approach. The White House faces a choice: Should the United States try to use sanctions leverage to obtain limited concessions from Maduro on energy security, migration, and democratic reforms? Or should it bet on a return to “maximum pressure” in the hope of deepening existing fissures among Venezuela’s ruling elites and hastening a more immediate transition?

This issue brief, informed by the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Venezuela Solutions Group, explores two options through which the Trump administration could adopt an “America First” policy towards Venezuela.

Option I: Shaping incentives for an economic and democratic opening

The Trump administration could leverage sanctions on individuals and the energy sector to attempt to push Maduro toward political and economic reforms that advance the administration’s stated interest in Venezuela accepting deportees from the United States. This would involve shaping incentives for Maduro and his inner circle to extract concessions that could move Venezuela toward a gradual opening.

Policy recommendations:

Adapt the first Trump administration’s Democratic Transition Framework to lay the foundations for creative power-sharing arrangements.
Advance migration policy cooperation and refrain from exacerbating outbound migration.
Issue conditional sanctions licenses in exchange for economic and political benchmarks.
Expand the footprint for US and Western-aligned energy firms in Venezuela while displacing Russia, China, and Iran.

Option II: Broad pressure to advance regime collapse

Alternatively, the Trump administration could revise its previous policy of maximum pressure, especially if Maduro does not cooperate with policies to reduce outbound migration and the influence of US geopolitical rivals. This involves using pressure mechanisms including sanctions, indictments, and law enforcement to attempt to provoke a fissure in Maduro’s inner circle. Divisions in Caracas could break the government’s hold on power and incentivize a democratic transition in which a new coalition in power is more willing to work with the United States on migration and security interests.

Policy recommendations:

Remove all licenses allowing oil companies to operate in Venezuela.
Pursue investigations and prosecutions against government officials tied to money laundering, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities.
Tighten enforcement of secondary sanctions on Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran- based organizations.
Ramp up individual sanctions.
Bolster the Venezuelan democratic opposition and civil society.

View the full report

About the Venezuela Solutions Group

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s (AALAC) Venezuela Solutions Group focuses on advancing a peaceful, democratic solution to Venezuela’s crisis as well as furthering policy coordination between the United States and allies in Europe and across the Americas.

Explore the program

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Why al-Sharaa’s success in Syria is good for Israel and the US

Itai Melchior and Nir Boms — Wed, 02 Jul 2025 15:36:10 +0000

Israel’s approach to Syria since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has become more assertive, driven by security fears that were intensified by the trauma of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks. For Jerusalem, the emergence of the interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s transitional government is a double-edged sword that could serve as an opportunity for strategic realignment, but also poses latent threats.

Although al-Sharaa’s rise has rightfully generated considerable concern given his jihadist background, the new Syrian government’s first six months has had notable positive developments. This includes the presentation of a pragmatic agenda that has emphasized power-sharing, minority rights, and economic development.

Further bolstering his international standing, al-Sharaa secured broad sanctions relief from the United States after a meeting with President Donald Trump in Saudi Arabia.

The US president’s recent executive order lifting Syria sanctions, signed on June 30, states that “the United States is committed to supporting a Syria that is stable, unified, and at peace with itself and its neighbors.” al-Sharaa also assuaged fears about potential nuclear activity after he offered full cooperation and access to the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency after a visit by the agency’s Director General Rafael Grossi in early June.

Although al-Sharaa has made several moves that should reassure Israeli decision makers: refraining from engaging with Hamas, expelling factions of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Hamas, arresting two senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad figures, and trying to thwart smuggling operations between Iran and Hezbollah across Syria—they appear unconvinced.

Instead of seeing the efforts as transformational, Israel is skeptical that al-Sharaa will be able to maintain control over the country, fulfilling the Israeli desire to prevent another security vacuum and preserve its operational freedom to neutralize potential threats.

But it is in this vein that, while keeping an eye on developments, there is a clear Israeli interest that al-Sharaa succeed. Israel will be wise to align its policy with those who seek to integrate Syria, rather than with those who seek to fragment it.

Fault lines beneath the surface

In early March, heavy clashes erupted in the Latakia region involving the Alawite minority, the National Syrian Army, and local Sunni militias that brought Israel’s relationship with the new Syrian government into question. In the aftermath, Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Sa’ar, went as far as saying that “they were Jihadists and remained Jihadists, even if some of their leaders have put on suits”. This obviously raises questions about Israel’s willingness to reconsider its relationship with Syria.

Then in early May, violent clashes between regime-affiliated forces and the Druze community erupted. The attacks left over forty Druze dead and raised questions about the new government’s commitment to minority inclusion and its ability to exert centralized control over Syrian territory amid persistent instability within the country. Israel responded with an airstrike next to the Damascus Palace driven in part by internal Israeli dynamics, including the pressure from Israel’s own Druze community to protect their brethren in Syria—but also due to a broader strategy to deter hostile militia activity south of the Damascus line. This incident highlighted that Israel’s policy toward Syria is increasingly defined by its self-declared commitment to minority protection, particularly for Kurds and Druze, as a hedge against the rise of Islamist forces. This strategy, however, places Israel at the heart of Syria’s internal conflicts and in opposition to the Sunni-majority-led government.

Then in early June, for the first time since Assad’s regime collapsed, rockets were fired from Tasil in Southern Syria into Israel. While this shelling is attributed to one of two small Palestinian or jihadists movements and Israel sent a stern message to al-Sharaa, the Israeli response to the strike, with a limited artillery counter-strike, was limited and in the lower range of possible retaliation, possibly signaling their interest in avoiding escalation while maintaining deterrence. For its part, Damascus condemned the Israeli shelling as a “blatant violation of Syrian sovereignty” that “aggravates tensions in the region”, but the Syrian foreign ministry blamed “numerous parties . . . trying to destabilize the region,” and asserted that it “has not and will not pose a threat to any party in the region.”

The view from Jerusalem

The Israeli military has taken advantage of this window of instability to expand its operational freedom. This includes moves like seizing the demilitarized buffer zone established under the 1974 ceasefire agreement (including areas on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon) and conducting intense airstrikes on Syrian military sites associated with the former Assad regime. These decisions and rhetoric from Israeli officials declaring that the new Syrian government is led by a “jihadist terrorist from the al-Qaeda school” reflect a confrontational stance and a prevailing mistrust of the new government.

Israeli analysts are also increasingly focused on other negative scenarios that could reshape the regional balance such as:

A fragmented Syria: Israel’s push toward minority sectarianism may align with other forces who seek influence in Syria, led by Iran. A fragmented Syria may give rise to different militias and proxy groups ruling in different areas at the expense of a weaker central government. This can revive terrorist organizations assumed no longer active in the region such as Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and al-Qaeda and may also rebuild Iran’s influence even after the fall of its ally in the Assad regime—once again making Syria an arms highway between Tehran and Hezbollah.

Turkish expansionism: Another source of anxiety in Jerusalem is Turkey’s growing influence in Syria as Ankara seeks to fill the military vacuum left by Russian and Iranian withdrawals. Since December 2024, Ankara and Damascus have been negotiating a defense agreement under which Turkey would provide air cover and military protection to Syria’s new government. Israel also sees Turkish troops in Syria as something that might escalate the tension between countries, if Turkish and Israeli troops were to be facing each other along a new shared border. This is probably the reason the Israeli Defense Forces have ramped up airstrikes on Assad-era Syrian military infrastructure, recently focusing on the T4 and Palmyra airbases, targeting runways and strategic assets, to prevent Turkish deployment.

Military reintegration: The Syrian government’s efforts to create a unified army has also remained a focal point of Israeli scrutiny. The Syrian government’s latest plan to absorb thousands of former rebel and foreign fighters, many of whom once fought alongside al-Sharaa’s militia against the Assad regime, into the country’s restructured national army have sparked Israeli fears that Damascus will institutionalize radicalism.

Although these scenarios create a deeply concerning security picture, Israeli policymakers need to recognize that the new government in Damascus is not Hamas and does not appear to be pursuing open confrontation with Israel. Thus, Israel should explore more comprehensive engagement with the new government that prioritizes regional integration over tactical dominance. If successful, this rapprochement could unlock significant opportunities like energy development, overland trade routes potentially through the India-Middle East corridor, containment of Iranian proxies, and even movement toward eventual normalization with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords.

The way forward

If successful, the new Syria project could be a first win for the Trump administration in turning a war-torn country into a functioning one. The cherry on top would be Syria joining the Abraham Accords.

Syrian interim President Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa holds meeting with US envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack at US ambassador\’s residency in Damascus, Syria, on May 29, 2025. Thomas Barrack, who raised the flag over the US ambassadors residence for the first time since it closed in 2012 amid Syrias civil war, said solving the issues between Syria and Israel needed to start with dialogue. (Handout photo/EYEPRESS)

But for both Israel and the United States, achieving such outcomes requires a decision on key policy objectives in Syria. Washington, having played an important role in counterterrorism and stabilization efforts in Syria, should now consider how best to support the new government in Damascus without ceding ground to Turkish or Iranian influence. The Trump administration’s decision to lift sanctions already signaled its desire for a strategic pivot, which could be built on by encouraging its Kurdish allies and other moderate forces in Syria to join Damascus under a healthy power-sharing structure.

Israel, who has thus far managed a minority-based sectarian policy, should consider looking at Syria as a whole, and engage beyond the Druze minority in the south. Defaulting to a policy that will further encourage sectarianism may result in further “Lebanonization” of Syria. On the other hand, Israel could utilize the extensive Syria network it has built, and signal that it is willing to change the trajectory of relations between the two countries, and ally with a Damascus that is committed to the protection of minorities.

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This may require Israel to accept that the Syrian government may not be in position to effectively control all of its territory and hence, while Israel may hold the al-Sharaa government accountable, it should focus less on outcomes and more on the Syrian government’s intentions with respect to attacks launched from within Syria’s borders. A mechanism that allows for security dialogue and real Syrian action to prevent aggression against Israel may lead to Israel withdrawing from at least some of the areas it has seized following the overthrow of the Assad regime. Down the road, this could even lead to normalization between the countries.

Though security cooperation would have seemed a dream just a week ago, Syria’s conduct during the Israel-Iran war showed that this is a real possibility. A source close to the Syrian government stated that although the new Syrian regime doesn’t want to become involved in a war between Israel and Iran, it does not oppose Israel acting to protect itself within Syrian skies. The source also revealed that there is a level of security coordination between both countries, something unthinkable just a few months ago.

Even more recently in light of the recent Israel-Iran conflict, reports that Syria and Lebanon may join the Abraham Accords have increased. US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack, said that al-Sharaa “has indicated that he doesn’t hate Israel and that he wants peace on that border.”

A spokesperson for Syria’s foreign ministry would not comment on this, although a senior official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told Reuters that normalization efforts with Israel must be part of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, and not through a separate track. The official added that Syria would never give up the Golan Heights, describing it as an integral part of Syrian territory, Reuters reported.

Sa’ar claimed that Israel would never give up the Golan Heights, while also adding that Jerusalem “will welcome Syria to the peace and normalization circle in the Middle East.”

For the new Syria to succeed, the al-Sharaa government must create a new economic reality that benefits everyone. During a May visit to Aleppo, an important economic hub and the first major city to fall in the hands of the rebels, al-Sharaa declared a new kind of war. “Oh great Syrian people, the battle of construction has just begun,” he said, adding that “we do not rest and we do not relax until we rebuild Syria anew and boast about it to the entire world.”

The United States and Israel, together with the Gulf states and Europe, can assist by providing Syria with capital, technology, and knowledge. Israel could leverage its advanced technologies on water and agriculture to bolster Syria’s failing economy.

Washington’s, and its Gulf allies’, recent recognition of al-Sharaa did not happen in a vacuum, but was meant to support a future Syria that will be different from its past. The promise of power sharing, minority rights, tolerance and respect for the country’s diversity is key not only to the internal peace, but also to a possible peace between Syria and its neighbors.

This prism offers a possible constructive interdependence between al-Sharaa’s “New Syrian National Project” and Israel’s interest in its northern border. The emergence of a New Syrian National Project could only be implemented if separatists and Islamists are further pushed away from Syria’s decision-making process.

A more cohesive and responsible Syria will help the United States in its regional stabilizing attempts and will open up the possibility of Syria joining the Abraham Accords.

Itai Melchior is a nonresident senior fellow with the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Melchior is a former diplomat, civil servant, and business leader.

Nir Boms is a Syria researcher and the co-director of the Forum for Regional Cooperation, Tel Aviv University.

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Dispatch from Damascus: Church attack shows transition’s fragility

Ibrahim Al-Assil — Thu, 26 Jun 2025 17:53:23 +0000

DAMASCUS—I was en route from Damascus to Beirut on June 22 when the news began lighting up my phone—messages from friends, notifications, headlines. A bomb had exploded at Mar Elias Church in Damascus during Sunday liturgy, killing twenty-five and injuring dozens more.

The moment I saw the target, I knew this wasn’t just a tragic security breach. It was something more deliberate, a calculated political message. The symbolic targeting of a minority place of worship suggests strategic intent: to fracture communal trust, to challenge the legitimacy of the transitional government, and to signal that no community is off limits. The sequence of recent attacks against Alawites, then Druze, and now Christians reveals a disturbing trend in Syria—and this attack on a Christian church marks an escalation. The perpetrators are sending a message, not only to religious minorities but also to Syria’s cosmopolitan and urban communities: everyone is vulnerable.

The attack raises urgent questions about who controls security in a post-Bashar al-Assad Syria, and whether any community can rely on protection under a new government led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly of militant opposition group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). For the United States and its allies, it’s a warning about the fragility of the transition, and a call to reassess how to support stability.

The attack and its immediate impact

The explosion represents the first mass-casualty terrorist attack in the capital since the fall of the Assad regime. The Syrian Interior Ministry attributed the attack to Islamic State sleeper cells. While this may prove true, many observers questioned the speed of this conclusion, suggesting that either the attack received internal facilitation or that a rush to assign blame masks deeper insecurity.

The Interior Ministry also claimed that authorities captured a second attacker who was allegedly en route to bomb a Shiite shrine in Sayyida Zeinab and thwarted a third operation targeting a crowded civilian area. These reports, if accurate, confirm that the church attack was part of a broader plot targeting both religious minorities and civilians. The Ministry added that the church bomber was not Syrian—but provided no further details.

The targeting of a Christian site, without any claimed justification or provocation, is a stark departure from previous patterns. Earlier attacks had been framed, however cynically, around perceived offenses or political allegiances. The bombing at Mar Elias lacked even that pretext. It was meant to send a broader signal: Syria’s minorities, regardless of their political alignment, remain vulnerable. Moreover, it highlights a chilling possibility that the capital, once considered the most secure part of the country, may no longer offer protection from asymmetric violence.

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Questions remain about the operational nature of the bombing: Was this an isolated sleeper cell attack? Did it receive external facilitation, or was it enabled, knowingly or not, by elements within Syria’s fragmented security architecture? In Damascus, some observers have quietly raised concerns that the attackers may have passed through compromised checkpoints, or received indirect support from local actors with divided loyalties or limited oversight. These are not yet proven claims, but they reflect a broader anxiety within the transitional government about infiltration, coordination gaps, and the limits of their own control.

Terrorist attacks pose challenges even to the most advanced and capable governments, especially in an era of decentralized threats and lone-wolf actors. Syria’s institutions, still reeling from years of conflict, face an even more daunting task.

Public sentiment and minority concerns

The attack’s immediate aftermath saw an outpouring of grief and solidarity from across the country, but also a palpable rise in fear.

Christian communities, already diminished by years of war and emigration, now face renewed anxiety about their future in Syria. They are not alone. The attack has raised alarm among other religious minorities, as well. Alawite communities in villages along the Syrian coast were recently attacked by armed militants and rogue groups. The violence followed a coordinated assault by remnants of the Assad regime in these areas against government security forces, sparking a wave of sectarian killings and retaliatory violence. Islamist armed groups raided Druze towns in southern Syria, accusing residents of blasphemy and religious violations. Now, Christians are targeted without cause. The trajectory suggests a calculated effort to fracture social cohesion.

Beyond religious identities, urban Sunnis and secular Syrians in cosmopolitan centers also feel exposed. Radical actors, like the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), view these communities as equally apostate or impure. There is growing concern that markets, Shia mosques, and other civic gathering places may be next. This is not just a crisis for minorities, it is a threat to Syria’s pluralistic social fabric.

Security sector gaps and government response

The bombing underscores the ongoing disarray in Syria’s security architecture. Assad’s notorious security apparatus, deeply associated with torture, repression, and systemic abuse, was rightly ousted after years of violent conflict. However, no ready force was in place to fill the void. What emerged instead is a fragmented system composed of local militias, ad hoc security bodies, and under-resourced police units. In Damascus, traffic police have recently returned, but many police stations are headed by inexperienced figures, some reportedly former HTS clerics. In my conversations with residents in Damascus, many described these officials generally as well-intentioned but untrained and ineffective.

Al-Sharaa’s interim government has struggled to reassure the public that it can provide security and prevent further attacks. Critics noted the vagueness of his initial statement, and some questioned how quickly officials pointed to ISIS as the culprit.

Al-Sharaa’s statement offered condolences, but little clarity.

“We extend our deepest condolences and sincere sympathy to the families of those who perished in this criminal bombing that affected the entire Syrian people,” he said, emphasizing the need for unity between government and citizens against threats to national security.

Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa attends an interview with Reuters at the presidential palace, in Damascus, Syria March 10, 2025. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

He pledged to mobilize all security forces to bring the perpetrators to justice. Yet notably, he did not mention Christians nor name the church that had been attacked. While Damascus now shows more visible patrols, many cities and towns remain dangerously under-secured. This bombing, coming just months after failed protection of Druze communities in Jaramana, suggests that communities around the capital are no longer a guaranteed safe zone.

The attack also deepens concerns among Kurdish and other communities who are already skeptical of relying on Damascus for protection. The question of who provides security is now central to Syria’s evolving social contract. As the state struggles to project competence, local communities may increasingly seek alternative arrangements, further fragmenting the national landscape.

The role of foreign fighters and fragmented armed groups

A sensitive but essential aspect of Syria’s current security reality is the integration of foreign fighters into newly formed national units. Fighters from Uighur, Dagestani, and other transnational networks were brought in during the conflict years and now form part of the pro-government order. But their limited ties to local communities, linguistic and cultural disconnects, and controversial pasts have made them a source of tension.

Though there is no confirmed link between foreign fighters and the Mar Elias bombing, recent public debates in Syria questioned their future role. Integrating such actors into national structures without rigorous vetting, training, and accountability mechanisms risks undermining both legitimacy and effectiveness. According to Syria’s Interior Ministry, the captured cell leader, Mohammad Abdelillah al-Jumaili, had ties to the al-Hol camp in northeastern Syria, where radicalized fighters have been recruited for attacks.

Policymakers in Washington should take note: This is a textbook case of the security dilemma in post-conflict transitions.

The bombing also underscored deeper challenges related to religious discourse in Syria and the need for religious institutional reform. What stood out to me is that the Ministry of Endowments, which oversees mosques and religious messaging, hasn’t been playing an active role or adapting to the moment. During my time in Damascus and Homs, I observed billboards from the ministry advertising Hajj prayers and religious programming, but nothing that spoke to unity, peace, or social solidarity. There is a pressing need for religious institutions to play a constructive role in social reconciliation and counter-radicalization. Reforming the religious establishment so it promotes pluralism rather than silence or sectarianism should be part of any long-term stabilization plan.

Regional and international stakes

The international reaction to the church bombing was swift—including condemnations from the Gulf states, European Union, United States, and Turkey. But condemnation alone is insufficient. The incident poses strategic questions: how can outside actors support Syria’s stabilization without inadvertently empowering abusive or unaccountable structures? Can external aid target inclusive governance, community policing, and deradicalization efforts without becoming enmeshed in domestic rivalries?

For Washington, the attack is a reminder of the unfinished work in Syria. Over the last decade, the US mission in Syria centered on countering ISIS and providing humanitarian aid. The focus must now expand to a broader agenda: supporting institution-building, security sector reform, and inclusive political transition. This shift is especially timely given US President Donald Trump’s active recalibration of Washington’s Syria policy, including new directives that support engagement with transitional actors and coordination on security matters. US officials have acknowledged working with Syrian authorities to track extremist networks and monitor the integration of foreign fighters into new national units, an implicit recognition that security coordination is already underway. Engagement with transitional actors, however messy or imperfect, should be guided by conditionality, partnership, and sustained support.

The bombing at Mar Elias Church is more than an isolated tragedy. It is a strategic signal that Syria’s transition remains vulnerable to sabotage. Without credible, professional security forces, religious reform, and meaningful inclusion of minorities and urban constituencies, Syria risks sliding into a new cycle of fear and fragmentation.

Policymakers in Washington and beyond must act on this warning. Supporting a secure, pluralistic Syria means helping to build the institutions that Assad destroyed, but without replicating his repressive legacy. This is not only a matter of moral clarity. It is a strategic imperative.

Ibrahim Al-Assil is a resident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is also a professorial lecturer at George Washington University’s Department of Political Science, where he teaches courses on comparative politics and great-power competition.

The post Dispatch from Damascus: Church attack shows transition’s fragility appeared first on Atlantic Council.

2025 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes: How political freedom drives growth

Ignacio Campomanes, Nina Dannaoui-Johnson, Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee, Joseph Lemoine — Mon, 23 Jun 2025 20:00:58 +0000

2025 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes:
How political freedom drives growth

By Ignacio Campomanes, Nina Dannaoui-Johnson, Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee, and Joseph Lemoine

topline summary

jump to the full report

The dangerous authoritarian narrative
What do the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes measure?
The state of Freedom and Prosperity around the world
Is political freedom needed for growth and prosperity?
Is political freedom disconnected from economic growth?
Factors masking the democracy-growth nexus
A refined analysis of political freedom and economic growth
Democracy favors economic growth
Political freedom as a linchpin of prosperity

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The dangerous authoritarian narrative

A dangerous belief has taken root globally: that political freedom is not essential to prosperity and may even be an obstacle to economic growth.¹ This report demonstrates that this narrative is not supported by rigorous empirical evidence. On the contrary, the Indexes show that political freedom does lead to stronger long-term growth. In fact, the process of democratization alone provides an average 8.8 percent boost to gross domestic product (GDP) per capita after twenty years compared to its autocratic peers.

The deterioration of political freedom that began in 2012 remains an ongoing trend affecting countries across all regions and income levels. The continuing erosion of core political rights, such as freedom of expression and association, as well as the weakening of institutional checks on executive power, including judicial and legislative oversight, are alarming developments highlighted in this 2025 update of the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes.

The benefits of political liberalization take time to materialize. Policymakers must be persistent and patient before reaping the rewards of liberalization. And the same logic likely applies in reverse: Declines in political freedom may not have immediate economic consequences, but they carry long-term risks. Complacency in the face of democratic backsliding may ultimately jeopardize the prosperity of the next generation.

Although the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes currently capture this decline of freedom most clearly in the political dimension, the outlook for the rule of law and economic freedom is not much better. The erosion of democratic institutions and oversight mechanisms will likely contribute to declines in the rule of law and economic governance. Executives unchecked by legislatures or civil society are less likely to be held accountable for bureaucratic inefficiency or corruption, and more likely to pursue harmful economic policies.

The authoritarian narrative must be challenged with rigorous research and evidence-based analysis. History shows that it was free institutions—political, legal, and economic—that enabled today’s most developed countries to escape poverty and achieve remarkable prosperity over the past two hundred years. The Freedom and Prosperity Center remains committed to this mission, working alongside thousands of freedom advocates around the world to safeguard and advance the institutions that foster long-term prosperity.

What do the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes measure?

The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center was created with the mission to increase the well-being of people everywhere—and especially of the poor and marginalized in developing countries—through unbiased, data-based research on the relationship between freedom and prosperity. The cornerstone of this project is the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes: a rigorous effort to assess the evolution of freedom and prosperity around the world, going back three decades.

The two indexes are based on well-established theoretical definitions of the concepts of freedom and prosperity, matched with respected empirical measures produced by international institutions, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the V-Dem project, or Fraser Institute.²

The Freedom Index

We think of freedom comprehensively, as a combination of a political dimension (democracy and individual rights), a legal dimension (the rule of law), and an economic dimension (free-market economy). Therefore, the Freedom Index aggregates three subindexes (political, legal, and economic), each covering several components.

The Freedom Index is composed of three equally weighted subindexes: political, legal, and economic

The political subindex measures the extent to which governments and lawmakers are responsive to the demands of citizens and respect their individual rights and liberties. The more democratic the political system, and the more it allows for citizens to oppose and contest those in power, the more public policies are expected to reflect the preferences of a majority of the population. The political subindex has four components: (1) elections; (2) political rights; (3) civil liberties; and (4) legislative constraints on the executive.

The legal subindex measures the degree to which a country abides by the rule of law—that is, whether citizens and government officials are bound by and abide by the regulations and laws of the land. It thus reflects certainty, stability, and predictability. The legal subindex includes five components: : (1) clarity of the law; (2) judicial independence and effectiveness; (3) bureaucracy quality and corruption; (4) security; and (5) informality.

The economic subindex is designed to measure whether most economic activity in a country is guided by the principles of free and competitive markets. An economically free society enhances the incentives to work and invest. Businesses and individuals can also capture the gains of an efficient allocation of resources guided by the price mechanism, and fully exploit the economic potential of its population. The economic subindex comprises four components: (1) property rights; (2) trade freedom; (3) investment freedom; and (4) women’s economic freedom.

We scale each component so that all have the same range (0–100), and compute each subindex as the unweighted average of its components. Finally, we arrive at a Freedom Index score for each country for each year, again using the unweighted average of the three subindexes.

In order to offer an intuitive and simple representation of the differences in freedom across countries, we assign one of four freedom categories (High Freedom, Moderate Freedom, Low Freedom, and Lowest Freedom) to each country-year observation. To do so, we use the Freedom Index rank for each year, labeling the level of freedom of the first quartile of countries as “High Freedom” (those that rank 1–41), “Moderate Freedom” for those in the second quartile (ranking 42–82), “Low Freedom” the third quartile (ranking 83–123), and “Lowest Freedom” those in the bottom quartile (ranking 124–164).

The Prosperity Index

The Prosperity Index also takes a broad view, going beyond the measurement of pure material well-being and including additional social aspects that we see as necessary for the discussion of a “prosperous society.” The Prosperity Index has six components: (1) income; (2) health; (3) education; (4) inequality; (5) minorities; and (6) environment. The first three components capture individual flourishing, while the last three assess whether prosperity is shared and sustainable.

Income per capita is the most widely used indicator of prosperity in economic and social science research. A prosperous society is necessarily one that has escaped generalized poverty and misery, and that generates sustained economic growth. The expectation of a long and healthy life and the opportunity to acquire knowledge are also widely considered to be standard dimensions of a holistic view of human flourishing.

A prosperous society requires that material well-being is shared among citizens and not concentrated in a small group. The components of inequality and minorities are intended to capture the degree of inclusiveness in a country. We measure inequality in terms of income, which is also highly correlated with education and health inequality. The minorities component captures the absence of discrimination regarding access to public services and opportunities, based on ethnic, social class, language, gender, political affiliation, and other considerations.

Finally, prosperity needs to be sustainable in the long run, and thus we include in the Prosperity Index a measure of environmental quality. This component is an equally weighted average of three sub-components, which deal with the wide variation in countries’ stage of development. First, we assess the cleanliness of a country’s production processes using the ratio of carbon dioxide emissions to GDP per capita (both in logs). Second, we capture the consequences of environmental quality for human life, using the rate of deaths from air pollution. Third, we consider the fact that in the least developed countries citizens can be exposed to unclean environments on a daily basis, so we use access to clean cooking technologies at a household level as a proxy.

As we do for the Freedom Index, we assign one of four prosperity categories (High Prosperity, Moderate Prosperity, Low Prosperity, and Lowest Prosperity) to each country-year observation. To do so, we use the Prosperity Index rank for each year, labeling as “High Prosperity” the first quartile of countries (those that rank 1–41), “Moderate Prosperity” those in the second quartile (ranking 42–82), “Low Prosperity” the third quartile (ranking 83–123), and “Lowest Prosperity” those in the bottom quartile (ranking 124–164).

The state of Freedom and Prosperity around the world

Global freedom continues to decline

The Freedom Map (linked below) illustrates the global landscape of freedom in 2024, as measured by our three subindexes (political, legal, and economic). Freedom remains unevenly distributed across the world, with scores ranging from a high of 93.8 in Denmark to a low of 16.9 in Afghanistan. The persistent low scores for some countries over several years (sometimes decades) highlight persistent gaps in institutional capacities and economic freedom, particularly in fragile and authoritarian states.

Explore Freedom and Prosperity world map

The Indexes rank 164 countries around the world. Use our site to explore thirty years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the subindexes and indicators that comprise our Indexes.

Explore the indexes

Detailed Freedom Index scores and rankings for each country are available in Table 1. which also highlights changes in rank over the past year.

Because institutional reform is typically a slow and gradual process, the overall global distribution of freedom has remained quite stable over the past three decades. Western European countries continue to dominate the top of the Freedom Index, alongside Australia and New Zealand. Differences in scores among these countries are small, which helps explain seemingly large changes in rank, such as Finland dropping three positions or Germany falling five, even in the absence of major changes.

That said, it is noteworthy that both Canada (ranked 20th) and the United States (22nd) have lost ground relative to their European peers, falling four and three positions, respectively. Significant movements within the top quartile include Poland’s reversal of its recent democratic backsliding: It has gained eight positions in the 2025 Index and reentered the “High Freedom” category after eight years. In contrast, Slovakia’s performance is cause for concern, dropping eight positions following a nearly four-point decline in its Freedom score.

Among the middle two quartiles, categorized as “Moderate Freedom” and “Low Freedom,” we observe more dynamic shifts. On the positive side, the largest improvements were seen in Guatemala (up 26 positions), Vietnam (up 21), South Africa (up 13), and Jordan (up 12). The sharpest declines were recorded in Georgia (down 22 positions), Burkina Faso (down 17), and Mozambique (down 13).

Unfortunately, mobility within the “Lowest freedom” category remains limited. This group continues to include many countries from Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. China (ranked 143rd) and Russia (145th), despite being two of the world’s most populous and geopolitically significant nations, remain firmly entrenched in the lowest tier, showing little progress toward greater freedom.

Table 1. Freedom Index scores and ranking for 2024

Looking beyond the most recent scores, the Freedom Index’s thirty-year coverage allows us to uncover some interesting dynamics. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the Freedom Index and its three subindexes since 1995 at a global level. The most striking—and worrying—trend is the negative evolution of the political subindex over the past twelve years. Democratic regression started in 2013, well before the COVID-19 crisis, accelerated during the pandemic, and continues today. The global average score of the political subindex in 2024 is similar to that of 1999, erasing 25 years of progress.

Figure 3. Political subindex is now at the same level as in 1999—a twenty-five-year low

The erosion of political freedom in the past decade is a generalized trend that affects countries at all levels of development, and across all regions of the world. Most notably, both the political subindex and the legal subindex have declined by more than two points globally.

Figure 4 shows that the OECD countries (those with the highest levels of income in the world, most of them well-established democracies) have experienced a decline in all three subindexes since 2014. For this group, the sharpest declines in the political subindex have occurred in Turkey, Mexico, Greece, and Hungary, each losing more than ten points over the past decade. In the legal subindex, which assesses the rule of law, Canada and the United States rank as the fourth- and sixth-largest decliners, respectively. Their scores dropped significantly due to a marked deterioration in the “clarity of the law” component, which evaluates whether legal norms are clear, transparent, stable, and consistently enforced.

Figure 4. OECD scores have declined across all three freedom subindexes in the past decade

Declines in the political subindex are significant across all regions, as shown in Figure 5. with South and Central Asia experiencing the largest fall (-6.12 points on average), followed by Middle East and North Africa (-5.27) and Sub-Saharan Africa (-5.16). Similarly, legal freedom has fallen in all regions except for South and Central Asia, but it is important to keep in mind that this region still shows the worst average score in this subindex.

Figure 5. The democratic decline has continued to worsen across all regions

The erosion of political freedom has been the most salient and generalized trend in recent times. We can examine what has been driving this by looking at the evolution of the political subindex components. Figure 6 presents the percentage change of each component since the political subindex peak in 2012. All three have decreased in the last twelve years, although with slightly different timing and strength. Changes in the components measuring elections, civil liberties, and legislative constraints on the executive are relatively minor until 2019, but worsen significantly during the pandemic (2019–2021) and continue to decline well after the world came back to relative normality.

The deterioration of the political rights component has been sustained and very strong since 2012, accumulating a loss of more than 10 percent. It seems clear that the restrictions imposed during the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 crisis were only an accelerator of a process already incubated, as political regression started well before 2019, and continues up to this day.

Figure 6. All components of political freedom have declined since 2012

Until now, our analysis has focused on global and regional simple averages, where each country carries equal weight in the aggregate trends, regardless of its population size, geographic area, or GDP. Figure 7 examines how political freedom has evolved for the average individual worldwide. It compares the global development of the political subindex using a simple country average (blue) versus a population-weighted average (orange).

Figure 7. Population-weighted averages show lower political freedom scores and a sharper decline

Two related facts stand out. First, the level of political freedom experienced by the average citizen of the world is significantly lower than the country average would indicate. Second, its erosion over the past decade has been much steeper when we examine it through population-weighted averages. This is because countries with larger populations carry more weight in population-based averages, meaning their declines in political freedom impact the global trend far more than those in less-populous countries.

China is a big factor explaining the former, as it comprises more than 17 percent of the world population and has ranked among the bottom ten countries on the political subindex, and all its components, since 1995. India, the most populous country in the world, is the main driving factor of the latter, with a plummeting trend in political freedom since 2014 (-14 points). Significant declines in several other populous countries have also contributed to the steep downward trend, such as Russia (-14.5), Indonesia (-11.8), and Bangladesh (-9.8).

While the political and legal subindexes have declined since 2014, the economic subindex shows positive progress over the same period. In fact, two of its components, property rights protection and, most notably, women’s economic freedom, are the only areas of the entire Freedom Index to have improved globally since 2014 (see Figure 8). Women’s economic freedom, in particular, has risen by nearly seven points globally since 2014, and by almost twenty-three points since 1995.

Figure 8. Only women’s economic freedom presents significant improvement in the last decade

Virtually every country in the Index has experienced improvements in women’s participation in economic affairs in the past decade. It is encouraging to observe that some of the largest increases in this component have taken place in countries that had the lowest scores just ten years ago. The Gulf monarchies (especially the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain), together with some African countries such as Gabon and Democratic Republic of the Congo, present significant expansions in women’s rights. However, it is important to acknowledge that this measure is limited to economic rights only, and that further progress is needed if these countries are to catch up with the most advanced countries of Western Europe.

Explore Freedom and Prosperity world map

The Indexes rank 164 countries around the world. Use our site to explore thirty years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the subindexes and indicators that comprise our Indexes.

Explore the indexes

Rising global prosperity, but worsening treatment of minorities

The Prosperity Map (linked below) shows the situation of prosperity around the= world according to the six prosperity components (income, health, inequality, environment, minorities, education) in 2024. Detailed scores and rankings for each country can be found in Table 2. The general distribution of prosperity is similar to that of freedom, with the Western world topping the top quartile (“High Prosperity”), and Africa being the least prosperous region.

Table 2. Prosperity Index scores and ranking for 2024

Large movements in the ranking position of specific countries in a single year are almost impossible as the components of prosperity vary only gradually and in the long term. Nonetheless, we do observe clear trends when looking at the evolution of prosperity and its components since 1995 (Figure 9). Most striking is the dramatic improvement of education globally, increasing by more than twenty points. The apparent stagnation in the last two years is the product of a lack of data from our preferred source (the UN’s Human Development Index). The disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic are only lightly visible, but these do not seem to have obstructed the generalized positive trend toward increasing years of education across the globe, and especially in developing regions.

Other noticeable trends in the components of the Prosperity Index (Figure 9) include: A U-shape evolution of income inequality, which worsened from 1995 to 2005 but has improved since. Steady gains in health outcomes until 2019, followed by a sharp decline due to the COVID-19 pandemic and a partial recovery. Consistent improvement in environmental quality. And a visible decline in the treatment of minorities since 2019.

Overall, the big picture is clear: The world is becoming more prosperous. However, the specific driving forces of this process vary significantly between regions and levels of development.

Figure 9. Prosperity has improved across all components since 1995, but the treatment of minorities has worsened in the past decade

Figure 10 shows the 2024 score in the Prosperity Index for all seven regions of the world (the tip of each arrow), as well as the size and direction of change in each region’s score since 2014 (beginning of the arrow). The substantial differences in levels of prosperity between regions is by no means a novel finding, but it is always necessary to keep in mind these disparities when discussing how the different regions have evolved in recent years.

Figure 10. The Global South has been catching up in overall prosperity since 2014, but a significant gap remains (ten-year change on the Prosperity Index)

Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Central Asia are the most improved regions since 2014, with much of that performance attributable to substantial increases in the health, environment, and education scores. Nonetheless, it is also worth noticing that although decreases in the minorities component are generalized across the globe, the fall in South and Central Asia is the largest in the Global South. This trend may be attributable to the deterioration of political freedom in the region (see above).

Figure 11. The treatment of minorities has worsened across all regions in the past decade

North America is the only region in which overall prosperity has declined over the past decade, a trend that warrants several important caveats. First, as previously noted, North America still maintains a significant lead in overall prosperity compared to other regions, with the exception of Europe. This advantage holds across most components of the Prosperity Index. Second, the primary driver of the region’s decline is a drop in the minorities component of the Index. In both the United States and Canada (the region’s only two countries in our grouping, which places Mexico with Latin America and the Caribbean) this indicator has experienced a notable downturn in recent years. This decline is likely linked to more restrictive immigration policies, which may have reduced access to public services and economic opportunities for non-nationals and minority groups.

Is political freedom needed for growth and prosperity?

We now turn to a deeper question at the heart of the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s mission:

What is the relationship between freedom and prosperity?

In other words:

Is freedom the surest path to long-term development and well-being?

Prosperity and overall freedom are closely associated

In the 2024 Freedom and Prosperity Report, we presented substantial evidence of a strong and consistent association between freedom and prosperity. Figure 12 provides an updated visual summary of this link, showing a clear positive correlation (0.71) between the two Indexes across all countries in 2024: Nations with greater freedom tend to enjoy higher levels of prosperity.

Last year’s report further supported this finding by examining changes over time rather than one-off snapshots—an approach that helps control for potential econometric concerns. Even then, the positive relationship held: Countries that improved most in their freedom scores since 1995 also experienced the largest gains in prosperity. In addition, we explored the long-term impact of a significant increase in freedom (a freedom “shock”) and again found substantial positive effects on prosperity.

Figure 12. There is a strong positive correlation (0.71) between the Freedom Index and Prosperity Index

Is political freedom disconnected from economic growth?

Having established a strong positive relationship between overall freedom and prosperity, we now take a closer look at the connection between each of the three freedom subindexes—political, legal, and economic—and the various components of the Prosperity Index (Table 3). While each of the freedom subindexes is positively correlated with all prosperity components, the strength of these relationships varies.

One clear pattern emerges: The legal subindex, which reflects the quality of the rule of law, shows the strongest correlation with nearly all prosperity components (with the exception of inequality). By contrast, the political subindex is the one least strongly correlated with nearly all prosperity components (with the exception of minorities).

Table 3. The legal subindex (rule of law) correlates most strongly with prosperity (2024)

Some might argue that this strong relationship is driven mainly by the wealthiest countries, such as those in Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which tend to score high in both freedom and prosperity. To test this, we re-ran the analysis, excluding these high-income OECD countries and focusing only on the remaining 126 non-OECD countries. The strength of the correlations decreased, but the relationships remained positive in nearly all cases. The one exception was for the inequality component, where the correlation was essentially zero. This can likely be explained by the Kuznets curve, a well-known economic theory that suggests inequality tends to rise in the early stages of development before falling as countries grow richer. Since non-OECD countries span a wide range of development stages, it is unsurprising that inequality patterns are inconsistent among them, weakening the overall correlation.

One of the standout findings from the global data—that the legal subindex relates much more strongly than the political subindex to prosperity—is also repeated in this non-OECD-country analysis. For example, the correlation between political freedom and GDP per capita is just 0.17—three times lower than the correlation for the legal subindex.

Figure 13 illustrates this divergence by plotting 2024 scores in the legal and political subindexes against income per capita for non-OECD countries. On the left graph (political subindex), several countries—including Gulf monarchies, Belarus, Russia, and China—score low on political freedom but still enjoy relatively high income levels. Conversely, we also see a number of countries with strong political freedom scores (above 75) that perform poorly in terms of income, clustered in the bottom right of the graph.

Figure 13. At first glance, political freedom alone is not strongly related to growth

These findings raise challenging questions: Should we conclude that political freedom is not important for economic growth, and only marginally related to broader prosperity? Should the international community focus solely on strengthening the rule of law in developing countries as the most effective way to boost income? And if political rights don’t appear to drive growth, should we be less concerned about the global democratic backsliding seen in recent years?

These may appear to be logical observations based on the data—but a deeper dive into the Indexes, and the explanatory factors behind them, reveals that they are also simplistic, and misleading.

Factors masking the democracy-growth nexus

The simple correlations do not account for several important factors that may obscure the true relationship between political freedom and economic growth. First, democratization is often a disruptive process, generating fundamental changes to a country’s institutional framework through the expansion of key political rights and civil liberties. In the short term, such political transformations can generate uncertainty and require significant adjustment from economic actors as they adapt to new rules, norms, and power dynamics.

Moreover, democratization is frequently triggered by economic crises. While such crises may help mobilize civil society and create momentum for reform, they also place a heavy burden on newly democratic governments. Political scientists have described this as the “tumultuous youth” of democracy, that is, a phase marked by instability and delayed returns. As a result, the time horizon used to assess the impact of democratization is crucial: The economic effects of increased political freedom may only become visible in the medium to long term.

Take the case of Gambia, one of the countries that has made the largest gains in political freedom over the past decade, following a major democratization process beginning in 2017. It is too early to fully assess the economic benefits of these reforms, especially considering the significant external shock of the COVID-19 pandemic between 2019 and 2021.

Another limitation of simple cross-sectional correlations is that they overlook the starting conditions under which countries undertake political reform. Some countries begin democratization with strong legal and economic institutions already in place, while others do not. The Freedom Index is particularly useful here, as it disentangles—and independently measures—the political, legal, and economic dimensions of freedom. For example, a country can achieve high performance on rule of law without being democratic, just as it is possible to have a vibrant democracy with weak rule of law. This raises an important question: To what extent do the rule of law and economic freedom shape the relationship between political liberalization and economic growth? Focusing on the relationship between political freedom and the rule of law, we can imagine two possible scenarios, depending on whether they function as substitutes or complements:

If substitutes: Political freedom could be especially beneficial in countries with weak rule of law, meaning improvements in either dimension could spark economic growth independently.
If complements: The benefits of democratization may depend on having a strong legal foundation already in place. In this case, only countries that democratize after establishing robust legal institutions would see significant economic gains, while those lacking such foundations may not.

Finally, when evaluating the effects of political freedom, it is critical to define the right comparison groups. The “treatment group” should consist of countries that have undergone substantial and lasting increases in political freedom—not those with marginal or temporary changes. At the same time, the “control group” must be carefully chosen to serve as a credible benchmark—countries that have remained politically unchanged but are similar to the “treatment” country in other relevant characteristics.

The next subsection outlines a more rigorous analysis of the political freedom-economic performance relationship, taking these methodological challenges into account.

A refined analysis of political freedom and economic growth

To better understand the relationship between political freedom and economic growth, we revert to our analysis of 126 non-OECD countries, now over the period 1995–2019. We intentionally end the period before the COVID-19 pandemic to avoid distortions caused by its unprecedented economic disruptions.

Since the political subindex is a continuous measure, we set a threshold score of fifty. Every country-year observation of fifty or above is classified as “democratic”, and any score below is “autocratic.” Acknowledging that this threshold is somewhat arbitrary, we also tested alternative cutoffs—forty-five, sixty, and the sample median (65.9)—to assess the robustness of our results. Varying the cutoff does not significantly affect the results. Based on the 50-point threshold, we are able to categorize countries into four distinct groups, based on their political trajectories over time:

Always Autocracies: Countries that remained below the fifty-point threshold throughout the entire period. This group includes twenty-five countries, such as China (Figure 14).
Democratizers: Countries that started below the threshold in 1995 but crossed above it by 2019, indicating a sustained shift toward democracy. This group includes twenty-one countries, such as Nigeria.
Autocratizers: Countries that started above the threshold in 1995 but fell below it by 2019, indicating democratic backsliding. There are nine countries in this group, such as Venezuela.
Always Democracies: Countries that remained above the threshold throughout the entire period. This is the largest group, with seventy-one countries, such as Botswana.

Figure 14. An “Always Autocracy”, a “Democratizer”, an “Autocratizer”, and an “Always Democracy.” Political subindex scores (1995–2019) for one exemplar country from each of the four types, grouped by political freedom trends

We then compare the group of Democratizers against the group of “Always Autocracies,” as this creates the clearest counterfactual: What happens when a country democratizes versus when it remains authoritarian? This comparison involves a total of forty-six countries: twenty-one “Democratizers” and twenty-five “Always Autocracies.”

To examine the long-term impact of democratization on economic performance, we use local linear projections as our main analytical tool. This method is well suited to address the concerns discussed in the previous subsection, especially regarding timing and variation across countries. In simple terms, the technique involves running a series of regressions that estimate how a democratization “shock” (i.e., a significant increase in political freedom) affects real GDP per capita over time. We project these effects for up to twenty years into the future, plotting the estimated impact for each year.

For each “Democratizer” country, we identify the year of democratization as the one with the largest single-year increase in the political subindex, for example, 1999 in the case of Nigeria. Local linear projections also allow for the inclusion of important control variables. Specifically, we include: (1) country fixed effects to account for time-invariant characteristics (such as geography or historical institutions) that might influence growth regardless of political regime; and (2) year fixed effects to control for global shocks or trends that could affect all countries in a given year (such as financial crises or commodity price shifts).

These controls help isolate the true effect of democratization from broader national or global events that could otherwise bias the analysis.

Democracy favors economic growth

Figure 15 shows the cumulative effect of democratization on GDP per capita over a twenty-year period, comparing countries that experienced a democratization shock or episode with those that remained autocratic. The results are clear: Democratization has a positive and substantial long-term impact on economic growth. On average, countries that democratize achieve GDP per capita levels 8.8 percent higher than their autocratic counterparts after two decades.

Figure 15 also supports our earlier insight about timing: The economic benefits of political liberalization do not appear immediately. On average, it takes around six to eight years for the growth dividends of democracy to become visible—and around ten to twelve years for those benefits to be fully realized.

Figure 15. Democratization generates a boost in GDP per capita of 8.8 percent (compared with countries that remained autocratic)

To explore the interaction between political freedom and the rule of law, we divided the democratization episodes into two categories:

High legal subindex score at time of democratization (above the median score)
Low legal subindex score at time of democratization (below the median)

We find that democratization leads to long-term economic gains in both groups, but the effect is more pronounced in countries with weaker legal institutions at the time of democratization. In those cases, GDP per capita had grown 12.3 percent after twenty years, measured against their autocratic counterparts. In contrast, for countries that democratized under relatively strong rule of law conditions, the gain was more modest, at 5.3 percent over the same period.

These findings suggest a degree of substitutability between political and legal freedom: Where the rule of law is weak, political liberalization plays a more critical role in unlocking growth potential.

Political freedom as a linchpin of prosperity

This thirtieth year of the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes presents a complex picture. Encouragingly, our Prosperity Index shows broad growth, though significant regional disparities and challenges persist. Conversely, political freedom and the rule of law are in decline across the board. Whether in OECD or non-OECD countries, or across regions, all are experiencing a downturn. Our political subindex, which measures the extent to which a nation upholds civil liberties, democratic legislature, and the political rights of its constituents, reveals the increasingly dire state of global democracy—sinking to its lowest point in twenty-five years.

While prosperity encompasses far more than just income, sustained economic growth remains a critical pillar of long-term well-being. Our analysis provides compelling evidence that democratization contributes meaningfully to long-term economic growth, even if its effects take time to materialize. Over twenty years, countries that democratize achieve per capita GDP that is 8.8 percent higher than their autocratic peers. While the rule of law emerges as a consistently strong predictor of prosperity, our analysis also shows that political freedom plays a vital and independent role, particularly in contexts where legal institutions are weak.

Political liberalization can act as a powerful catalyst for progress, especially when it helps correct institutional deficits. At the same time, the impact of democracy on growth is not automatic or immediate; it depends on timing, national conditions, and the broader institutional environment. This underscores a central insight of the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes: that freedom, when exercised in its full political, legal, and economic dimensions—is not just a moral imperative, but a pragmatic path to shared prosperity.

Read the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes methodology

The Indexes rank 164 countries around the world. Use our site to explore thirty years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the subindexes and indicators that comprise our Indexes.

Explore the indexes

Authors

Expert bio

Ignacio Campomanes

Senior Advisor

Economy & Business English

Staff

Nina Dannaoui-Johnson

Deputy Director

Africa Human Rights

Staff

Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee

Assistant Director

Nonresident Senior Fellow

East Asia Rule of Law

Former staff

Joseph Lemoine

Africa Economy & Business

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Will Mortenson and Christine Hutchinson for their valuable contributions, and the team at Soapbox for their support with data visualization.

The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes are a creation of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. The center’s mission is to increase the well-being of people everywhere—and especially of the poor and marginalized in developing countries—through unbiased, data-based research on the relationship between freedom and prosperity.

Explore the program

1 While the early literature on the relationship between political freedom and economic performance pointed to a null or even negative association (see, for example: Barro, R. J., “Democracy and growth,” Journal of Economic Growth 1 (1996): 1–27; or Gerring, J., Bond, P., Barndt, W. T., and Moreno, C., “Democracy and economic growth: A historical perspective,” World Politics 57(3) (2005): 323–364), recent research, based on significantly better data and econometric methods, finds strong positive effects of democracy on growth in the long run (see, for example: Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., and Robinson, J. A., “Democracy does cause growth,” Journal of Political Economy 127(1) (2019): 47–100; or Papaioannou, E. and Siourounis, G., Democratisation and growth. Economic Journal, 118(532) (2008): 1520–1551).

2 For a detailed explanation of the theoretical framework and construction of the Indexes see the “Methodology” section of the Freedom and Prosperity Report 2023.

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Addressing Georgia’s slide away from European integration

Matteo Mecacci — Thu, 19 Jun 2025 11:03:10 +0000

Relations between Georgia and the European Union have become increasingly strained over the last few years, as the Georgian government has taken steps that have placed the country’s longstanding commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration in doubt.

Tensions in the already polarized Georgian political and civic space grew sharply in 2024 when the governing Georgian Dream party adopted legislation targeting the country’s civil society. The Georgian government claimed this so-called Foreign Agents law was inspired by the US Foreign Agents Registration Act. However, critics argued that it closely resembled similar Russian legislation, with measures that included imposing a “foreign influence” label on all NGOs receiving funding from foreign partners, irrespective of their activities.

Since the first draft of Georgia’s Foreign Agents law was presented in 2023, it has faced widespread criticism from the international community. The ODIHR, the Venice Commission, the US State Department, and the European Commission have all found it contrary to international human rights standards. It should be noted that the Georgian authorities withdrew the initial draft in 2023, which played a key role in the EU Commission’s decision to grant Georgia EU candidate status. However, the legislation was subsequently adopted in 2024. Georgia’s EU candidate status has since been frozen.

The Foreign Agents initiative of 2024 was accompanied by an aggressive government campaign to discredit Georgia’s civil society and brand them as unpatriotic. While scrutiny and transparency are necessary elements of any vibrant democracy, the tone adopted by the Georgian authorities has sparked considerable alarm.

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The Foreign Agents law is one aspect of a broader geopolitical drama that has been underway in Georgia in recent years. This trend has accelerated since 2022 as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

On the international stage, the Georgian authorities have consistently condemned Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Georgia’s stance is understandable, as 20 percent of this small country of three million is still occupied by Moscow proxies following the 2008 Russian-Georgian War. In parallel, however, there has also been an escalation in the Georgian government’s anti-Western rhetoric. This has included claims that a so-called “Global War Party” is intent on dragging Georgia into a new war with Russia.

Political tensions escalated in late 2024 around the country’s parliamentary elections. The vote was marked by widespread allegations of electoral fraud from opposition forces, leading to months of ongoing street protests and a refusal by the opposition to take their seats in the new parliament.

This has resulted in a Georgian parliament that now functions without an opposition, and a Georgian government that is increasingly isolated from EU institutions and most individual EU member countries. Meanwhile, the Georgian authorities continue to adopt restrictive measures targeting the country’s political opposition and civil society activists, who now face heavy fines and intimidation amid increasing accusations of human rights violations.

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Is there any way to lower the political and social tensions in today’s Georgia? The path forward may be narrow, but it is worth pursuing.

The country is scheduled to hold local elections in October 2025. This will include voting in the capital Tbilisi, which will potentially have a significant impact on the national political landscape.

At present, some opposition parties are considering a general boycott of the coming vote. I would strongly urge them to participate. History shows that abandoning institutions to the ruling party rarely helps opposition movements to make their case or raise public awareness about their positions.

At the same time, the current authorities should resist the temptation to declare victory or create conditions that would push the opposition to stay away. While such an outcome may offer Georgian Dream a short-term advantage, it would do little to serve the long-term interests of Georgia and its citizens.

Instead, Georgia’s ruling party should demonstrate its readiness for renewed dialogue with the political opposition and with the country’s civil society. As a first step, the government could immediately invite credible international organizations to observe the local elections. Further steps could include signaling a willingness to scrap the Foreign Agents law and roll back recent restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly.

When it comes to staging elections and upholding democratic norms, the ruling party carries a special responsibility to engage with the opposition and wider society. While the Georgian government’s focus on maintaining peace with Russia may be understandable, the current authorities must not lose sight of the need to make peace at home as well. After all, governments represent all their citizens, not just those who voted for them.

Given that trust among Georgia’s different political forces is currently in short supply, the European Union should step up and declare its readiness to help facilitate dialogue. These efforts could focus on implementing ODIHR’s electoral recommendations to ensure the broadest and fairest possible participation in the upcoming vote.

As a gesture of trust and goodwill, the EU could offer to reverse the suspension of the visa-free regime for diplomats and officials that was introduced last year. This could be contingent on the Georgian government also taking steps to deescalate the current crisis.

It is important to recognize that previous efforts at dialogue have fallen short. It is also crucial to acknowledge that emotions are currently running high. Both Georgia and Europe could benefit from a more constructive approach to mending bilateral ties. If the Georgian authorities ultimately reject the idea of deescalation, this would at least provide the EU with greater clarity moving forward.

The people of Georgia continue to overwhelmingly support the country’s EU and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, as well as the reforms needed to build a free and prosperous society. It is our shared responsibility to exhaust every avenue to ensure we do not disappoint them.

Matteo Mecacci is the former director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

It was not always this way. When the modern square first began to take shape in the nineteenth century, it was a relative backwater in an elegant and aged city where the center of gravity remained firmly fixed elsewhere. Tellingly, when Ukrainian officials gathered in Kyiv on January 22, 1919, to publicly sign the unification act between the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, they chose to stage this historic event on Sophia Square rather than Maidan.

As Kyiv rose from the ashes following World War II, the square became more architecturally impressive and gained in logistical importance, but it continued to lack the aura attached to the city’s true heirlooms. Instead, Maidan remained a fairly identikit Soviet public space noted for its large fountains and even larger Lenin monument.

Maidan first became associated with political activism during the dying days of the Soviet Empire in 1990 when it hosted a two-week student protest dubbed the Revolution on Granite that played a significant part in Ukraine’s independence struggle. At the time, it was known as October Revolution Square. Maidan would receive its current name on August 26, 1991, two days after the Ukrainian declaration of independence, but it would be many years before the square began to earn its current reputation as a genuine symbol of Ukrainian statehood.

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During the first decade or so of Ukrainian independence, Maidan was anything but inspiring. The square remained largely empty, with no monuments or memorials to celebrate the newly independent state. Instead, the cult of communism was replaced by crass commercialism. On the spot once occupied by Lenin, a giant TV screen was installed broadcasting an eclectic mix of adverts, pop videos, cage fights, and catwalk shows. Taxi drivers would line up nearby and watch absentmindedly while waiting for new fares.

High above Maidan, the skyline was dominated by the Hotel Moscow. In 2001, the Ukrainian authorities finally decided that this branding was probably inappropriate for a country looking to shake off the shackles of empire, and the hotel name was duly changed from Moscow to Ukraine. Likewise, a colossal Soviet hammer and sickle was allowed to loom large over Maidan until 2003, when it was belatedly removed from the facade of the Trade Union building. The continued prominence of the Soviet crest made a mockery of Independence Square and spoke volumes about the often ambiguous attitudes toward Ukrainian statehood that characterized the early post-Soviet period.

The first big turning point in Maidan’s transformation came following Ukraine’s November 2004 presidential election. Amid massive public anger over a crude Kremlin-backed bid to steal the vote, huge crowds flooded into Kyiv from across the country and congregated on Maidan, establishing a tent city and a round-the-clock presence. This protest movement lasted for over two months and came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Millions of Ukrainians participated. They eventually succeeded in overturning the rigged election and forcing a rerun which was won by the opposition candidate, representing a watershed moment in modern Ukrainian history.

Maidan itself was synonymous with the Orange Revolution and occupied a central position in the mythology that grew up around it. From that moment on, Maidan became not just a place but also an event. To stage a Maidan meant to organize a grassroots protest and hold power to account. This was a particularly terrifying concept for the neighboring Russian authorities. Dread of a Moscow Maidan soon began to haunt the Kremlin, feeding Putin’s obsession with Ukraine and laying the foundations for the horrors that were to follow. The Russian propaganda machine promptly adopted Maidan as a buzzword signifying wicked foreign plots, and continues to use it two decades later without any need for further explanation.

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Nine years after the Orange Revolution, Maidan would be the scene of a second Ukrainian revolution. This time, the spark came when Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, pulled out of a long anticipated EU association agreement and unleashed the riot police against students who objected to this drastic geopolitical U-turn. Once again, millions of Ukrainians flocked to the capital and gathered on Maidan. This time, though, it would not be bloodless.

With strong backing from Russia, the Ukrainian authorities took a hard line approach to the protests, leading to weeks of running battles on Maidan and in the surrounding streets. The nadir came in late February 2014, when dozens of protesters were shot and killed in the city center. This Maidan massacre brought down the Yanukovych regime. With his support base evaporating, the disgraced Ukrainian president fled to Russia. Days later, Putin responded by invading Crimea. Russia’s war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood had begun.

The tragic events of February 2014 had a profound impact on Ukraine’s collective psyche and served to consecrate Maidan in the national imagination. Up until that point, the square had regularly hosted public holidays, pop concerts, and Christmas fairs. In the aftermath of the killings, such events were moved to other locations in the Ukrainian capital. Maidan itself would now be reserved for the most somber and significant occasions in the life of the nation, such as the funerals of soldiers, vigils for Ukrainians held captive in Russia, and memorials marking important Ukrainian anniversaries.

Since 2022, Maidan’s transformation has gained further momentum amid the shock and trauma of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, people began planting flags on the square in memory of fallen soldiers. This impromptu memorial has since expanded organically to become a sea of flags and portraits commemorating those who have lost their lives in the defense of Ukraine. It is an authentic grassroots tribute that is entirely in keeping with the spirit of Maidan.

As Russia’s invasion has unfolded, Maidan’s role as the principal site for wartime mourning and reverence has served to confirm the square’s position at the heart of modern Ukraine’s national story. There could hardly be a more fitting location. After all, Vladimir Putin launched the current war because he viewed the emergence of an independent Ukraine as an intolerable threat to his own authoritarian regime and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s long retreat from empire.

Maidan embodies Putin’s darkest fears. The Russian dictator’s goal remains the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation, but he is acutely aware that the country is slipping inexorably out of the Kremlin orbit. This is nowhere more evident than on Kyiv’s central square, which has become the ultimate symbol of Ukraine’s escape from empire and embrace of an independent identity.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The military coups and their aftermaths in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger have followed a similar pattern: They all occurred in poor and unprosperous countries; they were all followed by some sort of in-fighting or conflict within interim governments (and a second coup in the case of Burkina Faso); and the elections promised in all four countries have yet to take place.

By contrast, Gabon enjoys a comparatively enhanced level of national wealth and societal prosperity. With a population of just 2.3 million people and vast reserves of oil, gold, and manganese, Gabon boasts the second-highest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in continental Sub-Saharan Africa. It also has the third-highest prosperity score among the region’s countries in our Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, which measure prosperity levels across 164 countries by tracking income, health, inequality, environmental health, the treatment of minorities, and education. While Gabon suffers from a level of income inequality that rivals other countries in the region, on the whole, it is more prosperous than its West and Central African counterparts. Furthermore, while Gabon’s coup did give way to an interim military government, there was little to no post-coup conflict. And Gabon held democratic elections on April 12, 2025, that, while not without significant flaws, were nevertheless acclaimed by local, regional, and international observers as peaceful, lawful, and fair.

Gabon is more prosperous than its neighbors

Turning the page on the Bongo dynasty

In the weeks leading up the first election since the 2023 coup, Nguema’s picture could be seen plastered all over the capital city of Libreville. After serving as interim president for nineteen months, he was officially elected president on April 12, winning more than 90 percent of the vote. Both before and after the election, Nguema pledged to “restore dignity to the Gabonese people” and to root out the country’s corruption, which the legal subindex of our Freedom Index indicates is among the worst in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Despite these popular goals, the president has not been without his detractors. Such high vote shares are often indicative of corruption, and critics of Nguema note that he has long been a part of the corrupt political system he pledges to dismantle and that he broke his promise to relinquish power after deposing Bongo. In fact, Nguema is Bongo’s cousin and recently allowed Bongo and his wife to relocate to Angola despite them facing ongoing (but unspecified) corruption charges.

And although voter turnout was high and local observers were largely satisfied with the integrity of the election, Nguema’s most prominent opponent—former Prime Minister Alain Claude Bilie-By-Nze—accused Nguema of taking advantage of state resources to fund his campaign.

Furthermore, his interim government adopted a new constitution in 2024 that the Africa Center for Strategic Studies argues grants too much power to the executive and specifically favored Nguema. For example, the new constitution prevented a major political opponent from running in the election by banning candidates over seventy years of age. It also broke from past tradition by including a clause that allows military members to run in elections, extended the length of presidential terms to seven years, and eliminated the position of prime minister altogether. During Nguema’s time leading the interim government, he also suspended all political parties in a move that critics say gave him a distinct electoral advantage.

While Nguema was greeted with scenes of celebration after carrying out the 2023 coup and won an election victory indicative of overwhelming public support, it remains to be seen whether he is willing and able to instigate meaningful democratic reforms.

Yet, even if competition was restricted in this election, the very fact that it happened and that the Gabonese people were able to peacefully vote for someone other than a member of the Bongo family shows that there is an appetite for change and a willingness to engage in the most fundamental act of democracy.

In short, the years since the coup have provided both reason to believe that a more democratic future in Gabon is possible and reason to fear that Nguema is simply replacing the Bongo family’s form of autocracy with his own.

What the data tell us

The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes highlight a number of trends indicating that a country’s surest path to prosperity involves improving political and economic freedom, as well as the rule of law. Conversely, the data tell us that restricting freedom is a proven way to diminish societal well-being.

When a country experiences a freedom shock—meaning the one-year drop in its Freedom Index score is among the top 20 percent globally since 1995—its progress on prosperity tends to stall or even reverse as time goes on.

A country’s prosperity tends to stall or decline after experiencing a freedom shock

The drop in Gabon’s freedom score from 2022 to 2023 was among the most severe freedom shocks ever recorded—within the top 5 percent of one-year declines over the past thirty years. This decline was driven by a sharp dip in the country’s political freedom score, which was in turn driven by an even sharper fall in its elections score, which measures the extent to which political leaders are chosen in open, clean, and fair elections.

Gabon’s political freedom has declined sharply in recent years

Furthermore, out of the forty-six countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for which we have data, Gabon ranks thirtieth in the judicial independence and effectiveness indicator and thirty-eighth in the legislative constraints on the executive indicator.

Gabon’s judicial independence is below the regional average

Gabon’s executive has fewer legislative constraints than the regional average

It is important to recognize that these issues were fomented by the Bongo regime. However, the disempowered nature of the judiciary and legislature and the recent broad decline in political freedom show that Nguema must act quickly to reverse course before declines in freedom hinder Gabon’s long-term progress on prosperity. The country’s freedom score has changed very little in the time that Nguema has held power as interim president, with political freedom in further, albeit minimal, decline.

Despite Gabon’s impressive prosperity levels and per capita GDP in relation to its neighbors and to the broader Sub-Saharan Africa region, over one-third of the population currently lives in poverty. The Bongo family was known for gorging themselves on resource wealth while much of the population was left to suffer. Despite its high overall prosperity score, Gabon ranks in the bottom third of all Sub-Saharan African countries in the inequality component of the Prosperity Index. It has the fourth-highest unemployment rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, with over 20 percent of the total labor force—and 40 percent of young people—currently unemployed. If Nguema falls back on the autocratic habits of his predecessor and chooses personal wealth over the well-being of his country, any hope for democracy in Gabon that followed the 2023 coup will quickly die out.

The path to enduring freedom and prosperity

The data clearly show that establishing democracy as the political norm will help Gabon set itself apart from its neighbors and enhance national prosperity.

To create a strong and vibrant democracy, Nguema must first come to terms with the idea that his tenure as president is not indefinite. He must also commit himself to empowering core institutions of democracy such as the legislative branch and courts, and he must protect the societal freedoms that are fundamental to thriving democracies. This should include allowing political parties to exist and organize and lifting targeted age limits for presidential candidates.

By committing to competitive democracy and political freedom, Nguema can most effectively enhance prosperity and, in particular, reduce the inequality that has plagued Gabon for so long. It is too early to tell for sure whether Nguema has assumed the presidency with the intention of institutionalizing democracy and reducing inequality in Gabon or with the intention of ruling as an autocrat. What is certain is that the end of the Bongo regime—and the democratic impetus provided by the national election—provides Nguema with the opportunity to turn Gabon into the success story that West and Central Africa has been yearning for. For the good of the people who elected him, Nguema should do everything in his power to capitalize on it.

Will Mortenson is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Correction: This article was updated on June 4, 2025, to reflect the fact that Gabon is located in Central Africa, not West Africa.

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In Syria’s fragile transition there’s a glimmer of a more stable Middle East

Charles Lister — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

For the better part of half a century, Syria has been an open wound in the heart of the Middle East, provoking instability, fueling conflict, and brutally suppressing its own people. Throughout Syria’s nearly fourteen-year civil crisis, a long list of destabilizing knock-on effects spilled over into neighboring countries and the world at large. The long-standing moniker of “what happens in Syria never stays in Syria” perfectly encapsulated what for most of the past decade looked to be a truly intractable crisis.

All of that changed on December 8, 2024, when Bashar al-Assad fled his palace in Damascus en route to a hurried and unexpected asylum in Russia. After a sudden and lightning-fast offensive, a coalition of armed opposition groups toppled Assad’s regime like a house of cards—in the space of ten days. All of a sudden, the international community has been presented with a historic and strategic opportunity to reshape the heart of the Middle East into a more stable, more integrated, and more constructive part of the region.

Syria’s ongoing transition is profoundly fragile. It faces enormous challenges, but it also presents the international community with a dilemma. Since day one, the transition has been led and dominated at the top by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former affiliate of al-Qaeda that was originally born out of the Islamic State group’s predecessor movement, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). That historical baggage provides reason for pause when it comes to engaging Syria’s interim authorities.

However, the HTS of today is the outcome of nearly a decade of change. After splitting from ISIS in 2013, it went to war with the terror group. It publicly broke ties with al-Qaeda in 2016 and proceeded to facilitate the entry of thousands of soldiers into its territory by NATO member Turkey; agreed to and complied with a yearslong ceasefire brokered by Turkey and Russia; established a technocratic “salvation government” in northwest Syria that delivered a higher level of services than other regions of the country; launched crippling crackdowns on both ISIS and al-Qaeda; and began engaging with the international community behind closed doors. Throughout this formative post-2016 period, HTS’s ideology changed in ways that are arguably unprecedented in the history of the jihadist movement, with it not just turning away from global jihad, but turning against it—while embracing “revolution” and the green flag of Syria’s popular uprising.

Despite HTS and its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa being at the helm in Damascus, much of the international community has rushed to engage—calculating that contact and engagement offers a far greater chance of shaping the outcomes of a fragile transition than a policy of isolation. Initially, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland eased many sanctions linked to Syria’s economy, in the hope of breathing some life back into the country. For its part, the outgoing Biden administration introduced a six-month “general license” in January 2025, temporarily waiving some restrictive measures. But this had no effect in facilitating transactions with governing institutions in Syria.

After years of extraordinary conflict, Syria’s economy is broken and the humanitarian crisis worse than ever. Ninety percent of Syrians live under the poverty line; 70 percent of Syrians rely on aid; 99 percent of the Syrian pound’s value has been lost; 50 percent of the country’s basic infrastructure is destroyed; and fuel supplies have dropped to nearly zero. No matter who was running Syria’s transition, the prospects of successfully escaping such catastrophic conditions would be impossible without sanctions relief. Regional states—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar, in particular—stand poised to flood Syria with investment, oil, electricity, and cash, but not while American sanctions prohibit them.

Taking advantage of the historic opportunity provided by Assad’s fall requires doing away with short-term tactical approaches and embracing a long-term view focused on Syrian and regional stability. On December 8, transitional authorities in Damascus were restricted only to HTS. Three months later, some things had changed: A national dialogue and conference had been held; broad committees had been formed to frame a constitutional declaration; and a transitional government was formed that significantly widened representation and technocratic rule in Syria’s ministries. The latter marked a significant broadening of government representation, with just four HTS members out of twenty-three ministers. More than half of the new cabinet members were educated and worked professionally in Europe and the United States. All in all, it marked a shift toward genuine, technocratic government.

Nevertheless, some instability continues. Deeply entrenched sociopolitical and sectarian tensions remain a source of acute concern, but a major spike in violence—as was seen on March 7-8, 2025—was short lived. A government-appointed investigative committee has been tasked with determining culpability for crimes. Meanwhile, structural issues relating to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), foreign fighters, and challenges posed by ISIS and an Alawite armed resistance all persist, but ultimately, a fragile transition still offers the best hope for gradual stabilization.

The United States and NATO face two options: to engage and conditionally support Syria’s transition in the hope that it will continue to consolidate control and broaden its representation; or to disengage and isolate the transition in favor or some other alternative. Neither is without risk, but the latter guarantees severe instability while the former aims to avoid it. President Trump’s announcement in Saudi Arabia in May 2025 that he intends to end all sanctions on Syria is a sign that strategic calculations are returning to the forefront of US policymaking on Syria. Subsequent public comments by Secretary of State Marco Rubio in front of Congress underlined that shift, as he suggested that if the United States did not lift sanctions, Syria was destined to collapse back into civil conflict. The key here will be time – how swiftly can executive waivers be issued to de facto remove sanctions restrictions on Syria’s economy? The EU’s decision on May 20 to lift all sanctions would suggest that things are set to move quickly. Should US diplomats return to Damascus, Syria could confidently be placed on a new trajectory of recovery.

Meanwhile, US Central Command (CENTCOM) has continued to play an instrumental role in facilitating negotiations between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus, and in pressing the SDF to accept the framework agreement signed on March 11. Beginning in mid-December 2024, CENTCOM contact has included meetings with Sharaa and an established line of communication with the Defense and Interior ministries, through which counter-ISIS activities are coordinated, deconflicted, and planned. Since January 2024, at least eight ISIS plots have been foiled by the interim government in part due to intelligence provided by the United States. A surge in US drone strikes targeting legacy al-Qaeda operatives in Syria’s northwest in February 2025 was also almost certainly the result of a similar exchange.

With the United States determined to minimize its military and strategic investments in the Middle East and with NATO increasingly distracted by concerns in Europe, the prospect for stabilizing one of the thorniest and most destabilizing conflict theaters in recent history should be a no-brainer. Despite the risks and the many unknowns, prioritizing a strategy on Syria that is focused on shaping a stable and capable central government that is integrated into its neighborhood and capable of collectively resolving its own issues should be the only option on the table. That is the choice already made by Europe and the Middle East and the United States should follow suit. Should the Trump administration decisively join that track of engagement, the chances of Syria charting a course of stability will rise significantly.

Charles Lister is a senior fellow and head of the Syria Initiative at the Middle East Institute. Follow him on X at @Charles_Lister.

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The fall of Assad has opened a door. But can Syria seize the moment?

Qutaiba Idlbi, Charles Lister, and Marie Forestier — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 13:00:00 +0000

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For more than a decade, Syria’s crisis has caused unimaginable suffering inside the country and a constant stream of strategically significant spillover effects across the Middle East and globally. However, this dynamic changed in late 2024, when armed opposition groups in Syria’s northwest launched a sudden and unprecedentedly sophisticated and disciplined offensive, capturing the city of Aleppo and triggering an implosion of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In the space of ten days, Assad’s rule collapsed like a house of cards, dealing a crippling blow to Iran’s role in Syria and significantly weakening Russia’s influence.

Now, for the first time in many years, Syria has a chance to recover and reintegrate into the international system. If the United States, Europe, Middle Eastern nations, and other stakeholders embrace the right approach, support the right policies, and encourage Syria’s transition to move in the appropriate direction, the world will benefit—and Syrians will find peace. The work of the Syria Strategy Project (SSP) and the policy recommendations in the report “Reimagining Syria: A roadmap for peace and prosperity beyond Assad” present a realistic and holistic vision for realizing that goal.

This report is the result of intensive joint efforts by the Atlantic Council, the Middle East Institute (MEI), and the European Institute of Peace (EIP), which have been collaborating since March 2024 on the SSP. At its core, the project has involved a sustained process of engagement with subject-matter experts and policymakers in the United States, Europe, and across the Middle East to develop a realistic and holistic strategic vision for sustainably resolving Syria’s crisis. This process, held almost entirely behind closed doors, incorporated Syrian experts, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders at every step.

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How the United States can support Cameroon as it faces its next democratic test

Jude Mutah — Fri, 30 May 2025 13:43:49 +0000

Cameroon’s upcoming presidential election, slated for October 2025, is set to be a showdown of critical importance for the country. It can either break Cameroon’s pattern of disputed and unfair elections, opening the door to a democratic shift for the country, or entrench that pattern, fueling instability and leaving opportunities untapped.

Ahead of this pivotal moment, the United States can act now to support a democratic electoral process in Cameroon and help the country navigate what unfolds after the vote.

Cameroonian President Paul Biya, now ninety-two years old and having held power since 1982, is one of Africa’s longest-ruling leaders. Over the course of his decades in office, elections have been routinely marred by fraud allegations and repression. In the country’s first multiparty elections, held in 1992, Biya clung to power amid accusations of rigging, and opposition leader John Fru Ndi was placed under house arrest during ensuing protests. More recently, in the 2018 election, Biya was declared the winner and credited with 71 percent of the vote, but there were irregularities: Turnout in the conflict-torn Anglophone regions was barely 10 percent. Protests over the result led to mass arrests of opposition supporters. Despite concerns about his age and health, Biya is expected to run again, presenting himself as the guarantor of stability. However, public clamoring for change has grown loud: Catholic bishops have urged Biya to step aside, and even a pro-government newspaper opined that the long-time leader “deserves a rest” in favor of new leadership.

Biya’s ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) and its allies are closing ranks to preserve power. Throughout 2024, several CPDM elites and patronage partners have pressed Biya to seek another term, touting his experience and warning that the country could suffer instability if he steps down. They are again mobilizing a broad coalition of smaller parties to back Biya, as in past elections. Meanwhile, intense behind-the-scenes jockeying is underway over who might succeed the aging president in a post-Biya scenario. Various power brokers have been floated as successors. Talk about one such name, Biya’s son Franck, has raised fears of an undemocratic dynastic transition. The uncertainty around succession is a significant risk factor, a ticking time bomb that could trigger factional infighting if not managed transparently.

The opposition sees 2025 as a rare chance to finally end decades of one-person rule. Over thirty opposition parties have allied to unify behind a single candidate, Maurice Kamto, aiming to overcome Cameroon’s one-round, first-past-the-post system that has historically favored the incumbent. Kamto—a former minister who insists he won the 2018 election—is campaigning on anti-corruption and reform, tapping into public yearning for change. Yet the regime has moved aggressively to undercut this challenge. Early this year, authorities banned two opposition coalitions, calling them “illegal” and “clandestine” associations, driving Kamto’s alliance underground. Legal obstacles are piling up: Election law requires a candidate’s party to hold parliamentary seats, but the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC), Kamto’s party, has none after it encouraged Cameroonians to boycott a flawed 2020 legislative vote. In a brazen step, the CPDM-dominated government postponed the next legislative elections to 2026, denying the opposition any chance to gain seats before the presidential race.

Meanwhile, harassment of those who dissent continues unabated—activists and journalists are detained on spurious charges, peaceful protests are barred, and media outlets critical of the regime are silenced. These tactics cast doubt on whether the 2025 polls will be free or fair, absent significant pressure for a level playing field. Nevertheless, civil society and youth activists have been mobilizing: In 2024, they led mass voter registration drives to encourage turnout, signaling a grassroots appetite for change despite the odds.

The stakes extend beyond who wins. They encompass Cameroon’s stability, economy, and regional security. A flawed election could inflame simmering conflicts and public frustrations. The Anglophone Crisis in the country’s Northwest and Southwest regions has already killed over six thousand people and displaced nearly 700,000 internally, with around 100,000 more fleeing to Nigeria as refugees. Separatist militants reject the upcoming election and have violently enforced boycotts in those regions before, leaving a significant portion of the population disenfranchised.

Elsewhere, a contested outcome or a result marred by repression could spark unrest among a young population increasingly fed up with corruption and lack of opportunity. Ethno-regional tensions might also flare if a perceived power grab fuels resentment among communities who feel excluded. By contrast, a credible election and peaceful outcome would give the next government a mandate to address these crises, from pursuing a political solution to the Anglophone conflict to focusing the military on the Boko Haram insurgency in the Far North region. Cameroon is richly endowed with oil, timber, and fertile land, but its economic potential has been blunted by graft and mismanagement. Decades of kleptocratic governance have left over half the population impoverished. Another seven years of business-as-usual would likely deepen economic malaise and alienation, whereas a new commitment among leadership to reform could attract investment and better harness Cameroon’s resources for development.

International actors are watching closely, as Cameroon’s trajectory will impact Central African stability. France—Cameroon’s former colonial ruler—has backed Biya in the past, though French officials now avoid openly taking sides. The United States and European Union (EU) regularly urge fair elections and respect for human rights (the United States, for example, cut some military aid due to abuses in Anglophone regions). Still, their security cooperation interests temper Western leverage.

Meanwhile, other external players are exploiting the situation: Russian-linked media in Cameroon spread anti-Western narratives to bolster Biya’s regime. Regional governments, many led by entrenched leaders, generally prefer Biya to stay in power and are unlikely to press for change, prioritizing stability over democracy.

Ultimately, Cameroon’s future will be decided at home. A genuinely free and fair election would bolster Cameroon’s international standing and unlock greater foreign support, whereas a blatantly rigged vote may isolate the regime and sow internal turmoil.

Cameroon’s vote is about more than the country’s democratic future: As one analysis noted, it is part of a broader test of whether Africa’s elections will uphold democratic norms or contribute to a slide backward. Here is how the United States can help support democracy in Cameroon during this pivotal election year:

Use diplomacy to promote a free and fair election: The United States should convince Cameroonian leaders, both publicly and privately, to uphold democratic norms in the 2025 vote. Diplomatic engagement should emphasize that opposition candidates must be allowed to compete freely, international observers should be admitted, and security forces must refrain from violence. Coordinating these messages with allies (France, the EU, and the African Union) will increase impact and help deter electoral misconduct.
Leverage aid and security ties: Washington should tie aspects of its assistance to Cameroon’s electoral conduct and respect for human rights. The prospect of continued military aid and business engagement can be made conditional on the regime permitting a transparent election and avoiding crackdowns. Conversely, a blatantly fraudulent or violent process should prompt targeted consequences (such as visa bans or aid suspensions). By calibrating incentives and penalties, the United States can encourage accountability without undermining vital counterterrorism cooperation.
Support election monitoring and civic engagement: To reduce the risk of fraud or unrest, the United States should back robust election-observation and civil-society initiatives. This includes supporting credible international and domestic observers and assisting local groups in voter education and parallel vote tabulation. Such efforts—coordinated with other partners—will bolster public confidence in the process, deter manipulation, and empower Cameroonians to defend their votes peacefully.
Plan for post-election stability and reforms: The United States should prepare to help Cameroon navigate the vote’s aftermath. If the election results are disputed or violence looms, Washington (with African partners and United Nations agencies) can offer to facilitate dialogue or mediation to prevent escalation. In any outcome, the United States should encourage the winning candidate to pursue inclusive reforms—for example, an inclusive national dialogue to address the Anglophone Crisis and to introduce tangible anticorruption measures. Targeted US support (diplomatic partnership, technical aid, and peacebuilding programs) can be leveraged to help achieve these steps, reinforcing that long-term US partnership will deepen if Cameroon advances stability, inclusivity, and good governance.

Jude Mutah is a policy expert and practitioner in democracy support, peacebuilding, and governance, with over a decade of experience across Africa. He holds a Doctorate in Public Administration from the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Baltimore.

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From rubble to rebirth: A model for Syria’s reconstruction

Mahmood Alhosain — Thu, 08 May 2025 15:53:47 +0000

Almost six months have passed since Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria. The most notable event of this transitional phase was the establishment of a new Syrian government in late March 2025, consisting of twenty-three ministers from different backgrounds.

The new government has inherited the aftermath of more than five decades of authoritarian rule, compounded by the devastating consequences of nearly fourteen years of armed conflict. In addition, Syria continues to grapple with the impact of harsh international sanctions, which were imposed in response to the al-Assad regime’s widespread human rights violations. These challenges have rendered Syria a fragile state, with its institutions on the verge of total collapse.

However, the fall of the dictatorial regime and the formation of a new government offer an opportunity to begin rebuilding state institutions. Whether this new Damascus can seize this opportunity relies on four key pillars: achieving security and political stability, fostering inclusive political participation, establishing justice as a precondition for sustainable peace, and lifting sanctions to prevent the resurgence of violence.

The first pillar: Security and political stability

A deeply fragile security landscape, shaped by two major challenges, hinders Syria’s progress toward stability.

The first challenge is that the regions outside of the new Syrian government’s control, particularly the Jazira region of Eastern Syria—the provinces of Hasakah, Raqqa, and the eastern part of Deir ez-Zor—are currently under the authority of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In March 2025, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement outlining the integration of the SDF into the institutions of the newly formed Syrian state. However, the agreement remains vague in its provisions and lacks a concrete timeline for implementation.

Subsequently, it is imperative that the international coalition—led by the United States, which still maintains military presence in Syria—plays a proactive role in facilitating the agreement’s execution. This involves applying political pressure and actively sponsoring dialogue between the parties to foster mutual understanding and avoid any potential military confrontation.

Nevertheless, spoilers are working to derail any potential agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF. Among them is the hardline faction within the SDF, primarily composed of foreign cadres affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). They oppose the agreement because its implementation would significantly diminish their influence, including restoring Damascus’s authority over oil and gas sites currently under SDF control. The shift would also undermine the influence of prominent SDF warlords, many of whom are PKK affiliates wielding unchecked authority.

Consequently, they have sought to escalate tensions and resist cooperating with the new administration, as seen with the SDF’s recent crackdown on civilians who displayed the new Syrian national flag. Moreover, according to human rights organizations, the SDF arrested 93 civilians in March 2025, including seven children.

The second challenge is Israel’s incessant military operations, which pose grave risks for Syria, the region, and Israel itself.

Fragmentation of the Syrian state could invite renewed foreign interference, particularly from Iran, which may view Syria’s weakened and divided state as a strategic opportunity to expand its influence.

But for Israel, the military campaign in Syria serves an objective of systematic destruction of Syrian military infrastructure to prevent the rebuilding of a functional defense apparatus. This also assists Israel in implementing a new regional security landscape, aimed at obstructing stabilization efforts through continued airstrikes and ground incursions.

Change in this calculus must come through pressure. The international community—particularly the European Union, Arab states, and the United States—must exert more meaningful and sustained diplomatic efforts to halt Israel’s military actions if they want to achieve sustainable peace in Syria.

The second pillar: Inclusive political participation

In Syria, decades of exclusion and sectarian domination under the al-Assad regime dismantled social cohesion and eroded political trust. It will be crucial to establish a political system that ensures genuine participation for all societal components—political, sectarian, ethnic groups, and civil society organizations. Such a system must provide for the equitable distribution of political and administrative influence through effective participatory mechanisms.

While the new Syrian administration has launched a national dialogue and appointed a qualified government, political participation must go beyond surface-level representation. Participatory governance must be the foundation for rebuilding state institutions. Any political exclusion or power monopolization risks driving certain groups toward disengagement or opposition, transforming them from constructive participants into potential nemeses of the political process.

Achieving this requires pursuing two complementary paths: both a top-down and a bottom-up approach.

The top-down model necessitates that the government lead by initiating structured and transparent programs that facilitate political inclusion. This includes continuing the national dialogue on foundational issues like transitional justice, constitutional reform, state structure, the political system, and foreign relations. These dialogues must be inclusive and truly representative of Syria’s diverse fabric.
Notably, Syrian public opinion demonstrates clear rejection of sectarian-based systems, favoring instead frameworks rooted in civil representation and citizenship. The new Syrian government must treat all Syrians as individual citizens, rather than as members of religious or ethnic groups, and anchoring national discourse in the concept of citizenship is fundamental.

Equally vital is the bottom-up role of civil society in advancing political transition and decision-making. Civil society should be granted the necessary space to operate freely, reflecting Syrian societal dynamics and avoiding inflaming social sensitivities. Valuable lessons can be drawn from the experiences of exiled Syrian civil actors, who—during the war—demonstrated a clear willingness to engage politically. According to the literature, these initiatives reveal strong potential for grassroots engagement. Building on these experiences is crucial for forming a cohesive, credible civil society capable of playing a constructive role in stabilization and institutional rebuilding.

The third pillar: Transitional justice

Transitional justice is pivotal for achieving sustainable peace in Syria. After more than a decade of violent conflict—fueled by an authoritarian regime responsible for killing hundreds of thousands and displacing millions—there is growing consensus that any political settlement that neglects Syrians’ demands for accountability will neither end the violence, nor enable legitimate and stable state building.

Lack of transitional justice fosters a culture of impunity and fuels the risk of renewed violence, driven by cycles of personal and collective vengeance. As numerous studies have shown, accountability goes beyond a legal or ethical imperative—it is a structural requirement for achieving long-term stability and peace.

It also includes a social and moral process that must begin with public acknowledgment of the suffering endured by victims and their families throughout the 14-year war. Such acknowledgment lays the groundwork for reparations and paves the way for meaningful national reconciliation, helping to move beyond nearly half a century of repression and violence.

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The literature on conflict and transitional justice highlights the importance of context-specific approaches. In Syria, this means that transitional justice must be rooted in the aspirations of Syrians, particularly survivors of violence, internally displaced persons, and refugees. Empirical research on Syrian refugee communities abroad confirms that many see justice as essential to achieving sustainable peace.

Therefore, the new government needs to initiate a transparent and credible transitional justice process supported by the international community. This process must include well-defined implementation mechanisms aligned with international legal standards and grounded in justice and human rights principles. Moreover, it should avoid transplanting external justice models, as approaches that are not adapted to Syria’s social and political context may reinforce ethnic and sectarian divisions rather than heal them.

This effort demands sincere political will, robust institutional frameworks, and the active participation of a broad range of actors, including human rights and legal organizations, civil society groups, and local communities. Furthermore, sustained support from international institutions, particularly the United Nations, is essential to ensuring the effectiveness of the transitional justice process.

The fourth pillar: Lifting sanctions

In the wake of the regime’s collapse, lifting sanctions has become paramount to achieving two core objectives. First, enabling the reconstruction of state institutions. And second, alleviating the profound economic suffering endured by the Syrian civilian population.

The continuation of sanctions severely impedes stabilization and early recovery efforts. Without access to financial and material resources, the state remains incapable of delivering basic services, perpetuating Syria’s status as a fragile state. This vacuum risks fostering environments conducive to radicalization and renewed violence, which could destabilize Syria and the broader region.

Years of economic isolation have induced severe shortages in basic goods, rampant inflation, record unemployment, and a dramatic depreciation of the Syrian pound. These conditions have exacerbated poverty and social disintegration, undermining any prospect for national reconciliation and peacebuilding.

Economic sanctions against Syria are exceedingly complex. Following the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations imposed comprehensive sanctions in response to the al-Assad regime’s widespread violence against civilians.

US sanctions have proven to be the most stringent, as they are open-ended with no built-in expiration, unlike EU sanctions, which are subject to annual renewal. Additionally, US sanctions on Syria predate the 2011 uprising, tracing back to 1979 when Washington designated Syria a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The most expansive US sanctions to date were imposed after 2011, culminating in the Caesar Act, which significantly intensified financial and economic restrictions on the regime and its affiliates.

While reports have surfaced indicating that the United States has outlined certain conditions for sanction relief—such as addressing the issue of foreign fighters—it is imperative that the new Syrian administration prioritize meaningful internal reforms. These reforms should include guaranteeing fundamental rights, refraining from suppressing individual freedoms, enhancing transparency, and reinforcing the rule of law. Commitment to these principles will likely prove more effective in building international confidence than focusing solely on foreign policy overtures.

Rebuilding Syrian state institutions in the post-Assad era requires a comprehensive, multi-dimensional approach integrating security and political stability, inclusive political participation, transitional justice, and sustained efforts to lift economic sanctions. Achieving this requires the support of both international actors and local stakeholders to ensure sustainable peace and stability.

Mahmood Alhosain is a PhD candidate in Conflict and Peace Studies in the political science department at Radboud University. His areas of interest focus on: Post-conflict studies, development, and deconstruction.

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Four contests for democracy in Europe challenge the narrative of advancing authoritarianism

Daniel Fried — Mon, 21 Apr 2025 14:14:55 +0000

Today, we are bombarded with evidence of rising authoritarianism and retreating liberal democracy, from Russian aggression in Europe to the democratic decline and degradation recently documented by Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit. These twin trends are real and reshaping global affairs. But they do not tell the full story. Consider events that have been unfolding over the past weeks and months in countries in and around Europe, where large and in several cases sustained pro-democracy demonstrations have put some authoritarian regimes on the defensive.

Before zooming in on these storylines, it’s useful to zoom out on the broader sweep of history: For two centuries, Europe has advanced toward liberal democracy in uneven cycles: in 1848, a wave of mostly unsuccessful liberal and patriotic revolts; in 1918, the establishment of mostly liberal-democratic successors to the fallen Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires in Central and Eastern Europe; in the 1920s and 1930s, a surge of authoritarian and fascist takeovers; after 1945, democratic restoration in Western Europe under Pax Americana and Soviet imposition of communism in Central and Eastern Europe; and in 1989-91, a series of mostly successful liberal and patriotic revolts in Central and Eastern Europe. The twenty-first century has featured the ascent of nationalist, populist, and illiberal politics in Western Europe along with authoritarian and illiberal challenges or regression in Central and Eastern Europe.

These contemporary trends are on display in Hungary and Serbia, with the latter locked in a conflict between nationalism and liberal democracy since the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Further east, in Turkey, the democratic opening and economic success that marked the early years of the AK Party’s rule have since steadily eroded. While nearby Georgia experienced a wave of economic and some democratic reform after the popular Rose Revolution in 2003, it has gradually slid into authoritarianism under Georgian Dream after the party was democratically elected in 2012.

Now, however, pro-democracy demonstrators are turning out in big numbers in Budapest, Belgrade, Istanbul, and Tbilisi. The specific grievances propelling people to the streets vary, but all challenge political authoritarianism and cronyism. So far, these protests have not resulted in any changes of regime—and they may never do so. But, if nothing else, the upsurge of democratic action in the face of threats and repression challenges and complicates the dark narrative that authoritarianism is inexorably on the march across Europe.

Below are closer looks at how these consequential contests for democracy are playing out, drawing on assessments that knowledgeable observers connected with these countries shared with me.

Tbilisi

Georgia

Budapest

Hungary

Belgrade

Serbia

Istanbul

Turkey

Tbilisi, Georgia

For nearly one hundred and fifty days, Georgians have taken to the streets in protest, resisting an authoritarian system imposed on them through Russian-backed state capture and information and electoral manipulation.

The ruling Georgian Dream party, led by Georgian businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili—whom the United States has sanctioned under an executive order targeting Kremlin agents—was initially freely elected but has spent the past decade consolidating power over all branches of government and aiming to do the same with independent media and civil society, squandering a democratic mandate in favor of raw power. A “foreign agents” law, modeled after Russian legislation, has been revived to brand Western-funded nongovernmental organizations and independent media as enemies of the state and force them out of public life. US-sanctioned Chinese surveillance tools track demonstrators with precision yet somehow fail to identify the police officers and men in black uniforms who abduct, beat, and torture protesters and reporters. Independent journalists and civic activists are jailed on politically motivated charges. Repressive laws are mounting, designed to silence dissent and tighten the regime’s grip. What was once a slow erosion of democratic space has become a galloping assault on it.

Civil resistance began slowly, in the aftermath of parliamentary elections in October 2024 that were criticized by international observers. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, for example, noted “serious concerns” about “the independence of institutions involved in the election process and pressure on voters.” That resistance surged after Georgian Dream announced in late November that it intended to abandon Georgia’s path toward European Union (EU) membership, a goal that is supported by more than 80 percent of the population and enshrined in the Georgian constitution. Resistance was not partisan but civilizational, as it was in Ukraine in 2014: a movement for a European, not a post-Soviet, future.

In Tbilisi and across the country, public servants, artists, educators, business owners, and students joined forces in a show of unity rarely achieved in the country’s modern history. Even ambassadors have resigned in protest. Despite the government raising fines—now set well above the average monthly salary—threatening livelihoods, and weaponizing the legal system, the protesters remain undeterred week after week. They are demanding new elections, the release of political prisoners, and a commitment to seek a European future.

One Georgian sympathetic to the demonstrators put the stakes this way: “For over a decade, Georgia’s ruling party cloaked itself in pro-Western rhetoric, masking a steady drift toward illiberalism. But after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the mask slipped. The allegiances of the current regime in Tbilisi lie elsewhere: openly aligned with Moscow, increasingly tied to Beijing, and comfortably situated within a growing authoritarian bloc that seeks to discredit liberal democracy, declare it obsolete, and replace it with a new world order shaped in its image.”

Budapest, Hungary

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party have consolidated power and defeated rivals since he assumed power for a second time in 2010. Orbán has emerged as a leading advocate of “illiberal democracy” (he helped coin the phrase), attracting ideological sympathizers, especially from the United States. His governance has included cultural conservatism and emphasis on what Fidesz terms traditional values; rhetorical hostility toward the European Union, notwithstanding the substantial EU funding Hungary receives; authoritarian political evolution; and flirtation with Russia. Some of this political agenda has significant support in Hungary, but credible charges of corruption and economic stagnation have begun to change that picture.

Displaying a desire for change, hundreds of thousands of Hungarians attended a March 15 National Day event organized by the main opposition right-of-center party, the Tisztelet és Szabadság Párt (Respect and Freedom Party), which is abbreviated as Tisza. The demonstrations have continued in the weeks since, even as protesters face increasingly frequent and aggressive attacks.

Tisza is a comet in the Hungarian political landscape. Founded just a year ago, it is led by Peter Magyar, a former Fidesz member who resigned from his government post in protest in February 2024, accusing the ruling party of corruption. Now a fierce critic of Orbán and Fidesz, Magyar is targeting state-level corruption, the poor performance of the economy, and the government’s dismantling of the pillars of democracy. The demonstrations and strong showing by Tisza have occurred despite Orbán’s control of the national media, a smear campaign unleashed against Magyar, and the increasingly threatening and toxic environment in which the Hungarian opposition operates.

Orbán appears worried about upcoming national elections in 2026. His speech during National Day on March 15 was perhaps the ugliest address he’s ever delivered. He called for an Easter “clean-up” and labeled his opponents “bed bugs”—echoing, to Hungarians’ ears, Hungarian fascist speeches from the 1930s and 1940s. His rubber-stamp parliament has further restricted laws governing free assembly. On March 19, it banned LGBTQI+ pride marches. With the tanking of the economy and the highest inflation rate in the EU, Hungary’s political winds may be shifting.

In describing the change afoot in his native country, a veteran of Hungary’s successful democratic dissident movement in the 1980s relayed an anecdote. As he walked by a group of Tisza supporters gathering for a demonstration in Budapest, he said, “Go, Tisza, go.” In an apparent allusion to Tisza’s other meaning as the name of the second-largest river in Hungary, they responded, “We are flooding. We are flooding.”

People gather at the Elisabeth Bridge as they take part in a demonstration against the banning of the annual Pride march and curbing the rights of assembly, in Budapest, Hungary, April 1, 2025. REUTERS/Bernadett Szabo

Belgrade, Serbia

Protests in Serbia have been ongoing for more than five months. They were sparked by a tragedy on November 1, 2024, when the canopy of a newly renovated train station in the northern city of Novi Sad collapsed, killing fifteen people. The cause of the disaster was corruption; the project was vastly overpriced, and the building was opened without the necessary permits.

Unlike many protests in the past, the demonstrations across Serbia today are led by students with no formal or singular leader, making them difficult for the authorities to control. The demonstrators’ main demand is not a change of government but the enforcement of the law. They want the government to investigate corruption and the hold those responsible for it accountable.

Serbia has one of the most acute brain drains in Europe. It ranks among the top countries for youth emigration, especially in information technology, medicine, and engineering. However, students from state universities who are participating in these protests consistently emphasize that they do not want to leave Serbia. Instead, they explain that they want to stay and live in a normal, free country where institutions do their job, where young people can build a future without political interference, and where democratic principles are respected.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, whose roots are in Serbian nationalist politics, has dismissed the accusations against the government, claiming that protesters’ demands have already been met after officials published thousands of documents related to the construction of the Novi Sad train station, prosecutors placed more than a dozen people in custody over the canopy collapse, and Prime Minister Miloš Vučević stepped down in January. With the media largely under government influence, students have resorted to unconventional methods to express their views. They have walked across Serbia to personally spread their message, culminating in the largest protest in the country’s history, with an estimated 325,000 participants, on March 15.

Despite the peaceful nature of the March 15 protests, during the fifteen minutes of silence in honor of the victims of the Novi Sad disaster, authorities appear to have used a sonic weapon, or long-range acoustic device—a nonlethal device that emits high-intensity sound waves to cause disorientation and pain. As a result, hundreds of people reportedly required medical assistance. Initially, the government denied possessing such a weapon, but evidence later surfaced that it had purchased the device, and multiple photos appear to show it on a police jeep parked in front of the National Assembly on the day of the protest. Many Serbians believe that the intent was to provoke chaos, giving the government a pretext for imposing a state of emergency.

What comes next? Possible scenarios include a general strike to increase pressure on the government to form a transitional or expert government, with a mandate limited to six to twelve months. This approach might fulfill the students’ demands and ensure the holding of free and fair elections, or it could lead instead to increased state repression. As a Serbian observer put it, “Vučić is balancing between crackdowns and electoral manipulation, but one thing is clear: Students—strongly supported by university professors and deans, high school teachers, farmers, and many other Serbian citizens—have emerged as a crucial political force, determined to persist in their fight for justice.”

Istanbul, Turkey

The jailing on March 19 of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, who is seen as the main rival to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, set off nationwide demonstrations under the slogan “Right, Law, Justice” despite a temporary ban on gatherings. These are the largest protests in the country since the 2013 Gezi Park protests.

Prior to İmamoğlu’s jailing, the main political opposition in the country, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), was preparing to hold primaries to elect its presidential candidate for the 2028 elections amid speculation about a potential early election. İmamoğlu was expected to be elected as the CHP’s presidential candidate, given his popularity across the political spectrum. İmamoğlu has won the Istanbul mayorship—often considered a key indicator of national political trends (Erdogan himself was once Istanbul’s mayor)—three times: first in 2019, with the elections then repeated due to alleged irregularities, and most recently in 2024.

On March 18, only five days before the CHP primaries, İmamoğlu’s university nullified his bachelor’s degree, citing alleged irregularities. Since a bachelor’s degree is a requirement for the presidency in Turkey, the move has jeopardized İmamoğlu’s candidacy. The next day, on March 19, İmamoğlu was detained in an investigation over corruption and support for terrorist organizations. His detention sparked widespread protests across the country, with many viewing it as politically motivated. Despite the protests, the Turkish courts officially ordered İmamoğlu’s arrest for corruption charges on March 23. On the same day, the CHP held its primaries for official party members as scheduled, with an additional invitation extended to all Turkish citizens to vote in symbolic “support” ballot boxes. While İmamoğlu was being transferred to Silivri Prison—notorious for holding individuals accused of political crimes—more than fifteen million Turks voted for him to be the next opposition presidential candidate.

In the weeks since, Saraçhane district, where the İstanbul town hall is located, has been the scene of protests and nightly condemnation speeches by CHP leader Özgür Özel. Drone footage shows hundreds of thousands of people in and around the square, with more protesters also converging around other municipal buildings. Many nights at 8:00 p.m., the sounds of pans, whistles, car horns, and shouts of protest slogans rise in Istanbul and other major cities.

Across Turkey, university students are at the forefront of the protests, joined by members of parliament and bar associations. The demonstrations start peacefully but often escalate through the night into violent confrontations with the police, with widespread use of rubber bullets, pepper gas, and water cannons. At least 1,900 people have reportedly been detained, including students, academics, lawyers, and journalists. The social media platform X initially deactivated opposition accounts. After facing backlash from international media, however, it issued a statement condemning the pressure it received from Turkish courts.

While the street protests have mostly calmed down following the Eid holidays, a broader economic boycott called by the CHP continues. Many Turks are avoiding some major media outlets, bookstores, coffeeshops, bus companies, and furniture brands for either failing to cover the protests, mistreating the demonstrators, or generally being perceived as close to government figures.

Since March 19, a broad segment of Turkish society has taken to the streets and to social media to express a growing concern that the democratic will of the people is under threat. Turkish observers shared that many Turks view what happened to İmamoğlu as a tipping point, reinforcing longstanding apprehension about the gradual erosion of democratic values in the Turkish Republic.

***

These are ongoing, unfinished storylines that have produced no definitive results so far. Popular protest can rise and fall. Democratic dissent fails more often than it succeeds. Authorities have the guns and thus the advantage on any given day. New forms of information manipulation may give an additional edge to incumbent authoritarian regimes.

And yet, the dissidents of the Baltic states, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland’s Solidarity movement were all written off by Western experts in and out of government, who urged “realism” and resignation. As it turned out, pro-democracy movements can, sometimes, bend the arc of history despite the odds and the skeptics. Talk of the irresistible rise of authoritarianism may be premature.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He is also on the board of directors of the National Endowment for Democracy and a visiting professor at Warsaw University. Fried served for forty years in the US Foreign Service. He is a former US ambassador to Poland, assistant secretary of state for Europe, and coordinator of sanctions policy. Follow him on X @AmbDanFried.

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Charai joins TV Abraham to discuss how Trump can curb the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region

Atlantic Council — Wed, 16 Apr 2025 22:15:47 +0000

Original source

The post Charai joins TV Abraham to discuss how Trump can curb the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Tahir in MSNBC on how Trump’s decision to cut Radio Free Europe comes at a great cost to democracy

Muhammad Tahir — Mon, 24 Mar 2025 14:13:23 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On March 24, Muhammad Tahir, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former RFE/RL Central and South Asia liaison in Washington, DC, was published in MSNBC on the termination of the US Agency for Global Media’s RFE/RL federal funding grant and its impact.

In 2003, when I first walked through the doors of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), one of the first things I noticed was the wall of fallen heroes, RFE/RL journalists murdered for simply reporting the truth. Their names and photos were a chilling reminder that this wasn’t just a job. It was a mission.

Muhammad Tahir

Fellow

Muhammad Tahir

Eurasia Center

Central Asia Media

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Silencing Voice of America will only strengthen autocrats around the world

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 20 Mar 2025 18:53:47 +0000

United States President Donald Trump has moved to shut down a series of prominent US-funded international media outlets including Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty as he continues efforts to cut government spending and reshape US foreign policy. In a March 15 statement, the White House said the decision “will ensure that taxpayers are no longer on the hook for radical propaganda.”

Critics fear the move will strengthen the position of authoritarian regimes around the world while leaving millions of people in closed societies without access to independent information. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty CEO Steve Capus called the step “a massive gift to America’s enemies.” He warned that the shutdown would make the United States weaker and would be celebrated by “the Iranian Ayatollahs, Chinese communist leaders, and autocrats in Moscow and Minsk.”

Russian opposition figure Vladimir Kara-Murza was one of numerous activists from the front lines of the fight against resurgent authoritarianism to voice their alarm over the closures. For many people living in authoritarian societies, outlets like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty have provided an objective and trustworthy alternative to what is often a heavily censored domestic information space. Kara-Murza suggested the demise of these outlets would be toasted in Moscow and beyond. “One more champagne bottle opened in the Kremlin,” he quipped.

As expected, the shutdown of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America was enthusiastically welcomed on prime time Russian state TV. Margarita Simonyan, who heads Russia’s flagship international media platform RT and state-owned media group Rossiya Segodnya, called the news an “awesome decision by Trump.” Meanwhile, fellow Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov took time out from fantasizing about a nuclear attack on Britain to mock the more than one thousand journalists now facing an uncertain future. “You are nasty, lying, deplorable traitors to the motherland. Go and die in a ditch,” he commented.

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For decades, authoritarian regimes ranging from Nazi Germany to Communist China have griped against the influence of US-funded independent media outlets, and have adopted various measures to try and block them. Voice of America was first set up in 1942 at the height of World War II, while Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was established in 1950 during the early years of the Cold War to provide uncensored information to people living behind the Iron Curtain.

Initially focused on radio broadcasts, these outlets and their numerous affiliates have evolved over time to become multimedia platforms reaching hundreds of millions of people every week. This has never been a purely altruistic endeavor; advocates maintain that providing access to objective information abroad strengthens the US position internationally.

Until their dramatic recent shutdown, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and many other regional pro-democracy platforms such as Radio Free Asia were all overseen by the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM). While often the subject of debate in the United States due to allegations of political bias and doubts over their continued effectiveness, recent studies have indicated that they remained widely recognized by international audiences as important sources of unfiltered information.

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Despite being funded by the US government, the network adhered to a code of journalistic integrity and objectivity similar to the charters governing the work of other state-funded media such as the BBC. This independence from governmental editorial oversight had on occasion led to issues with United States officials. Some within the Trump White House attempted to justify the decision to cut funding by claiming that these state-funded broadcasters had become overly politicized and were no longer representative of the values the new administration wished to project.

The international impact of the USAGM stable of media outlets is perhaps most immediately apparent in the number of journalists jailed or otherwise targeted by authoritarian regimes for their professional activities. At present, ten journalists and staff members from USAGM-affiliated outlets are being held in countries including Belarus, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Myanmar. Following news of the shutdowns, Ukrainian journalist Stanislav Aseyev posted that while imprisoned by Russian forces in eastern Ukraine, he was subjected to electric shock torture specifically because he had previously worked for Radio Liberty.

The timing of Trump’s decision to shut down the United States international broadcasting network could hardly be worse. In today’s increasingly multipolar world, the information space is an critical front in the escalating global struggle between rival democratic and authoritarian camps. This has long been recognized by China and Russia, with both countries committing vast annual budgets to support sophisticated international media activities in a variety of guises. The US was previously seen as the world leader in this soft power contest, but that is suddenly no longer the case. Generations of autocratic regimes never did manage to silence Voice of America, but the Trump administration has now done so themselves.

Mercedes Sapuppo is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A light in the darkness: Why RFE/RL matters now more than ever

Muhammad Tahir — Thu, 20 Mar 2025 15:34:50 +0000

It was in the middle of a bitterly cold night in 2014 when my phone rang. At first, I ignored it. Then came a second call, and a third. The persistent buzzing was enough to jolt me awake. When I finally answered, a distressed female voice met me on the other end.

“They’re kicking me out of my home. I have two kids. Nowhere to go. I live in Mikrorayon,” she said, her voice breaking under desperation. She was referring to one of countless Cold War–era housing blocks built by successive regimes across the Soviet nations. Behind her, frantic voices clashed.

I knew that sound well. It was the sound of fear.

This was not unusual. As the director of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Turkmen Service, locally known as Azatlyk, I often received such calls—cries for help in a country where independent journalism is considered a threat.

Turkmenistan, like many of the authoritarian regimes RFE/RL has covered, was built on the iron grip of a single ruler. Dissent was crushed, voices silenced, and truth distorted. RFE/RL was for many the only major source of news free from government manipulation.

The woman on the phone, whom I will call Maya, was a young widow with two children, the youngest just six months old. That night, city officials had come to demolish her home under the national leader’s so-called “beautification” campaign in the capital city Ashgabat.

When she saw the municipal workers approaching her home, she slammed the door shut, pressed her back against it, and, in that moment of desperation, reached for the only thing she believed could bring hope and protection: RFE/RL.

After gathering details, we did the only thing we could: We made a call to the local municipality. It was a simple act of journalism. We asked why a young widow with children was being thrown onto the streets in freezing temperatures.

That call was enough. The officials withdrew—not out of mercy, but out of fear. It was fear that the leader of the nation might catch wind of the story—that, as in many similar cases, he might view it as a stain on his image and make those responsible pay the price.

This is the power of RFE/RL. It is not just a news organization, but a shield for those whose own governments have abandoned them. In Turkmenistan, as in many of the places the organization serves, there are no fair and impartial courts to turn to, no free press to expose wrongdoing, no way for many citizens to hold power accountable. Without RFE/RL, Maya’s story would never have been heard. And she would have been just another forgotten casualty of authoritarian rule.

In recent days, however, the Trump administration has raised the specter of a world without RFE/RL. On March 15, the US Agency for Global Media terminated the funding grant for RFE/RL, endangering the organization’s ability to provide journalism for millions of people who would struggle otherwise to get access to news that is not controlled by an authoritarian government.

What’s the price of truth?

The recent decision to cut funding for RFE/RL along with its sister networks—Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting—is not just a financial cutback. It is a major blow to the millions who rely on it.

For decades, these networks have signaled that the United States has not turned its back on those living under the rule of autocrats and radical extremists. They have served as a voice for the silenced, a bridge connecting the oppressed to the world beyond their borders.

RFE/RL’s annual budget was $142 million in fiscal year 2024. That is slightly less than the cost of three Apache helicopters, the same type of aircraft that was lost in large numbers over two decades of war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, with little lasting progress to show for it.

With that single investment, RFE/RL reaches nearly 47 million people each week, broadcasting in twenty-seven local languages across regions spanning from Russia to the Balkans, from Iran to Central Asia, and all the countries in between.

In the tribal regions of Pakistan, where the Taliban’s grip remains strong, the alternative to RFE/RL’s Pashto-language Mashaal Radio is what locals call “Mullah Radio”—an extremist-run broadcast spewing radical propaganda.

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service exposed war crimes while Russian state media flooded the airwaves with propaganda. Now, as Russia tightens its grip on Central Asia and China expands its influence in the region, RFE/RL remains an important line of defense against a rising tide of disinformation.

Hope, even in darkness

When I first joined RFE/RL in 2003, it had already been the lifeline for millions behind the Iron Curtain for over half a century. I remember when former Czech President Václav Havel visited RFE/RL headquarters. He spoke of growing up under communism, of listening to RFE/RL in secret, and of how those broadcasts carried the hope that one day freedom would come.

Havel wasn’t alone. Generations of dissidents, reformers, and ordinary citizens across Eastern Europe and Central Asia have similar stories. They drew strength from the words they heard in the media outlet’s broadcasts.. And when the Iron Curtain finally fell, they didn’t just see journalists at RFE/RL—they saw the voices that had never abandoned them.

Now, if the voice of RFE/RL and its sister networks is silenced, then what will fill the void? Chinese state media? Russian disinformation? The Taliban’s “Mullah Radio?” These forces have long pursued this outcome—weaponizing intimidation, censorship, harassment, and violence. Yet so far they have failed. The leaders of Iran, China, Russia, and Belarus are likely cheering the position in which these channels now find themselves. With no counterbalance, the propaganda of these regimes could go unchecked.

This outcome also would contradict the Trump administration’s own stated commitment to free speech, depriving millions of access to independent journalism. In many of its broadcast regions, RFE/RL remains one of the last sources, if not the only source, of truth.

History has shown that when free media disappears, oppression often takes its place.

For Maya, and for the millions like her, RFE/RL must endure.

Muhammad Tahir is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former RFE/RL executive who dedicated eighteen years to advancing independent journalism and press freedom in some of the world’s most restrictive environments.

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Inside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s diplomatic offensive with Syria’s Christians and Ismailis

Gregory Waters — Wed, 19 Mar 2025 17:48:44 +0000

Shortly after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) drove Bashar al-Assad out of Syria last year, the group pledged to respect the rights of minorities. Yet, since HTS took control over much of the country, some across the international community have raised fears that Syria’s new leaders—with their jihadist backgrounds—might erode minority rights or exclude these communities from the political transition process. These fears have been newly flamed by the massive, targeted violence against Alawites on Syria’s coast during the second week of March. Nevertheless, there have been some signs for optimism about the inclusion of at least some minorities in post-Assad Syria.

This analysis draws on my conversations with members of these groups as well as HTS leadership over the past several years as a consultant with the International Crisis Group and an independent researcher. The people I spoke with were granted anonymity given the tenuous security situation in the country and their ongoing political work.

There are legitimate reasons for worry, specifically about the future of the Alawite community. In March, Alawite insurgents linked to the former regime launched a coordinated attack against security forces. Government forces, independent armed factions, and Sunni vigilantes mobilized in response, engaging in nearly four days of mass executions, killing more than six hundred Alawite civilians and detained insurgents. The insurgency by ex-regime elements is still ongoing.

This violence and the state’s inability to control both its own forces and the independent forces has reignited fears over minorities’ safety, but these devastating events should not be viewed as indicative of the fate of other minorities. The violence is rooted in the fact that, over Syria’s brutal civil war, Alawite men formed the core of the regime’s fighting forces and intelligence apparatus and that the Alawite sect has come to be linked to the regime via both Assad’s policies and Sunni extremist narratives. These political and social dynamics do not apply to other minority groups.

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For the other minority groups, there are positive indications that they will be included in post-Assad Syria. Even before entering Damascus, HTS had been reaching out to Syria’s minorities in Idlib for sensitive, but successful, diplomatic engagement for five years. Christian leaders in Idlib told me in a meeting in 2022 that HTS had consistently reached out to them, first through senior religious figures and then through dedicated political attachés. HTS appointed these individuals—and thus engaged with these communities—directly, rather than through the Syrian Salvation Government that HTS and other opposition groups had formed to administer Idlib. These political attachés came to serve as advocates for the local communities, representing their demands to the Salvation Government and HTS security forces.

Through this, Christians in rural Idlib gradually regained control over their homes and farms and restarted public prayers. Additionally, security forces halted attacks on Christian communities. The engagement process was long and arduous, and, as HTS leaders told me in 2022, early on they were fearful that they’d face backlash from hardliners and populists in Idlib. However, as the years passed and the Christian community grew ever more integrated into Idlib’s society and the local government, HTS’s fears gradually ebbed.

Growing from this experience, HTS engaged with Syrian community and diaspora leaders just days into its final military offensive in late 2024. This diplomatic offensive helped ensure that HTS could sweep through Syria without taking many minority regions by force. The discussions, which took place primarily during the first week of December last year, resulted in a particularly strong relationship between HTS and Syria’s Christian and Ismaili minorities and also ushered in a new era of relations with groups previously seen as close to the regime.

A diplomatic offensive, from Nubl and Zahraa . . .

For example, the collapse of the regime in Aleppo in November last year spread panic through the nearby Shia towns of Nubl and Zahraa—once lynchpins of the regime’s defensive lines. Local Facebook pages claimed that two thousand Shia civilians had fled their homes, seeking shelter first in Aleppo and then in the town of Safira, where Hezbollah and Iran had built a strong militia network. By December 1, Safira came under at least partial opposition control, and regime forces abandoned the displaced people, resulting in widespread panic on Facebook over the fate of the civilians. On December 2, negotiations officially began between HTS and leaders from the displaced community to return them to their homes in Nubl and Zahraa, according to what an individual who facilitated the talks told me.

The negotiations began after members of the displaced community were able to reach one political activist living abroad, who told me that he helped establish a line to HTS’s political bureau and helped mediate. This initial experience quickly evolved into a small, multi-sect organization of activists representing a range of communities still under Assad’s rule—particularly the Ismaili-dominated cities of Masyaf and Salamiyah—all eager to assist in the peaceful handing over of their communities.

. . . to eastern Hama

This diplomatic approach expanded as HTS advanced on northern Hama. The city of Salamiyah, lying east of Hama, played a crucial role in the regime’s defense as it hosted the headquarters of several important regime militias operating in the countryside. But it also had a vibrant revolutionary movement dating back to the 1980s, particularly led by its Ismaili majority. “Ismailis have always opposed the regime,” one Ismaili activist told me, “but we work through political and civil means, not arms.” Salamiyah is also home to the Syrian National Ismaili Council, which supports and guides the Ismaili community across Syria. These factors opened the door to negotiations with HTS.

I spent several days in Salamiyah in early February, meeting with National Ismaili Council leader Rania Qasim and other security and civil society officials in discussions about the negotiations and resulting relations with HTS. According to Qasim, on December 2, HTS’s political bureau contacted her to initiate talks. The talks were led by Qasim and a representative from the Aga Khan Foundation, an international Ismaili humanitarian organization. The negotiations also included a coordination committee formed by the Ismaili Council’s Emergency Operations Center. Qasim told me that she and the other leaders of the negotiations saw themselves as participating in such talks on behalf of all communities across the Salamiyah region, not just Ismailis.

According to Qasim, the discussion focused on the fate of regime fighters in the region and on how HTS would enter the city of Salamiyah. The council, according to the people I spoke with, refused to provide cover for any criminals in the city, agreeing instead to HTS’s general taswiya (settlement) policy—employed nationally after the fall of Assad—that saw a grace period for all armed men to turn in their weapons and receive temporary civilian identification documents, but it did not provide them with blanket amnesty. In return, it was agreed that pro-regime fighters would lay down their weapons while HTS units simply drove through the main street on their way south to Homs. The coordination committee also agreed it would send a delegation to the outskirts of Salamiyah to meet the HTS convoy and escort them through the city.

These negotiations marked a significant first step in HTS’s relationship with the Ismaili community in Salamiyah. According to Qasim, the council spent the three-day negotiation repeatedly announcing to Salamiyah residents, “the council and the community will not fight; if you want to fight, it will be your own decision.” This message was carried even to some of the most infamous Alawite villages, such as Sabburah, where two pro-revolution Alawite ex-political detainees then worked within their village to ensure the local fighters agreed to lay down their weapons. Yet the Ismaili Council itself has never been affiliated with any armed faction and had no communication with regime military leaders; Qasim emphasized that at no point did they negotiate with or on behalf of any armed regime faction.

Instead, HTS leaders had to trust that the Ismaili Council had the influence needed to pacify the regime militias and ensure HTS’s safe entry into the city and surrounding villages. In fact, there was only one small skirmish—in the village of Tal Khaznah, on the road south to Homs—but otherwise, the handover of eastern Hama on December 4 was peaceful, local security officials and members of the Ismaili Council told me. According to Ismaili leaders in Salamiyah and Tartous, the Assad regime responded to these rapid negotiations by sending security officials to the Ismaili Council in Tartous and threatening them, telling them that their relatives in Salamiyah were “traitors.” However, the regime collapsed before these officials could follow through on any threats.

I was told that throughout this three-day negotiation period, other negotiations also took place on a more individual basis. Opposition fighters from both HTS and other factions who were from Salamiyah had begun reaching out to friends and families in their villages. One young commander remembered calling his family as his unit approached eastern Hama and asking them to connect him with the village’s mukhtar, telling me, “why would I want to risk fighting my father or brother?” He now leads a general security detachment in the countryside around his mixed-sect village, where he sees himself as bound to protect all locals no matter their sect.

The handover of the Salamiyah region was only the beginning of talks between HTS and the Ismaili Council, according to the Ismaili leaders I spoke with. The national council oversees seven regional branches, including ones in Tartous and Masyaf. With the regime still in control of western Syria, the Ismaili Council began negotiating on behalf of communities there. For its part, HTS ended its operations on the Masyaf front the same day it liberated Hama city, pausing its westward advance at the edge of the Ismaili- and Alawite-inhabited foothills. Ismaili leaders also told me that they began to share their positive experiences engaging with HTS with their contacts in the heavily pro-regime Christian towns of Muhradeh and Suqaylabiyah, which had ceased fighting but remained besieged by HTS. Those towns quickly concluded their own negotiations, which saw the peaceful entry of HTS units.

A foundation for a new Syria

The initial negotiations appear to have laid a strong foundation of trust that has extended beyond Salamiyah. According to the head of the Tartous Ismaili Council, HTS’s local military official met with the council the day after entering Tartous. The council was then invited to a general meeting between local representatives and HTS officials, was given a new line of communication with HTS’s political representative, and finally was welcomed to meetings with the new administrator of Tartous governorate. All of this evolved over just ten days. As one Ismaili official in Tartous described it to me, “It seems that the new government truly respects and has a special relationship with the Ismaili community. This came as a huge shock because we had never spoken with them before and had the same fears as the Alawites until December.”

HTS’s diplomatic offensive demonstrates the leadership’s political approach, which evolved over years of engaging with the Christian and Druze communities in Idlib. HTS leaders had justified these new policies to me years ago as a political necessity for one day governing a country as diverse as Syria and for legitimizing the movement among minority communities who only knew of the organization from its days as an al-Qaeda affiliate, then called Nusra Front. This understanding that Syria cannot be ruled as an Islamist Sunni country (but instead must be led as a country of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds) has begun to shape the post-Assad era—at least at a local administration and security level.

The initial Salamiyah negotiations laid a strong foundation of cooperation that has continued to grow, ensuring the Ismailis across Syria “feel confident we will be fully represented in the constitutional process,” as a leader from the Tartous office told me. In Salamiyah, the Ismaili Council now plays a central role in the region’s administration, facilitating civil-political engagement, running a volunteer security force to assist local police, and hosting a security committee consisting of both civilian and military representatives to address security gaps and any violations committed by government forces.

Such relations have grown even stronger in the coastal city of Qadmus. According to two local Ismaili activists I spoke with, a small Ismaili volunteer force has been supporting the undermanned government police forces in Qadmus since December. Government forces have even provided these volunteers with small arms, while a new Ismaili-run local council has worked closely with the regime-era mukhtar—also an Ismaili—to coordinate services and administration with the HTS-appointed regional director. The council has also engaged in outreach with the Alawite villages around Qadmus, serving as a bridge between the new local administration and the Alawites.

Despite these efforts, their close relationship with the new government has made the Ismailis in Qadmus a prime target for pro-Assad Alawites, who killed two Ismaili security volunteers in late February and an Ismaili Council member and two government police officers on March 6. When the March uprising began, the Ismailis tried to protect the government forces in the town, eventually negotiating for their safe exit from the area after being besieged by insurgents. However, as a result, they faced widespread threats—by Alawites both in person and over WhatsApp—for “siding with the government,” local residents told me. Security forces eventually peacefully reentered Qadmus, and according to the locals I spoke with, the experience has only strengthened their ties with Damascus. Many Ismaili men have now volunteered to support government security forces, with at least some applying to become official security officers. Meanwhile, local security officials are discussing extending salaries to the entire volunteer force. Despite the events of the past week, the city’s local council continues to serve as an intermediary between local security forces and the Alawite villages, as the former works to negotiate the handover of weapons and wanted criminals.

Meanwhile, Christian civil society leaders in Syria’s tense coastal region also described a strong working relationship with local HTS-appointed administrators and security officials. Although they still have concerns centered on basic services, the economy, and the constitutional process, several activists and local Christian leaders told me in February that they did not fear direct attacks from the new government but rather worried about being caught in the growing violence between Alawites and government forces. Christian leaders across Syria were among the first men engaged by pro-opposition security forces in the days after Assad’s fall, with Facebook pages publishing pictures of meetings between military and political leaders and religious figures in rural Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo. As the violence on the coast escalated in March, the head of Aleppo’s Catholic community, Bishop Hanna Jallouf, reiterated the importance of a united Syria, affirmed the good treatment of Christians across the country, and called for a continuation of efforts to fully integrate all minorities into the political process.

These new interfaith and civil-centric networks and relationships will play a central role in shaping post-Assad Syria. However, the new government should do more to engage and empower groups such as the Ismaili and the Christian communities. It should do so both on a local and an international level, by working with groups such as the Aga Khan Foundation (to give Ismailis assurances) and even the Vatican (to do the same with Christians). Such efforts would help expand the local trust built with these groups into genuine representation in Damascus and would give real reason for optimism about the future of Syria’s minorities.

Gregory Waters is a researcher at the Syrian Archive, an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute’s Syria Program, and a research analyst at the Counter Extremism Project.

The post Inside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s diplomatic offensive with Syria’s Christians and Ismailis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Zaaimi quoted in Al Araby on the negative consequences of Trump’s policies on Arab-American relations

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Mar 2025 17:40:45 +0000

original source

The post Zaaimi quoted in Al Araby on the negative consequences of Trump’s policies on Arab-American relations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Foreword: Protecting global freedom in an age of rising autocracy

Edward L. Glaeser — Wed, 05 Mar 2025 20:02:44 +0000

The man on horseback vanishes while executive aggrandizement persists

The decline of the West and limits on autocracies

Economic freedom and political freedom

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Will 2012 turn out to have been the high-water mark of human liberty? This volume documents that the downward trend in freedom and democracy, which started then, has continued for another year in 2024. Yet this Atlas also reminds us that there is hope amidst this adverse aggregate trend. In much of the world, women’s economic freedom is higher today than it was thirty years ago. Western Europe’s freedom is either unchanged or greater than it was fifteen years ago. The Global South is steadily becoming more prosperous.

The decline in freedom documented in this volume is clear, but it is also not a massive shift. Average global freedom has moved from Montenegro to Malawi, not from Sweden to Laos. Yet we can no longer maintain a Whiggish faith that we are on an inexorable path toward freedom, democracy, and prosperity, or that history has ended. As the fires of war burn in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Sudan, we must ask what has gone wrong, and what we can do about it. Measurement is the first task, and that is why this overview of liberty around the world is important.

The first section of this Foreword discusses the changing nature of the threat to freedom, and presents one hypothesis about rising executive aggrandizement. There has been a significant decline in the prevalence of coups since the 1960s, which means that democratically elected leaders need fear the “man on horseback” much less than in the past. Yet as the threat of military takeovers has fallen, the prevalence of “executive aggrandizements,” in which duly elected leaders push their power beyond constitutional limits, has not. Indeed, elected executives may be more likely to take risks precisely because military coups have become less plausible.

I present a simple framework for thinking about the interplay between technology and executive aggrandizement. Executives are limited by their ability to control the public sector and by popular opposition. Technology can enable the coordination of popular anti-regime action, as was shown vividly in the Twitter Revolutions of the Arab Spring. The increased threat of popular uprising may put limits on some political leaders, but technology can also increase the executive’s ability to control the public sector by monitoring disloyalty or malfeasance. Artificial intelligence (AI) could improve the central government’s ability to detect corruption. If the state is initially weak, the positive impact of technology on popular opposition may lead to less dictatorship. However, if the state is strong, technology will instead reduce the limits on executive activity.

The second section of this Foreword argues that geopolitical changes can also help explain why executive aggrandizement has increased and coups have fallen. Western powers, which used to engineer coups as Cold War policy, now intervene to reverse them. Even more importantly, the influence of the West, which championed democracy in the years after the Cold War, has declined. The 1990s was an era of democratic triumph, in which the strength of liberal democracies was at its apogee. What could have been more appealing to the former Warsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe than to rush toward European integration and prosperity? Mexico’s leaders similarly saw great advantages in tying their country to the United States through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In both cases, democracy ended up being the price of free trade.

Yet the last quarter century has seen a relative decline in the Western champions of liberty. The United States lost military face in its failed occupations of both Iraq and Afghanistan, and economic face in the global financial crisis. The economic importance of the European Union (EU) has declined, while China’s economic heft has expanded enormously. China’s growth provides an example of non-democratic success, and its foreign aid reduces the advantage of courting Western donors who have a deeper demand for democratic reform.

In the final section of the Foreword, I discuss the interplay between economic and political freedom. While I do not believe that complete economic freedom is necessary for political freedom, I do believe that a political executive with control over parts of the economy can use that control to augment its own political power. There are risks in supporting activist industrial and trade policies that enable political leaders to reward their supporters and punish their opponents. It would be far better for democratic leaders to articulate the positive case for freedom, which can both enable economic growth and empower human happiness, than to seek to micromanage the economy.

The man on horseback vanishes while executive aggrandizement persists

Bermeo documents that more than one-third of democracies faced coups between 1960 and 1964, and 15 percent of democracies were toppled by coups between 1965 and 1969. In every five-year interval since 1985, fewer than 5 percent of democracies fell to a coup. In every five-year interval since 1995, fewer than 10 percent of democracies have even faced the threat of a coup. Yet, as this volume documents, the global level of freedom has been declining since 2012.

Executive aggrandizement, where the executive expands its authority beyond constitutional limits, can erode freedom without the fireworks of a coup. Yet it has proven difficult to document a global wave in such expansions of incumbent power. Nevertheless, there are important examples, especially those of China, Russia, and Venezuela, in which political executives have significantly increased their power. Vladimir Putin and Hugo Chávez represent the more standard case in which a democratically elected executive expands his power. In the case of China, the more dispersed control of party leaders has been replaced by the more centralized control of Xi Jinping.

In this section, I first discuss the interplay between coups and executive aggrandizement, using Argentina’s 1930 coup as an example. I then turn to a framework that is meant to suggest how technological change might have influenced the prevalence of coups, protests, and executive aggrandizement. I focus on domestic forces that influence freedom in this section, and in the next section, I will focus on the role of foreign influence.

Coup and executive aggrandizement

Few coups seem so consequential as the 1930 coup in Argentina, which ended seventy-five years of political stability and liberal government and ushered in fifty years of coups and dictatorships. Argentina’s remarkable Generation of 1837, which included Domingo Sarmiento and Juan Bautista Alberdi, crafted that country’s 1853 Constitution and presided over a period of increasing freedom, wealth, and education. Like Britain before 1867, nineteenth-century Argentina was better at protecting freedoms than at promoting broad, uninfluenced suffrage, but after 1912, the Sáenz Peña Law made male suffrage universal, secret, and mandatory.

The Radical Civic Union (UCR) rode to power on the basis of broad population support in 1916, and came into conflict with the more conservative National Autonomist Party (PAN), which had held power since the end of Sarmiento’s presidency in 1874. Their conflict ended in 1930, when a military coup replaced the elected President Hipólito Yrigoyen with Lieutenant General Uriburu. Alemán and Saiegh provide evidence against “the claim that demands for drastic redistribution led to democratic breakdown is not a convincing explanation for the 1930 coup.” Instead, they see the coup as a response to the fact that Yrigoyen “used his authority to exclude the political opposition and take away their remaining bases of power.”

Alemán and Saiegh emphasize that the legislative divisions were not determined by ideology or attitudes toward redistribution. Instead, divisions were heightened over power plays, such as the frequent Federal “interventions” in which Yrigoyen replaced provincial governments with politicians that were more to his liking. While these interventions were and are (the last one occurred in 2004) supposed to be responses to unusual and deeply problematic local circumstances, there were twenty interventions during Yrigoyen’s first term and fifteen of these were done without legislative approval. During Yrigoyen’s second term, “between 1928 and 1929, he took over by executive decree the provinces of San Juan, Mendoza, Corrientes and Santa Fe,” and he nationalized the petroleum industry, which was also “seen as a political power-grab.”

On August 9, 1930, the opposition published the Manifesto of the 44 which denounced Yrigoyen for aggrandizement of executive authority. Within the month, a coup had begun and by September 10, Uriburu had replaced Yrigoyen as President of Argentina. Six more coups would follow in 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, 1976, and 1981. Executive aggrandizement is a perpetual possibility, and, historically, the opponents of that aggrandizement often came from within the government, including from within the military.

Of course, there have been many cases of executive aggrandizement that have not met with opposition from the military. It took eleven years, and the realization that Hitler had led them into a military catastrophe, for any of the Wehrmacht’s leaders to fight against Hitler’s subversion of the Weimar Republic. Similarly, there have been many military coups that had little or nothing to do with executive aggrandizement, including Argentina’s 1943 coup, and the attempted coups in France in 1961, and Spain in 1981.

These two failed coups suggest that improvements in communications have reduced the ability of officers to command their soldiers to fight against political leaders. Improvements in information technology have made it easier for symbolically important legitimate leaders to communicate directly with the army, which can be effective because “military forces—especially perhaps conscript ones—are susceptible to numerous pressures from the civilian population and from civil institutions.”

During the weekend on April 22, 1961, a junta of French officers, hoping to keep Algeria an integral part of France, took control of Algiers. As Thomas writes, “de Gaulle’s military resources were unimpressive,” because “500,000 [soldiers] were in Algeria, whereas in France itself there were very few regular operational units.” Instead of fighting, on the evening of April 23, De Gaulle took to the radio.

The same voice that had travelled the airwaves in 1940 denouncing “the capitulation” to Nazi Germany in the name of “honor, common sense, and the higher interest of the Nation,” and inviting “all the French who want to remain free to listen to me and to follow me,” declared in 1961 that “I forbid every Frenchman, and in the first place every soldier, to carry out any order.” Even though the rebels controlled the Algiers stations, they could not stop ordinary citizens and soldiers from hearing De Gaulle on their transistor radios, and turning against the plot. The defeat of the coup has been called “la Victoire des Transistors.”

On the evening of February 23, 1981, armed agents of Spain’s Civil Guard, led by a Lieutenant Colonel, took control of the Congress of Deputies. In Valencia, General del Bosch rolled out his tanks and declared a state of emergency. Del Bosch had fought under Franco during the Spanish Civil War, and under German Command during World War II, and he wanted to stop Spain’s shift to liberal democracy. But at 1:14 a.m., King Juan Carlos appeared on television in the uniform of the Captain General of the Army and declared that “the Crown cannot tolerate in any form any act which tries to interfere with the constitution which has been approved by the Spanish people.” The coup promptly fizzled, and Spain’s democracy would survive.

In both France and Spain, coups were stopped by leaders who broadcast strong messages which fundamentally undermined their military subordinates. The framework in the next section will argue that improvements in communications technology more generally make it easier for leaders to stop rebellions from within. This is one hypothesis as to why the risks to freedom now come more from executive aggrandizement than from military coups.

Yet there are other reasons why the frequency of coups has declined, most notably the end of the Cold War and the changing behavior of Western powers. During the Cold War, American leaders often preferred a friendly military regime or monarchy to a hostile democratic one, and the US government supported coups from Tehran in 1953 to Chile in 1973. Since 1991, US-led regime change has meant overt invasion far more than covert coups. In 1994, the United States even acted to reinstate President Aristide of Haiti, who had been ousted by a coup in 1991.¹ I will return to the role of the West in promoting democracy in the next section, after first providing a framework for thinking about the interplay between technology and constraints on political leaders.

Technology and constraints on chief executives

The section considers two impacts of improved information technology on the limits facing elected executives or autocrats. Information can be used to organize protests, such as the mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square, Egypt, which brought down the Mubarak regime in 2011, and that places limits on executive action. But information technology can also be used to centralize control over the public sector, such as by granting leaders the ability to communicate directly with soldiers during a coup. I will not focus on other impacts of communications technology, such as enabling leaders like India’s Narendra Modi to bond with their voters by using radio broadcasts and social media.

All actions that an executive might want to take will create some opposition from both the private and public sectors. That opposition places limits on the actions of the executive. I assume that the executive will not risk actions that generate sufficient opposition from either the public sector, which might refuse to implement the action, or the private sector, which might break out into mass protests. If technology expands the range of actions that the executive can take, then the technology is authority-enhancing, but if it contracts the range of executive action, then it is authority-eroding.

The limits on an autocrat’s options are captured by the two solid lines in Figure 1. If the autocrat wants to limit their opposition from either sector to a fixed amount, then his or her options are limited to a rectangle that is below the solid blue line and to the left of the solid orange line. I will argue that recent changes in communications technology have given effective autocrats more power over their own bureaucracies, causing the blue line to rise, but made private opposition more effective by enabling organization, which shifts the orange line to the left.

While China’s surveillance of its own private citizens is frequently discussed in the Western media, the surveillance of public sector workers and the associated anti-corruption campaign has been far more central to Xi Jinping’s centralization of power. The bribery convictions of Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang in 2013 and 2015 eliminated two potential rivals early in Xi’s term as president of China. Moreover, because China has “vague and incomplete anti-corruption laws that leave more room for party control,” and “institutional arrangements that centralize control over local anti-corruption agencies,” the fight against corruption essentially gives national leadership the ability to discipline a large swath of the public sector.

Figure 1. The autocrat’s options and technological change

Complaints by ordinary citizens play a significant role in China’s anti-corruption campaign, and those complaints are often transmitted electronically. Pan and Chen report that “China has devoted substantial resources to monitoring the performance of lower-tier officials” including “telephone hotlines,” “government-managed websites where citizens can complain online,” and “web and mobile apps designed for individuals to complain to the government.” In order to reduce bribery, some Chinese “hospitals even put in place monitoring systems with facial recognition technology to identify unregistered medical representatives or unapproved visits.” Fan et al. document that computerizing value-added tax invoices “contributed to 27.1 percent of VAT revenues and 12.9 percent of total government revenues in the five subsequent years.” Beraja et al. examine artificial intelligence procurement across China and find that “autocrats benefit from AI: local unrest leads to greater government procurement of facial-recognition AI as a new technology of political control, and increased AI procurement indeed suppresses subsequent unrest.”

If laws are sufficiently fuzzy, then abundant electronic monitoring, supplemented by the complaints of random citizens, should make it possible to convict almost any public servant. That ability to convict provides a chief executive with enormous control over the public sector. Information technologies, such as the on-board computers carried by commercial truckers, have long been used by corporate chieftains to monitor their workers. There is every reason to believe that government leaders should be able to do the same, and that better technology will strengthen the hold of authoritarian leaders over public sector employees.

For that reason, Figure 1 depicts the blue line rising higher because of better monitoring technology. As the autocrat has an increasing ability to repress opposition within the public sector through better monitoring, they have a greater ability to undertake activities, from suppressing religious minorities to invading their neighbors, that might have been opposed by some public sector workers. This increased range of executive power provides one reason why information technology can lead to less individual freedom. This effect should be much stronger in countries with a more effective public sector.

Better technology can also give the public sector more ability to monitor their private citizens, but there is a countervailing force that I suspect is more important worldwide. Information technology also enables the coordination of citizens, especially through the sharing of information. Historically, cities have been hotbeds of regime change, partially because density enabled the coordination of opposition to the government. Information technology makes it easier to spread information both about why someone should protest and where a protest will occur.

In 2011, protests were coordinated on Twitter in Tunisia and Egypt and two autocrats were forced out of power. In 2022, Maria Litvina called for protests against the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Instagram. While she was arrested, thousands still took to the streets and protests in Russia have continued since then. While the Putin regime does not seem to be in danger, this activity still creates direct and indirect costs for the government, including the challenge of locking up thousands and potential embarrassment on the world stage.

In Figure 1, I chose to capture the ability of improved private coordination as empowering private protest against government, which increases the costs to governments of taking actions that generate private opposition, which shifts the orange line to the left. Consequently, it is unclear whether technology will reduce freedom, by strengthening executives’ controls over their bureaucracies, or increase freedom, by making citizen protest easier. In countries that have large and capable public sectors, such as those in East Asia, I suspect that technology will typically be freedom-reducing. In places where the public sector is weak, then technology seems more likely to encourage regime change, which may lead autocrats to be more cautious.

The core hypothesis put forth in this section is that technology has centralized authority within the government, which can reduce freedom for the rest of us. Direct communication between legitimate leaders and soldiers has reduced the threat of coups. Better monitoring of subordinates has reduced local corruption. The implication of this change is that the centralized authority of autocrats has increased. We now turn to a second hypothesis: that the decline in freedom is associated with the relative weakness of the West.

The decline of the West and the limits on autocracies

The 1990s were a strange time in world history. The Soviet Union was no more. Liberal democracies had triumphed, and they were much wealthier than their alternatives. They were role models for countries emerging from communism. Moreover, the Western democracies were successful enough that they could indulge in the luxury of encouraging others to embrace democracy.

Levitsky and Way emphasize the “international dimension of regime change” and especially the power of “linkage” or “the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of trade and investment, people, and communication) between particular countries and the United States, the European Union (EU), and Western-led multilateral institutions.” These ties led Latin American and Central European countries to democratize in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The two democratizing nations that Levitsky and Way highlight were strongly influenced by the EU and NAFTA. In Slovakia, Vladimír Mečiar “regained control of the government and rapidly sought to eliminate major sources of opposition” and “in the absence of extensive linkage to the West, Mečiar’s autocratic government might well have consolidated power.” But the appeal of access to EU was enormous, and “it employed conditionality in 1997 by rejecting Slovakia’s request to begin accession negotiations due to a failure to meet democratic criteria.” This rejection had political bite, and “Slovakia’s failure to move towards EU membership, for which the EU directly (and very publicly) blamed Mečiar, created a salient electoral issue that benefited the opposition.” In 1998, Slovakia rejected Mečiar and the country has been democratic since then.

The authoritarian PRI (Institutional Revolution Party) controlled Mexico from 1929 to 2000, but the technocratic leadership of the party during the 1990s saw the tremendous economic advantages that could come by enacting NAFTA. While “successive U.S. administrations backed the PRI governments and explicitly excluded democracy from NAFTA negotiations… NAFTA increased Mexico’s salience in the U.S. political arena,” and “as NAFTA negotiations began, the PRI was subjected to intense international scrutiny, including unprecedented media coverage of electoral scandals and US congressional hearings on Mexican human rights”. Mexico’s attempt to placate the United States meant that “by the late 1990s opposition forces had strengthened to the point where they could win national elections” and that “preventing such an outcome would have required large scale fraud or repression, which, given Mexico’s international position, would have been extremely costly.”

Both of these case studies suggest that EU and US influence encouraged democracy in the 1990s either through clear conditionality (as with Slovakia) or through the court of US public opinion (as with Mexico). The democratizing push reflected the Western victory in the Cold War. That victory meant that Western powers looked like role models, and that access to Western markets was enormously profitable. Unlike during the Cold War, when the United States was eager for allies of any political variety, in the 1990s, the West felt sufficiently secure that they could risk alienating countries by pushing democracy.

Indeed, the level of American confidence reached such heights that the United States waged wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq with a stated goal of regime change. When President Bush addressed the nation on October 7, 2001, he said our goal in invading Afghanistan was to “defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear.” Two years later, when announcing the invasion of Iraq, President Bush reiterated “we will bring freedom to others and we will prevail” and “we have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people.” I am not claiming that promoting democracy was the primary objective of either war, but just that a significant number of policymakers believed that it was reasonable to go to war to promote freedom elsewhere.

Those wars were two reasons for the decline in US influence since 2006. While the US military readily defeated the armed forces of both Iraq and Afghanistan, the US government failed to establish lasting democracies in either country. Moreover, the US management of both occupations appeared incompetent to many global observers. The disastrous collapse of an American housing bubble then brought economic suffering not only to the United States but to the world. The United States started to seem far less like a role model, and a less triumphant United States was less likely to take on the mission of democratizing the world.

Europe’s economic clout has also waned over the last thirty years. While the EU produced one-fourth of the world’s gross domestic product in 1990 (at purchasing power parity prices), it produced less than 15 percent of global output in 2024. After 2005, Turkey seemed poised to join the EU, but it never came to be, partially because many Turks opposed EU membership. One Turkish poll in 2013 reported that “while one third of those surveyed agreed Turkey should persevere with the goal of becoming an EU member, two-thirds of the public lean closer to the view that Turkey should not become a full member.” Given those views, it is unsurprising that President Erdoğan supported a political referendum that would entrench his presidential power despite the risk that such a move would alienate the EU.

Europe’s relative economic heft has diminished, partially because of the growth of China. Between 1990 and 2024, China’s share of the world economy rose from 3.6 percent to 19.05 percent. A strong and wealthy China provides an alternative, non-democratic role model, and access to Chinese aid and markets most certainly does not require democratizing reform. Shinn and Eisenman write that “China’s focus on state sovereignty and reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations have assisted its ability to develop cordial ties with Africa.” Democratic powers are far less dominant now than they were twenty years ago, and that can help explain why freedom has declined since 2012.

Economic freedom and political freedom

Declining belief in the value of economic freedom in the West may also contribute to declining political freedom both in the Western democracies and elsewhere. Milton Friedman famously saw a particularly tight link between economic and political freedom, writing that “capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom.” Similarly Hayek saw economic planning as leading down the “road to serfdom.” Critics of this perspective have pointed out that the Scandinavian social democracies seem to have enjoyed almost perfect political freedom, even when their economies looked decidedly non-capitalistic. They have also noted that East Asian economies with very limited political freedom have occasionally been hotbeds of capitalism.

Yet even if Friedman’s statement goes too far, there is an essential truth in his perspective. When the public sector has more discretion to interfere with the economy, then it will also have more ability to reward its supporters and punish its opponents. Hugo Chávez’s direct control over Venezuela’s petroleum enabled his domestic and foreign activities, including subsidizing friendly neighbors with cheap oil. Relief from regulation has been one of the most common sources of illicit public revenues throughout history, and those revenues can also be used to enhance political power.

But as the example of Scandinavia illustrates, not all economic interventions empower political executives. If the rules are decided collectively and enforced strictly, then they are not a source of power for the executive. If the rules are ad hoc and decided by the executive on the spot, then economic intervention can help consolidate political strength. In Chávez’s Venezuela or the Shah’s Iran, public oil revenues became a tool for tyranny. In Norway, they did not, partially because oil revenues go largely into a sovereign wealth fund that is managed by the politically independent Norges Bank.

Yet in recent years, political leaders in the United States and EU have championed economic policies, including industrial policy and tariffs, that are largely discretionary. If a politician seeks support from domestic producers of some product, then that politician can reward those producers either with subsidies, now called industrial policy, or with a selective tariff on that product. The politicization of US pre-World War II tariffs generates little hope that any future discretionary tariff policy will somehow be divorced from politics. Moreover, even if the United States limits its discretionary interventions, public support for these policies, from both parties, reinforces the idea that political leaders should have the right to favor some industries over others.

The case for economic freedom would be strong even if there was not a link between economic and political freedom. Yet, as long as economic policy Edward L. Glaeser interventions provide more scope for political leaders to reward and punish, then these interventions will also pose risks to political freedom. If the leaders of the West want to reverse the downward trend in freedom, then they should continue championing both political and economic liberty and continue to be engaged with the world.

Edward L. Glaeser is the Fred and Eleanor Glimp professor of economics at Harvard University, where he has taught microeconomics and urban economics since 1992. Glaeser previously directed the Taubman Center and the Rappaport Institute. He also leads the Urban Working Group at the National Bureau of Economic Research, co-leads the Cities Programme at the International Growth Centre, and is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Glaeser has written hundreds of papers on cities, political economy, and public economics. He received his PhD from the University of Chicago in 1992.

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1 Former President Aristide has accused the United States of forcing his resignation during a later 2004 coup; the United States has denied these allegations.

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Why post-Assad Syria complicates the Iran-Turkey rivalry

Giorgio Cafiero — Wed, 26 Feb 2025 22:44:58 +0000

Turkey and Iran’s complex relationship can be best described as a “cooperative rivalry.” The two countries maintain important trade ties and their interests overlap on several matters, from opposing Israel’s war on Gaza and bombing of Syria to supporting Qatar during the 2017-2021 blockade. Turkey has also played a key role in helping Iran dull the impact of Western sanctions. But with Ankara and Tehran aspiring to play increasingly influential roles in the Middle East, they have at times also seen high levels of competition and tension in bilateral affairs.

With Syria’s Iran-allied regime falling late last year and being replaced by a Turkey-oriented political order in Damascus, Syria’s fluid dynamics have, at least for now, shifted the Levant’s balance of power in Ankara’s favor while weakening Tehran’s clout. Developments in Syria could complicate Iran-Turkey relations, especially given that Tehran believes Ankara’s Syria policies pose a threat to Iranian interests. Turkish policymakers are likely worried about Iranian meddling in Syria that could affect the country’s fragile transition in manners that harm Turkey’s interests.

Nonetheless, Turkey and Iran can manage and compartmentalize their tensions vis-à-vis Syria in a way that prevents outright hostilities between them. Additionally, if Turkey and Israel’s tensions in relation to Syria continue heating up, there could even be reason to expect a degree of Iran-Turkey alignment in Syria.

Iran’s loss and Turkey’s win

With Turkey emerging as a “big winner” in Syria after Bashar al-Assad’s fall, Iranian policymakers are nervous about some of the wider implications for Tehran’s strategic interests. With the rise of a Sunni Islamist government in Damascus—one that views Iran-backed nonstate actors as a serious regional threat and vows to stop Iranian arms from flowing through Syria—Tehran has concerns about the future of Hezbollah, a group that has long played a critical role in the Iran-led Axis of Resistance. With Assad out of the picture (after Iran invested tens of billions of dollars in propping up his regime) and a Turkey-oriented administration leading in Damascus, Iran has suffered a humiliating loss in Syria.

Iranian media outlets close to the state frequently depict Turkey as having worked with the United States and Israel to topple Assad as part of a grander plot aimed at empowering the West and Israel while weakening Iran. Since Assad fell late last year, a number of Iranian voices have blasted Turkey for its role in facilitating Azerbaijan’s oil exports to Israel amid the war in Gaza—arguing that Ankara bears some responsibility for Palestinian suffering.

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The Syrian tilt in Turkey’s favor comes after Ankara gained clout in the South Caucuses with the unfolding of the 2020 Karabakh war, a conflict that underscored the power of the Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance while fueling major geopolitical and security concerns for Tehran.

Turkey is determined to help the Islamist rebels-turned-rulers in Damascus cement their control over all of Syria. Ankara sees the potential for a strong unitary state in Syria with a pro-Turkish government in power that is aligned with Turkey’s long-term interests. Turkey has fears about Iran potentially lending support to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party-linked People’s Protection Unit (YPG)—the armed group in Syria that Ankara is most concerned about from a security standpoint. Turkish policymakers are also monitoring the situation in Latakia, Tartus, and other parts of western Syria where, in the event of further fragmentation of the country, a breakaway Alawite-led statelet supported by Iran could form, cutting off the new government in Damascus from much of the country’s Mediterranean coast.

The precedent for managing tensions

As much as Turkey has gained clout in Syria at Iran’s and Russia’s expense, Ankara recognizes that Tehran has cards to play in post-Assad Syria, which could challenge Turkey and weaken Syria’s new government amid the war-torn country’s fragile transition. Within this context, Turkey and Iran will likely be keen to prevent their Syria-related tensions from fomenting hostilities in bilateral relations—they may even look for ways to advance common interests through cooperation.

There is a precedent for that. For example, in 2017, Turkey, Iran, and Russia met in Kazakhstan for the Astana Process (a forum on peace in Syria). To be sure, the new reality in Syria is different from the country’s situation in 2017. But the Astana Process highlighted how Ankara and Tehran, despite their conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis, can come together as two regional heavyweights and engage in dialogue geared toward resolving the conflict. Although the Astana Process failed to resolve the civil war, the format did, to its credit, lead to reduced violence in Syria.

The potential for alignment

Israel’s foreign policy vis-à-vis post-Assad Syria could play a part in bringing Turkey’s and Iran’s interests into greater alignment. At this stage, it is unclear whether Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s anti-Israeli rhetoric will evolve into more concrete actions or how such actions would play out. Nonetheless, Turkey and Syria’s new government are exploring a defense pact that could include Turkish airbases in central Syria. That may fuel tensions between Turkey and Israel, which could play out in a variety of ways. Even if a Turkish-Israeli military confrontation on Syrian soil seems unlikely at this point, intensifying friction between these two US allies would probably serve Iran’s interests.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recently accused Ankara of facilitating Iranian cash flows to Lebanon’s Hezbollah. If true, this would mean that Turkey is helping Iran maintain influence in the eastern Mediterranean. The United States has also sanctioned Turkey-based Mira Ihracat Ithalat Petrol and its chief executive officer for “providing critical financial support” to a financial network that runs between Iran and Hezbollah. Some experts have noted that, since Assad’s fall, Iran could be eyeing Turkish airspace in its search for alternative routes for flying arms to Hezbollah. However, it is unclear whether Ankara would ever agree to playing this role for Iran and Hezbollah.

Looking ahead, the fragile transition in Syria is set to bolster Ankara’s regional influence in ways that complicate Turkey’s sensitive relationship with Iran. While the Trump administration surely would like to see Turkish influence in Syria serve as a bulwark against Iran, it is unlikely that Ankara will approach the Islamic Republic in a manner that fully aligns with any US-led “maximum pressure 2.0” agenda. With vested stakes in preventing hostilities with Iran, policymakers in Ankara are likely to seize on the new balance of power in Syria while also maintaining a fruitful dialogue with Iran and keeping Iranian security concerns about Syria-related issues in consideration.

Giorgio Cafiero is the chief executive officer of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.

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Pavia joins i24 News to discuss the 14th anniversary of Tunisia’s revolt during the Arab Spring

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:13:57 +0000

original source

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From Tunis to Baghdad: Can platform-based politics take root?

Carrie Schenkel and James Storen — Mon, 24 Feb 2025 19:30:13 +0000

This paper is the fifth in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

The organization of political parties has served multiple distinct roles in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In many cases, regimes use them to create a light veneer of democratic legitimacy for authoritarianism; in other cases, parties exist to represent one identity group or are centered around a singular individual. In rare cases, but with a few successful examples, parties exist to represent an ideology. Rarer still, but key to the future democratic success of the region, are true platform-based parties. Vacuums of political leadership have developed due to the limited role parties play in shaping governance, representation, and public policy. In a rapidly changing region, the opportunity for effective, issues-based parties has never been more evident. Iran’s proxies in the region have been significantly weakened and the “Axis of Resistance” dismantled, presenting openings for new political leadership to emerge.

Political parties are not yet poised to meet the moment. In much of the region, long histories of implicit and explicit bans and one-party dominance have left political parties weak, unpopular, and ineffective. Extended periods of suppression and restriction—such as Jordan’s thirty-year party ban, Iraq’s decades of one-party rule under Saddam Hussein, and Tunisia’s twenty-three years of party bans during the Ben Ali era—have resulted in political parties that lack both organizational capacity and broad public appeal. Rather, they are fragmented, ideologically vague, and centered around individuals rather than coherent platforms.

The proliferation of political parties—more than 220 are currently registered in Tunisia, for example—has further undermined any sense of clear policy platforms and the ability to differentiate one party from another. Rather than reforming or uniting under existing frameworks, disillusioned members frequently break away to form new parties, stymieing coalition-building and the development of rooted, comprehensive party ideologies.

Disillusionment with traditional parties has led citizens to favor actors perceived as more directly serving their interests, such as Hezbollah—which positions itself as a resistance force against Israel—or Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties, which have gained trust through their provision of essential social services in Egypt, Jordan, and elsewhere. In an era defined by youth-led movements, digital activism, and persistent calls for democratization, these parties stand at a crossroads. Whether they act as agents of change or instruments of entrenched power remains a central question, shaping not only the future of governance within individual nations but also the trajectory of regional stability and development.

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This pathbreaking new series delivers insights and policy recommendations from leading experts on how to enhance efforts to strengthen democracy in all regions of the world.

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Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 20 Feb 2025 23:43:38 +0000

As the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion draws close, the chorus of voices calling for new elections in Ukraine is growing louder and louder. Curiously, however, these calls are not coming from the Ukrainians themselves, but from the Kremlin and the Trump White House.

Since his inauguration one month ago, US President Donald Trump has begun echoing Russian demands for fresh Ukrainian elections. This week, he sparked outrage by branding Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a “dictator without elections.” These attacks have proved popular in Moscow but have fallen flat in Kyiv, with most Ukrainians rejecting the US leader’s claims and rallying behind Zelenskyy.

The debate over Ukrainian elections reflects the challenging wartime realities in the partially occupied country. Ukraine was scheduled to hold presidential and parliamentary votes in 2024 but was forced to postpone both ballots as the Ukrainian Constitution does not allow national elections during martial law, which was introduced in 2022 and remains in place. Zelenskyy has vowed to hold elections as soon as the security situation allows, but argues that it would be impossible to stage free and fair votes in the current circumstances.

The majority of Ukrainians appear to agree. Two of Zelenskyy’s main political rivals, Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, have publicly rejected the idea of wartime elections as impractical and illegitimate. Ukraine’s vibrant civil society has also voiced its opposition to the return of elections before a peace agreement has been signed. Meanwhile, a new opinion poll conducted in February 2025 found that 63 percent of Ukrainians are against holding any national votes until the war with Russia is over.

This lack of appetite for wartime elections is not the product of apathy or oppression. On the contrary, Ukrainians are fiercely proud of their country’s democratic credentials, which were hard-won during two separate pro-democracy revolutions in 2004 and 2014. On both occasions, millions of Ukrainians took part in massive protest movements opposing Russian-backed attempts to subvert the country’s emerging democracy and place Ukraine on a trajectory toward Kremlin-style authoritarianism. This grassroots embrace of democratic values has become central to modern Ukraine’s sense of national identity.

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For more than two decades, Ukraine’s burgeoning democratic culture has been one of the key triggers behind Moscow’s escalating campaign of aggression against the country. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s obsession with Ukraine can be traced back to the 2004 Orange Revolution, which was in part provoked by his botched intervention in the Ukrainian presidential election. This was to prove a watershed moment in relations between the two post-Soviet countries. Over the subsequent two decades, Ukraine has pursued a European democratic future, while Putin’s Russia has turned back toward the imperial past.

Putin’s fear of Ukrainian democracy is easy enough to understand. As a young KGB officer in East Germany, his formative political experience was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rapid collapse of the Soviet Empire as a wave of democratic uprisings swept across Eastern Europe. Ever since the Orange Revolution, Putin has been haunted by the idea that an increasingly democratic Ukraine could serve as a catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s imperial retreat and spark the breakup of the Russian Federation itself.

Mounting concern in Moscow over the possible impact of Ukraine’s democratic progress was a major contributing factor behind Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine in 2014. When the occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region failed to prevent the consolidation of Ukrainian democracy or derail the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration, Putin felt compelled to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

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Ukrainians would be the first to admit that their country’s democracy is still very much a work in progress that suffers from a wide range of imperfections including deeply entrenched institutional corruption and excessive oligarch influence. Temporary wartime security measures targeting Kremlin-linked political parties and institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church have also raised concerns. At the same time, Ukrainians are acutely aware that their country’s recent history of internationally recognized elections and strengthening democratic culture set them apart from their Russian neighbors.

The fight for democracy has in many ways defined Ukraine’s post-Soviet journey, but the vast majority of Ukrainians do not support the idea of holding elections in the current wartime conditions. This skepticism is understandable. More than ten million Ukrainians, representing around a quarter of the population, have been internally displaced by Russia’s invasion or forced to flee abroad as refugees. Millions more are currently living under Russian occupation. Without their participation, any vote would lack legitimacy. Likewise, around one million Ukrainian men and women are now serving in the armed forces. Attempting to provide safe voting conditions for them would be a logistical and security nightmare.

It would be similarly impossible to organize a credible election campaign. With the entire country subject to virtually daily Russian bombardment, large-scale campaign events and election rallies would be out of the question. It would be even more reckless to open thousands of polling stations on election day and invite attacks from Russian drones and missiles. Over the past three years, the Kremlin has repeatedly bombed Ukrainian civilians at train stations, funerals, and other public gatherings. There is little reason to believe election day crowds would not also be targeted. Even if a ceasefire was introduced well before the vote, the threat of renewed Russian air strikes would loom large over the entire campaign and deter public participation.

In addition to these practical impediments, attempting to stage an election campaign prior to the signing of a peace treaty would risk sowing division within Ukrainian society at a pivotal moment in the country’s history. Many believe this is the true reason for the Kremlin’s sudden and otherwise inexplicable enthusiasm for Ukrainian democracy. After all, Russia is the world leader in election interference. While Putin’s army has been unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, he may feel that he can still achieve his goal of dividing and subjugating the country via the ballot box. At the very least, if current Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy failed to win reelection, this would remove a very high-profile obstacle to a peace agreement in Russia’s favor.

Democracy is at the very heart of Ukraine’s current fight for national survival and is destined to remain one of the core values in postwar Ukraine. For now, though, most Ukrainians acknowledge that any attempt to stage elections would be impractical and irresponsible in the extreme. For this reason, there is currently no clamor whatsoever for elections within Ukrainian society. The current generation of Ukrainians have fought long and hard for their democratic rights, but they also recognize that the country must be at peace before credible elections can take place. It would be absurd to ignore their wishes and impose premature elections on Ukraine as part of a Kremlin-friendly peace process.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

With anti-government protests still taking place in cities across Georgia on an almost daily basis, the authorities have also recently introduced new laws limiting public gatherings and criminalizing minor protest actions such as placing stickers on public property. Since protests flared in late 2024, hundreds have been detained, with many reporting human rights abuses while in custody including beatings and torture.

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Critics say these latest steps serve as further confirmation of the Georgian government’s intention to establish a Kremlin-style authoritarian state. In early February, Transparency International Georgia executive director Eka Gigauri told the Associated Press that she believed the authorities were using the same tactics employed by the Putin regime against opponents. “There is nothing new in how they attack civic activists,” she said. “This was happening in Russia years ago.”

Similar sentiments have been expressed by international human rights watchdogs monitoring the current crisis. “The government is relentlessly taking the country into a repressive era that is uncharted for Georgia but all too familiar in authoritarian states,” commented Human Rights Watch Europe and Central Asia Director Hugh Williamson in January 2025.

In recent months, Georgia’s Western partners have become more vocal in their criticism of the country’s increasingly authoritarian policies and apparent turn toward Moscow. This Western response has included imposing sanctions against a number of Georgian officials including billionaire Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, who is widely seen as the country’s de facto leader and architect of Georgia’s current pro-Kremlin policies. On February 13, the European Parliament adopted a resolution questioning the legitimacy of the current Georgian authorities and calling for fresh elections in the coming months monitored by international observers.

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How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Conflict Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Human Rights

Meanwhile, relations with Russia continue to improve. Georgia has won favor in Moscow in recent years by refusing to participate in Western sanctions over the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Georgia has welcomed Russian businesses and has been accused of helping the Kremlin bypass international restrictions put in place in response to the war.

Members of the Georgian Dream party have positioned themselves as the only political force capable of establishing pragmatic relations with Russia. With around twenty percent of Georgia currently under Russian occupation, the threat of renewed Russian military aggression is a highly sensitive issue for Georgian society. In the run-up to Georgia’s October 2024 parliamentary election, Georgian Dream sparked controversy by using campaign posters contrasting peaceful Georgia with war-torn Ukraine as part of election messaging that sought to position the vote as a choice between war and peace.

With international attention now firmly fixed on developments in and around Ukraine, the political crisis in Georgia has slipped out of the headlines. However, this small nation in the southern Caucasus has a geopolitical significance that far outweighs its size. For the past two decades, Georgia has been widely seen in Western capitals as a post-Soviet success story, but the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations now hang in the balance. This represents a significant foreign policy challenge for the new Trump administration and for Europe.

Recent repressive measures indicate that the Georgian authorities are intent on escalating their clampdown against domestic opponents and strengthening ties with the Kremlin. If they succeed, it would represent a major victory for Vladimir Putin in the confrontation between the democratic world and an emerging alliance of authoritarian powers including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

Mercedes Sapuppo is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Dispatch from Syria: ‘Syrians cannot focus on their future if they are still drowning in their past’

Arwa Damon — Thu, 13 Feb 2025 16:07:06 +0000

SEDNAYAH—Sobhi Shebah shuffles through the hauntingly silent halls of Syria’s infamous Sednaya prison. Most of the cells are totally emptied out, while others have a smattering of discarded clothing. He’s not quite sure what he’s looking for—there are no guards here, no authorities, no one to answer questions—but it’s the last place he saw his son alive.

Sobhi’s son, Sameer, was carrying out his military service when Syria’s revolution first broke out back in 2011. He, along with most of his unit, was detained and accused of wanting to defect to rebel forces. Sobhi says that for years, he paid exorbitant amounts in bribes to get the paperwork needed to visit his son.

“It was always through a fence, no more than five minutes. A guard would shove him forward and it was always just ‘hi, how are you, how’s the family,’” he remembers.

Sobhi is utterly emotionally lost and has been for years. He shows us the notification he received with his son’s alleged death date.

“I saw him after this date,” he says. “What is the meaning of this, what is the goal of this psychological torture?”

He begged and pleaded with the authorities for answers.

“They all just played games with us,” he remembers. “I told them if he’s dead, let me know. Once one told me to stop nagging him. ‘I can’t tell you more, he’s alive, but I don’t know where.’”

Sobhi’s voice trembles with quiet anger as he lists the names of the officers. He wants more than just answers: He wants to see the officers behind bars, and he wants to be able to confront those who took his son, who caused him so much pain.

I went to Syria at the end of December, a country I covered extensively in my former job as a senior international correspondent for CNN. I was back this time in my capacity as the founder of my charity, the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA). One of the first neighborhoods my team and I visited was Darayya, a Damascus suburb that for years was bombed, besieged, and starved. In Darayya alone, local officials estimate that some fifteen thousand men were disappeared by the Assad regime. Mothers who used to tell their children “daddy is with the regime” are now at a loss, unsure how to answer the question “but mommy, the regime is gone, why isn’t daddy back?”

The pain felt by those searching for clues in the dark void of the former regime’s detention system is palpable.

Justice, accountability, and reparations are not just “catch words,” Joumana Seif, a prominent lawyer and Atlantic Council fellow, argues. Also a human- and women’s-rights activist, Joumana has been pushing for the creation of a Syria Victims Fund for years, so that the states that have been collecting hundreds of millions of dollars linked to violations of sanctions and other Syria-related crimes are no longer lining their own coffers but are giving that money back to the Syrian people.

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“It’s important for this damage, pain to be recognized and compensated, morally and also with some services and financial support,” Joumana explains. “Without this I think people will start to think about revenge, and this will be chaos. How to prevent revenge is to establish a clear transparent process of transitional justice.”

Time is not on Syria’s side, not when so much damage has been done, when the fabric of society is so frayed, when the country still is a patchwork of territories with de facto borders, and when there has been so much death and destruction. There have already been revenge attacks on Syria’s Alawite community—the sect with which the Assad family is affiliated.

Joumana knows the system well. Her father, Riad Seif, was a parliamentarian back in the 1990s and is a well-known voice of political dissent. He was twice jailed under the Assad regime.

“We need a process to go forward so that at least people see that there will be justice, and they can wait for that,” Joumana says.

As the rebel-forces-turned-rulers of Syria flung open the gates of the Assad regime’s prisons, a flood of hope and dread swept over the families of the missing.

“When the 8th of December happened, I was so scared because I thought that’s the end of the journey and now I will either know that my father is alive or no, that he’s not alive,” says Wafa Mustafa with The Syria Campaign. She is one of the most prominent and outspoken voices for the families of Syria’s missing.

“He’s here, I don’t know how, I don’t know in what form. I feel he’s here, but at the same time, I cannot see him. I’m this close, but I cannot find him.”

Wafa’s father disappeared from their Damascus home in 2013, forcing Wafa and the rest of her family into exile. He was always a dominant force in her life, as a father, a hero, a source of comfort, and a guiding light. The two were especially close, and both were highly politically active, first closely following as the Arab Spring erupted in other countries and then actively partaking in demonstrations in Damascus.

Since fleeing, first to Turkey and then onwards to Germany, Wafa has been relentless in her demand for answers, standing outside for hours in the freezing cold or sweltering summer heat, holding solitary vigils or joining others in holding photographs of missing loved ones. She has held and participated in countless press conferences, panels, meetings, and media appearances.

Now back in Damascus for the first time, memories reemerge, of not just her father but also the ghostly faces of friends and fellow protestors who are dead or missing.

The need for the truth—for Wafa, the truth of what happened to her father—is a gnawing and raw wound, one that rips through the psyche of countless Syrians. There are an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 Syrians missing, according to the International Commission on Missing Persons.

“If you don’t bring to justice those who were responsible, how do you think people will feel about justice? How do you think that people will seek justice? Many will go for revenge, and revenge literally means no peace,” Wafa warns.

Prison papers, identification documents, and other files were not preserved in the chaos following the shockingly fast fall of the regime of dictator Bashar al-Assad.

“We have no clarity on any level. We don’t know what they are doing with the detainees, the files, the mass graves,” Wafa explains.

It took two months for representatives of the families of the missing, including Wafa, to finally get an audience with Syria’s new president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, and its foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani.

“I think it was good as a first step,” Wafa says. “This is just the beginning, and I hope that this meeting will be a step towards an actual plan and the real and serious work.”

A number of regime officials, including Assad, managed to flee the country. Much criticism has been leveled at Syria’s new rulers for not publicly asking that the deposed dictator be handed back over to Syria. While that may not be realistic at this stage, the people at least need reassurance that their new leaders recognize the importance of justice and accountability.

Joumana says there need to be steps toward establishing a hybrid court and that the trial needs to happen in Syria with international judges to guarantee that international standards are followed.

“The people themselves need to decide if there should be amnesty or a forgiveness process for lower-ranking regime members,” she explains. “There also needs to be justice and recognition for the crimes of forced displacement, sexual and gender-based violence.”

“We need to create our own model. It’s different from one context, one people, one area to another,” she says. “We can find a solution, we can tailor our process, our transitional justice, and we will create a very good example of this.”

Syrians cannot focus on their future if they are still drowning in their past.

“For years the Assad regime made us feel unseen. We, our detained loved ones, our wounds and our demands, we were unseen,” Wafa says. “I will feel seen when we see actual steps.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

Andrea Ratiu — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

The Global Foresight 2025 survey

Full results

This survey was conducted from November 15, 2024 through December 2, 2024.

Demographic data

Survey questions

Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

Learn More Full Survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Civil Society Climate Change & Climate Action

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

Africa China

The post The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

Andrea Ratiu — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

Three worlds in 2035

Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

By Peter Engelke, Greg Lindsay, and Paul Saffo

Welcome to three possible worlds in the year 2035. As resident and non-resident senior fellows in the Atlantic Council’s foresight practice, we produced these scenarios by assessing how current trends and uncertainties across a variety of categories—including geopolitics, the economy, demography, the environment, technology, and society—might interact with one another in the years to come.

These are not forecasts or predictions of what the future will bring. Instead, these scenarios are intended to inspire imagination and spur readers to consider possible futures, including future worlds that do not align with the readers’ expectations. To paraphrase a sentiment often expressed by the physicist and futurist Herman Kahn, the point of working with future scenarios is to find out what you don’t know and should know but that you didn’t even know you didn’t know.

We invite readers to interpret these scenarios in that spirit. Consider the interplay among the cause-and-effect elements that lead to each of the potential future worlds, as well as the myriad other possible scenarios that could emerge in the years to come.

Perhaps the world of 2035 might vaguely resemble one of the three scenarios presented here, but that is not the central purpose of this exercise. The primary reason why we crafted these scenarios is to generate deeper insights into how today’s actions and inactions might create a better or worse world ten years from now.

Choose your global future

The reluctant international order

China ascendant

Climate of fear

The reluctant international order

Global governance has never been more complicated than it is in 2035. But although the problems are complex, thus far the governance landscape is proving capable of containing at least some of them, as occurred several years ago when we endured a near-miss catastrophe from a bioweapon-fueled pandemic.

We might not be experiencing the halcyon days of a revitalized multilateralism, but thankfully we’re also not inhabiting a kill-or-be-killed nihilistic hellscape. We seem to be living through what some commentators are now calling the “Reluctant International Order.”

Let’s begin with what has not happened: neither the much-feared collapse nor the much-hoped-for revitalization of what often is called the rules-based international order (we’ll use the acronym “RBIO”). Which means that neither the 1930s nor the 1990s have returned.

The international order that the United States and its allies created and maintained after 1945 delivered benefits for decades—benefits that were admittedly partial and often uneven but nonetheless real. Embedded within the RBIO are norms, such as non-aggression toward other countries and respect for human rights, that are laudable ideals. And at its core are multilateral institutions, including the United Nations (UN), World Bank, and World Health Organization (WHO), which were designed to contain conflict, assist with economic development, anticipate and then manage crises of various kinds, and provide some governance in an otherwise anarchic world. The whole order is premised on the notion that international cooperation, combined with the open exchange of ideas and goods, will lead to a better and more peaceful world.

Yet there has long been dissatisfaction with the RBIO. Today, as before, many countries are unhappy with the RBIO and seek to upend or reform it. China and Russia, the two most powerful and vocal of these states, have remained steadfast in their opposition to at least parts of this order, although it also has become clear that their ends are not identical. A decade ago, both began to join with North Korea and Iran to form a grouping that was labeled an “axis of aggressors” because of widespread concern about those countries coordinating to directly challenge the West and the international order, militarily and otherwise. Numerous other countries, often middle and emerging powers in the so-called Global South have sought, at a minimum, to modify the RBIO. These states—with India and Brazil the most prominent examples—have accused the RBIO of being unrepresentative and its defenders of being hypocritical because of their selective application of the order’s underpinning norms. Even the core group of democratic nations that historically defended the order, including the United States, often have acted against the RBIO when it suited their interests.

Resilient rules

Despite all this, the various challenges to the RBIO have never been powerful enough to destroy it. Neither the axis of aggressors nor the partnership between China and Russia ever amounted to real military alliances, reflecting weak rather than strong bonds among them. These revisionist states have acted in disjointed fashion, as a result of their divergent interests, and never staged a coordinated attempt to directly confront the West. Partly for that reason, there has been no global war and thus no wholesale shock that reset the global governance system, as occurred after World War II.

Russia emerged from its war against Ukraine (which ended in a negotiated peace in 2026) far weaker than it was when the conflict began, and it has yet to sufficiently recover to mount another similar challenge westward in Europe. China has made no overt move to seize control of Taiwan either. Evidently, Chinese President Xi Jinping has decided he does not want to gamble his country’s future in a confrontation with the United States, which after all remains a great economic and military power with a formidable nuclear deterrent. (The United States’ increased investment in defense of the Western Pacific also appears to have influenced Xi’s calculations.) It does not help China that Russia is a much-debilitated junior partner.

The case of Taiwan is important for another reason. It underscores that, so far, China and the United States have decided that coexistence is the preferable direction for their relationship, which has prevented the international system from collapsing altogether. Their rivalry has been channeled through other pathways short of war, including diplomatic efforts to curry favor abroad and support for various minilateral and multilateral institutions. And they’ve found, more than occasionally, that their interests actually intersect. In the realm of nuclear nonproliferation, for example, both China and the United States have continued working in tandem to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, albeit by utilizing very different mechanisms and forms of leverage.

But while the RBIO has not collapsed—meaning there has been no repeat of the era between World War I and World War II—it also has not been revitalized. There has been no return to a triumphalist end of history, no 1990s-style heyday wherein major and middle powers mostly work in concordance with one another toward peaceful and prosperous coexistence within what they perceive as a benign set of global norms and institutions. Hence the increasing references to a “Reluctant International Order,” if meant in jest.

What has happened instead has been an evolution rather than a revolution, characterized more by experimentation and incrementalism than by some jarring disruption. This has occurred because the world’s problems demand coordinated responses even for countries reluctant to do so and because those countries recognize that the opportunity costs of not engaging are so high.

Today, the outward institutional trappings of the RBIO remain in place. The UN continues its work as before, partially because China does not want to destroy it. (The UN’s embrace of state sovereignty, for example, appeals to China’s interests.) Global trade is still growing, despite the tariff wars of the mid-to-late 2020s, owing in part to technological developments that have continued to lower the cost of trade. And the norms underpinning the RBIO haven’t disappeared, either, since many around the world—national and sub-national governments, civil-society and non-profit organizations, grassroots groups and ordinary citizens—want to preserve them and continue to see value in cooperative approaches to transnational problems.

Trading places

Consider trade. More than a decade ago, many nations began curtailing their exposure to global trade flows out of justifiable concern that trade was having detrimental impacts on their security, economies, and societies. Yet despite extensive anti-globalization rhetoric and policies (with the tariff wars the best example), the prevailing perception is that the benefits of trade continue to outweigh the costs. China and the United States, for instance, still have one of the largest bilateral trade relationships of any two countries in the world, despite their now lengthy history of trade disputes, including tariffs and a range of trade restrictions in sensitive technologies.

The leaders of many countries have realized that they have a compelling interest in remaining engaged in trade and talks to increase trade. This has resulted in the creation, maintenance, or expansion of a number of regional free-trade agreements. Several of these efforts have proven quite successful, perhaps best illustrated by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Over the past fifteen years, African states have joined with the African Union to extend and deepen AfCFTA and, in so doing, to realize several of its longer-term objectives such as the reduction of intra-continental tariffs and loosening of visa restrictions. The case of AfCFTA and others like it—for instance, strengthened trade agreements between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Asian countries—underscore that while global trade volume has grown since the mid-2020s, the geography of trade continues to shift.

Nonstate actors have been critical to the maintenance of this system. Multinational companies around the world have made their support for trade well-known, which has helped compel countries to continue defining their interests in pro-trade terms.

Bioweapon-inspired cooperation

Nothing underscored both the value of cooperation and the powers (positive and negative) of nonstate actors like the 2029 bioweapon scare.

That year, a shadowy, transnational doomsday cult—akin to Aum Shinrikyo, which terrorized Japan with sarin gas in 1995—used an artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced synthetic biology (“SynBio”) process to develop a deadlier and more easily transmissible strain of smallpox. Because the cult’s plot to release it was foiled at the last minute, owing to frantic collaboration among national intelligence services and INTERPOL, the world narrowly avoided a pandemic that would have been far worse than the COVID-19 pandemic.

Horrified by this close call, most of the world’s governments—including the United States, China, and Russia—grasped for solutions. Since pandemics do not respect boundaries, world leaders recognized that there was an upper limit on how much they could protect their people on their own. In response, they quickly sought to deepen collaboration with one another and with leading multilateral public-health institutions such as the WHO, multinational corporations including companies that develop major AI platforms, and the global scientific community that sets standards and runs laboratories. The mandate was clear: Determine how to monitor and regulate the biotechnology space more effectively—or risk perhaps hundreds of millions dying in an AI-enhanced, SynBio-caused (“AIxBio”) pandemic along the lines that the doomsday cult had almost willed into existence.

One of this new coalition’s proposals, which was quickly funded and implemented, was to create an institution similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency but focused on AIxBio. Its formal membership is based on a novel multi-stakeholder model that includes national governments, big-tech firms, and scientific organizations.

The smallpox bioweapon scare vividly illustrated, even for adversarial major powers, the intolerably high risk of countries not engaging with one another through international institutions and on international norms to address the world’s greatest challenges—and on the enduring relevance and value of the RBIO ninety years after its creation. Halting progress in some areas of the international system doesn’t qualify as a renaissance. But even a Reluctant International Order is better than retreat.

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China ascendant

Welcome to 2035, and a world whose center of gravity has shifted decisively toward Beijing.

China now has more influence on world affairs than does any other country, including the United States. It is ascendant on every metric of power—diplomatic, military, economic, and technological. That power has enabled Beijing to begin remaking the world to its liking. It has been busy recasting the global system, including multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), in its preferred image, and is in the process of dismantling the democratic norms that have animated the international order since 1945.

China has arrived at this ascendant position in part because the United States has not done much to stand in its way. At the turn of this century, such an outcome would have been impossible to imagine. Even a decade ago, when Washington’s commitment to the rules-based international order showed initial signs of wavering, such an outcome would have been difficult to forecast. But US leaders have been consumed by the challenges of dealing with the country’s weakening economy, fraying societal bonds, and unrelentingly harsh domestic politics. These dynamics have eliminated the longstanding bipartisan consensus around defending the global order that the United States, along with its many allies and partners, had built and maintained for decades.

The result has been that the United States no longer has an unwavering commitment to its allies and partners, the core multilateral institutions at the center of the order that it built, and the norms and principles that it stood behind all those years. Instead, the United States has definitively turned inward. By nearly every metric, the United States remains a major power. But it no longer has much interest in maintaining its leadership role in the world. It has ceded that ground to others, especially to China.

Taiwan-style tipping points

The impact of the US withdrawal from global affairs is evident in various flashpoints around the world, including in Taiwan. While the prevailing fear in the 2010s and early 2020s was of a devastating clash between the United States and China over the island, the Taiwan issue was resolved without firing a shot. China subordinated Taiwan by applying intense pressure—via sabotage, cyber operations, propaganda campaigns, overt and covert influence campaigns within Taiwan, espionage, murky hybrid operations on the island and around its waters—to influence Taiwanese domestic politics toward a cross-Straits settlement with the People’s Republic of China. Its efforts to shape domestic politics within Taiwan succeeded. In 2030, Taiwan’s government agreed to (among other things) such a settlement, which included ceasing defense cooperation with foreign governments and reducing Taiwan’s direct engagement with foreign officials. The United States, which did not respond to China’s various forms of pressure against Taiwan, ultimately could not prevent the cross-Straits agreement, given the Taiwanese government’s support for it. None of China’s individual provocations were dramatic enough for an already hesitant United States to risk a direct military confrontation with China over it.

What happened in Taiwan has also played out on a global scale. There was no one exceptional event or even set of events that triggered a transformation of the international system—no explosion that China engineered to blow up the global order. Thus, there never was a single focal point for China’s rivals—especially the United States—to rally their citizens around and respond to in a coordinated and decisive way. Rather, there has been a gradual and now inexorable shift away from the US-led order and toward a Chinese-led one. This shift resulted from decisions made by both US and Chinese leaders: inward-looking in the case of the former, outward-looking in the case of the latter. It was, in short, a slow-motion fait accompli.

China has positioned itself as the world’s inevitable leader, seizing on its strengths to curry favor with other countries and on the opportunity presented by the United States’ implosion to diminish its rival. Take the performance of the two countries’ economies as an example. A decade ago, the economic outlook was bleaker for China than it was for the United States. But over the past ten years, that script has flipped. In the mid-2020s, Chinese President Xi Jinping managed to right China’s sputtering economy, stabilizing it and returning it to steady growth (if less spectacular growth than during the country’s long boom). He did so by successfully transitioning the country to what many are now calling “an innovation system with Chinese characteristics,” striking a balance of rewarding innovation and entrepreneurialism while maintaining the Chinese Communist Party’s control over the nation’s political apparatus.

All this has enabled China to return to selling itself and its economic rebound on the one hand, plus the United States’ economic stagnation (due to dysfunctional politics) on the other, as a compelling reason why the United States is both unreliable and a poor economic model for the rest of the world, and by extension why China represents a better model. That message has even more resonance around the world now than it did ten years ago.

Because of the pull of China’s growing economy, which remains integrated within global trade flows, plus the relative weakness of the US economy, foreign governments have become more willing to sign onto China’s various economic diplomacy efforts, such as the Global Development Initiative. Beijing now hosts a robust schedule of international economic forums that position it at the center of the economic universe, and thus as the destination for intergovernmental bargaining and influence on issues such as trade and investment. To outside observers, the economic pull of Beijing has eclipsed that of Washington and, for that matter, of Brussels, London, Paris, Seoul, or Tokyo.

As a result, China’s influence has grown in many parts of the world. In the Global South, lower- and middle-income countries in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia (where China remains engaged with India in a long-running contest for influence) have been even more eager to trade with and receive investment from China than they were in the 2020s. This outcome is the product of years (in some cases decades) of aggressive economic diplomacy by China and disinterest from the US government. It also stemmed from reform to China’s overseas lending and investment vehicles, which China recognized needed fine-tuning to make them more palatable abroad and deflect rising criticism of the unsustainable debt and other problems they engendered. Thus far, these policy shifts appear to have worked. China has also become the world’s largest trading nation for both imports and exports, ahead of the United States. Shifting trade in goods also has accelerated movement away from trade denominated in US dollars and toward trade denominated in renminbi—a sure sign of the relative strengths of the two economies.

For China, the advantages are enormous: more wealth at home and influence abroad. China’s diplomatic ties with major materials exporters such as Brazil (soybeans and other crops), the Gulf Cooperation Council states (oil), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (critical minerals such as cobalt) have increased. For the United States, the reverse has been true. For the average American, wages and incomes have stagnated, and imported goods are more expensive. Abroad, US goods are less competitive in foreign markets than Chinese goods are.

Allies hedging

The United States still has numerous allies and partners, but the bonds that held them together are weaker now than they were in the past owing to the rise of China and the self-induced retreat of the United States.

In Asia, nervous US allies including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines are hedging between China and the United States in more ways than they were in the 2020s. But now, having witnessed what happened in Taiwan, these countries are even more concerned about the security guarantee that the United States has provided to them. Both Japan and South Korea have admitted that they are exploring options to acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter China and North Korea, and most analysts expect both to become nuclear-weapons states by 2040. Various forms of US-led minilateral diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific such as the Quad have died slow deaths, the result of both US indifference and Asian countries’ doubts about the value of these efforts to counter and contain a rising China. India, for example, believes it can achieve more through its own bilateral actions to check Chinese influence than it can by working through such forums.

Also contributing to the deep unease of US allies is the growth of China’s military in size and capabilities, and its increasing forward presence in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere around the world. China has been steadily increasing its number of basing agreements globally to the point where, just as US intelligence services feared a decade ago, China now has bases in Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and the islands in the Pacific and Indian oceans.

A similar story is playing out in Europe, albeit focused on a different threat. There, European NATO members are arming themselves rapidly, spending well above the 2 percent of gross domestic product threshold for defense spending that Washington had been requesting for decades. Although that amounts to a victory of sorts for US foreign policy, it really is a defeat because the spending is an expression of serious doubt about the United States’ commitment to NATO and the Alliance’s Article 5 collective-defense pledge should war come again to the continent. Although the previous war in Ukraine ended in a negotiated stalemate, most European observers believe that it is only a matter of time before a rearmed and resurgent Russia decides to test NATO, likely through a long-feared invasion focused on the Baltics.

In this climate, many are pinning their hopes on Beijing rather than Washington, believing that China will restrain Russia, its junior partner, from going on the offensive in Europe. Partly for this reason, and the fact that China is now Europe’s largest trading partner (having surpassed the United States in the early 2030s), European leaders have muted their criticisms of China’s record on human rights, including privacy rights, and have eased China’s access to the common market despite ongoing concerns about dumping, intellectual-property theft, and other such practices.

Institutional shifts

In part because China never has been interested in tearing down the entire international system and replacing it with something else entirely, few Western leaders have paid much attention to how China has been busy recasting these institutions in its image. And indeed, the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) continue, with China maintaining its representation in them as it has for decades.

But there have been important changes within the UN system. Recently, for instance, China has been far more successful than it was in previous decades at getting its appointees installed within various technical standard-setting bodies such as the UN’s International Telecommunication Union—a function of China’s unrelenting focus on these specialized bureaucracies plus its rising economic, scientific, and technological prowess.

Or consider the UN’s historic role in maintaining peace and security. China was long willing to support UN peacekeeping operations around the world by providing troops and funds, at least to an extent. Yet with the United States and its democratic allies among the UN Security Council’s five permanent members—France and the United Kingdom—now far less willing to spearhead these operations, China has yet to pick up the leadership mantle. China remains willing to contribute to peacekeeping but generally not to lead large-scale efforts, whether in terms of the Security Council’s broad peacekeeping mandates or the financial, human, and technical resources necessary to build them. The result has been fewer such operations and weaker ones as well, leaving more of the world’s conflicts to devolve and even in some cases metastasize.

Perhaps the most worrisome change has to do with the norms and principles that underpin the global system—both within the UN and more generally as well. Although China expresses support for some of the system’s principles—for example, the UN’s emphasis on state sovereignty and territorial integrity—it manifestly does not support others and especially those based upon democratic values. As a result, serious emphasis on human rights and related norms, as well as global oversight of them, has collapsed within multilateral institutions, including the UN.

These developments are having real, on-the-ground impact. China has successfully built a more robust surveillance apparatus globally that includes more sophisticated cyber-espionage operations capable of tracking the communications of ordinary people around the world, along with a major expansion of China’s overseas police stations. The Chinese government claims that these stations are designed only to service the Chinese diaspora, but their true purpose seems to be to keep track of and pressure both the diaspora and China’s external critics as well.

The erosion of global human-rights enforcement speaks to a broader trend: The so-called democratic recession that has been plaguing the world since the early 2000s is now bordering on a depression. With China ascendant, the world’s autocratic leaders are acting with greater confidence at home and abroad. Midway through the 2030s, the long-running contest between democratic and authoritarian systems appears to be resolving—in favor of the latter.

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Climate of fear

In 2035, the Earth’s climate is hotter and less stable than it’s ever been in human history. This instability is causing people to turn on one another—and politics to become more abrasive than it was a decade ago. Climate-driven turbulence is making nearly every other problem—be it geopolitical or conflict-related—harder to solve. These challenges transcend national boundaries and afflict every country, whether rich or poor, to the north or south. Numerous local conflicts and one tense regional standoff (in South Asia) have been fueled by the consequences of a changing climate.

These trends have produced some positive outcomes as well, but in the 2030s it’s difficult to foresee a bright future. As a result, many are looking to radical solutions to get humanity out of its predicament.

Ecological crisis

There is almost no good news to be found in the natural world. A range of climate-induced problems are all worse than they were a decade ago. Observable, on-the-ground environmental changes have consistently outpaced scientists’ predictions from twenty or even ten years ago.

The data indicates that several climate tipping points—including the drying of the Amazon rainforest, the melting of the West Antarctic ice sheet, and the ongoing slowing of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation system, which regulates temperatures and precipitation in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere—are nearer than we previously thought. Scientists’ modeling, based on real-world data in the 2030s, now points even more strongly toward one or more of these or other critical systems collapsing in the next few decades. When these systems begin to collapse, there will be no practical way back from truly horrific ecological disasters.

Even short of such disasters, the world today lacks the capacity to adjust quickly enough to the climate impacts that are here already. Chronic heat is a problem nearly everywhere in the world, with lengthy heat waves now routine on every continent—including on Antarctica, where record highs, well above freezing, are increasingly common. Most frightening is the rapid increase in “wet bulb” days in some regions near the equator, where high heat plus high humidity make it impossible for humans to survive for long outdoors. Massive storms—flash flooding in the wake of record-breaking torrential rainfall, for example, or hurricanes and cyclones that strike well inland—are commonplace now as well. Several coastal cities around the world, including Bangkok, Miami, and Jakarta, regularly flood, even more frequently than they did a decade ago. In 2029, China’s low-lying Pearl River Delta was hit by a massive typhoon that crippled the region’s manufacturing output for months, disrupting global supply chains.

These developments have numerous second- and third-order consequences. The world’s forests, for example, have become tinderboxes, which means that firefighting has become a significant part of national-security planning for an ever-lengthening list of the world’s governments.

(Geo)political upheaval

Politics and geopolitics are changing with the natural world, largely for the worse. Climate change has weakened the world’s democracies, which already had suffered through decades of decline. From Spain and Greece to South Africa, Nepal, and Panama, storms and suffocating heat waves have disrupted elections by making it harder for some voters to cast their ballots. Such events have also affected who participates in elections in the first place, given how they have influenced the outflows and inflows of people through cities and countries, and the voter registration and verification problems that have followed.

Many years ago, when climate-driven migration was first hypothesized in the scientific literature, few paid attention. Not so today, as fears about the consequences of so-called climate migrants or climate refugees have generated real policies involving real people. These fears often have been based on lurid imagination about crime and chaos rather than on facts.

In 2035, there are an estimated 150 million migrants worldwide who are either temporarily displaced or permanently on the move because of climate impacts, although no one knows the true number because migration is such a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. Yet everyone agrees that more migrants are coming.

Most climate-driven migration remains within national boundaries, often coming in the form of rural-to-urban migration into cities such as Bogotá and Karachi. Or it is intra-regional migration within areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. Such trends are also occurring within wealthy regions and countries such as the United States.

These migration patterns have reminded many of the Syrian crisis of the early 2010s, which was preceded by drought-stressed migrants fleeing the countryside for the cities. Although that internal migration likely was only an indirect cause of the subsequent uprising against the Assad regime—which lasted well over a decade and ultimately resulted in the regime’s overthrow—many now see repetition of that past. They point to how climate-fueled internal displacements have increased recruitment into armed nonstate groups. They note the increasing number of communities around the world where climate impacts have exacerbated preexisting vulnerabilities to cause local conflicts, too many of which have started to become deadly. And they cite the increasing number of failed and failing states resulting in part from climate-driven disasters such as intense, multi-year drought.

Governments have responded through pull-up-the-drawbridges measures—and not just in Europe or the United States, where one might expect that to happen, but around the world, including within the Global South. Border walls designed to keep migrants out were already widespread ten years ago. They are everywhere now.

India, for example, has clamped down on its borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar, heavily fortifying them with more personnel, fencing, sophisticated electronic-surveillance systems, and autonomous enforcement technologies such as drones. Numerous critics, both within India and outside of it, have voiced objections, but the Indian government insists that it is only doing what its voters want. This has led to a volatile diplomatic situation in South Asia. Pakistan, which long ago patched up its relations with Bangladesh, has joined Bangladesh and Myanmar in loudly and publicly pushing India to reverse its border policies, to no avail. The region is not at war, nor is there an immediate risk of one. But it is at a knife’s edge, with climate-driven migration having become one of the biggest sources of friction.

Turbulence-induced transformations

There are some bright spots in this otherwise discouraging picture. Renewables are now firmly established as the world’s dominant sources of energy, reflecting both their market competitiveness and the rapid electrification of the global economy. And nuclear energy has begun making a comeback in much of the world, with the latest reactor designs now seen as safely providing reliable, zero-emission electricity. (New power plants, however, remain rare.) In addition, green-technology markets are expanding rapidly across many industries such as food, water, energy, transportation, and consumer goods. Nearly a third of the world’s stock of cars and trucks is fully electric.

The challenge lies in the rate at which decarbonization is occurring—a pace that simply has not been fast enough. Although global greenhouse-gas emissions finally peaked in the late 2020s, humankind nonetheless surpassed the carbon budget required to stay within the target of keeping global warming above pre-industrial levels to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as laid out in the 2015 Paris Agreement. Scientists had prioritized staying below this target to limit the worst impacts of climate change.

One of the factors contributing to this challenge is that much of the world’s legacy energy infrastructure remains in place. Decommissioning such infrastructure, particularly coal and natural-gas plants, is expensive. Too many of the world’s high-carbon plants still exist, especially coal-fired power plants concentrated in China.

Behind all this is global energy consumption, which has continued to rise fast, consistently outstripping renewables’ capacity to fully meet the demand. (A challenge here is that interest rates for borrowing in riskier storm-affected regions have increased, constraining the expansion of capital-intensive renewables such as offshore wind farms.) There are many drivers of this increasing demand, including technological developments such as advances in artificial intelligence (AI). As was feared in the mid-2020s, the infrastructure necessary to support AI’s growth—in the form of computing power and data centers—boosted global energy demand. Although tech companies have greened their models, the problem is about scale: AI’s ubiquity translates into a massive source of energy usage. Some tech companies have become players in the nuclear-energy space for this reason.

As they navigate this turbulence, and as already foreshadowed in the 2020s, both right- and left-wing populist governments are no longer reflexively hostile to policies to combat climate change like they once were. There is renewed interest in accelerating decarbonization efforts, including revitalizing the moribund United Nations-led process for mitigating climate change.

Another response to the unsustainable status quo has been the embrace of more radical solutions. Geoengineering—and specifically solar radiation modification (SRM), which refers to atmospheric and even space-based efforts to reduce warming by reflecting sunlight back into space—has rapidly gone from a scientific curiosity to a subject of serious research. Although SRM engineering is complex, compared with other approaches it is straightforward and inexpensive. As a result, already in 2035 both state and nonstate actors are experimenting with SRM in the atmosphere. There is great fear that the implementation of these new approaches will be a nightmare, as for-profit companies, tech billionaires, and rogue states initiate their own unilateral solutions, while countries fight over the expected (but dimly understood) impacts on their regions. Although the scientific community is warning that SRM’s consequences aren’t yet sufficiently understood, there is a growing sentiment among many (though not all) politicians that it should be tried at scale. But everyone is asking whether effective geoengineering is even possible without some sort of global governance and regulatory regime.

Meanwhile, the clock is ticking and the climate is changing. Humankind’s efforts to master the natural world during the post-industrial era produced the climate crisis. Now, in 2035, the Earth increasingly seems the master of human affairs rather than the other way around.

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About the authors

Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Engelke is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies and is a frequent lecturer to the US Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. He was previously a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Complex Risks, an executive-in-residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Bosch fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation, and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center.

Greg Lindsay, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Lindsay is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative, as well as a nonresident senior fellow of the Arizona State University Threatcasting Lab and the MIT Future Urban Collectives Lab.

Paul Saffo, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Saffo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative and co-editor of Futures Research Methodologies, which will be released later this year.

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irosales — Sat, 01 Feb 2025 21:06:55 +0000

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The foreign aid freeze poses risks to US interests in Syria

Diana Rayes — Fri, 31 Jan 2025 22:15:27 +0000

Days into the second Trump administration, the US State Department and US Agency for International Development (USAID) have paused—with few exceptions and waivers—all US foreign aid assistance as the administration undertakes a policy review. According to a State Department press release announcing the aid freeze, the pause is meant to ensure foreign assistance is “efficient and consistent with US foreign policy under the America First agenda.”

This comes at a critical time for Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime late last year and the establishment of a new interim government led by Ahmed al-Shara, who headed the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Syria—and US regional and European partners—are relying on the United States to lead the way in sanctions relief efforts to allow trade and investment to flow into the country and bolster the state-building process. While limited sanctions relief was granted in the final weeks of the Biden administration, likely prompting the European Union (EU) to also recently ease economic restrictions, the Trump administration’s foreign assistance freeze has the potential to jeopardize Syria’s fragile recovery.

In his confirmation hearing in January, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio previewed his priorities for an outcome in Syria that is favorable to US interests and, more importantly, for the people of Syria. Rubio described an endgame in which Syria is not a land bridge for Iranian proxies, a chessboard for foreign interventions, or an exporter of drugs and terrorism. On several fronts, the Trump administration should pick up where the Biden administration left off in helping Syrians to rebuild their country.

The United States should also use this critical opportunity in Syria to learn from the challenges of the past three administrations. While the strategic importance of Syria’s stability for the Middle East, European allies, and US adversaries has long been a point of bipartisan understanding, strategic outcomes in Syria have been ill-defined. US policy levers, from humanitarian aid and sanctions to military presence on the ground, were misaligned with US goals. Going forward, US humanitarian and economic assistance to the country should be better aligned with clearly identifiable goals that help the Syrian people while furthering US interests in a stable and peaceful Syria.

Reliance on foreign aid assistance in Syria

Humanitarian needs in Syria are at an all-time high—in 2024, 16.7 million people were estimated to require assistance, the largest number since the beginning of the civil war in 2011. Foreign assistance, particularly from the United States, has played a significant, lifesaving role in Syria in the last decade and a half. Despite this, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recently reported ongoing and severe underfunding for the Syria Humanitarian Response Plan—with only 34.5 percent of its $4.1 billion funding requirements fulfilled as of the beginning of this year.

The United States is the largest foreign aid provider to Syria, contributing more than $18 billion in humanitarian assistance since 2011, including $1.2 billion in 2024. Most of last year’s funding supported humanitarian and emergency response efforts, with $76.8 million for refugee and conflict victim support, $34.7 million for humanitarian aid like food and nutrition, and $20.2 million for emergency food assistance and related services.

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US funding has been crucial in supporting humanitarian efforts on the ground in Syria. The White Helmets, an internationally-supported Syrian civil rescue organization, has received US support for critical operations across the country, including search and rescue missions, as well as health and protection programming. In the weeks since Bashar al-Assad’s fall, their critical work has included the clearing of unexploded ordnance across the country, which pose a severe threat to civilians, especially children, and have resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries. The White Helmets have also prioritized securing and recovering chemical weapons stockpiles left by the Assad regime, activities which have since been halted by the recent pause, raising concerns over the ability to prevent the spread of chemical weapons in Syria and neighboring countries.

US aid has also played a critical role in managing Al-Hol and Al-Roj camps in northeast Syria, which house over 46,000 displaced individuals—primarily women and children—from former Islamic State of Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) territories. Essential water and sanitation services managed by US-funded humanitarian staff were suddenly suspended, placing camp residents at greater risk of lack of access to safe drinking water, as well as water and vector-borne disease spread. Also alarming was the effect of the sudden pause on funding that contributes to the security and administrative management of major detention facilities holding close to ten thousand ISIS fighters in these areas, which raised concerns among counterterrorism officials about mass prison breaks and a potential ISIS resurgence. State Department officials quickly responded by granting exceptions for foreign aid cuts related to the management of these facilities. However, other sudden moves to withdraw aid in Syria or downsize the US military presence in the country could pose significant counterterrorism risks for the United States and its partners. It is in the United States’ broader interest to ensure security needs in Syria are met in order to prevent violent extremists from exploiting political vacuums.

What does the “stop-work” order mean for Syria?

The recent “stop-work” order has introduced significant uncertainty for ongoing aid and economic recovery efforts in Syria—and as a result poses risks to US interests in the region. While the order originally included a carve-out for emergency food aid, the exact scope and implementation of these exceptions remain unclear for Syria, raising concerns from the United Nations and aid groups about disruptions to critical forms of assistance globally. In response to this pressure, Rubio has since issued a waiver for “life-saving assistance,” which includes medical services, food, shelter, and subsistence assistance. Aid organizations, like the White Helmets and even US-based contractors and small businesses supporting US-funded programs abroad, are still navigating an unpredictable funding environment, making it difficult to plan for long-term relief and stabilization efforts.

This development comes in the context of previous US measures aimed at mitigating the impact of sanctions on humanitarian aid in Syria. The Biden administration had previously granted select sanctions relief to Syria for six months through the US Treasury Department to facilitate the provision of public services and humanitarian assistance. This relief applied to sanctions related to transactions with Syria’s government and the processing of personal remittances to the country through the Syrian Central Bank. This was followed promptly by a waiver to the Foreign Assistance Act relating to Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terror for Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Ukraine. Not without its flaws, the move aimed to enable critical aid and development assistance in sectors ranging from energy and agriculture to technology and healthcare. Other countries, as well as the EU, are using a “step-by-step” approach to the lifting of sanctions on Syria as leverage to ensure the new government is meeting key indicators of a successful and sustainable political transition.

With the stop-work order now in effect, the future of US-backed humanitarian operations in Syria is now in question. The recent waiver issued by the State Department for this order notably does not include stabilization assistance—of which the United States has collectively contributed more than $1.3 billion since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011—and is defined as multi-sectoral support to “local governance, essential services, and livelihoods and economic recovery.” Experts have noted that these efforts to promote stability in Syria in the coming months is contingent on indicators to the Syrian people that the economic conditions in the country are on the mend under the new government. It is therefore in the United States’ and its partners’ national security interests to aid postwar recovery in Syria to begin the process of improving US-Syria relations, facilitate the return of refugees and displaced Syrians around the globe, and ensure regional stability.

The Trump administration has also issued a series of executive orders on personnel at the State Department and USAID. The administration has placed senior career civil servants on administrative leave, fired institutional contractors, and pressured employees to resign. These include officials who have worked on Syria for over a decade and possess critical institutional knowledge on conflict stabilization, humanitarian assistance, and development in fragile economies.

Aid groups and policymakers are closely monitoring whether additional exemptions or funding adjustments will be made to prevent further disruptions to essential services. The potential consequences of prolonged aid suspensions could exacerbate existing humanitarian crises and create new security risks in a region already facing instability.

Ensuring a stable Syria

Syria is at a critical juncture in its history, and the next few months are essential for the country’s interim authorities to ensure national and regional stability. As Sinan Hatahet highlights in a piece for the Atlantic Council, the United States has an especially vital role to play in Syria’s recovery efforts as this “post-Assad honeymoon” phase fades.

As other post-conflict contexts have demonstrated, foreign aid and stabilization programming—led out of the US State Department and USAID—will be instrumental in determining Syria’s trajectory. To facilitate a stable postwar recovery in Syria, the United States must ensure that US leadership in aid development is not in question. In addition to resuming existing aid programs, there are several steps the administration can take to improve its aid to Syria and better align it with US objectives.

Evaluate how local programs fit into broader US policy and Syria’s evolving political situation.
Ensure aid is aligned with local systems and development priorities as programs are renewed or new ones are developed.
If unwilling for political reasons to increase US aid to Syria, continue Biden administration steps, including taking further actions to permanently roll back sanctions in Syria and to remove barriers for allies and partners to do so.

Postwar Syria faces a precarious economic and security situation and the United States’ assistance—or lack thereof—will play an outsize role in its outcome. For the sake of both the Syrian people and the United States’ interest in a stable and peaceful Syria that does not become a terrorist threat, it is imperative that US aid to Syria continue.

Diana Rayes, PhD, is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Note: Some Atlantic Council work funded by the US government has been paused as a result of the Trump administration’s Stop Work Orders issued under the Executive Order “Reevaluating and Realigning US Foreign Aid.”

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Libya’s de facto partition demands a solution designed for it—not for outside contenders

Hani Shennib — Fri, 31 Jan 2025 20:09:15 +0000

While the West continues to fixate on elections in promoting democracy worldwide, many Libyans today have become resentful. They largely perceive the elections touted by the West as part of a strategy to legitimize a government that serves foreign interests rather than fulfilling Libyans’ needs for stability and institution building. They simply do not trust that elections conducted under current conditions—characterized by a lack of constitutional foundations, profound corruption, forceful arrests, and streets dominated by militias and warlords—can lead to fair outcomes.

Meanwhile, the West and its partners, caught up in defending democracy and human rights, feel guilt over their failure to stabilize Libya following an intervention that bizarrely morphed from a mission to protect a population from Muammar Gaddafi’s wrath into one of regime change. Consequently, the coalition has yet again turned to an inept United Nations (UN)to push for democratic change through elections. However, this goal has not materialized and is unlikely to do so in the near future.

Historically, other countries have approached resolving the situation in Libya with a mindset of “what’s in it for me?,” highlighting how national and regional interests shape attempts at change—particularly in the context of Libya. This was similarly true during UN discussions on how to address Italian colonies taken by the Allies post-World War II and the intense negotiations among the United States, European countries, and Russia regarding Libya’s fate in the late 1940s. Notably, strong views were expressed by Azzam Pasha (an Egyptian diplomat who was at the time the secretary general of the Arab League) regarding Egypt’s interests in Libya. Such discussions have an eerie similarity to today’s regional and international negotiations about Libya’s future.

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Currently, the motivations for international involvement in Libya are shaped by three main concerns: 1) Europe’s alarm over the massive scale of illegal migration flowing through porous Libyan borders and its significant security and socioeconomic implications; 2) unease about the potential downward spiral of sociopolitical conditions in North African and Sahel states, which could undermine the economic interests of major corporations in the region; and 3) worry that a chaotic and fragile state may allow terrorist entities to thrive and potentially spread, escalating security threats.

In the eyes of the international community, these concerns require dealing with a central authority in Libya, regardless of the authority’s perceived legitimacy or its true value to the Libyan people and their institution building. These factors have, in part, led to a series of poorly devised proposals and roadmaps put forth by the UN and endorsed by international actors, which have resulted in little progress and worsened the divisions currently observed in Libya today.

From my observations during my frequent visits to the country and my conversations with Libyan leaders, politicians, and academics, I have identified five reasons why previous efforts put forth by the international community to shape a modern state in Libya have failed.

First, there are historical roots of division that have not yet been addressed. This is one of the reasons why the numerous attempts by multiple representatives of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to engage Libyan actors in various stabilizing roadmaps over the last thirteen years have failed miserably. The last effort, expected to lead to elections in December 2022, went nowhere due to political wrangling between two executive bodies and two legislative ones located—by no coincidence—in the eastern and western parts of the country, reflecting the historical divisions between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. It is practically impossible to envision effective presidential and parliamentary elections occurring in the near future without acknowledging these historical roots of division.

Second, it is clear that political and security actors on the ground in both regions of Libya have exploited these divisions for their own political and financial benefit through alliances with benefactor militias, corrupt entrepreneurs, members of the nouveau riche, and cross-border smugglers. This blend of neo-militocracy and kleptocracy heavily influences political and security decisions in the executive, legislative, judicial, and security branches in Libya, ensuring that national and international distractions allow them to remain in power for the foreseeable future.

Third, after forty-two years of oppression and a dismissal of rights and democracy under Gaddafi, as well as additional fourteen years of poverty and insecurity following the collapse of state institutions in 2011, the populace is busy with surviving day by day and lacks the means necessary to express their discontent. This, along with a sense of defeat regarding their aspirations for a better life following the failed Arab Spring, renders it unlikely that any significant movement will arise from the streets of Libyan cities in the near future, creating grounds for the continuation of the status quo.

Fourth and most importantly, the emergence of more pressing global conflicts and a shift in the international community’s priorities over the past four years, particularly with a focus on Ukraine and Southeast Asia, has diminished the attention and resources devoted to Libya’s situation. That is the case despite the fact that the West is concerned about the exponential growth of Russian and Chinese influence in Libya and the African continent at large.

Last, it is clear that the populations of many developing countries, particularly in the Middle East and Africa (including Libya), perceive Western governments to have lost their moral compass and can no longer be trusted as custodians of democratic and humanitarian change. This perception has been exacerbated by the catastrophe that has befallen the Arab people of Gaza—which countries in the West either failed to prevent or openly supported. Thus, in the eyes of the Libyan people, the West’s ability to recommend, supervise, or contribute to any democratic or nation-building initiatives has become compromised. This observation reinforces a decade-long sentiment among Arabs that it is not uncommon for Western governments to support and deal with autocracies and militaries throughout the Arab world—from Algeria to Egypt to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States—contributing to their skepticism about elections and hopes for democratic change.

One of the few successes in Libya since 2020 (the year that marked the end of the civil war that divided the country into territories east and west of the city of Sirte), is that the line dividing the country has become more distinct. Today, Libya has two governments, effectively two legislative bodies, and two security entities controlling the political, economic, and daily operations in their respective regions. Ironically—despite initial unifying efforts to address the disastrous situation in the aftermath of Storm Daniel in 2023, which claimed nearly twelve thousand lives—grand reconstruction opportunities in the regions have instead led to further segmentation of decision making and project funding. Such mega-funding and the anticipated engagement of international corporations and governments has only further entrenched Libya’s split.

Thus, Libya is currently a de facto two-state entity. The elusive internationally recognized government based in Tripoli exists primarily to allow the international community and its corporations to advance their own interests, failing to address the complex realities on the ground in Libya. International players such as China, Russia, and others are moving within Libya with disregard to issues of migration or border security, and are more focused on strategic economic engagement with Africa. This further undermines European and US interests while taking advantage of the West’s inertia and lack of clear strategy and engagement in Libya.

Furthermore, Libyans have grown disillusioned with the role of the international community and the United Nations, and they no longer trust or see much value in UNSMIL. Libyans are now gradually accepting and adapting to the current de facto demarcation of the country, going along with this in almost every aspect of their daily functions. An unnatural symbiosis seems to be developing between the aspirations of the people of Cyrenaica for more regional governance—away from the centralist hegemony Tripolitania exercised since 1969—and the military autocracy led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. At the same time, the internationally recognized government in Libya’s west continues to struggle to maintain power under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah who (along with his cousin) was sanctioned for corruption by the Libyan interim government and continues to face allegations of corruption, which he denies. Recent street anger against Dbeibah, stemming from his government’s attempt at rapprochement with Israeli officials as well as an escalation of pressure from dissatisfied militia, could catalyze the collapse of the internationally recognized government. This, in turn, could prompt Dbeibah to resort to military skirmishes with the east to distract from public discontent and prolong his government’s lifespan.

This week, the UN secretary-general appointed Hanna Serwaa Tetteh, a seasoned Ghanaian diplomat, as the new head of UNSMIL, making her the tenth person to serve that position in thirteen years. The appointment came after much wrangling between the United States and Russia, again suggesting that foreign interests will likely continue to dominate conversations about resolutions for Libya.

Libya needs new ideas and a national and international will to reset a realistic path toward a modern state, premised on a recognition of its history and a mentality of “what’s in it” not just for the international community but, more importantly, for its own people, as well.

Hani Shennib is the founding president of the National Council on US-Libya Relations

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Lebanon’s prime minister-designate is unlikely to confront Hezbollah

David Daoud — Wed, 29 Jan 2025 16:16:41 +0000

After a two-year vacancy, Lebanon finally has a president. On January 9, Joseph Aoun was swept into office as its fourteenth holder to Lebanese and international acclaim. More importantly, if less glamorously, Lebanon has also selected a prime minister-designate to form a cabinet. Nawaf Salam—a former Palestine Liberation Organization and Fatah militant turned Lebanese diplomat who also served as president of the International Court of Justice—is now expected to assume the premiership. As the head of Lebanon’s true executive authority, lifting the country out of its compounding crises—not the least of which is the question of what will become of Hezbollah and its arms—will fall upon Salam.

His chances of success are far from clear. What is clear is that given Lebanon’s dire economic state, its postwar reconstruction needs, and the balance of political power in the country, Salam is highly unlikely to meaningfully confront Hezbollah and risk escalating internal conflict during his premiership.

The powers of the prime minister

Under Lebanon’s pre-civil war constitution, the presidency—earmarked by convention for a Maronite, the country’s dominant Christian sect—was Lebanon’s preeminent and most powerful office. The Taif Agreement of 1989, which ended the Lebanese Civil War, amended the constitution and shuffled Lebanon’s balance of power to better accord with the best estimate of the country’s new demographic realities. In part, it expanded the power of the Sunni-designated post of prime minister and his cabinet at the presidency’s expense—creating a balance between two offices that would now operate as mutual counterweights.

Today, according to the Lebanese constitution, the cabinet “set[s] the general policy of the State in all domains, draws up bills and organizational decrees,” and “Oversees the implementation of laws and regulations, and supervises the activities over all the State’s institutions, including civil, military, and security administrations and institutions without exception.” If he cobbles together a cabinet and then gains the parliament’s confidence within thirty days, Salam will become the latest beneficiary of that expanded power.

Lebanon’s political landscape

But Salam and his cabinet are unlikely to usher in fundamental changes.

Lebanon’s next parliamentary elections are set for May 2026. Salam therefore has a year and a half, at most, to tackle a wide range of issues, from a collapsed economy and poor infrastructure to security challenges, before his government dissolves by operation of law. His government will be responsible for fully implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the November 27, 2024, cease-fire deal with Israel. And Salam, who has not yet fully assumed the premiership, has already confronted and overcome a legitimacy crisis.

Salam’s candidacy won the support of eighty-four of Lebanon’s 128 parliamentarians. But that wasn’t supposed to happen. His predecessor and longtime ally of Hezbollah, Najib Miqati, was set to retake the office, reportedly as part of the guarantees and assurances that presidential candidate Aoun gave Hezbollah and the Amal Party—the so-called Shia duo—in exchange for backing Aoun’s election. When many of the parties that had seemingly committed to Miqati switched their votes at the last minute to Salam, first Hezbollah and then Amal responded by withholding their support. The pro-Hezbollah newspaper Al-Akhbar decried what it called a “total American coup” while the head of the group’s Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc, Mohammad Raad, angrily accused Salam’s backers of “sever[ing]” the conciliatory hand Hezbollah had extended by voting for Aoun.

The Shia duo thus denied Salam the backing of the only two representative parties of Lebanese Shias—likely the country’s largest and fastest-growing sect. Their statements also left it ambiguous as to whether they would join or support Salam’s government. While not constitutionally required, because Lebanon continues to operate on the basis of sectarian power sharing and consensus, convention would require Salam’s cabinet to have pan-sectarian support. Without it, the cloud of illegitimacy and “exclusion” of one of Lebanon’s constituent components would hang over his government. Salam and Aoun therefore reportedly scrambled to placate the Shia duo—with Salam sending them assurances that his designation wasn’t intended to exclude them, and Aoun stepping in to mediate.

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Salam and the Shia duo appear to have smoothed matters over. Caught off guard, Hezbollah and Amal’s intransigence was only temporary political muscle-flexing to extract concessions or guarantees from Salam. This was a similar tactic to when they withheld their votes from Aoun during the first round of voting for the president on January 9. Whatever the eventual composition of Salam’s future government or the content of its policy statement, they sought to ensure that Salam would uphold the president’s assurances that were supposed to come through Miqati—and not move against Hezbollah, its arms, or its shadow state.

To be sure, Salam is closer to a consensus candidate than the anti-Hezbollah pugilists Ashraf Rifi and Fouad Makhzoumi, the preferred candidates of the old-guard opposition and activist opposition, respectively, who withdrew in favor of Salam. Nevertheless, Salam is not a partner and known quantity like Miqati. And an unfriendly prime minister could theoretically initiate the process of disarming Hezbollah. After all, Lebanon’s armed forces are constitutionally “subject to the authority of the Cabinet”—and not the president, who is only their nominal commander.

Toeing the line

But Salam was always unlikely to pick a fight with Hezbollah. Salam’s list of vital tasks is long, and his time in office could be short. The Shia duo are not marginal societal actors. Hezbollah alone won 356,122 of the 1,951,683 votes cast in the 2022 parliamentary elections—the most of any party by 150,000 votes—and two separate 2024 polls showed that 85-93 percent of Shias in Lebanon support the group. Amal won an additional 191,142 votes. At best, clashing with them would be met with the obstructionism and political paralysis at which the Shia duo—and especially Hezbollah—excels. At worst, given their popularity, it would be flirting with civil war. But their compliance, at minimum, would enable Salam and his government to pursue at least some of its goals.

Salam must steer Lebanon through economic recovery, update and upgrade the country’s decayed infrastructure, enact political and judicial reform, and begin the work of postwar reconstruction. These are heavy lifts for a normally functioning state, and for Lebanon they may be impossible—even without compounding these challenges by trying to disarm Hezbollah. Therefore, confronting the group will likely drop to the bottom of Salam’s priorities, if it isn’t absent from his agenda entirely.

The danger of Israel resuming its campaign against Hezbollah, the main inducement for Lebanon to act against the group, diminished considerably under international and US pressure with Aoun’s election. Pressure on Israel to refrain from escalating again in Lebanon is only likely to increase, including from the Trump administration, as Salam forms his government. Salam wouldn’t be the first Lebanese politician to deem it unwise to risk igniting a civil war by pushing to disarm Hezbollah to stave off a renewal of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Another Lebanese civil war could last at least a decade and would devastate the entire country. Another full-scale Israel-Hezbollah war, in contrast, is now unlikely to recur for years, would probably be relatively short-lived, and its destruction would likely fall largely on Hezbollah-dominated areas.

Reports indicate that Salam’s intended cabinet policy statement will mirror Aoun’s inaugural speech. Based on Salam’s own promise to “fully implement Resolution 1701 and all terms of the [November 27] cease-fire agreement,” it will likely incorporate Aoun’s promise to monopolize force in the hands of the Lebanese state. Some have interpreted these ambiguous words as a vow to disarm Hezbollah. But Lebanon has long interpreted these terms idiosyncratically to exclude disarming the group. As Salam proceeds with the formation of his government, and if he succeeds in securing his premiership, he is very likely to fall back on these interpretations to avoid a clash with Hezbollah that will transform his term into a paralyzed failure.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs.

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On prosperity, Taiwan ranks high—but its future hinges on Chinese power plays

Shelley Rigger — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 19:14:15 +0000

Evolution of freedom

Evolution of prosperity

The path forward

Explore the Taiwan country scorecard

Return to Full Essay collection

Download PDF of the entire book

Evolution of freedom

Taiwan’s diplomacy stresses its peaceful transition from a single-party authoritarian state under the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), to a robust democracy with strong protections of civil and political rights. It identifies as a “beacon of democracy,” especially in East Asia, a region in which democracy has not been the predominant political form historically. The time coverage of the Freedom Index, 1995–2023, is well-suited to analyze Taiwan’s contemporary institutional evolution, and our survey findings support Taiwan’s self-image as a liberal democracy.

Binary indexes of democracy, such as the Boix-Miller-Rosato (BMR) or the Democracy Dictatorship Index, identify 1996 as the year of Taiwan’s democratic transition, but the transition away from the authoritarian system that had existed in Taiwan since 1945 was as early as the late 1970s. As pressure from below demanding steps towards greater political openness intensified in the 1980s, the KMT-led authoritarian regime grew increasingly tolerant of dissent, allowing the democratization process to move forward.

A key factor behind the regime’s changing attitude toward democratization was Taiwan’s deepening isolation as leading countries, including the United States, abandoned the view that Taiwan’s “Republic of China (ROC)” state represented all of China and shifted recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Some key inflection points included the lifting of the “Temporary Provisions for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” in 1991, which had originally been enacted as a constitutional amendment in 1948. This was accompanied by a series of increasingly significant elections, including the first comprehensive elections for the National Assembly (1991) and Legislative Yuan (1992), as well as the first direct election of a Taiwan Provincial Governor (1994).

While Taiwan’s democratization was an incremental process, 1996 is generally seen as the crucial milestone in Taiwan’s political history, for that year saw its first direct presidential election. The victor was the incumbent, Lee Teng-hui, the candidate of the former authoritarian regime’s ruling party, the KMT. Lee’s strong performance—he won more than 50 percent of the vote in a four-way race—benefitted from his decision to align himself with the democratic transition. His election also helped to marginalize those in the KMT who took a more skeptical view of democracy. The political subindex, based on the continuous measure of democracy produced by the V-Dem project, likely reflects the slow adoption of democratic values by those who saw their political dominance eroding under the new rules of the game.

Taiwan’s democracy took another big step forward in 2000. In that year, the index jumps to a level comparable to that of well-established democracies in Europe and North America. The Index reflects the first turnover of power in the new democracy following the victory of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) presidential candidate, Chen Shui-bian. The opposition party’s first national election victory marks the completion of the democratic transition of Taiwan, which since then has experienced only small, incremental changes in political freedom in areas such as women’s representation and protection of minorities.

Nonetheless, the political subindex components point to some features of Taiwan’s political and constitutional architecture that lag behind more established democracies. Most saliently, the component measuring the degree of legislative constraint on the executive receives a significantly lower score than the rest of the components, and presents a greater volatility throughout the period of analysis. I believe this discrepancy reflects the awkwardness of Taiwan’s quasi-presidential constitutional system. The head of state (president) is separately elected for a fixed term, giving him or her a popular mandate. This important role coexists with a standard parliamentary system in the legislature. The president appoints the head of government (premier), and while legislative confirmation is not required, the legislature can remove the premier with a vote of no confidence, which triggers new legislative elections. Since 1996, Taiwanese politics have been characterized by a constant debate about the relative powers of the presidency versus the legislature and premier. This challenge recedes during periods of unified government (2008–16, 2016–24), when the president takes the leading role, but it reemerges in periods of divided government (2000–08, 2024 to the present).

The legislative constraints indicator closely reflects the two parties’ relative strength in these two branches of power. From 2000 to 2008, the DPP held the presidency but the KMT had a majority in the legislature, leaving President Chen Shui-bian struggling to implement his domestic agenda. In 2008, the country returned to unified government under President Ma Ying-jeou, with the KMT holding both the presidency and the legislative majority. While Ma faced a surprisingly feisty legislative leadership, the legislature was still much more deferential to presidential power than had been the case under Chen. The small ups and downs in the indicator since 2016—a period of unified government under DPP President Tsai Ing-wen—reflect the ongoing search for a stable balance of legislative and executive power. Indeed, when Taiwan returned to divided government in 2024, the KMT-led legislature immediately proposed reforms aimed at constraining the presidency.

Taiwan’s scores on two other components of the political subindex are low compared to other measures and require explanation. First, the score for political rights of association and expression is lower than might be expected, in part because the two main political parties tend to exploit the popularity of democracy to achieve a political edge. Both parties, when they were out of power, accused their opponents of reviving undemocratic practices, including politically motivated prosecutions of party leaders and officials. In fact, accusations of corruption have been used to sideline politicians, especially after they leave office. Chen Shui-bian’s conviction on bribery charges in 2009 is a clear example of this practice.

Second, Taiwan imposes restrictions on media ownership, a practice which is reflected in the political rights component of the Index. Some Taiwanese see these restrictions as an effort to deny certain political views access to the media. However, others believe they are necessary to prevent the Beijing government from influencing mass media in Taiwan. In particular, the visible drop on this measure starting in 2020 probably captures the National Communications Commission’s decision not to renew the TV license of Chung T’ien Television. Chung T’ien was widely believed to be a mouthpiece for Beijing whose news coverage was biased against the DPP and in favor of KMT, which argues for more favorable relations with the PRC.

Turning now to the economic subindex, Taiwan has a long history of strong performance in terms of economic freedom. It is clear that the component measuring women’s economic freedom is the main factor driving the overall positive trend since 1995, and especially until 2004, with an extraordinary increase of more than thirty points. Half of this increase takes place in 2003, reflecting the improvement in legislation regarding workplace conditions for women, mainly in the areas of nondiscrimination, sexual-harassment prevention, and maternity leave conditions. Other important advances include granting equal treatment for men and women regarding asset holdings in 2004, and equal access to industrial and dangerous jobs in 2015. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the overall high degree of gender equality in the public sphere is not always accompanied by a similar level of equality in the private domain. Taiwanese women still carry a disproportionate share of household work, as well as other burdens typical in strongly patriarchal societies.

The indicators of trade and investment freedom seem to be highly sensitive to Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China. In particular, the large movements in investment freedom (2005, 2015, 2017, and 2022) reflect changes in cross-Strait investment regulations that alternately ease and tighten the conditions for PRC-Taiwan capital flows. Similarly, the seven-point drop in trade freedom in the early 2000s is likely a product of stricter restrictions for export and import of goods and services with China. As the concluding section details, China poses a significant threat to Taiwan’s democracy. Anxiety about how economic interactions could make Taiwan vulnerable to PRC economic coercion explains why Taiwan’s trade and investment policies have not moved consistently in the direction of greater openness. If we could exclude the China element from these indicators, I assess that Taiwan’s scores would be a lot smoother, reflecting a sustained commitment to fairly open trade and capital movement with the rest of the world.

The rule of law in Taiwan, as measured by the legal subindex, has experienced a mild increase since the year 2000, mainly driven by notable increases in improving bureaucratic quality, control of corruption, and informality. The democratization process very significantly improved the level of accountability for political leaders and public officials at large, improving the overall capacity and efficiency of the public sector to enforce and abide by the law. Judicial effectiveness and independence is an important factor contributing to this development, and the fact that the score on this area is relatively high since the year 2000 certainly captures the reality of the situation in Taiwan. My intuition is that the transitory dip in the 2008–16 period is due to what people perceive to be politically motivated prosecutions of politicians, a perception that was particularly acute in the immediate aftermath of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency.

Two more insights are worth mentioning. On one hand, the visible fall in clarity of the law between 2012 and 2016 can only be explained by an aggravation of the discussions regarding the balance of power between the presidency and the legislature in a period of intense partisan competition and outside-the-system political mobilization. Efforts to use constitutional revision to settle these disputes necessarily introduce uncertainty about the legal system.

On the other hand, Taiwan’s security score experienced a sharp decline of over ten points between 1996 and 2000. While this component has fluctuated since 2000, it remains below its 1995 level. I believe it would be a mistake to attribute this decline to domestic factors. Taiwan continues to be a safe society with low rates of crime. The timing of fluctuations in the security component suggest it is highly sensitive to Taiwan’s citizens’ feelings of insecurity relative to the PRC’s military threat. The drop in the security score during the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian presidencies (1996–2008) reflects the increase in PRC political and military pressure on Taiwan, beginning with its military exercises at the time of the 1996 elections. While the PRC paused some of its pressure on Taiwan during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency (2008–16), the sense of threat has steadily increased over the first quarter of the century.

Evolution of prosperity

The evolution of Taiwan’s Prosperity Index score is somewhat easier to analyze, as the positive overall trend since 1995 is mainly driven by economic and health outcomes, but nonetheless there are some interesting takeaways from the analysis of the different components.

Taiwan’s economic success story is well known, with impressive and sustained gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth numbers for several decades now. The income component of the Prosperity Index not only reflects this fact, but also the limited negative effects of the last two large global crises, namely, the Great Recession of 2008–09 and the COVID-19 pandemic. The Taiwanese economy has proven resilient and mature, despite a very profound transformation from a developmental state with a relatively high level of state intervention to a much more deregulated market economy.

Despite Taiwan’s strong growth, inequality has increased over recent decades, from a very low base in the early years of our study. Rising inequality is due in part to the structural changes in terms of economic policy mentioned above, together with a weak legal environment for unionization. Other forces driving incomes in a more unequal direction include the offshoring of traditional manufacturing after 1987, primarily to mainland China, and an economy increasingly bifurcated between the domestic-facing retail and service sectors and an export-oriented high-tech sector. Despite the decline in performance in eradicating inequality, Taiwan still maintains a more equitable income distribution compared to the United States and China. Its Gini coefficient, around eighty in recent years, remains higher than the East Asia and Pacific regional average (66), mainland China (56.5), and the United States(65.3).

Regarding health, Taiwan is among the top performers in the world, increasing its score by more than ten points since 1995, when the country adopted a universal health insurance scheme. The recent evolution of the health indicator in Taiwan contrasts sharply with that of other developed countries, especially when it comes to its handling of the COVID-19 crisis. Taiwan managed the health emergency better than virtually any other country of the world, closing its borders very early, requiring quarantine for everyone entering the country, implementing a state takeover of mask production and distribution, requiring masks in public, and accelerating the production and implementation of vaccinations. As a result, COVID-19 did not spread in Taiwan until the vaccines were available, and the death toll from the pandemic is negligible in the health indicator, unlike European countries and the United States (Figure 1). It is certainly true that other countries, especially Asian developed nations like Japan, were also capable of containing the negative public health effects of the pandemic. Nonetheless, the really distinctive feature of Taiwan is that it was able to do so without a major erosion, even if shortlived, of civil liberties of its citizens (Figure 1). There were restrictions in Taiwan, but the limitations on individual freedom were drastically lower than in other developed countries, and did not require draconian enforcement thanks to the generalized voluntary compliance of the population.

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, Atlantic Council (2024)

Finally, the dynamics of the minorities component are complex and require interpretation. The sharp increase in the year 2000, coinciding with the first DPP presidency, surely reflects the substantial improvement of the indigenous Taiwanese population in terms of access to public services, jobs, and opportunities. On the contrary, the fall in the score in the last five years is probably explained by the situation of migrant workers, whose numbers have increased significantly in the recent period, and whose legal status and conditions have not been as well protected as those of domestic workers. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, some foreign workers were confined to their workplaces for long periods of time, while most Taiwanese enjoyed a relatively normal lifestyle with few pandemic-related limitations on their day-to-day activities.

The path forward

Taiwan’s democratic institutions have functioned smoothly for nearly three decades. After eight rounds of presidential elections and even more of legislative and local elections, campaigning and voting in competitive, multiparty elections is routine. Taiwanese also enjoy a high degree of protection for their civil rights, in realms ranging from freedom of speech to marriage equality for LGBTQ+ couples. While all democracies have their flaws— Richard Bush’s book Difficult Choices outlines many of Taiwan’s—the island’s political system seems to meet the conventional definition of a consolidated democracy: democracy is, indeed, the “only game in town.”¹

Perhaps the best evidence of the strength of Taiwan’s democracy is its citizens’ tendency to view it as the defining trait that makes Taiwan Taiwan, and differentiates it from the People’s Republic of China.

With the exception of indigenous Taiwanese, who constitute a little over 2 percent of the population, the people of Taiwan are descended from settlers from mainland China. Their ancestors arrived over several centuries, including a long wave of migration between the late sixteenth and late nineteenth centuries and a short wave between 1945 and 1949. From 1895 to 1945 Taiwan was colonized by the Japanese empire.

For most of its history, Taiwanese were subjects of empires and states that controlled the island from afar. When the ROC took control of the island at the end of World War II, the new government expected Taiwan to uphold its goal of merging Taiwan into the Chinese state on the mainland. Even after the ROC lost the civil war and the PRC was founded in 1949, the ROC government continued to insist that “recovering the mainland” was its destiny, and Taiwanese should work toward restoring the ROC in the mainland. The PRC, too, believes in merging Taiwan into China, but its policy is that the Chinese state Taiwan should join is the PRC.

The advent of democracy in the 1990s opened the possibility of a different destiny for Taiwan. Some Taiwanese even called for formal independence from China—for abandoning the “ROC” label and eschewing forever the possibility of merging into a mainland-based nation. Some made the case for independence on the grounds that Taiwan is not “Chinese.” Advocates of Taiwanese cultural nationalism argued that, despite their Chinese ancestry, Taiwan’s culture is an amalgam of indigenous, Japanese, and Western influences that differentiate it from China.

No matter how the case for independence is made, however, the PRC government has made it clear that it will oppose such a move with military force, so the idea of formal independence has lost much of its support in Taiwan.

At the same time, Beijing’s pressure on Taiwan to allow itself to be absorbed into the PRC was intensifying, Taiwan’s political and social institutions were becoming freer and more democratic. Meanwhile, despite Beijing’s efforts to promote the idea, support for unification within Taiwan has dwindled. And the mainstream rationale for Taiwan’s separate status has shifted from cultural nationalism to a sense of civic nationalism—the idea that what makes Taiwan unique—and unification unwelcome—is the island’s liberal democratic political system. Democracy, warts and all, has become a point of pride and distinction for Taiwanese, which should make for a bright projection for its continued thriving in Taiwan.

Unfortunately, the future of democracy on the island does not depend on the Taiwanese people alone. The PRC opposes both Taiwan’s continued self-government and its democratic system. In Beijing’s view, Taiwan’s historic connections to the Chinese mainland make it an inseparable part of “China,” and as the PRC state is the current government of China, Taiwan must, sooner or later, be incorporated into the PRC. There’s no chance that the PRC would adopt Taiwan’s liberal democratic institutions and practices, so unification would almost certainly bring an end to democracy in Taiwan, as it has in Hong Kong.

How likely is this outcome? It is impossible to predict, but the PRC is determined to bring Taiwan to heel, peacefully if possible, but by force if necessary. So far, the two sides have managed to avoid conflict, in part because the costs and risks of forcible unification are high, and in part because Beijing believes it can prevail without force eventually. I think it is likely that this stalemate will continue in the near future. If it does continue for the next five to ten years, the situation may evolve to a point where a mutually acceptable arrangement is possible. Or it may not, in which case Taiwan’s democracy will continue to exist under constant threat.

Taiwan’s prosperity is similarly dependent on external factors. The high-tech boom that followed the offshoring of traditional manufacturing in the late 1980s and the 1990s has made Taiwan more important than ever in the global economy. The IT manufacturing ecosystem—of which the semiconductor giant Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is only the most famous of many critically important firms—has made Taiwan more central to the global economy than ever. Regional and global supply chains connect Taiwan to partners in Japan, Korea, the United States, the PRC, and more, as well as to customers around the world.

The mutual benefit derived from these relationships is an important deterrent to military conflict in the Taiwan Strait—Beijing has everything to lose, economically, if these economic relationships are disrupted. Beijing thus faces a dilemma: realizing its goal of unification could undercut its economic success, but avoiding that outcome means tolerating a political status quo in the Taiwan Strait that the PRC leadership has defined as unacceptable. As long as Taiwan continues to act with restraint— avoiding creating the perception that unification has become impossible—the economic benefit of tolerating the status quo will probably outweigh the political cost. Still, any of these factors could shift unexpectedly, with the likely result that both democracy and prosperity in Taiwan would take a tragic turn.

Shelley Rigger is Brown professor of East Asian Politics and vice president for academic affairs/ dean of faculty at Davidson College. Rigger has a PhD in government from Harvard University and a BA from Princeton University. Rigger is the author of two books on Taiwan’s domestic politics, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (Routledge 1999) and From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2001). She has published two books for general readers, Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse (2011) and The Tiger Leading the Dragon: How Taiwan Propelled China’s Economic Rise (2021).

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