Fourteen years after the 2011 uprising and NATO-led military intervention that toppled Muammar Gaddafi, Libya remains divided. While the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) rules the northwest, the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by military leader Khalifa Haftar, controls most of eastern Libya—with both factions backed by competing foreign militaries.

For years, the situation on the ground seemed frozen. Yet two recent developments mark a shift: Oil majors are returning to the country, and the United States is stepping up its military engagement. The visits by the top leadership from US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in October and December last year and the announcement that Libya will join Exercise Flintlock—AFRICOM’s largest annual special operations exercise historically focused on West Africa—signal that the US administration now views Libya’s trajectory as inseparable from broader regional stability.

Against this backdrop, the United States has a narrow—but real—opportunity to reset conditions in Libya by combining carefully calibrated security engagement with strategic investment. Taking this opportunity is urgent, especially as Russia and other foreign powers seek to cement their influence over the southern Mediterranean’s political future.

Libya’s geostrategic significance for energy, Europe, and the Sahel

Libya straddles Europe and Africa. While its coastline faces Italy, its southern expanse feeds directly into the Sahel, where al-Qaeda-aligned groups such as Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State (IS) affiliates operate. What happens in Libya affects US and European energy security, regional counterterrorism efforts, and global migration flows. Moreover, the country produces between 1.2 and 1.4 million barrels of oil per day and aims to reach two million by 2030. With Western sanctions tightening on Russian energy, Europe increasingly views Libyan crude oil as a pressure-valve alternative.

In November, Shell, Chevron, Eni, TotalEnergies, and Repsol* were all pre-qualified to participate in Tripoli’s first exploration auction in eighteen years. However, instability in southern Libya continues to amplify extremist mobility and arms flows from the Sahel, directly threatening these investments. That risk is further compounded by the expansion of Russia’s Africa Corps—the successor to the paramilitary Wagner Group—in the east and south. Meanwhile, the Central Mediterranean migration route remains a sensitive domestic political issue for Italy. Rome’s Mattei Plan is explicitly built around stabilizing Libya’s energy production and migration management.

Navigating fragmentation and proxy competition to unlock investment

Progress in Libya’s hydrocarbons sector remains contingent on a minimum threshold of stability and predictability in governance, which is still fractured between the Tripoli-based GNU—backed by Turkey and Qatar—and Haftar’s LNA in the east, supported by Russia (via the Africa Corps), Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.

The signing of a 2019 maritime boundary treaty with the GNU has given Turkey de facto veto power over Libya’s western security sector and offshore zones. Meanwhile, Russia has entrenched itself in eastern Haftar-controlled areas since 2023. Instead of relying on the Wagner Group, however, Moscow has transitioned to formal involvement via the Ministry of Defense. Russia now controls airbases, logistics hubs, and key desert routes into the Sahel, with personnel positioned near critical oil fields and terminals—the same assets the Tripoli government is attempting to license to Western firms.

The result is that Libya has become the Mediterranean’s most active proxy chessboard, with foreign powers positioning themselves to capture future revenues from hydrocarbons and reconstruction. Absent a credible US counterweight, decisions on energy access, migration management, and political transition will be made in Moscow or elsewhere—but not in Washington or Brussels.

A new window for US reengagement

Two developments suggest a modest but meaningful upward trend in US reengagement. First, building on the US Navy ship visit to Libya in April (the first in fifty years), AFRICOM’s deputy commander visited GNU-controlled Tripoli and LNA-held Sirte in October. Inviting Libya to Exercise Flintlock was deliberate signaling: The US government seeks to pull Libya into a broader Western security network—rather than cede the field to other countries with stronger influence, such as Russia. This trajectory continued in early December, when Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah met AFRICOM’s commander to expand cooperation on training, equipment, and force professionalization. The GNU’s public request for deeper US support in professionalizing Libya’s security forces marks a notable shift after years of strategic hedging between Washington, Ankara, and Doha.

Second, there has been a surge of activity around Libya’s energy sector. Since 2023, oil output has stabilized, front lines have frozen, and neither the LNA nor the GNU has achieved decisive military or political dominance. This stalemate has created political space for external influence. Energy-sector momentum has been reinforced by high-level diplomatic traffic in both directions. The US special envoy for Africa and Arab Affairs, Massad Boulos, traveled to Tripoli and Benghazi in July, followed by a GNU delegation visit to Washington in August. That trip signaled the GNU’s intent to re-anchor Libya with Western stakeholders and request US assistance in pushing Russia out of eastern military bases to restore unified territorial control.

That momentum was further reinforced by a joint statement on November 26 from the United States, major European partners, Gulf states, Turkey, Egypt, and the United Kingdom. The statement backed a renewed mandate for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), endorsed a political roadmap by UNSMIL head Hanna Tetteh, and explicitly called for deeper east-west military and economic coordination—a rare moment of alignment among Libya’s external powerbrokers. For the US administration, this sent the strategic signal that Libya’s unification is now within reach. The window of opportunity, however, is closing fast—and another conflict cycle, election breakdown, or foreign miscalculation could shut it indefinitely.

The energy-security nexus: Why investment alone will fail

The return of oil majors represents the most consequential shift in Libya in a decade. But investment without security is unlikely to endure. In March last year, Libya launched its first licensing round for oil exploration in eighteen years, signaling a bid to attract Western technology, capital, and expertise. Shell, BP*, TotalEnergies, and Eni have reopened channels with the National Oil Corporation (NOC)—and ExxonMobil* signed a memorandum of understanding in August for offshore exploration in the Sirte Basin.

Yet these developments do not change the fact that some of Libya’s most valuable reserves remain under Russian influence. Western firms cannot scale operations without predictable access, enforceable contracts, and baseline security guarantees.

An intentional presence to protect investment

To consolidate recent political and economic gains—and protect sizable Western energy investments—the United States should deliberately expand its diplomatic, military, and economic presence in Libya, in close coordination with allies.

The March 2024 announcement that the United States will reopen an embassy in Libya is a critical step toward sustained engagement across military and economic channels. It will also enable closer coordination with key partners—including Italy, Egypt, Turkey, and the UN—whose objectives overlap with US interests.

As the multi-year process to open the embassy inches forward, AFRICOM and its components should pursue near-term, high-impact initiatives. US special operations forces should help build and professionalize vetted Libyan special forces units across both western and eastern factions, units that would pursue shared security interests, no matter the progress toward an eventually possible unification. Additionally, maritime partnerships should be expanded rapidly to strengthen Libyan Navy and Coast Guard capabilities, particularly in interdiction, offshore asset protection, and port security. At the same time, the United States could leverage its convening power to establish a technical deconfliction cell in Sirte, allowing GNU and LNA representatives to coordinate security around oil infrastructure and prevent escalation. Such mechanisms could also support counterterrorism cooperation, including targeting IS remnants and blocking spillover from the Sahel.

Layered US engagement can unlock stability

However, military engagement alone will not be sustainable without economic development. Given the complex legacy of US involvement—from the economically devastating sanctions of the 1980s to the 2011 NATO intervention and the overthrow of the Muammar Gaddafi regime—the United States must work through partners to advance both economic and counterterrorism objectives. The US International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank could prioritize export credits for pipelines, gas processing, and power generation, explicitly linking financing to transparency and anti-corruption benchmarks.

US and partner foreign assistance could also support long-overdue reforms at the NOC, including modern contracting practices, environmental standards, and shared revenue frameworks. These efforts should extend beyond governments: Western energy companies involved in Libya should participate in coordinated infrastructure planning, rather than simply launching isolated investments.

Layering diplomatic, military, and economic tools would allow the United States to establish a modest but coherent posture capable of unlocking outsized stabilization effects—and preventing any country that works against US interests from having dominance over Libya’s future. For the United States, Libya offers a proving ground for a new model of engagement—one built on security assistance that enables Western investment instead of substituting for it. AFRICOM’s renewed presence and the surge of Western energy interest create a rare opportunity to reintegrate Libya into a Western orbit. If the United States seeks stability in the Mediterranean, resilience in the Sahel, and credible alternatives to Russian energy, now is the time to make coordinated security and economic investments in Libya.

Rose Lopez Keravuori is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, an associate director at Strategia Worldwide, and chair of the board of advisors of GCR Group. She previously served as the director of intelligence at the US Africa Command.

Maureen Farrell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and vice president for global partnerships at Valar, a Nairobi-based strategic advisory and risk firm. She previously served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs and director for African affairs at the US National Security Council.

Note: Several companies mentioned in this article—Shell, BP, Chevron, Eni, TotalEnergies, Repsol, and ExxonMobil—are donors to the Atlantic Council but not to this article series.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The GeoStrategy Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leverages strategy development and long-range foresight to serve as the preeminent thought-leader and convener for policy-relevant analysis and solutions to understand a complex and unpredictable world. Through its work, the initiative strives to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system in order to foster peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.

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The post The US is reengaging with Libya—and it’s the right call appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Such a statement comes after unproductive attempts by Washington to mediate the conflict. It also isn’t clear how the president would bring a halt to the situation, since both sides in the fighting are supported by US partners. But Trump is waking up to the reality of what is happening in Sudan—and he’s not the only one.

On October 27 this year, two and a half years into the Sudanese civil war, the international community seemed to finally grasp that a genocide was unfolding in front of its eyes. After enduring an eighteen-month blockade marked by relentless drone strikes, the city of El Fasher, the final major urban center in Sudan’s North Darfur state outside the grip of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), was overrun. The RSF is the paramilitary faction that has been at war with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) since April 2023.

Once the group pushed into El Fasher, reports and footage circulating across social media and television revealed widespread killings of civilians. Around 1,500 people were killed and some ninety thousand displaced, with another fifty thousand fleeing violence in the neighboring North and South Kordofan provinces, according to the Sudan Doctors Network and the United Nations.

El Fasher had long been one of the most violent fronts in the devastating conflict between Sudan’s national army and the RSF. In April, the paramilitary group had intensified its offensive on the city, shortly after being driven out of the capital, Khartoum.

The world’s most serious humanitarian crisis

For years, the genocide unfolding in Sudan barely registered on the world’s radar. The international community remained more focused on crises in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine. But the fighting and killing in Sudan never stopped.

In a country in tatters, where there is no systematic record of the dead, casualty estimates vary. Some sources suggest that the number hovers somewhere around 150,000. However, human rights organizations believe that the real toll of the civil war is likely much higher. The conflict has displaced about fourteen million people out of a population of fifty-one million. Half of them are refugees in neighboring countries. As of April 2025, twenty-five million Sudanese were facing acute famine—and according to Doctors Without Borders, over 70 percent of children under the age of five were acutely malnourished. Among those who fled El Fasher, 35 percent suffered from “severe acute malnutrition.”

With severe damage to its hospitals and water supply, Sudan now faces one of the world’s gravest humanitarian crises—one that some experts say even eclipses the emergencies in Gaza and Ukraine. Still, El Fasher is not the first, but merely the latest genocidal campaign in the country.

Naming the genocide

Engaging in war crimes and crimes against humanity, RSF soldiers have carried out child abductions, mass rape, sexual slavery, and village burnings for years, mostly in Darfur in western Sudan. Even as far back as 2001, the predecessor of the RSF—a militia known as the Janjaweed—repeatedly looted homes and engaged in gang rape in the region. Between 2003 and 2008, the group killed hundreds of thousands of non-Arab civilians. The campaign displaced around three million people and was described as a “genocide” by US President Joe Biden just before leaving the White House and as a “ethnic cleansing” by international observers. Against this background, Darfur is not a newly emerging hotspot. Home to several long-persecuted non-Arab tribes—Fur, Masalit, Berti, and Zaghawa—it is, in fact, again becoming one.  

The Zaghawa, who are the majority group in El Fasher, rallied to the army in late 2023 after the RSF committed massacres against the Masalit and other non-Arab communities in the city of El Geneina in West Darfur. In a report released in May 2024, Human Rights Watch documented these killings as ethnic cleansing. The report cited the testimony of a seventeen-year-old boy who described the murder of twelve children and five adults from several families: “Two members of the RSF… tore the children from their parents and, as the parents began to scream, two other members of the RSF shot and killed the parents. Then they piled the children up and shot them. They threw their bodies into the river, along with their belongings.”

African apathy—and cynical regional powers

With its paltry communiqués, a powerless African Union has, for two years, contented itself with calling for an end to the fighting or expressing its concern about the humanitarian crisis, without ever sending a single African head of state to the front lines in Khartoum or to visit the victims of the El Geneina massacre.

In a press release marking two years of conflict, Amnesty International noted that “the world has only contributed 6.6% of the funds needed to address the humanitarian catastrophe raging in the country.” Observers usually recommend enforcement of the arms embargo, increased emergency humanitarian aid, and justice for the victims. However, there is one issue on which the United Nations Security Council and the mediators remain discreetly, if not embarrassingly, silent: the armed support that the belligerents receive from regional powers.

Egypt, Iran, Turkey, China, the UAE, and even Russia and Ukraine have all turned their attention to Sudan, siding either with the SAF or the RSF. Drones, gold, military intelligence, and mercenaries are all being used to intensify the violence of the war, while the meddling regional powers deny any involvement. Motivations for their involvement include securing the Nile’s waters, controlling the eight hundred kilometers of Sudanese Red Sea coastline, and the mineral resources of eastern Sudan. Sudan has also accused Chad and Kenya of being parties to the conflict. At the London Sudan Conference on April 15, the second anniversary of the outbreak of the civil war, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef reiterated these allegations.

Clearly, the complex web of geostrategic interests in the region makes any mediation difficult, with Sudan even considering taking action against the UAE before the International Court of Justice for supplying the RSF with weapons.

The people as a solution

As it stands, Sudan is trapped in a dangerous regional power play and is threatened with partition. Should the country fall apart, this would not only destabilize the African continent but also endanger the exceptional Sudanese cultural heritage.

Any solution in Sudan must run through its civil society and, ultimately, its people. They are strong in part because of—and shown by—their history. With eight borders and a geostrategic position between the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, Sudan is a crossroads of African cultures, religions, and civilizations. The country still bears a name that means “land of the Blacks,” despite the attempts to erase its African roots carried out by the Islamist regime of long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir. Sudan, which rivaled ancient Egypt, eventually conquered and ruled the Egyptian throne, becoming the twenty-fifth dynasty of pharaohs. All this happened a long time ago, under Black African leadership, before Christians and Muslim Arabs expanded their influence in the country.  

This history and legacy help explain the political resilience of the Sudanese people and the dynamism of Sudan’s civil society. Bashir’s ousting in 2019 would not have been possible without democratic resistance, embodied by civic organizations such as the Sudanese Professionals Association, the nonviolent Forces of Freedom and Change coalition, and the grassroots Girifna movement.

Today, as in the past, the Sudanese people—rather than an apathetic international community or meddling regional powers—could once again be the decisive force for change. Empowering civil society and grassroots organizations should therefore be the starting point for any diplomatic initiative.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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This article is the first in a series published by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and the GeoStrategy Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security exploring the nexus between US security and economic interests across Africa.

On Africa’s southeastern coast along the Indian Ocean, Mozambique sits atop vast reserves of hydrocarbons and critical minerals. The country also controls a vital shipping corridor: the Mozambique Channel. Stretching between the mainland and Madagascar, this passage has become a critical chokepoint for commercial vessels seeking to bypass the pirate-ridden Red Sea.

Long overlooked by US policymakers, Mozambique’s resource wealth and strategic location have now brought it into the spotlight for foreign investment. Yet economic engagement in the country is anything but straightforward, as most of its assets are concentrated in the north—the same region where the Islamic State affiliate ISIS-Mozambique (ISIS-M) remains active.

For the United States, which increasingly seeks access to critical minerals and strategic resources—and remains committed to counterterrorism—this necessitates a twofold strategy: it must not only build commercial ties with Mozambique, but also strengthen security-sector cooperation to safeguard the country’s stability and economic potential.

From terrorism to trade?

Gas discoveries in the north during the 2010s catapulted Mozambique into the top ranks of global gas producers. Since then, the US Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) have invested heavily in the country’s energy sector—and particularly in developing its liquefied natural gas (LNG) reserves—and more modestly in projects that support economic stability in northern communities. Today, the combined commitments of ExxonMobil’s Rovuma Basin LNG project and TotalEnergies’ investments in Mozambique exceed the country’s gross domestic product.

In March 2025, EXIM approved a $4.7 billion loan for LNG equipment and services. Similarly, DFC launched several projects, ranging from less than $175,000 to $1.5 billion, aiming to bolster energy security for large LNG ventures and the surrounding communities. Besides forming the basis for mutually beneficial economic engagement, the United States hopes that these investments help build resilience in areas that might otherwise tolerate or even support ISIS-M. Exxon’s and Total’s investments in Mozambique also represent key down payments to ensure a stable supply of non-Russian LNG for the United States and its allies. At the same time, they have already led to increased security coordination between Mozambique and the United States, proving that investment can drive engagement.

Violence in the north puts economic development at risk

Beyond its gas reserves, Mozambique hosts the Balama mine—one of the world’s largest graphite mines—along with several other emerging critical minerals sites. Mozambican graphite is used in steelmaking, nuclear reactors, lithium-ion batteries, and as a lubricant for heavy machinery—all essential to the US industrial base. In addition, new mining concessions continue to be announced across the country.

Yet progress toward exporting Mozambique’s LNG and critical minerals has been severely hampered by insecurity. ISIS-M’s terrorist attacks in the north, which began in 2017, pose a direct threat to major US energy and critical minerals investments in the province of Cabo Delgado. They not only disrupt local governance but also cause mass displacement and casualties. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Mozambique has witnessed 2,162 political-violence events and 6,165 total fatalities since 2017—2,554 of them civilian.

Mozambique was identified as a priority country under the Global Fragility Act (GFA), passed into law during the first Donald Trump administration. Despite that designation, meaningful policy attention and funding have not materialized. Instead, the current administration rescinded $200 million in GFA funds that would have been shared among Mozambique and eight other countries to promote stability near LNG and mining projects. This stands in stark contrast to the nearly $820 million in development assistance that Mozambique received in FY 2024, mostly for health programming.

Building stability through partnership and purpose

The Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) first deployed to Mozambique in 2021 as part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission in Mozambique and have since maintained a presence in the north. While imperfect, the RDF presence has helped reduce violence to the point that the TotalEnergies–ExxonMobil consortium recently lifted its force majeure declaration that froze its Cabo Delgado LNG project mid-construction in 2021. The mission—coordinated by Rwanda and SADC—reflects the oft-promoted principle of “African solutions to African problems.” Still, Rwanda’s efforts alone will not stabilize the area.

Given that Mozambique possesses strategic resources highly sought after in the United States and that its terrorist threat is manageable, the US administration—working with Rwanda and in partnership with France, Portugal, and other allies and partners with investments in Mozambique—should pool resources to stabilize the country. Such a diverse group working to promote Mozambique’s security and prosperity—while respecting the country’s sovereignty—would also align with the burden-sharing model the Trump administration aims to advance in its foreign engagements.

To reinforce regionally-led counterterrorism efforts that both preserve Mozambican lives and promote stability around key US investments, the Department of Defense and the State Department should expand security cooperation and security assistance in northern Mozambique—especially because failure to engage risks leaving US firms dependent on insufficient Rwandan support or Chinese security guarantees. US Special Operations Forces, with their unique capabilities in counterterrorism training and civil-military operations, could strengthen Mozambican and regional forces through joint combined exchange training, civil affairs projects, and military information support operations.  

Mozambique could point the way for US engagement in Africa

Combined with the local economic growth that energy and minerals projects bring, such efforts can pave the way for northern communities to no longer view ISIS-M as their only opportunity. Instead, US security investments should help rebuild trust in the state by delivering security, essential services, and livelihoods that reduce the appeal of extremism. Maritime forces from the United States and partners such as India should also conduct freedom of navigation operations in the Mozambique Channel to preserve open access to this vital trade artery. Finally, the State Department’s counterterrorism programs should strengthen community-security force cooperation to protect strategic investments and prevent further terrorist attacks. Security for communities will translate into security for assets. If Washington wants sustainable influence in Africa, it must align stability with shared prosperity.

As global competition for critical resources intensifies, Africa will serve as a testing ground for the fusion of finance and security. Modest, targeted investments in Mozambique’s stability—building on those already made by regional partners—and a focus on value creation represent the clearest example for how US capital can shape a security posture in Africa. Mozambican President Daniel Chapo’s visit to Washington in late October, where he met with US Vice President JD Vance and the chief executive officer of the DFC, underscores this growing convergence of economic and security priorities. As Chapo announced on the sidelines of this year’s United Nations General Assembly, “Mozambique is open for business.”

Indeed, integrated regional solutions supported by measured US engagement can help ensure Mozambique remains a stable and secure partner contributing to the US industrial base. Such a strategy could make the country a model of “security through investment”—a blueprint the United States could apply elsewhere in Africa.

Rose Lopez Keravuori is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, an associate director at Strategia Worldwide, and chair of the board of advisors of GCR Group. She previously served as the director of intelligence at the US Africa Command.

Maureen Farrell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and vice president for global partnerships at Valar, a Nairobi-based strategic advisory and risk firm. She previously served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs and director for African affairs at the US National Security Council.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The GeoStrategy Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leverages strategy development and long-range foresight to serve as the preeminent thought-leader and convener for policy-relevant analysis and solutions to understand a complex and unpredictable world. Through its work, the initiative strives to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system in order to foster peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.

learn more

The post In Mozambique, US economic priorities hinge on security investments appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The African Great Lakes region is where nearly three‑quarters of global cobalt is mined and where flows of untraceable tantalum, tin, and tungsten continue to fuel sustainability risks that ripple through the supply chains of US manufacturers. If the peace agreement and the related US-DRC critical minerals deal fail to deliver on their promises, illicit networks will entrench themselves further, and China will remain the default processor and refiner of the minerals core to electric vehicles, semiconductors, and defense systems. The United States has one instrument that can respond with the scale, speed, and credibility this moment demands—the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).

Designed to turn political will into economic transformation

Founded in 2004, the MCC set out with the aim of using large grants to spur economic growth and open markets in poor countries with good governance. The MCC has been active in twenty-four African countries, making investments of over ten billion dollars in energy, agriculture, and infrastructure, with a notable 3,800 kilometers of road completed. Within the US government’s economic statecraft toolbox, the MCC’s large-scale grant capital is a rare and strategic asset able to fund enabling infrastructure for US investment in markets of strategic import. The MCC can also work regionally, not just bilaterally, which is exactly what a cross-border security and trade deal requires. Reimagined as “MCC 2.0,” it can accelerate the development of minerals-corridor infrastructure in African markets, help investors navigate complex permitting regimes, and crowd in US private investment. Armed with flexible funds, MCC compacts finance feasibility studies, workforce upskilling, data gathering, energy, and infrastructure that create the “bankability” that US investors need to move into the DRC market, while also driving regional economic development.

Unlike the US Development Finance Corporation, which is driving the US-Ukraine minerals deal signed earlier this year, the MCC has expertise in driving policy shifts by conditioning disbursements on reforms, addressing market entry barriers. The corporation’s regional focus also suits the fact that mineral supply chains will cross borders, allowing the MCC to reinforce both the corridor‑based US-DRC minerals deal and the related DRC‑Rwanda agreement. Tying disbursements to measurable governance benchmarks gives the United States leverage beyond diplomacy and makes reform inseparable from financing. With the MCC, the Trump administration has an execution platform, not just a financing source, that can support the long-term success of the US-DRC critical minerals deal. 

Country eligibility requirements: An operational choice, not legislative constraint

Over the past twenty years, the MCC has developed complex and often onerous eligibility requirements that score countries—using data from Freedom House, Reporters without Borders, and the World Bank, among others—and determine which can receive grants. Neither the DRC nor Rwanda would qualify for a full compact under MCC’s current scoring regime.

However, these eligibility practices do not have to stand in the way of the MCC being mobilized to make the peace and economic agreements successful. The metrics that are currently used to determine country eligibility are an operational choice: Such use of these metrics is not mandated by the statute that created the MCC, and it precludes the agency from adapting to urgent, strategic opportunities like the one now unfolding in Central Africa. Congress instructed the MCC to partner with countries demonstrating a commitment to governance, economic freedom, and investment in people, and the compacts must align with US national interests.

The procedural hurdles and rigid scorecard formulas that have been layered on the law’s framework can be removed by new political leadership. To let operational rigidity block US minerals security and Congolese development ambition is to let process defeat purpose.

MCC needs political direction

There is no need to rewrite the MCC’s authorizing statute. Congress has already put in place its legal authority and full‑year appropriations. What is needed is political direction. Now that the corporation has a new board that met in August, the agency is beginning work on compacts that had been paused during the foreign assistance review. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as chair of the MCC board, should instruct the MCC to fast-track a Great Lakes regional compact to become the platform for the execution of the peace agreement and critical minerals deal. Such a compact, focusing on power, rail, border systems, mining-skills training, and rule‑of‑law, could create an investible minerals corridor integrated with the US-supported Lobito Trans‑Africa Corridor* connecting the DRC to ports in Angola.  

At the least, a $750 million Great Lakes regional compact could rapidly do the following:

• Support data collection and the use of artificial intelligence in minerals exploration;
• Fund the basics of bankability, including through feasibility and environmental studies;
• Co‑fund last‑mile rail and road spurs to connect the Kivu (in the DRC) and Copperbelt (in Zambia) nodes to Lobito rail and border crossings in coordination with the DFC’s Lobito financing;
• Finance substation upgrades and dedicated lines to processing zones in eastern DRC;   
• Digitize customs, implement pre‑clearance for certified minerals, and modernize warehousing;
• Support metallurgy/geoscience training and tech transfer programs; and
• Accelerate traceability and the formalization of the artisanal mining sector through digitization.

The metrics for success could be visible within a year in terms of private capital mobilized, US offtake agreements, and reduced cost of production. As specific mining projects mature, DFC and Export–Import Bank financing could be leveraged to match the growing need for equity and debt financing and insurance products.

The bottom line for the administration

The Trump administration should be applauded for its diplomatic efforts in Central Africa. Now it must back that diplomacy with a minerals corridor that demonstrates the shared economic dividends of peace. The MCC is operating, the board is engaged, and the legal and financial authorities exist to move now. A Great Lakes regional compact would leverage the MCC’s unique strengths—flexible grants, reform conditionality, and regional scope—to turn a fragile deal into durable minerals security and local development. Any delay would simply entrench China‑centric processing. It’s time to move fast, with the MCC in front.

Aubrey Hruby is a senior adviser and senior fellow at the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council and leads the center’s Critical Minerals Task Force.

*Rawbank, which supports the Atlantic Council Africa Center’s work on the Democratic Republic of Congo, has an equity stake in the Africa Finance Corporation, which leads the development of the Lobito Corridor.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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A coup that promised stability—and delivered chaos

When Colonel Assimi Goïta seized power in back-to-back coups in 2020 and 2021, he vowed the “refoundation” of a sovereign and secure Mali. Instead, the Malian army—trained to fight terrorism—ended up dismantling what was left of the state’s institutional foundations.

Initially expected to strengthen the military, the power grab only deepened its divisions, splitting the army between privileged loyalists of the regime and those sent to the front lines. Coupled with the departure of international forces from Mali, this fragmentation led to abandoned positions, weapons falling into the hands of separatists, and jihadists expanding their hold over the rural north.

Meanwhile, internal purges multiplied and intelligence services—once meant to hunt terrorists—turned inward, redirecting their focus toward political opponents of the regime. The recent imprisonment of former prime ministers Choguel Maïga and Moussa Mara epitomizes a security apparatus more obsessed with loyalty than with counterterrorism.

Bamako’s isolation has deepened

Mali’s internal fragility has been exacerbated by the fact that it has methodically cut itself off from regional and global partners. While its break with France could be framed as a quest for independence and a response to two decades of unsuccessful anti-terrorist operations, Bamako’s estrangement from African allies—particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—and its withdrawal from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission underscore the junta’s preference for isolation over cooperation.

Even relations with Algeria, which once maintained relatively cordial ties with Mali, have sharply deteriorated. In April, Mali accused its northern neighbor of sponsoring terrorism after the Algerian military shot down a Malian drone. Algiers responded by closing its airspace to Malian aircraft. Meanwhile, Turkey’s recent diplomatic overtures in Algeria suggest that Ankara—which had deepened cooperation with Mali over the past years—might also adjust its policy away from Bamako.

The Russia illusion is fading

The junta’s hope that new alliances could fill this gap has not materialized. Initially optimistic that cooperation with Russia’s paramilitary Wagner Group would help the Malian military suppress jihadist insurgencies, the partnership has instead produced disastrous outcomes. After the Russian mercenaries failed to make meaningful gains, the Kremlin announced in June that it would restructure the paramilitary organization into a new entity called the “Africa Corps,” leaving behind a gaping security and political vacuum.

According to internal reports, Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries have since repeatedly clashed on the ground, and northern Mali has once again become a contested battlefield. In January 2024, the official abrogation of the 2015 Algiers Accord—a peace agreement with armed insurgent groups—reignited separatist tensions. As a result, the war in the north now stretches almost one thousand miles of front lines across territory the army struggles to control.

Amid this chaos, Mali has become a proxy battleground. Diplomatic sources cite indirect Ukrainian involvement—including intelligence assistance, drone supplies, and support for groups hostile to pro-Russian mercenaries. Meanwhile, Turkey advances its influence by supplying Bayraktar drones and technical support to the Malian army. Mali has essentially become a geopolitical chessboard, where foreign interests and competing local ambitions collide.

The economic asphyxiation of a landlocked nation

Adding to the chaos is Mali’s dependence on supply routes that are increasingly vulnerable. The landlocked country relies heavily on the Dakar-Bamako corridor to import essential goods. Senegal exports nearly 60 percent of its petroleum products to Mali, representing over 20 percent of its foreign trade. Meanwhile, the Casablanca-Nouakchott-Bamako corridor is blocked, as the commune of Diéma in the Kayes region is under siege by armed groups. The Abidjan-Bamako corridor is also disrupted, and even the internal route between Bamako and the city of Ségou in the northeast has come under growing threat, with attacks and kidnappings on the rise.

For weeks, fuel supplies have been interrupted by convoy attacks and restrictions imposed by armed groups, creating endless lines at Bamako gas stations. In a country where transportation, electricity, and logistics depend on diesel, this shortage is tantamount to a national shutdown. For the army, the consequences are severe: Without fuel, armored vehicles are immobilized, convoys are grounded, and northern bases are left exposed.

A fractured and demoralized society

Mali’s diversity has historically been a strength. Between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries, the Mali Empire, founded by Soundiata Keïta, was one of West Africa’s largest and most powerful civilizations. Stretching from the Senegal River to Gao and from the Sahara to the Gulf of Guinea, it thrived on multiculturalism and trade among different groups. In the fourteenth century, Mali was essentially a global commercial crossroads, supported by a flexible system that ensured stability across vast and diverse lands while maintaining a tradition of religious tolerance.

Today’s Mali tells a different story. Ethnic tensions in the central and northern regions, amplified by military abuses, have shattered intercommunity trust. The advent of self-defense militias has fractured national cohesion, and entire villages now refuse to cooperate with the armed forces. The demoralized population oscillates between fear and resignation.

Paths to reconstruction

The US evacuation call could foreshadow Mali’s imminent collapse. Yet, an end to the junta’s reign would not be cause for triumphalism, as Malians’ legitimate desire for sovereignty would persist.

For the time being, the urgent task is to mend the national fabric, restore constitutional order within a renewed governance framework, and rebuild alliances. To that end, the army must return to its primary role: defending the homeland, not governing it.

Counterinsurgency presents the most daunting challenge in this regard. France spent almost a decade on the ground, and while it had some early success, it abandoned its counterinsurgency effort.

While intelligence and counterinsurgency will be important going forward, it will be important not to repeat the mistakes of the past. Given the country’s fragmented state, dialogue with jihadists may be unavoidable. Still, their Wahhabi-inspired ideology remains marginal in Mali—and excessive concessions could spark conflict. Is there a potential institutional framework that reconciles demands for Islamization with maintaining a federal republic?

Addressing geographic challenges through deep decentralization or pragmatic federalism could restore power and responsibility to Mali’s regions. Engagement with the Atlantic—via Morocco’s proposals to enable access to the ocean for Sahel countries and Senegal’s historical cooperation—remains critical. Rebuilding ties with the subregion to jointly combat terrorism and reintegration into ECOWAS, even if it requires reform, is equally urgent.

Finally, Mali will need patriots capable of enlightened leadership—something the immediate predecessors of the junta failed to provide—to chart sustainable economic prospects. Mali’s assets remain vast: It is among Africa’s top gold producers; has untapped reserves of lithium, iron, bauxite, phosphates, manganese, and uranium; and has significant agricultural potential from cotton and livestock. Moreover, Mali maintains a strategic position in West Africa, with strong hydropower and solar potential, and, above all, a large and determined youth population.

All it needs is the right leadership to seize that potential.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Hussein Ba is a Senegalese columnist who frequently covers security and political issues in Mali.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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With a population approaching six million, Nairobi faces many of the same urbanization challenges as New Delhi and other cities in the Global South: rapid rural-to-urban migration, rising car ownership, and limited space for urban expansion—all putting immense pressure on the city’s transport infrastructure. Exploring the New Delhi model could provide a practical blueprint for addressing these challenges.

Lessons from India for African cities

Several features make the Delhi metro particularly instructive for cities like Nairobi. First, its per-kilometer construction cost of $24 million is not only low but the lowest among Indian metro projects—cheaper than similar endeavors in Mumbai, Bengaluru, Pune, and Chennai. This cost-effectiveness stems from the strong project governance and innovative procurement strategies by the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) and Rail India Technical and Economic Service, which have become sought-after consultants for metro projects both domestically and internationally, including Jakarta, Dhaka, and Mauritius. In New Delhi, DMRC leveraged Japanese engineering support to develop a hybrid model that balanced international standards with economic efficiency. Since Kenya—like many African countries—faces the twin challenge of building affordable infrastructure while managing a heavy debt burden, DMRC’s low-cost approach may be particularly appealing.

Second, India may offer a model that’s easier to replicate for Kenya than China. While the Chinese infrastructure record is impressive—and Chinese firms are still running many of Africa’s big infrastructure projects—its methods are not always applicable to countries with more robust private property protections. Meanwhile, India’s and Kenya’s laws around land acquisition and compensation are far more aligned. Whereas in China, the state can unilaterally appropriate land for public projects, both India and Kenya maintain stronger protections for property owners, including market-value compensation, judicial oversight, and public participation.

Third, the Delhi metro provides valuable lessons in logistical efficiency—and its seamless integration into the city’s urban fabric demonstrates the importance of transit-oriented development (TOD). In August 2025, the system set a new record by carrying 8.1 million passengers in a single day. In a city of more than fifteen million cars, it has significantly helped reduce road congestion, while simultaneously shortening travel times and lowering carbon emissions—all benefits that Nairobi could put to good use.

According to estimates, the Kenyan capital, notorious for its chronic traffic jams, loses an estimated $1 billion annually to congestion. As one of East and Central Africa’s largest economic hubs—accounting for half of Kenya’s formal employment and gross domestic product—it urgently needs a modern transit system incorporating TOD to reach its full economic potential. Not surprisingly, the Nairobi Metropolitan Area Transport Authority has noted that the “lack of a scheduled public transport system and an elaborate non-motorized transport network forces people to use personal vehicles over short distances, whereas they would have otherwise walked, cycled or used public transport.”

The road ahead for Nairobi’s urban transit

However, New Delhi’s experience also offers cautionary lessons: delays in early project phases, coordination failures among institutions, and challenges in integrating the metro with other transport systems. It will therefore be imperative that Nairobi plans for inclusive, equitable urban renewal, adapting rather than directly copying the New Delhi blueprint.

To emulate the Indian capital’s strategy and to avoid its missteps, Nairobi’s metro development should begin by focusing on high-density corridors and low-car-ownership areas, typically low-income neighborhoods. Such an approach would be more pragmatic than its current strategy of expanding highway infrastructure, such as the Nairobi Expressway, given that only 12.9 percent of Nairobi residents owned cars as of 2019. At the same time, the city must mitigate risks of gentrification and rising property prices that can accompany metro expansion.

Ultimate success—not only in Nairobi, but in other rapidly urbanizing African capitals—will depend on how well the New Delhi model can be tailored to the local context. As the continent’s urbanization rate is expected to climb from 45 percent in 2023 to around 60 percent by 2050, low-cost light rail systems will be central to Africa’s transportation future. While cities such as Dakar, Addis Ababa, and Lagos have already successfully implemented urban rail projects, many others will need to follow to live up to the promises of the African Union’s Agenda 2063, which envisions “world class infrastructure [that] criss-crosses Africa.”

Sibi Nyaoga is the program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. 

Srujan Palkar is the global India fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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In June 2024, coordinated suicide attacks in Nigeria’s Borno State struck a wedding, a hospital, and a funeral within hours, killing more than thirty people and wounding over one hundred. Months later, militants overran a garrison in Chad, killing more than forty soldiers, demonstrating the insurgency’s ability to operate across borders.

In 2025, violence has escalated further. Bombings and improvised explosive devices tore through markets and roads in Borno: one July attack killed more than ten people, while another at a fish market claimed at least twelve lives. Analysts warn that Boko Haram and its offshoot, the Islamic State West Africa Province, may be undertaking a broader tactical reset—including renewed use of armed drones and roadside mines.

Fatalities near record highs

Across the basin, fatalities tied to militant Islamist groups hover near record highs. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies estimates nearly four thousand deaths over the past year, with new hotspots in Cameroon’s Far North. Humanitarian needs remain staggering, even as displacement has dipped slightly: as of May 2025, more than 2.9 million people were still displaced across the basin.

One pattern has proven consistent over time: military force alone cannot defeat a movement fueled by governance failures, economic exclusion, and security-force abuses. To their credit, regional governments have been recalibrating their responses.

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has demonstrated that joint, intelligence-driven operations can exact real costs on militants. In 2024, Operation Lake Sanity II destroyed camps in the region, neutralizing dozens of fighters, while coordinating air and ground actions across sectors—precisely the kind of cross‑border pressure the insurgents fear most.

The African Union’s Peace and Security Council has sought to align these operations with the Lake Chad Basin Commission’s Regional Stabilization Strategy. At the same time, the UNDP-managed Regional Stabilization Facility launched a four-year phase to fund rapid, visible rehabilitation in liberated hubs.

Yet the basin’s security architecture is fragile. In April, Niger’s junta announced its withdrawal from the MNJTF to focus resources on protecting oil infrastructure. Whether a formal withdrawal has taken place remains unclear, but this episode illustrates how diplomatic tensions, national politics, and energy priorities can disrupt longtime cross-border routines.

The resource paradox

Security is only one half of the ledger. The other is an economic paradox: the Lake Chad countries are rich in hydrocarbons and minerals, yet governance weaknesses hinder their wealth from being transformed into opportunity or legitimacy.

Nigeria holds Africa’s largest natural‑gas reserves and is a top oil producer, but years of underinvestment, theft, and opaque contracting have eroded both its economic impact and public confidence. Cameroon is pushing to revive upstream and downstream activities—including a long-planned overhaul of its national oil refining company (SONARA)—while eyes turn to gas-to-power and storage investments that could anchor industrial growth if policy risks are managed carefully.

Niger, known for its high‑grade uranium, has also become an oil exporter through a nearly two-thousand‑kilometer pipeline to Benin. Despite diplomatic spats and sabotage last year, shipments resumed in August 2024, and the corridor now sits at the intersection of energy and politics. Chad, for its part, remains tied to the Chad–Cameroon export system that once carried the promise of a model corridor for development—and the cautionary tale of how social safeguards can fray without sustained transparency.

Why hasn’t all this resource potential translated into security and shared prosperity? Because governance is failing.

Governance failures feed insecurity

The latest Transparency International index scores Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger among the world’s most challenging environments for transparent governance and accountable public spending. Sector‑specific governance is equally uneven.

On paper, Nigeria’s 2021 Petroleum Industry Act offers a pathway to streamline the industry and share benefits with host communities. However, the broader oil-and-gas governance score remains classified as “weak,” with licensing transparency a persistent issue that discourages responsible investment. In practice, corruption and predation squander revenue and fuel insecurity, reinforcing insurgent claims that the state extracts resources while communities are left to suffer.

At the rural margins, citizens face corruption and insurgent “taxation,” which erodes trust and cooperation. Addressing this issue requires linking security, governance, and economic recovery through targeted operations paired with rapid stabilization: repairing infrastructure, restoring services, supporting livelihoods, and building accountable community security forces integrated into professional policing.

What real stabilization requires

Stabilization efforts should align with the Lake Chad Basin Commission’s strategy and be scaled through UNDP funding to turn military gains into trust. Resource development must adhere to strict transparency, requiring community consent, open contracts, shared revenues for local infrastructure, and genuine job creation. The Africa Mining Vision offers a framework for equitable, community-driven benefits—and it should become the standard for foreign‑backed deals in the basin.

Foreign partners should welcome this clarity. Partnerships—whether for offshore oil blocks, uranium concessions, or pipeline rights—must transfer technology, build local supply chains, and co‑finance community assets. This governance‑first approach serves both as development policy and a security strategy: when contracts are transparent, new pipelines fund local clinics and roads, and jobs are allocated to qualified locals, militants lose their recruiting fuel.

Trust as the ultimate security

Leaders must ground counterinsurgency in transparent, mutually beneficial economic deals. Despite persistent violence, governments have demonstrated their ability to coordinate effectively, and communities have proven resilient, with markets and farms sustaining life amid conflict.

The region’s resource base is real: oil and gas in Nigeria and Cameroon, uranium and oil in Niger, and a regional pipeline network that could become a development corridor—rather than a grievance machine—if managed effectively. The decision is ultimately political. Double down on short-term force and opaque resource deals, and violence will continue to adapt while the development window narrows. Or tackle the roots of conflict and build a transparent partnership that puts citizens first.

Only the latter can transform Lake Chad’s natural wealth into durable security—and offers the potential to outpace an insurgency that has finally learned to survive.

Stabilizing the Lake Chad Basin is fundamentally about trust. Building trust—through state protection, transparent contracts, and fair partnerships—is the only way to turn the basin’s crisis into an opportunity. If regional leaders commit now, alongside citizens who can hold them accountable, they can match insurgents’ adaptability and steer the region toward peace and prosperity.

Jude Mutah is a policy expert with extensive experience in Africa and holds a doctorate in Public Administration from the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Baltimore. He has worked with the United States Institute of Peace and the National Endowment for Democracy.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Today’s global financial architecture was designed in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference, which looked to rebuild postwar Europe. But there was no African representation there. Today, the global financial system struggles to meet the needs of a continent that is home to 1.5 billion people—nearly a fifth of the world’s population. African countries still face high borrowing costs, debt distress, and limited fiscal space.

But now, policy forums are looking to reform the financial system to ensure that it works for African countries. One such forum is the Group of Twenty (G20) International Financial Architecture Working Group (IFAWG), a technical working group of the G20’s Finance Track, which focuses on monetary, fiscal, and economic issues. I am participating in the group today in my capacity as an advisor at the African Development Bank. Here’s my analysis on the policy discussions we’re having this year in the IFAWG and why they matter for Africa.

Inside IFAWG

IFAWG was established following the 2008 global financial crisis and is mandated to promote stability in the international financial system. Initially focused on issues including capital flow volatility and crisis prevention, its role has since expanded dramatically. Today, the working group is the G20’s central venue for discussions on sovereign debt and debt sustainability, cost of capital, reforms of multilateral development banks (MDBs), and strengthening the global financial safety net.

The group submits its deliverables to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meetings, and such deliverables ultimately form part of the negotiated G20 communiqué. That’s why African representation in these working groups is so important. These groups are fora where policies are shaped before receiving endorsement at the ministerial level.

This shaping—of both policy and conversation—has increasingly been conducted by African voices, particularly during South Africa’s G20 presidency this year. South Africa chose “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability” as the theme of its presidency, and it has set priorities intended to align with the development needs of the African continent and the Global South. Within IFAWG, such priorities include strengthening MDBs, mobilizing development finance, addressing sovereign debt sustainability and liquidity challenges, reforming the global financial safety net, and enhancing capital flows to emerging markets and developing economies.

Strengthening MDBs and unlocking capital

IFAWG is focusing on strengthening MDBs, as implementing reforms will be particularly important for unlocking much-needed capital at scale. But the MDB-reform agenda has already been underway for some time. It began under Italy’s 2021 G20 presidency, when Italy initiated a review of capital adequacy frameworks, which help banks pinpoint the capital needed to support their assets, liabilities, and risks. By conducting the review, the G20 was looking to boost MDB lending capacity to respond to global challenges. The subsequent Indonesian, Indian, and Brazilian G20 presidencies have built on this work, with Brazil’s presidency specifically devising a roadmap for reforms to enable such banks to better address regional and global challenges—and ultimately help countries achieve their development objectives.

IFAWG, under the South African presidency, has focused its MDB work on a monitoring and reporting framework to track the implementation of these recommendations. Africa’s role in shaping this conversation is crucial for designing financial innovations geared toward the continent’s wants and priorities. For example, to boost MDB lending, the African Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank worked together on a joint proposal to use special drawing rights (or SDRs, global reserve assets maintained by the International Monetary Fund) as hybrid capital. In practice, this proposal would allow advanced economies to channel unused SDRs to the African Development Bank or Inter-American Development Bank, while still counting them as reserves. Subsequently, both banks could then leverage these SDRs to raise more financing on markets, multiplying their impact and providing long-term, low-cost resources for development.

On a broader scale, the G20 at a ministerial level is catching up to the conversations about strengthening MDBs and unlocking capital. This can be seen in G20 support, as expressed in recent communiqués, for the seventeenth replenishment of the African Development Fund—the concessional financing window of the African Development Bank Group, which provides grants and low-interest loans to Africa’s lowest-income countries.

Addressing debt sustainability

IFAWG is paying particular attention to fixing the debt architecture because of the urgency of doing so. African countries, on average, pay a roughly 300-basis-point risk premium on what they borrow from international financial markets, unlike even similarly rated peers. Interest payments alone consume 18 percent of government revenues on average. These are resources diverted from health and education systems, as well as infrastructure projects. Under these circumstances, many African nations find themselves at high risk of debt distress.

The G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatment, launched under the Saudi Arabian presidency in 2020, was meant to provide a structured and coordinated approach to sovereign debt restructuring for eligible low-income countries. Four African countries—Chad, Zambia, Ghana, and Ethiopia—have entered the framework, each navigating complex restructurings with mixed outcomes. Although the framework received much attention for being bold, its execution has drawn criticism for lack of clarity, predictability, and speed.

In response, IFAWG is working to improve transparency and consistency. African voices have played an active role in pushing for predictability, speed, and transparency. Senior government officials are advocating for faster and more transparent debt-resolution processes, more predictable timelines, a fair participation of all creditors, to name a few issues.

Therefore, Africa is not merely affected by these reforms. It is actively shaping them. The continent is proactively engaging in technical debates and, in so doing, is producing foundational shifts on issues ranging from strengthening multilateral development banks to debt restructuring and reducing the cost of capital. As the G20 Leaders Summit nears, Africa’s voice is no longer on the margins; it is at the heart of global financial reform. IFAWG’s work is proof of that.

Sijh Diagne is an advisor to the vice president of finance and chief financial officer of the African Development Bank Group. He participates as a representative of the African Development Bank at the G20 International Financial Architecture Working Group meetings. He previously served as senior advisor to the minister of economy, planning, and cooperation of Senegal and as G20 deputy representing the African Union during Senegal’s African Union chairmanship in 2022.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Despite Africa’s global significance, Western influence on the continent has waned in recent years. A 2024 Gallup report shows that the United States is losing ground on the soft power front to China, which just last year offered Africa $51 billion in funding over the next three years. And following Trump’s “liberation day” tariff announcements, China dropped all tariffs on African imports. Russia’s security influence in Africa is expanding as well, especially in the coup-laden Sahel, and Moscow is deepening its efforts at soft power on the continent, especially through sports. The Trump administration has approached relations with Africa with a trade-not-aid approach, and the 2025 US-Africa Business Summit yielded a record-breaking $2.5 billion in deals and commitments. Even so, the United States could use some help to gain favor in an increasingly complex international stage in which states don’t want to make binary choices between potential allies and where partnerships are based more on interests than ideology.

Though often overlooked as a major player in Africa, Turkey has been actively engaging and expanding its ties on the continent. Just this summer, Gabonese President Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, Congolese Prime Minister Anatole Collinet Makosso, and Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko made official trips to Turkey and were received by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. And in October, the Turkish president will travel to Senegal, where Turkey has built the Dakar Arena, the Abdoulaye-Wade Stadium, and the Cap-des-Biches power plant.

As Turkey continues to develop closer ties to African nations, the United States and Europe should work with Turkey as a partner in its efforts to gain soft power throughout the continent and counter Russian and Chinese influence.

Diplomatic and cultural ties between Turkey and Africa

Turkey’s relationship with Africa is a special one, unencumbered by the colonial baggage of Western powers. Turkey presents itself as an alternative to the West and an equal partner to African countries, a model that has been dubbed the “Ankara consensus” in contrast to both the neoliberal and state-led growth models.

For the past decade, Turkey has been growing its presence in Africa on all fronts, with forty-four embassies on the continent. Erdoğan has paid official visits to thirty African countries, more than any other state leader. Turkish Airlines flies to sixty-one destinations in forty-one African countries.

Turkey also has extensive involvement on the continent through aid and cultural projects. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency has twenty-two offices across Africa that function under a “Turkish-Type Development Cooperation Model.” And the Turkish Maarif Foundation operates 175 Turkish-curriculum schools across twenty-five African countries. All these developments point to growing Turkish soft power on the continent.

Turkey’s defense cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa

Turkey also has a significant military presence in Africa. Some two thousand Turkish soldiers are stationed at Turkey’s military base in Mogadishu and the Turkish Navy patrols the Horn of Africa. Turkey is also well-versed in navigating regional disputes. In December 2024, Turkey brokered the Ankara Declaration between Somalia and Ethiopia in an effort assuage concerns over sovereignty and maritime port access that arose over the Somaliland port disagreement between the two countries. This year, Turkey has even started to build a space base in Somalia.

Turkey also contributes to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in Sub-Saharan Africa. These include the UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (a disputed area between Sudan and South Sudan), the UN Mission in South Sudan, and the UN International Support Mission to Mali. Additionally, twenty-two Sub-Saharan countries have signed security agreements with Turkey.

As Turkey’s defense sector evolves, Turkish defense companies have also turned their attention to Africa. While still a relatively small arms supplier for Africa, Turkey’s influence is growing. In 2021, Turkey exported $328 million worth of arms to Africa, and in 2024, Turkey was the fourth-biggest arms supplier to West Africa, accounting for 11 percent of the region’s imports. Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles are especially popular in Africa due to their relatively low cost. Ten Sub-Saharan countries have ordered or are currently using Turkish Baykar drones. Most recently, Kenya acquired six TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles in late 2024.

Turkish investments in Africa

While Turkey has signed free trade agreements with only four African countries—Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Mauritius—Turkish businesses have been expanding in Africa over the past two decades. Turkey-Africa trade volume has grown from $5.4 billion in 2003 to $37 billion in 2024 and Turkey aims to raise this to $50 billion in 2025.

Turkish companies are especially active in construction and infrastructure in Africa. In the first half of this year, 17.9 percent of all international contracts awarded to Turkish construction firms in the came from Africa, valued at a total of $97 billion.

Turkey’s energy demand is currently 74 percent import dependent. Due to high energy bills, Turkey has turned to the African energy market as a cheaper alternative to regional suppliers. Through energy projects across Africa, Turkey aims to both diversify its supply and enhance its long-term energy security.

Turkey first struck energy deals with Nigeria in 1995 and with Algeria in 1998, diversifying Turkey’s natural gas imports. Turkey also signed a mineral exploration deal in Niger in September 2020. In 2024, the Turkish Petroleum Corporation signed a deal with Somalia on onshore hydrocarbon exploration, as well as an agreement to launch oil and gas exploration activities in Libya. In late 2024, Turkey signed a cooperation agreement with Senegal covering oil and gas exploration, production, and trade.

An alignment of alternatives

In the past several years, Turkey has expanded its footprint on the continent across sectors, from people-to-people ties, economic agreements, and security cooperation. As the West looks for likeminded allies to partner with on counterterrorism operations, strategic investments, and on-the-ground expertise, Turkey has much to offer. Not only are Turkey and the United States NATO allies, but following enhanced cooperation in Syria and Ukraine, the growing momentum behind their bilateral relations can help grease the wheels for cooperation in Africa.

For African nations, a core measure of success when it comes to foreign investment is local development. Creating jobs and raising domestic revenue are the top priorities for African countries in business and investment negotiations. The combination of increasing US interest in African goods and materials and Turkey’s presence on the ground creates an opportunity to counter China’s economic influence and security engagements on the continent. For African nations, more potential partners mean better potential deals and greater negotiating power.  

To be sure, efforts to develop cooperation between Turkey and the West in Africa to its full potential will face challenges. The expansion of Turkish influence can rub up against established Western interests, as highlighted by disputes between Turkey and France over their policies toward Libya, Mali, and the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, as Turkey continues to invest in and engage with the continent, its presence in Africa offers opportunities for collaboration.

It is therefore worthwhile for Africa watchers, both in Europe and the United States, to take note of Turkey’s diplomatic successes and growing footprint on the continent. US and European policymakers can help advance cooperation with Turkey on the continent in the following ways:

• Identify Africa’s most pressing needs by offering joint initiatives on social infrastructure, such as housing, hospitals, schools.
• Support African goals on global governance, such as establishing permanent African seats at the UN Security Council and strengthening Africa’s voting in Bretton Woods institutions.
• Incentivize joint initiatives on critical minerals and energy between Turkey and institutions such as the Export-Import Bank, the US International Development Finance Corporation, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
• Establish a multilateral business organization that will enable business interaction and networking between parties. 
• Encourage academic exchange and technology transfers by funding projects and universities that involve Turkish, US, European, and African universities.

Defne Arslan is the senior director and founder of Atlantic Council Turkey Program, leading the Council’s global work and programming on Turkey.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The Atlantic Council Turkey Program aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

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The post To counter Chinese and Russian influence in Africa, Turkey could be a decisive ally for the US and Europe appeared first on Atlantic Council.

US firms have traditionally focused on Cameroon’s hydrocarbons, but reserves and output are steadily declining. As a result, the country urgently needs to diversify its exports to sustain economic growth and preserve its foreign exchange reserves. Two commodities stand out in this regard: cocoa and timber, both of which the United States must import to meet domestic demand. Yet little action has been taken by US policymakers and firms to capitalize on this opportunity.

With the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) set to expire in the coming months, prompt steps to encourage greater US investment in these sectors could provide a blueprint for mutually beneficial trade—one that creates US jobs while bolstering Cameroonian industry and development.

Cameroon’s cocoa surge meets US demand

Cocoa products are Cameroon’s second-largest commodity export after hydrocarbons, including both raw cocoa beans and cocoa paste. The country consistently ranks among the world’s top ten exporters of these products. Over 90 percent of its cocoa—prized for its flavor and high butter content—is grown by smallholder farmers, with more than five hundred thousand Cameroonians depending on the trade for income. Cocoa exports have surged in recent years, peaking in 2023.

Cameroon’s cocoa trade has expanded even as production has declined elsewhere in Africa. In Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire—the world’s two largest cocoa suppliers—crop disease and drought have led to sharp decreases in yield. This has caused a global price surge, left sourcing firms undersupplied, and triggered a scramble to secure cocoa from Cameroon.

US firms are especially affected. As some of the world’s largest importers of cocoa paste—and with cocoa beans grown in the United States only on a small scale in Hawaii—they rely heavily on imports. The domestic market for cocoa products exceeds $15 billion, yet most US imports still come from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Given the risks of overreliance on these two countries, Cameroon presents a strategic opportunity for diversification—particularly as its government has announced plans to increase cocoa paste exports to 50 percent of total output.

Unlocking untapped potential in the tropical timber sector

Cameroon is also one of the world’s top exporters of tropical timber. Although the United States typically imports this resource from South America and Asia, Cameroon plays a critical role in the global market. Of the three hundred to five hundred species classified as tropical timber, as many as eighty can be commercially grown in the country—including high-value varieties like Ayous, Sapelli, Azobé, and Ebony woods, used in everything from musical instruments to infrastructure.

Cameroon mainly exports logs and sawn wood—products that are largely unprocessed. In recent years, however, the government has sought to limit such exports and boost domestic timber processing. Export duties, which have doubled since 2013, are a key part of this strategy—though still less restrictive than Gabon’s outright ban on logs and certain sawn wood exports.

Most logging land is government-owned and divided into so-called Forestry Management Units (FMUs) through public tenders. Companies gain access either through a sale of standing volume or an exploitation agreement—both of which enable industrial-scale production. Firms can choose FMUs based on the trees they contain, but the public tender process is vulnerable to political manipulation. A lack of centralized oversight also allows illegally sourced timber to enter the legal supply chain, complicating adherence to international conservation standards. Still, timber exports have continued to rise and are projected to grow further in 2025—highlighting the sector’s untapped potential.

Tropical timber is widely used across US industries but cannot be cultivated domestically, making imports essential for meeting demand and sustaining jobs. However, these imports—largely consisting of veneer and plywood—often involve costly shipping and complex, multi-country transit. Cameroon currently produces small quantities of both, and its government is offering new incentives to boost domestic processing.  

Turning promise into policy

Rising exports and new domestic incentives make Cameroon an increasingly viable partner—particularly as a reliable source of both timber and cocoa. Yet its full potential remains largely overlooked in the United States. This gap presents an opportunity for the Donald Trump administration to advance mutually beneficial trade ties—a key tenet of its Africa strategy. 

The most effective way for the administration to promote US commercial engagement in Cameroon’s cocoa and timber sectors is to help US firms overcome the initial barriers to market entry. Political risk and bureaucratic hurdles have long discouraged investment, making companies hesitant to commit capital. Targeted support—particularly in the form of early-stage equity—could help de-risk these ventures and enable US firms to enter the market.

The administration has already pledged to reorganize its development finance institutions to streamline funding and support US firms with the financial tools they need to grow their presence in Cameroon. The proposed increase of the Development Finance Corporation (DFC)’s budget in FY2026 presents an opportunity to assist US companies in obtaining the resources needed to make this expansion. 

Beyond facilitating market entry, preserving trade preferences for Cameroonian cocoa and timber is critical. These products currently enter the United States duty-free under the AGOA, giving them a competitive edge. However, the act is set to expire in September. Without renewal or replacement, tariffs will be reimposed—not just on Cameroonian goods, but on imports from across Africa. This would create logistical bottlenecks and raise costs for US firms importing from the continent.

To avoid these disruptions, bilateral agreements will be essential to sustaining trade and keeping prices stable—for everything from chocolate to wood flooring. In its trade dialogues with Cameroon, the United States should offer some form of continued duty-free access for key agricultural products. Increasing cocoa and timber exports is a priority for Cameroon—and a critical means of supporting US industries, jobs, and price stability at home. An initial agreement eliminating tariffs on these products could serve as a foundation and confidence-building measure for a broader trade framework in the future.

The administration also has an opportunity to deepen the opportunities for US firms in Cameroon by investing in Cameroon’s local agricultural processing infrastructure. It has emphasized its commitment to sustainable, inclusive growth abroad—including through a reimagining of US foreign assistance. Revitalized programs through the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the State Department, and the DFC offer opportunities to strengthen infrastructure— from roads to best practices in cocoa and timber farming.

Such targeted investments would not only facilitate exports but also improve livelihoods in Cameroon. In many cases, this infrastructure would serve multiple uses, enhancing connectivity and resilience beyond just the targeted sectors—maximizing the return on US investment.

R. Maxwell Bone is an advisor at Busara Advisors, a strategic advisory and commercial diplomacy firm focused exclusively on Africa.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Cameroon could bridge the gap in US cocoa and timber imports appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While the tragedy of leadership loss and the strain on frontline medical staff may seem unrelated, they are threads in the same fabric of fiscal and structural fragility that many developing nations face—a fragility tied, in part, to the opaque and discriminatory power of global credit rating agencies.

A system priced on perception

Zambia is one of more than fifty low- and lower-middle-income countries now spending more on servicing external debt than on public health or education, according to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As of July 2024, twenty-two African nations were either already in or at high risk of debt distress, according to the African Development Bank. For many, that distress is not simply the result of bad choices or poor governance—it’s also driven by credit downgrades steeped in Western-oriented bias, with devastating human consequences.

For years, African leaders have called for reforms to the global credit rating system. But today, only four countries on the continent—Botswana, Mauritius, Morocco, and South Africa—hold investment-grade ratings from the Big Three credit rating agencies Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch.

The rest remain classified as “junk,” regardless of their economic trajectories or structural reforms. These ratings carry high costs. A 2023 study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) found that African countries pay, on average, 1.5 percentage points more in interest than other nations with similar economic features. That disparity has cost the continent over $75 billion in excessive borrowing costs—resources that could have funded hospitals, classrooms, or climate adaptation projects.

When ratings fall, lives change

Zambia’s experience serves as a dire warning to many African nations. In November 2020, amid the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, the country defaulted on a $42.5 million Eurobond repayment, becoming the first African nation to do so in the pandemic era. Almost immediately, Fitch and S&P Global downgraded Zambia to “Restricted Default” and “Selective Default” respectively.

The downgrades triggered a series of economic consequences: inflation soared to nearly 16 percent by the end of 2020; the kwacha, Zambia’s currency, lost over half its value; unemployment rose to nearly 13 percent; and public debt ballooned to 103.5 percent of GDP—up from 62 percent just a year earlier.

While the crisis was framed internationally as a failure of fiscal discipline, it stemmed primarily from structural vulnerabilities long ignored by lenders and significantly worsened by COVID-19-related shocks—for example, Zambia’s overdependence on raw copper exports, lack of economic diversification, and exposure to global price swings.

To regain access to capital markets, Zambia turned to the IMF. In August 2022, the IMF approved a $1.3 billion Extended Credit Facility, but with strings attached. Subsidies on fuel, fertilizer, and seeds were slashed. Tax exemptions were eliminated. While these measures were intended to stabilize the economy, they exacerbated hardship for ordinary Zambians.

Despite a national health strategy aimed at achieving universal health coverage by 2026, government health spending stood at just 8 percent of the national budget in 2022—well below the 15 percent target African nations committed to under the Abuja Declaration of 2001. Across the country, public hospitals remain overcrowded, understaffed, and underfunded, while medical workers barely earn sufficient incomes.

Medical migration worsens health crisis

The effects ripple far beyond the wards. As health infrastructure deteriorates, skilled professionals are seeking opportunities abroad. According to data from the Global Press Journal, by mid-2023, more than seven hundred Zambians were working in the United Kingdom’s National Health Service—half as nurses, the others as support staff for doctors and midwives.

This migration has not only drained Zambia of vital expertise but reflects a deeper erosion of public trust.

Zambia is far from alone. As of 2024, thirty-six low-income countries were ranked by the World Bank and the IMF as either in or nearing debt distress. The highest number on record came in 2021, when forty countries fell into this category—largely due to pandemic-era disruptions and rigid creditor responses.

Yet debt relief remains elusive, especially when private creditors—often protected by Western legal jurisdictions—refuse to participate in restructuring. Bailouts, often financed with public funds, prioritize financial markets over human needs.

Reforming the ratings regime

That’s why calls to rethink sovereign credit ratings are gaining traction. African policymakers are urging the adoption of homegrown solutions—most notably the African Credit Ratings Initiative supported by the UNDP and AfriCatalyst—to support African countries navigate credit assessments and access affordable capital. Others are pushing for greater transparency in rating methodologies and the inclusion of developmental indicators and climate vulnerability metrics, which better reflect the realities on the continent.

Alongside these reforms, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) could fundamentally shift Africa’s risk profile and reduce its overreliance on external creditors. By connecting 1.4 billion people across 54 countries into a single market, AfCFTA offers African nations a pathway to scale up intra-African trade, diversify export bases, and build economic resilience against global commodity shocks. Greater regional trade integration can lead to stronger fiscal buffers, more predictable revenue streams, and a reduced perception of sovereign risk—all of which could, in time, help countries negotiate better borrowing terms and demand more equitable treatment from global credit markets.

In this context, aligning AfCFTA’s trade reforms with a reimagined financial architecture—including AfCRA and climate-linked development finance—could be transformative. Not only would it allow African nations to retain more value within the continent, but it would also reposition Africa as a cohesive economic bloc, capable of challenging outdated, externally imposed narratives about risk and creditworthiness.

More than metrics

Ultimately, this is not just a technical issue about creditworthiness or bond yields—it’s about justice. When a rating falls, it doesn’t just shake investor confidence in New York or London. It empties pharmacy shelves in the capital Lusaka, delays school construction in Ndola, and sends doctors to London instead of keeping them in Kitwe. Behind every downgrade is a family struggling to afford food, a patient turned away from a clinic, a child missing class because of budget cuts.

If the global financial system is to serve development rather than distort it, reforming the sovereign ratings regime is no longer optional—it is a moral imperative. Because ratings may be abstract, but their consequences are all too human.

Looking ahead, change is possible—and necessary. Governments can begin by investing in stronger data systems and institutional capacity to ensure that credit ratings accurately reflect real risk and resilience, not outdated assumptions. Credit rating agencies must also recognize the profound human consequences of their assessments and adopt more inclusive, context-sensitive approaches. This means going beyond narrow fiscal metrics to account for structural vulnerabilities—such as health system fragility, climate exposure, or commodity dependence—and giving greater weight to a country’s reform efforts and resilience strategies.

Agencies should also engage in transparent, two-way dialogue with African finance ministries, regional bodies, and development institutions to ensure their methodologies reflect local realities rather than global templates. A collaborative approach would mean treating African nations not simply as borrowers to be scored, but as partners in shaping more just and development-oriented financial systems.

The development community, in turn, should treat credit ratings as a development emergency—mobilizing support and reform with the same urgency as a health or climate crisis. Finally, deeper investment in domestic capital markets and financial institutions will empower countries to forge a more independent and stable fiscal future.

Because at the heart of every rating is a story not just of numbers—but of people and their right to health, dignity, and opportunity.

Maggie Mutesi is an analyst at the Africa Credit Ratings Initiative, a platform dedicated to reducing the cost of capital across Africa.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post Biased credit ratings are costing Africa billions—and worsening its health crises appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A broadening partnership

Turkey’s engagement in the Sahel predates the region’s security crisis, though it has grown in recent years. Trade between Turkey and Mali increased 32,000 percent over the previous two decades, from $5 million in 2003 to $165 million in 2022. Turkish firms have also played a key role in infrastructure development, constructing both an airport and a five-star hotel in Niamey, Niger. These relationships provide a strong base for defense cooperation.

Sahel-Turkey defense cooperation has steadily increased since 2018. What began as a five-million-dollar Turkish pledge to the now-defunct G5 Sahel Joint Force has matured into a broader, deeper partnership. Additionally, coups d’état in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger prompted the United States to halt its defense assistance, impeding these states’ ability to maintain and procure US equipment. Turkey became a more attractive partner as regional security deteriorated and Western assistance stagnated.

Military equipment sales are the cornerstone of Sahel-Turkey defense cooperation. They began in earnest in 2022, when Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger each took delivery of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. These drones rapidly proliferated across both the region and the continent, drawing comparisons to the AK-47 assault rifle because of their affordability, reliability, and ubiquity. These acquisitions heralded a shift in procurement, as Sahel states increasingly turned toward Ankara.

As time went on, drone sales continued apace. Chad obtained Anka-S drones in 2023 and Aksungur drones in 2024, while Mali expanded its TB2 fleet. Burkina Faso and Mali both procured Akıncı drones in 2024, signaling a shift toward more advanced systems. “Our defense capacity consists of the famous Bayraktar TB2s. We now have a new [drone] called Akıncı,” boasted Burkina Faso’s president, underscoring the centrality of Turkish equipment in Burkina Faso’s arsenal.

But it’s not just drones: Burkina Faso and Chad each acquired Turkish armored vehicles in 2022. Cooperation expanded further when Niger procured Turkish planes in late 2022, becoming the first export customer of an entirely Turkish-produced aircraft. Chad followed soon thereafter, acquiring the same aircraft in 2023.

Turkish equipment has addressed Sahel militaries’ acute security gaps and afforded them new capabilities. Turkish aircraft and drones offset ground mobility constraints by enabling militaries to surveil their territory and project force into contested areas. Turkish TB2 drones reportedly played a decisive role in Mali’s 2024 reconquest of Kidal, a rebel stronghold situated deep in the Sahara Desert.

Military equipment sales help grow Turkey’s relationships and influence. Partnering with Sahel states offers Turkey new avenues through which it can pursue its regional interests and bolster its image as a leader among Muslim-majority countries. A Turkish intelligence report from 2024 assessed that Niger was a “strategic partner,” capable of extending Ankara’s influence in Africa.

These relationships also enable Turkey to compete with rivals. Some analysts contend that Turkey’s outreach helps it outflank France and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, relations with Sahel states have helped Turkey constrain the Gülen movement, which the Turkish government labeled a terrorist organization and blames for the 2016 coup attempt. For example, Chad and Mali handed over control of Gülenist schools to a Turkish state-run organization in 2017.

Sahel states consider Ankara an important security partner. “We are taking a new course,” said the Malian minister of defense in November 2024. “[Turkish equipment] will help strengthen the territorial grid and neutralize threats wherever they are.” Burkina Faso awarded its highest state medal to the head of a Turkish defense company in 2023.

Defense cooperation may reach even further than equipment sales. In 2024, a report from Agence France-Presse indicated that SADAT International Defense Consultancy, a Turkish private military company, was deployed in the Sahel. It cited the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights as saying that one thousand Syrian personnel who had signed contracts with SADAT were deployed to Niger “to protect Turkish projects and interests.” (SADAT and the Turkish Ministry of National Defense denied these allegations). Africa Defense Forum, a magazine published by US Africa Command, reported that “Turkey said the fighters are in Niger to consult and guard Turkish interests, such as mines.” A deployment to Niger has not been confirmed.

Another report from Jeune Afrique suggested that SADAT had deployed to Mali and trained the country’s military in mid-2024. According to the report, SADAT personnel embedded with elite units loyal to the president and trained them to prevent coups d’état. This has not been verified, but, if accurate, would suggest that Turkey is employing new tools to deepen partnerships and address regimes’ desire for security.

There is also a small body of reporting indicating that Turkey is expanding its overt military presence. In February 2025, Military Africa reported that Chad granted Turkey control of a military base in the city of Abéché. If confirmed, this would be Turkey’s first base in the Sahel. It would also constitute a new element in defense partnerships that, to this point, have largely been driven by Turkish private industry and Sahel states’ demand for military hardware.

So what?

There are some conditions under which cooperating with Turkey could advance US regional objectives. Sahel states need defense assistance to fight a growing terrorist threat, which the United States often cannot provide. Turkish assistance does not face the same legal restrictions and thus fills urgent capability gaps. Turkish aircraft, armored vehicles, and drones improve force mobility and help militaries take the fight to terrorist strongholds. As terrorists expand operations, partnering with Turkey could help regional militaries manage the threat.

Turkey’s growing involvement in the region also presents opportunities to counter US adversaries. Turkish military equipment offers an affordable, high-quality alternative to Chinese or Russian products. In a similar fashion, SADAT could reduce states’ reliance on Russia’s Africa Corps, which has provided training and regime security to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. SADAT offers a suite of similar services, and its deployment to Mali, if confirmed, would suggest that Mali’s president may be looking to move beyond Russian assistance.

That said, there are also risks in working with Turkey, and Washington must approach any partnership with clear eyes. The United States requires recipients of advanced military equipment to submit to end-use monitoring, but Turkey does not enforce recipients’ compliance with the law of armed conflict in the same manner. Moreover, private military companies operate under different rules of engagement than conventional militaries, underscoring the risks associated with possible SADAT deployments in the Sahel. Turkish defense assistance often comes with fewer asks than US assistance, and the United States may incur reputational harm if it chooses to partner with Turkey.

Partnering with Turkey is not a panacea for declining Western influence either. Ankara oscillates between cooperation and competition with Russia, frustrating European leaders. Turkey has been accused of fueling anti-colonial sentiment in Africa; this once irritated the French president who, in late 2020, alleged that Ankara and Moscow had inflamed anti-French sentiment in Africa. The European Union has since expressed interest in partnering with Turkey to “generate a wide international coalition that can support [the Sahel].” Even so, Turkey’s foreign policy suggests that it may not share the West’s precise goals.

Any partnership with Turkey must be carefully calibrated and closely monitored. Partnership has the potential to advance some US objectives, but it alone cannot resolve the broader challenges posed by terrorism’s dramatic expansion and states’ pivot from the political West. The United States must be prepared to work with Turkey where objectives align, while preserving the capacity and flexibility to act independently in pursuit of its vital interests.

Jordanna Yochai is an analyst whose research examines West African security, with prior experience in the US Department of Defense.

The positions expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the US Department of Defense. The US Department of Defense does not endorse the views expressed in hyperlinked articles or websites, including any information, products, or services contained therein.

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Strategic minerals, migration, and commercial policy

The first Trump administration’s focus on Africa was laid out in the “New Africa Strategy,” unveiled by National Security Advisor John Bolton in December 2018. The strategy centered on three pillars: prosperity, security through “countering the threat from radical Islamic terrorism and violent conflict,” and stability. In contrast, with his invitation of five West African leaders within the first six months of his second term, Trump now seems to focus on a different set of priorities: securing critical and strategic minerals, tackling migration issues—including a proposal to accept US deportees—and prioritizing commercial policy. Taken together, these shifts likely set the tone for the administration’s Africa policy going forward.

During the summit luncheon, Trump praised Africa’s abundant natural resources, highlighting its “very valuable lands, great minerals, and significant oil deposits.” Ensuring US access to Africa’s critical mineral reserves remains a top priority for the administration—and Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal are all rich in these strategic resources.

Regarding migration, Trump underscored the need for countries to take back nationals residing unlawfully in the United States, and suggested they might also consider accepting deportees from third countries. He asked West African leaders how they might help address the issue. President Umaro Sissoco Embaló of Guinea-Bissau later rejected this suggestion, stating that taking in third-country nationals would violate his country’s policies.

On the economic front, the administration’s approach to commercial diplomacy—characterized by the principle of “trade not aid”—signals its intent to make economic engagement the primary mode of interaction with African nations. Embaló framed Trump’s approach as one focused on creating a “win-win partnership,” expressing optimism that more US businesses would invest in his country following the summit. Trump also urged African leaders to bolster their defense spending and procure more US military equipment, touting it as the best available. This emphasis on business-led engagement underscores the administration’s “America First” agenda as it seeks to reclaim influence in regions where China and Russia have gained ground.

The Sahel as a blind spot

What the summit notably lacked, however, was a detailed discussion of the pressing security challenges facing West African nations, particularly the deteriorating situation in the Sahel. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the Sahel is currently the world’s epicenter of terrorism and the fastest-growing hotspot for jihadist extremism. In fact, ACLED has placed the Sahel and Coastal West Africa on its conflict watchlist for 2025. This is primarily due to an entrenched jihadist insurgency in the region—led by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State-Sahel Province—that continues to expand, with violence against state forces, militias, and civilians escalating steadily.

During last week’s summit, Trump acknowledged the ongoing security challenges in the Sahel by referring to terrorism as Africa’s “big problem” and urging continued efforts to combat it. However, summaries of the meetings suggest that no specific actionable measures were taken, nor agreements made, to address security and counterterrorism.

In part, this might be due to the fact that the administration is still reassessing the US military’s global posture, particularly in Africa, and weighing how to best respond to security threats like the one unfolding in the Sahel. If its emerging strategy relies solely on commercial diplomacy and transactional economic engagement, however, it risks falling short. With extremist violence increasingly spilling across borders, the administration will need a more robust and coordinated approach to the crisis in the Sahel before the end of its term.

A new approach to West Africa

This new approach should outline a more comprehensive plan that includes robust support for African-led security initiatives. The administration should focus on coordinated investment across civil, military, and commercial infrastructure, as well as stronger regional cooperation among African states. After all, the social and economic interdependence that emerges from a more resilient and connected society can help close the fissures that extremists seek to exploit. Such an approach would lay the groundwork for a more productive and enduring US-Africa partnership.

While last week’s summit with African leaders marked a promising beginning, the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel must remain central to any long-term vision for regional stability and the continent’s economic future—and should be a priority at the upcoming US-Africa Leaders Summit this fall. It’s worth remembering that the Sahel was not always a hotbed of extremism. On the contrary, it was once renowned for its intellectual vitality, freethinking societies, and a tolerant version of Islam.

Like all sources of civil unrest, security issues left unaddressed do not improve over time. The al-Qaeda and Islamic State groups in the Sahel have expanded their presence from a limited foothold in northern Mali in 2012 to controlling vast swaths of territory across the region—reaching as far as the northern borders of coastal West Africa. The Trump administration’s Africa strategy emphasizes securing strategic minerals, addressing migration concerns, and enhancing commercial diplomacy through US business investments. But now is a critical moment to confront the security crisis in the Sahel, which threatens to undermine any purely economic approach to the region.

As history has shown, regions once renowned for knowledge and peace are often those that prosper, but they can just as swiftly descend into conflict. The Sahel need not follow that path. Areas now plagued by jihadist violence—often fueled by deep economic disparity—can be transformed into hubs of peace and economic opportunity. It is time for a renewed approach to the Sahel.

Rose Keravuori is the former director of intelligence at the US Africa Command and is currently an associate director at Strategia Worldwide.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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MMA channels a spirit of courage, discipline, and resilience in a regulated sport that combines striking and grappling, combat styles seen across boxing, wrestling, and jiu-jitsu. US-based MMA has become one of the fastest-growing sports; US broadcasts routinely pull in about 500,000 domestic viewers per fight, with some events reaching up to five million global viewers. Organizations such as the PFL have averaged eight million global viewers per event, have secured lucrative media deals, and have even drawn political attention. For example, US President Donald Trump is a longtime supporter of the sport, and he has attended several major events and expressed interest in hosting an MMA event at the White House in 2026.

The PFL will host its event in Cape Town on July 19. It will be historic, not only because it is the first PFL event in Africa, but also because it coincides with the launch of PFL Africa, a new league that could help make the continent a central player in the world of professional MMA. For that reason, it represents an exciting new chapter in African sports and athletes’ careers.

The new league will be led by Francis Ngannou, a Cameroon-born heavyweight superstar. Ngannou’s journey from working in sand quarries to becoming a world champion demonstrates how MMA can transform lives, offering young Africans a path to achieve their dreams and change their communities. “African athletes can achieve greatness,” Loren Mack, senior vice president of communications at the PFL, said. “[Ngannou] came from nothing and became a world champion, and that journey resonates deeply with many across Africa.

The PFL is not alone in recognizing the continent’s potential. Major global sports organizations are taking similar steps. The National Basketball Association launched the Basketball Africa League in 2021 as its first league outside North America, and the National Football League has seen over 150 players of African descent actively engaging with the continent through development camps, outreach initiatives, and efforts to grow the sport’s footprint across Africa. Together, these moves signal a broader shift: Africa is no longer just a source of talent but increasingly a hub for global sports investment and innovation.

Why Africa and why now?

While this may be MMA’s first formal leap onto the continent, Africa is no stranger to combat sports. Traditional disciplines such as Senegalese wrestling have captivated audiences for generations, with athletes achieving celebrity status and national acclaim. The cultural appetite for intense, disciplined competition already exists, making the ground remarkably fertile for MMA’s rise.

The PFL likely chose Africa for its dynamic, young population and deep-rooted passion for combat sports. Africa’s median age is under twenty, and approximately 60 percent of the population is under age twenty-five, so the continent offers a massive youth base—which is more likely to practice boxing, wrestling, or traditional martial arts. “We see it as an untapped well of talent,” said Mack, pointing to champions such as Ngannou, Cédric Doumbé, and Impa Kasanganay (an American born to Congolese parents) as examples of the continent’s global impact. Cape Town, Mack added, “ticked so many boxes strategically,” from its venues and vibrant sports culture to its appeal as a global tourist destination. The city could feasibly stage African events to the same standard as New York or Las Vegas can.

By building an MMA league in Africa—which will involve organizing tryouts, supporting training centers, offering professional contracts, and more—the league could potentially identify, nurture, and promote African fighters, as well as help make MMA a viable career path and a source of community pride in Africa.

Beyond the fight

As seen in football and other sports, African athletes often bring extraordinary skill and dedication that electrify international competitions.

But unlocking this potential requires more than just showcasing talent. It also requires investing in the systems around it, through building long-term infrastructure, leading scouting programs, launching grassroots partnerships, and driving development platforms that can sustain local talent over time. PFL’s international expansions in the Middle East and Europe have included efforts to invest in the ecosystems around the sport, such as establishing league-format competitions, initiating scouting programs, and forming regional training and broadcast partnerships aimed at developing local talent over time. Africa should not be an exception.

A successful expansion also depends on establishing trust with stakeholders, who range from fighters to their families to fans to sponsors. The PFL has indicated it will apply the same standards in Africa as in its events elsewhere, including ones regarding referees, medical coverage, and overall production quality. Trust is vital to ensure that African fighters can train and compete safely, while providing audiences with a professional, world-class experience.

Beyond the fights, it will also be important to create a commercially viable ecosystem around the sport, in part by engaging local media, broadcasters, and sponsors. Through youth initiatives, fan events, and training programs, the league could help shape not just the next generation of fighters but also future coaches, promoters, and supporters. That, in turn, could embed MMA more deeply into African society, not just as entertainment, but as a tool for community empowerment and economic growth.

The continent’s place in global sports is undergoing a historic shift. Investments in Africa’s future now can offer young people new arenas to excel and inspire the next generation of champions.

Anthony Manga is the founder and chief executive officer of Manga Global, a business advisory and trade facilitation firm.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post MMA’s arrival in Africa could transform opportunity for the continent’s youth appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What happens next will have implications for regions well beyond the Middle East. That is partially because a cornerstone of Iran’s foreign policy is its deepening engagement with Africa, particularly in military engagement and technology transfers. Tehran has framed its investments in the continent as part of a broader anti-imperialist resistance to the West, and it has elevated the continent to a strategic priority.

The fallout from this war could seriously hamper this growing influence in the short term. But depending on how the regime reacts, it could be a different story over the long run.

Hard and soft

Iran’s “drone diplomacy” has been a cornerstone of its foreign policy approach in recent years. Iran has deployed such diplomacy across the African continent, most notably in Sudan, a key gateway to the Red Sea. It is suspected that Iran has been providing the Sudanese Armed Forces with military equipment since the two countries resumed diplomatic ties in October 2023.

But Iran has also exercised an increasing amount of soft power on the continent. It has increased the number of Iranian ministerial and presidential visits to the continent, as well as the deployment of increasingly sophisticated soft power tools, many with a religious nature. These include the establishment of Islamic institutes in over thirty African countries, the provision of free social services by the Iranian Red Crescent Society and the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, and missionary activities conducted by Al-Mustafa International University. Government-supported IranRadio launched Hausa TV in Nigeria in 2017, presenting it as the first Iranian radio and television channel dedicated to the African continent.

Why Africa?

There are three primary reasons why Iran would focus on Africa.

The first is ideological. Seeking to break out of its diplomatic isolation, Iran has continued to work to expand its Axis of Resistance against Israel and the United States. Tehran saw Africa—particularly the Sahel, where it perceives a rise of anti-Western sentiment—as a historic opportunity. In 2022, the Iranian foreign minister visited Mali, a country whose 2020 coup was the first in a series of takeovers in the Sahel. In 2023, in meetings with Malian security officials, the Iranian defense minister was quoted as saying, “the Islamic Republic of Iran will spare no effort to strengthen Mali’s defense power against the threats posed by terrorist groups.”

The second is political. African partnerships play an important role in Tehran’s strategy regarding its nuclear program and human rights. It is worth noting that African countries represent 28 percent of the votes at the United Nations, a forum that has raised concerns in the past about Iran’s human rights record and nuclear development activities.

Iran has worked to strengthen its bonds with Africa on such issues, as demonstrated by former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s praise for Uganda’s anti-LGBTQI+ legislation, using anti-Western rhetoric, when he visited the African country in 2023 during a three-country tour of the continent. “The Western countries try to identify homosexuality as an index of civilization, while this is one of the dirtiest issues,” he said. In addition, Burkina Faso, which has been under military rule since 2022, signed a memorandum of understanding for cooperation on peaceful nuclear applications with Iran. This is probably why, on June 12, Burkina Faso was the only African country to vote against the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution condemning Iran for “non-compliance” with its nuclear obligations. Russia and China also voted against the resolution.

Nevertheless, many African countries support Tehran’s right to develop a civilian nuclear industry, calling for its use to be peaceful. This explains why countries such as South Africa, Ghana, and Egypt, as well as India, Indonesia, and Brazil, abstained in the IAEA vote. These votes echoed a joint statement issued on June 17 by twenty-one countries, including ten African states, which condemned Israel’s airstrikes on Iran and urged de-escalation; it also called for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

The third reason is an economic one. In 2024, it was reported that Iran secured a secret deal for three hundred tons of refined uranium from Niger, raising alarm in Washington. Iran’s interest in accessing commercial markets in Africa—including uranium from Niger, gold from Burkina Faso and Mali, and cobalt from Uganda—can be attributed, at least partially, to its efforts to circumvent the heavy sanctions imposed by the United States and gain access to key components for its defense systems. For some of these African countries, for example Niger (which is also under sanctions), this renewed cooperation with Iran may seem like a godsend.

Iran has also pursued other avenues of economic cooperation with African countries. During his cross-continent trip in 2023, the former Iranian president also visited Kenya, which is now a major non-NATO ally. Kenyan President William Ruto designated Iran as “a critical strategic partner” and announced the signing of five bilateral memoranda of understanding in various sectors, including information technology and fisheries. And this year, Tehran secured a joint economic cooperation agreement with Niger that spans sectors including mining, energy, industry, and technology.

For Iran, losing Africa would have substantial economic consequences. Iran’s push into Africa is taking place amid growing investments from Gulf states in Africa and rising competition between the Gulf states and Iran on African soil. Although Iran’s trade with Africa currently represents only 3 percent of Iran’s total exports and 1 percent of its total imports, the value of Iran-Africa trade has at least doubled since 2021. Today’s figure is estimated at between $800 million and $1.3 billion, but Iran is targeting an annual trade volume of ten billion dollars. In pursuit of improving economic cooperation, Tehran reportedly hosted seven hundred business leaders from thirty-eight African countries at the third Iran-Africa Cooperation Summit in April.

What comes next

The Israeli and US strikes could result in Iran abandoning its pivot to Africa to focus on its own stability.

But they could also reinforce Tehran’s resolve to accelerate its African engagement. It is possible that the challenges Iran faces in the region will force it to seek greater support in Africa in order to strengthen its position in the Middle East. This would be similar to how Russia leveraged African resources and anti-West anger to fuel its war in Ukraine. But that would require the regime to have a considerable amount of resilience—and for the great power competition already taking place on the continent to unfold in a way that is advantageous for Iran and its messaging.

Thus, what ultimately happens in Africa with respect to Iran’s influence depends on the future of the regime in Tehran.

For each African country, a relationship with Iran offers both opportunities for development cooperation and risks of becoming entangled in broader geopolitical tensions that could ultimately undermine their own stability and international standing.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post What to expect from Iran’s approach to Africa after its war with Israel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In 2024 alone, the continent added 32 million new gamers. This growth—six times faster than the global average—is attributed to the rapid adoption of internet-connected smartphones, with over 92 percent of Africa’s 350 million gamers playing exclusively on their phones. And with the continent set to be home to 40 percent of the world’s youth by 2030, it is shaping up to be the largest potential market for gaming and digital entertainment on the planet.

A survey of African gamers found that 62 percent spend money on gaming, building games, or making in-game purchases. In 2024, Africa’s gaming industry surpassed one billion dollars in revenue for the first time, marking 12 percent year-on-year growth. Forecasts project this figure to reach ten billion dollars by 2033. However, without urgent and sustained investment in local talent, homegrown intellectual property, and digital infrastructure, the continent risks remaining primarily a consumer of global games—not a global game-producing force in its own right.

It’s about more than entertainment

The creative talent is already in Africa. For example, Nigeria’s Maliyo Games has released more than forty titles, trained hundreds of developers, and reached millions of downloads (the studio’s multiplayer card game Whot King alone saw more than three million downloads). The studio’s games draw fans across Africa, the United States, Asia, and the Middle East. Meanwhile, Ghana-based Leti Arts has built a cross-media universe spanning games and graphic novels. Kenya’s Usiku Games runs the country’s first dedicated mobile games studio, with more than fifty thousand downloads of its flagship title. And South Africa’s 24 Bit Games has helped launch global hits such as Neon White and Twelve Minutes.

These studios are building games with global cultural relevance. When Disney launched its Afrofuturist series Iwájú, it partnered with Maliyo Games to create the official mobile tie-in. The result is the fast-paced cooking simulation Iwájú: Rising Chef, which brings Nigerian food, slang, and humor to a global audience. Cameroon’s Kiro’o Games built Aurion: Legacy of the Kori-Odan, a fantasy role-playing game where players draw power from ancestral energy to fight injustice, using hand-drawn art and Cameroonian languages. And in Africa’s Legends by Leti Arts, players take on the role of the Dogon warrior queen Tolo Sagala and other historical figures.

But African gaming is more than entertainment—it is also a powerful tool for civic education and social impact. In December 2024, Maliyo Games partnered with the US Consulate General in Lagos and US-based Global Game Jam on a Game Up Africa Jam for Democracy to tackle misinformation through interactive storytelling. Usiku Games launched Cyber Soljas, a mobile adventure designed to teach young people about online safety, and ChopUp’s Ebola Strikeforce educates players about preventive health measures. South African studio Sea Monster Entertainment partnered with Capitec Bank to create Livin’ it Up, a financial-management game that has been played around four million times by 160,000 unique users, helping players understand budgeting and saving.

Infrastructure woes and funding struggles curb potential

Much of this progress has been made despite limited financial backing. For instance, only 59 percent of African studios report receiving any external investment. Game development is expensive and can be slow to monetize, especially in mobile-first markets where most users expect free-to-play access. To illustrate this challenge, among those who downloaded ChopUp’s games, only 15 percent made in-game purchases.

Many studios still rely on personal savings, small grants, or outsourced work to survive, with just 46 percent of African game developers earning any income from their work. Cameroon’s Kiro’o Games raised $305,000 over five years through equity crowdfunding to develop Aurion—a major win, but far below what’s needed to scale globally. Similarly, mobile-games publisher Carry1st raised $27 million in one of the few major fundraisers in the African gaming sector. However, Carry1st focuses on distribution, not development, partnering with firms like Activision to adapt Call of Duty: Mobile for African players and enable in-app purchases in rand, shillings, or naira.

Capital, however, is only part of the challenge. Unstable electricity, high data costs, and limited broadband access regularly disrupt both development and gameplay, especially outside major cities. In Zambia, for example, mobile data costs remain at least twice the global average, while frequent power outages force some African gaming studios to rely on generators. Compounding these infrastructure issues, formal training remains scarce. With few university programs focused on game design or interactive media, Maliyo Games, for example, has built an in-house training pipeline to fill the gap, and it now sources up to 75 percent of its team this way. Meanwhile, most African governments offer little regulatory clarity or public funding support.

Africa’s gaming industry deserves international investment

Unlocking Africa’s gaming potential will require coordinated action. Investors need to move beyond one-off grants and embrace early-stage risk—through blended finance, regional incubators, and longer runways for studios building original intellectual property. Programs such as Accra-based incubator Meltwater Entrepreneurial School of Technology have shown what’s possible by backing teams such as Leti Arts with seed funding, training, and support. The big players—Sony, Activision, and Epic, for example—should follow suit, not just by localizing global hits, but also by funding African-made games and getting them in front of international audiences, including by tapping into the growing gaming console market on the continent. This approach has paid off for African music and TV with platforms such as Spotify and Netflix, and it can scale to gaming too.

On the talent side, educational institutions must begin treating gaming as a serious engine for creating productive, high-skill jobs and economic growth. Wits University in Johannesburg now offers a full degree in game design, while Kenya’s Africa Digital Media Institute has partnered with French gaming school Rubika to offer training through the CreaTech Animation and Game Lab in Nairobi. Regional accelerators such as GameUp Africa are also helping plug gaps, providing long-term training in coding, design, and production to early-career developers, often feeding directly into studios such as Maliyo Games and Usiku Games.

African gaming is poised to level up. The developers and audience are ready, and the stories being told are unlike anything else in the world. With the right investment, infrastructure, and visibility, Africa won’t just be a player in the global gaming industry—it will be the one pushing it forward.

Tom Bonsundy-O’Bryan is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and Meta’s head of misinformation policy for Europe, Middle East, and Africa.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Access to finance and technology is the most limiting constraint to economic growth and progress toward the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Nowhere is this constraint more overbearing than in Africa, where the extremely high incidence of sovereign debt has undermined governments’ capacity to invest sustainably in human capital development and research infrastructure. This has suppressed innovation and the building of technological infrastructure, exacerbating gaps (both income and otherwise) between Africa and other parts of the world.

Achieving the SDGs at the global level increasingly depends on progress being made in Africa. To date, however, there has been little to boast about, both across Africa and globally. The welfare gap between Africa and other regions of the world, including regions comprised of developing countries, is enormous and has been widening. Environmental degradation is accelerating. The global annual financing gap for the SDGs is immense, estimated at around four trillion dollars per year through 2030; for Africa alone, that figure sits at $1.3 trillion each year. The existing global financial architecture has drained scarce resources from Africa, exacerbating balance-of-payments constraints in most African countries, some of which have become net creditors to the rest of the world.

Credit rating agencies have inflated risk perceptions for the sixteen African countries that issued bonds, and the cost of such ratings biases is estimated to be $74.5 billion in excess interest and forgone funding. Last year, African governments spent an estimated $163 billion on debt servicing (a significant increase from $61 billion in 2010), dwarfing development financing from international financial institutions. The world’s prevailing development model consistently fails to meet the needs of the present, worsens global inequality and negative externalities, and erodes the long-term wealth of nations. Taken together, these factors jeopardize progress toward the SDGs and undermine the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

Only 17 percent of the SDGs are currently on track, and more than a third have either stalled or are regressing. Looking at Africa specifically, the number of people falling into poverty has increased sharply in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, and Africa now accounts for around 55 percent of global poverty. Sub-Saharan Africa is home to more than 237 million children living in extreme poverty (representing more than 71 percent of the global total), up from 210 million in 2013. These realities show setbacks for the first SDG of eradicating poverty.

Dispiriting poverty metrics and limited progress toward the SDGs have been at least partially attributed to the challenging global operating and geopolitical environment. Overlapping health, economic, and social crises resulting from the pandemic—compounded by tightening global financial conditions, rising geopolitical risks and uncertainty (including trade policy uncertainty), and climate catastrophes—have derailed countries’ growth trajectories and undermined progress toward the SDGs, especially in the most vulnerable low-income countries.

Heightened geopolitical tensions are undermining the global cooperation necessary to narrow the SDG financing gap or restructure sovereign debt to reduce the volatility of public spending and attract private investment. Simultaneously, rising protectionism is stifling growth in low-income countries, which rely heavily on trade for economic expansion and foreign exchange reserves. Global volatility is only making the situation worse, especially in the most vulnerable and natural-resource-dependent economies, where the deterioration of commodity terms of trade has been the bane of economic growth, exacerbating internal and external imbalances.

While the UN says that SDG 1 (eradicating poverty) has seen “moderate” and “marginal” progress, such gains are attributed mainly to the spectacular performance of Asia’s emerging market economies. In particular, China has benefited enormously from its integration into global value chains. Over the past forty years, the number of Chinese people living in poverty fell by almost 800 million, meaning China by itself accounted for around three-quarters of the global reduction in the number of people living in extreme poverty.

In China and other high-performing Asian economies that have driven the reduction of global poverty, sustained public investment in human, physical, and digital capital has catalyzed private investment, including large-scale foreign direct investment (FDI). According to recent data, Asia was the destination of more than 71 percent of combined inward FDI in the developing world in 2023, dwarfing Africa’s 6 percent share.

Sustained investment has helped establish Asia’s robust manufacturing base, driving the diversification of growth sources in the region and expanding employment opportunities, thereby strengthening the foundation of macroeconomic stability. And in a generally favorable geopolitical environment of increasing global economic integration and supply-chain optimization, the expansion of manufacturing industries catalyzed technology transfers. This, in turn, further enhanced Asian countries’ integration into global value chains and accelerated income convergence with advanced economies.

Meanwhile, entrenched inequality and the use of technology as a tool for rent-seeking have contributed to the marginalization of Africa in the distribution of global value chains. Indeed, trade in value-added goods is highly concentrated in three regions—Asia, Europe, and North America. Entrenched inequality and rent-seeking have also hindered the expansion of manufacturing industries, which have been key drivers of growth and welfare improvement in low- and middle-income countries.

But amid increasing exports of foreign value-added content, even more enduring economic costs have been imposed on African economies. Higher interest rates on external debt have shrunk fiscal space and locked countries into chronic deficits of human and physical capital, inhibiting FDI inflows and stymying the diversification of growth sources and the expansion of employment opportunities. FDI and diversified growth resources are necessary to catalyze technology transfers and to help the continent enter the global value chain..

Instead of providing African countries with adequate financing of sufficient quality (regarding the cost of capital and maturity of loans), the global financial architecture has subjected them to growth-crushing and default-driven borrowing rates. These increase the fiscal incidence of sovereign debt and undermine countries’ capacity to scale up the investment required to achieve the SDGs. Both African sovereign and corporate entities pay interest charges often 5 to 10 percent higher per year than the borrowing costs paid by advanced economies. Unsurprisingly, paying interest on external debt has become one of the largest expenses for these countries, averaging 14 percent of government spending across the region. Over thirty African countries spent more on debt interest services—excluding principal repayments—than on public healthcare in 2023.

And yet the world contains great wealth, and parts of it are awash with cash. At the end of 2023, total assets under management at the world’s five hundred largest investment managers reached $128 trillion. Developing countries, especially low-income African nations, should not have to choose between paying the interest on their external debt and providing healthcare to their vulnerable population, nor between debt sustainability and sustainable development. In the words of Nelson Mandela, “Like slavery and apartheid, poverty is not natural. It is manmade, and it can be overcome and eradicated by the actions of human beings. And overcoming poverty is not a gesture of charity. It is an act of justice.”

World leaders attending the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development must use the opportunity to transcend the old dichotomic developing/developed country mindset that has underpinned systemic global inequality. They must also take steps to improve access to financing and extend the benefits of education and technology globally. If they don’t, global income convergence will remain elusive, and so will the highly technology-intensive net-zero transition. Until then, progress toward the world’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals will continue to disappoint.

Hippolyte Fofack, a former chief economist at the African Export-Import Bank, is a Parker fellow with the Sustainable Development Solutions Network at Columbia University, a research associate at Harvard University, a distinguished fellow at the Global Federation of Competitiveness Councils, and a fellow at the African Academy of Sciences.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post In Seville, leaders have an opportunity to tackle systemic global inequality. Will they take it? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The quick succession of events offers the United States an opportunity to shape a sustainable sports legacy. It can do so by building on France’s planning philosophy that it used for the 2024 Paris Olympics.

But that legacy should expand beyond the host countries and the competitions that will unfold in North America over the next few years. The world’s major economies—which usually swap the honor of hosting the world’s biggest sports events—should also support Africa’s sports sector and its sustainability.

Starting with its initial bid to host the 2024 Summer Olympics, Paris promised to host the “greenest-ever Games,” with the main goal of reducing carbon emissions by 50 percent compared to previous editions. To accomplish that, Paris heavily relied on existing sites and minimized new construction. Ninety-five percent of Olympic venues were preexisting or temporary facilities. Moreover, new construction (such as the Olympic Village) was planned with post-Games conversion in mind.

The City of Light set the bar high. But, according to the Paris Summer Olympic Games Organizing Committee’s Sustainability and Legacy Post-Games Report, Paris achieved its goal. In doing so, the city showed that it is possible to think long-term about sustainability amid the short-term fever that accompanies the Olympic Games.

In the end, the Games brought hope in uncertain times, set a precedent for sustainable sports, and offered a strong model of what green global sports events can look like. Future editions must aim for ambitious environmental goals, particularly by conceiving sustainable sites or reusing preexisting venues.

Despite being co-hosted by three nations, with potentially high environmental costs, the organizers of the 2026 World Cup appear to be attempting to follow Paris’ model. All sixteen host cities will use existing venues (one of the sites, the Azteca Stadium, was previously used in the 1970 and 1986 World Cups in Mexico), making renovations to these sites to accommodate the influx of fans. FIFA has also announced key environmental initiatives, emphasizing the need for sustainable global sports events.

As for the 2028 Summer Olympic Games, Los Angeles has already announced it will rely on existing sites—one of which was also used during the 1932 and 1984 Olympics. Under its “Radical Reuse” plan, Los Angeles aims to host the Olympics without building a single new permanent venue, building on Paris’ legacy and marking a giant leap for sports sustainability. The United States could go further, pushing the International Olympic Committee to turn the “Radical Reuse” concept into a required commitment for future Olympic bids. Such pressure could help ensure that global sports sustainability is not just a short-term trend started by Paris but a torch passed by Los Angeles to future host cities.

From the World Cup to the Olympics, the biggest sports events offer an opportunity to solidify the Paris 2024 model as a major shift in the sustainability legacy of global sports. But as the West pushes forward on setting these standards and in shaping the sustainability conversation, Africa is searching for its spot.

Indeed, Africa is the “missing ring of the Olympics,” the only continent to never host the Games. The continent faces numerous challenges, such as governance issues, a lack of government support or appropriate infrastructure, and the loss of African talent to better-funded countries. The financial costs associated with hosting Olympic Games on the continent are believed to be high. As a result, few African nations see their bids to host advance. In addition, many countries face difficulties in participating in the Olympics when hosted elsewhere.

As for the FIFA World Cup, Africa has only hosted the event once, in South Africa in 2010. The issues weighing down on Africa’s Olympics prospects also help explain the continent’s track record in world soccer. The 2022 World Cup sparked an insightful conversation when Morocco became the first African country to reach the semifinals. The Atlas Lions’ soccer performance became a diplomatic win for the continent, but also raised once again the paradox of Africa’s sports legacy: Africa is brimming with talented athletes, but it is held back by its systemic issues. Without change, the continent is fated to remain excluded from the global sports discourse (mirroring its experience in international organizations, such as the United Nations Security Council).

Among several forms of support, Africa’s partners—several of them being the countries that often host the Olympics—should invest in Africa’s sports infrastructure. With the continent lacking the infrastructure needed to host major sports events and leagues, African countries and their partners should use this funding to set a sustainable foundation, constructing new infrastructure with sustainability in mind from the start. Doing so would be a game changer, not just for countries’ bids to host global sports events, but also for education, gender equality, and social cohesion: In a sense, it would be a game changer for the continent’s future.

Of course, African countries have already gotten the momentum started: Some, not waiting for investors or partners, have built sports infrastructure, noting how powerful the impact on their societies may be. For example, Senegal’s Dakar Arena and Abdoulaye Wade stadium embody this African vision of global sports. In addition, both infrastructures strengthen the continent’s stature for hosting future global sports events.

That is why Africa’s sports sector needs more funding than ever. The momentum is building and must be sustained. Senegal will host next year’s Summer Youth Olympics, and Morocco will co-host—with Portugal and Spain—the 2030 FIFA World Cup. As the spotlight slowly shifts to Africa, the continent’s sports movement is taking off. As it does so, Africa’s global partners can support the continent in carrying a legacy of sustainable global sports.

Malcolm Biiga is a senior consultant at Havas Paris.

Note: Havas ran marketing for the 2024 Paris Olympics, but the author had no involvement in the effort.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post Don’t leave Africa behind in sports sustainability—put it first appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While officials eventually confirmed the incident and activated contingency protocols, the episode revealed critical gaps in the nation’s cybersecurity, from outdated systems to inadequate training.

Much detail about Morocco’s response is not known, although officials claimed that the documents posted online, showing unverified financial data about prominent companies and individuals, were “misleading, inaccurate, or incomplete.”

Nevertheless, the cyberattack demonstrates the extent to which cybercrime has proliferated in Africa. Countries across the continent must do more to prepare to respond to such attacks quickly. After all, the difference between a manageable incident and a full-scale crisis often comes down to the speed and coherence of the response.

Africa’s digital transformation has made public institutions both more efficient and more vulnerable. Across the continent, public services are becoming more digital, more connected, and more exposed. National databases hold growing volumes of personal and financial data. Institutions that once operated in isolation are now integrated through shared identity systems, cloud platforms, and crossborder trade infrastructure.

This shift brings undeniable benefits: efficiency, inclusion, and modernization. But it also raises the stakes.

Cyberattacks can leak private information, as seen in the Morocco case, or cause surface-level disruptions—but they can also interrupt core infrastructure. Pension systems, customs platforms, digital ID services, and banking networks have become targets for attackers pursuing financial, political, or ideological objectives. For example, in 2021, South Africa’s Transnet state-owned port operator was paralyzed by a ransomware attack, severely disrupting trade at one of the continent’s most critical logistics hubs. Such systems are essential to daily operations, governance, and economic stability, making them high-value targets in an increasingly contested digital environment.

The pressure is compounded by trade dynamics. As African countries adopt digital trade frameworks and seek deeper integration through instruments such as the African Continental Free Trade Area, countries will be expected—by international partners, investors, and peer countries—to maintain adequate cybersecurity hygiene. A poorly handled response to a cyberattack could stall digitization programs, delay funding, or complicate regional cooperation.

Each attack carries political, financial, and reputational consequences—reaching far beyond the technical perimeter.

A challenge beyond technology

Many of the toughest barriers to an effective cyber response are not technology-based: They’re political and institutional.

In both the public and private sectors globally, teams often delay escalation for fear of reputational or political consequences. That hesitation, sometimes just a few hours, can turn a manageable incident into a full-blown crisis. Ambiguity about how leaders responded to attacks—in terms of whether alerts were triggered and whether decision-makers were activated promptly—can also be costly reputationally and politically. Still, such ambiguity is common.

Another widespread challenge is that responses are often siloed. Ministries, regulators, and public service operators sometimes act independently, fearing blame or jurisdictional conflict. But attackers rarely limit their scope to a single system. Without pre-agreed protocols, time is lost by navigating institutional hierarchies instead of stopping the threat. This was evident in the Transnet ransomware incident in South Africa, where coordination issues extended the disruption to national trade routes.

There is also an institutional instinct, in some settings, to manage cyber incidents quietly. While discretion is understandable, early internal escalation does not require immediate public disclosure—it simply ensures that the right people are activated in time to reduce harm. Silence, on the other hand, delays action.

Private-sector organizations, especially in regulated industries or critical infrastructure, have faced similar dilemmas. Yet, speed and transparency improve dramatically when senior leaders are involved early and when the culture favors accountability over blame.

Governments face additional complexity—political sensitivities, multiple layers of authority, media pressure—but the principle holds: Adequate responses take place in cultures built on trust, not just compliance. Shifting from a blame-based culture to a readiness mindset is essential if African states want to match the pace and sophistication of evolving threats.

What’s required

To ensure that they can adequately and quickly respond to cyberattacks, African states should work to improve governance, communication, and trust.

One way to do that is by setting a standard requiring cybersecurity teams to initiate a comprehensive response process within twelve hours of attack detection. This twelve-hour window should encompass critical early-stage activities including initial triage to assess severity, coordination of response teams across relevant departments, forensic analysis to understand attack vectors, and preliminary impact assessments to identify affected systems and data. Importantly, this timeframe focuses on launching the response framework rather than completing full remediation—which requires more time to ensure permanent fixes—or conducting exhaustive breach analysis, which demands thorough investigation. The twelve-hour standard also excludes public disclosure during this initial period, allowing teams to maintain operational security while attackers remain unaware of detection.

By establishing clear expectations for these foundational response activities, organizations can ensure they rapidly mobilize resources while preserving the time needed for comprehensive long-term solutions.

Igniting a response to a national cyber incident within twelve hours does not boil down to having cutting-edge cyber defense infrastructure. But three core capabilities—each attainable, even in resource-constrained environments—are needed.

First, basic detection capabilities across digital assets are needed. This doesn’t require advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence—just logs, alerts, and system awareness. Even well-organized and properly rehearsed manual processes can be effective. Establishing a situational awareness platform—even if rudimentary—that enables organizations, government entities, and incident response teams to exchange real-time threat intelligence can ensure visibility during a crisis.

Second, there needs to be a clear chain of command in the event of a cyberattack. Institutions need to know who is in charge, how to reach them, and what thresholds trigger escalation. Appointing a national cyber incident lead with the authority to coordinate across agencies can help mitigate slow reaction times caused by bureaucratic silos and overlapping mandates.

Third, secure communication platforms must be made available to all key actors on a response team. The most effective coordination happens with tools that are set up before the crisis—not in the middle of it. These don’t have to be expensive platforms, but they must be resilient, well-known to all key actors, and able to function even during partial system failures.

In addition, states should also hold periodic simulations to test these capabilities and to uncover gaps between agencies, protocols, and assumptions on the one hand and real-world behavior on the other.

Each of these capabilities is within reach. But they require more than technical fixes—they demand political prioritization, institutional alignment, and above all, consistent follow-through.

The twelve-hour test isn’t about beating a clock. It’s about knowing whether a country’s systems, people, and institutions are ready to act—before the damage is irreversible. That readiness is not out of reach for Africa. But it starts with treating cyber response as a core function of national security, not a technical afterthought.

Yasmine Abdillahi is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. She is the executive director of security risk and compliance and the business information security officer at Comcast.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post African countries must do more to prepare to quickly respond to cyberattacks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the informal or artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector, women’s participation is estimated at up to 50 percent. But despite their contributions, women across the region are subjected to discrimination—which results in fewer socioeconomic and professional opportunities—in addition to sexual and gender-based violence.

Today, the increasing demand for critical minerals has led global powers, including the United States, to consider critical-mineral deals globally in order to create stronger and more sustainable supply chains. African countries thus have a newfound opportunity to prioritize their development goals—but they first must address the discrimination and violence against women taking place across the industry.

For African countries to empower their women miners, they must tailor formalization pathways of women ASM miners and support grassroots organizations as operational partners, while deploying policies aimed at addressing gender biases in the industry and on a macro scale.

The reality for women miners

In the ASM sector, where working conditions are unsafe, women face gender-based discrimination and physical harm. Women miners are ninety times more at risk of death than their male counterparts, according to the World Bank. Women miners also face sexual violence, which is especially prevalent in conflict areas: For example, amid the ongoing conflict between Congolese armed forces and Rwanda-backed M23 rebels, women (both miners and not) reported 895 rapes in the last two weeks of February 2025, averaging sixty reports per day.

In the ASM sector and in large-scale mining (LSM), women have also been allocated fewer technical jobs in addition to unequal access to mining rights, tools, and financial resources, all diminishing their ability to achieve financial growth. Their restricted economic mobility often confines them to ancillary services such as preparing food and cleaning mineral ore. But regardless of the roles they take, women miners often receive lower wages than men for the same labor. Discrimination also results in women miners taking on a disproportionate burden of labor overall, as many are responsible for housework in addition to mining activities.

Legal infrastructures also reinforce discrimination against women miners: For example, the DRC’s Mining Code stipulates that pregnant women are not allowed to work in mining. Similarly, sections 55 and 56 of Nigeria’s 2004 Labor Act prohibit women from working in industrial undertakings, including mining, during nighttime hours and from doing any manual labor underground. These unequal legal measures can push more women to informal mining practices, making them more vulnerable to physical and gender-based harm.

Tapping the opportunity

African countries, for their development and economic growth, must address the challenges women in both ASM and LSM face, with policies that are tailored to the needs of local mining communities.

African countries must offer easily navigable pathways for ASM miners to formalize—and such pathways must be customized for local contexts. Formalization is particularly complex in regions with conflict and legal pluralism. There are frameworks available to guide African governments in this endeavor. For example, a nongovernmental organization called Pact has publicly put forth the model it uses to engage communities in formalization, tailoring the approach to the needs of local artisanal miners. Such a model includes stakeholder engagement and educational training for miners, in addition to support with securing licenses and land access and with addressing human rights and safety concerns.

African governments should also support local grassroots organizations in operationalizing these efforts to improve the well-being of women miners and their economic prospects. In the ASM sector in particular, these organizations are integral to reaching women miners, especially in spaces where governments lack reach. For example, Tanzania’s Women Miners Association economically empowers women miners through initiatives that organize savings and credit cooperative societies and support women as they work to acquire mining licenses and market access. An organization called IMPACT leads initiatives for women-led mining businesses to improve women miners’ safety and foster inclusion in global supply chains. IMPACT supported the building of at least fifty village savings and loans associations in the DRC and Burkina Faso, involving nearly three thousand women and men who saved more than $176,000.

In addressing women’s challenges in the mining sector—both ASM and LSM—more broadly, African governments must also deploy policies that are gender inclusive and women-centric in order to alleviate the gendered struggles of women in the mining sector. There are already positive examples of such policies on the African continent, some being South Africa’s programs to improve women’s participation in the LSM sector. In addition, the Rwanda Mines, Petroleum, and Gas Board implemented a gender strategy to improve awareness about the role of women in mining and to boost capacity building. Governments should also encourage women’s participation in mining governance.

Leveraging partnerships

Safeguarding and empowering women is essential for upholding human rights and fostering inclusive sustainable growth. While ensuring peace and stability, African countries need to leverage partnerships to advance their development goals.

As countries move forward on critical-minerals deals, they must do so ensuring that there will be mutual economic gains from such agreements. For example, the DRC must leverage its potential mineral deal—in which the United States would provide security against the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel attacks in exchange for access to DRC’s critical minerals—for community development. While signing any deal, governments should foster multistakeholder partnerships with grassroots organizations that can help reach women miners and advance development goals in Africa’s booming mining sector, for an inclusive and equitable future for all.

Neeraja Kulkarni is a researcher, writer, and development practitioner with experience in decarbonization, community resilience, and international development. The views expressed in this article are her own.

The post Empower women miners now for a just future in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Abdoul Salam Bello: A thirst for tangible impact

Rama Yade: A moment of opportunity for Africa

Frannie Léautier: A renewed sense of optimism

Tom Bonsundy-O’Bryan: Future-proofing the Bank

Emilie Bel: Remaking the donor base

Benjamin Mossberg: Yet, don’t discount the United States

Alexandria Maloney: An agility challenge

Didier Acouetey: A reflection of Africa’s biggest challenges

A sign of the thirst for tangible impact

Tah’s election, with 76 percent of the vote, signifies a pivotal moment for the institution and a reflection of evolving global development priorities. This robust mandate from shareholders acknowledges Tah’s multifaceted experience, which encompasses senior leadership roles in Mauritania’s public sector (including ministerial and advisory positions) and key functions within multilateral institutions focused on crisis management, financial restructuring, and resource generation for African development.

A critical factor in the shareholders’ decision was undoubtedly Tah’s leadership at the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa over the past ten years. His tenure saw the institution’s assets at least double and culminated in AA+/AAA credit ratings. This track record of financial acumen underscored a shareholder desire for clear, measurable outcomes and tangible impact in development initiatives, particularly within the context of reevaluating development financing models.

Achieving such outcomes will be essential as the AfDB looks to support the continent in addressing several critical challenges. These challenges include fostering substantial job creation (on a continent where the median age is about nineteen years), navigating an escalating debt burden, mitigating prevalent fragility, and securing crucial investments in sectors such as energy, agriculture, and infrastructure. The annual financing gap for Africa’s infrastructure needs is estimated at between $68 billion and $108 billion, which represents eight to ten times AfDB’s overall approvals from 2022 to 2023.

Finally, as Africa seeks to diminish its reliance on traditional aid and attract increased private investment, Tah is anticipated to catalyze more dynamic engagement with emerging economic partners actively seeking opportunities on the continent.

—Abdoul Salam Bello is a nonresident senior fellow with the Africa Center

A moment of opportunity for Africa

The AfDB and its newly elected president will be under a great deal of scrutiny.

In Washington, much of the commentary will focus on the cut in US funding. In May, the Trump administration proposed cutting $555 million in funding for the AfDB, at a time when the AfDB is looking to replenish its African Development Fund with a $25-billion fundraising campaign.

However, the new AfDB president should consider the US decision an opportunity to rebuild the financial foundations of an organization that is less “African” than other development institutions. Unlike the Africa Finance Corporation or the African Export–Import Bank, the AfDB is not entirely controlled by Africans. The AfDB has eighty-one shareholders, including twenty-seven nonregional members, ranging from Norway to the United Arab Emirates. While most of the voting power remains in the hands of African regional members, nonregional members such as Japan (the largest non-African shareholder) and the United States have significant voting power and board representation.

Consequently, these nonregional members play a key role in AfDB’s development priorities. In the previous cycle, they controlled over 40 percent of the bank’s resources. Of the nonregional members, Germany, France, and the United States pledged the most funds during the previous funding cycle. However, the US withdrawal will affect Washington’s role. Reducing the Bank’s access to US financial markets will impact dollar dominance in Africa. Given that the infrastructure needs of Africans are estimated at $100 billion per year, it is easy to forecast that the AfDB will increase its cooperation with non-US markets, including Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia.

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Africa Center

A renewed sense of optimism

As Tah’s campaign manager, I witnessed firsthand how his platform evolved—and how shareholders ultimately rallied behind him.

Tah brings over thirty-five years of experience in African and international finance. As president of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, he led a transformation and enhanced the institution’s lending capacity. Previously, Tah served as Mauritania’s minister of economic affairs and development, and before that, he was the country’s minister of economy and finance. In these roles, he implemented structural reforms and negotiated key agreements with development partners. His governance experience provides him with a comprehensive understanding of both the demand and supply sides of development finance.

Tah’s decisive victory reflects a desire among shareholders for a leader with a track record of institutional transformation and financial innovation. His election suggests a shift towards prioritizing capital mobilization (from both domestic and international sources), institutional reform to strengthen the agency and resilience of Africa’s financial systems, and inclusive growth. His victory also shows an acknowledgment of the importance of building infrastructure that not only meets development needs but also is resilient to climate change impacts.

With the US proposal to cut $555 million in funding for the AfDB, Tah is expected to enhance domestic resource mobilization and implement innovative financial instruments. He is also slated to strengthen partnerships and diversify funding sources, especially with emerging powers such as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and others, to secure needed resources for the continent’s development agenda.

Tah’s election as president of the AfDB comes at a critical juncture for Africa. His experience, strategic vision, and commitment to inclusive and sustainable development position him to lead the AfDB in addressing the continent’s pressing challenges. And as he assumes office, there is a renewed sense of optimism and determination to accelerate Africa’s transformation.

—Frannie Léautier is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Future-proofing the Bank

Tah’s election reflects a clear shareholder pivot toward Gulf capital as traditional donors pull back. With the United States proposing to cut $555 million in funding, shareholders prioritized a candidate who could mobilize alternative funding. Tah’s track record (doubling the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa’s assets) and his experience (with which he can likely channel Gulf sovereign wealth into AfDB co-investment vehicles) proved decisive. His landslide win signals a strategic consensus among shareholders: Future-proofing the Bank means diversifying, moving away from Western donors. 

—Tom Bonsundy-O’Bryan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a 2023 Millennium fellow.

Remaking the donor base

Tah’s large victory should give him the momentum needed to tackle the huge challenges facing the AfDB. Among them, he will have to deal with the erosion of the traditional donor base, best exemplified by (but not limited to) the United States’ cuts to the US Agency for International Development. He will need to tap new donors and solicit more support from current donors—for example, Gulf states—as well as unlock the full potential of the private sector. Moreover, given Africa’s vulnerability to climate change, he will have to accelerate climate-change adaptation and mitigation measures and face tough choices regarding the African energy mix.

—Emilie Bel is a nonresident senior fellow with the Africa Center

Yet, don’t discount the United States

While the United States may be losing interest in the AfDB, it is clear that other powers seeking greater influence in African countries and institutions were paying close attention to this contest. The race became bitter, as countries (both African ones and other shareholders) backed different candidates. But the attention was warranted; these are difficult times for the Bank, given the challenges it faces, from climate to trade to declining donor support.

With the United States—one of the largest contributors to the AfDB—proposing to cut $555 million in contributions, voting members smartly sought a solution to help the AfDB look beyond traditional Western donors. By selecting Tah, the outgoing president of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, AfDB will be well-positioned to seek contributions from Arab League members.

Yet, under Tah, AfDB leadership should not discount the United States; it should continue to court Washington. It can do so by ensuring that projects and investments funded by US contributions are prioritized appropriately. Toward that aim, Tah should deploy a more robust communication strategy with the goal of clearly articulating to a skeptical US domestic audience how US investments in the AfDB benefit Americans.

—Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Africa Center

An agility challenge

Tah’s victory signals continuity in some respects, but it is also a sign of potential recalibration ahead for the AfDB. While his platform emphasizes reform and modernization, the true test will lie in how he navigates entrenched institutional dynamics and mounting pressure for measurable outcomes. Tah has inherited a Bank at a crossroads and is tasked with addressing climate finance, youth unemployment, and shifting geopolitical alignments, especially amid intensifying competition among global powers, including the United States, China, and Gulf states. His legacy will be defined by his ability to sustain trust among member states while steering the Bank toward greater agility and impact in a rapidly changing development landscape.

—Alexandria Maloney is a nonresident senior fellow with the Africa Center, president of Black Professionals in International Affairs, and a visiting lecturer at Cornell University

A reflection of Africa’s biggest challenges

Tah’s decisive election comes at a pivotal moment for Africa. In a shifting global landscape marked by geopolitical realignment and the decline of traditional development aid, his election reflects a growing and urgent concern about accelerating Africa’s transformation and unlocking youth employment. It also underscores the need to mobilize African domestic resources and to harness the continent’s demographic growth as a powerful development dividend—rather than a burden. Tah’s vision is both bold and Africa-centered; but the delivery of that vision will depend on his ability to strike strategic partnerships.

—Didier Acouetey is a nonresident senior fellow with the Africa Center and president and founder of the AfricSearch Group

The post Experts react: How Sidi Ould Tah will shape the African Development Bank appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ahead of this pivotal moment, the United States can act now to support a democratic electoral process in Cameroon and help the country navigate what unfolds after the vote.

Cameroonian President Paul Biya, now ninety-two years old and having held power since 1982, is one of Africa’s longest-ruling leaders. Over the course of his decades in office, elections have been routinely marred by fraud allegations and repression. In the country’s first multiparty elections, held in 1992, Biya clung to power amid accusations of rigging, and opposition leader John Fru Ndi was placed under house arrest during ensuing protests. More recently, in the 2018 election, Biya was declared the winner and credited with 71 percent of the vote, but there were irregularities: Turnout in the conflict-torn Anglophone regions was barely 10 percent. Protests over the result led to mass arrests of opposition supporters. Despite concerns about his age and health, Biya is expected to run again, presenting himself as the guarantor of stability. However, public clamoring for change has grown loud: Catholic bishops have urged Biya to step aside, and even a pro-government newspaper opined that the long-time leader “deserves a rest” in favor of new leadership.

Biya’s ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) and its allies are closing ranks to preserve power. Throughout 2024, several CPDM elites and patronage partners have pressed Biya to seek another term, touting his experience and warning that the country could suffer instability if he steps down. They are again mobilizing a broad coalition of smaller parties to back Biya, as in past elections. Meanwhile, intense behind-the-scenes jockeying is underway over who might succeed the aging president in a post-Biya scenario. Various power brokers have been floated as successors. Talk about one such name, Biya’s son Franck, has raised fears of an undemocratic dynastic transition. The uncertainty around succession is a significant risk factor, a ticking time bomb that could trigger factional infighting if not managed transparently.

The opposition sees 2025 as a rare chance to finally end decades of one-person rule. Over thirty opposition parties have allied to unify behind a single candidate, Maurice Kamto, aiming to overcome Cameroon’s one-round, first-past-the-post system that has historically favored the incumbent. Kamto—a former minister who insists he won the 2018 election—is campaigning on anti-corruption and reform, tapping into public yearning for change. Yet the regime has moved aggressively to undercut this challenge. Early this year, authorities banned two opposition coalitions, calling them “illegal” and “clandestine” associations, driving Kamto’s alliance underground. Legal obstacles are piling up: Election law requires a candidate’s party to hold parliamentary seats, but the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC), Kamto’s party, has none after it encouraged Cameroonians to boycott a flawed 2020 legislative vote. In a brazen step, the CPDM-dominated government postponed the next legislative elections to 2026, denying the opposition any chance to gain seats before the presidential race.

Meanwhile, harassment of those who dissent continues unabated—activists and journalists are detained on spurious charges, peaceful protests are barred, and media outlets critical of the regime are silenced. These tactics cast doubt on whether the 2025 polls will be free or fair, absent significant pressure for a level playing field. Nevertheless, civil society and youth activists have been mobilizing: In 2024, they led mass voter registration drives to encourage turnout, signaling a grassroots appetite for change despite the odds.

The stakes extend beyond who wins. They encompass Cameroon’s stability, economy, and regional security. A flawed election could inflame simmering conflicts and public frustrations. The Anglophone Crisis in the country’s Northwest and Southwest regions has already killed over six thousand people and displaced nearly 700,000 internally, with around 100,000 more fleeing to Nigeria as refugees. Separatist militants reject the upcoming election and have violently enforced boycotts in those regions before, leaving a significant portion of the population disenfranchised.

Elsewhere, a contested outcome or a result marred by repression could spark unrest among a young population increasingly fed up with corruption and lack of opportunity. Ethno-regional tensions might also flare if a perceived power grab fuels resentment among communities who feel excluded. By contrast, a credible election and peaceful outcome would give the next government a mandate to address these crises, from pursuing a political solution to the Anglophone conflict to focusing the military on the Boko Haram insurgency in the Far North region. Cameroon is richly endowed with oil, timber, and fertile land, but its economic potential has been blunted by graft and mismanagement. Decades of kleptocratic governance have left over half the population impoverished. Another seven years of business-as-usual would likely deepen economic malaise and alienation, whereas a new commitment among leadership to reform could attract investment and better harness Cameroon’s resources for development.

International actors are watching closely, as Cameroon’s trajectory will impact Central African stability. France—Cameroon’s former colonial ruler—has backed Biya in the past, though French officials now avoid openly taking sides. The United States and European Union (EU) regularly urge fair elections and respect for human rights (the United States, for example, cut some military aid due to abuses in Anglophone regions). Still, their security cooperation interests temper Western leverage.

Meanwhile, other external players are exploiting the situation: Russian-linked media in Cameroon spread anti-Western narratives to bolster Biya’s regime. Regional governments, many led by entrenched leaders, generally prefer Biya to stay in power and are unlikely to press for change, prioritizing stability over democracy.

Ultimately, Cameroon’s future will be decided at home. A genuinely free and fair election would bolster Cameroon’s international standing and unlock greater foreign support, whereas a blatantly rigged vote may isolate the regime and sow internal turmoil.

Cameroon’s vote is about more than the country’s democratic future: As one analysis noted, it is part of a broader test of whether Africa’s elections will uphold democratic norms or contribute to a slide backward. Here is how the United States can help support democracy in Cameroon during this pivotal election year:

• Use diplomacy to promote a free and fair election: The United States should convince Cameroonian leaders, both publicly and privately, to uphold democratic norms in the 2025 vote. Diplomatic engagement should emphasize that opposition candidates must be allowed to compete freely, international observers should be admitted, and security forces must refrain from violence. Coordinating these messages with allies (France, the EU, and the African Union) will increase impact and help deter electoral misconduct.
• Leverage aid and security ties: Washington should tie aspects of its assistance to Cameroon’s electoral conduct and respect for human rights. The prospect of continued military aid and business engagement can be made conditional on the regime permitting a transparent election and avoiding crackdowns. Conversely, a blatantly fraudulent or violent process should prompt targeted consequences (such as visa bans or aid suspensions). By calibrating incentives and penalties, the United States can encourage accountability without undermining vital counterterrorism cooperation.
• Support election monitoring and civic engagement: To reduce the risk of fraud or unrest, the United States should back robust election-observation and civil-society initiatives. This includes supporting credible international and domestic observers and assisting local groups in voter education and parallel vote tabulation. Such efforts—coordinated with other partners—will bolster public confidence in the process, deter manipulation, and empower Cameroonians to defend their votes peacefully.
• Plan for post-election stability and reforms: The United States should prepare to help Cameroon navigate the vote’s aftermath. If the election results are disputed or violence looms, Washington (with African partners and United Nations agencies) can offer to facilitate dialogue or mediation to prevent escalation. In any outcome, the United States should encourage the winning candidate to pursue inclusive reforms—for example, an inclusive national dialogue to address the Anglophone Crisis and to introduce tangible anticorruption measures. Targeted US support (diplomatic partnership, technical aid, and peacebuilding programs) can be leveraged to help achieve these steps, reinforcing that long-term US partnership will deepen if Cameroon advances stability, inclusivity, and good governance.

Jude Mutah is a policy expert and practitioner in democracy support, peacebuilding, and governance, with over a decade of experience across Africa. He holds a Doctorate in Public Administration from the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Baltimore.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post How the United States can support Cameroon as it faces its next democratic test appeared first on Atlantic Council.

That was made clear at this year’s International Monetary Fund and World Bank Spring Meetings, where financial leaders warned about job loss and increasing poverty rates across these countries. 

But there are changes African countries can make to better withstand the economic headwinds they are facing. One such opportunity they should immediately seize lies in strengthening their approaches to combating money laundering and terrorist financing. By addressing deficiencies in legal and regulatory frameworks and by adjusting for developments in financial technology, African countries can bolster financial inclusion and tap economic growth opportunities—while preventing the abuse of the global financial system by nefarious actors. 

Key deficiencies seen across Africa—in the form of weak legal and regulatory frameworks, limited institutional capacity to conduct financial supervisory or enforcement activities, and a high degree of informality of economic activities—make it difficult to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other illicit financial flows. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog, keeps track of jurisdictions that do not meet global standards to combat money laundering, publicly identifying jurisdictions with weak performance on a “black list” and “grey list.” The black list hosts only three countries (North Korea, Iran, and Myanmar), but on the grey list, fourteen of the twenty-five countries (just over half) are African. Grey listing can result in serious reputational and economic damage, with negative spillover effects on economic growth, borrowing costs, foreign investment flows, and financial inclusion efforts—a particularly concerning impact considering that in Sub-Saharan Africa, less than half the population has a bank account. Given these effects, African countries have worked to make significant improvements to their anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) frameworks. Over the past few years, several countries that were once placed on the grey list have been removed, including Zimbabwe, Botswana, Morocco, and Mauritius.

One piece of the regulatory puzzle involves cryptocurrencies. FATF Recommendation 15 for combating money laundering and terrorist financing directs countries to identify and assess “risks emerging from virtual asset activities.” FATF data from March indicates that of the forty-one Sub-Saharan African countries with publicly available data, only seven countries were rated “compliant” with Recommendation 15, indicating that the country successfully met the global standard. For African countries looking to become more compliant, there are positive examples on the continent to draw upon; for example, South Africa was recently upgraded to “largely compliant” with Recommendation 15 and is continuing to make progress towards full compliance. 

At the same time, African governments must also harness the power of digital finance to weather today’s economic headwinds. According to the International Monetary Fund, as of 2022, just 25 percent of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa formally regulated cryptocurrencies, and two-thirds had implemented restrictions, with six countries having outright banned cryptocurrencies. The impact of this approach leaves the investors and entrepreneurs who are interested in Africa’s digital assets sector inclined to hold back investments due to the excessive regulatory uncertainty and possible regulatory swings. Africa is one of the fastest-growing crypto markets in the world, and crypto assets are actively used across the continent. 

Recent reporting from Chainalysis suggests that the cryptocurrency value received by Sub-Saharan Africa was less than three percent of the global share between July 2023 and July 2024. While this is a small global share, there is significant variance in adoption rates across the continent’s fifty-four countries, with a number of countries still rating relatively high in global adoption: Nigeria ranked second worldwide, and Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Africa also ranked in the top thirty countries. From 2022 to 2023, bitcoin was legal tender in the Central African Republic, but finance experts raised concerns about the lack of electricity and infrastructure and the high risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. One thing is certain: digital assets—including cryptocurrencies—are changing the financial landscape of the region. 

That digital finance can transform Africa’s financial landscape should be viewed positively. Africa’s population is set to increase from 1.5 billion in 2024 to 2.5 billion in 2050. This is the moment for African governments to leverage the economic power of their demographics, but to do that, they will need to consider public policies that support greater financial inclusion. Of the eight countries that will account for more than half of the global population growth between now and 2050, five of them are in Africa; two of them are global leaders in crypto adoption rates.  

As populations age and enter the workforce, African governments should consider how best to promote technological innovation in their societies, including in financial technology. Cryptocurrency adoption in African countries can be used for small retail transactions, for sending or receiving remittances, as a hedge against inflation, for business payments, and, potentially, for solving sticky foreign exchange issues in places such as Central Africa, where such issues dramatically reduce foreign investments. Due to its decentralized nature, cryptocurrencies can help people bridge the gap in access to financial services and formal banking systems in many countries across the continent.  

On one hand, governments have tried to use digital assets to boost financial inclusion, tax revenue, and small retail transactions with limited success; and on the other, countries have banned, unbanned, regulated, and deregulated cryptocurrencies, leaving a patchwork of regulatory frameworks across the continent for consumers and business to navigate. With such jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage and limited enforcement mechanisms, nonstate actors, including terrorist groups in Africa, are able to take advantage of the technologies and services that can move money the fastest and cheapest—and in ways that are least likely to be detected or disrupted. That can lead these actors to cryptocurrency.   

While serving as head of delegation to both the Central and West African FATF-style regional bodies, I heard from African government officials repeatedly that there were no digital assets being used in their countries and that their AML/CFT regulatory regimes were sufficient. This is simply not the case. African countries should consider policies to encourage the adoption of emerging financial technologies, including cryptocurrencies and other digital assets, while still exercising great care to avoid creating conditions allowing for regulatory arbitrage between countries or monetary unions that can be exploited by bad actors seeking to launder money or finance terrorism. Beyond policy frameworks, African governments should empower their enforcement agencies with the appropriate resources to ensure that policies, laws, and regulatory frameworks protect the integrity of the global financial system.  

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. 

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From these popes to other early figures, such as Mark the Evangelist and Saint Augustine, Africans have held important roles in the church’s theology, philosophy, doctrine, and discourse. Should the next pope be African, it would indeed be a milestone in the modern era. But for an institution that often takes a longer view of issues, it would signify the return of leadership for a continent that helped define what the church has become.

The face of faith

Discussions about an African pope emerging from a conclave are nothing new. In 2002, then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger spoke positively of the prospects of an African pope emerging at the next conclave, which took place in 2005. However, it was Ratzinger himself who was elected to the role, as Pope Benedict XVI. Yet his statement showcased the ongoing realpolitik of the College of Cardinals: an increasing number of Africans among the faithful and the clergy means more influence. As the French newspaper Le Monde pointed out during Pope Francis’s trip to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan in 2023, the overall number of priests in Africa is increasing, and so too is the number of seminarians, which includes future priests. In fact, Africa is the only continent seeing an upward trend among seminarians.

The increase in African clergy has accompanied an expansion of Catholicism across the continent. In 1910, Africa had fewer than one million Catholics, according to estimates. In 2024, that number was 265 million. In fact, by 2050, Africa is expected to be home to nearly a third of the world’s Catholics. This growth will have longstanding implications for the makeup of the church. In 2022, the Vatican estimated that around thirteen million people joined the church that year. More than half were in Africa.

It is clear that Africa’s presence in the church is immense and growing, but that does not necessarily translate into a certainty that this or the next pope will be African. It is true that Pope Francis did much to make that a possibility and that there are several papabile African cardinals among the multitude of lists of contenders being compiled. But those lists are notoriously unreliable and conclaves are typically unpredictable. Inevitably, the conclave will see a debate unfold between the progressive and conservative blocs—terms that do not necessarily apply to the church, but ones that media and commentators tend to use nonetheless. By those measurements, the majority of African members in the curia and the College of Cardinals defiantly tilt conservative. It is in this sphere of influence that Africa has made its presence and voice known.

Dogma and discourse

If Pope Francis is remembered as leading the charge for a more liberal church, then African cardinals and bishops are at the forefront of the countercharge. Take, for example, the issue of same-sex blessings. Pope Francis drew much attention for his attitude toward same-sex blessings and other reforms, and (in)famously for saying “If a person is gay and seeks God and has good will, who am I to judge?” Following these actions, there was significant backlash among African bishops, who united into a continental common front to lead the conservative response. They had enough clout to drive the curia to, in effect, provide some leeway. The church has not been exempt from the culture wars, and it is notable that Cardinal Robert Sarah of Guinea, a conservative favorite, has been described by the press as an “anti-woke” cardinal.

At the same time, Pope Francis installed most of those eligible to vote in the upcoming conclave, including several Africans. Most of these, unsurprisingly, fell under the label of liberal and aligned with an agenda for reforming the church.

Another African who might be considered for the papacy is Cardinal Fridolin Ambongo Besungu of Congo. But Africa is not the only continent mentioned often in discussions about candidates. Take Cardinal Luis Antonio Gokim Tagle of the Philippines, who, if selected, would become the first pope from the Indo-Pacific region. Regionality will not matter as much as dogma and voting blocs, and a conservative African cardinal could well find allies among his American and Italian colleagues.

At the end of the day, though, it is a mystery who will arise from the conclave. What is not a mystery, however, is the growing strength of Africa in the church, both in numbers among the faithful and in theological and dogmatic discourse. The world must wait for the white smoke to learn who will be the next pope, but it is already clear that African bishops and cardinals are at the forefront of the conservative charge in the church. An African pope is not a given in this conclave or the next, but African agency and leadership in the twenty-first-century church is.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post The next pope may be African—or not. Either way, Africa is at the forefront of today’s Roman Catholic Church. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In my work researching how African diaspora communities in the United States maintain their connections to their homelands, I have found that long-standing experiences involving racism, combined with growing anti-immigrant sentiments, have led many members of the African diaspora to strengthen their ties to the continent.

Such diasporans, especially second-generation diasporans (that is, the children of immigrants), have connected with their African identities by turning to the digital space, which has enabled them to follow Africa-related news and cultural trends, connect with diaspora organizations, and keep in touch with family and friends. Digital platforms reduce the distance between home and abroad, accelerating the movement of people, capital, and ideas. 

Second-generation diasporans have also turned to digital platforms to engage in cultural commerce. This digitized and culturally rooted economic engagement—which includes business development, trade, and investment—is what I call the digital identity economy. And this type of diaspora engagement offers new opportunities for reshaping US relations with the African continent.

Diaspora engagement is nothing new; African diaspora communities have long maintained economic, cultural, and social connections to their countries of origin. African immigrants in the 1970s and 1980s maintained homeland ties by opening cultural shops for food products, sending remittances, forming associations and religious institutions, and visiting home.

But the digital identity economy has created space for second-generation diasporans to channel their shared desire to connect with their homelands, offering products and services that meet their cultural needs while addressing the distinct challenges they face in reconnecting with home, challenges that first-generation immigrants may not experience in the same way. For example, one app called Nkenne, created by a second-generation Nigerian-American, helps diasporans learn African languages and addresses declining heritage-language fluency, a common issue for second-generation diasporans. The app provides cultural education about customs in African countries that younger diasporans may not be familiar with, helping them feel more connected to their culture and their identity from afar. 

Digital platforms such as Spotify and YouTube enable young diasporans to engage with African music, stream artists’ work, and share their content. The popularity of Afrobeats music has given rise to businesses and events centered around the genre, including parties and popular music festivals—such as Afrofuture and Afronation—which take place not only in African countries but also in diaspora communities. While some may view these events solely as entertainment, they reflect deep cultural connections that create economic activity.

The digital identity economy has created economic opportunities in tourism for second-generation diasporans. For example, acclaimed second-generation Ghanaian-American chef Eric Adjepong offers a Ghanaian culinary tour, using digital platforms for promotion and booking. And the digital identity economy has enabled second-generation diasporans to use fashion to express their cultural pride and identity. The brand Ashanti Beads, which creates apparel featuring the Akan Adinkra symbol Gye Nyame, is an example of this. Its tagline, “Bridging the gap in the African diaspora through fashion,” speaks to the growing demand for culturally rooted apparel. Ashanti Beads uses digital platforms to engage its audience, market its brand, and sell its products. 

These culturally rooted economic activities reflect the financial engagement patterns of second-generation African diaspora members. In speaking with second-generation Ghanaians in the United States and United Kingdom, I found that they are not sending traditional remittances at the same rate as the first generation and are also less likely to send remittances in the future. Reasons for this included not wanting to be taken advantage of financially, not having anyone to send money to, and fears around creating a cycle of dependency. They preferred practices that would promote widespread economic improvement, such as business development, investing, and collective remittances. 

Some view the lack of interest in sending remittances among young African diasporans to be a challenge, especially with cuts to foreign aid, tariffs threatening the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the end of Prosper Africa. While some have argued that remittances could fill that funding gap (in 2023, the African continent received over ninety billion dollars in remittances, significantly surpassing foreign aid and foreign direct investment), this is not realistic. Remittances are primarily used for consumption, immigrants face increasing financial difficulty in part due to restrictive immigration policies, and younger diasporans are less likely to send such funds.  

These shifts are seen by some as a threat to Africa’s development, but they really present an opportunity to reimagine US-Africa engagement. Washington can introduce new policies and initiatives that support diaspora investment, trade, and business development as an alternative to development aid. And it is in the United States’ interest to do so: Supporting the digital identity economy would yield growth for diaspora businesses and communities in the country.

One way to do that is by strengthening ties through American Chambers of Commerce. American Chambers of Commerce on the African continent can serve as connectors and champions for a new era of diaspora-driven trade. By supporting business matchmaking, policy reform, and transnational partnerships, they offer a ready-made infrastructure for unlocking the potential of the digital identity economy.

Another is by creating a post-AGOA US-Africa trade policy. A policy that centers on diaspora businesses and entrepreneurs—by offering concessions and incentives that reward investment in the continent’s creative, cultural, and digital sectors—would support the growth of African economies and diaspora businesses.

A third initiative could include redefining foreign direct investment (FDI) to include diaspora investment. US diaspora businesses investing in Africa should be recognized as a form of FDI. While diaspora direct investment may be harder to track than remittances or traditional FDI, it still offers a dual benefit by supporting Africa’s growth while strengthening diaspora businesses in the United States. Redefining FDI to include diaspora direct investment would provide a more accurate depiction of capital outflows and the actors driving them. It can also broaden how the United States views diaspora financial contributions, moving beyond a focus on remittances to acknowledge the businesses, services, and networks they provide.

By embracing the digital identity economy, fostering diaspora investment, and rethinking trade policies, the United States can adopt a collaborative approach that supports African economic empowerment while strengthening connections across the diaspora, encouraging mutual growth.

Kirstie Kwarteng is a postdoctoral research associate at SOAS University of London and founder of The Nana Project.

The post To redefine US-Africa engagement, Washington must recognize the power of the African diaspora appeared first on Atlantic Council.

One of the most immediate opportunities for the Trump administration lies in deploying MCC resources to execute and accelerate a US-Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) critical minerals partnership currently under discussion. As the global race for cobalt, copper, and other energy transition minerals intensifies, China continues to dominate global upstream and midstream processing. The MCC’s country compact model and its authority to engage in regional deals can be reimagined to secure US access to mining opportunities, support US companies in their investment plans, develop necessary energy and transport infrastructure, and advance the regulatory reforms needed to give US companies greater confidence in investing in the Central African region. This can all be done without new legislation. Now is the time to redesign MCC’s operations so it can become a core pillar of a strategic, security-aligned America First foreign policy; failing to leverage this tool would be a strategic oversight.

The MCC: A “big push” development effort

The MCC was established in 2004 through the MCA 2003. Inspired by the Marshall Plan, it was created with a bold vision: to deliver transformative, large-scale development aid to countries that demonstrate a commitment to democratic governance, sound economic policies, and investment in their people. Distinct from traditional United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programming, the MCC’s model to date has focused on large five-year grants negotiated on a bilateral basis between the United States and recipient countries. These five-year agreements, known as “compacts,” can range from $100 million to $700 million, with the average being $350 million. These compacts fund large-scale infrastructure, education, and policy reform projects in select low- and lower-middle-income countries, and can take years to negotiate given the many steps involved (Figure 1). Figure 2 shows how MCC compacts are structured.

Figure 1. From selection to signing: The MCC’s multi-year compact development at a glance

Figure 2. The MCC compact structure

At its core, the MCC has operated as a development assistance program based on an aid-based philosophy, seeking to advance poverty reduction, access to services, and governance improvements in foreign countries. As of January 2025, the MCC had signed forty-five compacts with twenty-nine countries, with many nations signing more than one compact after the completion of the first five-year period. More than 80 percent of the countries supported by the MCC are located in Africa. Historically, countries became eligible for MCC compacts by scoring high on a complex set of twenty indicators (measured by third parties), covering areas such as political rights to immunization rates to land rights to fiscal policy and conservation. In 2018, the MCC received the right to enter into regional compacts to advance cross-border infrastructure and economic development projects that support trade corridors, regional power pools, and customs harmonization. However, only one regional compact has been signed to date.

As the number of eligible countries based on the MCC scorecard has decreased over time, the MCC was able to award threshold programs, which were smaller grants (of one to three years, averaging $20 million to $40 million) focused on helping countries address lagging scores on some of the eligibility indicators. Additionally, the MCC Candidate Country Reform Act, passed as part of the fiscal year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, expanded the pool of eligible countries to include upper-middle-income countries. 

What sets the MCC apart from the DFC and the Eximbank?

While the DFC and Eximbank play important roles in US foreign economic engagement, their tools and mandates differ fundamentally from those of the MCC. The DFC provides loans, equity, and political risk insurance. And while it has mobilized billions in private capital, it is limited by its requirement to generate a return on investment. Similarly, the Eximbank supports US exports through loan guarantees and insurance products but cannot invest in upstream development or non-commercial infrastructure. In contrast, the MCC provides flexible grant capital—an asset class that offers strategic advantages for the United States when competing with China’s state-backed investments and concessional financing.

In the case of critical minerals, this access to untied, large-scale grant capital means the MCC can support essential early-stage project development, including feasibility studies for mining projects, and can enable infrastructure and policy reforms in ways that commercial or quasi-commercial institutions cannot. For example, in the mining sector, MCC funds can help finance roads, rail, and power infrastructure essential to project bankability—thus paving the way for US private investors and DFC-backed investments to follow. Furthermore, the MCC, which has deep experience working with governments, can directly fund regulatory improvements and workforce development—areas that would be off-limits for the DFC or Eximbank. In the context of critical minerals that are needed for long-term US national and economic security, the MCC’s tools are indispensable.

The Trump administration is considering folding the MCC into the DFC—or even shutting down the agency entirely—in an effort to streamline and simplify the tools of US economic statecraft. While this might work in the long run, it would be a mistake in the short term. Due to significant differences in operational frameworks between the MCC and DFC, maintaining the MCC as an independent entity is critical to deploying the powers discussed above. Specifically, under current Office of Management and Budget (OMB) scoring rules, DFC equity investments are treated similarly to grants—scored on a one-to-one basis, which limits the DFC’s ability to expand equity initiatives without substantial new congressional appropriations. Integrating MCC grant resources into the DFC before DFC reauthorization legislation is passed, which may resolve the equity scoring issue, could lead to the DFC prioritizing the use of such funds for equity rather than grants. While equity is important and the DFC’s equity capacity should be expanded, the MCC’s flexible grant-making capacity should be preserved and leveraged to significantly de-risk projects that are of strategic importance to the United States.    

MCC 1.0 vs. MCC 2.0

In the Trump administration’s ongoing transformation of US foreign assistance and commercial diplomacy architecture, rather than closing the agency altogether, there is an opportunity to use the MCC differently—to create an MCC 2.0 that will allow for the strategic deployment of US economic statecraft.

A reformed MCC—one that loosens eligibility requirements and speeds up compact development while still focusing on critical infrastructure development—would greatly benefit partner countries, particularly in Africa. With annual infrastructure needs exceeding $130 billion, African countries are actively seeking partners capable of mobilizing large-scale private investment responding quickly to the demands of their young and growing populations. The MCC can be redesigned to operate at the nexus of both African and US national interests. 

Using the MCC to counter Chinese dominance in critical mineral supply chains

By simply changing how the MCC operates within its legislative mandate, as defined by the MCA 2003, the Trump administration can access a pool of flexible capital that can be redirected to shape critical mineral supply chains in ways that enhance US national security. The following points illustrate key areas of flexibility:

• Country eligibility does not need to be defined through complex scorecards. Countries can be determined as eligible by the MCC board if they show adequate commitment to democratic governance, economic freedom, and investing in women and children (Section 607 MCA 2003). A board decision approach will dramatically reduce the time needed to negotiate compacts. The methodology can be changed each fiscal year with notice to Congress (Section 608.b.2.).
• Compact countries are asked to make contributions relevant to meeting the objectives of the compact (Section 609.b.2). These contributions could take the form of mineral resources or rights, as is being discussed between the Trump administration and the government of Ukraine. 
• The MCC can pay for expert consultants or legal counsel on behalf of eligible countries to fast-track compact negotiations with the MCC (Section 609.g). 
• The MCC can award subsequent and concurrent compacts (for example, regional compacts) to countries so that long-term planning is possible beyond the initial five-year compact (Sections 609.j, 609.k, and 609.l).
• MCC grants can be awarded (within the framework of a compact) to national governments, subnational governments, nongovernmental organizations, or private companies (Section 605.c).
• The MCC can make other grants to individuals, firms, or governments deemed necessary for the functioning of the corporation (Section 614.a.3).
• The MCC can make grants of up to five million dollars to universities (both foreign and US universities) for relevant data (Section 614.g). China has long supported the geology departments of African universities in its effort to access relevant data on mining opportunities and build a network of local experts. Under this provision of the MCA 2003, the MCC would be able to counter that influence and help build the skilled workforce needed for resilient mining industries.

In rethinking the MCC’s operations, large pools of grant resources could be strategically directed toward building US partnerships in the mining, processing, and manufacturing of critical minerals. A generic compact could be signed with a country such as the DRC within three months of determining eligibility (in accordance with the 2023 MCA’s congressional notification requirements). Subsequently, projects could be developed and funded on a rolling basis. Figure 3 shows a potential structure for a compact focused on critical minerals.

Figure 3. The MCC 2.0: An investment partnership model

Under this new MCC 2.0 compact structure, the United States and another country could form a joint venture (JV) focused on early-stage exploration. The JV would acquire exploration licenses from the country at no charge but would be required to advance licenses from exploration to the pre-feasibility stage within four years. This alignment of interests would help fast-track the permitting and government engagement around the deals. Once assets have been de-risked enough to generate interest from private investors, the JV company would sell down its interest. The JV would operate with the highest levels of transparency, good corporate governance, and data sharing, employing the latest technologies to more accurately assess mining opportunities.

Equity ownership of the JV could be assigned by the MCC to the DFC (which can legally have equity) or a US trust account and could also include subnational government or community ownership. The MCC would seed the JV with initial equity—perhaps $50 million of a $400-million compact—but subsequent rounds could be raised through capital market strategies. 

The remaining compact funds would be reserved for the infrastructure necessary for resilient and cost-competitive supply chains—including transport and energy projects. In Zambia and the DRC, the biggest constraint to expanding copper production is the lack of energy resources. The Congolese mining sector faces an energy deficit of between 500 megawatts (MW) and 1,000 MW. All procurements related to energy and mining-sector investments will incorporate a preference for US companies (an automatic 20-percent bonus point allocation by the Technical Evaluation Panel). The MCC will actively market projects to US companies through public relations, marketing efforts, and regular roadshows, and will provide support US companies in due diligence and vetting potential local partners. 

Launch MCC 2.0 as part of Trump’s first one hundred days

As Trump’s first one hundred days draw to a close, there is still time for action in regard to the MCC. Instead of shutting down the agency, the Trump administration should nominate a chief executive officer for the MCC without delay and, while confirmation is pending in the Senate, the administration should run the MCC through a beachhead team, as was done at the Eximbank since January. The MCC 2.0 model can be applied immediately to the DRC deal under consideration or to mining resource-rich countries familiar with the MCC, such as Zambia and Tanzania. The United States is working to turn around decades of policies that ceded strategic advantage in critical value chains to China. The MCC should be seen as a vital part of that effort.

Aubrey Hruby is a senior adviser and senior fellow at the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council and leads the center’s Critical Minerals Task Force.

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Conflict minerals and the M23 insurgency 

The Great Lakes region of Africa, which straddles the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, supplies 30 percent of the world’s coltan, a crucial mineral for high-end electronics. Other valuable minerals, such tin, tungsten, tantalite, and gold, are often mined alongside coltan in the region. Artisanal mining is common—while this provides livelihoods for many, it also gives rise to dangerous working conditions, child labor, and political conflict and instability.  

Much of the region’s coltan is deemed a conflict mineral as mining areas are controlled by armed groups and organized crime. The DRC government lacks firm control of its territories, especially in the eastern provinces, and transportation infrastructure is underdeveloped. Because of these challenges, foreign companies often avoid direct mining in the DRC, instead purchasing minerals through middlemen. 

The M23 rebel group, an ethnic Tutsi-led militia in the eastern DRC, is fighting the DRC national army and claims to protect Tutsi populations from Hutu militias. Its resurgence in 2022 is linked to frustrations over the government’s slow implementation of peace agreements and worsening security, although it is argued that M23 acts in service of Rwanda’s interests in the region’s minerals. The M23 insurgency is allegedly financed through the exploitation of coltan and other minerals, including reports that M23 fraudulently exported at least 150 metric tons of coltan (7-10 percent of DRC’s annual global supply) to Rwanda in 2024. Current estimates put this as high as 120 metric tons per month. The current involvement and role of Rwanda is evidenced by the presence of 4,000 Rwandan army personnel and heavy weaponry.  

The ongoing insurgency has halted regular mining activities, leading to “command” mining in which rebels control operations. This is affecting production levels, worker safety, and regional investment. Conflict has placed all transport routes under rebel control, increasing costs and delays due to road closures and violence.  

An important dynamic for global supply chains is that rebel groups like M23, along with other middlemen, foster the mixing of legal and illegal minerals. This effectively launders the illegally mined material, allowing its sale to parties that are mandated to buy ethically sourced product, such as US-based customers who must comply with the Dodd-Frank Act. These sales channel profits to armed groups while depriving the DRC of its rightful revenue. Rwanda is effectively complicit, as it does not charge taxes on mineral exports and allows imported goods to be reassigned as “Made in Rwanda” if they are transformed or processed within the country with a minimum 30 percent value addition. 

DRC efforts to regain control 

Amid the ongoing conflict in the eastern DRC, there is an intensified call for international accountability and economic reforms to address resource-driven violence. At the February 2025 United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council session, the International Chamber of Commerce and Development urged the UN to enhance transparency in raw material transfers from Rwanda to combat mineral exploitation crimes. Enhanced oversight, it argued, would hold resource looters accountable. 

Additionally, at the Munich Security Conference, the DRC accused Rwanda of destabilizing the region to exploit its minerals and proposed measures to encourage legitimate investments and transparent contracts while urging the international community to facilitate peace.  

The DRC, meanwhile, has classified certain mining sites in North and South Kivu provinces as “red” zones, halting mineral trading in these areas. The country is orchestrating legal and regulatory efforts, including installing ore tracking mechanisms to combat the illegal mineral trade, disrupt conflict financing, and align mining practices with international standards. The red zone classification is intended to last six months and includes independent audits to ensure responsible sourcing.  

On the diplomatic and military front, a quid pro quo of mineral rights for security cooperation seems to be developing whereby the DRC is courting Western governments’ security assistance to thwart the Rwanda-backed incursion. Much of the international community is also demanding stricter standards for purchasing minerals ostensibly mined and processed in Rwanda. The DRC will need international support to implement measures for strict oversight of the region and, more fundamentally, addressing the sources of instability that fuel the conflict. On a positive note, in late March, a Qatar-brokered peace summit resulted in commitments by the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda to cease hostilities. 

Next steps

Achieving lasting peace in the eastern DRC requires addressing the root causes of conflict, including ethnic tensions, political instability, and competition for mineral resources. It will not come quickly.  

The DRC needs sustained dialogue with rebel groups and neighboring countries to reach a peace agreement and foster reconciliation among ethnic groups. It also needs to improve the capacity and legitimacy of institutions to manage resources, provide security, combat corruption, and enhance transparency. 

Meanwhile, mineral buyers and the international community can help the DRC by enforcing ethical sourcing that follows regulations like the Dodd-Frank Act and OECD guidelines, supporting peace initiatives with diplomatic and financial aid, and providing humanitarian assistance to support displaced populations, rebuild communities, and enforce human rights laws. 

The M23 insurgency is yet another reminder that the international community must support resource-rich countries in building the capacity to formalize mining and adhere to recognized principles for working and living conditions. The United States’ and others’ overtures to help provide security may be a good first step, but it only sets a foundation for much more work to be done. 

Clarkson Kamurai is the critical minerals program manager at the Payne Institute and a PhD researcher in the minerals and energy economics program at the Colorado School of Mines. Kamurai has engineering experience in base and precious metal mining in sub-Saharan Africa and South America. 

Brad Handler is the program director for the Payne Institute for Public Policy’s Energy Finance Lab. Previously, he was an equity research analyst in the oil and gas sector at investment banks including Credit Suisse and Jefferies.  

Morgan Bazilian is the director of the Payne Institute for Public Policy at the Colorado School of Mines and a former lead energy specialist at the World Bank. 

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The post Illicit mineral supply chains fuel the DRC’s M23 insurgency  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Islamist insurgents, including al-Shabaab and the Somali affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS-S), are making territorial gains. These two groups represent distinct but overlapping threats—each transnational, each integrated into broader jihadist ecosystems, and each capable of destabilizing regional and global security if left unchecked. They are also quickly evolving, including by increasing connections with other groups and malign state actors such as the Islamic Republic of Iran—creating larger geostrategic implications.

To address this evolution, the United States must remain engaged in Somalia; but that does not necessarily require escalation. Strategic engagement through a forward embassy, regional partnerships, and calibrated intelligence operations can disrupt the evolution of the terrorist threat in Somalia—and it costs far less than what it would take to contain fully metastasized, adaptive adversaries down the road.

Increasingly adaptive

For too long, ISIS-S has been treated as an afterthought in Somalia’s counterterrorism landscape, but the group can no longer be ignored: Since 2019, it has evolved significantly, becoming the Islamic State’s most agile, digitally integrated, and externally operational franchise. This has aligned with the Islamic State’s global shift toward a decentralized, node-based network managed by the General Directorate of Provinces. Formerly a localized insurgency attempting to replicate elements of the core caliphate in miniature, ISIS-S is now modular, externally focused, and nonterritorial, with unique technical capabilities that elevate its threat beyond that of traditional insurgent groups.

It does not seek to hold Mogadishu; rather, ISIS-S bypasses the Somalian capital to exploit ungoverned spaces through coordinated disruption. Its efforts destabilize governance; it coordinates its operations via encrypted messaging apps, blockchain-based payment systems, commercial off-the-shelf obfuscation tools, and artificial intelligence-generated multilingual propaganda that enables large-scale recruitment.

The ISIS-S threat is transnational and no longer confined to Somalia; that is apparent with the group’s implication in terror plots overseas, including in Sweden. Perhaps most critically for the United States, the ISIS-S al-Karrar office is understood to serve as a funding node for ISIS-Khorasan, which has proven capable of devastating terror plots, including the 2021 Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan that killed thirteen US service members.

Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s East African affiliate, has also proven to be far more than a local insurgency—it is a deeply entrenched and militarily assertive force in Somalia, capable of executing complex operations, controlling territory, and challenging both national and international security efforts. This transnational terrorist organization has already exerted influence beyond Somalia, having executed mass-casualty attacks in Kenya and Uganda. In 2020, its operatives struck US and Kenyan forces in Manda Bay, killing three Americans. The group explicitly targets US and Western interests throughout East Africa. Withdrawing now, as al-Shabaab regains momentum, risks allowing it to strengthen its position and expand its influence.

Metastizing menace

Of parallel concern is the mounting evidence of cooperation between al-Shabaab and the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. This partnership represents a dangerous escalation. The Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to strike maritime targets in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden using anti-ship missiles, drones, and explosive-laden boats. These asymmetric maritime attacks have disrupted vital shipping lanes, endangered commercial vessels, and necessitated multinational naval responses. They also offer a template for al-Shabaab’s future posture.  

Growing evidence exists that Houthi weaponry, supplied by Iran, has been transferred into Somalia and reached both al-Shabaab and ISIS-S. These transfers suggest an intensifying convergence of interests but not ideologies. While al-Shabaab, ISIS-S, and the Houthis remain doctrinally divergent, they share three critical traits: a reliance on illicit maritime logistics, the use of asymmetric tactics, and a willingness to cooperate when it serves operational goals. This alignment adds complexity to counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa, blurring the lines between ideological enemies and functional partners.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, just north of Somalia, is a critical chokepoint for global trade, funneling approximately 12 percent of seaborne oil trade flows. Increased attacks or insecurity in these waters would drive up insurance costs, increase shipping expenses, and worsen instability across East Africa and the Middle East. Should al-Shabaab or ISIS-S, either independently or in partnership with the Houthis, begin to harass this artery, it would have immediate implications for the global economy.

But in addition to the potential economic impact, there is also a clear strategic threat from this cooperation. Hostility to the West and asymmetrical warfare exercised by these groups and the militias included in Iran’s Axis of Resistance could pose an enduring threat to US allies and partners in the region. For example, the US Navy could see its operational freedom eroded, and militant activity in the sea lanes around the Horn of Africa—which connect the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific—could complicate the United States’ ability to surge naval forces in response to crises involving China in the Taiwan Strait or Russia in the eastern Mediterranean.

Continuity as containment

The 2021 US withdrawal from Somalia offered a preview of what disengagement would yield. Following the withdrawal, al-Shabaab and ISIS-S regrouped, expanded their respective operations, and forged deeper regional ties that present the greater challenges that the United States faces today. Although US forces returned in 2022, the withdrawal had already proved costly.

Today, ISIS-S internally exploits the geography of Somalia, clan connections, and instability to thrive. Al-Shabaab forces inch ever forward in their ongoing campaign to isolate and potentially capture the capital of Mogadishu. Each debate over whether to stay or go provides strategic space that the groups use to adapt.

The post-9/11 experience has demonstrated that power vacuums can be quickly filled by hostile actors. The 2011 withdrawal from Iraq enabled ISIS’s rapid rise. Strategic ambiguity in Libya yielded terrain for jihadist experimentation. Afghanistan’s rapid collapse under the Taliban offered ISIS-Khorasan and al-Qaeda a second wind. Somalia is not an exception: It would be the next domino.

But it’s not just a matter of being present. For example, the 2012 Benghazi attack was not a failure of presence; it was a failure of planning, coordination, and establishing an adequate security posture. Similarly, abandoning Somalia without a coherent containment strategy creates the risk of empowering a transnational terrorist organization with international ambitions while simultaneously allowing Iran to extend its strategic reach. 

To maintain its foothold at the most critical junction of East Africa’s security architecture, the United States must prioritize continuity. This includes keeping the US embassy in Mogadishu open, as it provides a platform for intelligence coordination, interagency operations, and diplomatic leverage. Without it, the United States cannot assess—let alone contain—a threat that is actively recombining in real time and posing risks to maritime security, the regional balance of deterrence, and potentially the US homeland.

The terrorist groups based in Somalia are adapting faster, making broader connections, and integrating deeper than Washington’s withdrawal advocates seem to realize. To misread that evolution as localized or static is strategic negligence. A decision to withdraw at this moment will not be remembered as a tactical recalibration but as an unforced error. To leave is to license the evolution of these terrorist groups; to stay is to disrupt it. 

Danielle Cosgrove is a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group. She is a distinguished guest lecturer at Stanford University, a Stanford Medicine X scholar, and the founder of an acquired threat mapping startup.

Doug Livermore is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group, the national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the authors’ and do not represent official US government positions.

The post The US must sustain counterterrorism operations in Somalia—the costs of retreat are too high appeared first on Atlantic Council.

One such directive is the ninety-day suspension of all US foreign development assistance programs. As a result of such executive orders, projects that can be considered US geopolitical investments in Africa—such as the billion-dollar Lobito Corridor, which the US State Department calls the “most significant transport infrastructure that the United States has helped develop on the African continent in a generation”—now face an uncertain future. This underscores the broader implications of the administration’s evolving approach to US-Africa relations.

While Trump’s broader strategy for the continent remains unclear, he has emphasized a commitment to strengthening business partnerships that align with US interests. Accordingly, his administration has proposed redirecting funding from the US Agency for International Development to the US International Development Finance Corporation, an institution established during Trump’s first term. This approach demonstrates a shift in focus from traditional humanitarian aid to prioritizing private equity firms, hedge funds, and other investors, aligning with a broader US strategy to enhance economic influence globally.

As the continent adjusts to evolving global economic dynamics and changes in US policy, it is critical that Africa reduces its external dependency by embracing regional cooperation, financial autonomy, and sustainable investments.

The private sector will play a key role in reducing this dependency. And on May 12 and 13, African business leaders, investors, and policymakers will be gathering at the Africa CEO Forum in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, to exchange ideas, identify opportunities, and cultivate solutions that promote economic growth and sustainable development across Africa. The participants at the forum are also slated to discuss the United States’ policy shifts, exploring both difficulties and opportunities that arise from the changes.

As Africa navigates a shifting global landscape, the Africa CEO Forum must serve as a launchpad for strategies that reduce external dependency, enhance regional collaboration, and prioritize sustainable investment. In order for that to happen, public- and private-sector leaders convening at the forum must commit to expanding public-private partnerships, blended finance, and other measures to get Africa closer to its goal of becoming a global economic leader.

Expanding public-private partnerships would enhance Africa’s self-sufficiency while ensuring long-term economic resilience. These partnerships should be fostered in renewable energy, agribusiness, manufacturing, and, particularly, healthcare. A robust healthcare system boosts productivity, reduces preventable economic losses, and strengthens human capital. One example of such a partnership can be seen in Rwanda, where the government recently launched a partnership with US robotics company Zipline to deliver blood and other medical equipment to remove areas via drone. To sustain growth in Africa and equip the workforce to drive the continent’s industries and innovation, partnership and investment in healthcare, alongside infrastructure and digital transformation, are needed.

African governments and businesses must also commit to strengthening engagement with the United States and global partners through trade, investment, and infrastructure development while expanding financial partnerships with institutions such as the African Development Bank. Blended financing models—that include sources of funding such as private-public partnerships, sovereign wealth funds, and investments (from wealthy countries such as the Gulf states)—are key to bridging funding gaps. African leaders should more intently push Group of Twenty (G20) nations, multilateral banks, and private investors for fairer trade agreements, climate financing, and infrastructure investment.

African countries can also implement measures to support the African business environment. For example, they should take up debt restructuring processes and negotiations (led by the International Monetary Fund) with creditors such as China and the Paris Club. Doing so can ease financial burdens on governments, allowing them to invest more in infrastructure, education, and services that support businesses. Meanwhile, major economies such as Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt should also implement fiscal reforms and anti-corruption measures to ensure that public funds are being used effectively—a sign that would show businesses that they can expect a more predictable environment. Strengthening the African Continental Free Trade Area would boost regional trade and local manufacturing by requiring harmonized tariffs, streamlining customs, and improving logistics with roads, airline hubs, and hub-and-spoke ports.

It is important to pursue these partnerships and measures now. In November, global leaders will convene in Johannesburg for the G20 Summit—the first hosted by an African country. Thus, participants at the Africa CEO Forum must seize this opportunity to advance Africa toward becoming a self-sustained economic power.

Anthony Manga is the founder and chief executive officer of Manga Global, a business advisory and trade facilitation firm.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post African leaders must not miss their chance to jumpstart the continent’s business environment this May appeared first on Atlantic Council.

That review could put the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the crosshairs, raising doubts about the United States’ commitment to the stability and predictability these institutions were designed to uphold. The Trump administration reportedly paused contributions to the WTO this month, after targeting the organization in his first term. And though Trump engaged with the World Bank and IMF in his first term, he has not revealed his plans for these institutions in his second term. The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, from which Trump at times has distanced himself but which has formed a blueprint for much of the administration’s early agenda, calls for withdrawing from both.

Concerns are growing—particularly among policymakers and experts in “New South” countries in the Mediterranean and South Atlantic basins—about the direction in which the international financial system is heading. The coming months and years will reveal the consequences of these evolving dynamics for global economic governance.

Multilateral institutions under siege

The IMF, World Bank, and WTO have provided the backbone of post-World War II global financial stability. But if Trump’s review of multilateral organizations leads to the United States reducing its contributions or withdrawing its leadership entirely, that could render these institutions ineffective, leaving emerging markets vulnerable to soaring borrowing costs and financial instability.

The IMF’s effectiveness hinges on US backing. A disengaged Washington would severely weaken the institution’s ability to manage global financial shocks—or to see them coming in the first place. Without access to US fiscal data and financial support, the IMF’s early-warning system would be significantly impaired, leaving emerging economies particularly exposed to unforeseen economic crises. A diminished World Bank, meanwhile, could create space for alternative lenders, such as China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

In the event of a US withdrawal from the Bretton Woods institutions, other major players such as China, India, and European countries may push for reforms, but any new framework would likely be marked by deep internal divisions and a departure from consensus-driven governance.

From rules-based to power-based trade

Even before the apparent pause in US funding, the WTO has suffered under US pressure, with its dispute-settlement mechanism effectively sidelined by Washington’s refusal to appoint appellate judges. The result? Global trade is increasingly governed by bilateral deals, where economic power, rather than rules, dictates outcomes.

At best, this shift accelerates the rise of plurilateral trade arrangements, where smaller groups of nations set the terms of trade outside the WTO framework. At worst, it heralds a chaotic trade environment where power politics replace consensus-driven rulemaking, fragmenting the global trading system into competing blocs.

If nations are forced to align with either a US-centric order or alternative economic blocs, that would heighten the risk of fragmentation and global instability.

A shattered order—or the dawn of a new system?

As the United States considers pulling back from the global financial system, countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia are seeking greater financial independence and constructing alternative frameworks for trade, investment, and crisis management. These trends were evident before Trump’s return to the White House, and his approach is likely to only accelerate them. Among the key developments:

• De-dollarization initiatives: Nations from the BRICS grouping of emerging economies, including Brazil and India, are working to expand trade in local currencies, while China and Russia increasingly settle deals in yuan and rubles.
• New development banks: Institutions such as the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the New Development Bank (commonly known as the BRICS bank) are emerging as real—albeit far from optimal—alternatives to the IMF and World Bank. They offer financing without the traditional Western-style conditionalities, reflecting a growing desire among some countries for options that align more closely with their own political and economic priorities.
• Alternative payment systems: Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) and China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payments System (CIPS) platforms are attempting to serve as substitutes for the globally dominant, Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) messaging service, though both SPFS and CIPS are still a long way from becoming true alternatives to SWIFT. Meanwhile Iran and India are exploring digital-payment linkages to bypass Western financial restrictions.
• Regional trade agreements: The African Continental Free Trade Area and Latin America’s growing Mercosur bloc are shifting economic dependencies away from Western-led structures.

These developments signal a significant and, in many ways, regrettable development: The world is moving beyond the dominance of Western financial institutions toward a more fragmented and less coordinated economic order. While this new landscape may be more regionally responsive, it also risks undermining the coherence, predictability, and standards that global institutions—however imperfect—once aimed to provide.

The road ahead

The coming months—particularly April’s IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington, DC—will provide crucial insights into the trajectory of global economic governance. The Trump administration’s review of US membership in international organizations also will be a defining moment: Will US actions and global reactions bring about a complete retreat from multilateralism, or will international financial institutions adapt to new geopolitical realities?

One thing is clear: The global financial order is at a tipping point, and the choices made today will shape the economic landscape for decades to come.

Ferid Belhaj is a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South. He served as World Bank vice president for Middle East and North Africa from 2018 to 2024.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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But walking into Mining Indaba in South Africa earlier this year, the vibe was different. The eleven thousand attendees—representing governments, multilateral organizations, companies, civil society organizations, and nonprofits focused on mining—clearly see the urgency of focusing on Africa, in part because of the continent’s mineral deposits.

Trump’s second administration has made clear in its opening weeks that securing access to minerals is a top priority. Countries worldwide have taken notice: For example, Ukraine has agreed to sign a minerals deal with the United States to help with peace negotiations with Russia. African governments have moved US critical-minerals investment to the top of their foreign policy agendas, most clearly demonstrated by the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s offer to grant the United States exclusive access to its minerals in exchange for security assistance.

Seeing that the Trump administration is prioritizing securing access to minerals, it must also prioritize Africa. Making this case in Washington is quite complicated, as too often, issues regarding “Africa” or labeled “African” are muffled by issues perceived as higher priority to policymakers. However, securing access to these minerals is an urgent national security issue; the United States thus must view investments in African energy, minerals, and mining with similar importance. 

It is clear that African governments and communities view the current scramble for Africa’s minerals with an appropriate amount of urgency. During the opening ceremony, South African Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy Gwede Mantashe said “Look around,” gesturing to the thousands of people on the trade show floor. “Everyone is looking at Africa!” As Kgosi Seatlholo, chairperson of the National House of Traditional and Khoi-San Leaders, said during the opening ceremony, “our communities know that Africa has what the world wants.”

Yet African governments can also do more to help push the continent higher on the US list of priorities. I, and others at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, hear regularly from African government officials that they must carefully navigate the need for access to mineral assets by heavily industrialized and developed economies and the need to finance their own government expenditures, including their own development plans. While African countries may seek to move higher up the value chain, away from solely extracting minerals and toward hosting projects to refine them, they should not wait to green-light projects in search of better deals or additional greenfield investments in extraction, refining, recycling, or other midstream operations. Meanwhile, African governments should take steps that attract more urgently needed investment: for example, reducing administrative and bureaucratic barriers for investors and considering subsidies for labor or key utilities at notoriously energy- and water-intensive mining sites. Such steps can get projects, which often have ten- to fifteen-year returns on investment, moving along quickly. They can also help future-proof projects.

Financial institutions also have a key role to play. From private equity and venture capital firms to hedge funds and banks, financial institutions are critical to unlocking the full potential of Africa’s massive mineral endowment and supplying the huge amount of minerals needed for the energy transition. Smart investments are critically needed in processing and manufacturing, training the next generation of mining engineers, and launching new technologies that provide more information for decision-making, mapping mineral deposits, and making mineral projects safer.

More can also be done to raise Africa higher on the list of priorities on the business side. The United States and other Western governments seeking access to Africa’s rich mineral deposits must do more to identify projects, facilitate transactions—including business matchmaking, if necessary—and provide risk guarantees or project insurance. As Washington continues to make significant reforms, policymakers should seize the moment to quickly advance minerals-related projects that help achieve US national economic security goals. As the administration continues to have discussions about agencies such as the US International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and also about a potential US Sovereign Wealth Fund, Washington must use these tools to help the private sector reduce barriers to investment in Africa’s critical mineral projects. US government agencies should expedite the approval process to compete with foreign competitors, including China’s policy banks and commercial creditors.   

To advance discussions about investment challenges in African critical-mineral projects and shape policies that support critical-minerals security for the United States and other Western countries, the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center launched its Critical Minerals Task Force at Mining Indaba 2024. The Task Force not only brings together the public and private sectors in conversation about the African mining space; it also analyzes models for mineral development and recommends policies to encourage investment. We strive to tailor our recommendations for African and Western governments to limit barriers to investment in the mining sector, reduce supply chain dependence on China, and encourage policy outcomes that support critical minerals security for the United States and other Western countries.

Africa’s mineral deposits are not just a resource but a strategic asset that can shape the future of security, energy, and economic development worldwide. For example, as upcoming Africa Center analysis will cover, Africa’s critical minerals play a role in US national defense. The United States has an expanding opportunity to further secure its future by prioritizing investment in Africa’s critical mineral sector; the Trump administration must take it.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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The International Energy Agency expects between $180 billion and $220 billion to be invested in the mining of critical minerals between 2022 and 2030, with about 10 percent of this investment slated for Africa. Countries including the United States, Europe, China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and others are prioritizing supply-chain security with regard to the minerals and metals needed for the global energy transition and for defense industrial applications. The African continent is an important supplier of these commodities.

As this race for minerals and metals critical for the energy transition heats up amid a turbulent geopolitical environment, both companies and governments must not abandon environmental, social, and governance principles (ESG) with respect to Africa.

African countries are increasingly demanding that mining operations deliver more benefits for government revenues and local populations. Toward that aim, countries have adopted mining codes that assert national sovereignty over these minerals, implemented export bans on unprocessed minerals, and unveiled policy strategies to support domestic value-adding processes. In particular, African countries—including Ghana, Nigeria, Namibia, Botswana, Mali, Guinea, and Niger—are increasingly implementing policies of national preference in the mining sector, with the aim of increasing the share of local participation. Others, such as Tanzania, have banned the export of non-value-added minerals. In 2021, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) launched a review of the mining contracts signed by previous leadership with Chinese investors based on concerns that Chinese promises to build roads, hospitals, universities, and housing had not been fully realized.

However, significant portions of the mining industry are still unregulated. For example, the perspectives and interests of artisanal miners are not always fully captured in mining codes, which often have weak provisions on workers’ rights, equal working conditions, and wages.

International mining companies, per an EY survey, considered environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors to be the top risk to their business in 2024. They placed ESG as a top risk ahead of capital constraints, conflict, or even cyberattacks.

Mining companies usually face risk (even in the West, but particularly in fragile contexts) due to long lead times, volatility in commodity prices, policy uncertainty, and security challenges. However, the global map of minerals that hold strategic importance shows that mining activities for these commodities usually take place in countries where ESG remains a challenge, such as China, Russia, the DRC, Peru, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Turkey, and India. For example, the DRC is home to about half of the world’s cobalt reserves; meanwhile, more than three-quarters of the world’s platinum reserves are located in South Africa. Many rare earths, including lithium, nickel, and cobalt, are refined in China. For countries that mine and export minerals, especially the ones in Africa, such activities have not generally translated into sustained economic growth and broader improvements in human well-being. Instead, host communities of mining projects have often had to deal with environmental pollution, health challenges, and stagnant incomes.

Corporations increasingly turned to impact investment, especially soon following the launches of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals in 2000 and the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015. And over time, governments, institutional investors, and asset managers have set up various systems through which companies report their impact on the environment and on societies. For example, the European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive requires companies to explain the impacts of their business strategies. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission requires publicly listed companies to report climate-related information. Last year, the Global Reporting Initiative, founded in 1997 in order to promote standardized ESG reporting, launched a new mining-sector reporting standard.

But recently, the momentum for recognizing and adopting ESG principles at a global level has slowed down. Reports now abound of companies, investment banks, and other private-sector actors setting aside their ESG commitments in the face of economic recession or political instability. Some are discontinuing or disbanding their ESG divisions altogether. Governments too are abandoning commitments to social and environmental sustainability principles. While these are setbacks to the wider global ESG agenda, this is a worrying trend and could be detrimental if it were to extend deeply into the mining industry.

There have certainly been shifts in how stakeholders in the mining industry have approached ESG. According to the mining companies surveyed by EY last year, the three ESG risks to which investors paid the most attention were local community impact (64 percent), waste management (55 percent), and water stewardship (51 percent). In 2025, EY notes, miners have turned their focus more toward the environmental stewardship component of ESG, reporting that waste management (44 percent), water stewardship (31 percent), and climate change (31 percent) would attract the most scrutiny from investors. The category that includes local community impact dropped from the third top risk to the fifth. And it seems there was a deprioritization of the governance component of ESG among mining companies and leaders, which EY says raises “alarm bells.”

Nevertheless, there are mining companies bucking the trend in the sense that they still prioritize and recognize ESG; that is commendable. It will be important for them to continue to stay the course knowing how much work has gone into securing the social license to operate in difficult jurisdictions. The progress made over the past decades cannot be jettisoned. If mining companies resist the global trend that is turning away from ESG, they can even help nudge their home governments to commit more deeply to ESG principles.

To ensure that mistakes of the past are avoided, and Africa’s development is supported in this intensifying scramble for minerals critical to the energy transition, the West—both its governments and corporations—cannot afford to abandon ESG.

Zainab Usman is the director of the Africa Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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But while all countries should contribute to the global effort, they shouldn’t cut their emissions by the same proportions. Each country’s burden should be determined by their per capita emissions—not on rates of change in emissions. And the world’s poorest countries, including many in Africa, have not contributed anywhere near as much to climate change as industrialized nations.

Africa, specifically, is responsible for only 3.7 percent of carbon emissions from the burning of fossil fuels. Its per capita emissions are far lower than any other region. In addition, the African continent needs more plentiful and reliable energy supplies to fuel its development, both economic (as reliable energy supports manufacturing) and human (as energy allows children to do their homework in the evenings and medicines to be stored).

Meanwhile, industrialized countries are moving ahead with fossil fuel projects: The United States is looking to raise domestic oil production, while China has moved forward with building 94.5 gigawatts of new coal-fired power plants. In contrast, South Africa—which has the biggest installed generating capacity in Africa—has a total installed capacity of just 63.4 gigawatts. The International Energy Agency warned in 2021 that global climate goals may be missed if new fossil fuel projects proceed.

Before the international community asks African countries to leave undeveloped fossil fuel resources in the ground, it must make them an offer of clean energy financing—one substantial enough to fund Africa’s current and future appetite for electricity. Doing so would not only help reduce GHG emissions: It would also support Africa’s electrification and development goals.

A just energy transition

Slow progress on increasing electrification rates is already being made in Africa. Just over half of all Africans now have access to electricity at home for the first time, while twelve countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, and Nigeria, published detailed plans in January 2025 to connect more people to their respective grids. Population growth is driving up demand, which will be further boosted by the uptake of technologies such as electric vehicles in the future.

Amid this growing access to and demand for energy, the international community must offer clean energy financing to African countries and companies to convince them to forego fossil fuel development. Offering this financing now, as energy infrastructure is being constructed from scratch, would allow Africa to build infrastructure and supply chains meant for clean energy, instead of building them up for fossil fuels and having to adapt them later—at greater financial cost. It would have the added benefit of promoting economic development and higher living standards in Africa, which would dampen security threats and ease long-term migration pressures.

Some argue that Africa, for the sake of its development, should be allowed time to use fossil fuels such as gas, which is seen by some as a bridging fuel and thus part of the climate solution. However, emissions from gas-fired plants are at least half as high as those from coal, making gas a driver of climate change.

Additionally, financing is already difficult for some fossil fuel projects. Landlocked Botswana, for example, has 212 billion tons of coal that is largely undeveloped because large-scale mining would require exports. Proposed coal railways from Botswana to ports in either Namibia or Mozambique have failed to secure funding because of reticence among banks and financial institutions about financing coal projects. At the same time, Botswana has a generating capacity of only 892 megawatts and relies on electricity imports. New coal plants would be an obvious option, but here too financing is challenging. Clean energy such as solar offers a more fundable option.

Some projects are managing to secure financing—but only just. For example, the five-billion-dollar East African Crude Oil Pipeline project that will funnel oil from Uganda to the Tanzanian port of Tanga has attracted a great deal of criticism from environmental organizations and the European Union among others, with some calling on banks to rescind their financing. This seems unlikely given that construction began in late 2024. However, Ugandan efforts to secure financing for an oil refinery have thus far failed, pushing the government and UAE partner Alpha MBM Investments to try to fund it themselves. The project will ultimately contribute to climate change, but Kampala argues it must focus on economic development.

Some efforts are being made to offer countries clean energy investment in return for a reduction in fossil fuel development. For example, a group of Western countries has set up Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) to mobilize public and private finance for low-carbon projects in return for commitments on renewables or energy sector emissions. However, progress has been far too slow, with just four JETPs signed since 2021. Those four include partnerships with Indonesia ($20 billion), Senegal ($2.6 billion), South Africa ($11.6 billion), and Vietnam ($15.5 billion). Funding on this scale should be agreed with every developing country. According to the International Energy Agency, Africa needs investment of $200 billion a year by 2030 to achieve universal access to electricity and meet climate change pledges.

Challenging but possible

Many will argue that putting together such huge funding packages is impossible at the current time because of profound global economic and political instability and high sovereign debt levels after the COVID-19 crisis. Yet governments found the money for mitigation measures during the pandemic. For example, the United States spent $4.6 trillion; the United Kingdom spent between $387 billion and $512 billion. The required finance can be made available in times of real crisis—and climate change is a monumental crisis.

The real stumbling block is political will. Gaining political support for funding on this scale would be difficult at any time, but an ongoing uptick in nationalism and protectionism makes it even more challenging. The United States and European powers would have to participate, and other countries should too, including China, Japan, South Korea, and the Gulf states. And when governments seem hesitant about participating—for example, the Trump administration currently views overseas aid in a dim light—actors in the private sector, from corporations to philanthropists, can help.

Whether this plan is implemented by beefing up the JETP program or via a new vehicle, apportioning the money will be difficult. Many African countries have little or no hydrocarbons or coal. Thus, a continent-wide approach may be needed to ensure that the financing makes the desired impact, both in terms of boosting clean energy access and reducing fossil fuel development. Such an approach can include an agreement, possibly made through the African Union, although this could agitate those countries actually giving up their fossil fuel resources.

In addition to financing, technical support and skills transfer would also be needed. North American and European grid operators and bureaucracies are still struggling to keep up with the pace of complicated permit and grid interconnection applications from renewable energy developers. Such bottlenecks can derail development, so African governments need technical support, while international solar, wind, and storage operators could help build up the operations and maintenance expertise needed to ensure assets remain operational.

Africa has vast clean energy potential—it is home to 60 percent of the world’s best solar resources. However, the continent hosts just 1 percent of global solar generating capacity, about the same amount as the not-particularly-sunny country of Belgium. If the international community truly wants African countries to turn away from fossil fuel development, it will need to give those countries the financing to harness that clean energy potential. The big question is whether the international community is really serious about it.

Neil Ford is a freelance consultant and journalist on African affairs and the global energy sector. He produces reports for a wide range of organizations and has a PhD in East African development.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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As we celebrate Women’s History Month in 2025, much of this history of African women has been strangely forgotten. Instead, the international community often treats African woman as an object for study and, frequently, misinterpretation.

On the one hand, she is perceived as the demographic symbol of the African continent whose population is doubling every thirty years and must be contained. On the other hand, she is the one who keeps communities together and, outside the house, tends to be the world champion of entrepreneurship. She is also the primary victim of African conflicts. To paraphrase the French dramatist Jean-Baptiste Racine, the African woman deserves neither this excess of honor nor this indignity.

In fact, the African woman carries within her both a universal dimension that makes her a woman like any other and a singularity that makes her exemplary. Through data from multilateral organizations, however, each dimension of her existence seems to be under scrutiny.

Marriage. While only 2 percent of the world’s population lives in polygamous households, it is in sub-Saharan Africa that polygamy is most practiced (11 percent of the population), with all the rivalries, suffering, and conflict that can often be caused by families composed of several co-wives. As the United Nations (UN) Commission on Human Rights concluded in a 2019 report, polygamy is first and foremost discrimination against women. The practice also feeds into the wider problem of gender-based violence, which impacts 42 percent of women in eastern and southern Africa.

Pregnancy. African women are 130 times more likely to die from pregnancy-related complications than women in Europe and North America, according to a 2024 report by the UN Population Fund. When they survive childbirth, their child is likely to enter the risk zone: according to the World Health Organization, the infant mortality rate indicates seventy-two deaths per one thousand successful births in Africa, the highest rate in the world.

At work. When women in sub-Saharan Africa work, it is, according to a 2018 report by UN Women, mostly (89 percent) in informal employment. Although the African informal sector is not always a curse (behind this economic practice, there is a valuable sense of solidarity within the communities and many advantages foreign organizations don’t see), most international organizations consider informal employment to be problematic, citing “low pay, long hours, no sick or maternity pay, unsafe workplaces.”

During war. In conflict zones such as the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Sudan, women are prime targets for rape as a weapon of war. They are also the most efficient actors when it comes to rebuilding communities torn apart by war, to the point of inspiring the landmark UN Resolution 1325 on women’s participation in peace processes.

As elderly persons. Despite all this, African women live longer than African men. However, among the world’s women, they have the lowest life expectancy (sixty-five years compared to more than eighty years in Europe and North America), according to 2023 data.

These terrific data have led development agencies and international financial institutions to praise the resilience of African women. Would this type of language be used for women from Norway or the United States? Yet, this reality is accepted when it comes to African women.

The celebration of the resilience of African women belies the fact that they still do not get enough support in facing their exhausting daily lives. It echoes the racist bias that Black people—and Black women in particular—are more tolerant of pain, a belief rooted in stereotypes in the medical community about Black people’s supposed physical attributes. These and other prejudices are likely at the root of the fact that pregnant Black women are significantly less likely to have labor induced and more likely to have caesarian sections than white women. Among American women, Black women are three times more likely to die in childbirth than white women. Higher incomes and educational attainment do not spare Black women from the effects of these health outcome disparities. A 2023 UN Population Fund report finds that maternal deaths among African-American college graduates remain 1.6 times higher than among white women without a degree. 

But while these statistics can help policymakers understand the work that remains to improve the lives of women in Africa, as well as in the diaspora, they neglect to say anything about the often-overlooked achievements of African feminism. Here are some less well-known statistics and facts that are no less important to understanding the lives of African women in 2025.

First, there’s women’s participation in national legislatures. While women heads of state and government are more often found in Western countries, it is in the Southern Hemisphere that the highest proportion of women parliamentarians are found. Rwanda tops the list, as 61 percent of the country’s members of Parliament are women.

Next, African women lead some of the most far-reaching and impactful multilateral organizations in the world. These include Nigeria’s Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the director-general of the World Trade Organization; Rwanda’s Louise Mushikiwabo, the secretary general of Organisation internationale de la Francophonie; and Uganda’s Winnie Byanyima, the executive director of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).

And finally, some African nations have made significant strides on labor market equality. According to a 2024 World Economic Forum report measuring gender parity in labor market outcomes, Namibia ranked eighth in the world, higher than Spain (tenth), Belgium (twelfth), and Great Britain (fourteenth). South Africa ranked eighteenth, placing it above Switzerland (twentieth), France (twenty-second) and the United States (forty-third).

So this Women’s History Month, let us turn our attention not just to the litany of statistics cataloguing the challenges African women endure, but also their overlooked feminist breakthroughs. African women deserve recognition not just for the indignities they face, but for the heights they achieve.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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France’s departure is indicative of a larger shift in the region. The Sahel’s geopolitics have changed dramatically in the last five years. Since 2020, military juntas have seized power in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. They have gradually driven out thousands of Western troops, including troops from France, the European Union, and the United States. These troops were performing capacity-building missions and conducting counterterrorism operations. They have since been replaced, in large part, by Russian paramilitaries. The existing regional security architecture is in shambles, following Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger’s withdrawal from the G5 Sahel Joint Force and, more recently, from the Economic Community of West African States.

The Sahel is in the middle of a transformative process that has ushered in new leaders, military strategies, and foreign alliances. It is imperative that the United States rethink the bipartisan assumptions that have underwritten its Sahel policy. The region is experiencing profound change, and US policy must adapt accordingly.

Outdated assumptions, new realities

US policy toward the Sahel has rested on these four unspoken assumptions, all of which must be updated if Washington aims to help stabilize the region and improve its standing there.

1. Western allies’ involvement can achieve US regional security objectives.

For at least a decade, US policy has taken for granted that allies’ involvement in the Sahel would generate access, bolster influence, and help achieve US regional security objectives. This is evidenced by the fact that US resources were marshalled in support of partner-led efforts. Under Operation Juniper Micron, for example, which began in 2013 and lasted for roughly a decade, the US military provided logistical support, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, to enable French operations in Mali. Most Western troops deployed within the Sahel were not American.

There is nothing wrong with burden sharing or deconfliction. These measures can eliminate redundancy, reduce the cost of defense engagement, and amplify operational effects. That said, it would be wrong to assume that ally involvement translates directly into US gains. Perceptions of foreign powers vary, and it is not clear that Western investment earns the United States any additional influence. In fact, aligning itself with France, an unpopular former colonial power, may have inadvertently harmed US interests. The United States has steadily lost soft power on the continent since 2021. After Niger’s junta expelled French troops, Washington hoped to avoid a similar fate. The US military ultimately failed to differentiate itself and withdrew.

Moreover, relying on allies to advance its security objectives exposes the United States to risks if its they depart. The United States had few options to address rising instability in Mali after French and European Union troops withdrew in 2022. The situation has only worsened in the years since. Mali is currently ranked third among the countries most impacted by terrorism. Terrorists attacked the capital city this fall, indicating that they are capable of operating in large portions of Mali’s territory. This could pose a threat to US interests, facilities, or personnel.

2. An “outside-in” approach can prevent the spread of instability beyond the Sahel.

US policy has also assumed that investments in defense, economic development, and good governance can prevent the spread of instability from the Sahel to coastal West Africa. Some experts contend that Washington should adopt an “outside-in” approach, shifting focus from the Sahel to its southern neighbors. Proponents of this approach argue that very little can be done to improve stability in the Sahel, and that the United States would be better served partnering with peripheral states to bolster their defenses. The “outside-in” approach involves dramatically increasing assistance to coastal West Africa while reducing US assistance to the Sahel.

To this end, US leaders emphasize the importance of the Global Fragility Act, a law passed in 2019 that provides funding to curb instability in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo, among others—but does not address its origins in the Sahel. If it is not addressed directly, however, Sahel-based instability is likely to intensify.

The data speaks for itself. Last year was the deadliest in the Sahel’s history. The effects of this instability are evident in the coastal states of Benin and Togo, where al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has begun to consolidate its presence. Terrorist groups, especially JNIM, are poised to continue their push southward into coastal West Africa.

The “outside-in” approach rests on the assumption that, with sufficient assistance, coastal West African states can build institutional capacity faster than terrorists can expand operations southward. Unfortunately, there is limited evidence to support this claim.

3. States would forgo partnerships with US adversaries if they knew the consequences.

A third assumption embraces the idea that Sahel states would forgo partnerships with US adversaries if they appreciated the consequences. The United States has largely relied on messaging to dissuade states from expanding cooperation with its adversaries. US officials point out that the support offered by Washington’s adversaries is ineffective. “It’s self-evident that a Russian role, whether it’s Wagner or it has a GRU label, has not demonstrably improved the lives of Africans,” said Molly Phee, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, during an interview in March 2024. That same month, an interagency delegation cautioned Niger against deepening its ties to Russia and Iran.

Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have all ignored these warnings, partnering with Russia on counterterrorism in the past few years. Their leaders are rational and likely aware of the potential consequences, but they faced a difficult choice. The United States is legally restricted from providing these states assistance, as each experienced a coup d’état. Sahel leaders were not persuaded by US messaging. Absent competing offers, and facing an acute threat, these leaders opted to pursue ineffective security assistance from US adversaries.

4. The loss of forward-deployed positions in Chad and Niger critically threatens the United States’ ability to achieve its regional security objectives.

Last year, officials warned that withdrawals from Chad and Niger would prevent the United States from achieving its security objectives in the region. “If we lose our footprint in the Sahel, that will degrade our ability to do active watching and warning, including for homeland defense,” said General Michael Langley, the commander of US forces in Africa. From Niger, the US military was able to monitor threats in neighboring countries, such as Libya and Mali. 

Langley has a point. The US military must remain engaged in the Sahel if its goal is to provide strategic warning of threats to the United States. Proximity to the threat is important to this mission, but so are partnerships. The United States needs strong relationships with African partners, built on coordination, information sharing, and strategic access. In both Chad and Niger, the greatest loss was arguably that of willing and capable local partners.

The United States could still secure its vital national interests if it pursued light footprints and distributed security assistance across several African partner countries. This approach may also obviate the need for big base operations, offering a cost-effective and flexible solution.

What comes next

US policy options are constrained by the situation on the ground. The United States is legally restricted from providing certain forms of defense and development assistance to countries that experience military coups d’etat, a category that includes Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. This presents challenges, but it does not mean the United States is entirely without options. US leaders must still assess whether the risks of inaction outweigh those of engagement, but, at the very least, this exercise should foster a more thoughtful, constructive debate on the issue.

The United States could still pursue legal, limited, and nonlethal security cooperation with these states. It could provide critical enablers, such as force protection, military medical assistance, or logistical support. It could provide training on how to respond to improvised explosive devices or deliver humanitarian aid. Assistance could gradually be expanded if these states move toward democratic governance, reduce extrajudicial killings, and enhance military accountability—or curtailed if they fail to do so. The best way for the United States to promote regional stability and credibly compete against its adversaries is to address Sahel countries’ security concerns.

Finally, while maintaining investments in the Sahel, the United States could focus on building partner capacity in coastal West Africa. The “outside-in” approach constructs a false dichotomy, in which US policy can prioritize either the Sahel or coastal West Africa. The two regions are inextricably linked, and instability in one inevitably threatens the other. Investing in both affords the United States the greatest opportunity to prevent terrorism’s spread and secure its own interests. 

The challenges facing the Sahel are immense, but they are not insurmountable. By reevaluating long-held assumptions and adapting policy to the rapidly changing geopolitical environment, the United States can play a vital role in the region. Amid adversaries’ encroachment and terrorist groups’ expansion, the United States must adjust its approach to maintain its relevance and protect its interests. There are opportunities to do so, but success will depend on a willingness to pursue new policies, with a clear-eyed consideration of the risks and rewards that lie ahead.

Jordanna Yochai is a defense analyst, whose portfolio includes the West African Sahel. She is currently on leave from the US Department of Defense, pursuing a master’s degree at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA).

The positions expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the US Department of Defense. The US Department of Defense does not endorse the views expressed in hyperlinked articles or websites, including any information, products, or services contained therein.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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On February 1, AFRICOM conducted airstrikes targeting a local branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in the remote Golis Mountains in northern Somalia. AFRICOM later announced that the airstrikes managed to kill their main target: Ahmed Maeleninine, an ISIS recruiter, financier, and leader responsible for the deployment of jihadists to the United States and Europe. Following that strike, there have been a series of strikes against both al-Shabaab (a branch of al-Qaeda) and ISIS-Somalia, firmly placing the region at the forefront of the new administration’s kinetic military activities.

While most of the conversation about US military presence around the world has focused on paring back, in Somalia, the United States appears to be taking the opposite approach. The approach surprised some, in part because US President Donald Trump had withdrawn seven hundred US troops from Somalia during his first term. But the shift shouldn’t come as such a shock. It shows a broader understanding of a new reality: That combating terror globally starts in Africa.

Africa is at the forefront of the war on terror; in 2024 alone, the African Union reportedly recorded more than 3,400 terrorist attacks and 13,900 resulting deaths on the continent. And what is happening on the continent affects the wider world—Somalia in particular is an unfortunate showcase of that.  

ISIS-Somalia, for example, shows how terrorist groups have become embedded in the continent. Since breaking away from al-Shabaab in 2015, the Somali branch of ISIS has been growing exponentially. AFRICOM reported that just last year, the group had doubled in size. What’s more, rumors persist that Abdul Qadir Mumin, the leader of ISIS-Somalia who reportedly became the global leader of ISIS in 2023, survived a US strike last year. Thus, it’s clear why the United States is placing such attention on the group. While unconfirmed, the mere possibility that the leader of ISIS is not of Arab decent and is based in Africa signifies just how terror and the continent have become intertwined.

The involvement of terrorist groups on the continent is by no means limited to Somalia. From the Great Lakes of Central Africa to Mozambique, terrorist groups are prevalent—as are their financiers. Nowhere, however, are terrorist groups more prevalent than in the Sahel, where they have been expanding and strengthening for years. An array of groups—including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, the Islamic State in West Africa Province, and Boko Haram, among others—now call the Sahel home. They even battle each other for territory and power.

In the past several years, a series of coups have driven out democracies from the Sahel and sought to replace US and European Union support with Russian mercenaries. But, as has been seen across the region, Russian support has hard limits. For example, in Mali—where leaders turned to Russia for military support—al-Qaeda jihadists briefly took over Bamako’s airport last year and posed for photos with the presidential jet. Even away from the hotbed of the Sahel, the limits of Russian mercenary support were made clear in Mozambique, where the Wagner Group was pulled from an operation targeting al-Shabaab after twelve mercenaries died. As this broader dynamic changes in the Sahel, jihadists groups are still gaining power.

So, what’s next?

Expect increased US attention toward Africa from a counterterrorism perspective. From what has been displayed so far, the United States’ tactics are looking quite muscular. Will this attention include rapprochement with the Sahelian juntas? That is still unclear. In weighing rapprochement, the Trump administration is sure to remember the lessons of the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush in Niger, in which a joint US-Nigerien mission pursuing a leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara was attacked, resulting in the deaths of four US Special Forces soldiers. At the time, the ambush was the deadliest attack against the US military in Africa in decades. 

In recent years, global attention has focused on Eastern Europe and conflict in the Middle East rather than African conflicts. Yet, with international terror and jihadist groups now entrenched in the continent and pursuing global aspirations greater than carving out territory in Africa—presenting a major threat to the United States and its allies—attention is needed. The war on terror will be fought in Africa, and whatever direction that takes, the United States will need to be involved.

Some involvement is already underway. Notably, at a time when discourse about US global deployments is focused on withdrawals and wind-downs, discussions over US presence in Africa are taking the opposite direction. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, whose first visit overseas conspicuously included the AFRICOM base in Germany, said, “Africa is very much the front lines of a fight from Islamists . . . We’re not going to allow them to maintain a foothold, especially to try to strike at America.” Notably, it was in a meeting with AFRICOM leaders that Hegseth signed a directive easing restraints and executive oversight on foreign US airstrikes and the deployment of US commandos.

Last month’s airstrikes in Somalia are likely the first of many. And while many analysts are loath to guess what this US administration will do on the foreign affairs front, the fact remains that combating terror in the modern era will require action in Africa.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Almost a year since his election, President Bassirou Diomaye Faye now has a clear mandate to carry out reforms, following his party’s resounding victory in November’s legislative elections. He must now turn his focus to continuing along the democratic track, lifting the constraints associated with credit rationing and leveraging commodity-based industrialization, and setting Senegal up for robust economic growth and welfare improvements.

By the end of the presidential election early last year, outgoing President Macky Sall—who had attempted to postpone the election, a move that led to deadly protests—congratulated Faye, calling the elections the “victory of Senegalese democracy.” Such a victory is important for Senegal, as democracy (contrary to what Chirac suggested) is not a luxury but a necessity for national reconciliation, the legitimacy of national institutions, and, ultimately, shared prosperity.

The presidential election was a victory not only for Senegal’s democracy but for democracy globally, rekindling confidence internationally in a system of government that has come under strain in Africa, especially in West Africa, where military coups have surged. That boost in confidence comes as people in even Western democracies grow dissatisfied with how democracy works in their countries. For example, an Ipsos poll in 2023 conducted across seven Western countries (including France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) found that most respondents believed the economy is rigged to the advantage of the rich and powerful and that “radical change” is needed to improve the political system.

In that poll, 70 percent of American respondents and 73 percent of French respondents—whose countries are seeing rising political polarization—said they believe that the state of democracy has declined in their countries in recent years. Moreover, the 2024 Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index ranked both the United States and France as “flawed democracies.”

While massive amounts of campaign financing are considered a prerequisite (and perhaps the most important attribute) for winning an election, Senegal’s presidential election was a reminder that conviction and ideas still matter. Faye—who secured 54.28 percent of the vote as an independent after his party was banned—defeated candidates who had far more financial firepower and ample time to rally support on their campaign trails. Despite being released from prison just a little over a week before the presidential election, Faye’s message and program were in sync with people’s aspirations and garnered broad-based support at the ballot box.

Faye promised to improve the living conditions in Senegal. For too long, the country has contended with widespread poverty, especially in rural areas where as many as 57 percent of people are considered poor. Furthermore, Senegalese youth continue to face high unemployment. The informal economy—which is generally associated with low productivity and endemic poverty—has become a major piece of the economy, accounting for nearly 37 percent of Senegal’s gross domestic product (GDP). Recently, the rising cost of living and income inequality have exacerbated Senegal’s socioeconomic challenges. Inflation has proven particularly sticky and is eroding household purchasing power. Amid these challenges, increasing numbers of Senegalese migrants are risking their lives to sail the seas en route to Europe in search of better opportunities.

Faye has also promised to fight corruption, promote good governance, and strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions. For years, a “strongman” culture across Africa has enabled collusion between politicians and multinational companies, which has weakened agency and popular ownership of policies to undermine economic opportunity and exacerbate income inequality. This is especially the case in countries rich in natural resources, which are more vulnerable to corruption due to the significant revenues generated by resource exploitation, management, and trade.

Departing from the norm, Faye declared his assets in the lead-up to the presidential election. Upon becoming president, he announced he would conduct an audit of Senegal’s oil, gas, and mining sectors to rebalance them in the national interest. These moves establish baselines against which the people of Senegal can assess the president’s work toward tackling corruption and enhancing efficiency in the allocation of resources, with an ultimate goal of achieving more inclusive growth and shared prosperity in the country.

These are important steps in the right direction. Improving welfare for the Senegalese people requires a fundamental transformation of the economy. Expectations in Senegal are high following the discovery of major oil and gas reserves a few years ago. There are similarly high expectations for Africa as a whole. Despite its immense natural-resource wealth, the continent has, over the last several decades, become the world’s epicenter of poverty: Africa has the largest share of extreme poverty rates globally and is home to twenty-three of the world’s poorest twenty-eight countries.

This starkly contrasts with Nordic countries and the Gulf states, which have successfully leveraged their natural-resource wealth to boost prosperity in a span of a few decades. This contrast is partly due to the fact that rather than processing its own natural resources, Africa instead largely exports them overseas, increasing the prevalence of macroeconomic shocks and the risk of poor governance—both of which adversely affect the investment climate and heighten growth volatility.

But Senegal, arguably a latecomer to the hydrocarbon world, can learn from other African countries’ management (and mismanagement) of natural resources.  

Considering the experience of the most successful oil-rich countries, Faye should look to alter the structure of value chains to retain more production and refining processes locally. If Senegal can nurture these industries, it will set up the country for commodity-based industrialization that expands employment opportunities, enhances technology transfer, and accelerates integration into the global economy. This will help Senegal avoid a deterioration in commodity terms of trade, which is fueling internal and external imbalances. Last October, Moody’s downgraded Senegal’s long-term credit rating, citing a significantly weaker fiscal and debt position.

There are mechanisms and conditions in Africa that would help Faye in localizing natural-resource production and refining processes. The African Continental Free Trade Area’s rules of origin (which prioritize made-in-Africa goods) should help catalyze the production of intermediate and manufactured goods and the development of robust regional value chains. The scale of the continental market should help Senegal offset the potential losses of international trade associated with expanding protectionist barriers in a geopolitically fractured world.

The rise of globally competitive African businesses necessitates large-scale, long-term investment, so reforming the banking system will also be important. Affordable patient capital is particularly critical in Senegal, where domestic credit to the private sector remains very low (31.3 percent of GDP, versus 126.8 percent in Norway) and overwhelmingly short term. According to a report by the Central Bank of West African States, more than 80 percent of loans issued in 2022 had a maturity within less than two years.

Faye has an opportunity to achieve the systemic change he promised. Democracy has provided a path to greater ownership of policies that equalize access to opportunities and raise living standards in Senegal and more generally across Africa, a continent rich in resources and where the people are no longer prepared to accept intergenerational poverty as an inevitability. But democracy must not be regarded as an end; it must be seen as a means to greater security and prosperity. Thus, Faye must actively use the opportunity provided by the rekindling flame of democracy to usher in a new era—one that yields huge democratic and economic dividends.

Hippolyte Fofack, a former chief economist at the African Export-Import Bank, is a fellow with the Sustainable Development Solutions Network at Columbia University, a research associate at Harvard University, a distinguished fellow at the Global Federation of Competitiveness Councils, and a fellow at the African Academy of Sciences.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The country, at the crossroads of Central and West Africa, faces uncertainty across political, social, economic, and security environments. This is happening at a time when the United States’ global competitors are opportunistically seeking engagement in Cameroon and the region, boxing out the United States as it looks to protect its interests there.

Paul Biya, Cameroon’s ninety-two-year-old leader, has been in power as president since 1982, and from 1975 to 1982, he was the prime minister. Currently rumored to be in poor health, Biya is not seen frequently in public, has little direct contact with US or other foreign officials, and remains relatively recluse. The country faces economic and security challenges despite having a resilient, young population and a capable (yet stretched) military—one with significant experience gained from navigating armed conflict (at home and abroad); counter-piracy, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping, campaigns; and efforts to contain an insurgency in the English-speaking regions of the country.

Biya’s age and the country’s elections, due to be held in October 2025, bring into question what comes next for Cameroon. Navigating the aftermath of Biya’s presidency will require a coordinated and elevated strategic approach by senior US officials. If crisis breaks out in Cameroon, US missteps could play a part in thrusting the country and the region into significant upheaval and instability.

On paper, the president of Cameroon’s Senate, Marcel Niat Njifenji (who was appointed by Biya), would succeed the Cameroonian president in an untimely vacancy. Njifenji—currently at ninety years old and reportedly in poor health—would be tasked with holding elections between 20 and 120 days after the office becomes vacant, as outlined by Cameroon’s constitution. That is a relatively difficult job, even for the nimblest governments. As the ruling political party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement and its allies retain all facets of political power in the country. Many key opposition leaders have been divided, fled to self-imposed exile, or have passed away over time. Those in government hold relatively little power for actual change. In recent years, it has seemed possible that Biya would elevate his son as a successor in what has become a trend for the region, but the success of that approach is far from guaranteed.

Absent a unifying leader—one that is unlikely in a country not easily unified by ethnicity, religion, or language—a dangerous and violent scenario could unfold. Acute political instability would unsettle both West and Central Africa and would provide oxygen to armed groups in the Anglophone Crisis as well as in the Chad Basin (where the extremist groups Boko Haram and the Islamic State—West Africa Province are active) and in the porous eastern border with the Central African Republic. Opportunistic criminal networks could exploit any power vacuum in Cameroon and nearby, including next door in southeastern Nigeria.

The question remains: Why should the US government care about Cameroon, a country roughly the size of California with a gross domestic product around the size of Alaska’s, internal and external security issues, and a paralytic gerontocracy? Thus far, despite Cameroon’s strategic location, large economy, and incredible diversity, the United States and Cameroon have been unable to set up a winning partnership that benefits the Cameroonian people. As Cameroon increasingly looks to China as a development partner of choice, the United States should realize that its influence in Cameroon can’t be taken for granted.

US-Cameroon relations have historically been prickly and sometimes even outright rocky. Cameroon has come to distrust the United States after a series of real or perceived slights, including misunderstandings about contested presidential elections in 1992 (that ultimately saw Paul Biya prevail), suspension from the African Growth and Opportunity Act during the first Trump administration, and certain US policy decisions regarding conflict in the Anglophone regions of the country, which led to severe restrictions on US foreign assistance and military cooperation. US-Cameroon relations have also been affected by the fact that a small minority of the Cameroonian diaspora in the United States has engaged in the Anglophone Crisis, including by rallying funding, commanding fighters, and publicly coordinating messaging campaigns for militia groups seeking independence from the Francophone-dominated government. While the US government took some steps to reign in these actions, Cameroonian officials saw extended timelines on the US response and limited results as fundamentally unhelpful. At the same time, some members of the Cameroonian diaspora felt that the US government should have exerted more pressure on both the Biya-led government and armed groups to negotiate an end to the conflict. Back in Cameroon’s capital, the Biya-led government (in keeping with its history as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement) kept its options for international partnership open by engaging with Russia and China, in addition to France, Israel, and the United Kingdom.

From Cameroon’s standpoint, US engagement lacks consistency, seeing as Washington has been one to walk away, reduce foreign assistance programming, or limit security cooperation when Cameroonian human-rights or governance issues (which Cameroon perceives as domestic issues) become bilateral foreign policy irritants. Regardless, US policymakers expect Cameroon to accept the US worldview even if it doesn’t meet the country’s development, security, or economic goals.

One reason the United States should care about Cameroon is because of the country’s role as an economic hub for the region. Cameroon, located on the Gulf of Guinea, connects landlocked Central African countries such as Chad and the Central African Republic to the Atlantic Ocean. Cameroon’s ports at Douala and Kribi (the latter a project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative) provide a significant economic lifeline, facilitating the export of crude petroleum, natural gas, and timber and the import of refined petroleum, food, and clothing. Like many global ports, these port facilities also function as hubs for criminal networks and conflict actors. For example, according to the Africa Report, the Russian paramilitary organization Wagner Group used the port of Douala to enrich themselves and move their assets further inland.

The United States also has an economic interest in a secure and transparent Cameroon. Currently, Cameroon struggles with corruption, although efforts to combat such corruption remain ongoing. A loyalty-based patronage system as well as paper-based procurement processes (through which it is easier to exchange bribes) contribute to this climate. According to the US Department of State, US firms have said that corruption is most pervasive in government procurement, the award of licenses or concessions, monetary transfers, performance requirements, dispute settlements, the regulatory system, customs, and taxation. Efforts to hold officials accountable for corruption are mixed. In 2012, Cameroonian authorities found former Minister Hamidou Marafa Yaya guilty of corruption, but Marafa denied making any attempt at embezzlement and said his detention is politically motivated—and a United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded his detention is arbitrary, saying his right to a fair trial had been violated. In 2023, a Cameroonian court sentenced former Minister of Defense Edgar Alain Mebe Ngo’o, his wife, and three other co-defendants to prison for corruption charges involving military contracts (Ngo’o and his wife denied any wrongdoing).

There is much at stake in Cameroon. Here are ten recommendations for the Trump administration.

Recommendations for the immediate term

• Develop a high-level interagency Cameroon strategy. It should include visits by senior US Department of State and other executive-branch officials. This effort can reinforce the work of the US ambassador to Cameroon as a potential crisis looms. In an era of great-power competition, this strategy should include a clear definition of US goals in Cameroon, in addition to a review of the US foreign policy tools available to assist Cameroon with its development, security, and governance challenges.
• Intensify engagement and meetings with all parties involved in the upcoming presidential elections. Avoid statements or appearances that could be interpreted as picking potential successors, which were the source of ruffling in the US-Cameroon relationship in 1992.
• Focus on creating stronger economic ties with Cameroon while also supporting human rights and good governance. This is what Cameroonian officials tell US officials that they want. Previous US policy reduced economic and commercial ties in Cameroon out of concern for human rights and governance, using standards that may not be universally applied to other non-African countries facing similar challenges. Instead, the United States can push for improved human rights and governance (for example, by advocating for the release of high-profile political prisoners such as Marafa) while also pursuing stronger economic and commercial ties.
• Seek wider perspectives beyond government-to-government contact. Engage credible voices on Cameroon in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere in real and consistent policy discussions instead of one-off roundtables that lack staying power and impact. Doing so can ensure that the United States has access to a full range of views about the political process and to networks that the administration can draw upon in a crisis.
• Proactively engage congressional leaders and their senior staff on Cameroon matters. This can be accomplished through testimony, hearings, the Congressional Research Service, and other legislative branch tools. Encourage congressional staff and member delegations to Cameroon to inform other congressional staff and members of what is at stake.

Recommendations for the short-to-medium term

• Task the intelligence community with assessing the political, economic, social, and security situation in the country. This assessment should outline critical public messaging themes that can help unify Cameroon in a potential crisis, the key players in the country’s future, and potential successors among the political, economic, and military elites. The assessment should include listings of monetary assets, real estate and commercial holdings, and any US dollar-denominated bank accounts. The intelligence assessment should also shed light on money laundering and terrorist financing vulnerabilities for this regional banking hub, and it should map and analyze the relationships key Cameroonians have with Russia, China, and Israel for potential leverage points during a crisis.
• Hold a tabletop exercise to plan for realistic political scenarios. The tabletop exercise should include agencies from across the US government and also the US embassy in Cameroon. Such an exercise would help the US government understand what the various scenarios mean for US personnel, Peace Corps volunteers, and US facilities in the country. In Cameroon, most official US personnel and facilities are based in Yaoundé, so evacuation may be difficult: While Yaoundé has an international airport, the Cameroonian international airport that offers the most flights and destinations is in Douala, nearly five hours away. Such challenges require early contingency planning.
• Learn from past mistakes in Cameroon and more recent ones made elsewhere, for example in Sudan. Political transitions can happen quickly. Ensuring that the US government has a strategy and network to draw from in a crisis or post-crisis scenario can help decisionmakers as they articulate what a positive relationship with Cameroon could look like—potentially with an untested or unknown leader. Doing so may go a long way toward building credibility.
• Develop a quick response package. Drawing on an interagency Cameroon strategy, an intelligence assessment, and lessons learned from the past, the US administration should take proactive steps to prepare diplomatic and economic statecraft tools that can be rapidly deployed in the event of crisis. For example, the US administration should consider sanctions targets and be ready to announce them quickly. Government departments and agencies—including State, Defense, Treasury, the Development Finance Corporation, the Millenium Challenge Corporation, and others—should have humanitarian aid, economic support, and incentives for security sector reform ready to deploy quickly in a crisis.

A recommendation for ongoing strategy

• Do not wait on traditional allies such as the United Kingdom, France, or others to act in concert. US and ally interests in Cameroon often do not align. France, now on the back foot in several African countries, may not be able to help. Russia and China are in Cameroon for themselves. Global competitors are already aggressively pursuing their political, economic, and security goals in Cameroon.

Cameroon faces an uncertain future. US policymakers have the opportunity to change Cameroon’s trajectory by accompanying the country as it navigates its future uncertainties. Should Cameroon’s future bring wider violence, the potential for the country to fracture around ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other lines could look similar to, or potentially worse than, the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in southern Europe in the 1990s. But if Cameroon can successfully navigate the period ahead with the United States as a viable partner, it will have contributed to stabilizing the heart of Central Africa, building a brighter and stronger future, and keeping US global adversaries at bay.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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US President Donald Trump has sought to immobilize USAID as part of his mission to downsize the federal government. That mission also drove Trump to sign an executive order freezing foreign aid for ninety days and subjecting all aid programs to a review of whether they are aligned with US foreign policy, although exceptions include life-saving humanitarian assistance.

Since then, the administration has announced that it would merge USAID into the State Department, put thousands of staffers on paid leave, and order international staffers to return to the United States. Despite a few court rulings that have temporarily reinstated workers and funding for foreign-aid contracts, USAID—the largest humanitarian aid organization in the world—is now in pieces.

While many are assessing the Trump administration’s priorities and the consequences of the USAID shutdown for US competitiveness in the world, it is important to also consider the African perspective and analyze how Trump’s decision could shape Africa’s future.

Africa, the first victim?

Many are arguing that Africa will be the first victim of the USAID collapse. Even if the amount of USAID assistance to Africa has been decreasing over the past few years, the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa still received twelve billion dollars from USAID in 2024. Looking at the continent as a whole, Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) receive the most aid.

The level of concern is high: From Sudan to the DRC, hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of food and medicine, already delivered by US farmers and manufacturers, is stuck in ports due to the aid pause and confusion around unclear guidance from the government.

Foreign assistance to Africa has come to include aid with a variety of focuses, including economic development, health, peace and security, democracy and human rights, and education, going far beyond its primary goal. Some African leaders argue that such aid has led to interference in African internal affairs. In terms of efficiency, aid has never lifted any country out of underdevelopment, and the level of aid for Africa has been so low that it has never been able to meet the continent’s development needs. Nongovernmental organizations regularly deplore the fact that the development aid deployed by rich countries remains below the recommendations of the United Nations.  

In addition, the full scope of aid to Africa has weakened focus on business and trade partnerships, which are more effective in combating structural underdevelopment. Moreover, for countries sending aid, such aid tends to be seen as a demonstration of influence and power rather than generosity. The power dynamic that is associated with aid—as exemplified by an African proverb that says “the hand that gives is always above the hand that receives”—has contributed to bias and prejudice against Africans, portraying them as eternally in need of charity. On the contrary, Africa draws in other forms of financing and investment, notably remittances from African diasporas (the amount of which surpasses funds received through development assistance or foreign direct investment). Money sent to Africa is increasingly coming from Africans themselves, not from foreign assistance. This is a promising path.

On fundamental issues, such as health, girls’ education, and security, Africa should not be dependent on foreign contributions, from the United States or elsewhere. As some African leaders have argued, the US freezing of federal aid is a “wake-up call” for the continent.

The concern about this dependence is not new: For decades, Africa observers have been warning about African dependence on perpetual external aid. Rather than replacing US aid with more assistance from other countries, Africa’s next efforts should be devoted to much more decisive policies. Such policies include ones that, for example, accelerate intra-African trade (which accounts for less than 20 percent of Africa’s total trade; for Europe, intra-regional trade accounts for 60 percent), support the introduction of sovereign currencies (the eco, a currency proposed for West Africa, has still not seen the light of day), or bring more local resource processing and technical and scientific training to the continent.

Offering a deal to Trump

Africans should not have waited for Trump to cut off economic development aid. They should have taken the lead and prioritized healthier cooperation, based on balanced and fair partnerships. Under Trump’s foreign policy, the United States is looking to put itself first; Africans, too, should be concerned about efficiency and should strive for foreign policy that puts their countries first.

Some African countries have made steps in this direction. With its Ghana Beyond Aid vision, Ghana had tried to revolutionize its policy under President Nana Akufo-Addo. Botswana has arguably already accomplished this shift, using revenues from its diamond industry to fuel a remarkable growth strategy.

Africans should support the US effort to evaluate its aid mechanisms; but more than that, they should take advantage of the end of USAID to propose new partnerships made up of direct investment and fairer trade. After all, African economies have assets and resources that few states in the world have on a large scale. Trump, the “dealmaker,” will likely welcome this approach.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Note: Some Atlantic Council work funded by the US government has been paused as a result of the Trump administration’s Stop Work Orders issued under the Executive Order “Reevaluating and Realigning US Foreign Aid.”

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Africa’s space sector presents significant opportunities for the United States. The sector is projected to generate over twenty billion dollars in direct revenue annually. Meanwhile, it serves as a platform to advance broader US foreign policy objectives related to national security, space diplomacy, sustainability, and global influence.

The Biden administration achieved notable progress in building relationships with African countries in the space sector. For example, Nigeria and Rwanda became the first and second African countries to sign the Artemis Accords—a framework for best practices to use in space, drafted by the United States—and Angola quickly followed in 2023. US-Africa partnerships expanded with public and private sector representatives from the United States and Africa gathering at convenings such as the US-Africa Commercial Space Stakeholders Meeting in Azerbaijan and the NewSpace Africa Conference in Angola, which my company and the African Union co-hosted.

These efforts demonstrated a growing recognition that Africa’s space sector holds strategic importance. But the Biden administration still fell short of establishing a coherent and actionable strategy for long-term US engagement with African space programs.

As the Trump administration takes the reins, it faces a pivotal opportunity to build on this groundwork by solidifying relationships, streamlining strategy, and ensuring consistent engagement with African space programs. But Trump will need to take a collaborative approach: In order to harness the opportunities of the African space sector, the United States must also fill the gaps in its space coordination with Africa.

Clarify the office in charge

Uncertainty lingers among African leaders about which US institution would lead this charge: the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Office of Space Commerce under the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or the National Space Council (if the second Trump administration keeps it). Much of the implementation has been thus far led by the Office of Space Commerce. The Trump administration can help address this uncertainty by establishing a dedicated task force within an appropriate US space entity to oversee US-Africa space collaboration. This could include personnel from other institutions such as the National Space Council, Office of Space Commerce, NASA, the US Geological Survey, the US Space Force, and other relevant agencies.

This task force should help strengthen US partnerships with African institutions—including the African Space Agency and national space agencies—restructuring programs (for example, NASA Harvest) to align with the new US foreign policy. Likewise, the task force should support and advocate for US space businesses in Africa, opening new channels for space commerce between the United States and Africa.

Support the adoption of sustainable space practices

Africa, though contributing minimally to space debris, disproportionately bears the consequences of poorly regulated space activities. Incidents involving what is reported to be space-related debris in Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda—and a recent one in Kenya that saw a five-hundred-kilogram metallic ring fall from the sky—highlight what is at stake in shaping global norms and practices for responsible space exploration.

The United States has a strong foundation in advocating for space sustainability, as shown by its Space Priorities Framework and NASA’s sustainability strategy. In addition, the 2022 National Orbital Debris Implementation Plan offers actionable steps for mitigating, tracking, and remediating debris. The Trump administration should work closely with African leaders to integrate these practices into their national and continental space strategies. This includes offering technical assistance, helping build capacity for debris monitoring, and encouraging African participation in multilateral initiatives on space sustainability. Collaborating on these efforts would not only help mitigate the risks African countries face but also strengthen the United States’ position as a global leader in promoting responsible space use.

Differentiate the US approach

The Trump administration should also offer transparent, mutually beneficial agreements that contrast with concerns about predatory practices associated with global geopolitics. Promoting democratic values, governance, and the rule of law in space agreements will further differentiate the US approach.

Build Africa’s space capacity

The United States should also more closely align US initiatives with the African Space Policy and Strategy, which has several aims, including one to develop on-continent space capacity. Toward this effort, and to respond to China’s and Russia’s increasing involvement on the continent, the Trump administration should do more to co-develop technologies, provide education and training opportunities, and facilitate technology transfer that empowers African nations to build domestic space capabilities. The US private sector plays a pivotal role in this effort, and the US government should encourage space companies to invest in Africa, establish joint ventures, and share advanced technologies that will foster innovation-driven partnerships.

Ease lingering tensions

Since its 2023 launch in Nigeria, Starlink has rapidly expanded its operations across Africa. While Starlink has been transformative in bridging Africa’s digital divide, its rapid entry has sparked concerns among African satellite operators and telecom companies. Local players face intensified competition, and some governments—such as Algeria and Egypt—have yet to give a license to Starlink, likely in part because they are protecting their national satellite infrastructure business. Additionally, some African telecom operators have argued that Starlink’s operations undermine local development goals as Starlink builds no local infrastructure, employs few locals, and benefits from less stringent regulations—whereas local companies face more complex licensing requirements and tax obligations and their investments in infrastructure benefit local economies. The playing field is also getting more complex, as Eutelsat’s OneWeb has entered the African market and is offering more favorable licensing terms, threatening Starlink’s hegemony.

All of this has an impact on how Africans perceive the United States as a potential collaborator on space issues. The Trump administration should, through diplomacy, help resolve such licensing disputes, protecting African and US interests and supporting Starlink’s role in global connectivity goals.

Ramp up diplomacy

The new administration should also enhance its soft power through space diplomacy. Doing so will deepen trust and strengthen ties between the United States and Africa.

One way to accomplish that is by hosting African researchers in US space institutions. Another is by sending more high-level representation to space-related events and convenings on the African continent. Doing so would signal the Trump administration’s readiness to partner with African nations in achieving their space ambitions—and offer the United States another platform to discuss cooperation on everything from technology transfers to launchpad use.

If the Trump administration can fill these gaps in the US approach to collaborating with Africa on space, it will not only unlock a massive (and lucrative) industry but also
protect US foreign policy objectives and programs on the continent, propel local development priorities, and shape space norms in line with democratic values. 

Temidayo Oniosun is the managing director of Space in Africa, an analytics and consulting company in the African Space and satellite industry.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Trump should patch the holes in US-Africa space cooperation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Recent years have seen an upsurge in repressive measures. For example, in 2023, Uganda enacted an anti-homosexuality law that, among other measures, restricts healthcare access for LGBTQI+ individuals and criminalizes renting property to them. In July 2024, Ghana’s supreme court upheld a colonial-era law that criminalizes same-sex conduct. Another anti-LGBTQI+ bill approved by Ghana’s parliament but not yet signed into law by the president would impose heavy penalties for same-sex activities and punish people advocating for LGBTQI+ rights. And in October 2024, Mali’s Transitional National Council—the interim parliament set up after the country’s 2020 coup—passed a law that criminalizes homosexuality.

To stem this tide, the United States must adopt carefully designed messaging to persuade those who do not want to be persuaded on rights. In so doing, Washington’s argument in favor of rights must be unimpeachable.

During and since my time as US ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire, I had several constructive conversations with African leaders from the public sector and civil society that gave me a sense of the messaging required. For example, one senior African diplomat once cautioned me that “overreach invites backlash.” And when I raised LGBTQI+ rights with one of Africa’s most senior Catholic prelates, he expressed a willingness to live and let live, explaining that his culture and religion did not allow the approval of homosexuality. Such a sentiment falls in line with the legal bases for LGBTQI+ rights. There are two such bases: one for matters of identity (nondiscrimination) and one for matters of activity (protections for dignity). Neither has anything to do with the approval of homosexuality; it’s about tolerance. The distinction is crucial, and it can be highly useful in Africa, where many societies value the spirit of peaceful coexistence among diverse groups. These bases are essentially the same as the bases for religious freedom, which many Africans pride themselves on respecting.

Properly presented, tolerance fits well with African values, and many Africans may even be proud to exercise such tolerance. I could see this was the case in interactions with some influential religious leaders in Africa: For example, some Muslim leaders had already been advocating for the destigmatization of HIV/AIDS victims for twenty years by the time I met them, even though they strongly disapproved of homosexual activity.

In addition, leaders of Catholicism—practiced by around 20 percent of Africa’s population—have released new guidance or statements embracing tolerance: Pope Francis has said that homosexuality is not a crime but a sin and allowed priests to give an informal blessing to people in a same-sex relationship.

But reactions to such guidance have been mixed. For example, in the Catholic context, a body representing bishops in Africa said that they would not give informal blessings to people in same-sex relationships because it would contradict the “cultural ethos of African communities.” In response, the pope has emphasized that the blessing isn’t for the relationship, it’s for the individuals.

Yet, as another example, Cardinal Peter Turkson of Ghana has said publicly that “LGBT people may not be criminalized because they’ve committed no crime . . .  We need a lot of education to get people to . . . make a distinction between what is a crime and what is not crime.”

Opponents of LGBTQI+ rights typically ignore the distinction between tolerance and approval: They simply express vehement disapproval of homosexuality without acknowledging, let alone addressing, the legal principles involved.

Thus, in promoting tolerance on the continent, the United States should point to the fact that LGBTQI+ rights are, indeed, rights—and as is the case with rights, they have a legal basis. There are two legal bases for LGBTQI+ rights, one for matters of identity and one for matters of activity.

The principle of nondiscrimination provides the legal basis for matters regarding identity. That principle is enshrined in several international laws and treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which 174 countries (including all African countries) are states party. The multilateral treaty outlines that each state party will aim to respect and ensure that all individuals in its jurisdiction maintain their rights regardless of any distinction such as (but not limited to) race, color, sex, language, and religion. This principle was reinforced when the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee—a group of experts set up by the ICCPR to consider whether states party are complying with the treaty—decided Toonen v. Australia. In that case, an individual challenged legislation in Tasmania that criminalized consensual homosexual activity. The committee said that the criminalization of private, consensual homosexual activity between adults breaches a state party’s nondiscrimination obligations.

In my experience, I have found that Africans generally understand the importance of nondiscrimination, if only because their collective history includes so much suffering from massive violations of that principle. Indeed, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights affirms the right to freedom from discrimination. It even says that every individual has a responsibility to contribute to a society of mutual respect and tolerance.

But nondiscrimination applies only to matters of identity, not activity. The principle of dignity and freedom provides the legal basis for respecting the right to privacy of activity for individuals. This, too, is enshrined in various international laws and treaties. The ICCPR states that no one should be subject to “arbitrary or unlawful interference” in their privacy. Toonen v. Australia reinforced this principle as well, as the committee found that adult consensual activity in private is covered under the ICCPR and that criminalizing such activity amounts to a continuous interference with an individual’s privacy.          

It is true that in the West, LGBTQI+ activists have had remarkable success pursuing more than mere tolerance, so it is understandably tempting to aim high in Africa too. But there is no right to other people’s approval, as that would erode freedom of conscience widely. In addition, basing a claim of LGBTQI+ rights on approval is likely to be not only counterproductive but also conceptually problematic: It could promote societal division. For example, the intolerant could gain a false impression that supporting the rights of an individual depends on whether there is approval for that individual’s actions—which is not the case. It could also make it seem as though anyone in the tolerating camp actually promotes LGBTQI+ activities and identity, allowing those who vehemently disagree an opportunity to discredit the tolerant as purveyors of immorality. This perception is already commonplace in Africa, and it can undermine Western credibility with regard to human rights issues in general.   

In today’s interconnected world, anything one says or does publicly is likely to be noticed widely, not just by the intended audience but by people who disagree with the intended audience. Thus, the United States must ensure that any new messaging it adopts in Africa is threaded throughout all its work, from its wider strategy toward the continent to the daily interactions its diplomats have with African societies.

For example, US embassies in Africa have, in the past, honored Pride month in various ways, from hoisting Pride flags to organizing Pride events. But official participation in Pride events by government representatives such as diplomats sends a default message of approval; that plays into the hands of those who wish to distort and discredit the sound argument for LGBTQI+ rights. Where Pride events are lawful, there is no obvious need for official support from foreign governments such as the United States; where they are unlawful, diplomats’ participation would be contrary to the respect for local laws that is expected of them (an expectation that the US State Department generally takes very seriously). It would also play into the hands of those who accuse the West of trying to impose its cultural values on others.

From what I observed in my thirty-plus years in the US Foreign Service, the overall perspective laid out above is not reliably understood by US diplomats, even those tasked with promoting human rights. The best chance to make progress where it is most needed is in disseminating a disciplined message of tolerance and resisting the temptation to overreach. The State Department should start by insisting on clear, consistent messaging that supports internationally recognized rights—but does not go further by appearing to promote LGBTQI+ activities.

Richard K. Bell is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He served as the US ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire from 2019 to 2023.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post The United States needs a new guiding message in promoting LGBTQI+ rights in Africa: Tolerance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

French authorities have this month arrested several Algerian citizens living in France for allegedly inciting violence and hatred online targeting opponents of the Algerian government. One such Algerian national, Boualem Naman, was arrested on January 5 and promptly expelled from France. But upon his arrival at Algiers airport, authorities refused his entry, reportedly arguing that Naman should be offered the opportunity to defend himself in France, thus ordering his return. This all led to a diplomatic crisis between the two countries, with the French interior minister accusing Algeria of “trying to humiliate” his country.

In addition, just before the new year, Algerian political activist Abdelwakil Blamm was also arrested for allegedly taking part in a terrorist organization and publishing false and malicious news through his social profile on Facebook. Critics argue that these arrests are targeted and part of a crackdown campaign to silence opponents, a move that worries European authorities for the potential reversal of what is left of Algeria’s freedom of expression. 

Blamm is an activist, well known in the country for his fierce criticism of the government. Meanwhile, and as reflected by the charges brought against Blamm, authorities accuse him of being linked to a foreign terrorist network, in whose favor he allegedly spreads false information.

Earlier, on November 16, Algerian authorities arrested French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal, who is known for being critical of Algeria’s political leadership and has been accused by local authorities of threatening Algerian national security. He was arrested shortly after arriving in Algeria, and he is being prosecuted under an article of the penal code on terrorist or subversive acts against the constitutional order and state security. Algerian President Abdelmajid Tebboune himself has spoken on the subject, calling Sansal an impostor sent by France to destabilize the country’s public order. According to some reports, Algerian authorities may have been offended by Sansal’s comments to a French news outlet about Western Sahara being part of Morocco.

But even beyond this recent escalation of tension, however, the bilateral relationship has been progressively deteriorating in other areas.

The two countries’ positions on both the bilateral relationship and regional politics have increasingly diverged. Last July, France signalled for the first time that it would recognize an autonomy plan for the Western Sahara region, albeit under Moroccan sovereignty, leading to outrage and strong condemnation from Algeria, with a formal statement from the government calling the decision “unexpected, ill-judged, and counterproductive.”

Several members of the Algerian political system believe that the relationship has also deteriorated due to the increasing political assertion of the far right in France, whose anti-immigration policies heavily impact Algerian citizens. At the same time, however, some French officials and politicians—including members of Macron’s government—have criticized Algeria and its increasingly anti-French drift.

Yet, the deterioration of the relationship extends even beyond recent tensions and issues related to Western Sahara and Morocco. The nature of the crisis between Algeria and France seems to have much deeper roots, which lie in the failure to define a real postcolonial reconciliation process and in France’s persistent refusal to engage in a critical reinterpretation of its role in the country. For example, recent studies suggest that the French school system still refers to the colonial period as having positive effects in addition to negative consequences, angering Algerians. 

With France and Algeria apparently unable to engage in constructive dialogue on the substance of their bilateral relations, it seems quite unlikely that they will be able to manage a positive turnaround of the current state of crisis in the short term. Algeria’s fear of growing international isolation, coupled with growing internal tensions in French domestic politics, risk aggravating misunderstandings between the two countries. If left unchecked, these disputes could push France and Algeria toward an irrevocable rupture in their relations reminiscent of Paris’s diplomatic breaks with its former allies in the Sahel region.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Nicola Pedde is the director of the Rome and Brussels-based Institute for Global Studies.

The post The roots of recent Algeria-France tensions are deeper than it may seem appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In his first days in office, Trump has made it clear that immigration is at the top of his agenda. Since taking office on Monday, Trump has already issued a series of executive actions restricting US immigration, including an executive order declaring a national emergency on the southern border. Furthermore, one of the first votes of the 119th Congress was on the passage of the Laken Riley Act, a key immigration enforcement bill backed widely by Republicans—and also supported by some Democrats after a bruising election cycle. The United States’ policy focus of early 2025 is clear—and this likely means that US-Africa relations will be no exception. If the Trump administration’s first days are any indication, African leaders shouldn’t be surprised if relations with the United States are guided by immigration issues rather than trade and investment in the immediate months to come.

Previously, African leaders and policymakers did not need to be too concerned about US domestic immigration enforcement when it came to their wider relations with Washington. While the past decades have seen rising numbers of Africans migrating to the United States and obtaining legal permanent resident status, most came via legal channels, and immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest economies have achieved some of the highest median household incomes in the country. In the past several years, however, there has been a sharp increase in the number of African migrants arriving at the southern US border, having made it across the Atlantic one way or another, and then joining more traditional routes overland to the United States. Toward the end of Trump’s first term, articles abounded stating that African migrants had become the new face of the US border crisis.

Historically, the numbers of African migrants arriving at the US border have been so low that they were classified as “other”. But this is no longer the case. Recently, as Europe’s economic outlook falters and European Union member nations increasingly crack down on migrants and asylum seekers, African migration to the United States is surging. The New York Times reported that “the number of Africans apprehended at the southern border jumped to 58,462 in the fiscal year 2023 from 13,406 in 2022,” with Mauritania, Senegal, Angola, and Guinea the largest sources of migration from Africa to the United States. These, of course, are only the reported numbers, and illegal migration, by definition, is not fully accounted for. And while the number of African migrants entering the United States each year still pales in comparison to that of Latin American migrants, they are no longer insignificant numbers. As refugee, asylum, and immigration systems are being revised, and if 2025 brings the unprecedented level of attention and focus on deportations that the political climate is forecasting, then it’s almost inevitable that African migrants will be affected by whatever immigration policies the new administration implements.

Deportations to African countries are nothing new, as US Immigration and Customs Enforcement have routinely carried out removal flights to the continent. What would be different is the scale and the political landscape around them. There is a very good chance that significant numbers of African migrants will be returned to their countries of origin as part of a broader push against illegal immigration. In addition to migrants without status, should Temporary Protected Status (a humanitarian parole program) be rescinded, Africans in the United States under the program (which covers Cameroon, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan) would lose their work permits and protection from deportation. Any US mass deportation scheme is therefore bound to include African nationals.

As African governments await sit-downs with their new US counterparts in the departments of Treasury, State, and Commerce (as well as the US trade representative) to discuss AGOA and the G20, they may find that the US officials most eager to meet with them initially are from Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Department of Homeland Security, and US Customs and Border Protection.

As for Trump, his past comments on African migrants and the prevailing belief that he will take a more transactional approach toward the continent could mean that African governments that express reluctance to accept back migrants will face hurdles in future initiatives with the United States. Indeed, the first Trump administration sanctioned Eritrea, Guinea, and Sierra Leone for refusing to accept migrants deported from the United States.

The G20 Summit and AGOA renewal are rightfully at the forefront of every Africa watcher’s attention for 2025. Both offer unique, timely, and much-needed opportunities to relaunch US-African relations and commercial ties. But for the United States, domestic politics is king, and notably, reauthorization of AGOA was not included in Congress’s continuing resolution last month, despite a concerted effort by African diplomats and industry allies. In today’s Washington, there is a lack of political will for such a key piece of legislation on trade and investment with Africa, but when it comes to immigration policy, political will is omnipresent.  

For better or worse, the focus of US policy in the early days of Trump’s second term will be on immigration, and this focus will almost certainly extend to how the United States approaches African nations. With rising numbers of African migrants in the United States, it is inevitable that the US immigration debate will have a significant impact on wider US-Africa relations.

The United States and Africa will get to trade and finance, but only after seeing what US immigration policy has in store for the relationship first.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Immigration looms large over US-Africa relations in 2025 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This pledge reflects the United States’ heightened focus on securing supply chains for critical minerals, resources that play a pivotal role in the development of technologies from electric vehicles to solar panels to defense systems.

But Biden’s visit to Angola also underscores a bigger shift for the United States: both in its engagement with African nations and in its approach to the geopolitical competition for critical minerals unfolding in Africa. The Lobito Corridor exemplifies an approach to US engagement with Africa that prioritizes collaborative and equitable partnerships over exploitative models.

A new engagement strategy with Africa

The Lobito Corridor project is the United States’ largest effort to counter China’s presence in Africa.

China went on a notable buying and investment spree—solidifying its footprint in Africa’s mining sector by the early 2000s, particularly in the Copperbelt region in Central Africa. China owns or has a stake in fifteen of the DRC’s nineteen cobalt mines and has also made substantial investments in lithium production in Zimbabwe, giving China a significant advantage in the production of batteries and renewable energy technologies. Since China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, Beijing has established significant economic inroads in many African nations through investments in transportation, infrastructure, and energy.

While US interest in African mining slowed for decades, the United States is increasingly working with and investing in African countries to develop the continent’s vast mineral resources.

In 2022, the Biden administration and several partner countries, along with the European Commission, launched the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). This partnership aims to develop sustainable, transparent, and secure supply chains for critical minerals, with an emphasis on environmental, social, and governance standards.

Then in May 2023, the Group of Seven’s (G7’s) Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) took up the Lobito Corridor project; in September of that year, the United States and the European Union announced that they would be co-leading the project. The proposed rail project involves the construction of approximately 350 miles of new rail line in Zambia that will connect its northwest region to the southern part of the DRC. This line will ultimately link to track in Angola and grant Zambia access to the Atlantic Ocean. The project also entails constructing hundreds of miles of feeder roads along the corridor and renovating the 120-year-old Benguela railway.  

When completed, the Lobito Corridor will provide greater access to the global market for these critical mineral-rich economies by expanding export possibilities, boosting regional trade, and reducing the time it takes to transport minerals and other goods. Its construction will advance the United States’ economic interests by unlocking investment opportunities, thereby creating avenues for US businesses to diversify supply chains, establish partnerships, and contribute to the economic diversification of the region—as well as offer African countries a more collaborative and transparent alternative to the BRI. Additionally, the corridor will help facilitate westward trade flows of critical minerals needed for the energy transition via the Atlantic, whereas previously many mineral exports have tended to flow eastward for export out of Tanzania’s Dar es Salaam port.

Overall, the United States’ increasing work with and investment in Africa, particularly through the Lobito Corridor and the MSP, demonstrates a US commitment to fostering infrastructure that supports shared economic growth and strives for more equitable access to resources.

Who is involved in this ambitious infrastructure project?

The PGII’s Lobito Corridor project stems from the Lobito Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency Agreement, which was signed by the governments of Zambia, Angola, and the DRC in January 2023 to advance the growth of domestic and cross-border trade along the Lobito Corridor. Then solely a regional effort, its development has been bolstered by international cooperation with the United States, the European Commission, the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC).

In October 2023, the United States signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Zambia, Angola, the DRC, and the European Commission to kickstart the project. The MOU named the AFC as the lead developer of the rail line, and the AfDB also signed on—contributing $500 million and committing to help raise $1.6 billion in additional financing.

In February 2024, more than 250 business and government leaders from the DRC, Angola, Zambia, the European Union, and the United States—together with international investors and industry leaders—convened at the PGII Lobito Corridor Private Sector Investor Forum in the Zambian capital of Lusaka. This forum highlighted the importance of public-private partnerships for the project. These kinds of partnerships have the potential to foster mutual prosperity for US investors and African economies. Additional funding commitments to the Lobito Corridor project were made at the gathering. Perhaps most notably, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) announced a $250 million loan to the AFC to help support its efforts to develop and strengthen infrastructure across the African continent.

Most recently, at the 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29) in Baku, Azerbaijan, in November, the DFC’s board approved a loan of up to $553 million to the Lobito Atlantic Railway in Angola for the upgrades and rehabilitation needed to help make the transport of critical minerals more reliable. The DFC also committed $3.4 million in technical assistance to Pensana—a rare-earths processing hub located in the United Kingdom—to explore the possibility of a rare-earth mine and refining facility in the Lobito Corridor.

The Lobito Corridor project today

Within eighteen months of the United States’ initial commitment in September 2023, PGII partners had already allocated more than three billion dollars to advancing the Lobito Corridor, including investments in diverse sectors such as clean energy, transportation and logistics, agriculture, healthcare, and digital infrastructure. By leveraging both public and private financing—and committing to anti-corruption, transparency, and good governance—the Lobito Corridor project is designed to create employment opportunities, facilitate regional and global trade, and spur investments in clean energy, as well as agriculture, digital connectivity, and food security.

This significant investment has already catalyzed additional developments. In September, the AFC signed concession agreements with Angola and Zambia to support the railway project. The AFC was also awarded two million dollars in grant funding by the US Trade and Development Agency to complete the preliminary environmental and social studies for the project and ensure that the Lobito railway aligns with environmental standards and international best practices. These agreements lay the foundation for the subsequent, more ambitious phases of the project centered around rail lines that connect Angola to the DRC and extend the corridor into Zambia.

A model for future investment in Africa

The Lobito Corridor project underscores a growing recognition of Africa’s pivotal role in the global energy transition and marks a notable shift in how the United States engages with the continent.

The new model offered by the Lobito Corridor’s funding structure—which relies on a mix of public-private partnerships, grants, and concessional financing—differs significantly from state-led investments in infrastructure through China’s BRI, which has often drawn criticism for saddling African nations with unsustainable debt through opaque and unaffordable loan agreements. The Lobito Corridor, by contrast, is designed to minimize financial risk to participating African nations.

But the opportunity to lean into this shift in how the United States works with Africa could be missed once the new US administration and Congress take office in January 2025. President-elect Donald Trump’s policy record would suggest a more transactional approach to critical minerals development and infrastructure investment, with less focus on multilateral cooperation. In contrast, the Biden administration has emphasized partnerships with African governments and international bodies. But there is a chance that Trump might pursue more bold infrastructure projects like the Lobito Corridor, albeit with a stronger emphasis on advancing the United States’ strategic priorities, in line with his heavy emphasis on “America first” policies and his transactional approach to trade relationships.

The Lobito Corridor’s success depends on several factors, chief among them equity in partnerships, transparency, and the outcomes of the broader geopolitical dynamics at play. But if effectively implemented, the project could demonstrate the possibility of successful development strategies that promote collaboration, sustainability, and mutually beneficial outcomes—and thus redefine how the United States and other international actors engage in Africa.

Sarah Way is a graduate of the University of Colorado Boulder’s International Affairs Program with a specialization in Africa and the Middle East. Her research centers on the intersection of natural resources and development, with a specific focus on extractive minerals in Africa.

The post What to know about the Lobito Corridor—and how it may change how minerals move appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This intercepted arms supply speaks to a broader reality: Sudan’s war is far from a contained domestic struggle. While often framed as a “civil war” between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF, it is instead shaped by extensive foreign interference that prolongs violence. While foreign actors help drive Sudan’s suffering, an international effort to bring an end to the war—and bring needed aid to the people of Sudan—has been lacking. Unraveling the web of outside interests is essential to cultivating an adequate international response to this crisis.

Although Abu Dhabi denies doing so, there is ample evidence that the UAE has been supplying weapons and ammunition to the RSF. Before the conflict erupted, Dubai was already a key destination for the RSF’s gold smuggling, providing financial lifelines to the militia. There are also reports of the UAE covertly providing weapons to the RSF under the guise of humanitarian aid, as well as UAE-manufactured armored vehicles outfitted with French-designed defense systems. The Colombian passport is evidence of international mercenaries’ deployment, a hallmark of UAE operations in other regional conflicts. The UAE’s support—combined with its investments in mining and agriculture—signals a calculated bid to shape Sudan’s political and economic trajectory. This interventionist strategy mirrors those employed by the UAE in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict and in Libya, where Abu Dhabi expanded its influence through military aid and economic ventures.

The Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary organization, provides another example of foreign interference. Active in Sudan since 2017, Wagner secured lucrative gold mining concessions in exchange for political and military support to Omar al-Bashir’s regime. Wagner evolved into a key player in Sudan’s war, funneling weapons and aid to the RSF. Moscow has also deepened ties with the SAF, offering military aid in exchange for a naval base at Port Sudan. Adding to this, Sudan has become a proxy battleground for the Russia-Ukraine war, with reports of Ukrainian special forces targeting Russian operatives over the past year. Together, these dynamics reflect Russia’s broader strategy in Africa: exploiting instability to expand influence while profiting from resources and military alliances.

While Russia and the UAE dominate headlines, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia also shape Sudan’s conflict. Egypt, heavily dependent on Nile water security and historically aligned with Sudan’s military, cautiously supports the SAF as a counterweight to RSF-aligned actors. By providing military aid, Cairo seeks to protect its southern border and preserve regional influence while hosting diplomatic initiatives to facilitate ceasefires and a military-led transition in Sudan.

Turkey, meanwhile, has bolstered the SAF’s air capabilities. Following SAF chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s visit to Turkey in late 2023, Cairo reportedly delivered Bayraktar TB2 drones to the SAF. These deliveries, partly enabled by the rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey, included training for Sudanese personnel in Egypt to operate the drones. This reflects Ankara’s broader strategy to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, leveraging defense and economic partnerships alongside infrastructure projects to strengthen its foothold in Sudan.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia focuses on stabilizing the Red Sea corridor, hosting peace talks in Jeddah, and emphasizing soft-power initiatives—such as Red Sea tourism projects—to counterbalance the UAE’s militarized strategy for influence and to secure strategic advantages and investment opportunities.

Other regional conflicts have also played a role in shaping the crisis in Sudan. For example, during Libya’s post-revolutionary era, Darfuri rebel groups served as mercenaries—mostly for General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army. Even after Sudan’s October 2020 ceasefire, Darfuri rebels remained in Libya, drawn by the steady flow of financing and supplies that made conflict more lucrative than peace.

Haftar—a key ally of Egypt, the UAE, and Russia—is leveraging Sudan’s instability to expand his own influence. While sporadically making headlines for covertly supporting the RSF, he mainly focuses on rerouting resource flows into Sudan, reaping economic dividends and political capital vis-à-vis his many backers. Since the conflict’s outbreak, Haftar has also used Sudan’s refugee crisis to attract international aid, positioning his government in eastern Libya as a necessary partner for migration and humanitarian assistance. By posing as a stabilizer, he has gained support while fueling the very crisis he perpetuates.

Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby employs a similar strategy. As Sudan’s war drives more than 700,000 refugees into Chad, Déby appeals for international aid, emphasizing the strain on host communities. He carefully navigates the rivalry between Russia and the West, deepening ties with both to extract concessions and support. At the same time, he offers the UAE plausible deniability for its role in Sudan’s war, securing military backing to shore up his position amid mounting pressures.

Porous borders between Sudan, Chad, and Libya—across which people, arms, fuel, and fighters move—further embed Sudan’s war within a larger network of regional instability. Unlike in Libya, whose oil sustains a tenuous power balance, Sudan’s zero-sum contest over resources—combined with deep ethnic and regional grievances—amplifies its complexity.

Yet amid this web of external interference, Sudanese military elites have continued to gamble their nation’s future for the fleeting promise of dominance, leaving devastation in their wake. Conservative estimates say that the war has killed more than twenty thousand people—with other estimates significantly higher—and displaced more than eleven million. Refugees fleeing RSF-controlled areas face extortion, sexual violence, and exploitation while neighboring countries such as Chad, Libya, and Egypt struggle to manage the influx. Organized crime, including human trafficking, thrives in the chaos, compounding the suffering of the displaced. Sudan now faces famine and economic collapse in contested areas, leaving millions more vulnerable and deepening the crisis.

Despite these dire consequences, the international response remains inadequate. Arms embargoes are routinely violated, and sanctions targeting groups such as Wagner have proven insufficient. A coordinated global approach is urgently needed to disrupt the illicit networks sustaining Sudan’s war. Sanctions targeting foreign companies that finance or equip warring factions—particularly through gold smuggling—could curb interference. Enforcement of the US Magnitsky Act, its European Union equivalent, and similar frameworks could address human rights violations tied to external actors. Financial tracking to freeze assets linked to illicit networks, alongside stricter enforcement of arms embargoes, is critical to stemming the flow of weapons and resources. Mobilizing the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and appointing a UN special rapporteur for Sudan could provide much-needed oversight and diplomatic momentum.

Addressing the humanitarian fallout is equally critical. Refugees and displaced persons require immediate assistance, and neighboring countries need financial and logistical support. However, aid must be managed carefully to avoid inadvertently bolstering the networks fueling Sudan’s suffering. Efforts to combat human trafficking and protect vulnerable populations must also be prioritized.

International efforts must go beyond rhetorical condemnations and piecemeal sanctions. A unified strategy, combining economic, political, and diplomatic pressure—and drawing on lessons from conflict zones such as Sierra Leone and Liberia—should target all actors violating arms embargoes and profiting from Sudan’s instability. The European Union and United States should jointly commit to exposing these networks, declassifying information on violations, and holding complicit states accountable through targeted sanctions and public admonishments. Imposing tangible costs on violators providing arms, smuggling resources, or exploiting Sudan’s humanitarian crisis would curb interference and set a precedent for accountability. Only a unified and decisive approach can disrupt the ambitions fueling Sudan’s suffering and prevent the region from descending further into chaos.

Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Recent reports have indicated that President-elect Donald Trump is poised to recognize Somaliland. Such recognition would be beneficial for several reasons—it reflects the reality on the ground, acknowledges and rewards Somaliland for building a successful democracy, and could help deepen regional trade with key US partners such as Ethiopia. It could also encourage a pro-Somaliland cadre of nations to follow suit and would allow the United States to develop a beneficial security partner in a challenging region of the world.

However, the United States should also proceed with caution. Moving too quickly could destabilize the Somalia security sphere, empowering al-Shabaab and angering other US partners, such as Turkey, Egypt, and the African Union. Moving forward without bipartisan support could also give the impression that the matter of Somaliland’s recognition is backed exclusively by the Republican Party, jeopardizing the effort.

In lieu of recognition, the United States should consider deepening the US-Somaliland partnership across other sectors: for example, security, diplomatic, business, and trade. That would be a good first step, and such a partnership (even without full recognition) would still be positive for Somaliland.

Over the past eight years, Somaliland’s strategic location along the Gulf of Aden has led US officials from both the Trump and Biden administrations to look more closely at the US-Somaliland relationship. Somaliland is located at the intersection of several converging US interests, as it is host to hundreds of miles of peaceful coastline along one of the world’s busiest trade routes. It is also strategically located near Yemen, where the Houthis have become increasingly emboldened against US allies and disruptive for Red Sea maritime trade since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war. A deeper partnership with Somaliland would also allow the United States to keep a watchful eye on the conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as the fight against al-Shabaab in Somalia. It could also help relieve the military congestion in Djibouti, freeing up the United States to more flexibly operate against national security threats in the wider Red Sea security arena.

However, there are several factors that could hinder the prospects for an expanded US-Somaliland partnership. The United States’ focus on other regions, US relations with Egypt’s anti-Somaliland leadership, and the potential for Somaliland to become a partisan US political issue all risk derailing the potential benefits of deeper cooperation between Washington and Hargeisa.

Opportunity for renewed support

Under the first Trump administration, Somaliland was embraced by the United States to an unprecedented degree. Several officials working on Africa under Trump were advocates of recognizing Somaliland. Simultaneously, Somaliland was able to build bases of support with congressional Republicans and conservative policy institutions close to the president. Though Trump formally supported a “One-Somalia” policy (standard US policy, though often championed by Democrats), his National Security Council praised Taiwan’s recognition of Somaliland and the president withdrew US forces from Somalia, a sign interpreted by Somalilanders as a pivot toward a new Somalia doctrine in Washington.

Under the Biden administration, bipartisan US-Somaliland ties continued to grow. Top officials from Somaliland’s government, including a delegation led by Abdi, visited Washington to meet with leaders in Congress and the administration. Furthermore, both houses of the US Congress introduced key Somaliland-related legislation, including provisions for greater collaboration with the Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland in the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Additionally, the commander of US Africa Command visited Hargeisa, meeting with Abdi, in 2022; and a delegation of congressional staffers (from senior policy analysts to chiefs of staff) visited Somaliland in June. Just this month, US Ambassador to Somalia Richard H. Riley and Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa Major General Brian T. Cashman were in Somaliland for meetings with both Abdi and Irro.

However, Democrats in Washington continued to leave Somalilanders frustrated. Though bipartisan, most of the US support for recognizing Somaliland continues to be led by Republicans and conservative policy analysts. Republicans introduced pro-Somaliland legislation to Congress, but the bills were ultimately rejected in both the House and the Senate. Additionally, the Biden administration continued to favor Somalia over Somaliland rhetorically and in practice, once again deploying US troops to Somalia, training Somalia’s Danab special forces, and building new bases for the Somali military. The Biden administration also excluded Somaliland representatives from the 2022 US-Africa Leaders Summit and was publicly critical of the Somaliland government. 

With Trump returning to office in January and Republicans resuming control of the House and the Senate, many in Somaliland are optimistic that their cause could take a prominent place in US foreign policy. One can expect the Trump administration to again install pro-Somaliland aides and advisers to positions of influence. With wars raging in the Middle East, just north of the Horn of Africa, the new US administration may be motivated to deepen security ties with Somaliland.

With control of both houses of Congress, Republicans will also have a better chance of passing pro-Somaliland legislation. Additionally, countering Chinese influence is likely to be a cornerstone of Trump’s second-term foreign policy. Somaliland’s relationship with Taiwan—and rejection of Chinese engagement—could potentially therefore play a role in the years to come. What’s more, Trump has a proven track record of making untraditional foreign policy decisions, such as when he recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara in 2020 (a move that happened in the context of Morocco normalizing relations with Israel). While the context behind the Western Sahara case differs from that around Somaliland, Trump’s willingness to reverse longstanding US policy regarding Africa could favor Somaliland come January. The Trump administration is also likely to be frustrated with Somalia, where stalled counterterrorism efforts, an increase in al-Shabaab activity, and electoral reform issues paint Somalia as an unreliable partner. If Trump feels that the United States is not benefiting from its investment in Somalia, he may look for partners elsewhere in the region.

Challenges ahead

Nevertheless, it is the unpredictability of Trump’s politics that directly challenges Somaliland’s progress in its quest for recognition. Increasingly, isolationist foreign policy has become a trend within the Republican Party. On the one hand, questioning and challenging the institutions and precedents that hold back Somaliland’s recognition prospects may help its cause. But completely withdrawing from those institutions, or being unwilling to cooperate with them, could leave Somaliland, and the entire African continent, behind.

Engagement with Africa was not a pillar of the first Trump administration’s “America first” foreign policy. But the Biden administration pushed for the African Union to be a permanent member of the Group of Twenty (G20) and advocated for African nations to be given permanent seats in the UN Security Council. Based on his first administration’s foreign policy, Trump is very likely to deprioritize bolstering Africa’s inclusion in international institutions, as he will be focusing on the wars raging in Europe and the Middle East, challenges around the US-Mexico border, and increasing tension with China. For Somaliland to play a role in global affairs, and sell itself as a partner worth investing in, it will have to garner attention from the Trump administration at a challenging time.

Additionally, Egypt may be another major roadblock to Somaliland’s relationship with Trump. For several reasons—such as Ethiopia’s building a dam on the Nile River and the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by Somaliland and Ethiopia earlier this year—Egypt has become a major supporter of Somalia. Included in this support are weapons and training for Somalia’s military. Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Sisi also have a close relationship, with the former calling the latter a “good man” and claiming the Egyptian leader has done “a fantastic job” with his country in 2019. With Egypt under pressure internally and externally, Trump looking to quickly end the war in Gaza, and both Sisi and Trump looking to expand and deepen relations between the United States and Egypt and its partners, these two leaders are almost certain to strengthen their ties. It is unlikely that Trump would want to squander relations with Sisi over Somaliland in the near future.

Relatedly, as of last week, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to begin working on resolving their tension over the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU, which granted landlocked Ethiopia sea access. After talks on December 11, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to set up commercial arrangements that would allow Ethiopia “reliable, secure, and sustainable access to and from the sea.” However, it is still unclear whether these new commitments—negotiated by Turkey, a key partner to Somalia and Egypt—will impact the MOU and Ethiopia-Somaliland relations. However, if relations between Somalia and Ethiopia are to improve, the Trump administration may step further away from greater engagement with Somaliland out of concern over adding to destabilization in the region.

Longstanding US policy priorities—most importantly the fight against al-Shabaab—might also prevent the Trump administration from fully shifting course. Despite its many challenges, the Federal Government of Somalia still remains an active US partner in the fight against al-Shabaab and other militant groups in the Horn. Additionally, the recent rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham in Somalia, with the affiliate setting up base in Puntland, may cause the Trump administration to proceed with caution as it approaches Somalia policy. Moreover, at the end of this year, the African Union mission in Somalia is undergoing a transition, with new forces coming in and a new mandate taking place. This period of transition will be very fragile, and a new Trump administration may not be willing to make immediate moves that would jeopardize the success of any apparatus aimed at fighting Islamic militants in the Horn. On top of all of this, Somalia is currently facing its own internal problems, with tensions rapidly rising between the federal government and the government of Jubaland. All of this is to say that, while the Trump administration has good reason to engage with Somaliland, the fear of further destabilizing an already precarious situation in Somalia may cause the White House to use caution around the issue of recognition.

Finally, Somaliland’s core supporters in the US government are Republican politicians and conservative analysts in mostly right-wing policy spaces. While this support is important, if Somaliland becomes a focal point of Trump’s foreign policy, it risks its recognition becoming a partisan issue and could face backlash the next time the Democratic Party retakes the White House. If Somaliland works to bolster support for its cause only among the Republican Party, it could hurt its own quest for recognition.

The path forward

Despite these challenges, politics within Somaliland may provide the necessary boost to surpass the challenges of the moment. Following the election, it was announced that Irro and the Waddani party won with 64 percent of the vote. The election has been praised by international partners, including the United States, as being free, fair, and well-executed. Irro ran on the notion of unifying Somaliland amid internal division and on reforming the economy to stabilize the country’s finances. On foreign policy, Irro has expressed frustration with the lack of transparency around the memorandum of understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia and is expected to take a more nuanced approach to the agreement, while still supporting it. Moreover, he has stated a commitment to resolving the conflict in the eastern regions of Sool and Sanaag, an issue that has not only divided the country and hurt it economically but also drew concern from international partners, particularly the United States. Irro has expressed interest in continuing to build relations with Washington, and he offered Trump congratulations for his election victory.

The Irro administration will have a chance to reenergize relations with the United States and overcome any hurdles it might face with Trump. As far as US partners in East Africa, Irro could be an appealing choice for the Trump administration, as the new US president will be looking for opportunities to end conflict and resolve regional tension, and Irro is likely to lead a more nuanced approach to foreign policy. With key Trump allies having contributed to the praise of Somaliland’s elections, a successful democratic transition in the coming months will send a big signal to the incoming US administration of Somaliland’s reliability as a partner.

This isn’t to say that US-Somaliland relations still don’t face an uphill battle. Somalilanders will need to undertake robust and active diplomacy with both Republicans and Democrats to capitalize on the momentum of their election. The Irro administration will need to double down on its efforts to demonstrate Somaliland’s value to the United States and make a larger push to appeal to Democrats and diversify their base of support. Meanwhile, the United States needs to take Somaliland’s success as a democracy seriously. There are real opportunities for partnership across sectors. The United States must take advantage of Somaliland’s key strategic positioning against US adversaries, including China, or else lose the opportunity to develop a democratic partner in an important region.

Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.

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There is risk of a build up of demographic pressure as urbanization erodes traditional family-based elder-care systems. One billion Africans are expected to move from rural, largely multigenerational households to cities by 2050. National long-term care systems for senior citizens are few and far between, but countries such as Mauritius, Seychelles, and South Africa have established such systems for their senior citizens. Just 22.7 percent of elderly Sub-Saharan Africans receive pensions, leaving many in poverty.

To avoid a demographic disaster, African elderly populations will need more support—and that presents an opportunity for African governments, entrepreneurs, and investors, who all play a critical role in unlocking the economic potential of this “silver surge” and in creating a new model for elderly care.

More revenue for funding health and social care for the elderly lies ahead in Africa, as over the coming decades, more young people will enter the workforce in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the world, contributing to state revenue through income tax (although 72.6 million new jobs will need to be created by 2050 to employ all these young people). The continent, by continuing to improve its healthcare standards, could also recover some of the $426 billion in productivity lost annually to diseases among seniors.

Expanding pension coverage should be a top priority to ensure older Africans’ prosperity. While more than half of Sub-Saharan Africans do not have a traditional bank account and more than 80 percent of African employment is informal, African pension funds now manage assets totaling around $350 billion. Leading the way are countries such as Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, and South Africa, with Namibia’s public fund managing assets exceeding its gross domestic product. Governments should pass new laws both to expand access to financial services for all and to make pension contributions more attractive to citizens, by offering tax breaks or even matching contributions.

African pension funds can also help bridge the continent’s annual $100 billion infrastructure financing gap. Many funds focus on investing in listed equities abroad or in government securities due to a perceived lack of bankable local projects. But initiatives such as the Kenya Pension Funds Investment Consortium (which has committed $200 million to domestic infrastructure investment over five years) demonstrate what’s possible. Development financial institutions can help derisk local investments, channeling resources into unlocking growth and job creation.

In addition to passing policies that expand pension contributions, African governments should pass stricter regulations to ensure the safety and dignity of care home residents—the need for such regulations has been highlighted by high-profile scandals involving mistreatment and neglect in some care homes. While many African families prefer to care for their elderly at home, urbanization and demographic change will make some form of live-in residential care necessary for an increasing number of families.

The continent’s “silver economy” will create opportunities for social entrepreneurs to develop new models for care at home, avoiding the Western model which has resulted in institutionalization and loneliness. Innovators like South Africa’s Ernest Majenge, who designed an off-road wheelchair, and Nigeria’s Greymate Care, which connects families with vetted caregivers through an app, exemplify this potential.

The recent 2025 Africa Tech Festival demonstrated that African tech firms are well-positioned to create innovative solutions for the elderly. Companies such as BlackRhino VR and Ìmísí 3D demonstrate the potential for African virtual-reality experiences, with studies showing that group-based virtual-reality activities improve cognition and foster social connections among seniors. Zipline’s drone deliveries of medicine to rural elders in Rwanda demonstrate how technology can meet healthcare needs while driving economic growth.

Advances in artificial intelligence and wearable technology position firms, such as Nigeria’s Nextwear Technologies, to enable real-time health monitoring and personalized support for Africa’s older adults. Research suggests the market for wearable medical devices in Africa and the Middle East will surpass two billion dollars by 2030 and is set to further increase as the continent’s elderly population expands.

Africa’s demographic transformation presents an opportunity for African governments, innovators, and entrepreneurs. They could potentially reimagine aging and unlock economic growth associated with the “silver surge.” Africa can set a global standard for dignity and care, proving that its elders are not a burden but a source of prosperity and resilience.

Tom Bonsundy-O’Bryan is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and Meta’s head of misinformation policy for Europe, Middle East, and Africa.

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But reading between the lines of Trump’s campaign promises—and looking back on the president-elect’s first administration—reveals that Africa can expect substantial changes from the United States over the next four years.

Trump’s first term

In his first term, Trump’s isolationist strategy and “America first” foreign policy led him to advocate for Congress to reduce development programs. Most of them are in Africa. While administration officials such as Mike Pompeo and Trump family members—including his wife, Melania, and his daughter Ivanka—visited several countries in Africa, Trump never actually visited himself. During his four years in the White House, Trump welcomed only two Sub-Saharan African heads of state: Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria and Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya. His administration did not host a US-Africa summit; meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin spectacularly kicked off a series of Russia-Africa summits, the first taking place in Sochi in 2019.

Notably, Trump recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the territory of Western Sahara in 2020, making the Maghreb country a decisive player in the Abraham Accords. From this precedent, the kingdom could see its importance rise under Trump 2.0.

Seeing Africa through a lens of competition with China

Following substantial growth in China’s influence in Africa—and the weakening of US influence in Africa—the Trump administration created the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which was better funded than its predecessors. The first Trump administration also launched the Prosper Africa initiative, in an effort to “support US investment across the continent, grow Africa’s middle class, and improve the overall business climate in the region,” according to John Bolton, the national security advisor at the time. The fact that the announcement was made by the national security advisor clearly demonstrated that competition with China and Russia was a main driver of these new initiatives.

Since then, these adversaries have expanded their influence on the continent: Russia has confirmed its status as Africa’s largest arms seller and China has become Africa’s largest trading partner, now having five times more trade volume with Africa than the United States does.

Beyond Trump, the profiles of leading officials will say a lot about the intentions of the White House. From Marco Rubio (as secretary of state) to Elise Stefanik (as ambassador to the United Nations), Trump’s picks for influential positions suggest a clear interest in containing China, Russia, and other adversaries. That tougher approach could potentially be employed in the competition over influence in Africa.

Project 2025

While Trump has repeatedly distanced himself from the policy agenda known as Project 2025, he has since tapped people who helped craft the plan for various administration posts.

Project 2025, in its suggestions for the US Department of State, calls for a return of focus to “core diplomatic activities” and away from promoting policies focused on cultural values, for example ones that support LGBTQI+ rights. This would resonate positively in African countries that have criminalized LGBTQI+ people and activities, including in democratic countries such as Senegal or Ghana. Similarly, Uganda—which the Biden administration excluded from preferential trade treatment under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) due to concerns about gay rights—could find a more sympathetic ear from the Trump administration.

A business mindset

Trump’s focus on a transactional approach with Africa will likely place an emphasis on reducing development assistance in favor of expanding US-Africa business ties and fostering economic growth through free-market principles.

Renewals of AGOA and DFC in 2025 and the Export-Import Bank in 2026—if they occur—would provide signals of the direction Trump wants to pursue in his trade strategy toward Africa. The fate of certain large-scale projects such as the Lobito Corridor—US President Joe Biden’s major legacy in Africa—will also have to be monitored.

Arguing that the Paris Agreement places an unfair economic burden on Americans and their businesses, Trump withdrew from the international treaty on climate change during his first presidency. Africa, meanwhile, is paying disproportionately high costs for climate adaptation despite having contributed relatively little to the changing climate—and there remains a massive climate-finance gap. With reports indicating Trump is preparing to withdraw from the Paris Agreement again (jeopardizing global cooperation on climate change) and with African countries walking away disappointed from the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (also known as COP29) in Azerbaijan, Africa can likely expect to keep paying increasingly steep costs.

It’s also worth watching Elon Musk, the South African-born billionaire who has emerged as a close advisor to Trump and is keen to make gains in African markets, particularly with Starlink, and may offer new perspectives for reducing the energy divide. He was seen in New York, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September, meeting with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Namibian President Nangolo Mbumba, and Lesotho Prime Minister Sam Matekane.

Musk is set to play an influential role with the incoming administration, and his relationships with Ramaphosa in particular could take on outsized importance. South Africa’s relationship with the United States has become more complex due to its growing ties with Russia and China and its recent genocide case against Israel.

Security concerns

The next Trump administration will need to keep a close eye on various security situations in Africa.

One such situation is the one unfolding in Somaliland. In recent years, some Republicans have advocated for the recognition of Somaliland as an independent state in order to strengthen US strategic influence by the Red Sea. Recent reporting suggests that Trump may do so once in office—marking a considerable change in US policy toward the Horn of Africa.

But there will be other risks to watch closely. The war in Sudan is raging on, tensions between Rwanda and the DRC are rising, and the cease-fire in Ethiopia is fragile. Accordingly, it would be risky for Trump to erode the US relationship with Kenya, officially a major non-NATO ally of the United States, for the sake of US interests in East Africa.

In the Sahel, after Niger and Chad told the United States to remove its military bases, the United States will need to find new strategic locations that could host US defense systems vital for US security interests. Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire may be countries of interest for the new Trump administration.

Africa first?

Much has changed in Africa since Trump left the White House in January 2021. Most notably, African nations have an ace up their sleeve: a new centrality on the world stage that makes them highly courted partners around the world. Africa now has options. The ball is therefore in Washington’s court to engage on the continent. Otherwise, “America first” may take a backseat to “Africa first”—to US adversaries’ benefit.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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Faced with rising macroeconomic pressures and the aftershocks of global crises, many nations are scrambling to stay afloat. Unsustainable debt has too often prevented my country—Ghana—from achieving its full potential. Recently, Ghana has successfully restructured thirteen billion dollars in international debt, offering important lessons for countries facing such issues and the wider international financial community.

Lessons for debtor countries

Successful debt restructuring cannot be achieved until a country puts its house in order. An IMF-supported reform agenda that stabilizes the economy and lays the foundation for sustainable, inclusive, and long-term growth is essential. In Ghana, this meant restructuring domestic debt, bringing inflation down, strengthening social safety nets, increasing the flexibility of exchange-rate policies, and tightening monetary policy. Ghana has also used this debt restructuring to refocus our medium-term policy vision on green investments and development projects that will help us meet our climate goals while driving sustainable growth and the creation of new, well-paying jobs for the Ghanaian people. This will ensure that Ghana not only leaves debt challenges behind for good but reemerges in international markets stronger.

Second, Ghana’s proactive approach to negotiating with the IMF, bondholders, and the official creditor committee allowed for swift progress under the Group of Twenty (G20) Common Framework. The negotiation took just two years, making it the fastest to date. We adapted to move at the speed of the market and aligned Ghana’s internal bureaucracies to respond to creditor feedback and proposals more quickly. The involvement of African advisers with a deep understanding of financial markets, local knowledge, and key stakeholders, as well as the ability to navigate Ghana’s bureaucracy, was essential in getting the deal across the finish line—an important lesson for other countries.

Lastly, countries must prioritize transparency to regain the trust of their creditors, investors, and international partners. In Ghana’s case, we committed to regular disclosures of the public debt portfolio, increased our surveillance on debt issuance by public entities, and are digitizing debt management to enhance transparency and efficiency. These are all policies that have been supported and recognized by the IMF. These reforms helped boost the confidence of our private and international partners and show that Ghana is planning for long-term fiscal stability and sustainable growth. Ghana’s priority now is ensuring we do not need a future restructuring, which would damage the market confidence we’ve worked hard to restore.

Lessons for the international financial community

Ghana’s case shows that the G20 Common Framework is working out its growing pains. The Common Framework has come a long way in improving coordination between traditional and nontraditional creditors and accelerating the pace of restructuring. However, the international financial community must continue to increase these coordination efforts to further improve the Common Framework’s speed and efficiency. Waiting two years to regain access to international markets may not seem long, but it still hampers economic progress. Swift, transparent, and fair processes in the international financial system benefit not only debtor countries but also the global economy.

Additionally, many African nations are actively reforming and building stable, growth-focused economies, but they are limited by international perceptions. While political and geopolitical dynamics naturally influence credit ratings, as recognized by the United Nations Development Programme, it is imperative that these standards are applied fairly and consistently.  Credit agencies should ensure that they have sufficient on-the-ground resources to understand the complexity of the continent for their qualitative assessments of policies and geopolitical dynamics. The international financial community must reassess whether risk evaluations reflect today’s realities accurately or are influenced by misperceptions.

Ghana is a stable democracy and serves as an important trading partner on the global stage. Despite that, skewed risk perceptions continue to hinder access to capital, driving up interest payments and stifling development. These biases are costing Africa billions—funds that could be otherwise invested in infrastructure, healthcare, education, and economic growth.

The international financial community can foster a more equitable financial environment by working together to address these disparities. This will benefit African nations and, more importantly, contribute to a more robust and fair global economy. It is my hope that Ghana’s case can serve as a catalyst to continue accelerating the pace of restructurings and improving the international financial system so that it can be a driver of inclusive growth, poverty reduction, and global innovation. 

Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo is the president of the Republic of Ghana.

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The E3 model would offer the United States an advantage because of how starkly it contrasts with China’s method of partnership. China has been criticized for making usurious loans for infrastructure projects and demanding long-term commodity offtakes in the face of predictable defaults.

Despite China’s method of partnership, its offer of readily available, speedily deployed financing—for needed infrastructure and for to bolster foreign currency reserves—has appealed to African countries. Countries, including Chad, Angola, and the Republic of the Congo have formed such partnerships, fallen into deeper debt, and have over the past decade restructured their commodity-backed loans to China.

A key component of China’s model is its exploitation of the continent, which is well documented. With China’s practices—from low wages and unpaid overtime to unsafe working conditions to a lack of formal employment contracts—African workers find themselves without recourse, and debt traps reduce national autonomy. An E3 model, focused on value creation and equitable distribution of revenues, offers an alternative to neo-serfdom.

China’s rise—and the United States’ fall

Through its deals, China has managed to gain control over 60 percent of the mining and 85 percent of the processing of rare earths—an important subset of critical minerals used in technologies such as magnets and batteries.

China’s dominance of global rare earths has been achieved by design. In 1987, then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping announced to the world that “the Middle East has oil, but China has rare earths,” a reflection of China’s early understanding  that the coming boom in the electrified economy would open up the opportunity to gain leverage and control within a then nascent market.  

Then in the 1990s, Chinese state-owned firms started going on a buying spree globally, across rare earth elements and critical minerals more broadly. By 2022, Chinese firms had a stake in or owned fifteen of nineteen cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which produces over 70 percent of the world’s cobalt. In one notable deal—signed in 2007—China pledged roughly three billion dollars to infrastructure development and, in exchange, secured mining rights for Chinese firms, giving them access to deposits valued at $93 billion in the DRC’s south.

As this buying spree unfolded, US involvement in the mining and processing of critical minerals declined—most substantially seen in rare earths. For example, the Mountain Pass rare-earth mine in California (formerly the producer of a majority of global rare earths) closed in 2002 after a toxic waste spill, leading to a large decline in the share of US rare-earth processing that has not been recovered. In 1995, General Motors sold Indiana-based neo magnet producer Magnequench to several entities including two Chinese firms. The plant eventually closed, making the United States more dependent on importing magnets for use in technology and defense tools. And over the mid-1990s, the US National Defense Stockpile sold off most of its stockpiles of rare earths, and its funds were reallocated to other defense priorities over several National Defense Authorization Acts. Altogether, these events effectively extinguished the United States’ rare-earth element business. Meanwhile China, in less than ten years, built more than one hundred permanent magnet manufacturers by 2007. 

The loss of share in the rare-earths market shows how the United States must use targeted and precise policies to form partnerships—focused on rare earths but also critical minerals more broadly—with countries on the African continent, which is home to 30 percent of the world’s known critical minerals.

In forming these partnerships, the United States should harness innovations—and their economic, sustainability, and ethical advantages—to push forward a different model of partnership than China’s, with a focus on long-term strategic value creation.

Innovation for impact

In working together on critical minerals, deploying innovations can help ensure that African countries benefit from critical-minerals partnerships just as much as the United States does. Deploying refining capabilities to the continent can both drive down costs (economic and environmental) while affording the United States multiple sources of these critical minerals for a domestic manufacturing base. Doing so can also help align the continent, which has the world’s youngest population, with the rules-based international order.

Innovative practices in the recovery and refining of critical minerals include chromatography (which my company, ReElement Technologies, specializes in), a refining process in which minerals are separated and purified, requiring fewer chemicals and generating less waste. But there are also other technologies that show the United States’ capacity for innovating in this space: For example, there are electrochemical processes that can extract lithium from saltwater brines, using assets left over from oil and gas production. Ion-exchange-based technologies similarly extract lithium from brines with less impact on the environment. There are also emerging modeling systems using gravity and magnetic data processing as well as artificial intelligence to expedite the discovery of critical minerals. By harnessing technological innovation in African critical-minerals projects, the United States can reduce the inputs needed to power the modern economy, limit the impact of production on the environment, and make projects more cost efficient.

Africa on board?

A rising generation of African leaders is looking warily upon current partnerships, with some countries restricting the export of raw minerals and asking that firms invest in domestic value-added processing. For example, Zimbabwe (in 2022) and Namibia (in 2023) placed bans on exports of raw critical minerals. By promoting the E3 model, policymakers must assist with financing, political risk insurance, and free trade agreements, but private enterprise must lead in developing frameworks that are both economically viable and mutually beneficial.

There is a golden opportunity for the United States to reach out with an innovation-based approach. Sustainable trade beats occasional aid every time.

Chris Moorman is the chief commercial officer of the ReElement Technologies Corporation.

The post The US won’t gain a lead in the competition for Africa’s critical minerals without innovation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

European leaders, beyond their congratulatory messages, have shown concern about tariffs and the fate of Ukraine. Many Middle Eastern leaders have welcomed Trump’s return. African leaders in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, and beyond quickly congratulated Trump following his election victory, but more broadly, they could take a wait-and-see approach on the new administration.

Nevertheless, there is one African country in particular whose position in Washington and globally could be strengthened by the new Trump presidency.

Morocco is one of the United States’ oldest allies, having been among the first to recognize the independence of the young nation in 1777 when Sultan Mohammed III opened Morocco’s ports to US ships. In 1786, that implicit recognition became formal with the signing of a treaty of peace and friendship, which is still in force today. Designated a major non-NATO ally in 2004, Morocco also plays an important role in the United States’ activities, including in the international fight against terrorism.

Trump recalled these ties in December 2020 when, a few weeks before the end of his first term, he recognized Western Sahara as part of Morocco. A month later, the US ambassador to Morocco visited the Saharan city of Dakhla to begin the process of opening a consulate. But US President Joe Biden never made this project a reality. France’s new backing for Morocco’s claim (announced before the Moroccan Parliament during a historic visit to Rabat last month) could help Morocco accelerate this agenda.

Israel is among the countries that have recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara—it did so in 2023. A few years beforehand, in 2020, Morocco had joined the list of countries in the Arab world to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords. However, Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel and the resulting Israeli bombing and invasion of Gaza have provoked massive demonstrations in Morocco in support of the Palestinian population. Morocco also quickly sent aid to Palestinians trapped in Gaza and, at the United Nations, reaffirmed the need to respect Palestinian rights—but did not break off relations with Israel.

Undoubtedly, whatever Trump’s strategy in the Middle East, Morocco will have a central role. But under King Mohammed VI, the kingdom has established a future role for itself well beyond the Middle East.

To its south, Morocco, which returned to the African Union in 2017, continues to deepen its African footprint. France, taking note of Morocco’s role across the continent, has considered how it could rely on Morocco as a way to regain lost ground in Africa, particularly in the Sahel; Washington may follow suit. In November 2023, Mohammed VI announced a new initiative to “enable the Sahel countries [Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso] to have access to the Atlantic Ocean” via large-scale development projects.

This plan has an ambitious Atlantic component that will undoubtedly require coordination with the United States. That can be accomplished through the Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation, which was launched in September 2023 and includes many African countries, including Morocco and Sahelian countries such as Senegal and Nigeria. There are other initiatives and challenges on which the United States and Morocco can collaborate, including addressing the drug trade that sweeps from South America and through the Sahel—and is becoming increasingly connected to the terrorist movements that have been sowing chaos in the Sahel for twenty years. How the Trump administration approaches these Atlantic projects will determine the direction of the United States’ relationship with Morocco because of Rabat’s central role in these initiatives.

What Trump does on the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) may also impact Morocco’s place on Washington’s map. The Moroccan economy has benefited from the IRA, which is based, among other things, on supplies from countries linked by free trade agreements with the United States. (Morocco has had a free trade agreement with the United States since January 2006.) With the IRA in place, Chinese companies have even turned toward Morocco, making investments there to maintain access to US markets. Meanwhile, for Morocco, it was a winning system that promoted job creation on its soil and technology transfers and strengthened its position as a key player in the green industry in Africa. Morocco is counting on its economy, one of the strongest in Africa, to achieve its regional ambitions and strengthen its impact—it is already the second-largest investor on the continent, after South Africa.

But Trump working with the Republican-controlled Congress to repeal the IRA or restrict the policy could make Morocco less tempting for China, and thus result in fewer investments. In the event of growing tensions between the United States and China, Morocco could review its strategy of equidistance between these two powers.

With China now Africa’s leading trading partner—China now has five times more trade volume with the continent than the United States does—how Trump approaches the Moroccan partnership will say a lot about his intentions for Africa.

The Africa that is awaiting Trump’s second administration is not the one his first administration left in 2021. The continent’s landscape has been profoundly changed by the pandemic, the energy crisis following the war in Ukraine, a series of coups in the Sahel, the civil war in Sudan, the strengthening of the BRICS group of emerging economies, and much more. On each of these issues, Morocco has a voice that will carry weight in Washington.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post Why Morocco could see its importance to Washington rise during Trump 2.0 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Should US Vice President Kamala Harris get elected president this November, African leaders will already have some sense of what to expect, as she would likely follow policies from the current administration. Harris would walk into the office on day one with significant Africa experience having played an important role in supporting the Biden administration’s Africa agenda, served on the intelligence committee in the US Senate, and spent years prosecuting cases with international links.

But Harris has an important opportunity to build on those efforts to advance US-Africa policy. As a candidate for president, Harris has framed her campaign as a “fight for freedom,” suggesting that Harris may pursue a foreign policy that focuses on promoting democratic ideals, institutions, and norms globally. And while she has not detailed a foreign policy agenda, her focus on specific issues—domestically, those include abortion access and LGBTQI+ rights—suggests that she may lean toward an issue-based foreign policy that more forcefully supports human rights and anticorruption efforts, among other issues.

Using the power of the presidency

As a prosecutor and California attorney general, Harris pursued a wide array of cases and legislation with an international connection on issues including corruption, human trafficking, and more. Harris should bolster the US Strategy on Countering Corruption, released in December 2021, which could further empower executive branch agencies to combat corruption in Africa.

In remarks reflecting on her 2023 visit to Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia, Harris spoke about the power of partnership with African countries and the significant investment opportunities they offer, such as those in culture, music, and arts. Harris could use the power of the presidency to build on President Joe Biden’s 2022 executive order supporting African culture, creative industries, and digital innovation to strengthen economic growth and prosperity in Africa.

In what would amount to a visible paradigm shift, as president Harris should avoid repeatedly rescheduling visits to Africa, as Biden has done. She has garnered some momentum in showing Africa how much it matters to her with her March 2023 visit to the continent. Nevertheless, if she wins she should strongly consider making a visit to Africa within her first one hundred days (or at least meeting with African presidents in Washington) to show that Africa is not too far down her priority list.

Working with Congress

While US-Africa policy—especially on human rights, good governance, and US national security priorities—has historically been bipartisan, if she becomes president Harris must still make a deliberate effort to work with both Democrats and Republicans to advance critical legislation to her desk. Several US-Africa policy tools would require legislative action during her administration. 

The Prosper Africa Initiative, an ongoing initiative started in September 2019 to increase two-way trade and investment between the United States and African countries, should be codified into law to ensure its long-term success in supporting economic growth in Africa. On trade and investment, legislation is required to reauthorize the African Growth and Opportunity Act and the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in 2025 and the US Export Import Bank in 2026. The potential Harris administration must work with Congress to prioritize efforts to reauthorize and modernize such policies and agencies. For example, the DFC needs the power to make quicker financing decisions and the ability to deploy more robust resources to counter the influence of global competitors, expand partnerships, secure access to critical minerals, and ensure US national economic security objectives in Africa.

Personnel as policy

A successful US-Africa policy will come down to the people who are executing it. If she wins, Harris will need to ensure that she staffs up her National Security Council (NSC) with experts who are committed to showing that Africa is a presidential priority, to informing impactful policies, and to organizing meaningful senior-level visits to the continent and White House meetings with African leaders. Harris and her team should hire creatively for roles at the NSC, looking across the public and private sector to ensure the right people are in the right roles. 

For starters, Harris should ensure that the assistant secretary for African affairs at the State Department is one of the United States’ top diplomats and that he or she has the connections and skills needed to lead a dynamic workforce on day one. Beyond that, Harris should spend political capital with Congress to ensure the State Department can do the job asked of it. This includes having the ability to quickly staff historically difficult-to-fill positions across the Africa bureau and embassies, along with reducing reporting burdens for annual reports on issues like human rights and trafficking in persons and deemphasizing the kind of generic reporting and cables that can easily be found in open-source media—as these efforts take time away from more important tasks.

If she becomes president, Harris will need to tackle issues that have proven difficult for US policymakers and African leaders alike, ranging from promoting economic growth, to protecting human rights, to fighting corruption and beyond. To address these issues effectively, she will need a reinvigorated strategy that bolsters and modernizes previous efforts. Harris can’t miss the mark on Africa—after all, Russia and China are closely watching and waiting to exploit any missed opportunities.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post What Africa can expect under a Kamala Harris administration: A reinvigorated strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

If nothing else, former US President Donald Trump is a numbers guy. So when he thinks of Africa, he likely sees the incredible numbers reflecting the massive youth movement on the continent. And with that youth movement comes, of course, youthful energy and innovation.

That’s why, as a former Republican member of the US Congress from Minnesota, I am hopeful about what a second Trump administration would do for the United States’ relationship with African countries and organizations.

If Trump wins the presidency again in November, his next administration would likely seek to unleash as much of that youthful energy as possible. It would likely build on some important existing initiatives, some of them launched by other Republican presidents: efforts such as those led by the Millennium Challenge Corporation and its compacts with African countries, as well as creative initiatives from the US International Development Finance Corporation.

For US companies working on the continent, one could expect a second Trump administration to streamline processes, rules, and regulations to make doing business easier—and faster—than in previous years.

And under the leadership of Trump, who has vast experience in fields such as sports and entertainment, his administration would strongly support the partnerships that are developing all across the continent between the United States and Africa based on shared interests.

Given all those demographics that make Africa more important to a second Trump administration than to the first, another Trump term would likely focus on enhancing trade with the continent.

It’s more likely that the administration would form bilateral trade agreements than any multination deals. But there is no reason to believe that Trump would seek to weaken the African Growth and Opportunity Act. As it approaches its twenty-fifth anniversary, the legislation—up for reauthorization in 2025—is finding broader and deeper support in the business communities on both continents.

Indeed, whoever becomes the next US president will feel compelled to encourage such economic interaction to counter the massive presence of China on the continent. Given Trump’s pledge to impose substantial tariffs on Chinese imports to the United States, it is likely that the US-China bilateral relationship will become even more contentious with another Trump presidency.

There is already ample evidence that the US-China rivalry will intensify on the African continent, especially when it comes to the United States’ increasing focus on critical minerals and their supply chains.

Lastly, perhaps the elephant in the room when it comes to how a second Trump presidency might impact African countries, is how it will address the threat from terrorist groups. All across the continent, whether in Somalia or Nigeria or Libya, various forces of terror threaten not only African but global stability.

A second Trump administration would be likely to confront these threats forcefully and frontally, by strengthening US Africa Command and by assisting African antiterror efforts.

Regardless of which candidate wins the presidency, the next administration will enter into office with urgent challenges it will need to address on the African continent. African leaders will be watching to see whether the next US president can solve those challenges while simultaneously tapping new opportunities for partnership.

Vin Weber is a former US representative from Minnesota and a former advisor to several Republican campaigns for president.

The post What Africa can expect under a second Trump administration: A focus on the ‘numbers’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

No Western partner is swooping in to assist Mali’s overburdened military, as France once did. Mali’s current approach, reliant on show-of-force air strikes and support from the Russian Wagner mercenary group, has failed to deliver a decisive victory. In late July, armed groups killed as many as forty-seven Malian soldiers and eighty-four Wagner mercenaries near the Algerian border, sparking a new round of fighting.

There is only one way to avert further loss of life and territorial contestation: mediation. Algiers, which has brokered multiple hostage releases and peace deals in northern Mali—including the 2015 Algiers Accord—is no longer a welcome interlocutor. Bamako has accused Algiers of meddling in its affairs by meeting rebel leaders. Mali’s neighbors to the east, Burkina Faso and Niger, are too consumed with their own domestic security challenges to play a meaningful role. But Mauritania, Mali’s neighbor to the west, is in a unique position to foster peace.

The case for Mauritania

Mauritania is a relatively stable country, whose historic neutrality in regional disputes has earned it generally positive foreign relationships. Previous attempts at mediation have failed to install an enduring peace in northern Mali, largely because they were not inclusive. But with its neutrality, Mauritania has the ability to talk to all conflict parties in northern Mali—nonterrorist armed groups, terrorists, and government-aligned forces. This offers distinct advantages.

Mauritania’s president, Mohamed Ould El Ghazouani, was recently inaugurated for a second and final term, which he is serving concurrently with the African Union (AU) chairmanship. The AU has substantial convening power, and Ghazouani is an ideal mediator because of Mauritania’s neutrality, making the timing optimal for a push for regional peace.

Peace would advance Mauritania’s interests, too. Mali’s widening conflict has destabilized its eastern border. More than 55,000 Malians fled to Mauritania last year, flooding refugee camps. Mauritania accused the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and Wagner of crossing the eastern border and killing Mauritanians. Mediation offers Ghazouani an opportunity to stem the refugee flow and permanently end the violent cross-border incursions that have killed his constituents.

It won’t be easy

The two primary parties in the conflict, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Malian transition government, have opposing goals. JNIM is an al-Qaeda affiliate and aims to displace the government, whereas Bamako aims to eradicate terrorism and assert control over its territory. At the same time, an anti-government, nonterrorist armed group coalition—the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA)—is fighting for greater regional autonomy and economic opportunity. The CSP-DPA’s relationship with JNIM is unclear.

Regardless, none of the parties have given Mauritania consent to mediate, so Nouakchott will need to operate outside of a formal peace process, at least at the outset. This is risky but necessary. Bamako has gradually driven away French, European Union, and United Nations (UN) troops over the past few years, demonstrating its hostility to international stabilization efforts. The Malian transition government would probably reject a request to engage terrorist or nonterrorist armed group leaders.

The conflict still merits mediation. After months of fighting, no actor has achieved sustained momentum on the battlefield. There are clashes, of course, but the conflict is nowhere near over. The FAMa and Wagner have expended large amounts of munitions during offensive operations. These operations have displaced and killed northern civilians while failing to meaningfully degrade the capabilities of armed groups. Armed groups have withdrawn to more remote areas of the Sahara Desert, where they are expending scarce resources to survive. This cannot go on forever.

Ending the war

Here’s how Mauritania can bring all the parties to the negotiating table:

1. Open a direct line of communication with northern leaders

Mauritania is well-positioned to initiate contact with the leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups, given the historic relationship that its Beidane (White Moor) population has with Mali’s Tuareg population. The two ethnic groups have historically adopted similar migration patterns, and their personal, religious, and business connections persist to this day. Mauritanian citizens have maintained ties with populations in northern Mali by traversing age-old transhumance routes.

Mauritania should leverage these relationships and routes to initiate contact with leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups, many of whom are Malian Tuareg, without arousing suspicion. Once contact is made, Mauritania should arrange low-profile in-person meetings with select leaders of these armed groups to determine whether they are amenable to further engagement.

2. Persuade JNIM leaders to defect from al-Qaeda

Mauritania must clearly articulate the value of further engagement to leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups. JNIM is particularly important, as its members never reconciled with Bamako or laid down their arms. Their operations, as well as their continued recruitment of northern populations, made true peace impossible. JNIM’s leaders are thus critical to the installation of an enduring peace in northern Mali.

Mauritania can offer incentives for armed group leaders to engage in mediation. For example, it can offer to intercede with the Malian transition government on their behalf, push for pauses in military operations, and legitimize their bid for northern leadership.

JNIM’s Tuareg leaders may be receptive to the argument that, without this support, it will be impossible for them to evade persecution and exert true leadership over northern Mali, their homeland. Their ambition to secure leadership in their homeland predates JNIM’s establishment, after all. Ultimately, however, only engagement can reveal whether they are open to mediation.

Mauritania’s offer to mediate must come with conditions: JNIM’s Tuareg leaders must commit to disaffiliation with both al-Qaeda and JNIM. They must permanently cease all terrorist activity, and they must stop attacking civilians or permitting youth to serve as fighters. The leaders may choose not to accept these conditions; if that is the case, they must not be included in talks.

This step assumes that mass Tuareg defection from JNIM will not prompt conflict with one of its major factions, the Fulani-dominated Macina Liberation Front (MLF). Evidence suggests that the MLF will not instigate a violent conflict, as this would ultimately drain their resources. There is a strong incentive for the MLF to accept mass defection, and the risk of fratricidal conflict is thus low. It is far more likely that severing JNIM improves Mali’s long-term stability.

3. Solicit formal consent to mediate the conflict in northern Mali

Mauritania should make a formal bid to mediate this conflict. Ghazouani can arrange meetings with each conflict party and seek their consent to initiate multiparty talks. If the previous steps succeeded, leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups may have already agreed to talks. Ghazouani can thus “deliver” JNIM and the CSP-DPA to Malian officials. 

The Malian transition government will be difficult to persuade to enter multiparty talks. This year, the FAMa deployed and held territory in northern Mali. The recapture of Kidal in November 2023 was a major symbolic victory. Bamako may wish to continue fighting. If this is the case, the best strategy for engaging government officials would be to praise Mali’s strength.

Ghazouani should personally travel to Bamako to meet the interim president, Colonel Assimi Goïta. Ghazouani and Goïta are both military commanders who participated in coups d’état in their respective countries. Ghazouani is the elder of the two, and he has successfully navigated the transition from military to civilian leader. He can advise Goïta.

Ghazouani can praise Goïta’s leadership and make the argument that the Malian leader played a decisive role in bringing CSP-DPA and JNIM leaders to the table. He should also highlight the benefits of participating in multiparty talks. Settling the conflict in the north would allow the FAMa and Wagner to shift focus and dedicate more troops to the faltering counterterrorism campaign against the MLF in central Mali. The MLF recently launched a deadly attack against military facilities in Bamako. In light of this, Goïta may be receptive to this argument.

4. Seek international support for the peace process

After acquiring Goïta’s consent, Mauritania should seek backing from the international community and begin planning the first round of talks in Nouakchott. Ghazouani can capitalize on his position as AU chairman to form a Northern Mali Contact Group. The contact group would help coordinate, fund, and execute programming in support of negotiated outcomes of the multiparty talks.

It is very important that the group balance different perspectives and international alliances. Mali’s military junta swapped the country’s Western security partners for Wagner, and Bamako would object if the group contains a disproportionate number of Western states. Ghazouani’s initial efforts should focus on the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Two are not part of the West, and all are involved in regional initiatives.

Mauritania’s neutrality affords it positive relations with all the UNSC permanent members. Accordingly, it is well-equipped to navigate any tensions among them. It must emphasize that the permanent members have a common interest: improving stability. This is only achievable if they collaborate.

Within North and West Africa, Ghazouani should focus initial efforts on recruiting former members of the Algiers Accord Monitoring Committee: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania. Morocco should be included as well, to avoid upsetting the regional balance of power. These six states all stand to benefit from a peaceful and secure northern Mali.

Once the Northern Mali Contact Group is established, Ghazouani and the AU should focus on coordinating, funding, and executing programs in parallel to the multiparty talks. The parties to the conflict are extremely sensitive to external meddling. The Northern Mali Contact Group must keep the parties’ goals at the center of this deliberative process.

Parting shots

This is an ambitious concept, but it seizes upon the many advantages afforded by Mauritania’s current position. It generates momentum for multiparty talks by engaging terrorist and nonterrorist armed group leaders. It then uses their willingness to negotiate as a bargaining chip with which to compel the government to permit multiparty talks. It concludes by seeking external backing.

Considering and including representatives from all conflict parties in northern Mali is the pathway to a more durable, inclusive political settlement that brings peace to a region historically beset by violent conflict.

Jordanna Yochai is a defense analyst, whose portfolio includes the West African Sahel. She is currently on leave from the Department of Defense, pursuing a master’s degree at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA).

The positions expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the US Department of Defense. The US Department of Defense does not endorse the views expressed in hyperlinked articles or websites, including any information, products, or services contained therein.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post Mauritania should mediate in Mali. Here’s how. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Replenishing the IDA would provide several economic, social, and security benefits.

In the 1950s, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. It was a major recipient of concessional funding from the IDA. South Korea’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 1960 was just $158, but in 2022 it was $32,254. Within a decade of receiving concessional funding, South Korea turned its economy around, became a donor to the same fund, and is now one of the richest countries in the world. South Korea’s story is a timely and powerful reminder of the transformative potential of international development.

Concessional finance works, and it benefits everyone. Decades of evidence back this. Since it was created by the World Bank, the IDA has helped lift millions out of poverty, fostered inclusive growth, increased school enrollment, expanded health services, built government capacity, and strengthened regional cooperation. The economic devastation created by the COVID-19 pandemic might feel like a thing of the past, but these funds provided life-saving support throughout those years.

And as a result, thirty-six countries have graduated out of being recipients of these funds. Many of them are now themselves donors. But despite that progress, nearly 700 million people still live in extreme poverty today, mostly in Africa. They face unprecedented challenges that the next phase of the fund—which is up for replenishment at the end of this year—can help address.

For example, these funds can help propel job creation and economic transformation. In 2012, according to the World Bank Group, the GDP per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa was $1,819. In 2022, it was $1,701. It’s been a lost decade of African growth. The next decade must be different. With appropriate funds, African countries could invest in an educated and healthy workforce, especially among women and girls, including by introducing measures that reinforce their right to determine when and how many children to have. And African countries don’t have to rely just on concessional financing: These funds can work hand in hand with the private sector arm of the World Bank to create jobs, expand markets, bring clean and affordable energy to the 600 million people who currently go without, and accelerate the digital transition.

Adapting to climate change is also a major challenge that is not contained by countries’ borders. In April, African leaders met in Kenya to discuss the next phase of the fund. Days later, heavy rains covered 80 percent of Kenya, which caused floods, landslides, and significant damage. Nearly 200,000 people were displaced. Extreme weather events like this are increasingly common, especially in Africa. And without urgent action to adapt to them, a further 130 million people could be pushed into extreme poverty by 2030. A significant replenishment of IDA would offer more support to countries to help them understand the risks of climate change, protect critical infrastructure, better prepare for crises, and hardwire adaptation into their development.

Adequate funding would also massively contribute to preventing conflict and forced displacement and creating the right incentives for peace. By 2030, nearly 60 percent of extremely poor people will be living in fragile and conflict-affected situations. These countries face overlapping crises, which are pushing forced displacement to record highs. The number of people needing humanitarian assistance has more than doubled since 2018.

This is why African leaders have called for an ambitious replenishment for IDA21. The business case is strong: This funding can leverage capital markets, which would turn every donated dollar into over three dollars of support to low-income countries. And while donor countries face many pressures, it is paramount that these contributions are seen for the strong economic, social, and security benefits they provide for everyone.

That shared responsibility extends to the recipient countries. They must make the necessary decisions (oftentimes difficult ones), implement reforms, and invest their own resources in development priorities. But the World Bank must also play its part. With each replenishment, the fund has become more complex, which has introduced heavy requirements for client countries. The World Bank is aiming to reverse that trend, by shifting our incentives from the loans and money we provide to the development outcomes we can help achieve, to reach the most marginalized people and to ensure that every single dollar goes as far as possible.

Abdoul Salam Bello is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and executive director of Africa Group II at the World Bank Group board of directors, where he represents twenty-three African countries.

Vel Gnanendran is the executive director of the World Bank Group representing the United Kingdom.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post The days of multilateralism are not behind us appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Figures put together by the World Bank illustrate this surge: between 2019 and 2022, over 160 million Sub-Saharan Africans gained broadband access. From 2016 to 2021, internet users in the region increased by 115 percent, and from 2014 to 2021, 191 million people made or received digital payments.

While these digital advances are promising, they also come with significant risks in the form of cyber vulnerabilities. Threat actors—individuals, organized groups, and even countries—are becoming increasingly sophisticated and are propelling a rise in cybercrime. In addition, digital systems can be compromised by unintentional acts and errors, as seen in the recent CrowdStrike incident, in which a single corrupted software update triggered a chain reaction, affecting multiple sectors and regions.

International institutions and governments are becoming increasingly aware of this reality, driving the development of cyber policies across Africa and beyond. Governments of countries such as South Africa, Kenya, and Mauritius have taken early steps with national frameworks, while regional actors (notably the African Union) and global organizations such as the International Criminal Police Organization have introduced strategies and initiatives to strengthen defense efforts across the continent.

While these initiatives are important, grand strategies and policies often lack practicality, especially for African firms with limited capacity. In resource-constrained environments, core and basic practices are often easier to achieve than comprehensive frameworks. Thus, to foster a more secure continent, organizations engaging in the digital sphere—including businesses, nongovernmental organizations, government bodies, and more—should first be encouraged to implement basic cybersecurity measures to identify, protect, and recover critical assets.

Despite the increasing use of advanced and complex technologies like artificial intelligence, basic security measures remain surprisingly effective at diminishing the likelihood of cyber threats and mitigating their impact. A significant portion of cyberattacks can be prevented through the implementation of fundamental cybersecurity measures, as shown by the Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report and Microsoft Digital Defense Report. By implementing basic safeguards and preparing for recovery when critical assets are compromised, African organizations and corporations of all types can greatly diminish the impact of cyber threats:

• Create a comprehensive inventory of assets: The foundation of effective cybersecurity lies in knowing what to protect. Organizations should inventory all systems, devices, and data assets. They should document relevant data elements to facilitate categorization, risk assessment, and prioritization. Outdated or unauthorized systems are common in remote offices, making a thorough inventory crucial.
• Limit access rigorously: Organizations should restrict system access to essential personnel and enforce multi-factor authentication. In Africa, where mobile devices are often the primary means of internet access, secure authentication is especially important.
• Devise an application whitelist: It is important to allow only approved software in systems, as doing so prevents the execution of unauthorized or malicious programs. This is particularly valuable in regions of Africa where pirated software is prevalent and users might be tempted to install unauthorized applications due to resource constraints. Only allowing approved software would also reduce risks associated with unauthorized or outdated software.
• Standardize security configurations: Organizations should enforce uniform security settings across systems, which would minimize vulnerabilities and simplify management, ensuring consistent protection even in remote locations.
• Proactively deploy patches: It is critical to promptly address software vulnerabilities systematically with patches. In areas with limited connectivity, creative solutions for distributing and applying patches (such as using local caching servers or scheduling updates during off-peak hours) can help ensure updates are applied.
• Develop robust plans for backups and recovery: Developing, regularly updating, and testing recovery plans tailored to the most critical threat scenarios is essential for minimizing downtime when a disruption occurs. Organizations should consider both on-site and off-site backup solutions, taking into account local regulations and data sovereignty issues that may affect where data can be stored.

Governments play a crucial role in fostering the widespread adoption of cybersecurity practices. They can leverage various policy tools to incentivize organizations, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, to prioritize cybersecurity. Tax incentives for cybersecurity investments can make implementation more financially viable for both local and foreign companies operating within the country. These incentives could include tax credits for cybersecurity expenditures, accelerated depreciation for security-related hardware and software, or reduced corporate tax rates for companies meeting certain cybersecurity standards. By extending these benefits to foreign investors, governments can also attract international expertise and capital to bolster the country’s cybersecurity infrastructure.

The basic cybersecurity practices listed above not only protect against common threats but also bolster organizational resilience, drive innovation, and contribute to a more secure digital ecosystem. They are practical and balance immediate needs with strategic goals, making robust cybersecurity more accessible. By laying this foundation, African organizations of all sizes can build their cybersecurity programs, contributing to a safer and more resilient digital world.

Yasmine Abdillahi is the executive director for security risk and compliance and the business information security officer at Comcast.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Nine months later, the situation has been exacerbated by decisions made by countries outside of the Horn, such as Egypt’s signing of a security agreement with Somalia. The agreement includes the delivery of weapons, troops, and military hardware, the first tranche of which was sent to Somalia on August 27. The involvement of other players in the Horn of Africa’s security landscape is a prime example of how middle-power politics and diplomacy in one region could, over time, create a tinderbox of conditions: one in which even a small mistake could cause a rapid escalation.

A nine-month downward spiral

In 2018, Ethiopia and Somalia had seen a détente in relations thanks to Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed’s attempt to reshape regional alliances and exert Ethiopian influence. But the MOU—which Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in an address days after the signing, said is a denial of his country’s territorial sovereignty—has set back nearly all progress made.

Somalia has reacted in various ways: In his address, Mohamud declared Ethiopia one of the greatest enemies of the state, on par with Al-Shabaab. He also signed a law that he said nullified the MOU. In the nine months that followed, negative rhetoric against Somaliland worsened, and Mohamud began a diplomatic blitz to rally support against the MOU. Nevertheless, the MOU lives on, with Somaliland and Ethiopia strengthening their relations, exchanging ambassadors, training security forces, and regularly setting up meetings between leaders.

Over the past nine months, other countries have made moves that have had implications for the already inflamed turmoil in the region. In February, Turkey and Somalia, reaffirming their long-standing security partnership, signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. The agreement is formally aimed at helping “Somalia develop its capacity and capabilities to combat illegal and irregular activities in its territorial waters,” but no doubt also serves as a counterweight to any growth in Ethiopian naval capabilities. Upon signing this deal, Somaliland warned Turkey against any form of naval deployment in its territorial waters; but in July, Turkey’s parliament approved a deployment of the Turkish military to Somalia (including Somalia’s territorial waters). Beyond hard power, the Turks have been flexing their political muscles in the Horn, not only offering vocal support to Somalia following the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU but also hosting negotiations between Somalia and Ethiopia at Abiy’s request. The negotiations in Ankara amounted to little success.

Starting in January, Egypt was a vocal opponent of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has spoken up for Somalia, declaring that “Egypt will not allow anyone to threaten Somalia or affect its security.” Following the signing of the MOU, Egypt hosted Mohamud for high-profile meetings with Egyptian and Arab League officials in January, and since then, Sisi has been a staunch Somalia advocate. In August, Somalia and Egypt signed their security agreement.

There are several likely reasons that can explain why Egypt is strengthening its ties with Somalia: For example, the countries’ shared Islamic identity and Arab League affiliation, Egypt’s genuine desire to support Somalia in its fight against terrorism, or the trade opportunities that could come from a safer Gulf of Aden. Nevertheless, a significant motivation for Egypt is likely its animosity with Ethiopia. The two countries, among the largest military and economic powers on the African continent, have been at odds since 2011, when Ethiopia began construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile River. While Ethiopia argues the dam would generate significant economic and development gains for the country, Egypt asserts that the dam jeopardizes its access to water and threatens Egyptian agriculture, a major part of its economy. Despite many rounds of negotiations, Egypt and Ethiopia have yet to find a solution, pushing Egypt to look for additional channels to pressure the Ethiopians. Adding to the pressing nature of this conflict, the Egyptian foreign minister said on September 1 that he had written to the UN Security Council with serious concerns about Ethiopia’s approval of the fifth phase of dam construction.

The Al-Shabaab throughline

Throughout all of this, Al-Shabaab has grown stronger and still poses a threat to all the countries of the region. Despite Mohamud having launched what he called in 2022 an “all out war” against the militant group, Al-Shabaab has regrouped and made significant gains since the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU, with reports saying the group has had an influx of financial capital and a surge in recruiting, particularly drawing in people who do not like Ethiopia. In February, Al-Shabaab attacked an Emirati-run military base in the region, and the following month attacked several Somalian military sites in the Lower Shabelle region. In June, it was reported that US intelligence learned of discussions between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab about the former providing weapons to the latter. In August, Al-Shabaab killed thirty-two and injured more than sixty in a suicide bombing at a beach in Mogadishu.

At the same time, the current international mandate to fight Al-Shabaab, the African Union (AU) Transition Mission in Somalia, is in the final stages of its drawdown, and a proposal was submitted to replace it with the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) on January 1, 2025, pending approval by the African Union in November. Though Ethiopia has played a massive role in fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia—with three thousand troops deployed under the current AU mission and 5,700 troops deployed throughout the Somali security sphere—Somalia requested that Ethiopia not contribute forces to AUSSOM and said it would expel Ethiopian troops from Somalia unless it cancels the MOU with Somaliland. Meanwhile, Egypt plans to commit five thousand troops to AUSSOM at the start of the deployment and another five thousand troops separately.

This is a slap in the face for the Ethiopian troops who sacrificed over the past nineteen years in the name of regional security. For the Egyptians, this is an opportunity to exert regional influence and pressure the Ethiopians. Moreover, regional infighting among political leadership risks the viability of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia ahead of its pivotal transition to AUSSOM. Lack of cooperation between Ethiopia, Somalia, Egypt, and Somaliland undermines the effectiveness of the counterterrorism effort—and a weakened counterterrorism environment is fertile ground for Al-Shabaab to gain footing in its efforts to destabilize the Horn of Africa.

What to expect in the short-term

In the near future, regional tensions bring into doubt the future of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU. Ethiopia took a big risk by embarking on a deal with an unrecognized state. Though the risk could produce a high return on investment—increased trade revenue in the region, greater security in the Gulf of Aden, and for both Ethiopia and Somaliland a boost to national pride—the pressure is on for Ethiopia to take a different path. Despite progress with Somaliland, there is still room for Ethiopia to walk its commitments back. Already bogged down in conflict in the Ethiopian region of Amhara and scarred by his mishandling of the war in Tigray, Abiy is looking for a win in building the Ethiopian navy back up. Yet facing pressure from actors on all sides, he may be keen to look for another avenue to naval power, such as Djibouti’s recent proposal to give Ethiopia access to a new port and trade corridor. Supporters of the Somaliland MOU must think strategically about how to ensure the reward of coastal access is worth the risk posed to Ethiopia, and all eyes should be focused on the next round of negotiations in Ankara.

If Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia all continue down this path, there may soon be a situation in which Ethiopian and Egyptian troops are stationed opposite one another along the Somalian border, the Ethiopians in their territory and the Egyptians in Somalia as a part of AUSSOM. With two powerful militaries stationed across from each other, increased proximity heightens the risk, even if small, that mistakes could escalate into skirmishes or worse—interstate conflict in the Horn. Even if Egypt and Ethiopia were to go to war directly, it’s easy to fathom a situation in which the various regional players end up on different sides of proxy wars. Conflicts in and near the Horn of Africa have long been hotbeds for proxy conflicts, as typified by the ongoing Sudanese civil war.

Instability between regional countries could also empower Al-Shabaab to escalate its aggression in the Horn. The militant group has benefited from the past nine months of instability, and periods of transition between military deployments are always fragile. According to the nonprofit organization Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, the first nine months of 2024 have already seen 127 events of violence targeting civilians perpetrated by Al-Shabaab, with 187 reported fatalities. This year has also seen an increase in recruitment efforts by the militant group, fueled by the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU. With Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia at odds, it will be incredibly challenging to successfully transition the current mission to AUSSOM without things falling through the cracks. Moreover, if Ethiopia (with its extensive experience fighting Al-Shabaab) does not contribute to the deployment, a critical base of institutional knowledge will be missing. An emboldened Al-Shabaab with ties to the Houthis, in a region where leaders are unable to cooperate with each other on matters of security, would pose a threat to countries around the world. If left unmanaged, there could be much larger consequences for the international community down the line.

Looking toward the future

Though the moment feels catastrophically tense, increased violence is not inevitable. Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia may walk their rhetoric back, negotiations may succeed in Ankara, and the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU could still go through and lead to many positive outcomes for the parties and the region. Yet those invested in the Horn of Africa must keep a close eye on how things develop. Though different in many ways, the leaders of the countries involved in Horn geopolitics share one thing in common: They are all opportunistic leaders who are looking for a chance to gain the upper hand in a battle for power, influence, and opportunity at a time when the global system is under immense strain.

Ultimately, noncooperation in this part of the world will lead to many lost opportunities. Immense potential in the Horn remains untapped while the region suffers from clashes. Restoring peace to the region, reducing the threats posed by violent extremism, addressing critical challenges around food and energy security (amid climate change, no less), and harnessing the political and economic opportunities of the Red Sea all depend on greater collaboration and cooperation—not fragmentation and hostility. Cooperation will not only benefit the people of the region and the security interests of the international community but will also address the needs of those same leaders looking to stitch themselves into the fabric of their countries’ national ethos.

The past decade has seen a rise in middle-power politics around the world. The situation in the Horn of Africa is not unique, but it is a prime example of where this new form of competition could serve as a tinderbox, igniting regional war, if not handled properly.

Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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However, not all news surrounding the launch was positive. Shortly after liftoff, footage circulated appearing to show suspected toxic rocket debris had fallen over a populated area in Guizhou province, which lies next to the launch site’s province. This was not an isolated incident. In December 2023, footage emerged showing what appear to be rocket boosters falling to the ground in the Guangxi region, with one booster landing near a house following the launch of new satellites (via a Long March 3B rocket) from the same launch center. On June 30, Beijing Tianbing Technology Co. (also known as Space Pioneer) accidentally launched its Tianlong-3 rocket during a test, causing the first stage of the rocket to leave the launch pad and crash in a hilly area of Gongyi. The incident, which caused a local fire that was subsequently extinguished, was notable because it involved an unplanned flight and crash by a rocket that at the time was under development. These incidents show there are considerable safety concerns associated with rocket launches near populated areas.

The search for safer and geographically advantageous launch sites has turned global attention toward Africa. Launching rockets in remote areas minimizes the risk of explosions, falling debris, and environmental impacts such as pollution and wildlife disturbance. These remote sites provide clear flight paths, large safety zones, and the space for necessary infrastructure for safe and efficient operations, ensuring minimal risk to human life and property. Additionally, Africa’s proximity to the equator brings with it a “slingshot effect” for rockets, helping satellites reach geostationary transfer orbit (the optimal initial placement for geostationary satellites) with less fuel and costs, and prolonging the lifespan of the satellites.

The quest for African launch sites is creating new geopolitical dynamics. In February 2021, Turkey’s space program, which has plans for a moon landing by 2028, proposed building a rocket launch site in Somalia. This East African nation hosts Turkey’s largest overseas military base. The interest in Somalia isn’t new; for example, in the 1960s, France considered using the country as a spaceport due to Somalia’s equatorial location.

In January 2023, Djibouti signed a memorandum of understanding with Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group Limited and the Shanghai-based Touchroad International Holdings Group, committing to jointly develop a spaceport in the northern Obock Region. This project, estimated to cost one billion dollars, is expected to take five years to complete, with Djibouti’s government providing at least ten square kilometers of land under a minimum thirty-five-year lease. This is not China’s first quest for dual-use infrastructure development in Djibouti. China operates a military base in Djibouti that opened in 2017 with goals of anti-piracy and freedom of navigation but has since expanded to logistics, supported by up to two brigades of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). China’s expanded role in Djibouti, seen reflected in the spaceport project and the military base, is one example of China’s growing ambitions in space exploration and infrastructure development in Africa—and its larger strategy to grow its influence on the continent.

In 2021, Longshot Space Technologies Corporation (a hypersonic launch startup from California), in collaboration with the Viwanda Africa Group, commissioned a report on the viability of establishing a spaceport in Kenya. The authors of the report—engineers from a couple of Kenyan universities—concluded that building a spaceport in Marsabit County was “highly feasible” and listed other towns and counties as potential sites including Laikipia, Kilifi, Tana River, Isiolo, Turkana, and Narok. Kenya already hosts the Italian-owned Luigi Broglio Space Center, which was built in the 1960s by Sapienza University of Rome’s Aerospace Research Centre and the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In 2020, Kenya ratified a new deal allowing Italy and third parties to use the multi-billion-dollar facility for an annual fee.

Africa has held strategic importance for other critical space missions and infrastructure. In 2018, China and the Arab Information and Communication Technology Organization opened the China-Arab BeiDou Center in Tunisia, marking China’s first overseas center for its BeiDou Navigation Satellite System. In 2022, NASA renewed its lunar exploration partnership with the South African National Space Agency with a communication site in Matjiesfontein, South Africa, which will support NASA’s Artemis missions. In 2023, the Rwanda Space Agency partnered with ATLAS Space Operations (an American company) on a teleport, a type of facility used to connect to and communicate with satellites, in Rwanda. The teleport features a 9.3-meter antenna for lunar mission communications. Meanwhile, Russia handed over a space debris tracking system to Nigeria and commenced similar work in Tanzania.

While still developing, the African space sector has shown its potential as a partner in space missions. The continent’s geographical advantages and growing technological capabilities make it an attractive location for spaceport development. The establishment of spaceports in Africa could bring significant economic benefits, including technology transfer, increased investment, and job creation across various sectors, from construction to research and development to aerospace engineering. Those benefits make collaboration on space missions a compelling proposition for African nations.

Opportunities for the United States

In 2023, the United States conducted 103 space-mission launches, up from seventy-six the previous year; two-thirds of these launches took place at Cape Canaveral in Florida, according to an American Enterprise Institute report, raising concerns about the site’s capacity to handle increased traffic without affecting support services from the US Space Force and regional air traffic. This surge led lawmakers to advocate for alternative launch sites to relieve pressure on heavily used spaceports in the United States. Lieutenant General Philip Garrant, the second commander of Space Systems Command, emphasized the need to upgrade existing infrastructure and explore new sites to enhance resilience and mitigate risks from adversaries and natural disasters.

The environmental impacts of US rocket launches are a growing concern. Conservation groups filed a lawsuit against the Federal Aviation Authority in May 2023 for its approval of SpaceX’s operations at a launch pad in the area of Boca Chica, Texas. The groups argued the operations were approved without adequate environmental review, citing debris and environmental impact incidents. These legal and ecological challenges underscore the pressing need for more strategically located launch sites.

If the United States works with African countries to establish rocket launch sites, that collaboration would offer substantial potential for advancing space ambitions—both for the United States and the partner country in Africa—and strengthen bilateral partnerships. African spaceports, strategically located and equipped with the necessary infrastructure, could also serve as hubs for international launches, enhancing efficiency and reducing the operational costs of global space missions. Joint investments in space infrastructure would be mutually beneficial, creating opportunities for US companies to access emerging markets and expand their global footprint.

Success in this collaboration, however, is not guaranteed: Regulatory cooperation is crucial, and the United States should work with African nations to harmonize regulatory frameworks, ensuring that all partner countries comply with international standards and foster a conducive environment for investment and innovation. This would facilitate the integration of African spaceports into the global space economy, attracting more international launches and partnerships. Environmental sustainability should also be a key consideration when developing new spaceports. Modern spaceport designs must minimize ecological impacts, such as those caused by pollution and debris.

The United States can benefit from Africa’s growing technological infrastructure and talent pool. African universities and research institutions increasingly produce skilled graduates who can contribute to the global space industry. In addition, there are now more than a dozen African countries with a national space agency. By partnering with these institutions, the United States can tap into a new source of talent and innovation. The potential for spaceport development in Africa also aligns with broader geopolitical strategies. As global competition in space intensifies, having launch sites in strategic locations such as Africa can enhance national security and geopolitical influence. For the United States, this means advancing its space capabilities and strengthening its alliances and partnerships in a region that is becoming increasingly important in the global landscape.

By working together on expanding the roster of rocket launch sites available to the United States, Washington and its African partners can set a global standard for responsible space exploration.

Temidayo Oniosun is the managing director of Space in Africa, an analytics and consulting company in the African Space and satellite industry.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Could the United States’ future liftoffs take place in Africa? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sudan is experiencing its worst levels of food insecurity ever recorded, with more than 25.6 million people across ten states facing heightened risk of famine. Seventeen months into one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, the internal conflict has spread across the country and is marked by widespread death, war crimes, recruitment of children as soldiers, rape and violence against women, disease, intentional destruction of the country’s food reserves, and now heavy rains causing flooding.

The full scope of international attention on Sudan

On August 14, a delegation, including countries supporting the RSF, claiming to want to improve the humanitarian situation in Sudan met in Geneva. The Aligned for Advancing Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan (ALPS) Group, whose members included the United States, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the African Union, and the United Nations, convened to develop immediate actions to alleviate the suffering of the Sudanese people. The ALPS facilitated ten days of peace talks between the warring parties. The RSF attended the talks in person and the SAF attended virtually.

At the end of the negotiations, two access points for food, medicine, and humanitarian aid were opened—the Western border crossing into Darfur at Adre, Chad, and the Dabbah Road crossing, allowing access to the north and west from Port Sudan. This is a small step, but the Sudanese people need much more.

The atrocities in Sudan have not received enough attention. The lack of sustained international scrutiny, especially from the United States, has allowed the conflict to deepen. The crisis is exacerbated by the global community’s diminished will to address the root causes of the war. Corruption and personal gain are fueling the conflict. Foreign malign actors, in a fight for Sudanese natural resources and the ability to exploit the country’s strategic location, supply funds and weapons to the RSF and the SAF.

Corruption appears in many forms. According to the United States Agency for International Development, “corruption employs sophisticated schemes to siphon off the wealth of a country from its rightful owners: the people.” One form of corruption, strategic corruption, as demonstrated in Sudan, involves the improper influence by international actors in collaboration with domestic actors to weaponize practices of foreign policy or access to natural resources. Activities such as gold mining are prioritized to the benefit of domestic power and corrupt foreign interests above the interests of the people.

Sudan’s civil war has a large cast of foreign malign actors. A June 2024 report by Amnesty International found that despite the Darfur embargo, recently manufactured guns, ammunition, drone jammers, mortars, and rifles have been imported into Sudan in large quantities from Russia, China, Turkey, and the UAE. Paul Sullivan, an analyst who focuses on the Middle East and North Africa, told Voice of America last year that China is interested in Sudan’s gold deposits and the Port Sudan location on the Red Sea in relation to growing world trade.

Sudan-Russia talks that began in 2007 under Omar al-Bashir were revived in June 2024, with Sudan’s RSF agreeing to give Russia a Red Sea base in exchange for weapons, ammunition, and replacement parts for Russian-made warplanes. Russia’s extended ties to Sudan also include gold mining that is presently organized by the Kremlin’s Africa Corps (and which was formerly run by the Wagner Group).

In March 2024, Iran petitioned Sudan to establish a naval base at the Port of Sudan on the Red Sea. The SAF rejected Iran’s request. Despite the rejection, Iran has reportedly supplied the SAF with Mohajer-6 drones.

Finally, there is the UAE. In violation of the Darfur arms embargo, the UAE is supplying weapons and ammunition to the RSF, as documented by a 2024 United Nations report to the Security Council. (The UAE strongly denies arming any group in Sudan.) The UAE is also the largest buyer of Sudanese gold. The RSF commits grievous violence against civilians using funds and weapons reportedly supplied by the UAE in return for gold from the country’s massive gold supplies. In 2023, Sudan was the third largest gold-producing country in Africa, yet Sudanese civilians are dying of hunger at the hands of corrupt military factions.

How the United States should respond

Foreign malign influence in Sudan is widespread, and strategic corruption is a relatively new and complex concept. In addition, some US government agencies do not yet have a clear definition of strategic corruption that would allow them to categorize its extent.

For this reason, the United States should develop a government-wide definition for strategic corruption. Doing so could help facilitate a whole-of-government response and allow agencies to better identify the full extent of illicit activity and the foreign actors involved in Sudan and the region.

With this clearer sense of foreign malign influence in Sudan, the United States could then consider wider sanctions against states and individuals involved in the crisis, and it could encourage partner countries to do the same. In addition, Washington should continue to garner international cooperation to end the war.

The August peace talks facilitated by the ALPS Group in Switzerland have ended. The hosting delegations have returned home. The flurry of articles on the conflict, and with it the world’s attention to the floods, famine, and atrocities in Sudan, have lessened. The Sudanese people, now more than ever, need the help of the United States and the international community to bring an end to the war; identify and hold accountable everyone enabling the violence; bolster sustained engagement for greater access to humanitarian aid; and continue to advocate for peace, stability, and the restitution of the rule of law.

Andrea Currie-Edwards is a senior technical advisor for anti-corruption and illicit finance with Millennium Partners, and former consultant to the World Bank Group.

The post The Sudan crisis has become a magnet for foreign malign influence and strategic corruption appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It is no difficulty to find crises across the Sahel and its adjacent neighborhoods: Economic stagnation, extreme weather and climate degradation, multiple terrorist organizations and jihadist groups claiming territory, a series of military coups and democratic backsliding, various non-jihadist rebel and separatist alliances, a youth bulge and widespread unemployment, and a genocide all compete for sparse outside attention.

Yet, sailing from distant shores comes yet another crisis: An increase in drug trafficking, with flows originating in the Americas, crossing the Atlantic, and making their way into the markets of Europe.

This influx of drugs will have a marked impact, not only on the region itself, but also on the wider world should the worst happen.

The best-case scenario is merely the introduction of additional groups of well-funded armed criminal enterprises with international connections in an already volatile region. The worst-case scenario is the emergence of narco-terrorism on a scale hitherto unheard of and the entrenchment of partnerships between drug smugglers and increasingly well-funded terrorist groups, armed with cash and boasting access to international connections and smuggling routes.

In short, the worst-case scenario is one in which organizations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) are fueled and financed by one of the largest drug markets in the world.

A bad situation getting worse

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), between 2015 and 2020, an average of thirteen kilograms of cocaine was seized per year in the region. In 2021, the amount seized rose to forty-one kilograms. Then in 2022, it spiked to 1,466 kilograms.

In comparison to 2015 seizures, that is an increase of 11,176 percent.

Before complete data for 2023 became available, the UN cited that 2.3 tons (just over two thousand kilograms) of cocaine had been seized in Mauritania alone between January and June 2023. These statistics are alarming, and they don’t even show the full picture: Amounts seized are not amounts trafficked—that amount is likely far higher.  

While domestic drug use is rising across the Sahel, sparking public health crises that are ill-afforded in many countries, the region is becoming a drug trafficking corridor. The drugs are bound for outside markets, with the increase in activity attributed to Europe’s surging demand for illegal narcotics and trafficking groups searching for new routes to markets.

The region is a drug smuggler’s paradise.

Located on the doorstep of Europe and the Middle East, the region is vast and often sparsely populated. It is also riddled with economic deprivation, with an ever-increasing population of youth desperate for opportunity. The countries in the Sahel often have weak governance, widespread corruption, and ongoing battles with insurgents and fundamentalists.

On top of that, Sahelian officials and individuals are vulnerable to the influence of drug gangs—but they are not alone. There are numerous documented cases from across the world of drug gangs using officials to further their work, such as a premier of the British Virgin Islands. Following recent seizures and arrests in the Sahel, the UN expressed concerns about the range of individuals—including the political elite, community leaders, and armed groups—who appear to be involved in facilitating drug trafficking.

While the involvement of key individuals in facilitating drug trafficking is widespread, what makes the situation in the Sahel worrisome are the “armed groups” involved. In Latin America, armed groups facilitating drug trafficking are organizations such as FARC and in Southeast Asia they are militias tied to regional forces or even the drug traffickers themselves. In the Sahel, they are international jihadist organizations, ones with global ambitions and a willingness to export terror and war from their base of operations.

Worrying signs

An array of terrorist organizations operate in the Sahel region: Groups include al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Boko Haram.

These groups control vast swaths of land in the Sahel, are expanding and entrenching their control, and are also competing with each other, propelling their searches for more resources. Because of this, they are among the groups that can most stand to financially benefit from the burgeoning drug trade.

While the drug smuggling flows are opaque, the UNODC highlights that the “limited evidence” of violent extremist armed groups involved in drug trafficking “does not mean that such groups are not involved.” These groups, the UNODC adds, are “likely to benefit indirectly” from drug trafficking, explaining that groups such as JNIM and ISGS demand taxes or fees from traffickers in areas where they operate.

Even if these organizations are not directly managing the drug trade, they stand to benefit from the routes and from facilitating drug smugglers’ operations in the territories they control. Such a partnership could be devastating for the region and beyond.

The UNODC notes that information about these groups’ involvement in the drug trade could still emerge. Historically, terrorist and jihadi organizations have embraced a more hands-on approach to the drug trade to fund their organizations and operations. The Taliban in Afghanistan has long been linked to the opium trade (and the drug trade has supported terrorism), ISIS in Syria has produced drugs for market in Europe and smuggles drugs across the Middle East, and Hezbollah has been tied to Columbian drug rings.

With the Sahel becoming an increasingly major drug trafficking corridor, terrorist groups could shift from merely facilitating the drug trade toward actively managing and participating in it, spreading narco-terrorism and expanding the funding for these groups. A war on drugs and narco-terrorism in the Sahel would be a devastating addition to the current war on terror across the region, where 43 percent of global terrorism deaths take place. A development such as this would not only be dangerous for the Sahel, but for the wider Middle East and Europe as well. Drug routes are known to facilitate other forms of international smuggling and for hiding activities from authorities—ever more dangerous when involving jihadist groups.

What the West can do

Unfortunately, the West can’t do much in the Sahel.

Both the United States and the European Union (EU) have retreated from the region, driven away by military juntas that do not share the West’s democratic values and concern for human rights. Various joint military efforts that had been underway to combat terror groups have fallen apart as the United States and EU left the region and lost partners. This is unlikely to change, and if the United States and EU lack the partners necessary to combat jihadist groups in the Sahel, they will likely also lack the ability to combat drug smuggling.

What they can do, however, is support and strengthen partnerships with the costal democracies in West Africa, preventing drugs from entering the Sahel in the first place.

West African democracies are on the frontlines of combating jihadists. Terrorists are attempting to expand operations and territory in countries including Senegal, Benin, Togo, and Ghana. These democracies are also on the frontlines of combating drug smuggling and are making waves with seizures. For example, last November, Senegal’s navy seized three tons of cocaine that was headed towards Europe. In April this year, the country made headlines for seizing 1,140 kilograms of cocaine (the most ever intercepted on land), which was headed toward Mali. More seizures followed in June. In Ghana, authorities have also clamped down on trafficking, making headlines after arresting a duo attempting to smuggle an amount of cocaine worth six million dollars through Accra’s airport and to London. On September 7 in Guinea-Bissau, authorities (with help from the US Drug Enforcement Administration and a European organization called the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre) seized 2.6 tons of cocaine that had arrived from Latin America.

As drugs continue to flow, and as the domestic use of drugs continues to rise, West African politicians and societies are just as interested in addressing drug trafficking as the United States and EU are. These West African democracies would be willing partners in combating the twin threats of expanding terrorist groups and a burgeoning drug trade.

Should the Sahel become home to narco-terrorism, the consequences would be catastrophic, not only for the Sahel but for the world. The international community must not ignore yet another crisis.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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The global demand for critical minerals is only expected to increase in the coming years: The International Energy Agency predicts that by 2050, the demand for nickel will double, demand for cobalt will triple, and demand for lithium will rise tenfold as the shift toward low-carbon technologies (which use critical minerals) continues.

As the world sets its sights on Africa’s minerals, the competition for access is getting tougher, putting into question future access to these critical minerals. Multiple parties are actively laying claim to certain minerals and building supply chains to ensure their access—perhaps at the expense of the United States’ interests.

The power players

China is by far the largest player in the African mining sector, having secured advantageous supply chains for cobalt, graphite, magnesium, and other critical minerals. China has been closely involved in the extraction, refining, and production of these minerals for decades, as a result of efforts such as its massive Belt and Road Initiative. China currently controls 60 percent of global critical mineral production and 85 percent of processing capacity. Between 2003 and 2020, Chinese foreign direct investment in African minerals increased from $75 million to $4.2 billion. To date, China has established strategic partnerships with at least forty-four African countries. China has not, however, pursued multilateral alliances with other international partners, choosing instead to focus on renovating its state-owned enterprises.

Russia’s economic presence in Africa is not as vast as China’s, although Russian enterprises have engaged in projects that—while not massive in investment scale—carry significant strategic and political weight. Russian companies are aggressively increasing energy and mineral concessions in Africa, with significant stakes in ventures such as South Africa’s fourth-largest manganese miner, United Manganese of Kalahari. In Namibia, Russia’s Uranium One group secured eight uranium exploration licenses but has, in recent years, faced hurdles with securing permits that allow it to continue with uranium exploration.

Russia has also been expanding its influence across the continent through a state-funded military company called the Wagner Group (which the Russian Ministry of Defense reportedly recently took control of and lumped under a bigger group called the Africa Corps). In addition to expanding Russia’s influence, these mercenaries have secured lucrative mining deals. While those deals have primarily centered around gold, some experts are concerned about what such dealmaking means for the West’s access to critical minerals. These fighters capitalize on instability and supporting governments in times of conflict; in return, they benefit from increased access to natural resources and special diplomatic status. Russia, like China, has not positioned itself as a leader in major multilateral agreements, opting instead to maintain bilateral relationships with African nations that support its domestic industrial needs.

Whereas China made it a priority to corner the market for critical minerals two decades ago, the West (including the United States) was much later to the game and, therefore, has a comparatively weaker foothold in the sector. Western businesses have been hesitant to invest in African mining due to the many challenges associated with Africa’s natural-resource industries. Many countries rich in critical minerals struggle with weak governance, and this—combined with poor labor practices, environmental degradation, and the potential of fueling armed conflict—makes for a high-risk, unpredictable, and often unappealing investment environment. Despite these challenges, the potential rewards from securing a stable and diversified supply of these essential resources are growing, increasing international interest and investment in African mining.

The team players

While the gravity of Chinese and Russian activities around African minerals cannot be understated, the landscape of international involvement is much broader than these two giants. Several other countries are taking part in this strategic race. Notably, South Korea, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom are involved, not only in agreements with African countries but also in frameworks or partnerships with each other, sharing commitments that aim to enhance cooperation, ensure the use of sustainable and ethical mining practices, and secure stable supply chains for critical minerals. These countries are drawn to African minerals for their own national interests, and many also see the need to counterbalance Chinese and Russian efforts through the creation of partnerships with African countries and other partner countries interested in cooperation.

Canada is significantly involved in critical minerals in Africa, investing heavily in exploration and development projects, focusing on minerals such as cobalt, copper, and lithium. According to Canadian government data, the country has $37 billion worth of assets in African mining, with recent increases in assets in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia.

Australia also has an extensive and growing presence, with over 145 Australian Securities Exchange-listed mining companies operating just under five hundred mines across thirty-four countries. Many current operations surround gold reserves in West Africa, but several companies are beginning to explore the continent’s graphite, manganese, and uranium reserves. Much of Australia’s recent focus has been on Tanzania, with Australian companies having claimed more than 90 percent of the new exploration licenses offered by the critical-mineral hotspot in the last two years. In addition to Australia’s significant economic presence in Africa, there has been a renewed emphasis on strengthening diplomatic ties. In December 2022, Australia’s assistant foreign minister visited Ghana, South Africa, and Morocco, marking the first visit by an Australian foreign affairs ministerial representative to the continent in six years.

The United Kingdom is similarly expanding its partnerships, with an eye on promoting responsible exploration, development, production, and processing of critical minerals. In November 2022, the United Kingdom and South Africa agreed to a working partnership on minerals for clean energy technologies, and they have also agreed to hold a regular ministerial dialogue on critical minerals. Eager to diversify its supply chain, the United Kingdom has recently turned to Zambia, a major producer of copper, cobalt, manganese, and nickel. The two nations entered into the Green Growth Compact, aimed at generating over $3.2 billion of British private-sector investment in Zambia’s mining, minerals, and renewable energy sectors, with an additional $650 million of government-backed investments. Beyond forming partnerships with African countries, the United Kingdom is also pursuing partnerships with other nations looking to invest in minerals and curb Chinese influence in Africa. In September 2023, the United Kingdom and Japan established a framework to jointly invest in African mine development and to stabilize their mineral supply chains. Diversifying sources of critical minerals is especially important for Japan, which has become increasingly dependent on China for its minerals for the production of electric vehicle batteries and clean energy.

South Korea has significantly ramped up its efforts to establish a robust presence in the mining sector, focusing on securing raw minerals essential for its electronic and automotive industries. In June 2024, the South Korean government held its first summit with Africa, which took place in Seoul and Ilsan. The summit—attended by more than thirty African heads of state—sought to directly develop stronger ties with countries that are increasingly seen as vital for South Korea’s production of semiconductors, solar panels, and electric vehicle batteries. The countries meeting at the summit launched a Korea-Africa Critical Minerals Dialogue, and South Korea committed to expanding official development assistance to African countries. South Korean companies pledged $57.9 million in various commitments, and forty-seven agreements and memorandums of understanding were cemented—including two on critical minerals cooperation with Madagascar and Tanzania. South Korea also pledged to donate ten billion dollars in foreign aid to Africa by 2030 and a further fourteen billion dollars in export credits to South Korean firms wanting to enter African markets. Lastly, while not directly focused on critical minerals, Seoul signed a $2.5 billion concessional loan agreement with Tanzania and solidified a similar billion-dollar deal with Ethiopia, both intended to fund significant health and infrastructure upgrades, signifying South Korea’s intensifying interest in working with African countries.

What sets these countries apart in the critical-mineral competition is that they are engaging simultaneously in international collaborative efforts. Recognizing that no single country can address these challenges alone, these countries have come together with others to form international initiatives and agreements to promote sustainable and ethical mining practices and secure stable supply chains.

In 2022, Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Commission came together to form the Minerals Security Partnership to create diversified and responsible supply chains and catalyze public and private investment in critical minerals. Another agreement to come out of 2022 was the Sustainable Critical Minerals Alliance—established by Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States—which promotes ethical, environmentally sustainable, and socially responsible sourcing of critical minerals.

These multilateral initiatives play a pivotal role in the global race for Africa’s critical minerals. They promote high standards in mining initiatives, enhance supply chain security, support international dialogue, and facilitate knowledge and resource sharing. By promoting investment diversification, high governance standards, and geopolitical alliances, these initiatives also offer African nations sustainable and equitable alternatives to the often-exploitative practices of China and Russia. They contribute to a more balanced and fair global competition for Africa’s critical minerals, ensuring that the benefits of these resources are more widely and fairly distributed to the people in the countries producing critical minerals​.

The lone wolves

Other countries are pursuing critical minerals in Africa but are doing so more independently. India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia, in particular, are focusing on securing critical minerals through bilateral agreements and direct investments, often outside of broader international frameworks.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both expanded their presence in Africa’s critical-mineral industry, with the UAE leading the charge. The UAE has made significant investments in Africa’s mining sector as it seeks to diversify its economic portfolio and keep pace with the shift to low-carbon energy. Emirati foreign direct investment has been primarily directed toward copper-rich Zambia and the DRC. The UAE has also been deepening its economic ties with Angola since 2021, as Angola is thought to have sizeable unexplored reserves of critical and rare-earth minerals, such as copper, cobalt, manganese, and lithium, which are all essential to the UAE’s tech and renewable-energy ambitions.

According to the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Saudi Arabia has been actively pursuing critical-mineral deals in Africa over the past year and has pledged to invest ten billion dollars in African mining projects over the next five years. Saudi Arabia ‘s interest in Africa’s critical minerals has increased in recent years, especially as it tries to meet the goals of its Vision 2030 economic diversification plan, although it hasn’t yet disclosed any direct and formal deals. In January, Saudi Arabia signed memorandums of understanding for mining investments with the DRC, Egypt, and Morocco. It has demonstrated interest in bauxite mining in Guinea as well.

India is also ramping up its engagement in the African mining sector through direct investments and partnerships with African countries. India is focused on securing essential minerals to support its rapidly growing manufacturing and technology sectors, aligning with its broader strategic goal to counterbalance the dominant position of China. India’s Ministry of Mines said that New Delhi was in discussions with the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Madagascar, South Africa, Mali, Morocco, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to secure mining collaborations and access agreements. India currently has memorandums of understanding with six of those countries, through which it aims to secure supplies of cobalt, nickel, graphite, diamonds, platinum, and uranium.

The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and India, however, are not part of multilateral frameworks that promote collaborative, standardized, and sustainability-focused mining practices, such as the Minerals Security Partnership or the Sustainable Critical Minerals Alliance.

How the United States should navigate this race

Despite many significant challenges, establishing a secure and stable supply chain for critical minerals is crucial to the United States’ security interests and economic future, and Africa remains a necessary component of that strategy. The United States must capitalize on the growing international interest in Africa’s critical minerals and strengthen partnerships with other collaborating countries (such as through multilateral frameworks) that might help counterbalance China and Russia’s influence, secure access to minerals for the United States, and ensure that African countries can reap the benefits of their own mineral wealth.

It would be wise to strengthen multilateral frameworks such as the Minerals Security Partnership or the Sustainable Critical Minerals Alliance, as they provide an already-established mechanism for international cooperation and bring together diverse groups of countries committed to sustainable and ethical mining practices. The United States can do so by extending membership to other countries including mineral-rich African nations, which would enhance global cooperation, further promote shared sustainability and transparency standards, and help facilitate the transfer of necessary technical and financial support. This increased participation would not only regulate standards across borders but also create a more transparent and predictable investment environment. And the shared standards and accountability mechanisms established through these multilateral frameworks would make conditions more attractive for private-sector investors too, ultimately boosting financial support for critical-mineral projects that are both economically viable and socially responsible.

As the race for Africa’s critical minerals continues, the United States should rally its allies and partners around a common vision backed by democratic values.

Sarah Way is a graduate of the University of Colorado Boulder’s International Affairs Program with a specialization in Africa and the Middle East. Her research centers on the intersection of natural resources and development, with a specific focus on extractive minerals in Africa.

The post The strategies driving the players in competition for Africa’s critical minerals appeared first on Atlantic Council.

That risk is due to a number of factors, but one glaring reason is the limited availability or mining of these minerals in the United States. That is increasingly problematic as demand for these minerals rises, considering the role they play in building a green economy globally.

In contrast, across the Atlantic, Africa is home to over 30 percent of the world’s known reserves of critical minerals. While international interest and investment in the African critical-minerals industry have been lagging, it is rapidly picking up; this is welcome news for resource-rich African nations.

But history shows that mining interest and investment—even if welcome—can have inadvertent negative effects. In recent years, mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia, and South Africa have been found to be polluting waterways, contributing to acid rain, and poisoning residents. Thus, the US public and private sectors should develop strategies surrounding mining projects that ensure African workers’ health is protected, the environment is not damaged, and the opinions of local communities are sought out, heard, and respected.

Acknowledge the checkered history of mining in Africa

It is important for mining companies and foreign governments to be cognizant of the historical context that surrounds the African mining industry.

For example, in South Africa in the nineteenth century, the discovery of diamonds and gold brought Africans and Europeans alike to mining areas such as the Witwatersrand and mining towns such as Kimberley. After the initial boom, the South African government passed the Natives Land Act in 1913, which restricted Black Africans from buying or occupying land outside of specified areas, except as employees. This policy restricted many Africans from benefiting from the proceeds of mining minerals, and for these people, their main access to any financial gain from the mines came only from working as miners.

While the legislation was repealed in 1991—and others like it are firmly in Africa’s past—it created the conditions for a variety of socioeconomic challenges, including poverty, inequality, and landlessness. Thus, as the US public and private sectors look to get more involved on the continent with mining projects, they should integrate into their strategies a plan for increasing economic opportunity for local communities.

The US government seems to be headed in this direction already with its support for and investment in the Lobito Corridor project, which aims to update the infrastructure along an economic route stretching from the DRC and Zambia to an Angolan port in order to improve the flow of mining-related trade and also to create jobs for local communities. Concerns still remain, but this form of holistic engagement is essential to ensuring mutual prosperity in mining projects.

Don’t exacerbate the “resource curse”

Many African countries have been associated with a “resource curse,” a term that refers to the failure of many resource-rich countries to fully benefit from their natural resources.

For example, Cabo Delgado, a small province in Mozambique’s north, is one of the country’s poorest regions, despite the region’s many natural resources. This has led many in Cabo Delgado to feel marginalized and angry at the central government. A 2011 discovery of a massive natural gas field off the northeastern coast of Mozambique further exacerbated this dissatisfaction. Specifically, youth in the region felt sidelined as foreigners and Mozambicans from elsewhere in the country benefited from the jobs and wealth associated with the discovery.

As the government formalized the mining sector and centralized control of it, artisanal miners were displaced. A widely held sense of injustice gave rise to an Islamist militant group, Mozambique’s al-Shabaab, which took advantage of these grievances to gain popularity among youth in the region. The activities of various armed groups in Cabo Delgado have resulted in around five thousand deaths and the displacement of 582,000 people since 2017.  

In conducting mining projects on the continent, the US public and private sector should add to their strategies specific plans to ensure that the benefits of natural-resource endowment reach local communities.

Botswana provides a positive example. In recent years, the country—one of the world’s leading producers of diamonds and also among the least corrupt on the African continent—has developed a “pro-equity based extractive sector strategy,” taking revenues from extractive sectors and investing them in health and education infrastructure and also into long-term savings through an asset fund. There are also various mechanisms and institutions set up to prevent or catch corruption, such as a constitutionally independent body in charge of cases of corruption. Botswana shows that strong business and the fight against corruption are perfectly compatible.

As part of any strategy, US stakeholders should support African countries in their anti-corruption endeavors and empower human-rights organizations that risk much to protect the resources of these countries and ensure benefits from mining reach local communities. Doing so would encourage African countries to take corruption issues seriously and, in the long run, would create a more attractive environment for sustainable investments. That contradicts the naive belief of some people—such as Israeli businessman Dan Gertler, who was sanctioned by the Trump administration for what it called “corrupt mining and oil deals” in the DRC (he has denied wrongdoing)—that lifting sanctions would be a way to bring back foreign investors.

Strategize for stability

Over time, mismanaged mining projects have contributed to instability, violence, and conflict across Africa.

That dynamic can be seen not only in the Mozambique case but also in Kivu, a region in the DRC’s east. The DRC is central to the production of several critical minerals. For example, as much as 70 percent of global cobalt comes from the DRC. A conflict has gripped the region for almost three decades, and armed groups have wrestled control of mining areas to finance their operations. The DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and China have often put their interests ahead of those of the residents, who are hoping to see their quality of life improve. Currently, six million people are internally displaced within the DRC, and since the start of the conflict in 1996, six million people have been killed.

With this history in mind, US mining companies with projects on the continent must strategize on how to limit the role mining plays in exacerbating conflicts and tensions. They can do that by bringing more of the supply chain—specifically, value-adding stages of critical-mineral processing—to the continent.

Industrializing the mineral sector in Africa

Historically, mining in Africa has been exploited by foreign partners. China, for example, controls 80 percent of the world’s raw mineral refining and owns fifteen of the seventeen cobalt mining operations in the DRC.

But the US public and private sector can change this status quo by bringing more of the value-adding stages of critical-mineral processing to the African continent, rather than extracting the minerals and bringing them immediately overseas for processing. Not only would this appeal to local populations—as it would encourage industrialization—but employing this different strategy would offer the United States a comparative advantage over China.

A strategy that brings value-adding steps of the value chain to the continent should promote local job creation, prioritize environmental protection in areas with high floral and animal biodiversity, and protect workers’ health. It should also prioritize the deployment of cleaner mining techniques (including those mobilizing artificial intelligence) and encourage countries to adopt a tax that allows for a more fair and just distribution of revenues from mining.

Economic communities—such as the Southern African Development Community—should also play a role in promoting regional value chains. Through such groupings, countries should take advantage of opportunities to share information and data, build capacities, and harmonize legal frameworks.

Stakeholders from the United States must remember that this is about more than curbing Chinese and Russian influence on the continent; rather, it is about avoiding past wrongdoings on the continent, by supporting local communities and preventing mining operations from contributing to various forms of instability and conflict.  

But there’s also a bigger picture to keep in mind: By getting mining investment right, the United States can set a new precedent for its collaboration with African countries in other areas, such as in health, security, and technology.

Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center. She is also a professor of African affairs at Mohammed VI Polytechnic University in Morocco and at Sciences Po Paris.

Sibi Nyaoga is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center where he supports the center’s work on critical minerals and migration. 

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While African athletes that year had won thirty-seven medals, including eleven golds, it is expected that they will rake in much more—about fifty—in Paris. There is a lot expected of several stars, including Kenyan marathon runner Eliud Kipchoge (considered the greatest marathoner of all time), Botswanan sprinter Letsile Tebogo, Burkinabé triple jumper Hugues Fabrice Zango, Senegalese tae kwon do champion Cheick Cissé Sallah, and Moroccan breakdancer Fatima El-Mamouny (who competes as Elmamouny). Some athletes are already meeting these expectations, with South African swimmer Tatjana Smith having already won a gold medal and Tunisian fencer Fares Ferjani having earned the silver. Beyond individual athletes, there is also optimism about various teams: For example, the Bright Stars of South Sudan were the object of great attention after giving the US team a wake-up call in a shockingly close exhibition game earlier this month (but on Wednesday, they lost to the United States).

There are also athletes who, in search of better training conditions, have migrated from Africa to countries in the West and will compete under those countries’ flags.

It is a challenge to be a high-level athlete in Africa. The International Olympic Committee’s (IOC’s) initiatives in Africa, which fund projects to support sports on the continent, do not solve the structural problems that push African athletes to leave the continent. Usually, these expatriates blame the lack of African infrastructure and mentoring programs, in addition to the costs of training and other professional challenges. While some of the African athletes who train in the United States are still competing under the flags of African countries—such as Ivoirian sprinter Marie-Josée Ta Lou or world-record-holding Nigerian hurdler Oluwatobiloba “Tobi” Amusan—time away from the African continent can easily turn into a permanent departure and end with a change of citizenship.

With that being the case, the Olympic performances of African countries don’t fully reflect the true power of the continent in sport.

As a former French deputy minister of sports, I see a paradox in Africa’s sports sector: the youngest continent in the world (70 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is under thirty years old) is a place where people aren’t engaging as much in physical activity such as sports. Plus, a recent survey highlighted that the sports sector is “underdeveloped” with key deficits in data, public strategy, and private investments.

Sports are much more than hobbies for personal fulfillment or ways to improve health. They are also powerful tools for development, major business opportunities, and pivotal ways to exercise soft power.

The opportunity at hand

According to the United Nations (UN), sports play a role in achieving many of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, including goals such as eradicating poverty and famine, securing education for all, supporting victims of disasters or emergency situations, and fighting diseases. Sports can also help promote gender equality, as taking part in sports is associated with getting married later in life. The UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization runs a flagship initiative called Fit for Life, which uses sports to not only improve youth wellbeing and empowerment but also support more inclusive policymaking. The African Union (AU) has recognized the role that sports can play, as a driver of the cultural renaissance outlined in its Agenda 2063; the AU proposed a Sports Council to coordinate an African sports movement.

But the international recognition of the role sports play in development has come late—and there are issues that have yet to be sorted out. Olympic Agenda 2020, adopted by the IOC in 2014, outlines recommendations for countries to make the most of sports’ impact on society, encouraging them to align sports with economic and human development, build climate-friendly infrastructure, promote gender equality, protect the rights of children and laborers, acquire land ethically and without causing displacement, improve security, and protect the freedom of the press.

At previous global sport gatherings (notably the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar) human-rights communities have raised these issues. Their voice over many years has pushed organizations, such as FIFA and the IOC, to adopt various human-rights policies and frameworks. In considering the host nation for the 2026 World Cup, FIFA for the first time required bidding countries and cities to commit to human-rights obligations. Such requirements could have an impact in Africa, although that remains to be seen; an African country has only once hosted a global sport gathering (South Africa hosted the 2010 FIFA World Cup), while Egypt currently has its eye on the 2036 Summer Olympics, over a decade from now.

Beyond development, sports are major business opportunities. South Africa has continued to argue that hosting the World Cup was worth it, as the billions it spent went toward much-needed infrastructure that has supported an increase in tourism—and thus, economic activity—that lasted for more than a decade. The global sports industry was worth $512 billion in 2023 and is projected to grow to $624 billion in 2027. 

In Africa, the contribution of sports to the continent’s gross domestic product is more limited (0.5 percent) than it is for the world at large (3 percent). And while North America has the largest share of the sports market, Africa’s share is growing at a rate of 8 percent each year. The National Basketball Association’s investment in the Basketball Africa League is a signal to other investors of the positive outlook for African sports and the new ecosystem of opportunities. With Africa’s middle class estimated to reach 1.1 billion by 2060, and with the continent urbanizing and growing more connected, Africa is a premier market for ventures in the sports industry.

If this business opportunity is harnessed, there is reason to be optimistic that African talent will no longer have to seek earnings abroad and that African markets will see added value, including in the form of new infrastructure, hospitality offerings, merchandising, and content/media. Upcoming major sports events on the continent are slated to generate such growth, with Senegal organizing the 2026 Youth Olympic Games and Morocco co-hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup.

Well-structured and adequately supported sports are also tools of soft power, and countries around the world, notably Saudi Arabia, are investing in them. In Africa, the Olympic Games have always been an opportunity for African countries to speak more loudly than in the UN fora. For example, African countries boycotted the 1976 Montreal Olympics, protesting New Zealand’s participation after the country’s national rugby team played several matches in South Africa (which had been banned from the Olympics because of its apartheid policy). At the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, as apartheid came to an end, the finalists of the ten-thousand-meter race—Derartu Tulu, a Black athlete from Ethiopia, and Elana Meyer, a white athlete from South Africa—hugged each other to celebrate South Africa’s return.

A new sports agenda

Africa had a late introduction to global sport competition. No African country has ever hosted the Olympic Games. The first Black African athletes—South African runners Len Taunyane and Jan Mashiani—didn’t get the opportunity to compete until 1904, eight years after the first modern Olympic Games were held. It wasn’t until the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome that the first Black African athlete took the gold: Ethiopian Abebe Bikila won the marathon running barefoot. Since then, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Africa have been the leading Olympic teams from Africa.

To be able to compete with the best teams today and to hold onto its talents, Africa needs a more robust agenda that covers all dimensions of sports.

First, it is essential to address youth education. Governments should include sports in education systems, and sports federations should organize regular competitions within local leagues for youth. Governments should also consider making their funding of training centers contingent on the number of enrolled athletes; it has been shown that sports help improve enrollment and attendance at school, and thus sporting excellence can lead to academic excellence. Of course, in addition to investing in sports facilities at schools, it is crucial to also invest in infrastructure that helps underserved populations access these facilities, thus easing regional inequalities.

However, the financing of African sports cannot be too dependent on governments’ budgets (as it currently is) seeing as national budgets are limited. African governments should provide a fiscal and regulatory framework that supports the work of the private sector. Rather than abandoning the athletes to themselves, governments should consider creating national centers of excellence or institutes for training—similar to France’s National Institute of Sport, Expertise, and Performance—which would allow athletes to access better training conditions on the continent, hopefully keeping them in Africa.

Governments should also ensure that foreign clubs and teams that continue to host the greatest African athletes financially support the development of the African sports industry, which would not only help cultivate more star talent but also foster job creation in advertising, sports medicine, journalism, and fitness.

Sports have much greater geopolitical significance than many decision makers realize. Moving forward, they should integrate sports into their foreign policy, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

For Africa, the surge in athletic talent is evidence that its people are committed to a new era for the continent. Leaders should harness this opportunity to supercharge Africa’s transformative sports movement.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. She was formerly the French deputy minister of sports and also served as the ambassador of France to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

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If the United States does not collaborate more with Africa on space-related activities, it risks not only losing strategic and geopolitical influence to China and Russia and missing out on a growing market but also hindering scientific and technological advancements. That would limit the contribution of space-based solutions to solving challenges, for example ones related to sustainability, climate change, and disaster management. A lack of collaboration would also leave behind an opportunity to shape space security and strengthen diplomatic relations with African countries.

Collaboration as it stands today

Following the US-Africa Leaders Summit in October last year, the US Departments of Commerce and State and the African Union organized the US-Africa Commercial Space Stakeholders Meeting in Baku, Azerbaijan, to build multilateral space partnerships and foster space commerce. At the meeting, the African Union representatives highlighted the African Outer Space Programme—which looks to strengthen the African Union’s use of space—and the role it plays in realizing Africa’s Agenda 2063 and powering development. Meanwhile, the US Office of Space Commerce, tasked with protecting conditions for economic growth and technological innovation in space, outlined how African institutions can reach US space institutions to explore collaborations on capacity building, Earth observation, positioning and navigation, satellite communications, and more—although no clear plans for such collaboration were finalized.

Currently, the United States’ main space-related projects with Africa are SERVIR and Harvest. SERVIR, an initiative by NASA and the US Agency for International Development, helps countries use Earth observation data and geospatial technologies to improve environmental management and climate resilience. SERVIR West Africa, launched in 2016, gathers several science and research institutions in promoting the use of satellite imagery and geospatial tools to help stakeholders and decision makers across the Sahel make informed decisions about agriculture, water resources, the weather, the climate, and ecosystems. SERVIR Eastern and Southern Africa ran from 2008 to 2023 and developed geospatial services using Earth observations and NASA data to support resilient development.

NASA Harvest, led by researchers at the University of Maryland, aims to advance the use of satellite Earth observations to benefit food security, agriculture, and environmental resilience. The Harvest Africa initiative applies Earth observation-based data to agricultural monitoring and assessments conducted across East and Southern Africa. National and regional agencies work together to ensure a smooth transition to respective government agencies or partners. Projects include enhancing Tanzania’s agrometeorological services, developing Earth observation-based agricultural monitoring systems, and improving food security and resilience.

Skyrocketing opportunity

Out of approximately $4.7 billion in satellite contracts from Africa between 1998 and 2023, $1.396 billion went to China and Russia, while only $250 million went to US companies, according to a report by my analytics company, Space in Africa (based in Nigeria and Estonia). Furthermore, out of 187 space collaboration agreements with African institutions from 2001 to 2023, fifty-eight were with Chinese and Russian entities and only twenty-seven with US institutions. Additionally, Egypt and South Africa have joined the International Lunar Research Station mission led by Russia and China, with Ethiopia and Kenya recently signing memorandums of understanding to join as well.

Significant satellite communications infrastructures—such as NigComSat-1R for Nigeria, AngoSat-2 for Angola, and AlComSat-1 for Algeria—were developed by China or Russia. For instance, in addressing national security, Nigeria’s Defence Space Administration launched the DelSat-1 satellite, contracted and launched by China, with plans for five additional satellites.

But while many US foreign policies towards Africa aim to counter China and Russia’s influence, this approach should not extend to the space sector. Space cooperation offers the opportunity to achieve broader US foreign-policy goals independently.

Africa’s space industry presents the United States with economic opportunity. For example, according to the Space in Africa report, Africa’s space industry currently generates about $19 billion annually, with projections indicating growth to over $22.64 billion by 2026. US satellite communications companies such as ViaSat and Starlink—along with Earth observation data providers such as Maxar Technologies, Tomorrow.io, and Planet Labs, and geographic-information-system (GIS) software companies such as Esri—have found a robust market in Africa.

Africa offers significant opportunities for space diplomacy as well. For instance, Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group signed an agreement with Djibouti to build a launch site there, and Turkey announced a space program that would build a launch site in Somalia. The United States can similarly leverage these opportunities to foster mutual benefits including capacity development, technology transfer, and ecosystem development. African space programs, at both national and continental levels, often embrace nonaligned diplomacy, allowing them to cooperate with a variety of countries based on mutual interests. While the United States is taking some steps in the right direction and showing its willingness to collaborate with Africa on space issues—as US stakeholders did at the NewSpace Africa Conference, which my company and the African Union co-hosted—it is time for the United States to identify mutual interests with Africa to develop a robust space partnership.

The United States, as a global leader in the space sector, has an opportunity to strengthen diplomatic relations with African countries and the African Union (through the African Union’s African Space Agency). African countries have demonstrated their capability to contribute to critical technology development, supporting ambitious space missions and building satellite components for global markets. For example, South Africa provides tracking support for the Artemis mission, and Rwandan students have developed artificial-intelligence algorithms for onboard satellite image processing. The United States can capitalize on these developments to foster a mutually beneficial space partnership with Africa.

The United States can, for example, support African policies aligned with US best practices that promote space sustainability at the grassroots level, which can enhance US space diplomacy in select African countries. This support can help African nations establish standards for safe and responsible space activities, thereby promoting stability, security, and long-term sustainability in alignment with several US policies and strategies. Additionally, fostering US participation in African space innovation can build strategic partnerships, increase trade opportunities, facilitate technology transfer, and encourage US investments in the African space market, boosting its global competitiveness. Facilitating market and trade exposure for small to medium US businesses to engage with Africa, along with providing networking opportunities, can deepen relationships between US and African space enterprises—much in alignment with the broader US Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa and the White House’s previous efforts to expand the US-Africa partnership.

While recent US engagements have advanced discussions on collaboration with Africa in space development, it is now time to implement clear actions backed by strong strategies.

Temidayo Oniosun is the managing director of Space in Africa, an analytics and consulting company in the African Space and satellite industry.

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But, as entertainment and media experts from PwC warn, growth in Africa’s entertainment industries “will be distributed unevenly, with some sectors stagnating while others skyrocket.” African governments, international partners, and global investors can all play a strategic role in unlocking the commercial potential of overlooked markets and creative economies across the continent.

African music, for example, has witnessed a meteoric global rise, with the likes of Wizkid and Tems “reshaping the sound and texture of pop music,” according to Rolling Stone. Afrobeats artists were streamed over thirteen billion times on Spotify in 2022. Revenue from the music industry in Sub-Saharan Africa grew by 24 percent last year, the fastest growth globally. Between 2017 and 2023, royalties for South African artists on Spotify have increased by 500 percent; Tyla, a twenty-two-year-old who earlier this year referred to herself as a “Jozi girl living the dream,” won the first Best African Music Performance award at the 2024 Grammys. And major labels like Audiomack and Universal Music Group have opened offices on the continent, investing heavily in African talent.

Africa’s television and film industry is also reaching new global audiences. Showmax, a streaming platform headquartered in South Africa, is ramping up production on twenty-one new and original African shows. Since 2016, Netflix has invested more than $175 million in African films, including a multi-title deal with a Nigerian production company. The Nigerian movie The Black Book was watched by over twenty million people in its first weeks, becoming at one point the third most-streamed movie worldwide. African film companies have inked deals with the likes of Walt Disney Animation Studios for original productions released globally on services such as Disney+, including the animated Iwájú series, for which Disney collaborated with London-based African storytelling company Kugali Media. Nollywood, the world’s second-largest film industry by production volume, generates $1.2 billion in annual revenues.

With Africa’s population projected to nearly double to 2.5 billion people by 2050, the continent will host one-third of the planet’s young people and the fastest-growing consumer markets for the entertainment industry. Music streaming revenues in Africa are expected to rise from $92.9 million in 2021 to $314.6 million by 2026. Platforms like Spotify, Paramount+, and Netflix are vying for a share of this expanding market with compelling, locally produced content. Nigeria, poised to become one of the ten biggest economies in the world by 2050, generated $45.2 million in revenues from music, television, and film streaming in 2022—a 55 percent increase compared to the year before.

Other creative industries, like gaming, have significant growth potential in Africa but haven’t yet seen breakthrough moments comparable to music, television, and film. The continent is the fastest-growing global market for the gaming industry, expected to generate more than one billion dollars in 2024 for the first time ever, with the number of African gamers doubling over the past five years—mostly driven by youth gaming on their phones. But local game developers have yet to gain a strong foothold on the continent or beyond, despite the clear potential for new and culturally rich gaming experiences rooted in the African context. Innovators like Guzo Technologies (which has participated in programs backed by Meta, where one of the authors works) are developing innovative gaming and learning experiences harnessing virtual reality, but there remain significant barriers to access and use for many Africans.

Some African governments, international partners, and investors are striving to boost their creative industries to stimulate growth, attract investment, and create jobs. In April 2024, Côte d’Ivoire partnered with a venture capital firm and bank to create a fund for entertainment startups. In October 2023, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Sony collaborated to invest in Africa’s creative industries. In announcing the initiative, the IFC highlighted the African creative economy’s “significant, untapped potential . . . for boosting economic growth and improving employment opportunities for young people and women.” Zambia announced a $100-million investment plan to transform its film industry. Actor Idris Elba is backing new film studios in Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Ghana, while Senegalese Director Mati Diop is opening a new film production house.

But African governments, their international partners, and investors can do more to ignite Africa’s creative industries. Artists have too often succeeded in spite of, not thanks to, the state—where regulatory barriers, weak intellectual property protections, and exacting tax regimes may inhibit the creative economy. Development finance institutions can follow the IFC’s lead by offering blended finance options to de-risk similar investments in other countries. The Democratic Republic of Congo—historically considered a regional cultural superpower, especially in music—shows significant growth potential, for example. Contemporary Congolese stars are yet to experience success akin to that of their Nigerian and South African peers; even Congolese icon Fally Ipupa has less than 7 percent of Nigerian artist Burna Boy’s monthly listeners on Spotify.

Beyond their remarkable economic impacts, Africa’s cultural entrepreneurs are reshaping global perceptions of the continent. As one African analyst noted, “historically, when we talk about global soft power, Africa has never really been top of mind.” But through television series and films set in Africa and written by Africans, artists are rewriting the infamous “single story” that has shaped international perceptions of a continent ravaged by war, poverty, and disease. One African-British journalist wrote about how “Afrobeats artists were the best [public relations] team we could ever have asked for—talented, arrogant, and unapologetically African.” The World Economic Forum has heralded a “rising Afro Wave inspired by the arts and cultural leaders of African and Afro diaspora . . . [empowering] nations to participate more actively in global conversations, enhancing their diplomatic influence, and forging connections that extend beyond geopolitical boundaries on key themes, issues, and business opportunities.”

Some caution that there are challenges presented by the rapid rise and commercialization of African cultural industries. Nollywood’s roots in the Yoruba people’s traveling theater tradition, with rapid recording and distribution networks, may become consigned to history as the local film industry transforms. Some African artists have also rejected the ubiquitous term “Afrobeats”—they argue it is a catchall term for an incredibly broad and diverse set of musical genres. Burna Boy, the first African artist to sell out a US stadium, said, “it’s not fair to just join everybody . . . It’s almost like joining hip-hop, R&B, and dancehall into one thing and [calling] it ‘Ameribeats.’ It doesn’t do justice to what’s really going on.”

African governments, international partners, and investors can all play a critical role in further unlocking the potential and impact of the continent’s creative industries. However, they must ensure that African artists and entrepreneurs retain ownership and creative control amid increasing international engagement and investment. Whether that is successfully done will determine whether Africa’s cultural economies benefit from the hard work of the artists and whether creative industries across the continent can build a new, better-informed international appreciation for Africa’s economic and cultural power.

Tom Bonsundy-O’Bryan is a 2023 Millennium fellow at the Atlantic Council and Meta’s head of misinformation policy for Europe, Middle East, and Africa.

Josefina Bonsundy-O’Bryan is a Women in Africa laureate, La Caixa Foundation fellow, and lawyer at Withersworldwide.

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The post It’s time to invest in the African creatives shaping global trends appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The higher demand for critical minerals is expected to cause a significant expansion in the extraction and production of an array of mineral resources. For example, the World Economic Forum projects that the production of minerals including graphite, cobalt, and lithium could increase by nearly 500 percent by 2050 to meet the growing demand for clean-energy technologies. Estimated to hold approximately 30 percent of the volume of critical-mineral reserves, the African continent is situated at the very center of the energy transition.

A considerable amount of minerals—for example, 25 percent of tin and 26 percent of tantalum production—is sourced by artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM): low-tech, labor-intensive mining operations in which workers (largely unskilled labor) use rudimentary tools and techniques to access mineral ore. ASM is an important source of rural employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an estimated ten million people in the region working as artisanal and small-scale miners—sourcing critical minerals but also other minerals such as gold. These workers are often driven to the sector by poverty. At least sixty million other individuals facilitate these informal supply chains.

However, many of these artisanal and small-scale miners work informally and face harsh conditions. Before critical-mineral production ramps up even further, African communities, stakeholders, and governments must take steps to formalize these workers—and the international community, including the United States, should help.

What is the problem?

In contrast with ASM, large-scale mining (LSM) is industrial and long-term, utilizing heavy machinery to extract resources. Furthermore, LSM has more geological information available to it and better access to capital and finance. Most importantly, LSM generally operates within the rules of law and adheres to international standards and regulations. It is accompanied by many challenges, however, including causing ecological and habitat damage; polluting the water, air, and soil; and threatening human health. Even where mining operations are conducted legally and formally, they still pose significant environmental and socioeconomic problems.

Although vastly different types of mining, ASM and LSM often take place in overlapping spaces, with ASM operations appearing on the periphery of larger industrial sites. Artisanal miners frequently live and work in areas earmarked for large-scale mining projects, blurring the line between the two. This is exemplified by the presence of illicit or licit networks of middlemen who transport ore from ASM sites to LSM companies and processing facilities. Middlemen often aggregate minerals from various sources, including both ASM and LSM operations, making it especially difficult to trace the origin of the minerals. The fragmented and opaque nature of the mineral supply chain complicates the traceability of products from upstream suppliers to downstream companies.  

There are many challenges associated with artisanal mining. At least 90 percent of artisanal miners work informally, without the necessary licenses or permits required by law. Securing permits improves miners’ access to services they are unable to access in the informal economy—such as microfinance credit, grants, and government loan facilities, which, in turn, place the miners in a better position to accumulate wealth. In many cases, ASM activities are found in regions that are out of reach of regulators, where the institutional presence of the government is weak. By operating outside of state recognition, it becomes impossible for the government to establish and enforce health and safety standards and regulations.

With informal mining operations flying under the radar of the government, either by the design of mining site owners or willful ignorance on the part of the government, workers are routinely exposed to poor labor conditions and dangerous situations. Artisanal miners often work without proper tools and protective gear in unsupported and poorly ventilated underground shafts where, as Amnesty International points out, temperatures can be extremely high. Exposure to the dust and mineral waste generated from these mines can lead to potentially fatal diseases and health conditions, and the dust and waste also contributes to pollution and environmental degradation in the area surrounding the mine.

Across the African continent, artisanal mining has been linked to human-rights violations, forced labor, crime, and conflict. These issues, compounded with artisanal miners’ lack of legal rights, exacerbates their vulnerability and the cycles of poverty and exploitation they face.

More at stake

The problems in ASM often present a significant barrier to sustainable foreign investment in African critical minerals. The aforementioned problems in the artisanal sector have made Western business interests hesitant to invest in Africa’s critical minerals. Poor labor practices and human rights violations associated with ASM could expose global companies to reputational and regulatory risks. These concerns—combined with pressure from non-governmental and human-rights organizations—make investment in ASM a complicated and risky proposition.

This barrier is present in artisanal cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Cobalt is a critical component of many lithium-ion batteries, including ones used to power electric vehicles, produce components for wind and solar energy technologies, and power portable electronic devices such as smartphones. The DRC accounts for more than 74 percent of global cobalt mining, and 20 to 30 percent of that is via ASM.

In some regions of the DRC, artisanal miners are exploited by armed groups that seek to control mining areas and siphon revenue to finance their operations, purchase weapons, and sustain conflicts. Militias have abducted and trafficked children to extract cobalt as well as copper, in a bid to fund their groups. In addition, some ASM cobalt operations employ children. It was once estimated that forty thousand children were mining for cobalt, working in life-threatening conditions and exposed to violence, extortion, and intimidation.

Such problems associated with informality, including the absence of regulatory standards and the occurrence of human-rights violations, make it difficult for potential investors to justify long-term investments. Without clear, enforceable laws, investors face a high-risk business environment and unpredictable changes in mining policies, which undermine investor confidence.

In addition to posing these immediate risks to artisanal miners and their communities, informal mining exacerbates economic and market instability on a macroeconomic level. Informal miners typically earn a meager and unstable income, which is subject to fluctuation based on the market prices and demand for cobalt. Miners’ economic instability translates into broader economic uncertainty for the sector and limits opportunities for community development. The presence of such substantial unregulated economic activity leads to significant tax revenue losses for the government, because these transactions primarily occur outside of official channels. This undermines the state’s capacity to invest money in necessary social programs, build infrastructure, and quell violence in other regions of the DRC. In spite of these challenging economic implications, African governments might resist formalization efforts, unwilling to disrupt the vital role ASM plays in the livelihoods of many individuals and communities across Africa.

While artisanal cobalt mining in the DRC provides a case study, some of these issues associated with informality are also prevalent in the mining of critical minerals in other African nations, such as lithium production in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Across the continent, the volatility of ASM creates a less attractive investment environment, given that investors seek dependable production to ensure stable supply chains and therefore profitability.

What might formalization look like?

Despite the complications associated with the informal production of many critical minerals, the solution is not to disengage from ASM; it employs 90 percent of the mining workforce. Rather, the solution lies in formalizing and legalizing ASM, which will help mitigate the risks inherent to these mining operations while fostering a more regulated and stable environment for international investment in Africa’s critical minerals.

Integrating the ASM sector into the formal economy would help improve local security, stabilize incomes, and ensure that safer and more environmentally sustainable practices are implemented. It would also help create national regulations and international standards, pressuring the ASM sector to improve practices to become compliant.

Formalization means that miners are registered with proper mining titles. Even in some countries where ASM is recognized by law, governments have not made it possible for miners to obtain the necessary permits and licenses. But in addition to these permits and licenses, formalization also includes—according to the Washington-based nonprofit Pact—efforts by the mining industry to enact chain of custody and supply chain transparency measures; health, safety, and environmental protections; security and human-rights protections; measures that improve access to finance; and requirements to use proper mining techniques. In addition, formalization includes sound industry policies, procedures, and due diligence systems, which should be in place throughout the life cycle of a mine. These components of formalization create a framework within which artisanal miners can operate safely and legally, contributing positively to community-wide and country-wide development goals and global supply chains.

Given the complexity of the informal economy, there is no simple, one-size-fits-all approach to formalization. We can, however, look for strategies that have been effective in other countries or industries and use them to guide the approach towards formalizing ASM. For example, Rwanda’s 2010 Land Tenure Reform Programme initiated a systematic registration effort to promote land access and address tenure insecurity. This program registered over ten million land parcels in less than five years and enabled landowners to use their property as collateral for loans, facilitating access to credit. The program has been widely regarded as successful in integrating the informal economy, particularly due to its simple registration process and involvement of community members and stakeholders in the reform. Transitioning ASM to the formal economy must also use an integrated whole-of-society approach, centering African communities, stakeholders, and governments. This might mean starting small at a grassroots level by engaging local communities in social dialogue, allowing informal miners to express their views and defend their interests. Their inclusion at an early stage of the formalization process will ensure that policies address informality efficiently and enhance the effectiveness of such measures.

There have been some efforts in recent years to support the formalization of ASM workers and improve social and environmental practices in the sector. For example, as the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF) explains, international Fairtrade and Fairmined standards set minimum standards for responsible mining, which support formalization. Furthermore, chain of custody initiatives trace supply chains from mine to market to ensure that supply chains are not associated with any conflicts or human rights abuses and that they meet international regulations. These are certainly steps in the right direction but, as the IGF explains, there are concerns about the long-term sustainability of these initiatives and whether they are reaching the most marginalized communities.

Formalization is a very complex but necessary process that can improve the lives of miners and address issues in the critical-mineral supply chain—and therefore attract more sustainable investment to the sector, contributing to the broader development goals of African countries.

How the international community can help

As mineral extraction in Africa is only expected to increase in the foreseeable future, it would be strategically unwise for the international community, and in particular the United States, to sit idly by on the issue of formalizing artisanal mining.

Going forward, the United States can focus on capacity building and simplifying trade processes and market access to help formalize artisanal mining in Africa, which could lead to increased global investment in critical minerals. To build the foundation for policies and programs that provide legal protection for ASM miners, the United States could fund and support training programs for artisanal miners, local authorities, and government officials on sustainable mining practices, health and safety standards, regulatory compliance, and business skills. By strengthening local and national institutions responsible for overseeing the ASM sector, governments would be better able to enforce regulations, protect the rights of artisanal miners, and formalize the sector.

The United States could also work with African governments and international organizations—such as the African Union and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—to simplify trade procedures, enabling miners to participate legally and more fully in global supply chains. In December 2022, the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with the DRC and Zambia to develop a productive electric-battery supply chain—from the extraction of minerals to the assembly line. The agreement also serves as a commitment to respect international standards and to prevent, detect, and fight corruption and build a sustainable industry in Africa that benefits workers and local communities, as well as the US private sector. At this time, it is more political than actionable, although it creates a framework for future negotiations and strengthened partnerships. Deepening ties with African nations and collaborating with international organizations can help leverage the resources, expertise, and global networks to ensure a more conducive environment for investment and sustainable growth. Increasing institutional capacity would also allow governments to strengthen tenure security and clarify property rights for ASM, particularly reducing the incidence of ASM-LSM conflict.

The creation of more legal channels for miners to sell their products could enhance supply chain transparency and promote more sustainable market practices. Implementing an international certification mechanism, similar to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), offers the ASM sector an opportunity for empowerment and a pathway towards legitimacy. Originally established to remove conflict diamonds from the global supply chain, the KPCS mandates that member countries adhere to strict certification requirements, import and export controls, regular audits, and controlled trade. The principles of the Kimberly Process might be adapted to the extraction of critical minerals so as to increase the security of artisanal miners and their access to legal markets.

Not only would these policy actions benefit African countries in the context of the critical-minerals boom and improve the livelihoods of miners, but they would allow the United States to strengthen its economic and strategic partnerships with African countries. As critical minerals will continue to advance the clean-energy transition, decisive action is essential to make the future of mining a pathway for inclusive, sustainable development for the countries that supply minerals to the world.

Sarah Way is a graduate of the University of Colorado Boulder’s International Affairs Program with a specialization in Africa and the Middle East. Her research centers on the intersection of natural resources and development, with a specific focus on extractive minerals in Africa.

The post Integrating artisanal mining into the formal economy would benefit African miners and economies alike appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The US elections are quickly approaching. But while there may be a shift in administrations, critical minerals are poised to remain a central theme in US policy: Deep bipartisan support for remaking global supply chains and reducing dependence on China’s current dominance in processing have virtually election-proofed focus on the issue.

Rich in minerals and with a strategic location, African countries should be benefiting from this growing US interest. But currently—due to the investment-intensive nature of greenfield projects, the United States’ and Europe’s increased focus on self-reliance, and competition from other countries with more established mining industries—African countries risk largely losing out on this historic opportunity to attract more investment in the minerals that will fuel future industries,

To ensure that supply chains are restructured to best advance both US and African strategic interests, the US government must accelerate an integrated approach that combines investment facilitation, technological innovation, and capacity building.

New mines take a long time and a large amount of capital to build. Such challenges have hindered non-Chinese capital flows into African markets for decades; but non-Chinese investors and governments are aware of the strategic role the continent could and should play in the global shift to cleaner energy sources. For example, 56 percent of global cobalt reserves, key to electrical vehicle manufacturing, can be found in African countries, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo. While investment in critical-mineral infrastructure has grown in recent decades, a significant financing gap persists, estimated to be up to $108 billion each year.

The United States and the European Union (EU) are unable to finance infrastructure projects through the government-to-government lending model that China typically employs; thus, the emphasis is put on the private sector to make large-scale investments that must be financed from the firms’ balance sheets or through the capital markets rather than from government coffers. Yet, many Western companies view Africa through a lens of risk, which could be attributed to persisting negative narratives about African markets and people and the heightened scrutiny of global brands by nongovernmental organizations. Western companies’ concerns about political risk and corruption often override their assessments of opportunities. This is in sharp contrast with companies, such as ones from China, the Middle East, or even Turkey, that seem to focus more steadily on the opportunity in African economies created by young populations, rapid digitalization, and wide diversification, motivating these companies to work to mitigate the risks as they encounter them.

Another challenge for African countries hoping to attract Western investment for mining is the growing onshoring focus of the United States and EU. Western countries have resurrected industrial policy in a big way in recent years, ramping up billions in financing and guarantees for mining projects as the strategic vulnerability posed by dependence on Chinese supply chains becomes clearer. African and Western governments are united in their goal to change the current supply chain.

In response to China’s approach to critical minerals, onshoring, nearshoring, and friendshoring have proven a bipartisan priority in the United States. And, on both sides of the Atlantic, hundreds of billions of dollars are being pumped into this effort. This can be seen in the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the US CHIPS and Science Act, and both the EU’s Net-Zero Industry Act and its batteries regulation of 2023, which all seek to make progress toward net zero and reduce dependence on China’s role in critical-mineral supply chains. The expanded processing capacity that will result from IRA-incentivized investment in the United States will require more inputs and, therefore, a dramatic expansion in mining—over three hundred new mines will be needed to meet electric-vehicle battery demand alone by 2035.

African countries will be home to many of these new mines. Including them in US friendshoring efforts in the years ahead will require investment that is responsibly structured to overcome historical sins. The history of mining and colonialism in Africa—with its extractive, exploitative, and environmentally damaging legacy—has fostered a deeply emotional context for conversations about the future of the industry on the continent. But while mining was part of an ugly past, it is also a necessary part of a brighter and greener future. To advance this vision, Western governments, investors, and development partners must ensure that economic benefits are broadened to meaningfully include local communities, national companies, and environmental and academic groups.

Africa, as a region, has vast potential to build value-adding mining industry capabilities; but potential, if left untapped, won’t attain the economic growth African countries are searching for. Tangible economic progress will require billions of dollars of investment. Washington must invest in its partnership with African countries by derisking increased investment from the private sector and by encouraging the adoption of transparent, equitable, and sustainable practices.

If governments, investors, and development partners don’t make dramatic changes in the next five years (during this administration and the next one) African nations may miss this opportune moment to leverage historic levels of demand for critical minerals to fuel industrial growth, foreign-exchange generation, skills acquisition, and job creation—and the United States may fail to counter Chinese influence in the supply chains that are critical for sustained US global competitiveness and national security. 

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Report

Jul 1, 2024

From greenfield projects to green supply chains: Critical minerals in Africa as an investment challenge

By Aubrey Hruby

This report provides a snapshot of Africa’s mineral wealth and mining industries, draws out the similarities between the mining and infrastructure investment attraction challenges, describes the competitive landscape African nations find themselves in, and makes innovative recommendations—namely to the US government—to rapidly accelerate investment in sustainable mining industries in African markets.

Africa Critical Minerals

Aubrey Hruby is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and co-founder of Insider and Tofino Capital.

The post Increasing investment in African mining should be a higher priority for the United States appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In 2017, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Gertler, accusing him of “opaque and corrupt mining and oil deals” that cost the DRC more than $1.36 billion in revenues from 2010 to 2012 alone. Gertler has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing and, through a representative, said that he would abide by sanctions. The news that the Biden administration may ease these sanctions should be viewed positively, as an indication that US sanctions can achieve both economic and geopolitical goals.

Eased sanctions, whether a formal delisting or the issuing of a general license to Gertler, would allow for the sale of currently sanctioned entities. Following the easing of sanctions in this case, US firms could gain access to new investment opportunities by investing in mining projects that currently have links to Gertler, leading to economic growth in the United States and the DRC. In addition, the DRC has an opportunity to showcase the improvements that the country is making in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. While some senior officials, human-rights defenders, and anticorruption fighters have valid concerns about easing sanctions on Gertler, the decision could be a win for the DRC and the United States.

The choice—and the history behind it

Both the Trump and Biden administrations have gone back and forth over the tightening and easing of sanctions on Gertler. That has drawn much attention, but what hasn’t is the fact that the United States has quietly used sanctions effectively in this case to get its way.

In 2019, The Sentry—an investigative organization that aims to hold to account predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy—conducted a six-month-long study on the effectiveness of sanctions in Africa in the twenty-first century. The study found that better strategies for achieving identified goals in each sanctions program must be developed if sanctions effectiveness was to improve. The Sentry study set the stage for the Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review, which drew conclusions on how to modernize US sanctions and make them more effective. Treasury recommended a “structured policy framework” that “links sanctions to a clear policy objective.” The Biden administration has made no secret of its desire to improve access to critical minerals, diversify its supply chains, and work with US partners to achieve those goals. Since 80 percent of the DRC’s cobalt output is owned by Chinese companies, US policymakers should be seeking ways to reduce barriers to entry in the DRC’s mining sector and to actively promote investment there. 

As the United States seeks to gain greater access to critical minerals and diversify its supply chains away from Chinese influence, Biden administration officials hope that granting Gertler a general license to sell his holdings in the DRC would increase US or Western firms’ willingness to invest in the country. That’s because those firms have been largely boxed out as Gertler, according to the US Treasury, used his closeness with government officials to secure below-market rates for mining concessions for his companies. Beyond Gertler, the business environment of the DRC ranks 183 out of 190 on the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators. Easing sanctions, through a coordinated US government effort that seeks to maximize this move, could send an important signal to Western investors that the DRC is open for business. Western firms could lift their bottom lines while stimulating the DRC economy by paying market rates.

The potential delisting of Gertler and his companies is a good example of an instance in which sanctions—or, in this case, the easing of sanctions—are being used in support of a specific policy objective.

Delisting would be good—but more must be done

Building on a potential delisting, the Biden administration should work with Congress to expeditiously pass the bipartisan BRIDGE to DRC Act—which helps the United States secure access to critical-mineral supply chains and sets human-rights and democracy benchmarks for strengthening the US-DRC relationship. These moves could be further timed or calculated to magnify the impact of ongoing foreign assistance programs led by the United States Agency for International Development or other US government agencies.

The United States should coordinate additional moves to support the DRC. In October 2022, the Financial Action Task Force, the standard-setting international organization that seeks to strengthen the global financial system, placed the DRC on its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring—also known as the “grey list”—for the country’s dismal record in fighting money laundering and terrorist financing. While many African countries are on the grey list, the impact is considerable, as it limits capital inflows, makes investors wary of doing business, and leads to reputational damage and a reduction of correspondent banking relationships, among other consequences. The US Treasury should look to bolster the DRC government’s approach to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) by equipping the country with the knowledge, know-how, and capacity that it needs.  

Regardless of whether the delisting happens or whether the BRIDGE Act becomes law, the DRC must do more to help itself. News of a failed coup attempt in Kinshasa on May 19 certainly does not help, especially since—according to local reports—the assailants were linked to exiled DRC politician and US citizen Christian Malanga, who was killed by the country’s security forces in a firefight. Three US nationals were allegedly also involved in the attempt to overthrow the government of President Felix Tshisekedi.

The DRC must continue to take concrete steps to improve the business environment and reduce its political and economic risk factors. Since 2022, the DRC built on its high-level political commitments to improve its AML/CFT regime, finalize its three-year national AML/CFT strategy, and improve its macroeconomic performance—boosting its credit rating. The DRC has an opportunity to continue to make progress in its fight against corruption, money laundering, and terrorist financing that threaten the stability of the country from Matadi on the Atlantic seaboard to Goma in the Great Rift Valley.

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A win in the heart of Africa

Delisting Gertler would not only help the United States get its way, but it would show that its sanctions policy in Africa can be effective; its industrial and national security policies can be successfully implemented; and that all of this can be done in a manner that can help an African partner generate greater economic growth, jobs, and the foreign investment it seeks.

The United States can’t do it alone. It must also partner with the DRC in a serious manner to help strengthen the DRC’s framework to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, improve Kinshasa’s image, and reduce barriers to investment such as perceived political and economic risk.

The DRC occupies a central role on the African continent and with its economic potential could serve as a future hub for transportation, logistics, mineral processing, and more. If the DRC wins, all of Africa benefits—as do the United States and the West.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He previously served in the US Treasury Department and US State Department with a focus on Africa policy.

The post In a Congolese mining case, Biden can secure a win for US sanctions policy in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But chances are you’ve heard little about this conflict or the other security tensions throughout East Africa given the lack of traditional media coverage or social media buzz in the United States. That’s due in part to a lack of consistent high-level engagement from the US government in the conflict. Those who are working on this region and care about security and instability need to do more to raise the profile of the disaster in Sudan and in the larger Horn of Africa—because more visibility can help light the way toward solutions.

The United States did not cause a civil war in Sudan, but the inability to deliver quickly on promises of development-related aid in 2021 left the country off balance, leading to an overthrow of the nascent democracy taking shape. Ultimately, the two primary and current belligerents—the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces—took up arms after attempts to retain power failed, leaving a path of destruction in their wake and destroying a country in the process.

It’s been just over a year since US forces evacuated the US embassy in Sudan in a daring operation that resulted in the rescue of just under one hundred Americans and a handful of foreign diplomats from the country. Due to the fighting devastating the country, the economy of Sudan collapsed as millions of people struggle to survive amid the chaos, suffering, and misery. US officials point out that regional players continue to fund and provide weapons to both sides of this conflict, claims that the United Arab Emirates and others deny.

From outside government, it is easy to spot the difficult nature of the policy problems in play: There are belligerents who are not interested in an end to the violence, economic collapse, and human suffering that they are causing. Outside actors are waging a proxy war perpetuating the violence. Diplomats seem to be unable to find a negotiated solution to end the conflict.

The United States is not addressing the confluence of these challenges with its full effort—and it is clear to anyone who follows these issues closely that the efforts it is making are not working. The US government has put in place multiple rounds of targeted financial sanctions on bad actors perpetuating the violence. In February 2024, the State Department announced a special envoy for Sudan to coordinate policy. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee seem to be the loudest voices when it comes to Sudan, drawing attention to the atrocities, the ineffectiveness of US sanctions, and the modest policy successes, but their reach has limits. The executive branch appears to be quietly trying to do its critical work but has said very little publicly beyond the setting of testy congressional hearings. The nongovernmental organization and advocacy community continues to try to shed light on the problem through task forces, letter-writing campaigns, demonstrations, and articles like this one. The problem is that nobody in the broader public seems to be listening.

Where does this leave the people of Sudan? US efforts to mediate between the parties have not been successful to date. Fighting continues, sanctions are not working, and people are dying. Behind-the-scenes work by the diplomatic community is useful, but more should be done in public to raise the profile of the conflict, get more attention from people who do not work on Africa every day, and bring about more public pressure to end it.

This should include visits to Sudan by top Biden administration officials, as security allows, similar to what we’ve seen with senior-level visits to Israel during its war in Gaza or to Kyiv repeatedly in the past three years. Media appearances by senior US officials, as well as the advocacy community, can be helpful too. Alternatively, civil society, diaspora organizations, the nongovernmental organization community, and the general public should encourage journalists to ask US officials tough questions about their approach to Sudan, providing an additional avenue to reach a wider audience. Sudan’s dynamic diaspora in the United States, as well as everyday Americans, should also encourage continued bipartisan attention on Sudan on Capitol Hill.

East Africa’s security challenges extend well beyond Sudan. As one foreign diplomat told me recently on condition of anonymity, the region is full of “division and risks fracture.” Fighting in Sudan damaged an oil pipeline used by neighboring South Sudan to export oil from Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The disruption in oil exports from South Sudan, where a tenuous peace is under threat, led to an economic meltdown in the country and threatens the patronage system placating the delicate political coalition of elites. Continued violations of a United Nations Security Council arms embargo on South Sudan could fuel a return to conflict or perpetuate the fighting in Sudan to the north. Eritrean troops, who helped Ethiopia in its fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, remain in northern Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s prime minister continues to make public moves to secure access to a Red Sea port, leaving its neighbors uneasy and further contributing to regional instability. Longstanding security challenges continue in Somalia, which remains locked in a fight against rising threats from al-Shabbab and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

In all of these areas, the United States appears to be largely ineffective and viewed externally as not doing enough or lacking the political will necessary to have significant impact, particularly in Sudan. We can ask ourselves if this is another example of the waning influence of the United States in Africa in real time, a string of bad bureaucratic decisions, or, worse, acceptance that senior levels of the Biden administration lack a coordinated strategy for the country (and the wider Horn of Africa), but they would prefer to avoid dealing with it so as to divert their limited attention elsewhere.  

If the United States does not have the will to engage more forcefully in Sudan, its geopolitical rivals will continue to exploit the security vacuum in the country for their own gain and the region will be worse off for it. As East Africa teeters on the brink, US rivals are increasingly setting the terms of engagement. It’s time to pay attention, before it’s too late.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He previously served in the US Treasury Department and US State Department with a focus on Africa policy.

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He announced the launch of an international initiative to “enable the Sahel countries to have access to the Atlantic Ocean.” Landlocked Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso are at the center of the Moroccan plan, which involves making Morocco’s road, port, and rail infrastructure available to them and implementing large-scale development projects.

Even if it is not detailed yet, the Moroccan initiative comes after military regimes came to power by unconstitutional means or through coups d’état, which for three of these states resulted, at various points, in having sanctions imposed on them. For example, Niger was sanctioned by the United States, European Union (EU), and European countries such as France and the Netherlands. Notably, Malian army officers who collaborated with the Wagner Group or were suspected of crimes were sanctioned by the United States. And the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which had sanctioned Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, lifted its sanctions on Niger and Mali in February this year, a month after the three Sahelian countries left the organization and soon after the countries formed the Alliance of Sahel States. Chad has not yet seen sanctions imposed after the undemocratic accession of its president following the death of his father. While the sanctions imposed on the three countries are intended to apply pressure on those who seized power by force or defied the constitution, in the hopes of restoring democratic systems, these sanctions also impact the populations.

The people in these countries are essentially penalized twice: On the one hand, they are led by governments that have revoked the right of the people to choose their leaders. On the other hand, these populations also suffer from the effects of sanctions, which cause them economic hardship, limit their access to essential goods, cut them off from the world, and deprive them of trade opportunities.

That creates a quandary for the democratic world: While sanctions are intended to target unconstitutional governments, it is the ordinary people in these countries who suffer the most from them.

Behind the initiative

Morocco’s efforts to cooperate with the states in the Sahel seem inspired by Morocco’s 2011 Constitution—mainly the preamble.

In this preamble, Morocco commits itself to supporting the Maghreb Union (which it says is a “strategic option”), deepening its bonds with the Arab-Islamic Ummah, intensifying cooperation with European countries around the Mediterranean, strengthening cooperation across Africa, and diversifying its relations with the rest of the world.

Specifically, when it comes to Africa, the preamble states that Morocco intends to “consolidate relations of cooperation and solidarity with the peoples and countries of Africa, particularly the countries of the Sahel and Sub-Saharan countries.” This short sentence helps explain Morocco’s initiative. The Moroccan Constitution does not drown the Sahel in the mass of Africa, but on the contrary highlights it by mentioning it separately. In his November 6 speech, the king of Morocco even called the Sahelian countries “African sister countries.”

In addition, the Moroccan Constitution’s commitment to the Islamic world—each of the three sanctioned countries are majority Muslim—and its pledging solidarity with the “peoples and countries of Africa” help explain Morocco’s new initiative. By specifying that its solidarity goes to the countries as well as to the peoples, Morocco is distinguishing people from the regimes that govern them.

As for the content of the Atlantic initiative, it has been received well by the Sahelian states because it offers alternatives for growth and development—and indeed, even survival. For example, Niger (one of the poorest countries in the world) depended on international aid for its annual budget, which was slashed by 40 percent in 2023 due to donors and creditors withholding support. Following the coup, malnutrition skyrocketed, only compounded by the fact that the United Nations (UN) World Food Program’s cargos were getting blocked from reaching Niger due to border closures, with one UN coordinator saying that their goal—to deliver humanitarian aid to at least 80 percent of 4.4 million vulnerable people—was in jeopardy.

The success of this initiative is contingent on several factors: It will require funding, a robust regulatory framework, efforts to address challenges such as piracy, and harmonization with and between maritime governance actors. In addition, the economic activity this initiative would create could have benefits for the governments, as well as the people, in the sanctioned Sahelian countries. However, the focus of this initiative is on helping the people, who have continued to suffer for decades.

The Atlantic advantage

The initiative underscores the importance placed—across centuries—on accessing the Atlantic Ocean. For example, El Hadj Omar Tall (founder of the Toucouleur Empire) and Samori Ture (a leader of the Wassoulou Empire) each governed landlocked areas of West Africa in the nineteenth century. Burkinabe historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo chronicled how the two African heroes, facing the inevitable advance of European colonial conquest, hurried to “capture, before it was too late, the political initiative and keep it in African hands.” They both did that by directing their troops to the ocean. Eventually, however, their efforts to reach the sea were halted by the French.

The strategic importance of the Atlantic as taught by history resonates today.

Today, over one hundred countries border the Atlantic Ocean, and importantly those countries include the world’s leading power (the United States), other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (including the United Kingdom and France), Latin American powers (such as Argentina and Brazil), and African nations stretching from Morocco (which itself has a 1,800-mile coastline on the ocean) to South Africa.

For countries that have the means to take full advantage of their coasts, such as Morocco and Senegal, the Atlantic is a boon. Indeed, Africa’s twenty-three coastal nations are home to 46 percent of the continent’s population, 55 percent of its gross domestic product, and 57 percent of its trade. They also contain a large amount of natural resources, including oil.

But access alone won’t grant people in Sahelian countries access to the boon. Here is what is needed for this initiative to succeed:

• Defining common strategic priorities between the countries participating in this initiative and also their partners in order to focus on the most pressing issues.
• The integration of projects already underway such as the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project or the Great Green Wall. Their inclusion will bring a more holistic approach to the Moroccan initiative, which focuses on road, rail, and maritime infrastructure.
• The inclusion of the African Union (through the 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy) as well as maritime governance mechanisms, specialized institutions, and other important stakeholders such as the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa, African Port Management Associations, Union of African Shippers’ Councils, maritime training institutions, the UN, and the International Maritime Organization. This inclusion in discussions will help to harmonize the maritime rules and avoid double governance systems.
• Access to substantial financing, particularly via international partners such as in the private sector and development and financial institutions. Financing will be needed to support the blue economy and the modernization of road, rail, and port infrastructure.

Sahelian civilian populations have been suffering from the effects of a twenty-year war against jihadist attacks. These populations deserve peace and prosperity. After the security failures of so many domestic and foreign military interventions and the unfolding of the coups, this proposal offers a much-needed brighter perspective for these people.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center.

Abdelhak Bassou is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South.

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These condemnations sharply contrast with the past decade, which had largely been positive for Jerusalem on the global stage. Indeed, the Abraham Accords boosted Israel’s diplomacy and regional integration in the Middle East and North Africa, while the Jewish state’s expertise in technology, water, and irrigation was acclaimed worldwide. Israeli leaders were even among the few delegations to have been welcomed in Washington, Moscow, and New Delhi with warmth.

The war in Gaza has also affected African countries’ postures toward Israel, which had seen a sharp improvement in the past twenty years. Several nations on the continent, in addition to the African Union (AU), have directly criticized Israel for its actions in Gaza. However, as of now, most of these criticisms haven’t materialized into major diplomatic setbacks for Israel. It appears that the political, economic, and security dynamics that have been steadily developing since the early 2000s may be able to survive the public condemnation of Israel in several African capitals.

Impact of the war on Africa-Israel relations

Even though Jerusalem initially received wide international support following Hamas’s onslaught, numerous African countries soon voiced criticism as the number of Palestinian casualties swelled.

In South Africa, the criticism has echoed historical Palestinian support for the African National Congress. At the end of December 2023, South Africa filed a lawsuit against Israel at the International Court of Justice, and Pretoria positioned itself as one of the major critics of the Jewish state globally. The president of the AU Commission, Chad’s Moussa Faki, publicly condemned Israel during the AU’s most recent summit in February. He called the Israeli offensive in Gaza “the most flagrant” violation of human rights. Comoros President Azali Assoumani went as far as denouncing “the genocide Israel is committing in Palestine under our nose.” Additionally, the prime minister of the Palestinian Authority was given a place of honor at the AU summit, while no Israeli delegation was invited. Finally, thirty-eight African countries voted in favor of a United Nations (UN) resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza.

However, unlike with the Yom Kippur War (during which most African states suspended their diplomatic relations with Israel), the Second Intifada (during which Tunisia and Morocco cut ties with Israel), and the first Gaza War of 2009 (in response to which Mauritania told the Israeli ambassador to leave), African countries today have largely avoided drastic diplomatic steps against Israel.

Even Muslim-majority nations such as Morocco, Chad, and Sudan (the latter having had no official relations with Israel until a few years ago) have not gone beyond public condemnation of the war in Gaza. A number of Sub-Saharan nations—such as Togo, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, and South Sudan—abstained from voting for the UN ceasefire resolution. Kenya and Malawi agreed to send workers to Israel after Jerusalem stopped issuing work permits to Palestinians. Meanwhile, Ugandan Judge Julia Sebutinde was the only one at The Hague who opposed every single accusation leveled against Israel in South Africa’s case during preliminary hearings in January.

A long history of unique North-South cooperation

The refusal (at least thus far) of African nations to break ties with Israel over the Gaza war, despite deep and publicly articulated differences, is rooted in an old relationship that has survived previous ups and downs. 

Even before the creation of Israel, Theodor Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement, expressed interest in the fate of Africa. One of the characters in his 1902 book Altneuland declares: “Once I have witnessed the redemption of the Jews, my people, I wish also to assist in the redemption of the Africans.”

After Israel’s independence, cooperation developed spontaneously and at full speed with many African countries. The 1960s have even been called the “golden age” of Israel-Africa relations. At that time, Israel maintained thirty-three ambassadors in Africa and its development aid, in proportion to Israel’s population, exceeded that of most Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development members. Furthermore, Israel offered Africa a model of decolonization: It had managed to secure its self-determination from the British, win what is known in Israel as the war of independence against an alliance of armies from Middle East countries, and quickly overcome the challenges of self-sufficiency and development. Nelson Mandela himself took inspiration from Zionist paramilitary groups like the Irgun in leading the African National Congress’ armed wing.

Finally, the socialist model adopted by Israel’s first leaders established from the start a model of “egalitarian” cooperation with African countries, an approach which differed greatly from the one promoted by former European colonial powers.

However, as the Yom Kippur War broke out in 1973, Israel saw its relations with most Sub-Saharan African countries break down under the pressure exerted on the continent’s governments by the Arab League. Israel’s leaders felt deeply betrayed, which likely partly explains the absence of coherent reinvestment by Israel in Africa in the following decades. In the 1980s, African leaders expressed their frustration with Arab nations that had not kept their promises—in particular in the field of energy—in exchange for the break with Israel.

Following that frustration, and in the favorable context of the Oslo Accords, Israeli-African diplomatic relations were gradually re-established. From the mid-2000s onward, Avigdor Lieberman, while minister of foreign affairs from 2009 to 2012 and then from 2013 to 2015 , began a diversification of Israel’s diplomatic alliances and focused his efforts on African states. In 2016, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu followed with a historic visit to East Africa. Then in June 2017, the Economic Community of West African States invited Netanyahu to address its summit. The Israeli prime minister was back in Kenya in November 2017 to meet eleven African leaders for a discussion on security cooperation in the geostrategically important Horn of Africa.

New paradigms

Still, as of 2024, Israel lacks ambitious economic and diplomatic policies to develop its ties with Africa. While it had thirty-three ambassadors on the continent in the 1960s, the Jewish state has today only thirteen diplomatic missions, three economic representations, and a single military attaché in Africa. This can be attributed to some combination of a limited Israeli strategy, narrow resources dedicated to its relationship with Africa, or the fact that African countries have been focusing their efforts on developing links with other international actors. Israel also continues to approach its diplomatic relationship with the continent mostly through the lens of its relations with the Muslim world. As such, the normalizations with Morocco and Sudan as well as the resumption of diplomatic relations with Chad were celebrated in Jerusalem as diplomatic breakthroughs within the Middle East and its periphery.

At the same time, several dynamics that have emerged in the past two decades are fueling an impressive acceleration in Africa-Israel relations beyond the periphery of the Middle East.

First, the Abraham Accords significantly modified the paradigm that had prevented Israel from fully integrating into the region without a peace treaty with the Palestinians. In the wake of these agreements, Jerusalem was able to undertake normalization discussions with other countries, with reports indicating it had initial conversations with Somalia, Comoros, and Niger. Israel inaugurated a diplomatic mission in Rwanda and recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Malawi recently opened an embassy in Tel Aviv, while Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo announced their intention to do the same in Jerusalem. Israel has, in turn, committed to reopening a representation in Kinshasa after an absence of thirty years. In May 2022, the first diplomatic conference on Africa-Israel was organized in Paris by the Embassy of Israel in France and the American Jewish Committee. (The authors of this article were the organizers.) In January 2023, El Al, Israel’s national airline, commenced its first flights to West Africa, serving the Nigerian cities of Abuja and Lagos. Finally, the prospect of Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia, which is still being discussed behind closed doors despite the current war, could further accelerate normalization with Muslim-majority African nations such as Somalia, Niger, Comoros, Mauritania, or Djibouti.

Second, Israel has been active at the multilateral level so as to strengthen its position on the continent. The Jewish state initially regained its observer status at the African Union in 2021, which it had lost in 2002 under Libyan pressure. The decision was however overturned the following year in a dramatic move that Jerusalem blamed on South Africa and Algeria. Before the current crisis, Israel had also initiated a quiet campaign at the United Nations to convince specific African states to move away from the non-aligned movement. These efforts had initial signs of success before the current war brought them to a halt.

Third, after experiencing the influence of former colonial powers, Cold War competitors, and powerful petrostates, Africa’s countries are now polishing their fully independent foreign policies. Their economies are rapidly growing, the continent’s political influence is starting to be felt globally, and major powers are competing with each other to put in place local partnerships. As such, African nations today are arguably less vulnerable to the external pressure that led to the diplomatic shutdowns of the Yom Kippur War and the Second Intifada. Israel appears to many of them as a pragmatic partner whose know-how in fields such as agriculture, water, and technology is essential to development.

Surviving the war in Gaza

The current war in Gaza is certainly a major step back for Israel’s diplomatic standing worldwide, including in Africa. The international pressure on Jerusalem might also increase as the IDF gears up for an offensive in Rafah, or if Israel’s tit-for-tat exchange of direct attacks with Iran continues.

However, the public criticism of the war does not appear to lead to the diplomatic consequences that prevailed during previous crises in the Middle East. Israel can be a pivotal partner in addressing many of the continent’s foremost development challenges for the decades to come, and most African leaders today seem unwilling to sacrifice this partnership.

The Abraham Accords, cemented in mutual security, diplomatic, and economic interests between Israel and several Muslim countries, appear to be strong enough to survive the current war. They could, in the long term, open the door to cooperation between Israel, other countries in the Middle East, and Africa. For example, Jerusalem could benefit from Morocco’s diplomatic and economic networks in Africa—particularly in the areas of banking and infrastructure. Likewise, sovereign funds from Gulf states interested in African markets represent an extraordinary financing opportunity for innovative Israeli companies supporting economic development on the continent.

After the war in Gaza ends, a new, integrated architecture could play a significant role for the two regions as they seek a more prosperous and secure future.

Anne-Sophie Sebban-Bécache is the director of American Jewish Committee Paris (AJC Paris) and was formerly an attaché at the political chancellery of the French embassy in Israel and at the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York. She holds a PhD in geopolitics focusing on Israel’s perceptions and politics towards the Horn of Africa.

Simon Seroussi is currently undertaking a mid-career master’s in public administration at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He previously served as the spokesperson of the Israeli embassy in France and the deputy chief of mission of the Israeli embassy in Cameroon.

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Minerals often lie at the heart of this cooperation, and while the words the presidents said may have been similar, the meaning and context behind them couldn’t be more different.

Russia offers quid pro quo partnerships with promises of kinetic military, security, and political support—and assisted by faux anti-imperialist messaging. The United States, on the other hand, touts an approach that places emphasis on economic and community investment. There is a widening gulf emerging between the two models—and each model offers something that the other cannot.

Russia’s give—and take

Russia’s version of partnership has been aptly described as a “regime survival package,” in which the Russian government offers military and security assistance to struggling African governments; soon after come resource concessions for Russian companies.

This exchange has relied heavily on the Wagner Group, as the military company’s running operations allowed Moscow to distance itself via proxy. However, since the Wagner Group’s consolidation and rebranding into the Africa Corps (following the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin), the exchange is arguably more direct and state-to-state, as Africa Corps activities are now reportedly being directed by the Russian state and managed by Russia’s military intelligence agency (the GRU) and the Kremlin. The Russian Defense Ministry, with the Africa Corps now reportedly in-house, is expanding its operations.

Russia’s offer of partnership has appealed particularly to governments in the Sahel. The Central African Republic is often viewed as the textbook case, with Wagner arriving in 2018 to push back rebels from the capital. Soon after, gold and diamond mining licenses were granted to a Russian-owned company that even the United Nations warns is “interconnected” with Wagner. And last year, Wagner helped Mali retake rebel-held areas in the north; in the months that followed, Russia and Mali signed agreements on gold refining and on oil, gas, uranium, and lithium production.

More recently, a contingent of Africa Corps personnel arrived in Burkina Faso in January to, according to the group’s Telegram channel, “ensure the safety of the country’s leader Ibrahim Traore and the Burkinabe people.” Two months later, Burkina Faso’s minister of energy, mining, and quarries told Sputnik Africa that Russian companies can become “strategic partners” in the extraction of minerals—such as gold, zinc, manganese, copper, graphite, and lithium—from mines and quarries.

Russia’s offer is currently supplanting other forms of partnership in Niger. The junta halted military cooperation with both France and the United States—whose militaries were there to help improve the security situation for Niger’s previous democratic leadership—pushing French troops to leave the country late last year and propelling the United States to agree to withdraw its forces. Earlier this month, Russian forces and military advisors arrived in Niger, equipped with an air defense system and other security equipment—a choice reflecting the fact that US forces were allocated between two airbases, from which they used drones to target militants. Once again, resources seem to be on the table in exchange for Russia’s partnership.  

While there are some actual value-added projects being developed from Russia’s deals, such as the agreement with Mali on building a gold refinery, such deals are exceptions to the rule. A number of Russia’s grandiose economic promises to Africa have failed to fully materialize. The fact is that Russia’s economic potential for Africa cannot compete with that of the West. Russia contributes less than 1 percent of the global foreign direct investment going to the continent, and when it comes to trade revenue, it’s $17.7 billion (as of 2021) is dwarfed by the United States’ $65 billion and the European Union’s (EU) $295 billion. If economic measures were the only consideration in choosing partnership, Russia likely wouldn’t make any list.

The only market where Russia leads in Africa is the arms market. Last year, Russia overtook China as the largest supplier of arms to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Part of what makes Russia so appealing as a partner—in addition to its offers of security assistance—is Russia’s ability to market itself as anti-imperialist based on the Soviet Union’s support for African countries when they were fighting for independence. For example, when the junta seized power from a French-backed president, Russia’s Prigozhin framed the coup as a liberation from Western powers. African countries still have concerns about the remaining influence wielded by former colonial powers.

How Washington works

The United States, on the other hand, makes its appeal to African countries by promising partnership on local economic development—the critical minerals discussion is only part of that partnership. The US approach is reflected in projects such as the Lobito Corridor—which is intended to make transport, including of critical minerals, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia to Angola easier. Alongside its mineral extraction initiatives, the United States is eager to showcase regional and community benefits for its projects. 

In addition, the United States often cooperates and coordinates with its European partners when approaching investment and activity in Africa. For example, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have signed similar agreements with both the United States and EU in which the countries agree to promote responsible mineral extraction activities that build local capacity and to bring more of the minerals value chain (including processing, manufacturing, and assembly) to the region.

Partnership with Europe can be an effective strategy for the United States, as such an approach gathers more funds, capacities, and markets. Yet, there are downsides. By tying itself with Europe, the United States ties itself to a colonial legacy. In Niger, the junta took power and quickly sought to evict French forces and EU partners—but not US forces (at least initially). This generated tension in the US-France relationship and underscored the extent to which the United States is willing to deviate from cooperation with its partners to maintain engagement in Africa. Such a method lines up with the revamped US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa under which the Biden administration has been adamant that it is seeking to partner with African countries on equal footing and that it will not treat Africa as a great-power battleground. Europe is itself aware of its history. A former Latvian prime minister, for example, called for EU members without colonial pasts to lead the bloc’s engagement with countries across Africa.

The United States, for the most part, holds its engagement conditional on the health of each country’s democracy. In the case of Niger, the United States suspended financial assistance, saying that “Any resumption of US assistance will require action . . .  to usher in democratic governance in a quick and credible timeframe.” The United States has also not shied away from terminating partnership in programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (which provides duty-free entry for certain products) when the country in that partnership has seen an erosion in democratic governance, human rights, and freedoms. The United States shouldn’t shy away from doing so; but this is not a priority Russia shares.

To be fair, the United States, often alongside its European partners, does collaborate on military affairs with African countries. For example, the United States and United Kingdom joined African democratic partners in conducting a large military drill in Kenya. Many African countries, especially those that are partners with the United States, recognize the risk Russia’s support poses. Some have been vocal in making their opposition to Russia’s geopolitical actions known.

Yet, deadly incidents (and the resulting political fallout)—such as the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush or the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu—have doused US enthusiasm for assistance with direct combat. The United States focuses on supporting roles with airpower, intelligence sharing, and training. Even France, after deploying troops across the Sahel for years in Operation Barkhane, was unwilling to deploy its forces to Niger during the coup to support the president it had backed. Compare that to Russia, which seems willing to sustain partnership with blood. When the Central African Republic’s president changed the constitution last year to abolish term limits, Russian forces in the country increased their presence and provided support and security services to the president.

The United States (especially when joining with its allies) is an economic power, and that is attractive for African countries seeking much needed domestic development and value addition. Yet, US partnership does have its limitations. Should a country’s domestic policies run afoul of American principles, partnership is near impossible. Unlike Russia’s limitations, the United States’ are largely self-imposed.

Weighing the choice

Going forward, African countries must choose wisely between the United States (and its offer of economic and development support) and Russia (and its offer of direct military support) in their search for a partner on critical minerals.

Juntas and dictatorships will likely choose Russia, even if offered another choice (which seems unlikely). Russia offers them the equipment and military support they need to fight insurgent and terrorist groups.

The West will need to closely watch democratic countries in Africa. Russia is looking to make the choice easier by deploying disinformation. France has accused Russia of even staging atrocities and framing the West to promote its narrative.

As for what the United States could do: It could theoretically start adding direct kinetic security support to its offer. However, the United States isn’t likely to align itself with military leaders who trampled democracy on their road to power, and it isn’t very likely to deploy forces to protect them. The United States could, theoretically, also turn to the private sector—supporting the efforts of private military companies that are already operating in the continent. But the government would still be limited, rightly so, by laws that restrict it from supporting nondemocratic regimes.

With African minerals in high demand, Russia and the United States will continue to offer what the other can’t.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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This “democratic winter” is not unique to Africa. In the United States, according to Gallup, only 28 percent of Americans—a record low, fewer even than in the aftermath of the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021—are satisfied with the way their democratic system works. In France, two in five voters dream of an unelected strongman at the head of the country.  It is not surprising that the value of democracy is also disputed in Africa, and that arguments against it take the form of claims to national sovereignty and are mainly directed against the former colonial powers. Wherever recent coups have taken place, the putschists have publicly rejected the influence of former colonial powers (as in the Sahel region with France) or Western institutions (as in Sudan, where General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan used the structural reforms inspired by the World Bank to justify his coup in October 2021). Coup leaders have accused the previous governments of having installed falsely democratic regimes, which they claim were weak and responsible for the persistence of underdevelopment. In Niger, President Mohamed Bazoum is still being held against his will, accused by a military junta of having had “exchanges” with “foreign heads of state” and “heads of international organizations.”

How has the concept of democracy, at least in terms of aspiration, become so divisive that its rejection is no longer even taboo? No international conference lacks African putschists who have not been elected by anyone claiming their legitimacy to take power by force with the cheers of their supporters. While some of the allegedly “spontaneous” demonstrations in the streets they refer to are organized, these events resonate deeply in African opinions, especially among the younger generations.

These are poor excuses, not to mention that there is something deeply insulting about suggesting that Africans do not deserve to choose their leaders and, therefore, to live freely. Besides, why should anyone believe that democracy is only a Western concept?

An African vision of democracy

The Manden Charter, proclaimed in 1222 at the time of the Mali Empire—centuries before the UK Bill of Rights—is considered in Africa to be the first declaration of human rights in history. The charter celebrated the preservation of life (Article 5: “Everybody has a right to life and to the preservation of physical integrity”) and organized coexistence between communities (Article 11: “When your wife or your child is missing, stop running after them in the neighbour’s house”). It also protected the rights of women (Article 14: “Never offend women, our mothers”; Article 16: “Women, apart from their everyday occupations, should be associated with all our managements”), foreigners (Article 24: “In Manden, do not maltreat the foreigners”), the homeless (Article 31: “We should help those who are in need”) and even the enemy in battle (Article 41: “You can kill the enemy, but not humiliate him”).

As we can see, Africans are very familiar with democratic practice, and that is true well beyond the Mali Empire. Among the Yoruba, the power of the chief was revocable. Among the Ashanti in Ghana, the village chief was chosen by the heads of families, who formed a council. An association of adults from each village represented public opinion and elected a president.

Today, there are plenty of examples of democratic successes in Africa. In its 2023 report, Freedom House wrote, “Freedom in Africa slightly advanced in 2022 with 11 countries seeing improvements in their political rights and civil liberties and 9 experiencing declines.” In Liberia in January 2024, Joseph Bokai peacefully succeeded George Weah, who had succeeded Africa’s first female president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, in January 2018. In Botswana, all elections since independence in 1966 have been conducted peacefully, in a multiparty institutional system where minorities are represented. Botswana has no curse around raw materials: Diamonds, which generate half of public revenues, ensure the prosperity of the country and the government finances the primary and secondary education of all students. From Mauritius to the Seychelles to Cabo Verde, African islands enjoy remarkable political stability. According to Freedom House, “Cabo Verde (receiving a total score of 92 on Freedom in the World’s 100-point scale), Mauritius (85), and São Tomé and Príncipe (84) have the highest aggregate scores in the region. All are rated Free.” Namibia is notable for having only three presidents since 1990. The third—Hage Geingob, who died in February 2024—was first elected in November 2014 in Africa’s first fully electronic elections. He succeeded Hifikepunye Pohamba, who respected the constitution and stepped down after two terms in office.

Ghana is one of the countries that has made progress in its democratic practice. Since the 1992 constitutional reform, Ghana has held eight free elections, while the current president, Nana Akufo-Addo, is preparing to leave power in December 2024 after two terms.

In Zambia, President Hakainde Hichilema took office in August 2021 following a smooth political transition with outgoing President Edgar Lungu, despite a longstanding rivalry between the two men. Hichilema was running for president for the sixth time, three of them against Lungu. This was the third time since 1991 that power passed to the opposition in Zambia.

In Tanzania, former President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who introduced multiparty democracy and recently died at the age of ninety-eight, was called the “champion” of democracy in East Africa by US Vice President Kamala Harris during her March 2023 visit. Under his successor, Samia Suluhu Hassan—in office since April 2021 and one of two women leading African nations, a distinction she shares with Ethiopia’s Sahle-Work Zewde, who has been in office since 2018—Tanzania is fighting for a democratic practice that began with Julius Nyerere, the Mwalimu (“the Teacher”), the president of Tanzania from 1964 to 1985.

In Senegal, recent upheavals—including a February announcement, since rescinded, by President Macky Sall that he would delay the previously scheduled February 25 elections—have not derailed the institutional system. Sall and the National Assembly have complied with the decision of the top legal authority that set the date of the presidential election, confirming the exceptional democratic journey of Senegalese society. In sixty years, the country has had only four presidents, and each transition has taken place under the watchful eye of communities and institutions—including the army, which is known for its peacemaking role.

At the level of regional organizations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been criticized by commentators for failing to prevent recent coups d’état in the region and for the withdrawals of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso from the organization. However, the majority of ECOWAS members have upheld democratic norms—including Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, which previously faced war and conflict. Notably, from 2015 to 2020, ECOWAS maintained peace and stability in the region, without any coups.

It is worth noting that while all these successful experiences are individually celebrated as exceptions, they represent a significant trend of African democratic successes. Out of fifty-four African countries, 17 percent are considered “free” by Freedom House and 37 percent are considered “partially free.” Added together, the majority of African nations (54 percent) are at least partially free. In comparison, of the twelve countries in the Eurasia region (the countries of the former Soviet Union), 67 percent are considered “unfree” and none are perceived as “free.” According to Freedom House, people live freer in Africa than in Eurasia thirty years after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Contrary to the popular belief that Africa is a land of inter-ethnic wars, the continent’s significant cultural diversity, far from being only a challenge, is one of the most original elements of African democratic systems. For example, Senegal was led for twenty years by a president who belonged to two minority groups, Serers and Catholics, in a country that is predominantly Wolof and Muslim. With more than three thousand languages spoken and multiethnic cultural challenges, African political models have no equivalent elsewhere in the world. 

Africa’s history is full of experiences of multicultural governance. In the Mali Empire, diverse ethnic peoples—Tuareg, Wolof, Malinke, Bamba, Fulani, and Toucouleur—lived together, and a religious tolerance prevailed in which no Malian king waged a holy war (jihad). The Ghana Empire, which covered a large area from Tekrour to Awdaghost, included populations as diverse as the Bambara, Toucouleur, Wolof, and Serer. While the emperor practiced animist religion, he showed tolerance toward Muslims and chose most of his ministers from among them, as recalled by the Burkinabe historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo.

There’s no conflict between democracy and sovereignty

But if the arguments against democracy made by coup leaders and their supporters hit the nail on the head, it is because modern democratic practice, far from this African heritage, has disappointed them. First, the colonial period resulted in the destruction of traditional African participatory structures such as “acephalous societies, centralized kingdoms, elective theocracies, independent city-states, and oligarchic republics,” as researchers Fanny Pigeaud and Ndongo Samba Sylla reported in a January 2024 book. Democracy in Africa was then the collateral victim of geopolitical rivalries, as ordinary men who sought power in the aftermath of independence—such as Patrice Lumumba in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Samora Machel in Mozambique, and Amilcar Cabral in Guinea-Bissau—were killed during or after running for office. Secondly, security was prioritized over democracy in countries where jihadist danger needed to be contained. In several cases, containing such danger has been a convenient excuse to muzzle dissidents, and to dodge or even rig elections. In the 1990s, the democratic opening was able to sweep away old leaders—such as the first president of Zambia, defeated in 1991 after twenty-seven years in power, or the first president of Malawi, Hastings Kamuzu Banda, defeated in 1994 after thirty years—but family and military transitions are a widely shared reality in Africa. The most successful democratic experiences have been akin to national liberation struggles and have come at a high price, as symbolized by South Africa, where the story of former President Nelson Mandela demonstrates the harshness of the democratic struggle.

Undoubtedly, these hardships have created a “democratic fatigue” that has been reinforced by the persistence of underdevelopment in countries richly endowed by nature.

The restoration of the democratic ideal requires going far beyond simple rankings with points awarded according to indicators of freedoms or rights. It also requires doing better than the use of election-observation missions in Africa. Although there are numerous such missions (including those by the African Union, International Organisation de la Francophonie, European Union, ECOWAS, foundations, and nongovernmental organizations), and they are governed by the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation (2005), the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers (2007), and the Declaration of International Principles for the Impartial Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizens’ Organizations (2012), election-observation missions are often perceived as illegitimate because they are externally funded and, in some cases, do not prevent protests or violence. Moreover, missions can fail for security reasons, such as when the European Union withdrew from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in November 2023. Solutions to restore the luster of these missions have been widely documented, including greater integration of in-country residents, improvement of civil-status registers, better distribution and security of polling stations, and national financing of electoral missions.

But in an ideal situation, Africa would still be able to do without such solutions. Democracy is bigger than any one election. No matter how perfectly organized an election is, if the turnout is low, if the political parties competing are on the same side, if the conditions for competition are biased, if citizens are not educated or informed about the stakes, or if there is no possible appeal, a country is still falling short of the democratic ideal. These things are matters of education policy, civic training, and strong institutions, and often escape international observation missions and rankings.

With its population expected to double in the next twenty-five years, and a generation emerging with the ambition of making its voice heard, Africa holds much of global democracy’s future in its hands. The youth of Africa are fiercely committed to public affairs. There is a clear gap between the young Africans, including movements such as Le Balai Citoyen and Lucha, who are chasing away authoritarian regimes,  and those who applaud the Sahelian putschists. Young Africans are united by their desire for stronger national sovereignty. To regain value in the eyes of the people, the African version of democracy will not only have to renew some of their leaders (the new forty-year-old leaders of West Africa contrast with the advanced age of African leaders) but also embody their aspiration for sovereignty and a regained dignity. Neither Washington nor Beijing can bring this to Africans. As for the Westerners who want to reconnect with this old continent with such a young population, it is important that they do not practice the double standards, and instead apply to Africa the level of democratic demands they have for their own citizens. This is a competitive advantage they have over the Russians and the Chinese. This path holds great promise, as it is not certain that African youth—more educated and attached to their freedom of expression—would let Russia and China drag them onto the authoritarian path they promote.

African leaders must understand that democracy, far from being a simple electoral operation, is first and foremost an act of patriotism. That is why it is fundamental to teach the democratic history of Africa, so that democracy and national sovereignty on the continent no longer clash. It is also essential to strengthen civic education, starting in elementary school. In the political arena, the strengthening of institutions is crucial, including the administrations, federal institutions and services, and checks and balances such as the judiciary and media. It will also be necessary to reform institutions so that they better reflect African realities, including better representation of elders, strengthening of local governance, and inclusion of youth associations. Finally, it is crucial that the opponents—often weakened by years or even decades of opposition, exile, or prison—be equal to their heavy task. While men in fatigues are in vogue today, we can bet that this will not always be the case, and it will then be necessary for visionary patriots to be ready to take over.

Ambassador Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center. She is also a professor of African affairs at Mohammed VI Polytechnic University in Morocco and at Sciences Po Paris.

She is a Senegalese and French citizen.

Prior to joining the Council, she was a consultant for the World Bank. She also has strong experience in the private sector as an editor in London and as director for development at a French consulting firm in corporate and social responsibility.

Yade has over a decade of experience working in French, European, and international politics. At the age of thirty, she was appointed as the deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights of the Republic of France: the first ever French minister for human rights and the first woman of African descent to become a member of the French cabinet. In recognition of her work, she was Nelson Mandela’s personal guest on his ninetieth birthday in Johannesburg. At that time she was also recognized as Young Leader by the World Economic Forum.

She was subsequently appointed to the position of deputy minister of sports. Yade was also appointed as the ambassador of France to UNESCO. She started her professional career as a parliamentary high civil servant at the French Senate and director of communications of the TV network of the Parliament.

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The post Why Africans hold the future of global democracy in their hands appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Just as important as a technology’s impact is the technology’s origin—or origins. Any given technology can be traced back, through its individual components and materials, to a number of sources. And the question about where those components and materials come from matters. Modern technology, economies, livelihoods, and weapons depend on critical minerals such as magnesium, cobalt, lithium, or even copper. Where countries source these minerals makes a difference for national and strategic security.

Since Africa is home to 30 percent of the world’s known critical minerals, the continent is at the forefront of conversations. But currently, African nations aren’t getting their fair share of the benefits of the critical-minerals boom and buzz generated by the evolution of modern technologies. For that to happen, Africa will need more investment in its capacities to refine or add value to minerals within the continent; such investment could fuel a long-awaited boost in development.

Africa is home to many critical-mineral reserves, but it is not home to industry that adds value to the minerals, such as the processing and refining of them. While Africa does have some processing and refining capacity for certain minerals, substantial value-additive steps across the sector remain absent. To be blunt, Africa will only reap the benefits from the critical-minerals boom associated with mineral extraction. Concrete action toward the goal of the development of long-awaited value chain enhancement and investment in the continent remains elusive.

The African Union (AU) and various African nations have long been aware of the continent’s need (and right) to benefit from its mineral wealth, instead of supplying the minerals to the rest of the world for others to process and then reap economic benefits. In 2009, the AU released its African Mining Vision, highlighting the importance of value-adding industry. In 2019, the AU released the African Commodities Strategy, calling for the transformation of Africa from a continent that is merely a raw materials supplier to a continent that is integrated into global value chains. The AU created a African Minerals Development Centre to coordinate and oversee the implementation of the African Mining Vision. But since it was created in 2016, the center hasn’t been ratified by enough member states, meaning that it hasn’t been fully put into operation. 

At this year’s Mining Indaba—for which heads of state, ministers, and thousands of mining-industry leaders and experts descended upon Cape Town, South Africa to chart a new future for African mining—it was clear that several topics are slated to dominate the critical-mining space on the continent in the years to come. Among the conference’s participants were members of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, who were there as part of a newly launched task force on critical minerals. Here are a few insights into the topics that will dominate Africa’s critical mining space in the near future and what the Africa Center will be focusing on in the sector over the next three years.

Minerals matter—for now

As the ever-growing importance of critical minerals continues to influence geopolitical gamesmanship, so too does a growing desire to find alternatives to the current supply chains in order to alleviate overreliance. Resources are being poured into initiatives that could lessen dependence on the extraction of critical minerals.

Take battery recycling for example. The global lithium-ion battery recycling market alone was valued at $6.5 billion in 2022 and is projected to reach $35 billion by 2031. On the public investment side, the United States has deployed funding and regulatory incentives for the recycling of batteries. The European Union (EU) adopted a regulation that sets target percentages for the recovery of critical minerals from batteries. Part of the regulation includes the introduction of a new “battery passport,” a digital record that accompanies each battery and includes information about its history and components to ensure it is recycled responsibly. Beyond efforts to increase battery recycling, there are also initiatives underway to develop batteries that are not reliant on rare-earth elements.

Private investment in research about battery replacement and alternative materials is rising—and with it, so too rises the likelihood that the economic benefits from today’s critical-minerals boom will bypass Africa. Today, the world needs what Africa has, but that may not be the case tomorrow.

US presence and prose

This year’s Mining Indaba was notable for the large delegation sent by the United States, which included high-level government officials such as Amos Hochstein, Jose Fernandez, British Robinson, and Reta Jo Lewis. That delegation is a clear demonstration of Washington’s level of interest regarding Africa’s critical minerals sector.

Perhaps the cornerstone of public US investment in Africa’s mining sector today is the Lobito Corridor project, which is looking to lay over a thousand miles of railroad to help transport critical minerals from Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to a port in Angola. The United States has emphasized that its interest in the project is not just about mineral extraction. As Hochstein highlighted at Mining Indaba, a train runs both ways. For the United States, publicly highlighting associated energy and livelihood projects is a way to show that the country is in Africa to do more than just national resource extraction.

Following Mining Indaba, US delegates made the trip from South Africa to Zambia for the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) Lobito Corridor Private Sector Investor Forum. The forum sought to gather up private-sector investment for the Lobito Corridor. At the forum, the US International Development Finance Corporation announced a new $250 million debt facility to the Africa Finance Corporation to support infrastructure across the continent. Other attendees—from the public and private sectors—rolled out projects for and investments in building energy power plants and storage facilities, and struck various mining and refining deals, including one that will seek to build the continent’s first refinery for electric-battery-grade cobalt sulphate.

While these are promising developments, most of the investment in the corridor is from the public sector: The United States, in partnership with the EU, has joined with the African Development Bank and the Africa Finance Corporation to inject over one billion dollars into the project. While the EU and United States are involved, private sector involvement is crucial for economic success. Just because Washington wants something doesn’t mean that it’ll happen; plus, what the US government wants and what private sector companies do does not always align. For example, while the US was relatively inactive in the minerals sector in Africa, China purchased cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from sources including a US-based mining company. The private sector, and the money and operations it chooses to conduct, will steer the success of projects such as the Lobito Corridor.

At Indaba, Hochstein stressed that there is no expectation from the US side for African nations to side exclusively with any country. The Biden administration has gone to great lengths to deemphasize great-power competition in its strategy toward Africa. This aligns with the US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, which the White House released in 2022. Yet, some experts view US and EU investment in the Lobito Corridor as an effort to counter China, amid concerns about Beijing’s dominant position over the African critical-minerals market.

Ideally, investment in Africa’s critical-mineral sector would support the continent’s capacity to add value to minerals before shipping. But efforts are needed beyond the Lobito Corridor which is, after all, intended to help transport—and eventually export—critical minerals. The underlying impetus of this project is the minerals; so if the demand for minerals falls, investment may begin to wane too.

The connection between Africa’s natural mineral wealth and the continent’s strategic importance for the United States is hardly new. The United States has sought out Africa’s critical minerals, for example for its geopolitical objectives, in the past: Infamously, the uranium used in the atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was sourced from the Shinkolobwe mine in the Congo.

What the Africa Center is doing

The critical minerals discussion on extraction, national security, and supply chains will move past Africa unless the moment is seized.

The Africa Center’s task force will aim to unite stakeholders from the United States, Europe, and Africa, including representatives from the financial sector, development institutions, and government. Together, this group will regularly convene to explore the role and potential of African minerals in critical supply chains, strategies for greater inclusion of African nations and suppliers, and ways to mobilize the private sector. The task force will host public conversations on topics ranging from the need for private investment (and how to best facilitate it) to domestic African policymaking. The task force hopes to contribute to the building of a new business and development model through strategic and win-win partnerships.

If Africa is to truly benefit from the critical-minerals boom and buzz, then it will need support in developing its ability to add value to its minerals on the continent. Unless African nations can break from a history of serving only as a minerals supplier, they will be left behind.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post The critical-minerals boom is here. Can Africa take advantage? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Those developments are in the form of two significant agreements that Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991) struck with countries in the region. The developments could bring simmering conflicts to a boil or add significantly to regional instability in the Horn; on the other hand, they could potentially advance peace and prosperity in the region. The uncertainty about what will follow these agreements, even in the months after they were signed, is due cause for global leaders to monitor the situation closely.

A communiqué with Somalia

The first agreement is a communiqué, which followed a meeting between Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Djibouti on December 28 last year. In the communiqué, the countries’ officials agreed to resume diplomatic discussions, implement previous agreements, resolve ongoing conflicts, and bolster cooperation on security and organized crime. 

While initially promising, the deal has raised tensions for civilians across the region. Some Somalilanders I spoke with saw the agreement—which referred to the breakaway territory as the “northern regions” instead of the “Republic of Somaliland”—as a threat to Somaliland’s perceived sovereignty. Having the agreement signed by Somaliland’s minister of the interior, Mohamed Kahin Ahmed, instead of the foreign minister further signaled that the agreement was being approached as an internal Somali affair rather than an agreement between two sovereign entities. On their end, some Somalis were displeased that the communiqué referred to Somaliland’s delegation as the Government of Somaliland (rather than the Somaliland administration).

Abdi’s term as president of Somaliland has also been marred by delayed elections, causing controversy and leading some to believe he has no mandate to make such decisions. Opposition parties such as the Somaliland National Party (Waddani) and the Justice and Welfare party (UCID) have capitalized on this, accusing the president of jeopardizing Somaliland’s sovereignty. Both Abdi and Mohamud returned to their cities under scrutiny.

The Somalia-Somaliland communiqué’s calling on both parties to resolve ongoing conflicts brings to mind conflict in the regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn, where a violent war over sovereignty has tarnished Abdi’s (and Somaliland’s) international reputation. Some civilians in these regions would prefer to not be governed by Somaliland, but rather become their own federal member state of Somalia—a real threat to Somaliland’s fight for independence and a humanitarian burden to both Somalia and Somaliland. Resolution of these internal conflicts would benefit both Somaliland and Somalia.

An MOU with Ethiopia

The second agreement is a memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed by Abdi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on January 2, granting Ethiopian naval forces access to twenty kilometers of Somaliland coastline for fifty years. In return, Abiy agreed that the Ethiopian government would engage in an “in-depth assessment” of Somaliland’s recognition. Somaliland also received a stake in Ethiopian Airlines.

Ethiopia has been eyeing sea access since Eritrea’s 1993 independence left Ethiopia without a coastline and reliant on Djibouti for port access. Abiy has repeatedly called Red Sea access an existential question for his country, worthy of holding talks with Eritrea; eventually, rumors that Ethiopia may invade Eritrea to secure port access spread, escalating regional tensions. Reestablishing a presence in the Red Sea with the MOU would not only benefit Ethiopian commercial interests, but also revive Abiy’s political legacy, which has been tainted by his handling of conflict in Tigray and the development of new crises in Amhara and Oromia.

Abdi returned from Addis Ababa to see thousands lining the streets, waving flags and expressing a patriotic fervor. If Ethiopia (an influential member of the African Union) were to recognize Somaliland, it could be a game-changer for the breakaway region, helping advance its quest to be recognized internationally, particularly as it faces pushback from Mogadishu. On the social platform X, some pro-Somaliland users prematurely celebrated Somaliland becoming the fifty-fifth state in Africa—despite it not having yet won any additional recognition globally. On January 7, Abdi convened a meeting of Somaliland’s political stakeholders to discuss the agreement, which a Somaliland official said showcased the president’s inclusive approach.

Despite these signs of support, things have not been entirely smooth sailing for Abdi. Protests occurred in the Somaliland city of Borama, where hundreds chanted “our sea is not for sale” in opposition to Ethiopian troops in their territory. Moreover, just days after the MOU was signed, the Somaliland minister of defense resigned in protest. This domestic Somaliland pushback challenges and complicates Abdi’s efforts to sell this deal as a complete victory for the Somaliland cause.

Somalia sees this agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and Mohamud has already signed a law nullifying the MOU. This largely symbolic move is Somalia’s way of asserting its jurisdiction over Somaliland; Somalia views Ethiopian efforts to establish a presence in Somaliland as an attempt to illegally infringe on its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Somalia and Ethiopia have fought devastating territorial wars in the past, and this decision also invokes the trauma within this fraught relationship. Many in Somalia have boycotted Ethiopian Airlines. Somalia even forced an Ethiopian Airlines flight (which was carrying Ethiopian officials bound for Somaliland) back to Addis Ababa. If this deal fully materializes, it could undo progress Mohamud has made to reintegrate Somalia into international institutions, sort out domestic tensions, and fight terrorist group al-Shabaab: Somali officials suggested that al-Shabaab would take up arms following the MOU, with al-Shabaab leaders swiftly issuing a call to defend Somalia’s territory.

The global response begins to take shape

In the weeks since the signing of these agreements, Washington has seemingly stuck to its “one-Somalia” policy, with several statements by top US diplomats reiterating the United States’ support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, a US State Department official also said that the United States supported conversations between the people of Somalia and Somaliland about their shared future, leaving the door open for potential future support depending on the results of those conversations. This also comes on the heels of an informal softening of long-standing positions, as indicated by diplomatic visits to Somaliland, such as one by General Stephen Townsend, commander of US Africa Command, in May 2022.

Beyond the Biden administration, US Representative Ilhan Omar (D-MN)—the first Somali-American to serve in Congress—gave a speech to Somali constituents largely in support of Somalia, invoking ire from both Republicans in Congress and Somalilanders with US ties. 

The United Kingdom, one of Somaliland’s closest Western partners, has also expressed deep concern over the MOU, encouraging restraint and acknowledging its support of Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, one member of parliament called for the United Kingdom to recognize Somaliland in light of these developments. 

The Arab League, led by Egypt (which has a complicated relationship with Ethiopia), has been steadfast in its support for Somalia. However, DP World, a Dubai-based developer that is already heavily invested in Berbera Port, has continued to express interest in developing the port alongside Ethiopia and Somaliland. This could be an indication that the United Arab Emirates could shift its policies vis-à-vis Somaliland and the Arab League. 

The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have joined the international community’s call for restraint and reiterated their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, Somalia rejected African Union mediation, arguing that there was no room for mediation until Ethiopia retracts the MOU and reaffirms Somalia’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, Ethiopia sat out a recent IGAD meeting that was set to address conflict in Sudan and—to a lesser extent—tensions between Ethiopian and Somalia over the MOU. Though the Ethiopian government claimed its absence was due to the meeting clashing with a “commitment to a prior engagement,” Abiy was still present at a nearby summit for the Non-Aligned Movement the next day, suggesting that he snubbed the IGAD meeting.

Despite global reactions, the MOU has persisted, and progress toward Ethiopian port access continues.

The risk of the escalation of tensions across this region—which includes Sudan, the site of calamitous security, political, and humanitarian crises—is rising. If these tensions are managed poorly, conflict could spread across the Horn of Africa and then potentially even spill into the Red Sea. However, if managed properly, the tensions could subside, making way for prosperity and economic growth.

The security interests of many countries—particularly the United States—are at stake. As tensions flare between the United States and Yemen-based Houthi rebels in the Red Sea, Washington may be looking for ways to expand its military presence in the region beyond its significant presence based in Djibouti. Over the past two years, the United States has reportedly expressed interest in using Somaliland’s Berbera port and airfield as a base for the purposes of countering al-Shabaab. Though US visits to Berbera have been carefully coordinated with the Somalian government, this engagement could be interpreted as a major victory for Somaliland in bolstering its sovereignty. With Berbera, and an eagerness for international engagement, Somaliland could potentially help the United States gain a footing to protect vital maritime routes and diversify its regional footprint away from the already crowded military hub of Djibouti. However, since Somaliland remains unrecognized, the United States would first need to get Somalia’s approval—an arrangement that could be made easier by the cooperation outlined in the initial communiqué signed in Djibouti, although such easing could be jeopardized if tension around the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU continues to increase.

Moreover, armed conflict involving Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Somalia could complicate security cooperation agreements between Somalia and the United States in the fight against al-Shabaab. This further emphasizes the importance of US leadership and diplomacy in ensuring this tension doesn’t escalate further.

The United States should use financial and diplomatic leverage to ensure that the governments of Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Somalia act cautiously in the coming weeks, while seeking to preserve US security interests in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, specifically regarding Berbera and its counterterrorism efforts.

The agreements seem contradictory: One calls for cooperation between Somalia and Somaliland, to some undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty, while the other outlines political and economic cooperation between Somaliland and Ethiopia, which to Somalia undermines its sovereignty. But the agreements are each rooted in promoting regional cooperation, negotiation, and partnership. In lending focus to this region, international actors must emphasize the strategic benefit that comes with cooperation. This must be the path forward, lest the world see more conflict in 2024.

Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.

The post What the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal means for Washington’s strategy in the Red Sea appeared first on Atlantic Council.

If left to its own devices, US policy probably would default to a business-as-usual approach in West Africa. Unfortunately, that approach has not worked and is even less likely to work now that the French have been ousted from the region. US rhetoric about governments transitioning to civilian rule often falls on deaf ears, and many people in the region are convinced that Russia is a better partner than the United States was and is likely to be in the future. Worse, it is not clear that they are wrong.

A better approach would be for US policymakers to look more comprehensively at the entire region and the major trends there, which include anti-French sentiment, impatience with democracy, and support for Russia. Meanwhile, China clearly dominates the region in terms of investment and trade. The United States is looked upon much more favorably than France, but Washington offers little that might help counter pro-Russia and pro-China views. The United States is not positioned to fill the vacuum France has left behind.

One way to try to increase US influence is to step up significantly what the United States is offering, though for various reasons, Washington is at a competitive disadvantage in this regard vis-à-vis Russia and China. Announced this past fall, the Biden administration’s major investment in the Lobito Corridor rail and road project in Angola, Congo, and Zambia (a key talking point for US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Angola in January) is a big step in the right direction. But Washington’s Lobito initiative is all the more striking for how unusual it is for the United States to be playing China’s game of massively investing in large-scale infrastructure projects.

It is also important for US policymakers to discern among those countries that Washington is unlikely to pull away from the Russian orbit (including the juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger), those that are open to it, and those that in fact are pro-American. Washington should then find creative ways to engage with each of these three groups to strengthen, reorientate, or weaken them.

The difference between the first two groups—countries firmly in Russia’s orbit and those that might break free—often is a function of the balance between ideology and pragmatism on the part of a country’s leaders. Some African leaders are ideologically predisposed to working with Russia and committed to the idea. Others are driven more by pragmatism: They might earnestly believe Russia and China to be better partners, but perhaps can be convinced otherwise. Carrots will work better than sticks, which do not work and are more likely to provoke resentment. The Sahel’s military juntas have demonstrated remarkable insouciance in the face of economic sanctions and Western countries’ cessation of financial assistance. Washington, for example, presently seems to think that it can entice Niger’s junta with the promise to reduce sanctions as part of its effort to keep open the drone base in the north of the country; it is highly unlikely that the junta cares. The recent decision by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to quit the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) underscores the fact that their governments have different priorities. Leaving ECOWAS may do profound damage to the economies of these poor landlocked countries, which rely on regional trade.

The last group, countries that are indeed pro-American, is larger than one might think, especially but not exclusively in Anglophone countries and regions. For example, in West Africa, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone are friendly. (Nigerians also happen to make up the largest African immigrant group in the United States, including several US officials.) US policymakers could focus on cultivating even more positive views of the United States in those countries as a first step in a new US strategy toward West Africa.

In some cases, a country’s government might be drifting toward Russia, but significant portions of its population are not. An example of this is Southern Cameroons, also known as the Anglophone region of Cameroon. Southern Cameroons is the portion of the German colony of Kamerun that came under British colonial rule after Britain and France carved up the German possession in World War I. In 1961, the two Cameroons were fused into a single entity after the United Nations voted in favor of Cameroonian independence. Today, they remain considerably distinct, and there is a Southern Cameroons independence movement, which the Cameroonian government represses.

The argument here is not necessarily to recognize the Anglophone region’s independence (which the United States opposes on principle) or to build bases there (which is impossible without Yaoundé’s blessing). The argument is instead to be more attuned to trends in African countries and among their populations, and then find creative ways to engage those countries and their peoples in the US interest, including at levels below the national governments in local communities and municipal and regional governments.

US policy in sub-Saharan Africa should focus not only on dialogue with leaders in national capitals but also with a much broader array of people at different levels and in different regions. This is particularly imperative in the areas where the United States had relied on French influence, only to see it collapse in recent years, with Russia filling the vacuum. Cameroon, whose government appears to be tilting toward Russia, is an example of that, and the English-speaking periphery region of the country presents the United States with opportunities for engagement based on language, geography, and real competition from the big powers.

The United States can no longer stick to its current way of engaging with West African countries, which often involves dealing with centers rather than peripheries. Long-standing policies regarding whom to talk to and how should be questioned, to see if the United States should try a different approach to the region.

Michael Shurkin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and a former political analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency.

The post No more business as usual: The US needs a broader engagement strategy in West Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the aftermath of the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, the Caribbean republic has seen escalating gang violence that has threatened the political system and security. Between January and August of this year, 2,439 Haitians were killed, 951 were kidnapped, and 902 were injured. On October 3, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted resolution 2699, which approved a multinational mission, led by Kenya, to help the Haitian National Police defeat the onslaught of criminal gangs perpetrating violence and other crimes. Although the mission is UN-authorized, it is not an official UN peacekeeping mission. Kenya plans to lead the mission by sending over a thousand officers, a number that will be supplemented further by the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Antigua and Barbuda.

An intervention in a Caribbean state by an African country could perplex some given the vast physical distance between the regions and a lack of historic military and security support. However, the planned deployment aligns closely with Ruto’s foreign relations agenda.

Under Ruto’s presidency, Kenya has stepped up to play a more active role in regional and international politics and to secure for itself a leadership role in championing African interests. Kenya hosted the first Africa Climate Summit in September which concluded with the Nairobi Declaration, a document laying out a consensus among participating African countries about their climate priorities. Ruto also recently announced that Kenya will no longer require visas for visitors from all countries beginning January 2024 in an effort to boost tourism and international connectivity.  

A policing mission to Haiti could further raise Kenya’s profile as a champion of African interests. While there has been little collaboration between African countries and Haiti historically, many Haitians are a part of the African diaspora. Since Haiti’s 1804 revolution and independence, the country has experienced repeated bouts of instability further worsened by nearly two decades of occupation by the United States (from 1915 to 1934), and subsequent UN-approved intervention missions, including one led by Brazil that ran from 2004 to 2017. For Kenya to achieve its newly oriented foreign-policy goals through this intervention, it would have to avoid repeating the failures seen in past missions and steer clear of channeling US paternalism.

In October 2022, Acting Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry authorized a request for foreign intervention through a written appeal to international partners. However, observers including the National Haitian American Elected Officials Network and the Family Action Network Movement are highly skeptical of further intervention and are concerned that supporting the unelected Henry government could worsen the nation’s political crisis. Those organizations have called on the Biden administration to withdraw US support for the mission.

Critics in Kenya have been asking another question: Who asked Kenya, specifically, to intervene? Officially, Kenya volunteered to lead the security force on July 29 in a statement by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Mutua. According to Mutua, the commitment came after a request by the “Friends of Haiti Group of Nations.” However, some observers argue that Kenya is leading the intervention to be a good “friend” to the United States. In September, the United States pledged one hundred million dollars in support to the intervention; days later, the United States and Kenya signed a defense agreement that included resources and support for security deployments.

Putting theories and unknowns aside, it is clear that Kenya is taking a newly proactive approach to the crisis in Haiti. That new approach underscores Ruto’s atypical foreign policy strategy, which aims to distinguish Kenya from its African peers globally and add to Nairobi’s list of accomplishments as a pan-African leader. Success in achieving that strategy could pave the way for greater influence in regional and international politics, setting Kenya up to challenge South Africa and Nigeria, who have historically been regional hegemons. But success in Ruto’s foreign policy approach depends, in part, on the success of this mission to Haiti—one that will be hard to come by.

To be sure, Ruto’s plan has faced numerous domestic challenges. On November 16, Kenya’s high court extended an order blocking the mission’s deployment pending a final decision in January 2024. Despite the court order, the mission was approved by the Kenyan Parliament.

There have also been signs that public support is mixed, as some people have questioned Nairobi’s priorities, arguing that it should focus on protecting lives in Kenya first. Currently, insurgencies are underway along the Somalia border and cattle banditry and clashes between nomadic pastoralists have challenged communities in Northern Kenya.

Amnesty International has also condemned the deployment, not just because of a “troubling history of abuses” associated with past interventions in Haiti, but also because of extrajudicial killings and excessive force used by the Kenyan police. These concerns about human rights violations raise questions as to whether the Kenyan police will be able to succeed in Haiti where other missions have failed.

Regardless, the first batch of police officers have begun training for their planned mission in Haiti. In preparation for the deployment, the director general of the Haitian National Police, alongside a delegation from the Haitian government, visited Kenya last week. However, in early November, Interior Minister Kithure Kindiki asserted that police officers will not be deployed to Haiti “unless all resources”—perhaps including extra funding from the United Nations, recently requested by Kenya—“are mobilized and availed.”

Former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta oriented Nairobi’s foreign policy more closely towards China. Ruto, on the other hand, appears more interested in seeking out partnerships with the West—particularly the United States. This year alone, at least six high-level US officials have visited Kenya: First Lady Jill Biden, United States Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Trade Representative Katherine Tai, Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield, and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry. Kenya and the Millennium Challenge Corporation also signed a sixty-million-dollar threshold program focused on urban mobility and growth in September.

At the same time, Ruto’s administration has also developed a new policy focused on pan-Africanism and, in its dealings beyond the continent, South-South cooperation. If Kenya were to achieve success in Haiti, which would require learning from the tough lessons of past interventions while incorporating the aspirations of Haitians, its global profile could benefit, and Nairobi could secure a status as a reliable ally to the United States both on the continent and beyond.

It remains to be seen whether Kenyan police will eventually be deployed to Haiti. If the deployment occurs, watch the mission closely: Success in helping Haiti secure its future, if attained properly and without repeating mistakes of the past, could see Kenya amplify its bid to claim a bigger seat on the world stage.

Sibi Nyaoga was a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post What Kenya’s proposed mission to Haiti says about Nairobi’s foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But will COP28 give Africa the attention it deserves on other climate needs? Our experts, some of whom are headed to Dubai, outline what is at stake for Africa.

1. What are African countries hoping to achieve at COP28?

First, there is a strong and well-accepted push among African countries for a change in narrative, recasting the continent from a recipient of climate aid to a full participant in climate solutions. Following the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact in June, the Africa Climate Summit in September, and the Annual International Monetary Fund-World Bank Meetings in October, Africans are hoping to secure a place for themselves to do more on adaptation and mitigation because—despite having the lowest greenhouse gas emissions in the world—they live in the continent that is the most affected by climate change.

Second, governments are grappling with debt sustainability, while balancing the need to address the climate crisis. Even though climate is a priority for leaders, they must balance their climate-related initiatives with poverty alleviation, health, education, and debt financing. Governments are starting to think creatively about how to bring more money into the system—climate finance is becoming an important part of the solution.

COP28 will offer the grounds to test, improve, and challenge innovative financing products such as debt-for-nature swaps (such as the $500 million debt-for-nature swap deal in Gabon), a variety of bonds focusing on social and environmental impact, carbon markets, blended finance, and more. A promising trend that will likely have impact on the ground in Dubai is the push for green banks, which can be seen in examples across the African continent, including in an initiative with the African Development Bank.

Finally, as a new push for innovative technology—in solar and wind energy, and in newer fields such as carbon capture and green hydrogen—is underway, African entrepreneurs are looking to carve a place for themselves as leaders in climate technology and will likely be looking for opportunities to scale their solutions at COP28.

—Jacqueline Musiitwa is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center

African countries are managing a delicate balancing act when it comes to the green transition.

On one hand, African countries are among those which suffer the worst from the negative impacts of climate change while having contributed the least to global warming. On the other hand, the African continent has the lowest energy access rates in the world, with more than six hundred million people lacking access to electricity.

There is considerable need for energy on the continent, and the private sector and public decision makers face dilemmas in deciding how to get that energy to people. Given the large economic development challenges, it may be tempting to prioritize short-term access to energy, whatever the source (especially oil and gas). African countries must reconcile economic development with the green transition—or, rather, ensure that the green transition is the faster route to economic development.

At COP28, African countries—with their widely differing energy access, natural resources, and green transitions—will seek the recognition of their unique circumstances and the need for tailored support. They will likely call for a differentiated approach to climate action, acknowledging that Africa’s priorities differ from those of developed countries and other regional groupings. They are likely to advocate for a fair transition and seek concrete and significant financial support for adaptation and mitigation measures—including financing to build better energy infrastructure.

In that respect, COP28 is an opportunity to show that the green transition boosts, rather than hinders, economic development by mobilizing and driving investment towards green energy infrastructure. Africa’s abundant renewable resources (including solar, wind, hydropower, and biomass) can help foster economic development by providing clean, affordable, and reliable energy while also meeting decarbonization and net-zero climate goals.

—Emilie Bel is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center

2. How will COP28 be different from previous years?

COP28 will likely unfold like its predecessors—African countries will call for the realization of promises made at past conferences, particularly pledges made by developed countries that have benefited from carbon-intensive growth. The cynical view would be that, by the end of the convening, COP28 probably will not be too different than UN climate conferences in the past. But given that COP28 will be in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Gulf countries have become major sources of global capital recently, there may be more announcements of new climate initiatives backed by Gulf governments focused on Africa. In September, the UAE committed $4.5 billion to finance climate projects in Africa, and in October, Saudi Arabia hosted the first Saudi-Africa summit. There seems to be a willingness by Gulf countries to partner and put forth financing offers—the question is how the projects will be structured.

—Aubrey Hruby is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and leads the Africa Center’s work on climate and energy issues.

3. Which African issues related to finance, inclusion, and technology and innovation—COP28’s biggest themes—are likely to draw attention?

The question of climate justice is deeply tied to Africa’s development experience and will characterize discussions at COP28 as well. African countries have contributed the least to carbon emissions yet bear enormous costs. Without a sensitivity to the climate justice issues at play, it will be difficult to make meaningful progress.

In addition to discussions about the need to develop natural gas capacity, there will be discussions around how to ensure African countries and companies meaningfully participate in newly minted climate finance flows and green technologies. Expect discussions to prioritize three key technologies: green hydrogen, electrical vehicle batteries, and nuclear. Africa’s role in the critical minerals that are necessary for electric vehicles will certainly be highlighted in Dubai as the conference continues to unfold. Not many people are talking about Africa’s nuclear potential yet—though the world arguably should. Bangladesh has just inaugurated its first nuclear power plant, but it is yet to be seen how this fits into the African context.

With six hundred million people lacking reliable access to electricity on the continent, there is a dual imperative for African countries to go green and connect their populations to power resources. This must be recognized at COP28 to meaningfully make progress in Dubai.  

—Aubrey Hruby

4. Will the Nairobi Declaration, issued by African leaders following the Africa Climate Summit, affect negotiations at COP28?

Since COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, African stakeholders have been working to develop a unified African position that can meet the needs and challenges of the continent. The Africa Climate Summit helped African countries achieve consensus on key negotiation points such as global decarbonization and openness to green investment (summarized in the Nairobi Declaration) strengthening the continent’s negotiating position and supporting efforts to initiate a big push to help Africa green.

With the Nairobi Declaration having helped drive an African consensus, two subjects should dominate the African agenda as COP28 unfolds. The first topic is ensuring that Africa is not marginalized in the green industrial revolution, which can be achieved with a focus on technology appropriations and with Africa serving as a foundation of green value chains. Second, leaders should push to secure a climate-finance architecture capable of financing the continent’s greening needs. Attracting more private capital is paramount, but leaders should also place pressure on developed countries to meet the one-hundred-billion-dollar climate finance pledge, mobilize new resources, and implement key reforms—for example, initiatives to ensure Africa gets fair prices for its carbon credits.

—Jean-Paul Mvogo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and author of “Developing Green Banking Ecosystems: A Solution to Better Finance Green Challenges and Address Climate Change in Africa,” a new Africa Center report to be launched at COP28.

5. How are discussions around critical mineral extraction likely to play out?

This year has seen Africa’s importance in the green energy transition increase because of the number of critical minerals in Africa’s soil. 

There is an increased push by African countries to localize supply and production chains of critical minerals (such as lithium, cobalt, and copper) and other resources. For example, a new agreement between Botswana and De Beers Group commits the jeweler to move more of the value chain to Botswana, and a memorandum of understanding between Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (with support of the United States and European Union) sets them up for collaboration on the processing of copper and cobalt for electric vehicles locally. The trend will likely continue.

—Jacqueline Musiitwa

Developed countries’ increased focus on Africa’s critical mineral deposits, coupled with rising competition to access those resources, creates an opportunity for Africa and its trade partners to avoid repeating history—one in which partners lost out when mining and exporting raw or scarcely processed natural resources. New cooperation models should favor virtuous cycles—characterized by local, value-added transformation and ownership. By creating much-needed jobs and local added value, those new value chains could help offset the social consequences of climate change, reduce migratory pressures, and generate the resources to achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Those value chains could be drivers of “glocal” prosperity and stability, if well structured.

—Jean-Paul Mvogo

6. COP28 participants include not only government leaders but also private-sector leaders. What is their role in supporting African countries?

Private sector funding has to play a massive role.

To achieve the green transition, mobilizing billions in investment for green energy infrastructure will be necessary. Today, African governments are the first source of infrastructure financing (33 percent of total commitments). The current financing gap is too large to be bridged by public funding alone. African countries therefore need to explore multiple financing sources, especially private funding.

In every discussion at COP28, officials will have to look at how the private sector, and especially international investors, can be leveraged. The current trend is a mix between public and private financial tools.

—Emilie Bel

7. Will the coalition of African countries likely see support from other regional groups?

Africa shares similar climate vulnerabilities and demands as many other developing countries in Latin America and small island developing states. Many of these countries face increased debt vulnerability, reduced fiscal space, pressing social issues, and high borrowing costs when seeking to implement climate change adaptation and mitigation programs. 

African negotiators, as peers of other developing regions, are also focused on ensuring that climate policies in developed countries do not harm development objectives in developing countries. By adopting policies, such as carbon trade measures, developed countries may inadvertently weaken key systemic sectors in developing countries without providing the adequate support to help those sectors transition to greener standards.

—Jean-Paul Mvogo

The post Africa’s priorities at COP28, from climate finance to a brand-new narrative appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Online Event Tue, September 19, 2023 • 1:30 am ET

2023 Atlantic Council in New York

On the sidelines of the 2023 United Nations General Assembly, the Atlantic Council hosted global leaders taking on the world’s most pressing issues and shaping its future.

Africa’s population is set to double by 2050. Knowing the continent’s ability to feed its current population of over 1.3 billion people “is weak, how are we going to feed 2.6 [billion]?” asked Ibrahim Mayaki, the African Union special envoy for food systems.

Mayaki outlined solutions to that challenge during Atlantic Council in New York, in a discussion hosted by the Council’s Africa Center and the Policy Center for the New South on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. Mayaki joined Cary Fowler—the US State Department’s special envoy for global food security—who argued that any solution will need to “focus on the smallholder farmer” to be effective.

On Monday, the United States and Norway unveiled a new seventy-million-dollar fund to provide financing for farmers and small- and medium-sized agricultural businesses in Africa “to try to de-risk some of the risks that are inherently” embedded in Africa’s agricultural sector, as Fowler explained.

“There is a consensus on the necessity to protect the small-scale farmers,” Mayaki said, adding that because these farmers “produce 80 percent of the food we eat,” empowering them would be a “huge boost” to the continent’s development.

Below are more highlights from the event, which was moderated by Africa Center Senior Director Rama Yade and Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby and featured the launch of a new issue brief on the promise of agritech by the Africa Center and the Policy Center for the New South.

Read the issue brief

Issue Brief

Sep 19, 2023

Unlocking Africa’s agricultural potential

By Aubrey Hruby and Fatima Ezzahra Mengoub

The ongoing digital revolution in Africa presents a valuable opportunity to revolutionize the continent’s food systems.

Africa Economy & Business

Innovative solutions

• In addition to rising food prices, the war in Ukraine has “increased food insecurity” in Africa, said Yade, adding that “weak local infrastructure” and “the lowest levels of [agricultural] productivity” only make matters worse.
• In July, Russia pulled out of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which allowed Ukrainian food exports to continue during wartime. But even when the agreement was in place, it benefited Europe “much more” than Africa, Mayaki said, “because we got very little percentage of the grains that were supposed to come” to the continent. This, coupled with Africa’s supply-chain struggles during the COVID-19 pandemic, showed Mayaki “that it’s important for Africa to count on itself… first” for food security.
• But “there’s no such thing as food security in a land where the soil is degraded… or where the crops are [not yet adapted] to climate change,” Fowler warned. “Unless we begin to start building the soils and adapting the crops, we’re going to run into real trouble.”
• “If you look into the future, you’ll see that there’s a need to produce 50 to 60 percent more food in Africa” by 2050, Fowler said; but projections based on current trajectories, he warned, indicate that for some crops, “the yield will be even smaller than it is today.”
• Fowler said that in continuing to support Africa’s food systems, the US government is looking to build food systems “in a sustainable way” that is going to be resilient to climate change. It is now working with the AU and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization on an initiative to identify traditional indigenous crops that offer the most nutritional value—and that can grow in a climate-changed world.
• Mayaki said that fragmentation across the AU’s fifty-five countries is holding back the agricultural industry’s development. “We must push for regional policies” that allow countries to specialize in what they’re strongest in, effectively creating continental “food baskets” that trade effectively and attract investors, he argued.
• Policies will also need to be “holistic,” he added, in that they will need to tackle agricultural issues alongside trade, infrastructure, and even governance challenges—for example, land tenure policies. “We will not be able to feed” the African population “if we do not think holistically,” Mayaki said.

The next frontier

• Hruby said that the digital revolution currently underway in Africa offers a “game-changing opportunity” to implement potentially transformative agritech solutions for the “hundreds of millions of smallholder farmers” who are currently operating “at suboptimal and unproductive” levels across the continent.
• Agritech offers a way to improve agricultural productivity without demanding more resources, explained Fatima Ezzahra Mengoub, a senior economist at the Policy Center for the New South—and co-author of the newly launched agritech issue brief. But, she added, the technology must be accessible and fitting for each local context.
• Eli Pollak, chief executive officer of Apollo Agriculture, discussed how Apollo helps farmers access needed credit—which is important particularly for women farmers who may not have collateral for bank loans. According to Ezzahra Mengoub, women contribute between 60 and 80 percent of total food production in Africa.
• Niraj Varia, the chief executive officer of iProcure, which digitizes rural supply chains, advocated for building up digital infrastructure across the continent to make sure that farmers can better access the materials and equipment they need. Cameron Alford, vice president of the Department of Compact Operations at the Millennium Challenge Corporation, said that working with African governments will be important in identifying and implementing solutions, as “country ownership is an important part of the model.”
• Highlighting the solutions that are growing in Africa has helped shape a more positive vision for investors and supporters, said Mayaki. “We are out of the negative narrative.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

The post What it will take to feed Africa—and the world—in the coming decades appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Together, the BRICS countries have already overtaken the Group of Seven (G7) advanced economies in terms of their contribution to global gross domestic product, with the group now accounting for almost a third of worldwide economic activity measured by purchasing power parity. The consequences of this economic rise have reverberated through a number of areas, including trade. While trade between Russia and the G7 has fallen by more than 36 percent since 2014 under the weight of economic and financial sanctions, trade between it and the other BRICS nations has soared, increasing by more than 121 percent over the same period. China and India have become the largest importers of Russian oil following bans imposed by the European Union. China’s trade with Russia hit a record of $188.5 billion last year, a 97 percent increase from 2014 and around 30 percent greater than in 2021. The surge occurred as Russia more than doubled its rail exports of liquefied petroleum gas as part of a drive to diversify its exports under the harsh sanctions regime.

By opting not to comply with western-led economic and financial sanctions, the solidarity of BRICS has been a balm for Russia. The bloc has offered trade diversion and other relief to one of its founding members and, in the process, weakened the effectiveness of US-led sanctions as a tool for advancing economic and geopolitical interests.

Online Event Wed, August 23, 2023 • 1:30 pm ET

The 2023 BRICS Summit: Africa in Action

With South Africa hosting the BRICS Summit and the 2023 AGOA Forum, the Africa Center brings together leading experts examining Africa’s growing role on the geopolitical landscape.

Africa Economy & Business International Financial Institutions International Organizations

A multipolar magnet

Thwarting the sanctions regime has had consequences that reach far beyond the impact of the crisis in Ukraine. Bolstered by their success on the economic and geopolitical fronts, the BRICS group is increasingly viewed by a growing number of countries in the Global South as an attractive agent of multilateralism. More than forty nations—including Algeria, Egypt, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates, but also key Group of Twenty (G20) countries such as Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia—have formally expressed their interest in joining the BRICS in the lead-up to this week’s summit.

If the effectiveness of trade diversion by BRICS nations in weakening the impact of western sanctions against Russia is any indication, sanctions could become less effective as a tool for advancing the economic and geopolitical interests of the G7 after the admission of new BRICS members. In a zero-sum global trading environment, the bloc’s expansion would also accelerate the diversification of demand away from G7 countries and reduce members’ exposure to future geopolitical risks.

The focus in Johannesburg will certainly be on the admission of new members, as well as trade and investment facilitation in a challenging global environment where the escalation of trade and tech wars—along with the “friendshoring” of supply chains—has increased the risk of global growth deceleration and a hard landing in China. BRICS members are likely to discuss sustainable development in the climate change era, global governance reform, and an orderly process of increasing trade in local currencies. On the latter point, more and more emerging economies are exploring ways to conduct trade in non-dollar currencies following the imposition of sanctions against Russia.

The dollar remains the global reserve currency, and the pace at which other currencies have chipped away at its dominance has been incremental. But a growing number of experts, including senior US government officials, recognize that the aggressive use of economic and financial sanctions to advance US foreign policy could threaten the dollar’s hegemony in the years ahead. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen recently emphasized this point: “There is a risk when we use financial sanctions that are linked to the role of the dollar that over time it could undermine the hegemony of the dollar.”

A new reserve currency?

The significance of dedollarization takes on greater importance in light of rumors that the bloc might attempt to develop a BRICS-issued reserve currency to be used by members in cross-border trade. While the BRICS nations—which collectively enjoy a comfortable balance of payment surplus—have the financial wherewithal to establish such a currency or unit of account, they lack the institutional architecture and the scale to sustainably achieve this end.

Even assuming that its members are fully aligned geopolitically and more inclined to co-operate than to compete, adopting a common currency presents several challenges. As the creation of the euro, now the world’s second largest reserve currency, illustrated, hurdles will include: achieving macroeconomic convergence, agreeing on an exchange rate mechanism, establishing an efficient payment and multilateral clearing system, and creating regulated, stable, and liquid financial markets.

The United States was able to persuade other countries to use the dollar owing to its hegemonic position as the world’s industrial powerhouse and single-largest trading nation following the end of World War II, reinforced in the decades since by the size of the market for US treasuries, which are often considered to be the world’s leading reserve asset. If they wish to provide a competitive alternative, the BRICS countries would need to agree upon a state-of-the-art bond market. It would need to be big enough to absorb global savings and provide assets with low risk of default where surplus funds could be parked when not used for trade.

Reflecting on these challenges, Anil Sooklal, South Africa’s ambassador-at-large to BRICS, reiterated in July that a BRICS currency will not be on the agenda during the summit, though expanding trade and settlement in local currencies will be. In fact, BRICS countries are already making strides in the use of local currencies in cross-border transactions. Their use is helping to sustain and boost cross-border trade between members, even amid a challenging operating environment of heightened geopolitical risks. It is also loosening the balance of payments constraints associated with dollar funding, bolstering local economies.

Although China and India may have diverging security interests, they each stand to benefit from the increased use of local currencies. BRICS nations are already using their own currencies for some bilateral trade payment settlement, and Saudi Arabia is considering signing a deal with China to settle oil transactions in renminbi. Meanwhile India is expanding the use of local currencies for bilateral trade payment and settlement beyond the BRICS group, inviting more than twenty countries to open special vostro bank accounts to settle trade in rupees. In a history-making move, India made its first oil payment to the United Arab Emirates in rupees earlier this month.

If the BRICS group expands its membership, then it could increase the risk of a divergence of interests and raise more coordination challenges—but it could also dramatically expand the group’s consumption power, with significant economic and geopolitical implications. Expansion could create scale and enhance the transition from bilateral to multilateral clearing, and perhaps ultimately toward a common BRICS currency. This would address one of the major challenges associated with the use of local currencies for bilateral trade payment settlement: the difficulty of deploying these currencies once imbalances arise. Lately, such challenges led to the suspension of bilateral trade arrangements that had allowed India to settle imports of Russian oil in rupees, with Russia accumulating billions of Indian rupees that it could not use.

Meanwhile, membership expansion could further weaken the effectiveness of US-led economic sanctions and accelerate the multipolarization of the global monetary order. Several members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries have already said they wish to join the BRICS group, which would increase the shared benefits associated with the use of local currencies for cross-border transactions and could further curtail the volume of global trade conducted in dollars.

To be sure, the stickiness of institutional arrangements, along with the breadth and depth of US financial markets is such that dollar dominance will remain a key feature of the global financial architecture for some time. But following membership expansion, the BRICS group could set in motion its transformation into an even more powerful geopolitical coalition that could accelerate the process of dedollarization and the transition to a multipolar world.

Hippolyte Fofack is the chief economist and director of research at the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank).

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In Africa too, the ongoing coup in Niger seems to trigger a harder reaction than the previous ones in Mali and Burkina Faso. After earlier sending Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby to Niger to lead mediation talks, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—under Nigerian President Bola Tinubu’s leadership—threatened to use force if the coup leaders don’t reinstate Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum by August 6 and announced new sanctions, harder than those used for other junta-led Sahelian countries. That is predicted to deal a blow to Niger, a country that depends on external aid. This unusual firm answer can be explained by several reasons:

• First, there is a strong fear that the region may collapse now that the G5 Sahel—a regional group of countries promoting development and security—is led by four juntas. Among the five members, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Chad have recently experienced an undemocratic transition; Mauritania remains. Niger is the fifth country in West Africa to experience a coup d’état over the past three years.

• Second, despite numerous African Union and ECOWAS sanctions over the past few years, the regional coup leaders seem to taunt the African organizations for whom this recent coup in Niger is an ultimate test of credibility.