UkraineAlert - Atlantic Council

Drone superpower Ukraine can teach Europe how to defend itself

Lesia Orobets — Fri, 30 Jan 2026 22:54:12 +0000

Ever since US President Donald Trump returned to the White House just over a year ago, it has become increasingly apparent that the world is now entering a new and unpredictable era of international relations. For Europe, this has meant coming to terms with the idea that continued US military support can no longer be taken for granted. After decades of outsourcing their security to the Americans, Europeans must once again learn to defend themselves.

Throughout the past twelve months, there has been much talk in European capitals of wake-up calls but relatively little actual action. While many European countries have vowed to dramatically increase defense spending, the debate over a new European security architecture still lacks a sense of urgency and remains hampered by competing national interests.

One of the few things that a majority of European policymakers appear to agree on is the importance of Ukraine in the continent’s emerging security strategy. This recognition of Ukraine’s role underlines the scale of the changes that have taken place over the past four years.

When Russia’s full-scale invasion first began in February 2022, Ukraine was heavily reliant on Western military aid as the country fought for survival. Since those early days, the Ukrainian army has expanded dramatically and evolved into the largest and most experienced fighting force in Europe. As a result of this transformation, a country that many had previously dismissed as a minor military player is now widely regarded as indispensable for the future defense of Europe.

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Ukraine’s potential to shape Europe’s new security architecture is most immediately obvious in the field of drone warfare. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is widely acknowledged as the world’s first full-scale drone war, with huge quantities of drones dominating the battlefield and operating deep inside enemy territory. Over the past four years, Ukraine has established itself as a “drone superpower” with an annual output of around four million drones, Bloomberg reported in November 2025.

Western security experts are no doubt acutely aware that alongside Ukraine, the two other nations currently driving the international development of drone warfare are Russia and China. This underlines Kyiv’s strategic importance as the democratic world adjusts to the challenges posed by an emerging alliance of authoritarian powers centered on Moscow and Beijing.

A growing number of US and EU defense companies have already sought to establish a presence in Ukraine in order to capitalize on the country’s technological expertize. This approach is understandable but may be shortsighted. In reality, Ukraine’s value extends far beyond access to existing military drone technologies.

Since 2022, Ukrainian drone developers and military units specializing in unmanned operations have learned to solve problems and adapt to new battlefield realities at lightning speed. Out of necessity, they have become accustomed to upgrading individual drone models and counter-drone systems within ever-decreasing innovation cycles that can now be measured in weeks.

Ukrainian forces have pioneered the use of combat drones on the front lines of the war. The country has also led the way at sea, with Ukrainian naval drones sinking multiple Russian warships and forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his remaining fleet from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russia itself. Meanwhile, long-range Ukrainian drones now routinely strike targets deep inside Russia. This Ukrainian success can serve as the foundation for a wider European security strategy as the world moves into a new era of drone-based warfare.

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Ukraine’s most immediate contribution to European security is likely to be in terms of helping countries defend against the mounting threat posed by Russian drones. The Kremlin’s current harassing activities around airports and other strategic sites across Europe are essentially an annoyance, but even such small-scale drone operations have exposed an alarming lack of readiness. At present, it seems safe to say that the continent as a whole is utterly unprepared for the kind of large-scale Russian drone attacks that have become a routine feature of the war in Ukraine.

Europe has responded to escalating Russian drone activity by developing plans to establish a “drone wall” along the continent’s exposed eastern flank. So far, however, this initiative remains somewhat fragmented with no unified concept or central coordination. While a collective response could eventually prove effective, pursuing this goal without learning from Ukraine’s unique experience makes little sense. Only Kyiv has the data and insights necessary to build layered defensive networks capable of combating waves of Russian drones.

In recent months, a growing number of European countries have taken the practical step of seeking to tap into Ukraine’s drone warfare prowess by working with Ukrainian trainers or establishing joint production initiatives. “Ukraine’s experience is the most relevant in Europe right now. Our specialists and technologies can become a key element of the future European drone wall, a large-scale project that will ensure safety in the skies,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy commented in September 2025.

In addition to drone tactics and technologies, Ukraine can also offer its European partners an unrivaled environment for drone operator training and weapons development. The whole of Ukraine is now a vast drone warfare laboratory where novel threats are identified and addressed on a daily basis. As a result, new drone models and upgraded designs can move from the drawing board to the battlefield at a pace that is unheard of in peacetime Europe.

Drone warfare is just one of the many areas where Europe can learn from Ukraine. As European leaders explore new security strategies in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment, it should be abundantly clear that Kyiv has a crucial role to play. No other European country has such a battle-hardened army or intimate knowledge of modern warfare. In an increasingly unpredictable world, that makes Ukraine a vital partner.

Lesia Orobets is the founder of the Price of Freedom air defense initiative and a former member of the Ukrainian parliament.

Ukrainian officials have recently made clear that Lukashenka and his regime must be held accountable for complicity in Russia’s aggression. Meanwhile, in a further indication that Ukraine is moving toward more systemic engagement with the Belarusian democratic opposition, plans have emerged to potentially appoint a special envoy and host Tsikhanouskaya in Kyiv.

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Some analysts believe this recent change in tone toward Belarus may reflect the growing influence of former Ukrainian spymaster Kyrylo Budanov, who was recently appointed as President Zelenskyy’s new chief of staff. Budanov has long been involved in contacts with the Belarusian side and helped facilitate the transfer of released political prisoners to Ukraine in December 2025.

Kyiv’s apparent pivot may also reflect the fact that Russia’s military footprint in Belarus continues to grow. Ukrainian officials claim Russia uses Belarus to conduct drone attacks on Ukraine and evade air defenses. Lukashenka recently announced the deployment of nuclear-capable Russian Oreshnik missiles to Belarus, which Zelenskyy described as a threat to both Ukraine and the European Union.

Meanwhile, Russia’s integration of the Belarusian military industrial complex continues, with up to 80 percent of Belarusian enterprises reportedly now engaged in production for Russia’s military needs. Belarus is accused of supplying ammunition, providing repair services for Russian equipment, and channeling sanctioned technology to Russian defense companies.

Lukashenka is understandably eager to distance himself from any direct ties to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the available evidence indicates that his regime is becoming more deeply embedded in the Kremlin war effort. This is the reality confronting the Ukrainian authorities. As long as Belarus remains firmly under Kremlin control, it will continue to pose a serious security threat along Ukraine’s northern border.

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Europe should be paying particular attention to indications of a new Ukrainian approach to Belarus. As US foreign policy priorities shift, responsibility for managing relations between Belarus and the West will increasingly fall on the European Union. EU officials must decide between freezing the Belarus issue or recognizing the country as a strategic challenge that requires European leadership.

Belarus has most recently made headlines due to a series of prisoner releases tied to partial US sanctions relief. The humanitarian impact of these deals should not be underestimated, but it is also important to underline that more than one thousand Belarusian political prisoners remain incarcerated. Some skeptics have argued that without a broader strategy, reducing sanctions pressure on Minsk in exchange for prisoner releases risks strengthening the current regime and reinforcing an oppressive system that imprisons political opponents.

This presents opportunities for Europe to demonstrate its ability to take the lead on the international stage. While the US seeks practical short-term results such as the release of political prisoners, Europe can push for more systemic change and democratic transition in Belarus. In this context, sanctions should be seen as a tool to undermine authoritarian rule rather than locking in the current status quo. This can be achieved by closing existing loopholes while targeting the revenue streams and logistical networks that sustain the Lukashenka regime and support the Russian war machine.

In the current geopolitical climate, any talk of a neutral Belarus is delusional. Lukashenka will not turn away from his patrons in the Kremlin voluntarily. If European policymakers wish to see genuine change in Belarus, they will need to demonstrate a readiness to increase the pressure on Minsk. The enticing prospect of future European integration can play a crucial role in these efforts.

Belarus now occupies a strategic position in Europe’s rapidly shifting security landscape. The country remains deeply involved in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and also represents a key challenge for European leaders as they seek to prove that the continent is capable of defending itself in an era when US support can no longer be taken for granted. The Ukrainian authorities clearly feel the time is right for a more proactive approach to Belarus. The question now is whether Europe will follow suit.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The core question now is not whether the state should intervene, but how to design intervention that protects national interests without suffocating private initiative or driving away international investors. This means finding the middle ground between security and economic freedom. Democratic Ukraine must seek to strike a better balance than its authoritarian adversary in order to enable the kind of continued defense tech innovation necessary to prevail on the battlefield and increase deterrence.

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There are currently concerns that Ukraine’s fast‑growing defense tech sector risks inheriting longstanding governance problems including opaque procedures, slow decision‑making, and uneven enforcement. Recent corruption scandals in Kyiv have already damaged trust, creating what some businesses have described as “negative expectations.”

From the Ukrainian government’s side, there is recognition that institutions are still adapting, with many of the available economic security tools still fragmented or not yet fully operational. This represents an opportunity for Ukraine if the country is able to build governance structures tailored to strategic sectors rather than retrofitting existing and outdated bureaucratic models. Creating a new generation of transparent institutions to address defense sector exports, investment screening, and procurement could become a competitive advantage for Ukraine if designed with private sector input from the outset.

Export licensing is one of the most acute potential bottlenecks. Ukraine’s defense tech businesses currently face a process requiring excessive approvals from multiple institutions, with little accountability or predictability. There is also a perception of unequal treatment, undermining confidence in the system. Ukrainian officials, meanwhile, tend to stress the necessity of strict controls to prevent leakage of sensitive technologies.

A risk‑based and tiered export control regime could address these concerns. By clearly defining a narrow list of highly sensitive technologies requiring strict oversight, the Ukrainian authorities could create faster and more predictable export pathways for less sensitive defense and dual‑use products. This would support economic growth while preserving core security interests.

Wartime currency controls and capital movement restrictions severely limit the ability of Ukrainian defense sector companies to expand internationally. Multiple investors have noted the paradox of profitable Ukrainian firms being unable to deploy their own capital abroad, forcing them to raise funds outside the country simply to operate globally.

From the perspective of Ukrainian policymakers, currency restrictions are viewed as necessary to preserve macro‑financial stability and to prevent capital flight. Targeted exemptions for vetted defense and dual‑use companies, particularly those pursuing foreign acquisitions or joint ventures aligned with national priorities, could unlock growth without undermining financial stability. Such a mechanism would signal trust in compliant firms and reward transparency.

Another key issue is intellectual property (IP). Standard IP processes are too slow for wartime innovation cycles. In the dynamic current environment, Ukrainian companies rely on trade secrets and know‑how rather than formal patents, but this increases risks when partnering internationally.

Ukrainian officials acknowledge the importance of innovation but have so far only been able to offer limited concrete solutions. Accelerated IP pathways for defense and dual‑use technologies, combined with support for joint research and development frameworks with trusted foreign partners, could help Ukrainian firms secure protection in allied jurisdictions while strengthening international integration.

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There is a degree of uncertainty in Ukraine’s expanding defense tech sector that can be seen in inconsistent terminology, unclear boundaries, and undefined red lines. A shared vocabulary and published strategic framework, co‑developed by the public and private sectors, could help reduce this uncertainty.

Different priorities lead to diverging visions. Defense tech industry executives and investors tend to view the issue of economic security primarily through the lens of scalability, competitiveness, and speed. Their key assumptions include the notion that innovation thrives in predictable, transparent environments.

Many also argue that Ukraine’s combat‑tested technologies represent a unique global opportunity, while cautioning that excessive controls risk pushing talent, capital, and IP abroad. With this in mind, industry representatives and investors generally support targeted security measures but fear blanket restrictions that treat all technologies and companies as equally sensitive.

Ukrainian officials tend to frame economic security primarily as a defensive necessity. They warn that adversaries actively use markets, investment, and technology transfer as weapons. Many are also concerned that under‑regulation could result in irreversible strategic losses. Naturally, their perspective prioritizes caution, monitoring, and alignment with allied security frameworks, even at the cost of slower growth.

The central tension here is time-based and risk‑based. Businesses operate on market timelines and accept calculated risk, while governments operate on security timelines and seek to minimize worst‑case scenarios. Without structured dialogue, these differences manifest as mistrust rather than complementary roles.

If managed effectively, wartime Ukraine’s approach to economic security in the defense tech and dual-use sectors could become a model for the country’s broader postwar reconstruction. Ukraine has the opportunity to redesign institutions in a strategic sector that already commands global attention. Success may depend on whether government policy is seen by businesses as a partnership or as an obstacle.

Constructive cooperation grounded in transparency, risk‑based policy, and continuous dialogue can transform economic security from a constraint into a catalyst for Ukraine’s long‑term strength and sovereignty, providing significant security benefits for allies and partners along the way. This is a realistic objective. After all, industry, investors, and government all ultimately seek the common goal of a resilient, innovative Ukrainian economy integrated with democratic allies and protected from adversarial exploitation.

Bridging the gap between perspectives is less a matter of ideology than of process, trust, and execution. Ukraine is currently in a period of transition that is marked by many significant challenges but no irreconcilable obstacles. Industry and investors are ready to scale globally while the government is racing to build safeguards against unprecedented threats. The task now is to synchronize these efforts.

Eric K. Hontz is director of the Accountable Investment Practice Area at the Center for International Private Enterprise.

At the same time, many have expressed frustration over the continued media emphasis on Ukrainian resilience amid a mounting humanitarian crisis that has left much of the country in desperate need of help. “Resilience doesn’t mean immunity. Ukraine cannot withstand everything indefinitely,” wrote Ukrainian commentator Iryna Voichuk on January 16. “Framing this as only a story of strength risks dulling the urgency of what’s happening.”

Others have echoed this sentiment, including some of Ukraine’s most prominent international supporters. “Mythologizing endurance is a quiet form of abandonment. Resilience does not mean invulnerability,” cautioned R.T. Weatherman Foundation president Meaghan Mobbs in a recent post. “When we speak as if Ukrainians can simply ‘take it,’ we absolve ourselves of responsibility.”

With the present arctic weather conditions expected to continue well into February, the situation in Ukraine is critical. In the high-rise apartment blocks that dominate Ukraine’s cities, many less mobile residents have already been housebound for weeks and will likely remain trapped in frigid darkness throughout the coming month. The outlook is particularly grave for the elderly, those with young families, and people in need of medical care. In other words, Russia’s present bombing strategy appears to have been specifically tailored to target the most vulnerable members of Ukrainian society.

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As the potential for large-scale loss of life becomes increasingly apparent, international audiences are waking up to the true extent of Russia’s criminal intentions. Wall Street Journal chief foreign affairs correspondent Yaroslav Trofimov recently referred to Russia’s winter bombing campaign as “Putin’s genocidal effort to make Kyiv unlivable.” It is easy to see why such terms are now being employed. The 1948 UN Genocide Convention identifies “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,” as one of five recognized acts of genocide. At the very least, Russia’s current actions closely resemble this definition.

The current winter bombing campaign reflects a broader trend of mounting Russian attacks against Ukraine’s civilian population. According to UN data, 2025 was the deadliest year of the war for Ukrainian civilians since 2022, with more than 2,500 people killed and over twelve thousand injured. This was 31 percent higher than the figure for the previous year and 70 percent more than in 2023. Many of these deaths were due to a spike in Russian missile and drone strikes on civilian targets including residential buildings, hospitals, and a children’s playground.

Russia also stands accused of conducting a systematic campaign of drone strikes targeting members of the public in the front line regions of southern Ukraine. These attacks have been dubbed a “human safari” by terrified locals. They involve the use of drones with video camera guidance systems to hunt individual victims, underlining the deliberate nature of the killings. An October 2025 United Nations investigation into this drone terror found that Russia was guilty of “systematically coordinated actions designed to drive Ukrainians out of their homes,” and concluded that the Kremlin’s actions in southern Ukraine qualified as the crimes against humanity of murder and of forcible transfer of civilians.

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Putin is dramatically escalating attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population because he cannot win the war on the battlefield. When he first launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Putin was expecting a quick and complete victory. Instead, his army has become bogged down in a brutal war of attrition that will soon enter a fifth year.

Despite pouring vast resources into the invasion and placing his entire country on a war footing, the Kremlin dictator has been unable to secure a decisive breakthrough. Many in Moscow had hoped the return of Donald Trump to the White House would transform the military situation, but even a dramatic decline in US aid for Ukraine over the past year has failed to turn the tide in Russia’s favor. Putin’s army captured less than one percent of Ukrainian territory during 2025, while suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties. At the present glacial pace, it would take Russia decades and millions of men to fully subjugate Ukraine.

In his official statements, Putin continues to project confidence and boast of his invading army’s success. However, with so few genuine victories to toast, this has often meant inventing imaginary advances. Putin’s habit of exaggerating Russian gains came back to haunt him in late 2025 when he repeatedly claimed to have captured the Ukrainian city of Kupyansk, only for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to personally visit the city and record a selfie video exposing the Russian ruler’s lies. This embarrassing episode underlined the growing credibility gap between Putin’s bold talk of inevitable Russian victory and the far more sobering battlefield reality of minimal Russian gains and disastrous losses.

With no obvious route to military victory, Putin is now openly embracing a strategy of terror tactics against Ukraine’s civilian population. He hopes that by weaponizing winter and putting millions of lives at risk, he can finally break Ukrainian resistance and force Kyiv to capitulate. Europe has not witnessed criminality on such a grand and terrible scale since the days of Hitler and Stalin.

So far, the international response to Russia’s winter bombing campaign has been utterly inadequate. While many of Kyiv’s partners have rushed to provide humanitarian aid, no additional costs whatsoever have been imposed on the Kremlin. Instead, it is Ukraine and not Russia that is reportedly being asked to make concessions. Unless this changes, the normalization of Russian war crimes will continue and Putin’s sense of impunity will become even more deeply entrenched. It will then only be a matter of time before other civilian populations experience the horrors currently taking place in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure have been a routine feature of the war ever since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. According to Ukrainian Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal, every single energy-generating facility in the country has been bombed. “There is not a single power plant in Ukraine that has not been hit by the enemy since the beginning of the war,” he commented last week. “Thousands of megawatts of generation capacity have been knocked out. Nobody else in the world has ever faced a challenge like this.”

Russia’s current aerial offensive began to escalate noticeably during the final months of 2025 ahead of the cold season. As temperatures plummeted in early January, there was a further intensification of attacks on Ukraine’s power and heating infrastructure, with large numbers of drones and missiles concentrated on specific cities to overwhelm air defenses. The timing of Russia’s bombing campaign leaves no room for reasonable doubt; this was a premeditated attempt to target the Ukrainian population by weaponizing the winter weather.

The Kremlin’s goal is easy enough to decipher. By making Ukrainian cities unlivable and threatening to freeze millions of civilians, Moscow aims to break Ukraine’s resistance and force the Kyiv authorities to accept peace on Russian terms. In other words, the present bombing offensive is Putin’s response to US President Donald Trump’s peace efforts. Rather than agree to a ceasefire or offer concessions, Putin uses terror as a negotiating tool to secure Ukraine’s surrender.

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The targeting of Ukrainian civilians is not limited to attacks on critical infrastructure. According to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, 2025 was the deadliest year of the invasion for Ukrainian civilians since 2022. In a report released in early January, United Nations officials confirmed that more than 2500 Ukrainian civilians were killed in 2025. This was 31 percent higher than the figure for the previous year and 70 percent more than in 2023. A separate assessment by European governments reached similar conclusions and found that the scale of Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians increased whenever the Trump administration attempted to advance peace negotiations.

The rising civilian death toll in Ukraine is largely due to increased Russian bombing of Ukrainian cities. Moscow’s mounting air offensive owed much to a spike in domestic drone production, which has made it possible to launch hundreds of drones at Ukraine in a single night. Russia has also been accused of conducting a large-scale campaign of individual drone strikes against civilians in southern Ukraine that terrified locals have branded a “human safari.” UN investigators reported in October 2025 that Russia’s targeted drone strikes on civilians were a crime against humanity.

Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians have increased amid mounting frustration in Moscow over the slow pace of the invasion. Despite holding the battlefield initiative throughout 2025, Putin’s army failed to achieve any significant breakthroughs and gained less than one percent of Ukrainian territory while suffering heavy losses. With little immediate prospect of military success, Putin seems to have decided that his best chance of victory lies in terrorizing the civilian population.

So far, Russia’s terror tactics do not appear to be working. A nationwide poll conducted in mid-January by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that a majority of Ukrainians continue to reject the Kremlin’s territorial demands in eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, more than two-thirds of Ukrainians do not believe the present round of US-led negotiations will result in a lasting peace. Instead, most Ukrainians remain convinced that Russia aims to continue the war.

Today’s arctic conditions will eventually give way to milder weather, but the damage done to Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure in recent weeks will take months to repair. Nor is there any reason to believe that Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians will abate. On the contrary, the Kremlin is likely to escalate further in a bid to demoralize, destabilize, and depopulate the country. By seeking to freeze millions of Ukrainians, Putin has underlined his readiness to target civilians as he seeks to impose an imperialistic vision of peace through submission.

Yuliya Kazdobina is a senior fellow at the “Ukrainian Prism” nongovernmental analytical center.

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Ukraine’s arsenal of long-range weapons has evolved significantly since 2022. Over the past four years, the country has managed to develop a variety of strike drones with the capacity to reach targets located well over a thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Ukraine also now boasts an expanding selection of domestically produced cruise missiles. This enhanced long-range firepower has made it possible for Ukraine to conduct an escalating bombing campaign inside Russia that has already changed the geography of the war.

Since summer 2025, long-range Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory have reached record highs. Ukraine has struck dozens of military facilities and defense industry enterprises, while also paying special attention to the oil and gas infrastructure that fuels the Russian war economy. Ukraine has hit refineries, pipelines, oil rigs, ports, and a number of tankers belonging to the Kremlin’s so-called shadow fleet. These strikes have complicated the logistics of the invasion while contributing to a significant decline in Russia’s energy export revenues.

In addition to hampering the Kremlin war machine and causing economic damage, Ukraine’s mounting campaign of long-range strikes has also had a major psychological impact that is helping to bring home the reality of the war to the Russian public. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin has worked hard to shield ordinary Russians and contain the conflict within the borders of Ukraine. However, with air raid sirens becoming an increasingly routine feature of daily life in Russian towns and cities, the Putin regime is no longer able to control the narrative.

A recent survey conducted by Russia’s only remaining independent pollster, the Levada Center, has highlighted the impact Ukrainian strikes are having on Russian public sentiment. Asked to name the most notable event of the past year, 28 percent of respondents cited Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian cities and industrial facilities, making this the third most popular answer. Clearly, Ukraine’s long-range bombing campaign has succeeded in breaking through the Kremlin propaganda bubble and has made a strong impression on the Russian population.

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For Ukraine’s partners, the objective now should be to boost Ukraine’s long-range capabilities to the maximum in order to equip the country with the kind of strike power that can deter Russia. Numerous Western leaders have shied away from providing Kyiv with long-range missiles from their own arsenals due to escalation fears. The solution is simple: Western partners should focus their efforts on helping Ukraine produce sufficient quantities of drones and missiles domestically.

Ukrainian officials are well aware that the ability to hit targets across the Russian Federation may be their country’s most effective security guarantee against further Kremlin aggression. They are now appealing to Kyiv’s international partners for increased support as they seek to exploit the country’s considerable spare defense industry production capacity and crank up output.

“The modern arms race is not about nukes. It is about millions of cheap drones. Those who can scale up production quicker will secure peace,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha in late 2025. “This requires quick and sufficient funding for Ukraine’s defense industry, which is now the greatest source of defense innovation in the world. We can produce up to twenty million drones next year if we get sufficient funding.”

Throughout the past year of faltering US-led peace efforts, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that he has no intention of ending the invasion. As long as the war is being fought predominantly inside Ukraine, he is unlikely to change his position, regardless of Russian combat losses. However, if Ukrainian drone and missile strikes inside Russia continue to expand during 2026, the economic and social impact may become too serious to ignore. This could force Putin to abandon his stalling tactics and finally enter into genuine negotiations. It would also oblige him to think carefully before restarting his invasion in the years ahead.

Serhii Kuzan is chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). He formerly served as an adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (2022-2023) and as an advisor to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (2014).

Ukraine’s enhanced fortifications are increasing the cost of Putin’s invasion

David Kirichenko — Thu, 15 Jan 2026 22:01:39 +0000

Russian forces continued to gradually advance in Ukraine during 2025, but suffered huge losses in exchange for minimal gains. This unfavorable ratio reflects the increasing effectiveness of Ukraine’s defensive lines, which now feature a combination of layered fortifications backed by deadly drone coverage. Together, these elements have turned much of the front line into a controlled kill zone that makes large-scale offensive operations extremely challenging while dramatically raising the cost of each new assault.

As Ukraine focuses on preventing further Russian advances and solidifying the front lines of the war, Kyiv has invested consideration resources in a major upgrade of the country’s defenses. This has resulted in what Britain’s The Economist recently described as a “massive fortification system” up to two hundred meters in depth covering much of the Ukrainian battlefield. “Ukraine now has the fortress belt it wishes it had in 2022,” the publication reported in early January.

Physical obstacles play an important role in this approach. Anti-tank ditches, razor wire, and concrete obstacles are layered to slow Russian advances. Defensive lines are often spaced within mortar range of one another, allowing Ukrainian units to trade space for time and counterattack against exposed enemy assault groups before they have had an opportunity to consolidate. The emphasis is on attrition and disruption rather than rigid territorial defense.

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Ukraine’s defensive strategy goes far beyond a reliance on traditional static barriers. Over the past year, there has also been a growing emphasis on dispersed, concealed, and flexible defensive networks. These small-scale fortified positions are often located underground or embedded in tree lines at strategic locations, and are supported by remote fires and decoys. Each individual node in these networks is designed to shape enemy movement rather than stop it outright, channeling attackers into deliberately prepared kill pockets without exposing defenders. By creating choke points for Russian troops, Ukraine aims to maximize Kremlin casualties and capitalize on its in-built advantages as the defending party in a war of attrition.

There are growing signs that this approach is working. Ukraine’s top military commander Oleksandr Syrskyi commented recently that the current strategy has proved particularly effective on the Pokrovsk front, which has witnessed some of the heaviest fighting of the entire war over the past year. According to Syrskyi, “timely and high-quality fortifications and engineering obstacles” enabled Ukrainian forces to inflict maximum losses on Russian units close to Pokrovsk and disrupt their plans, even when facing numerical superiority.

Where Ukrainian defenses have failed, the reasons are instructive. In areas such as Toretsk and parts of the Kharkiv front, troop rotations occurred without sufficient time or equipment to construct proper fortifications, leading to Russian gains. Constant Russian drone surveillance made the use of heavy engineering machinery dangerous, leaving units unprepared when assaults followed. These cases serve as confirmation that fortifications are not optional enhancements but foundational to battlefield survival under drone saturated conditions.

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Drones are at the heart of Ukraine’s defensive strategy, serving as a ubiquitous presence over kill zones and preventing localized Russian advances from consolidating into more substantial breakthroughs. Meanwhile, in some sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk, ground robotic systems are now being used to deliver the vast majority of supplies to troops. With this in mind, Ukrainian commanders argue that all future defensive lines should be optimized for both aerial and ground drones.

These technological advances do not eliminate the need for manpower. Even the most sophisticated fortifications require soldiers to react to emerging threats. When Russian units manage to infiltrate defensive lines or push into urban areas, infantry forces remain essential in order to clear and secure ground. While Ukraine’s improved fortifications are an encouraging development for the war-weary nation, no physical barrier can realistically stop Russia unless it is supported by sufficient quantities of well-trained troops.

Strengthening Ukraine’s fortifications and addressing manpower shortages will be among the top priorities for incoming Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, who took up his post this week. Fedorov made his name in government as Minister of Digital Transformation. Since 2022, he has been one of the driving forces behind Ukraine’s rapidly expanding drone warfare capabilities.

Fedorov’s extensive defense tech background, along with his reputation as a modernizer who has countered institutional corruption through the digitalization of state services, has led to considerable optimism over his appointment. He is now faced with the twin challenges of improving Ukraine’s front line defenses while addressing the mobilization and desertion problems hindering the Ukrainian war effort. If he is able to make progress on these two fronts, Ukraine’s prospects for 2026 and beyond will begin to look a lot better.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

When conditions allow for free and fair Ukrainian elections to take place, a key issue will be the inclusion of those who are currently defending the country. According to a preliminary forecast by the Ministry of Veterans Affairs, after the war ends, the number of war veterans and their family members will reach five to six million people, or one in six Ukrainians.

Opinion polls indicate strong public trust in the Ukrainian military along with widespread support for the participation of veterans in Ukrainian politics. In contrast, Ukraine’s existing democratic and political institutions are among the least trusted entities in society. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that veteran involvement in politics could help counter this trust deficit and strengthen Ukrainian democracy.

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It is important to note that most Ukrainian veterans are not career military personnel. The vast majority of today’s Ukrainian soldiers joined the military voluntarily or were mobilized and expect to return to civilian life in peacetime. Veterans are also not a homogeneous group and do not represent a specific political agenda. They differ in views, values, and priorities, and should be understood as individuals seeking meaningful participation within legitimate democratic institutions.

Electing military personnel to public office is not without risk. Military experience does not automatically translate into political skill. Veterans transitioning from the battlefield to politics may face challenges in terms of essential political know-how such as policy coherence, negotiation tactics, coalition-building, and working within institutions. Without targeted support and a clear civilian framework, veterans risk being marginalized within political parties or exploited as symbolic figures without real influence.

Ukraine has previous practical experience of veterans entering politics, notably during the country’s 2014 parliamentary elections. One of the former military personnel elected on that occasion was Oksana Korchynska, who recalled at a recent Kyiv event how she “came from the front line, from Mariupol, two days before taking the oath of MP.”

Korchynska noted that in 2014, veterans were frequently included on electoral lists without being integrated into decision-making structures. While veterans enjoyed high public trust, their actual influence within parties and parliament has so far often been limited. This experience underscores a critical lesson: Political inclusion must be substantive, not symbolic. Veterans need pathways to real influence within parties and institutions, not mere visibility.

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Members of Ukraine’s veteran community do not need to wait for elections to take up a role in public life. Many are already serving in local government or building civic organizations and veteran associations. Kateryna Yamshchykova is a veteran who became acting mayor of Poltava in 2023. “Opportunities already exist for everyone,” she reflected. “Did I really want the position of acting mayor? It was the last thing I wanted in my life, but I understood that this responsibility had to be taken on in order to build the country we are fighting for.”

This kind of local engagement can help veterans develop the skills they need to run as candidates in national elections after the war ends. Democratic participation, civic habits, and political responsibility cannot be developed overnight. Instead, early engagement can help bring about a stable postwar transition.

For established Ukrainian political parties, engagement with the country’s veteran community is already becoming increasingly necessary to maintain public support. This will likely lead to intensified internal competition as veterans seek leadership roles alongside longstanding party members.

Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK and former commander of the Ukrainian army, has warned that established political elites might see veterans as a threat to their position. If this happens, everyone in Ukraine stands to lose. Public trust in politicians would erode further, undermining the legitimacy of decisions that will be essential for European integration and postwar recovery.

A critical step toward the meaningful political participation of veterans is the development of a clear legal framework for Ukraine’s first postwar elections. This should ensure inclusive participation, clarify registration requirements for new political parties, and potentially impose stricter campaigning rules to protect electoral integrity.

Ukraine’s democracy is not on pause; it is being reshaped under fire. The emergence of veterans as political actors represents a profound structural change in Ukrainian society. In and of itself, this change is neither a threat to democracy nor a guarantee of positive change. Instead, it requires a deliberate and inclusive approach. If Ukraine succeeds in integrating veterans into civilian political life while preserving pluralism, accountability, and fair competition, it may emerge from the war with a more resilient democracy capable of sustaining inclusive recovery, reforms, and European integration.

Vasyl Sehin is the WFD Country Director in Ukraine.

Putin is weaponizing winter as Russia tries to freeze Ukraine into submission

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 13 Jan 2026 22:39:41 +0000

Russia is “going all in” to destroy Ukraine’s power system, Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister Mykola Kolisnyk said on January 13 following the latest in a series of major bombardments targeting civilian energy infrastructure in cities across the country. “Today, Russia launched an attack just five days after the previous bombardment, using drones and ballistic missiles. We see that the enemy is going all in, deploying its forces to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure,” he commented.

The current wave of attacks have hit the Ukrainian capital Kyiv particularly hard. “The Russians are trying to disconnect the city and force people to move outside Kyiv,” Ukrenergo CEO Vitaliy Zaichenko told the Kyiv Independent. According to Zaichenko, around 70 percent of the Ukrainian capital’s approximately 3.5 million residents were left without electricity on Tuesday. Meanwhile, large numbers of apartments also had no heating amid subzero winter conditions.

Kyiv is one of multiple Ukrainian population centers currently facing rolling blackouts that in many cases can last for over 24 hours. Russia’s air offensive has also struck energy infrastructure supplying Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Chernihiv, and many other major cities.

Teams of engineers are working around the clock to repair damaged facilities, fix power lines, and reconnect Ukrainian homes and businesses to the electricity grid. However, repeated Russian attacks are making it increasingly difficult to patch up battered equipment and find the necessary replacement component parts.

The bombing campaign appears to have been timed to coincide with the coldest period in over a year, with temperatures plummeting to minus fifteen Celsius (five degrees Fahrenheit) for extended periods of time. “ They deliberately waited for freezing weather to make things worse for our people. This is cynical Russian terror specifically against civilians,” stated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

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This is not the first time Russian President Vladimir Putin has attempted to weaponize winter in his war against Ukraine. Russia launched a major air offensive against Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in October 2022, establishing a pattern that would be repeated each year as the cold season approached. While this tactic is not new, the present destruction of the Ukrainian power grid is widely recognized as the most severe of the entire war.

In Kyiv and other cities, the Ukrainian authorities have established so-called Points of Invincibility in heavily populated areas featuring heating and internet access along with electricity sources that can be used to charge up personal devices and power banks. Visitors can also expect hot drinks and a warm welcome.

Throughout Ukraine the buzz of generators has become the background noise of the winter season. Many Ukrainians have installed backup power sources in their homes, which are typically able to provide electricity for a limited period of time. Portable gas stoves are also a common feature as people adapt and improvise in the extreme conditions caused by Russia’s bombardment.

With millions of Ukrainian civilians at risk of being trapped in freezing darkness for days at a time, the potential for a humanitarian catastrophe is obvious. Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko has already urged residents of the Ukrainian capital to temporarily leave the city if they are able to and move to less affected areas where power and heating are more readily available. With the present cold snap set to last for at least another week and further Russian attacks widely expected, fears are now mounting over a possible winter exodus to neighboring EU countries.

That may be exactly what Putin has in mind. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia has repeatedly targeted Ukrainian civilians in a bid to break Ukraine’s resistance and depopulate large parts of the country. In addition to attacks on energy, heating, and other critical infrastructure, Russia has also launched large-scale drone strike campaigns designed to make entire towns and cities unlivable. A recent United Nations probe into Russia’s campaign of drone attacks throughout southern Ukraine’s front line regions concluded that Moscow’s actions amounted to the crimes against humanity of “murder and forcible transfer of population.”

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As Russia attempts to freeze Ukrainians into submission, Kyiv desperately needs a wide range of international support. This includes alternative energy supplies to replace domestic gas production damaged in Russia’s attacks, along with spare parts to mend the country’s power stations and associated infrastructure.

Ukraine also urgently requires additional air defense systems and interceptor missiles. At present, Ukraine’s existing air defenses are struggling to cope with the dramatically increased intensity of Russia’s aerial attacks, which now routinely feature hundreds of drones along with dozens of cruise and ballistic missiles.

Most of all, Ukraine needs to be able to strike back. However much Ukraine’s network of air defenses improves, the sheer scale of the Russian bombardment means that a percentage of missiles and drones will inevitably reach their targets. The only truly effective defense is deterrence. In other words, Russia’s attacks will continue until Putin is restrained by the knowledge that Ukraine has the capacity to reply in kind.

The next few weeks will be among the most challenging of the war for Ukraine’s civilian population that will test the country’s famed resilience to the limit. “I think the Russians want to break us. They want to make Ukrainians angry and unhappy. They think this will make us go out on the streets and protest but that won’t happen,” Kyiv resident Valentina Verteletska told Britain’s Guardian newspaper. “This makes us tougher and more determined. War doesn’t make people bad or good but it amplifies who you are. It allows people to show who they are inside and we have seen a lot of people volunteering to help their neighbors.”

Many believe Russia’s wintertime bombardment of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure now represents Putin’s best chance to achieve some kind of breakthrough at a time when his army is struggling to advance on the battlefield. Russia gained less than one percent of Ukrainian territory in 2025 despite suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties, and is still fighting over villages located within walking distance of the front lines at the start of the invasion in February 2022.

Despite this lack of progress, Putin remains committed to his original invasion objective of extinguishing Ukrainian independence and forcing the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. He clearly has no qualms about targeting millions of Ukrainian civilians in pursuit of this criminal goal. “You can see with your own eyes what is going on,” commented Kyiv building manager Oleksandr Matienko. “They are trying to kill us. They can’t win any other way. So they are willing to do anything to destroy Ukraine.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

There are no signs that this trend will change anytime soon. Despite mounting economic challenges on the home front amid falling energy export revenues, Russia’s defense budget for 2026 remains close to record highs. Moscow will continue to prioritize domestic drone production this year, while also allocating large sums to finance the system of generous bonus payments and salaries for army recruits who volunteer to serve in Ukraine.

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Russia’s refusal to embrace the idea of a compromise peace should come as no surprise. After all, Putin has built his entire reign around the promise of restoring Russian greatness and reversing the perceived humiliations of the Soviet collapse. After nearly four years of full-scale war, a negotiated settlement that secured Ukraine’s status as an independent country would represent a major political failure.

Since 2022, Kremlin officials and Russian state media have consistently portrayed the invasion of Ukraine as an existential struggle against Western aggression with the aim of establishing a new world order and returning Russia to its rightful place as a great power. However, a peace deal based on the current line of contact would leave approximately 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and firmly anchored in the West. Such an outcome would be viewed in Moscow as an historic Russian defeat.

This framing creates a political trap of Moscow’s own making. Putin knows he would face a potentially disastrous domestic backlash if he accepted anything less than a clear Russian victory in Ukraine. Peace terms that failed to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit would raise difficult questions about the enormous costs of the invasion. Russians would want to know why the country had spent vast sums of money and sacrificed so many men in order to achieve so little. Putin would risk entering Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine.

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Putin has begun 2026 in a challenging position. He remains reluctant to upset Trump, but he dare not accept the compromise peace the US leader is proposing. Instead, Putin needs either total victory in Ukraine or indefinite conflict. Any attempt to end the war without establishing complete political control over Ukraine would threaten the stability of Putin’s own regime. His interests are therefore best served by seeking to prolong negotiations while working toward a military solution.

If Western leaders wish to change the current political calculus in Moscow, they must first acknowledge that there is no alternative to increasing the pressure on Putin. At present, the Kremlin dictator views escalation as necessary for regime survival and has no plans to end the war.

Two scenarios could disrupt this trajectory. A collapse in global oil prices combined with successful secondary sanctions enforcement could create an economic crisis that would force Putin to revise his priorities. Alternatively, mass casualties during a failed spring 2026 Russian offensive could trigger domestic instability, while also highlighting the fading prospects of a military breakthrough.

Both these outcomes are realistic but would require significant additional action from Ukraine’s partners. If the West is unable to muster the requisite political will, escalation remains Moscow’s most rational path in 2026. Putin has little choice but to continue his invasion. Even if Russian victory remains out of reach in the coming year, he knows he cannot accept any peace deal that secures Ukrainian statehood.

William Dixon is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Service Institute specialising in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security.

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Evidence of Belarusian involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine is not new, of course. On the eve of the invasion, Lukashenka allowed Putin to station tens of thousands of Russian troops in Belarus. The country then served as the main gateway and logistics hub for Russia’s blitzkrieg offensive to seize Kyiv in spring 2022. The Lukashenka regime is also implicated in the Kremlin campaign to abduct and indoctrinate thousands of Ukrainian children.

Reports of Lukashenka’s ongoing involvement in the Russian war effort come amid speculation of a potential thaw in diplomatic relations between Belarus and the United States. In December, 123 political prisoners were freed by the Belarusian authorities, with the US easing sanctions measures in exchange. This followed two smaller scale trade-offs earlier in 2025 as the Trump administration seeks to increase diplomatic dialogue with Minsk as part of ongoing efforts to broker a negotiated settlement to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Despite these headline-grabbing humanitarian steps, there is little sign of a more comprehensive shift in Minsk away from domestic repression or any reduction in support for Russia’s aggressive foreign policy agenda. On the contrary, the available evidence indicates that while Lukashenka may seek increased engagement with the West, he has no intention of turning away from Moscow or ending human rights abuses inside Belarus.

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By continuing to provide Moscow with its full backing, Belarus enhances Russia’s ability to wage war in Ukraine. This is undermining the Trump administration’s efforts to end the Russian invasion and secure a lasting peace settlement. Belarus also remains deeply implicated in Putin’s hybrid war against Europe and stands accused of weaponizing everything from migrants to balloons against its EU neighbors.

US outreach to Minsk over the past year has secured the release of many prominent prisoners, but continued arrests mean that the overall number of political detainees in the country remains high. Naturally, Lukashenka is happy to reengage with American officials in order to secure a relaxation of sanctions pressure, but there are also concerns that the current approach risks incentivizing hostage-taking.

Yes, a less isolated and more neighborly Belarus remains a worthwhile goal, but in the current circumstances, Lukashenka has little motivation to compromise. He is looking at possible gains without actually reducing the current level of repression in Belarus.

Sanctions relief would be a significant gain for Lukashenka. In exchange for that, the US should be able to achieve some limits on Belarusian facilitation of Kremlin aggression in Ukraine or, at a minimum, a notable decrease in the number of political prisoners in Belarus.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Over the past year, Russian attacks on Ukraine’s agricultural sector have escalated alarmingly. According to research conducted by the University of Strasbourg, the University of Maryland, and NASA’s Harvest program, the number of farmland fires identified in Ukrainian-controlled areas of the Kherson region during 2025 rose by 87.5 percent.

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The Kherson farming community’s wartime experience is mirrored throughout Ukraine, particularly in areas close to the front lines of the invasion. By attacking agricultural infrastructure, Russia seeks to undermine Ukraine’s food security, just as it targets the country’s energy infrastructure to deprive Ukraine’s civilian population of access to electricity and heating.

The implications of Russia’s war on Ukrainian farmers are international in scope. Known historically as the breadbasket of Europe, Ukraine is home to around one quarter of the world’s black soil, the most fertile farmland on the planet. This makes Ukraine a potential agricultural superpower and a key contributor to global food security. Ukrainian farmers are among the leading exporters of foodstuffs to the European Union, with Ukrainian produce also playing a prominent role in aid programs to counter hunger throughout the developing world.

Russia’s invasion has had a devastating impact on Ukrainian agricultural output. In addition to mined fields, burned crops, and bombed facilities, large numbers of Ukrainian farms are currently in Kremlin-controlled regions, leading to seized harvests.

Kherson region farmers received a further blow in summer 2023 when a suspected Russian sabotage operation destroyed the Kakhovka Dam in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine. This act of ecocide undermined one of Europe’s largest irrigation systems, leaving hundreds of thousands of hectares without access to water. The impact on the environment was catastrophic, leading to drought conditions, failed crops, and the loss of farmland.

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Despite the unprecedented challenges posed by Russia’s ongoing invasion, Kherson’s farmers continue to work. In 2025, they managed to harvest a remarkable quantity of the watermelons that serve as the region’s unofficial calling card. Other key Kherson crops include wheat and potatoes.

Since 2022, domestic and international support programs have proved instrumental in bolstering the resilience of the Kherson agricultural industry. Initiatives in recent years have included subsidies for farmers and technical assistance focused on areas such as irrigation, with the goal of helping farmers adapt to the new wartime realities.

Kherson agricultural businesses are also responding to the changing conditions. Due to water scarcity and rising temperatures, some farms have reduced planting areas and turned to cultivating crops that utilize soil moisture more efficiently. Research is also underway to develop additional drought-resistant crops better suited to the current environment.

Further international support for Ukrainian farmers will be critically important during 2026. Ukraine’s agricultural industry is one of the cornerstones of the national economy and a major exporter to global markets. By targeting farmers and their land, Russia aims to make Ukraine unlivable and break the country’s resistance. This strategy poses a significant threat to international food security and must be addressed.

Oleksandr Tolokonnikov is Deputy Head of the Kherson Regional Military Administration.

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The current emphasis on UGVs is part of a broader technological transformation taking place on the battlefields of Ukraine. This generational shift in military tech is redefining how modern wars are fought.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, homegrown innovation has played a critical role in Ukraine’s defense. Early in the war, Ukrainian troops deployed cheap commercial drones to conduct reconnaissance. These platforms were soon being adapted to carry explosives, dramatically expanding their combat role. By the second year of the war, Ukraine had developed a powerful domestic drone industry capable of producing millions of units per year while rapidly adapting to the ever-changing requirements of the battlefield.

A similar process has also been underway at sea, with Ukraine deploying domestically produced naval drones to sink or damage more than a dozen Russian warships. This has forced Putin to withdraw the remainder of the Black Sea Fleet from occupied Crimea to Russia itself. Recent successes have included the downing of Russian helicopters over the Black Sea using naval drones armed with missiles, and an audacious strike on a Russian submarine by an underwater Ukrainian drone.

By late 2023, drones were dominating the skies over the Ukrainian battlefield, making it extremely dangerous to use vehicles or armor close to the front lines. In response to this changing dynamic, Ukrainian forces began experimenting with wheeled and tracked land drones to handle logistical tasks such as the delivery of food and ammunition to front line positions and the evacuation of wounded troops.

Over the past year, Russia’s expanding use of fiber-optic drones and tactical focus on disrupting Ukrainian supply lines has further underlined the importance of UGVs. Fiber-optic drones have expanded the kill zone deep into the Ukrainian rear, complicating the task of resupplying combat units and leading to shortages that weaken Ukraine’s defenses. Robotic systems help counter this threat.

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Remote controlled land drones offer a range of practical advantages. They are more difficult to jam electronically than aerial drones, and are far harder to spot than trucks or cars. These benefits are making them increasingly indispensable for the Ukrainian military. In November 2025, the BBC reported that up to 90 percent of all supplies to Ukrainian front line positions around Pokrovsk were being delivered by UGVs.

In addition to logistical functions, the Ukrainian military is also pioneering the use of land drones in combat roles. It is easy to see why this is appealing. After all, Ukrainian commanders are being asked to defend a front line stretching more than one thousand kilometers with limited numbers of troops against a far larger and better equipped enemy.

Experts caution that while UGVs can serve as a key element of Ukraine’s defenses, they are not a realistic alternative to boots on the ground. Former Ukrainian commander in chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi has acknowledged that robotic systems are already making it possible to remove personnel from the front lines and reduce casualties, but stressed that current technology remains insufficient to replace humans at scale.

Despite the advances of the past four years, Ukraine’s expanding robot army remains incapable of carrying out many military functions that require infantry. When small groups of Russian troops infiltrate Ukrainian positions and push into urban areas, for example, soldiers are needed to clear and hold terrain. Advocates of drone warfare need to recognize these limitations when making the case for greater reliance on unmanned systems.

UGVs will likely prove vital for Ukraine in 2026, but they are not wonder weapons and cannot serve as a miracle cure for Kyiv’s manpower challenges. Instead, Ukraine’s robot army should be viewed as an important part of the country’s constantly evolving defenses that can help save lives while raising the cost of Russia’s invasion.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Ukraine security guarantees are futile without increased pressure on Putin

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 07 Jan 2026 15:57:40 +0000

Kyiv’s allies hailed progress toward “robust” security guarantees for Ukraine on January 6 following a meeting in Paris attended by representatives of more than thirty countries who together make up the Coalition of the Willing.

As details of a possible security framework for postwar Ukraine continue to take shape, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a joint declaration committing to deploy troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace agreement between Moscow and Kyiv. Crucially, US officials attending the talks in France also voiced American backing for security guarantees, with the United States expected to play a supporting role that will focus on ceasefire monitoring.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy praised the “substantive discussions” and suggested that he was now more confident about the credibility of the security commitments being proposed by Ukraine’s partners. “Military officials from France, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine worked in detail on force deployment, numbers, specific types of weapons, and the components of the armed forces required and able to operate effectively. We already have these necessary details,” he commented.

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This was the latest in a series of meetings over the past year that have sought to define workable security guarantees for Ukraine as a key element of the US-led push to end Russia’s invasion. Since early 2025, Britain and France have been at the forefront of ongoing efforts to establish a Coalition of the Willing bringing together countries prepared to contribute to postwar security measures. The objective is to prevent a resumption of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The Paris Declaration signed on January 6 is a step in the right direction, but many key questions remain unanswered. The document does not provide the kind of NATO-style commitment to collective security that many believe is essential in order to deter Putin. Nor does it clarify the exact role of a potential European military contingent on Ukrainian territory, or define whether their mandate would include defending themselves in the event of a Russian attack. Instead, it contains vague references to “the use of military capabilities.” This language is hardly likely to convince the Kremlin, especially in light of the escalation fears that have dominated the Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The other obvious problem with the current peace plan is implementation. The signatories of the Paris Declaration all agree that the envisioned package of security guarantees for Ukraine can only be put in place once a ceasefire has been agreed. This will inevitably strengthen Moscow’s objections. Over the past year, Russia has repeatedly rejected ceasefire proposals while stressing its unwavering opposition to any Western military presence in Ukraine. That is exactly what the Coalition of the Willing is now proposing.

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As Ukraine’s partners discuss the technical aspects of security guarantees, the elephant in the room remains Russia’s lack of interest in peace. The Kremlin was not represented at talks in the French capital this week, just as it has been absent during a similar series of recent meetings between US, Ukrainian, and European officials.

While the Trump administration has sought to maintain a parallel dialogue with Moscow, there is no indication whatsoever that Russia shares the optimistic assessments being offered by Zelenskyy and other Western leaders. On the contrary, Putin and his Kremlin colleagues continue to signal that they have no intention of compromising and remain committed to the maximalist goals set out at the start of the invasion in February 2022.

Throughout the past year, Putin has been careful to avoid openly rejecting US peace proposals due to concerns over possible retaliatory sanctions. Nevertheless, his actions speak for themselves and underline his opposition to ending the war.

Just one day after Trump and Zelenskyy met in Florida in late December and announced significant progress toward a settlement, Putin called the US leader and accused Ukraine of launching an attack on his presidential residence. The news appeared to shock Trump and placed the entire peace process in jeopardy. However, it soon transpired that the incident had been hastily invented in a bid to discredit Ukraine and derail peace talks. Trump has since acknowledged that Putin’s resident was not targeted. “I don’t believe that strike happened,” he told reporters on January 4.

The Kremlin dictator’s apparent readiness to lie directly to Trump says much about his determination to disrupt peace efforts. The faked attack on Putin’s residence was the latest in a series of Russian steps over the past year to stall or otherwise obstruct negotiations. This has led to mounting claims that Putin is playing for time without having any intention of ending his invasion.

Putin’s rejection of a negotiated settlement should come as no surprise. His army is advancing in Ukraine and retains the upper hand in a war of attrition that strongly favors Russia. With the Ukrainian military suffering from increasingly acute manpower shortages and Kyiv’s allies showing growing signs of weakening resolve, Putin remains confident that he can achieve a decisive breakthrough in 2026.

Even if he did not believe that victory was on the horizon, Putin would be highly unlikely to risk a compromise peace involving limited territorial gains. After all, he is not fighting for land in Ukraine; he fighting for Ukraine itself.

Putin views the invasion of Ukraine in the broadest of possible historical contexts as a sacred mission to reverse the injustice of the Soviet collapse and revive the Russian Empire. The terms currently on offer would leave around 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and free to pursue further European integration. To Putin, that would not be a partial victory; it would be a catastrophic defeat.

In the coming weeks, Russia will almost certainly reject the latest peace framework agreed in Paris. How will the Coalition of the Willing respond to this setback? Unless they are willing to impose more costs on the Kremlin and bolster Ukraine’s ability to hurt Russia militarily, all talk of postwar security guarantees and reassurance forces will continue to ring hollow. If Western leaders are serious about ending the war in Ukraine and safeguarding European security, they must acknowledge that there is no alternative to increasing the pressure on Putin.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Unmanned systems of all kinds have emerged since 2022 as a fundamental element of modern military doctrine. This is radically changing everything from the structure of armies to the role of the individual soldier. Remotely controlled equipment no longer needs a large crew to support it, while individual models are becoming more compact and maneuverable. As a result, the power of unmanned weapons systems is increasing exponentially, while production is expanding to industrial scale and becoming significantly cheaper.

More and more soldiers now serve as unmanned systems operators. Those who remain in more traditional roles perform tasks such as special operations, guard duties, or logistical functions. The war being waged by Ukraine has demonstrated that the modern battlefield features a kill zone up to 25 miles deep and spanning the entire front line. This zone is controlled by drones that destroy any infantry or equipment. Combat operations are increasingly conducted by drone operators located deep in the rear or in underground bunkers.

In these conditions of drone dominance over the battlefield, any attempts to stage major breakthroughs are doomed to failure. Instead of tank columns and artillery duels, offensive operations require maximum dispersal of forces and the greatest possible camouflage. The main task of troops is to gradually shift the kill zone deeper into the enemy’s rear.

Success depends upon the ability to rapidly produce large quantities of inexpensive combat drones and continually update their control systems. Initial tactics involving single drones and individual targets are already becoming a thing of a past. Instead, operators can now use artificial intelligence to control entire fleets featuring large numbers of drones deployed simultaneously. This approach allows a single soldier to manage kilometers of front line space rather than just a few hundred meters. The result is a reduction in the need for mass mobilization and an emphasis on the professionalism and technical skills of each operator manning the front.

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Combat operations now boil down to two main scenarios: Either the collapse of an enemy who is not prepared for the new intensity of combat, or a positional struggle in the style of World War I. In a protracted positional war, it is crucial to ensure control over the kill zone and maintain sufficient supplies while depriving the enemy of similar capabilities. The protection of logistics networks and the infliction of maximum damage on the enemy’s rear areas is of decisive importance.

First and foremost, this means cutting off ground supply routes. To protect logistics, armies must develop fleets of maneuverable transport drones that are not dependent on road quality and can navigate minefields. Meanwhile, to ensure the steady supply of ammunition and spare parts to underground storage points along the front lines, a mobile air defense system featuring interceptor drones is necessary.

At the strategic level, key targets are now weapons factories, logistics centers, and command posts, which are often hidden deep in the rear or located inside underground bunkers close to the front lines. Destroying these high-value targets requires guided missiles or other air strike capabilities. Military planners are therefore faced with the challenge of moving away from expensive manned aircraft toward reusable strategic drones.

Testing of fully-fledged unmanned aircraft is already underway. The transition toward unmanned aviation will open up the mass deployment of guided aerial bombs, which are significantly cheaper than missiles. In addition, strategic drones will themselves be able to act as “aircraft carriers” for kamikaze drones.

The same principles apply equally to the maritime theater of operations. Ukrainian Sea Baby naval drones have already proven themselves by destroying numerous warships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and carrying out attacks on Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers.

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To ensure their future national security, states must focus on the mass production of unmanned systems and their components. China currently accounts for the lion’s share of component parts. This is a challenge for any country that seeks to play a role in global affairs. China must be deprived of the strategic advantages it enjoys due to its status as the leading producer of components for unmanned systems.

Many NATO generals appear to think that recent technological advances are making war cheaper and creating a more level military playing field. This is a mistake. In reality, any reduction in the cost of weapons is more than offset by the need for increased quantities.

It is also important to stress that unmanned technologies alone are not enough. Another key factor is an army’s access to reliable digital communications similar to Starlink. Without this capability, it is impossible to coordinate combat operations, collect data, and maintain connections between individual units and command structures. It is no coincidence that China is already investing billions to address this issue.

The transformation currently underway in the military sphere also increases the role of cyber warfare. Disruption to logistics, power outages, and communications breakdowns can all provide the enemy with the opportunity to advance. A hacked cyber system can expose vital defenses or dramatically reduce the possibility of recovery.

Looking ahead, technological innovation in the military must be recognized as a national priority when allocating defense budgets. This applies to everything from unmanned systems to the development of artificial intelligence.

The most important revolution must take place within the minds of today’s military generals. A comprehensive rethink of existing military doctrines is currently needed. Armies must be completely re-equipped. It is time for the top brass to acknowledge that they should either change or give way to a new generation of military strategists.

Ukraine’s experience since 2022 has confirmed that in order to be successful in modern warfare, armies should model themselves on technological giants like Amazon and SpaceX. They must embrace flexible thinking and be capable of competing in terms of implementing new innovations.

In an era of accelerated military change, all countries face a simple choice of adapting or accepting the inevitability of defeat. The winners will be those who embrace the lessons from the technological revolution currently underway on the battlefields of Ukraine.

Oleg Dunda is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament from the Servant of the People party.

Putin’s reference to “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”) raised eyebrows and was widely seen as a signal that Russia may be preparing to increase its territorial demands. The Czarist era term “Novorossiya” was first employed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by imperial administrators to describe large swathes of southern and eastern Ukraine then under Russian rule. It fell into disuse during the Soviet period, only to be resurrected by the Kremlin following the onset of Russia’s Ukraine invasion in 2014.

Russian nationalists have yet to agree on the exact boundaries of Novorossiya, but most envisage a territory stretching far beyond the partially occupied Ukrainian provinces of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson that are currently claimed by the Kremlin. Putin has indicated that his definition of Novorossiya encompasses approximately half of Ukraine, including the country’s entire Black Sea coastline and major cities such as Odesa and Kharkiv.

Then there is the question of Kyiv. According to Russia’s own national mythology, the capital of Ukraine is also the mother of Russian cities and the spiritual birthplace of Russian Orthodoxy. Putin has repeatedly referenced the sacred status of Kyiv in his many essays and speeches denying the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood. It is therefore extremely difficult to imagine him accepting any peace proposal that secures Kyiv’s postwar position as the capital of an independent Ukraine. Putin can hardly claim to be reuniting Russia’s historic lands if he leaves the most Russian city of them all firmly in the hands of a hostile state.

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Based on his own public pronouncements and extensive writings on the subject, it seems reasonable to conclude that Putin’s understanding of historically Russian lands includes the whole of Ukraine. Indeed, he has made no real secret of this conviction. “I have said many times that I consider the Russian and Ukrainian peoples to be one people. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours,” Putin told guests at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in summer 2025. The real question is whether his imperial agenda extends beyond the borders of Ukraine.

In a geographical sense, Putin’s vision of historical Russia is definitely not confined to Ukraine alone. Instead, it includes the vast additional expanses of the Czarist Russian Empire and its Soviet successor. “What is the Soviet Union? It is historical Russia,” Putin declared in 2022. A year earlier, he had lamented the fall of the USSR as “the disintegration of historical Russia” by another name. “We turned into a completely different country,” Putin stated. “And what had been built up over 1,000 years was largely lost.”

When European dictators start ranting about lost thousand-year empires, it rarely bodes well for international security. Putin is no exception. The Kremlin dictator’s determination to reverse modern Russia’s fall from grace has come to dominate his reign and has led directly to the biggest European war since World War II. His deeply felt sense of historical grievance over the Soviet collapse has fueled a poisonous obsession with Ukraine, which Putin regards as the ultimate symbol of the injustice resulting from the breakup of the USSR.

Due to its large size, geographical proximity, shared history, significant ethnic Russian population, and perceived cultural closeness, Ukraine occupies a prominent place in Russia’s imperial identity. However, it is wishful thinking to imagine that sacrificing Ukraine will appease Putin or persuade him to forget about the rest of the former Russian Empire. Instead, the same bogus historical arguments used to justify the invasion of Ukraine could easily be applied to a host of other nations. Any country that was previously subjected to Russian imperial rule could technically fall within Putin’s broad definition of historically Russian lands. “We have an old rule,” he commented earlier this year. “Wherever a Russian soldier sets foot is ours.”

Based on the boundaries of the Czarist Empire at its greatest extent on the eve of World War I, potential targets of future Russian aggression could include Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the nations of Central Asia. Nor is this list exhaustive. A truly maximalist approach would also require the inclusion of the many former Soviet satellite states that made up the Eastern Bloc during the second half of the twentieth century.

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With the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine about to enter a fifth year, many in the West are now beginning to take Putin’s imperial ambitions increasingly seriously. According to Reuters, recent United States intelligence assessments confirm that Putin has not abandoned his aims of capturing all of Ukraine and reclaiming parts of Europe that once belonged to the former Soviet Empire. “The Europeans are convinced of it. The Poles are absolutely convinced of it. The Baltics think they’re first,” the report noted.

Not everyone is so sure. Skeptics tend to question Putin’s ability to wage a major war against the West, with many pointing to his army’s underwhelming performance in Ukraine as proof of Russia’s military limitations. This is comforting but dangerously misleading. In reality, Russia’s lack of progress since 2022 is not a sign of any fundamental weakness; it is testament to the formidable strength and staggering sacrifices of the Ukrainian nation. However, Ukraine’s remarkable resistance against overwhelming odds cannot continue indefinitely and must not be taken for granted. If Ukraine falls, Europe will face a challenge it is utterly unprepared for.

Today, the Ukrainian army is by far the biggest and most experienced fighting force in Europe, other than Russia itself. It is backed by a rapidly expanding and highly innovative domestic military industry that is rewriting the rules of modern warfare. If Putin is permitted to succeed in establishing control over Ukraine, all this will be rapidly integrated into the Kremlin war machine. A partially disarmed Europe will then find itself confronted by a dramatically emboldened Putin, who will have the continent’s two largest armies at his disposal. In such uniquely favorable circumstances, the chances of him choosing not to press home his advantage are next to zero.

The internal logic of the Putin regime is an additional factor driving Russia’s expansionist impulse. Economically, politically, and culturally, Russian society is now deeply militarized in ways that will be extremely difficult to reverse without destabilizing the country. Nor is the Kremlin in any hurry to deal with the hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers currently fighting in Ukraine. These men are now used to receiving vastly inflated salaries and have been brutalized by the bloodiest invasion in modern history. Keeping them occupied, and preferably as far away from Russia as possible, is now a very real national security priority for Moscow.

Putin may also be encouraged to act by the current geopolitical climate, which presents a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to advance Russia’s imperial agenda. The return of Donald Trump to the White House has signaled a radical shift in US policy toward the war in Ukraine and the broader defense of Europe. This has led to a mounting sense of insecurity in European capitals amid unprecedented concerns over America’s commitment to NATO collective security. Would a Russian attack on the Baltic states trigger an Article 5 response from the US? Given Trump’s posturing on NATO budgets and his administration’s ambivalent attitude toward Europe, some believe this can no longer be taken for granted.

Europe alone is not yet in a position to defend itself against Russia. After decades of defense sector neglect, effective rearmament will take years to complete. European leaders have also failed to demonstrate the kind of collective political will necessary to deter the Kremlin. The recent failure to agree on the use of frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s war effort was the latest in a long line of climb downs that have signaled Europe’s chronic disunity and crippling fear of escalation. There are many good reasons why Putin may not rush to expand the war, but concern over a potentially decisive European response is not one of them.

As evidence of Western weakness continues to mount, Putin is growing bolder. In recent months, he has escalated Russia’s hybrid war against Europe with sabotage attacks on critical infrastructure and drone incursions across the continent. In the diplomatic arena, Kremlin officials recently renewed calls for NATO to retreat from central and Eastern Europe, a move that would expose more than a dozen countries to the threat of Russian aggression for the first time in a generation. Meanwhile, rhetoric in the Russian state media targeting Finland, the Baltic states, and other front line countries now increasingly echoes the propaganda that preceded the invasion of Ukraine.

As he plots to rebuild the Russian Empire, Putin is unlikely to be working to any set schedule or clearly defined territorial goal. Instead, the gradual escalation of Russia’s Ukraine invasion over the past twelve years indicates that he is an opportunistic imperialist whose appetite grows with eating. At the same time, it is obvious that his radical revisionist agenda is not limited to Ukraine and poses a very real threat to European security.

Putin believes he is on an historic mission to restore Russia to its rightful place as a global superpower and the dominant force in Europe. Erasing Ukrainian statehood is just the beginning. While we cannot know for sure where he will strike next or how far he ultimately plans to go, it is delusional to think that handing Putin victory in Ukraine will convince him to stop. On the contrary, a Russian success in Ukraine would almost certainly mean more war and lead to decades of European instability.

Putin’s vow to liberate historically Russian lands is an open-ended excuse for imperial expansion that makes a complete mockery of US-led efforts to broker a compromise peace based on limited Russian gains in southern and eastern Ukraine. Clearly, this would not be enough to placate Putin and cannot serve as the basis for a sustainable settlement.

The peace terms currently being discussed would leave approximately 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and free to continue integrating with the West. This is exactly what Putin aims to prevent. After four years of fighting to reverse the verdict of the Cold War, any peace deal that safeguards Ukrainian independence would be recognized in Moscow as a Russian defeat of historic proportions. Instead, Putin knows he must continue the invasion until a fully subjugated Ukraine can become a stepping stone for the next stage in his expansionist agenda.

In his quest to secure a place in history among Russia’s greatest rulers, Putin has long since passed the point of no return. He will not deviate from this messianic goal for the sake of sanctions relief or minor territorial concessions. Any efforts to establish a lasting peace must be firmly grounded in this sobering reality. Peace is possible, but only if the pressure on Putin is increased to the point where he begins to fear defeat on the battlefields of Ukraine and potential collapse on the home front inside Russia.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The Lukashenka regime has clearly learned from similar agreements with the United States earlier this year, which also saw prisoners freed in exchange for sanctions relief. This is fueling a transactional approach to what should be primarily a human rights issue.

While this year’s prisoner releases demonstrate that sanctions relief can produce welcome results, any further reduction in sanctions pressure by the United States should be approached with caution. If prisoner releases are rewarded without any expectation of broader shifts away from authoritarian policies, repression itself becomes a bargaining tool. In such a scenario, there is a very real danger that political prisoners could become virtually inexhaustible bargaining chips for Lukashenka.

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In one if his first interviews following his release, Ales Bialiatski warned about the dangers of negotiating with Lukashenka without demanding wholesale change. He noted that releasing individual prisoners will not be enough to end repression in Belarus. The regime could easily exchange prisoners on a regular basis, he cautioned, freeing some and imprisoning others while asking for new concessions. Bialiatski’s insights should help inform international engagement with Belarus.

Looking ahead, the United States and European Union can play complementary roles in relations between Belarus and the democratic world. Washington’s sanctions tend to be intentionally more flexible. This makes it possible to offer targeted relief based on concrete humanitarian progress, while also allowing for an increase in pressure if Minsk backslides.

In contrast, European sanctions are more focused on systemic change. They are tied to ending policies of political persecution, embracing elements of democratic transition, and addressing Belarusian participation in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Any steps to weaken EU sanctions would reduce Europe’s ability to influence Minsk and rob Brussels of the tools to bring about more meaningful change.

Recent events have highlighted the lack of genuine progress toward constructive engagement between Belarus and the country’s European neighbors. Despite a number of goodwill gestures toward Belarus such as the reopening of EU border crossings, Minsk has continued to engage in provocative actions such as launching weather balloons into Lithuanian airspace.

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Lukashenka may have economic motives for seeking to secure sanctions relief in exchange for limited concessions. The Belarusian economy has benefited in recent years from a spike in wartime demand linked to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but this growth is now cooling. With less room to maneuver. the Belarusian dictator has good reason to engage in deals that can relieve the financial pressure.

He may also believe the time is right to reestablish his credentials on the geopolitical stage. As US-led negotiations to end Russia’s war against Ukraine continue, Lukashenka might see opportunities for a return to the mediator role he occupied during the initial stages of Russian aggression just over a decade ago. Many observers noted that during the latest prisoner releases, most of the freed detainees were sent to Ukraine rather than Lithuania, which has previously served as the main destination. This may have been an attempt to highlight ongoing cooperation between Kyiv and Minsk.

Greater engagement between the Lukashenka regime and the West could potentially be beneficial but a measured approach is essential. Future sanctions relief must be conditional and tied to verifiable steps such as the release of all political prisoners, an end to new politically motivated arrests, and the restoration of basic civic liberties. The rights of released prisoners must also be respected. This includes allowing them the option to remain in Belarus and providing them with full documentation.

Further steps to improve dialogue with Belarus should also be based on a realistic assessment of achievable goals. For example, it is wishful thinking to suggest that limited sanctions relief could somehow pull Minsk out of the Kremlin orbit. On the contrary, Lukashenka is now more dependent than ever on the Kremlin and will almost certainly never dare to distance himself from Russia, regardless of how skillfully sanctions are applied and relaxed.

What sanctions can do is constrain Lukashenka’s options and secure specific concessions. The ultimate objective should be an end to all human rights abuses and oppressive policies, rather than the targeted release of high-profile prisoners. Until that goal is within reach, the European Union in particular has a key part to play in maintaining pressure on Lukashenka.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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In June, the Department of Defense redirected 20,000 anti-drone air defense interceptors specially made for Ukraine under USAI to Israel and US forces in the Middle East. Congress is now using the NDAA to make it more difficult for the Pentagon to repeat this, while also requiring that any arms redirected into US stocks are ultimately replaced for Ukraine.

Though Congress doesn’t expect the White House to make use of USAI in the near future, the NDAA modifies the program so that these funds will now remain available until 2029. As the Trump administration looks for ways to both revitalize the US defense industrial base and provide Ukraine with credible security arrangements, USAI could make a return as a useful way to bolster Ukraine’s defenses.

During 2025, the Trump administration has sought to pressure Ukraine with the prospect of withholding US intelligence support. The NDAA creates strict new reporting requirements to discourage any such moves. As recently as November, the White House said that unless Kyiv agreed to a new US proposal to end the war, it would stop sending weapons and providing the intelligence Ukraine uses in its defense, including to detect Russian air raids.

The new legislation requires the US Secretary of Defense to submit reports to Congress within 48 hours of any decision to “pause, terminate, or otherwise restrict or materially downgrade intelligence support, including information, intelligence, and imagery collection,” to Ukraine. This does not concretely prevent the administration from ending intelligence support, but it is a clear signal from Congress that any action to do so would be met with sharp political backlash.

The NDAA also creates significant new reporting requirements related to the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), the primary mechanism for arms sales to Ukraine. In order to increase the transparency of the PURL system, Congress will use its oversight power to mandate quarterly reports.

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The NDAA includes the Abducted Ukrainian Children Recovery and Accountability Act, a bipartisan bill introduced by Senators Chuck Grassley (R-IA) and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) to support efforts to locate, return, and rehabilitate Ukrainian children abducted by Russia. The mass abduction of Ukrainian children has united Republicans and Democrats in Washington. In early December, Congress held a hearing with Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States and experts working to rescue and rehabilitate abducted children.

The bill authorizes the State Department and Department of Justice to assist Ukraine in locating and returning Ukrainian children as well as prisoners of war and civilian detainees, and to support the rehabilitation of returned children and seek accountability for the Russians who abducted them. It also authorizes the Secretary of State to provide support to Ukraine’s government and civil society groups in providing rehabilitation services for victims.

As it stands, unless Congress exercises its foreign policy powers, efforts to end Russia’s invasion will be stymied by limited US assistance to Ukraine. However, there are some signs that Congress is taking critical steps forward. Recently, Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA) reportedly worked with Democrats to advance a discharge petition to force a vote on Russia sanctions and potential new military assistance to Ukraine. If passed, new Russia sanctions could deliver a much-needed shot in the arm to the Trump administration’s peace efforts.

While it includes measures that will be welcomed by Kyiv, the NDAA’s Ukraine provisions are largely about mitigating potential harm from the Trump administration. In order to provide significant new material assistance to Ukraine, Congress will need to advance other legislation that it has so far kept on ice while awaiting approval from the White House.

Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and the deputy director for policy and strategy at Razom for Ukraine, a nonprofit humanitarian aid and advocacy organization.

‘Putin is lying’: Zelenskyy visits front to expose false claims of Russian gains

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 16 Dec 2025 23:00:14 +0000

According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the invasion of Ukraine is going entirely according to plan, with Russian troops advancing everywhere and conquering all before them. This swaggering stance is intended to bolster Russian support for the war while demoralizing Ukrainians and deterring Kyiv’s partners. Most of all, it is designed to secure US President Donald Trump’s support for a Kremlin-friendly peace by convincing him that Russian victory is inevitable.

In order to maintain this air of inevitability, Putin stands accused of routinely inflating Russian battlefield achievements. At a time when Kyiv is already coming under mounting pressure to make painful concessions, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is clearly conscious of the dangers posed by these exaggerated claims. In a bid to expose the Kremlin’s disinformation efforts, Zelenskyy traveled personally to the front lines in eastern Ukraine last week to visit a city that Putin and his colleagues have repeatedly bragged of seizing.

Zelenskyy’s trip to Kupyansk came amid a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in the vicinity that resulted in significant gains. The selfie video he recorded during his visit was masterclass in wartime messaging that debunked Putin’s boasts while also underlining Ukraine’s continued ability to defeat Russia on the battlefield. “Putin publicly lied, claiming that Russian forces had already taken the city. So I went to Kupyansk myself to show the world that Putin is lying,” the Ukrainian leader commented. “We must keep exposing every single Russian falsehood because truth restores justice.”

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Kupyansk is a strategically important city located close to the Russian border in northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region. It was occupied by Russian troops in the initial stages of the full-scale invasion before being liberated during Ukraine’s September 2022 counteroffensive. In recent months, the city has once again become a key target for the advancing Russian army, with Putin and his generals announcing the capture of Kupyansk on multiple occasions.

Putin’s proclamations of victory in Kupyansk began in late October, when he issued an invitation to international journalists and promised to provide them with safe passage to witness the encirclement of Ukrainian units trapped in the city. Days later, he told a meeting of Russia’s National Security Council that Kupyansk was “practically in the hands of Russian forces,” with victorious troops engaged in mopping up operations. “The city’s future has already been determined,” Putin stated.

On November 20, Russia’s top general Valery Gerasimov informed Putin that Russian forces had established full control over Kupyansk. The following day, Putin invoked the alleged fall of the city in an attempt to project Russian strength and intimidate Ukraine. “If Kyiv does not want to discuss President Trump’s proposals and refuses it, then both they and the European warmongers should understand the events that took place in Kupyansk will inevitably be repeated in other key areas of the front,” he warned.

Similarly bold Russian statements continued into the current month. On December 2, Putin remarked that Kupyansk had been under Russian occupation “for several weeks now,” and accused the Ukrainian authorities of being completely detached from reality. In fact, it is now apparent that Ukrainian assessments of the battle were broadly accurate, while Putin was guilty of spinning fantasies about the imaginary conquest of Kupyansk. Speaking on the outskirts of the evidently unconquered city, Zelenskyy openly mocked the Kremlin dictator’s dishonesty. “The Russians have had a lot to say about Kupyansk,” he commented. “The reality speaks for itself.”

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Zelenskyy’s latest front line appearance was much more than a high stakes photo opportunity or a chance to troll the Kremlin. In his selfie video, the Ukrainian leader acknowledged the importance of challenging false Russian narratives and stressed the need to shape international perceptions of the war in order to strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position. “Today, achieving results on the front line is crucial so that Ukraine can achieve results in diplomacy,” he noted. “This is exactly how it works: All our strong positions within the country translate into strong positions in the negotiations to end the war.”

Ukraine’s recent gains in the Battle of Kupyansk do not alter the country’s precarious position at various other points along the vast front lines of Europe’s largest armed conflict since World War II. Nevertheless, Zelenskyy was right to shine a spotlight on the city. His headline-grabbing selfie video served as a timely reminder that Putin is a proven liar whose word cannot be trusted. It also confirmed that contrary to Kremlin propaganda, the Ukrainian army is far from collapse and remains a formidable fighting force.

These are exactly the messages Ukraine needs to convey to the current US administration. Donald Trump seems remarkably susceptible to Putin’s portrayal of Russia as an irresistible military force, and has repeatedly suggested that Ukraine should accept a Kremlin-friendly peace or risk destruction. The facts on the ground simply do not support this defeatist assessment.

While the Russian military holds the overall initiative and is currently advancing, it is grinding forward at glacial pace while suffering catastrophic losses. Nobody understands this better than Putin himself, who must be acutely aware that he would not need to exaggerate Russian gains and invent new triumphs if his invasion had not yielded such underwhelming results at so high a cost.

Last week’s front line visit by the Ukrainian leader underscored the fact that Russian victory is anything but inevitable. The military outlook for 2026 is actually far more nuanced. With enough international support, there is good reason to conclude that the Ukrainian army could replicate its recent Kupyansk success elsewhere and eventually stem the tide of Russia’s invasion. This is a realistic recipe for peace. Indeed, it may be the only way to pressure Moscow into serious negotiations. Putin wants the world to believe he cannot be beaten on the battlefield, but the Russian troops retreating from Kupyansk would likely tell a different story.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The only winner from Ukrainian wartime elections would be Putin

Yuriy Boyechko — Tue, 16 Dec 2025 19:34:10 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is once again facing pressure to hold wartime elections after US President Donald Trump accused the Ukrainian leader of using Russia’s invasion to postpone a vote and suggested it was now time for the country to go to the polls. Zelenskyy has responded to Trump’s recent comments by expressing his readiness to organize elections in the next two to three months, while calling on Ukraine’s Western partners to play a role in preparations. “I’m asking now, and I’m stating this openly, for the US to help me, perhaps together with our European colleagues, to ensure security for the elections,” he said on December 10.

Zelenskyy’s commitment to democratic principles is commendable, but he should nevertheless resist international pressure to rush into wartime elections. Attempting to hold a national vote at a time when the country is under relentless Russian bombardment and while millions of Ukrainians remain displaced by the war would not be a demonstration of democracy; it would be a strategic blunder that could hand a propaganda victory to Moscow.

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The issue of potential wartime elections in Ukraine has been raised on numerous occasions since spring 2024 when Zelenskyy’s presidential term officially ended, with Russia frequently referencing the absence of elections in Ukraine as part of efforts to undermine the legitimacy of the current Ukrainian authorities. These Kremlin claims of illegitimacy are inaccurate. The Ukrainian Constitution specifically forbids elections while martial law is in place, which has been the case in Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

This constitutional barrier to wartime elections is not a mere legal loophole or a convenient excuse. It is a foundational safeguard designed to ensure the continuity of governance during times of national crisis. Of course, it is possible to argue that the relevant legislation could be revised. But any attempt to change the Ukrainian Constitution would risk a constitutional crisis in the middle of a major war. It would divert the attention of Ukraine’s parliament, the country’s judicial system, and the public away from the war effort, with obvious potential for political infighting and domestic instability.

The constitutional arguments against a wartime election are convincing, but the main reason why Ukraine cannot go to the polls while the Russian invasion continues is because any such vote would fall far short of recognized democratic standards in terms of freedom, fairness, and representation. A truly democratic election requires a level playing field, security for participants, and the ability for all eligible citizens to cast their ballots. None of these conditions can be met in today’s Ukraine.

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Security problems alone should be enough to rule out the idea of a wartime ballot. With Russia bombing civilian targets across Ukraine on a daily basis, candidates would be unable to stage any public campaign gatherings in safety. Likewise, polling stations would become high-value targets for Russian drones and missiles, creating unacceptable risks for thousands of election workers and millions of voters.

The logistical challenges of a wartime vote would be similarly overwhelming. Millions of Ukrainians are currently located abroad as refugees in the European Union and elsewhere. Millions more are internally displaced inside Ukraine. This creates huge issues for voter registries, which would need to be completely revised and updated. Furthermore, the voices of Ukrainian citizens living under Russian occupation would be silenced entirely, disenfranchising a large portion of the overall electorate and further undermining the credibility of any vote.

If Zelenskyy chooses to proceed with a wartime election, the potential for domestic political destabilization would be huge. An election held under wartime conditions would inevitably be a flawed process, with millions unable to vote and security restrictions placing limits on meaningful campaigning opportunities. Regardless of the outcome, Russia would seize on these flaws in order to declare the results illegitimate, sow internal discord, and undermine the credibility of the Ukrainian government in the eyes of the international community. The resulting instability could prove a far greater threat to Ukraine’s survival than any perceived democratic deficit.

According to his country’s constitution, Zelenskyy is the legally elected leader of Ukraine and will remain so until conditions in the country allow for the relaxation of martial law restrictions and the organization of genuinely free and fair elections. This will only become possible once a comprehensive and verifiable ceasefire is in place. Until the bombs stop falling, the Ukrainian government’s priority must remain the defense of the nation.

Ukrainians are fighting to defend their democracy against Russian authoritarianism, but they are also in no rush to hold a wartime vote. Instead, opinion polls consistently demonstrate that most Ukrainians oppose the idea of any elections while active hostilities continue. When the right moment arrives, Ukrainians will be the first to demand their democratic rights and will insist on new elections. However, they understand that the right moment has not yet arrived.

Yuriy Boyechko is CEO of Hope For Ukraine.

Russia’s insistence on a defenseless Ukraine betrays Putin’s true intentions

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 11 Dec 2025 08:21:08 +0000

As American, Ukrainian, and European officials continue to debate potential peace plans among themselves, there remains very little to indicate that Russia is genuinely interested in ending the war. On the contrary, many of the Kremlin’s key demands during negotiations appear tailored to facilitate a continuation of the invasion on more favorable terms.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s territorial claims alone should be enough to set off alarm bells. He insists that in order to secure a ceasefire, Ukraine must first hand over the remaining 10 percent of the Donbas region that his troops have failed to seize since the invasion first began eleven years ago.

As the ruler of what is by far the largest country in the world, Putin has no pressing need for the approximately 6600 square kilometers of Donbas territory still under Ukrainian control. Nor does the region contain any particularly important natural resources or historic sites that could justify its present position at the very heart of the peace process.

Putin’s true motivation is not difficult to discern. The unoccupied portion of the Donbas that he now so openly covets may seem relatively inconspicuous on the map, but it plays host to some of Ukraine’s strongest fortifications. Developed over the past decade, this fortress belt represents a formidable obstacle to Moscow’s invasion.

Analysts estimate that it could take years for Russia to occupy the area by force, and would likely cost the Kremlin hundreds of thousands of additional casualties. Beyond the fortress belt, the way would be open for further sweeping Russian advances into central Ukraine and toward Kyiv itself. This vital role in Ukraine’s overall defense explains why Putin is prepared to reduce his demands elsewhere but remains so eager for Kyiv to hand over this particular territory without a fight.

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Among Moscow’s many demands, the biggest red flag of all is the Kremlin’s determination to demilitarize Ukraine and deprive the country of international allies. Ever since the first round of peace talks during the initial months of the war, Putin has consistently sought to impose restrictions on the size of the Ukrainian military and the categories of weapons the country can possess. While recent drafts envision a Ukrainian army of 600,000 troops, the fact that Russia remains so keen on limiting Ukraine’s ability to defend itself is an unambiguous signal of Putin’s bad intentions.

Likewise, the Kremlin’s bitter opposition to continued international support for Ukraine betrays the reality behind Moscow’s current peace posturing. This extends far beyond Russia’s well-documented objections to Ukrainian membership of NATO. Putin’s negotiators also seek to block future arms supplies to Kyiv and have completely ruled out the possibility of even a symbolic Western troop presence in postwar Ukraine, while demonstrating a deep reluctance to accept anything resembling credible security guarantees.

Attempts to defend Russian objections on security grounds are unconvincing. Putin has debunked his own claims of a NATO security threat to Russia by reacting with obvious indifference to neighboring Finland’s NATO accession in 2022, just months after using the issue as a convenient pretext for the invasion of Ukraine. According to this bizarre Kremlin logic, Ukraine’s slim hopes of joining NATO in the distant future were sufficient grounds to unleash the largest European war since World War II, but Finland’s almost immediate membership of the alliance was “no problem” for Moscow, despite the fact that both countries share long land borders with Russia.

Putin’s refusal to countenance purely defensive commitments from Kyiv’s allies that are clearly designed to safeguard Ukrainian sovereignty is even harder to justify. If the Russian ruler intended to coexist with an independent Ukraine, he would surely recognize the need for international involvement in efforts to reestablish stability in the region. Instead, he has adopted the opposite approach. While Ukraine appeals for security guarantees, Putin seeks to guarantee Ukraine’s insecurity.

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The insincerity of Russia’s current approach to the US-led peace process should come as no surprise. After all, while Putin may be willing to consider a pause in hostilities if it comes on Kremlin-friendly terms, he simply cannot risk a peace deal that secures the continued existence of an independent Ukrainian state. Any settlement based on the present front lines of the war would leave around 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and free to continue along the path toward greater European integration. That is exactly what Putin is fighting to prevent.

The Kremlin dictator has always viewed his war against Ukraine in the broadest of historical contexts as a crusade to reverse the verdict of 1991 and return Russia to its rightful place as a global superpower. Like many of his contemporaries, Putin remains embittered by the Soviet collapse and determined to avenge what he perceives as modern Russia’s humiliating fall from grace. This has fuelled his obsession with independent Ukraine, which he has come to regard as the ultimate symbol of the historical injustice resulting from the breakup of the USSR.

Putin’s increasingly rabid opposition to Ukrainian independence reflects his Cold War experience as a KGB officer in East Germany, where he witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet Empire firsthand. This traumatic experience has helped to convince him that the Ukrainian state-building project now poses an existential threat to Russia itself. If Ukraine is able to consolidate its statehood and emerge as a recognizably European democracy, Putin fears this could serve as a catalyst for the next phase in a Russian imperial retreat that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Over the past two decades, Putin’s determination to undermine Ukrainian statehood has come to dominate his entire reign and has led directly to a new Cold War. From the 2004 Orange Revolution to the 2014 seizure of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of 2022, Ukraine has been at the epicenter of each new milestone in the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West.

Time after time, Putin has demonstrated his readiness to sacrifice all other Russian national interests in his quest to subjugate Ukraine and force the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. He has reversed decades of integration into Western economies, placed Russian society on a wartime footing, and sent hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers to their deaths. It is deeply delusional to think that he is now suddenly ready to abandon all of this and accept the reality of Ukrainian independence in exchange for the marginal gains of a compromise peace.

Putin’s own position during peace talks betrays his complete lack of interest in ending the war. His territorial demands would rob Ukraine of crucial fortifications and set the stage for further Russian advances, while his calls for restrictions on the Ukrainian armed forces and Kyiv’s ability to maintain military ties with the West would leave postwar Ukraine disarmed and defenseless. In isolation, any of these demands would look deeply suspect. Taken together, they represent overwhelming evidence of Putin’s intention to continue the invasion.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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As the bombardment of Kharkiv intensifies, events taking place one hundred kilometers to the east are reshaping the city’s broader security outlook. In recent months, advancing Russian troops have attempted to reoccupy Kupiansk. This strategically important city came under Russian occupation during the initial phase of the full-scale invasion before being liberated during Ukraine’s successful September 2022 counteroffensive. Renewed Russian gains in this direction would further strain Ukraine’s defenses and expand the aerial threat looming over Kharkiv.

As the front line creeps closer to Kharkiv, the main threat remains air strikes. Russian attacks focus on civilian targets including energy infrastructure, apartment blocks, schools, hospitals, and shopping malls. The overall intention is clear: Russia aims to degrade municipal infrastructure, disrupt essential services, and make the city unlivable for its inhabitants.

One of the most shocking attacks in recent months took place on October 22, when Russia carried out a targeted drone strike on a Kharkiv kindergarten. On that occasion, images of firefighters carrying young children from the burning building made global headlines. However, the vast majority of attacks targeting the Kharkiv population do not attract the attention of international audiences.

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Alongside drones, Kharkiv residents must also now contend with extended periods of darkness. In early November, a major Russian bombardment caused the city’s energy supply system to collapse, leaving entire districts without electricity, heating, and light. Local residents have had to adapt to the realities of life without power while navigating the city in the winter gloom. For the Kharkiv population, this has meant returning to familiar blackout routines developed during earlier Russian winter bombing campaigns.

Despite these pressures, Kharkiv continues to function and maintain an air of normality. Everyday life in the city is in many ways defined by a culture of resilience that is both practical and disciplined, reflecting years of adaptation under fire.

Utilities crews repair power lines within hours of each new Russian attack. Municipal workers immediately clear away debris from air strikes and make sure the city remains tidy, even in the most extreme of circumstances. Teachers hold classes in specially constructed underground schools or metro stations. Doctors treat patients behind boarded up windows. Each individual demonstration of resilience is a direct rejection of Russia’s efforts to depopulate Kharkiv.

In order to maintain this remarkable resilience, Kharkiv requires continued international support. Most of all, this means additional air defenses. Supporting Kharkiv is not just a matter of humanitarian assistance. It is a strategic investment in European security.

Today, Kharkiv serves as a vital bastion in eastern Ukraine. The city’s endurance makes it possible to reinforce Ukrainian front line units, bolster the country’s defenses, offer a safe haven to the region’s civilian population, and prevent the war from spreading further west. A secure Kharkiv means a stronger Ukraine and a safer Europe, but this will only be possible with help from the international community.

Maria Avdeeva is a Ukrainian security analyst. The views in this article are her own and are expressed in a personal capacity.

Europe’s choice: Fund Ukraine now or pay a far higher price if Russia wins

Elena Davlikanova, Lesia Orobets — Tue, 09 Dec 2025 20:39:44 +0000

When European leaders convene in Brussels on December 18, continued funding for the Ukrainian war effort will be top of the agenda. However, it remains far from clear whether the European Council meeting will result in a breakthrough. Failure to reach a consensus could have catastrophic consequences for Ukraine and may prove disastrous for the future of European security.

The most realistic financing option currently under consideration is a so-called reparations loan backed by frozen Russian assets. With more than $200 billion of immobilized Russian Central Bank assets currently held in Europe, this loan would be sufficient to bankroll Ukraine’s defense for the coming two years, with Russian reparations set to cover repayments.

European officials are also mulling an alternative format that would involve a joint debt guaranteed by the EU budget. This approach would generate around $100 billion over the coming two years. However, while the reparation loan would place the financial burden on Russia, this approach would introduce new demands on the already overstretched budgets of individual EU member states.

Using frozen Russian funds as security for a major Ukrainian loan would send a message to Moscow about Kyiv’s ability to continue defending itself for years to come. Advocates of the reparations loan see it as a justified move to make Russia pay for the invasion, but the proposal faces obstacles on both sides of the Atlantic.

The Trump administration has reportedly been working behind the scenes to obstruct the reparations loan. US officials argue that the frozen Russian assets should instead become bargaining chips during negotiations with Putin to end the war.

Belgium, which hosts the largest portion of immobilized Russian funds in Europe, remains the main obstacle. The Belgian government has complained that seizing the Russian assets will expose it to legal liabilities that could bankrupt the country. Meanwhile, Belgian Prime Minister Bart de Wever claims that Moscow has “let us know that if the assets are seized, Belgium, and me personally, will feel the effects for eternity.”

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The debate over further funding for Ukraine comes at the precise moment when Russia’s own economic model is showing signs of fragility. Indeed, some forecasts indicate that Putin’s war economy will face mounting challenges in 2026 that could have a major impact on the Kremlin’s ability to continue the invasion. This may be a factor driving Moscow’s determination to block further EU funding for Ukraine.

As Russian military spending reaches new highs, the Kremlin is rapidly burning through strategic reserves. At the same time, revenues from Russia’s economically crucial energy exports have recently fallen to multi-year lows amid mounting sanctions pressures and escalating long-range Ukrainian attacks on oil and gas industry infrastructure across the Russian Federation.

For now, Putin can still afford to pay his military. However, as Russia’s economic outlook worsens, he will have to prioritize the invasion of Ukraine over other state expenditures, while shifting the burden increasingly onto the Russian public. These trends do not imply imminent collapse, but they do expose a vulnerability reminiscent of the late Soviet era that Western governments could exploit in order to push the Russian dictator toward the negotiating table.

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One of the best ways to pressure Putin is by backing Ukraine. Right now, Kyiv faces a massive funding gap for the coming year that could have serious implications for the war. Unless Ukraine can secure tens of billions of dollars in additional financing, it will be extremely difficult to pay for the military, rebuild battered energy infrastructure, and cover basic social expenditures.

Crucially, a lack of Western financial backing for Ukraine will also embolden Russia. Why should Putin consider ending the invasion when Ukraine is running out of money and Kyiv’s Western partners are showing such obvious signs of hesitation?

Europe’s reluctance to pay for Ukraine’s defense is shortsighted, to say the least. If Russia’s invasion succeeds, European governments will soon have to boost defense spending to levels that would dwarf the current cost of backing Ukraine.

A recent New York Post article highlighted the sheer scale of the likely price tag for Europe if Russia achieves victory in Ukraine. Citing research by Scandinavian think tanks, the report predicted that the expense of fortifying Europe’s eastern flank against a triumphant Russia would be approximately $1.6 trillion, or more than double the likely figure required to finance the Ukrainian war effort for four more years.

The EU’s reparations loan initiative is lawful, financially sound, and strategically necessary. By hesitating now, Western leaders risk repeating the same mistakes that shaped earlier phases of Russia’s invasion, when delayed decisions and piecemeal support only served to embolden the Kremlin and prolong the war. If European leaders are unable to act decisively on December 18, Putin will toast another strategic victory and the cost of stopping Russia will rise even further.

Elena Davlikanova is a senior fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis and Sahaidachny Security Center. Lesia Orobets is the founder of the Price of Freedom air defense initiative and a former member of the Ukrainian parliament.

Industrial control systems were not designed for modern cyber warfare. The systems that operate electrical substations, power distribution logistics, and grid balancing typically prioritize availability and uptime rather than cyber defense. Russia exploited this structural vulnerability in 2015 and 2016, when Ukraine became the first country in history to suffer a nationwide power outage triggered by a cyberattack.

The same attacks that exposed digital fragility also revealed Ukraine’s greatest source of strength: Analog resilience. Even as digital control systems were compromised, engineers were able to manually isolate impacted grid segments, reroute power, and restore transmission through mechanical overrides and localized network segmentation.

The lessons are clear. While digital modernization delivers efficiency, full digital dependency creates systemic brittleness. Meanwhile, resilience can be enhanced through layered systems that incorporate manual fallbacks, localized control, and the ability to physically outmaneuver a digital attack. And while the ability to manually connect electricity to an electrical substation was not by design, the lack of digitalization at the time of the attacks proved to be an advantage in terms of service restoration speed.

The global takeaway from Ukraine’s grid defense is not a rejection of modernization; it is a rejection of exclusively digital modernization. True resilience requires hybrid architectures in which digital innovation is paired with analog redundancy, segmented control, and last resort options when networks are taken down.

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If the Ukrainian power grid demonstrated the value of technical redundancy, Ukraine’s banking sector has shown the value of institutional autonomy. The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) has emerged since the onset of Russian aggression as one of the most effective national actors in defending and sustaining critical infrastructure under attack. This has not only been due to advanced cybersecurity measures, but also thanks to operational freedom to act in line with the pace of the threat environment. The NBU has rapidly introduced mandatory security protocols, created a dedicated incident response unit, synchronized directly with law enforcement, and deployed real-time regulatory updates to address emerging vulnerabilities.

This capacity for decisiveness has helped ensure continuity in one of the country’s most essential sectors. Even under sustained digital attack, Ukrainians could still access their bank accounts, make electronic payments, and rely on national financial infrastructure without systemic interruption.

The most innovative aspect of this resilience came in the form of the Power Banking Initiative, a nationwide network of bank branches retrofitted for operational continuity during extended outages. Equipped with alternative energy sources, satellite communications, secure cash storage, and offline transaction capacities, these branches ensured uninterrupted access to currency, transfers, and basic banking services during power blackouts and infrastructure disruptions.

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Ukraine’s experience confirms that the boundary between cyberattacks and conventional warfare is often blurred. In many cases, the two elements are sequenced, synchronized, and structurally interdependent. Cyber operations can blind infrastructure sensors, disrupt communications, compromise operational decision-making, and erode trust in essential systems, often in direct coordination with physical strikes.

Resilience does not depend on preventing breaches, but on the ability to sustain essential services when breaches succeed. This requires a hybrid framework that integrates digital security, infrastructure continuity planning, and decentralized operational responses.

Alignment with EU and NATO standards will accelerate interoperability with allied infrastructure defense systems and enable long-term investment security. Compliance must move beyond voluntary adoption to formal certification, standardized auditing, and enforceable resilience benchmarks for infrastructure operators.

Ukraine’s national bank has shown the importance of sector-specific response units. This model should expand to the energy, telecommunications, transportation, healthcare, and regional government systems. In order to be effective, response units require independent monitoring authority, 24/7 threat detection, digital forensics, and integration into NATO and EU cyber fusion hubs.

Infrastructure resilience also demands institutionalized public-private intelligence sharing. A legally protected, mandatory, real-time intelligence exchange will shorten detection timelines and prevent cascading failures. Critical infrastructure owners must integrate into national security information-sharing with liability protections, rapid alert systems, and reciprocal intelligence flows.

Looking ahead, a national resilience investment fund should pool Ukrainian government resources, EU support, World Bank guarantees, EBRD/EIB financing, and private capital to enable infrastructure segmentation, micro-grid deployment, backup power systems, secure cloud environments, and hardened data centers. However, none of these technical investments will succeed without sufficient human capital. Ukraine should aim to develop a minimum of 10,000 new security specialists through university partnerships, military-civilian pipelines, veteran reskilling programs, and national cyber reserves.

Today, Ukraine possesses infrastructure resilience tested continuously under real cyber-kinetic attack. This unique experience should form the basis of international efforts to enhance critical infrastructure resilience. Ukraine can lead an international training center, host multinational resilience exercises, publish attack anatomy case files, and shape new NATO and EU doctrine. This would allow Kyiv to position itself not only as a defender, but as an architect of resilient infrastructure strategy.

Dr. Oleksandr Bakalinskyi is a Senior Researcher at the G. E. Pukhov Institute for Modeling in Energy Engineering at the National Academy of Sciences in Ukraine. Maggie McDonough is the Senior Vice President and Chief Innovation Officer at the Baltimore Development Corporation. She was previously affiliated with the Purdue Applied Research Institute (PARI) and Purdue’s Center for Education & Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS), where she served as a technical advisor on global cyber security resilience programming.

Ukraine’s warning to the West: A bad peace will lead to a bigger war

Myroslava Gongadze — Thu, 04 Dec 2025 22:04:35 +0000

Almost every night last week, I woke up in Kyiv to the piercing sound of air raid sirens. Like countless other Ukrainians, I scrambled out of bed, grabbed a few essentials, and headed down to the bomb shelter.

Not everyone follows this routine. Some people, tired of the nightly bombardments, choose to sleep through air raid alarms, even if that means risking potential death. Many others, including the elderly and those with physical impediments, are unable to make their way downstairs every time the sirens sound. Each new Russian attack is a reminder of how precarious life has become in wartime Ukraine.

While civilians struggle to maintain a sense of normality, the reality on the front lines could hardly be more dramatic. Ukrainian troops are overstretched and desperately short of reinforcements, ammunition, and equipment. Inch by inch, the Russian army continues to grind forward, testing each vulnerability and exploiting every weakness.

Despite these incredible challenges, the Ukrainian military continues to adapt and innovate as it seeks to hold the line with new tools and evolving strategies. The will to resist remains unbroken, but the toll this struggle exacts on soldiers, their families, and the entire Ukrainian nation often feels unbearable.

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As Ukrainians fight for national survival on the battlefield, another struggle is also playing out against domestic corruption. Ukraine’s efforts to move toward a more accountable and democratic system of government are a key cause of Moscow’s escalating aggression, with Putin viewing Ukrainian democracy as an existential threat to Russian authoritarianism. Ukrainians understand that battling corruption is just as vital in this war as resisting Russia on the battlefield.

Ukrainian society has been attempting to combat corruption for decades. Exactly twenty-five years ago, the Kuchmagate scandal rocked Ukraine. This implicated then-president Leonid Kuchma in the murder of my husband Georgiy Gongadze, a prominent investigative journalist and the founder of the Ukrainska Pravda news site. On that occasion, the pathway to the truth began with a lone whistleblower from the presidential security team, who took huge risks to expose what he saw as grave misconduct.

A quarter of a century later, there are strong indications that Ukraine is making progress in the fight against corruption. In late November, one of Ukraine’s most powerful men, presidential administration head Andriy Yermak, resigned following a search of his home by the country’s anti-corruption authorities amid a rapidly unfolding scandal involving figures close to the very highest levels of power.

Once again, Ukrainska Pravda journalists were instrumental in breaking the story, but the differences between then and now are also striking. Back when my husband was murdered, there were no institutional checks in place and no raids on the homes of senior officials. Today, Ukraine has built institutions capable of pushing back and producing results.

Clearly, the ghosts of corruption still haunt Ukraine’s corridors of power, but impunity is giving way to accountability. This is exactly the transformation that many Ukrainians are fighting for, and one of the main reasons why Ukraine scares Putin so much.

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After nearly four years of full-scale war, most Ukrainians want peace, but they also realize that peace will only be possible if accompanied by justice and security. For a generation, Ukrainians have fought for these goals. They know that simply stopping the shooting will not bring real peace, and are committed to ending the war in a way that will last.

From Kyiv to Lviv, I hear the same message from people who desperately want the war to be over but understand that a rushed peace could have disastrous consequences. “We have sheltered too long in the dark to accept a peace that isn’t just,” one woman commented. “Our sons and daughters are not only fighting to defend our land, but for the justice that must come after,” a taxi driver told me.

The world needs to understand that Russia’s invasion is already reshaping global security. Putin is not just seizing Ukrainian territory; he is trying to erase Ukraine as a nation and erode the entire international order. If the world lets this happen, a much larger war will no longer be a distant risk. It will become inevitable.

There is now a clear danger that Western leaders will support a hurried and unfair peace deal. This would send a dangerous message that aggression pays. Autocrats around the world would draw the obvious conclusion that they can change borders by force. This would undermine the foundational principles of international relations established in the post-World War II era. Europe cannot afford to set such a precedent.

With the Russian invasion entering a critical phase and Moscow’s hybrid war spreading across Europe, the time to act is now. Ukraine’s defense is Europe’s defense. The West must increase support and stop Putin before he goes even further. It is delusional to think that sacrificing Ukraine will satisfy Russia. Instead, a bad peace will only lead to a bigger war. The price of hesitation will be far higher than the cost of action.

Myroslava Gongadze is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior fellow at Friends of Europe.

At the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector represented an important asset that the authorities in Kyiv were quick to mobilize. This tech prowess helped cement the country’s strategic focus on drones, which could be designed and produced domestically to compensate for a lack of more conventional weapons.

Since 2022, the number of Ukrainian companies developing drones has skyrocketed, while annual output has risen to millions of units. This has allowed Ukraine to establish a “drone wall” along the front lines of the conflict, making any buildup of enemy forces extremely challenging. Over the past year, around three-quarters of all Russian casualties have been as a result of Ukrainian drones.

At sea, Ukraine has used drones to sink multiple warships and break the Russian navy’s Black Sea blockade, forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his remaining fleet from Russian-occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s growing drone capabilities have also made it possible to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia with an escalating campaign of deep strikes on military and industrial targets across the Russian Federation.

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Russia has responded to Kyiv’s groundbreaking use of drone warfare by studying Ukrainian tactics and technologies, while also dramatically expanding its own domestic drone manufacturing base. The Kremlin has been aided in this by allies including China and Iran, who have provided vital components along with the blueprints for key drone designs.

The Kremlin strategy has focused on mass producing a limited range of models for use on the battlefield and in the bombardment of Ukrainian cities. This methodical approach has paid dividends. By the end of 2024, it was already becoming clear that the drone war was turning in Russia’s favor. This trend has only intensified over the past year.

One of Russia’s most important innovations has been the widespread use of fiber-optic drones. These drones are controlled by a wire connected directly to the operator, making them immune to jamming technologies and extremely difficult to intercept.

Russian commanders first began using large quantities of fiber-optic drones during fighting in late 2024 to push Ukrainian troops out of Russia’s Kursk region. The drones proved highly effective at disrupting Ukrainian logistics by targeting supply vehicles. This was widely seen as a crucial factor behind the success of the operation.

Russia has now replicated and scaled up these tactics throughout southern and eastern Ukraine, creating a drone wall of its own while reaching deeper and deeper into Ukrainian-controlled territory. Fiber-optic drones are being used to ambush supply vehicles far behind the front lines, forcing Ukraine to become increasingly reliant on ground robotics to supply combat units and evacuate the wounded.

In addition to striking Ukrainian logistics, Russian drone forces are also prioritising attacks on their Ukrainian counterparts, forcing Ukrainian drone crews to pull further back from the line of contact to ensure safety. This distance gives Russian operators room to move their own teams forward, increasing their ability to dominate the battlefield.

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Russia’s Rubicon drone unit has emerged during 2025 as a prominent symbol of the Kremlin’s rapidly evolving and increasingly effective drone warfare strategy. Highly trained and well funded Rubicon teams are leading the campaign to cut Ukraine’s supply lines and widen the kill zone.

Crucially, Rubicon pilots pass their experience on to newcomers and provide extensive training that is helping to improve the effectiveness of other Russian army drone units. According to Ukrainian drone commander Yurii Fedorenko, Rubicon can rapidly scale up drone units using manpower and financial advantages that Ukraine cannot replicate.

In the drone war between Russia and Ukraine, the Kremlin is betting on mass and hoping that a combination of smart choices, specialised production, extensive training, and sheer numbers will eventually overwhelm Ukraine’s technological edge. In contrast, Kyiv continues to rely on a highly decentralised ecosystem of volunteer groups, startups, and military workshops producing a wide variety of different drone models. This diversity helps to drive innovation but also creates coordination challenges.

The current effectiveness of Russia’s drone units does not mean the drone war has shifted decisively in Moscow’s favor, but recent trends do expose a gap that Ukraine must urgently close. In order to counter Russia’s increasingly centralised and well-resourced drone formations, Kyiv needs to adopt key elements of the Rubicon model. This means scaling up training pipelines, sharing front line experience more systematically, and ensuring Ukrainian drone units have all the resources they need to hunt down Russian operators and regain the initiative.

Since 2022, the Russian military has been widely mocked for its primitive “human wave” tactics and generally poor performance in Ukraine. However, the progress made by Russia in drone warfare indicates an army that is fully capable of learning, adapting, and innovating. Moscow has not been able to achieve any major technological breakthroughs, but Russian military strategists have significantly strengthened their country’s position by concentrating on scale, training, and relentless battlefield experimentation.

This progress should be a major wake-up call for European leaders. Small numbers of suspected Russian drones are already causing chaos and disruption across Europe. The longer the war in Ukraine lasts, the more advanced Russia’s drone capabilities will become.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Returning Ukraine’s abducted children should be central to any peace plan

Kristina Hook — Wed, 03 Dec 2025 21:30:17 +0000

This week, the US Senate is holding a landmark Congressional hearing on Russia’s mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Most will understandably frame the issue as a grave human rights crisis, but it is also much more. Rescuing Ukraine’s abducted children can help pave the way for peace, while allowing Russia’s crimes to go unpunished would set a disastrous precedent for global security.

Russia’s systematic removal, indoctrination, and militarization of Ukrainian children goes to the heart of the broader security dilemma that must be resolved before the war in Ukraine can end. Any credible conversation about peace negotiations or security guarantees for Ukraine must begin with a demonstration that the United States and its allies can meaningfully influence Russian behavior. Ensuring the safe return of these children is a concrete way to do that.

The scale of the crime is staggering. Ukrainian authorities have verified 19,456 children taken to Russian or Russian-occupied territories, while independent experts estimate the actual number of victims may exceed 35,000.

What is indisputable is that Russia’s mass deportations are now among the best-documented crimes of modern warfare. Among numerous other investigations, the Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab identified at least 210 facilities inside Russia or Russian-occupied territory where deported Ukrainian children have been sent for “re-education,” forced assimilation, and in many places, military-style training.

The evidence is overwhelming and includes coerced relocations, illegal adoptions and naturalization under Russian citizenship, ideological indoctrination aimed at erasing Ukrainian identity, and numerous violations of international law. This is not incidental collateral damage. It is a deliberate state policy of population transfer and Ukrainian national identity destruction; a Russian program that mirrors the legal definitions of numerous atrocity crimes, including genocide.

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So far, it has only been possible to rescue a small fraction of abducted children. As of November 2025, 1,859 children have returned to Ukraine, while international experts estimate that 90 percent of the burden of rescue currently falls to Ukrainians themselves.

Moscow’s refusal to facilitate repatriation and its ongoing efforts to conceal identities and locations underscores the impossibility of any stable post-war order without addressing this crime. Humanitarian language alone obscures a critical truth: The forced transfer of children is not a peripheral human rights issue; it is a central obstacle to any credible security settlement in Europe.

For months, United States and European officials have been exploring frameworks for eventual peace talks with Russia and long-term security guarantees for Ukraine. But these conversations often treat Russian atrocities, including child deportations, as adjacent to the real business of hard security. This is a mistake.

Russia’s abduction of children is a window into its strategic intent. The Kremlin campaign to kidnap young Ukrainians and turn them into Russians reveals that Moscow’s war is not merely about territory but about imperial restoration. If Vladimir Putin only sought to adjust borders, the millions spent on relocating, indoctrinating, and militarizing thousands of Ukrainian children would make little sense.

Putin’s ominous intent becomes clearer when viewed alongside Russia’s broader atrocities. The Russian ruler clearly seeks to diminish the demographic future of an entire neighboring nation, while preparing the next generation for future Russian military aggression.

The issue of abducted Ukrainian children is especially relevant for Ukrainians as they debate painful political compromises, territorial concessions, and security guarantees premised on Western assurances. If world leaders cannot secure the return of the most vulnerable victims of Russia’s aggression, how could Ukrainians trust that those same leaders can prevent Russia from reigniting the war or committing new atrocities?

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Western policymakers insist that any post-war settlement must include credible enforcement mechanisms. But credibility is not defined by rhetoric; it is a matter of capability and political will. Right now, both are in question.

If the United States, with its immense military, diplomatic, and economic power, cannot compel Russia to return thousands of abducted Ukrainian children, it becomes harder to argue that Washington can deter further aggression or prevent violations of a future peace agreement. Ukrainians understand this reality well.

Demonstrating US leverage over Russia is therefore not merely symbolic. It is a strategic prerequisite to any durable peace. The United States has untapped tools at its disposal. These include sanctioning individuals and institutions directly involved in the abduction of Ukrainian children, while supporting multilateral accountability efforts. It should be also possible to condition further diplomatic engagement on verifiable steps toward repatriation. Meanwhile, the United States could lead a coordinated information effort to identify children and counter Russian concealment tactics.

These measures are proportional responses to atrocity crimes recognized under international law. The forcible transfer of children is a premeditated crime designed to shatter Ukraine’s future. A successful effort to bring Ukrainian children home will demonstrate that the United States can influence Russian behavior. This is a critical condition for any effective peace initiative.

Securing the return of abducted children would also help to build the trust needed for Ukrainian society to accept Western-backed security frameworks. After many failed efforts to constrain Russian aggression, Ukrainian society needs to know that Western promises are not empty.

Ignoring the issue, or relegating it to the humanitarian margins, undermines the very negotiations that the Trump administration is seeking to advance. Ending the war requires Ukrainian faith in international guarantees.

Child abduction is among the clearest moral red lines in global conflict. Failure to uphold this red line in Ukraine will invite repetition elsewhere. If Russia can abduct tens of thousands of children with impunity during a major European war and face no real consequences, then no norms protecting children in conflict can hold anywhere.

This week’s hearing marks an opportunity for Congress, the Trump administration, and Ukraine’s other partners to clarify that returning abducted Ukrainian children is not optional, negotiable, or separate from security discussions. It is central.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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One of the most striking provisions in US President Donald Trump’s recently unveiled 28-point Ukraine peace plan was a full amnesty for all parties for their actions during the war in Ukraine and an agreement not to make any claims or consider any complaints in future. While Trump’s initial plan has already been subject to multiple revisions, the idea of a blanket amnesty has sparked alarm and outrage among Ukrainians, with critics viewing it as a move to pardon all Russians responsible for war crimes in Ukraine.

The Trump peace plan first emerged just days after a Russian missile strike on a residential building in Ternopil that killed more than thirty people including seven children. Many Ukrainians recalled this attack following the publication of Trump’s plan, noting that it served to highlight the injustice of offering an amnesty for the vast quantity of crimes committed since the start of the full-scale invasion almost four years ago.

Some have also pointed out that failure to prosecute war crimes in Ukraine could have disastrous implications for the future of global security. “It would ruin international law and create a precedent that would encourage other authoritarian leaders to think that you can invade a country, kill people and erase their identity, and you will be rewarded with new territories,” commented Ukrainian Nobel prize winner Oleksandra Matviichuk.

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Addressing Russian war crimes in Ukraine is not only a matter of providing justice for victims. It is also essential in order to prevent further Kremlin aggression. While the legitimacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal continues to provoke discussion, few would argue that it provided important lessons for Germany and sent an unambiguous message that international aggression ends in defeat and accountability.

Russian society has never experienced anything comparable to Nuremberg. They was no accountability for the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968, or the invasion of Afghanistan. Since the fall of the USSR, there have been no systematic investigations into crimes committed during Russia’s Chechen wars, the 2008 invasion of Georgia, or the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

This absence of accountability has fueled a sense of impunity in the Kremlin and throughout Russian society that has been instrumental in creating the political climate for the current attack on Ukraine. Unless addressed, this historically rooted sense of Russian impunity will inevitably fuel further aggression.

Advocates of the US-led peace initiative have suggested that the priority now should be securing peace rather than seeking justice. In reality, however, the two goals are interlinked. It is delusional to think that any future treaty obligations or declarations of non-aggression from Russia’s leaders can be trusted, especially if they are not held to account for the crimes of the past four years.

It is important to recognize that many of the 28 points featured in the United States plan are realistic and could serve as the basis for a viable peace settlement. At the same time, it is also abundantly clear that the proposed amnesty for war crimes will only embolden the Kremlin. If adopted, it would encourage Russia to continue the invasion of Ukraine or escalate elsewhere in the Baltic region, the southern Caucasus, or Central Asia. That is clearly not in the interests of the United States, Europe, or the wider international community.

It is therefore vital to thoroughly investigate all war crimes committed in Ukraine and establish the facts in a manner that challenges Russia’s sense of impunity and allows for the rehabilitation of victims. The Nuremberg Tribunal did not succeed in ending wars of aggression, but it did establish a precedent of legal responsibility. If we now forego this principle of accountability entirely, progress toward a safer world will not be possible.

Ivan Horodyskyy is an associate professor of the School of Public Management at the Ukrainian Catholic University.

The decree, entitled “Russian National Policy Until 2036,” was published on November 25 and is set to come into force in January 2026, Reuters reports. It calls on the Russian authorities in occupied Ukraine to “adopt additional measures to strengthen overall Russian civic identity.” The policy document also praises the invasion of Ukraine for “creating conditions for restoring the unity of the historical territories of the Russian state.”

This bureaucratic language is an attempt to sanitize the Kremlin’s ongoing campaign to erase Ukrainian national identity. Throughout Russian-occupied regions in the south and east of the country, Moscow has instituted a reign of terror against the civilian population while systematically targeting the symbols of Ukrainian statehood, language, heritage, and culture.

Wherever Russian troops advance, local populations are subjected to large-scale arrests, with anyone deemed a potential threat to the occupation authorities likely to disappear into a vast network of camps and prisons. Victims typically include elected officials, journalists, religious leaders, activists, and military veterans. A UN investigation published in spring 2025 found that these detentions constituted a crime against humanity.

Those who remain are pressured to accept Russian citizenship or face being deprived of access to essentials such as healthcare, pensions, and banking services. In line with Kremlin legislation adopted earlier this year, property owners who refuse Russian passports can be evicted from their homes and deported. Meanwhile, schoolchildren are being taught a heavily militarized Kremlin curriculum that demonizes Ukrainians while praising Russian imperialism and glorifying the invasion of their country. Any parents who resist these policies risk losing custody of their children.

The most notorious element of Moscow’s campaign to extinguish Ukrainian identity is the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, around twenty thousand victims are believed to have been taken to Russia and subjected to ideological indoctrination designed to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian identity. In 2023, the International Criminal Court of The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin over his personal involvement in these child abductions.

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Russian policies in occupied Ukraine serve as a chilling blueprint for Putin’s future actions if he is able to establish control over the entire country. Indeed, Russia is already actively seeking to depopulate large parts of Ukraine that remain beyond Moscow’s grasp. In front line areas throughout southern Ukraine, the Russian military has embarked on an unprecedented campaign of targeted drone strikes against the civilian population that has killed hundreds and been branded a “human safari.” A recent United Nations probe concluded that these attacks are war crimes with the goal of making whole towns and cities unlivable.

Likewise, during 2025 Russia has intensified the missile and drone bombardment of Ukraine’s civilian population and the country’s critical infrastructure in an apparent attempt to spark fresh waves of refugees. Due in part to these attacks, Ukrainian civilian casualties rose by 27 percent during the first ten months of the year, according to the United Nations Monitoring Mission in Ukraine.

Putin’s posture during peace talks has raised further fundamental questions over his willingness to coexist with an independent and sovereign Ukraine. Ever since the initial round of negotiations in spring 2022, Russia has consistently demanded the comprehensive demilitarization of Ukraine. This has included calls for strict limits on the size of the Ukrainian army and the categories of weapons the country is allowed to possess, along with a ban on NATO membership or any other form of military cooperation with Western partners.

Russia’s insistence on an internationally isolated and disarmed Ukraine remains at the heart of the current negotiations. This should serve as a massive red flag for anyone who still believes that Putin is ready for peace. The Russian dictator obviously has no intention of abandoning the reconquest of Ukraine and aims to resume the invasion in more favorable circumstances once Ukraine has been stripped of allies and rendered defenseless.

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Putin’s determination to continue the invasion of Ukraine should come as no surprise. While Trump sees the current war as a geopolitical real estate deal, Putin believes he is on an historic mission to reverse the Soviet collapse and revive the Russian Empire. This explains his otherwise inexplicable obsession with ending Ukrainian independence, which Putin has come to view as the ultimate symbol of modern Russia’s humiliating fall from grace.

On the eve of the full-scale invasion, Putin called Ukraine “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” But his desire to extinguish Ukrainian statehood goes far beyond any toxic feelings of shared kinship. For Putin, the consolidation of a democratic, European Ukraine poses an existential threat to authoritarian Russia that could serve as a catalyst for the next stage in an imperial retreat that begin with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Haunted by the people power uprisings that brought down the USSR, he will do almost anything to prevent a repeat.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began with the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Putin’s crusade to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit has come to dominate his reign. In pursuit of this goal, he has sacrificed Russia’s relationship with the democratic world, while also doing untold damage to the country’s economic prosperity and international standing. After everything that has happened, he can hardly now accept a peace deal that leaves 80 percent of Ukraine permanently hostile to Russia and firmly embedded in the West. Putin’s propaganda machine is perhaps the most powerful in the world, but even his most skilled media managers would struggle to spin such an outcome as anything other than a disastrous Russian defeat.

Putin’s latest presidential decree demanding further efforts to create a Ukraine without Ukrainians underlines the absurdity of attempts to find any meaningful middle ground between Moscow and Kyiv. With a compromise peace out of the question, Putin’s plan is to keep fighting while hoping to outlast the West and exhaust Ukraine. He will continue to engage in negotiations with the United States as a tactic to stall further sanctions and divide his enemies, but there is virtually zero chance of Russia voluntarily accepting any deal that guarantees the continued existence of a Ukrainian state.

This does not mean that Putin cannot be forced to end his invasion. But it does mean that current efforts to broker a negotiated settlement are doomed to fail. Putin is convinced that in order to correct the historical injustices of the past three decades and safeguard Russia’s place in the world, he must destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. It is delusional to think that a man committed to criminality on such a grand scale could be swayed by talk of sanctions relief and minor territorial concessions.

Instead, the objective should be to increase the economic and military pressure on Putin until he begins to fear a new Russian collapse in the tradition of 1917 and 1991. This will require the kind of political courage from Ukraine’s partners that has been in short supply since 2022, but it is the only way to secure a sustainable peace in Europe. Putin dreams of taking his place in Russian history alongside Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Joseph Stalin, but he most definitely does not want to share the ignominious fate of Czar Nicholas II and Mikhail Gorbachev.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The proposal drew criticism from a number of congressional Republicans. “Those who think pressuring the victim and appeasing the aggressor will bring peace are kidding themselves,” wrote Senator Mitch McConnell, who likened the plan to “a capitulation like [former US President Joe] Biden’s abandonment of Afghanistan.”

“This so-called ‘peace plan’ has real problems, and I am highly skeptical it will achieve peace,” said Roger Wicker, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

A Wall Street Journal report that Trump would withhold arms sales to Ukraine if Kyiv didn’t accept the proposal by Thanksgiving elicited a rebuke from Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick, who wrote: “Correction: The United States wants Russia’s answer on an unconditional withdrawal of Ukraine by Thursday. This Russian-drafted propaganda must be rejected and disregarded for the unserious nonsense that it is.”

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Comments from US Vice President JD Vance indicate that the White House has received significant pushback from Republicans in Congress over its recent handling of the Russia-Ukraine peace process. “The level of passion over this one issue when your own country has serious problems is bonkers,” he posted on November 24.

Perhaps the biggest challenge to the Trump administration’s position on Ukraine peace talks has come from Fitzpatrick, who filed a discharge petition to force a vote in the House of Representatives on Russia sanctions once a majority of members have signed on. This is the same mechanism used in 2024 to pressure Speaker of the House Mike Johnson to pass a $61 billion aid package for Ukraine.

A more prominent congressional role in Russia-Ukraine peace efforts would mark a departure from recent trends. At present, 2025 is the first year since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion that Congress has not passed any legislation to assist Ukraine. From the US-Ukraine minerals deal to shuttle diplomacy in Istanbul and arms sales to NATO, the White House has made it clear that ending the war in Ukraine is Trump’s portfolio.

This helps to explain why the Sanctioning Russia Act, introduced in April 2025 by Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), has gone nearly eight months without a vote despite pledges of support from 85 percent of senators. Originally written to signal strong congressional support for Russia sanctions, the legislation has since undergone technical changes to improve the effectiveness of the sanctions and gain Trump’s approval, according to congressional staff.

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Fitzpatrick’s initiative could now change things. The discharge petition, which he says would force a vote on a version of the Sanctioning Russia Act and potentially also the Democrat-led Ukraine Support Act, which includes both sanctions and new military support for Kyiv, could mobilize Republicans uneasy with current peace efforts.

After nearly a year of deferring to Trump to manage a peace process, Republican criticism in Congress is growing. “The President’s appeasement plan to Russia is forcing our hand,” commented Rep. Don Bacon (R-NE), who says he considered resigning from Congress in protest over the recently proposed peace plan.

To force a vote, the discharge petition will require majority support from House members. Most Democrats will likely back the move, though some are privately sharing concerns about granting Trump increased authority to levy tariffs, should that provision remain in the final legislation attached to the petition. A handful of Republicans could push it over the line.

Further action to back Ukraine and pressure Russia is likely to find support among Trump’s base. Fresh polling from the right-leaning Vandenberg Coalition found that only 16 percent of Trump voters agree with the proposal that Ukraine should surrender territory to the Kremlin, while 76 percent support sanctioning Russia.

The reality is that without serious additional pressure on Russia, Putin is unlikely to agree to any of the peace frameworks currently being floated. However, if Congress pushes to enact crippling sanctions, extend military assistance to Ukraine, and codify security guarantees, the Trump administration’s peace efforts could finally bear fruit.

The last few days have shown that Congress is eager to help Trump force Russia to end its war in Ukraine. Capitalizing on the revised peace framework agreed by US and Ukrainian negotiators in Switzerland will now require action from both sides of Pennsylvania Avenue.

Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He also serves as deputy director for policy and strategy at Razom for Ukraine, a US-based nonprofit humanitarian aid and advocacy organization.

Every city the Russian military bombs, every child it kidnaps, every Ukrainian life it destroys today can only be understood within the long genealogy of Russia’s imperialistic state ideology. For centuries, this violent brand of expansionism has been directed at Ukraine.

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The present full-scale invasion of Ukraine will soon pass the four-year mark, but the war did not begin in 2022. It was preceded by eight years of warfare in eastern Ukraine following Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea. This has been recognized by the European Court of Human Rights, which has ruled that Russia has been conducting sustained military operations in Ukraine since at least 2014. But even this is only the most recent chapter in a far older story.

During the eras of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the authorities consistently pursued policies aimed at dismantling Ukrainian identity. Tactics included banning the Ukrainian language, repressing cultural and religious leaders, and imprisoning advocates of Ukrainian independence.

Most devastatingly, Stalin and his regime engineered an artificial famine in the 1930s that killed at least four million Ukrainians in less than two years. Today, this deliberate mass starvation of Ukrainians is known as the Holodomor (“killing by hunger”). No outlier, the Holodomor was central to a broader Soviet campaign aimed at breaking Ukrainian resistance and other assertions of political autonomy. The lawyer who coined the term “genocide,” Raphael Lemkin, identified this attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation as the “classic example” of Soviet genocide.

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What unites these episodes is not only the violence itself but the ideology behind it. Moscow’s long history of crimes in Ukraine reflects an imperial worldview that treats human beings as resources to be harnessed for the state and as obstacles to be eliminated in the pursuit of total domination.

This ideology has evolved over time, but its core logic has remained remarkably consistent. Crucially, it has never faced sustained, meaningful repudiation by the international community. Because it was never confronted, Russia’s imperial ideology has been allowed to regenerate. A clear line of impunity links Stalin’s starvation of Ukrainian society in the 1930s to today’s Kremlin rhetoric insisting Ukraine is not a real nation at all.

This continuity is not abstract; it directly shapes present-day atrocities. When a state views humans as raw material for empire, the kidnapping and forced Russification of thousands of Ukrainian children becomes an acceptable instrument of policy rather than an aberration. This logic also applies to other aspects of the current invasion including filtration camps, torture chambers, rape and sexual violence, and mass deportations, along with the systematic destruction of Ukrainian cultural and religious life throughout every area under Russian control.

Ukraine’s top prosecutor notes that the number of open war crimes investigations has reached 178,391 documented cases. Indicating deliberate Kremlin policy, the former US ambassador-at-large for global criminal justice recently stated that Russian atrocities in Ukraine are “systematic” and have been identified “literally everywhere that Russia’s troops have been deployed.”

The current actions of Putin’s occupation forces in Ukraine are the same state practices that have long defined Russian imperial rule: Absorb what can be absorbed, erase what cannot, and turn the conquered into fuel for the next stage of expansion.

Russia’s genocidal intent is not limited to eliminating Ukrainian identity. Putin’s extreme ideology drives him to pursue the incorporation of Ukrainians into Russia’s war machine against the West. The danger is not only the destruction of Ukraine as a nation, but the possibility that Russia will assimilate as much of Ukraine’s territory, cutting-edge technology, and population as it can before continuing further.

Contemporary Russian rhetoric makes this explicit. Strikingly, the Putin era has witnessed the resurgence of the slogan “We can do it again.” Originally graffiti scrawled on the Reichstag by Red Army soldiers in 1945, the popularity of this phrase surged after Russia’s 2014 occupation of Crimea to become a menacing mantra of modern Russian nationalism that signals a society intent on conquest and domination.

The atrocities we are witnessing today in Ukraine reflect centuries of Russian impunity. Impunity not only allows perpetrators to continue; it invites them to escalate. Russia’s imperial ideology has never been confronted with the kind of accountability needed to dismantle it. As long as this ideology persists unchallenged, the threat will not stop at Ukraine’s borders.

The international community now finds itself confronted with the consequences of a genocidal worldview that has been left intact for generations. The urgent question is not only how to halt Russia’s genocidal actions against Ukrainians today, but how to ensure that the world finally repudiates the extremist ideology that made this war possible. Without that repudiation, millions of Russians will remain convinced that they can, in fact, “do it again.”

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

While recent US sanctions on two Russian energy giants mark an important step forward in efforts to pressure Putin, their immediate impact is limited as China and India are unlikely to stop buying Russian oil. Moreover, sanctions alone will not force Putin to abandon an invasion that he regards as central to his entire reign.

The coming fourth winter of the war will arguably be Ukraine’s most arduous since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Ukraine faces a constant barrage of Russian missiles and drones, along with a persistently worsening economic outlook and acute manpower crisis on the front lines. Russian President Vladimir Putin is confident that he can wear down Ukrainian military and civilian resistance, and is also counting on Western support to dwindle.

The war is now as much a test of economic endurance as it is a military struggle. The United States and Europe should be under no illusions that Putin is unlikely to compromise on Ukraine unless he is forced to accept that continuing the war will be prohibitively costly.

The Kremlin dictator’s intransigence was underscored by a recent US intelligence assessment stating that he is more determined than ever to prevail. This makes it even more important to underline the West’s own unwavering determination to continue supporting Ukraine economically as well as militarily.

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To effectively support Ukraine, Washington and Brussels need to move beyond short-term crisis responses and embrace a longer term strategy. The goal should be to help Ukraine strengthen its wartime economy and put the country in a position to continue military operations throughout 2026 and beyond.

The most pressing issue is removing obstacles to the use of immobilized Russian assets. Before the end of 2025, EU leaders must resolve internal disagreements that are currently preventing Europe from utilizing these frozen assets to cover large gaps in Ukraine’s budget for the coming year.

Plans for a $160 billion reparations loan have so far been blocked by Belgium over concerns of retaliatory Russian lawsuits and other potential Kremlin countermeasures. In order to minimize the threat, Belgium wants all EU member states to offer political guarantees for the loan. One option is to have Norway step up as guarantor, but Oslo has so far refused to take on that role alone. The United States could use its influence and leverage to offset European concerns. Alternatives to the reparations loan are subpar and would signal a weakening of Western resolve to Moscow.

Any breakthrough on the issue of immobilized Russian assets would set the stage for a proposed “mega deal” that would see Ukraine purchase large quantities of arms from the United States using $90 billion backed by European partners. Washington’s weapons deliveries to Ukraine could also be accelerated by working with Brussels through the EU’s $170 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) funding mechanism. This kind of transatlantic coordination would ensure that Ukraine receives the weapons it so urgently needs while strengthening NATO’s industrial base.

Support for Ukraine’s energy sector will also be vital as Western partners seek to provide Kyiv with greater economic stability. The Kremlin has dramatically expanded domestic drone production over the past year, making it possible to increase the bombardment of Ukraine’s cities and energy infrastructure. This is leading to widespread blackouts that undermine Ukrainian morale while impacting economic activity and military production.

Brussels must do more to persuade EU member states including Romania and Slovakia to lift existing restrictions on gas exports to Ukraine. This would help Kyiv cover energy supply shortfalls. Increased funding is equally crucial. Energy experts currently estimate that it will take $2.5 billion for Ukraine to import enough gas to get through the coming winter heating season. Meanwhile, the US and EU should take steps to encourage investment in Ukraine’s energy security to help repair, replace, and upgrade critical infrastructure.

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As Russia’s full-scale invasion approaches the four-year mark, policymakers in Washington, London, and across the EU must recognize that strengthening Ukraine’s wartime economy is a top strategic priority. Ukraine’s economic resilience will shape the outcome of the war and help determine European security for decades to come.

Funding Ukraine is expensive, but the arguments in favor of such an investment are convincing. After all, the cost of supporting the Ukrainian economy today would be dwarfed by the far higher price Western governments will have to pay in terms of increased defense spending if Putin’s invasion succeeds.

At present, there is little reason to believe a just and lasting peace is close. Ukraine is suffering on the battlefield, while the credibility of the country’s leadership has been seriously undermined by the largest domestic corruption scandal of the wartime period. Nevertheless, the public mood across Ukraine remains defiant and determined. In Russia, Western sanctions and Ukrainian airstrikes are causing real pain for Putin’s wartime economy, but his fixation on establishing political control over Ukraine far outweighs his need to address these mounting costs.

The United States and Europe must adopt a long-term perspective to effectively counter Moscow’s maximalist aims. Current efforts to broker a hasty peace deal risk emboldening Putin, sacrificing Ukrainian sovereignty, and compromising European security. Instead, Western leaders should send a clear message to the Kremlin that their own resolve is as strong as ever. Taking steps to strengthen Ukraine’s economic resilience would certainly underline this message, and could help to convince Putin that his hopes of outlasting the West are futile.

Zahar Hryniv is a Young Global Professional at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

While Zelenskyy is understandably eager not to alienate Trump, there is little optimism in Kyiv or across Europe that this latest US initiative can end the continent’s largest invasion since World War II. Multiple similar attempts to secure a settlement by offering the Kremlin generous terms have already been made without success.

This approach reflects a fundamental failure to recognize that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not driven by the same straightforward cost-benefit rationality as his Western counterparts. On the contrary, Putin believes he is engaged in an existential struggle to revive Russia’s great power status and secure his own place in history. It is therefore delusional to think that he can be satisfied by promises of minor territorial concessions or future economic opportunities.

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The disconnect between Moscow and Western capitals over Russia’s war aims has been most immediately apparent during Trump’s attempts to broker a peace agreement. Since February 2025, US-led discussions over a possible negotiated settlement have featured plenty of vague talk about lucrative joint ventures and potential US investments in Russia. Some Trump administration members may have interpreted the prominent role of Putin’s economic envoy Kirill Dmitriev as a positive signal that Moscow is open to such overtures. However, promises of business opportunities have not translated into any meaningful progress toward peace.

Trump has also often given the impression that he views the issue of a territorial settlement between Russia and Ukraine from the perspective of a real estate developer solving a property dispute. The US leader has spoken of the need for “land swaps” and described Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine as “prime territory,” while indicating that the two sides should sit down and agree on new boundaries. This overlooks the awkward but important fact that Putin is not actually fighting for Ukrainian land. He is fighting for Ukraine itself, and will regard the war as lost unless he is able to reassert complete Russian dominance over the whole country.

Another issue that highlights the tendency of Western leaders to project their own logic onto Putin is the topic of Russian military losses. Western officials and media outlets often identify the extremely high Russian casualty figures in Ukraine as a key argument for ending the war, while pointing to Russia’s slow advance as evidence that the invasion has reached a strategic stalemate.

From a Western perspective, this makes perfect sense. But high casualty rates are a traditional feature in the Russian army, which has always relied on mass to win wars. Furthermore, Putin has been careful to make sure his army’s heavy losses in Ukraine do not destabilize the domestic front. Since 2022, the Kremlin has focused recruitment efforts on the poorest provinces of Russia and has enlisted large numbers of inmates from the country’s vast prison network, while also offering extremely attractive financial packages to volunteers. This has helped reduce any social pressures to a minimum, despite the high death toll of the invasion.

Some Western leaders have sought to strike a chord by underlining the damage Putin is doing to Russia’s long-term prospects and his own legacy. Outgoing British MI6 chief Richard Moore offered a good example of this in his September 2025 farewell speech, which highlighted the threats posed by the ongoing invasion of Ukraine to Russia’s economic and demographic outlook. Moore’s logic would certainly have resonated with Western policymakers and electorates, but it meant little to an ageing autocrat guided by imperial delusions and his own distorted reading of history.

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If Western leaders wish to end the war, they must stop trying to implement peace plans that they themselves would find persuasive and accept that Putin’s motivations are altogether different. He sees the invasion of Ukraine as part of a sacred historic mission that will define his reign and determine Russia’s place in the world for decades to come. Extinguishing Ukrainian independence is only one part of this process. Putin ultimately aims to reshape the global order and end what he sees as the period of geopolitical humiliation suffered by Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Most of all, Western policymakers must finally come to grips with the sheer scale of Putin’s imperial ambitions and acknowledge the central role these ambitions play in fueling Russian aggression in Ukraine and beyond. This would be long overdue. Since 2022, Putin has publicly compared himself to Russian Emperor Peter the Great. He frequently claims to be returning historically Russian lands, and has declared that “all Ukraine is ours.”

Attempting to bargain with such a man by appealing to common sense or offering limited concessions is worse than futile; it actually helps convince Putin that his Western opponents are too weak and overindulged to grasp the historical significance of the moment. This makes him more confident than ever that his enemies will ultimately back down and hand him victory in Ukraine.

Instead of trying to appease Russia, Ukraine’s allies must first admit that Putin is playing for the highest possible stakes and has no interest whatsoever in a compromise peace. They must then demonstrate that they have the political will to prevent his twisted imperial fantasies from becoming reality.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Axis of authoritarians poses mounting threat on the global information front

William Dixon, Maksym Beznosiuk — Thu, 20 Nov 2025 20:19:56 +0000

Ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, there has been growing alarm over the support that Moscow is receiving from fellow authoritarian regimes including Iran, North Korea, Belarus, and China. However, while Western officials have publicly raised concerns over material support for the Russian war effort, the issue of cooperation in the information sphere has received less attention.

This is short-sighted. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the critical importance of the information front in modern conflicts. The lessons of the war in Ukraine have not been lost on the Kremlin, which invests vast sums to finance information operations and has repeatedly used disinformation to destabilize its opponents. China is also well aware of the increasing role played by information capabilities and has established a range of powerful tools. This is creating potentially significant challenges for Western policymakers.

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Many Western countries continue to view the issue of information warfare as primarily a matter of fact-checking and debunking fakes. In contrast, there are growing indications that Moscow and Beijing share a vision of the information space as a key element of their power projection and national security strategies.

A recent meeting between Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and his Chinese counterpart Li Qiang signaled deepening cooperation between Moscow and Beijing on the information front. The annual summit held in Hangzhou in early November featured commitments from both sides to partner on media initiatives, countering disinformation, and promoting traditional values.

Moscow already has extensive experience in information operations designed to disrupt and reshape Europe’s political landscape, and is widely regarded as a global pioneer in the use of multimedia information operations to advance foreign policy objectives. Beijing has also faced accusations of playing a role in these activities, which are aimed at exploiting social divisions and boosting polarizing narratives with a view to generating support for anti-establishment political forces throughout the Western world.

While measuring the success of information operations is not an exact science, there is certainly no shortage of evidence to suggest that these tactics are having an impact. Support for far-right political parties is now surging across Europe. While each party has its own individual agenda, these populist political forces tend to share a sympathetic stance toward Russia while enjoying extensive coverage on Kremlin-linked media platforms.

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Perhaps the clearest indication of cooperation between Russia and China in the information arena is the growing Russian state media presence on TikTok. This is alleged to include coordinated campaigns and the use of AI technologies.

Disinformation watchdogs from Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council have accused the Kremlin of using the TikTok platform to conduct information campaigns designed to demoralize Ukrainian society and undermine resistance to Russia’s invasion. Ukrainian officials claim Moscow has employed AI to create videos featuring “ordinary Ukrainians” conveying pessimistic messages.

Russia is also reportedly using Chinese social media platforms to recruit Chinese citizens for the war in Ukraine. The large volume of recruitment adverts across China’s strictly controlled and monitored social media sphere has been interpreted by some as a sign of tacit approval from the authorities in Beijing.

Chinese and Russian information ecosystems appear to be engaging in significant cross-promotion. Kremlin outlets actively promote war-related content on platforms such as China’s Weibo. Meanwhile, Chinese state media and officials amplify key Kremlin narratives blaming the West for the Russian invasion of Ukraine and framing sanctions policies as self-defeating. Both Beijing and Moscow employ similar language to describe the war in Ukraine, which they typically depict as a defensive reaction to the West’s provocative policies.

As information cooperation between Moscow, Beijing, and other authoritarian regimes expands, Western policymakers must recognize that information warfare is now a tier-one national security threat requiring a comprehensive response. This should include signaling that information offensives will be treated as comparable to other violations of sovereignty, with the European Union and NATO working to establish clear diplomatic, legal, and economic red lines in the information domain.

Efforts must be undertaken to defend the information space more effectively by combining the initiatives of individual governments along with civil society. This could draw on a wide range of specific examples, such as Ukraine’s wartime experience and recent elections in Romania and Moldova. Greater accountability for hostile information operations is also crucial. Western governments must be prepared to publicly expose attacks and impose tangible costs.

The authoritarian axis that has taken shape since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is currently setting new standards in terms of coordinated information operations across media platforms. The West’s response must be equally systematic. The tools and frameworks exist; Western governments must now demonstrate the necessary political will.

William Dixon is an associate fellow of the Royal United Service Institute specializing in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategic policy and security analyst with a focus on Ukraine, Russia, European security, and EU-Ukraine cooperation.

Vladimir Putin fears entering Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 18 Nov 2025 21:47:02 +0000

The invasion unleashed by Vladimir Putin almost four years ago has often been called unprovoked, but nobody can say it was entirely unexpected. On the contrary, the full-scale invasion of 2022 was merely the latest and most extreme stage in a prolonged campaign of escalating Russian aggression aimed at preventing Ukraine from leaving the Kremlin orbit and resuming its place among the European community of nations.

During the early years of Putin’s reign, this campaign had focused primarily on massive interference in Ukrainian domestic affairs. Following Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity, the Russian dictator opted for a far more forceful combination of military and political intervention. When even this descent into open aggression failed to derail Kyiv’s westward trajectory, Putin sought to solve Russia’s Ukraine problem once and for all by launching the largest European invasion since World War II.

As the fifth year of the war looms on the horizon, there is very little to indicate that Putin’s hard line tactics are working. While Russia has managed to occupy around 20 percent of Ukraine, opinion in the remaining 80 percent of the country is now overwhelmingly hostile to Moscow and supportive of closer European ties. For the vast majority of people in Ukraine, the invasions of 2014 and 2022 represent watershed moments that have profoundly impacted their understanding of Ukrainian identity while radically reshaping attitudes toward Russia.

The transformation in Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation is being mirrored by changes taking place domestically as the country’s center of gravity shifts decisively from east to west. For the first decade or so of independence, Ukraine was politically and economically dominated by the industrial east, with major cities including Donetsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia serving as power bases for billionaire oligarch clans who shaped the Ukrainian national narrative and helped maintain high levels of Russian influence across the country. At the time, the comparatively quaint cities of central and western Ukraine lacked the wealth and general wherewithal to compete.

The first indication of a significant change in this dynamic was the 2004 Orange Revolution, which saw an unprecedented nationwide protest movement erupt over an attempt to falsify the country’s presidential election orchestrated by Kremlin-backed political forces rooted firmly in eastern Ukraine. This popular uprising represented a clear and unambiguous rejection of the idea that Ukraine was inextricably bound to Russia. A decade later, the onset of Russian military aggression would turbo-charge modern Ukraine’s historic turn toward the west.

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Since 2014, traditional east Ukrainian bastions of Russian influence such as Donetsk and Luhansk have been occupied by Kremlin forces and effectively cut off from the rest of Ukraine. More recently, the full-scale invasion has left the broader Donbas region devastated and depopulated, while the formerly preeminent metropolises of the east face an uncertain future as fortified front line cities under relentless Russian bombardment.

The situation in western Ukraine is strikingly different. Cities throughout the region are experiencing rapid growth thanks to an influx of families and businesses seeking to relocate away from the war zone. The experience of Lviv since 2022 illustrates this trend. The largest city in western Ukraine, Lviv’s population has expanded by around a quarter since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion to reach approximately one million. The Lviv real estate market has comfortably surpassed the regional capitals of eastern Ukraine and now rivals Kyiv itself. Likewise, Lviv is also second only to the Ukrainian capital in terms of new companies and investments.

Politically and diplomatically, Lviv is clearly in the ascendancy. Many Kyiv embassies partially relocated to the city in 2022 and continue to maintain a presence. Over the past three years, Lviv has hosted a number of high-level international events including presidential summits and gatherings of EU ministers. The rise of Lviv has been so striking that it has sparked rumors of jealousy among the establishment in Kyiv, with some suggesting that the potential reopening of Lviv International Airport has been deliberately sidelined in order to prevent the further eclipse of the Ukrainian capital.

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Whatever happens in the war, the shift in Ukraine’s national center of gravity toward the west of the country is unlikely to be reversed. In addition to the urgent impetus provided by Russia’s ongoing invasion, the emergence of western Ukraine is also being driven by the pull factor of EU integration. Over the past decade, Ukraine has secured visa-free EU travel and been granted official EU candidate status. This is transforming the investment climate in western Ukraine, which shares borders with four EU member states.

Large-scale infrastructure projects are already helping to cement western Ukraine’s status as the country’s most attractive region and gateway to the EU. Work on a 22km European-gauge railway line from the EU border to Uzhhorod was completed earlier this year, while construction of a far more ambitious Euro-gauge line connecting Lviv to the Polish border is scheduled to begin in 2026. As the EU accession process continues to gain momentum, these logistical links will only strengthen.

It remains unclear exactly when Ukraine will become a fully fledged EU member state, but there is a growing sense of confidence throughout the country that the once distant dream of EU membership is now finally within reach. For western Ukraine in particular, joining the European Union will complete the region’s historic journey from imperial outpost on the fringes of the Soviet Empire to economic engine nestled in the heart of the world’s largest single market.

All this is very bad news for Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin dictator’s Ukraine obsession reflects his fear that the consolidation of a democratic, European, and genuinely independent Ukraine could serve as a catalyst for the next phase in the long Russian retreat from empire that began almost four decades ago with the fall of the Berlin Wall. As Putin’s reign has progressed, his determination to prevent Ukraine’s geopolitical defection has only intensified, as has his readiness to sacrifice Russia’s more immediate national interests in pursuit of his anti-Ukrainian crusade. It is now increasingly obvious that his decision to invade Ukraine has backfired spectacularly, eroding centuries of Russian influence while accelerating the European integration he so bitterly opposes.

Unless Putin succeeds in dismantling Ukrainian statehood entirely and erasing the very idea of the Ukrainian nation, he must surely realize that the Ukraine of the postwar period is now destined to establish itself within the wider Western world while remaining implacably hostile to Russia. Rather than acknowledging this disastrous outcome, he will seek to continue the war indefinitely. If he stops now and accepts a compromise peace, Putin knows he will be doomed to enter Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

According to NABU officials, the investigation uncovered a criminal enterprise run by Timur Mindich, a film producer and a former business partner of Zelenskyy. Additional suspects include former Minister of Energy and recently appointed Minister of Justice Herman Halushchenko; former Naftogaz CEO and Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Chernyshov; former Minister of Defense and current National Security and Defense Council member Rustem Umerov; and Ihor Myroniuk, former deputy head of the State Property Fund and former advisor to Halushchenko.

Mindich fled Ukraine the day before his premises were raided and is reportedly now in Israel. Both Chernyshov and Mindich have long had ties with Zelenskyy, who co-founded the latter’s production company in 2003. Thus far, formal charges have been filed against eight of those implicated. Halushchenko has said he would defend himself against the accusations.

The alleged theft took the form of 10-15 percent inflated prices for infrastructure project contracts, which contractors were forced to pay in order to avoid losing their supplier status. The kickback scheme reportedly included security measures for the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant. The Ministry of Energy is suspected of facilitating the scam.

The stolen funds were allegedly laundered through an office linked to fugitive ex-Ukrainian MP and now Russian Senator Andrii Derkach before being extracted from Ukraine. Derkach has been sanctioned since 2021 and was stripped of his Ukrainian citizenship in 2023.

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While the investigation is still underway, the scandal is already proving extremely damaging to Zelenskyy and his entire administration. The alleged involvement of a former Ukrainian MP turned Russian fugitive in the middle of the Kremlin’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine may be the most scandalous aspect of the accusations.

Meanwhile, Zelenskyy’s long contact with many of the accused and their high-level appointments has raised the political stakes for the President. This has led to speculation over whether the scandal could topple Zelenskyy and cost Ukraine the war.

The investigation comes in the wake of a recent standoff between Zelenskyy and his administration with Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. In July 2025, a law proposed by Zelenskyy’s political party was passed by the Ukrainian parliament stripping NABU and other anti-corruption institutions of their independence.

This led to vocal condemnation from Ukraine’s civil society and the international community, including the largest street protests since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Days later, Zelenskyy reconsidered and signed a law that restored and guaranteed the independence of the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

That guarantee has now been tested and proven credible. While the sheer number of criminal investigations and indictments targeting prominent Ukrainian officials has raised concerns about possible political prosecutions by NABU, the apparent success of Operation Midas and its exposure of alleged corruption on the part of some of the most powerful people in Ukraine would seem to confirm the agency’s independence and its efficacy.

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Zelenskyy appears to recognize the dangers of the situation and has begun responding to the crisis. The Cabinet of Ministers is looking at sanctions against Mindich and businessman Oleksandr Tsukerman, who was also implicated in the scandal. The Ukrainian leader has already forced the resignations of Halushchenko and newly appointed Minister of Energy Svitlana Hrynchuk.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko has announced a comprehensive audit of all state-owned companies, especially in the energy and defense sectors. Anastasia Radina, head of the parliament’s anti-corruption committee, has called for a parliamentary inquiry into the transfer of funds to Russia.

These steps are significant but are unlikely to prove adequate. The stakes are extremely high, not just for Zelenskyy’s political future, but for Ukraine’s conduct of the war. European leaders answer to their citizens, many of whom might now be wondering why they are sending massive aid to Ukraine if large sums are being siphoned off by privileged insiders. In the US, while Trump is slowly moving in the right direction with recent sanctions on Russia, there are still influential figures in his orbit who are looking for ways to end all American support for Ukraine’s defense against Kremlin aggression.

This means that Zelenskyy must turn his attention to the crisis energetically. A good next step would be for him to speak up on the issue publicly and strongly, much as he did in the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Zelenskyy might start by acknowledging, as former US President Harry Truman did when he said the buck stops with him, that as President of Ukraine, he is ultimately responsible for failures in his government. He should recognize the magnitude of the scandal and the underlying problem of corruption, while explaining how he intends to take the lead in fixing it. This means bringing to justice, in accordance with the law, all those responsible, no matter who they are and where they are. He can do this by vowing to empower NABU and other relevant state institutions fully.

Zelenskyy could frame the scandal as proof that despite clear progress made by Ukraine in dealing with corruption, much more remains to be done. He could demonstrate his openness by inviting advice from Ukrainian civil society and the country’s international partners. This current crisis has clearly demonstrated the dangers of relying on just a small circle at Bankova to get things done.

Such a speech should not be a one off. It should be the start of a dialogue with the Ukrainian public, much like Zelenskyy’s masterful wartime communications. This dialogue should include regular updates on efforts to bring those responsible for this theft to justice, and news about steps to strengthen state institutions against the scourge of corruption. Zelenskyy has the skills to take this on. Now is the time to do it.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Iakovenko is a small part of a big story about how Ukrainian entrepreneurship is contributing to local economies across the United States. A new report by the ISE Group, a think tank and startup accelerator with offices in Warsaw, Washington DC, and Kyiv, estimates that Ukrainian-American companies generate nearly $60 billion in annual revenue and support about 300,000 US jobs.

The findings are the first attempt to quantify the economic footprint of Ukrainian-American businesses in the US. Researchers mapped and verified 2,270 Ukrainian-American firms across all fifty states and surveyed a network of more than 45,000 diaspora enterprises. Collectively, the report says, these firms bring in around $55 billion in annual sales, pay out roughly $24 billion in wages, and contribute at least $8 billion in federal, state, and local taxes.

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Study lead Alexander Romanishyn said the team defined “Ukrainian-American” based on self-identification by business owners including diaspora firms, relocated companies, immigrant-founded ventures, and joint US–Ukrainian enterprises. “We estimate there are roughly 45,000 Ukrainian-American businesses in the US today, about one-third of which employ staff,” said Romanishyn, a former deputy minister of the economy in Ukraine. “We deliberately took a conservative approach to avoid overstating the diaspora’s economic weight.”

Technology is a particular strength, accounting for around 130,000 people, or nearly half of the total workforce in Ukrainian-American companies. With pockets in the Bay Area, New York, Boston, Austin, Dallas, and Seattle, they specialize in software development, AI and machine learning, and cloud integration. Many maintain teams in both the US and Ukraine, helping sustain both economies.

Beyond tech, Ukrainians run businesses in nearly every industry including consulting, healthcare, logistics, manufacturing, retail, construction, real estate, finance, and agriculture. Their presence is spread across the entire country, with concentrations in California, New York, Illinois, Florida, Texas, and New Jersey.

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While Ukrainian entrepreneurship in the United States dates back to the 1880s, most Ukrainian-American owned businesses have been launched recently, with around 40 percent opening since 2022. Approximately 180,000 Ukrainians have arrived in the US following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, often through humanitarian programs. Most are still finding their footing. In many cases this means opening small, necessity-driven ventures like home bakeries or cleaning services.

The potential for growth is significant. The report cites surveys indicating that many recent Ukrainian refugees have business experience. Projections suggest they could create 18,000–27,000 new enterprises in the next few years. New arrivals face steep barriers such as lack of savings, no US credit history, and complex visa requirements. Community networks have stepped in to help. In Silicon Valley, for example, the Ukrainian Syndicate Club co-invests in startups founded by Ukrainians.

The big picture is that Ukrainians in the US are builders not beneficiaries. Roman Nikitov, General Partner at United Heritage, a Polish–Ukrainian private equity firm that supported the study, put it this way: “The results mirror what we’ve already seen in Europe. Ukrainians are not beggars but builders, active contributors who strengthen every economy they become part of.” In Poland, for example, where more than a million Ukrainian refugees have settled since 2022, 69 percent are now employed and pay more in taxes than they receive in social support.

The Ukrainian Embassy in Washington DC welcomed the report’s findings. “This study highlights a reality often overlooked, that Ukrainian-American founded businesses in the US are driving local growth and job creation while serving as trusted partners for America’s engagement in Ukraine’s recovery,” said Ihor Baranetskyi, Minister-Counsellor for Economic Issues. “They understand both markets and are uniquely positioned to channel US capital and technology into Ukraine’s reconstruction, advancing prosperity and security for both nations.”

Melinda Haring is a senior advisor at Razom for Ukraine and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Ukraine’s drone war lesson for Europe: Technology is nothing without training

David Kirichenko — Tue, 11 Nov 2025 00:47:02 +0000

As Europe races to strengthen its defenses against the mounting threat posed by Russian drones, more and more countries are looking to learn from Ukraine’s experience. Speaking in October, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen acknowledged that Ukraine is currently a world leader in drone warfare and called on her European colleagues to “take all the experiences, all the new technology, all the innovation from Ukraine, and put it into our own rearming.”

It is clear that Europe has much to learn. A spate of suspected Russian drone incursions during the second half of 2025 have highlighted the continent’s vulnerability to drone-based aggression and raised fundamental questions over whether European armies are currently preparing for the wrong kind of war. While Europe’s rearmament efforts continue to gain ground, even big spenders like Poland remain focused primarily on traditional weapons systems. This is fueling concerns that European defense policymakers may not fully appreciate the growing dominance of drones on the battlefields of Ukraine.

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Ukraine’s embrace of drone warfare since 2022 can provide Kyiv’s partners with a wide range of important insights. Following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost four years ago, Ukraine has turned to relatively cheap drone technologies in order to offset Moscow’s often overwhelming advantages in conventional firepower and reduce the country’s dependence on Western weapons supplies. As a result, the number of Ukrainian drone producers has skyrocketed from a handful of companies to hundreds, while overall drone output has shot up to millions of units per year.

Ukraine’s vibrant prewar tech sector has proved a major asset, serving as fertile ground for the dynamic expansion of the country’s defense sector. Meanwhile, Ukrainian initiatives like the government-backed Brave1 defense tech cluster have helped to empower innovators and optimize cooperation between the army, the state, and individual drone producers. In summer 2024, Ukraine became the first country to establish a separate branch of the military dedicated to drones with the launch of the Unmanned Systems Forces.

The results speak for themselves. Drones are now thought to be responsible for up to three-quarters of Russian battlefield casualties, with Ukrainian army units creating a “drone wall” around ten kilometers in depth along the front lines of the war. At sea, Ukraine has used naval drones to break the Russian blockade of the country’s ports and force Putin to withdraw the bulk of his fleet away from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea coast. Kyiv has also deployed an expanding arsenal of long-range drones to strike high-value targets with increasing frequency deep inside Russia.

In addition to these offensive roles, drones have become a vital element in Ukraine’s air defenses. Since 2024, Russia has dramatically increased the production of kamikaze bomber drones, making it possible to launch hundreds of drones at targets across Ukraine in a single night. The sheer scale of these attacks has meant that traditional missile-based air defenses are no longer practical due to the high cost and limited availability of interceptor missiles. Instead, Ukrainian defense companies have focused on developing and producing interceptor drones in large quantities.

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So far, European efforts to learn from Ukraine’s drone warfare experience have concentrated primarily on securing access to the latest Ukrainian drone innovations. This approach certainly makes sense. However, many Ukrainian specialists have stressed that as their European partners look to develop drone capabilities of their own, effective training programs will be just as important as advanced technologies.

Maria Berlinska, who heads Ukraine’s Victory Drones project, has argued that up to 90 percent of success in drone warfare depends on the training of the team behind the drone rather than the technology involved. “A drone on its own, without the coordinated work of the team, delivers nothing,” she commented in an October 2025 article addressing the need for skilled drone crews.

Training an effective drone pilot is a complex task that can take at least three months. Many categories of drone operators must also be able to act as engineers and mechanics with the ability to repair and reconfigure their systems in the field. To help meet this challenge, Ukraine has developed a strong network of volunteer organizations dedicated to training new drone pilots and preparing them for combat operations. By late 2024, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense had certified over thirty training centers for drone operators. Novel innovations include a mobile drone school located inside a converted bus.

Speaking to Euronews in October, Ukrainian drone warfare expert Fedir Serdiuk warned that Europe was currently focusing too much on drone technologies while overlooking the need to train operators and commanders in the effective battlefield use of drones. “I don’t see as many training centers being built as factories. It’s a major mistake. Not only for technical skills but also for tactical skills,” he commented.

Ukraine appears poised to play a central part in the training of Europe’s drone forces. Ukrainian trainers have already reportedly begun sharing their expertise with a number of countries including Britain, Denmark, and Poland. This trend reflects an important eastward shift in Europe’s defense landscape, with Ukraine emerging as a key contributor to the continent’s future security. This contribution will draw heavily on technological innovations developed during the war with Russia, but it will also emphasize the importance of effective training.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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Jolie’s visit struck a chord with the Ukrainian public at a time when concerns are mounting that the country’s fight for national survival is slipping out of the international headlines. With the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion now approaching, Ukrainians are painfully aware that global audiences have become jaded by endless war coverage and are now no longer shocked or even particularly surprised by reports of fresh Russian war crimes. The high-profile actor’s decision to personally visit some of the most dangerous places in Ukraine was therefore welcomed as a particularly timely and meaningful gesture.

Many Ukrainians praised Jolie for exposing herself to considerable risk in cities that few international guests dare to visit. “Much respect and many thanks for your kind heart, Angelina Jolie!” commented the deputy speaker of the Ukrainian parliament Olena Kondratiuk. “Angelina Jolie went to Kherson, where Russian drones hunt civilians daily. That takes courage,” wrote Ukrainian journalist Svitlana Morenets. “I can’t help but praise her selflessness and kindness in choosing to help draw attention to Ukrainian civilians, especially children, suffering from the war.”

Ukrainian human rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk called Jolie “one of Hollywood’s bravest hearts” and expressed her hope that press and social media coverage of the star’s trip could help educate international audiences about “the cynical drone safaris on civilians that the Russians love to do.” Fellow Ukrainian civil society activist Olena Tregub said she had been personally moved by Jolie’s visit and noted that it sent a “powerful message” to the local population that they have not been forgotten.

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Angelina Jolie is not alone in attempting to focus international attention on Russia’s ‘human safari’ tactics in Ukraine. A United Nations probe recently addressed the issue and confirmed that the Russian military is purposely targeting Ukrainian civilians in a coordinated campaign of drone killings with the aim of depopulating large parts of the country. In an October report by the UN Human Rights Council-appointed Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, investigators concluded that Russia’s actions in southern Ukraine amount to the crimes against humanity of “murder and of forcible transfer of population.”

The UN investigation covered Russian drone activity across three provinces of southern Ukraine including the regions visited by Jolie. It found evidence of systematic attacks against civilians including drone strikes on pedestrians, public transport, essential infrastructure, and emergency services workers, leading to the deaths of at least 200 people since July 2024. As a result of this relentless and coordinated bombing campaign, some of the targeted areas are now said to be “almost entirely vacated.” Crucially, the drones used in these attacks all featured video cameras allowing operators to methodically select and track victims, leaving no room for doubt regarding the deliberate nature of the killings.

Russia stands accused of committing a staggering quantity of war crimes in Ukraine, ranging from the destruction of entire towns and cities and the bombing of vital civilian infrastructure, to the mass detention Ukrainian citizens and the torture of prisoners. The International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin on war crimes charges for his personal involvement in the mass abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children, which may qualify as an act of genocide.

So far, there has been little concrete progress toward holding Russia legally accountable for the invasion. Ukraine and the Council of Europe signed an agreement in summer 2025 to establish a special tribunal, but is remains unclear when further steps can be expected. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has signaled that the United States will no longer back international efforts to prosecute Putin. Despite these setbacks, Russia’s ‘human safari’ is worthy of special attention as it provides such conclusive proof of the Kremlin’s intention to kill Ukrainian civilians.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an attempt to shatter the existing international order and rewrite the rules of war. If Western leaders fail to impose additional costs on the Kremlin over the deliberate use of drones to hunt down civilian populations, this will set a potentially disastrous precedent that could soon be extended to the rest of Ukraine and beyond. Angelina Jolie’s efforts to highlight this crime against humanity will not prove decisive, but her celebrity intervention has at least made it more difficult for others to claim they did not know.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The Kremlin dictator is particularly fond of showcasing new weapons with nuclear capabilities. In late October, Putin announced the successful testing of the nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable Burevestnik missile. “This is a unique product that nobody else in the world has,” he commented. Days later, Putin hailed the similarly successful testing of the Poseidon drone, an atomic-powered and nuclear-capable underwater weapon. He trumpeted the Poseidon’s supposedly unmatched capabilities and stated that “there is no way to intercept it.”

It is impossible to independently assess the veracity of Putin’s claims or confirm the effectiveness of his latest alleged “wonder weapons.” Many have noted that neither weapon is entirely new, with the development of both being first announced back in 2018. In reality, the timing of these alleged tests is probably far more significant that the weapons themselves, and reflects Russia’s desire to engage in yet more nuclear saber-rattling.

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Russia’s latest bout of nuclear posturing reveals much about Moscow’s frustration over continued Western support for Ukraine, and is likely a direct response to strong energy sector sanctions imposed in recent weeks by US President Donald Trump. It is a tactic that could eventually backfire on the Kremlin. By threatening to renew nuclear tests and boasting of unstoppable nuclear-capable wonder weapons, Putin risks highlighting Russia’s inability to project strength via more conventional means. In other words, the Kremlin dictator’s increasingly frequent use of nuclear blackmail may actually be a sign of weakness rather than strength.

Like a geopolitical gangster, Putin has come to rely on Mafia-style intimidation tactics as he seeks to reassert Russia’s great power status amid mounting evidence of his country’s steadily eroding military capabilities. Putin’s nuclear threats are at least in part an attempt to distract attention from the lackluster performance of the Russian army in Ukraine. While Russian forces currently hold the battlefield initiative and continue to advance, they have only managed to seize around one percent of Ukrainian territory over the past three years while suffering exceptionally high losses. This underwhelming outcome led Trump to brand Russia a “paper tiger” in September. The insult is believed to have struck a particularly raw nerve with Putin.

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By brandishing his nuclear arsenal on the international stage, Putin aims to menace risk-averse Western leaders and deter them from opposing Russia in Ukraine. He also hopes to underline that victory over Ukraine remains Moscow’s overriding goal. Putin seeks to demonstrate his readiness to prioritize this quest for victory above all other considerations, including the nuclear deterrence system established over decades by Russia and the United States.

So far, Trump has offered a fairly robust reaction to Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling. This has included ordering US nuclear submarines to be moved closer to Russia in response to “provocative statements,” and indicating a readiness to resume nuclear testing “on an equal basis.” The US leader’s stance is a welcome sign that he is no longer easily swayed by Putin’s dramatics and recognizes the dangers of allowing himself to be intimidated.

Other Western leaders should now follow Trump’s example and acknowledge that the only way to bring Putin’s reckless nuclear blackmail to an end is by demonstrating resolve and reviving deterrence. This must include regenerating sufficient European and American conventional forces to deter Russia from attacking its neighbors. In parallel, sanctions on Putin’s war economy should be tightened, while Ukraine must finally be provided with the weapons its needs to defeat Russia’s invasion.

Nobody can afford to to take the risk of nuclear war lightly, of course. Nevertheless, it is unfortunately necessary to remind the Kremlin that Russia is not the only country with a nuclear arsenal. Genuine conventional and nuclear deterrence must be restored to deprive gamblers like Putin of the ability, let alone the desire, to employ nuclear blackmail in order to enable further acts of international aggression. Unless this is achieved, Putin will continue to use nuclear threats as a tool to intimidate his opponents and disguise Russian weakness.

Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Ukraine’s youth exodus highlights mounting demographic challenges

Kateryna Odarchenko, Zoryana Golovata — Thu, 06 Nov 2025 20:26:31 +0000

A large number of young Ukrainian men have left the country in the past two months following an August 2025 decision allowing males aged between eighteen and twenty-two to travel internationally. While there are no exact figures confirming how many men have exited, the exodus has sparked a lively debate within Ukrainian society and added to existing concerns over the deteriorating demographic situation in wartime Ukraine.

With millions of Ukrainians crossing the border in both directions each week, it is difficult to gain a clear sense of the recent surge in young men traveling abroad. Britain’s Daily Telegraph reported in late October that almost one hundred thousand Ukrainian males in the eighteen to twenty-two age bracket had entered Poland during the previous two months. Meanwhile, Germany’s Interior Ministry noted that the number of young Ukrainian men registering in the country had risen tenfold from around one hundred per week to almost a thousand.

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With men younger than twenty-five not currently subject to mobilization by the Ukrainian military, the recent outflow has been primarily felt in the employment sector. Since the relaxation of martial law travel restrictions in August, many labor-intensive industries that have traditionally relied on large numbers of young employees have reported a sharp decline in the workforce.

Ukraine’s low birth rates and high levels of economic migration meant that the country was already experiencing mounting labor shortages prior to 2022. Following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, these demographic challenges have become far more acute, with millions displaced internally or crossing the border into the European Union. A 2024 survey conducted by Ukraine’s European Business Association found that 71 percent of companies were experiencing significant workforce deficits.

Ukrainian companies are responding to these new recruitment realities in a variety of ways. With hundreds of thousands of men now serving in the military, more and more women are being recruited to take on professional roles traditionally occupied by males. In an August 2024 article highlighting this employment trend, the New York Times claimed that the unprecedented wartime influx of women was “reshaping Ukraine’s traditionally male-dominated workforce, which experts say has long been marked by biases inherited from the Soviet Union.”

There has also been increased focus on retraining opportunities and vocational programs as business owners and educational institutions seeks to fill gaps in the workforce. With current shortages most severe in skilled blue collar professions, many of these training initiatives are geared toward producing candidates with the skills to address immediate shortages in strategically important sectors of the economy. According to Ukraine’s State Employment Service, the industries experiencing the largest shortfalls include construction, manufacturing, and transportation.

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In the Ukrainian retail sector, some companies are turning to teenagers and seeking to employ those aged fifteen to seventeen during vacation periods and after school hours. This trend is expected to gain momentum as employers search for practical solutions to staffing shortages. As a result, large numbers of Ukrainian teens may now be set to gain an unprecedented degree of economic independence, with possible knock-on effects for the job market and beyond.

Nobody currently anticipates a wave of returning Ukrainian refugees anytime soon. Instead, Ukrainians living in the EU are now widely recognized as an economic asset for their host countries. Research conducted in summer 2025 for the UN Refugee Agency found that Ukrainian refugees living in Poland generate around 2.7 percent of Polish GDP. “All evidence shows that Ukrainian refugees will continue having a positive economic impact while they remain in Poland, vastly outstripping the cost of any support they received,” the report concluded.

As the wartime Ukrainian diaspora becomes increasingly well established in the European Union, fewer and fewer refugees will seek to relocate back to Ukraine. At the same time, however, many of those living and working abroad continue to maintain strong ties with friends and relatives in their home country. These transnational networks are often led by Ukrainian women. They serve as an informal but importance source of economic support for families separated by the war and those based in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s demographic challenges were present long before Russia’s full-scale invasion, but the outlook has worsened significantly as a result of the war. Addressing these challenges will require coordinated efforts to integrate young Ukrainians into the workforce, mobilize underutilized labor, provide more opportunities for vocational training, and take steps to support return migration. For now, the Ukrainian labor market reflects the harsh realities of the Russian invasion, while also highlighting the resilience, resourcefulness, and ingenuity of the Ukrainian population.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group USA and president of the PolitA Institute for Democracy and Development. Zoryana Golovata is head of the Expert Group on Cognitive Management at the Ukrainian Political Science Association and founder of Women’s Voice in Action, focusing on economic resilience and mental health recovery for women in wartime Ukraine.

Learning the lessons from Ukraine’s fight against Russian cyber warfare

Oleksandr Bakalynskyi, Maggie McDonough — Thu, 06 Nov 2025 19:36:30 +0000

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine is among the most technologically advanced wars the world has ever seen. But while the rapid developments taking place in drone warfare tend to attract most attention, the cyber front of the conflict also offers important lessons for international audiences.

The Russian state and affiliated groups have been refining their cyber warfare tactics in Ukraine ever since the initial onset of Russian aggression in 2014. In January 2022, Ukrainian government sites and other critical elements of the country’s digital infrastructure experienced a series of major cyber attacks in a precursor to the full-scale invasion, which began weeks later.

This escalating cyber war has made Ukraine both a critical source of intelligence on Russia’s evolving cyber capabilities and a front line arena for cyber defense strategies. Cyber operations have become integral to Russia’s campaign of aggression, with cyber attacks and kinetic strikes frequently coordinated. Today’s Russian cyber strategy involves continuous, adaptive, and multi-vector operations encompassing malware, phishing, and disinformation.

Ukraine’s cyber defense is critical to international security and the stability of the global digital environment. As a testing ground for Russian cyber tools, Ukraine faces attacks that, once refined, can be directed against allied governments, critical infrastructure, and private sector entities. The question is not whether such attacks will occur, but when this will happen, how costly these attacks will be, and how quickly recovery can be achieved.

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Unlike conventional warfare, cyberspace has no borders. A criminal or adversary can strike targets in Kyiv, Washington, or New York with equal ease. Sustained collaboration between Ukrainian, United States, and allied cyber specialists is therefore critical, especially given the escalating cyber threat posed by China, North Korea, Iran, Belarus, and their state-backed proxy groups.

Despite the growing threat, institutional capabilities for a coordinated response by Ukraine, Europe, the US, and other allies are still underdeveloped. The NIS2 Directive, the legal framework that sets minimum cyber security standards across the EU, was an important step toward increasing coordination around risk management, threat sharing, and supply chain security. However, the process of building a dynamic cyber defense coalition has been slow, given the large number of jurisdictions in Europe.

To compound these challenges, Western governments have often been hesitant to share sensitive information with Ukrainian counterparts, or even with each other. Thankfully, there are measures that can be adopted to offer more effective support to Ukraine while still safeguarding classified information. These include sharing tiered or sanitized intelligence reports, conducting joint cyber security operations, and expanding advisory access to expertise. Sustained knowledge exchange, international assistance, and cooperative engagement remain essential to countering the breadth and sophistication of Russian cyber operations.

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Ukraine’s experience highlights the importance of increased investment in critical infrastructure protection. Since 2014, Russia has repeatedly targeted Ukraine’s critical infrastructure with cyber offensives designed to disrupt vital services. The cyber defense of these assets is highly specialized and requires specific strategies.

Cooperation between the public and private sectors is crucial in the fight against Russian cyber warfare. Civilian engagement and private sector partnerships have played important roles in Ukraine’s cyber defense, with both groups filling gaps that government and military structures cannot fully cover, especially under conditions of relentless hybrid warfare. However, there are a number of problematic related issues that need to be resolved.

One of the most difficult topics in terms of legislation is the issue of cyber volunteers. Ukrainian initiatives such as the IT Army have shown that civilians are prepared to work long hours to protect their country. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s private sector and international companies have provided a multi-layered defense by combining technical expertise, rapid incident response, and coordination with state authorities and civilian volunteers.

These contributions have proved vital in the struggle to preserve Ukraine’s digital sovereignty, protect citizens, and support the broader war effort. But many questions remain. How can large numbers of volunteers be effectively vetted? How should they be organized, when in many cases they are not cyber security specialists? Who should lead? Do volunteer cyber defenders become legitimate military targets? One solution could be to formalize a framework for civil-military-tech collaboration integrating vetted civilian volunteers with appropriate oversight.

There is a strong case for strengthening sanctions against Russia’s IT sector. Sanctions already play a critical role in constraining the Kremlin’s offensive cyber capabilities, but additional measures could further limit access to advanced technologies and signal the risks of collaboration with sanctioned entities, thereby reducing opportunities for knowledge transfer.

Potential measures include technology export bans, targeted entity designations, secondary sanctions, restrictions on software and cloud services, limitations on talent pipelines, and the financial isolation of IT firms. Implemented multilaterally, these steps could weaken Russia’s ability to innovate in cyber warfare, increase the Kremlin’s reliance on less advanced domestic technologies, and raise the cost of sustaining long-term cyber operations against Ukraine and its allies.

Finally, it is important to underscore that people remain the central element of effective cyber defense. Even with regular training designed to strengthen the skills of cyber defenders, individuals remain vulnerable to cyber fraud and social engineering techniques. Addressing these risks requires not only technical safeguards but also robust organizational policies and a sustained commitment to individual vigilance. Continuous awareness, preparedness, and adaptability are therefore essential components of a comprehensive cyber security posture.

Dr. Oleksandr Bakalinskyi is a Senior Researcher at the G. E. Pukhov Institute for Modeling in Energy Engineering at the National Academy of Sciences in Ukraine. Maggie McDonough is currently affiliated with the Center for Education & Research in Information Assurance and Security at Purdue University, where she serves as a technical advisor on global cyber security resilience programming.

EU praises Ukraine’s progress but warns Zelenskyy over corruption

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 04 Nov 2025 22:01:55 +0000

Ukraine’s bid to join the European Union received a boost this week with the release of an annual assessment praising the war-torn country’s progress toward future membership. The European Commission’s yearly overview of potential future EU members identified Ukraine as one of the best performers among ten candidate countries, acknowledging advances made by Kyiv in a number of reform areas including public administration, democratic institutions, rule of law, and the rights of national minorities. “Despite Russia’s unrelenting war of aggression, Ukraine remains strongly committed to its EU accession path, having successfully completed the screening process and advanced on key reforms,” the report noted.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed this positive appraisal of his country’s efforts and said the European Commission report confirmed that Ukraine “is confidently moving toward EU membership.” It was not all good news for the Ukrainian leader, however. EU officials also raised concerns over Zelenskyy’s domestic policies amid mounting allegations of backsliding in Kyiv on core anti-corruption reforms that are widely regarded as vital for Ukraine’s further European integration. “Recent negative trends, including pressure on the specialized anti-corruption agencies and civil society, must be decisively reversed,” the annual accession review underlined.

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The criticism currently being leveled at the Ukrainian authorities in Brussels is not entirely unexpected. In July 2025, Zelenskyy stunned Ukraine’s Western allies and sparked domestic outrage by backing a controversial parliamentary bill that was widely interpreted as an attempt to end the independence of the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

The scandal provoked Ukraine’s largest street protests since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, with thousands of Ukrainians braving possible Russian bombardment to rally in cities across the country against Zelenskyy’s apparent power grab. Kyiv’s partners were also quick to voice their alarm and signal that the move could put future international support for the Ukrainian war effort at risk.

Faced with overwhelming opposition at home and anger in key foreign capitals, Zelenskyy quickly backed down and reversed efforts to assert control over Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. Nevertheless, this week’s European Commission Enlargement Report has highlighted the lingering damage done by this brief and entirely self-inflicted crisis to the Ukrainian leader’s credibility.

Nor is this the only fly in the ointment. In addition to his headline-grabbing summer 2025 U-turn over Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms, Zelenskyy is also facing accusations from political opponents and civil society representatives of using lawfare to silence critics and consolidate power in his own hands. This is not a good look for a man who has sought to position himself as one of the leaders of the democratic world.

Zelenskyy has pushed back hard against his critics. He has pointed to Ukraine’s unprecedented success in meeting EU accession targets amid extremely challenging wartime conditions, while underlining the scale of his country’s anti-corruption reforms. “We have implemented the widest, the broadest anti-corruption infrastructure in Europe. I don’t know about any country that has as many anti-corruption authorities,” he commented in response to this week’s report. “We are doing everything possible.”

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For the time being, any disquiet over Zelenskyy’s anti-corruption credentials is unlikely to derail Ukraine’s EU membership momentum. While there is no agreement on how soon Ukraine can expect to join, the country’s eventual accession is now viewed in most European capitals as crucial for the continent’s future stability and security.

Ukrainian aspirations to join the EU first began to take shape in the wake of the country’s 2004 Orange Revolution, leading to years of meandering negotiations over a possible Association Agreement between Kyiv and Brussels. When this document was finally ready to be signed in 2013, Russia intervened and pressured the Ukrainian authorities to reject the deal. This led directly to a second Ukrainian revolution and the fall of the country’s pro-Kremlin government.

With Moscow’s efforts to thwart Ukraine’s European integration rapidly unraveling, Russian President Vladimir Putin chose to escalate and launched the invasion of Crimea in February 2014. This watershed moment marked the start of Russian armed aggression against Ukraine. Following the seizure of the Crimean peninsula, Moscow established Kremlin-controlled “separatist republics” in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. When this limited Russian military intervention failed to derail Ukraine’s EU ambitions, Putin raised the stakes further with the full-scale invasion of 2022.

As Russian aggression has escalated, Ukrainian public support for EU membership has increased and opposition has withered away. An issue that once divided Ukrainians fairly evenly now unites the nation. This is hardly surprising. For millions of Ukrainians, the quest to join the EU has become synonymous with the country’s civilizational choice of European democracy over Russian autocracy.

Zelenskyy would be well advised to keep this in mind as he seeks to balance domestic political considerations with Ukraine’s EU aspirations and the urgent need to maintain international support for the war effort. Ukrainians have made staggering sacrifices along the road toward EU membership and will not take kindly to anyone who places this progress in jeopardy. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s EU integration currently enjoys strong public and political support across Europe, but backsliding on core values could still undermine Kyiv’s case and provide fuel for Russia as it seeks to discredit Ukraine and prevent the country’s historic exit from the Kremlin orbit.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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A number of legislative complexities will need to be addressed during negotiations to determine the final version of the ban, with talks expected to continue into next year. The European Commission published the first draft of the phaseout roadmap for imports of Russian pipeline and liquefied natural gas during summer 2025. The document stipulated that short-term contracts of less than a year would be discontinued in 2026, while longer-term contracts would be terminated by January 2028.

The draft proposal raised some eyebrows, particularly due to the introduction of an article suggesting that the ban could be temporarily lifted in case of market emergencies. Contrary to expectations, the clause was not pushed through by Hungary and Slovakia, the EU’s most Kremlin-friendly Russian gas buyers. Instead, it was introduced under pressure from Spain, where several companies still hold long-term LNG import contracts with Russian producers.

The text has been reviewed by both the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, with the former pushing for even more ambitious terms. For example, MEPs would like to see all imports terminated by 2027, a year earlier than initially stated by the European Commission. They also insist on closing loopholes by targeting circumvention risks.

The draft version adopted by the Council of Ministers aligns to a large degree with the version circulated by the European Commission and continues to include an emergency brake. The final text will have to be negotiated as part of talks involving the European Parliament, Council of Ministers, and European Commission.

To further complicate matters, the EU recently adopted its nineteenth Russian sanctions package, which includes a ban on Russian LNG imports from 2027, a year earlier than the deadline proposed by the EU’s own phaseout roadmap. This fast-tracked LNG ban was likely introduced in response to pressure from US President Donald Trump, who has singled out Europe for continuing to buy Russian fossil fuels.

While this sanctions-mandated ban may lead to an earlier block on Russian LNG exports, many observers fear that it is insufficiently robust and could be overturned, since EU sanctions are up for review every six months and require unanimous backing in order to be extended. This means the fast-tracked LNG ban could be vulnerable to opposition from any individual EU member.

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While the legislative path toward a full EU ban on Russian gas imports remains long and complex, enforcement may prove even more difficult. The ban enjoys strong political backing across Europe, but there are widespread concerns that the Kremlin will try to identify potential loopholes to evade the ban.

Russian gas is currently exported to Europe via the Black Sea and Turkey, using a dedicated pipeline transporting the gas to the Balkans and Hungary. The EU has included this entry point in legislation and notes that flows must stop from 2028, but Russian gas arriving in Turkey via an interconnection point nearby could be relabelled and sold under a different name. The risk of relabelling Russian gas also extends to the entire bloc because there are still a number of companies with large import portfolios which hold long-term LNG contracts with Russian producers.

Regulations related to the enforcement of the EU ban, including penalties for potential breaches, will need to be reviewed and tightened up. Existing EU proposals may not be sufficient, while it is still unclear how violations will be penalised. This must be addressed in order to deter non-compliance.

EU officials are well aware that Moscow will fight efforts to exclude it from lucrative European markets. Deprived of fossil fuel revenue and with its economy facing mounting difficulties, the Kremlin will seek any opportunity to continue selling oil and gas to Europe. Allowing loopholes to remain could create large grey areas in European energy markets that would fuel Russia’s war in Ukraine and allow the Kremlin to retain leverage over Europe.

Dr. Aura Sabadus is a senior energy journalist who writes about Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine for Independent Commodity Intelligence Services (ICIS), a London-based global energy and petrochemicals news and market data provider. Her views are her own.

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The mobilization issue has been exacerbated by President Zelenskyy’s reluctance to lower the age for compulsory military service from twenty-five to eighteen. This has led to criticism from Ukraine’s Western partners, who have argued that it is unrealistic to wage a major war while exempting so many young Ukrainians from mobilization. Rather than take the politically dangerous decision to reduce the conscription age, Zelenskyy has backed an incentive scheme to attract volunteers in the eighteen to twenty-five age bracket. However, the initiative has so far failed to fill the gaps in Ukraine’s decimated front line units.

The recent decision to lift international travel restrictions on young Ukrainian men aged eighteen to twenty-two has further complicated Ukraine’s manpower problems. Around 100,000 Ukrainian males have left the country since restrictions were eased around two months ago, Britain’s Daily Telegraph reports. This exodus deprives the country of potential future army recruits and has created a range of more immediate personnel issues that are already reverberating throughout the Ukrainian economy. While some of these men may plan on returning to Ukraine, experience since 2022 suggests that many will seek to settle elsewhere in the European Union.

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Moscow is also facing difficulties replenishing its invasion force amid catastrophic losses in Ukraine that dwarf the death toll from every other Kremlin war since 1945. Putin initially sought to address this problem by launching a partial mobilization in September 2022, but the move proved hugely unpopular and led to around one million young Russians fleeing the country. Instead, the Kremlin has introduced a system a lavish financial incentives including huge enlistment bounties and generous monthly salaries in order to attract volunteers willing to join the invasion of Ukraine. While it has proved necessary to repeatedly increase the sums on offer, this approach has made it possible to secure around thirty thousand new recruits per month.

Based on the current trajectory of the war, Russia’s manpower advantage over Ukraine will only grow wider during the coming year. This is already making itself on the battlefield, with Russian forces exploiting gaps in Ukraine’s defenses along the more than one thousand kilometers of front line and edging forward at multiple points. While Putin’s troops have so far been unable to achieve any major breakthroughs, Russia’s territorial gains are slowly but surely adding up.

The most intensive fighting is currently taking place in the Donetsk region as Russia seeks to complete the capture of Pokrovsk. If Putin’s commanders succeed in taking the city, it will be seen by many as vindication of the Kremlin strategy to grind out victory by relying on the sheer size of the Russian army. Putin has long believed that he can win the war by outlasting the West and overwhelming Ukraine. He will view Kyiv’s increasingly evident infantry shortage as a strong indication that time is on his side.

For Zelenskyy, there are no easy options. Lowering the mobilization age would generate a new wave of recruits but could also pose a significant threat to Ukrainian national morale. Reforming the terms of military service to provide greater rotation guarantees while also adopting a more meritocratic approach to the appointment of army commanders may help restore flagging public confidence and attract more volunteers, but this would take time that Ukraine quite frankly no longer possesses.

For now, the battle-hardened but exhausted and outnumbered Ukrainian army has little choice but to remain in a defensive posture. Ukraine’s commanders must be prepared to cede ground when necessary in order to preserve precious fighting strength, while looking for opportunities to maximize enemy casualties. The goal should be to withstand the Russian onslaught until a combination of punishing front line losses, escalating long-range strikes inside Russia, and deepening economic woes finally forces Putin to the negotiating table.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen echoed Nausėda’s comments and expressed solidarity with Lithuania, calling the Belarusian balloons a “hybrid threat” that Europe will not tolerate. She linked the issue to the European Union’s broader push for enhanced military readiness, particularly in terms of airspace defense capabilities against the growing threat posed by Russian drones and aircraft.

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Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has dismissed European concerns and attacked the Lithuanian decision to close the border as a “crazy scam,” while also accusing the West of waging a hybrid war against Belarus and Russia. His denials lack credibility, however, given the recent spate of airspace violations across Europe and along the EU’s eastern frontier with Russia and Belarus.

Around twenty Russian drones penetrated Polish airspace in early September, leading to an unprecedented armed response from NATO jets. Some of the Russian drones entered Poland via Belarus, highlighting Minsk’s role in Moscow’s campaign of hybrid aggression. Days later, a small group of Russian fighters violated NATO airspace off the coast of Estonia.

There have also been numerous incidents over the past two months involving suspected Russian drones close to strategic sites throughout Europe including military bases and international airports. Speaking in September, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen claimed the drone incursions were part of a Russian hybrid war and said Europe was facing its “most difficult and dangerous situation” since the end of World War II.

European airspace violations serve a number of purposes for Putin and his Belarusian proxy. In practical terms, they allow the Kremlin to probe NATO defenses and test the alliance’s readiness to combat incursions. Russian drones and Belarusian balloons also inconvenience the European public and intimidate European leaders at a time when the continent is already increasingly alarmed by US President Donald Trump’s mixed messaging over America’s commitment to European security.

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In response to Lithuania’s border closure, Lukashenka has warned that he may now stop cooperating with Brussels on migration issues. Given his regime’s well-documented prior weaponization of migrants on the Belarusian border with the European Union, this is a very thinly-veiled threat.

At the same time, the Belarusian ruler is also attempting to engage in renewed outreach to the West, with a particular emphasis on the US. Lukashenka has held a number of meetings with United States officials in recent months, leading to the release of political prisoners held by Belarus and an easing of American sanctions against Belarusian national airline Belavia.

This apparent thaw has been hailed in Washington as a sign of progress, but not everyone is convinced. Human rights groups have identified 77 new political prisoners in Belarus during September 2025, more than the total number of detainees freed in US-brokered releases since the start of the year. In other words, it would appear that Lukashenka is seeking sanctions relief without committing to end repressive policies at home and while continuing to serve Moscow’s strategic interests.

The Trump administration has signaled its dissatisfaction over recent Belarusian balloon violations of Lithuanian airspace. “I made clear we stand in solidarity with Lithuania amidst recent balloon incursions. Belarus should prevent further such incidents,” commented US Special Envoy John Coale, who has been directly involved in this year’s talks with the Lukashenka regime.

Growing tensions on the Lithuanian border with Belarus should serve as further confirmation that Lukashenka remains fully committed to participating in Russia’s confrontation with the West. Belarusian balloon violations of EU airspace are part of a Kremlin-led campaign to test Western resolve, strain NATO solidarity, and intimidate Europe. As long as Lukashenka continues to play a supporting role in Putin’s hybrid war against the West, he should be regarded as an adversary.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The UN investigation identified numerous instances on Russian attacks on first responders, including the bombing of ambulances and fire brigade crews attempting to provide emergency aid following earlier strikes. With sudden death from above now an everyday fact of life for the local population, residents of southern Ukraine say they feel hunted and refer to the relentless Russian drone attacks as a “human safari.”

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The drones deployed by the Russian military in this bombing campaign feature video cameras allowing operators to carefully select and track victims, confirming the deliberate and calculated nature of the killings. “All the types of short-range drones used in these attacks are equipped with live streaming cameras that focus on particular targets, leaving no doubt about the knowledge and intent of the perpetrators,” the UN report confirmed.

Russian intent it further underlined by the widespread practice of posting ghoulish video footage online celebrating drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians. These posts are often accompanied by menacing language and warnings for remaining Ukrainian residents to flee the area. “Russian military units often release videos of drone-eye views of civilians being killed, to be posted online by the units or groups affiliated with the Russian army, apparently as a means of amplifying the threat,” reports the New York Times.

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This new UN report underscores the industrial scale and systematic nature of Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Moscow’s efforts to displace the civilian population in the Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv provinces are only one part of a broader Kremlin campaign to render much of Ukraine unlivable. This depopulation strategy is designed to fuel anti-government sentiment within Ukrainian society and increase the pressure on the Kyiv authorities to capitulate, while also generating fresh waves of Ukrainian refugees and setting the stage for further Russian advances.

In addition to the human safari tactics employed in regions of southern Ukraine located close to the front lines, Russia is engaged in a nationwide bombing campaign of civilian infrastructure that aims to deny Ukrainians access to basic amenities such as heating, electricity, and running water. These attacks are part of a long-running airstrike offensive that escalates each year on the eve of the winter season as Russia seeks to weaponize subzero temperatures and freeze the Ukrainian population into submission.

Since the beginning of the current year, Moscow has also increased the terror bombing of residential districts and other civilian targets such as hospitals and kindergartens in cities across Ukraine. This is fueling a climate of fear and has resulted in a series of mass casualty attacks including a ballistic missile strike targeting Palm Sunday churchgoers in Sumy and the bombing of a park and children’s playground in Kryvyi Rih. Ukrainian civilian casualties surged by 31 percent year-on-year during the first nine months of 2025 due to this intensification of Russian drone and missile strikes.

In a separate probe conducted earlier this year, UN human rights investigators determined that Russia is also guilty of committing crimes against humanity targeting the civilian population in occupied regions of Ukraine. A report released in March 2025 found that Moscow’s large-scale program of illegal detentions and mass deportations throughout areas of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control was “perpetrated pursuant to a coordinated state policy and amounts to crimes against humanity.”

These United Nations findings make a complete mockery of Russia’s attempts to deny targeting Ukrainian civilians. While Kremlin officials frequently assert that the Russian army never deliberately conducts strikes on non-military objects and respects the human rights of noncombatants, overwhelming evidence identified by United Nations investigators demonstrates that Russia is in fact engaged in systematic and centrally coordinated efforts to attack Ukraine’s civilian population.

Russia’s use of drones to conduct a “human safari” in southern Ukraine marks a grim new milestone in the long history of Kremlin war crimes against civilians. UN investigators have now recognized this lethal drone campaign as a crime against humanity. Putin’s decision to target the Ukrainian civilian population in this coordinated manner is a reminder that the current Russian invasion is not only an attempt to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation; it is also an attack on the fundamental principles of international law.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Anyone approaching Kherson is immediately made aware of the threat from above. The entrance to the city is marked by signs reading “Warning! Danger! Enemy Drones.” Meanwhile, major roads leading into the heart of Kherson and the Dnipro River are covered in improvised netting in a bid to offer some basic protection against the ever-present threat of Russian drones.

For local residents, Russia’s human safari has made sudden death from above an everyday fact of life. During the first nine months of 2025, more than a hundred people were killed and over one thousand were wounded in drone attacks. Those who remain say they feel hunted whenever they dare to leave their homes and venture out into the open air. A United Nations report released in May 2025 concluded that the Russian drone attacks were part of a systematic, coordinated state policy and constituted a crime against humanity.

The Russian side does not appear to have any serious reservations about the routine targeting of Ukrainian civilians in this manner. On the contrary, video footage of drone attacks on the Kherson population are posted online on an almost daily basis and are typically met with overwhelming approval. Nowhere is deemed off-limits by Russian drone teams. Targets have included private homes and residential buildings, cars, buses, and pedestrians. On numerous occasions, ambulances have been targeted as they have attempted to provide emergency care for victims of earlier attacks.

The hardest hit communities are those located along the banks of the Dnipro River and therefore closest to the Russians. In these riverside districts, Russian drones are a more or less constant feature circling in the sky and waiting to attack anything that moves. This makes it extremely difficult to repair damaged infrastructure or deliver essential supplies such as food and medicine. Instead, life has ground to a halt.

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Combating the Russian drone menace is a relentless technological struggle as each side races to innovate and evade the latest countermeasures. In practical terms, it is often difficult for the Ukrainians to cope with the very large numbers of drones deployed by the Russians. The present interception rate in late October of around 80 percent may sound impressive, but this means that 20 percent of drones are still getting through.

Kherson’s current predicament should set alarm bells ringing across Europe and beyond. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is widely recognized as the world’s first drone war. Moscow’s human safari tactics in Kherson offer a chilling window into what this could mean when military drone technologies are unleashed against civilian populations.

Based on what is known about the Russian human safari campaign in the Kherson region, it should now be abundantly clear that drones can potentially paralyze the life of any modern city. They can be used to leave the population without access to electricity, water, and heating, while also disrupting core supply chains and even preventing people from setting foot outside.

Few countries are currently ready to address this threat. Indeed, the recent appearance of small numbers of Russian drones in Polish airspace and above strategic sites such as airports across Europe has highlighted how unprepared many NATO members are to face the rapidly evolving challenges of drone warfare.

These challenges are nowhere more immediately apparent than in Kherson, which has been living with the horrors of Russia’s human safari for more than a year. The fate of Kherson should serve as a warning to the wider world about the threat posed to civilians by military drone technologies. As countries seek to protest their populations, Ukraine’s unrivaled experience will prove priceless.

Oleksandr Tolokonnikov is Deputy Head of the Kherson Regional Military Administration.

US voices concern over Chinese support for Russia’s Ukraine invasion

Katherine Spencer — Thu, 23 Oct 2025 14:20:49 +0000

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has raised concerns over Chinese components in Russian military drones amid fresh allegations of Beijing’s mounting support for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Speaking in mid-October, Bessent announced that the US would soon release photo evidence supplied by the Ukrainian government indicating China’s growing involvement in the war.

China has claimed neutrality throughout Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and denies providing lethal weapons to either party in the conflict. However, evidence including publicly available trade data, satellite activity, and indications of drone development between Russian and Chinese companies tell a different story.

A Washington Post report published on October 13 claimed that China has dramatically increased shipments to Russia of critical parts required to build fiber-optic drones used extensively by Putin’s army on the battlefields of Ukraine. In particular, the quantity of exported fiber-optic cables and lithium-ion batteries has skyrocketed in recent months. In August 2025, China exported a record 328,000 miles of fiber optic cable to Russia. In the same month, China supplied the Russians with approximately $47 million of lithium-ion batteries.

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Both Russia and Ukraine have been heavily reliant on Chinese drone components throughout the past three and a half years of full-scale war. However, export volumes to Russia now dwarf deliveries of key component categories to Ukraine. Many Ukrainians have come to view their dependence on Chinese suppliers as a strategic liability. This vulnerability has been highlighted by restrictions imposed by China on drone component exports to Ukraine including motors, navigation cameras, and flight controllers.

Beijing’s support for the Russian war effort allegedly goes far beyond the provision of drone components. At the end of September, Reuters reported that Chinese experts were traveling to Russia to develop military drones at a state-owned weapons manufacturer currently under Western sanctions. The Russian arms maker in question was accused of producing a new drone, the Garpiya-3, in collaboration with Chinese experts.

Garpiya-3 strike drones are said to feature Chinese technologies and have an operational range extending hundreds of kilometers. Kyiv claims around five hundred of these drones are now being launched at targets inside Ukraine every month. China has denied the reports. If confirmed, this and other instances of collaboration between Russian arms producers and Chinese companies would represent a flagrant violation of Beijing’s stated neutrality.

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Chinese support for the Russian military has also extended to assisting Moscow with the provision of satellite imagery in order to help Russian forces identify potential Ukrainian targets. In October, a senior Ukrainian intelligence official stated that China was supplying satellite intelligence to Russia to facilitate missile strikes inside Ukraine.

Such accusations are not new. In 2023, the US Treasury Department sanctioned seven Chinese firms for providing high-resolution satellite imagery to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. In 2024, a Financial Times report citing senior US officials asserted that China was assisting in the development of Russia’s satellite and space-based capabilities, while also sharing current satellite imagery in support of the Russian war effort.

Claims of deepening military collaboration between China and Russia are complicating efforts by the Trump administration to broker a peace deal and end the largest European invasion since World War II. Despite multiple rounds of sanctions on Russian and Chinese companies, the US and EU do not appear to have made any progress toward reducing the stream of dual use Chinese components heading to Russia.

In recent months, US State Department officials have estimated that China is now providing “nearly 80 percent” of the sanctioned dual use items Russia requires to continue the war in Ukraine. The significance of this Chinese contribution cannot be overstated. Without a steady supply of cheap Chinese drone components, for example, it is unlikely that Russia would be able to maintain the bombardment of Ukrainian cities and the country’s civilian infrastructure at anything like the current intensity.

Bessent’s recent remarks are an encouraging sign that the US authorities recognize China’s integral role in enabling Russia’s invasion. However, further steps are needed. Cooperation between Beijing and Moscow in areas including the development of new military technologies and the sharing of satellite information for bombing raids cannot be ignored. This problematic collaboration will continue to undercut efforts to end the war in Ukraine until it is addressed.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Budapest summit postponed as Putin rejects Trump’s ceasefire proposal

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 21 Oct 2025 21:27:35 +0000

Just days after US President Donald Trump announced plans for a new peace summit with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, their proposed Budapest meeting has been thrown into doubt. Trump first shared news of the summit late last week following a lengthy and “very productive” telephone call with Putin. Speaking on Tuesday, however, White House officials said there were now “no plans” for the two leaders to meet in the “immediate future.”

This sudden change in tone came after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reportedly failed to make any meaningful progress during a preliminary call ahead of planned talks in Budapest. Lavrov later confirmed that Putin had dismissed Trump’s ceasefire proposal and remained fully committed to achieving the maximalist goals of his invasion. “A ceasefire now would mean only one thing: A large part of Ukraine would remain under Nazi rule,” Russia’s top diplomat stated.

Lavrov’s latest comments serve as a timely reminder that Moscow’s objectives in Ukraine go far beyond limited territorial concessions and extend to regime change in Kyiv. His insistence on branding the Ukrainian government as “Nazis” is nothing new, of course, but it does underline Russia’s rejection of peaceful coexistence with an independent Ukraine, while also highlighting the scale of the current disconnect between Moscow and Washington. While Trump attempts to broker a geopolitical real estate deal, Putin is seeking to secure his place in history by extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and reviving the Russian Empire.

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It is not surprising that some within the Trump administration still struggle to grasp the true motives behind Russia’s attack on Ukraine. After all, the current invasion has been accompanied by an unprecedented deluge of disinformation designed to distract international attention from Putin’s imperial ambitions. Since 2022, the Kremlin has sought to pin the blame for the invasion on everything from NATO enlargement to phantom fascists. Moscow’s many excuses have undeniably succeeded in clouding perceptions of the war, but none of the justifications presented by the Kremlin can stand up to serious scrutiny.

Putin has repeatedly framed the war as a response to decades of NATO expansion that has brought the alliance ever closer to Russia’s borders. His own actions, however, have largely debunked this argument. When neighboring Finland responded to the invasion of Ukraine in spring 2022 by announcing plans to join NATO, Putin did nothing and said he had “no problem” with Helsinki’s decision. He has since gone even further and withdrawn most Russian troops from the frontier with Finland. Given the fact that Finnish accession virtually doubled Russia’s shared border with NATO, this nonchalance is revealing. Clearly, Putin knows very well that NATO poses no threat to Russia itself. His real problem is with Ukrainian independence not NATO expansion.

The Kremlin’s claims to be waging a crusade against Ukrainian Nazis are even more far-fetched. Russian attempts to equate Ukrainian national identity with Nazism date all the way back to World War II and have been enthusiastically revived by the Putin regime. This approach shamelessly exploits the Russian public’s reverence for the Soviet role in the defeat of Hitler, while conveniently ignoring the political realities in today’s Ukraine.

Ever since Ukraine regained independence in 1991, Far Right political parties have been relegated to the margins of the country’s fledgling democracy. During Ukraine’s last prewar parliamentary election in 2019, most nationalist parties formed a single coalition in a bid to overcome years of ballot box disappointment. They failed miserably, receiving just 2.16 percent of the vote.

Nothing has exposed the absurdity of Kremlin attempts to portray Ukrainians as Nazis more than the election of Jewish candidate Volodymyr Zelenskyy as the country’s president. Ever since Zelenskyy won the presidency by a landslide in 2019, Putin and other Kremlin officials have engaged in deeply unsavory mental gymnastics as they have struggled to explain how a supposedly Nazi nation could overwhelmingly vote for a Jewish leader. The most notorious example of this disgraceful trend came in spring 2022, when Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov declared during an Italian television interview that “Hitler also had Jewish blood.”

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Putin has typically been far franker about his war aims when speaking to domestic Russian audiences. For years, he has argued that Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”) who are occupying historically Russian lands and have no right to a separate nation of their own. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he began referring to Ukraine as an artificial “anti-Russia,” and took the highly unusual step of publishing a rambling 5000-word history essay that read like a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. Following the outbreak of hostilities, he began proclaiming the “return” of Russian lands and comparing his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great.

The criminal actions of the Russian army in Ukraine have been profoundly shaped by Putin’s bitter opposition to Ukrainian national identity. In areas under Kremlin control, anyone viewed as a Ukrainian patriot or deemed a potential threat to the occupation authorities is likely to disappear into a vast network of camps and prisons. A United Nations probe has ruled that these mass detentions represent a crime against humanity.

Huge numbers have also been deported. This includes tens of thousands of children, who are subjected to ideological indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian identity. Those who remain in occupied Ukraine are being forced to accept Russian citizenship amid a brutal campaign to systematically erase all traces of Ukrainian history, culture, language, and identity. This genocidal conduct makes a complete mockery of attempts to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a mere border dispute that can be settled via limited land swaps.

Putin’s Ukraine obsession is rooted in his experience as an eye witness to the collapse of the Soviet Empire while serving as a KGB officer in East Germany, and reflects his fears that the further consolidation of a democratic and European Ukraine could act as a catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s imperial retreat. Beginning with the 2004 Orange Revolution, his determination to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit has come to dominate Russian foreign policy and has slowly but steadily compromised Moscow’s relationship with the wider Western world. Putin has now bet everything on the reconquest of Ukraine and knows that his entire reign will be judged by the outcome of the current war.

If Trump wishes to end the bloodshed in Ukraine and secure his precious Nobel Peace Prize, he must first recognize that Putin is playing for the highest possible stakes on the stage of history and will never compromise unless forced to do so. Indeed, he dare not back down. At this point, anything less than the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation would be regarded in Moscow as a major defeat that would plunge the Kremlin into crisis.

Putin will doubtless continue to profess his desire for peace while engaging in stalling tactics and playing for time. He will string Trump along with yet more seductive phone calls and headline-grabbing summits that flatter the US leader’s ego, but he will almost certainly not enter into genuine peace negotiations until the alternative is defeat in Ukraine and disaster for Russia itself. The sooner Trump accepts this reality, the sooner we can move beyond the current phony peace process and begin the hard work of securing a sustainable settlement through the long overdue application of Western strength.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Vladimir Putin’s war machine may finally be running out of fuel

Vladyslav Davydov — Tue, 21 Oct 2025 20:46:18 +0000

As reports of cracks in Russia’s wartime economy continue to mount, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is now predicting that the Kremlin will face an unprecedented budget deficit of around $100 billion in 2026. The Ukrainian leader is far from alone in forecasting more economic pain in the pipeline for Russian dictator Vladimir Putin. US President Donald Trump has recent stated that the Russian economy is “going to collapse” unless Putin ends the invasion of Ukraine.

This is not the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion that Russia has faced major budgetary strains. In 2022, the Kremlin’s urgent need to cover rising military expenditures forced it to resort to improvised measures such as windfall taxes on the energy and banking sectors. A surge in commodity prices then helped cover Russia’s ballooning defense budget, while mobilization and additional recruitment in 2023 and 2024 were financed mainly through municipal and regional budgets, along with minor tax hikes.

For much of the past three and a half years, international attention has focused on Russia’s apparent success in overcoming the impact of sanctions, along with the Kremlin’s ability to maintain modest GDP growth while transitioning to wartime conditions. However, the economic strain of the ongoing invasion is now becoming increasingly hard to disguise.

Russia’s deepening economic difficulties have been exacerbated by a highly effective Ukrainian campaign of long-range air strikes targeting the oil and gas industry that fuels Putin’s war machine. Since August 2025, Ukraine has launched a large-scale air offensive against oil refineries, gas processing plants, fuel depots, pipelines, logistics hubs, and export terminals across the Russian Federation. This has contributed to a sharp drop in Russian energy export revenues and led to spikes in fuel prices for domestic consumers. In recent months, fuel shortages have been reported in regions throughout Russia, with car owners forced to queue for hours in search of limited supplies.

The current fuel crisis in Russia is unlikely to be resolved soon. In a recent assessment, the Paris-based International Energy Agency stated that the impact from Ukrainian drone strikes is expected to suppress refinery processing rates for Russia’s economically crucial oil industry until at least mid-2026. Ukrainian strikes are also continuing to gain pace, with Kyiv in the process of developing a new generation of domestically produced missiles that should enable a further escalation in the bombing campaign.

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To cover the growing gaps in the Russian budget and continue funding the war, the Kremlin plans to hike the country’s VAT rate from 20 to 22 percent. Tax increases are also expected to impact entrepreneurs, as the threshold for Russia’s simplified system with lower rates is set to be reduced fourfold. Critics have characterized this strategy as redirecting money away from ordinary Russian citizens and private businesses in order to finance the invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s deteriorating economic situation places the Kremlin in a difficult position. On the one hand, a combination of sustained Western support for Ukraine and funding issues in Moscow mean that the Russian military could soon face increasing difficulties on the battlefield. On the other hand, the longer the fighting drags on, the more Russia’s economy is likely to suffer. Meanwhile, further sanctions measures and Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s energy industry are creating new pressure points that risk fueling domestic discontent inside Russia.

With relatively little movement along the military front lines in Ukraine over the past two years, the economic front of the war may ultimately prove decisive. “Putin will only stop this war when he thinks he can’t win, and for him to come to that conclusion, there needs to be more pressure on the Russian economy and more help for the Ukrainians,” commented Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski in September. “The war will likely end the way World War I ended. One side or another will run out of resources to carry on.”

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The objective in Western capitals must now be to make sure Russia runs out of resources before Ukraine. This should not be beyond the realms of possibility, given the vastly superior resources of Ukraine’s allies.

Russia’s current goal is to reduce its dependence on oil and gas. The planned Russian budget for 2026 is based on a lower oil price and aims to rely more on domestic taxes instead. Over time, this approach could make Russian state finances more resilient by cutting the share of oil and gas revenues from the current level of around 40 percent to about half that figure. But if Western countries tighten sanctions at the right moment, this plan could backfire, triggering runaway inflation and a further slowdown in Russian economic activity.

There are currently encouraging signs of Western readiness to increasingly target Putin’s war economy. Trump’s efforts to impose tariffs on countries that buy Russian oil have already made some nervous about trading with Moscow. The EU and UK have also stepped up sanctions, including blacklisting more ships from Russia’s shadow fleet. These measures are having an impact. For example, China’s Qingdao Port recently introduced technical restrictions on tankers that will effectively ban shadow fleet vessels, a move that underscores growing caution toward doing business with the Kremlin.

Ukraine’s deep strikes have exposed Putin’s Achilles heel and have helped demonstrate that the Russian economy is far more fragile than many in Moscow would like us to believe. Kyiv’s Western partners should now exploit their economic leverage over Russia in order to increase the pressure on Putin and convince the Kremlin that continuing the war could lead to economic ruin.

Vladyslav Davydov is an advisor to Ukraine’s First Deputy Minister for Development of Communities and Territories.

Putin seeks more foreign fighters amid mounting Russian losses in Ukraine

David Kirichenko — Thu, 16 Oct 2025 20:55:05 +0000

As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches the four-year mark, Moscow is facing increasing difficulties replenishing the ranks of its invading army. With fewer Russians now prepared to volunteer, the Kremlin is seeking to recruit more foreign fighters to serve in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s colonial war.

A number of recent media reports have highlighted the growing role of foreign nationals in the Russian military. In early October, an Indian citizen was captured by Ukrainian forces while fighting for Russia. The 22 year old claimed to have been arrested in Russia while studying and pressured into signing a contract with the Russian army in order to secure his release from prison. After just two weeks of basic training, he was sent to the front lines of the war in Ukraine.

Also in early October, the Los Angeles Times reported that Russia may have recruited tens of thousands of foreign fighters via social media, with many coming from disadvantaged countries across the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia. The article detailed how many of these recruits are allegedly enticed with offers of generous benefits including large salaries and Russian citizenship in exchange for military service in non-combat roles. In practice, however, most are soon sent straight into battle.

Meanwhile, a group of more than twenty Kenyan men were rescued from a suspected human trafficking ring in September following a raid on a residential complex in Nairobi. The men had reportedly been promised jobs in Russia but were set to be sent to fight in Ukraine. The multi-agency operation highlighted growing concerns that Moscow is stepping up efforts to lure African men to Russia and forcing them to join the Russian army.

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The single largest contingent of foreigners currently fighting for Russia may be Cubans. An October 2 cable from the US State Department sent to dozens of US diplomatic missions claimed that up to 5000 Cuban nationals are currently serving in the ranks of Putin’s army. Ukrainian officials say the total number could actually be far higher and estimate that as many as 20,000 Cubans may have been recruited by Russia.

While Russian officials have typically been tight-lipped about the presence of foreigners in the country’s military, some have recently acknowledged the growing presence of Cuban troops. Andrey Kartapolov, who heads the Russian Parliament’s Defense Committee, defended the practice of recruiting Cubans and indicated that many more may soon be joining the invasion of Ukraine. “If young people from Cuba want to help our country, there is nothing strange about that,” he commented.

This increasing openness has also been evident in relation to the participation North Korean soldiers in Russia’s war. When reports first emerged of North Korean troops being deployed to Russia in late 2024, the Kremlin responded with a series of denials. Months later, Putin himself officially confirmed the presence of a North Korean contingent. “We will always honor the Korean heroes who gave their lives for Russia, for our common freedom, on an equal basis with their Russian brothers in arms,” he commented in April 2025.

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It is easy to understand why Moscow is so interested in enlisting foreigners to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to Britain’s Ministry of Defense, more than one million Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded since the start of the full-scale invasion, making the current war by far the costliest undertaken by the Kremlin since World War II.

The human wave tactics favored by Russian commanders require a steady supply of fresh troops, but Moscow is reluctant to conscript large numbers of Russian civilians into the army. A partial mobilization in September 2022 sparked a major backlash, with hundreds of thousands of Russians fleeing the country to avoid wartime service. Instead, the Kremlin has focused on sourcing manpower from Russia’s prison population and attracting volunteers by offering increasingly large financial incentives. CNN reports that numerous Russian regions have dramatically increased the amounts they offer to new recruits in recent months amid a decline in volunteers.

There are growing indications that the current approach may no longer be enough to compensate for Russia’s heavy losses on the front lines in Ukraine. The number of new recruits receiving signing-on bonuses during the second quarter of 2025 was the lowest in two years, according to research by independent Russian investigative outlet iStories based on Russian federal budget data. The outlet’s findings indicated that around 38,000 people volunteered for military service between April and June 2025, two and a half times lower than the figure for the same period one year earlier.

The Kremlin’s appetite for foreign fighters is not merely an attempt to make up the numbers. Crucially, Moscow also regards the recruitment of non-Russian troops as significantly cheaper and less politically risky. Since 2022, the Kremlin has established an extensive system of compensation payments for Russian soldiers killed or wounded in Ukraine. None of this applies to foreigners. Likewise, every Russian military death on the Ukrainian front lines risks fueling anti-war sentiment at home, while casualties from faraway lands have virtually no impact on Russian public sentiment.

These factors have encouraged Putin and other Kremlin leaders to view foreign fighters as an expendable alternative to dwindling numbers of Russian recruits. “If a foreigner dies, there are no social payouts and no responsibility. There are no relatives inside Russia who are unhappy with the war, and of course there are fewer dead Russians,” Ukrainian Military Intelligence spokesman Andriy Yusov told US Congress officials in September.

Moscow’s efforts to secure more foreign troops are an indication of the mounting manpower challenges confronting the Kremlin. Russia is still a very long way from running out of soldiers, but Putin has no more easy options as he seeks to replenish his decimated invasion force and continue the war into a fifth year. With declining numbers of Russians prepared to risk their lives in exchange for financial incentives, Putin may have to choose between a deeply unpopular mobilization or a further expansion of Russia’s international recruitment campaign. Neither option is likely to produce the kind of skilled and motivated fighting force capable of defeating Ukraine.

The presence of assorted Cubans, North Koreans, Indians, Africans, and other foreign troops within Putin’s military directly undermines widespread but misleading notions of Russia’s limitless resources. In reality, the Russian army in Ukraine is increasingly overstretched and may be far more vulnerable than Moscow would like us to believe. This should motivate Kyiv’s partners to expand their support for the Ukrainian war effort. Putin currently has no interest in ending his invasion, but the prospect of military defeat could force him to accept the necessity of a negotiated peace deal.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

The so-called social contract between Putin and the Russian population had already begun to unravel long before the present wave of Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s energy industry. Over the past three and a half years, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resulted in military losses unseen in Europe since World War II. At least one million Russians have been killed or wounded in the conflict, according to Britain’s Ministry of Defense and other international sources.

In parallel, economic growth in all but the defense sector has stagnated, with massive payments to military personnel deepening public dependency on the war. Throughout Russian society, policies of repression have reached unprecedented new levels as Putin has exploited wartime conditions to complete the country’s transition from flawed democracy to authoritarian dictatorship. Despite this deteriorating domestic situation, there is still no sign of any significant anti-war movement in today’s Russia.

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It is probably unrealistic to expect any Russian revolt over Putin’s breach of the social contract. This should not come as a surprise. While opinion polls have often indicated strong public support for the Putin regime, the Kremlin has always relied primarily on coercion rather than consensus. Throughout Putin’s reign, opposition figures have been exiled, imprisoned, or silenced, while the independent media has been muzzled and civil society suppressed. Following the onset of the full-scale invasion, these trends have all intensified. As a result, there is currently little prospect of any grassroots protests.

Opposition from within Russia’s elite looks equally unlikely. With the Russian economy increasingly on a war footing, the full-scale invasion is now a crucial factor determining the wealth and status of the country’s political and business establishment. With most members of the elite personally dependent on Putin and largely locked out of the Western world, the conditions for a Kremlin coup appear to be almost entirely absent. Instead, the invasion of Ukraine has allowed Putin to consolidate his grip on power and has forced those around him to draw closer to the throne.

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This does not mean that Ukraine’s current strategy of long-range strikes against the Russian energy sector is futile. Far from it, in fact. But with Putin firmly entrenched on the home front, only external pressures can realistically force him to abandon his invasion. Ukrainian attacks on Putin’s oil and gas industry are already having a significant impact on the Russian economy. If the current momentum can be maintained into 2026, the economic damage could become far more severe. This will curtail Moscow’s ability to finance and prosecute the war in Ukraine, while also negatively impacting many other aspects of Russian daily life.

Ukrainian efforts to push Putin to the negotiating table can only succeed with stronger Western support. Despite Russia’s claims of resilience, its economy remains heavily dependent on energy exports, with China and India the main clients. Effective Western action should include tightening sanctions on these buyers. Efforts must also continue to end all European purchases of Russian energy exports, either directly or via third parties. Additionally, Western leaders could help end the war by working to bring down global oil prices, thereby starving the Kremlin of much-needed export revenues.

Economic measures alone will not be enough. Military aid to Ukraine should also increase, with an emphasis on the provision of weapons systems capable of strengthening Ukraine’s domestic defenses while allowing Kyiv to expand attacks inside Russia. The objective should be to stabilize the front lines in Ukraine and protect Ukrainian cities from bombardment, while escalating the destruction of Russia’s war economy through a combination of air strikes and sanctions. If these goals can be achieved, Putin may finally be compelled to seek a settlement.

Christopher Isajiw is an international relations commentator and business development consultant to private, governmental, and non-governmental organizations.

It is easy to understand why Moscow so adamantly opposes the idea of sending Tomahawks to Ukraine. With a potential range of up to 2500 kilometers, these powerful missiles would make it possible for the Ukrainian army to radical expand their current campaign of long-range strikes against military and industrial targets deep inside Russia. Kyiv has already been able to significantly damage Putin’s war machine using domestically produced drones and missiles. There is now clearly a growing sense of alarm in Moscow that the additional firepower provided by American Tomahawks could tip the balance further in Ukraine’s favor.

The real question is whether Russia’s latest threats deserve to be taken seriously. After all, Kremlin officials have frequently used similarly apocalyptic language throughout the past three and a half years of full-scale war, but have consistently failed to back their words up with actions. Time and again, Moscow has declared a new red line while warning the West of potential Russian reprisals, only to then do nothing when these red lines are subsequently crossed.

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Russia’s attempts to impose red lines on Ukraine’s Western allies are a key part of the intimidation tactics employed by Putin since the start of the war. During his address announcing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin threatened the West with “such consequences that you have never faced in your history” if they dared to intervene. This rather obvious reference to nuclear war set the tone for the relentless nuclear blackmail that has followed. When it became apparent last year that Putin’s nuclear bluster was losing its potency, he ostentatiously revised Russia’s nuclear doctrine to lower the threshold for nuclear strikes and heighten the fear factor throughout the democratic world.

Russia’s nuclear threats have certainly not been subtle, but they have proved surprisingly effective against risk-averse Western leaders. From the eve of the invasion onward, every single debate over the delivery of new weapons to Ukraine has been dragged out and delayed by overblown fears of possible escalation and craven talk of the need to avoid provoking Putin.

The timidity of the West has only served to embolden the Kremlin dictator and prolong the war, enabling Russia to punch well above its geopolitical weight against far wealthier and better armed opponents. Indeed, while his armies have struggled to advance on the battlefields of Ukraine, Putin’s ability to intimidate the West has been arguably his single biggest success of the entire invasion.

This success is all the more remarkable given how many times Putin’s threats have been exposed as empty. Russia’s unilaterally declared red lines over the supply of everything from Javelin anti-tank weapons and Patriot air defense systems to F-16 fighter jets and Leopard tanks have all eventually been violated without consequence. Likewise, the Ukrainian army has repeatedly demonstrated its complete disregard for Putin’s red lines by liberating large swathes of the country from Russian occupation, chasing the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of Crimea, and invading Russia itself.

None of this has sparked World War III. On the contrary, Putin has responded to each fresh military setback by attempting to downplay the significance of his latest humiliation. Russian retreats have been rebranded in Orwellian fashion as “goodwill gestures,” while earlier protests over the planned delivery of new weapons systems have been replaced by expressions of defiant indifference.

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Based on the wartime experience of the past three and a half years, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that Russia’s red lines are credible. Instead, the only logical conclusion is that Putin has been bluffing all along. Trump must now decide whether he will call Putin’s bluff and arm Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles.

There are mounting indications that he may be inclined to do so. Since the end of summer, the US leader’s rhetoric toward Russia and Ukraine has changed markedly, with Trump mocking the Russian army as a “paper tiger” and stating that Ukraine is now in a position to win the war. Meanwhile, reports have emerged in recent days that the US is already providing vital intelligence support for Ukraine’s long-range strikes against Russia’s oil and gas industries.

Trump’s apparent change of heart can be partially explained by his loss of patience with Putin, who has rejected the US leader’s generous peace terms and has proven himself to be completely untrustworthy during the past eight months of faltering negotiations. The new US stance is also due to Trump’s evolving understanding of the war in Ukraine. Knowledge of Russia’s failed summer offensive and the country’s escalating economic woes appear to have helped persuade Trump that the time has come to rethink his earlier assumptions regarding the inevitability of Russian victory.

There is some speculation, based in part on Trump’s own comments, that the current US strategy is to raise the prospect of arming Ukraine with Tomahawks without actually supplying them in order to bring Putin to the negotiating table. Even if the missiles are delivered, they are not wonder weapons and will not win the war for Ukraine overnight. Nevertheless, the current debate over Tomahawks represents a potentially important turning point in the biggest European war since World War II.

From the onset of the invasion, Putin has managed to limit support for Ukraine by skillfully exploiting the West’s collective fear of escalation. Trump now has an opportunity to convince his Russian counterpart that he is not as easily intimidated as other Western leaders and is more than ready to increase the pressure on Moscow until Putin agrees to pursue peace. Many of Trump’s detractors will no doubt scoff at the idea of the US president adopting such a uncompromising stance toward Putin, but few objective observers would question that this approach is the only way to end the war.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure are a European problem

Aura Sabadus — Tue, 14 Oct 2025 11:47:09 +0000

Winter is not yet here but Russia has already intensified missile and drone strikes on Ukraine’s civilian energy installations. A series of powerful bombardments in the first ten days of October hit gas production in eastern Ukraine and left large parts of Kyiv and neighboring regions without electricity and water.

This is nothing new, of course. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia has unleashed thousands of attacks on power lines, substations, pipelines, storage facilities, and processing plants as the Kremlin attempts to plunge Ukraine into darkness and cow the country into submission.

Russian attacks are now being conducted on an unprecedented scale. Targets are pounded by dozens of drones in one go, overwhelming Ukraine’s anti-missile systems. For example, in the early hours of October 9, Russia launched approximately 450 drones and 30 missiles at energy infrastructure, dwarfing the scale of attacks in previous years.

The coming winter is shaping up to be the harshest of the war for Ukraine’s civilian population. Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko described the recent attack on the city’s electricity infrastructure as one of the most devastating since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Meanwhile, officials at Ukraine’s state-owned energy giant Naftogaz say the latest Russian strikes have disabled 60 percent of the country’s gas production.

Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated remarkable resilience, including in recent days as emergency crews worked to restore electricity to millions of people within hours of Russian strikes. Nevertheless, with the situation set to become more critical in the weeks and months to come, Ukraine’s allies need to consider decisive action.

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Russia’s strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure are no longer just a Ukrainian problem. Moscow’s bombing campaign will become a wider European issue unless more support is offered to Kyiv. The threat to European energy markets has been increasingly apparent throughout the current year. A number of Russian attacks on Ukrainian gas production assets in February 2025 led to severe imbalances, with a knock-on impact on most central and eastern European countries.

Between February and September, Ukraine bought close to five billion cubic meters of gas from European markets to plug the gap and prepare for winter, lifting regional demand and prices. If Russia continues its attacks this winter, the impact on Ukraine and the wider region promises to be even more dramatic. To prevent a regional deficit, all neighboring countries should therefore consider lifting existing restrictions on exports to Ukraine.

Europe has options to improve the energy outlook for Ukraine, but this will require quick political decisions. Global supplies of liquefied natural gas are set to rise in the coming months thanks to a surge in production, primarily in the US. While most western European countries will benefit from these additional imports because they have access to sea terminals and functional markets, consumers further to the east are less privileged as most are landlocked or have regional transmission capacity that is either congested or too expensive to use.

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Restrictions on energy logistics networks are having a direct impact on Ukraine. Despite sharing borders with four EU countries, Kyiv has been relying mostly on Poland and Hungary to secure imports and offset the domestic deficit caused by Russian attacks. Although Slovakia could offer ample transmission capacity, most of which is now idle because the country no longer transits Russian gas, its transmission tariffs are prohibitively expensive, limiting Ukraine’s ability to import gas from western Europe.

To compound matters, tariffs could increase by a further 70 percent in January 2026 if a planned hike is approved before the end of the year. Meanwhile, neighboring Romania has no less than four border interconnectors with Ukraine. However, its gas grid operator, Transgaz, allows gas to be shipped only on one of these at less than full capacity.

Romania has significant gas production but currently bans exports to Ukraine, quoting technical differences in gas quality in the two countries. Transgaz also charges some of the most expensive transmission tariffs in the region, which means that even countries which would like to ship gas to Ukraine via Romania may be discouraged from doing so.

Keeping tariffs high or blocking infrastructure is not only bad news for Ukraine. It also poses risks to the entire region, including consumers in Romania and Slovakia, because any congestion creates artificial deficits which lead to higher prices. EU and US policymakers understand the extent of the problem and privately admit that even their own interests may be impacted. For example, blocked capacity could also limit the ability of US companies to sell LNG to clients across central and eastern Europe.

Discussions are ongoing but the clock is ticking. As winter approaches, it is now more pressing than ever for Brussels and Washington to convince countries such as Slovakia and Romania to cooperate.

In an ideal scenario, Western allies would consider radical measures such as establishing a no-fly zone over parts of Ukraine with NATO aircraft patrolling its skies and protecting its people and civilian infrastructure. However, as NATO members remain deeply reluctant to risk a direct clash with the Kremlin, the next best option is to persuade Ukraine’s neighbors to put narrow national interests aside and take concrete steps to support Kyiv.

Putin the geopolitical gangster is trying to intimidate Europe

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 09 Oct 2025 20:59:03 +0000

Russian incursions into NATO airspace have become alarmingly commonplace in recent weeks as Vladimir Putin escalates his shadow war against the West. The first clear signal of an upturn in hostile Kremlin activity came in early September when a wave of Russian drones crossed the border into Poland, sparking an armed response from NATO jets. Days later, three Russian fighters violated Estonian airspace. More recently, suspected Russian drones have forced shutdowns at international airports in a number of European countries including Denmark, Norway, Germany, and the Netherlands.

These incursions are far from unprecedented. Ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began more than a decade ago, the Kremlin has been engaged in a campaign of gray zone aggression throughout the democratic world involving everything from social media disinformation and cyberattacks to infrastructure sabotage and assassinations. Nevertheless, the sharp rise in high-profile incidents over the past month suggests we may now be entering a dangerous new phase.

What is Russia’s objective? Many have speculated that the Kremlin may be seeking to test NATO and assess how well the alliance is adapting to the rapidly changing military realities of drone warfare. This is a reasonable assumption. It is certainly true that each new Russian provocation has yielded a treasure trove of useful intelligence on the current state of Europe’s defenses.

At the same time, it is difficult to believe that Putin is in a position to dramatically expand the current war. The Kremlin dictator has committed the vast majority of Russia’s available military potential to the invasion of Ukraine, leaving him too overstretched to intervene elsewhere on behalf of Russian allies in Armenia, Syria, and Iran. A Russian attack on NATO therefore looks unlikely, at least for now. Instead, the recent surge in Russian hybrid warfare activities is primarily an attempt to intimidate Europe and deter further support for Ukraine.

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Putin has long been recognized for his skill in the dark arts of international intimidation. This reputation has been significantly enhanced by the success of his scare tactics during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, while Putin’s armies have struggled to live up to expectations on the battlefield, his ability to intimidate his Western adversaries has been arguably the Russian leader’s single greatest achievement of the entire war.

Since the initial hours of the invasion, Putin has used a combination of thinly-veiled threats and nuclear saber-rattling to browbeat the West and isolate Ukraine. Like a geopolitical gangster, he has repeatedly intimidated Europeans with the prospect of shattering their peaceful existence if they dare to interfere in his criminal affairs. While he has typically steered clear of direct ultimatums, the underlying message behind Putin’s many menacing statements has been unmistakable: “Nice countries you have there. It would be a shame if something happened to them.”

This strategy has proved remarkably effective. While Western governments have condemned Russia’s “irresponsible” use of nuclear rhetoric and have publicly insisted that they will not be bullied by the Kremlin, there can be no serious debate that Putin’s threats have had the desired effect. His intimidation tactics have been fundamental in shaping the overly cautious international response to Russia’s invasion, which has been consistently characterized by an excessive emphasis on avoiding escalation.

The Kremlin dictator is now looking to employ the same approach as he seeks to exploit Europe’s growing sense of insecurity. Putin is well aware that European leaders have been unnerved by US President Donald Trump’s mixed messaging on NATO and his plans to reduce America’s involvement in the defense of Europe. For Moscow, this presents an inviting opportunity. By engaging in increasingly open acts of aggression across Europe, Putin is sending a signal to European capitals that they are all alone against a resurgent Russia and can no longer count on the reassuring presence of the United States.

Earlier this week, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev provided the most explicit indication yet that the recent spike in Russian gray zone operations is aimed at intimidating Europeans. While refusing to accept responsibility for the sharp rise in disruptive drone activity, Medvedev noted with satisfaction that the “drone epidemic” was causing widespread panic and could persuade Europeans to turn away from Ukraine. “The main thing is for narrow-minded Europeans to experience the dangers of war for themselves. To tremble like dumb animals in a herd being driven to the slaughter. To soil themselves with fear, anticipating their imminent and painful end,” he commented in typically understated fashion.

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Putin is clearly hoping his drone diplomacy will spread a sense of alarm across Europe and encourage the continent’s leaders to abandon Ukraine. Desired initial outcomes include a reduction in European military aid for Kyiv and the redirection of existing resources away from Ukraine in order to bolster defenses closer to home. By exposing Europe’s vulnerability to Russian attack, Moscow may also be able to undermine the prospects of a unified European defense policy and strengthen support for Kremlin-friendly political parties advocating appeasement toward Russia.

This strategy is not without risk, of course. Some in Europe, particularly those with firsthand experience of Russian imperialism, are pushing hard for comprehensive countermeasures to Putin’s recent provocations that will underline the continent’s commitment to defending itself. Many remain unconvinced that Europe will rise to the challenge, however. The Kremlin certainly appears confident that the current rhetoric in European capitals will ultimately result in little concrete action.

This apparent lack of concern in Moscow should come as no surprise. After all, Putin has been betting on Western weakness for over two decades. Ever since he first embarked on an expansionist foreign policy with the 2008 invasion of Georgia, Putin has been counting on the democratic world’s deep reluctance to risk a direct military confrontation with the Kremlin. So far, his low opinion of the West has proved more than justified.

Putin’s invasion has not gone according to plan but he still firmly believes he can win the war by outlasting the West and overwhelming Ukraine. He has recently been encouraged by Trump’s efforts to downgrade US involvement, and now views Europe as the last remaining obstacle to Russian victory. It is therefore safe to assume that the Kremlin’s campaign of gray zone aggression will continue to gain momentum as Putin seeks to cow Europe and isolate Kyiv. The Russian leader thinks his enemies are weak and can be easily intimidated. Until he is proved wrong, the cost of stopping him will only rise.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Ukraine’s defense tech sector must guard against innovation drain

Andriy Dovbenko — Thu, 09 Oct 2025 00:01:12 +0000

On the outskirts of Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine, Ukrainian electronic warfare teams are deploying home-grown systems that automatically detect and suppress Russian drones. Along the southern front, domestically developed observation drones are giving Ukrainian troops real-time visibility in contested airspace. These are not prototypes; they’re battle-proven Ukrainian technologies saving lives on a daily basis and shaping the future of warfare.

Yet as Ukraine cements its reputation as a defense tech powerhouse, a strategic risk is emerging. Without robust intellectual property (IP) protections, Ukraine may lose control of the very breakthroughs that are currently helping to defend the country on the battlefield. Ukraine could potentially win the war itself and secure national survival, only to lose the innovation economy that should underpin its recovery.

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Wartime urgency creates pressure to sacrifice IP sovereignty. Startups under fire need capital, global market access, and production capacity which foreign investors and international partners can provide. But too often, these deals require handing over IP rights. What looks like a lifeline can, in fact, be a strategic loss.

This leaves Ukraine exposed to a quiet leakage of its designs. Meanwhile, the absence of a strong domestic IP framework risks pushing entrepreneurs to register patents and commercialize outside the country, where protections are stronger and funding is more accessible. The result could be both a brain drain and an innovation drain, hollowing out Ukraine’s defense tech sector just as it proves its global potential. Instead of becoming an international hub, Ukraine risks being relegated to the status of pipeline for foreign defense industries.

The case for IP sovereignty is not only about Ukraine’s economy and national security; it is also about the future resilience of Europe and NATO. For Ukraine, retained IP means royalties, licensing revenues, and a steady funding stream for reconstruction. It signals to investors that Ukraine is not just a wartime incubator but a serious innovation ecosystem. Most importantly, it preserves national sovereignty. Control over sensitive technologies ensures Ukraine is not permanently dependent on foreign suppliers for security.

For Kyiv’s allies, Ukrainian IP is also an important asset. The United States is currently exploring a multi-billion dollar joint drone production deal with Ukraine. But if Ukraine cannot retain ownership, partners risk relying on fragmented supply chains and losing access to innovation. Europe’s Defense Industrial Strategy, launched this year, calls for a resilient continental base. That goal will be undermined if Europe’s most battle-tested and innovative nation loses control of its own technologies.

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Protecting IP involves more than goodwill. It requires policy, legislation, and institutional design. Every foreign aid package and licensing deal should include explicit protections for Ukrainian IP ownership. Likewise, technological solutions co-developed with international partners must not result in the wholesale transfer of rights.

Ukraine’s current plan to relax restrictions on some categories of arms exports is good news. Export barriers force many firms into joint ventures (JVs) or licensing arrangements that often strip away their IP protections. Enabling direct exports would ease this dependency on JVs or licensing, reducing both complexity and IP risk, as well as the danger of leakage. Ukraine should encourage co-production and investment, but on terms that guarantee domestic equity and enforceable IP rights.

Currently, the Ukrainian government is closely monitoring its top innovators to prevent IP leaks abroad. Some companies have sought to incorporate outside of Ukraine in order to free themselves from these shackles, but have encountered problems related to unfair IP structuring. One solution could be greater intergovernmental cooperation. This could allow Ukraine to access external capital and expertise while keeping control over core technologies.

Tech parks and defense incubators should anchor talent domestically, providing access to funding, testing grounds, and mentorship. With 40,000 trained drone pilots and a new generation of AI engineers, Ukraine could benefit hugely if the country can create the right climate to build global companies at home. Speed is also important. Traditional patent offices often move too slowly for battlefield innovation. Ukraine needs a dedicated defense IP office to fast-track protection, address dual-use complexities, and guard against theft or predatory licensing.

The Israeli experience provides a potentially useful model for Ukraine. Decades of conflict have forced Israel to develop technologies with immediate battlefield relevance. Crucially, Israel has managed to retain IP sovereignty, even when foreign funding was involved, and has built an ecosystem where defense innovation feeds into global competitiveness.

Europe also offers lessons. Airbus shows how multinational collaboration can preserve shared IP while scaling production across borders. The overall objective is clear: Ukraine should be positioned as a central node in Europe’s defense industry and not just as a subcontractor.

Ukraine’s battlefield innovations are saving lives today, but they can also lay the foundations for tomorrow’s Ukrainian economy. Without IP sovereignty, Ukraine risks becoming a laboratory for others. With the right frameworks, Ukraine can transition from its current status as a war-driven exporter of ideas to become a global defense industry innovation leader. This can only happen if the country’s IP assets are protected.

Andriy Dovbenko is the founder and principal at UK-Ukraine TechExchange.

Putin rejected Trump’s generous deal. Time to try peace through strength.

Sergiy Solodkyy — Mon, 06 Oct 2025 20:39:26 +0000

Many Ukrainians agree with US President Donald Trump’s criticism of the Russia policies adopted by his predecessors. Like Trump, they believe that the excessive caution displayed by both Barack Obama and Joe Biden only served to embolden Vladimir Putin. This shared sentiment led to a surprising degree of optimism in Ukraine when Trump returned to the White House, despite his perceived ambivalence toward the country.

Much has happened since then to dampen any initial Ukrainian enthusiasm. Rather than getting tough with Putin, Trump has spent much of 2025 trying to win the Kremlin dictator over by offering generous peace terms while pressing Kyiv to make painful concessions. Putin has responded by intensifying his invasion. This has included major new offensives on the front lines of the war and a sharp escalation in the bombardment of Ukrainian cities.

With Trump’s patience now apparently wearing thin, there has recently been a striking change in United States rhetoric toward the Kremlin. The US leader has even taken to mocking Russia as a “paper tiger.” In order to pressure Putin into accepting a peace deal, however, Trump will have to match his increasingly harsh statements with decisive actions.

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While Ukrainians are grateful for all the international support their country has received since the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, there is also a strong sense that the democratic world has been far too slow and uncertain in its efforts to deter the Kremlin. For over a decade, the West’s underwhelming sanctions, limited military support for Ukraine, and obvious reluctance to risk escalation have been interpreted in Moscow as a tacit green light to go further.

The feeble reaction to the Russian seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in early 2014 set the tone for all that was to follow. Rather than uniting to oppose the first major European land grab of the twenty first century, Western leaders urged Ukraine not to respond to Russia’s unprecedented attack and even praised Kyiv for showing “restraint.” This appeasement led directly to Russia’s covert invasion of eastern Ukraine and ultimately set the stage for the full-scale invasion of 2022.

Trump is correct when he claims that Putin invaded Ukraine because he believed he would not face a strong response from the United States and its European allies. However, this has not yet led to a more decisive stance from the White House to match the current administration’s talk of “peace through strength.” Trump’s recent change in tone and his unprecedented criticism of Russia certainly send the right signal, but Putin will not be moved by words alone.

While Trump’s somewhat unconventional approach to diplomacy has left many frustrated, he can take credit for a number of encouraging developments. Most significantly, he has obliged Europe to take its own security more seriously and pressed European leaders to accept greater responsibility for supporting the Ukrainian war effort. By agreeing to sell US weapons to Ukraine via Europe, he has also established a potentially long-term format for stable and reliable arms deliveries to Kyiv.

Efforts to improve relations with Russia have proved far less successful. While Moscow has been careful to voice its theoretical support for US-led peace efforts, Putin has repeatedly attempted to stall the process and play for time. Meanwhile, he has continued to escalate the invasion. During Trump’s time in office, Russia has dramatically increased drone and missile attacks targeting Ukraine’s civilian population, setting a new daily record in early September. By his actions, Putin has rejected Trump’s calls for peace and made it abundantly clear that he has no interest in ending the war.

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There are now indications that Putin’s unwillingness to compromise has finally forced Trump’s hand. His recent statement that Kyiv can “win all of Ukraine back in its original form” was widely seen as a major shift in the United States stance. There have also been reports of more tangible changes in Washington such as a growing readiness to expand intelligence sharing with Ukraine to enable deep strikes inside Russia, along with the possible delivery of Tomahawk missiles. Kyiv and Moscow will both be watching closely to see whether these developments signal the start of a more fundamental change in the Trump administration’s efforts to broker a peace agreement.

One key sign would be Trump’s willingness to provide Ukraine with longer term indications of his support. This relates to US arms deliveries and also to the provision of security guarantees. So far, the mixed messages coming from the White House on these crucial issues have encouraged Putin to believe he can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine.

The US leader can also turn up the pressure on Russia’s allies and enablers via secondary sanctions and other economic measures. Since 2022, Russia has found a large number of willing international partners ready to help the country bypass Western sanctions. The obvious answer is to target the authoritarian alliance that supports Putin and helps fund his war machine.

In order to make any progress, Trump must convince Russia to take his talk of peace through strength seriously. Moscow is currently betting that the United States will eventually grow tired of Ukraine and scale back its diplomatic efforts to end the war. That assumption reduces Russia’s readiness to accept a compromise peace, as Putin is confident that Ukraine will be too weak to resist without US support. However, if Russia can be persuaded that Trump will not abandon Ukraine and is committed to securing the country’s long-term survival as an independent state, Putin will be more likely to engage in serious negotiations.

For more than half a year, Trump has tried to entice Russia to the negotiating table with offers of advantageous peace terms and attractive cooperation opportunities. So far, he has been met with nothing but empty promises and deadly escalations. It is now time to speak to Putin in the language of strength, the only language he truly understands and respects.

Sergiy Solodkyy is director of the New Europe Center in Ukraine.

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Russia is said to have invested heavily in the recent campaign to shape the outcome of Moldova’s election. This included everything from financial incentives to disinformation campaigns. A BBC investigation found evidence of a Russian-funded network that paid people to post fake news online and organize rigged polls showing inflated levels of support for pro-Kremlin parties.

Social media was a key battleground in the Kremlin’s efforts to interfere in the election. Information warfare watchdogs claim Russia recruited operatives locally and employed AI technologies to create large quantities of fake accounts and flood Moldovan social media platforms with disinformation attacking President Sandu and her political party.

The scale of Russia’s efforts caused considerable alarm in Chisinau. Days before the vote, Sandu accused the Kremlin of spending hundreds of millions of euros on an election interference campaign in order to buy votes and “intoxicate” the Molodvan electorate with misleading and often inflammatory online content.

The Moldovan authorities also uncovered evidence of illicit financing including undeclared cash flows and cryptocurrency schemes. Just two days before the vote, Moldova’s Central Electoral Commission barred one pro-Kremlin party from running following a court ruling over allegations of voter bribery, illegal party financing, and money laundering.

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Russia’s attempt to sway the elections in Moldova ultimately failed. The reasons for this failure are instructive. Moldova’s state institutions deserve credit for displaying impressive vigilance and resolve. This included enforcing election campaign financing laws, acting to counter disinformation, and communicating clearly with the electorate.

Moscow’s plans may also have been undermined by corruption among those entrusted with the task of interfering in the Moldovan election. Some of the Kremlin’s local partners allegedly pocketed cash themselves rather than paying for influence operations or using allocated funds to bribe potential voters.

The decisive role was played by the Moldovan electorate. Despite Russia’s extensive efforts to discredit the pro-European camp with all manner of lurid fakes and conspiracy theories, Sandu’s electoral platform of European integration, transparency, and reform received majority backing from the Moldovan public.

This overwhelming pro-European victory highlighted modern Russia’s lack of a coherent ideology or convincing counter-narrative. While Kremlin operatives are experts in the dark arts of negative campaigning, they struggle to offer anything that can compete with the undeniable appeal of democratic rights, higher living standards, and the rule of law.

Moldova’s election is a case study in the limits of Russian interference operations. Moscow invested considerable resources in the campaign, but was ultimately unable to overcome the country’s institutional safeguards or persuade enough Moldovan voters to turn against the ruling authorities.

The lessons from Moldova seem clear: Russian election interference operations represent a genuine and persistent threat to all democratic countries and need to be taken seriously. However, as the Moldovan experience has demonstrated, an informed electorate, resilient democratic systems, and vigilant law enforcement can blunt even large-scale Kremlin campaigns.

Moldova is now in a strong position to advance further along the path toward European integration. This is also good news for Ukraine, which would have faced the prospect of a possible new front in the war with Russia if pro-Kremlin forces had won control of the Moldovan parliament. For Moscow, meanwhile, the vote was one more indication that Russia is losing influence throughout the former Soviet Empire and is struggling to compete with the more compelling ideas of its democratic opponents.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

Drone superpower Ukraine is teaching NATO how to defend against Russia

David Kirichenko — Thu, 02 Oct 2025 20:23:42 +0000

The recent escalation in Russian drone incursions across Europe has inadvertently underlined Ukraine’s burgeoning reputation as the continent’s leading practitioner of drone warfare. A number of individual countries including Denmark and Poland have responded to Russia’s provocative actions by seeking to establish joint anti-drone training initiatives with Ukrainian instructors, while Ukraine has featured prominently in the fast-evolving discussion over a collective European defense against Putin’s drones.

Ukraine’s drone warfare prowess was a hot topic at this week’s European Political Community Summit in Copenhagen. “The only expert right now in the world when it comes to anti-drone capacities is Ukraine, because they are fighting the Russian drones almost every day,” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen commented. “We need to take all the experiences, all the new technology, all the innovation from Ukraine, and incorporate it into our own rearmament.”

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte agreed with the Danish leader’s assessment of Ukraine’s pivotal role. “Ukraine is a powerhouse when it comes to military innovation and anti-drone technology,” he noted, adding that Ukraine’s readiness to share its insights with the country’s NATO partners was “very important.”

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Ukraine’s rapid rise to drone superpower status confirms the old adage that necessity is the mother of invention. When Putin first launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it was clear that the Ukrainian military could not realistically hope to compete with Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower and conventional firepower. Instead, Kyiv would have to rely on a combination of raw courage and innovative technological solutions.

From the early stages of the war, Ukraine began pioneering the large-scale deployment of drones in combat roles. By 2023, this was enabling Ukrainian commanders to compensate for artillery shell shortages and blunt Russian advances. This emphasis on relatively cheap and highly effective drones has transformed the battlefield and created a kill zone along the front lines that Ukrainians have dubbed the “Drone Wall.”

With drones now ubiquitous above the battlefield, any soldier or vehicle that breaks cover in a zone stretching for many kilometers on either side of the zero line risks becoming an instant target. This has made it extremely challenging to concentrate large quantities of troops and armor, which helps explain the lack of major front line breakthroughs over the past three years.

Ukraine has also employed drone technologies to great effect far beyond the battlefield. Kyiv’s innovative use of marine drones has turned the tide in the Battle of the Black Sea, breaking the Russian blockade of Ukraine’s southern coastline and forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his warships from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports. More recently, Ukrainian marine drones have been modified to carry anti-aircraft missiles and have reportedly shot down Russian helicopters over the Black Sea. This unprecedented success has revolutionized naval warfare and led to growing global interest in Ukraine’s domestically developed marine drones.

Kyiv has dramatically expanded its long-range drone fleet in recent years as part of a strategy to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia. As a result, Ukraine has been able to mount a highly effective bombing campaign since August 2025 targeting oil refineries, logistics hubs, and military industrial sites deep inside the Russian Federation. This has led to a fuel crisis across Russia, with some regions forced to introduce gasoline rationing amid supply shortages and record price hikes. Ukraine’s long-range strikes have helped to reshape perceptions of the war and have demonstrated how Kyiv’s technological edge can offset its material disadvantages.

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Former Ukrainian Commander in Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi was one of the architects of Ukraine’s drone warfare doctrine until being relieved of his position in early 2024. In a recent commentary, he argued that innovation must remain the foundation of a sustainable Ukrainian resistance strategy against Russia. Zaluzhnyi stressed that Ukraine’s embrace of drone technologies has helped offset the imbalance between the two countries while inflicting disproportionate costs on the Kremlin. “Ukraine must compensate for its relative lack of resources by constantly introducing military innovations,” he commented.

Ukraine and Russia now find themselves locked in a relentless race to innovate, with the window between the appearance of new weapons systems and the development of effective countermeasures now sometimes reduced to a matter of weeks. The intensity of this competition has turbo-charged Ukraine’s domestic drone industry and propelled it far ahead of its Western counterparts.

If NATO members wish to close this gap, they must lean heavily on the technical and strategic lessons learned by the Ukrainian military over the past three and half years of full-scale drone warfare. Training initiatives are already underway, with President Zelenskyy expressing his readiness to share Ukraine’s experience with more of the country’s NATO partners.

A growing number of countries are also looking to establish joint drone production in order to benefit from Ukrainian defense tech know-how. In late September, Britain announced that it would soon launch the mass production of interceptor drones developed in collaboration with Ukraine. Romania has also recently unveiled ambitious plans to manufacture drones in partnership with Ukraine for domestic use and for potential export to NATO allies. Meanwhile, a Ukrainian delegation is reportedly in the United States this week to negotiate a landmark deal with the Trump administration that would see Kyiv sharing battle-tested drone technology with the US.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the world’s first fully fledged drone war and represents a watershed moment in military history. With drones now set to play a dominant role in the wars of the future, Ukraine’s unique experience in this technologically advanced form of warfare makes the country a key partner for NATO and an indispensable ally in the defense of Europe.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Freedom, Chapiuk argues, brings a painful clarity to what has been taken away. “Six months, one year, then three; those numbers felt oddly insignificant because you were always surrounded by people who had served longer. Once you’re free, you realize how long that time really is.”

Chapiuk remains deeply concerned for his friends and colleagues who are still unjustly imprisoned, such as Marfa Rabkova. “Masha has missed so much over this period, left so much behind. There are health problems, too. I think it will feel even heavier when she’s released.”

The longer you’ve been inside, says Chapiuk, the harder it is to adjust to the new realities of freedom. “You step out into a world you last saw during COVID. People in masks. Now there’s a war. Belarus feels emptier. Technology has leapt ahead and you’re supposed to just jump right back in.” The arrival of artificial intelligence especially struck him. “In prison, we heard rumors. Once free, I was amazed at how cohesive and powerful these tools are.”

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Chapiuk says that political prisoners in Belarus now face restricted access to books and education. “When I arrived in 2023, inmates could still apply for secondary education. Months later, the authorities cut it off entirely, especially for those of us on the extremism list. Then they started confiscating foreign language books, even personal ones.”

The confiscation of books is used as a form of punishment. “People tried hiding their own books but staff still found and confiscated them. The mindset in the system is that prisoners must suffer constantly. And since political prisoners tend to value books and education, the system decided to eliminate those.”

While discussing what life might have been like if he had not been arrested in 2020, Chapiuk is adamant that there really was no alternative. “Historically in Belarus, after civic activity, repression follows. I expected something to happen after the 2020 protests, but not the scale. Given the situation in Belarus, I’d likely have ended up either imprisoned or forced into exile anyway.”

On the subject of exile, we discuss Chapiuk’s decision to leave Belarus after his release. Faced with constant harassment and the likelihood of rearrest, he felt that fleeing Belarus was the only option. “The police presence in Belarus is constant. Former prisoners are subjected to mandatory check-ins twice a month, weekly lectures, and home visits, often late at night with flashlights in your face.”

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In early 2022, news of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine reached Belarusian inmates via state media. “Only later did I learn the truth about occupied cities and mass casualties. There was constant fear that Belarus would be dragged in and that we prisoners would be used as cannon fodder,” Chapiuk recalls. He says that even the prison guards seemed unsettled, secretly following independent news sources and perhaps worrying about what role they might be forced to play should Belarus enter the war.

International attention has become a complex issue for Belarusian political prisoners in recent years. Relatives of prisoners often ask human rights organizations not to make posts marking detention anniversaries or birthdays, as such attention can lead to reprisals inside prison. At the same time, Chapiuk argues that media coverage can make a difference. “After reports of abuse, inspectors arrive at colonies or jails. Prisons often hide people in punishment cells, but overall, high-profile prisoners are sometimes mistreated less to avoid trouble.”

Chapiuk emphasizes the importance of keeping the health of political prisoners high on the agenda. “The more medical units are checked, the more violations are documented, the better for inmates in the long run. Prison healthcare is terrible everywhere.”

Letters were once a lifeline for political prisoners in Belarus but are now heavily censored, says Chapiuk. Nevertheless, he urges people not to give up and to continue writing. “Even if letters don’t reach us, the authorities see the activity. It shows we’re not forgotten.”

The families of political prisoners also face pressure and can be targeted by the Belarusian authorities. Chapiuk recalls the case of one co-defendant’s mother who was given a prison sentence for simply sharing information about her son. “The state has built a second ring of repression to cut off information flows.”

Chapiuk is deeply troubled by the idea that the suffering of Belarusians will be forgotten and that no one will be held accountable for the years of abuse, despite the extensive documentation of human rights violations by Belarusian civil society. Recent prisoner releases have given him hope, despite the fact that these releases have often been followed by forced exile. “It would be better if people were freed earlier, not just at the end of their terms. But still, each release matters. It means someone can finally live freely again and feel what freedom really is.”

Craig Jackson is senior communications officer at the Human Rights House Foundation.

The results speak for themselves. Ukrainian drones have excelled along the front lines of the conflict and have allowed Kyiv to turn the tide in the Battle of the Black Sea. Far beyond Ukraine’s borders, the country’s growing fleet of bomber drones now routinely strike targets deep inside the Russian Federation.

Many partner countries are understandably eager to incorporate Ukrainian drone technologies into their own defense doctrines. Britain recently confirmed that it will begin mass producing drones developed in collaboration with Ukraine as part of efforts to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank against the threat of Russian incursions. A Ukrainian delegation reportedly set off for the United States in late September to begin discussions on a potentially major drone production cooperation agreement.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is well aware of his country’s rising military profile and sees the current mission to Denmark as a potential model for a more comprehensive approach to Ukrainian drone warfare training initiatives with other European countries. “Our experience, our specialists, and our technologies can become a key element in Europe’s future Drone Wall initiative,” he commented on September 30.

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Ukraine’s burgeoning reputation as a key player in the field of drone warfare reflects the dramatic shifts currently taking place in Europe’s security architecture. Until quite recently, Ukraine was treated as a military minnow struggling to adopt NATO standards. Strikingly, it is now NATO that is seeking to adopt Ukrainian standards.

The emergence of Ukraine as a drone superpower is only one aspect of the country’s remarkable recent transformation into a major military force. The Ukrainian army is also at the cutting edge of innovation in defense tech sectors including electronic warfare, robotic systems, and cyber security. It came as no surprise that the recent Defense Tech Valley industry showcase event in western Ukraine attracted at least 5000 participants from over 50 countries, with Western companies pledging more than $100 million in investments.

The technological progress made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2022 is certainly eye-catching, but the country’s human capital remains its greatest asset. Today’s Ukraine boasts Europe’s second-largest army, with almost one million men and women currently in uniform and a large reserve of battle-hardened combat veterans. This dwarfs anything else on the continent, even before Ukraine’s unrivaled experience of modern warfare is taken into account. With the United States seeking to reduce its role in European security, the Ukrainian military is now the biggest single barrier between an expansionist Russia and an unprepared Europe.

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Ukraine’s newfound status as one of Europe’s leading military powers is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s worst nightmare. It is nightmare entirely of his own making. Indeed, this military metamorphosis would have been inconceivable without the impetus of Russian imperial aggression.

When Putin began the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Kyiv had only a few thousand combat-ready troops at its disposal. At first, things went according to plan for Moscow, with minimal Ukrainian resistance to the seizure of Crimea. However, Russian efforts to push further into mainland Ukraine then sparked a wave of popular resistance, with thousands of ordinary Ukrainians forming improvised volunteer battalions to block the Kremlin advance. This epic grassroots response saved Ukraine and laid the foundations for the subsequent expansion and modernization of the Ukrainian army.

Despite this stunning setback, Putin refused to accept defeat. With his initial plans to extinguish Ukrainian statehood thwarted, the Kremlin dictator made the fateful decision to escalate further and began preparing to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

On the morning of the invasion, Putin identified the “demilitarization” of Ukraine as one of his two key war aims. This made perfect sense. After all, in order to effectively subjugate Ukraine, it would first be necessary to render the country defenseless. However, it is now abundantly clear that Putin’s plan to demilitarize Ukraine has backfired disastrously.

Russia’s invasion has spurred the creation of a formidable military machine in Ukraine that has quickly come to occupy a pivotal role in European security. In capitals across Europe, there is a growing sense of recognition that the Ukrainian army is indispensable for the defense of the continent and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Kyiv’s partners now have an obvious and urgent self-interest in supporting Ukraine’s defense industry and financing the Ukrainian war effort. Indeed, the choice currently facing European leaders is disarmingly simple: Support Ukraine today or face Russia tomorrow.

With Russian troops still advancing and Russian drones and missiles pummeling Ukrainian cities, it remains far too early to declare Putin’s invasion a failure. Nevertheless, it is already difficult to conceive of any outcome that would leave Ukraine undefended and at Moscow’s mercy. Instead, the Ukrainian army is likely to emerge from the war stronger than ever and fully capable of defending the country’s place within the European community of nations. Putin had hoped to disarm and decapitate the Ukrainian state, but his self-defeating demilitarization campaign has inadvertently created the strong and fiercely independent Ukraine he feared most of all.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

This might look like progress at first glance, but the reality is less encouraging. For every Belarusian prisoner released, others are being jailed. Just days after the US delegation left Minsk in September, journalist Ihar Ilyash was sentenced to four years in prison. Since June, when former Belarusian opposition leader Siarhei Tsikhanouski and others were freed thanks to American efforts, 131 new political prisoners have been locked up, representing almost exactly double the total number released during the same period. Today, around 1,300 Belarusian political prisoners remain behind bars.

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It should come as no surprise to see Lukashenka imprisoning more people. After all, recent sanctions relief has given him an obvious incentive to manufacture more hostages, which he can then trade for further concessions during future negotiations.

The United States and Europe have been down this road before. Between 2015 and 2020, some Western sanctions against Belarus were lifted and high-level visits to Minsk resumed, while Lukashenka was courted as a potential mediator in efforts to resolve Russia’s undeclared war against Ukraine. This led to a series of symbolic gestures but no structural reforms. Ultimately, hopes of building bridges with Belarus collapsed in 2020 when Lukashenka responded to nationwide pro-democracy protests by launching a brutal crackdown.

Any serious effort to improve relations between Minsk and the democratic world must be grounded in a realistic appraisal of the Lukashenka regime. In the final analysis, Lukashenka will always choose Moscow over the West because his political survival depends on it. This has become abundantly clear since 2020, when the Kremlin intervened to help the Belarusian dictator crush protests. Two years later, Belarus served as a launchpad for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Today, Belarus reportedly hosts Russian tactical nuclear weapons and plays a supporting role in Moscow’s hybrid war against the West. Even when he appears to be acting independently, Lukashenka is careful not to directly cross the Kremlin. When Russian drones recently violated Polish airspace, including some that entered Poland via Belarusian territory, Minsk warned Warsaw of the threat but carefully avoided blaming Moscow.

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Advocates of renewed engagement with Minsk argue that efforts to punish Lukashenka have failed to prevent Belarus’s slide deeper into authoritarianism. But a premature thaw would now carry enormous costs. Relaxing sanctions and reopening trade would boost state-controlled Belarusian companies and revitalize the regime while demoralizing the democratic resistance at home and abroad. Crucially, it would also provide Russia with a potential sanctions loophole in the heart of Europe.

Addressing the challenges posed by an authoritarian Belarus is vital for European security. As long the Lukashenka dictatorship endures, NATO’s eastern flank will remain unstable and Ukraine will continue to face a major threat along the country’s northern border. Other authoritarian regimes are also watching the Western approach toward Belarus closely. If Lukashenka is able to secure benefits without compromising his own position, his fellow autocrats will draw the obvious conclusions and act accordingly.

Rejecting high-level engagement with Lukashenka does not mean abandoning Belarus. Instead, the current focus should be on seeking ways to support Belarusians directly while maintaining pressure on the regime. This could involve greater support for Belarusian civil society and independent journalism in exile, along with cultural and educational outreach that strengthens links between Belarusians and the wider European community. More scholarships should be made available, while access to visas and professional opportunities could also be significantly enhanced.

Rewarding Lukashenka without requiring any meaningful change in Belarus is not pragmatism. It is appeasement. This kind of short-term thinking will only serve to further entrench the current dictatorship. Instead, the message to Minsk must be one of Western unity and resolve, with a commitment to maintaining sanctions pressure on the regime while investing in a better future for ordinary Belarusians. Ultimately, Western policy toward Lukashenka must be shaped by recognition that only a democratic Belarus can bring lasting stability to the wider region.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Trump called Russia a ‘paper tiger’ because he believes Putin is losing

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 25 Sep 2025 20:41:25 +0000

US President Donald Trump made headlines this week with a social media post that suggested a dramatic shift in his position on the Russia-Ukraine War. After months of insisting that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “doesn’t have the cards” and must “make a deal” involving sweeping concessions to the Kremlin, Trump suddenly declared on September 23 that Ukraine was now “in a position to fight and win all of Ukraine back in its original form.”

Much of Trump’s post focused on taunting Putin over his faltering invasion. In characteristically abrasive language, the US leader mocked the Russian army’s lack of progress in Ukraine and suggested Moscow was facing major economic problems due to the spiraling cost of the war. “Russia has been fighting aimlessly for three and a half years a war that should have taken a real military power less than a week to win,” Trump wrote. “This is not distinguishing Russia. In fact, it is very much making them look like a paper tiger.”

Many commentators chose to leap on Trump’s statement as proof of a major change in US policy toward Ukraine. In fact, the post contained nothing that suggested a new approach to relations between Washington and Kyiv. On the contrary, Trump stressed that it would now now be up to Europe to take the lead in supporting Ukraine.

While the US President repeatedly asserted that Ukraine could defeat Russia, there was no indication that America was ready to increase its support for the Ukrainian war effort or expand sanctions against Moscow. Instead, Trump limited himself to confirming that the US will continue to sell weapons to Ukraine via NATO partners. In other words, the Trump administration’s stance on the war is set to remain largely unchanged. However, instead of pressing Ukraine to accept a Kremlin-friendly peace deal, Trump is now openly talking about Ukrainian victory.

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What caused President Trump’s rather radical change in tone? Putin’s relentless stalling tactics and his shameless backtracking have no doubt played a role, exhausting the US leader’s patience and making him look foolish for touting their alleged personal friendship. Trump himself has suggested that his new assessment of the war is based on a detailed understanding of the current military and economic situation in Russia and Ukraine. This version has been endorsed by US Vice President JD Vance, who commented this week that Trump has “grown very confident this war is bad for Russia.”

It is not difficult to imagine how intelligence briefings on the current state of the war in Ukraine might have convinced Trump to revise his earlier assumptions regarding Russia’s economic and military might. Putin’s recent summer offensive was billed as a potential turning point in the war but has clearly failed to achieve its objectives. Russian troops were unable to secure any major breakthroughs during the summer months and have made little progress toward the establishment of a border buffer zone in northern Ukraine. This underwhelming outcome was entirely in line with broader battlefield trends that have seen Russia forces seize less than one percent of Ukrainian territory over the past three years.

Russia’s modest gains have come at a terrible price. While neither Moscow nor Kyiv release official casualty figures, independent research based on open source data and intelligence reports indicate that hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine, with even greater numbers wounded. This dwarfs the losses suffered in all the wars waged by the Kremlin since World War II.

In order to replenish the depleted ranks of his army, Putin has been forced to offer ever-larger bounties to new recruits. Nevertheless, the catastrophic casualty rate in Ukraine means that even the present steady flow of Russian volunteers may not be enough to sustain the invasion. In an indication of Moscow’s mounting manpower challenges, Putin brokered a deal with Pyongyang last year that saw more than ten thousand North Korean soldiers deployed to fight alongside the Russian army.

Putin is also visibly in struggling in the wider geopolitical arena. With the vast majority of Russia’s military resources already committed to the invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has found itself unable to project strength elsewhere. Russia could do nothing when the simmering war between Azerbaijan and Armenia flared up in 2023, and has since been largely excluded from the peace process between the two countries, leaving centuries of Russian imperial influence in doubt. Similarly, when the regime of Kremlin client Bashar al-Assad was under threat in late 2024, Moscow was unable to intervene to save the Syrian dictator. Iranian officials encountered the same toothless response more recently when they appealed to their Russian allies for help during Israel’s brief air war against the country.

As Russia’s international influence declines, Putin is facing growing economic woes on the home front. These problems are being compounded by an escalating Ukrainian bombing campaign targeting the Russian oil and gas industry. Since the beginning of August, Ukraine has launched dozens of airstrikes against Russian refineries, pipelines, pumping stations, and ports. This Ukrainian aerial offensive has dealt the biggest blow to the Russian economy since the start of the war, Reuters reports, with refining capacity significantly curtailed and energy exports down. Crucially, Ukrainian attacks have sparked a worsening fuel crisis in regions across Russia, with long queues forming at gas stations amid supply breakdowns and record price hikes.

Russia’s inability to defend its economically vital energy industry against Ukrainian long-range drones has highlighted just how overstretched the country’s military currently is. With the army’s limited supply of air defense systems deployed to the front lines in Ukraine or guarding major Russian cities along with the palaces of Putin and his cronies, there is simply not enough spare capacity to protect the vast oil and gas infrastructure that serves as the engine of Putin’s war machine.

This does not bode well for the Kremlin. Ukraine is clearly intent on methodically destroying Russia’s energy industry and is developing its own domestically produced cruise missiles to do so. If these weapons become more readily available in the coming months as anticipated, Kyiv’s capacity to strike targets deep inside Russia will be drastically enhanced.

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The unfavorable current military and economic outlook helps to explain why Trump chose to brand Russia a “paper tiger.” The jibe seems to have struck a nerve among Russians, many of whom are no doubt already beginning to feel uneasy about the worsening domestic situation and their army’s lack of progress in Ukraine. Pro-war bloggers and Kremlin pundits lined up to attack Trump and ridicule his “paper tiger” assertion, while Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov felt obliged to directly address the insult. “Russia is by no means a tiger. Russia is traditionally seen as a bear. There is no such thing as paper bears. Russia is a real bear,” he somewhat bizarrely insisted during a radio interview.

Putin has so far remained silent but is likely to be seething. The Kremlin dictator is well known for his gangster-like obsession with respect, and has made no secret of his bitter resentment over Russia’s humiliating loss of superpower status following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin was said to have been deeply offended when US President Barack Obama dismissed Russia as a mere “regional power” in 2014 during the initial stages of Moscow’s attack on Ukraine. He will now also be haunted by Trump’s “paper tiger” taunt, which strikes at the very heart of his imperial insecurities.

The invasion of Ukraine was conceived by Putin as a decisive step to reverse the injustice of the Soviet breakup and revive the Russian Empire. He had hoped for a rapid victory that would transform the wider geopolitical landscape and return Russia to its rightful place among the world’s great powers. Instead, the war has ruthlessly exposed the limitations of the Russian military.

Today, Putin’s armies remain bogged down in brutal fighting for control over villages that lie within walking distance of the original front lines when Russia’s invasion first began more than three and a half years ago. At sea, Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports has been broken, with the bulk of Putin’s fleet forced to retreat from Crimea. Despite possessing one of the world’s largest air forces, Russia has been unable to secure air superiority in Ukraine and cannot even prevent the Ukrainians from striking targets deep inside the Russian Federation itself.

In light of this poor performance, it is hardly surprising that Russia’s military reputation has taken such a battering since 2022. Putin still possesses a vast and powerful war machine that is capable of inflicting untold harm and misery, but few would now classify Russia as a global superpower. Trump’s “paper tiger” barb was meant as an insult, but it may be closer to the truth that Putin’s pretensions to great power status.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

One year later, the costly failure of Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive led to a noticeable lowering of expectations. With the terrible human cost of the war continuing to mount and little progress to report on the battlefield, perceptions of victory began to shift once more. While the desire to liberate the entire country remained strong, many Ukrainians began to acknowledge that temporary territorial concessions may prove necessary in order to end hostilities. This helped to refocus attention on the need to establish a lasting peace.

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For the past year, Ukraine’s main demand has been for credible security guarantees to remove the threat of future Russian aggression. This is widely recognized as essential for the country’s continued viability as an independent state. While Ukraine’s eventual objective remains NATO membership, the current goal is to secure commitments from the country’s partners that confirm Kyiv’s irreversible Euro-Atlantic integration and convince the Kremlin to abandon its imperial agenda. Only then will genuine peace be possible.

In addition to expectations regarding security guarantees, Ukrainians also seek accountability for war crimes committed during Russia’s invasion. Many in today’s Ukraine feel that justice should be central to any postwar settlement. They argue that the immense sacrifices of the war must not be in vain, and believe Russia needs to pay for the devastation it has caused in Ukraine.

Calls for a just peace settlement create significant challenges for Ukraine’s political leadership. If the Ukrainian authorities fail to address demands for accountability, this could fuel political divisions and lead to social tensions, especially among veterans, military families, and communities most directly affected by the invasion. Any peace deal that feels like a betrayal could destabilize the entire country and radicalize Ukrainian public opinion, with unpredictable and potentially dangerous consequences for Ukraine.

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As Ukraine prepares for a fourth wartime winter, Ukrainians continue to debate what would represent acceptable peace terms. It is currently possible to identify some key trends. While there has been a clear move away from the optimistic interpretations of victory that dominated the debate during the first year of the war, relatively few Ukrainians appear ready to accept peace on Russian terms. Instead, there is a sense that Ukraine must find ways to fight on if necessary until it can reach a settlement that safeguards the country’s future freedom and security.

Ukrainians are acutely aware that Russia remains determined to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. They understand that the war will not truly be over until the Kremlin has been decisively deterred from pursuing its imperial ambitions.

While any progress toward a ceasefire would likely receive widespread support from the Ukrainian public, this would not satisfy their demands for a longer term solution to the threat posed by Russia. Indeed, some believe a pause in hostilities that did not lead to a more permanent settlement could create new risks and undermine the sense of common purpose that has played such an important part in maintaining Ukrainian public support for the war effort.

With the recent US-led peace initiative now running out of steam and Europe deeply reluctant to risk direct military confrontation with Russia, there is a growing realization among Ukrainians that no external actor can fully guarantee Ukraine’s security. International support has been absolutely vital since 2022 and remains indispensable, but there can ultimately be no substitute for a strong and self-sufficient Ukrainian military backed by a resilient and united population.

Ukrainians recognize that they cannot allow their national survival to hinge on the ever-changing political and geopolitical dynamics in Western capitals. Instead, Kyiv must look to strike a balance between long-term international security partnerships and powerful domestic deterrence. Peace with Putin’s Russia is possible, but it must be peace through strength.

Yaroslava Shvechykova-Plavska is a lecturer at the Educational and Scientific Institute of International Relations at Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv. This article is based on the Security Guarantees for Ukraine project, undertaken with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. It represents the views of the author and does not reflect the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.

What we can learn from Tibetan and Ukrainian freedom fighters

Nolan Peterson — Wed, 24 Sep 2025 14:33:34 +0000

About two months before a mortar killed him, 19-year-old Ukrainian soldier Daniel shared a cigarette with me in a trench in eastern Ukraine. On that hot June afternoon, with small arms fire rattling in the background, he told me why he’d volunteered to go to war. “We are fighting for our homes and for our land,” he said. “Ukraine is a free country, and when Russia invaded I had no other choice. I had to fight.”

Four months later, 77-year-old Jampa Choejor offered me a cup of masala chai at his home in the Jampaling Tibetan refugee settlement outside of Pokhara, Nepal. I was still slightly amped from the motorcycle ride it took to get there, an hour-long slalom course dodging cows and overloaded buses amid the free-for-all chaos of Nepal’s rural roads. As we sat with legs folded on yak skin blankets and sipped our tea, Choejor, a former Buddhist monk, explained his decision decades earlier to join Tibet’s guerrilla war against the Chinese invaders.

“When the Chinese came, they bullied, they killed,” Choejor said of China’s invasion of Tibet in the 1950s. “There was no freedom, no religion. After so many brutal acts, there was no way to stay silent. We couldn’t stay living like that. We suffered. But there was no other choice. We had to fight back.”

When it comes to their culture, history, and geography, Tibet and Ukraine appear to have few things in common. But scratch beneath the surface and you’ll find many surprising similarities, including the fact that when neighboring empires invaded their homelands, the Tibetan and Ukrainian nations summoned a devotion to their freedom and an unbreakable will to fight for it.

Beginning in the mid-1950s, Tibetan irregulars fought a decades-long insurgency against China’s occupation. It wasn’t until 1974, and at the Dalai Lama’s request, that they finally laid down their arms. The legacy of this armed resistance continues to inspire generations of Tibetans, both inside Tibet and in exile, to resist Chinese oppression in other, non-violent ways.

Likewise, Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 spurred a nationwide resistance movement to take root, paving the way for Ukraine’s remarkable stand in February 2022. After more than three and a half years of full-scale war, Ukraine’s will to resist remains unbroken.

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I’ve spent the past thirteen years embedded in the Tibetan and Ukrainian freedom struggles, wanting to understand how these two nations summoned the will to defy the empires that meant to destroy them. This quest has taken me to the ends of the earth and to the extremes of the human experience. I dodged Russian snipers on Ukraine’s battlefields and crossed remote Himalayan passes that soar as high as jetliners fly.

Along the way, I met Ukrainian university students who adapted small commercial drones to kill their Russian enemies, and shared tea with Tibetan monks and nomads who had fought on horseback, armed with swords and World War I-era rifles, against China’s mechanized invasion. Throughout it all, I’ve been consistently surprised by all the similarities these two stories share.

Whether I was talking to a 20-year-old Ukrainian soldier or an 80-year-old Tibetan veteran, I kept hearing the same humble explanations for their actions, such as the shared sentiment that they had “no other choice.” For many of those I have met, going to war for their homeland’s freedom wasn’t really a decision at all. It was automatic and instinctual, like an immune system response. Their country was invaded and innocent people were dying, so they had to fight. Simple as that.

Ukrainian soldier Denys put it to me like this: “Wars aren’t won by surrendering. You have to fight. If you don’t fight, you won’t be supported by anyone. Because it’s your own freedom and you have to fight for it.”

Kelsang Tsering, a former Buddhist monk who served in the Tibetan resistance from 1955 to 1974, had a similarly matter-of-fact explanation for his decision to resist China’s occupation. “I saw what China was doing in Tibet and it made me so angry, I had to fight,” he said.

Tsering and I spoke over tea one evening at his home in a Nepalese refugee settlement. A flickering fluorescent lamp lit the room. A picture of the Dalai Lama hung on the wall. Tsering’s wife sat on the floor, legs folded, spinning a prayer wheel while she chanted a Buddhist mantra. I asked Tsering if it was difficult for him to take a life in combat, given that he was once a Buddhist monk who eschewed all violence, even the killing of an insect.

“In the beginning, I was thinking we were monks, and so we shouldn’t kill,” he answered. “But when I recalled all the abuses, all the terrible things the Chinese did, I forgot my hesitation. After seeing so many bad things, I forgot that killing was a sin.”

Such moral certitude echoes what I’ve heard from many Ukrainians. “The Russians came to our country and killed our people. It’s our country, our land, our families. For us, it’s very clear. We kill them, or they kill us,” a Ukrainian special operations soldier named Serhii told me.

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China and Russia are on the march against the US-led world order. Yet, the way I see it, America’s military might isn’t the only obstacle holding these aggressive, wannabe empires at bay.

By refusing to surrender their identities and submit to imperial rule, the Tibetan and Ukrainian nations defy the fantasies of civilizational greatness, detached from historical reality, that the Chinese and Russian regimes depend on for their domestic legitimacy. The authoritarians in Beijing and Moscow see such expressions of independence and self-determination as existential threats to their grip on power. Their retaliation has been brutal.

Russia launched its disastrous full-scale invasion in 2022 to destroy the Ukrainian state and extinguish Ukraine’s national identity entirely. China, for its part, has spent decades trying to erase Tibet’s culture and ethnicity. Today, after seventy-five years of occupation, Tibet is a nightmarish Gestapo state for the Tibetans living there, a chilling portent of what Ukrainians are fighting to prevent from happening in their homeland.

The irony, of course, is that the Ukrainian and Tibetan nations are more unified today than they ever were prior to being invaded. Rather than break Ukraine’s spirit, each new Russian atrocity reinforces the resolve of the Ukrainian population to resist. As for Tibetans, a people once divided by regional dialects and cultures, they’ve now coalesced around a single version of their language and national identity, at the heart of which is their universal devotion to the Dalai Lama.

The price of freedom is set by those who wish to destroy it. And yet, as the Dalai Lama said in a speech not long after the Soviet Union collapsed, “brute force, no matter how strongly applied, can never subdue the basic human desire for freedom.” In today’s troubled world, that’s a message worth remembering.

Nolan Peterson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US Air Force Special Operations pilot.

In recent weeks, the Kremlin has launched drones into Polish and Romanian airspace, while also sending warplanes into Estonian airspace above the Baltic Sea. On September 22, major airports in Norway and Denmark were forced to suspend operations due to suspicious drone activity. While the source of this sophisticated drone disruption has not yet been clarified, Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said Russian involvement cannot be ruled out.

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Russia’s recent actions reflect the ongoing integration of drones into the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare playbook as Moscow looks to raise the stakes in its confrontation with the democratic world. Since US President Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, Moscow has been cheered by his efforts to reduce support for Ukraine and limit the US role in European security. Russia now appears intent on exploiting growing divides within the Western camp and intimidating Europe with thinly-veiled threats of possible drone bombardment.

European leaders must take the Russian drone threat seriously. Since 2022, the Kremlin has made drones one of the key components of Russia’s overall military strategy. Domestic production of bomber drones has increased dramatically over the past year in particular, making it possible for Russia to conduct mass bombing raids on Ukrainian cities featuring as many as 800 drones in a single night.

In addition to increased numbers, Russian drones are also undergoing significant upgrades. The most common form of kamikaze drone used by the Russian army is based on the Iranian Shahed model, but recent versions are significantly larger, faster, and more explosive. Russia has also implemented improved navigation and control systems, making the current generation of bomber drones far deadlier than their predecessors.

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At this stage, it appears that Russia is looking to assess NATO’s readiness to defend itself and is unlikely to be preparing any large-scale attacks. However, there is no time to waste. European countries cannot wait until Russia goes even further before addressing the urgent security concerns raised by the Kremlin’s drone diplomacy.

Crucially, this means learning from Ukraine’s unrivaled experience in defending against large-scale Russian drone attacks. Only Ukraine has the know-how to develop layered air defenses featuring ground-based missile systems, mobile gun crews, fighter jets, propeller planes, helicopters, and a rapidly expanding fleet of interceptor drones. Likewise, only Ukraine can offer practical tips on effective jamming and other electronic warfare strategies. These lessons make Ukraine an indispensable security partner for Europe.

NATO member states need to collectively establish realistic and unambiguous rules of engagement for cross-border drone and fighter jet incursions that provide maximum clarity for all countries, including Russia. The alliance’s somewhat improvised Eastern Sentry initiative along the NATO frontier with Russia should be expanded and given permanent status, with Ukraine fully integrated as a strategic partner. Europe should prioritize the production of cost-effective anti-drone technologies and invest in Ukrainian defense sector companies that are already producing key elements such as interceptor drones and electronic warfare tools.

Individual European countries also need to make sure civilian populations are protected against potential Russian drone attacks. This means checking existing bomb shelters. In many cases, it will no doubt be necessary to conduct comprehensive renovation works. By addressing this issue now rather than waiting for the next Russian escalation, governments can prevent panic and demonstrate that the security situation is under control.

Putin has clearly been encouraged by Trump’s efforts to downgrade America’s involvement in transatlantic security and feels emboldened to escalate his own hybrid war against Europe. For now, the Kremlin dictator appears to be focused on probing Europe’s responses and fueling insecurity across the continent. Looking ahead, his strategic objective is to split the Euro-Atlantic alliance and reduce support for Ukraine to minimal levels. If he succeeds, the threat to Europe will reach a new level entirely and the cost of stopping Russia will only rise.

Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategic policy specialist whose work focuses on Russia’s evolving military and hybrid strategy, EU-Ukraine cooperation, and Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Moldova accuses Russia of election interference ahead of key vote

Aidan Stretch — Mon, 22 Sep 2025 23:10:53 +0000

Moldova is raising the alarm over escalating Russian interference as the country approaches a crucial geopolitical crossroads. On September 28, Moldova’s pro-Western government will face a parliamentary election amid widespread allegations of Kremlin cyberattacks, propaganda, and various other Russian attempts to influence the outcome of the vote. If pro-European parties lose their majority, Moldova’s Western integration could stall.

The implications of an election victory for pro-Russian forces would extend far beyond Chisinau. Moldova shares a long border with Ukraine, while the two countries are currently on a joint EU accession track. A Kremlin-friendly government in Moldova could potentially derail EU integration for both nations, while also creating a significant new security threat on Ukraine’s southwestern frontier. The coming vote is therefore an important test of Russia’s ability to reassert its influence and a potential landmark moment for the wider region.

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Allegations of Russian interference have become a routine feature of Moldovan elections in recent years. During the country’s 2024 presidential election, the Kremlin reportedly spent $217 million funding Russian proxies, representing nearly 1 percent of Moldova’s GDP. Despite these efforts, incumbent Maia Sandu narrowly defeated pro-Russian candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo.

Russia is now accused of escalating its interference operations, with Moldovan President Sandu warning recently of an “unprecedented” Kremlin campaign that includes party financing, cyberattacks, and disinformation. These efforts reportedly expand beyond Moldova itself and are targeting the Moldovan diaspora, which played a key role in Sandu’s 2024 election win.

Moscow’s main goal is to boost support for pro-Russian parties including Stoianoglo’s Alternative Bloc and the Socialist-leaning Patriotic Bloc. There are also claims that the Kremlin’s plans extend beyond the ballot box. The Moldovan authorities reportedly detained dozens of suspects on Monday as part of an ongoing probe into an alleged Russian-backed plot to destabilize the country around this weekend’s pivotal parliamentary election.

Recent election forecasts position Sandu’s PAS party in first place but without sufficient support to govern alone. PAS is expected to receive around 25 percent of the vote, which would be enough to deliver a plurality but not an outright majority of seats. The most likely scenario at this stage of the campaign may be a coalition government led by PAS and featuring one or more of the pro-Russian parties. This would almost certainly undermine Moldova’s European integration.

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Kyiv will be watching the Moldovan vote closely. Ukraine’s 1,222 kilometer border with Moldova has been quiet since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago. However, this tranquility cannot be taken for granted. Moldova is home to Transnistria, a Kremlin-backed breakaway region that currently hosts around 1,500 Russian soldiers along with large supplies of Soviet-era military equipment.

According to Moldovan intelligence assessments, Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to reinforce Transnistria by sending an additional 10,000 troops. If a more Moscow-friendly government takes power in Moldova, this may become feasible. Ukraine would then be forced to divert precious military resources from other fronts to counter the mounting Russian threat coming from across the Moldovan border. In particular, a reinforced Russian troop presence in Transnistria would directly threaten nearby Odesa, Ukraine’s main port city and the country’s maritime lifeline to global markets.

The coming vote could also shape the European aspirations of Moldova and Ukraine. Both countries have been granted EU candidate status in recent years. Officials in Brussels have made clear that the two bids are linked and will be reluctant to advance one country without the other. A pro-Russian victory in Chisinau could therefore undermine Kyiv’s momentum while placing Moldovan EU ambitions in doubt. Moldova’s pro-Western politicians have stressed this potential outcome if they lose control of parliament.

For Russia, the Moldovan vote is an opportunity to push back against Western influence in the former Soviet Empire and demonstrate that the invasion of Ukraine has not deprived Moscow of its ability to dominate the region. At present, Putin is confronted with a mixed picture. Georgia’s Kremlin-friendly government has effectively stalled the country’s EU integration, while nearby Armenia has recently began the EU accession process.

While Russia’s objectives in Moldova appear obvious, there is less clarity regarding the Western position. In late 2024, Brussels committed nearly $2 billion in aid to bolster Moldova’s economic security and thwart Russian influence. This year, however, the United States has shuttered offices charged with combating Russian disinformation, while also slashing funding for democracy assistance programs in Eastern Europe.

This week’s Moldovan parliamentary election is part of the escalating confrontation between Russia and the West. A pro-Kremlin victory could significantly impact the war in Ukraine and undermine EU integration momentum in both Chisinau and Kyiv. Amid growing signs of disunity between Brussels and Washington, Putin may sense that he currently has a window of opportunity to secure a meaningful success in a country that is small in size but strategically important for the wider region.

Aidan Stretch is a freelance journalist living in Ukraine.

Putin’s Polish probe demands decisive response to restore NATO deterrence

Zahar Hryniv — Thu, 18 Sep 2025 20:53:19 +0000

On September 10, nineteen Russian drones entered Poland, marking the largest violation of NATO airspace since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine more than three and a half years ago. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski described the attack as an attempt to probe NATO defenses and test the alliance’s commitment to protect its eastern flank. Afterwards, Poland invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty initiating consultations with allies, but opted not to push for Article 5, which calls on all NATO countries to provide assistance if a member state’s security is threatened.

Over the past week, numerous Western leaders have condemned Russia’s “reckless” incursion. Meanwhile, NATO has announced the launch of the Eastern Sentry deterrence initiative, with plans for more integrated air defense, intelligence sharing, and new assets. Despite these steps, some believe the response has so far been insufficient. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has criticized NATO’s “lack of action,” suggesting that European countries need to go further and work on a joint air defense system to create “an effective air shield over Europe.”

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If the West fails to credibly deter further Kremlin escalations, this would have potentially disastrous consequences for international security. At stake is not only Ukraine’s survival as a sovereign state, but NATO’s continued existence as the main guarantor of peace and stability in Europe. A conventional Russian invasion of Poland or the Baltic states remains within the realm of possibilities if Moscow is successful in Ukraine. However, a far more likely scenario would be some kind of gray zone aggression on NATO’s eastern flank with the aim of discrediting the alliance’s core commitment to collective security.

This could take many forms. For example, Russia could launch a significantly larger drone attack against Poland. Alternatively, the Kremlin could stage a hybrid cross-border incursion into Estonia, utilizing the same kind of plausible deniability employed during the 2014 seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. Moscow’s goal would be to demonstrate that the NATO alliance lacks the resolve to act on its collective security commitments, while remaining below the threshold that could trigger a full-scale war.

Even prior to the recent appearance of Russian drones over Poland, there were already ample indications that the scale of the threat posed by the Putin regime was not fully understood in Western capitals. Recent diplomatic efforts to end the invasion of Ukraine via some form of compromise peace deal suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of Russia’s maximalist war aims. Putin’s ambitions extend far beyond limited territorial gains in Ukraine; any attempt to appease him with “land swaps” will merely whet his imperial appetite and encourage further aggression.

Members of the so-called Coalition of the Willing led by France and the UK have spoken recently of providing Ukraine with “robust” security guarantees, but only after a ceasefire is in place. This gives the Kremlin dictator no incentive to back down. While Putin’s recent summer offensive in Ukraine has failed strategically, Russia continues to make marginal gains on the battlefield while mercilessly striking Ukrainian cities and civilians with drones and missiles. It is therefore imperative to compel the Kremlin to agree to a ceasefire first, separating this from discussions over security guarantees while retaining a commitment to both.

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A far more united, assertive, and multi-pronged approach is required in order to deter Russia. Western governments must make full use of the extensive economic leverage at their disposal. Washington and Brussels should seize Russia’s frozen assets and implement tougher sanctions that drastically cut Russia’s income from oil exports, including measures targeting Moscow’s shadow fleet of tankers. Applying additional secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that facilitate the purchase of Russian oil will force buyers like India and China to comply with US sanctions or risk losing access to the global financial system.

At the same time, the US and Europe must ensure Ukraine becomes a “steel porcupine” capable of defending itself and deterring future Russian aggression on its own. This should involve guaranteed weapons deliveries, an end to all restrictions on Ukrainian long-range strikes inside Russia, increased intelligence sharing, and enhanced industrial cooperation between Western and Ukrainian defense companies, especially in terms of drone technologies and electronic warfare.

This combination of intensifying economic pressure on Russia and increased military support for Ukraine could set the stage for a ceasefire agreement. If this is achieved, the West must then unilaterally implement security guarantees and deploy troops from as many countries as possible to Ukraine to ensure maximum deterrence. Any deployments should take a layered approach. The initial step would be a monitoring mission on the line of contact, followed by the deployment of soldiers across Ukraine, along with air and naval patrols.

While American troops will almost certainly not be involved on the ground in Ukraine, it is vital that US President Donald Trump sticks to his commitment to back any reassurance force with continued intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support, along with a potential aviation component. The Trump administration has successfully encouraged NATO members to spend more on defense and support Kyiv, but Trump’s skepticism toward alliances and his often ambiguous position on Ukraine increase the likelihood of a Russian challenge to NATO’s Article 5 in the near future.

Putin’s latest escalation in the skies over Poland is an unmistakable signal that NATO’s credibility is under threat. In order to reduce the potential for a larger European war, a new approach to engagement with the Kremlin that projects strength and resolve is clearly required. Failure to act accordingly will place the entire international security architecture in question, including the foundational principle that borders cannot be changed by force.

Zahar Hryniv is a Young Global Professional at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Europe needs a new approach to Belarus focused on practical outcomes

Valery Kavaleuski — Wed, 17 Sep 2025 18:28:22 +0000

More than five years since pro-democracy protests threatened to topple the regime of Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, relations between Belarus and the country’s European neighbors remain locked in a downward spiral that is only adding to the instability of the wider region.

When Lukashenka resorted to a brutal crackdown against protesters in 2020, the West responded with sanctions and withdrawal. The aim was to impose penalties on the Belarusian ruler and ensure his political and diplomatic isolation. Five years on, it is now abundantly clear that this has failed to prevent Belarus from sliding further into dictatorship.

Today, large numbers of Belarusian political prisoners remain behind bars amid a political climate that is more repressive than ever. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has capitalized on Lukashenka’s predicament to strengthen its grip on Belarus and involve the country in Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. Belarus is now not only a nation with a weakened civil society and undermined sovereignty that is moving further away from democracy; it has also become a threat to international security.

If Europe maintains its present policies, it is safe to assume that relations with Belarus will remain on the current trajectory. This may suit Lukashenka, who has managed to stabilize his rule and minimize the threat posed by his exiled opponents. It would certainly suit Russia, which has used the last five years to strengthen control over Belarus and weaponize the country against its European neighbors.

However, regional security would be further undermined, with broader Euro-Atlantic strategic interests also likely to suffer. This would be particularly unwelcome at a time when the democratic world already faces growing challenges from an emerging alliance of autocratic powers including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

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The Belarusian role in European security should not be underestimated. Following the watershed events of 2020, Lukashenka abandoned his earlier geopolitical balancing act and became a loyal supporter of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Belarus served as a crucial launchpad for the February 2022 full-scale invasion, and has since agreed to host Russian nuclear weapons. Moscow also uses the country as a proxy in its hybrid war against the European Union, including the weaponization of migrants along the Belarusian border with the EU.

It is important to stress that the current standoff between Belarus and Europe is complex and multifaceted, with a number of overlapping but distinct elements. These include European criticism of widespread human rights violations in Belarus and alarm over the country’s deepening military cooperation with the Kremlin. There are also broader concerns related to international migration and regional stability.

If European leaders want to make any meaningful progress on these issues, they will need to move away from the current explicitly confrontational stance and adopt an alternative approach that creates room to engage on matters of mutual interest. Sanctions will remain a necessary tool against those supporting the war in Ukraine, but this approach in general has already proven to have limited impact on Minsk. A more outcome-oriented strategy that envisages a revived diplomatic presence and pragmatic engagement would enable Europe to address its concerns while maintaining constructive pressure on the Lukashenka regime.

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The United States has recently demonstrated that it is possible to achieve progress with Belarus by focusing on a humanitarian agenda. US Special Envoy Keith Kellogg visited Minsk in June 2025 after months of preparations, resulting in the release of fourteen political prisoners. US President Donald Trump has directly discussed prisoner releases with Lukashenka, signaling a readiness to prioritize engagement over isolation in his approach to Belarus. A further US visit to Minsk in September led to the release of 52 prisoners in return for lifting sanctions on national aviation company Belavia.

An updated EU strategy toward Belarus should pursue reduced confrontation by focusing on a number of deliverables. The top priority must be saving lives by securing the release of more than 1000 political prisoners. This will require active diplomacy, measured communication, and a readiness to compromise. It will also be necessary to engage on practical matters such as finding a resolution to the migrant crisis on the Belarusian border with the EU, restoring severed air and rail transportation ties which have restricted mobility for Belarusians across Europe, and ending repressions in Belarus.

In parallel to any increased diplomatic engagement, the European Union and individual European nations could also consider expanding their involvement in social programs for Belarusians. A more people-oriented approach could help rebuild relationships by providing support for vulnerable Belarusians who have suffered as a result of cuts to foreign aid in recent years.

Security issues will inevitably be at the heart of any reset between Europe and Belarus. Lukashenka openly underscores his role as Vladimir Putin’s closest wartime ally and junior partner in Moscow’s confrontation with the West. While Europe currently has little chance of breaking up this unequal partnership, confidence-building measures could help to reduce mutual suspicions and pave the way for a more constructive dialogue addressing key security concerns.

Belarus is a strategically important European nation that no European leader can afford to ignore. The country’s descent into international isolationism and authoritarianism is a European problem that poses difficult questions for the EU in terms of border security and foreign policy credibility. Evidently, the positions adopted in 2020 have not produced the desired results. It is therefore time to consider new approaches and initiatives.

A smarter Belarus policy does not mean abandoning a critical and clear-eyed view of the country’s situation. Engagement does not equal appeasement. Instead, the goal should be an outcome-driven strategy that seeks practical and pragmatic solutions to specific problems while providing incentives for more fundamental shifts in Minsk. Ignoring Belarus or treating it as a lost cause will only amplify current geopolitical challenges while deepening the existing human rights problems in the country.

Valery Kavaleuski is head of the Euro-Atlantic Affairs Agency. He previously served as a Belarusian diplomat and as foreign relations lead to Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

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The appearance of Russian drones in the skies above Poland set off alarm bells in a number of European capitals. This trend toward greater insecurity can help drive the radicalization of European politics, which often means increased support for Kremlin-friendly parties on both the far-left and far-right of the political spectrum.

Fears over a mounting Russian threat could also divert attention and resources away from Ukraine, with Europeans growing less inclined to support the Ukrainian war effort and more concerned about their own security. In the aftermath of the recent drone incident, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned of growing anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland fueled by Moscow, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested that Russia may be seeking to prevent the delivery of additional air defenses to Ukraine ahead of the winter season.

With the Western response to Russia’s drone raid still taking shape, it remains too early to draw any definitive conclusions. However, the mixed initial reaction from Western leaders is unlikely to have deterred the Kremlin. Rather than projecting unity and purpose, US President Donald Trump appeared to contradict many of his NATO allies by claiming that the large-scale Russian incursion into Polish airspace could have been “a mistake.”

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Russia’s drone escalation has revived the long-running debate over the possibility of a NATO-backed no-fly zone of some kind in Ukraine. Following the Kremlin’s aerial attack, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski became the latest figure to publicly voice his support for allied efforts to close the skies over Ukraine. Poland’s top diplomat argued that protecting Ukrainian airspace from Russian drone and missile attacks would also serve as the first line of defense for the rest of Europe.

This concept has been under discussion since the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion but has so far failed to gain serious traction due to widespread Western fears of escalation. Skeptics have noted that any NATO jets deployed to Ukraine would immediately become targets for the Russians, creating the potential for a direct military confrontation between the alliance and the Kremlin. A single downed NATO aircraft over Ukraine or a destroyed anti-aircraft system on Russian territory could plunge Europe into a major crisis with unpredictable outcomes for international security.

Europe can minimize the risks associated with a no-fly zone by ruling out the deployment of fighter jet squadrons in Ukrainian airspace and focusing instead on boosting the number of ground-based air defense systems covering western Ukraine. Many systems could be positioned across the border and need not actually enter Ukraine at all.

Participating countries could also increase their support for Ukraine’s own layered air defenses, including Kyiv’s growing interceptor drone capabilities. This approach would strengthen the security of European airspace without the necessity of sending NATO pilots into combat.

Enhanced air defenses would not entirely neutralize the Russian threat but could succeed in creating significantly safer conditions for millions of Ukrainians along with citizens in neighboring EU states. While Moscow would inevitably protest over any increased European involvement, it would be hard for the Kremlin to argue convincingly that intercepting Russian drones and missiles constitutes an act of international aggression.

Recent events offer a clear precedent for a greater European role in Ukraine’s air defenses. Jets from multiple NATO countries shot down a number of the Russian drones that entered Polish airspace last week without sparking an escalation. There is therefore no reason to believe that expanding the no-fly zone into western Ukraine would suddenly spark World War III.

Ukraine also has an important role to play in efforts to strengthen Europe’s air shield. Following the recent Russian incursion into Polish airspace, European countries now recognize that they need to urgently study Ukraine’s unrivaled experience of defending against Russian missiles and drones. This process is already underway, with Poland looking to implement lessons learned by the Ukrainians over the past three and half years of regular Russian bombardment. Other countries will no doubt soon be joining the Poles in seeking the advice of Ukrainian air defense crews. Looking ahead, Ukraine’s unique air defense expertise must be fully integrated into NATO and EU security planning.

It should now be abundantly clear that Putin will continue to escalate until he is stopped. The Kremlin dictator’s imperial ambitions extend far beyond the conquest of Ukraine. To achieve his goals, he seeks to discredit NATO and divide Europe. Acting decisively through smart air defense, leveraging Ukrainian expertise, and deepening regional cooperation can help safeguard European security. If Western leaders continue to hesitate, Putin will grow bolder still and the cost of stopping Russia will only rise.

Alina Zubkovych is Head of the Nordic Ukraine Forum and Academic Director at the Kyiv School of Economics.

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Like many other NATO members, Poland has invested heavily in recent years in high-end air defense systems such as Patriots and F-35 warplanes. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has revealed a new kind of war that requires alternative solutions. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three and a half years ago, unmanned systems have emerged as the decisive weapon above the battlefield and have also been used extensively for longer range attacks on land and at sea.

With Russia and Ukraine locked in a relentless race to innovate, the Kremlin has prioritized the mass production of deadly strike drones capable of hitting targets hundreds of kilometers away. The number of drones involved in Russian aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities has risen dramatically over the past year from dozens to hundreds, with record waves in recent months featuring as many as eight hundred drones. Europe remains dangerously unprepared to address the unprecedented challenges posed by these large-scale Russian drone swarms.

Ukrainians have been advising their European colleagues for some time of the need to reassess their air defense strategies in line with the growing dominance of drones. Ukrainian drone warfare specialist Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, who leads the country’s Unmanned Systems Forces, warned in July 2025 that NATO commanders must urgently review their air defense doctrines in order to focus on the dangers posed by swarms of Russian attack drones.

Brovdi’s call to Kyiv’s Western partners and his offer to share Ukraine’s unique experience of drone warfare did not initially provoke much of a response. However, following Russia’s recent escalation in the skies above Poland, that may now be changing. Within days of the Russian drone incursion, Polish and Ukrainian officials announced plans for Ukraine to provide anti-drone training in Poland. Other NATO members are now expected to follow suit, reflecting Ukraine’s status as a leading authority on drone warfare.

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Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski is one of numerous senior European politicians to acknowledge the need for NATO countries to learn from Ukraine. “The Ukrainians have better equipment for dealing with Russian drones and more up-to-date experience,” he commented during a visit to Kyiv last week. “This is something that the public and governments in the West need to urgently integrate into their thinking. It is the Ukrainians who will be training us on how to stand up to Russia, not the other way around.”

US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg echoed this sentiment, commenting on September 12 that Ukraine has emerged in recent years as a “world leader” in drone warfare. Noting that the evolution of drone technologies was changing the nature of modern war, Kellogg credited Ukraine with playing a leading role in this trend while acknowledging that other nations including the United States were now “well behind.”

In addition to offering air defense training to the country’s allies, Ukraine is also ready to help NATO partners identify and procure the necessary defensive tools to combat Russian drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently stressed that nobody in the world has enough missiles to shoot down the large volumes of drones currently being deployed by the Kremlin. Instead, a more eclectic approach is needed, featuring ground-based air defenses and jet fighters together with defensive drones, helicopter patrols, and propeller planes.

Ukraine has already developed and begun deploying a number of interceptor drones that serve as a cost-effective solution to Russia’s expanding swarms of strike drones. Work is now underway to increase production in order to keep pace with Russia’s growing output. Kyiv’s partners are engaged in these efforts. A new initiative was recently unveiled that will see Britain support Ukraine by mass producing interceptor drones based on existing Ukrainian technologies. This should make it possible to deliver thousands of drones to Ukraine every month.

Ukraine’s sophisticated anti-drone defenses will now set the standard for NATO as the alliance adjusts to the changing face of modern warfare and the mounting threat posed by Putin’s drones. At present, Putin is using drone incursions to test NATO and probe the alliance’s military and political responses, but his appetite for escalation has never been more apparent. European countries must therefore prepare to defend themselves against potential large-scale attacks involving hundreds of Russian drones. As they scramble to do so, Ukraine’s experience will prove absolutely indispensable.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

China, India, and North Korea back Russia as changing global order takes shape

Katherine Spencer — Thu, 11 Sep 2025 21:19:24 +0000

The outlines of a new global order were on display in China last week as Chinese President Xi Jinping played host to more than twenty leaders from non-Western countries. The visiting dignitaries were attending a series of events that aimed to showcase China’s growing superpower status while also highlighting continued support for Russia in its confrontation with the West.

One of China’s most prominent guests was Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was accorded a place of honor alongside the Chinese leader at a military parade in Beijing to mark eighty years since the Japanese surrender and the end of World War II. On the eve of the parade, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was pictured in friendly discussion with Putin and Xi at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin.

The optics coming out of China were unmistakable. While the main message was one of Chinese economic and military might, the Tianjin summit and Beijing parade also allowed China, India, North Korea, and others to underline their continued backing for Russia and their rejection of Western efforts to isolate Vladimir Putin over the invasion of Ukraine.

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The Chinese and Russian leaders held a series of meetings during Putin’s visit, with Xi hailing his Kremlin counterpart as an “old friend.” This warm welcome came as no surprise. While China officially claims to have a neutral stance toward the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Beijing stands accused of playing a pivotal supporting role in the Russian war effort. Since 2022, China has emerged as the key client for Russian energy exports, helping the Kremlin to compensate for the loss of European markets. Chinese companies also reportedly provide “nearly 80 percent” of the sanctioned dual-use items Russia needs to continue the war.

China and Russia indicated their commitment to further energy sector cooperation by signing a deal to build the long-delayed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline connecting the two countries. While the agreement leaves a number of key questions unanswered, Moscow is signaling that it has energy export markets beyond Europe. Even if only smaller oil and gas projects move forward, they could prove jointly consequential for the two countries.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un joined Xi and Putin for the Beijing military parade and used the occasion to reaffirm his “full support” for Russia, which he framed as a “fraternal duty.” While China continues to deny directly supporting the Russian war effort, North Korea has reportedly provided Russia with over 12 million rounds of artillery, rocket launchers, self-propelled guns, over 100 ballistic missiles, vehicles, and other forms of heavy artillery, while also sending around 15,000 soldiers to fight alongside the Russian army. By summer 2025, Pyongyang was supplying up to 40 percent of the ammunition used by Russia in Ukraine, according to Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov.

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India’s Modi also displayed warm ties with Putin, praising his “excellent” bilateral meeting with the Russian leader in Tianjin. Delhi has stressed the need for peace in Ukraine while emphasizing a business-focused relationship with Russia, but India has recently faced a Trump administration backlash over the country’s expanding imports of Russian energy resources. Since the start of the invasion, India’s Russian crude purchases have risen dramatically. In 2024, Russian crude represented around 40 percent of Indian imports, up from just 3 percent three years earlier.

Modi and Putin came together in China against a backdrop of tariffs imposed by the United States in response to India’s continued purchase of Russian oil, a move slammed by Delhi as “unfair, unjustified, and unreasonable.” Amid mounting tensions with the US, Modi’s very public show of support for Putin was interpreted by many as a calculated act of defiance.

None of this went unnoticed in Western capitals. Indeed, numerous politicians and commentators saw events in China as confirmation that an “anti-Western alliance” was taking shape, with Beijing and Moscow leading the way. The most striking response came from US President Donald Trump. “Looks like we’ve lost India and Russia to deepest, darkest China. May they have a long and prosperous future together,” the US leader quipped on social media. While Trump later walked this comment back in regard to India, he repeated his “disappointment” with Delhi over its Russian oil purchases.

Not everyone is convinced by talk of a new global order. Skeptics noted that beyond the pomp and pageantry, last week’s events in China did not produce much in the way of concrete results. The single biggest breakthrough was the agreement over a new Russia-China pipeline, but even this was far from conclusive. Meanwhile, although China, Russia, and India may be able to find common ground in their mutual dislike of Western dominance, they also disagree on a wide range of important issues.

It is still too early to proclaim the emergence of a fully-fledged anti-Western alliance, but major geopolitical shifts are clearly underway that will shape the global order for decades to come. In the short term, the support of China, India, and North Korea for Russia’s war in Ukraine will allow the killing to continue while undermining Trump’s efforts to pressure the Kremlin into ending the invasion.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Fighting corruption strengthens Ukraine in the war against Russia

Matthew H. Murray — Thu, 11 Sep 2025 20:17:19 +0000

In recent months, Russian President Vladimir Putin has responded to US-led peace efforts by escalating attacks on Ukrainian civilians and seeking to undermine the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government. The Russian ruler refuses to even meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for talks, attempting instead to portray him as the illegitimate leader of an irredeemably corrupt government. Moscow’s goal is to delay meaningful negotiations and weaken Western resolve to support Ukraine in the hope that this will cause the Zelenskyy government to fall and derail the entire Ukrainian war effort.

Putin’s uncompromising stance reflects his commitment to extinguishing the threat posed by a free and democratic Ukraine. The Russian leader was driven to invade primarily because he saw an independent Ukraine slowly but steadily building the institutions of a functioning democracy right on Russia’s border. This represented an existential challenge to Putin’s own regime, an autocracy fueled by systemic corruption and dependent on repression.

Faced with Russia’s determination to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation, Ukrainians could be tempted to delay the fight against corruption at home in order to first defeat Russia. In reality, however, this is a false choice. Ukraine has been locked in a struggle against both Russian imperial aggression and domestic corruption for more than a decade. From the 2014 Revolution of Dignity to the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022, Ukrainians have been battling not only to defend their land, but to build a country that belongs to its citizens rather than oligarchs and autocrats. The fight against Russia and the fight against corruption are two fronts of the same war.

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Recent events in Ukraine underscore just how wrong Putin is to question the nation’s fundamental commitment to democracy. Over several days in July, thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets in cities across the country, braving the threat of Russian missiles and drones to demonstrate against their leaders. They were not protesting wartime hardships or economic woes, though both are deeply felt. These protests were driven by a more fundamental desire to safeguard the country’s anti-corruption institutions against efforts to turn back the clock and undo the progress achieved since the Revolution of Dignity.

These recent protests were sparked by a government move to strip Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies of their independence. The Ukrainian authorities may have been attempting to use wartime exigencies to bring anti-corruption bodies under their control and prevent the possible prosecution of high-level officials. If so, this was a major miscalculation. Within hours of a parliamentary vote placing key anti-corruption institutions under the authority of the prosecutor general, Ukraine’s first major protests since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion were underway.

International stakeholders including the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, and Ukraine’s G7 partners also reacted swiftly. The EU publicly demanded the full reversal of the legislative changes, stressing that independent anti-corruption institutions are a prerequisite for Ukraine’s EU accession. To exert concrete pressure, Brussels suspended €1.5 billion in macro-financial assistance that was already in the pipeline for Ukraine.

The IMF echoed these concerns, indicating that Ukraine’s compliance with anti-corruption commitments was essential for ongoing financial support. Similarly, G7 officials issued a statement urging the Ukrainian authorities to protect the autonomy of anti-corruption bodies, warning that continued support from international partners depended on upholding the rule of law.

Bolstered by this international support, Ukraine’s civil society won the day. Zelenskyy moved quickly to reverse course, proposing new legislation that reinstated the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies. The lesson was clear: There can be no trade-offs for Ukraine when it comes to combating corruption, just as there is no room for half measures in the fight against Russia.

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Ukraine’s July 2025 protests reaffirmed a commitment to grassroots democracy that has defined the country’s post-Soviet experience. During the Revolution of Dignity, millions of Ukrainians rallied not merely to remove an unpopular president who was viewed as a surrogate of Russia, but to demand a system of government where institutions work for the public good rather than the benefit of the few. This has served as a vision for the country’s future ever since. Even now, amid the largest European invasion since World War II, Ukrainians continue to demand accountability while working to create a truly democratic society rooted in the rule of law.

Ukraine’s courage, ingenuity, and resolve in the war against Russia draw heavily from the sense of empowerment that sprang from landmark events like the Revolution of Dignity and subsequent democratic reforms such as the decentralization of power. This has helped give Ukrainians more confidence in their ability to shape their communities and their country, fostering solidarity and promoting engagement in public life.

Greater Ukrainian agency has translated into remarkable resilience on the battlefield and beyond. Local initiatives, volunteer networks, and territorial defense units have all thrived because the Ukrainian authorities ceded space for society to organize itself. When power flows from the ground up, a nation becomes so much more than the territory it defends. This has helped make Ukraine capable of fighting back against a far larger adversary.

Ukrainian society’s lack of tolerance for corruption is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the defense sector, where the stakes could not be higher. As Ukraine fights for its very existence, citizens and soldiers alike have demonstrated zero patience for anyone accused of exploiting the war for private gain. Wartime corruption scandals related to military procurement have provoked widespread outrage across the country. The public response has often been swift and unrelenting with investigations launched, resignations demanded, and reforms accelerated.

Despite the success of this summer’s protest movement, the battle to protect Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture is far from over. As Ukraine moves forward, its commitment to safeguarding the autonomy and integrity of anti-corruption organs will be tested by adversaries who are as persistent as they are resourceful. In parallel to the ongoing Russian invasion, Moscow will continue to push the message that Zelenskyy’s government is illegitimate, while also promoting perceptions of Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt.

Putin’s fear of Ukraine’s emerging democracy is the root cause of the war. Unlike Russia’s traditionally authoritarian and highly centralized system of government, Ukrainian democracy pulses with the will of the people. It is a highly dynamic and decentralized political culture that derives its strength from the grassroots level. Time and again, Ukrainians have reminded Zelenskyy and his predecessors that true power lies not at the highest levels of government in Kyiv, but with the Ukrainian people. The anti-corruption reforms of the past decade manifest this reality. They have set an example that resonates far beyond Ukraine’s borders and helps generate strong international backing for the country.

As peace negotiations continue to unfold and Ukraine’s partners seek a security formula to prevent further Russian aggression, the fight against corruption will fortify Ukrainian sovereignty. Each advance in transparency and the rule of law strengthens Ukraine’s standing, both at home and abroad, while exposing the malign intent of Russia’s disinformation. In the end, Ukraine’s freedom will not be secured solely by military victories, but also by a new social contract under which every Ukrainian knows that no one is above the law.

Matthew Murray is an Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. He is the former Chair of the Selection Commission for the Head of the US National Agency for Corruption Prevention, and former Deputy Assistant US Secretary of Commerce for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

Belarus hosts Russian war games as Putin’s drones probe Poland

Hanna Liubakova — Thu, 11 Sep 2025 11:42:47 +0000

On September 12, Belarus will play host to Russia as the two countries stage their largest joint military exercises since the start of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The war games are set to begin against a backdrop of dramatically heightened regional tensions, coming just two days after at least nineteen Russian drones penetrated Polish airspace. Some of these Russian drones entered Poland via neighboring Belarus.

Polish and other NATO jets reportedly shot down a number of Russian drones in the skies above Poland early on September 10. This was the first time in NATO history that alliance fighter pilots have engaged Russian targets in allied airspace, officials stated. Addressing members of the Polish parliament in Warsaw, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said the incident was “the closest we have been to open conflict since World War II.”

Moscow’s decision to target Poland with drones was the latest in a series of alarming escalations by the Kremlin following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s August summit meeting in Alaska with US President Donald Trump. This has served to significantly raise the stakes ahead of Russia’s military drills in Belarus. While the authorities in Minsk have sought to downplay the significance of the joint exercises, they are a timely reminder that Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka is a key accomplice in Russia’s war effort who poses a security threat to NATO’s eastern flank.

Even before this week’s unprecedented appearance of Russian drones over Poland, Belarus’s European neighbors were already stepping up security measures along the frontier. Lithuania and Poland are accelerating construction work on enhanced border defenses, while the Polish authorities have announced the closure of border crossings with Belarus during the military exercises, citing the risk of provocations tied to the drills.

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The “Zapad” military exercises, meaning “West” in Russian, are large-scale drills that have been jointly organized for a number of years by Russia and Belarus. The planned 2023 iteration was canceled as Russian troops and equipment were needed for the ongoing invasion of Ukraine. This year’s war games are set to be significantly smaller in scale that the 2021 exercises, which were used as cover for preparations ahead of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Following Russia’s recent drone incursion, NATO forces across the border from Belarus will be on high alert for any further escalations during the drills.

This week’s Zapad 2025 military exercises will underline the transformation of Belarus into a forward base for the Russian army and will further normalize Moscow’s military footprint in the country. Infrastructure for hosting Russian troops is already in place including missile facilities, fortified munitions depots, and expanded rail links. Almost 300 Belarusian state enterprises are also reportedly involved in the production of weapons or munitions for the Russian military.

Lukashenka has been steadily trading Belarusian sovereignty for regime security ever since 2020, when he became dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival following the brutal suppression of anti-regime protests across Belarus. Hosting Russian troops, supplying Putin’s war machine, and supporting the invasion of Ukraine are all part of this bargain. Russian backing has made it possible for Lukashenka to transform Belarus into an increasingly repressive dictatorship, with regime opponents exiled and over a thousand political prisoners currently behind bars.

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While Lukashenka has little choice but to continue playing the role of junior partner in Putin’s anti-Western crusade, there are signs that he may not be entirely comfortable with his current predicament. In fact, the Belarusian response to this week’s Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace says much about how cornered the Lukashenka regime has become.

Early on Wednesday morning, officials in Minsk reportedly contacted their Warsaw counterparts to offer advance warning that drones were heading their way from the direction of Belarus. Poland said this information was unexpected but helpful. “It was surprising that Belarus, which is really trying to escalate the situation on our land border, decided to cooperate in this way,” commented Polish military officials. While the Belarusians were ready to help the Poles, they also avoided blaming Russia directly for the incident, highlighting just how carefully Lukashenka is treading.

The message from Minsk seems straightforward. Lukashenka is desperate to demonstrate to his EU neighbors and the wider international community that he is not fully tied to Moscow’s war machine and can still act independently of the Kremlin. He is probing for geopolitical space and signaling a cautious openness to dialogue with the West, while trying to avoid provoking a furious response from his Russian patrons.

This should not be interpreted as a sudden thaw. Moscow will certainly fight to keep Belarus as a key pressure point against NATO for many years to come, and is in a position to do so. Over the past five years, Russia has managed to establish extensive levers of influence throughout Belarus’s political, military, business, and cultural establishments in a process that some have characterized as a “creeping annexation.” Meanwhile, Lukashenka may have earned a reputation as a wily political operator, but he will almost certainly always gravitate back toward the Kremlin, regardless of any overtures from the West.

Lukashenka’s room for maneuver is clearly limited. But at the same time, his fear of being dragged directly into Putin’s war against the West creates a potential opening for pragmatic diplomacy. The September 11 visit by a US delegation to Minsk, which secured the release of dozens of political prisoners, shows that this diplomatic path is already producing tangible results. Western governments should now build on this momentum to press Lukashenka harder for the release of all political prisoners and an end to the repression of domestic opponents.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

What is the Coalition of the Willing actually willing to do in Ukraine?

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 09 Sep 2025 20:24:11 +0000

French President Emmanuel Macron announced last week that 26 nations have now committed to participating in a so-called “reassurance force” to help guarantee Ukraine’s security following the end of hostilities with Russia. Macron was speaking in Paris after hosting European colleagues from the Coalition of the Willing, a grouping of countries led by Britain and France that is attempting to spearhead efforts to secure a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Work on the Coalition of the Willing has been underway since early 2025, as Europe seeks to convince the Trump administration that it is prepared to take the lead in efforts to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The initiative received a boost in recent weeks when US President Donald Trump offered to provide crucial backup support for a European reassurance force in Ukraine. However, the exact nature of this American role has not yet been specified.

Crucially, there is also a lack of clarity over exactly what form a European military presence in Ukraine could take and what functions participating troops would be expected to serve. This has given rise to some fundamental questions over the nature and goals of any future reassurance force. In the final analysis, what is the Coalition of the Willing actually willing to do in Ukraine?

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The biggest question of all is whether European troops in Ukraine would be permitted to fight back if attacked by Russia. Russian opposition to a Western military presence in Ukraine is well known, with Putin recently stating that any European troops would be regarded by the Russians as legitimate targets.

A clash between Russian and European troops in Ukraine would not be inevitable. While the Kremlin would certainly be eager to test Western resolve by targeting European troops in Ukraine, this would be balanced by fears in Moscow that any acts of Russian aggression could end up backfiring and strengthening Europe’s commitment to stand with Ukraine. Nevertheless, the obvious potential for unpredictable escalations means that any Western soldiers deployed to postwar Ukraine would almost certainly be limited to areas far away from the front lines.

Europe’s collective desire to avoid a direct military confrontation with the Kremlin places serious limits on the potential scope of any reassurance force. However, this cautious approach does not mean that a European military presence in Ukraine would be entirely useless.

As long ago as spring 2024, France’s President Macron was already raising the prospect of deploying Western troops to rear areas as a way of establishing red lines for the Kremlin. More recently, US Special Envoy Keith Kellogg has suggested a European military presence on the right bank of the Dnipro River to safeguard central and western Ukraine. This could help create the security and confidence necessary for Ukraine’s revival.

European soldiers on the ground inside Ukraine could make a meaningful contribution to a possible air shield over the country. This is widely regarded as the most realistic form of Western military support for Ukraine, with air force squadrons from participating countries and enhanced air defenses combining to guard Ukrainian airspace against Russian missile and drone attacks. Western troops based in Ukraine could potentially operate air defense systems and provide ground support for the growing fleet of foreign jets in service with the Ukrainian Air Force.

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In addition to these more direct contributions to Ukrainian security, a European reassurance force could also help train the Ukrainian military. At present, most of the specialized training that Ukrainian soldiers and commanders receive takes place outside the country. This is expensive and inefficient. Establishing a comprehensive training program inside Ukraine would save lots of time and money. It would also have the added benefit of improving knowledge exchange between Ukrainian troops and their European colleagues.

European forces could make a very significant contribution to Ukraine’s security by taking on responsibility for repairing and maintaining the huge amounts of Western weaponry donated to Ukraine since 2022. Kyiv’s partners have provided a vast array of military kit ranging from hand-held anti-tank weapons and air defense systems to mobile artillery and armored personnel carriers. Keeping all of this in working condition is a herculean task that requires thousands of Ukrainians who could theoretically be replaced by their European counterparts. In some instances, it may even make sense for partner countries to take responsibility for the equipment delivered by their respective governments.

There are no illusions in Ukraine over the potential role of foreign soldiers. Nobody believes that the presence of a reassurance force would in itself be enough to deter further Russian aggression. On the contrary, Ukrainians are well aware that their country’s only truly credible security guarantee is the Ukrainian army. At the same time, troops from the Coalition of the Willing could boost the Ukrainian military in meaningful ways. European soldiers could play a supporting role in areas such as logistics, maintenance, and air defense, and could contribute to the training of Ukrainian troops.

Ukrainians do not expect anyone to fight for them. They would welcome the presence of European soldiers on the ground in Ukraine, but recognize that they must defend themselves and their nation. A reassurance force could serve as a meaningful element within a broader deterrence package, but the Coalition of the Willing would be well advised to focus its energies primarily on the practical goal of creating a Ukrainian military strong enough to deter the Kremlin.

Ukrainian bombing campaign turns Russia’s sheer size into a weakness

David Kirichenko — Thu, 04 Sep 2025 21:09:42 +0000

For centuries, Russia’s sheer size has been its greatest asset, making the country virtually unconquerable and guaranteeing an almost limitless supply of human and material resources that have helped secure generations of superpower status. However, there are signs that this may now be changing. Ukraine is currently conducting a long-range bombing campaign across Russia that turns the country’s vastness into a weakness and exploits the Kremlin’s inability to defend every inch of the endless Russian skies.

Ukrainian bombing raids on Russian oil refineries have been underway since the early stages of the war but have gained significant momentum over the past month. While the Kremlin remains tight-lipped over the impact of these attacks, evidence of significant damage is mounting. By late August, Ukraine had succeeded in disrupting at least 17 percent of Russia’s refining capacity, according to Reuters. Britain’s Economist magazine says that the figure may be as high as 20 percent.

Ukraine’s attacks have sparked a fuel crisis in Russia, with queues reported at gas stations throughout the country amid a surge in prices. By early September, Russia’s wholesale gasoline price had climbed to record highs. This combination of shortages and rising costs is already creating unwelcome social pressures that the Kremlin cannot afford to ignore. If Kyiv is able to maintain the current pace of attacks, this could begin to seriously constrain Putin’s ability to fund the invasion of Ukraine.

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Russia depends heavily on oil and gas revenues to maintain the war effort and cover the rising cost of enticing new military recruits. The Kremlin requires a steady flow of manpower as it seeks to overwhelm Ukraine’s defenses, but the Russian army’s reliance on frontal assaults virtually guarantees heavy losses. In order to sustain current troop levels, Russia is therefore forced to offer exceptionally high salaries and generous enlistment bonus payments.

Disruption within the oil and gas industry will not immediately impact Russia’s war economy, but it could force Putin to make difficult decisions. Since the start of the full-scale invasion more than three years ago, the Kremlin dictator has made it a priority to shield ordinary Russians from the impact of the war. If Ukrainian attacks on oil refineries continue, the Kremlin may have to cut spending elsewhere in order to finance the military, creating the potential for destabilization on the home front.

So far, Moscow is attempting to downplay the significance of Ukraine’s airstrikes, with Kremlin officials attributing fuel problems to other causes and blaming any obvious damage to refineries on falling drone debris. However, efforts are also underway to suppress news of successful Ukrainian attacks. This has reportedly included Orwellian announcements broadcast in public spaces informing Russians not to post footage of drone strikes on social media.

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Ukraine’s increased capacity to strike deep inside Russia reflects the progress made by Kyiv since 2022 in developing its own arsenal of long-range drones and missiles. During the initial stages of the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainians had only a handful of drones capable of conducting strikes across the border. The country is now reportedly producing thousands of long-range drones every month, and has recently unveiled a number of domestically produced cruise missiles with far greater payloads that could allow Ukraine to significantly escalate the current bombing campaign in the coming months.

The Ukrainian military is learning and improving with each new strike. Key refineries and weak points in Russia’s energy infrastructure are now being struck again and again in order to hinder repair works and compound the burden on Moscow’s energy logistics. When selecting targets, Ukrainian planners are also well aware of the Russian energy industry’s dependency on Western components, with sanctions often making it difficult for Moscow to source replacements.

Crucially, Ukraine’s bombing campaign is exploiting Russia’s size and taking advantage of the country’s already overstretched air defenses. Much of Russia’s existing air defense capacity is currently deployed in occupied regions of Ukraine and along the front lines of the invasion. This leaves a limited number of available systems to defend Russian cities and other high value targets such as the palaces of Putin and the Kremlin elite. By increasing the geographical range of its bombing raids, Ukraine is forcing Russia to further disperse its air defenses. This creates inviting gaps and leaves some targets undefended.

Even with dramatically enhanced air cover, it is likely that the Kremlin would still struggle to entirely nullify the threat of further airstrikes on the oil and gas sector. With dozens of refineries, storage facilities, and port terminals, together with thousands of kilometers of pipelines spread over eleven times zones, Russia’s energy industry may simply be too large to be adequately protected against aerial attack.

Officials in Kyiv recognize that the current air offensive will not prove decisive. Nevertheless, they hope Ukraine’s increasing ability to inflict serious damage on Russia’s energy sector can help persuade Putin to finally engage in peace talks. The Russian ruler seems completely unconcerned by the catastrophic casualties his army is suffering in Ukraine, but he may not find it so easy to ignore growing threats to the economic stability of Russia itself.

Many Ukrainians also see enhanced long-range strike capabilities as crucial for efforts to deter future Russian aggression. Russia’s size makes it a formidable foe but this scale also leaves the colossal country exposed to counterattack by a smaller opponent with an arsenal of weapons tailored to the task of giant-killing. As former Ukrainian defense minister Oleksiy Reznikov noted recently, “Ukraine is a David that tries to find Goliath’s weaknesses.”

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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Much of the discussion over security guarantees has focused on the deployment of a military contingent to Ukraine in order to help enforce and monitor any ceasefire agreement. However, the potential composition and exact role of such a force remain unclear. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently told the Financial Times that Europe has a “pretty precise” plan in place to send troops to Ukraine, but other senior European officials have since suggested that her comments were premature.

Europe appears to be divided over the issue of sending troops to Ukraine. France and Britain have committed to leading what is being called a reassurance force, with others including Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and Lithuania signalling their readiness to also contribute soldiers. In contrast, Poland, Italy, Spain, and the Czech Republic have rejected the idea of deploying troops to Ukraine, while Germany has so far adopted a skeptical stance.

Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump has ruled out the presence of American soldiers in Ukraine. Instead, discussions are reportedly underway over the possible participation of private US military companies as part of a long-term peace plan for Ukraine. American contractors could potentially perform a number of functions including the strengthening of Ukraine’s air defenses.

The key question regarding the presence of foreign troops on Ukrainian soil is whether they would be given a mandate to engage in combat operations. In other words, would European soldiers be allowed to fight back if attacked by Russia? Critics have noted that this is unlikely. Instead, they argue, any foreign troop contingent deployed to Ukraine would be largely symbolic with no meaningful military role.

International military involvement of some kind in the air and maritime domains may be more realistic. Ukrainian officials are hopeful that the country’s European partners will participate in air patrols to defend Ukraine against Russian drone and missile attacks. Allied countries may also contribute to the strengthening of Ukraine’s existing network of air defense systems. This could lead to significantly enhanced security over at least a portion of Ukraine’s skies, creating opportunities for the resumption of commercial flights and providing a safer environment for the civilian population.

Similar support in the Black Sea is also under discussion, with the Turkish navy expected to play a prominent role. With Russia’s Black Sea Fleet already weakened by Ukrainian drone and missile strikes, allied involvement could help safeguard maritime supply corridors and secure uninterrupted trade flows from Ukrainian ports. This would provide the country with an important economic boost and help ease the pressure on congested land routes via Poland and Romania.

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While Ukrainian officials will certainly welcome further talk of troops on the ground, air shields, and naval missions, any serious discussion of security guarantees must acknowledge that Western leaders are deeply reluctant to risk direct military confrontation with the Kremlin. With this in mind, Ukraine’s most realistic security strategy lies not in empty promises or symbolic deployments of foreign soldiers, but in strengthening the country’s own defense capabilities.

Kyiv’s top priorities in this context include securing the continued supply of US and European weapons, ongoing intelligence support, and increased international investment in the rapidly expanding Ukrainian defense industry. Integration into existing European security structures will be crucial, including full coordination of the Ukrainian military with foreign partners providing the aviation and naval components of any future security guarantees.

Greater cooperation between Ukrainian defense tech companies and their Western counterparts can also contribute to the process of strengthening security ties between Ukraine and the rest of Europe. Today’s Ukraine has unrivalled experience in drone warfare and numerous other aspects of the contemporary battlefield. This makes the country a strategic partner with much to offer its European neighbors.

At present, a strong Ukraine looks to be by far the most realistic deterrent against further Russian aggression. This will require extensive material support and binding long-term political commitments from Kyiv’s allies, but is unlikely to involve a major foreign military presence in Ukraine.

The benefits of backing Ukraine will be potentially far-reaching for Europe as a whole. A strengthened and integrated Ukrainian military can serve as a bastion of European security for years to come as the continent seeks to modernize its military and adapt to the new geopolitical realities of an isolationist United States and an expansionist Russia.

Elena Davlikanova is a senior fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis and Sahaidachny Security Center. Yevhen Malik is a veteran of the Ukrainian Army’s 36th Marine Brigade.

Russia’s extremely modest recent gains have come at a terrible price. While the Kremlin does not release information about its war dead, conservative estimates of Russian casualties based on open source data suggest catastrophic losses during the summer months numbering tens of thousands. As German journalist and BILD correspondent Julian Röpcke has noted, any sober assessment of Russia’s summer offensive must conclude that it has been a “debacle.”

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The failure of Putin’s summer offensive should now help to debunk the persistent myth of inevitable Russian victory. For far too long, international perceptions of the war in Ukraine have been distorted by exaggerated notions of Russia’s military might. Perhaps most notoriously, this has led US President Donald Trump to criticize Ukraine for daring to defend itself against a far larger aggressor, while suggesting that Russia is somehow uniquely accustomed to waging and winning wars.

In reality, Russian history has been shaped to a significant degree by military defeats, including a long list of lost wars in the past few centuries alone. Russia suffered a comprehensive defeat against an Anglo-French coalition in the Crimean War of the 1850s. This was followed by a humiliating loss to Japan in 1905, which sparked a revolution. Russia then contrived to lose World War I, despite starting the war on what would eventually be the winning side. This led to the downfall of the Czarist Russian Empire.

In the immediate aftermath of the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks lost the 1920 Polish-Soviet War. The Soviet era would also end in defeat, with Russia retreating from Afghanistan in 1988 before losing the Cold War itself. Following the collapse of the USSR, post-Soviet Russia went on to lose the First Chechen War in the mid 1990s.

Despite this very mixed military record, modern Russia has managed to convince much of the outside world that it remains an unstoppable superpower. Putin has embraced the militarism of the Soviet era and brought it into the digital age, combining traditional elements such as annual parades and Hollywood-style blockbusters with viral social media messaging and rampant disinformation campaigns designed to cultivate an image of overwhelming strength.

Putin’s militaristic myth-making has played an important role in shaping the international response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ever since the outbreak of hostilities in February 2022, Western leaders have allowed themselves to be intimidated by Putin’s projections of power and his liberal use of nuclear blackmail. Rather than providing Ukraine with everything it needs to secure victory, the West has consistently hesitated while citing fear of escalation. This timid approach has merely served to embolden Moscow and prolong the war.

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With little actual progress to report on the battlefield, the Kremlin is now reportedly scrambling to inflate its gains in an apparent bid to overawe Western policymakers and persuade them that their continued backing of the Ukrainian war effort is futile. “The Kremlin is trying to convince the West that Russia will inevitably achieve its war goals on the battlefield, such that Ukraine should concede to Russian demands and the West should therefore cease its support of Ukraine,” the US-based Institute for the Study of War noted on August 30.

The facts on the ground tell a different story. While Putin boasts of relentless advances and irresistible battlefield momentum, his army is in many instances still fighting over villages located within walking distance of Russia’s original positions at the start of the full-scale invasion more than three and a half years ago. Over the past one thousand days, Russia has occupied around one percent of Ukraine, while failing to capture a single Ukrainian regional capital. Indeed, the largest city occupied by Russian forces during the whole war remains Rostov in Russia itself, which was briefly seized in June 2023 during the short-lived Wagner mutiny.

Putin’s ability to intimidate Western leaders is his greatest single achievement in a war that has seen his army perform far below expectations. The success of his saber-rattling is a triumph of style over substance that conveniently ignores unfavorable battlefield realities while relying heavily on the West’s own obvious reluctance to confront the Kremlin. As evidence of the Russian army’s limitations continues to mount, this reluctance looks harder and harder to justify.

It would be extremely foolish to underestimate the threat posed by Putin’s war machine, of course. The Russian army dwarfs anything in Europe and is backed by vast quantities of drones, missiles, and air power, along with the kind of ruthless political will that is almost entirely absent in most European capitals. But at the same time, it is vital to recognize that Russian victory in Ukraine is anything but inevitable.

The costly failure of Russia’s recent summer offensive is a clear signal that Putin’s invasion is not going according to plan. For now, the Kremlin dictator shows no sign of compromising and still thinks he can bluff his way to victory, but his army is obviously far more vulnerable that he would like us to believe. If the Ukrainians receive the necessary backing from their allies, recent evidence suggests that they are more than capable of turning the military tide in their favor and forcing Putin to the negotiating table.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Hungary has alternative energy options but chooses to rely on Russia

Aura Sabadus — Tue, 02 Sep 2025 19:42:11 +0000

Hungarian officials have responded angrily in recent weeks to repeated Ukrainian attacks on the Kremlin’s Druzhba pipeline, which supplies Hungary with Russian oil. Ukraine hit the pipeline on three occasions during August, provoking protests from Budapest and warnings from Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto that Ukraine “must expect consequences.”

Hungary’s first act of retaliation was to ban Ukraine’s drone force commander Robert Brovdi from entering the country. Brovdi, who is of Hungarian descent, responded defiantly. In a strongly-worded social media post, he branded Hungary’s pro-Kremlin authorities “dancers on bones” and accused them of being complicit in Russian war crimes by funding Moscow’s invasion. “Your hands are soaked in blood up to the elbows, and we will not forget it,” he commented.

Brovdi’s reply may not have been very diplomatic, but it reflected the painful truth. Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine is being financed primarily by the export of Russian oil and gas. As one of the Kremlin’s last remaining European customers along with neighboring Slovakia, Hungary is feeding Putin’s war machine.

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Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Hungary and Slovakia are believed to have paid Moscow close to $6 billion in tax revenues for crude oil deliveries alone. This contribution is enough to finance thousands of the cruise missiles that are used to bomb Ukrainian towns and cities on a daily basis.

Following Russia’s invasion, the EU announced plans to completely phase out Russian fossil fuel imports. However, rather than diversify away from Moscow, Budapest and Bratislava have actually increased their dependency on Russian energy deliveries. Hungary has expanded its reliance on Russian oil from 61 percent on the eve of the invasion to the current figure of 86 percent, while Slovakia is now thought to be almost entirely dependent on Moscow for oil. Similar trends are evident in terms of Russian gas exports to both countries.

This continued reliance on Russia is a choice rather than a necessity. A report published earlier this year by the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) and the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) found that Hungary and Slovakia could both potentially diversify their energy supply strategies by importing non-Russian oil via alternative sources such as Croatia’s Adria pipeline.

Opportunities for diversification also exist in relation to natural gas. For example, the two countries could secure non-Russian gas deliveries in the form of liquefied natural gas from global suppliers via existing LNG terminals located in Germany, Poland, Italy, or Greece.

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Hungary and Slovakia argue that their reliance on the Kremlin is motivated by cost, with imports from Russia cheaper than purchasing energy resources elsewhere. While wholesale prices paid by Hungarian and Slovakian buyers are not officially released, data published by the European Commission indicates that natural gas prices for end consumers in Hungary and Slovakia are among the highest in the EU. In other words, Hungarian and Slovakian consumers do not appear to be any better off than their EU peers as a result of ongoing Russian oil and gas deliveries.

A key long-term oil export contract between Hungarian and Russian companies was due to expire at the end of June 2025, thus potentially freeing the Hungarian side of contractual obligations and empowering it to seek alternatives elsewhere. It is unclear whether the agreement has been renewed or if Hungary is now simply buying Russian oil on the spot market, but continued imports point to the fact that the Hungarian government has no plans to turn away from Russian fossil fuels.

Hungary has known for more than three years that the EU is aiming to end energy imports from Russia. Budapest also has alternative options available that would allow the country to reduce its reliance on Russian oil and gas supplies. Instead of diversifying, however, the Hungarian government has chosen to deepen its dependence on the Kremlin. They have done so despite knowing that they are helping to finance the largest European war since World War II.

Ukraine’s recent strikes on the Druzhba pipeline are not only an attack on Russia’s war economy. They are also a wake-up call for Hungarians highlighting the role being played by their country in the funding of Russia’s invasion.

Putin wants to capture Ukraine’s crucial fortress belt without a fight

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 28 Aug 2025 21:16:11 +0000

As US-led efforts to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine struggle to gain momentum, Vladimir Putin’s latest territorial demands include the surrender of strategically vital and heavily fortified Ukrainian land in the east of the country. Moscow is calling on Kyiv to unilaterally withdraw from the approximately one-third of Donetsk province that remains in Ukrainian hands as part of any peace deal. In other words, Putin aims to secure territory at the negotiating table that his army has been unable to conquer in more that three and a half years of full-scale war.

The northern third of the Donetsk province is the last remaining part of eastern Ukraine’s industrial Donbas region that is still under Kyiv control. It has been at the epicenter of Putin’s invasion ever since the onset of Russian aggression more than a decade ago in 2014, and is home to Ukraine’s most extensive network of fortifications. Putin’s proposed peace terms pose a series of grave political and military threats for the Ukrainian authorities.

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Gifting Russia large swathes of unconquered territory that thousands of Ukrainians have died defending would be an extremely bitter pill for the Ukrainian population to swallow, to put it mildly. It would also be widely seen as rewarding Russia for launching the largest European war since World War II. This would legitimize Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine and set the stage for further Russian aggression.

Even if Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was personally inclined to appease Putin, he does not constitutionally have the authority to cede land. Instead, changes to Ukraine’s borders must be agreed via a national referendum. Any indication that Zelenskyy favored accepting Putin’s territorial demands would likely provoke strong domestic opposition. This would potentially destabilize Ukraine, creating a range of opportunities for Russia to exploit. A weakened and divided Ukraine would be far more vulnerable on the battlefield and in the diplomatic arena.

Alternatively, if Zelenskyy maintains his current position and continues to rule out Putin’s Donbas land grab, the Kremlin will likely use this rejection to poison the Ukrainian leader’s relations with US President Donald Trump by portraying Ukraine as the main obstacle to peace. Putin would no doubt welcome the opportunity to drive a wedge between Kyiv and Washington as Moscow seeks to isolate Ukraine and reduce international support for the Ukrainian war effort.

Militarily, the surrender of the northern Donetsk region would place large parts of eastern Ukraine at risk of being overrun by the advancing Russians. The region currently serves as a bastion against Russia’s invasion. While there is no guarantee that fortified areas will be able to hold out indefinitely against Russian attacks, Putin would almost certainly be forced to sacrifice huge numbers of troops before achieving his goal. In this sense, the Donbas fortress belt is one of Ukraine’s trump cards in its war of attrition against Russia.

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Over the past eleven years, Ukraine has constructed a range of defensive fortifications in the northern Donetsk region centered around the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. The area has served as a logistical hub for the Ukrainian war effort and has been a focus of efforts to develop defense in depth. If Ukraine retreats from this stronghold, Russia would be able to secure a vital staging post for further advances while avoiding hundreds of thousands of casualties. The Ukrainian military would then be forced to hastily construct new fortifications in significantly less favorable terrain.

With current military technologies favoring defensive operations, Ukraine’s fortress belt in the northern Donetsk region represents a formidable obstacle for Putin’s invading army. The ubiquity of drones above the battlefield makes large-scale mechanized breakthroughs extremely challenging to accomplish, leaving Russia to rely on small groups of infantry to infiltrate Ukrainian forward positions. This approach can be successful against thinly defended and hastily constructed defensive positions, but is unlikely to prove effective against the most heavily fortified sector of the Ukrainian front lines.

Ukrainians recognize the need for concessions, with a majority acknowledging that areas of the country currently occupied by Russia will likely remain under Kremlin control as part of any peace settlement. Crucially, however, almost nobody in Ukraine believes that handing over additional unconquered territory in the Donbas would satisfy Putin’s imperial ambitions or remove the threat of future Russian invasions. On the contrary, most Ukrainians agree that this would only encourage the Kremlin and embolden Putin to go further. He would be able to do so from a position of strength, having secured Ukraine’s fortress belt without the prolonged fighting that has proved necessary in order to secure far smaller territorial gains elsewhere in eastern Ukraine.

From both a military and political perspective, it would make little sense for Ukraine to accept Russia’s territorial demands and voluntarily surrender the northern Donetsk region as part of a peace deal. As long as Kyiv continues to control the Donbas fortress belt, there is a good chance that the Ukrainian military can turn the entire region into a graveyard for Putin’s invading army. Meanwhile, a withdrawal would leave large parts of Ukraine dangerously undefended and dramatically undermine faith in the country’s leadership.

Even if Putin concentrates his best military units in a bid to complete the conquest of the Donbas region, he would almost certainly be forced to pay a very high price for any significant advances. Indeed, the Russian army may become bogged down for years in bitter fighting that would dwarf earlier battles of attrition and could conceivably change the entire course of the war. This is exactly why Putin is pushing for Ukraine to surrender the region without a fight, and helps explain why Ukraine is reluctant to do so.

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Ukraine’s defense tech sector can play a key role in economic security

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As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Further reading

Ukraine’s best security guarantee is the ability to strike back inside Russia

Unable to win on the battlefield, Putin escalates war on Ukrainian civilians

Veterans can shape the future of Ukrainian democracy

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Unable to win on the battlefield, Putin escalates war on Ukrainian civilians

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Further reading

Ukraine security guarantees are futile without increased pressure on Putin

Putin is weaponizing winter as Russia tries to freeze Ukraine into submission

Surrender or freeze: Putin’s winter blitz targets Ukrainian civilians

Read more from UkraineAlert

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Surrender or freeze: Putin’s winter blitz targets Ukrainian civilians

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Further reading

Putin cannot accept any peace deal that secures Ukrainian statehood

Veterans can shape the future of Ukrainian democracy

Putin is weaponizing winter as Russia tries to freeze Ukraine into submission

Read more from UkraineAlert

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Ukraine’s best security guarantee is the ability to strike back inside Russia

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Further reading

Putin cannot accept any peace deal that secures Ukrainian statehood

Veterans can shape the future of Ukrainian democracy

Putin is weaponizing winter as Russia tries to freeze Ukraine into submission

Read more from UkraineAlert

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Ukraine’s enhanced fortifications are increasing the cost of Putin’s invasion

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As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Eurasia Center events

How Russia’s winter warfare strategy targets Ukrainian civilians

Further reading

Putin cannot accept any peace deal that secures Ukrainian statehood

Putin is weaponizing winter as Russia tries to freeze Ukraine into submission

Belarus hosts nuclear-capable Russian missiles despite talk of US thaw

Read more from UkraineAlert

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Veterans can shape the future of Ukrainian democracy

Stay updated

Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
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Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
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Follow us on social media
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Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
and support our work

Follow us on social media
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