Fourteen years after the 2011 uprising and NATO-led military intervention that toppled Muammar Gaddafi, Libya remains divided. While the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) rules the northwest, the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by military leader Khalifa Haftar, controls most of eastern Libya—with both factions backed by competing foreign militaries.

For years, the situation on the ground seemed frozen. Yet two recent developments mark a shift: Oil majors are returning to the country, and the United States is stepping up its military engagement. The visits by the top leadership from US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in October and December last year and the announcement that Libya will join Exercise Flintlock—AFRICOM’s largest annual special operations exercise historically focused on West Africa—signal that the US administration now views Libya’s trajectory as inseparable from broader regional stability.

Against this backdrop, the United States has a narrow—but real—opportunity to reset conditions in Libya by combining carefully calibrated security engagement with strategic investment. Taking this opportunity is urgent, especially as Russia and other foreign powers seek to cement their influence over the southern Mediterranean’s political future.

Libya’s geostrategic significance for energy, Europe, and the Sahel

Libya straddles Europe and Africa. While its coastline faces Italy, its southern expanse feeds directly into the Sahel, where al-Qaeda-aligned groups such as Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State (IS) affiliates operate. What happens in Libya affects US and European energy security, regional counterterrorism efforts, and global migration flows. Moreover, the country produces between 1.2 and 1.4 million barrels of oil per day and aims to reach two million by 2030. With Western sanctions tightening on Russian energy, Europe increasingly views Libyan crude oil as a pressure-valve alternative.

In November, Shell, Chevron, Eni, TotalEnergies, and Repsol* were all pre-qualified to participate in Tripoli’s first exploration auction in eighteen years. However, instability in southern Libya continues to amplify extremist mobility and arms flows from the Sahel, directly threatening these investments. That risk is further compounded by the expansion of Russia’s Africa Corps—the successor to the paramilitary Wagner Group—in the east and south. Meanwhile, the Central Mediterranean migration route remains a sensitive domestic political issue for Italy. Rome’s Mattei Plan is explicitly built around stabilizing Libya’s energy production and migration management.

Navigating fragmentation and proxy competition to unlock investment

Progress in Libya’s hydrocarbons sector remains contingent on a minimum threshold of stability and predictability in governance, which is still fractured between the Tripoli-based GNU—backed by Turkey and Qatar—and Haftar’s LNA in the east, supported by Russia (via the Africa Corps), Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.

The signing of a 2019 maritime boundary treaty with the GNU has given Turkey de facto veto power over Libya’s western security sector and offshore zones. Meanwhile, Russia has entrenched itself in eastern Haftar-controlled areas since 2023. Instead of relying on the Wagner Group, however, Moscow has transitioned to formal involvement via the Ministry of Defense. Russia now controls airbases, logistics hubs, and key desert routes into the Sahel, with personnel positioned near critical oil fields and terminals—the same assets the Tripoli government is attempting to license to Western firms.

The result is that Libya has become the Mediterranean’s most active proxy chessboard, with foreign powers positioning themselves to capture future revenues from hydrocarbons and reconstruction. Absent a credible US counterweight, decisions on energy access, migration management, and political transition will be made in Moscow or elsewhere—but not in Washington or Brussels.

A new window for US reengagement

Two developments suggest a modest but meaningful upward trend in US reengagement. First, building on the US Navy ship visit to Libya in April (the first in fifty years), AFRICOM’s deputy commander visited GNU-controlled Tripoli and LNA-held Sirte in October. Inviting Libya to Exercise Flintlock was deliberate signaling: The US government seeks to pull Libya into a broader Western security network—rather than cede the field to other countries with stronger influence, such as Russia. This trajectory continued in early December, when Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah met AFRICOM’s commander to expand cooperation on training, equipment, and force professionalization. The GNU’s public request for deeper US support in professionalizing Libya’s security forces marks a notable shift after years of strategic hedging between Washington, Ankara, and Doha.

Second, there has been a surge of activity around Libya’s energy sector. Since 2023, oil output has stabilized, front lines have frozen, and neither the LNA nor the GNU has achieved decisive military or political dominance. This stalemate has created political space for external influence. Energy-sector momentum has been reinforced by high-level diplomatic traffic in both directions. The US special envoy for Africa and Arab Affairs, Massad Boulos, traveled to Tripoli and Benghazi in July, followed by a GNU delegation visit to Washington in August. That trip signaled the GNU’s intent to re-anchor Libya with Western stakeholders and request US assistance in pushing Russia out of eastern military bases to restore unified territorial control.

That momentum was further reinforced by a joint statement on November 26 from the United States, major European partners, Gulf states, Turkey, Egypt, and the United Kingdom. The statement backed a renewed mandate for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), endorsed a political roadmap by UNSMIL head Hanna Tetteh, and explicitly called for deeper east-west military and economic coordination—a rare moment of alignment among Libya’s external powerbrokers. For the US administration, this sent the strategic signal that Libya’s unification is now within reach. The window of opportunity, however, is closing fast—and another conflict cycle, election breakdown, or foreign miscalculation could shut it indefinitely.

The energy-security nexus: Why investment alone will fail

The return of oil majors represents the most consequential shift in Libya in a decade. But investment without security is unlikely to endure. In March last year, Libya launched its first licensing round for oil exploration in eighteen years, signaling a bid to attract Western technology, capital, and expertise. Shell, BP*, TotalEnergies, and Eni have reopened channels with the National Oil Corporation (NOC)—and ExxonMobil* signed a memorandum of understanding in August for offshore exploration in the Sirte Basin.

Yet these developments do not change the fact that some of Libya’s most valuable reserves remain under Russian influence. Western firms cannot scale operations without predictable access, enforceable contracts, and baseline security guarantees.

An intentional presence to protect investment

To consolidate recent political and economic gains—and protect sizable Western energy investments—the United States should deliberately expand its diplomatic, military, and economic presence in Libya, in close coordination with allies.

The March 2024 announcement that the United States will reopen an embassy in Libya is a critical step toward sustained engagement across military and economic channels. It will also enable closer coordination with key partners—including Italy, Egypt, Turkey, and the UN—whose objectives overlap with US interests.

As the multi-year process to open the embassy inches forward, AFRICOM and its components should pursue near-term, high-impact initiatives. US special operations forces should help build and professionalize vetted Libyan special forces units across both western and eastern factions, units that would pursue shared security interests, no matter the progress toward an eventually possible unification. Additionally, maritime partnerships should be expanded rapidly to strengthen Libyan Navy and Coast Guard capabilities, particularly in interdiction, offshore asset protection, and port security. At the same time, the United States could leverage its convening power to establish a technical deconfliction cell in Sirte, allowing GNU and LNA representatives to coordinate security around oil infrastructure and prevent escalation. Such mechanisms could also support counterterrorism cooperation, including targeting IS remnants and blocking spillover from the Sahel.

Layered US engagement can unlock stability

However, military engagement alone will not be sustainable without economic development. Given the complex legacy of US involvement—from the economically devastating sanctions of the 1980s to the 2011 NATO intervention and the overthrow of the Muammar Gaddafi regime—the United States must work through partners to advance both economic and counterterrorism objectives. The US International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank could prioritize export credits for pipelines, gas processing, and power generation, explicitly linking financing to transparency and anti-corruption benchmarks.

US and partner foreign assistance could also support long-overdue reforms at the NOC, including modern contracting practices, environmental standards, and shared revenue frameworks. These efforts should extend beyond governments: Western energy companies involved in Libya should participate in coordinated infrastructure planning, rather than simply launching isolated investments.

Layering diplomatic, military, and economic tools would allow the United States to establish a modest but coherent posture capable of unlocking outsized stabilization effects—and preventing any country that works against US interests from having dominance over Libya’s future. For the United States, Libya offers a proving ground for a new model of engagement—one built on security assistance that enables Western investment instead of substituting for it. AFRICOM’s renewed presence and the surge of Western energy interest create a rare opportunity to reintegrate Libya into a Western orbit. If the United States seeks stability in the Mediterranean, resilience in the Sahel, and credible alternatives to Russian energy, now is the time to make coordinated security and economic investments in Libya.

Rose Lopez Keravuori is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, an associate director at Strategia Worldwide, and chair of the board of advisors of GCR Group. She previously served as the director of intelligence at the US Africa Command.

Maureen Farrell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and vice president for global partnerships at Valar, a Nairobi-based strategic advisory and risk firm. She previously served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs and director for African affairs at the US National Security Council.

Note: Several companies mentioned in this article—Shell, BP, Chevron, Eni, TotalEnergies, Repsol, and ExxonMobil—are donors to the Atlantic Council but not to this article series.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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There are compelling reasons for the United States to increase its footprint in Nigeria, but fears of a genocide against Nigeria’s Christian population are unfounded. In fact, both Christians and Muslims are victims of violence and terrorism in Nigeria, as Trump’s own senior advisor for Arab and African affairs, Massad Boulos, has noted. If the United States is genuinely interested in helping the Nigerian government address violence and terrorism, then it must change course. After all, applying pressure on Nigeria risks driving it toward greater economic dependence on China or deeper military reliance on Russia, as has occurred with some of Nigeria’s Sahelian neighbors in recent years.

Why Nigeria matters

Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, is a major oil producer, and has the potential to become an African superpower. Contrary to the trajectory of many Sahel states in recent years, Abuja stands as a bulwark against further destabilization in West Africa and is a leader within the Economic Community of West African States. Though the country experienced democratic backsliding under former President Muhammadu Buhari from 2015 to 2023, Nigeria has been an electoral democracy since 1999—and it remains politically stable despite last month’s unconfirmed coup plot and military reshuffle.

Among African countries, Nigeria had the most favorable view of the United States in 2025, according to surveys by the Pew Research Center. While US favorability ratings in Kenya have dropped by double digits over the past year, Nigerian favorability ratings have remained relatively stable. Last year, two-thirds of Nigerians expressed confidence that Trump would do the right thing in world affairs, putting him three points ahead of former US President Joe Biden. By applying overt pressure in dealing with Nigeria, the United States would risk alienating a key regional partner whose population still expresses confidence in US leadership.

Moreover, if US ties with Nigeria were to deteriorate, this could provide an opening for China or Russia to gain influence. The Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity Index shows a steep rise in Chinese influence in Nigeria over the past decade and a half. China has become Nigeria’s largest trading partner, and Nigeria is one of the most active participants in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Last September, Tinubu met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, where the two leaders formally elevated China-Nigeria relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”

Russia, too, has increased its influence over Nigeria in the past decade, signing a military cooperation agreement with Abuja in late 2021. In May 2025, the head of Nigeria’s military visited Moscow for discussions with top Russian military officials. Russia offered additional weaponry and training, which the Nigerian military saw as a reaffirmation of Russian support. Following Trump’s comments about potential US military action in Nigeria, Russia warned that such a step could escalate global tensions.

Given these dynamics, US pressure on Nigeria could backfire, inadvertently driving the country into the arms of Russia and China. This would ultimately weaken US influence in a strategically vital region and mirror the path of some members of the Alliance of Sahel States—a bloc comprising Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—that have come to depend on Moscow for security and on Beijing for economic support.

Surveying political violence in Nigeria

Violence is a big problem in Nigeria, but it’s also a complex one. It’s local and it’s regional, occurring both between groups and within them. To shape effective US policy, it is important to understand the country’s complex landscape of political violence.

Nigeria ranks sixth among countries most afflicted by terrorism, according to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project lists Nigeria as one of ten countries globally—and three in Africa—experiencing “extreme” levels of conflict. As the charts below show, political violence in Nigeria has grown significantly since 2020, reaching all-time highs in 2025, though fatalities have not increased proportionally.

Political violence in Nigeria has risen—though fatalities have not grown at the same rate

Political violence in Nigeria    Demonstrations in Nigeria    Fatalities in Nigeria

Source: ACLED, accessed November 1, 2025

Terrorism in the northeast

The terrorist group Boko Haram has been militarily active in Nigeria’s northeastern states since 2009. The group’s violent attacks surged in 2014 and 2015, after it infamously abducted 276 schoolgirls in the town of Chibok and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). However, internal disputes prompted the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) to split from Boko Haram by 2016. Since then, an inter-jihadist turf war has been waged, leaving Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau dead in 2021. In 2024, armed conflict involving the two groups killed nearly 1,400 people, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)—and in 2025, they attempted at least twenty ambushes on military positions in Nigeria’s northeastern Borno State. On November 17, ISWAP militants claimed to have captured and killed a Nigerian brigadier general.

Banditry and kidnappings in the northwest

Nigeria’s northwest is a hub for criminal violence. Kidnappings in this region and throughout Nigeria are generally carried out by criminal gangs rather than ideologically motivated groups. In November, twenty-five schoolchildren were kidnapped in Kebbi State in northwest Nigeria and fifty-two more in Niger State in the country’s Middle Belt region. In March 2024, militants kidnapped 280 schoolchildren in the northwest state of Kaduna. Ansaru, a Boko Haram offshoot, is also active in this region. It is responsible for a series of kidnappings for ransoms and attacks against the Nigerian government.

Middle Belt violence

The crisis in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, one of the country’s most ethnically diverse regions, is mostly driven by farmer-herder conflicts. Violence in the Middle Belt occurs primarily between ethno-religious groups amid disputes over resources and land. These conflicts have long and complex roots, exacerbated by climate change and desertification. However, conflating violence by primarily Muslim Fulani herders against mostly Christian farmers with jihadist violence has, in part, led to misconceptions of a “Christian genocide” in the country. In some years, pastoral violence has indeed resulted in more fatalities than Boko Haram-ISWAP insurgencies—for instance, in 2018. However, this was not the case in 2025.

Oil militancy and piracy

Decentralized networks of oil militants, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), have attacked oil infrastructure and kidnapped oil workers in Nigeria’s southeast for two decades. While less threatening than in the 2000s, oil militants remain active, as evidenced by a MEND attack on an oil facility earlier this year. Piracy off Nigeria’s coast, once more severe than Somali piracy, has declined due to shipping security measures, but both pirates and militants continue to evolve and collaborate whenever opportunities arise.

Separatist troubles

Aiming to restore the short-lived Republic of Biafra, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) was established in 2014. Protesting the marginalization of the Igbo people, IPOB’s militant wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), has waged a low-level insurgency against the Nigerian government. In 2024, this conflict caused about two hundred fatalities, according to UCDP data. On November 6, just days after Trump’s statements about Nigeria, IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu appealed to the US president to investigate state-sponsored killings of Christians in eastern Nigeria. On November 20, Kanu was sentenced to life in prison for terrorism, raising the risk of further clashes between the ESN and security forces.

Neighboring problems

In neighboring Mali, the deadliest Salafi jihadist terrorist group, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), continues to expand its influence. JNIM launched its first attack in Nigeria’s Kwara State on October 28, killing one soldier. Of additional concern are potential links between JNIM and Ansaru. In late August, Nigerian security officials arrested two Ansaru leaders who allegedly underwent substantial training from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, now a part of JNIM. Boko Haram also operates in Cameroon’s Far North region.

How the United States can support Nigeria

Nigeria faces major security challenges, but carrots, rather than sticks, are more likely to succeed when it comes to US-Nigeria security cooperation. Two primary areas for strategic cooperation should be prioritized:

First, help professionalize Nigeria’s security services. A new US-supported working group presents opportunities for increased engagement with Nigerian military and security forces. This can help Nigeria build a force that appreciates the importance of professionalization, training, and respect for human rights. In late November, Nigeria’s national security advisor met with US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth in Washington. According to a State Department official, the United States is considering an “expansive” engagement plan, including intelligence sharing. Given Nigeria’s record of operational mishaps—including incidents that have killed civilians—this is an opportunity for the United States to help train the Nigerian military on intelligence analysis and mission planning.

Similarly, the United States can support Nigeria as it incorporates advanced technology into its military. In recent years, the country has expanded its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but there are risks to such rapid UAV adoption. In fact, the proliferation of drone technology can exacerbate domestic conflicts—and Nigeria is no exception. Between 2017 and 2023, at least three hundred Nigerian civilians were killed in Nigerian air force strikes. Extensive training and engagement, potentially including better communication systems and intelligence integration, could reduce casualties.

In addition to broader military engagement, the United States has pursued specialized partnerships with Nigerian forces. Last year, for instance, the US Coast Guard proposed a partnership with the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, and in the past, US special forces have trained the so-called Special Boat Service, a special forces unit of the Nigerian Navy—though this hasn’t occurred since 2021. Such efforts can both strengthen the integrity of the bilateral relationship and professionalize Nigerian forces. This cooperation can also help shape the force into a pro-Western military and build relationships between Nigerian and US soldiers that could foster future collaboration.

Second, support anti-corruption efforts. Nigeria’s security challenges exist within a context of widespread government corruption, which fuels the grievances of various rebel groups. In Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, Nigeria ranks 140 out of 180 countries, with 180 indicating the highest level of perceived corruption. For many Nigerians, working toward changing this status quo is a priority—and both the US administration and the Nigerian government should keep that in mind. Security cooperation alone isn’t enough. There must also be political action that improves government performance and accountability more broadly—something the United States could assist with. Recently, the Nigerian president warned public officials about corruption and government theft, opening the door for the United States to offer support for and encourage anti-corruption programs. 

Despite its myriad security challenges, Nigeria remains a major regional power. Trump is not wrong to focus on the country, but a punitive approach or unauthorized military action risks missing key opportunities to deepen engagement. If the United States relies solely on sanctions and threats, then it may find itself on the outside looking in. A more effective strategy is to engage Nigeria from within—offering carrots rather than sticks.

Haleigh Bartos is an associate professor of the practice in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. She teaches courses on policy writing and national security at Carnegie Mellon University.

John Chin is an assistant teaching professor of political science in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. He is the lead author of the Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups D’état, which was named one of the best historical materials published in 2022-2023 by the American Library Association.

Julien Derroitte is completing a BA in architecture with dual minors in international relations and political science and in American politics and law at Carnegie Mellon University.

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On November 18, the United Nations (UN) secretary general briefed the UN Security Council on “a moment of profound urgency” and the risk of “a disastrous domino effect” across West Africa and the Sahel. The ongoing blockade is an escalation by JNIM, with the group extending its reach further south than ever before. It is possible that the blockade forces the junta, led by Mali’s President Assimi Goïta, to the negotiating table, or in a replay of 2012 events, militant advances could provoke a coup d’état. A JNIM seizure of power, though less likely, is possible—and threatens to turn Mali into Africa’s Afghanistan, similar to the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 2021, where terrorists can train, operate, and plan freely in a safe haven.  

How did the situation arrive here? And what are the implications of a jihadist takeover in Mali? A JNIM takeover in Mali would represent the first time an al-Qaeda affiliate had taken power in a country, with major regional and underappreciated global implications. This strategic turning point in Mali’s decade-long insurgency could, in the short term, mark the beginning of the end of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, as well as Russian influence in the region. In the long term, a JNIM regime heightens risks of transnational terror.

A jihadist takeover is now on the board

Since 2012, Mali has suffered three military coups (in 2012, 2020, and 2021) and an escalating separatist-turned-Islamist insurgency. Domestic insecurity contributed to growing public and military unrest that led to the ouster of two democratically elected presidents, Amadou T. Touré and Ibrahim B. Keïta.

Attempts to restore democracy and stability have only had temporary successes since. In 2012, major population centers fell to Islamists and Tuareg rebels who sought to establish a regime in the north (sometimes referred to as the “Azawad” by some northern groups). French intervention with Operation SERVAL in 2013 saved Mali’s government and prevented extremists from moving further south on Bamako. The UN launched the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali in 2014 to bolster stabilization efforts. 

In 2017, a conglomerate of four smaller organizations, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), merged to form JNIM. Problematically, the security situation worsened in spite of the presence of UN and French forces, prompting calls for the West to leave Mali after the 2020 and 2021 coups. Ultimately, both France and the UN withdrew their forces, as Malian protestors waved Russian flags and called for Moscow’s support. They got it. By 2022, the Russian private military Wagner Group became Mali’s principal security partner. Human rights abuses and armed conflict only increased.

In 2024, Mali was ranked fifth among countries most affected by terrorism in the Global Terrorism Index. Armed conflict in Mali caused at least 1,900 fatalities last year, the third-highest figure on record (behind 2022 and 2023). JNIM expanded its geographical reach in central, northeast, and southern Mali. With the army and Wagner Group unable to protect many communities, pro-government Dozo militias have mobilized for self-defense across central Mali, often exacerbating insecurity. Army and Dozo operations to combat the fuel blockade brought record levels of violence and mass atrocities to Mali’s Segou and Sikasso regions last month.

The beginning of the end of the Sahel alliance

Burkina Faso and Niger have similar stories—a poor security environment as a result of JNIM and ISIS-Sahel attacks, military coups, and a fragile post-coup political environment as juntas repudiated Western security assistance and turned to Russian forces (initially Wagner Group, which morphed into Russia’s Africa Corps).

In September 2023, the three countries withdrew from the long-standing regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and in its place established the AES, a defense pact to defeat jihadists and maintain power. The fall of Bamako would lead one of three core members to leave the Sahel alliance; the rump Burkina-Niger axis would be imperiled and on the defensive.

A setback for Russia in the Sahel

Although JNIM sees itself as an alternative to “puppets of the West,” a JNIM takeover would first and foremost see Russia’s star over the Sahel dim. JNIM, which has been fighting Russian mercenaries for years, will not be lining up to deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The failure of the AES and Russia to defend Mali serves as a cautionary tale that Russian intervention often exacerbates conflicts on the ground. Ditching security cooperation with Western democracies for Russia’s Africa Corps in the name of national sovereignty may have been popular, but it is a losing strategy.

Russia’s influence across the African Sahel has expanded since 2017, with Russian forces arriving in Burkina Faso in January 2024 and Niger in May 2024. Russia will not receive such invitations from others at this rate.

Inviting the French back in may be out of the question in light of public opinion in the Sahel on French intervention, but regime change in Mali by either a rival military faction or JNIM extremists might provide a window of opportunity for the United States to bolster cooperation with eager states outside of the Sahel alliance—especially among the West African littorals and Mali’s neighbors. 

Risks of state-sponsored terrorism in Africa

If there is one group to watch on the continent other than al-Shabaab (one of al-Qaeda’s most competent branches that once had a pilot in flight training for a 9/11-style attack), it’s JNIM. If it were to capture the state apparatus in Mali, the country could easily become a haven for jihadists in the region and become a leading state sponsor of terrorism on the continent, much like Sudan became after Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood affiliate National Islamic Front) came to power following a 1989 coup.

Many terrorist groups in Africa that have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda senior leadership or ISIS remain fixated on local grievances despite rebranding—but JNIM has the potential to evolve given its al-Qaeda identity is baked into its roots. JNIM’s DNA is comprised in part of an organization, AQIM, that, despite also having local gripes, had leadership (though now deceased) that fought the Soviets in Afghanistan and had historical links to Osama bin Laden. JNIM maintained its allegiance to al-Qaeda senior leadership and maintained AQIM’s relevance and reach in the Sahel with a newer, larger, and more lethal brand under the leadership of Iyad al-Ghali.

Countries beyond the Sahel could become targets, and JNIM could expand its area of influence. At the end of October, JNIM claimed responsibility for its first attack in Nigeria, which killed a Nigerian soldier. It is worth noting that a Boko Haram spinoff, Ansaru, operates not terribly far from where this attack occurred—this group was once believed to have a connection to AQIM, though to what extent is unclear.

Bamako faces a stronger enemy than ever, but unlike in 2013, it now lacks Western support to defeat it. The African Union offers rhetorical support, but no boots on the ground. Military support from ECOWAS seems like the only plausible intervention. Despite the Sahel alliance rebuking Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso’s membership earlier this year, ECOWAS offered to keep the door for reengagement open. If there is a lifeline, Bamako should grab it. If left unchecked, JNIM could grow bolder, bigger, acquire additional affiliates, and, one day, sponsor or enable operations beyond the region.

Haleigh Bartos is an associate professor of the practice in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. She teaches courses on policy writing and national security at Carnegie Mellon University.

John Chin is an assistant teaching professor of political science in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. He is the lead author of the Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups D’état, which was named one of the best historical materials published in 2022–2023 by the American Library Association.

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As the US role in the Sahel is weakening, Turkey’s role is rising. With new defense agreements, increasing diplomatic engagements, and joint economic development projects with new, junta governments that espouse anti-colonial rhetoric in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, Turkey finds itself working in the same theater as the Kremlin to fill the void left after Western forces departed. Turkey’s new trusted status among Sahelian governments and its state-led approach make it one of the nations positioned to influence regional security dynamics during a time when other Western powers are constrained. Although Turkish efforts in the Sahel have been primarily based on its own strategic ambitions and national interests, Ankara’s growing influence offers a rare channel through which the United States and its allies could recalibrate their approaches to the region. 

The Sahel’s break with the West 

Since these coups and the establishment of military juntas in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, France and the United States have faced the annulment of defense agreements in the region, French and US troops have withdrawn from the region, the European Union’s Takuba Force ceased anti-Jihadist operations in Mali, and, in January, Niger revoked a counterterrorism accord with the United States, demanding the withdrawal of 1,000 US troops from the country. The United States has laws that prohibit it from assisting governments that have overthrown democratic governments, including clear guidance from the US State Department against foreign assistance to Niger, and now Washington finds itself without a clear role in the Sahel.

The region’s Western-backed security architecture has collapsed: Three withdrawals (i.e., Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger) prompted the dissolution of the Group of Five (G5) for the Sahel. The same three departures from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has left the Sahel searching for new patrons and new strategic frameworks. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, for example, have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a political and defense bloc that rejects old alignments. To fill the new defense void, alternative partners without the baggage of colonial legacy—most notably Russia and Turkey—have stepped in, offering defense cooperation without the governance conditions demanded by the West. 

The United States, which provided humanitarian aid, economic investment, and security forces to the region for roughly a decade prior to the coups, lost much of its ability to advance regional security interests when it was pushed out of the region. Its ability to monitor threats in the region and in neighboring countries like Libya, coordinate strategies with local forces, and access crucial intelligence was significantly degraded. Although US security operations in the region have been constrained by new partnerships, it still has options. Opportunities remain through indirect engagement—particularly with actors that retain both credibility on the ground and diplomatic standing in the West. Turkey is one of the only powers operating in the Sahel that meets both criteria.

​Turkey’s role amid a shrinking Western presence, rising Russian influence

Turkey’s military cooperation in the Sahel draws on nearly two decades of experience positioning itself as a rising power in Africa, rooted in its 2003 ​​​​Strategic Depth​ doctrine and early initiatives like the “Strategy for the Development of Economic Relations with Africa” and the “year of Africa” in 2005—the same year it secured observer status in the African Union. Initially, Turkey relied on soft power, leveraging shared Ottoman heritage, cultural diplomacy, and economic partnerships to expand its influence. However, what began as a soft-power push—through development aid, cultural ties, and embassy openings—has evolved into a defense and infrastructure strategy, especially under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s aim to position Turkey as a leader among emerging powers. Turkish delegations have conducted regular visits to AES capitals, striking arms and infrastructure deals while pursuing bilateral military agreements.  

At the same time, Russia, too, has made swift inroads. It is capitalizing on anti-colonial sentiment and offering support through its largest private military company, the Wagner Group, to provide “training, close protection, and counter-terrorism operations.” Through proxy forces, Russia has gained access to political influence and resource extraction in exchange for security-force training, arms deals, and protection of junta leaders. Russia’s use of proxy forces has allowed it to distance itself from Russian casualties and military failures. 

However, Russia’s war in Ukraine has slowed its operations in the Sahel. Across AES, Russian forces are stretched thin. Despite Russia’s success in stabilizing the Touadéra regime in the Central African Republic in 2021—a conflict that gave Russia defense legitimacy despite the fact that Sahel—Russian forces have largely been unsuccessful. In 2024, fifty-one percent of global terrorism-related deaths took place in the Sahel. This was the deadliest year in the Sahel’s history as the region remains mired in conflict and plagued by violent insurgencies, fragile state institutions, and waning international engagement. 

​​​​In the Sahel, Turkey can play the same role as Russia. Turkey can offer Sahelian militaries affordable, “rapidly deployable” equipment. And Russia, which has been struggling to keep up with military-industrial demands, is an increasingly unreliable partner. Sahelian clients grew more discontented with the Russian proxy forces’ unsuccessful operations and inability to fulfill weapons contracts, and the Wagner Group officially left Mali, announcing on Telegram that its mission was accomplished. In its place, Russia plans to consolidate its troops under the Russian Ministry of Defens​​​​e-backed Africa Corps. Reestablishing connections, building trust, and establishing higher capacity supply lines will take time; meanwhile, alternative partners like Turkey are in place in the Sahel and can take advantage of the Kremlin’s declining foreign-operations capacity. 

In contrast to Russia’s focus on mercenary deployments and ​​​​direct-combat missions, Turkey offers a more varied tool​ ​kit: combining diplomacy, state-to-state defense deals, economic engagement, intelligence sharing, and technology transfers. Turkey’s defense industry, particularly its drone sector, made early moves into the African market, supplying low-cost, high-capability platforms like Baykar’s Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci drones. These have become cornerstones of AES air power, and are ​​​​​often more cost-effective​ than systems from Iran, Israel, or even Russia. 

Turkey is now the main producer of combat drones for Africa, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (part of the US Department of Defense). In December 2024 Mali received Turkish Akinci drones in addition to its eight TB2 drones; Niger has purchased six TB2 drones, five Karayel-SU drones, and Aksungur drones; and Burkina Faso has purchased at least six TB2s and two Turkish Akinci drones. These drones are managed and operated out of local airbases, like the Niamey air base in Niger or the Bamako Air Base 101 in Mali, and are managed by a “hyper-closed circle” of high-ranking officials. In early April 2025, Mali was also found to be using MAM-T bombs 20 kilometers from its border with Algeria when a Turkish-made Akinci drone was shot down. This was the first time the Malian armed forces were found to be using MAM-T bombs, which are guided, high-explosive fragmentation munitions that can be strapped to Bayrak drones, and are manufactured by Turkish company Roketsan. 

On the ground, Turkey’s engagement increasingly makes up for declining Russian power. Turkish drones and, ​​​​​​reportedly, Turkish-hired Syrian mercenaries disrupt insurgent operations in areas where state forces are absent, helping to alleviate local manpower shortages. ​​​​​Although unconfirmed, Sadat, a private Turkish military contractor often referred to as Erdogan’s “parallel army,” was alleged to have sent more than one thousand Turkish-trained Syrian mercenaries to Niger and Burkina Faso in 2024, ​​​​tasked with protecting mines, petroleum infrastructure, and military installations​. This is not the ​​first time​​ Sadat has been accused of using Syrian ​​mercenaries​​ in foreign conflicts.

Already, Turkey has increased intelligence-sharing capabilities in the region through its intelligence agency, Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, which recently opened a hub in Niger. Its growing network​ of embassies, companies, and security personnel across the Sahel gives Ankara access to critical information, which can influence security operations.

Turkey’s economic expansion in the Sahel

Turkey has slowly expanded its influence in the Sahel by expanding its security operations simultaneously with its commercial agreements. 

While the AES has implicitly distanced itself from former colonial powers through new security partnerships and arms contracts, the three states are also turning to alternative partners for economic support. They had perceived prior Western economic conditions as unfair and are seeking more beneficial economic relationships. After revoking mining licenses and pulling out of economic partnerships with the West, the Sahel now needs new partners to help develop its potentially lucrative energy and raw materials sectors.  

Since the 2010s, Turkey has increasingly engaged with Africa’s energy sector, leveraging its 2017 National Energy and Mining Policy to enhance its energy independence. It has signed agreements with at least seventeen African countries across North, West, and East Africa, as well as the Horn of Africa, focusing on renewables and critical minerals. Trade volumes between Turkey and Africa increased from ​​​​$5.4 billion in 2003 to $40.7 billion in 2022, and a ​​​​growing number of Turkish companies are expanding their operations in Africa. 

Turkey now has greater reason to diversify its imports away from Russia and Iran— given the disruption of trade patterns by conflicts in Ukraine, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East—and toward Africa. The Sahel’s underdeveloped energy sector offers Turkey a foothold in new supply routes and economic opportunities.  

A Turkish energy company has taken a leading role in Mali, supplying 60 megawatts of power and building a heavy fuel oil power plant. Turkish exports to Mali rose from $87 million in 2021 to $111 million in 2023. Similarly, Turkey has boosted trade with Burkina Faso, despite regulatory hurdles in the mining sector. Exports rose from less than $100 million prior to 2020 to $166 million in 2024, reflecting Ankara’s deeper economic engagement with the new military government. 

In the Sahel region, Niger has traditionally been Turkey’s strongest energy partner in the region. Turkey and Niger have signed bilateral mining agreements and oil and natural gas agreements, established a working committee​ to expand economic cooperation, and held leadership-level discussions about infrastructure development projects​ in northern Niger. Turkish firms have been uniquely willing to engage in high-volatility regions, implementing critical infrastructure, energy, and mining projects simultaneously with increased defense cooperation. 

The Sahel’s mineral wealth is critical to Turkey’s industrial ambitions and plans to become a processing hub for critical minerals. Turkey’s defense industry depends heavily on critical minerals used in advanced weaponry, aerospace systems, and batteries and, at the same time, Turkey’s rising clean technology industry has accelerated the need for lithium, nickel, copper, and other raw minerals. While Turkey is beginning to build up its raw mineral processing capabilities in an attempt to limit foreign control over critical supply chains, Ankara is in search of suppliers for these materials.  

With limited domestic reserves and rising industrial needs, Ankara is targeting the region’s large supplies of raw materials. Mali is Africa’s second-largest lithium producer; Niger is a leading exporter of uranium; and Burkina Faso is a major gold supplier. Though Turkey has domestic reserves of tungsten, graphite, and cobalt, access to the Sahel’s minerals enables Turkey to compete in global markets and develop its own processing base. 

Through diplomatic and corporate efforts, Turkey has tried to secure access to gold and uranium in Niger, the world’s seventh-largest producer of uranium; Turkish and Azerbaijani companies have discussed joint mining projects in the Sahel; and, until recently, a Turkish company held the industrial exploitation rights of the largest gold mine and the largest manganese mine in Burkina Faso. Russian companies have likewise expanded their economic presence in the Sahel; Russian companies ​​​​have signed lithium mining deals with Mali, lithium and uranium mining deals with Niger, and deals on nuclear cooperation with Burkina Faso. While Western companies have been sidelined, governments in the Sahel remain open to cooperation with both Ankara and Moscow. Turkey, as a NATO ally that retains the political space to operate in these markets, is a potential counterbalance to Russia’s growing influence while advancing its own strategic and industrial objectives.

Solution-based diplomacy in a security-first landscape

What sets Turkey apart from other external actors—especially Russia—is the diversity of its engagement. Unlike Moscow’s arms-for-access model, which is often viewed as exploitative and destabilizing, Ankara has prioritized a ​​​​multifaceted approach that includes trade, infrastructure, defense, diplomacy, and development. Turkish-African trade spans sectors from textiles to healthcare and energy, and Turkey’s public and private sectors have actively invested in education and capacity building across the continent. This “solution-based” diplomacy contrasts sharply with Russia’s security-first playbook. 

Yet Turkey’s growing presence in contested regions comes with risks. Infrastructure investments in unstable political environments require security guarantees—and that often means greater military involvement. As Ankara deepens its footprint, it must decide whether to align more openly with Russia, or to use its position to mediate and potentially counter Russian influence. 

Turkey is viewed by many African leaders as a reliable, noncolonial partner. This gives Ankara access that Western powers now lack. While Turkey has not publicly aligned with US or European policy in the Sahel, its access and credibility in the region offer an opportunity to bridge the growing gap between Western interests and Sahelian realities. 

If Ankara chooses to leverage this position, it could quietly support Western objectives—sharing intelligence, coordinating security policies, or shaping development strategies that undercut Russian influence. Turkey would not be acting as a Western proxy, but as a sovereign actor leveraging its credibility and access to serve both its own interests and those of the broader international order. In a region where Western engagement is rapidly shrinking, Turkey’s role may become indispensable—not as a rival, but as a crucial partner.

Not a proxy but a pathway: The West’s reentry point in the Sahel

The power balance between Russia and Turkey is markedly different from conflict zones where they stood or stand on opposite sides—such as Syria, Libya, Ukraine, and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. In the Sahel, both powers are engaging the same postcoup regimes—Russia through mercenary-led counterinsurgency and Turkey through state-led arms deals, drone operations, and economic development. They are not in direct confrontation in the Sahel, nor are they locked in zero-sum competition. Instead, they operate in parallel, often in the same theaters and with the same governments, but with divergent methods, capabilities, and long-term goals. 

Parallel engagement between Russia and Turkey raises security concerns for Western powers who have lost their influence in the region, but it also creates a unique opening. While Russian security forces have been largely unsuccessful in their efforts to mitigate threats in the Sahel, Turkey has an opportunity to increase its engagement with local forces. And as the only Western partner force that is directly engaging with the region, Ankara can potentially disrupt Russian influence and coordinate with the West on security strategy. Its access to critical mineral assets, defense infrastructure, and high-level political relationships across the AES bloc can offer the West indirect access to a region from which it has been largely expelled. 

Since President Donald Trump returned to office at the beginning of 2025, both Washington and Ankara have shown renewed willingness to deepen their bilateral partnership on regional matters and cooperate in third countries, most notably Syria. In addition to diplomacy, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Secretary of State Marco Rubio meeting in Washington and Brussels, both capitals have continued demonstrating top-level cooperation on Syria with the trilateral gathering in Riyadh, where Trump and Erdoğan met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, together with the creation of the joint Syria Working Group to further enhance closer cooperation on Syria’s reconstruction and stability efforts. This dynamism and strategic alignment can be a strong foundation for extending the US-Turkey partnership into Africa, where shared interests in stability and security could help reshape the dynamics of great​-​power competition in the region. 

Turkey’s pragmatic foreign policy is not without complications. But in the Sahel, that very pragmatism can work to the West’s advantage. If Washington moves beyond its reflexive skepticism and recognizes Turkey’s intermediary potential, the Sahel could shift from a symbol of Western retreat to a frontier of renewed influence—anchored by a partner that understands and navigates both the streets of Niamey and the corridors of NATO.

Alp Burak Ozen is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program.

Haley Nelson is a Boren Scholar and a Georgetown University alumna. She is an independent geopolitical consultant with a focus on energy and infrastructure security in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Turkey.

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Last month’s vote—which constitutes a rupture from the status quo of the international community’s decades-long balancing act between Moroccan and Algerian interests—came days before the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the 1975 Green March. The event saw a peaceful, Moroccan-led march of 350,000 people lead to the liberation of Western Sahara from Spanish colonialism.

When Spain withdrew, Morocco asserted historical claims of sovereignty over the territories, while the Polisario Front declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and sought full independence. The ensuing war and its 1991 cease-fire left the region divided by a fortified berm and a frozen political process.

Originally brought to the UN in 1963 as a decolonization issue, Western Sahara remains one of the world’s most protracted, unresolved conflicts.

Persistent challenges remain after last month’s landmark vote. Importantly, the Polisario Front has categorically rejected the UN resolution, stating that “it violates the territory’s decolonization status and undermines the UN peace process by supporting Morocco’s autonomy plan.”

But today, Morocco is nevertheless experiencing a similar dynamic to that hopeful moment in 1975, with the success of a series of well-orchestrated diplomatic victories, “marching” intently toward a lasting resolution of the conflict.

This resolution marks a decisive turn in the future of the dispute, as it eliminates the possibilities of a partition or a referendum, focusing instead on crafting “genuine” autonomy and on the practicalities of the advanced regionalization plan under Rabat’s flag. The document expresses “full support of the Secretary General and his Personal Envoy in facilitating and conducting negotiations taking as basis Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal” and “calls upon the parties to engage in these discussions without preconditions, taking as basis Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal.”

The other previous proposals by the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) since the 1991 cease-fire, including a territorial partition or a referendum, were becoming increasingly obsolete and impractical in the eyes of key political players, given the demographic complexities on the ground. Drawing a line in the sand dividing Western Saharan people—who are a transnational community extending from Mauritania to northern Morocco, Algeria, and Mali—would only compound colonial border disputes, which led to the current conflict in the first place.

Similarly, a referendum is nearly impossible. Western Saharan people are not indigenous to the current disputed territories, and any voting lists would have to take into consideration the Hassani people’s movement since the fourteenth century. Not to mention, there is much ambiguity around the populations, which over the past fifty years moved to the Moroccan-administered territories (around 80 percent of the disputed land) and the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria.

The UN is playing catch-up

While this recent shift is deemed a turning point in the semantic sense, the UN is barely catching up with the fast-evolving realities on the ground. The Moroccan autonomy plan has been gaining momentum since 2020, when US President Donald Trump’s first administration recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and stated that the conflict can only be resolved within that framework.

Soon after, France and Spain—the former colonizers of the region, both at the very source of the current territorial disputes due to the legacy of colonial borders—decided to side with Morocco. Other key international allies have since joined this new momentum in favor of Rabat, including the United Kingdom, Belgium, Israel, and numerous Arab, Latin American, and African countries that opened diplomatic representations or undertook significant investment projects in Western Sahara in support of the Moroccan stance.

The second Trump administration has taken a more assertive approach, largely advocating for the autonomy proposal and offering to host mediations between the parties to the conflict. Trump’s current cabinet has been pressuring the UN, Morocco, and Algeria to push for a fast and sustainable deal—likely seeing resolution to the Western Sahara dispute as low-hanging fruit that Trump can add to his arsenal of peace trophies, according to sources from the current administration.

The United States in September signaled to UN Special Envoy for Western Sahara Staffan de Mistura that the only way forward for the conflict was under Moroccan sovereignty. Washington’s UN funding cuts added more pressure on MINURSO. MINURSO, which was becoming outdated and dysfunctional within the current context, had no other option but to play along to survive.

A firmer US leadership to harness peace

The United States has, meanwhile, been directly pursuing its own mediation efforts outside the corridors of the UN. Massad Boulos, Trump’s senior advisor for Africa, has prioritized the conflict and led several bilateral negotiations to address the dispute with North African leaders over the summer. He has also repeatedly reiterated Washington’s support of Morocco’s claim to the territory, even promising to open a consulate in Dakhla, Western Sahara, to cement this position.

Additionally, US Peace Envoy Steve Witkoff recently revealed in a televised interview that a Morocco-Algeria peace deal could be imminent. The interview, which was conducted alongside Jared Kushner—another strong Rabat advocate in the Trump administration and the de facto broker of the Morocco-Israel peace deal—reveals firmer US leadership aimed at advancing peace in North Africa, starting with Western Sahara.

The United States has been holding the pen on this recent UNSC resolution and trying to shape the conversation in line with its vision of the dispute. An earlier draft leaked to the media this week disclosed a more decisive tone in favor of Morocco and a less nuanced vision for the future of MINURSO, limiting the mission’s renewal to only three months.

Another less-known fervent supporter of Moroccan territorial integrity is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Abu Dhabi put its full diplomatic weight behind this new resolution by fielding multiple calls with UNSC permanent members, including France and Russia, to ensure their support of the US-proposed draft, according to my discussions with diplomatic sources.

Besides the UAE’s long-term push to build a pan-Abrahamic bloc in North Africa with Morocco, Mauritania, and Sahel countries, its president, Mohamed Bin Zayed, also has a lesser-known connection to the dispute. Indeed, the UAE president had lived and spent his formative years at the Royal Academy in Morocco. At age fourteen, he became one of the youngest participants of the 1975 Green March to Western Sahara alongside members of the Moroccan kingdom’s royal family. Once more, the UAE is walking along its historical ally, pouring thirty billion dollars in investments into the North African country and becoming the first Arab state to open a consulate in Laayoun, Western Sahara, in 2020.

The challenges ahead for an autonomy plan

Now that the diplomatic dust has settled, all eyes are on Morocco and whether it can practically operationalize its autonomy plan.

Rabat has been heavily investing in ambitious infrastructure and strategic projects in Western Sahara. Projects include the Atlantic Initiative, which is promising economic prosperity and integration for Western Sahara with landlocked Sahel neighbors. Additionally, the Dakhla Atlantic Port, a $1.2-billion project, is estimated to handle 35 million tons of goods a year starting in 2028. Other strategic projects include significant investments in adventure and business tourism infrastructures.

However, economic prosperity alone cannot guarantee a sustainable and genuine autonomy plan. Morocco will have twelve months to deliver a detailed, advanced regionalization workplan that outlines the territories’ governance and economic management through elected local representatives. This will also require constitutional reforms and a referendum on the Moroccan side, but, more importantly, an agreement from the Polisario Front to sit at the negotiation table and to operate under the Moroccan flag—a distinct challenge given their rejection of the resolution.

Meanwhile, serious diplomatic moves are at play. The Moroccan king recently visited the UAE. Additionally, there are signs of appeasement between Algeria and France, with Algeria’s recent pardon of detained French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal, a prominent advocate of a Moroccan Western Sahara.

King Mohamed VI also clearly stated in his address following the vote that he wants “no winners or losers” in this conflict and invited “his brother,” the president of Algeria, to revive the Maghreb Union together. These are all positive signals for meeting Witkoff’s prediction of a Morocco-Algeria peace deal within the next sixty days.

The UN Western Sahara resolution is an essential milestone in US leadership, aligning the international community with “the most credible and realistic” solution to end the fifty-year-long agony of the Sahrawi people. Still, much needs to be unpacked at the levels of local governance, economic resource management, and local culture promotion to achieve “genuine autonomy,” and to organize a second, peaceful Green March.

Sarah Zaaimi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Her research focuses on North Africa, the Western Sahara conflict, and Arab-Israeli normalization.

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During the Arab Spring in 2011 and 2012, many large-scale demonstrations were led or at least widely participated in by youth. More recently, young voters helped unseat the party that had governed Botswana since independence and caused the vote share of South Africa’s African National Congress party to fall below 50 percent for the first time since the end of apartheid. Youth protesters in Bangladesh, too, ousted the government of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in July 2024.

Even against this backdrop, however, the global scale and impact of the Gen Z protests in the past year is unprecedented.

In Kenya, protests against rising prices, youth unemployment, and corruption broke out after the announcement of new tax hikes in 2024, with further protests taking place in July. In Indonesia, young people have been protesting against high allowances for members of parliament and widespread food poisoning brought about through the government’s school meals program. In the Philippines, public demonstrations sparked by the misallocation of flood relief funds began in September.

And there’s more. Outraged by government bans on social media, young people in Nepal burned the parliament building and ousted the sitting government on September 9. The same month, Peruvian youth protesting against increased crime and corruption sparked conversations about government overhaul. Morocco’s “Gen Z 212” movement, (named after the country’s international dialing code), took to the streets to express their frustration with government funds being directed toward preparations for the 2030 World Cup rather than public services. Just last month, demonstrations by disillusioned youth in Madagascar sparked by water and electricity failures sent the president into exile and prompted a military-led government overhaul.

The root causes of public upheaval vary widely across these seven countries, as do the countries’ political contexts and the ultimate outcomes of their youth-led protest movements. Moreover, these seven countries are by no means the only nations around the world that have experienced mass protests led by young people dissatisfied with the political status quo in the past few years, as evidenced by youth-led protest movements in Serbia and South Korea.

Even so, the past year’s Gen Z protests are worth analyzing together for what they have in common, as these movements are influenced by one another and were all initiated by youth adept at using technology to organize. And, as the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes demonstrate, there are other broad similarities that warrant further examination.

What do the data tell us?

For starters, six of the seven countries score well above their respective regional averages in the political rights component of the Freedom Index, indicating that these countries protect freedom of association, expression, and access to information better than their neighbors. The only exception is Peru, which only recently saw its political rights score dip below the Latin America and the Caribbean regional average.

Secondly, these countries all perform below the regional average on at least one key metric of prosperity, whether that be income, health, or education.

Nepal and Madagascar score higher than their regional averages on political rights

Nepal and Madagascar score lower than their regional averages on income

If people are prone to comparing their conditions to those of their counterparts in neighboring countries, then the data indicate that conditions for protests may be largely defined by an appreciation for relatively high levels of political expression and a frustration with relative shortfalls in income levels, health standards, or education quality.

Lastly, and critically, these countries all have notably high youth populations. In all seven countries, the median age is lower than the global median and the percentage of the total population between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four is higher than the global average.

What the data show, then, is that all these countries have a lot of young people with an understanding of democratic rights, expectations of government accountability, and legitimate grievances related to the lack of government service provision.

Pair that with a growing confidence in their ability to drive change due to youth protests that came before and access to technology that allows them to easily communicate and organize, and you get the globally connected youth movement that has sprung up in recent months.

A force for positive change, or a temporary disruption of the status quo?

Attempting to find explanations for why these youth-led protests are happening is important, but assessing their impact is even more critical. Of the seven countries where protests have occurred or, in the cases of Morocco and Peru, are still occurring, two have experienced full regime change.

In both Nepal and Madagascar, the head of state was removed and replaced with interim governments organized by military figures. Perhaps one explanation for the protests leading to regime change in these two countries is that, in both cases, the military stood by and allowed protests to oust the sitting government before ushering in transitional governments of their liking. In both countries, the political influence of the young people who instigated the upheaval has diminished as new governing regimes have taken shape. Youth in Madagascar have expressed frustration with a career politician and former opposition leader being chosen to lead the country’s National Assembly, and Nepalese protest leaders say they have been frozen out of the transitional government.

The effects of the Gen Z protests in countries that have not experienced regime or leadership change have been mixed. In Kenya, protesters succeeded in convincing President William Ruto to withdraw his contentious tax bill but failed to bring about the systemic change that many wanted. The Moroccan government has responded to protests by pledging to increase health and education spending, but protesters remain unsatisfied.

If the aftermath of the Arab Spring and last year’s revolution in Bangladesh are any indication, establishing more accountable democracies through youth mobilization will prove exceptionally challenging. It is too early to tell whether the recent youth protests will truly bring about the systemic change that young people are demanding, but breaking with history will undoubtedly require young people to sustain the tremendous organized effort they have undertaken.

What’s next?

As the effects of Gen Z protests continue to materialize, there are two important questions to consider.

First, can young people use their numbers and organizational power to make government more democratic, more accountable, and less corrupt in the long term?

Only time will tell whether the answer to this question is yes or no.

The second question is perhaps more interesting: Based on the characteristics of the countries where Gen Z protests have occurred, is it possible to predict where they will happen next?

While exact predictions are impossible, the number of countries with characteristics like those of the seven examined above is limited. For example, Honduras has a high youth population, scores well above the regional average on political rights, and scores well below regional income and education averages. Côte d’Ivoire also has a high youth population, scores well above the average Sub-Saharan African country on political rights, and scores below the regional average on health and inequality. If the governments of either of these countries are widely blamed for corruption or failure to deliver services among younger people, youth populations may well follow the example their counterparts around the world have set. In Côte d’Ivoire, initial frustration over the results of last month’s presidential election could serve as a flashpoint for prolonged unrest.

Côte d’Ivoire scores higher than the regional average on political rights

Côte d’Ivoire scores lower than the regional average on life expectancy

Broadly, the data show that countries within the “low freedom” and “low prosperity” categories that have high youth populations and relatively well-protected political rights, and that perform relatively poorly in at least one indicator of prosperity, appear more prone to Gen Z demonstrations.

This is not to say that Honduras, Côte d’Ivoire, or other countries that share similar characteristics are destined for a youth uprising. But it certainly should not come as a surprise if the movement of youth-led protests spreads further across the developing world.

Protesters in Madagascar took inspiration from the Gen Z movement in Nepal, which was in turn inspired by demonstrations in Indonesia. With protests in Peru and Morocco continuing, it is possible that the wave of Gen Z frustration with a lack of government effectiveness and accountability is only just getting started.

What is certain is that increased access to technology and global information has empowered youth in limited, flawed, and unaccountable democracies to attempt to incite change through organized protest.

The voices of these young people are undoubtedly being heard; whether their demands will be met remains to be seen.

Will Mortenson is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

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For Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, the designation and threat of military intervention couldn’t have come at a more politically fraught moment. With a population of more than 230 million people, Nigeria continues to grapple with inflation, a struggling currency, and widespread poverty despite recent reforms. With the CPC designation, Washington is questioning the government’s ability to protect its citizens from religiously motivated violence. The moment demands Nigeria to deliver a more coherent diplomatic posture toward the United States.

A relationship built on mutual interests

The US–Nigeria relationship has historically been one of pragmatic partnership. The United States is Nigeria’s largest foreign investor, with US investments concentrated in oil and gas, wholesale trade, and services. Bilateral trade surpassed thirteen billion dollars in 2024, and Nigeria ranks among the top African markets for US exports.

Washington also provides strategic security support, including military training, counterterrorism assistance, and limited arms sales to help Nigeria confront groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province, while also addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria, in turn, remains a strategic partner for US interests in West Africa, which faces overlapping crises of extremism, migration, and democratic backsliding. Under Tinubu, however, the relationship appears to be drifting—not through open hostility, but mutual disengagement.

A diplomatic drift

Since his inauguration in May 2023, Tinubu has not traveled to Washington and allowed a diplomatic vacuum to fester. In September 2023, Tinubu recalled all Nigerian ambassadors worldwide and still has yet to appoint permanent replacements. What’s more, he was conspicuously absent from Trump’s meeting in July with West African leaders. Tinubu’s distance from the White House may also reflect political caution on his part, following renewed reporting on his past in the United States, including his connection to a federal criminal case and questions about his academic records.

Although Tinubu appointed a handful of consuls-general and chargés d’affaires (including in Washington) earlier this year, Nigerian foreign policy experts note that these temporary measures fall far short of the representation expected of a country of Nigeria’s stature, and reports have detailed the poor state of Nigerian diplomatic missions. Officials in Abuja cite financial constraints for the delay in appointing ambassadors. Amid the dispute with the United States, Tinubu is now reportedly finalizing a list of ambassador nominees.

Tentative diplomacy

Tinubu’s contacts with the Trump administration appear to be limited. In April in Paris, he met for the first time with Massad Boulos, Trump’s senior advisor for Africa and a citizen of Nigeria among other countries. While that encounter signaled a tentative opening, there is no indication of any ongoing back-channel relationship.

Boulos himself recently stirred debate in Nigeria when he remarked publicly that it is not only Christians who are victims of violence in Nigeria. The comment diverged from claims made by Christian advocacy groups that a genocide against Christians is taking place in Nigeria, a claim that resonates with segments of Trump’s political base. Boulos’s attempt to bring some nuance to the conversation appears to have done little to shift Washington’s broader perception that Abuja has not done enough to contain extremist violence or to demonstrate accountability for religiously targeted attacks.

But even before the religious freedom debate, there was friction on other fronts. Earlier in July, Nigeria’s government vowed to resist pressure from the Trump administration to accept deportees from Venezuela and other third countries.

What the CPC designation means for Nigeria

Being named a “Country of Particular Concern” is not merely symbolic. Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), it places a country in the category of states that have “engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” It can trigger diplomatic censure and, in some cases, targeted sanctions or aid restrictions, unless the president grants a waiver for national-security reasons.

Nigeria was first placed on the CPC list in 2020, during the first Trump administration, but was removed in 2021 by the Biden administration ahead of then Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Nigeria. The decision drew sharp criticism from the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), an independent body created by the IRFA. And last month, US Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) introduced a bill calling for the CPC designation and the imposition of sanctions on Nigeria, including measures against Nigerian officials who “implement or support blasphemy and Sharia laws.” The redesignation, therefore, represents a policy reversal and a warning that Washington expects progress on religious-freedom protections or further consequences may follow.

At a crossroads

Tinubu, himself a Muslim, faces a delicate balancing act in a country roughly evenly divided between Muslims and Christians. Ahead of the 2023 presidential election, his selection of a Muslim vice presidential running mate from Nigeria’s northeast Borno state drew opposition from voters who considered the move at odds with Nigeria’s religious diversity. While his administration has vigorously rejected the notion of a “Christian genocide” in Nigeria—arguing that that framing does not reflect the true situation in the country—terrorist organizations have targeted churches, kidnapped clergy, and committed massacres in Christian farming communities. Washington’s renewed CPC designation challenges Nigeria’s leadership to confront Christian-targeted extremist violence more decisively.

For Tinubu, who has already clinched his party’s endorsement for re-election in 2027, his approach to this issue will define his foreign-policy credibility and political legacy. Domestically, as a politician from Nigeria’s predominantly Christian south, he must avoid alienating Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim north or feeding perceptions of Western bias in framing the country’s security crisis. Internationally, he must reassure partners that his government is committed to defending pluralism and prosecuting those responsible for faith-based atrocities.

The cost of inaction could be severe. Nigeria’s CPC status could complicate security cooperation—including military training and intelligence sharing—and add to concerns over the foreign investment environment unless Abuja demonstrates measurable improvements.

More profoundly, the designation exposes the fragility of Nigeria’s social contract. When Nigeria gained independence in 1960, its founders envisioned a country where ethnic and religious pluralism would coexist. Decades later, deepening religious and ethnic polarization poses a threat to that vision. Unless the Tinubu administration tackles corruption, poverty, and insecurity, any diplomatic fallout will be secondary to the domestic unraveling already underway.

A path forward

Restoring confidence will require concrete steps. Tinubu should:

1. Reassert Nigeria’s diplomatic presence in Washington. Nigeria, as the world’s largest Black democracy, should project the diplomatic stature befitting its status on the world stage. The absence of robust diplomatic representation has left Nigeria increasingly vulnerable in Washington. The country has been hit hard by the new US tariff policy and could face further repercussions if the Trump administration expands its travel ban. This diplomatic gap is particularly striking given that Nigeria is the most common country of origin for African immigrants to the United States and those of African descent. Restoring a full ambassadorial presence in Washington can help send a message that Abuja has the will and resources to revitalize US–Nigeria relations. A credible diplomat with bipartisan connections in Washington could help reset the tone of engagement and re-establish trust.
2. Open Nigeria’s doors to transparency and external scrutiny. It is not enough for the government to dismiss claims of a “Christian genocide.” Nigeria must cultivate an atmosphere of transparency that allows external observers to assess the facts firsthand. That should include inviting assessments by USCIRF or multilateral partners such as the United Nations or the African Union, along with greater access for journalists, civil society organizations, and independent researchers.
3. Restore accountability in Nigeria’s fight against sectarian violence. Many Nigerians have grown accustomed to government complacency and the impunity that has characterized the violence across parts of Nigeria. Abuja’s credibility at home and abroad depends on visible consequences for perpetrators of sectarian violence—regardless of faith or region—and protection of witnesses who can testify to atrocities. That starts with better funding for security forces. Nigeria’s fight against insecurity may remain a myth if its police force remains underfunded and ranked among the lowest globally in capacity and morale. The government must also address growing concerns that former Boko Haram fighters and other defectors are evading rehabilitation and reintegrating directly into local communities. Compensating victims, whether Christians or Muslims, while empowering them to rebuild and resettle, could further signal that the state values every Nigerian life equally.
4. Prioritize the welfare of Nigerians and address the root causes of violence. Nigeria’s minimum wage stands at 70,000 naira (about $48) per month—one of the lowest in Africa—while legislators, among the highest paid globally, earn between $150,000 and $190,000 annually, and there has been a recent push for increased pay. This disparity reflects a failure to align the cost of governance with the realities of most citizens. Long-term security will depend on tackling the roots of instability: poverty, youth unemployment, and social exclusion. With eighty million Nigerian youths out of work, the government must expand education, job creation, and rural development, especially in conflict-prone areas. Prioritizing these domestic investments would signal commitment to reform and help shift Nigeria’s global image from a country that manages crises to one that builds resilience.

For its part, the United States should moderate its pressure with an open door for engagement. Blanket condemnation risks provoking defensiveness in Abuja. Constructive partnership could yield better results. US policy should aim not merely to punish but to strengthen Nigeria’s capacity to protect its own citizens. Without a doubt, Nigeria’s renewed CPC designation is a diplomatic alarm bell, but it need not herald a breakdown in US–Nigeria relations or escalate into a wider geopolitical standoff, with Beijing already warning against US “interference” or “use of force.” As an African adage cautions, “when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”—and in this case, ordinary Nigerians stand to bear the cost of great-power rivalry in the region. The current imbroglio could instead become an inflection point, prompting both governments to re-evaluate their priorities and restore the principled cooperation that once defined their ties.

But the ball is now in Tinubu’s court. With Nigeria on the brink of a major diplomatic crisis with one of its most important strategic partners, he must confront extremist violence without inflaming sectarian divides, rebuild diplomatic trust with Washington, and prove that Nigeria’s diversity is its strength, not its death knell. If he can navigate that delicate balance, Nigeria might yet emerge from this moment of scrutiny stronger, more credible, more prosperous, and more united.

Ohimai Amaize is a Nigerian journalist and the senior editor for social media strategy and audience engagement at the Atlantic Council.

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A coup that promised stability—and delivered chaos

When Colonel Assimi Goïta seized power in back-to-back coups in 2020 and 2021, he vowed the “refoundation” of a sovereign and secure Mali. Instead, the Malian army—trained to fight terrorism—ended up dismantling what was left of the state’s institutional foundations.

Initially expected to strengthen the military, the power grab only deepened its divisions, splitting the army between privileged loyalists of the regime and those sent to the front lines. Coupled with the departure of international forces from Mali, this fragmentation led to abandoned positions, weapons falling into the hands of separatists, and jihadists expanding their hold over the rural north.

Meanwhile, internal purges multiplied and intelligence services—once meant to hunt terrorists—turned inward, redirecting their focus toward political opponents of the regime. The recent imprisonment of former prime ministers Choguel Maïga and Moussa Mara epitomizes a security apparatus more obsessed with loyalty than with counterterrorism.

Bamako’s isolation has deepened

Mali’s internal fragility has been exacerbated by the fact that it has methodically cut itself off from regional and global partners. While its break with France could be framed as a quest for independence and a response to two decades of unsuccessful anti-terrorist operations, Bamako’s estrangement from African allies—particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—and its withdrawal from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission underscore the junta’s preference for isolation over cooperation.

Even relations with Algeria, which once maintained relatively cordial ties with Mali, have sharply deteriorated. In April, Mali accused its northern neighbor of sponsoring terrorism after the Algerian military shot down a Malian drone. Algiers responded by closing its airspace to Malian aircraft. Meanwhile, Turkey’s recent diplomatic overtures in Algeria suggest that Ankara—which had deepened cooperation with Mali over the past years—might also adjust its policy away from Bamako.

The Russia illusion is fading

The junta’s hope that new alliances could fill this gap has not materialized. Initially optimistic that cooperation with Russia’s paramilitary Wagner Group would help the Malian military suppress jihadist insurgencies, the partnership has instead produced disastrous outcomes. After the Russian mercenaries failed to make meaningful gains, the Kremlin announced in June that it would restructure the paramilitary organization into a new entity called the “Africa Corps,” leaving behind a gaping security and political vacuum.

According to internal reports, Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries have since repeatedly clashed on the ground, and northern Mali has once again become a contested battlefield. In January 2024, the official abrogation of the 2015 Algiers Accord—a peace agreement with armed insurgent groups—reignited separatist tensions. As a result, the war in the north now stretches almost one thousand miles of front lines across territory the army struggles to control.

Amid this chaos, Mali has become a proxy battleground. Diplomatic sources cite indirect Ukrainian involvement—including intelligence assistance, drone supplies, and support for groups hostile to pro-Russian mercenaries. Meanwhile, Turkey advances its influence by supplying Bayraktar drones and technical support to the Malian army. Mali has essentially become a geopolitical chessboard, where foreign interests and competing local ambitions collide.

The economic asphyxiation of a landlocked nation

Adding to the chaos is Mali’s dependence on supply routes that are increasingly vulnerable. The landlocked country relies heavily on the Dakar-Bamako corridor to import essential goods. Senegal exports nearly 60 percent of its petroleum products to Mali, representing over 20 percent of its foreign trade. Meanwhile, the Casablanca-Nouakchott-Bamako corridor is blocked, as the commune of Diéma in the Kayes region is under siege by armed groups. The Abidjan-Bamako corridor is also disrupted, and even the internal route between Bamako and the city of Ségou in the northeast has come under growing threat, with attacks and kidnappings on the rise.

For weeks, fuel supplies have been interrupted by convoy attacks and restrictions imposed by armed groups, creating endless lines at Bamako gas stations. In a country where transportation, electricity, and logistics depend on diesel, this shortage is tantamount to a national shutdown. For the army, the consequences are severe: Without fuel, armored vehicles are immobilized, convoys are grounded, and northern bases are left exposed.

A fractured and demoralized society

Mali’s diversity has historically been a strength. Between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries, the Mali Empire, founded by Soundiata Keïta, was one of West Africa’s largest and most powerful civilizations. Stretching from the Senegal River to Gao and from the Sahara to the Gulf of Guinea, it thrived on multiculturalism and trade among different groups. In the fourteenth century, Mali was essentially a global commercial crossroads, supported by a flexible system that ensured stability across vast and diverse lands while maintaining a tradition of religious tolerance.

Today’s Mali tells a different story. Ethnic tensions in the central and northern regions, amplified by military abuses, have shattered intercommunity trust. The advent of self-defense militias has fractured national cohesion, and entire villages now refuse to cooperate with the armed forces. The demoralized population oscillates between fear and resignation.

Paths to reconstruction

The US evacuation call could foreshadow Mali’s imminent collapse. Yet, an end to the junta’s reign would not be cause for triumphalism, as Malians’ legitimate desire for sovereignty would persist.

For the time being, the urgent task is to mend the national fabric, restore constitutional order within a renewed governance framework, and rebuild alliances. To that end, the army must return to its primary role: defending the homeland, not governing it.

Counterinsurgency presents the most daunting challenge in this regard. France spent almost a decade on the ground, and while it had some early success, it abandoned its counterinsurgency effort.

While intelligence and counterinsurgency will be important going forward, it will be important not to repeat the mistakes of the past. Given the country’s fragmented state, dialogue with jihadists may be unavoidable. Still, their Wahhabi-inspired ideology remains marginal in Mali—and excessive concessions could spark conflict. Is there a potential institutional framework that reconciles demands for Islamization with maintaining a federal republic?

Addressing geographic challenges through deep decentralization or pragmatic federalism could restore power and responsibility to Mali’s regions. Engagement with the Atlantic—via Morocco’s proposals to enable access to the ocean for Sahel countries and Senegal’s historical cooperation—remains critical. Rebuilding ties with the subregion to jointly combat terrorism and reintegration into ECOWAS, even if it requires reform, is equally urgent.

Finally, Mali will need patriots capable of enlightened leadership—something the immediate predecessors of the junta failed to provide—to chart sustainable economic prospects. Mali’s assets remain vast: It is among Africa’s top gold producers; has untapped reserves of lithium, iron, bauxite, phosphates, manganese, and uranium; and has significant agricultural potential from cotton and livestock. Moreover, Mali maintains a strategic position in West Africa, with strong hydropower and solar potential, and, above all, a large and determined youth population.

All it needs is the right leadership to seize that potential.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Hussein Ba is a Senegalese columnist who frequently covers security and political issues in Mali.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

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In June 2024, coordinated suicide attacks in Nigeria’s Borno State struck a wedding, a hospital, and a funeral within hours, killing more than thirty people and wounding over one hundred. Months later, militants overran a garrison in Chad, killing more than forty soldiers, demonstrating the insurgency’s ability to operate across borders.

In 2025, violence has escalated further. Bombings and improvised explosive devices tore through markets and roads in Borno: one July attack killed more than ten people, while another at a fish market claimed at least twelve lives. Analysts warn that Boko Haram and its offshoot, the Islamic State West Africa Province, may be undertaking a broader tactical reset—including renewed use of armed drones and roadside mines.

Fatalities near record highs

Across the basin, fatalities tied to militant Islamist groups hover near record highs. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies estimates nearly four thousand deaths over the past year, with new hotspots in Cameroon’s Far North. Humanitarian needs remain staggering, even as displacement has dipped slightly: as of May 2025, more than 2.9 million people were still displaced across the basin.

One pattern has proven consistent over time: military force alone cannot defeat a movement fueled by governance failures, economic exclusion, and security-force abuses. To their credit, regional governments have been recalibrating their responses.

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has demonstrated that joint, intelligence-driven operations can exact real costs on militants. In 2024, Operation Lake Sanity II destroyed camps in the region, neutralizing dozens of fighters, while coordinating air and ground actions across sectors—precisely the kind of cross‑border pressure the insurgents fear most.

The African Union’s Peace and Security Council has sought to align these operations with the Lake Chad Basin Commission’s Regional Stabilization Strategy. At the same time, the UNDP-managed Regional Stabilization Facility launched a four-year phase to fund rapid, visible rehabilitation in liberated hubs.

Yet the basin’s security architecture is fragile. In April, Niger’s junta announced its withdrawal from the MNJTF to focus resources on protecting oil infrastructure. Whether a formal withdrawal has taken place remains unclear, but this episode illustrates how diplomatic tensions, national politics, and energy priorities can disrupt longtime cross-border routines.

The resource paradox

Security is only one half of the ledger. The other is an economic paradox: the Lake Chad countries are rich in hydrocarbons and minerals, yet governance weaknesses hinder their wealth from being transformed into opportunity or legitimacy.

Nigeria holds Africa’s largest natural‑gas reserves and is a top oil producer, but years of underinvestment, theft, and opaque contracting have eroded both its economic impact and public confidence. Cameroon is pushing to revive upstream and downstream activities—including a long-planned overhaul of its national oil refining company (SONARA)—while eyes turn to gas-to-power and storage investments that could anchor industrial growth if policy risks are managed carefully.

Niger, known for its high‑grade uranium, has also become an oil exporter through a nearly two-thousand‑kilometer pipeline to Benin. Despite diplomatic spats and sabotage last year, shipments resumed in August 2024, and the corridor now sits at the intersection of energy and politics. Chad, for its part, remains tied to the Chad–Cameroon export system that once carried the promise of a model corridor for development—and the cautionary tale of how social safeguards can fray without sustained transparency.

Why hasn’t all this resource potential translated into security and shared prosperity? Because governance is failing.

Governance failures feed insecurity

The latest Transparency International index scores Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger among the world’s most challenging environments for transparent governance and accountable public spending. Sector‑specific governance is equally uneven.

On paper, Nigeria’s 2021 Petroleum Industry Act offers a pathway to streamline the industry and share benefits with host communities. However, the broader oil-and-gas governance score remains classified as “weak,” with licensing transparency a persistent issue that discourages responsible investment. In practice, corruption and predation squander revenue and fuel insecurity, reinforcing insurgent claims that the state extracts resources while communities are left to suffer.

At the rural margins, citizens face corruption and insurgent “taxation,” which erodes trust and cooperation. Addressing this issue requires linking security, governance, and economic recovery through targeted operations paired with rapid stabilization: repairing infrastructure, restoring services, supporting livelihoods, and building accountable community security forces integrated into professional policing.

What real stabilization requires

Stabilization efforts should align with the Lake Chad Basin Commission’s strategy and be scaled through UNDP funding to turn military gains into trust. Resource development must adhere to strict transparency, requiring community consent, open contracts, shared revenues for local infrastructure, and genuine job creation. The Africa Mining Vision offers a framework for equitable, community-driven benefits—and it should become the standard for foreign‑backed deals in the basin.

Foreign partners should welcome this clarity. Partnerships—whether for offshore oil blocks, uranium concessions, or pipeline rights—must transfer technology, build local supply chains, and co‑finance community assets. This governance‑first approach serves both as development policy and a security strategy: when contracts are transparent, new pipelines fund local clinics and roads, and jobs are allocated to qualified locals, militants lose their recruiting fuel.

Trust as the ultimate security

Leaders must ground counterinsurgency in transparent, mutually beneficial economic deals. Despite persistent violence, governments have demonstrated their ability to coordinate effectively, and communities have proven resilient, with markets and farms sustaining life amid conflict.

The region’s resource base is real: oil and gas in Nigeria and Cameroon, uranium and oil in Niger, and a regional pipeline network that could become a development corridor—rather than a grievance machine—if managed effectively. The decision is ultimately political. Double down on short-term force and opaque resource deals, and violence will continue to adapt while the development window narrows. Or tackle the roots of conflict and build a transparent partnership that puts citizens first.

Only the latter can transform Lake Chad’s natural wealth into durable security—and offers the potential to outpace an insurgency that has finally learned to survive.

Stabilizing the Lake Chad Basin is fundamentally about trust. Building trust—through state protection, transparent contracts, and fair partnerships—is the only way to turn the basin’s crisis into an opportunity. If regional leaders commit now, alongside citizens who can hold them accountable, they can match insurgents’ adaptability and steer the region toward peace and prosperity.

Jude Mutah is a policy expert with extensive experience in Africa and holds a doctorate in Public Administration from the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Baltimore. He has worked with the United States Institute of Peace and the National Endowment for Democracy.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post The Lake Chad Basin could power growth instead of conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The younger “Gen Z” generation is leading the latest protest movement, demanding greater government accountability and structural reforms in the fields of employment, health, and education. The movement represents the largest mass protest the country has seen since the February 20, 2011, Arab Spring uprisings. These demonstrations place Morocco at a crossroads between spectacle and substance, as its youth are no longer content with “bread and circuses” alone. The most anticipated reaction, however, is due this week—with a consequential address from King Mohamed VI to the parliament set for October 10.

A healthy sign in a two-speed country

On September 11, Morocco celebrated the inauguration of its state-of-the-art Prince Moulay Abdellah soccer stadium in Rabat, which has a capacity of 68,500 and a construction cost of over $75 million. This architectural jewel was completed in under two years, just months before hosting the 2025 African Cup of Nations. Three days later, protests erupted in the coastal city of Agadir over medical negligence, leading to the alleged death of several female patients. The incident, along with the stark contrast between the country’s sports ambitions and public health policies, fueled public outrage among Morocco’s youth online, leading to the launch of the #GenZ212 hashtag and calls for protests.

The kingdom lives in a disjointed reality, where the government prioritizes large-scale infrastructure and entertainment projects over the country’s external branding and tourism industry at the expense of investing in servicing its citizens. This reality was best described with the words of the kingdom’s own monarch: “a two-speed country.”

Morocco, for example, is eleventh in the world on the FIFA soccer ranking, yet ranks 120th out of 193 countries in the United Nations’ 2025 Human Development Index (HDI). It is building the largest stadium in the world in anticipation of hosting the 2030 World Cup, yet it still sits in the bottom half globally of the Healthcare Index score. It rose to second place as the fastest bullet train in the world and dropped to ninety-eighth place in the Global Knowledge Index.

Protests in a stable and dynamic country like Morocco, with a historical empire muscle and a proven survival record over the past twelve centuries, should be seen as a positive form of political participation. That’s especially true given the outsized participation of a younger, statistically more apathetic generation—and serves as a sign of a healthy society holding accountable its elected officials amid the apparent failure of performative, spectacle politics. Nonetheless, danger persists if the demonstrations spiral further. The protests have already seen moments of confrontation and vandalism, resulting in casualties, signaling how volatile the situation could become.

A generation searching for the ‘One Piece’

To understand the ongoing demonstrations, it’s essential to understand the generation that drives them. There are nearly eleven million Moroccans between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four, a quarter of whom are NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training), according to a recent study by the Moroccan Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CESE). The rates are far worse among women and in rural populations. Morocco’s unemployment rate soared to 13.3 percent in 2024, as the economy continues to recover from the COVID-19 crisis, despite achieving significant strides in niche industrial sectors like automotive, aeronautics, and pharmaceuticals. The current Akhannouch government coalition, led by a mishmash of oligarchs and technocrats, vowed to reduce unemployment to under 9 percent and create 350,000 new jobs by 2026, but failed to convince Moroccan youth who grew disenchanted with most political elites.

The numbers place Gen Z as the lowest age group in terms of political participation, with only 33.5 percent of the eighteen to twenty-four-year-olds registered to vote, and 55 percent of the eighteen to twenty-nine age group wanting to emigrate. Still, the massive numbers of youths who took to the streets, paired with their active online engagement, offer a different point of insight on youth political investment. Mobilization content produced on social media platforms like Discord and Instagram demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of political dynamics and a high sense of social justice.

The symbolism used in some social content borrows metaphors from popular culture, such as the Korean series Squid Game or the Spanish drama The Platform—both startling allegories about social injustice and proletarian struggle—confirms the values and aspirations guiding the protests. Similar to Gen Z movements in Nepal, Indonesia, and Europe, there is one Japanese anime that became the main symbol of these protests: One Piece. Moroccan youth seem to identify most with the manga, which tells the story of a brave subaltern youth seeking to defeat the establishment and find a mysterious treasure called the One Piece.

The ‘Zlayji’ versus the ‘Hargaoui’

Gen Z in Morocco, however, is not a homogeneous group, as it comprises several distinct archetypes within the same generation. The Z word, for example, can also apply to the “Zlayji” group of youth. The pejorative term entered the Urban Dictionary in recent years amid the raging cultural war between Morocco and Algeria over heritage symbols, such as the Kaftan, couscous, and Zellij tiles—hence the appellation of Zlayji (tile artisan). A typical Zlayji Gen Z is a fervent defender of Moroccan exceptionalism. He or she unquestioningly supports a supremacist narrative calling for the revival of the glory of the Moorish Empire in North Africa under Moroccan leadership.

The trend, which began as a spontaneous reaction to the ongoing Moroccan-Algerian rivalry, quickly evolved into an ideological tool to further expand the government’s “bread and circuses” posture and disseminate a form of banal nationalism. During the recent events, this group went completely silent, especially the army of online influencers who benefited financially from promoting Morocco’s World Cup ambitions. Others tried to recalibrate and join the new wave, siding with the more peaceful form of demonstrations.

In opposition to this class of neo-chauvinists, another archetype appeared in the kingdom’s public sphere: the “Hargaoui.” The term historically refers to a class of “uncivilized” people who behave against the social norms of politeness and respect for public property and order. The appellation Hargaoui, however, is not exclusive to a particular socio-economic class in Moroccan society, but rather a behavioral profile inherited from the era of “Blad Siba”, which was widespread in non-state-governed areas prior to the colonial encounter with the French and Spanish in 1912. 

The Hargaoui Gen Z never felt ownership of the infrastructure erected in preparation for the African and World Cups, and even actively engaged in vandalizing stadiums, signaling that they do not adhere to the government’s entertainment-focused development model. This group soon took center stage in what started as peaceful demonstrations, dragging the movement into violent confrontations, leading to the destruction and looting of private and public property.

Where we go from here

Initial government reactions show positive signs of containment and readiness to engage in constructive dialogue and reforms. Some even publicly confessed their failure in governing and responding to the aspirations of the new generations. After the demonstrations turned sour, many opposition leaders, such as Abdelilah Benkirane (the former prime minister from 2011 to 2017), who had initially fueled the discord, started calling for restraint and condemning violence. One year before the next electoral cycle, which is due in September 2026, partisan elites have come to understand the significance of youth in their political future and are attempting to appeal to them. Nevertheless, Gen Z has lost hope in the political class and is demanding accountability and the resignation of the current government.  

King Mohamed VI’s address this week will send an important signal on the steps forward. The monarch is largely considered the guarantor of the social contract between elected officials and the citizens and the symbolic “Commander of the Faithful”, according to the Moroccan Constitution. Back in 2011, in the height of the February 20 movement, the king stepped in with bold constitutional reforms and offered a pathway out of the crisis for the country’s Millennial generation. The movement has recently published its petition calling for the King to impeach the government, dissolve certain political parties, and hold public courts to punish fraudulent politicians. These demands pose a real existential conundrum for the very nature of a constitutional monarchy. Such ends will constitute a regression from the gains of the 2011 constitution, limiting the powers of the King in favor of stronger legislative and executive branches, which other generations sacrificed to attain.

An equally crucial response is expected from Crown Prince Moulay El-Hassan, who is actively being groomed for throne succession and is a Gen Z himself. Moulay El-Hassan has been increasingly active in representing his father at important development initiatives, greeting world leaders, and slowly forging a separate, more youthful, and firm public persona for himself. Several protesters have addressed him directly in some of their social media posts and solicited his mediation. 

Beneath the spectacle of gleaming stadiums and bullet trains lies a deeper hunger for dignity, accountability, and equity. Just like the pirates of “One Piece”, Gen Z Moroccans are charting their own course toward justice and belonging. Their quest is not against the crown or the system, but against the illusion that performance equals progress. Whether the Makhzen (the establishment) chooses to listen—or continues dazzling itself with its own reflection—will define the trajectory of an entire nation.

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, where she also serves as the center’s deputy director for communications.

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In May 2025, the China Global South Initiative (CGSi), a collaboration between the Keough School of Global Affairs and the Atlantic Council Global China Hub, convened a group of twenty-two African environmental experts at the Peduase Valley Resort in Ghana for a three-day workshop on China’s environmental impact in West Africa. This policy workshop, hosted with the support of the Ford Foundation, included representatives from eleven West African countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo—and South Africa. Amid three days of comradery and collaboration, these experts worked together to draft policy memorandums on China’s environmental impact across the region. In the months following the workshop, we worked closely with the authors to curate three briefs—on mining and resource extraction, timber and wildlife, and fisheries and water resources—that identify the challenges and offer actionable policy solutions. We would like to recognize the excellent work of the co-authors who contributed their time and expertise to creating these briefs. In particular we would like to thank the group leaders Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, and Ebimboere Seiyafa and Awa Niang Fall, respectively, for their diligent work.

First and foremost, we would like to thank Caroline Costello, assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, for her essential contributions to the workshop in Ghana and this collection of issue briefs. Her tireless efforts were truly essential to the success of the project. Ashley Bennett, events strategy program director of the University of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs, provided critical logistical support across a dozen countries. Alexandra Towns at the Keough School and Cate Hansberry, Beverly Larson, and Jeff Fleischerat the Atlantic Council provided expert editorial support. Guidance from Notre Dame’s Pamoja Africa Initiative helped us identify contributors, and the Kellogg Institute helped support their participation. We would also like to thank the excellent staff of the Peduase Valley Resort for their hospitality during the May 2025 workshop. Last, but not least, we would like to thank our partner, the Ford Foundation, whose support made the workshop and these policy briefs possible. Ford is not responsible for the content of these policy briefs.

Executive summary

West Africa’s forests are vital for climate regulation, biodiversity conservation, poverty alleviation, and economic growth. They store carbon, protect watersheds, and sustain millions of rural livelihoods. However, accelerating deforestation, habitat loss, illegal wildlife trade, and unsustainable resource extraction—often linked to Chinese actors—threaten these critical functions. Chinese timber companies, agribusinesses, infrastructure developers, and wildlife traders have increasingly contributed to forest degradation across the region. Illegal logging— particularly of rosewood and other valuable timber in Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Liberia— has fueled widespread forest loss, including in protected areas. Driven almost entirely by Chinese demand, rosewood is now the world’s most trafficked illegal wildlife product in terms of both value and volume, surpassing ivory and rhinoceros horn combined. Though Chinese investments in the region’s timber industry have brought some economic benefits, the environmental costs far outweigh the local gains. Largescale land acquisitions and infrastructure projects frequently lead to forest conversion, erode community land rights, and put endangered species at risk of extinction. This policy brief examines the environmental and social impacts of Chinese exploitation of forests and wildlife in West Africa and offers recommendations to strengthen enforcement, promote accountability, and engage Beijing to address these challenges.

Background

West Africa contains some of the continent’s most intact tropical forests, which support more than nine hundred bird species and nearly four hundred species of terrestrial mammals.¹ The region is recognized as a global biodiversity hotspot and hosts 113 key biodiversity areas across countries such as Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, and Cameroon.² However, these ecologically important regions are under increasing threat, with more than 265,000 hectares of forest lost in the past decade.³

A significant driver of this forest loss is the growing footprint of Chinese economic activity in the region. China’s involvement in timber extraction, agribusiness, infrastructure development, and wildlife trade has been linked to deforestation, biodiversity loss, and the breakdown of essential ecosystem services such as climate regulation, water provision, and carbon storage.⁴ The demand for valuable hardwoods, especially rosewood—driven almost entirely by the Chinese market—has led to widespread illegal and unsustainable logging, often in protected areas and forest reserves.⁵

Over the past two decades, Chinese investments in West Africa—estimated at more than $200 billion as of 2021—have expanded rapidly across various sectors.⁶ While these investments have spurred infrastructure development and trade, they have also caused serious environmental damage. In countries such as Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone, Chinese firms are frequently associated with both legal and illicit timber operations. In addition, Chinese-backed agribusiness ventures, particularly in rubber and palm oil, have led to extensive land acquisitions and deforestation, undermining traditional land tenure systems and disrupting local livelihoods.⁷

Chinese infrastructure and mining projects have opened previously undisturbed forest and conservation areas, fragmented habitats and weakened the ecological integrity of critical landscapes. These developments often erode community-based forest management practices and contribute to the marginalization of local populations.⁸

Despite existing legal and voluntary frameworks—including forest codes, environmental impact assessment laws, and international commitments such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+, developed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) and the African Forest Landscape Restoration Initiative—many West African countries struggle with enforcement due to weak institutional capacity, underfunded regulatory agencies, corruption, limited monitoring, and political interference.⁹ In many cases, Chinese firms bribe local officials to push forward opaque timber and land deals.¹⁰ The co-optation of local elites further shields environmental offenders from accountability.¹¹

There is an urgent need for coordinated national and regional responses to address these challenges. Key policy priorities should include strengthening environmental governance, enhancing transparency in investment and land deals, securing community land rights, and holding Chinese firms accountable for environmental damage. Without these measures, the region’s forests—and the critical ecological and social benefits they provide—will remain at risk from unchecked Chinese firms’ exploitation.¹²

Evidence

The evidence of China’s role in accelerating deforestation and biodiversity loss in West Africa is substantial and alarming. Driven by surging demand for valuable timber and wildlife products Chinese firms have emerged as the dominant foreign actors in the trade. Even when there are existing protections for threatened tree species (e.g., the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), these logging activities, which are often conducted illegally or through weak regulatory channels, have far-reaching consequences for ecosystems and rural livelihoods.¹³

At the heart of the crisis lies demand for rosewood, a valuable tropical hardwood used in traditional Chinese furniture. According to the Environmental Investigation Agency, rosewood is now the most trafficked illegal wildlife product globally—by both value and volume—surpassing ivory, rhinoceros horn, and big cats combined.¹⁴ The value of rosewood exports from West Africa to China was estimated to have surpassed $2 billion between 2017 and 2022, with logs fetching on average more than $20,000 per metric ton in 2021.¹⁵ China’s domestic market demand drives rampant logging in West Africa, with an estimated 70 percent of logging in Ghana, 65 percent in Cameroon, and 56 percent in Nigeria classified as illegal.¹⁶ Despite an export ban, Ghana sent 540,000 metric tons of rosewood to China between 2012 and 2019—equal to six million trees or about 2,000 acres of forest loss.¹⁷

The financial losses attributed to illegal timber harvesting are staggering. The World Bank estimates that illegal logging deprives source governments worldwide of between $7 billion and $12 billion annually.¹⁸ In 2018, illegal deforestation cost countries approximately $4,000 per hectare in lost tax revenue, ecosystem degradation, and social conflict.¹⁹ Each year Nigeria loses $191 million to $383 million in tax revenues; Cameroon loses $51 million to $103 million; Côte d’Ivoire loses $38 million to $76 million; and The Gambia loses $4 million to $9 million.²⁰ The illegal rosewood trade—driven by corruption, the misuse of licenses to recover trees downed by storms or construction, and weak oversight – has been particularly profitable.

Criminal and extremist networks use profits from this illicit trade to fund their operations. As of 2020, more than 1 million trees were illegally harvested and sent to China from Senegal’s Casamance region, helping to fund separatist groups such as the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance.²¹ In Mozambique, the rosewood trade fuels al-Shabab militants linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).²² Chinese smugglers source rosewood from Nigerian regions controlled by Boko Haram, allowing the group to profit.²³ In Mali, despite a 2020 national export ban, nearly 150,000 tons of rosewood—equivalent to 220,000 trees—were exported to China.²⁴ In Mali, al-Qaeda-linked Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin militants profit by controlling access to rosewood forests.²⁵

Corruption plays a central role in sustaining the illegal timber trade. Chinese companies often operate through shell firms or local agents to obscure accountability.²⁶ Regulatory enforcement remains underfunded and inconsistent, while laws requiring environmental impact assessments for logging are frequently bypassed or ignored. Forestry agencies and customs offices are often compromised by corruption.²⁷ One of the most egregious cases happened in Nigeria in 2017, when Chinese customs authorities intercepted 1.4 million illegal rosewood logs valued at $300 million, facilitated by nearly $1 million in bribes to Nigerian officials.²⁸ Chinese-funded infrastructure also contributes to deforestation.

Chinese-funded infrastructure also contributes to desforestation. Chinese-financed roads, ports, and dams often cut through protected areas, offering loggers access to previously unreachable forests. Operating through local intermediaries, Chinese timber companies extract high-value hardwoods such as rosewood, teak, and ebony either illegally or through legal loopholes. Based on geospatial analysis, approximately 10 percent of Ghana’s critical forest reserves and 11 percent of Côte d’Ivoire’s over-lap with Chinese-sponsored infrastructure.²⁹ One of the most contested cases is Ghana’s Atewa Forest Reserve, a biodiversity hot spot threatened by Chinese bauxite mining.³⁰ Despite strong civil-society opposition, the government proceeded with road construction in anticipation of mining operations, causing significant environmental degradation including forest fragmentation, incursions into conservation zones, and habitat destruction. Deforestation disrupts rainfall patterns, accelerates erosion, and increases the frequency of droughts and floods, undermining agricultural productivity in a region where 70–80 percent of rural livelihoods depend on farming.

Large-scale agricultural ventures compound these impacts. In Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Cameroon, Chinese agribusinesses have cleared vast tracts of forest for rubber, palm oil, and rice cultivation. Free, prior, and informed consent policies are on the books in all of these nations, requiring consultations with indigenous peoples and local communities.³¹ But agribusinesses routinely ignore such requirements. In
Cameroon, Sudcam (a subsidiary of China Hainan Rubber Group) cleared more than 10,000 hectares between 2011 and 2018 and contributed to 45,000 hectares of deforestation.³² These enterprises displace communities without proper compensation.

In addition to timber, China’s demand for exotic wildlife has turned West Africa into a hub for global wildlife trafficking. Since 2015, Nigeria has been China’s primary source for ivory and pangolin scales. Between 2018 and 2023, seizures in Nigeria included more than 30 metric tons of ivory and 167 metric tons of pangolin scales, equivalent to at least 4,400 elephants and hundreds of thousands of pangolins, respectively.³³ While West African countries are signatories to relevant international frameworks like CITES, which monitors the trade in endangered wild animals and plants, in many West African countries sales continue due to weak enforcement, corruption, poor monitoring, and lack of effective local regulatory mechanisms.³⁴

China has responded to criticism of its global development and infrastructure initiatives by releasing voluntary environmental sustainability guidelines, including the 2017 Guidance on Promoting a Green Belt and Road and the 2021 Green Development Guidelines for Overseas Investment.³⁵These guidelines encourage Chinese firms to abide by host country laws, but they lack enforcement mechanisms. Similarly, China’s 2019 Forest Law discourages illegal timber imports but lacks provisions for supply chain oversight. Firms can evade prosecution by claiming ignorance of illegality.³⁶ A 2022 draft regulation aims to apply aspects of China’s domestic Forest Law to its international practices, but it lacks the enforcement mechanisms necessary to make the international supply chain traceable.³⁷

In short, China’s timber harvesting, infrastructure construction, agriculture investments, and wildlife trade have contributed significantly to deforestation and biodiversity loss in West Africa. The convergence of high domestic Chinese market demand, weak governance across West Africa, lapse enforcement within China, and corruption has created a perfect storm of environmental degradation. Addressing this behavior requires a strong political commitment to combat criminal activity and shift the incentives that drive the market for illegally traded wildlife products. To address the problem, African countries must coordinate policy responses across the local, regional, and international levels. For its part, China should adopt and strictly enforce mechanisms that ensure responsible practices toward West African forests and wildlife.

Policy recommendations

Improve oversight and compliance

• Disclose environmental and social impact assessments. To enhance transparency and facilitate oversight. West African governments should require all foreign investments in logging, agribusiness, and infrastructure to conduct and publicly disclose their environmental impact assessments. These results must be made available to relevant local authorities prior to project approval.
• Improve legal transparency. Publish a national land and concession registry that includes all foreign allocations and permits. Ensure contracts are clearly defined, legally binding, and aligned with national conservation laws. Update land tenure legislation to protect customary rights and require public registration of all foreign land concessions. Strengthen customs enforcement in African countries, shared border points, and Chinese ports to prevent the export and import of unverified timber and endangered species.
• Establish escrow accounts to ensure reforestation. Require licensed logging and agribusiness firms to deposit funds into escrow accounts dedicated to ecological restoration. Funds should only be released upon verification of reforestation or land rehabilitation by either a certified private institution or the relevant state agency, depending on relevant laws and regulations. If companies fail to restore the land, the funds should be redirected to local communities for remediation and compensation.
• Create national whistleblower systems. Develop national level secure, multilingual tools—such as short message service (SMS) platforms, mobile apps, and anonymous hotlines—for communities, nongovernmental organizations, and forestry workers to report illegal logging, land grabs, and wildlife crimes. Rather than rely entirely on global reporting platforms that may be inaccessible, national and local level platforms would enable faster and real time detection of illegal logging for prompt action by relevant subnational institutions. Enforce strong legal protections for whistleblowers and environmental defenders. Partner with international bodies such as Interpol, TRAFFIC (a network of two hundred experts on the trade of wild species), and CITES to verify and investigate reported violations.

Raise public awareness

• Support regional civil-society coalitions. Fund and strengthen regional and national coalitions of civil-society organizations that monitor Chinese forestry investments and expose violations of national laws and regulations. Recognize land governed and managed according to traditional community-based systems and build local capacity to negotiate fairer contracts. Equip community actors with tools including drones, Global Positioning System (GPS) devices, and mobile reporting apps to document and report illegal activities in real time.
• Train and protect environmental journalists. Work closely with local and transnational civil society organizations to provide training for local journalists to investigate the illegal timber trade, land seizures, and biodiversity threats linked to foreign investments. Training should focus on developing investigative methods, digital security, environmental law, and data-gathering. National and regional safety support programs should be made available to journalists, including emergency legal support, and encrypted communication platforms for those facing threats or harassment.

Regional cooperation

• Adopt a regional forestry code of conduct. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should establish a binding regional code of conduct that sets minimum environmental and social standards for all foreign investments in terms of forests and biodiversity. This framework could be modeled on the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) polices of the European Union or United Kingdom, and include voluntary partnership agreements.³⁸ Collective regional action can encourage individual reform-minded leaders to act as a counterweight against corrupt local officials.
• Create a regional public forestry investment database. Establish and maintain an online database that tracks foreign licenses, timber exports, and environmental violations. Under ECOWAS auspices, this platform should become a regional information hub that documents licensing status, compliance records, and audit outcomes. The intention is to enable public oversight of Chinese and other foreign firms operating in forest and critical biodiversity areas.
• Enhance international coordination. Set up an ECOWAS task force to regularly exchange information on West African forest and wildlife resource exploitation. The task force would facilitate intelligence sharing on illegal timber trade routes and identify specific violations and bad actors. It could facilitate joint investigations into cross-border violations in shared forests such as the Upper Guinea region, which traverses Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea. The group would publish an annual report for ECOWAS members states and make specific recommendations to member countries. The task force could form a collective negotiation platform in collaboration with national forestry commissions to engage Chinese state-owned enterprises and private investors.
• Work with China. Create formal and informal dialogue channels among African environment ministries, ECOWAS, and Chinese embassies and companies to address logging violations and environmental disputes. To enhance contract transparency, the equitable sharing of benefits, and improve oversight, urge Beijing to make its Green Development Guidelines for Overseas Investment mandatory. West African governments should push China publicly and privately to implement timber supply chain tracing and to regularly publish customs data on timber imports into China.

Roland Azibo Balgah is professor of development studies at the University of Bamenda, Cameroon, and visiting professor at Sol Plaatje University, South Africa and University of Cologne, Germany. As a social economist, he researches on the human-nature sustainability nexus, with thrust on hazards, poverty and livelihoods, and sustainable development in Africa.

Caroline Costello is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Costello worked on the U.S. Department of State’s International Visitor Leadership Program. In previous roles, she has taught English in Xiting, China; interned with the Peace Corps, the Department of State, and Save the Children; and served as the head of Learning Enterprises, an international volunteer program which sends students to teach English in underserved communities abroad.

Moses Fayiah is a forestry lecturer at the Department of Forestry and Wood Science, School of Natural Resources Management, Njala Campus, Njala University, Sierra Leone and has over 10 years of professional experience. He is also the executive director of Universal Consulting Services and the Forum for Environment, Biodiversity and Climate Change in Sierra Leone. His research interests include forest regeneration, sustainable forest management, climate change, forest policy and ecosystem restoration and conservation.

Jean-Luc Kouassi is an assistant professor of forestry and environmental management at the Felix Houphouet-Boigny National Polytechnic Institute (INP-HB) of Cote d’Ivoire with a decade of experience in cacao agroforestry, fire ecology, and GIS. His research explores the intersection of agriculture and sustainability, focusing on climate change mitigation, community empowerment, and sustainable landscape management.

Christine Ajokè I. N. Ouinsavi is a professor at University of Parakou (Benin), where she coordinates doctoral training in natural resources management, chairs the Scientific Committee of Natural Sciences and Agronomy, and leads the Forestry Studies and Research Laboratory. Her research focuses on ecology, agroforestry, climate change, biodiversity conservation, forest management and restoration in tropical regions. As former cabinet minister she led national policies in trade and education, chaired critical commissions, and participated in international negotiations.

Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh is an Associate Professor in in ecology and sustainable management of land at Nangui Abrogoua Universiy, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. He has an extensive experience in stakeholder engagement, feasibility studies, and strategic planning. He is currently involved in projects for the sustainable management of tree-based cash crops agroforestry and other climate smart cropping practices. He is also in dialogue with various ministries responsible for forest, agriculture, and the environment in Côte d’Ivoire to provide science-based insights into their activities and develop integrated management plans for the sustainable management of agroecological landscapes.

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese fishing in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Ebimboere Seiyafa, Awa Niang Fall, Ellis Adjei Adams, Kadidia Kane, Isa Elegbebe Olalekan, Kodjo N’Souvi, and Salamatu Joana Tannor

Chinese companies have rapidly expanded into West Africa’s fishing sector, often operating illegally in prohibited coastal waters.

China Climate Change & Climate Action

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese mining in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Richard Asante, Joseph Asunka, Joshua Eisenman, Fancies Egu Lansana, Sanusha Naidu, Igwe Ogbonnaya, Youmanli Ouoba, and Boukary Sangare

Chinese entities are expanding legal and illegal mining for minerals in West Africa.

Africa China

The Global China Hub tracks Beijing’s actions and their global impacts, assessing China’s rise from multiple angles and identifying emerging China policy challenges. The Hub leverages its network of China experts around the world to generate actionable recommendations for policymakers in Washington and beyond.

Learn more

The post Chinese demand for timber and wildlife in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In May 2025, the China Global South Initiative (CGSi), a collaboration between the Keough School of Global Affairs and the Atlantic Council Global China Hub, convened a group of twenty-two African environmental experts at the Peduase Valley Resort in Ghana for a three-day workshop on China’s environmental impact in West Africa. This policy workshop, hosted with the support of the Ford Foundation, included representatives from eleven West African countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo—and South Africa. Amid three days of comradery and collaboration, these experts worked together to draft policy memorandums on China’s environmental impact across the region. In the months following the workshop, we worked closely with the authors to curate three briefs—on mining and resource extraction, timber and wildlife, and fisheries and water resources—that identify the challenges and offer actionable policy solutions. We would like to recognize the excellent work of the co-authors who contributed their time and expertise to creating these briefs. In particular we would like to thank the group leaders Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, and Ebimboere Seiyafa and Awa Niang Fall, respectively, for their diligent work.

First and foremost, we would like to thank Caroline Costello, assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, for her essential contributions to the workshop in Ghana and this collection of issue briefs. Her tireless efforts were truly essential to the success of the project. Ashley Bennett, events strategy program director of the University of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs, provided critical logistical support across a dozen countries. Alexandra Towns at the Keough School and Cate Hansberry, Beverly Larson, and Jeff Fleischer at the Atlantic Council provided expert editorial support. Guidance from Notre Dame’s Pamoja Africa Initiative helped us identify contributors, and the Kellogg Institute helped support their participation. We would also like to thank the excellent staff of the Peduase Valley Resort for their hospitality during the May 2025 workshop. Last, but not least, we would like to thank our partner, the Ford Foundation, whose support made the workshop and these policy briefs possible. Ford is not responsible for the content of these policy briefs.

Executive summary

Overfishing by Chinese trawlers poses a serious threat to West Africa’s rich fisheries and water resources, endangering regional food security, national economies, and local livelihoods. Chinese companies— including state-backed firms and private actors—have rapidly expanded into the region’s fishing sector, often operating illegally in prohibited coastal waters. Hundreds of Chinese vessels now fish off the West African coast, primarily between Senegal and Mauritania. These vessels are much larger than the artisanal canoes used by local fishermen and easily outcompete them. The expansion of Chinese companies’ fishery operations and overfishing in the region strains marine and freshwater ecosystems and undermines longstanding livelihoods of traditional fishing communities. Chinese vessels employ bottom trawling and other destructive methods, which—combined with limited oversight and poor enforcement of national and transboundary laws—have caused severe environmental degradation and declining fish stocks, weakened local economies, and deteriorated coastal water quality. At the same time, inland fish populations—especially in transboundary rivers such as the Falémé, Niger, and Volta—continue to decline due to runoff pollution from Chinese companies’ illegal mining operations. This policy brief examines the ecological and social risks posed by Chinese trawlers’ fishing in West Africa, and offers policy recommendations to strengthen legal protection and enhance regional cooperation to safeguard the region’s fisheries and water systems.

Background

Fisheries and aquaculture are vital to West Africa’s food security and economy—contributing more than 15 percent of regional gross domestic product (GDP), with Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana accounting for 70 percent of total production.¹ Fish are the main source of animal protein for more than 60 percent of households in the region, which produces 32 percent of Africa’s annual fish catch and 21 percent of its aquaculture in Africa.²

In recent decades, growing concerns have emerged among environmental experts, national policymakers, and coastal communities in West Africa about the environmental and socioeconomic effects of China’s expanding role in the region’s fisheries and water resources. Chinese firms’ involvement— driven by the depletion of domestic fish stocks—now extends throughout West African countries’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), major rivers, and shared transboundary watersheds.

Small-scale, artisanal local fishermen are no match for the larger, more powerful Chinese trawlers, which engage in both legal and illegal fishery activities, often exploiting weak local regulations, limited enforcement capacity, and the complicity of corrupt local actors.³ The lack of coordinated monitoring
and limited presence of enforcement agencies, such as coast guards or marine patrols, have enabled these fleets to operate with minimal oversight.⁴ China’s sizeable investments in industrial fishing—backed by state subsidies, low-interest loans, and tax exemptions—has resulted in growing instances of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in West Africa, ultimately undermining the long-term sustainability of the region’s fishery stocks.⁵

Besides fishing, Chinese companies’ activities in mining, dredging, and infrastructure development compound pressures on water quality and aquatic ecosystems, with direct implications for fishery sustainability. Gold mining operations, particularly those involving mercury and cyanide, have contaminated rivers and their fish with harmful chemicals.⁶ Bucket excavators used in mining operations deposit oils, fuels, and alluvium into riverbeds, which causes erosion, changes the shape of river channels, and damages ecosystems. Dredging also stirs up sediments, turning clear water murky. This increased cloudiness, known as high turbidity, makes water hazardous for drinking and affects aquatic ecosystems.⁷ The consequences of mine-related pollution extend to upstream catchments and transboundary river basins with socioeconomic and ecological importance, including the Tano-Bia Basin (Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire), the Falémé River (Senegal and Mali), and the Bagoé River (Côte d’Ivoire and Mali).⁸

West African governments face structural obstacles in addressing Chinese vessels’ impact on fisheries and water resources, including under-resourced enforcement agencies and outdated legal frameworks that hinder effective regulation and governance. Corruption—particularly at the local level, where Chinese fishers sometimes pay communities not to report illegal fishing and mining—weakens oversight.⁹ Political and business elites with vested interests in fishery ventures involving Chinese companies often obstruct reform or weaken enforcement. Moreover, the presence of non-state armed groups in key maritime zones, such as the Gulf of Guinea, hampers monitoring and leaves fisheries and waterways increasingly vulnerable to exploitation by Chinese trawlers.¹⁰

These governance challenges are further compounded by West African states’ dependence on loans from China’s state-owned banks and infrastructure projects, which have reduced their bargaining power and undermined their ability to hold Chinese companies accountable. Despite the existence of regional initiatives such as the Economic Community of West African States Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP) and the African Common Fisheries Policy, implementation has remained weak.¹¹ Taken together, these impediments to enforcement leave marine and freshwater sectors neglected, allowing the associated environmental and social devastations to persist.

Evidence

China’s fishing fleet is currently considered the largest in West Africa, with nearly 17,000 vessels and annual catch amounting to roughly $3.8 billion.¹² Chinese vessels benefit from state subsidies and advanced fishing technologies, enabling them to overwhelm local fisheries, leaving artisanal fishers unable to compete. In Ghana, local fishermen in wooden canoes have drowned after their small boats capsized in the wakes of large Chinese vessels.¹³

Many Chinese fishing companies exploit poorly regulated licensing systems to conceal vessel ownership, engaging in joint partnerships with local actors, operating through local intermediaries, or registering as subsidiaries of local operators.¹⁴ Using local companies as legal fronts allows Chinese firms to circumvent fishing license laws that prevent foreign vessels from operating within national EEZs.¹⁵ Meanwhile, local corruption and collusion between China’s fishing operations and local political elites further stifles law enforcement.

Chinese industrial vessels operating in West African waters often fish in prohibited zones and use illicit practices such as dynamite, illegal nets, and chemicals that harm marine life and pollute waters.¹⁶ The impacts of these destructive techniques on local coastal communities in West Africa are profound. In Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana, which account for 70 percent of the region’s fish production, foreign vessels dominate the industry, undercutting local economies and ecosystems.¹⁷

Due to illegal fishing, small-scale fishers, many of them women working in fish processing and sales, face declining catches and rising unemployment.¹⁸ Illegal fishing has led to over 300,000 losses in artisanal and traditional fish related jobs in West Africa. In 2018, illegal fishing cost Nigeria an estimated $70 million.¹⁹ In Ghana, Chinese firms’ fleets engage in saiko, a form of illegal fishing in which industrial trawlers deliberately catch and resell small, juvenile fish at sea.²⁰ By catching undersized fish, they undermine the sustainability of fish populations in the region’s marine ecosystems. This illegal fishing practice threatens the livelihoods of coastal communities that rely on sustainable fishing for survival.²¹

The abuse and neglect of local workers is common on Chinese fishing vessels. Interviews by the Environmental Justice Foundation found that 94 percent of Ghanaian crew members received inadequate medicine or witnessed verbal abuse.²² One fisherman claims that he was treated like a “slave”: beaten, spit on, starved, forced to drink dirty water, and witnessed the deaths of three other African fishermen due to neglect and abuse.²³ In Ghana and Senegal, local communities have reported labor violations and bribery involving local officials—practices that undermine local governance and strain relations between China and West African countries.²⁴

Industrial pollution is another major concern. Chinese vessels and processing plants routinely discharge harmful waste into both marine and inland waters. Pollution from Chinese-owned fishmeal factories has been reported in The Gambia, where the process contaminates inland waters, killing fish and precipitating the collapse of some local lagoons.²⁵ Gold mining operations, particularly those involving mercury and cyanide, are a public health menace, contaminating rivers and groundwater and threatening both fish and crops. Chinese companies dredging and mining operations have polluted and deformed the Falémé River in Senegal and Mali and the Bagoé River in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, reducing the productivity of local fisheries and farmlands.²⁶ China’s infrastructure development has further complicated water governance. The construction of the Lekki Deep Seaport in Lagos, for example, has severely disrupted local water and fishery ecosystems.²⁷

Efforts by individual countries—such as Ghana’s Fisheries Commission and Nigeria’s new Ministry of Marine and Blue Economy—have been undermined by weak institutional capacity and limited financial investment.²⁸ In Togo, understaffing and poor coordination among fisheries and water institutions undermine enforcement despite the country’s accession to the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) to combat illicit and unregulated fishing.²⁹ The presence of armed groups in the Gulf of Guinea inhibits enforcement officers’ ability to conduct the surveillance and monitoring necessary to curb illegal activity and protect marine sovereignty.³⁰ These multilayered security challenges underscore the urgent need for national and regional policy interventions to improve oversight and safeguard the sustainability of fisheries and water resources by regulating Chinese fishers exploitation in the EEZs of West African countries.

Policy recommendations

Strengthen governance and legal frameworks

• Implement stricter penalties. Penalize local fishing companies that collaborate with Chinese trawlers to circumvent fishing license laws and other environmental policies. Fines, vessel confiscation, and blacklisting mechanisms should be introduced for companies and individuals acting as intermediaries to enable illegal fishing or the dumping of waste and pollutants into marine and freshwater systems.
• Revise outdated fisheries and water resource policies. Update policies and laws to reflect current realities including the rapid expansion of industrial-scale overfishing, invasive ballast discharge by foreign vessels, and plastic waste pollution. Policymakers should engage all relevant stakeholders—including small-scale fishers, processors, local nongovernmental organizations and local communities—to revise existing laws and policies. New laws should clearly outline regulatory loopholes and specify new monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to address them.
• Invest in the navy and the coast guard. To better monitor China’s illegal fishing activities along their coasts and EEZs, West African countries should invest in increasing the capacity—through better equipment and training—of their navy, coast guard, and other maritime security and enforcement agencies. Port authorities, coast guards, and inland water management units must be trained and incentivized to enforce existing environmental standards effectively and consistently.
• Work with the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC). The SRFC, based in Dakar, Senegal, should grow its policy influence in West Africa by coordinating closely with member states to develop regional policies and guidelines for dealing with overexploitation. The SRFC can become the regional hub for the harmonization of fishery laws, joint patrols, and shared resource management.

Improve regional monitoring and surveillance

• Develop a regional real-time monitoring system to track water resources, illegal activities, and waste dumping. The system should integrate satellite data, citizen reporting platforms, and automatic identification systems (AIS) to create a comprehensive monitoring web across the Gulf of Guinea and key river basins. AIS are positional awareness systems used to identify ships and provide additional information such as location, speed, intended port of call, prior identities, and activity history. They give authorities a full view of ships’ likely involvement in illegal fishing activity.³¹ Ghana has already employed AIS tools as part of its Vessel Viewer pilot program, and has seen success in strengthening its monitoring, control, and surveillance operations.³² AIS should be made mandatory for all industrial vessels operating in West African EEZs, with remote data made accessible to national and regional authorities.
• Develop public reporting systems. Growing public anger and grassroots activism have the potential to force governments to respond to these challenges, even if elites prefer the status quo. Highly publicized labor abuses, coupled with increasing resentment toward corrupt officials, exact a reputational toll. Civil society campaigns should seek to channel this anger into action, standing up platforms that allow citizens to anonymously report bad actors, including vessels, companies, complicit government officials, and intermediaries involved in illegal fishing or toxic waste disposal. This system should offer multiple online reporting options. This system should begin on the national level with an eye toward expanding to the regional level. By democratizing the response to this problem, civil society leaders can diversify oversight away from a small group of corrupt actors and elite gatekeepers. By demonstrating to officials that the desire for public monitoring is widespread, a successful reporting system will also be a mechanism for generating greater political will for change.

Promote sustainable fisheries agreements and mechanisms

• Empower the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to promote transboundary cooperation on shared waterways. Joint watershed management programs should be established to address shared pollution risks, dam regulation, and hydrological data sharing. This should begin with transboundary river systems such as the Volta Basin, the Falémé, and the Tano-Bia. ECOWAS could promote multilateral agreements and provide a multinational venue for promoting data sharing and enabling enforcement transboundary agreements. Working multilaterally can help override local elite resistance, as reform-minded officials can justify enforcement by citing binding regional commitments and reputational risks within ECOWAS.
• Negotiate regional fisheries agreements with China that prioritize the interests of coastal communities. Enforced under ECOWAS, these regional agreements should emphasize environmental sustainability, verifiable catch quotas, mandatory gear and equipment specifications, and designated no-fishing zones.

Ellis Adjei Adams is an associate professor of geography and environmental policy at the Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame. With background in both social and natural sciences, his research examines the social, political, institutional, and governance dimensions of environmental and natural resources, particularly water. He currently conducts research in Ghana, Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, and the United States.

Awa Niang Fall is full professor of physical geography at Cheikh Anta Diop University, in Dakar, Senegal. Since 2010 she has been involved in the African Networks of Centres of Excellence on Water Sciences Project, and leads the Master/UNESCO Chair on Integrated Management and Sustainable Development of West African coastal zone (Master GIDEL). Since June 2022 she has been coordinating the European Union-funded GoNEXUS project on behalf of UCAD, covering 6 river basins in Europe and Africa.

Kadidia Kane is a Malian civil servant working at the Mopti Regional Hydraulics Directorate. She holds a degree in hydrogeology engineering and a master’s degree in integrated water resources management. She currently serves as Head of the Water Resources Inventory and Management Division within this directorate, where she is involved in all activities related to water and related resource management.

Kodjo N’Souvi holds a master’s degree in economic analysis and policy and a doctorate in agricultural economics, majoring in fisheries economics and management. He is currently working as post-doctoral research associate at the College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Ocean University, China. His major area of research includes economics of aquaculture, namely shrimp, the socioeconomics of small-scale fisheries, sustainable fisheries, aquaculture development, and climate change.

Isa Olalekan Elegbede is a distinguished environmental assessment, planning, and sustainability expert focusing on marine sustainability and the blue economy. He is the Deputy Chair of IUCN/CEESP/TGER, Switzerland, and a Future Earth Coast (FEC) Fellow. Dr. Elegbede plays a key role in shaping policies for sustainable fisheries management and marine governance through his contributions to the Central and South Atlantic Regional Scientific Research Working Group and as a co-chair of the GEO BON Blue Planet Fisheries Working Group.

Ebimboere Seiyefa is a lecturer at Baze University in the department of international relations and diplomacy, with a background in politics, governance and security in West Africa. She has worked with Conflict Research Network West Africa, ACLED, NATO Southern Hub and USIP, amongst other institutions, to advance human security initiatives towards a peaceful West Africa.

Salamatu J. Tannor is a certified Mining HSE Professional with an interdisciplinary background in natural sciences. She is currently working as postdoctoral research associate at the Faculty of Life Sciences, Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences Kleve, Germany. Her research interests include the interactions of global economic systems such as mining and agribusinesses with other socio-ecological systems (people & water) within rural landscapes.

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese demand for timber and wildlife in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, Roland Balgah, Caroline Costello, Moses Fayiah, Jean-Luc Kouassi, and Christine A. I. Nougbodé Ouinsavi

West Africa’s forests are vital for climate regulation, biodiversity conservation, poverty alleviation, and economic growth.

China Climate Change & Climate Action

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese mining in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Richard Asante, Joseph Asunka, Joshua Eisenman, Fancies Egu Lansana, Sanusha Naidu, Igwe Ogbonnaya, Youmanli Ouoba, and Boukary Sangare

Chinese entities are expanding legal and illegal mining for minerals in West Africa.

Africa China

The Global China Hub tracks Beijing’s actions and their global impacts, assessing China’s rise from multiple angles and identifying emerging China policy challenges. The Hub leverages its network of China experts around the world to generate actionable recommendations for policymakers in Washington and beyond.

Learn more

The post Chinese fishing in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In May 2025, the China Global South Initiative (CGSi), a collaboration between the Keough School of Global Affairs and the Atlantic Council Global China Hub, convened a group of twenty-two African environmental experts at the Peduase Valley Resort in Ghana for a three-day workshop on China’s environmental impact in West Africa. This policy workshop, hosted with the support of the Ford Foundation, included representatives from eleven West African countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo—and South Africa. Amid three days of comradery and collaboration, these experts worked together to draft policy memorandums on China’s environmental impact across the region. In the months following the workshop, we worked closely with the authors to curate three briefs—on mining and resource extraction, timber and wildlife, and fisheries and water resources—that identify the challenges and offer actionable policy solutions. We would like to recognize the excellent work of the co-authors who contributed their time and expertise to creating these briefs. In particular we would like to thank the group leaders Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, and Ebimboere Seiyafa and Awa Niang Fall, respectively, for their diligent work.

First and foremost, we would like to thank Caroline Costello, assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, for her essential contributions to the workshop in Ghana and this collection of issue briefs. Her tireless efforts were truly essential to the success of the project. Ashley Bennett, events strategy program director of the University of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs, provided critical logistical support across a dozen countries. Alexandra Towns at the Keough School and Cate Hansberry, Beverly Larson, and Jeff Fleischer at the Atlantic Council provided expert editorial support. Guidance from Notre Dame’s Pamoja Africa Initiative helped us identify contributors, and the Kellogg Institute helped support their participation. We would also like to thank the excellent staff of the Peduase Valley Resort for their hospitality during the May 2025 workshop. Last, but not least, we would like to thank our partner, the Ford Foundation, whose support made the workshop and these policy briefs possible. Ford is not responsible for the content of these policy briefs.

Executive summary

Driven by growing global demand for minerals, West Africa has become a major hub for mining. Chinese entities—including individuals and private actors and corporations, some of them backed by state financing—are expanding legal and illegal mining for gold, diamonds, iron ore, bauxite, lead, zinc, stones, and critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and copper. These activities, which range from large-scale commercial ventures to small-scale artisanal mining, often cause serious environmental degradation. In many West African countries, Chinese nationals involved in illegal artisanal mining collaborate with local and transnational criminal actors. While some Chinese operations have created jobs and infrastructure in mining communities, their negative impacts on water resources, forests and biodiversity, livelihoods, health, and food security across West Africa have been profound. National or regional policies and enforcement mechanisms have failed to adequately address the social and environmental impacts of mining in the region. This brief proposes policy recommendations responding to the detrimental social and environmental impacts of Chinese mining in West Africa.

Background

There is growing concern about the detrimental environmental effects of Chinese mining operations in West Africa. Chinese companies exploit policy gaps, weak institutions, and the lack of regulatory enforcement
across mineral-rich West African countries. Their involvement in legal and illegal large-scale corporate mining, as well as the small-scale artisanal mining intended for locals, demands policy responses that strengthen governance and enforcement across the region.

The environmental impacts of Chinese mining activities in the region are complex, evolving, and difficult to fully identify due to the blurred lines between formal and informal mining operations. While industrial-scale mining tends to be confined to specific areas and is somewhat better regulated, illegal small-scale mining operations are poorly monitored despite their environmental and social harms. Chinese actors’ deployment of heavy-duty machinery in small-scale mining has significantly damaged ecosystems, especially forests and watersheds. Ultimately, both large- and small-scale mining have become major sources of environmental degradation, enabled by noncompliance with mining regulations, weak regulatory enforcement, and a lack of accountability and prosecutions for legal violations in the mining sector.

The impacts of these activities are not only ecological but also social. The scale of Chinese mining operations with heavy machinery drive land dispossessions and displacement across the region.¹ Chinese operators in illegal mining often convert farmland, forest, and rivers into mining sites—sometimes forcibly or through collusion with government, traditional leaders, and private landowners—eroding long-standing livelihoods rooted in agriculture and fishing.² The loss of land for farming bananas, rice, potatoes, and other traditional crops undermines food security, fuels social tension, and stokes conflicts between local communities and Chinese miners.³

Weak regulatory enforcement in the mining sector stems from both systemic and political failures. Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are underdeveloped, and existing legal frameworks fail to address the complex challenges posed by the involvement of Chinese nationals throughout the formal and informal mining sectors. Critically, there is a lack of political will to enforce existing laws—due in large part to the complicity of state and local authorities. High-level government officials, security personnel, and local leaders often benefit from illegal mining operations through bribery schemes, unlawful permits and licensing, and even ownership of mining equipment and operations.⁴ These activities undermine law enforcement, shielding both local and Chinese violators from prosecution. Compounding the problem is the widespread failure of Chinese mining companies to honor their corporate social responsibility (CSR) agreements. Although mining laws in many West African countries require community engagement and CSR implementation, Chinese company compliance is often absent or minimal, leading to public resentment and straining diplomatic relations between China and countries such as Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Nigeria.⁵ These problems, detailed in the following section, underscore the urgent need for national and regional policy responses that address regulatory gaps, strengthen enforcement mechanisms, and promote transparency and accountability in the mining sector.

Evidence

The environmental impacts of Chinese mining activities are broad and far reaching, encompassing land degradation, ecosystem destruction, landslides, pollution deforestation, biodiversity loss, desertification, and exacerbating climate change. Chinese miners’ consistent flouting of environmental standards and safety measures has severely damaged forest reserves, farmlands, and water resources. Chinese mining in West Africa is commonly tied to illegal small-scale artisanal operations carried out in collusion with local and transnational actors, including criminal gangs.⁶ These activities have profound consequences across the region.

Deforestation and soil erosion are commonplace across West African mining sites, and pollution of marine and freshwater bodies occurs at multiple stages of mining exploration. Small-scale gold mining causes extensive land degradation and harms water quality.⁷ In Nigeria, Liberia, Mali, and Ghana, Chinese financing has enabled local miners to excavate deeper with bulldozers and use harmful chemicals more extensively.⁸ Local mining workers and artisanal miners are exposed to hazardous mercury, cyanide, arsenic, and fluoride, often due to the lack of proper protective gear.⁹ Wastewater from mining containing these and other toxic heavy metals pollutes soil, groundwater, and rivers in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Mali, where landslides at abandoned Chinese-owned artisanal mines have resulted in fatalities.¹⁰ In Nigeria, lead poisoning in mining sites in Zamfara State in 2010 resulted in about four hundred children falling ill or dying.¹¹ Wastewater discharge onto farmlands from mining reduces crop yields and introduces toxins into the food chain, affecting human and animal health.¹² Many mining communities have reported disproportionate cases of cancer, respiratory infections, waterborne diseases, reproductive disorders, skin disorders, asthma, spontaneous abortions, and birth defects.¹³

In coastal communities where mining is widespread, dredging boats discharge oil, fuel, and chemicals, obstruct riverbeds, cause erosion, and deform watercourses. Chinese mining operations have also released ballast water containing invasive species and toxic waste into marine ecosystems.¹⁴ Harmful runoff in mining sites poisons fish and reduces the size and quality of local stocks. Meanwhile, loss of farmland worsens poverty and undermines food security. In Ghana, the majority of small-scale “galamsey” gold mining sites are run by Chinese nationals, with more than fifty thousand Chinese nationals entering the country between 2008 and 2013 to engage in illegal gold mining. According to the Mankurom Cocoa Cooperative Farmers Association, small-scale gold mining has destroyed more than 100,000 acres of cocoa farmland.¹⁵ In Nigeria, mining-related disruptions have intensified farmer-herder conflicts due to declining access to water and grazing land.¹⁶

Chinese artisanal and illegal mining has also accelerated deforestation.¹⁷ In Ghana, bauxite mining in the Atewa Forest has devastated 5,000 hectares.¹⁸ In Nigeria, mining in forest zones has resulted in significant habitat loss. From 1975 to 2005, Bukuru, Plateau state, lost 63 percent of its forested area due to mining.¹⁹ These forests filter pollution and ensure a steady supply of water to important inland rivers such as the Falémé River (Senegal and Mali), Bagoé River (Côte d’Ivoire and Mali), Tano-Bia Basin (Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire), and the Volta Basin (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, and Togo).²⁰

Chinese involvement in mining across West Africa is linked to organized crime and the proliferation of weapons.²¹ Transnational criminal networks linked to Chinese mining have destabilized mining regions and eroded trust in both local and national governance.²² Illegal mining has also become a funding source for armed groups and terrorists, such as Boko Haram and bandits in the Nigerian state of Zamfara.²³ Illicit gold mining in the Central Sahel countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—has been linked to transnational organized crime and instability. The illicit trade in Sierra Leonean diamonds and Malian gold has been tied to criminal syndicates and terrorism.²⁴

While Chinese involvement in mining has supported some job creation, infrastructure development, and technology transfer in mining communities, these benefits are typically accompanied by poor working conditions, low wages, environmental hazards, and labor-rights violations.²⁵ Even when communities negotiate infrastructure projects, the benefits rarely offset the environmental and social damage.²⁶ Numerous cases of inadequate compensation, unpaid royalties, and poor infrastructure have fueled community tensions and intracommunity disputes.²⁷ In Niger, for example, top Chinese oil executives were expelled for failing to adhere to the mining code requiring them to use local subcontractors and laborers
for extraction.

Governance weaknesses exacerbate these challenges. Environmental and natural resource agencies across West Africa are underfunded, lack the independence needed to enforce regulations, and are plagued with corruption.²⁸ Overlapping mandates and poor interagency communication hinder enforcement, while lax licensing systems allow illegal Chinese operations to flourish. Weak coordination between federal, provincial, and local authorities further enables illegal mining to thrive.²⁹ Many countries also lack clear procedures governing the entire process from mineral exploration to mine decommissioning.³⁰ In Nigeria, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia, small-scale mining licenses are often misused for large-scale operations and many Chinese firms operate without proper registration or licenses.³¹ In Ghana, where artisanal mining is restricted to nationals, Chinese actors are heavily involved through local intermediaries.³² Governments frequently issue licenses without consulting or compensating local landowners.³³ In Nigeria and Ghana, vague and controversial land laws allow governments to appropriate land regardless of prior ownership, often keeping marginalized communities from receiving the economic benefits of mineral extraction.³⁴

Even in countries that have environmental impact assessment (EIA) laws—such as Ghana, Nigeria, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire—implementation is politicized and inconsistent and rarely results in severe penalties for violators. Officials often exploit the EIA process for personal gain, circumventing pollution-mitigation and land-restoration requirements. In Ghana, EIAs are mandatory for small-scale mining, but enforcement is weak.³⁵ In Nigeria, the process remains opaque, and officials have misled local communities, particularly in areas with high illiteracy.³⁶

This evidence underscores the urgent need for national and regional policies to close regulatory gaps and strengthen enforcement to curb the socioenvironmental consequences of Chinese mining in West Africa.

Policy recommendations

Improve oversight and compliance

• Establish a digital reporting system. To empower reform-minded actors as a counterweight to corrupt elites, civil society organizations should develop a secure, accessible, and digitalized reporting system that includes strong whistleblower protections. Under the banner “See something, say something,” the system should allow for various channels—such as phone calls, WhatsApp, Telegram platforms, encrypted messaging, and dedicated call lines—to report violations and upload images. It should include a robust mechanism for data protection to ensure the safety of whistleblowers and the integrity of reports. Simplicity, reliability, and accessibility should guide its design, and the system should be created in partnership with credible civil-society organizations and community groups that could help provide capacity to investigate the veracity of each report and guard against manipulation by corrupt actors. To demonstrate its effectiveness and have immediate impact, the system should be piloted in select mining regions in which civil society groups and community organizations have existing local relationships. The system could be expanded gradually, region-by-region, with the ultimate aim being the creation of an integrated reporting network throughout West Africa.
• Update and enforce visa regulations for Chinese nationals and strengthen immigration and border controls. To address the poorly regulated licensing regimes and the involvement of Chinese entities in illegal mining, visa requirements and regulations should be reviewed, strengthened, and strictly enforced for Chinese visitors entering the region. Extradition treaties must be updated and enforced to hold foreign violators, including Chinese citizens and entities, accountable for environmental crimes. Locals who help foreign mining firms violate visa laws should be strictly prosecuted under the law.
• Clarify and improve mining license regimes and land tenure laws. Clear, equitable land policies are essential to protect communities from dispossession and ensure fair access to the profits of mining. Governments should review their existing licensing structures to close loopholes and clearly distinguish between different categories of mining operations—both formal and informal. Land tenure laws should be updated and reformed to eliminate ambiguities—particularly around the ownership and use of mineral-rich lands. This will ensure transparency, streamline oversight, and reduce regulatory loopholes for illegal mining.
• Create a regional mining compliance database to monitor implementation of EIA and CSR and identify bad actors. West African countries should establish an online monitoring and evaluation mechanism for all international mining companies operating in the region. The system would be overseen by a multinational committee comprising state and local stakeholders and civil-society organizations, which would conduct random biannual checks to verify compliance and enforcement. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) could develop the database in collaboration with member states.
• Establish mining escrow accounts. This mechanism would ensure that mining companies have set aside sufficient funds for land reclamation and environmental remediation. Firms would pay into an escrow account before they begin mining. If they clean up the environmental destruction associated with their activities, the funds would be returned to them with interest. But if mining companies fail to carry out proper land remediation, then the money in the escrow account would be used to support the cleanup and/or as compensation.

Raising public awareness

• Strengthen public education. Governments and civil society should establish national and sub-national level educational programs to inform the public—especially grassroots actors and traditional leaders—about the health risks and environmental impacts of illegal and artisanal mining. These efforts should include targeted publicity campaigns using radio broadcasts pamphlet distribution, and social media platforms with language-accessible slogans. Mining communities should also be educated about the environmental, social, and health consequences of mining through community meetings and gatherings designed to raise public awareness. These educational initiatives can leverage regular community gatherings and forums, and should be conducted in local languages to reach a broader audience. They could be led by nonprofit and civil-society organizations in close partnership with local health authorities and relevant stakeholders. This collaborative approach would help to effectively communicate medical and environmental risks while fostering greater community awareness and engagement.
• Train and protect journalists. Journalists should receive specialized training by professionals from local and international media and other international community organizations to build capacity for professional and investigative reporting on mining issues involving Chinese actors.

Empower communities

• Form community monitoring committees. Local community groups should be formed and should work in collaboration with security agencies, government bodies, local and international nonprofit organizations, civil-society groups, and the press to distinguish between legitimate (i.e., properly registered and escrow backed) and illegal mining activities. These groups would expose collusion between Chinese entities, local actors, and transnational criminal networks. To prevent corrupt actors from co-opting them, these committees should prioritize transparency and undergo regular reviews and oversight checks by a committee of experts from neighboring countries.
• Register local miners and support cooperatives. Begin a campaign to register local small-scale miners to enhance transparency. Registration could come with access to credit facilities to disincentivize them from relying on Chinese financing. Establish mining cooperatives, or support existing ones, that encourage small-scale artisanal miners to move from illegal to formal mining by helping them apply for appropriate licenses and explaining the harm caused by heavy metals.

International engagement

• Engage the Chinese government. West African governments should establish regular channels for both formal and informal discussions between state institutions (e.g., environmental protection agencies, ministries of environment and natural resources, ministries of mines and energy, minerals commissions, and other such institutions with oversight over minerals and mining), the local Chinese embassy, and their counterparts in Beijing. West African leaders and officials should raise the issue of environmental degradation in discussions with senior Chinese leaders, and it should be placed on the agenda and prioritized at the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and other multilateral meetings with Chinese counterparts.
• Engagement among West African governments. West African governments should establish regular channels for information sharing among their relevant ministries. These mechanisms can be formal or informal, bilateral or multilateral, but their objective should be to exchange timely information—for example, about cross-border bad actors and mining-induced environmental pollution—as well as to coordinate collective action among likeminded officials.

Richard Asante is an Associate Professor of Comparative Politics, Development and African Studies at the University of Ghana, Legon. His research focuses on the intersection between politics and development, with particular focus on Africa-China relations, Ghana-U.S security cooperation, natural resource governance, environmental security and communal conflicts, and impact of peacekeeping on domestic and regional security. Asante has been a visiting professor at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Pomona College, Claremont, California, USA, where he taught comparative politics of Africa and peace and security in Africa (2016/2017). He also served as a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow, at the Program of African Studies (PAS), Northwestern University; he taught comparative politics and development in Africa (2012/2013). Asante holds a B.A and M. Phil degrees in Political Science from the University of Ghana, and a PhD degree in Political Science under the Harvard University (Boston, USA)-University of Ghana split-PhD program. He was a special student in the Department of Government at Harvard University, Boston, USA (2008/2009). He is the Regional Manager, West Africa for the Varieties of Democracy.

Joseph Asunka is the CEO at Afrobarometer, a pan- African survey research organization that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy, and social issues across Africa. Joseph’s research interests are broadly in governance and democracy in Africa, with specific interests in elections and electoral processes and public service delivery. Joseph holds first and second degrees in Statistics & Computer Science and Economics from the University of Ghana and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California at Los Angeles.

Abosede Omowumi Babatunde is a professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. Prof. Babatunde has been awarded several distinguished academic fellowships including the 2024 Afox Visiting Research Fellow (Africa-Oxford Initiative) in the Merton College and African Studies Centre, University of Oxford, United Kingdom. Her work has been supported by research grants from CODESRIA; APN/SSRC, APSA Centennial Foundation and IPRA Foundation. Her research interests include conflict resolution, natural resources governance, human rights and security, peacebuilding and gender studies. She recently co-authored the book “Managing Violent Religious Extremism in Fragile States: Building Institutional Capacity in Nigeria and Kenya,” Routledge African Governance Series” (recommended by CHOICE and selected for the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Ethiopia Tana High Level Forum Book Launch, 2023).

Joshua Eisenman is a professor of politics at the Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame. His research focuses on the political economy of China’s development and foreign relations with the United States and the Global South — particularly Africa. His latest book, China’s Relations with Africa: A New Era of Strategic Engagement (Columbia University Press, 2023), explains the tactics and methods that China uses to build relations with African countries and contextualizes and interprets them within Beijing’s larger geostrategy.

Francis Egu Lansana is a forward-thinking development enthusiast with technical knowledge in natural resource governance, gender inclusion and leadership. He is an experienced public and private sector manager. He has a strong foundation in current methodologies paired with an understanding of trends and a desire to innovate. His research examines open governance and citizens’ participation in mining concession decision-making. He holds a master’s degree in development studies from Erasmus University, The Netherlands.

Sanusha Naidu is a senior research associate with the Institute for Global Dialogue. Her areas of analysis include democracy, development and the political economy of Africa’s international relations and South Africa’s Foreign Policy. She has also focused her interests on South-South Cooperation and the footprint of emerging powers in Africa. She previously worked at the Centre for Conflict Resolution based in Cape Town and managed the South African Foreign Policy Initiative (SAFPI) at the Open Society Foundation for South Africa.

Ogbonnaya Igwe is the chairperson of the Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Research Group, and the Lead of Engineering Geology/Geotechnical Engineering Unit, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He is an environmental expat specializing in sustainable environmental protection and disaster prevention/management. He is the coordinator of the ICL-UNESCO Centre of Excellence and Tuning Africa Project in Applied Geology University of Nigeria, Nsukka
and consults for the oil and gas industry in environmental and social impact assessment and environmental evaluation studies projects.

Youmanli Ouoba is a professor of economics at the University of Thomas SANKARA. His research interests are in natural resources management, agricultural development and environmental economics. He is the current director of the Center for Economic and Social Studies, Documentation and Research (CEDRES) of Thomas SANKARA University, Burkina Faso.

Boukary Sangaré is a Malian anthropologist and independent consultant and has conducted several studies for international NGOs working in Mali and the Sahel. He joined the Institute for Security Studies in 2019 as a research consultant. Before joining ISS, he was a program officer for the Peaceful Coexistence, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Program at the Danish Embassy in Bamako. Boukary has worked in the Sahel for the past decade on conflict, violent extremism, radicalization, governance, social mobility and social media.

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese fishing in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Ebimboere Seiyafa, Awa Niang Fall, Ellis Adjei Adams, Kadidia Kane, Isa Elegbebe Olalekan, Kodjo N’Souvi, and Salamatu Joana Tannor

Chinese companies have rapidly expanded into West Africa’s fishing sector, often operating illegally in prohibited coastal waters.

China Climate Change & Climate Action

Issue Brief Oct 6, 2025

Chinese demand for timber and wildlife in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

By Ebagnerin Jérôme Tondoh, Roland Balgah, Caroline Costello, Moses Fayiah, Jean-Luc Kouassi, and Christine A. I. Nougbodé Ouinsavi

West Africa’s forests are vital for climate regulation, biodiversity conservation, poverty alleviation, and economic growth.

China Climate Change & Climate Action

The Global China Hub tracks Beijing’s actions and their global impacts, assessing China’s rise from multiple angles and identifying emerging China policy challenges. The Hub leverages its network of China experts around the world to generate actionable recommendations for policymakers in Washington and beyond.

Learn more

The post Chinese mining in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• United States: After the war, it’s time to revive and expand the Negev Forum
• Israel: That the accords have endured is telling
• UAE: The accords fulfill Sadat’s people-to-people dream 
• Bahrain: Balancing domestic sentiment and regional integration
• Morocco: ‘Pan-Abrahamism’ is crucial for the monarchy’s throne succession

Five years ago, the announcements that the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain would normalize relations with Israel caught the world by surprise. Subsequent announcements on Kosovo, Sudan, and Morocco demonstrated that the new spirit of cooperation in the Middle East—embodied in the Abraham Accords signing ceremony at the White House on September 15, 2020—was not an isolated trend.

The world and the Middle East specifically have changed significantly in those five years, with intensifying major power competition, a reimagining of the US role in the world, rapid technological change, major evolutions in the conflict between Iran and both Israel and Gulf countries, significant political change across the Middle East, and the  October 7 tragedy and the resulting war in Gaza—to name a few. 

Many of these developments have reinforced the trends driving the Abraham Accords: Evolving geopolitical dynamics and economic and technological change have underscored the value of stronger cooperation between Israel and its neighbors and the importance of mending the rifts that have impeded the Middle East’s economic potential for too long. For the United States, the diplomatic achievement of the Abraham Accords highlights the value of America’s unique form of strategic partnership (as compared to competitors like China) and provides a platform for transforming its partnerships in the Middle East for a new era: away from counterterrorism and forever wars and toward cooperation around mutually beneficial, private-sector-led prosperity. The force of these trends explains why there was so much momentum toward deepening and expanding the accords in mid-2023, as Dan Shapiro describes in this collection of essays. 

Of course, other recent developments—most notably October 7 and the war in Gaza but also fears of Iranian retaliation—have challenged the positive trends associated with the Abraham Accords and demonstrated that the forces propelling division and discord remain influential. There is a risk that these forces could derail or at least further delay positive momentum. But at the N7 Initiative, we remain hopeful that these forces are waning in the face of more powerful global and regional trends. A durable end to the war in Gaza is essential to realizing the potential for a new era of de-escalation and cooperation in the Middle East. And a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear threat will help resolve one of the most persistent challenges to that new era.

This compilation of essays and reflections from American, Bahraini, Emirati, Israeli, and Moroccan authors reminds us that the transformational change and “warm peace” envisioned by the Abraham Accords is a long-term, generational project. Sarah Zaaimi describes how the Moroccan king was inspired to embrace the accords precisely because he was thinking about future generations and creating a more stable and prosperous country when leadership eventually passes to his son.  And as Loay Alshareef points out, positive economic and cultural change between Israel and its neighbors is continuing, and this change has deep roots that predate the accords themselves.

Those who believe in the vision for an integrated Middle East must retain a commitment to this project and continue to invest in initiatives today that will make that more promising vision for the future possible. In his reflection, Dan Shapiro, who served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017 and deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East from 2024 to 2025, describes what some of these initiatives could entail and underscores the importance of investing in a multilateral architecture to institutionalize a range of economic, security, and cultural projects. While less flashy than major new political announcements, this architecture is what will help cement regional integration for decades to come.

Finally, remaining focused on the long-term promise of the Abraham Accords can help policymakers navigate the immediate challenges facing the region more effectively. As Israel’s first ambassador to the United Arab Emirates Amir Hayek points out, the strategic partnerships Israel has forged through the Abraham Accords can provide Israel with a more comprehensive security than military power alone can deliver.  Similarly, Ahmed Khuzaie argues that Bahrain’s engagement with Israel has elevated the small country’s position as a leader of pragmatic diplomacy, allowing Bahrain to help shape regional discourse on issues like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

The N7 Initiative remains committed to working with policymakers, the private sector, and thought leaders to build on these lessons. In doing so, we seek to ensure the Middle East five years from now is a more integrated, tolerant, and prosperous place.

Allison Minor is the director of the N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation dedicated to strengthening cooperation between the United States, Israel, and Arab and Muslim countries. She previously served as the deputy US special envoy for Yemen and the director for the Arabian Peninsula at the US National Security Council.

United States: After the war, it’s time to revive and expand the Negev Forum

Five years after the Abraham Accords, the promise of these agreements to help shape a far more peaceful, prosperous, and integrated Middle East remains. But advancing it is also frustrated by the ongoing war in Gaza that Israel launched in response to Hamas’s terrorist attacks on October 7, 2023. But the war will end, the sooner the better. When it does, countries committed to this vision of integration must move quickly to restore momentum that has been lost.

One opportunity that should be seized as soon as possible after the war is to resume the work of the Negev Forum. The Negev Forum was launched at the Negev Summit in Israel in March 2022, when the foreign ministers of Israel, the United States, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Egypt, and Morocco met together in the first gathering of its kind. They launched the Forum, with a steering committee and six working groups, covering security, health, water and agriculture, energy, education and coexistence, and tourism. The working groups were tasked with developing multilateral projects aimed at bringing the benefits of regional integration to the citizens of these nations. (The N7 Initiative conducted its own conferences on education and coexistence, water and agriculture, and trade with regional experts in 2022 and 2023 to support the governments’ work.)

Progress was mixed, as some working groups progressed faster than others, and countries had different bandwidths and levels of commitment to pursuing projects. But by the summer of 2023, when I assumed the duties of the US representative to the Negev Forum steering committee as part of my role as the State Department Senior Adviser on Middle East Regional Integration, we were gaining momentum. At the UN General Assembly in September, plans were finalized to host a second Negev Forum ministerial in Marrakesh, at which working group projects would be endorsed by the foreign ministers and advanced toward implementation. Host country Morocco insisted on going forward with the meeting despite a recent, devastating earthquake. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was set to attend, following a visit to Israel and Saudi Arabia intended to advance work on a normalization agreement. The date of the ministerial was set for October 19, 2023.

Of course, it never happened. Hamas’s brutal attack and the war that ensued consumed the region’s attention. But when the war ends, reconvening this gathering should be an early goal, with working group projects dusted off and updated, ready for ministerial approval.

In fact, the Marrakesh ministerial was set to be an expanded version of the original Negev Summit. Plans were at an advanced stage to include Jordan as a new member, and to invite senior Palestinian Authority representatives to participate in some of the sessions. In addition, a number of other countries, including African members of the Arab League and other countries outside the region, had expressed interest in attending as observers.

That expansion, too, should be on the table for after the war. Jordan, as a full member, and the Palestinian Authority are obvious participants. Oman, Mauritania, the Comoros, Somalia, Djibouti, and Indonesia are all plausible participants as observers. A number of European partners could also attend at lower levels to indicate where their governments could provide expertise and funding to support the main countries’ efforts.

Over time, the institutionalization of a regional grouping like the Negev Forum would add considerable ballast to efforts to build a more integrated region. As its projects deliver benefits to the citizens of Negev Forum countries, more countries will want to join the club. In time of war, it may seem far-fetched, but the goal should be for an ASEAN-style regional organization to take hold in the Middle East and North Africa region, the kind of organization that creates a thickened web of ties that help make war less likely in the future.

It will be tempting to let post-war priorities that are more urgent—like the reconstruction of Gaza—or flashier—like Israeli-Saudi normalization or Israeli-Syrian understandings—crowd out the work of building a broader regional architecture. The United States should not let that happen. But given the intensity of the work involved, more resources are needed. That is why President Donald Trump should nominate, and the Senate should confirm, the special envoy for the Abraham Accords that Congress created in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. The appointment of a high-profile envoy in this role will communicate the United States’ seriousness about expanding regional integration in every direction, and buttress the work of other senior envoys who may focus on the higher profile efforts in Riyadh and Damascus.

Once the Negev Forum has been revived with an expanded ministerial meeting, Trump could make a major contribution to his peacemaking aspirations by convening a Negev Forum head of state summit. This summit could be held in concert with, or as a means of encouraging, progress toward an Israeli-Saudi normalization deal. As much as anything, the summit would demonstrate that the dramatic regional transformation toward integration launched by the Abraham Accords is alive and well and moving forward as the Middle East emerges from the tragedy of October 7 and the Gaza war.

Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy. He also previously served as the director of the N7 Initiative.

Israel: That the accords have endured is telling

As we mark the fifth anniversary of the Abraham Accords, the region is living through another difficult chapter of violence and uncertainty. The horrific October 7 attacks and the ongoing war have challenged even the most resilient partnerships. War, by its nature, undermines trust and stability. And yet, despite these headwinds, the Accords have endured. From my perspective, that endurance is not accidental. It is the product of leadership, commitment, and the recognition that the path blazed by UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed five years ago is that of a marathon, not a sprint. 

When I speak about the Abraham Accords, particularly the relationship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, I often think about it as a marathon. In a marathon, there are stretches where the road is smooth and momentum is strong, but there are also moments of fatigue. But the essential point is that you keep running. That is what we have seen in the past five years: Despite difficulties there has been an unshakable commitment to continue moving forward. 

In recent weeks, the United Arab Emirates has made it clear that Israeli annexation of  West Bank territory would jeopardize its relationship with Israel after an Emirati official made a public statement saying that such a move is a “red line”  and would “foreclose on the idea of regional integration.” This sentiment is not new, as the suspension of previous West Bank annexation plans was a condition for the UAE to sign the Abraham Accords. The Emiratis, known for their long-term planning, want to take action—and believe that action must be taken—to build a new, secure, and strong Middle East economically and strategically. For the Emiratis, annexation would lead to a loss of hope in their vision for the future of the Middle East, and this loss would jeopardize long-term plans. From my acquaintance with the Emirati leadership, I know that their words should be taken very seriously.

We must do everything to continue, develop, and preserve the Abraham Accords for the benefit of future generations.

The UAE’s stance following October 7 has illustrated its commitment to moving forward. Despite facing significant regional and domestic pressure, Abu Dhabi remained firmly committed to the Abraham Accords and condemned Hamas’s brutal attacks. The UAE went beyond rhetoric and maintained flights to Israel from the very first day of the war, when nearly all others suspended them. At the same time, the Emiratis leveraged their relationship with Israel to deliver humanitarian support to the people of Gaza—they provided food, medicine, medical treatment for children, and critical infrastructure like hospitals and desalination plants.

For Israel, one of the clearest lessons of the past five years is that the country waited too long to pursue these kinds of partnerships. Israel lost decades of potential cooperation in the region by relying only on military power and conflict management, rather than investing in regional alliances. The Abraham Accords have shown that real security does not come from military power alone—it comes from trusted partners, shared interests, and commitments to growth and stability. Israel has found such partners in the UAE, Morocco, and Bahrain, and the country’s long-standing peace with Egypt and Jordan remains foundational. I believe more countries will join this circle of normalization in time, motivated by the desire to counter radicalization and to pursue regional prosperity. This is not wishful thinking; it is the realistic trajectory of a region that cannot afford to remain hostage to old conflicts. 

Future partners in the region can look at Israel’s relations with the UAE and ask themselves: “Why not us?” 

The past five years have also demonstrated the tangible benefits of peace. Trade between Israel and the UAE reached over $3.2 billion in goods last year, not including government-to-government transactions or software and services. Investments have surpassed $5 billion, and more than two million Israelis have traveled to the UAE since normalization. These are not abstract statistics; they represent millions of human interactions and billions of dollars driving growth on both sides. Looking forward, the next phase must include deeper cooperation in science, academia, culture, and the arts—because while leaders may sign agreements, it is ultimately people-to-people connections that sustain them. 

The priority for Israel and its Abraham Accords partners should not be narrowly defined. Security cooperation cannot stand without economic growth. Economic growth cannot last without cultural and human connections. Trust cannot deepen without all three reinforcing each other, thus they must be pursued simultaneously. Areas of potential cooperation include regional food security, energy innovation, AI, tourism, and more. 

While the potential of bilateral relations is high, the potential of regional and multilateral cooperation is much higher.   

As we reflect on these first five years, we must avoid the temptation to take a snapshot in a moment of crisis and declare the Accords a failure. Marathons are not judged at the halfway mark. They are judged by whether the runners reach the finish line. 

Amir Hayek is a nonresident senior fellow in the N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation. Hayek served as the first Israeli ambassador to the United Arab Emirates from 2021 to 2024, working to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties between the two countries after they formalized relations under the Abraham Accords.

UAE: The accords fulfill Sadat’s people-to-people dream 

When I think about the Abraham Accords, I cannot help but look back to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, my role model for peace. In 1979, Sadat’s peace with Israel brought Egypt the full return of Sinai and opened diplomatic relations. But his dream went beyond maps and treaties. Sadat envisioned a true people-to-people peace between Egyptians and Israelis that would transform generations and replace suspicion with trust. 

Tragically, Sadat paid for this vision with his life in 1981. The bullets that killed him also killed the momentum for deep human connection. His successor, Hosni Mubarak, maintained security cooperation without cultural, social, or economic warmth as he was too afraid of the political risk. While Sadat paid the cost for peace, history remembers him as a hero who dared to dream beyond the limits of his time. 

The Abraham Accords, signed in September 2020, are in many ways the realization of Sadat’s unfinished mission. Unlike the Egypt-Israel peace, these agreements between Israel, the UAE, and later Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan have not stopped at the level of government-to-government arrangements. They have opened the gates for business partnerships, tourism, cultural exchange, and everyday friendships between peoples who for decades never met face to face. 

Trade between Israel and the UAE has soared into the billions of dollars. Daily flights between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv are packed with the likes of diplomats, entrepreneurs, tourists, and families. Israelis shop in Dubai’s malls and Emiratis tour Jerusalem’s holy sites, demonstrating that this is a warm peace where people learn each other’s languages, work on joint ventures, and share meals together. 

Up until the October 7 attacks the peace was unstoppable. Reports and seized Hamas documents confirm that Hamas carried out that massacre as a way to derail the potential normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Only two weeks earlier, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia publicly said, “Every day, we get closer” in reference to normalization with Israel. That statement must have infuriated Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, who feared peace more than war. 

The UAE suddenly found itself in an extremely challenging position. On one hand, the leadership has always been clear in supporting the Palestinian people. On the other, it had to navigate a public mood already warming to the Abraham Accords. The reality is that enthusiasm for the Accords varies across the Emirates—Abu Dhabi embraces them strongly, while in Sharjah the sentiment is much cooler. 

In the midst of the crisis, the UAE was one of only two governments in the entire Middle East to condemn Hamas’s barbaric attacks—the other being Bahrain, whose Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa also spoke out. Both took a principled stance, knowing that condemning terrorism is essential for any genuine peace to survive. 

The way forward will not be easy. But I believe the war must end in the right way: Hamas’s total surrender, the complete release of all hostages, and the removal of a radical ideology that has held Palestinians hostage for decades. Only then can we begin to repair what was broken on October 7. 

When that moment comes, peace activists must double down on building more people-to-people projects that connect Muslims and Jews, Arabs and Israelis, in ways that create real human investment in peace. Initiatives like the I2U2 Group, a partnership between India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States, show the potential for cross-regional collaboration in areas like agriculture, energy, water technology, and infrastructure. This is a model worth expanding, but it is not enough. 

We must create platforms that also include Palestinians who reject Hamas’s pathological ideology—voices that want to see prosperity, education, and mutual respect flourish. Without them, peace will remain incomplete. 

The future I believe in is one where Ishmael and Isaac both prosper—where their children travel, trade, and thrive together. The biggest loser after this war must be the extremist worldview that seeks endless cycles of bloodshed. 

Five years on, the Abraham Accords remain the best hope we have for Sadat’s dream—a peace that is lived, not just signed. And that dream is worth defending, nurturing, and expanding, no matter the cost. 

Loay Alshareef is a United Arab Emirates-based Arab Muslim peace advocate whose mission is to bridge divides between Muslims and Jews and to champion peace in the Middle East.

Bahrain: Balancing domestic sentiment and regional integration

Bahrain’s formalization of relations with Israel—which the country has remained committed to despite intensifying domestic and regional pressures following October 7—has recalibrated its foreign policy approach. The kingdom now finds itself navigating a nuanced landscape, where strategic partnerships must be weighed against the evolving currents of negative public sentiment.

When Hamas launched an incursion into southern Israel in October 2023, resulting in the subsequent Israeli military campaign, scrutiny of Bahrain’s normalization with Israel intensified. Public sentiment in Bahrain remains overwhelmingly pro-Palestinian, rooted in long-standing civil society activism and religious solidarity. Unlike the UAE, Bahrain has a more vibrant public sphere, where demonstrations and symbolic acts—such as protests outside the Israeli embassy and parliamentary statements—have expressed opposition to continued normalization. 

Anti-Israeli sentiment in Bahrain is largely shaped by the ideological influence of regional Islamist movements, particularly the Iranian ayatollahs and the Muslim Brotherhood. These groups have cultivated narratives that resonate with segments of the population, framing normalization efforts as a betrayal of regional and religious identity. In response, Bahrain has sought to marginalize this influence through deepening strategic collaborations with Western partners—most notably Israel—as part of a broader effort to insulate its foreign policy from ideological pressures. 

In November 2023, Bahrain’s parliament issued a statement declaring the suspension of economic ties with Israel and the departure of the Israeli ambassador. However, this move was merely symbolic; foreign policy remains under the purview of the executive, and Bahrain has not formally abrogated the Abraham Accords. Instead, the government has adopted a nuanced approach: condemning violence on both sides, calling for a ceasefire, and emphasizing humanitarian assistance, while quietly maintaining strategic ties with Israel and the United States. 

This balancing act reflects Bahrain’s broader geopolitical calculus. Hosting the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet and participating in operations like Prosperity Guardian against Houthi threats, Bahrain remains closely aligned with Western security frameworks. Yet, it has also engaged in regional diplomacy, including communicating with Iran via Omani intermediaries, to mitigate domestic and regional backlash. 

Despite the political sensitivities, Bahrain’s relationship with Israel has yielded several tangible benefits across economic, strategic, and diplomatic domains. Since 2020, Bahrain and Israel have signed multiple bilateral agreements covering sectors such as technology, healthcare, tourism, and telecommunications. Direct flights and business exchanges have facilitated commercial ties, although the scale remains modest compared to the UAE-Israel corridor. Bahrain’s strategic positioning as a financial hub and its free trade agreement with the United States have made it an attractive partner for Israeli firms seeking Gulf access. 

The normalization has as well reinforced Bahrain’s role as a key US ally in the Gulf. With the Abraham Accords serving as a platform for regional security cooperation, particularly in maritime and cyber spheres, Bahrain’s participation in multilateral naval coalitions and its leadership in the US-led Combined Maritime Forces Task Forces underscore its strategic utility. 

Increased engagement with Israel has elevated the country’s diplomatic profile as well, positioning it as an Arab state willing to engage in pragmatic diplomacy. This has facilitated its inclusion in gatherings like the Negev Summit and enhanced its bilateral ties with the West. The normalization also provides Bahrain with leverage in shaping regional discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, advocating for a two-state solution while maintaining dialogue with all parties. 

The Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA), signed in September 2023 between Bahrain and the United States, offers a blueprint for deepening regional integration. Structured around three pillars—defense and security, economics and trade, and science and technology—C-SIPA redefines traditional security cooperation by incorporating economic and technological dimensions. 

Bahrain’s navigation of the post-Abraham Accords landscape illustrates the complexities of small-state diplomacy in a polarized region. While domestic sentiment poses constraints, Bahrain’s leadership has pursued a pragmatic strategy that preserves strategic partnerships and economic opportunities. By building on frameworks like C-SIPA and expanding regional cooperation, Bahrain can reinforce its role as a bridge between Gulf pragmatism and Mediterranean integration—without abandoning its commitment to Palestinian rights or regional stability. 

Ahmed Khuzaie is an international political consultant, writer, essayist, and media commentator from Bahrain. He is the managing partner of the Washington-based political consultancy firm Khuzaie Associates LLC.

Morocco: ‘Pan-Abrahamism’ is crucial for the monarchy’s throne succession

To ensure the continuity of Morocco’s Alaouite dynasty, the ailing King Mohammed VI is gradually preparing his heir, Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, for a seamless succession. This effort translates into ambitious infrastructure and development initiatives, alongside strategic alliances with global powers to secure a lasting resolution to the Western Sahara dispute and cement the kingdom’s fate. Morocco’s 2020 re-normalization with Israel, brokered by the first Trump administration, should be viewed less as a diplomatic shift and more as a calculated move to position Rabat as a dependable pro-Western, pan-Abrahamic partner in North Africa—consolidating the future of the throne.

In his July 30 speech commemorating the twenty-sixth anniversary of his accession to the throne, it became undeniable that the Moroccan monarch is growing more feeble than ever. Mohammed VI, at sixty-two, has accumulated long periods of public absences and surgeries over the past decade, which have led to international speculation about his level of involvement in state affairs, despite local media cover-ups. In line with the Alaouite dynasty’s succession traditions since 1631, the current king has been gradually prepping and empowering the next monarch in line. Moulay Hassan, who recently turned twenty-one, is gradually being entrusted with more royal duties, meeting global leaders like Chinese President Xi Jinping, inaugurating major initiatives, and even being promoted to the rank of colonel-major in the Royal Armed Forces in July 2025—all signaling that the crown prince’s star is rising in key governance matters.

To reign over an ethnically and culturally diverse country like Morocco in a challenging regional and international context, the young prince needs to be surrounded by trustworthy and influential allies, hence the importance of joining the Abraham Accords’ newly forming bloc together with traditional allies from the “Arab monarchy club” like the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Jordan—which are also looking for self-preservation by ensuring seamless succession for their kingdoms—along with influential players like the United States, Israel, and the European transatlantic community.

The Moroccan monarchy has survived for twelve centuries, and the Makhzen (the establishment) is wise enough to read the tea leaves and understand the profound geostrategic shifts that the region is undergoing after the 2024 collapse of the last of the pan-Arabist regimes in Syria. Alliances are being redefined, and narratives are being reimagined to provide a new ideological framework for the countries of the region, where a shared and integrated future is possible together with Israel. Similarly, the “Axis of Resistance” countries are gearing up proxies and client-states to shape the region in their own image, offering an anti-hegemonic alternative based on Iranian revolutionary Islamism and enabled by China and Russia, who increasingly challenge US unipolarity. While neighboring Algeria appears to align with old Cold War allegiances, showing an increased rapprochement with the axis, Morocco remains consistent with its post-World War II positioning and has chosen to strike a new pact with the Pan-Abrahamist clan.

Beyond this more existential zeitgeist, the Abraham Accords and the reestablishment of ties with Israel in December 2020 have yielded numerous benefits for both Rabat and Tel Aviv in the past five years. The two reconciled countries have never been closer at the military, intelligence, and economic levels despite the growing popular anti-normalization sentiment in Rabat amid the ongoing Gaza war.

October 7 sounded the alarm among Moroccan governing elites of what an Iranian proxy is capable of, especially with the growing rapprochement between Polisario militants in Western Sahara and Iran and its proxies. The kingdom’s appetite for Israeli-made weapons and security systems has grown in recent years as it found in Tel Aviv an evident partner with similar priorities and adversaries. So far, the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces have acquired three Israeli-made Heron drones, developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), for approximately $48 million. Additionally, they have purchased SkyLock Dome anti-drone systems for $500 million and Barak MX missile systems for another $500 million. Morocco is also poised to acquire a spy satellite from IAI in a $1 billion deal.

Since the tripartite agreement between the United States, Israel, and Morocco in 2020, in which the United States recognized Rabat’s sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara territories in exchange for Israel and Morocco resuming diplomatic relations, the kingdom has become increasingly emboldened and achieved multiple consecutive foreign policy successes. Morocco, mainly thanks to the Accords, has moved from seeking international recognition for its national cause to de facto exercising sovereignty over Western Sahara. With the historical neutrality regarding Western Sahara of the former two colonizers of North Africa, France and Spain, reversed and support from key global actors like the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, in addition to multiple Arab and African countries, the incoming monarch can confidently ascend to power. Moulay Hassan will not have to worry that half of the territories of his kingdom are internationally contested, empowered with the vote of three UN Security Council members and the favorable momentum facilitated by his father’s long-term vision.  

The young prince will still have to defend Morocco’s strategic choices to side with pan-Abrahamism against revolutionary Islamism, particularly with his emotionally charged and largely pro-Palestinian population, which may favor regional pan-Arab and pan-Islamic sentiments over regional security and dynastic continuity. As the war in Gaza entered its second year, support for normalization with Israel dropped from 31 percent in 2021 to only 13 percent in 2024, according to the Princeton University Arab Barometer. While kingdoms with a millennial memory and an empire muscle see beyond isolated wars and conflicts, symbolic historical positions remain crucial for forging national unity and shaping public imaginaries—and Moulay Hassan will have to convince his citizens that he is a visionary leader who stands on the right side of history.

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, focusing on normalization and minorities in the region. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

MENASource Aug 12, 2025

There is a way forward for a two-state solution, if Palestinian leaders embrace the Abraham Accords

By Ghaida Rinawie Zoabi

By collaborating with regional partners and taking incremental steps within the framework of the Abraham Accords, the PA can move closer to realizing a Palestinian state.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist Jun 10, 2025

Yes, now is the time to double down on the Abraham Accords

By Allison Minor

The United States and its partners cannot simply wait for the war in Gaza to end or for Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel. They must take steps now.

Economy & Business Israel

The N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and the Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation, seeks to broaden and deepen normalization between Israel and Arab and Muslim countries. It works with governments to produce actionable recommendations to deliver tangible benefits to their people.

Learn more

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Overall, his visit reflected the Trump administration’s “deals, not aid” approach, which is intended to shift foreign policy from values-based principles to a more transactional strategy. Nevertheless, Boulos was warmly received during his visit, particularly in Algeria and Libya, a signal that US influence remains strong in these North African countries and that the current administration could still have a significant impact in solving some of the region’s most pressing issues.

During his first stop, Boulos met with Tunisian President Kaid Saied and later with Foreign Minister Mohamed Ali Nafti to discuss bilateral ties and strengthening collaboration on fighting terrorism and boosting trade. Saied reiterated his stance on noninterference by external governments, which he has stood by since coming to power in 2019—and especially so in response to international criticism of his jailing of opposition voices, lawyers, and journalists. He also used the occasion to champion the Palestinian cause, showing Boulos a picture of starving children in Gaza, which appeared to cause a moment of tension between the two leaders.

Several issues were notably absent from the conversation. One such issue was migration: Illegal migration from North Africa to Europe has recently increased, and Tunisian border police have been dismantling makeshift migrant camps to avoid a further surge in migration to Europe. Such surges, especially if sudden, can present significant challenges for Europe, a key ally and trading partner of the United States. In the past, and especially under the Biden administration, the thorny migration issue has been a topic of interest for European leaders during bilateral talks with the United States. For example, in July 2023, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni met with former US President Joe Biden. The official communiqué emerging from the meeting highlighted migration from Tunisia as a key issue, an addition that may have been made to secure Italy’s continued support for Ukraine.

Today, migration is still a top issue of national interest for Europe. And at a moment when transatlantic cooperation is so critical for a number of US priorities, including countering Russia, a Europe destabilized by uncontrolled migration may come at great costs for the United States. However, by overlooking the North African migration issue while visiting Tunisia, Boulos missed an opportunity to send an important signal of unity to the United States’ transatlantic allies, especially as Europe grows more and more concerned about Russia cooperating with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Libya on weaponizing migration against Europe.

Similarly, it does not appear as though Boulos addressed the issue of US aid (frozen under the Biden administration), consistent with Trump’s shift away from aid and toward a more transactional and business-oriented approach. The United States was one of Tunisia’s largest sources of foreign aid, providing hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance, later cutting much nonmilitary aid after Saied tightened his grip on power in July 2021.

Also absent from the conversation, at least according to publicly released reports, were Tunisia’s stalled negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which have been paused since 2023, when Saied accused the organization of imposing strict conditions on the country. Tunisia is in immediate need of support and reform; the economy remains vulnerable, with unemployment at 15.7 percent and a widening trade deficit (from $2.79 billion to $3.46 billion in the first quarter of 2025). But without IMF support, the country’s economy risks tanking even further, incentivizing migrants to cross illegally into Europe. Given that the United States is the largest shareholder of the IMF, it holds significant influence and leverage, but the apparent lack of mention of this issue at the Boulos visit was a missed opportunity to try persuading Tunisia to go back to the negotiating table.

Trump’s foreign-policy stance was particularly evident during Boulos’s trip to Libya, with the signing of an eight-billion-dollar oil and gas exploration deal. The project at the center of the deal is set to begin in 2026 and will see US construction consulting company Hill International work with Mellitah Oil and Gas (a joint venture of Libya’s National Oil Corporation and Italy’s Eni) to boost Libya’s oil output and direct oil exports to Europe. The agreement’s current goal is to ramp up gas production to 750 million cubic feet of gas per day with the construction of additional gas fields.

The deal was facilitated by ongoing backchannel cooperation happening in the two rival governments, between the Tobruk-based one headed by Haftar and the one based in Tripoli (and recognized by the United Nations), led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. While at loggerheads over most other issues concerning the country, resulting in a prolonged civil war, the two sides collaborate on matters concerning oil and gas, as these form the bedrock of Libya’s economy. During his trip, Boulos met with both Dbeibah and Hafter, signaling a continuation of the US posture of legitimizing both governments despite the United Nations’ stance.

In Algeria, Boulos was warmly received by Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, likely in part the result of a military agreement the United States signed with Algeria earlier this year, which pledges cooperation between US and Algerian troops and paves the way for potential weapons sales. This warm welcome is a good sign for advancing US influence in the region. Algeria, since Morocco joined the Abraham Accords in 2020 and since the United States recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, has been isolating itself from the United States and growing closer to longtime ally Russia. For example, it applied to become a BRICS member in 2023 (but later withdrew it after growing frustrations because it was excluded from that year’s summit) and signed a Declaration of Enhanced Strategic Partnership later that same year. With Algeria spending the most on its military among African countries, a military that sources much of its weaponry from Russia, the US-Algeria deal reflects Washington’s foreign-policy strategy to, through deals, keep Algeria balancing between the two superpowers, positioning it as a potential swing player in the broader great-power competition.

Despite the warm welcome, it is safe to assume that Tebboune was disappointed by Boulos’s reiteration of the United States’ stance in support of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Algiers supports Western Sahara’s independence and it is unlikely this position will shift any time soon, particularly after fifty years of tension and periodically conflict. Thus, Algeria may begin to more strictly isolate itself from the United States and look for increased support elsewhere—for example, China and Russia—and continue exerting influence in neighboring Tunisia. Algeria’s continued isolation could pose challenges for a number of US partners, including European allies such as Italy, which heavily rely on energy exports from Algeria following efforts to reduce dependence on Russian gas and oil. This enables Algeria, if it does stand firm on its isolation, to have more leverage in attempting to shift the balance of power to its favor vis-à-vis the Western Sahara issue.

Nonetheless, Boulos’s visit yielded positive results, showcasing that the United States still considers the region important and central to Washington’s foreign policy, particularly as it looks to manage global competition with China and Russia—and as other countries consider tilts eastward.

Alissa Pavia is the associate director of the North Africa Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

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A broadening partnership

Turkey’s engagement in the Sahel predates the region’s security crisis, though it has grown in recent years. Trade between Turkey and Mali increased 32,000 percent over the previous two decades, from $5 million in 2003 to $165 million in 2022. Turkish firms have also played a key role in infrastructure development, constructing both an airport and a five-star hotel in Niamey, Niger. These relationships provide a strong base for defense cooperation.

Sahel-Turkey defense cooperation has steadily increased since 2018. What began as a five-million-dollar Turkish pledge to the now-defunct G5 Sahel Joint Force has matured into a broader, deeper partnership. Additionally, coups d’état in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger prompted the United States to halt its defense assistance, impeding these states’ ability to maintain and procure US equipment. Turkey became a more attractive partner as regional security deteriorated and Western assistance stagnated.

Military equipment sales are the cornerstone of Sahel-Turkey defense cooperation. They began in earnest in 2022, when Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger each took delivery of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. These drones rapidly proliferated across both the region and the continent, drawing comparisons to the AK-47 assault rifle because of their affordability, reliability, and ubiquity. These acquisitions heralded a shift in procurement, as Sahel states increasingly turned toward Ankara.

As time went on, drone sales continued apace. Chad obtained Anka-S drones in 2023 and Aksungur drones in 2024, while Mali expanded its TB2 fleet. Burkina Faso and Mali both procured Akıncı drones in 2024, signaling a shift toward more advanced systems. “Our defense capacity consists of the famous Bayraktar TB2s. We now have a new [drone] called Akıncı,” boasted Burkina Faso’s president, underscoring the centrality of Turkish equipment in Burkina Faso’s arsenal.

But it’s not just drones: Burkina Faso and Chad each acquired Turkish armored vehicles in 2022. Cooperation expanded further when Niger procured Turkish planes in late 2022, becoming the first export customer of an entirely Turkish-produced aircraft. Chad followed soon thereafter, acquiring the same aircraft in 2023.

Turkish equipment has addressed Sahel militaries’ acute security gaps and afforded them new capabilities. Turkish aircraft and drones offset ground mobility constraints by enabling militaries to surveil their territory and project force into contested areas. Turkish TB2 drones reportedly played a decisive role in Mali’s 2024 reconquest of Kidal, a rebel stronghold situated deep in the Sahara Desert.

Military equipment sales help grow Turkey’s relationships and influence. Partnering with Sahel states offers Turkey new avenues through which it can pursue its regional interests and bolster its image as a leader among Muslim-majority countries. A Turkish intelligence report from 2024 assessed that Niger was a “strategic partner,” capable of extending Ankara’s influence in Africa.

These relationships also enable Turkey to compete with rivals. Some analysts contend that Turkey’s outreach helps it outflank France and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, relations with Sahel states have helped Turkey constrain the Gülen movement, which the Turkish government labeled a terrorist organization and blames for the 2016 coup attempt. For example, Chad and Mali handed over control of Gülenist schools to a Turkish state-run organization in 2017.

Sahel states consider Ankara an important security partner. “We are taking a new course,” said the Malian minister of defense in November 2024. “[Turkish equipment] will help strengthen the territorial grid and neutralize threats wherever they are.” Burkina Faso awarded its highest state medal to the head of a Turkish defense company in 2023.

Defense cooperation may reach even further than equipment sales. In 2024, a report from Agence France-Presse indicated that SADAT International Defense Consultancy, a Turkish private military company, was deployed in the Sahel. It cited the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights as saying that one thousand Syrian personnel who had signed contracts with SADAT were deployed to Niger “to protect Turkish projects and interests.” (SADAT and the Turkish Ministry of National Defense denied these allegations). Africa Defense Forum, a magazine published by US Africa Command, reported that “Turkey said the fighters are in Niger to consult and guard Turkish interests, such as mines.” A deployment to Niger has not been confirmed.

Another report from Jeune Afrique suggested that SADAT had deployed to Mali and trained the country’s military in mid-2024. According to the report, SADAT personnel embedded with elite units loyal to the president and trained them to prevent coups d’état. This has not been verified, but, if accurate, would suggest that Turkey is employing new tools to deepen partnerships and address regimes’ desire for security.

There is also a small body of reporting indicating that Turkey is expanding its overt military presence. In February 2025, Military Africa reported that Chad granted Turkey control of a military base in the city of Abéché. If confirmed, this would be Turkey’s first base in the Sahel. It would also constitute a new element in defense partnerships that, to this point, have largely been driven by Turkish private industry and Sahel states’ demand for military hardware.

So what?

There are some conditions under which cooperating with Turkey could advance US regional objectives. Sahel states need defense assistance to fight a growing terrorist threat, which the United States often cannot provide. Turkish assistance does not face the same legal restrictions and thus fills urgent capability gaps. Turkish aircraft, armored vehicles, and drones improve force mobility and help militaries take the fight to terrorist strongholds. As terrorists expand operations, partnering with Turkey could help regional militaries manage the threat.

Turkey’s growing involvement in the region also presents opportunities to counter US adversaries. Turkish military equipment offers an affordable, high-quality alternative to Chinese or Russian products. In a similar fashion, SADAT could reduce states’ reliance on Russia’s Africa Corps, which has provided training and regime security to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. SADAT offers a suite of similar services, and its deployment to Mali, if confirmed, would suggest that Mali’s president may be looking to move beyond Russian assistance.

That said, there are also risks in working with Turkey, and Washington must approach any partnership with clear eyes. The United States requires recipients of advanced military equipment to submit to end-use monitoring, but Turkey does not enforce recipients’ compliance with the law of armed conflict in the same manner. Moreover, private military companies operate under different rules of engagement than conventional militaries, underscoring the risks associated with possible SADAT deployments in the Sahel. Turkish defense assistance often comes with fewer asks than US assistance, and the United States may incur reputational harm if it chooses to partner with Turkey.

Partnering with Turkey is not a panacea for declining Western influence either. Ankara oscillates between cooperation and competition with Russia, frustrating European leaders. Turkey has been accused of fueling anti-colonial sentiment in Africa; this once irritated the French president who, in late 2020, alleged that Ankara and Moscow had inflamed anti-French sentiment in Africa. The European Union has since expressed interest in partnering with Turkey to “generate a wide international coalition that can support [the Sahel].” Even so, Turkey’s foreign policy suggests that it may not share the West’s precise goals.

Any partnership with Turkey must be carefully calibrated and closely monitored. Partnership has the potential to advance some US objectives, but it alone cannot resolve the broader challenges posed by terrorism’s dramatic expansion and states’ pivot from the political West. The United States must be prepared to work with Turkey where objectives align, while preserving the capacity and flexibility to act independently in pursuit of its vital interests.

Jordanna Yochai is an analyst whose research examines West African security, with prior experience in the US Department of Defense.

The positions expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the US Department of Defense. The US Department of Defense does not endorse the views expressed in hyperlinked articles or websites, including any information, products, or services contained therein.

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Strategic minerals, migration, and commercial policy

The first Trump administration’s focus on Africa was laid out in the “New Africa Strategy,” unveiled by National Security Advisor John Bolton in December 2018. The strategy centered on three pillars: prosperity, security through “countering the threat from radical Islamic terrorism and violent conflict,” and stability. In contrast, with his invitation of five West African leaders within the first six months of his second term, Trump now seems to focus on a different set of priorities: securing critical and strategic minerals, tackling migration issues—including a proposal to accept US deportees—and prioritizing commercial policy. Taken together, these shifts likely set the tone for the administration’s Africa policy going forward.

During the summit luncheon, Trump praised Africa’s abundant natural resources, highlighting its “very valuable lands, great minerals, and significant oil deposits.” Ensuring US access to Africa’s critical mineral reserves remains a top priority for the administration—and Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal are all rich in these strategic resources.

Regarding migration, Trump underscored the need for countries to take back nationals residing unlawfully in the United States, and suggested they might also consider accepting deportees from third countries. He asked West African leaders how they might help address the issue. President Umaro Sissoco Embaló of Guinea-Bissau later rejected this suggestion, stating that taking in third-country nationals would violate his country’s policies.

On the economic front, the administration’s approach to commercial diplomacy—characterized by the principle of “trade not aid”—signals its intent to make economic engagement the primary mode of interaction with African nations. Embaló framed Trump’s approach as one focused on creating a “win-win partnership,” expressing optimism that more US businesses would invest in his country following the summit. Trump also urged African leaders to bolster their defense spending and procure more US military equipment, touting it as the best available. This emphasis on business-led engagement underscores the administration’s “America First” agenda as it seeks to reclaim influence in regions where China and Russia have gained ground.

The Sahel as a blind spot

What the summit notably lacked, however, was a detailed discussion of the pressing security challenges facing West African nations, particularly the deteriorating situation in the Sahel. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the Sahel is currently the world’s epicenter of terrorism and the fastest-growing hotspot for jihadist extremism. In fact, ACLED has placed the Sahel and Coastal West Africa on its conflict watchlist for 2025. This is primarily due to an entrenched jihadist insurgency in the region—led by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State-Sahel Province—that continues to expand, with violence against state forces, militias, and civilians escalating steadily.

During last week’s summit, Trump acknowledged the ongoing security challenges in the Sahel by referring to terrorism as Africa’s “big problem” and urging continued efforts to combat it. However, summaries of the meetings suggest that no specific actionable measures were taken, nor agreements made, to address security and counterterrorism.

In part, this might be due to the fact that the administration is still reassessing the US military’s global posture, particularly in Africa, and weighing how to best respond to security threats like the one unfolding in the Sahel. If its emerging strategy relies solely on commercial diplomacy and transactional economic engagement, however, it risks falling short. With extremist violence increasingly spilling across borders, the administration will need a more robust and coordinated approach to the crisis in the Sahel before the end of its term.

A new approach to West Africa

This new approach should outline a more comprehensive plan that includes robust support for African-led security initiatives. The administration should focus on coordinated investment across civil, military, and commercial infrastructure, as well as stronger regional cooperation among African states. After all, the social and economic interdependence that emerges from a more resilient and connected society can help close the fissures that extremists seek to exploit. Such an approach would lay the groundwork for a more productive and enduring US-Africa partnership.

While last week’s summit with African leaders marked a promising beginning, the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel must remain central to any long-term vision for regional stability and the continent’s economic future—and should be a priority at the upcoming US-Africa Leaders Summit this fall. It’s worth remembering that the Sahel was not always a hotbed of extremism. On the contrary, it was once renowned for its intellectual vitality, freethinking societies, and a tolerant version of Islam.

Like all sources of civil unrest, security issues left unaddressed do not improve over time. The al-Qaeda and Islamic State groups in the Sahel have expanded their presence from a limited foothold in northern Mali in 2012 to controlling vast swaths of territory across the region—reaching as far as the northern borders of coastal West Africa. The Trump administration’s Africa strategy emphasizes securing strategic minerals, addressing migration concerns, and enhancing commercial diplomacy through US business investments. But now is a critical moment to confront the security crisis in the Sahel, which threatens to undermine any purely economic approach to the region.

As history has shown, regions once renowned for knowledge and peace are often those that prosper, but they can just as swiftly descend into conflict. The Sahel need not follow that path. Areas now plagued by jihadist violence—often fueled by deep economic disparity—can be transformed into hubs of peace and economic opportunity. It is time for a renewed approach to the Sahel.

Rose Keravuori is the former director of intelligence at the US Africa Command and is currently an associate director at Strategia Worldwide.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

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Such an agreement would not only inject a breath of fresh air into the stalled normalization process since October 7, 2023—but also confer geostrategic superiority for the United States in the Sahel by forming a new bloc of US allies alongside Morocco and the UAE, capable of countering the growing Chinese-Iranian-Russian economic and political expansion in the region.  

According to the same source, citing a “person familiar with the plans,” it was US President Donald Trump who facilitated the meeting between Netanyahu and Ghazouni, as the Mauritanian ambassador to the United States, Cissé Mint Cheikh Ould Boïde, denied arranging the meeting on her end.

This appears to build upon a foundation set by Trump’s first administration, which, in 2021, was led by then-senior White House adviser Jared Kushner and then-special envoy Avi Berkowitz. They had identified Nouakchott, along with Jakarta, as the closest Muslim-majority countries to join the Accords. Officials, at the time, had stated that Mauritania was “weeks away” from signing a deal.

Early indications of a return to negotiations

Indications of Mauritania—a member of the Arab League—warming up to the Abraham Accords began when its foreign ministry described the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) 2020 signing of the landmark agreement establishing regional relations with Israel as a sign of “wisdom and good judgment.” The ministry added that “the UAE possesses absolute sovereignty and complete independence in conducting its relations and assessing the positions it takes in accordance with its national interest and the interests of Arabs.”

Like many Arab countries, Mauritania became reluctant to go ahead with the imminent normalization deal with Israel due to public perception amid the 2023 Gaza War, as thousands of citizens regularly took to the streets, condemning the humanitarian toll of the Israeli Defense Forces’ military operations in the Strip.

Ould Ghazouani has always been sensitive to the pulse of the streets of the North African country, given his sensitive position in a country prone to violent extremism and a series of political upheavals, starting with the 2005 military coup by the Military Council for Justice and Democracy that ousted former President Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya. Taya was among the few Arab leaders who had recognized the state of Israel and established full diplomatic representation back in 1999, with the hope of reinforcing economic and anti-terrorism cooperation with the United States and repositioning his country as a key Western ally in North Africa and the Sahel.

Under Taya’s predecessors, Mauritania initially maintained ties with Israel, but eventually had to give in to the popular pressure amidst the 2008 Gaza War and freeze all relations in January 2009 before entirely severing connections in March 2010.

A Mauritania-Morocco-UAE axis is forming

When and if Mauritania joins the Abraham Accords clan, it will not be a mere reestablishment of ties with Israel, but will unequivocally align with a new forming bloc in the Sahel, which aims at countering Iranian, Russian, and Chinese ambitions there, and reinforce US geostrategic presence in the region through a trusted Mauritania-Morocco-UAE trilateral alliance. 

According to my Moroccan sources, this alliance began to take shape when Mauritania’s first lady, Mariem Bint Dah, landed in Casablanca with her spouse to undergo emergency surgery in the kingdom in December 2024. This private visit provided Ould Ghazouani with the opportunity to meet King Mohammed VI and open a new chapter in bilateral relations, which was later described by Mauritania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Salem Ould Merzoug, as “going through their best period.”

A series of subsequent steps cemented this regained trust between the two neighbors. Soon after the 2024 visit, Mauritania and Morocco signed multiple strategic agreements in the fields of electricity, internet connectivity, infrastructure, and renewable energies. Then in February, the two neighbors opened a new border crossing through the disputed Western Saharan territories, with a 93-kilometer road connecting Smara to the Mauritanian border via Amgala and Tifariti—further enraging the Polisario Front and its patrons in Algiers.  Then, in April, negotiations to update their thirty-eight-year trade agreement were launched. The commercial framework aims to boost bilateral trade to $350 million by the end of 2025. An industrial deal was also recently announced, capitalizing on Mauritania’s significant iron reserves.

These movements appear to confirm that Nouakchott is ending its four-decade-long “positive neutrality” between Morocco and Algeria regarding Western Sahara, which it had carefully observed after recognizing the Sahrawi Republic in 1984, and is shifting steadily towards support for Rabat starting in 2024.  As confirmed by declassified Central Intelligence Agency wires, Mauritania had long feared that once Morocco recovers the disputed territories of Western Sahara—lost in colonial border disputes—it would soon turn to demanding sovereignty over parts of Mauritania, established by France in 1904 as a separate protectorate, due to their intertwined histories.

This new dynamism was ushered in by the two leaders’ common friend, the UAE’s Mohamed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ)—the third pillar of this new alliance. The presence of both Mohammed VI and Ould Ghazouani in Abu Dhabi at the same time sparked speculations about the launch of a new Atlantic corridor between the coast and Sahel countries, announced by Morocco and partially financed by the UAE, which has shown growing ambitions in the African continent. The Atlantic Initiative is meant to link economically landlocked Sahel countries to the ocean through Mauritania and Western Sahara. The UAE soon confirmed the rumors by joining the $25 billion Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline Project, the world’s longest offshore pipeline, which will benefit both Mauritania and Morocco, connecting West Africa to Europe.

Diplomatic sources, whom I spoke with from both Morocco and Mauritania, signaled that a fourth guest might have been present at the meetings in Abu Dhabi: Israel. These meetings could have served as a preparation for the Netanyahu and Ould Ghazouani meeting in Washington this week. The UAE is no stranger to such secret talks between Israel and other Muslim-majority countries. Mauritanian officials, themselves, reportedly met with an Israeli envoy in the calm corridors of Emirati palaces in 2023 to reactivate normalization talks.

What’s at stake for the United States and Mauritania

Mauritania is the missing piece of the puzzle to unlocking the Sahel for the United States, Israel, and European allies. The region has been experiencing seismic shifts in the past few years, with anti-colonial and anti-Western regime changes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and a retreat of French and US forces in favor of new Russian, Iranian, and Chinese actors.

The US strategy so far has been to stabilize this critical region at the doors of the Mediterranean and Europe by supporting classical allies like Morocco and attempting to incentivize other reluctant ones to join the Abraham Accords as its newest framework for the Middle East and North Africa to counter violent extremism and build a prosperous and economically integrated region. In its North African chapter, the Accords needs new allies like Mauritania and others with existing diplomatic relations with Israel and alignment with the Moroccan Atlantic Initiative, like Senegal, to counter an increasingly isolated and anxious Algerian regime, which openly sides with Iran, or the new lords of the land in the Sahel who are more ideologically-sympathetic with Russia and China.

Mauritania, however, due to its sensitive situation regarding the Western Sahara dispute—being a party to the conflict until 1979—and its problematic borders with President Assimi Goïta’s Mali and President Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s Algeria, requires guarantees to engage in such a project. An alliance with Morocco and the UAE, in this case, aims to reassure Nouakchott with both military support and financial backing. MBZ had already injected two billion dollars into the city of Chinguetti (about 20 percent of the country’s GDP), which helped in the acquisition of MALE BZK-005 Chang Ying drones to secure its borders, resulting in the closing of its borders with Algeria in Lebriga back in May and several interceptions of Polisario Front illicit activities.

With its northern neighbor, things are more complex. It seems, however, that current threats from Iran and Algeria, as well as economic interests, are overshadowing historical qualms, as evidenced by the increased economic and military cooperation between the two countries in recent years. Rabat today desperately needs Nouakchott’s adherence to its Atlantic Initiative and is inviting it into the exclusive Abraham Accords club and providing guarantees and training against border tensions with Algeria.

If the rumors are true and Mauritania is nearing a historic deal with Israel, this could mark the beginning of a re-engagement, not only with Nouakchott but also with Sahel countries that have previously severed ties with Israel, such as Mali and Niger. This could also be a moment of realignment for Israel with new countries, such as Burkina Faso, with the help of Moroccan–UAE mediation, as the two Abrahamic countries both enjoy high credibility and access in the Sahel. This would also provide a strategic foothold for the United States in the area, enabling Washington to monitor any malign influence by third parties and promote greater stability and prosperity for the soft underbelly of its European allies.

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, focusing on identity and minorities in the region. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

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Public Event Wed, July 9, 2025 • 9:00 pm ET

President Umaro Sissoco Embaló on the future of US-Africa trade and security

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—President Umaro Sissoco Embaló of Guinea-Bissau joins the Atlantic Council while he is in Washington, DC for a summit between West African leaders and US President Donald Trump. 

North & West Africa Politics & Diplomacy Security & Defense Trade and tariffs

China tends to show up to fulfill African countries’ needs more quickly, while there is a “delay” that is “too long” in working with the West, said President Umaro Sissoco Embaló of Guinea-Bissau. “How are we going to leave the Chinese?”

Embaló spoke Thursday at an Atlantic Council Front Page event hosted by the Africa Center, following a meeting with US President Donald Trump and four other African presidents—representing Senegal, Liberia, Gabon, and Mauritania—at the White House on Wednesday.

On the topic of Guinea-Bissau’s nonaligned foreign policy, which has seen Embaló meet with not only Trump but also Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the past year, Embaló said that he is “a free man” and that Guinea-Bissau never asks the United States or China who they maintain relations with. “Nobody can impose” on his country’s relationships with other powers, he said.

He added that Guinea-Bissau considers Russia and China “good friends” because when the African country was fighting for independence, they were “behind us . . . helping us.”

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Africa Center Senior Director Rama Yade, where Embaló talked about his meeting with Trump, US migration policy, and the challenges facing the African continent.

Migration moves

• Embaló said Trump’s proposal to have select African countries take in migrants from other countries that the United States wishes to deport would violate Guinea-Bissau’s own policies. If those migrants are citizens of another country, he asked, “why are we going to take them?”
• Contrary to some media reports, Embaló said the proposal was a topic of conversation at the African leaders’ lunch with Trump, but not yet an explicit ask; Embaló also said that there wasn’t a specific request made regarding the return of immigrants originally from the five African countries represented at the meeting.
• “We have procedures to do, and then here also they have procedures to do,” he said. “But if they are our citizens . . . [and] they are illegal here, if they want to go back to Guinea-Bissau, of course they are going back home.”

What happens next

• Embaló said that Trump received the five African leaders “very kindly” and that he appreciated how Trump “knows what he wants”—and has a “win-win partnership” in mind.
• Following the summit, Embaló said that he expects that more US businesses will invest in Guinea-Bissau. He highlighted opportunities related to the country’s minerals, specifically its phosphate, bauxite, and oil. If US companies “want to come to Guinea-Bissau,” he said, “they can come.”
• Embaló forecasted that Trump’s tariff policy would not have as profound an impact on the continent as it will in other regions because of Africa’s closeness with China—recently demonstrated by China’s commitment to remove tariffs on African exports. “Most of the countries, we have more relations . . . with China, not with the US,” Embaló explained.
• Embaló also said that his country likely wouldn’t be heavily impacted by the Trump administration’s decision to close the US Agency for International Development, but he added that the “department is very important.”

Search for peace

• Surveying the challenges facing the Sahel, Embaló said that African forces are “still fighting the jihadists.”
• While security missions led by the European Union, France, or the United States have ceased or been forced out of the region in recent years, Embaló argued that “it’s the time now” for the United States and the West more broadly to “come to join us to fight.”
• Embaló argued those countries have a responsibility because NATO “started this problem” when the Alliance intervened in Libya to depose dictator Muammar Gaddafi, an event that is considered a factor in the expansion of jihadist groups along and beyond the Libyan border. “The start of this issue hails from there,” he argued.
• On security, Embaló reflected on his work to mediate peace deals, a recent one being agreed upon in February, between the Senegalese government and factions of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance, a separatist group. With his country having experienced independence efforts and civil war, Embaló said he thinks it is “important to be the peacemaker.”

Katherine Golden is an associate director on the Atlantic Council’s editorial team.

Watch the full event

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With the launch of Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza, followed by escalation with Hezbollah and Iran, harrowing images from the strip, and fears of Palestinian displacement to Egypt—Egyptian anxiety is elevated, and the national debate has shifted from reform to national security. By the end of 2023, al-Sisi had secured a third term without a meaningful electoral contestation amid calls for national unity.

It’s clear that the post-October 7 era has not only devastated the Gaza strip, it has also influenced Egypt’s economy and domestic political dynamics—and the impacts extend beyond the ballot box. This includes deepening ideological fractures among Egypt’s intellectuals and secular opposition, further discrediting their democratic narrative while lending credibility to conspiracy theories, and restoring the battered image of Egypt’s military as the nation’s ultimate protector.

Displacement overshadows political reform

After years of mismanagement, Egypt faced an economic crisis between 2022 and early 2023. Inflation climbed to over 32 percent by March 2023, and foreign debt exceeded $160 billion. These pressures created a narrow opening for discussions about political and economic reform and the military’s expanding role in the Egyptian economy.

To mitigate domestic discontent and reassure international donors, al-Sisi announced a “National Dialogue,” launched in May 2023. The dialogue was officially framed as a platform to promote political reform and to gather input from the full political spectrum, except the banned Muslim Brotherhood, on the country’s economic and governance challenges. Moreover, the government released several secular political prisoners, allowed the return of some exiled dissidents, permitted media space for opposition, and lifted the asset freeze and travel ban imposed on many human rights defenders. The “State Ownership Policy Document,” issued and approved in December 2022, pledged a timeline to reduce the state’s dominance over key economic sectors.

These steps raised some hopes that the 2023 presidential and 2025 parliamentary elections would differ from previous ones, where al-Sisi won 97 percent of the vote and state allies dominated parliament. They also raised the expectation that the state would allow greater participation for secular opposition, tolerate more serious candidates to compete with al-Sisi, allow for the opposition to form independent electoral lists, or at least guarantee broader inclusion within state-approved electoral lists in the coming parliamentary election. Egypt’s drained intellectuals and opposition groups, still recovering from the failures of the post-2011 uprising hoped for a modest revival of political dynamism after years of exclusion under al-Sisi.

Yet, the outbreak of the Gaza war abruptly shifted the national discourse, and the debate of political reform quickly faded behind the war’s horrific scenes, along with debates over plans to displace Palestinians to Egypt and Jordan. Amid public anxiety, Egypt’s December 2023 presidential election passed largely unnoticed and without serious competition. Al-Sisi secured a third term with an overwhelming majority, with 89.6 percent this time, facing only nominal opposition, calling his victory a “rejection of the inhumane war in Gaza.”

Even the conviction and imprisonment of former Member of Parliament Ahmed Tantawi—who had sought to run for president—for possessing and distributing unauthorized election documents sparked far less public debate than expected. With parliamentary elections expected by within weeks, there is little meaningful discussion of electoral reform or the measures that guarantee free elections, especially after a new amendment to the election law was hastily passed in parliament. and approved by the president without serious public debate or political consensus with opposition. Many fear the parliamentary election will merely echo the presidential election’s non-competitive and tightly controlled nature.

Polarizing the polarized intellectuals

Since 2011, Egypt’s intellectuals have been divided along multiple fault lines—first between reformists and revolutionaries, then between Islamists and secularists. These divisions sharpened during the brief presidency of Mohamed Morsi, a senior Muslim Brotherhood figure, and deepened after his 2013 ouster, backed by many secular groups and the military. The ensuing economic deterioration, coupled with the shattered dream of democratization, have disillusioned most of the Egyptian intellectuals despite their differences.

More recently, however, mounting economic hardship and the failure of the post 2011-2013 political trajectories have begun to soften these ideological rifts, creating space for some intellectuals and opposition figures to reflect and publicly reassess a decade of political failures. Yet the conflict in the region has reopened old wounds, turning debates over the conflict into a new arena for polarization.

Many Islamists, leftists, and Nasserist figures voiced strong support for both Hamas’s and Iran’s responses to the recent US-Israel strikes on Tehran’s nuclear facilities, framing Hamas and Iran as legitimate anti-colonial resistance forces. In contrast, many nationalists and liberal figures condemned Hamas, blaming it for derailing the Israeli peace process in the nineties and portraying the October 7 attack as reckless and damaging to the Palestinian cause. Nationalists and liberals have also accused Iran of destabilizing the region through its proxies and irresponsible actions.

Ultimately, what began as debates over Hamas’s strategy and its outcome soon escalated into media confrontations, accusations of treason, and ruptured ties within the intellectual class. In an already drained political landscape, the resurgence of these fractures deepened weakness within Egypt’s intellectuals and opposition.

Discrediting democracy and embracing  conspiracy

The Gaza war’s impact went beyond political actors and debates, shaking the cultural foundations of Egypt’s reform movement. The inability of the Western-led international community to halt the scale of suffering in Gaza served as a second major blow to the liberal democratic narratives that were embraced by many Egyptian intellectuals since the 1990s, including the framing of democracy a prelude for development, peace, and progress.

In Egypt, perceived Western double standards deepened public skepticism towards democracy, increasingly seen not as a normative framework for foreign policies but as a tool of political pressure primarily serving Western interests. Many Egyptians were reminded of the US decision to freeze military aid to Egypt in 2013 over human rights concerns—after the Egyptian Army ousted Morsi. For some Egyptians, the human rights violations committed by their governments since 2013—which once drew US sanctions—now pale in comparison to the international accusations of genocide committed by Israel in Gaza, which the West met with outright support or passive silence. That inconsistency was also apparent in Washington’s decision to launch strikes on Iranian targets linked to its nuclear program, while continuing to support Israel—a state widely believed to possess a nuclear arsenal.

The agenda of Palestinian displacement abroad—once dismissed during the 1990s and 2000s as a conspiracy theory amplifying a fringe agenda in Israel—now appears real as Israel and the United States publicly pushed proposals to export the Gaza crisis into Egypt.

This is not the first instance in Egypt’s recent political history where Egypt’s versions of a liberal peace narrative have faced a popular reckoning. The first came when the 2011 Arab uprisings devolved into civil wars rather than democracy. And now, conspiracy theories that framed those uprisings as a Western plot to divide Arab countries and ensure Israel’s regional supremacy are experiencing a revival.

Amid these dynamics, the image of Egypt’s army and president—previously tarnished by widespread socioeconomic suffering—began to recover. The military has once again emerged as the ultimate protector with current and past traumas colliding: memories of the Sinai insurgency and post-June 2013 terrorist attacks, the enduring conflicts in neighboring Sudan and Gaza, and now Israel seizing control of the Rafah crossing. The Egyptian troop presence in Sinai, al-Sisi’s public rejection of US President Donald Trump’s plan to displace Palestinians from Gaza and his refusal to meet Trump at the White House, as well as widespread media calls to rally behind the state amid a national security threat all reinforce this image.

By strengthening the image of the army and the president, while weakening Egyptian dissidents through polarization and discrediting their democratic narrative, the Gaza war further enhanced the asymmetry between a strong, entrenched authority and a weak, fragmented opposition and intellectuals. This growing imbalance continues to block any meaningful change in power dynamics.

Al-Sisi’s security concerns

Despite al-Sisi’s renewed confidence in his restored image, and state media calls for national unity, his persistent security concerns remain.

The Palestinian cause has historically been a potent mobilizing force against the Egyptian authority, frequently harnessed by political Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, whose formal political role al-Sisi dismantled in 2013. Yet while the Brotherhood’s organizational presence has been curbed, its narrative over the conflict—alongside that of the broader “resistance camp”—may  resonate with some of the Egyptian public, particularly among a younger generation that came of age during one of the most violent phases of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Many in this cohort are disillusioned with prospects for peace and increasingly receptive to boycott campaigns, championed by Muslim Brotherhood media, against Israel and the United States. They are also exposed to narratives framing the Egyptian regime as a complicit actor aligned with Western interests and Israel’s war in Gaza. The appeal of these narratives, coupled with rising sympathy for Hamas in the early months of the war and the resurgence of Islamism in neighboring Jordan—as seen in the September 2024 elections—has likely deepened al-Sisi’s anxieties. Although there is no immediate sign of large-scale pro-Palestine mobilization, due to the state’s zero-tolerance to demonstrations, these dynamics raise the risk of rekindling ideological currents viewing them as potential challenges to its stability.

Ultimately, the post-October 7 era has not only demolished Gaza. It also disrupted Egypt’s fragile political opening: deepening polarization, weakening opposition forces, and temporarily consolidating the public standing of the president and military amid heightened insecurity. The erosion of the foundations of democratic narratives, widening fractures among intellectuals, and the simmering threat of Islamist mobilization leave Egypt’s political opening increasingly elusive, with the country seemingly sliding back into political stagnation.

Whether Egypt can resist these turbulent crosscurrents—reshaped by the regional war—without sliding again into stagnation, or revive its reform ambitions, remains the defining challenge in the post-October 7 era—one that the parliamentary elections are likely to reveal.

Amr Salah Mohamed is a scholar and lecturer at the Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University, specializing in conflicts in the Middle East and Egyptian politics.

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NATO summits are milestone events for the Alliance. Each summit’s communiqué outlines the Alliance’s priorities and signals the policies it expects its member states to adopt. While the focus of the summit is on the allies, it is an increasingly common practice for NATO to invite important non-NATO partners as well. This reflects the “cooperative security” function of the Alliance, reaffirmed in the 2022 Strategic Concept adopted at the Madrid summit.

The power of partners

Inviting partners has not always been the norm. NATO’s declaration at its 1997 Madrid summit marked a turning point by formally recognizing the shared strategic interests of NATO and the European Union, leading to the bloc’s regular participation in NATO Summits. Building on this precedent, the Alliance has expanded its engagement to other strategic partners in recent years: Ukraine, for example, has been consistently invited since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea are also regular participants.

Meanwhile, the members of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue—Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia—have rarely been invited to NATO summits, aside from occasional exceptions. The same holds true for the members of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) that was established in 2004 to complement the Mediterranean Dialogue. The ICI includes Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait. In part, this is because of concerns over some countries’ participation. Algeria and Egypt, for example, have been accused of maintaining close ties with Russia, while varying degrees of friction persist between Morocco and Spain, Algeria and France, and Egypt and Turkey.

Still, the decision to exclude Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI countries this year remains surprising for several reasons. To begin with, at the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington, allies tasked the secretary general with appointing a special representative for the southern neighborhood. In July 2024, Spanish diplomat Javier Colomina was tapped for this role, with a mandate to enhance NATO’s visibility in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel.

Also at the 2024 summit, allies adopted an action plan for the southern neighborhood, drawing on a NATO-commissioned report prepared by an independent expert group in May of that year. The report called for a renewed strategic approach centered on “a strengthening of NATO’s political dialogue about and with the region.” It also called for better integration of the NATO Strategic Direction-South Hub (NSD-S HUB) into the NATO structure. The NSD-S HUB had been created in 2017 to help bridge NATO’s gap with Middle East and North African countries.

These recommendations, however, remain largely unfulfilled. The role of the special representative for the south, which was initially intended to preside over a department, remains a marginal player with little leverage over the rest of the Alliance. The NSD-S HUB remains on the sidelines, lacking power due to its limited mandate and disconnect from NATO headquarters. Meanwhile, NATO cooperation with countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue remains negligible (with the possible exception of Tunisia, which became a major non-NATO ally of the United States in 2015).

The Russia factor

The decision not to invite Mediterranean partners is also striking given Russia’s expanding presence in the so-called wider Mediterranean and its growing role in fueling instability along NATO’s southern flank. Moscow is exploiting the fragility of several states in this area. Russia’s footprint in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Central African Republic (CAR)—where it has maintained a strong presence since 2021—has increased. These countries’ regimes (with the exception of the CAR) have progressively dismantled existing security partnerships with France, the European Union, and the United States, which has allowed Russia to consolidate its security ties with these junta-led regimes and further expand its influence. Moscow’s reach into the Sahel is also reinforced by its growing military presence through the Africa Corps, which now operates under the explicit command of the Russian Ministry of Defense. This marks a significant institutional deepening of direct Kremlin control over its paramilitary involvement in the region.

Under former leader Bashar al-Assad, Syria maintained close ties with Russia, even hosting a Russian naval facility at Tartus. But since the Assad regime’s fall in December 2024, Russia has pivoted toward Libya, a country still fractured by internal conflict. Moscow has sought to expand its military presence by deepening its ties with the Haftar family in Libya. With the al-Khadim, al-Jufra, and Maaten al-Sarra airbases, Russia has established several footholds in the country and it is engaged in ongoing negotiations for a new naval base in the port city of Derna. The strategic rationale is clear: Unlike the port of Tartus—which lacks dry-dock facilities for major overhauls—Derna would provide Moscow with a much-needed site for essential naval maintenance, reducing its reliance on distant ports in the Baltic. 

Russia’s growing influence in North Africa and the Sahel poses both indirect and direct challenges to NATO’s security. On the indirect front, authoritarian, unaccountable, and externally controlled regimes fuel grievances, which are in turn often exploited by jihadist groups. Moreover, these governments’ reliance on Russia-backed militias for survival leaves them vulnerable to becoming instruments of leverage against NATO members—whether through the manipulation of migration flows toward Europe or by tightening control over critical raw material supply chains.

In terms of direct threats, Russia’s expanding naval presence in the Mediterranean raises concerns about freedom of navigation in the region, as well as the risk of direct incidents between NATO and Russia. The chief of staff of the Italian Navy, Admiral Enrico Credendino, recently stated that “Italian ships operating off the coast of Libya are almost always followed by a Russian spy ship.” Permanent military bases in Libya would grant Moscow new strategic footholds with which to threaten Europe, including with missile systems, while Russia is already recruiting African mercenaries—nicknamed “Black Wagners”—who are currently active in Ukraine and may also be deployed in future crises.

The Mediterranean matters

NATO’s presence in the Mediterranean remains primarily naval, and there is growing concern that this presence is insufficient to provide effective deterrence against Russian expansionism and the threats posed by its proxies. More and more European officials are drawing attention to the fact that Russia’s threat is not limited to NATO’s eastern flank alone. Just a few days before the most recent summit, Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto said that NATO “as it is, no longer has a reason to exist,” in part expressing his frustration at the Alliance’s lack of engagement with the Global South. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, too, criticized the Alliance’s priorities during the summit, calling the increased defense spending benchmark of 5 percent of gross domestic product “unreasonable.”

Given these developments, the decision not to invite any of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries to the NATO Summit at The Hague was a missed opportunity. Including at least these partners would have marked an important step in demonstrating to southern European member states that the Alliance’s commitment to a “360 degree vision of security” is not merely rhetorical. 

NATO has a strategic opportunity to deepen its engagement with the broader Mediterranean region—especially in light of next year’s summit in Turkey. The Defense and Related Security Capacity Building programs, originally designed to bolster the defense and security capabilities of partner countries, remain underutilized. Expanding cooperation with key states such as Algeria and Egypt through these programs would not only help reinforce NATO’s southern flank but also counter the growing influence of Russia in the region.

Another avenue for impact lies in strengthening cooperative security efforts with Mediterranean partners by reinvigorating existing frameworks, most notably the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI. These platforms offer valuable, existing tools for trust-building and joint action.

Finally, NATO should enhance its understanding of the evolving dynamics on its southern flank by expanding the role of the NSD-S HUB in Naples to serve its initial purpose of identifying tangible opportunities for cooperation. All these efforts would meaningfully advance NATO’s goal of a 360-degree approach to security, while also reassuring southern European members that their concerns are being heard and addressed.

Gabriele Natalizia is a visiting fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Sapienza University of Rome.

Alissa Pavia is the associate director of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa program.

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In recent days, scores of pro-Palestinian activists—including a group of forty Algerians and two French nationals—were reportedly barred from entry into Egypt and deported shortly after their arrival at Cairo International Airport despite having obtained visas. Hundreds of other campaigners planning to participate in the march were attacked on June 14 near a checkpoint in the north-eastern city of Ismailia, where they had gathered to wait for a nod of approval from the authorities to travel on to el-Arish. The area between el-Arish and Rafah is classified as a military zone and remains off limits to travelers without prior security permits.  

Cairo’s moves to deter the march to Gaza are baffling to many because the international initiative expressing solidarity with Gaza is in line with Egypt’s declared position on Gaza. So why is Cairo resorting to excessive measures to nip the movement in the bud?     

An international activist coalition

Organizers, comprising a blend of regional volunteers and international groups against Israeli occupation, said they were taking matters into their own hands “because Arab governments haven’t pushed enough” to end the war between Israel and Hamas.  

The regional-based “Soumoud” (Steadfastness or Resilience in Arabic) Caravan—comprising volunteers from Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Libya—was supported by various Tunisian civil society groups and rights organizations, including the Tunisian Labor Union and National Bar Association. The activists who started their protest journey in Tunis on June 9, had been planning to travel along the Libyan coast and cross into Egypt though the country’s northwestern Saloum border, before trekking the Sinai to el-Arish to join other international activists on a Global March to the Rafah border crossing—a major entry point into southern Gaza where a sit-in had been planned June 15 to 19.

The second international march, organized by the Global Coalition Against the Occupation of Palestine—a coalition of rights groups, trade unions, and solidarity movements from over thirty-two countries—mobilized thousands of rights campaigners from more than fifty countries to participate in the rally.

More than 55,000 Palestinians have been killed since the start of Israel’s war on Gaza following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, and much of the enclave’s 2.1 million people have faced the threat of famine under Israel’s suffocating blockade. Israel says it is blocking aid to put pressure on Hamas to release the remaining hostages still held in Gaza.

A statement released by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry on June 11 welcomed foreign delegations but cautioned that anyone traveling to Sinai must obtain prior government permission and comply with Gaza border regulations.

Organizers of the Steadfastness Convoy, meanwhile, said they had met with the Egyptian ambassador in Tunis prior to their departure to coordinate their entry into the country but had since received no word from the embassy. This was despite also sending an official letter to the embassy requesting support from the Egyptian authorities for their mission.

But Cairo was skeptical and made it clear that it opposed the march.

Egyptian opposition

Cairo does not wish to provoke the ire of the Israeli government, which has made clear it is opposed to any mass mobilization at Rafah. If the Egyptian leadership had given the march the green light to proceed, the move would have certainly escalated tensions between Egypt and Israel, and subsequently, between Cairo and Washington. Worse still, it may have caused instability at the border if Israel had attacked the march. 

Israel Katz, Israel’s defense minister, made his country’s position clear when he publicly called on Egypt to block the Steadfastness Convoy. Katz said, “I expect the Egyptian authorities to prevent the arrival of Jihadist protesters at the Egypt-Israel border and not to allow them to carry out provocations or attempt to enter Gaza.” 

However, there are also internal factors behind Cairo’s decision, foremost among them being the authorities’ fear of Egyptian protesters joining the foreign participants. Many Egyptians watching the scenes of bloodshed from Gaza over the past twenty-one months are ashamed of their own helplessness and their government’s failure to stop the war. Their frustration and despair could spark a new wave of unrest that may prove difficult to contain. 

The Egyptian government has cracked down on protests of any kind, criminalizing demonstrations held without prior authorization from the interior ministry. At a time of rising domestic discontent over soaring prices of food, fuel, and basic commodities, the authorities fear any mass mobilization, as protesters may end up directing their anger at the government, prompting renewed turmoil and political instability.

Cairo did, however, allow a rare but small pro-Palestinian protest to be held outside the Journalists Syndicate on June 12, possibly to allow pro-Palestinian activists to let off steam. Alternatively, the rally could have been a test balloon by the government to gauge the level of public anger over the Gaza war. Mahienour el-Masry, a rights lawyer who took part in the rally, said the protesters called on the government to allow the solidarity convoys to travel to the Rafah border crossing; they also called for the crossing to be opened to allow aid to enter Gaza.   

Some government loyalists in the media painted the solidarity convoys as a ploy meant to embarrass Egypt and implement Israel and Washington’s plan of displacing Palestinians. They questioned why the activists had chosen to travel to Gaza via Egyptian land instead of sea. Others warned that the convoys are a threat to Egypt’s national security. The convoys also stirred controversy on social media with some internet users suggesting that Islamists organized the Steadfastness caravan in a bid to sow dissent in Egypt, and others shared videos of some of the convoy’s participants lambasting the Egyptian president for not allowing the convoys to pass through.

Major General Samir Farag, a military strategist and former Head of the Armed Forces Morale Affairs Department, told me that some of the activists had obtained tourist visas prior to their arrival in Egypt but had not disclosed their plan to participate in the march to Gaza.

Farag said, “Egypt has enough internal problems; we don’t need more challenges. We don’t know who these activists are or what they are bringing into the country. The march should have been coordinated with the authorities beforehand.”  

While the convoy’s passage through Western Libya has been smooth, traversing eastern Libya—which is under the command of General Khalifa Haftar—proved more challenging. On June 12, Haftar’s security forces stopped the caravan in Sirte, demanding additional security clearances before it was allowed passage to Benghazi. Phone lines and internet services were cut off in the area, leaving the protesters incommunicado. The moves were likely at Cairo’s behest—Egypt has been a staunch supporter of Haftar, who shares Cairo’s anti-Islamist stance. 

Yasmine Hamrouni, a spokesperson for the Steadfastness Caravan, finally returned my calls on June 17. She told me that the activists had decided to return to Tunisia after it became clear they would not be granted access to Benghazi or Egypt. Both the Libyan National Army and the Egyptian authorities had joined forces to block the march to Rafah.  

Even if the marchers had gotten clearance from the Egyptian authorities, the Israeli Defense Forces would have likely thwarted their efforts.  Eight of the twelve activists who were on board the Madeleine Freedom Flotilla, which had also attempted to break the siege on Gaza, remain in detention in Israel, their fate uncertain. Israel deported the remaining four activists.

Like the Freedom Flotilla, the Global March too has been stopped in its tracks. Both attempts, however, signal that  international pressure is mounting on Israel to break its blockade on Gaza, described by United Nations spokesperson, Jens Laerke, as “the hungriest place on earth.” 

Whether or not Israel will bow to international pressure and alleviate the widespread shortages of food, fuel, and basic commodities will largely depend on neighboring countries, especially Egypt’s willingness to cooperate with international rights campaigners. For now, it appears that the Egyptian leadership is not taking any chances and will not hesitate to resort to violence to block “any attempts to destabilize the country.”

As Farag insisted to me: “Egypt’s security comes first.”

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, focusing on Egypt, economics, energy, water access, and women’s issues.

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Yet despite Saied’s apparent opposition to joining the Abraham Accords, his decision in November 2023 to halt the Tunisian parliament’s controversial bill criminalizing normalizing ties with Israel provided a glimpse into the president’s cost-benefit analysis over measures that could alienate the West completely. It signaled an opening, even if a very narrow one, that the possibility of Tunisian—Israel rapprochement might not be as far-fetched as experts predict, and that even a rogue actor like Saied sees the benefits in joining a Westernized coalition during times of war.  Yet in the long run, especially after the war in Gaza, Tunisia’s historical openness to the West might present an opportunity to advance normalization between the two countries.

Stubborn challenges: Israel and Tunisia’s rocky relations

Israel and Tunisia do not currently maintain any kind of formal relations, but this has not always been the case.

Beginning in the 1950s, under former Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, limited ties developed between the two countries. These included informal connections and meetings between politicians from both sides, initiated by diplomats from each country. The relationship served mutual interests—Israel sought recognition from an Arab state, while Tunisia aimed to secure support for its development, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and tourism. Consequently, in the nineties, Tunisia and Israel established low-level diplomatic relations (culminating in the opening of “interest sections” in each other’s countries, serving as de facto embassies), making the relations between the countries formal.  

However, the Palestinian issue has long been a central element of Tunisia’s foreign policy, causing attrition between Israeli and Tunisian diplomatic relations. Tunis has long expressed solidarity with the Palestinian people and their struggle for self-determination and has historically defended the two-state solution. More importantly, Tunisia hosted the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters from 1982 to 1993 after Yasser Arafat was forced to flee Beirut, Lebanon, then under siege by the Israelis during the first Israel-Lebanon War. Tunis hosted the PLO headquarters until the Oslo Accords, when it relocated to Gaza and the West Bank.  

This period helped cement closeness between Tunisians to the Palestinian cause, a sentiment further solidified by Israel’s deadly aerial attack on Hammam Chot on the PLO headquarters in 1985, killing a number of civilians and causing further resentment among Tunisians. Tunisians never forgave Israel for what they perceived to be an illegal incursion on their territory.

In 2000, with the outbreak of the Second Intifada in Israel and Palestine, relations between Israel and Tunisia entered a period of further crisis, leading to the suspension of official ties. While the relationship had deteriorated significantly already, the outbreak of violence between Israelis and Palestinians rendered diplomatic efforts virtually impossible.

A continuation of the deteriorating relations underpinned the decades that followed. During Tunisia’s Jasmine revolution, Israel remained on the fence about improving ties with the new political forces, fearing the rise of an anti-Israel posture. Meanwhile, the Tunisians passed a new Constitution in 2014, underscoring its commitment to the Palestinian cause, and open letters signed by academics and researchers calling for criminalizing ties with Israel circulated among political forces.

Under Saied’s current rule, these tensions have escalated significantly, including when he rejected Israel’s 1948 borders and called for the “full liberation of Palestine,” while avoiding any overt condemnation of Hamas after its October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel. On some occasions, Saied adopted an overtly antisemitic posture, accusing “the Zionists” of plotting the deadly 2023 floods in  Libya that killed some four thousand people, a trope linked to the long-held antisemitic prejudice that Jews somehow control the world. His remarks sparked outrage across Israeli media.  

Tunisia’s foreign policy has recently shifted markedly into a more anti-Western stance, cozying up to Iran in the process.

In May 2024, Saied visited Tehran to pay respects to the late President Ebrahim Raisi, marking the first-ever visit of a Tunisian president to  Iran. That same month, rumors swirled in Italian and French news outlets of unusual air movements by Russian aircraft in the coastal city of Djerba, raising eyebrows at a potential Tunisia-Russian alignment. In August of the same year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Tunis for the second time in over a year, pledging to help the country grapple with its wheat drought.

Why would Tunisia choose to normalize ties with Israel?

But there is even historical precedent to disrupt this trend.

Historically, Tunisia has tended to align more with the West than with the broader Arab world. However, its geographic location has made it essential to maintain strong relations with neighboring countries, particularly Algeria and Libya. While Tunisia has strategic interests in its ties with Algeria, especially in the areas of energy, trade, and finance, former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali sought to moderate the country’s financial connections to Arab countries and aimed to avoid the kind of reliance on crude oil revenues seen in other Arab states in the region.

Beyond the more apparent economic and trade incentives for Tunisia to normalize relations with Israel, Tunis could also gain from reigniting this closer alignment with the West, particularly as Iran and Russia, with whom it has recently signaled an openness to closer ties, face mounting setbacks that may force them to turn inward. Both Moscow and Tehran have faced major setbacks on the international stage. The former is dealing with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and an exorbitant number of human losses, and the latter is temporarily retreating after receiving a significant blow from Israel during the ongoing regional war between Israel and Iranian proxies. Tunisia is far from being a strategic priority for either power, and these setbacks should worry Tunisia, which might be left on its own to deal with an increasing migration threat from sub-Saharan Africa and an impending economic crisis.  

Another factor that might lead Tunisia to normalize ties with Israel is the potential for hedging between regional powers. Tunisia is particularly susceptible to external influences from countries with greater international stature, particularly when looking at its ongoing relationship with Algeria. Algeria, for its part, has steadily been courting Tunisia by supporting Tunis economically and politically, including a 2022 grant worth 200 million dollars from President Abdelmadjid Tebboune to help with the country’s struggling economy, and offering leniency and cheaper prices on electricity and gas from the Transmed pipeline. Tunisia, grappling with high public debt and stagnant growth, and with the economy desperately reeling since the Covid-19 pandemic, has had little choice other than to accept Algeria’s offerings. Algeria’s rationale for influencing Tunisia stems from a need to counter perceived external Western interference—exacerbated by the signing of the Abraham Accords between its regional rival Morocco and Israel—which has heightened its sense of isolation and vulnerability.

Normalizing ties with Israel could allow Tunisia to hedge between regional powers to avoid full alignment with Algeria and maximize its personal gains. It would reduce Tunis’ risk of overdependence on Algeria, and limit the risk of collateral damage should the relationship sour and challenges emerge for Algeria itself.

Israel’s interest

Normalization between Israel and Tunisia could offer Israel several potential advantages. These include contributing to regional stability and peace, expanding international recognition and support, and possibly encouraging other countries to engage more openly with Israel. Additionally, normalization could pave the way for stronger ties in trade, tourism, and investments, especially in the field of agriculture and irrigation. It would also promote Israeli legitimacy in the region, reducing international efforts to isolate it, increasing its international standing, and opening new business opportunities in Arab markets.

From a strategic perspective, improved relations with Tunisia might also help limit Tunisia’s cooperation with countries hostile to Israel, such as Algeria, Libya, and Iran. It could even reduce the potential for renewed activity by terrorist groups operating in or from the region.

That said, many of these benefits are not unique to Tunisia—they reflect the broader advantages Israel could gain from normalizing relations with any additional Arab country.

Threats and pathways to improvement

On the other hand, normalizing with Israel poses a severe threat to Tunisia, which Saied may not be apt to overlook. Firstly, it will inevitably fracture its relationship with Algeria, alienating Tunis’ primary economic backer. Algeria has had no qualms in stressing its disdain for the Abraham Accords, recently reiterating its historic backing of a full Palestinian state, the support of which is enshrined in its constitution. Algeria would certainly take it personally and would do everything in its power to retaliate, including rescinding its economic partnership, nullifying diplomatic ties, and reinstating tighter controls on late payments.

Secondly, Saied will face severe internal backlash. Tunisians have been at the forefront of pro-Palestinian demonstrations, the likes of which the country has not witnessed since the 2011 revolution. In a time when Saied is tightening control over the country, he still understands the importance of maintaining public support, and normalizing ties with Israel may pit the population against him, lessening his power and legitimacy.  

While Israel perceives normalization with Tunisia as naturally beneficial, the same cannot be said in reverse, and normalization between the two does not seem feasible as long as the war in Gaza continues.

If the West wished to see normalization between these two countries prevail, it would have to provide Tunis with significant concessions. These could take the form of economic support through International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans with fewer austerity measures, or simple economic bailout packages with few strings attached.

However, such a decision carries significant risks, namely the potential erosion of the IMF’s credibility and legitimacy on the international stage. Additionally, the West, particularly the United States, can seek to leverage its ongoing military partnership with Tunisia to retain strategic influence.  This could involve conditioning Tunisian aid to agreements such as the obligation to maintain secrecy over military knowledge and capabilities, especially when dealing with enemies such as Iran. This could restrict Tunisia’s movement while placing greater value on Washington’s ongoing support.

Normalization between Arab countries and Israel is still a top foreign policy agenda for US President Donald Trump’s administration. While Israel’s war rages on in Gaza, Trump has made no secret of his wish to see Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords, a feat which will undoubtedly help him reach his objective of becoming the peacemaker of the century.

While the potential for these two countries to normalize may seem farfetched, there are many strategic benefits for both that go beyond what meets the eye. Analysts may do well to keep an eye out for potential signs of rapprochement, as even small shifts may signal deeper political changes in the region.

Alissa Pavia is the Associate Director of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program.

Maayan Dagan is a visiting research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, from the Israeli military.

The views in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of any other entity.

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With growing instability in North Africa and the Sahel, and intensified geopolitical competition in the Mediterranean, the United States, Morocco, and Israel have an opportunity to spearhead a forward-looking joint investment fund and coordination forum that would transform diplomacy into durable infrastructure that delivers on tangible results.

Jointly governed by Morocco, Israel, and the United States, this fund would both directly and jointly coordinate finance strategic projects in energy, digital infrastructure, advanced industrial, and regional security. An instrument like this would be a perfect marriage between US financial and political convening power, Morocco’s industrial platforms, and Israel’s innovation ecosystem to collectively enhance competitiveness, create jobs, and secure regional supply chains. For a Washington calling on partners to stand up, establishing a fund would help empower the three countries to support long-term regional stability and collective prosperity that both showcases and deepens the benefits derived from the Abraham Accords. 

The problem and the solution for an alliance without strategic leverage

Since the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, the normalization of relations between Morocco and Israel has opened a new era of cooperation. Politically and economically, signs of rapprochement are evident: increasing bilateral visits, sectoral agreements, business initiatives, and emerging technological partnerships. Yet this momentum remains fragile, fragmented, and incomplete.

Without a shared mechanism, cooperation between Morocco and Israel remains vulnerable to political fluctuations, lacks visibility for long-term investors, and fails to reach the scale needed to reshape regional dynamics. While isolated successes exist—such as joint innovation programs or sectoral agreements—they remain disconnected and difficult to replicate. A structured platform would allow the three parties to consolidate trust, pool resources, and define common priorities across security, energy, industry, and technology. This is a major missed opportunity to move beyond ad-hoc engagements at a time of rapid transformation across the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, while strategic challenges are proliferating, particularly from instability in the Sahel, increased geopolitical competition in the Mediterranean, and rising migration pressure toward Europe.

A convening forum and trilateral investment fund, jointly governed by Morocco, Israel, and the United States, would be an effective tool to give the strategic alliance deeper geopolitical weight. This central body would be tasked with coordinating disparate lines of effort across each country’s respective public and private sectors and providing direct financing for high-impact strategic projects in key divisions, including energy, critical infrastructure, industrial transformation, security technologies, defense industry, maritime industry, and logistics innovation.

The forum would be designed not as a development aid mechanism but rather as a sovereign investment tool that could generate measurable returns. Its operational model would be based on shared governance between the three states, including having representatives from the private sector and diaspora communities, and a rigorous, transparent selection of projects based on economic viability, strategic relevance, as well as clear investment return for the forum’s backers.

What the United States gains through a trilateral fund

As global power dynamics continue to shift, the United States must go beyond supporting traditional bilateral alliances and reimagine its most important growing strategic partnerships, as with Israel and Morocco. Intentionally curated regional platforms are capable of producing tangible and lasting outcomes that would also reliably return real value from investments. Therefore, the proposed trilateral investment forum would constitute an important innovation in both regional Mediterranean policy for the United States and offer important lessons for new mechanisms for US engagement that combine traditional diplomacy, economic strategy, and direct returns on mutual interests.

The model would ensure that the United States improves its long-term standing through a durable, coherent, transparent, and scalable architecture. This fund is especially timely and relevant for three primary reasons.

First, the fund would serve as a counterweight to the growing influence of rival powers—namely, China, Russia, and Iran. All three players are advancing their agendas across North Africa, the Sahel, and the Mediterranean through major investments in infrastructure, energy, ports, and security. If designed with proper financial resources, this proposed trilateral forum would provide a credible alternative for financing and competitive projects that would promote US interests and support local innovation ecosystems.

Second, the fund would deliver value that would help publicize the “normalization dividend” that was expected from the Abraham Accords. Five years after their signing, few concrete mechanisms have emerged to convert diplomatic momentum into long-term economic prosperity, largely due to the absence of a standard operational vehicle to coordinate and scale projects. Since the Accords were signed, most engagement has remained bilateral and unstructured, often driven by individual ministries, private actors, or external partners without a shared vision or platform. Moreover, in the absence of a dedicated fund or permanent forum, many successful initiatives—particularly in business, innovation, and security—remain under the radar and disconnected from broader strategic messaging. A trilateral forum could lay a model that could support the overall expansion of the Abraham Accords, demonstrating Washington’s ability to support strategic and enduring projects with key regional partners, advancing regional security and prosperity.  

And third, the fund would give the United States a results-driven tool of influence and a mechanism to return value to the American taxpayer. Unlike one-off aid programs or broad diplomatic commitments, this fund could generate measurable benefits, including local job creation, inclusion of American companies in regional initiatives through the requirement for US primes, growth in trilateral trade, and supply chain security, all while integrating American partners into the overall ecosystem of the Abraham Accords.

Roadmap and success indicators

The implementation of the trilateral investment fund should follow a three-pronged and phased implementation strategy, with the ultimate goal of achieving a well-structured governance architecture and a clear remit for the new body:

1. The initial phase focused on political agreement and framework design, including trilateral deliberations on the working level across all three parties.
2. The secondary phase focused on deploying high-impact pilot projects in priority sectors, potentially through the Development Finance Corporation or other appropriate funding mechanisms.
3. The final long-term structuring phase aimed at scaling the mechanism and embedding it within an enduring institutional architecture, such as a jointly governed trilateral fund.

To ensure credibility and effectiveness, the fund must deliver measurable outcomes based on clear criteria, including economic impact (mobilized investment, job creation, industrial upgrading), tangible strategic alignment (political engagement, intergovernmental coordination, diplomatic returns), and proven replicability (ability to adapt the model to other regional cooperation frameworks).

A new trilateral forum that delivers on the promise of the Abraham Accords is a unique opportunity to support American engagement in an area of critical geopolitical importance.  By aligning capital, innovation, and market access, this forum would not only reinforce the foundations of the Abraham Accords but also project a stabilizing influence across the Afro-Mediterranean space at a time of intense competition and uncertainty. It would offer the United States a modern, agile, and measurable tool of engagement that would competitively address the core sovereignty, security, and economic concerns its partners face in the Global South.

Aïssa Christophe Agostini is a strategic economic advisor and founder of Prosper Atlas, a consulting firm focused on trilateral partnerships between the United States, Israel, and Morocco.

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“The Secretary reiterated that the United States recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and supports Morocco’s serious, credible, and realistic Autonomy Proposal as the only basis for a just and lasting solution to the dispute,” reads the statement issued by the State Department after the visit. Nevertheless, one obstacle persists: Dismantling the obsolete and dysfunctional United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

This time, the United States went further by urging the parties to engage in discussions without delay, stating that Morocco’s Autonomy Plan is the only acceptable framework for dialogue. Rubio even stepped up to offer to facilitate the process, signaling that the only way out of this fifty-year colonial impasse may be outside the United Nations and its legacy of failure to secure a sustainable solution for the Sahraoui people.

A mission without a mandate

As its name stipulates, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara was initially established in 1991 by Security Council resolution 690 to prepare for a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. However, the mission failed to deliver on its mandate and only served to maintain a state of paralysis throughout the years. It is essential to clarify that while the MINURSO monitors the ceasefire, which still holds for nearly thirty-five years between Morocco and the Polisario Front separatists, it is in no way an active peacekeeping mission, and Morocco continues to administer de facto over 80 percent of the Western Saharan disputed territories since the Spanish exit in 1975. MINURSO staff remained spectators, even during the rare skirmishes that were reignited along the sand wall, when Morocco decided to retake the strategic Guerguerat crossing in November 2020 to open trade routes with Mauritania.

Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations Secretary-General envoy to Western Sahara, was set for defeat from the start. Since 2022, de Mistura has felt out of place in a fast-moving international context, shifting in favor of Morocco.

First, the United States recognized Rabat’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in conjunction with re-establishing diplomatic ties between Morocco and Israel in December 2020, knocking down the chessboard in a fragile geopolitical context where MINURSO had maintained the status quo between Morocco and Algeria.

Then came the coup de grace by the two former colonizers of Morocco and Western Sahara, who are at the source of the current superfluous borders, when Spain sided with Morocco in 2022. France followed in 2024, and over twenty-nine countries decided to open diplomatic representations in Western Sahara as a sign of support for the Moroccan stance.

The Italian diplomat himself indicated in October 2024 his intention to step down, alluding to his inability to mediate between a Morocco emboldened by overwhelming international support and an Algeria obstinate in supporting the mirage of Sahraoui self-determination until the very end. In his latest faux pas, Staffan de Mistura proposed the partition of Western Sahara, suggesting that the envoy and the MINURSO are neocolonial instruments from the past, wasting a sixty-one million dollar annual budget, funded in majority by the United States.

Another flagrant example of MINURSO’s irrelevance is how the disputed Western Sahara borders have been, for decades, uncharted territories for terrorist activities from al-Qaeda to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and, more recently, a fertile ground for Iranian and Russian influence. Besides gathering intel and filing situation reports, the Mission has done very little to address the flourishing drug and human trafficking business in the disputed territories, leaving this task to the Moroccan and Algerian military.

The diversion of humanitarian aid destined for Sahrawis in the camps in Tindouf, Algeria, also continues to raise concerns, especially with evidence showing that much of the aid is subject to corruption and reselling in open markets like Nouadhibou in Northern Mauritania.

The impracticality of a Sahraoui referendum

Several founding myths surround the Western Sahara file, making a referendum a preposterous and impractical solution—a reality that Western allies like the United States started grasping in recent years.

Contrary to other conflicts, where Indigenous people claim the right to self-determination based on their distinct cultural identity, the Saharaoui people are not native to North Africa. The Arab tribes of Beni Hassan, who trace their ancestry to the Yemeni tribe of Maqil, started moving westward to the Maghreb around the thirteenth century, invited by the Almohad empire of Morocco that needed to reinforce its rule by balancing the Amazigh tribe with the Arab warrior populations. If anything, the Hassani people were the ones who pushed the Indigenous Amazigh tribal confederation of Sanhaja out of the Sahara after the massacre of Char Bouba War in the seventeenth century.

The Hassani people today are transnational communities inhabiting large sections of Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, and Western Sahara—hence the impossibility of carrying out a census of who gets to participate in a referendum. To complicate things further for the MINURSO, the Alaouite sultan Moulay Ismail had established the “Guich System”, a feudal system where these very Hassani tribes were used to counter Amazigh rebellions in exchange for land up to the nineteenth century. The descendants of these fighters still live around the capital, Rabat, Marrakech, and Sidi Kacem, and still assert their Sahraoui roots.

In the Moroccan-administered portion of the territory, the central state had additionally provided generous incentives, including double salaries and subsidized gas and essential subsistence items, since the seventies for those willing to relocate to the Sahara, and two generations at least have been in the disputed land. Even in the five refugee camps in Algeria, where about 173,600 individuals still live, it is extremely hard to determine who is a Saharaoui and who came to Tindouf as a result of a multitude of other conflicts in the Sahel. Due to all these complexities, the MINORSO has consistently failed since its establishment to come up with voter lists that would be acceptable to all parties, thereby nullifying the prospects of a referendum and the relevance of a UN Mission entrusted to organize it.

What many Sahraoui people want

In a recent field study in July 2024 to Dakhla, Laayoun, and Boujdour, I covered nearly four hundred miles and spoke to dozens of civil society activists, journalists, officials, and ordinary Sahraoui people from my own tribesmen of Oulad Dlim. Most interviewees in the Moroccan-administered portion of Western Sahara (about 1.1 million inhabitants according to the September 2024 census) expressed extreme fatigue from five decades of conflict and a desire for normality and prosperity. They seemed more hopeful for a sustainable resolution through the Moroccan federal advanced regionalization plan proposed in 2006, which preserves their cultural identity and gives them sovereignty over local governance and natural resources under the Moroccan flag.

It was interesting to observe the shift in the Moroccan strategy toward the Sahara conflict, transcending the purely security approach under Driss al-Basri in the 1990s, beating and arresting demonstrators, to a vision focusing on regional development, a dynamic tourism sector, and the looming hope of the $1.2 billion Dakhla Atlantic harbor megaproject—the cornerstone of the kingdom’s Atlantic Initiative. This recent economic boom made some interlocutors confident in the future, although many stated that Morocco hasn’t provided any details of how the autonomy plan will work in practice and how much control they will have over their natural resources. It’s important to note that the research didn’t include Sahrawis in the camps, who may remain attached to self-determination after five decades on a different trajectory.

For the past thirty-four years, MINURSO has consistently deceived the Sahrawi people by failing to deliver on its mission, promoting a laissez-faire culture, and holding hundreds of thousands hostage to complicated geopolitical calculus. Now, the time is up, and the Sahrawi communities can no longer afford another fifty years of political stalemate. The parties to the conflict, along with US and trans-Atlantic allies, will need to defund, dismantle, and terminate it so the autonomy plan can start taking shape.

In The Revenge of Geography, Robert D. Kaplan said that “borders are not just lines on a map; they are a reflection of power dynamics,” and today’s dynamics are calling for greater accountability for UN programs like the MINURSO and for out-of-the-box decisive solutions under Trump’s leadership.

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, focusing on the Western Sahara conflict. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

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France’s departure is indicative of a larger shift in the region. The Sahel’s geopolitics have changed dramatically in the last five years. Since 2020, military juntas have seized power in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. They have gradually driven out thousands of Western troops, including troops from France, the European Union, and the United States. These troops were performing capacity-building missions and conducting counterterrorism operations. They have since been replaced, in large part, by Russian paramilitaries. The existing regional security architecture is in shambles, following Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger’s withdrawal from the G5 Sahel Joint Force and, more recently, from the Economic Community of West African States.

The Sahel is in the middle of a transformative process that has ushered in new leaders, military strategies, and foreign alliances. It is imperative that the United States rethink the bipartisan assumptions that have underwritten its Sahel policy. The region is experiencing profound change, and US policy must adapt accordingly.

Outdated assumptions, new realities

US policy toward the Sahel has rested on these four unspoken assumptions, all of which must be updated if Washington aims to help stabilize the region and improve its standing there.

1. Western allies’ involvement can achieve US regional security objectives.

For at least a decade, US policy has taken for granted that allies’ involvement in the Sahel would generate access, bolster influence, and help achieve US regional security objectives. This is evidenced by the fact that US resources were marshalled in support of partner-led efforts. Under Operation Juniper Micron, for example, which began in 2013 and lasted for roughly a decade, the US military provided logistical support, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, to enable French operations in Mali. Most Western troops deployed within the Sahel were not American.

There is nothing wrong with burden sharing or deconfliction. These measures can eliminate redundancy, reduce the cost of defense engagement, and amplify operational effects. That said, it would be wrong to assume that ally involvement translates directly into US gains. Perceptions of foreign powers vary, and it is not clear that Western investment earns the United States any additional influence. In fact, aligning itself with France, an unpopular former colonial power, may have inadvertently harmed US interests. The United States has steadily lost soft power on the continent since 2021. After Niger’s junta expelled French troops, Washington hoped to avoid a similar fate. The US military ultimately failed to differentiate itself and withdrew.

Moreover, relying on allies to advance its security objectives exposes the United States to risks if its they depart. The United States had few options to address rising instability in Mali after French and European Union troops withdrew in 2022. The situation has only worsened in the years since. Mali is currently ranked third among the countries most impacted by terrorism. Terrorists attacked the capital city this fall, indicating that they are capable of operating in large portions of Mali’s territory. This could pose a threat to US interests, facilities, or personnel.

2. An “outside-in” approach can prevent the spread of instability beyond the Sahel.

US policy has also assumed that investments in defense, economic development, and good governance can prevent the spread of instability from the Sahel to coastal West Africa. Some experts contend that Washington should adopt an “outside-in” approach, shifting focus from the Sahel to its southern neighbors. Proponents of this approach argue that very little can be done to improve stability in the Sahel, and that the United States would be better served partnering with peripheral states to bolster their defenses. The “outside-in” approach involves dramatically increasing assistance to coastal West Africa while reducing US assistance to the Sahel.

To this end, US leaders emphasize the importance of the Global Fragility Act, a law passed in 2019 that provides funding to curb instability in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo, among others—but does not address its origins in the Sahel. If it is not addressed directly, however, Sahel-based instability is likely to intensify.

The data speaks for itself. Last year was the deadliest in the Sahel’s history. The effects of this instability are evident in the coastal states of Benin and Togo, where al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has begun to consolidate its presence. Terrorist groups, especially JNIM, are poised to continue their push southward into coastal West Africa.

The “outside-in” approach rests on the assumption that, with sufficient assistance, coastal West African states can build institutional capacity faster than terrorists can expand operations southward. Unfortunately, there is limited evidence to support this claim.

3. States would forgo partnerships with US adversaries if they knew the consequences.

A third assumption embraces the idea that Sahel states would forgo partnerships with US adversaries if they appreciated the consequences. The United States has largely relied on messaging to dissuade states from expanding cooperation with its adversaries. US officials point out that the support offered by Washington’s adversaries is ineffective. “It’s self-evident that a Russian role, whether it’s Wagner or it has a GRU label, has not demonstrably improved the lives of Africans,” said Molly Phee, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, during an interview in March 2024. That same month, an interagency delegation cautioned Niger against deepening its ties to Russia and Iran.

Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have all ignored these warnings, partnering with Russia on counterterrorism in the past few years. Their leaders are rational and likely aware of the potential consequences, but they faced a difficult choice. The United States is legally restricted from providing these states assistance, as each experienced a coup d’état. Sahel leaders were not persuaded by US messaging. Absent competing offers, and facing an acute threat, these leaders opted to pursue ineffective security assistance from US adversaries.

4. The loss of forward-deployed positions in Chad and Niger critically threatens the United States’ ability to achieve its regional security objectives.

Last year, officials warned that withdrawals from Chad and Niger would prevent the United States from achieving its security objectives in the region. “If we lose our footprint in the Sahel, that will degrade our ability to do active watching and warning, including for homeland defense,” said General Michael Langley, the commander of US forces in Africa. From Niger, the US military was able to monitor threats in neighboring countries, such as Libya and Mali. 

Langley has a point. The US military must remain engaged in the Sahel if its goal is to provide strategic warning of threats to the United States. Proximity to the threat is important to this mission, but so are partnerships. The United States needs strong relationships with African partners, built on coordination, information sharing, and strategic access. In both Chad and Niger, the greatest loss was arguably that of willing and capable local partners.

The United States could still secure its vital national interests if it pursued light footprints and distributed security assistance across several African partner countries. This approach may also obviate the need for big base operations, offering a cost-effective and flexible solution.

What comes next

US policy options are constrained by the situation on the ground. The United States is legally restricted from providing certain forms of defense and development assistance to countries that experience military coups d’etat, a category that includes Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. This presents challenges, but it does not mean the United States is entirely without options. US leaders must still assess whether the risks of inaction outweigh those of engagement, but, at the very least, this exercise should foster a more thoughtful, constructive debate on the issue.

The United States could still pursue legal, limited, and nonlethal security cooperation with these states. It could provide critical enablers, such as force protection, military medical assistance, or logistical support. It could provide training on how to respond to improvised explosive devices or deliver humanitarian aid. Assistance could gradually be expanded if these states move toward democratic governance, reduce extrajudicial killings, and enhance military accountability—or curtailed if they fail to do so. The best way for the United States to promote regional stability and credibly compete against its adversaries is to address Sahel countries’ security concerns.

Finally, while maintaining investments in the Sahel, the United States could focus on building partner capacity in coastal West Africa. The “outside-in” approach constructs a false dichotomy, in which US policy can prioritize either the Sahel or coastal West Africa. The two regions are inextricably linked, and instability in one inevitably threatens the other. Investing in both affords the United States the greatest opportunity to prevent terrorism’s spread and secure its own interests. 

The challenges facing the Sahel are immense, but they are not insurmountable. By reevaluating long-held assumptions and adapting policy to the rapidly changing geopolitical environment, the United States can play a vital role in the region. Amid adversaries’ encroachment and terrorist groups’ expansion, the United States must adjust its approach to maintain its relevance and protect its interests. There are opportunities to do so, but success will depend on a willingness to pursue new policies, with a clear-eyed consideration of the risks and rewards that lie ahead.

Jordanna Yochai is a defense analyst, whose portfolio includes the West African Sahel. She is currently on leave from the US Department of Defense, pursuing a master’s degree at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA).

The positions expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the US Department of Defense. The US Department of Defense does not endorse the views expressed in hyperlinked articles or websites, including any information, products, or services contained therein.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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On February 1, AFRICOM conducted airstrikes targeting a local branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in the remote Golis Mountains in northern Somalia. AFRICOM later announced that the airstrikes managed to kill their main target: Ahmed Maeleninine, an ISIS recruiter, financier, and leader responsible for the deployment of jihadists to the United States and Europe. Following that strike, there have been a series of strikes against both al-Shabaab (a branch of al-Qaeda) and ISIS-Somalia, firmly placing the region at the forefront of the new administration’s kinetic military activities.

While most of the conversation about US military presence around the world has focused on paring back, in Somalia, the United States appears to be taking the opposite approach. The approach surprised some, in part because US President Donald Trump had withdrawn seven hundred US troops from Somalia during his first term. But the shift shouldn’t come as such a shock. It shows a broader understanding of a new reality: That combating terror globally starts in Africa.

Africa is at the forefront of the war on terror; in 2024 alone, the African Union reportedly recorded more than 3,400 terrorist attacks and 13,900 resulting deaths on the continent. And what is happening on the continent affects the wider world—Somalia in particular is an unfortunate showcase of that.  

ISIS-Somalia, for example, shows how terrorist groups have become embedded in the continent. Since breaking away from al-Shabaab in 2015, the Somali branch of ISIS has been growing exponentially. AFRICOM reported that just last year, the group had doubled in size. What’s more, rumors persist that Abdul Qadir Mumin, the leader of ISIS-Somalia who reportedly became the global leader of ISIS in 2023, survived a US strike last year. Thus, it’s clear why the United States is placing such attention on the group. While unconfirmed, the mere possibility that the leader of ISIS is not of Arab decent and is based in Africa signifies just how terror and the continent have become intertwined.

The involvement of terrorist groups on the continent is by no means limited to Somalia. From the Great Lakes of Central Africa to Mozambique, terrorist groups are prevalent—as are their financiers. Nowhere, however, are terrorist groups more prevalent than in the Sahel, where they have been expanding and strengthening for years. An array of groups—including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, the Islamic State in West Africa Province, and Boko Haram, among others—now call the Sahel home. They even battle each other for territory and power.

In the past several years, a series of coups have driven out democracies from the Sahel and sought to replace US and European Union support with Russian mercenaries. But, as has been seen across the region, Russian support has hard limits. For example, in Mali—where leaders turned to Russia for military support—al-Qaeda jihadists briefly took over Bamako’s airport last year and posed for photos with the presidential jet. Even away from the hotbed of the Sahel, the limits of Russian mercenary support were made clear in Mozambique, where the Wagner Group was pulled from an operation targeting al-Shabaab after twelve mercenaries died. As this broader dynamic changes in the Sahel, jihadists groups are still gaining power.

So, what’s next?

Expect increased US attention toward Africa from a counterterrorism perspective. From what has been displayed so far, the United States’ tactics are looking quite muscular. Will this attention include rapprochement with the Sahelian juntas? That is still unclear. In weighing rapprochement, the Trump administration is sure to remember the lessons of the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush in Niger, in which a joint US-Nigerien mission pursuing a leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara was attacked, resulting in the deaths of four US Special Forces soldiers. At the time, the ambush was the deadliest attack against the US military in Africa in decades. 

In recent years, global attention has focused on Eastern Europe and conflict in the Middle East rather than African conflicts. Yet, with international terror and jihadist groups now entrenched in the continent and pursuing global aspirations greater than carving out territory in Africa—presenting a major threat to the United States and its allies—attention is needed. The war on terror will be fought in Africa, and whatever direction that takes, the United States will need to be involved.

Some involvement is already underway. Notably, at a time when discourse about US global deployments is focused on withdrawals and wind-downs, discussions over US presence in Africa are taking the opposite direction. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, whose first visit overseas conspicuously included the AFRICOM base in Germany, said, “Africa is very much the front lines of a fight from Islamists . . . We’re not going to allow them to maintain a foothold, especially to try to strike at America.” Notably, it was in a meeting with AFRICOM leaders that Hegseth signed a directive easing restraints and executive oversight on foreign US airstrikes and the deployment of US commandos.

Last month’s airstrikes in Somalia are likely the first of many. And while many analysts are loath to guess what this US administration will do on the foreign affairs front, the fact remains that combating terror in the modern era will require action in Africa.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Executive summary

Africa is increasingly asserting its participation in the advancement of emerging technologies by engaging in active dialogues and devising roadmaps for the development, deployment, and regulation of these technologies. However, strategies to employ emerging technologies vary widely both in levels of progress as well as regulatory mechanisms. This report explores how five African countries—South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, and Zambia—are strategically navigating the governance of new technologies to enrich their citizens’ lives while mitigating potential risks. It focuses on three key emerging technology domains, namely: connectivity, digital public infrastructure, and artificial intelligence (AI).

Beginning with an analysis of the foundational digital technology policies around data protection and governance and cybersecurity, the country reviews highlight the current landscape of laws, and strategies governing each of the emerging technologies of interest. By exploring the strengths and weaknesses of each country’s policy landscape across these technology domains, the report offers insights into prospects and challenges in harnessing emerging technologies for societal good.

The report finds that governments are generally optimistic about the potential impact of emerging technologies on economic development in their respective countries. This is reflected in the large public investment in technology infrastructure, promotion of innovative ecosystems, and the integration of information and communication technologies (ICTs) into e-governance and e-services toward a holistic digitalized economy and society. The countries’ multistakeholder approaches highlight the need for responsible governance while promoting active private-sector engagement for the public good.

Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, and Ghana were found to have comparatively robust policies for each emerging technology examined, or at least—as is the case with Kenya—documentation or drafts in the form of gazettes and public consultation documents. Government efforts are more prominent in the AI domain, given the increased attention it has garnered lately. However, these frameworks are hampered by limited implementation capacities, poor infrastructure, policy fragmentation and overlap, low digital literacy levels, and a growing digital divide. Zambia on the other hand, while having strong aspirations to become an ICT-enabled knowledge economy, lacks dedicated policies pertaining to emerging technologies. Although the country’s data-protection laws, intellectual property, cyber security, and consumer protection provide a foundational framework, more updated regulations are required to keep pace with the speed at which emerging technologies are playing an increasingly pivotal role in citizens’ daily lives.

A SWOT (i.e., strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis of the broader digital-technologies sector across these countries reveals some universal themes. Strengthwise, governments are generally proactive and enthusiastic about engaging new technology issues, and ICT authorities tend to adapt quickly to new developments by publishing subsidiary laws, releasing draft statements, or convening multistakeholder workshops, where national policy frameworks are absent. An overarching rather than specific sectoral or technology-domain approach also drives national technology pursuits, where for example, all the five countries examined have a national ICT/digital economy strategy which predates and already makes foundational provisions for emerging technology policies. Policy-formulation processes were driven by stakeholder engagement and public consultations, as seen in regular calls for contributions and multistakeholder convenings leading up to policy enactment. Yet huge disparities were observed within countries, where rural and marginalized urban communities, as well as women, are left behind by governmental technology ambitions. This calls for updated policy frameworks and strategies that emphasize inclusion and other sociopolitical considerations to avoid deepening inequities.

For Africa to leverage emerging technologies for socioeconomic development while maintaining accountable and transparent systems, legislative frameworks must be streamlined alongside strong institutional integration to ensure effective enforcement. It is imperative that policymakers develop a strong understanding of emerging technologies to enhance their capacities for developing comprehensive policies to address them. Equally important is raising public awareness to protect the African people’s digital rights and foster safe digital environments.

Ayantola Alayande is a Researcher at the Global Center on AI Governance. There, Ayantola works on the African Union Continental AI Strategy and the African Observatory on Responsible AI. He is also a researcher at the Bennett Institute for Public Policy at the University of Cambridge, where he focuses on industrial policy and the future of work in the public sector.

Samuel Segun, PhD is a Senior Researcher at the Global Center on AI Governance. He is also an AI Innovation & Technology consultant for the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), where he works on the project ‘Toolkit for Responsible AI Innovation in Law Enforcement’.

Leah Junck, PhD is a Senior Researcher at the Global Center on AI Governance. Her work explores human-technology experiences. She is the author of Cultivating Suspicion: An Ethnography and Like a Bridge Over Trouble: An Ethnography on Strategies of Bodily Navigation of Male Refugees in Cape Town.

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

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Almost a year since his election, President Bassirou Diomaye Faye now has a clear mandate to carry out reforms, following his party’s resounding victory in November’s legislative elections. He must now turn his focus to continuing along the democratic track, lifting the constraints associated with credit rationing and leveraging commodity-based industrialization, and setting Senegal up for robust economic growth and welfare improvements.

By the end of the presidential election early last year, outgoing President Macky Sall—who had attempted to postpone the election, a move that led to deadly protests—congratulated Faye, calling the elections the “victory of Senegalese democracy.” Such a victory is important for Senegal, as democracy (contrary to what Chirac suggested) is not a luxury but a necessity for national reconciliation, the legitimacy of national institutions, and, ultimately, shared prosperity.

The presidential election was a victory not only for Senegal’s democracy but for democracy globally, rekindling confidence internationally in a system of government that has come under strain in Africa, especially in West Africa, where military coups have surged. That boost in confidence comes as people in even Western democracies grow dissatisfied with how democracy works in their countries. For example, an Ipsos poll in 2023 conducted across seven Western countries (including France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) found that most respondents believed the economy is rigged to the advantage of the rich and powerful and that “radical change” is needed to improve the political system.

In that poll, 70 percent of American respondents and 73 percent of French respondents—whose countries are seeing rising political polarization—said they believe that the state of democracy has declined in their countries in recent years. Moreover, the 2024 Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index ranked both the United States and France as “flawed democracies.”

While massive amounts of campaign financing are considered a prerequisite (and perhaps the most important attribute) for winning an election, Senegal’s presidential election was a reminder that conviction and ideas still matter. Faye—who secured 54.28 percent of the vote as an independent after his party was banned—defeated candidates who had far more financial firepower and ample time to rally support on their campaign trails. Despite being released from prison just a little over a week before the presidential election, Faye’s message and program were in sync with people’s aspirations and garnered broad-based support at the ballot box.

Faye promised to improve the living conditions in Senegal. For too long, the country has contended with widespread poverty, especially in rural areas where as many as 57 percent of people are considered poor. Furthermore, Senegalese youth continue to face high unemployment. The informal economy—which is generally associated with low productivity and endemic poverty—has become a major piece of the economy, accounting for nearly 37 percent of Senegal’s gross domestic product (GDP). Recently, the rising cost of living and income inequality have exacerbated Senegal’s socioeconomic challenges. Inflation has proven particularly sticky and is eroding household purchasing power. Amid these challenges, increasing numbers of Senegalese migrants are risking their lives to sail the seas en route to Europe in search of better opportunities.

Faye has also promised to fight corruption, promote good governance, and strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions. For years, a “strongman” culture across Africa has enabled collusion between politicians and multinational companies, which has weakened agency and popular ownership of policies to undermine economic opportunity and exacerbate income inequality. This is especially the case in countries rich in natural resources, which are more vulnerable to corruption due to the significant revenues generated by resource exploitation, management, and trade.

Departing from the norm, Faye declared his assets in the lead-up to the presidential election. Upon becoming president, he announced he would conduct an audit of Senegal’s oil, gas, and mining sectors to rebalance them in the national interest. These moves establish baselines against which the people of Senegal can assess the president’s work toward tackling corruption and enhancing efficiency in the allocation of resources, with an ultimate goal of achieving more inclusive growth and shared prosperity in the country.

These are important steps in the right direction. Improving welfare for the Senegalese people requires a fundamental transformation of the economy. Expectations in Senegal are high following the discovery of major oil and gas reserves a few years ago. There are similarly high expectations for Africa as a whole. Despite its immense natural-resource wealth, the continent has, over the last several decades, become the world’s epicenter of poverty: Africa has the largest share of extreme poverty rates globally and is home to twenty-three of the world’s poorest twenty-eight countries.

This starkly contrasts with Nordic countries and the Gulf states, which have successfully leveraged their natural-resource wealth to boost prosperity in a span of a few decades. This contrast is partly due to the fact that rather than processing its own natural resources, Africa instead largely exports them overseas, increasing the prevalence of macroeconomic shocks and the risk of poor governance—both of which adversely affect the investment climate and heighten growth volatility.

But Senegal, arguably a latecomer to the hydrocarbon world, can learn from other African countries’ management (and mismanagement) of natural resources.  

Considering the experience of the most successful oil-rich countries, Faye should look to alter the structure of value chains to retain more production and refining processes locally. If Senegal can nurture these industries, it will set up the country for commodity-based industrialization that expands employment opportunities, enhances technology transfer, and accelerates integration into the global economy. This will help Senegal avoid a deterioration in commodity terms of trade, which is fueling internal and external imbalances. Last October, Moody’s downgraded Senegal’s long-term credit rating, citing a significantly weaker fiscal and debt position.

There are mechanisms and conditions in Africa that would help Faye in localizing natural-resource production and refining processes. The African Continental Free Trade Area’s rules of origin (which prioritize made-in-Africa goods) should help catalyze the production of intermediate and manufactured goods and the development of robust regional value chains. The scale of the continental market should help Senegal offset the potential losses of international trade associated with expanding protectionist barriers in a geopolitically fractured world.

The rise of globally competitive African businesses necessitates large-scale, long-term investment, so reforming the banking system will also be important. Affordable patient capital is particularly critical in Senegal, where domestic credit to the private sector remains very low (31.3 percent of GDP, versus 126.8 percent in Norway) and overwhelmingly short term. According to a report by the Central Bank of West African States, more than 80 percent of loans issued in 2022 had a maturity within less than two years.

Faye has an opportunity to achieve the systemic change he promised. Democracy has provided a path to greater ownership of policies that equalize access to opportunities and raise living standards in Senegal and more generally across Africa, a continent rich in resources and where the people are no longer prepared to accept intergenerational poverty as an inevitability. But democracy must not be regarded as an end; it must be seen as a means to greater security and prosperity. Thus, Faye must actively use the opportunity provided by the rekindling flame of democracy to usher in a new era—one that yields huge democratic and economic dividends.

Hippolyte Fofack, a former chief economist at the African Export-Import Bank, is a fellow with the Sustainable Development Solutions Network at Columbia University, a research associate at Harvard University, a distinguished fellow at the Global Federation of Competitiveness Councils, and a fellow at the African Academy of Sciences.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Doing so will require facing the roots of the tension. There are deep-seated elements of discord between the two governments. These elements relate to Algeria’s colonial past, Algerian migration to France, and the divergence of their positions over Western Sahara. The shared history between Algeria and France is complex. That history is marked by more than a century of France’s colonization of Algeria, which ended with a bloody war of liberation. The two countries’ shared history has also witnessed successive waves of migration from Algeria to France. The relationship between the two governments has been rather rocky over the past decades with occasional periods of reconciliation.

For a while, the close relationship between the two heads of state, Abdelmadjid Tebboune and Emmanuel Macron, seemed to have brought about a hopeful rapprochement between the two countries. In 2021, Macron announced the creation of a “memory and truth commission,” involving both Algerian and French historians to mend wounds from the history of French colonial rule. Discussions were underway on the return of Algerian cultural artifacts and archives from the colonial period. That rapprochement came to a halt after Macron officially affirmed Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in October 2024.

A diplomatic route to resolve the discord is not only still possible but imperative. There is a lot more at stake than just the welfare of Algeria and France. Considering the shared history and the deep ties between their populations, the pair is at the center of a matrix of relationships between Europe and Africa and between the Global North and Global South more generally.

The tensions between Algeria and France are flaring up in the context of deepening rifts among Global North and Global South countries over trade, migration, energy, environmental and climate cooperation, and the rules-based international order. But these unfavorable geopolitical circumstances are all the more reason for the two neighbors on both sides of the Mediterranean sea to resolve their differences and provide a model for how other nations can reconcile North-South divides. For example, France and Algeria could cooperate to combat wildfires in the Mediterranean basin, which continue to kill hundreds people, destroy hundreds of thousands of hectares of land, and to devastate biodiversity and people’s livelihoods.

More and more, “sovereigntist” waves both in the North and South are pushing countries to close their economies. There is also a growing trend of politicians scapegoating the “other.” That said, if Algeria and France could resolve their differences, it would open new avenues to help partner further not only on combating wildfires, but also on security, energy projects, and finding new pathways to solve migration issues. The two countries must bear in mind their joint responsibility to ensure stability in the Mediterranean Sea and beyond, as well as to look forward to develop further economic and security cooperation.

The Mediterranean Sea has served as the crossroads between civilizations in the east and the west for millennia. Yet, it has become the backdrop for thousands of tragic journeys by refugees and migrants heading north toward Europe. A reinvigorated relationship between Algeria and France would serve to rekindle the potential for commerce and prosperity in the Mediterranean and beyond. Algeria is the doorstep to Africa, as France is for Europe. Yet, the economic ties between the two countries are well below what they could be. Total trade was just under twelve billion dollars between the two countries in 2023 and the stock of direct investment from France in Algeria that year was well below three billion dollars. Building common ground between these two countries could boost trade and investment, increasing both nations’ prosperity.

Just as France and Germany have become the engine of European integration after having fought bloody wars, France and Algeria could become an engine for partnership between Europe and Africa. For instance, as green technologies are becoming economical not just in solar but soon perhaps with hydrogen, the partnership between Algeria and France could help with the transfer of technology that will spur investment and trade in energy across both sides of the Mediterranean. Similarly, in agriculture and agribusiness, there is an opportunity for increases in investment and trade that can mutually benefit of not just Algeria and France but the whole of Africa and Europe.

The galloping demography of the African continent far outweighs that of Europe, which should lead investment to flow massively from the North to the South. There are, of course, important frictions that prevent that. To be sure, deeper investments, including in infrastructure, require further progress on the investment climate in Algeria, as well as removing nontariff barriers to economic integration in Africa. But increasing investments between Africa and Europe also requires a new way for the two continents to view and treat each other.

Something else is required, too: Europe should move away from the paternalism of former colonizers, which has alienated many Africans. That may sound remote from economics and business, but that is likely a major reason why the relationship between Africa and Europe is stuck. Algeria and France’s relationship epitomizes this tension. Small but symbolic steps were taken to bridge the gap in perspectives between Algeria and France over their colonial past. These steps should continue to take place.  

The geographic proximity and societal ties between Algeria and France should allow the two countries to reinvent the relationship between Africa and Europe and, more broadly, between the Global North and Global South. A successful reinvention of France-Algeria relations could serve as a model for Europe-Africa relations based on mutual respect that face up to the wounds of the past while looking to the opportunities of the future.

Rabah Arezki is a former vice president at the African Development Bank, a former chief economist of the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa region and a former chief of commodities at the International Monetary Fund’s Research Department. Arezki is now a director of research at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Studies and Research on International Development, and at the Harvard Kennedy School.

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Evolution of freedom

The Freedom Index illustrates well two important aspects of Nigerian institutional development in the last three decades. First, the transition to democracy explains the sharp increase of the Index score in 1999, which closes the gap with the average of the Sub-Saharan Africa region. Second, the often volatile evolution in the subsequent decades is a sign that the liberalization process has not been free of challenges and inconsistencies. Politically, the country has consistently held elections since the turn of the century, even though these have often fallen short of high levels of fairness and transparency. In terms of economic policy, while the successive governments have enacted varying degrees of reforms, these efforts have been somewhat inconsistent and not often coherent depending on the sector we analyze.  

The economic subindex exemplifies well this latter point, with really high short-run fluctuations throughout the period of analysis, mainly driven by the trade and investment freedom components. To be sure, the oil industry is central for Nigeria’s economy, representing 90 percent of its exports, and the fluctuations in both measures is, to an important extent, driven by the situation and the legal framework governing this sector. For about twenty years, the country has had internal debates about new oil industry legislation, and a new law was enacted in 2021, which has generated a climate of uncertainty, causing investors to be reluctant to pursue new investments in the country. In fact, Nigeria is producing less oil today than it did in 2010.  

Another factor that can explain some movements, such as the substantial fall in trade and investment freedom in the first decade of the century, is the introduction of different local content policies. Obviously, these kinds of policies are favored by domestic investors and can support a country’s broader development agenda, but they can often affect the degree to which foreign capital finds the country attractive for investment. Finally, the relevance of the oil industry in generating government revenue and foreign reserves has many times led the government and central bank to heavily intervene in the exchange rate market, sometimes in non-orthodox ways. This was particularly the case after the oil price collapse of 2015, which may explain the fifteen-point fall in trade freedom in the following years.  

It is fair to say that the liberalizing effort has been robust in some other sectors of the Nigerian economy. The telecoms industry was liberalized in the early 2000s, as well as the banking sector, which certainly helped unlock growth and productivity. But trade policy has at best been erratic, with the country pursuing an import substitution strategy in sub-sectors such as beverage products, sugar, flour, and cereal. As a result, it is clear that the country has not yet been able to establish a stable and secure framework for international trade and investment.  

Nigeria’s score on property rights protection is relatively low, compared to the regional average, and does not seem to vary much along the period 1995–2023. Nonetheless, this score has less to do with a risk of government expropriation of property than may be the case in some other economies with such low scores. The score may be reflecting the strict local content policies implemented across different sectors, which in some ways impose limits on the capacity of companies and owners to manage their assets.  

The women’s economic freedom component seems to have improved in the last three decades, but is still lower in Nigeria (66.3) than in other comparator countries in the region like Kenya (83.8), Ethiopia (80), or South Africa (88.1). Some important laws regarding gender equality are probably weaker in Nigeria. For example, there are no quotas for parliamentary participation for women, nor specific legislation incentivizing women’s economic participation, although there are a variety of customary and religious laws at the subnational level that have varying impacts on women’s acquisition of assets. Overall, there might be a significant gap between formal legality and actual practice on this matter, because women in the country are highly entrepreneurial, and girls’ school enrollment has increased substantially since the 1990s, which favors their labor force participation and overall economic activity outside the home.  

Moving on to the political subindex, the democratic transition of 1999, that situated the country together with other democracies in the region, is evident in the graph. All components of the subindex sharply improve, with the notable exception of civil liberties. This indicator is the average of two variables, one measuring private civil liberties (freedom of movement, religion, etc.) and another the degree of physical violence (freedom from torture and political killings). When looking at the disaggregated data, it is clear that the very low level of the civil liberties component is generated by an extremely poor performance in the latter, while private civil liberties have consistently scored above 80 in the last two decades. Violent insurgencies are likely influential in the low level of the physical violence variable, with Islamist Boko Haram in the northeast, the separatist movement Indigenous People of Biafra in the southeast, and the rising levels of violent crime including kidnapping for ransom in various parts of Nigeria. The declining quality of the police forces may also be an important factor. There have been protests against police brutality around the country, most recently in 2020, and individual rights relating to detention and imprisonment are not always adequately guaranteed.  

The rest of the components of the political subindex reach standard levels for young democracies in the developing world, at least until 2016, even though there are some small fluctuations that can be discussed. The component measuring the quality and fairness of the electoral process suffers a five-point drop in 2003, and does not recover the initial level until 2011. This fits well with the generalized view that the 2003 and 2007 elections held in the country suffered clear deficiencies. Subsequent elections in 2011 and 2015 were visibly more credible, and the data reflect it well with a ten-point increase.  

Legislative constraints on the executive have been historically strong in Nigeria. Two episodes illustrate this fact fairly well. First, in 2007, the first post-military president tried to extend his tenure to get a third term in power, but he was successfully thwarted by the legislature. Second, in 2010, the successor president fell ill and his inner circle tried to prevent the handover of power to his vice-president. The legislature stepped in again, ensuring a legal transition of power. However, the data show a clear fall starting in 2015, exacerbated in 2019, and only reversed in 2023. It is not clear that any important piece of legislation was passed during this period that could have reduced the power of parliament to control the executive, so the scores may just be capturing the fact that, in the 2015 elections, the opposition party won a decisive majority in the legislature, and thus in the following years legislative checks on the executive may have been relatively soft as a result of both being of the same political party.  

Finally, the seven-and-a-half-point drop in political rights in 2020 can be explained by a combination of the emergency situation generated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the security concerns due to the insurgencies in the Niger Delta, the northeast, and the southeast of the country. It is undeniable that the government became increasingly intolerant with some forms of freedom of speech, for example limiting the use of social media. Nonetheless, the Nigerian situation is not necessarily comparable to other parts of the world that are experiencing deeper and more extended democratic regressions, and the partial recovery in 2023 seems to confirm this intuition. 

Turning to the legal subindex, it is very clear that judicial independence and effectiveness and clarity of the law receive significantly higher scores than the rest of the components of the subindex. This is comparable to the regional average, at least since the democratic transition of 1999. In the last twenty years, there have been numerous disputes between different branches of power (legislative versus executive, federal versus the thirty-six states, etc.) which have been decided in high courts, often times against the powerful federal government. A good example is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case between the federal government and the Lagos state over local government funds, which was decided in favor of the latter, a strong indication of Nigeria’s judicial independence. In most cases, judicial decisions are accepted, respected and abided by.  

Security, as well as bureaucracy quality and control of corruption, are the components dragging the legal subindex score down, generating a substantial gap with respect to the Sub-Saharan Africa regional average. These scores reflect realities on the ground. As commented earlier, the various insurgent movements around Nigeria, together with the spread of organized violent crime and banditry, generate a generalized environment of insecurity. The government appears to have made some progress in fighting insurgents in the last few years, pushing them back and dismantling their strongholds in both the oil-rich Niger Delta in the south and with regards to the Islamist Boko Haram in the northeast. However, there are high levels of violent crime, kidnapping for ransom, and banditry that the government—both at the federal level and across the thirty-six states—has struggled to address, with significant implications for the continuing development of the country.  

Last but not least, the recurrent and discouraging low score on bureaucracy and corruption is very real. The Nigerian civil service desperately needs a total overhaul, and the country’s successive political leaders are fully cognizant of this fact. But such reform could affect tens of thousands or even millions of public employees, who are politically powerful, which makes it politically very costly for any government. The crucial anti-corruption agencies created in the early 2000s, such as the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, were somewhat effective initially, in the first decade of the century, but soon became politicized. Thus, widespread and grand corruption in public administration can only be tackled with a holistic reform, which does not seem to be imminent. 

Evolution of prosperity

Despite the sustained growth of Nigeria’s score in the Prosperity Index since 1995, it still finds itself among the lowest prosperity group, ranking 136 out of 164 countries covered by the Indexes. However, there are some encouraging trends worth noting. First, the income component was influenced by the oil boom, in terms of high global oil prices in the 2002–15 period. Yet, as my own research shows, the oil boom was only a small part of the story. Other sectors of the economy also thrived since the early 2000s, such as banking and financial services and the telecoms industry, which were liberalized, smaller industrial services adjacent to oil production, and other non-oil exporting sectors. As a result, the data clearly show that oil’s contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) growth has been declining—from around 40 percent in the year 2000 to less than 10 percent today—with respect to the rest of the economy, denoting that Nigerian growth was not only based on the commodity boom. Nevertheless, the commodity price crash of 2015 affected the country’s overall growth trajectory, as Nigeria relies on oil exports for the bulk of its foreign exchange reserves, and thus many non-oil industries and sectors suffered increasing difficulties in accessing foreign imported inputs. The global effects of the COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated the situation, and Nigeria has not yet been able to recover the 2015 level of real GDP per capita. 

The promising evolution of the inequality component is probably capturing the substantial decrease in poverty rates within the country. Yet it must be noted that there is a clear regional divide in Nigeria, and the inequality and poverty reduction has not been homogenous across the country. The majority Muslim regions in the north of Nigeria are significantly poorer than the south, explained by much lower levels of educational attainment, higher prevalence of informality, and lower levels of industrial production, etc. Therefore, interregional or horizontal inequality is certainly deep and pervasive, and public policy should be directed to reduce the north-south gap.  

By far the most striking data come from the health component, where Nigeria ranks 162 among 164 countries, and the gap with respect to the Sub-Saharan Africa average has been widening in the last two decades. Nigeria’s life expectancy is much lower than its income level would predict, close to that of much poorer countries in West and Central Africa like Niger, Central African Republic, and others. This is a combination of two factors. First the already mentioned violence across the country, with its associated high levels of mortality of young fighters. Second, a precarious healthcare system that is significantly underfinanced, lacking professionals and personnel, especially in rural areas, a problem that will only be aggravated in the coming years given the high levels of population growth.  

The similarly low score regarding equal access and absence of discrimination for minorities also has important regional differentiations. The imposition of Sharia law in some northern states in the early 2000s did not favor Christian and other religious minority groups, or secular-oriented Muslims, in these states. However, since the mid2010s, the popularity of Sharia law in these states has declined significantly because the political leaders who championed its implementation were largely underperformers in terms of the actual quality of governance.  

Finally, the score on the environment component of the Prosperity Index is clearly low, but seems to show a positive trend in the last twenty-five years, with important caveats. On the one hand, pollution related to oil production is high, and there is uncertain commitment on its decisive reduction, which necessarily worsens air quality in the areas where oil extraction and refineries are prevalent. On the other, indoor air quality may have improved since the year 2000, when less than 1 percent of the population had access to clean cooking technologies, but even today that share is below 20 percent, which is very low. Deforestation, particularly in the north, is pervasive because many households still rely on biomass, wood burning, and other sources of domestic energy that are highly detrimental for their health. 

The path forward

Developments within Nigeria, within the African continent, and around the world will contribute to the country’s freedom and prosperity trajectory within the medium term. There are likely to be continuities and changes in the various dimensions that constitute Nigeria’s Freedom Index. The consolidation of the country’s electoral democracy will continue even if progress is not linear—it is very unlikely to experience a military coup or other such drastic setbacks to its democracy as was recently the case in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso in West Africa. Yet, the quality of Nigeria’s elections will continue to vary by election cycle, contingent on the nature of the electoral competition and the profile of candidates running.  

The pace, consistency and scope of Nigeria’s domestic economic reforms, as well as global economic conditions, will have a determinative impact on Nigeria’s economic subindex. While the country’s debilitating challenge of depending on fuel subsidies will remain prominent in the short term, efforts to increase the domestic refining and supply of refined fuels, including the completion of the Dangote refinery complex, will eventually address this challenge in the medium to long term. Nigeria will also continue to implement local content policies across various industries due to the demand coming from the country’s large and vibrant private sector. In addition to the oil and gas sector, creative industries (entertainment, movies, music), and the f inancial sector, where these local content policies have been most visibly enforced, information and communications technology and the digital economy could be the next frontier. A dynamic trade policy will certainly help propel Nigeria’s economy to greater heights, including helping to further advance important elements of small business development and women’s economic empowerment, but its design and implementation is not yet on the radar of the country’s top decision makers.  

There are likely to be both significant advancements and notable setbacks in the components of Nigeria’s political subindex. The exercise of effective checks on the executive by Nigeria’s National Assembly (i.e., federal legislature) may increase in the next election cycle, especially if opposition parties are able to leverage the current popular discontent and gain more seats in the two legislative houses. Progress on this front in the subnational legislatures—state houses of assemblies—is perhaps less certain. Without drastic and concerted efforts at addressing Nigeria’s security challenges, including a wholesale overhaul of the national police force, the significant levels of violent crime are unlikely to abate in the medium term.  

So much about Nigeria’s legal subindex will continue to be weighed down by the absence of comprehensive civil service reform. While this does not have direct bearing on the country’s notable levels of judicial independence, it directly impacts Nigeria’s bureaucratic quality. It remains to be seen whether any government can shoulder the political costs of overhauling Nigeria’s civil service by implementing the recommendations of the Oronsaye report to reform the public sector. 

In the short term, Nigeria’s per capita income will continue its declining trend as a result of COVID-19 shocks as well as the inflationary impacts of recent exchange rate and subsidies reforms. Consequently, Nigeria’s per capita income will continue to trail its regional peers including South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire. However, the pace of this income decline could be halted and even reversed in the medium term with the design and implementation of pro-productivity economic policies on the supply side but also on the demand side. Addressing Nigeria’s electricity, transportation and digital connectivity infrastructure gaps will be crucial on this front. Reducing the incidents of violent crime, especially banditry plaguing rural farming communities, is also necessary. Effective coordination of trade, investment and industrial policies focused on labor-intensive industries, particularly agriculture and manufacturing, will be essential. 

In the near term, Nigeria’s social indicators are likely to deteriorate before they stabilize and, contingent on the rollout of mitigating policies, experience a trend reversal. Due to domestic factors, such as, the impacts of the removal of subsidies, harmonization of exchange rates, and inflation, as well as exogenous factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the incidence of poverty is very likely to increase inequality. Findings from a new round of the Nigeria Living Standards Survey when released—the last round was conducted in 2018–19—will likely confirm this trend. However, a comprehensive rollout of income-smoothing social protection interventions could support households and even small businesses to navigate the adverse impacts of liberalization policies. Increased health spending as well as workforce training could further bolster Nigeria’s health and mortality indicators.  

Finally, Nigeria’s environment-related indicators may stabilize and take an improving turn as relevant policies take effect. Progress in the implementation of Nigeria’s natural gas masterplan, in the medium term, could help reduce gas flaring and the associated environmental pollution. Political outreach by the federal government to aggrieved groups in the oil-producing Niger Delta could help reduce some types of small-scale oil theft and illegal oil refining that often result in oil spills and aggravate environmental degradation. Extensive support being provided by multilateral development banks and other international organizations to support clean cooking solutions could help reduce biomass use by households and thereby slow down the pace of deforestation in the country. 

Zainab Usman is the founding director of the Africa Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. Usman’s enduring area of expertise is identifying the policies and institutions to enable low- and middle-income economies to harness their natural resources to achieve sustainable economic development. She is author of the book Economic Diversification in Nigeria: The Politics of Building a Post-Oil Economy, which was selected as one of the best books of 2022 on economics by the Financial Times. 

The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.

2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

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Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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Evolution of freedom

Indexes are only as good as the data they use and the methodology they follow. However, for Africa, indexes are an important determinant of how citizens perceive progress in the country, how bilateral donors make decisions on when, where, and how to extend support, and, lately, they are a fundamental component of rating agency assessments. As African countries seek to improve access to more affordable capital and crowd in more foreign direct investment, it is crucial that they pay attention to these indexes. Cameroon is no exception. In addition, indexes can provide rare insights into the linkages between issues such as environmental freedom and gender prosperity. The data on Cameroon suggest a strong link between economic freedom, health, education, and gender empowerment. This essay will focus on that and draw lessons for the future. 

Cameroon’s score in the Freedom Index (47.6) is well below the average for the African continent (64.03) and many similar countries such as Senegal (68.7) and Côte d’Ivoire (61.7). The overall freedom measure is a composite score of the legal, political, and economic subindexes, where Cameroon ranks 133rd, 120th, and 144th respectively, out of 164 countries covered by the Indexes.  

Cameroon’s poor performance in the Freedom Index since 1995 is mainly determined by the political and legal dimensions. The political subindex includes four main components: elections, political rights, civil liberties, and legislative constraints on the executive. Political power is centralized in Cameroon, unlike Senegal, for example, and as a result there is no effective system of separation of powers, with both legislative and judicial branches being dependent on the executive power. The level and trend of different components of the Index capture this general assessment.  

The low levels of legislative constraints on the executive and judicial independence, compared to Côte d’Ivoire, for example, reflect the high level of concentration of power in the executive. The judiciary is subordinated to the Ministry of Justice, and the president is entitled to appoint judges (this is not unlike the United States but the degree of independence of the judiciary is also about implementation of policies) and only the president can request the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of a law. Regarding the legislative, the formation of political parties has been permitted since 1997, and political rights are protected by law. Parliament is also highly dependent on the presidency, which appoints thirty out of the one hundred members of the Senate, the second legislative chamber established in 2013.  

Strong executive power could and should actually benefit women’s economic freedom but currently does not. There are spillovers from the political subindex to other aspects of the institutional framework of Cameroon. This is visible in the economic subindex, which measures trade and investment openness, protection of property rights, and economic opportunities for women. Regarding the latter, Cameroon’s score in the women’s economic freedom component (60) is—surprisingly—among the lowest in the world, ranking 140th among the 164 countries covered by the Indexes. Despite a ten-point increase in 2018, reflecting the introduction of legislation dealing with workplace nondiscrimination and sexual harassment, Cameroon’s performance in this component is still significantly lower than that of other countries in the region, such as Côte d’Ivoire (95), Senegal (72.5), Nigeria (66.3), Gabon (95), and Kenya (83.8).  

Important areas affecting gender equality, where Cameroon does not yet grant legal protection similar to the countries mentioned above, include civil liberties such as freedom of movement and marital rights, and financial inclusion legislation regarding access to banking services, asset ownership, and administration. While implementation of some of the more restrictive legislation may differ from the reality on the ground—for example, women can own property in their name today—the lack of changes to the legal documents opens the door for predatory compliance and legal battles in some cases.  

Having women in government leadership positions has led many countries in the region to advance significant improvements in women’s rights and opportunities. One illustrative example is the case of Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in Nigeria, who introduced several policies aimed at empowering women during her periods as finance minister (2003–06 and 2011–15), such as the Growing Girls and Women in Nigeria (G-WIN) program. This created a gender-responsive budgeting system that ensured a certain share of public procurement went to female entrepreneurs. Similar legislation can be identified in Kenya, with the Access to Government Procurement Opportunities program introduced in 2013, as well as in Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Adopting some of these tried and tested programs in Cameroon could help improve women’s economic freedom de jure and de facto.  

Cameroon’s commitment to open and free trade is ambiguous, despite its very strategic location. Total trade to gross domestic product (GDP) has decreased substantially in the last decade, from 50 percent in 2014 to 39 percent in 2023, well below the average for Africa (74.49 percent). On the one hand, the country imposes relatively high tariffs on imports besides primary necessity goods, established at 10 percent for raw materials and equipment goods, 20 percent for intermediary and miscellaneous goods, and up to 30 percent for fast-moving consumer goods, implying an average tariff rate around 18 percent, more than double the average for Africa. With women being the most active small and medium entrepreneurs in cross-border trade, 20 percent tariffs have the potential to disproportionately affect them as a group.  

On the other hand, Cameroon has signed trade agreements with the European Union, United States, China, Japan, and several other nations. In 2020, the country also ratified the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement, the signature African trade agreement. Cameroon is also a member of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, which aims a common market among Central African countries. Nonetheless, Cameroon has a negligible trade relationship with Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the other five member states. More generally, inter-Africa trade is still marginal, with only 12.7 percent of Cameroon’s export earnings coming from African partners, and less than 10 percent of total imports in 2023. For example, Cameroon’s trade with Nigeria—the largest economy in Africa—was less than 1 percent in 2021. The two countries having difficult and high tariffs undermines their collective prosperity. Policies to improve trade between the two countries will also disproportionately support small women-owned businesses.  

The most relevant factor regarding investment and capital movement regulations in Cameroon is the fact that the national currency, the Central African CFA franc, is shared by the five neighbors mentioned above, and is pegged to the euro at a fixed exchange rate. This has the benefit of providing stability and predictability but also constrains Cameroon’s capacity to autonomously determine its monetary, investment, and capital flows policies. Another factor certainly influencing the investment climate in Cameroon is the security situation in the country and the region. With low tariffs in the sector, foreign capital continues to focus on extractive industries and infrastructure, and the repeated efforts of the government to expand international investment to other sectors have not borne the expected fruits.  

Two other features of Cameroon’s institutional framework stand out in the legal subindex components, namely, the high levels of corruption across all levels of the administration, and the low level of security. Both of these unduly penalize women, who are generally the most affected by conflict and petty corruption. 

Cameroon is host to a large number of refugees as a result of the conflict in the subregion, and this has impacted civil liberties. With respect to security, relatively high levels of small criminality have combined with a surge in terrorist attacks, especially in the last decade, with the emergence of Boko Haram and other Islamist groups, as well as the unrest in the north and southwest of the country. These different violent conflicts, together with the substantial immigration flows coming from Nigeria, Libya, Central African Republic, Chad, and other neighboring countries, have increased the need for tighter security within the country. 

Evolution of prosperity

On the Prosperity Index, measured as the average of six constituent elements (income, inequality, minorities, health, environment and education), Cameroon performs better than its peers but still remains below the African average. The country has outpaced the low regional average in prosperity growth at least since 2005. Education, health, and environment seem to be the areas where improvements have been most palpable, and will be the focus of the following paragraphs. 

The health component of the Prosperity Index, based on life expectancy data, shows a change of tendency around the late 1990s. This is not a feature unique to Cameroon; a similar inflection point from decreasing to rapidly increasing life expectancy is also observable in other African countries such as South Africa, Gabon, and Côte d’Ivoire. An important push in the fight against AIDS, substantially financed by programs led by the international donor community such as the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, was instrumental in this case. Additionally, the increased availability of vaccines for different diseases and some progress in terms of infant and maternal mortality have contributed to this positive evolution.  

Nonetheless, there is still huge room for improvement. First, total public expenditure on health has been below 4 percent of GDP since 2001 (3.82 percent in 2021, the last year of available data), not yet close to the necessary level to ensure substantial and sustained betterment in health outcomes, usually estimated between 5 and 7 percent. For comparison, the average for Sub-Saharan Africa in 2021 is 5.1 percent, and for the Middle East and North Africa region reaches 5.76 percent. Similarly, health expenditure per capita in Cameroon was in 2021 just $155.56, substantially lower than in Nigeria ($220.40), Gabon ($411), or the average of the Sub-Saharan Africa region ($203.70). 

Not only is aggregate spending relatively low, but also the destination of healthcare investment is not optimal. In the last decades, Cameroon has consolidated a series of big training hospitals, mainly located in big cities. On the contrary, investment in primary and preventive healthcare has been deficient, especially in rural areas, creating wide inequalities across the country. Recent disease outbreaks underscore the need for improved strong healthcare systems at the local level. As for other least developed countries, the potential gains of basic health interventions to ensure generalized access to vaccination and maternal and infant care are enormous, as the experience of other African countries has shown.  

Turning to education, the data on school enrollment show a very significant acceleration since the early 2000s, when Cameroon started to grow faster than the regional average. It is important to note the very low initial level of this indicator, but the progress is still remarkable. Free primary education was introduced in the year 2000, and this is probably one important factor explaining the trend in the last two decades.  

Nonetheless, families still need to cover the costs of uniforms and books, which is a significant barrier for an important share of the population. Recall that, according to the World Bank, 23 percent of Cameroon’s population is today living in extreme poverty (under US$2.15 a day), and thus such costs are very significant for them. Moreover, secondary school tuition and fees are not subsidized, which constrains educational attainment for a much larger fraction of children.  

Two areas requiring substantial improvement are, first, the poor quality of the education received, which undermines actual learning outcomes of Cameroonian students. Learning poverty, the share of children not able to read and understand an age-appropriate text by age ten, is estimated by the World Bank at a high 71.9 percent, with girls especially disadvantaged.  

Second, there are important sources of educational inequality, particularly gender and regional based. School enrollment rates are significantly lower for girls than for boys at all levels of the educational system, heavily influenced by high rates of child marriage and early childbearing among girls.  

The attempt to impose French curricula across the whole country led to heated debate, protests, civil unrest, and ultimately, violent clashes in some parts of the country. As a result, schools closed for two years (2018–19), and before they had fully reopened, the COVID-19 pandemic hit and schools were closed again. This combination of shocks has probably generated a very significant slowdown in educational attainment that is not yet captured by the data used in the Prosperity Index.  

Cameroon’s score on the environment component is heavily influenced by one of the variables used to compute it: access to clean cooking technologies. Although this indicator has improved consistently in the last twenty-five years, from barely 10 percent of the population to almost 30 percent today using clean technologies, once again we observe striking spatial differences across the country and between rural and urban populations. Cameroon produces gas and therefore could rapidly improve on this indicator. New cooking stoves are widely available and easily diffused. The executive has the power to improve on this indicator and save lives while improving livelihoods.  

Most importantly, the Prosperity Index does not include any indicator on deforestation, which is extremely relevant for Cameroon, which has the second largest forest area in the Congo Basin, from which many women earn an income.  

The evolution of tree cover areas reveals a loss of 1.53 million hectares between 2001 and 2020, of which 47 percent was in primary forests. As a result, forest as a percentage of land decreased from 47.6 percent in 1990 to 43.03 percent in 2020. In 2021, Cameroon was seventh on the list of the world’s top deforesters, with 89,000 hectares of forest lost. This trend not only threatens to significantly alter weather and crop patterns in the country, affecting women disproportionately, but may lead to deteriorating health conditions as nature and Cameroon’s biodiversity are altered significantly.  

This situation is by no means unavoidable but requires a clear policy commitment if it is to be averted. Cameroon has important gas reserves, and the low usage of wood by households in cities proves that there are possible alternatives. Obviously, providing access to gas and other forms of energy to rural areas requires an important investment in infrastructure and creation of logistic networks that are not yet in place, but certainly should be a priority for the government and the international community in the near future. Cameroonian women not only suffer from a very unequal legislative environment, but also due to structural conditions on these areas that further hamper their personal development compared to men. 

The path forward

The strength of data lies in its capacity to tell stories and be scrutinized. The data on Cameroon need more attention and the authorities should work with the groups that collect the original data used to build these Indexes, along with the Cameroon National Statistics Office, development institutions, and other research institutions that collect data, to ensure representation of Cameroon is accurate, especially since these data are often used by market players to inform investment decisions.  

In the interim, one crucial conclusion from the data is the interdependence between the health, education, and environment components and the women’s economic freedom component. This interconnectedness is a double-edged sword, as weak legislative focus undermines women’s economic empowerment, which leads to poor health and education outcomes and in some cases may also lead to environmental degradation.  

Bottom-up or top-down policies could help move these indicators, building on the successes already achieved in these domains, first by focusing on laws that provide women with better economic empowerment. This essay has cited several examples of initiatives in other countries which could be adapted to fit the national context and implemented in Cameroon.  

Education remains the fastest way to economic empowerment of populations and women in general. In the long run it can help reduce costs of healthcare as educated women tend to adopt more preventive approaches for themselves and their children, reducing the cost of healthcare which is not only high but still comprises lots of risks for women. To this end, the policy of free primary education must be coupled with robust teacher quality and performance indicators to ensure that children are actively learning. A year of lost learning, even if it appears free, is costly for teacher, student, and parent. This kind of waste undermines the economy in the long run as an unskilled population is an economic cost to the country over time.  

Cameroon’s environmental resources, if well managed, could represent an important source of revenue for local populations and women in particular in an economic environment where carbon markets are growing, protection of fauna and flora is valued, and organic production commands a premium from markets. Support by government to reforestation projects could help generate resources for rural populations while promoting more nature tourism, building on the strengths of the country. An important component of the women’s health and environment nexus, however, would be policies which help women use cleaner cooking practices, as unsafe technologies claim the lives of many women.  

Overall, the policies needed to improve the economic freedom components for women are well within reach of the Cameroonian government, as many are policy-based first and foremost. In addition, it would serve the government well to work with the Indexes to scrutinize the data and scoring so that they can provide a more accurate report on the economic freedom of women in Cameroon. 

Vera Songwe is a nonresident senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development practice at the Brookings Institution and chair and founder of the Board of the Liquidity and Sustainability Facility. Songwe is a board member of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation and previously served as undersecretary-general at the United Nations and executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Songwe’s expertise includes work on Africa’s growth prospects in a global context, with a focus on improving access to sustainable finance. 

The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.

2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

Read the Book

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post Cameroon’s future relies on empowering its women  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

French authorities have this month arrested several Algerian citizens living in France for allegedly inciting violence and hatred online targeting opponents of the Algerian government. One such Algerian national, Boualem Naman, was arrested on January 5 and promptly expelled from France. But upon his arrival at Algiers airport, authorities refused his entry, reportedly arguing that Naman should be offered the opportunity to defend himself in France, thus ordering his return. This all led to a diplomatic crisis between the two countries, with the French interior minister accusing Algeria of “trying to humiliate” his country.

In addition, just before the new year, Algerian political activist Abdelwakil Blamm was also arrested for allegedly taking part in a terrorist organization and publishing false and malicious news through his social profile on Facebook. Critics argue that these arrests are targeted and part of a crackdown campaign to silence opponents, a move that worries European authorities for the potential reversal of what is left of Algeria’s freedom of expression. 

Blamm is an activist, well known in the country for his fierce criticism of the government. Meanwhile, and as reflected by the charges brought against Blamm, authorities accuse him of being linked to a foreign terrorist network, in whose favor he allegedly spreads false information.

Earlier, on November 16, Algerian authorities arrested French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal, who is known for being critical of Algeria’s political leadership and has been accused by local authorities of threatening Algerian national security. He was arrested shortly after arriving in Algeria, and he is being prosecuted under an article of the penal code on terrorist or subversive acts against the constitutional order and state security. Algerian President Abdelmajid Tebboune himself has spoken on the subject, calling Sansal an impostor sent by France to destabilize the country’s public order. According to some reports, Algerian authorities may have been offended by Sansal’s comments to a French news outlet about Western Sahara being part of Morocco.

But even beyond this recent escalation of tension, however, the bilateral relationship has been progressively deteriorating in other areas.

The two countries’ positions on both the bilateral relationship and regional politics have increasingly diverged. Last July, France signalled for the first time that it would recognize an autonomy plan for the Western Sahara region, albeit under Moroccan sovereignty, leading to outrage and strong condemnation from Algeria, with a formal statement from the government calling the decision “unexpected, ill-judged, and counterproductive.”

Several members of the Algerian political system believe that the relationship has also deteriorated due to the increasing political assertion of the far right in France, whose anti-immigration policies heavily impact Algerian citizens. At the same time, however, some French officials and politicians—including members of Macron’s government—have criticized Algeria and its increasingly anti-French drift.

Yet, the deterioration of the relationship extends even beyond recent tensions and issues related to Western Sahara and Morocco. The nature of the crisis between Algeria and France seems to have much deeper roots, which lie in the failure to define a real postcolonial reconciliation process and in France’s persistent refusal to engage in a critical reinterpretation of its role in the country. For example, recent studies suggest that the French school system still refers to the colonial period as having positive effects in addition to negative consequences, angering Algerians. 

With France and Algeria apparently unable to engage in constructive dialogue on the substance of their bilateral relations, it seems quite unlikely that they will be able to manage a positive turnaround of the current state of crisis in the short term. Algeria’s fear of growing international isolation, coupled with growing internal tensions in French domestic politics, risk aggravating misunderstandings between the two countries. If left unchecked, these disputes could push France and Algeria toward an irrevocable rupture in their relations reminiscent of Paris’s diplomatic breaks with its former allies in the Sahel region.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Nicola Pedde is the director of the Rome and Brussels-based Institute for Global Studies.

The post The roots of recent Algeria-France tensions are deeper than it may seem appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Like other Arab countries with existing diplomatic ties with Israel, Morocco needed to appease its local public opinion by reducing its public-facing appearances with its newly gained ally and raising the tone of its official speeches calling for a ceasefire and a two-state solution as the war continued to escalate. Yet, far from the crowded streets of Tangier or Casablanca, where pro-Palestinian demonstrators gather, another reality persists in the country’s security and intelligence spheres. In reality, security cooperation between Israel and Morocco is flourishing and has never been stronger, driven by a common Iranian threat and a shared vision for regional integration.

Countering Iranian Neo-Sasanian imperialism

Since 2018, Morocco has warned about Iranian expansionist ambitions in Western Sahara following its severance of relations with Tehran over alleged military and financial support for the Polisario Front separatists through Lebanese Hezbollah. Reports have confirmed increased Iranian interference in the disputed territories of Western Sahara, which Morocco has claimed sovereignty over since its independence from Spain in 1975. This interference has involved Iran supplying lethal unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), surface-to-air missiles, and HM-16 mortar shells, along with training that has emboldened the separatist group. Consequently, Polisario forces began shelling towns within the Moroccan-administered areas of Western Sahara, specifically in Smara and Mahbes, alongside the Gaza war. This is a troubling development, as these actions violate the ceasefire established in September 1991.

The recent fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime may have uncovered the depth of relations between the Polisario Front and Iran, with Syria acting as the intermediary. Amid the chaos following the fall of Damascus, an unverified document emerged that revealed correspondence between the Syrian Ministry of Defense and the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Republic regarding the training of 120 Polisario soldiers in armed combat at Iran’s request. During the capture of Aleppo in Northern Syria, at least thirty Sahrawi mercenaries were apprehended by rebel forces, while Fahad Almasri, the head of Syria’s National Salvation Front, disclosed that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had dispatched about two hundred Polisario members to Thaala military airport, the Sweida army base, and rural Daraa over the past three years. Recently, Representative Joe Wilson of South Carolina (R-SC) also briefed the US House about the situation, stating that “war criminal Putin, Iran & Cuba are actively destabilizing West Africa by supporting Polisario Front, a threat to the Kingdom of Morocco—an essential US partner.”

The partnership between Morocco and Israel is inspired and reinforced by their shared interest in opposing Iran’s expansion and its anti-Western, Neo-Sasanian ideology, which traditionally saw Arabs as vassal kingdoms like the Lakhmids. Iran is looking to recreate this pattern through its regional proxies in countries like Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and—if the international community doesn’t address this pressing threat—in Western Sahara. However, the kingdom failed to persuade its own population that its alignment with Israel is not against the Palestinian cause but against Iranian malign expansionist ambitions in the region.

The Moroccan population has long-standing and established ties with the Palestinian people—with whom it shares culture, language, and religion—and a large portion has become increasingly vocal in demanding an end to normalization with Israel amid the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza. Recently, a Moroccan citizen who permanently resides in the US even carried out atrocious terrorist attacks, stabbing four people at the heart of Tel Aviv—an incident likely motivated by a deep discontent towards the events in Gaza. This stance, however, is not shared by the political and security apparatus in Rabat, which understands that countries can’t be ruled by sentimentalism, particularly after the collapse of the last of the pan-Arabist regimes in Damascus.  

The annals of Morocco-Israel security cooperation

While the Moroccan government publicly attempts to appease the sentiments of its population and strike a balance between Morocco’s Arab-Islamic duties and its higher security interests, in private, security cooperation with Israel is thriving thanks to the intimate relationship between the two allies’ military and intelligence communities.

These institutions have a history of secret cooperation dating back to the 1960s and more formal relations since the late King Hassan II met Prime Minister Shimon Peres in Rabat in 1986. In 2020, the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces reportedly acquired three Israeli-made Heron drones, developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), for some $48 million. The systems, which were long-endurance models, were intended to be used in reconnaissance missions along the wall of sand in Western Sahara. Rabat’s appetite for Israeli weapons has grown since, with the purchase of the SkyLock Dome anti-drone systems in 2022 for $500 million and the Barak MX missile systems in 2023 for another $500 million, and the announcement in 2024 of the opening of a drone manufacturing facility by Israeli BlueBird Aero Systems in Morocco.

Business has continued to strengthen since the onset of the Gaza war. On the defense side, Morocco is poised to acquire a spy satellite from IAI in a $1-billion deal. Rabat recently faced backlash from local human rights groups when it extradited Nassim Khalibat, a Palestinian holding an Israeli passport who is suspected of being behind the 2021 bombing of the Nazareth Health Ministry. Trade cooperation has also increased, with bilateral exports reaching $53.2 million during the first six months of 2024, a 64-percent increase from the same period last year. 

Beyond the practical benefits of cooperation, deeper historical and cultural ties are also at the foundation of this intimate relationship. Indeed, many Israeli security leaders have roots in the once-Jewish kingdom of Morocco. Meir Ben-Shabbat, the former Israeli national security advisor and a Moroccan Jew, once famously performed the allegiance bow before King Mohamed VI, repeating, “May God bless your age, my master” in Arabic. Another key figure is Amir Perez, the architect of the Israeli Iron Dome, who—like Yassine Manssouri, the head of the Moroccan intelligence services—was born in the small mountainous town of Boujad. One in ten Israelis today have Moroccan ancestry, including influential politicians like Speaker of the Knesset Amir Ohana, Aryeh Deri, and Yaakov Margi, to name only a few.  Moroccan-Israeli relations have become stronger than ever since the recent events in the Middle East, and those relations are here to stay.

Though the United States brokered it, this critical alliance transcends Washington’s mediation and will be sustained by shared history and common geostrategic interests. Morocco has no intention of closing its liaison office in Tel Aviv like it did in 2000 during the Second Intifada, no matter how loud the popular opposition in Rabat becomes. Recently, a high-level Moroccan official told me it was “a regrettable decision that the kingdom is not prepared to repeat in light of a regional threat that may cost us half of our territories and the security of our children.” He added, “We share with the Israelis a common destiny and a vision for a peaceful and prosperous future.”

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, where she also serves as the deputy director for communications.

The post How the Gaza war brought Morocco and Israel closer appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Evolution of freedom

Morocco has substantially improved in all institutional dimensions during the last three decades, as measured by the progress in the Freedom Index. The Kingdom navigated the Arab Spring, which rocked certain countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. As a result, a diverging trend has emerged between the sustained improvement in Morocco and the deterioration in MENA’s regional average since 2013, resulting in a gap of more than eleven points in their respective Freedom Index scores. As this chapter will detail, there are many areas in which Morocco still needs to continue its reform effort toward fully free and open institutions, building on recent positive trends.

The economic subindex shows a very sharp discontinuity in the year 2004, where Morocco’s score jumps more than eight points, opening a very substantial gap with respect to the rest of the region. A closer look at the components included in the economic subindex evinces that it is primarily driven by an extensive improvement in women’s economic opportunities, produced by the implementation of a new Family Code, known as Moudawana, in 2004. This piece of legislation is seen as one of the most progressive of the region, expanding women’s rights and protections in relation to civil liberties like marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance; as well as labor and economic aspects such as workplace protection, equal pay, maternity leave, and access to credit.

Morocco has historically been fairly open to international trade and foreign investment. The European Union-Morocco Association Agreement that entered into force in the year 2000, creating a free trade area with the European Union, has certainly expanded exporting opportunities. Yet, the concentration of trade relations with Europe may have slowed down economic integration with neighboring countries in the Middle East and Africa. The signing of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement in 2018, and its ratification in 2022, will likely favor the expansion of Morocco’s trade and investment flows with the rest of Africa in the coming decades.

The different components of the economic subindex are not wholly capturing domestic aspects of free and fair competition. Like in most countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Morocco is subject to an important level of market concentration in many sectors, especially non-tradable sectors. That is despite progress made in the competition policy framework. Leveling the playing field will be paramount if Morocco wants to ignite productivity and job creation.

The political environment in Morocco is complex, as evidenced by the large differences in the scores of the four components of the political subindex. Following the Arab Spring, a new Constitution was adopted which aimed at fostering more democracy, reinforcing the independence of the judiciary, combating corruption, and better protecting women and minorities. As a result of the new Constitution, judicial independence and effectiveness scores increased by ten points. While the Constitution brought important strides, critics argue that the concentration of power has not changed. Political rights in Morocco are better protected than in most other countries in the region, but the overall level is still far from the most advanced countries of the world. Freedom of expression is fairly protected, but it is limited. As a result, the press cannot fully fulfill its role as a public watchdog, including on issues of corruption. Morocco performs poorly in the bureaucracy and corruption component of the legal subindex.

The positive trend in terms of reduction of informality reflects efforts by the authorities to formalize the economy. The enrollment of informal workers into the public health system is, however, proving difficult. The trend in informality is linked to progress toward poverty reduction in Morocco. Yet poverty remains pervasive, especially in rural areas. The informal sector serves as a shock absorber, Evolution of Prosperity and as such, adopting a more inclusive approach as opposed to coercion is desirable. Reduction in barriers to entry into the formal sector is the way to go to reduce informality.

Evolution of prosperity

The evolution of the Prosperity Index since 1995 illustrates the sustained improvement in standards of living in Morocco, which has reduced the gap with the average of the MENA region. It is important to note that the regional average includes several low-population, oil-rich countries, namely the Gulf monarchies, which partially explains the persistent gap.

An important factor that increased the cohesiveness of Moroccan society, and certainly improved the recognition and protection of minorities, is the acceptance of the Berber language as official in 2011. This historic step has produced positive spillovers in terms of cohesiveness but it remains to be seen whether this will translate into reduced regional inequality in the medium term.

Regional inequalities are significant in several components included in the Prosperity Index, The Path Forward such as income, education, and health. Increasing economic prosperity in the last decades has disproportionately benefited urban populations in cities, which have also been the destination of most investments and growth-enhancing public policies. As a result, there are still sizable pockets where poverty is severe.

The performance of the educational system reflects that duality. While access to primary education has become universal, the quality of education is uneven. Indeed, the quality of education is much lower in rural than urban areas, further exacerbating spatial inequalities. The situation of the healthcare system is not very different, and suffers from several issues already mentioned, like the large disparities along the urban-regional divide.

The path forward

Overall, Morocco has made notable progress toward economic transformation, but further efforts to balance its economic development are needed. Morocco’s experience with economic development is unbalanced. On the one hand, there are pockets of rapid development, and on the other, pervasive poverty remains, especially in rural areas. In 2021, Morocco has started to implement a “new development model” to improve human capital, boost productivity, and foster inclusion. Despite the progress, economic growth remains tepid and poverty is pervasive. What is more, Morocco is faced with a relatively high level of debt. The lack of fiscal space constrains government spending to reduce spatial disparities and support poorer households.

The danger for Morocco is that it could remain stuck in a so-called middle-income trap with low growth and high poverty, which could further ignite social tensions. To reignite growth and transform its economy, Morocco must level the playing field. To do so, issues of market structure and competition must become more central. That would help jumpstart productivity and create good jobs. Take the example of the telecom sector, where anti-competitive practices have long made the quality and cost of digital services expensive.

Barriers to the adoption of so-called general-purpose technology such as quality and affordable internet are an important factor keeping Morocco in the middle-income trap, and also could further the divide between urban and rural areas. The pervasive lack of contestability, and the slow pace of technology adoption, help explain why Morocco is stuck in low growth. Governments play a key role in the regulation of entry in key “upstream” sectors such as telecom. Meanwhile, the lack of availability of frontier technology may have forced firms into low-productivity activities and limited their trade and economic growth.

More generally, unfair competition that results from markets dominated by connected firms deters private investment, reducing the number of jobs and preventing countless talented youngsters Rabah Arezki from prospering. This lack of fair competition is the underlying reason that Morocco, like other Middle East and North African economies, is unresponsive. The lack of contestability leads to cronyism and what amounts to rent-seeking activity, including, but hardly limited to, exclusive licenses, which reward their holders and discourage both domestic and foreign competition.

Morocco has adopted a competition framework to champion open competition, but the limited independence of the competition authority reduces its ability to decisively shape the market structure of the economy. An integral part of the competition and contestability agenda is transparency and data availability. Morocco, like other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, trails behind other similar middle-income countries on government transparency and the disclosure of data in critical areas on the degree of competition in sectors. Greater transparency would help build a consensus over the need for more competition to stimulate growth and job creation.

Rabah Arezki is a former vice president at the African Development Bank, a former chief economist of the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa region and a former chief of commodities at the International Monetary Fund’s Research Department. Arezki is now a director of research at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Studies and Research on International Development, and at Harvard Kennedy School.

The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.

2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

Read the Book

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post Morocco’s government must foster greater economic competition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Pavia interviewed by Warrior Diplomacy on the struggle for power in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Freedom and democracy are in decline globally, according to the Atlantic Council’s Freedom Index. Political freedom in particular has slumped sharply since 2019, bringing the world to a twenty-four-year low. The biggest backsliders—the places with the sharpest declines in political freedom—span every major geographic region and many are particularly relevant to US national security.  

There are several fundamental reasons for the United States to support strategies that aim to halt such backsliding and foster democratization, including ones that go beyond the moral obligation to support humanitarian values. For instance, research shows that democracies are less prone to enable and export transnational crime or terrorism, and democracies are better at adapting to adverse economic events and avoiding large-scale disasters, and are more reliable trading partners, offering better business opportunities by upholding the rule of law and protecting investments from the arbitrary predation of political elites. Most notably, the vast majority of people around the world continue to prefer to be governed democratically.

Democracy support also strengthens the US position more broadly in the strategic contest against the autocratic rivals of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Robust democratic institutions—transparent judiciaries, capable legislatures, responsive political parties, an active civil society, and a free press—make it harder for the rulers in the autocratic bloc to co-opt elites in other countries and advance their malign agendas.

But with the world experiencing a global democratic recession, questions arise as to whether supporting democracy is a losing battle. Despite the bleak recent data on global democratic progress, democracy assistance is still crucial, not only in countries undergoing political openings and democratic consolidation but also—and perhaps even more so—in countries that are backsliding.  

Case studies in the Middle East, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa suggest that using foreign assistance (in addition to and in concert with diplomacy and investment) to support democracy champions wherever they are is an effective strategy, even if the payoff is not immediately apparent at the level of a country’s political system.  

Report Sep 5, 2024

Supporting credible elections to advance democracy globally in 2024 and beyond

By Katherine Ellena, Mario Mitre, and Patrick Quirk

The US and its allies support free and fair elections to strengthen democracy, ensuring global stability and security. This paper explores how US foreign aid for elections is a wise investment, highlighting priority elections in 2024 and 2025 where focused assistance can uphold democratic values and foster citizens’ trust in the democratic process.

Africa Elections

Report Jul 3, 2024

Advancing freedom, defeating authoritarianism: A democracy agenda for 2025-2029

By Patrick Quirk

This report provides actionable and measurable policy recommendations for the upcoming administration’s foreign policy to advance democracy and strengthen the US position in international development.

Economy & Business Freedom and Prosperity

Issue Brief Sep 19, 2023

Less freedom, weaker states, more conflict: can that cycle be broken?

By Patrick W. Quirk and Owen L. Myers

Why and how advancing freedom (political, economic, and judicial components) is the surest way to advance sustainable stability and associated prosperity.

Democratic Transitions Freedom and Prosperity

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post Even in authoritarian countries, democracy advocates are worth investing in appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Faced with rising macroeconomic pressures and the aftershocks of global crises, many nations are scrambling to stay afloat. Unsustainable debt has too often prevented my country—Ghana—from achieving its full potential. Recently, Ghana has successfully restructured thirteen billion dollars in international debt, offering important lessons for countries facing such issues and the wider international financial community.

Lessons for debtor countries

Successful debt restructuring cannot be achieved until a country puts its house in order. An IMF-supported reform agenda that stabilizes the economy and lays the foundation for sustainable, inclusive, and long-term growth is essential. In Ghana, this meant restructuring domestic debt, bringing inflation down, strengthening social safety nets, increasing the flexibility of exchange-rate policies, and tightening monetary policy. Ghana has also used this debt restructuring to refocus our medium-term policy vision on green investments and development projects that will help us meet our climate goals while driving sustainable growth and the creation of new, well-paying jobs for the Ghanaian people. This will ensure that Ghana not only leaves debt challenges behind for good but reemerges in international markets stronger.

Second, Ghana’s proactive approach to negotiating with the IMF, bondholders, and the official creditor committee allowed for swift progress under the Group of Twenty (G20) Common Framework. The negotiation took just two years, making it the fastest to date. We adapted to move at the speed of the market and aligned Ghana’s internal bureaucracies to respond to creditor feedback and proposals more quickly. The involvement of African advisers with a deep understanding of financial markets, local knowledge, and key stakeholders, as well as the ability to navigate Ghana’s bureaucracy, was essential in getting the deal across the finish line—an important lesson for other countries.

Lastly, countries must prioritize transparency to regain the trust of their creditors, investors, and international partners. In Ghana’s case, we committed to regular disclosures of the public debt portfolio, increased our surveillance on debt issuance by public entities, and are digitizing debt management to enhance transparency and efficiency. These are all policies that have been supported and recognized by the IMF. These reforms helped boost the confidence of our private and international partners and show that Ghana is planning for long-term fiscal stability and sustainable growth. Ghana’s priority now is ensuring we do not need a future restructuring, which would damage the market confidence we’ve worked hard to restore.

Lessons for the international financial community

Ghana’s case shows that the G20 Common Framework is working out its growing pains. The Common Framework has come a long way in improving coordination between traditional and nontraditional creditors and accelerating the pace of restructuring. However, the international financial community must continue to increase these coordination efforts to further improve the Common Framework’s speed and efficiency. Waiting two years to regain access to international markets may not seem long, but it still hampers economic progress. Swift, transparent, and fair processes in the international financial system benefit not only debtor countries but also the global economy.

Additionally, many African nations are actively reforming and building stable, growth-focused economies, but they are limited by international perceptions. While political and geopolitical dynamics naturally influence credit ratings, as recognized by the United Nations Development Programme, it is imperative that these standards are applied fairly and consistently.  Credit agencies should ensure that they have sufficient on-the-ground resources to understand the complexity of the continent for their qualitative assessments of policies and geopolitical dynamics. The international financial community must reassess whether risk evaluations reflect today’s realities accurately or are influenced by misperceptions.

Ghana is a stable democracy and serves as an important trading partner on the global stage. Despite that, skewed risk perceptions continue to hinder access to capital, driving up interest payments and stifling development. These biases are costing Africa billions—funds that could be otherwise invested in infrastructure, healthcare, education, and economic growth.

The international financial community can foster a more equitable financial environment by working together to address these disparities. This will benefit African nations and, more importantly, contribute to a more robust and fair global economy. It is my hope that Ghana’s case can serve as a catalyst to continue accelerating the pace of restructurings and improving the international financial system so that it can be a driver of inclusive growth, poverty reduction, and global innovation. 

Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo is the president of the Republic of Ghana.

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European leaders, beyond their congratulatory messages, have shown concern about tariffs and the fate of Ukraine. Many Middle Eastern leaders have welcomed Trump’s return. African leaders in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, and beyond quickly congratulated Trump following his election victory, but more broadly, they could take a wait-and-see approach on the new administration.

Nevertheless, there is one African country in particular whose position in Washington and globally could be strengthened by the new Trump presidency.

Morocco is one of the United States’ oldest allies, having been among the first to recognize the independence of the young nation in 1777 when Sultan Mohammed III opened Morocco’s ports to US ships. In 1786, that implicit recognition became formal with the signing of a treaty of peace and friendship, which is still in force today. Designated a major non-NATO ally in 2004, Morocco also plays an important role in the United States’ activities, including in the international fight against terrorism.

Trump recalled these ties in December 2020 when, a few weeks before the end of his first term, he recognized Western Sahara as part of Morocco. A month later, the US ambassador to Morocco visited the Saharan city of Dakhla to begin the process of opening a consulate. But US President Joe Biden never made this project a reality. France’s new backing for Morocco’s claim (announced before the Moroccan Parliament during a historic visit to Rabat last month) could help Morocco accelerate this agenda.

Israel is among the countries that have recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara—it did so in 2023. A few years beforehand, in 2020, Morocco had joined the list of countries in the Arab world to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords. However, Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel and the resulting Israeli bombing and invasion of Gaza have provoked massive demonstrations in Morocco in support of the Palestinian population. Morocco also quickly sent aid to Palestinians trapped in Gaza and, at the United Nations, reaffirmed the need to respect Palestinian rights—but did not break off relations with Israel.

Undoubtedly, whatever Trump’s strategy in the Middle East, Morocco will have a central role. But under King Mohammed VI, the kingdom has established a future role for itself well beyond the Middle East.

To its south, Morocco, which returned to the African Union in 2017, continues to deepen its African footprint. France, taking note of Morocco’s role across the continent, has considered how it could rely on Morocco as a way to regain lost ground in Africa, particularly in the Sahel; Washington may follow suit. In November 2023, Mohammed VI announced a new initiative to “enable the Sahel countries [Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso] to have access to the Atlantic Ocean” via large-scale development projects.

This plan has an ambitious Atlantic component that will undoubtedly require coordination with the United States. That can be accomplished through the Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation, which was launched in September 2023 and includes many African countries, including Morocco and Sahelian countries such as Senegal and Nigeria. There are other initiatives and challenges on which the United States and Morocco can collaborate, including addressing the drug trade that sweeps from South America and through the Sahel—and is becoming increasingly connected to the terrorist movements that have been sowing chaos in the Sahel for twenty years. How the Trump administration approaches these Atlantic projects will determine the direction of the United States’ relationship with Morocco because of Rabat’s central role in these initiatives.

What Trump does on the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) may also impact Morocco’s place on Washington’s map. The Moroccan economy has benefited from the IRA, which is based, among other things, on supplies from countries linked by free trade agreements with the United States. (Morocco has had a free trade agreement with the United States since January 2006.) With the IRA in place, Chinese companies have even turned toward Morocco, making investments there to maintain access to US markets. Meanwhile, for Morocco, it was a winning system that promoted job creation on its soil and technology transfers and strengthened its position as a key player in the green industry in Africa. Morocco is counting on its economy, one of the strongest in Africa, to achieve its regional ambitions and strengthen its impact—it is already the second-largest investor on the continent, after South Africa.

But Trump working with the Republican-controlled Congress to repeal the IRA or restrict the policy could make Morocco less tempting for China, and thus result in fewer investments. In the event of growing tensions between the United States and China, Morocco could review its strategy of equidistance between these two powers.

With China now Africa’s leading trading partner—China now has five times more trade volume with the continent than the United States does—how Trump approaches the Moroccan partnership will say a lot about his intentions for Africa.

The Africa that is awaiting Trump’s second administration is not the one his first administration left in 2021. The continent’s landscape has been profoundly changed by the pandemic, the energy crisis following the war in Ukraine, a series of coups in the Sahel, the civil war in Sudan, the strengthening of the BRICS group of emerging economies, and much more. On each of these issues, Morocco has a voice that will carry weight in Washington.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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While Morocco hopes to pick up where it left off in negotiations with the incoming administration, Trump’s more pragmatic and transactional approach to foreign policy indicates that he would look to Rabat for something in exchange for renewed support of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and the opening of a consulate in Dakhla to seal the deal. The political climate in Morocco around normalization with Israel, however, has shifted since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, and the Abraham Accords seem to have lost momentum among most Arab states, which are fearful of angering their populations and have moved to a more discreet approach to their dealings with Israel. What deepening collaboration with Morocco can offer the United States, however, is the chance to thwart Iran’s ambitions in North Africa and the Sahel and unlock lucrative investment opportunities in the region for US companies.

What Morocco wants from the US

What Moroccan officials hope for in Trump’s second term is an end to what they viewed as an ambiguous policy toward their country under the Biden administration. The Biden administration has attempted to balance historical US-Morocco ties and joint security interests on the one hand and, on the other, Washington’s transatlantic responsibility to ensure the continued flow of Algerian gas to Europe to substitute for dwindling Russian energy supplies. This has meant treading a careful line between the official US position on Western Sahara and Washington’s relations with Algeria, which strongly opposes Morocco’s claim to the region and hosts the Polisario Front separatist group on its soil.

The Biden administration reversed the Trump administration’s 2020 decision to open full diplomatic representation in Western Sahara, opting instead to open a virtual consulate. Biden also showed reticence toward the Moroccan proposal of hosting the second Negev Forum between Israel and its Arab partners in the disputed territories of Western Sahara. The forum was postponed multiple times until the eruption of the Israel-Hamas war, after which Rabat completely altered its public messaging on normalization.

The current administration’s approach of keeping Morocco at arm’s length risks prolonging the fifty-year-long Western Sahara dispute and allowing Iran to gain influence in the region at Morocco’s expense. Thus, the incoming administration should reinvigorate US-Morocco security and economic ties to bolster security in the Sahara.

Iran’s regional ambitions

Since reestablishing ties with Israel in 2020, Moroccan decision makers have struggled to articulate that this move was never meant as opposition to the two-state solution or a distancing from its support for the Palestinian people. Rather, it was intended as a strategic move to ally with other countries opposed to Iran to thwart the Polisario Front, the pro-independence movement in Western Sahara that receives funding and weapons from Iran. Iran’s backing for the Polisario Front—and Algeria’s role in transferring Iranian drones to the group, according to Moroccan officials—presents a security threat in the Sahara and the Sahel that threatens to destabilize the entire region and unleash unprecedented migration flows into Southern Europe.

After the Gaza war broke out, millions of Moroccans took to the streets in solidarity with the Palestinians, but officials in Rabat read the conflict differently. They saw the threat from Iranian proxies in the damage that Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis were able to inflict on Israel and on global maritime trade. Among Moroccan officials, these developments sounded the alarm of what a potential Iranian proxy militia in Western Sahara could do. This brought Israel and Morocco closer together and was translated into a one-billion-dollar satellite deal and a rare drone manufacturing collaboration, among other ambitious intelligence and security partnerships.

Nevertheless, the kingdom chose to temper public-facing exchanges with Israel because of the dissonance between Moroccan governing elites and an increasingly heated public opinion. This public sentiment is fed by the religious, historical, and linguistic affinities between the Palestinian and Moroccan people but also by the political opportunism of Islamist parties that are instrumentalizing the Palestinian cause to undermine the government of Moroccan Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch. Recent violent clashes between members of the Moroccan community in Amsterdam and visiting Israeli soccer fans are another worrying indicator that Moroccan popular sentiment remains largely against normalization.

Meanwhile, tensions in Western Sahara are rising. With the restoration of ties with Israel in 2020, confrontations escalated in Western Sahara, especially after Moroccan forces reannexed the Guerguerat checkpoint on the borders with Mauritania, which was becoming a worrying hot spot for smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorist activities, according to Moroccan officials. Emboldened by the Gaza conflict, Polisario militants tried to capitalize on the favorable public sentiment toward self-determination and started carrying out regular shelling in the Moroccan-controlled territories Smara and Al-Mahbes. Iran, meanwhile, found the Polisario Front to be a favorable ally to further its geostrategic ambitions to gain a foothold on the Atlantic and get closer to Western Europe and the Mediterranean.

A compelling case for US-Moroccan ties

The realignment of other US allies behind Morocco, such as Spain, Israel, and France, reaffirms the imperative of standing together collectively to end the possibility of a third front, in addition to Ukraine and the Middle East, with Russian- and Iranian-backed militias in North Africa and the Sahel. This would cause tremendous risks for regional escalation, especially as Algeria continues its rapprochement with Iran and repeatedly claims that there are parallels between the Palestinian and the Western Saharan causes—although historical and anthropological realities say otherwise. Some experts even declare the Western Sahara conflict over, with the two former colonizers, Spain and France, having supported the advanced autonomy plan that Morocco proposed (and which the United States also supports) as the only serious way to resolve the dispute.

The incoming Trump administration has a historic opportunity to turn the page once and for all on this conflict and thwart any ambitions of expansion by the “axis of aggressors” in North Africa. The incoming president’s skepticism for supranational institutions might provide enough firmness to forge a pathway for the United Nations (UN) to adopt a better approach to this conflict, especially after the proposal by the UN envoy for Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, to partition the territories between Morocco and the Polisario Front—a plan that is reminiscent of the very colonial “lines in the sand” approach that led to this conflict in the first place. The United States has an opportunity to veto the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), which has proven to be ineffective, as well as to pressure the UN to change its overall policy toward the conflict, since a referendum on Western Saharan independence is no longer on the table.

It is also in the US interest to incentivize the countries of the region by joining France in investing in Morocco’s aspiring Atlantic Initiative, which aims to offer landlocked Sahel countries mobility and trade access to the Atlantic Ocean through the $1.2 billion Dakhla harbor megaproject to make the region more economically integrated and less prone to rivalry and conflicts. The economic opportunities for US companies are also immense, given Morocco’s longstanding free trade agreement with the United States and the country’s vibrant car and aeronautics industries, in addition to large deposits of phosphate and cobalt necessary for the mass production of lithium batteries. Likewise, the incoming administration might consider reviving Senator Dan Sullivan’s proposal to transfer the headquarters of US Africa Command from Stuttgart, Germany, to Morocco to deter any destabilization attempts and build on the military partnership initiated through the joint African Lion exercises, which take place in part in Western Sahara. Additionally, from a military perspective, Morocco’s history with the United States during World War II and its geographic proximity to West Africa, the turmoiled Sahel, and the Mediterranean offer a better geostrategic positioning compared to other contenders for the relocation of US Africa Command, such as Kenya.

The Western Sahara conflict might not be at the top of the new Trump administration’s list of priorities. Still, there are compelling reasons to reinforce the United States’ security and economic partnership with Morocco and help reach a resolution to this “forgotten conflict” before it comes to haunt Washington and its allies.

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa and deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.

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FOCAC was established in 2000 at the insistence of the African Union, which sought to increase and institutionalize China’s presence on the continent. The forum is held every three years, alternating between Beijing and an African capital city. FOCAC’s several sub-forums formalize cooperation across sectors like youth leadership, health, poverty reduction, and development, among others. Africa is always the first destination of the year for China’s foreign minister, a three-decade-old tradition. This year, Foreign Minister Wang Yi kicked off diplomacy with a visit to Egypt, Tunisia, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire from January 13-18. Beijing’s presence in Africa is such that journalist and professor Howard French has described it as “China’s second continent.”

Within FOCAC are nine Arab League member states—Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia—meaning the forum has an impact in the Middle East as well. Interestingly, these FOCAC participants also have institutionalized multilateral engagement with China through the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), which was established in 2002, following a framework similar to FOCAC’s. The most recent CASCF Senior Officials’ Meeting was held in Beijing on May 29. Several developments between China and North African participants were announced, and momentum has only increased since then.

At the CASCF meeting in May, China and Tunisia announced that they had established a strategic partnership. This Chinese diplomatic mechanism pledged to increase cooperation in areas of mutual interest without making any formal commitments beyond that. This type of partnership typically results in increased trade and contracting. Since the China-Tunisia relationship has never been especially significant—or strategic—there is much room to grow. For example, bilateral trade between the two countries in 2022 was relatively insignificant at just $3.94 billion, according to data from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics, with the bulk of that being $3.89 billion in Chinese exports. 

The American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker shows a similarly modest Chinese footprint, with only a single construction contract, worth $110 million, since 2005 and no investment. That Tunisia was deemed a strategic partner is puzzling. Iraq, for example, is also a strategic partner, and bilateral trade between Iraq and China in 2022 was valued at $52 billion. Since 2005, investment has totaled over $14 billion, while contracting has been worth $20 billion. Clearly, not all strategic partnerships are created equally, but conferring this status on Tunisia seems to indicate that Beijing wants a stronger diplomatic presence across North Africa.

Other developments at CASCF confirmed this. This year, Libya, which had seen little in the way of Chinese cooperation since Beijing had to evacuate 36,000 citizens in 2011, sent a delegation to participate in the first Libyan-Chinese Economic Forum, attended by eighty-four Chinese companies that were encouraged to return to Libya to help with reconstruction. Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, the head of Libya’s interim Government of National Unity, met with Foreign Minister Wang on the sidelines of this year’s CASCF, and the two discussed activating eighteen bilateral agreements, including facilitating the return of Chinese companies.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was one of the four heads of state at CASCF—his eighth visit to China since he took office in 2014. While in Beijing, Sisi held a summit with Xi Jinping to mark the ten-year anniversary of the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Egypt. The two declared 2024 the “China-Egypt year of partnership,” and discussed deeper cooperation in information and communications technology, artificial intelligence, renewable energy, food security, finance, and cultural exchanges. 

It would be easy to dismiss all of this as typical summitry, but since the CASCF, there has been serious momentum in China’s Maghreb relations in areas that indicate long-term regional ambitions. 

The bilateral relationship with Libya has also continued to expand. In June, Libya’s Economy and Trade Minister Mohamed al-Hwej announced that the Libyan-Chinese Joint Economic Chamber was being activated to “help build bridges and enhance investment communication between the two countries.” In August, Libyan official Badr al-Deen al-Toumi met with a delegation from China and described three priorities: cooperation with China on Belt and Road Initiative projects; the reactivation of contracts that were stopped due to conflict; and enhanced bilateral cooperation in renewables, infrastructure, industrial technology, and urban planning. Chinese companies have been invited to discuss infrastructure construction, with a delegation visiting al-Zawiya in August to pitch the development of a seaport. Given this momentum, it was unsurprising that during FOCAC, Libya became the most recent Arab country to announce a strategic partnership agreement with China.

Separately, Algeria has made inroads in economic and military cooperation with China. In August, the Chinese embassy in Algiers announced that three Chinese carmakers—JAC, Chery, and Geely—would be setting up factories in Algeria, producing cars for the domestic and African markets. The Chery factory’s capacity is projected to be 100,000 vehicles per year within three years, and the Geely factory is said to represent a $200 million investment that will be operational in 2026. On the military front, Algeria inducted Chinese YJ-12B anti-ship missiles in August, complementing the CX-1 ASCM cruise missiles it acquired from Beijing in 2018. It has since kicked the treads on Chinese VT-4 battle tanks, an action that “aligns with its broader strategy of incorporating various Chinese military assets into its defense arsenal.” 

Morocco has also seen substantial movement from China. There was a major infrastructure announcement in September, with China Railway Engineering signing a $350 million contract to develop a high-speed rail line between Kenitra and Marrakech. On the sidelines at FOCAC, a Chinese textile company, Sunrise, announced that it will invest $422 million to establish industrial complexes. Maghreb Agence Presse claimed the investment, projected to create 11,000 new jobs, will “revitalize the national textile sector.” It is in the auto industry where Morocco has been especially interesting, however.

In June, Gotion High Tech announced its plans to build an electric-vehicle (EV) battery gigafactory for $1.3 billion, an investment it says will eventually reach $6.5 billion. This came on the heels of several announcements in 2024 about Chinese EV battery factories in Morocco. Hailiang, Shinzoom, and BTR New Material Group have each announced plans to build plants near Tangiers, and CNGR Advanced Material has plans for one in Jorf Lasfar. CITIC Dicastal has established an aluminum alloy wheel manufacturing plant, the largest Chinese investment in Morocco. Taken together, Morocco’s goal of becoming a major EV producer, combined with its proximity to the European Union (EU) and its trade deals with the EU and the United States, make it an important location for Chinese EV firms to invest, potentially circumventing tariffs.    

Of the Maghreb countries, Egypt has been China’s most varied—and most important—partner. There has been an uptick in security-focused cooperation. In August, China and Egypt held a joint naval exercise in the Mediterranean Sea north of Alexandria, where they carried out training courses in communications coordination, formation maneuvering, and maritime replenishment positioning. Shortly after, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force sent eight planes to an air show in Egypt. In mid-September, China’s defense contractor ELINC signed a contract with Egypt’s Arab Organization for Industrialization to work with Egypt on manufacturing advanced defense systems. And, of course, there has been a wide range of economic and developmental bilateral cooperation. At FOCAC, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly was on hand for a billion-dollar signing ceremony for projects in the Suez Canal Economic Zone that involved manufacturing chemical products, food products, and energy components. On the sidelines, China announced it would inject $14 million into Egypt to invest in joint projects. Chinese forums are a godsend for a country with an economy like Egypt’s, which has appeared moribund at several points in recent years.

North Africa is frequently described as one of the least integrated regions in the world. However, when considering Chinese engagement across the Maghreb, it becomes clear how the seeds Beijing is planting today could result in intra-regional industrial chains and business clusters in the not-so-distant future.

Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow for Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an association professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, UAE.   

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No Western partner is swooping in to assist Mali’s overburdened military, as France once did. Mali’s current approach, reliant on show-of-force air strikes and support from the Russian Wagner mercenary group, has failed to deliver a decisive victory. In late July, armed groups killed as many as forty-seven Malian soldiers and eighty-four Wagner mercenaries near the Algerian border, sparking a new round of fighting.

There is only one way to avert further loss of life and territorial contestation: mediation. Algiers, which has brokered multiple hostage releases and peace deals in northern Mali—including the 2015 Algiers Accord—is no longer a welcome interlocutor. Bamako has accused Algiers of meddling in its affairs by meeting rebel leaders. Mali’s neighbors to the east, Burkina Faso and Niger, are too consumed with their own domestic security challenges to play a meaningful role. But Mauritania, Mali’s neighbor to the west, is in a unique position to foster peace.

The case for Mauritania

Mauritania is a relatively stable country, whose historic neutrality in regional disputes has earned it generally positive foreign relationships. Previous attempts at mediation have failed to install an enduring peace in northern Mali, largely because they were not inclusive. But with its neutrality, Mauritania has the ability to talk to all conflict parties in northern Mali—nonterrorist armed groups, terrorists, and government-aligned forces. This offers distinct advantages.

Mauritania’s president, Mohamed Ould El Ghazouani, was recently inaugurated for a second and final term, which he is serving concurrently with the African Union (AU) chairmanship. The AU has substantial convening power, and Ghazouani is an ideal mediator because of Mauritania’s neutrality, making the timing optimal for a push for regional peace.

Peace would advance Mauritania’s interests, too. Mali’s widening conflict has destabilized its eastern border. More than 55,000 Malians fled to Mauritania last year, flooding refugee camps. Mauritania accused the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and Wagner of crossing the eastern border and killing Mauritanians. Mediation offers Ghazouani an opportunity to stem the refugee flow and permanently end the violent cross-border incursions that have killed his constituents.

It won’t be easy

The two primary parties in the conflict, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Malian transition government, have opposing goals. JNIM is an al-Qaeda affiliate and aims to displace the government, whereas Bamako aims to eradicate terrorism and assert control over its territory. At the same time, an anti-government, nonterrorist armed group coalition—the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA)—is fighting for greater regional autonomy and economic opportunity. The CSP-DPA’s relationship with JNIM is unclear.

Regardless, none of the parties have given Mauritania consent to mediate, so Nouakchott will need to operate outside of a formal peace process, at least at the outset. This is risky but necessary. Bamako has gradually driven away French, European Union, and United Nations (UN) troops over the past few years, demonstrating its hostility to international stabilization efforts. The Malian transition government would probably reject a request to engage terrorist or nonterrorist armed group leaders.

The conflict still merits mediation. After months of fighting, no actor has achieved sustained momentum on the battlefield. There are clashes, of course, but the conflict is nowhere near over. The FAMa and Wagner have expended large amounts of munitions during offensive operations. These operations have displaced and killed northern civilians while failing to meaningfully degrade the capabilities of armed groups. Armed groups have withdrawn to more remote areas of the Sahara Desert, where they are expending scarce resources to survive. This cannot go on forever.

Ending the war

Here’s how Mauritania can bring all the parties to the negotiating table:

1. Open a direct line of communication with northern leaders

Mauritania is well-positioned to initiate contact with the leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups, given the historic relationship that its Beidane (White Moor) population has with Mali’s Tuareg population. The two ethnic groups have historically adopted similar migration patterns, and their personal, religious, and business connections persist to this day. Mauritanian citizens have maintained ties with populations in northern Mali by traversing age-old transhumance routes.

Mauritania should leverage these relationships and routes to initiate contact with leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups, many of whom are Malian Tuareg, without arousing suspicion. Once contact is made, Mauritania should arrange low-profile in-person meetings with select leaders of these armed groups to determine whether they are amenable to further engagement.

2. Persuade JNIM leaders to defect from al-Qaeda

Mauritania must clearly articulate the value of further engagement to leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups. JNIM is particularly important, as its members never reconciled with Bamako or laid down their arms. Their operations, as well as their continued recruitment of northern populations, made true peace impossible. JNIM’s leaders are thus critical to the installation of an enduring peace in northern Mali.

Mauritania can offer incentives for armed group leaders to engage in mediation. For example, it can offer to intercede with the Malian transition government on their behalf, push for pauses in military operations, and legitimize their bid for northern leadership.

JNIM’s Tuareg leaders may be receptive to the argument that, without this support, it will be impossible for them to evade persecution and exert true leadership over northern Mali, their homeland. Their ambition to secure leadership in their homeland predates JNIM’s establishment, after all. Ultimately, however, only engagement can reveal whether they are open to mediation.

Mauritania’s offer to mediate must come with conditions: JNIM’s Tuareg leaders must commit to disaffiliation with both al-Qaeda and JNIM. They must permanently cease all terrorist activity, and they must stop attacking civilians or permitting youth to serve as fighters. The leaders may choose not to accept these conditions; if that is the case, they must not be included in talks.

This step assumes that mass Tuareg defection from JNIM will not prompt conflict with one of its major factions, the Fulani-dominated Macina Liberation Front (MLF). Evidence suggests that the MLF will not instigate a violent conflict, as this would ultimately drain their resources. There is a strong incentive for the MLF to accept mass defection, and the risk of fratricidal conflict is thus low. It is far more likely that severing JNIM improves Mali’s long-term stability.

3. Solicit formal consent to mediate the conflict in northern Mali

Mauritania should make a formal bid to mediate this conflict. Ghazouani can arrange meetings with each conflict party and seek their consent to initiate multiparty talks. If the previous steps succeeded, leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups may have already agreed to talks. Ghazouani can thus “deliver” JNIM and the CSP-DPA to Malian officials. 

The Malian transition government will be difficult to persuade to enter multiparty talks. This year, the FAMa deployed and held territory in northern Mali. The recapture of Kidal in November 2023 was a major symbolic victory. Bamako may wish to continue fighting. If this is the case, the best strategy for engaging government officials would be to praise Mali’s strength.

Ghazouani should personally travel to Bamako to meet the interim president, Colonel Assimi Goïta. Ghazouani and Goïta are both military commanders who participated in coups d’état in their respective countries. Ghazouani is the elder of the two, and he has successfully navigated the transition from military to civilian leader. He can advise Goïta.

Ghazouani can praise Goïta’s leadership and make the argument that the Malian leader played a decisive role in bringing CSP-DPA and JNIM leaders to the table. He should also highlight the benefits of participating in multiparty talks. Settling the conflict in the north would allow the FAMa and Wagner to shift focus and dedicate more troops to the faltering counterterrorism campaign against the MLF in central Mali. The MLF recently launched a deadly attack against military facilities in Bamako. In light of this, Goïta may be receptive to this argument.

4. Seek international support for the peace process

After acquiring Goïta’s consent, Mauritania should seek backing from the international community and begin planning the first round of talks in Nouakchott. Ghazouani can capitalize on his position as AU chairman to form a Northern Mali Contact Group. The contact group would help coordinate, fund, and execute programming in support of negotiated outcomes of the multiparty talks.

It is very important that the group balance different perspectives and international alliances. Mali’s military junta swapped the country’s Western security partners for Wagner, and Bamako would object if the group contains a disproportionate number of Western states. Ghazouani’s initial efforts should focus on the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Two are not part of the West, and all are involved in regional initiatives.

Mauritania’s neutrality affords it positive relations with all the UNSC permanent members. Accordingly, it is well-equipped to navigate any tensions among them. It must emphasize that the permanent members have a common interest: improving stability. This is only achievable if they collaborate.

Within North and West Africa, Ghazouani should focus initial efforts on recruiting former members of the Algiers Accord Monitoring Committee: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania. Morocco should be included as well, to avoid upsetting the regional balance of power. These six states all stand to benefit from a peaceful and secure northern Mali.

Once the Northern Mali Contact Group is established, Ghazouani and the AU should focus on coordinating, funding, and executing programs in parallel to the multiparty talks. The parties to the conflict are extremely sensitive to external meddling. The Northern Mali Contact Group must keep the parties’ goals at the center of this deliberative process.

Parting shots

This is an ambitious concept, but it seizes upon the many advantages afforded by Mauritania’s current position. It generates momentum for multiparty talks by engaging terrorist and nonterrorist armed group leaders. It then uses their willingness to negotiate as a bargaining chip with which to compel the government to permit multiparty talks. It concludes by seeking external backing.

Considering and including representatives from all conflict parties in northern Mali is the pathway to a more durable, inclusive political settlement that brings peace to a region historically beset by violent conflict.

Jordanna Yochai is a defense analyst, whose portfolio includes the West African Sahel. She is currently on leave from the Department of Defense, pursuing a master’s degree at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA).

The positions expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the US Department of Defense. The US Department of Defense does not endorse the views expressed in hyperlinked articles or websites, including any information, products, or services contained therein.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Since his consolidation of power, Saied has dismantled many democratic institutions, extending the state of emergency and adopting a new constitution that centralizes power around the presidency. As a result, political pluralism has been significantly restricted, leading to fears of increased political repression and tighter control over the media. This shift has raised concerns about the erosion of democratic institutions established following the 2011 Arab uprisings, of which Tunisia constituted the only real attempt to reach a pluralistic and liberal government in North Africa.

The current political climate indicates that Saied will likely continue to consolidate his influence over Tunisia’s political landscape. The president’s track record of suppressing dissent, restricting media freedom, and sidelining political opponents suggests that these authoritarian measures will likely persist in the months and years ahead. Recent changes to the electoral process have further tightened his grip on power, with several key presidential candidates imprisoned or barred from participating in the elections. This has effectively cleared the field for Saied, raising concerns about the integrity of the electoral process and the future of political pluralism in Tunisia. The increasingly restricted political environment, combined with these legal and procedural maneuvers, points to a continued erosion of democratic norms under his rule.

In addition to the dire political evolution of the country is its deteriorating economic situation. Tunisia’s economy is precarious, since it is heavily reliant on agreements with the European Union (EU) and even more so with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to sustain its political and economic viability. The EU is a key economic partner, pledging over $900 million in funding contingent upon successful negotiations with the IMF, which are stalled due to the Tunisian government’s withdrawal from negotiations. In fact, Saied’s skepticism toward certain reforms, particularly those involving subsidy reductions and austerity measures, has complicated these negotiations. This hesitance has created uncertainty about Tunisia’s economic future and the government’s ability to address growing public discontent, underscoring a perilous state of affairs with unforeseeable consequences for the whole region.

Furthermore, migration has become a critical issue in Tunisia’s relations with the EU. In response to rising irregular migration from North Africa, the EU has sought to bolster border control and manage migrant flows through partnerships with Tunisia. While Saied has occasionally cooperated with EU initiatives, he has also adopted more nationalistic rhetoric, accusing foreign powers of seeking to use Tunisia as a border guard for Europe. This dual approach complicates negotiations and poses risks not only to the agreements on migration with the EU, but also to the more general economic well-being of the country.

Moreover, the outcome of the upcoming US presidential elections could also significantly affect Tunisia and North Africa. Former President Donald Trump has advocated for an isolationist foreign policy, and if he wins it could lead to the United States reducing economic and political assistance to Tunisia while maintaining military aid for monitoring the situation in the region. In contrast, Vice President Kamala Harris, given her past positions in areas such as rallying international support for Iranian women following Mahsa Amini’s death, may adopt a more proactive stance on human rights and governance, possibly increasing scrutiny on Saied’s administration while still recognizing the importance of military support given the region’s challenges. In this case, the risk of Tunisia radicalizing would increase, with Saied veering toward further authoritarianism and even aligning with countries such as Algeria and possibly Russia and China.

As Tunisia heads toward its election, the intertwining of domestic politics, economic struggles, and international relations sets the stage for a complex political environment. Saied’s presidency, marked by an increasing hold on power and skepticism toward reform, poses critical questions about the future of Tunisia.

The situation makes it difficult for the international community to take decisive action. For the United States, due to geographical distance and a lack of direct national interest in Tunisia, it may be easier for the administration to adopt a tougher stance on the political establishment and push for a return to the democratic process. However, for Europe, the situation is more complex. The EU must maintain a strategic balance between addressing its own challenges—such as migration, terrorism, and regional stability—and upholding the democratic ideals that the Tunisian people championed during the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. Balancing these interests while engaging with Tunisia’s current political realities will be a delicate task.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Alissa Pavia is the associate director of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. 

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It is no difficulty to find crises across the Sahel and its adjacent neighborhoods: Economic stagnation, extreme weather and climate degradation, multiple terrorist organizations and jihadist groups claiming territory, a series of military coups and democratic backsliding, various non-jihadist rebel and separatist alliances, a youth bulge and widespread unemployment, and a genocide all compete for sparse outside attention.

Yet, sailing from distant shores comes yet another crisis: An increase in drug trafficking, with flows originating in the Americas, crossing the Atlantic, and making their way into the markets of Europe.

This influx of drugs will have a marked impact, not only on the region itself, but also on the wider world should the worst happen.

The best-case scenario is merely the introduction of additional groups of well-funded armed criminal enterprises with international connections in an already volatile region. The worst-case scenario is the emergence of narco-terrorism on a scale hitherto unheard of and the entrenchment of partnerships between drug smugglers and increasingly well-funded terrorist groups, armed with cash and boasting access to international connections and smuggling routes.

In short, the worst-case scenario is one in which organizations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) are fueled and financed by one of the largest drug markets in the world.

A bad situation getting worse

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), between 2015 and 2020, an average of thirteen kilograms of cocaine was seized per year in the region. In 2021, the amount seized rose to forty-one kilograms. Then in 2022, it spiked to 1,466 kilograms.

In comparison to 2015 seizures, that is an increase of 11,176 percent.

Before complete data for 2023 became available, the UN cited that 2.3 tons (just over two thousand kilograms) of cocaine had been seized in Mauritania alone between January and June 2023. These statistics are alarming, and they don’t even show the full picture: Amounts seized are not amounts trafficked—that amount is likely far higher.  

While domestic drug use is rising across the Sahel, sparking public health crises that are ill-afforded in many countries, the region is becoming a drug trafficking corridor. The drugs are bound for outside markets, with the increase in activity attributed to Europe’s surging demand for illegal narcotics and trafficking groups searching for new routes to markets.

The region is a drug smuggler’s paradise.

Located on the doorstep of Europe and the Middle East, the region is vast and often sparsely populated. It is also riddled with economic deprivation, with an ever-increasing population of youth desperate for opportunity. The countries in the Sahel often have weak governance, widespread corruption, and ongoing battles with insurgents and fundamentalists.

On top of that, Sahelian officials and individuals are vulnerable to the influence of drug gangs—but they are not alone. There are numerous documented cases from across the world of drug gangs using officials to further their work, such as a premier of the British Virgin Islands. Following recent seizures and arrests in the Sahel, the UN expressed concerns about the range of individuals—including the political elite, community leaders, and armed groups—who appear to be involved in facilitating drug trafficking.

While the involvement of key individuals in facilitating drug trafficking is widespread, what makes the situation in the Sahel worrisome are the “armed groups” involved. In Latin America, armed groups facilitating drug trafficking are organizations such as FARC and in Southeast Asia they are militias tied to regional forces or even the drug traffickers themselves. In the Sahel, they are international jihadist organizations, ones with global ambitions and a willingness to export terror and war from their base of operations.

Worrying signs

An array of terrorist organizations operate in the Sahel region: Groups include al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Boko Haram.

These groups control vast swaths of land in the Sahel, are expanding and entrenching their control, and are also competing with each other, propelling their searches for more resources. Because of this, they are among the groups that can most stand to financially benefit from the burgeoning drug trade.

While the drug smuggling flows are opaque, the UNODC highlights that the “limited evidence” of violent extremist armed groups involved in drug trafficking “does not mean that such groups are not involved.” These groups, the UNODC adds, are “likely to benefit indirectly” from drug trafficking, explaining that groups such as JNIM and ISGS demand taxes or fees from traffickers in areas where they operate.

Even if these organizations are not directly managing the drug trade, they stand to benefit from the routes and from facilitating drug smugglers’ operations in the territories they control. Such a partnership could be devastating for the region and beyond.

The UNODC notes that information about these groups’ involvement in the drug trade could still emerge. Historically, terrorist and jihadi organizations have embraced a more hands-on approach to the drug trade to fund their organizations and operations. The Taliban in Afghanistan has long been linked to the opium trade (and the drug trade has supported terrorism), ISIS in Syria has produced drugs for market in Europe and smuggles drugs across the Middle East, and Hezbollah has been tied to Columbian drug rings.

With the Sahel becoming an increasingly major drug trafficking corridor, terrorist groups could shift from merely facilitating the drug trade toward actively managing and participating in it, spreading narco-terrorism and expanding the funding for these groups. A war on drugs and narco-terrorism in the Sahel would be a devastating addition to the current war on terror across the region, where 43 percent of global terrorism deaths take place. A development such as this would not only be dangerous for the Sahel, but for the wider Middle East and Europe as well. Drug routes are known to facilitate other forms of international smuggling and for hiding activities from authorities—ever more dangerous when involving jihadist groups.

What the West can do

Unfortunately, the West can’t do much in the Sahel.

Both the United States and the European Union (EU) have retreated from the region, driven away by military juntas that do not share the West’s democratic values and concern for human rights. Various joint military efforts that had been underway to combat terror groups have fallen apart as the United States and EU left the region and lost partners. This is unlikely to change, and if the United States and EU lack the partners necessary to combat jihadist groups in the Sahel, they will likely also lack the ability to combat drug smuggling.

What they can do, however, is support and strengthen partnerships with the costal democracies in West Africa, preventing drugs from entering the Sahel in the first place.

West African democracies are on the frontlines of combating jihadists. Terrorists are attempting to expand operations and territory in countries including Senegal, Benin, Togo, and Ghana. These democracies are also on the frontlines of combating drug smuggling and are making waves with seizures. For example, last November, Senegal’s navy seized three tons of cocaine that was headed towards Europe. In April this year, the country made headlines for seizing 1,140 kilograms of cocaine (the most ever intercepted on land), which was headed toward Mali. More seizures followed in June. In Ghana, authorities have also clamped down on trafficking, making headlines after arresting a duo attempting to smuggle an amount of cocaine worth six million dollars through Accra’s airport and to London. On September 7 in Guinea-Bissau, authorities (with help from the US Drug Enforcement Administration and a European organization called the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre) seized 2.6 tons of cocaine that had arrived from Latin America.

As drugs continue to flow, and as the domestic use of drugs continues to rise, West African politicians and societies are just as interested in addressing drug trafficking as the United States and EU are. These West African democracies would be willing partners in combating the twin threats of expanding terrorist groups and a burgeoning drug trade.

Should the Sahel become home to narco-terrorism, the consequences would be catastrophic, not only for the Sahel but for the world. The international community must not ignore yet another crisis.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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Despite the turmoil in the Middle East since October 7, 2023—the pain, suffering, polarization, and destruction of land and hope—the Abraham Accords are still alive. They have laid a foundation far beyond any one conflict for greater peace in the region. Reflecting on their fourth anniversary, this piece explores where the Abraham Accords started, where they are today, and where they are headed.

Where it started

The seeds of the Abraham Accords were planted well before 2020. Longstanding hopes for peace began to become a reality publicly when the UAE named 2019 the “Year of Tolerance,” celebrating the diversity of religious life in the country. Among other milestones, the UAE invited Israel to participate in the Dubai 2020 World Expo, welcomed Pope Francis for a landmark visit to the Arab world, signed the Document of Human Fraternity with the Catholic Church, and announced the construction of the Abrahamic Family House—a mosque, church, and synagogue coexisting on the same campus in Abu Dhabi. For those paying attention, like I was, the ground was shifting—the UAE of 2019 that was building a synagogue was clearly a country that had greater ambitions with Israel.

Then, on September 15, 2020, history was made as 700 guests gathered at the White House to witness the normalization of relations between Israel and two Arab nations: the UAE and Bahrain. Then-US President Donald Trump presided over the signing of the Abraham Accords, alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan, and Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani. Shortly after this milestone, Israel expanded its diplomatic ties by announcing agreements with Sudan on October 23, 2020, and Morocco on December 10, 2020.

In the immediate aftermath, the accords were well-received by the governments involved, who viewed them as opportunities to enhance economic ties, security cooperation, and diplomatic relations. The agreements were heralded by many as the “dawn of a new Middle East,” as Trump noted, marking the most significant transformation in regional geopolitics in a generation and the most important step toward peace and stability in the Middle East since the Israel-Jordan peace agreement twenty-five years earlier.

The early years

Between 2020 and 2023, diplomatic relationships flourished with the establishment of mutual embassies, air and trade corridors, political and cultural advocacy activities, strategic military agreements, and people-to-people ties. Groundbreaking bilateral and multilateral forums, like the Negev Summit in Israel, the Negev Forum Steering Committee in Bahrain, and the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative, were established, fostering unprecedented regional collaboration. High-level visits and joint initiatives that once seemed unimaginable brought together innovators, investors, experts, academics, and women leaders, further strengthening these new relationships. Economic ties flourished, with trade between the Abraham Accords countries surging from practically nothing in 2019 to an estimated $10 billion over the first three years.

Israel and the UAE saw the most significant trade, tourism, and innovation advancements following the Abraham Accords: Annual bilateral trade surged, reaching almost $3 billion by 2023, driven by a historic free-trade agreement and numerous business partnerships. Tourism flourished, with over one million Israelis visiting the UAE by 2023, facilitated by 106 weekly direct flights between the two countries. Both nations established embassies, engaged in security cooperation, and collaborated on innovation and technology projects. Cultural exchange programs further deepened these ties, promoting mutual understanding. Joint initiatives in areas like renewable energy and space exploration broadened the scope of their partnership.

Four years later

As their fourth anniversary arrives, the good news is that the Abraham Accords remain intact. Despite the Gaza war, none of the signatories have backtracked from their normalization agreements: No ties have been permanently broken, and no country has withdrawn from its commitments or closed its embassy—a powerful diplomatic signal that the relationships are enduring. Ambassadors from Israel, Bahrain, and the UAE continue to play active roles, maintaining diplomatic channels and fulfilling their duties to sustain these historic ties. Trade between the signatory nations continues, fostering economic prosperity, and security and airspace cooperation also remain largely in place.

However, the period between 2020 and 2023, characterized by hundreds of signed agreements, booming tourism, and vibrant public diplomacy, has given way to a more subdued phase. October 7, 2023, and its implications for all of the signatory countries have shifted the posture from very open and public to very private. People-to-people ties have been limited, public celebrations have been muted, and much of the once-public diplomacy now happens behind closed doors.

A look at the social media channels of the embassies reflects this shift. The Israeli Embassy in Bahrain is focused on the fate of hostages and advocating for their safe return. Israeli Ambassador to the UAE Amir Hayek emphasizes positive messages and sticks to sharing holiday wishes while recognizing milestones in the UAE. Emirati Ambassador to Israel Mohamed al-Khaja has been publicly quiet throughout 2024, albeit sharing Passover wishes in April. His most recent substantial post on X was issued on the third anniversary of the accords in September 2023.

Nevertheless, despite these challenges and the current state of the Middle East, there is still room for hope, and here are the reasons why:

1. A foundation of principles: The Abraham Accords declaration was more than just a political agreement. It was a statement of shared principles: a commitment to “strengthening peace in the Middle East and around the world based on mutual understanding and coexistence, as well as respect for human dignity and freedom.” The aspirations of the Abraham Accords represent universal values that resonate globally—and that are more relevant than ever today.
2. Shifting security alliances: Security alliances have shifted, enabling better responses, particularly from Israel and the UAE, to shared regional challenges ranging from the Red Sea attacks to Iran and from the Houthis in Yemen to Hamas.   
3. People-to-people engagement: The Abraham Accords are a warm peace built not just on politics but also on people-to-people ties, offering a powerful counter to dehumanization, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia. The Abrahamic Family House is a testimony to that enduring faith in shared humanity. The site recently ranked among Time Magazine’s “2024 Greatest Places in the World to Visit” and is just one example of the signatories’ ongoing commitment to coexistence and understanding.
4. Prosperity as a pathway to peace: Economic cooperation between Israel and the Abraham Accords countries continues, paving the way for peace by addressing key drivers of conflict like poverty, unemployment, and inequality and by shifting the focus to collaboration, innovation, and mutual benefit. In August, Israel Aerospace Industries announced plans to establish a presence in Abu Dhabi, where it will convert Emirati aircraft into freighters. This move highlights the UAE’s ongoing commitment to building ties with Israel, even as regional tensions rise.
5. The essential role of women: To ensure the long-term success of the Abraham Accords, integrating women equally in policy-making, decision-making, and programming will be crucial. Research shows that when women are actively engaged in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, negotiations are more effective, peace is more enduring, and broader segments of society benefit. Including women across all sectors—economy, education, environment, politics, and the legal system—will foster a more prosperous, sustainable, and peaceful future for the countries involved in the Abraham Accords and the entire region.

As the Abraham Accords turn four years old, they stand as a testament to the power of diplomacy and the pursuit of shared interests, even in a region as complex and historically fraught as the Middle East. However, the future of the accords cannot be fully realized without a sustainable and just resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

While the accords have faced criticism for sidelining the Palestinian issue, there is still potential for them to serve as a framework that encourages renewed dialogue. Additionally, the potential inclusion of Saudi Arabia—the most influential Arab nation—in the Abraham Accords would be a transformative development. While Riyadh has shown interest, any formal move toward normalization would likely hinge on meaningful progress toward resolving the Palestinian situation. Riyadh’s participation would not only bolster the accords but could also set the stage for even broader regional acceptance of Israel, further reshaping Middle Eastern geopolitics and potentially opening new avenues to address Palestinian concerns comprehensively.

Looking ahead, the survival and success of the Abraham Accords will depend on a continued commitment from all parties to maintain open dialogue, strengthen economic ties, and foster people-to-people connections capable of transcending political tensions. It is essential for signatory countries to reaffirm their dedication to these agreements, not only as a means of advancing their national interests but also as a broader contribution to regional stability. The Abraham Accords may not have solved all of the region’s problems, but they have undeniably shifted the geopolitical landscape in a positive direction: toward lasting peace and cooperation in the Middle East.

Marcy Grossman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and former Canadian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. 

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Despite a mixed record on foreign policy and the economy, Tebboune has increased his popular support by partly redirecting windfall oil and gas revenues into expanded social spending. He also enjoys the substantial advantages of incumbency in Algeria’s highly centralized presidential system. Algeria’s largest political parties, unions, and social organizations—which function as tacit arms of the state—all support his campaign. Most critically, he has the backing of the country’s powerful security apparatus, which has ruled the country from behind the scenes for six decades.

During his first years in office, the military’s support was less certain. Just days after Tebboune’s inauguration in December 2019, army chief Ahmed Gaid Salah died of a heart attack, stranding the new president without his main benefactor. Since then, rumors have circulated of squabbles and backstabbing between the president’s office and the new army leadership. In December 2022, Ihsane El Kadi, one of Algeria’s last remaining independent journalists, wrote an op-ed questioning just how firmly the army supported Tebboune. Merely posing the question was enough to make El Kadi the first political detainee of this election cycle. He would not be the last.

Algerian authorities seemingly intimidated several of Tebboune’s potential challengers into seeking exile abroad or announcing their retirement from politics. Others were weeded out this summer in the candidate registration process, which saw some punished with electoral fraud charges. In the past couple weeks, security forces have also detained multiple high-profile political dissidents. The seizures have been accompanied by an uptick in state propaganda, along with conveniently timed operations to break up an alleged separatist plot and spy ring.

While familiar from previous elections, none of these measures are the hallmark of a strong leader confident in his electoral chances—or of a strong state confident in its stability.

They indicate that the country’s military and political leaders correctly understand elections to be moments of vulnerability. It was an aborted election in 1992—part of a long-overdue, yet nonetheless ill-prepared democratic transition—that tipped the country into civil war. And it was an approaching election in 2019 that sparked the Hirak, a nationwide protest movement calling for new leaders and a new governing system.

Military leaders rebuffed that demand, instead imposing a new election that saw Tebboune designated over protesters’ objections. Their boycott has tarnished his legitimacy ever since.

Having done what was needed in his first term to shore up the army’s support (including doubling the military budget and tightening laws to stifle the Hirak), Tebboune is now returning to the population in hopes of obtaining a more convincing mandate.

He was last elected with 58.1 percent of the vote, a share he is likely to exceed this weekend. Less clear is how many Algerians will choose to vote.

Official turnout in 2019 was just 39.9 percent, a historic low for an Algerian presidential election. Of those who voted, one in eight cast an invalid ballot, a common form of protest vote in Algeria. In fact, turnout has been trending downward and protest votes trending upward in recent presidential elections. Tebboune knows that his second term will be smoother if he can improve on these figures.

To help him do so, he has enlisted two willing contenders: Youcef Aouchiche, leader of the left-wing Socialist Forces Front, and Abdelaali Hassani Cherif, head of the Movement of a Society for Peace, Algeria’s largest Islamist party. They are the only two candidates whom electoral officials authorized to challenge Tebboune. Both consider their parties among the “constructive opposition,” and have chosen to run in order to engage their bases, build electoral credibility over rival parties, and curry favor with the authorities ahead of legislative elections expected by 2026. Alongside Tebboune, they have spent the three-week official campaign period imploring Algerians to turn out in force.

The question of participation rates is among the few unsettled ones around this election. If Tebboune and his fellow candidates manage to incite turnout beyond that of 2019, the president will enter his second term with the wind at his back. If turnout is low, authorities are likely to blame it on timing: Tebboune’s choice to schedule the campaign and election amid the summer vacation period offers a convenient excuse for low turnout. But Tebboune has already shown through his first term that even with limited electoral legitimacy, the combined strength of his office, hydrocarbon revenues, and the army’s backing can suffice to buttress his rule.

Algeria’s election is likely to ensure continuity. Those Algerians who yearn for more participatory governance, protection for essential freedoms, and economic diversification beyond oil and gas will be kept waiting once more.

Andrew G. Farrand is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and author of The Algerian Dream.

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The news broke after the Moroccan royal palace released a communiqué that referenced a letter from French President Emmanuel Macron to the king of Morocco on the commemoration of the silver jubilee of his coronation. The letter states that the “present and future of Western Sahara fall within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty.” In his correspondence with the Moroccan king, Macron added that “France intends to act consistently with this position at both national and international levels.” Although the French position explicitly references Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, it will need more clarification and translation into concrete policies in the coming months.

Nonetheless, the French decision is particularly significant given its colonial past in North Africa and its shared responsibility with Spain in largely determining the postcolonial borders of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. These borders are the origin of many of the current territorial disputes in the region. France’s endorsement of the Moroccan autonomy plan this week follows similar support from Spain in 2022 and recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara expressed by the United States in 2020 and Israel in 2023, along with a growing list of Arab and African nations.

Understanding the French calculus

France’s shift of stance comes as its relations with Morrocco have been strained. Since 2020, Rabat has pressured Paris to break the status quo—a neutrality on the issue apparently intended not to upset either Morocco or Algeria—and take a clearer stance on the Western Sahara. Striking a deal with then-US President Donald Trump in 2020 over the disputed territories and normalizing ties with Israel boosted Morocco’s diplomatic confidence and helped redefine the kingdom’s foreign policy. As a result, the Sahara issue, in the words of the Moroccan king, became “the lens through which Morocco looks at the world.”

As an example of the deteriorating bilateral relations, Mohammed VI reportedly “definitely shelved” relations with Macron and declined state visit requests by the French president last year. In addition, the kingdom started to increase its divestment from business partnerships with France—previously considered its international economic partner of choice. Torn between Morocco and Algeria, France failed to balance its act in the Maghreb after a chain of unfortunate events, including the Pegasus spyware case, a visa crisis, and the recall of Rabat’s ambassador to France in February 2023. Most recently, Morocco refused French aid after the Marrakesh earthquake in September 2023.

France, however, never stopped courting Morocco, because Paris did not want to lose strategically important economic and political ground in Africa. For its part, Rabat did not break its relations with Paris entirely, continuing its intelligence and security cooperation with France. Moroccan forces, for example, are currently helping to secure the Paris Olympics. Morocco also appointed Samira Sitail, a dual national and Makhzan insider, as its ambassador to attempt to stir the stagnant waters.

Rather than trying to deter Morocco’s ambitious Atlantic Initiative—aimed at offering landlocked Sahel countries trade access to the ocean through a $1.2 billion harbor in Dakhla, Western Sahara—France is eying a share of the economic benefits promised by the project. The only catch is how to address the 2021 European Union (EU) court ruling against the Morocco-EU trade deal over Western Sahara, which the Elysée may now advocate to reverse together with other pro-Moroccan EU countries ahead of the final judgment, due in a few months.

Western Sahara and global realignment

Another defining factor in understanding the recent French decision lies in the global realignment behind old Cold War frontiers, and NATO allies engaging in historic contests against increasingly destabilizing forces. Morocco has always been a reliable partner to the global liberal West in its fight against Russian aggression and different terrorist groups. The country is also more-or-less aligned with the United States and France on a common vision of the future. As Iran and its proxies reinforce ties with the Algerian regime, which has been cultivating close relations with Russia since the 1970s, North Atlantic allies fear a new stronghold of antagonists in North Africa.

For the past five decades, Western Sahara has been a major security loophole at the doors of the Mediterranean and the Sahel. With growing rumors about Iranian and Wagner Group presence among Sahrawis in the Tindouf camps in western Algeria, where an estimated 173,600 refugees live, it’s becoming imperative for the United States and European countries to try to resolve the Western Sahara file once and for all.

Disrupting the status quo in the Maghreb

While on paper the French decision to side with Morocco may seem in line with its economic and global priorities, it does come at a price. EU neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict and exclusive reliance on the United Nations peacekeeping mission to maintain the status quo between Rabat and Algiers has been central to stabilizing the region. After the United States and Spain sided with Morocco, Algeria responded by severing diplomatic relations with Morocco in 2021 and recalling its ambassador in Madrid in 2022. Algeria also disrupted gas exports to Spain through Morocco by closing the EU-Maghreb pipeline just as tensions were building around Russia’s gas exports ahead of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The first reaction by Algiers to Macron’s swing toward Mohammed VI described France and Morocco as “colonial powers, new and old.” This was followed on Tuesday by Algeria recalling its ambassador in Paris to express its discontent.

Macron’s decision has alienated an already nervous Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who is running for reelection on September 7. This week’s events may push him deeper into Iranian and Russian arms. Even though not expressly sought by any of the parties, the risk of recent events sparking up a wider regional conflict in the Maghreb is higher than ever. Even if in a way designed to avoid escalation, Algeria will likely feel it necessary to respond in some form.

Sarah Zaaimi is a cultural studies researcher and the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

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The Mattei Plan is not supposed to operate in a vacuum but is solidly affected and conditioned by the wider international community. However, evolving international dynamics among superpowers and regional powers do not bode for much optimism. Despite some positive events—such as French center-left parties’ relative containment of what was initially expected to be a glamorous victory for right-wing populism and extremism, as well as some successes in cohesion and policymaking by international organizations and institutions such as the Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty (G20), and NATO—the trend doesn’t look positive at all. In the background lie the war in Ukraine, the Gaza war, and a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The renewed rivalry for world dominance and the great-power competition between the United States, China, and Russia loom above everything.

North Africa is particularly vulnerable to these dynamics. The ideal part of the Mattei Plan is that it can positively defuse regional tensions. It has been a long-held belief of the European Union (EU), the United States, and the main international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that, to create a beneficial environment for economic development and political evolution, the five North Africa states of Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania should agree to form some sort of “union.”

The Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) was born out of this thinking in 1989. In reality, the regimes then in power created it to fight the Islamist-led popular revolts, which, starting in the mid-1980s, were occurring in each of the North African countries in increasing numbers. UMA was also created to facilitate the exchange of security personnel and intelligence cooperation by these regimes. Because of this, no other sectors—such as the social, political, and cultural sectors—were developed. And once each UMA country felt more secure, it de facto withdrew from the union.

For a brief moment following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings—which were poised to bring to power, in a more or less democratic way, new elites more responsible for the wellbeing of their populations—international actors thought there was a will to renew a pledge to the UMA. However, the five North African regimes were generally unresponsive to their populations’ demands. There was an expectation that things would improve through democratic elections and that, once in power, the populations would be more prone to engage their neighbors in some kind of integration. But that didn’t happen. Instead, each country backslid into authoritarianism and, thus, in a more isolationist direction.

With this in mind, the prevailing trend, as determined by today’s evolution of the international system, may lead North Africa not toward integration but toward creating rival blocs. Morocco, which has elites strongly tied to Western nations and with Western values, has adapted a policy of cooperation and alliance with Western countries, especially the United States, and institutions such as NATO and the EU. Clear evidence of this pro-Western position is King Mohammed VI’s adhesion to the Abraham Accords pushed by then President Donald Trump as a way to create a new peaceful path to collaboration between Arab states and the state of Israel, in exchange for the US president’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara.

Morocco’s ruler has exerted enormous effort for Moroccan banks and commercial entities to penetrate the West African region’s economy. The success of this action has also gained much support for the ruler’s political ambitions.

Just to the East of Morocco and in contrast to its policies and economic activities, is the country of Algeria. The military-backed regime in power—which values nationalism, Arabism, and third-worldism—finds its legitimacy in the Algerian people’s war for independence from France in the late 1950s.

Algeria has been a staunch supporter of revolutionary and liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere. Thus, support for the Palestinian struggle against Israel quickly became a rallying cry in Algeria. Its relative closeness with the Soviet Union, and with Vladimir Putin’s Russia today, is the natural outcome of these positions. It is easy to see how Algeria could constitute an bloc adversarial toward Morocco. Add to this the wide influence that Algeria exerts on Tunisian President Kais Saied’s quest for absolute power and the natural gravitation of western Libya toward Algeria and Tunisia, and it’s easy to see the formation of bloc in opposition to that represented by Morocco.

Eastern Libya today is controlled by the rogue General Khalifa Haftar and his family, which is almost entirely dependent on Egyptian military support, and will probably detach the region from the western part of the country. Sadly, this would mean the end of a united Libya. This is a scenario that the West should do whatever it can to avoid. The United States seems too distracted by other issues and incapable of reacting to these trends. On the other hand, Italy and some of its European partners could use the idea behind the Mattei Plan to play a neutral role in the North Africa contest and help a rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco. This requires not making Algeria feel isolated from Western countries.

Prime Minister Meloni’s personal visit to Algeria in January 2023 was important for this reason, as was the one made afterward. Italian diplomacy was also active in keeping relations open and ongoing with Tunisian President Saied and in the warm relationship with the United Nations-recognized government in Tripoli. While this might sound ideal, Italy and its allies must take one step forward, which would foster a faster and deeper rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey. This could lead to an agreement in Libya in which the western part, strongly under the influence of Turkey, and the eastern part, which is entirely dependent on Egyptian support, may be convinced to find a way out of their crisis that entails the unity of the country rather than separation. A united Libya under the protection of NATO member Turkey and longtime US ally Egypt will not fall into the radical bloc. On the contrary, it might even be able to help lure Tunisia away from the pro-Russian potential bloc, while exerting an opposing influence on Algeria’s historical pro-Russian tendency by showing the benefits of standing with the West and collaborating with the Mattei Plan.

The Piano Mattei, a new vision of cooperation and collaboration on all fronts with the emerging societies of Africa, will be a great engine for this Italian and, ergo, Western policy of utilizing soft power to overcome issues that have previously created many problems for European countries.

Those who criticize the plan as empty of content, or cite its lack of purpose or precise allocation of resources, are missing the point. It is not only an economic plan but a political intuition to move away from today’s stagnant international cooperation policies and toward new dynamics that could produce extraordinary results if carefully implemented.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Economic diversification and foreign direct investment

The US-Morocco FTA removed tariffs and significantly reduced trade barriers between the two countries. This, alongside other FTA and advanced trade agreements with the European Union (EU), China, Egypt, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), contributed to Morocco’s efforts to diversify its economy and trade. Through providing access to the US market, the FTA encouraged Moroccan firms to expand into new high-tech manufacturing such as automotive and aeronautics parts, as well as electronics. The agreement has also contributed to a steady increase in bilateral trade. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, US-Morocco trade in goods and services has grown to nearly $7 billion annually. This trade growth reflects a deepening of economic ties between the two countries.

Another significant impact of the US-Morocco FTA and other trade agreements has been increased foreign direct investment (FDI). The agreement provided a framework that infused confidence in US and EU investors and caused an inflow of investment in various sectors, including manufacturing, tourism, and renewable energy. These investments have been central in creating jobs and developing the skills of the Moroccan workforce.

One example is the automotive industry, in which major companies like Japan-based Yazaki, Ireland-based Delphi Technologies, Germany-based Schlemmer, and US-based Lear Corporation have established operations in Morocco. These investments have created thousands of jobs and positioned Morocco as a regional hub for automotive parts manufacturing, generating more than $10 billion in revenue and making it a leading sector in the country’s export market. Additionally, the growth of the renewable energy sector has made Morocco a global leader in the green energy industry, with ambitious projects like the Noor Ouarzazate Solar Complex.

Challenges and structural reforms

While Morocco’s FTA and trade agreements with the United States and other major economies have brought numerous benefits, challenges exist. One of the main issues has been guaranteeing that the gains from free trade are distributed equitably across Moroccan society. There is a need for sustained efforts to address regional disparities and support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that may struggle to compete with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in a liberalized trade environment.

Moreover, the agreement has highlighted the importance of structural reforms to enhance Morocco’s competitiveness. Hence, the Moroccan government has undertaken various measures to improve the business climate, such as simplifying regulatory procedures, developing and improving infrastructure, and investing in education and vocational training, with a particular focus on empowering girls and women. These reforms are crucial for sustaining long-term economic growth and ensuring that Morocco can fully capitalize on the opportunities presented by free trade.

Future prospects

Looking ahead, the US-Morocco FTA serves as a foundation for further economic cooperation and integration between the two economies. Both countries have expressed a commitment to deepening their trade relationship and exploring new areas of collaboration. For Morocco, this includes leveraging the FTA to attract more investment in high-tech industries and innovation-driven sectors. Morocco’s strategic location and proximity to European Union and African markets, coupled with its relatively modern infrastructure and stable political environment, position it as an attractive investment destination in emerging market economies.

Alongside the agreements signed between Morocco and other countries, the US-Morocco FTA remains one of the most important as it has played an integral role in transforming Morocco’s economy and labor force, contributing to the diversification of its trade portfolio and helping to attract foreign investment. However, regulatory, legal, and labor force challenges remain, and continued efforts are needed to ensure that the benefits of free trade are more equitably shared across various sectors of Moroccan society.

As Morocco looks to the future, the strategic vision should focus on further enhancing its competitive edge and strengthening its position as a key player in the global supply chain. Morocco’s Atlantic Sahel initiative is an important step in this direction. With sustained commitment and strategic planning, the next twenty years can bring even more prosperity and development for the Moroccan economy and greater profits for US and other foreign businesses operating in the kingdom.

Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou leads the Bretton Woods 2.0 Project at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. He is also a senior lecturer of economics at the American University in Washington, DC.

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Migration is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has significant implications for both sending and receiving countries. In the Atlantic basin, the movement of people across borders has been shaped by various factors such as economic opportunities, political instability, social networks, and historical ties.

This joint report, in partnership with Policy Center for the New South and the Africa Center, aims to explore the trends in African migration within the Atlantic basin, focusing on case studies of Nigerian migration to the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa as well as Moroccan migration to the European Union. It seeks to provide valuable insights into ongoing discourse on African migration by exploring case studies from diverse regions within the Atlantic basin, it highlights the interconnectedness of migration flows and their impact on individuals, communities, and societies on both sides of the Atlantic.

The report examines factors such as economic disparities, political instability, educational opportunities, and family ties to explain motivations behind Nigerian and Moroccan migration. By analyzing the “push and pull factors” influencing Moroccan migration to France and Spain alongside Nigerian migration to the United States, the UK, and South Africa, it builds a nuanced understanding of migration dynamics within the Atlantic basin and what is at stake for the home countries experiencing brain drain.

Public Event Thu, June 27, 2024 • 6:00 am ET

New trends in African migration: Case studies from Morocco and Nigeria

The Africa Center brings together experts to discuss current and future trends in African migration.

Africa Migration Morocco Nigeria

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Report

Aug 3, 2023

Irregular migration from North Africa: Shifting local and regional dynamics

By Matteo Villa and Alissa Pavia

Irregular migration from North Africa to Europe, especially through the Central Mediterranean route connecting Libya and Tunisia to Italy, is increasing once more. Italy has witnessed a surge in irregular arrivals, with approximately 136,000 migrants disembarking between June 2022 and May 2023, almost comparable to the high arrival period of 2014-2017 when around 155,000 migrants landed each year.

Human Rights Italy

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This paper is the first in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

In 2024, as many as seventeen countries across Africa, with a total population of nearly 300 million people, will hold national elections. These electoral processes are consequential because whether they are free, fair, and transparent will help determine if the troubling trend in several countries across the continent of democratic regression, military coups, or political instability worsens—or ebbs and begins to reverse, as was recently demonstrated in Senegal.

The stakes are clearly high in these contests, which will occur in the so-called year of elections wherein more than four billion people globally are eligible to cast ballots. While the elections are important to Africa’s democratic trajectory, they are not single-handedly determinative of it.

Strong and institutionalized political parties are also key to the future of democracy on the continent; however, policymakers have not afforded this key institution much attention or associated resources. For example, the US’s national security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa does not reference strengthening political parties despite the document’s emphasis on democracy promotion. Further, the Biden administration’s Summits for Democracy—the third of which took place in March 2024—have not included commitments from participating governments (the United States included) to strengthen political parties.

Robust political parties inform whether a political system delivers for citizens, provide a key link between citizens and their government, and foster measurable resilience against democratic erosion. For these and other reasons, therefore, political parties as a core institution of democracy will help chart the continent’s future, both in terms of freedom and prosperity.

This piece analyzes the state of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa and uses Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes data and other sources to show why parties are essential to democratic progress. It examines this argument through four case studies and concludes with a path forward for re-centering democracy assistance work in Africa to shore up this critical component.

Issue Brief Aug 30, 2024

South Asia’s political parties need internal reforms to revitalize regional democracy

By Steve Cima, Geoffrey MacDonald, James Storen

This paper is the third in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

Democratic Transitions Elections

Issue Brief Aug 30, 2024

Unloved but indispensable: Political parties in Europe

By Paul McCarthy, Thibault Muzergues, Patrick Quirk

The experience of the past decade has shown that despite their unpopularity, political parties remain indispensable for the functioning of democracies in Europe—when they are present, plural, and organized, democracy is doing well. To prove this assertion, this paper will look at four telling examples in recent European history.

Democratic Transitions Elections

Issue Brief Nov 19, 2024

The shift from party to personality politics is harming Latin American democracies

By Christine Zaino, Sofia Herrera

This paper is the fourth in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

Americas Democratic Transitions

State of the Parties

This pathbreaking new series delivers insights and policy recommendations from leading experts on how to enhance efforts to strengthen democracy in all regions of the world. 

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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The latest sign of Algeria’s obsession with Morocco was its decision to confiscate the jerseys of Moroccan soccer club RS Berkane after its players traveled to Algeria on April 19 to play a CAF Confederation Cup semifinal match against USMA Alger. Algeria justified its decision by stating that the team’s equipment bore an “illegitimate” map of Morocco, which included Western Sahara. 

African soccer’s governing body intervened, ordering Algeria to drop its case and allow RS Berkane to play in the jerseys. However, Algiers disregarded the ruling, seizing any opportunity to display its support for what it describes as the self-determination of the Sahrawi people.

Many have maintained that one of the main drivers of Algeria’s hostility toward Morocco is the ideological makeup of the Algerian establishment and its strategy of seeking popular legitimacy.

Algeria’s operating philosophy is to galvanize nationalist fervor against its enemies. For the past three decades, it has constantly needed to create external enemies to mobilize national support and divert public opinion from the country’s economic, social, and political problems. 

While largely pertinent, this analysis ignores the psychological dimension of this chronic animosity between the two countries. Algeria’s military and political leaders harbor unresolved grievances against Morocco, which contribute to tensions. Additionally, Morocco is one of the oldest monarchies in the world, and has managed to maintain its sovereignty for much of its history. The same cannot be said of Algeria, a sixty-two-year-old country. 

This makes the Algerian regime reluctant to fully explore the past, out of fear that a deep dive into the country’s history might lend credence to some critics’ claim that modern Algeria is the creation of imperialist France.

It’s worth mentioning that Morocco was a strong supporter of the Algerian liberation movement, contributing financially and logistically to the war effort against French domination. Then a champion of what some have described as a strong belief in the urgency and imperative of Muslim solidarity, Morocco ignored warnings and secret deals from France, committing itself to the liberation of Algeria instead.

Yet, post-independence, Algeria’s leadership quickly whitewashed this well-documented episode of Moroccan solidarity and generosity, providing invaluable insights into what would later become Algeria’s deep-seated desire to be the Maghreb’s undisputed leader.

Morocco’s defeat of Algeria in the border war known as the 1963 Sand War created a psychological barrier, as generations of Algerian military and political elites grew up with the idea of avenging the humiliation that newly independent Algeria had suffered at Morocco’s hands.

Morocco’s “betrayal” of Algeria

Over time, Algeria’s resentment against Morocco for its humiliating defeat morphed into a radical desire to take revenge by fostering separatism on Moroccan territory. Therefore, Algeria’s support of the Polisario Front is the culmination of the Algerian elite’s strategy of attaining regional primacy by establishing a satellite state in southern Morocco. While proclaiming its support for the “liberation struggle” of the “oppressed Sahrawi people,” Algeria’s primary goal is to keep Morocco in check by fomenting and prolonging the dispute over the Western Sahara region to prevent Rabat from reopening the issue of unresolved Algerian-Moroccan borders.

As far as Algiers is concerned, ending the Western Sahara dispute would provide Morocco with a level of strategic continental depth that would overwhelmingly consolidate its status as a regional hegemon. Algeria has steadfastly supported the Polisario for the past four decades to prevent Morocco from settling the territorial dispute. The Algerian-Moroccan rivalry entered a new phase in 2017 when Morocco joined the African Union (AU). Algeria had tirelessly used Morocco’s absence from the AU to push for a “parallel African agenda” on the Western Sahara question. This entailed lobbying for the Polisario Front’s Sahrawi cause, which it presents as a decolonization struggle against what it describes as Moroccan occupation.

Given that the AU’s official position on Western Sahara has shifted in Morocco’s favor since 2018, some of Algeria’s anti-Moroccan agitation speaks of deepening diplomatic disarray and a profound sense of disappointment. Algeria seems to be furious that Morocco, in the short time since its return to the AU, has effectively destroyed all the work that Algerian diplomacy had done for three decades to get the AU to fully support a self-determination referendum that would culminate in the creation of an independent state in the Western Sahara region.

Algeria’s displeasure with Morocco’s growing continental influence can be seen in three regional efforts that Algiers has undertaken in recent years to contain Rabat’s rising leadership. The first is the attempted revival of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project in 2022 to derail the more promising Nigeria-Morocco pipeline project. The second is the planned creation of free-trade zones with Niger and Mali to counter Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative for the Sahel. Finally, the most recent is the Algerian regime’s push for the creation of a Maghreb Union without Morocco.

For all these counterattacking efforts, highlighted by the projected openings of more African consulates in Dakhla and Laayoune, the fact remains that Morocco’s African diplomacy is having morale-boosting results. In contrast, Algeria’s diplomatic influence has declined across the continent. More importantly, Morocco’s African diplomacy now extends to countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Nigeria, outside its so-called traditional francophone comfort zone. In the coming months and years, Algeria will redouble its efforts to persuade some of these countries to reconsider their cooperation with Morocco. 

Perhaps the most significant blows to Algeria’s diplomacy have come from outside Africa. These include the consistent pro-Moroccan stance reflected in all United Nations (UN) resolutions on Western Sahara since 2007, the decisive US decision in 2020 to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the region, and Spain’s 2022 declaration of full support for Morocco’s autonomy plan. While the first development has been gradual, and lacks absolute finality due to the presence of marginal pro-Polisario voices within the UN, the latter two events have shaken Algeria.

Taken together, however, these and other emerging developments clearly indicate that self-determination dreams have been buried—and that compromise is the only viable route to a politically feasible and lasting solution in the Sahara dossier. Faced with what increasingly appears to be an irreversible diplomatic setback, Algeria has shifted tactics by confronting Morocco on alternative battlefields. In recent months, as noted earlier, Algeria has used the unconventional platform of sport to settle scores with Morocco.

The goal is to open a second narrative front to rally popular sympathy and support for the Algerian-backed Polisario Front. Algeria’s permanent representative to the UN recently drew parallels between Palestine and Western Sahara, reflecting the regime’s overarching aspiration to distort historical facts and equate the Western Saharan and Palestinian cases. 

It is unlikely that Algeria’s continued attacks on Morocco will compel the UN to reconsider its implicit, but increasingly apparent, burying of the self-determination option on Western Sahara. At the same time, there are growing signs that many in Morocco, having grown tired of ignoring Algiers’s unrelenting hostility toward Rabat, might start pushing Morocco to discard its long-standing patience and the ensuing hope of brotherly reconciliation between the two countries.  

Time for the United States to step in

The animosity and hostility between the two countries have reached worrying levels, raising the specter of a military conflagration breaking out. Against this bleak backdrop, the United States should lead a vigorous diplomatic campaign.      

To calm the waters between the two countries and ensure that the current state does not get out of hand, the United States should give more attention to its military cooperation with Morocco, while signaling to Algeria that Washington would do everything in its power to prevent it from taking any actions that could destabilize the region. Such a move could send Algeria an unmistakable signal of Washington’s commitment to security cooperation with Rabat.     

Second, the United States must pressure the Algerian government to abide by the provisions of the UNSC Resolution on the Western Sahara issue since 2018, all of which call on Algeria to fully cooperate with the UN as it works toward a compromise-based and realistic political solution to the dispute. As Algeria’s rejection of some recent UN resolutions has shown, the only way to get it to commit to the UN-led political process is to pressure it to fully acknowledge its political responsibility for creating and prolonging this conflict and to negotiate a face-saving political solution with Morocco. 

However, this goal will remain out of reach if the United States clings to a balancing diplomacy that prevents it from unequivocally supporting Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara. The time has come for the United States to break with this policy. It must align its political discourse and actions by reaffirming its recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara while calling on Algeria to fully participate in the UN-led political process to achieve a political solution to the dispute.

Indeed, such a move would simply reflect the long-standing US position in the dispute. Numerous declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents show that the United States has never believed in the viability of establishing a satellite state in southern Morocco. Americans have long praised the proverbial friendship that unites the United States and Morocco, stressing that Morocco was the first country to recognize US independence. It is time for the United States to give true meaning to this friendship by fully supporting Morocco’s decades-long quest to end the dispute over Western Sahara; by doing so, it could help end the conflict between Rabat and Algiers once and for all.    

Samir Bennis is a senior political analyst specializing in Arab affairs and Morocco’s foreign policy. He is the co-founder and publisher of Morocco World News. His upcoming book, The Self-Determination Delusion: How Victim Politics and Feel-good Advocacy Have Hijacked the Western Sahara Case, comes out in July.

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As political tensions between Algiers and Rabat have continued to mount since 2020, threatening to destabilize the entire North African and Sahel region, another front is being fought with no possible détente in sight: the cultural heritage war. The most recent chapter of this absurd dispute began when the Moroccan Ministry of Culture took legal action on May 20 by filing a complaint against Algeria with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for the alleged appropriation of a unique Moroccan traditional garment known as Caftan Ntaâ El Fassi (Ntaâ Kaftan), which came originally from the Moroccan city of Fez and which Algeria is trying to inscribe among its intangible cultural heritage list.

In recent years, there has been a renewed awareness about the significance of cultural heritage symbols and their undisputable value in nation branding. This was popularized, in part, by the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage introduced by UNESCO in 2003, which calls for the documentation and preservation of living cultural expressions such as crafts, oral traditions, and performing arts. This phenomenon was also encouraged by the business opportunities presented by cultural tourism, an important source of national wealth that accounts for an estimated 40 percent of all tourism worldwide.

Starting in 2008, Morocco and Algeria raced to inscribe diverse aspects of their local traditions with UNESCO. For Morocco, these included the Tbourida equestrian performance, Gnawa music, and the Argan tree and its know-how; for Algeria, they included the pilgrimage to the mausoleum of Sidi ’Abd el-Qader Ben Mohammed, Tlemcen wedding traditions, and the rituals of Sebeiba. However, many cultural elements remain the subject of fierce clashes between the two countries, which compete over the authenticity, exclusivity, and preeminence of disputed cultural symbols like Rai music, the couscous dish, or the Moorish Zellige tile.

The limits of cultural fortresses

Culture is a complex anthropological phenomenon that cannot be confined within the limits of modern nation-state borders—a more recent and contested political invention often inherited from colonial calculus over natural resources. This is particularly true in the case of the Moroccan Kingdom and Algerian Republic’s borders, which were engineered by their former occupiers after the 1845 Treaty of Lalla Maghnia. It is common knowledge by now, as demonstrated by historical maps, archive documents, and an International Court of Justice ruling, that colonial France considered Algeria one of its foreign territories—it annexed Algeria in 1830 and maintained control there until 1962—while Morocco was a mere strategic protectorate with a perpetual Alaouite monarch, which Paris would eventually need to exit with the growing decolonial movements starting in the 1930s. It was evident to France that it was more beneficial for its long-term interests to extract as many territories as possible from the Cherifian kingdom and generously subjoin them to the Ottoman Regency of Algiers.

The impossibility of drawing a line in the sand between two intertwined cultures is the very source of the recent conflict between Rabat and Algiers. Disputed bordering districts like Tlemcen, Tinduf, and Bechar are witnesses of the demographic hybridity and heritage spillover of several forms of craftsmanship, musical expressions, and culinary traditions. For instance, it would be absurd today for Morocco to claim the cultural exclusivity of Malhoun music or for Algeria to claim Rai music—though both are ironically inscribed under one country with UNESCO. This example and many others around the world demonstrate how this United Nations (UN) mechanism, while claiming to preserve cultural heritage, also contributes to the creation of imaginary borders and obsolete disputes among transnational communities that share many affinities, such as the indigenous inhabitants of North Africa.

The concept of cultural authenticity itself is historically questionable. It was established by authors like Eric Hobsbawm in The Invention of Tradition and David Lowenthal in The Past Is a Foreign Country that nation states handle, and often fabricate, historical narratives “celebrating certain aspects and expunging others.” It all depends on what serves their immediate interests, unity, and legitimacy. While Algeria’s oil-economy dependency and introverted military regime delayed its quest to reclaim its heritage, Morocco has benefited from its alignment with Western liberal economies and the urge to develop its tourism and services sectors to tap into its rich traditions and brand itself as an attractive destination at the doors of Europe—often caressing a certain Western orientalist fantasy about the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Rabat profited from its first-mover status to successfully market its souks, food, and crafts, sometimes exclusively claiming certain shared North African heritage symbols like Amazigh carpets, pottery, and the iconic dish of couscous, though such claims upset its Maghreb neighbors.

Heritage as a unifying juncture

Another recent episode illustrating this cultural heritage battle occurred in 2022, when the sports company Adidas revealed the Algerian soccer team’s jerseys comprising patterns commonly found in Moroccan ceramics, such as Fez Zellige. Morocco responded by issuing a legal warning to the company. The German sportswear brand ended up officially apologizing to Rabat and settling the dispute amicably after admitting to being inspired by Moroccan craftsmanship. Interestingly enough, back in 2015, the kingdom had engaged in patenting the Fez Zellige in the Vienna Classification of Figurative Elements of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)—a more robust and legally binding mechanism to preserve national crafts compared to the UNESCO treaty. Morocco has since attempted to trademark many more cultural elements, including kaftan embroidery patterns, which closes the loop for anyone trying to “culturally appropriate” Moroccan designs and use them for commercial gains.

Local media, Wikipedia, and social platforms are becoming central fronts in this incongruous cultural war. Both Morocco and Algeria engage restlessly and spend large amounts of money on distasteful online confrontations on YouTube, Facebook, and X (formerly Twitter) debating whether the kaftan is Almohad or Ottoman in origin and if the tajine is an authentic Moroccan or Algerian earthenware pot. Algerian bots, in particular, have been notorious for spreading propaganda and claiming many confirmed Moroccan traditions for themselves. Moroccan social media users carried out an outrageous, yet revealing, social experiment to prove this theory. To make a point, online users jokingly posted that the “Jaghdid” (colloquially meaning poison in Darija) is “a purely Moroccan delicacy,” prompting Algerian users to rush to claim the imaginary dish as theirs.

On the positive side, North African countries are gaining awareness of the importance of documenting and researching their history and memory, leading to a true revival in local crafts, ethnographic research, and a certain pride to showcase and reinvent those ancestral traditions long ignored in favor of Western consumerist goods. Moreover, this awareness contributed to liberating the Maghreb from the shadows of living in the periphery of Middle Eastern capitals like Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad that repetitively spread false claims that North African countries’ heritage and aesthetic beauty are all to be credited to romanticized and fictitious perceptions of “Arab” Andalucía—a claim that historical evidence strongly refutes.

Last year, “the arts, skills, and practices associated with engraving on metals (gold, silver, and copper)” were inscribed as intangible world heritage by UNESCO in ten MENA countries, including Morocco and Algeria. If the Algerian copper artisan I had encountered and Si Mohamed, the Moroccan one, were to speak today, they would surely approve of this positive collective effort to recognize their craft. The artisans would also agree that while respecting local know-how, originality, and unique historical trajectories is essential, cultural heritage can also be plural and an essential juncture for constructive exchanges beyond trivial political agendas.  

Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

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He announced the launch of an international initiative to “enable the Sahel countries to have access to the Atlantic Ocean.” Landlocked Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso are at the center of the Moroccan plan, which involves making Morocco’s road, port, and rail infrastructure available to them and implementing large-scale development projects.

Even if it is not detailed yet, the Moroccan initiative comes after military regimes came to power by unconstitutional means or through coups d’état, which for three of these states resulted, at various points, in having sanctions imposed on them. For example, Niger was sanctioned by the United States, European Union (EU), and European countries such as France and the Netherlands. Notably, Malian army officers who collaborated with the Wagner Group or were suspected of crimes were sanctioned by the United States. And the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which had sanctioned Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, lifted its sanctions on Niger and Mali in February this year, a month after the three Sahelian countries left the organization and soon after the countries formed the Alliance of Sahel States. Chad has not yet seen sanctions imposed after the undemocratic accession of its president following the death of his father. While the sanctions imposed on the three countries are intended to apply pressure on those who seized power by force or defied the constitution, in the hopes of restoring democratic systems, these sanctions also impact the populations.

The people in these countries are essentially penalized twice: On the one hand, they are led by governments that have revoked the right of the people to choose their leaders. On the other hand, these populations also suffer from the effects of sanctions, which cause them economic hardship, limit their access to essential goods, cut them off from the world, and deprive them of trade opportunities.

That creates a quandary for the democratic world: While sanctions are intended to target unconstitutional governments, it is the ordinary people in these countries who suffer the most from them.

Behind the initiative

Morocco’s efforts to cooperate with the states in the Sahel seem inspired by Morocco’s 2011 Constitution—mainly the preamble.

In this preamble, Morocco commits itself to supporting the Maghreb Union (which it says is a “strategic option”), deepening its bonds with the Arab-Islamic Ummah, intensifying cooperation with European countries around the Mediterranean, strengthening cooperation across Africa, and diversifying its relations with the rest of the world.

Specifically, when it comes to Africa, the preamble states that Morocco intends to “consolidate relations of cooperation and solidarity with the peoples and countries of Africa, particularly the countries of the Sahel and Sub-Saharan countries.” This short sentence helps explain Morocco’s initiative. The Moroccan Constitution does not drown the Sahel in the mass of Africa, but on the contrary highlights it by mentioning it separately. In his November 6 speech, the king of Morocco even called the Sahelian countries “African sister countries.”

In addition, the Moroccan Constitution’s commitment to the Islamic world—each of the three sanctioned countries are majority Muslim—and its pledging solidarity with the “peoples and countries of Africa” help explain Morocco’s new initiative. By specifying that its solidarity goes to the countries as well as to the peoples, Morocco is distinguishing people from the regimes that govern them.

As for the content of the Atlantic initiative, it has been received well by the Sahelian states because it offers alternatives for growth and development—and indeed, even survival. For example, Niger (one of the poorest countries in the world) depended on international aid for its annual budget, which was slashed by 40 percent in 2023 due to donors and creditors withholding support. Following the coup, malnutrition skyrocketed, only compounded by the fact that the United Nations (UN) World Food Program’s cargos were getting blocked from reaching Niger due to border closures, with one UN coordinator saying that their goal—to deliver humanitarian aid to at least 80 percent of 4.4 million vulnerable people—was in jeopardy.

The success of this initiative is contingent on several factors: It will require funding, a robust regulatory framework, efforts to address challenges such as piracy, and harmonization with and between maritime governance actors. In addition, the economic activity this initiative would create could have benefits for the governments, as well as the people, in the sanctioned Sahelian countries. However, the focus of this initiative is on helping the people, who have continued to suffer for decades.

The Atlantic advantage

The initiative underscores the importance placed—across centuries—on accessing the Atlantic Ocean. For example, El Hadj Omar Tall (founder of the Toucouleur Empire) and Samori Ture (a leader of the Wassoulou Empire) each governed landlocked areas of West Africa in the nineteenth century. Burkinabe historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo chronicled how the two African heroes, facing the inevitable advance of European colonial conquest, hurried to “capture, before it was too late, the political initiative and keep it in African hands.” They both did that by directing their troops to the ocean. Eventually, however, their efforts to reach the sea were halted by the French.

The strategic importance of the Atlantic as taught by history resonates today.

Today, over one hundred countries border the Atlantic Ocean, and importantly those countries include the world’s leading power (the United States), other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (including the United Kingdom and France), Latin American powers (such as Argentina and Brazil), and African nations stretching from Morocco (which itself has a 1,800-mile coastline on the ocean) to South Africa.

For countries that have the means to take full advantage of their coasts, such as Morocco and Senegal, the Atlantic is a boon. Indeed, Africa’s twenty-three coastal nations are home to 46 percent of the continent’s population, 55 percent of its gross domestic product, and 57 percent of its trade. They also contain a large amount of natural resources, including oil.

But access alone won’t grant people in Sahelian countries access to the boon. Here is what is needed for this initiative to succeed:

• Defining common strategic priorities between the countries participating in this initiative and also their partners in order to focus on the most pressing issues.
• The integration of projects already underway such as the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project or the Great Green Wall. Their inclusion will bring a more holistic approach to the Moroccan initiative, which focuses on road, rail, and maritime infrastructure.
• The inclusion of the African Union (through the 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy) as well as maritime governance mechanisms, specialized institutions, and other important stakeholders such as the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa, African Port Management Associations, Union of African Shippers’ Councils, maritime training institutions, the UN, and the International Maritime Organization. This inclusion in discussions will help to harmonize the maritime rules and avoid double governance systems.
• Access to substantial financing, particularly via international partners such as in the private sector and development and financial institutions. Financing will be needed to support the blue economy and the modernization of road, rail, and port infrastructure.

Sahelian civilian populations have been suffering from the effects of a twenty-year war against jihadist attacks. These populations deserve peace and prosperity. After the security failures of so many domestic and foreign military interventions and the unfolding of the coups, this proposal offers a much-needed brighter perspective for these people.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center.

Abdelhak Bassou is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South.

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Minerals often lie at the heart of this cooperation, and while the words the presidents said may have been similar, the meaning and context behind them couldn’t be more different.

Russia offers quid pro quo partnerships with promises of kinetic military, security, and political support—and assisted by faux anti-imperialist messaging. The United States, on the other hand, touts an approach that places emphasis on economic and community investment. There is a widening gulf emerging between the two models—and each model offers something that the other cannot.

Russia’s give—and take

Russia’s version of partnership has been aptly described as a “regime survival package,” in which the Russian government offers military and security assistance to struggling African governments; soon after come resource concessions for Russian companies.

This exchange has relied heavily on the Wagner Group, as the military company’s running operations allowed Moscow to distance itself via proxy. However, since the Wagner Group’s consolidation and rebranding into the Africa Corps (following the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin), the exchange is arguably more direct and state-to-state, as Africa Corps activities are now reportedly being directed by the Russian state and managed by Russia’s military intelligence agency (the GRU) and the Kremlin. The Russian Defense Ministry, with the Africa Corps now reportedly in-house, is expanding its operations.

Russia’s offer of partnership has appealed particularly to governments in the Sahel. The Central African Republic is often viewed as the textbook case, with Wagner arriving in 2018 to push back rebels from the capital. Soon after, gold and diamond mining licenses were granted to a Russian-owned company that even the United Nations warns is “interconnected” with Wagner. And last year, Wagner helped Mali retake rebel-held areas in the north; in the months that followed, Russia and Mali signed agreements on gold refining and on oil, gas, uranium, and lithium production.

More recently, a contingent of Africa Corps personnel arrived in Burkina Faso in January to, according to the group’s Telegram channel, “ensure the safety of the country’s leader Ibrahim Traore and the Burkinabe people.” Two months later, Burkina Faso’s minister of energy, mining, and quarries told Sputnik Africa that Russian companies can become “strategic partners” in the extraction of minerals—such as gold, zinc, manganese, copper, graphite, and lithium—from mines and quarries.

Russia’s offer is currently supplanting other forms of partnership in Niger. The junta halted military cooperation with both France and the United States—whose militaries were there to help improve the security situation for Niger’s previous democratic leadership—pushing French troops to leave the country late last year and propelling the United States to agree to withdraw its forces. Earlier this month, Russian forces and military advisors arrived in Niger, equipped with an air defense system and other security equipment—a choice reflecting the fact that US forces were allocated between two airbases, from which they used drones to target militants. Once again, resources seem to be on the table in exchange for Russia’s partnership.  

While there are some actual value-added projects being developed from Russia’s deals, such as the agreement with Mali on building a gold refinery, such deals are exceptions to the rule. A number of Russia’s grandiose economic promises to Africa have failed to fully materialize. The fact is that Russia’s economic potential for Africa cannot compete with that of the West. Russia contributes less than 1 percent of the global foreign direct investment going to the continent, and when it comes to trade revenue, it’s $17.7 billion (as of 2021) is dwarfed by the United States’ $65 billion and the European Union’s (EU) $295 billion. If economic measures were the only consideration in choosing partnership, Russia likely wouldn’t make any list.

The only market where Russia leads in Africa is the arms market. Last year, Russia overtook China as the largest supplier of arms to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Part of what makes Russia so appealing as a partner—in addition to its offers of security assistance—is Russia’s ability to market itself as anti-imperialist based on the Soviet Union’s support for African countries when they were fighting for independence. For example, when the junta seized power from a French-backed president, Russia’s Prigozhin framed the coup as a liberation from Western powers. African countries still have concerns about the remaining influence wielded by former colonial powers.

How Washington works

The United States, on the other hand, makes its appeal to African countries by promising partnership on local economic development—the critical minerals discussion is only part of that partnership. The US approach is reflected in projects such as the Lobito Corridor—which is intended to make transport, including of critical minerals, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia to Angola easier. Alongside its mineral extraction initiatives, the United States is eager to showcase regional and community benefits for its projects. 

In addition, the United States often cooperates and coordinates with its European partners when approaching investment and activity in Africa. For example, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have signed similar agreements with both the United States and EU in which the countries agree to promote responsible mineral extraction activities that build local capacity and to bring more of the minerals value chain (including processing, manufacturing, and assembly) to the region.

Partnership with Europe can be an effective strategy for the United States, as such an approach gathers more funds, capacities, and markets. Yet, there are downsides. By tying itself with Europe, the United States ties itself to a colonial legacy. In Niger, the junta took power and quickly sought to evict French forces and EU partners—but not US forces (at least initially). This generated tension in the US-France relationship and underscored the extent to which the United States is willing to deviate from cooperation with its partners to maintain engagement in Africa. Such a method lines up with the revamped US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa under which the Biden administration has been adamant that it is seeking to partner with African countries on equal footing and that it will not treat Africa as a great-power battleground. Europe is itself aware of its history. A former Latvian prime minister, for example, called for EU members without colonial pasts to lead the bloc’s engagement with countries across Africa.

The United States, for the most part, holds its engagement conditional on the health of each country’s democracy. In the case of Niger, the United States suspended financial assistance, saying that “Any resumption of US assistance will require action . . .  to usher in democratic governance in a quick and credible timeframe.” The United States has also not shied away from terminating partnership in programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (which provides duty-free entry for certain products) when the country in that partnership has seen an erosion in democratic governance, human rights, and freedoms. The United States shouldn’t shy away from doing so; but this is not a priority Russia shares.

To be fair, the United States, often alongside its European partners, does collaborate on military affairs with African countries. For example, the United States and United Kingdom joined African democratic partners in conducting a large military drill in Kenya. Many African countries, especially those that are partners with the United States, recognize the risk Russia’s support poses. Some have been vocal in making their opposition to Russia’s geopolitical actions known.

Yet, deadly incidents (and the resulting political fallout)—such as the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush or the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu—have doused US enthusiasm for assistance with direct combat. The United States focuses on supporting roles with airpower, intelligence sharing, and training. Even France, after deploying troops across the Sahel for years in Operation Barkhane, was unwilling to deploy its forces to Niger during the coup to support the president it had backed. Compare that to Russia, which seems willing to sustain partnership with blood. When the Central African Republic’s president changed the constitution last year to abolish term limits, Russian forces in the country increased their presence and provided support and security services to the president.

The United States (especially when joining with its allies) is an economic power, and that is attractive for African countries seeking much needed domestic development and value addition. Yet, US partnership does have its limitations. Should a country’s domestic policies run afoul of American principles, partnership is near impossible. Unlike Russia’s limitations, the United States’ are largely self-imposed.

Weighing the choice

Going forward, African countries must choose wisely between the United States (and its offer of economic and development support) and Russia (and its offer of direct military support) in their search for a partner on critical minerals.

Juntas and dictatorships will likely choose Russia, even if offered another choice (which seems unlikely). Russia offers them the equipment and military support they need to fight insurgent and terrorist groups.

The West will need to closely watch democratic countries in Africa. Russia is looking to make the choice easier by deploying disinformation. France has accused Russia of even staging atrocities and framing the West to promote its narrative.

As for what the United States could do: It could theoretically start adding direct kinetic security support to its offer. However, the United States isn’t likely to align itself with military leaders who trampled democracy on their road to power, and it isn’t very likely to deploy forces to protect them. The United States could, theoretically, also turn to the private sector—supporting the efforts of private military companies that are already operating in the continent. But the government would still be limited, rightly so, by laws that restrict it from supporting nondemocratic regimes.

With African minerals in high demand, Russia and the United States will continue to offer what the other can’t.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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Stability at home translates to leadership abroad

Across the political divide, the consensus in Rome is that Meloni’s position is secure. A year and a half into her tenure, Meloni maintains strong approval ratings. She faces no real threats from the opposition or her coalition partners. Would-be rivals of Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party, including Deputy Prime Minister and Infrastructure Minister Matteo Salvini and the League, have been outflanked. Forza Italia, led by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, is on the rise, but it still lags in the polls. Both those in power and in opposition predict that Meloni will last for the remaining three years of the legislature—barring any twists, which even now no one can write off in Italy.

An important part of this stability comes from the fact that Meloni’s foreign policy priorities are largely supported among Italy’s policymakers and fit within transatlantic priorities. Initially feared as another weak link in the European Union (EU), Meloni has shown herself to be staunchly pro-Ukraine. She is a Euroskeptic but not anti-EU. And while US President Joe Biden differs from her on several notable domestic policies, he has found an ally in Meloni. “We have each other’s backs,” Biden declared during their March 1 meeting in Washington. It’s an interesting turn given that, shortly after her election, Biden used Meloni as a warning to Democrats. She has played a delicate balancing act on China, officially leaving the Belt and Road Initiative—Italy being the only Group of Seven (G7) country to have signed on—while still maintaining economic ties with Beijing. If anything, Meloni’s domestic opposition criticizes her for a lack of follow-through, especially on Italy’s aid to Ukraine and the funds pledged for development projects in North Africa.

Uncontested leadership and support for its foreign policy priorities allow Italy’s government to be much more impactful abroad. This stability comes at an opportune time. Italy holds the G7 presidency in 2024 and for that reason is in the driver’s seat when it comes to advancing the vision of the “steering committee for the world’s most advanced democracies,” as described by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Stability and popularity also allow Rome to make its priorities for the West heard, most notably the security of the Mediterranean and Western outreach to Africa.

Recentering the Mediterranean

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and arguably before, much of the West’s attention has focused on Europe’s eastern flank—and with good reason. As a result, Rome’s focus on the Mediterranean can at times seem like a regional preoccupation, but the case for the area’s importance for the transatlantic alliance is strong.

The Mediterranean is NATO’s southern flank, and a rather weak one at that. Italian policymakers do not see Russia as just threatening NATO’s eastern flank. Russia has long played a destabilizing role in Libya, for example, funneling weapons into the country as well as deploying its own forces. This destabilizing activity directly affects Europe, impacting migration flows and propping up an important presence off Italy’s coast. Italy’s leadership in the EU’s naval Operation Aspides in the Red Sea provides a useful example of the role Italy can play in organizing its European counterparts, and Rome should seek to extend that leadership to provide greater security in the Mediterranean in the face of threats from Russia and other actors.

The Mediterranean region is also poised to play an important role in the planned India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). A major deliverable of the 2023 Group of Twenty (G20) Summit in New Delhi, this rail-and-sea infrastructure network has huge potential for countries such as India and for Italy and the Mediterranean region to be a conduit that deepens Europe’s ties with emerging new global partners. Europe could provide these partners with an alternative to deepening economic ties with China and boost sustainable infrastructure investments across the network. Italy is well positioned to carry forward this effort. But it needs to make sure this massive project stays viable and on the West’s agenda. Italy should use its current G7 presidency to garner greater Western support for IMEC, and position itself as a key partner on the European link of the corridor.

The infrastructure development race to the top

Italy’s focus on infrastructure goes beyond IMEC. Rome is paying greater attention to infrastructure development across the Global South and stands ready to build on earlier efforts by the West. In June 2022, the G7 adopted the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII) to facilitate six hundred billion dollars in infrastructure projects by 2027. The EU’s Global Gateway promises to provide three hundred billion dollars for EU-supported projects, also by 2027.

Meloni, too, has jumped into the infrastructure development space. She has made infrastructure a cornerstone of her foreign policy and of Italy’s relationship with Africa through the Mattei Plan for North Africa, unveiled in January 2024.

Rome’s Mattei Plan has several drivers that fit in with the West’s larger infrastructure push. First, the plan aims to help African countries build stability at home to limit migration abroad. Meloni explicitly stated this goal, as Italy remains a key port of entry from North Africa. Second, the plan is intended to position Italy as a European energy hub, deepening the economic link between Europe and Africa. Third, the plan fits within the G7’s larger effort to prove the West’s rules-based system is fit for purpose and to offset the influence of China through a truly nonexploitative partnership framework. Fourth, mineral-rich states in Africa will be critical to the twin green and digital transitions. The extraction and processing of these resources must be supported with sustainable practices that respect the rule of law and labor standards, and help countries move up the global value chain. Doing so will help in the West’s de-risking efforts to shift away from overreliance on China while boosting states’ long-term development.

Building relationships that are not extractive or exploitive will be key to ensuring long-term partnerships, and Italy has said it intends to take this approach with future infrastructure development. Creating public-private partnerships will also be important, since the private sector will play an integral role in the financing of said investments. But the private sector needs to be convinced that investing doesn’t come along with an unacceptable amount of risk. There is a role for the government to play in minimizing these risks, and focusing on the opportunities presented by these markets.

Italy is well suited to set up the mechanisms needed to coordinate these projects. With its G7 presidency, Italy should focus on deepening the coordination of projects such as the PGII, Global Gateway, and the Mattei Plan. The Mattei Plan specifically will require greater effort to be successful. While the plan’s framework presents a possible blueprint for increased European and G7 engagement with the Global South, in its current form it is humble both in the number of projects and the amount of financing proposed—just over five billion euros for nine projects—compared to the PGII and Global Gateway. For this project to really take off, Rome will need to find more money to invest through the Mattei Plan and expand its scope, while fully integrating it into larger investment plans.

Until recently, political chaos and economic woes have caused Italy, the EU’s third-largest economy and a G7 member, to punch below its weight. The current political calm won’t last forever, but in this period of steadiness at home, Rome can expand its leadership role abroad.

Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Nicholas O’Connell is the deputy director for public sector partnerships at the Atlantic Council.

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Read up on the events shaping the democratic world order below.

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatens to set a date to invade Rafah amid mounting US and international pressure to limit civilian harm. The Israeli government continued attacks across Gaza before, in early April, withdrawing all but one of its battalions and reportedly setting a date for a military operation in the city of Rafah. However, significant skepticism abounds as to whether the date is real or simply a tactic to try to pressure Hamas. The United States sought to help shape Israel’s Rafah plan given concerns for civilian casualties, but did not reach an agreement on how Israel might proceed with such an operation. The United States continued high-level pressure on the Netanyahu government to limit civilian casualties and agree on a temporary ceasefire. Vice President Kamala Harris called for an immediate temporary ceasefire and US Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer criticized Netanyahu, going so far as to call for fresh elections in Israel. Netanyahu canceled  a meeting between senior Israeli officials and US counterparts to discuss Rafah after the United States abstained from voting on a United Nations Security Council resolution pressing for an immediate temporary ceasefire in Gaza, which allowed the measure to pass, before allowing a virtual meeting to take place. Meanwhile, negotiations between Israel and Hamas in Qatar stalled after Israel claimed Hamas was “not interested” in talks; however, as April began the talks were expected to restart in Cairo. The humanitarian crisis in Gaza worsened, despite ongoing aid deliveries by air and sea. Conditions close to famine levels are now present, according to the International Court of Justice at the Hague, which also ruled unanimously that Israel must let food aid enter Gaza.

• Shaping the order. The Israel-Hamas war retains a high risk for spreading into a broader regional, state-on-state conflict. This risk heightened at the start of April as Israel reportedly killed two Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) generals and five military advisors in an airstrike on the Iranian consulate building in Damascus, Syria, which Israel claims is being used as a cover by the IRGC to conduct regional malign activities. Meanwhile, the manner in which the Netanyahu government has prosecuted the war has prompted significant debate between those viewing the tens of thousands of casualties as having driven support to Hamas and those who argue that Israel’s urban warfare conduct has actually set a new “gold standard.”  What does seem clear is that Hamas is turning battlefield losses into strategic advantage, as the United States warned Israel was the likely outcome if it went into Gaza in a way that causes mass civilian casualties and hunger.
• Hitting home. The war and humanitarian crisis being felt every day by Gazans is helping to shift US public opinion on Israel. Gallup’s March survey found that 55 percent of Americans now disagree with how Israel is conducting its war against Hamas, up from 50 percent in November. A group of eight Democrat senators pushed US President Joe Biden to end the US provision of military weapons to Jerusalem.
• What to do. In the immediate term, the United States must continue to press (and put pressure on) the Israeli government to limit civilian casualties and pursue a temporary ceasefire that would enable mass humanitarian aid to flow into Gaza and release all hostages. The Biden administration, even as it urges Netanyahu to limit civilian casualties, must mobilize key Middle Eastern partners, namely Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, to devise and resource a viable plan for post-war Gaza, a core pillar of which should be a two-state solution.

Ukraine fights on with European support while US support remains stuck in Congress. Ukraine’s strikes deep into Russian territory continued, with significant impact, including the destruction of one-third of Russian naval vessels and the brief closure of (and possible damage to) the Kerch Bridge in Crimea. Despite this progress, Ukraine faced munitions and personnel shortages that could imperil its hold on the front lines. The Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, debated lowering the draft age from twenty-seven to twenty-five to deal with manpower shortages, but without ammunition and with US support in doubt, morale is sagging.

The United States continued sending mixed messages on its support for Ukraine. A minority in the US Congress again held up passage of a large-scale military aid package for Kyiv, though as April started, there were signs a vote could be called soon. The Biden administration reportedly urged Kyiv not to attack Russian oil refineries, a message that generated frustration in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Europe held firm in its support for Kyiv. French President Emmanuel Macron told European allies and partners, “Today, to have peace in Ukraine, we must not be weak,” and refused to rule out Western troop deployments to Ukraine. A Czech-led ammunition initiative to supply Kyiv with artillery shells by June received additional support. Sweden announced it will help bankroll the effort with thirty million euros and Germany announced it would pay for 180,000 rounds.

• Shaping the order. US military support, in the form of weapons and munitions, along with the same from European allies, will largely determine whether Kyiv succeeds or fails on the battlefield. The minority in the US Congress preventing the military aid bill from passing is sending a message to Russia (and China) that US resolve might not hold. Absent continued US and European military support, Ukraine could lose the war. This would likely embolden Russian President Vladimir Putin to attack NATO countries and in so doing draw the United States directly into a land war in Europe to defend a NATO ally.
• Hitting home. Ukraine defeating Russia is a plausible outcome and would advance US national interests by weakening a US adversary without costing US soldiers. Despite these realities, a minority in Congress continued holding up further military support to Ukraine. Many Europeans are alarmed by rising isolationism in the United States, particularly following Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s claims that former US President Donald Trump had told him he would end military aid to Ukraine should he be elected.
• What to do. The Biden administration must continue to push Congress to pass military aid for Ukraine and work with its allies in Europe to continue their support for Kyiv.

Senegal’s democracy shows resilience. On March 24, Senegalese citizens elected Bassirou Diomaye Faye as president, just ten days after his release from prison. The election was initially scheduled for February 25, until Sall, in office for twelve years, announced a delay and pushed for legislation that rescheduled the contest for December 2024. The opposition and some analysts feared that Sall wanted to delay the election to extend his time in power; although in February, Sall promised to end his term in April. However, the Constitutional Court rejected the plan to postpone the elections and ordered the government to set the date for elections, which it set as March 24. Many had feared that the postponement of the election would result in violence, after security forces violently responded to protests against the election delay. 

• Shaping the order. Democracy in West Africa has been on the backfoot following a string of coups across the Sahel. Senegal, which looked at risk of backsliding after the unfolding of these events, showed the importance of strong and independent institutions in restoring democracy.
• Hitting home. A democratic and stable Senegal benefits the United States. More broadly, the United States benefits when there are more democracies in the world. Democracies are more reliable trading partners, are less likely to go to war with one another, and are less likely to incubate and export transnational crime and terrorism.
• What to do. The United States should continue pursuing partnerships with the new government on a range of economic, cultural, and security matters.

Quote of the Month

“My purpose tonight is to both wake up this Congress and alert the American people that this is no ordinary moment either . . . What makes our moment rare is that freedom and democracy are under attack, both at home and overseas, at the very same time.”
– Biden in his State of the Union address before the US Congress.

State of the Order this month: Weakened

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy (↓)

• In the first Iranian election since protests erupted in 2022 following the death of Mahsa Amini, many Iranians boycotted parliamentary elections, seemingly expressing, by refusing to cast a ballot, their opposition to the government’s oppressive rules and handling of the economy.
• Venezuela’s regime officially blocked the leading opposition candidate, Corina Yoris, from running in July’s presidential elections, a major blow to opposition hopes to unseat Nicolas Maduro. The regime’s decision is also a setback for the Biden administration, which lifted sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry in an effort to encourage Maduro to hold free and fair elections.
• Article 23, Hong Kong’s new security law, came into effect, enabling officials to conduct closed-door trials and allowing the police to hold individuals for up to sixteen days without bringing charges for violating state secrets, fomenting sedition, and engaging in treason, all of which have broad definitions under the law. Radio Free Asia shut down its office in Hong Kong due to fears that its staff could endangered.
• India put in place a new citizenship law that excludes Muslim migrants and establishes a religious test for migrants of prominent faiths in South Asia other than Islam. Experts say that under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government, Muslims have faced increased discrimination.
• On balance, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security (↓)

• Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry resigned from office, following a meeting in Jamaica of the United States, Caribbean partners, Canada, and France. An alliance of gangs, which has sowed instability across the country, including by releasing thousands of prisoners from government facilities and controlling most of the capital, had threatened civil war if Henry did not resign.
• Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham–Khorasan (ISIS-K), launched an attack on a concert hall in Moscow that left at least 144 dead. The group claimed responsibility but Putin has continued to link the attack to Ukraine.
• The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) warned that the number of individuals experiencing female genitalia mutilation increased by 15 percent in the last eight years, with UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell stating that these unnecessary procedures are happening at younger and younger ages, sometimes even before children reach the age of five.
• On balance, the security pillar was weakened.

Trade ()

• Chinese Premier Li Qiang announced that China’s economic growth goal is 5 percent; however, he offered few details on how China would increase growth, even as its real estate crisis continued and public confidence in China’s economy declined.
• The Bank of Japan, after eight years of negative interest rates, increased short-term interest rates to 0-0.1 percent, demonstrating the central bank’s confidence in the country’s economic recovery and sustainable inflation.
• On balance, the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons ()

• The oil and gas company Shell initiated court proceedings to formally repeal the 2021 ruling wherein a district court in The Hague ordered Shell to cut its carbon emissions by 45 percent by 2030 compared to 2019 levels.
• On balance, the commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances (↑)

• Sweden formally joined NATO, strengthening the Alliance and positioning it to better defend its northern flank.
• On balance, the alliances pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

• Liselotte Odgaard, in Foreign Policy, argues that NATO is not ready to deter Russia in the Arctic.
• Hal Brands, in Foreign Affairs, contends that new autocratic alliances are a genuine threat.
• Sahar Halaimazi, Metra Mehran, and Marika Theros, as part of a project examining Afghanistan’s gender apartheid, map the timeline of the Taliban’s decrees restricting women.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Frederick Kempe, in Inflection Points Today, assesses that the United States needs to make the case for winning the “strategic battle for the global future,” including by banning TikTok and passing aid to Ukraine.
• Jenna Ben-Yehuda and Matthew Kroenig, in the New Atlanticist, respond to Biden’s State of the Union address.
• Andrew Michta and Jeffrey Cimmino, as part of the Scowcroft Center’s project on twenty-first-century diplomacy, analyze the risks and benefits of generative artificial intelligence for diplomacy.
• Jerzy Koźmiński and Daniel Fried, in the New Atlanticist, discuss NATO enlargement on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joining the Alliance.
• Patrick Quirk, in the Hill, argues that technology companies and Russian democracy activists must work together to combat Putin’s online authoritarianism.
• Samantha Vinograd, on Face the Nation, analyzed the ISIS-K terror attack in Moscow.
• Jeffrey Cimmino, in the New Atlanticist, lays out how the United States can play a bigger role in protecting religious freedom across the globe.

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The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Patrick Quirk – Nonresident Senior Fellow
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Sydney Sherry – Program Assistant

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It is an epilogue to months of suspense in what has long been West Africa’s most stable and democratic country. Senegal has landed back on its democratic feet. It has demonstrated to the world that its reputation as a democratic bastion in its region remains strong.

It took a combination of factors to make this outcome possible, after the country lived for months under the scrutiny of observers from around the world.

Democracy is culture

For the Senegalese, democracy is not a slogan or even simply the rule of law. It’s a way of life. Journalists, intellectuals, youth organizations, families, religious communities—all strata of society are imbued with this democratic culture, as evidenced by the high voter turnout, the positive takeaways of international observers, and the presence of nineteen presidential candidates. But there is another important element that observers who are not familiar with Senegalese culture might have missed. There is an ongoing tradition in Senegal of open dialogue between the opposition and the outgoing majority, thanks to many mediators, including former Senegalese presidents.

For the opposition parties in Africa, the Senegalese election is a lesson. Boycotting an election in protest, instead of contesting it, is not always the best solution. Moreover, no one is irreplaceable. The fate of Faye, who emerged from relative obscurity to replace the former opposition candidate Ousmane Sonko at the last moment, proves this. The Senegalese will now get to know President Faye. But it will be necessary for the new president to distinguish himself beyond the slogan that emerged during the campaign: “Diomaye moy Sonko,” or “Diomaye is Sonko.”

For the putschists in the region, some of whom have strangely welcomed Faye’s victory, this election is a stinging refutation of their seizure of power by brute force. Faye may present a program of rupture with the outgoing administration, but the fact remains that he submitted to the vote of his people. Neither Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya of Guinea, nor Captain Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso, nor General Abdourahamane Tiani of Niger had the courage to do.

In Senegal, change comes through the ballot box, not through weapons. While a few members of the Senegalese army committed the folly of whispering the names of the most eminent generals as a possible recourse, the armed forces remained stoic in their barracks, aware that their duties are not of that nature and never have been.

The outgoing president

The actions of the outgoing president should be noted here. Unlike some leaders in the region, Sall relinquished his power when it was time. He renounced a third term when he understood that his reading of the constitution on this subject was not shared by all Senegalese, despite pressure from his supporters. Then, at the height of the crisis over the postponement of the election, he complied with the decision of the Constitutional Council. It is only in a democracy with strong institutions that the president (and the national assembly) accepts the decision of a court that has just contradicted the head of state. Finally, Sall’s amnesty bill, which freed hundreds of prisoners, some of whom had been guilty of abuses and looting, displeased the members of his party, but he understood that opponents did not belong in a prison.

Undoubtedly, for Senegalese to elect Faye, a candidate whom they knew nothing of until two months ago, the power of “dégagisme”—or rejection of the current political class—had to be exceptionally strong. But as usual with outgoing presidents, it will take time for Sall’s full legacy both internationally and domestically to be fully understood.

During Sall’s presidency, Senegal led the African Union in 2022-2023, replacing Mali at the last minute. In his role as the African Union chairman, Sall brought important attention to the issue of food security during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi in June 2022, to the financing of African economies, and to the need for a permanent seat for the African Union in the Group of Twenty (G20), which was finally approved in September 2023.

In Senegal, Sall leaves an economic record that can be measured by the large number of major infrastructure projects undertaken during his tenure. This includes the new city of Diamniadio, as well as new trains, airports, stadiums, highways, and hospitals. Sall’s administration also spearheaded an emergency development plan for small rural communities. But in this country of eighteen million inhabitants, 75 percent of whom are under thirty-five years old, who have had to face economic consequences stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is the high cost of living that has given energy to the opposition. Youth unemployment and social inequalities have persisted, despite financial support for the poorest.

The incoming president

Faye takes office at a pivotal moment for his country. Important oil and gas projects are set to begin production later this year, potentially providing a boost to the country’s economy—and drawing interest from regional and global powers. At the same time, Senegal sits in a precarious region that has been hit by a series of coups d’état in recent years. In addition, the jihadist threat has never ceased, as evidenced by the regular arrests of terrorists by Senegalese military forces, which have been heavily mobilized at the border in recent years.

Faye campaigned on enacting a rupture on three levels:

• First, a break with Senegal’s former colonial power, France, by questioning the CFA franc and potentially introducing a new currency.
• Second, a break with the “resource curse” with the promise of a better distribution of revenue from oil and other natural resources.
• Third, a break with bad governance via institutional reform.

None of these will be easy, but the biggest challenge for the new president will undoubtedly be the one that all Senegalese presidents before Faye have faced as well: How to keep campaign promises and not disappoint the Senegalese youth, who have proven their ability to make the difference on election day.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center.

The post In Senegal, Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s win shows that change comes through the ballot box appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The divergences caused by fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) situations are particularly stark, as the incidence of conflict events has increased 40 percent since 2020, to the highest number of events since World War II. Half of the world’s poor live in FCV-affected countries and that number is expected to rise to 60 percent by 2030, in part as the duration of conflicts extends—to now an average of twenty years. In addition to the death, destruction, and disruptions they cause, conflict and fragility are disincentives to investment and further undermine economic growth. One-fifth of International Monetary Fund member countries are considered fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS) and twenty of the most climate-vulnerable economies are also on the World Bank’s FCS list.

According to the most recent Women, Peace, and Security Index: “In 2022, approximately six hundred million women—15 percent of women in the world—lived within fifty kilometers of armed conflict, more than double the levels in the 1990s.” These numbers don’t lie, but they also don’t necessarily tell the whole truth. And the truth is that women and girls are disproportionately impacted by fragility and conflict economically, socially, and politically. The impacts are well-documented. The data show, for example, that women and girls are more likely to see their educations disrupted, are more vulnerable to gender-based violence, and are more likely to be displaced or become refugees.

Women often face much greater economic hardships than men in conflict-affected areas, as well. Notably, six out of ten of the World Bank’s FCS countries are in the lower quartile on the “Economic Participation and Opportunity” subindex on the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index, indicating wider gender gaps and more challenges facing women in conflict contexts. Similarly, a majority of FCV countries can be found in the bottom of the latest Women Business and the Law rankings released on March 4. These impacts also further undermine economies: The World Bank estimates that gender-based violence costs some countries up to 3.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and a 1 percent increase in violence against women lowers economic activity by 9 percent.

The roles women hold during conflict and reconstruction

But there can be opportunities for women’s economic empowerment in conflict and reconstruction, as well. Women are experiencing these outcomes despite the important role they play in economies during conflict, in post-conflict reconstruction, and in efforts to sustain peace.

Most of today’s FCV economies are characterized by low female labor force participation. For example, in 2022, the United Nations estimated that closing gender gaps in women’s labor force participation in Yemen would increase the country’s GDP by 27 percent. War has historically created windows of opportunity for women to fulfill workforce shortages—including in male-dominated fields—since men make up a majority of combatants. War—often coupled with crippling inflation—makes finding paid work more acceptable and, importantly, this openness tends to continue as income generation changes women’s economic value and power in society. In the United States, for example, women took to manufacturing and government administration for the war industry and beyond during World War II, with nineteen million women entering the US workforce during this period. Today, women continue to join or rejoin the workforce—including in the informal sector—at higher rates amid conflict and take on more culturally nontraditional jobs. For instance, Ukrainian women have joined the mining workforce, filling the gaps left by conscription after Russia’s invasion.

Like most economies worldwide, micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises dominate the market landscape of fragile and conflict-torn countries.

Even though these smaller businesses face more start-up and operational constraints, they provide a key pathway for women’s economic participation during conflict and on the road to recovery. A study in Syria estimated that the proportion of female entrepreneurs increased from a low base of 4.4 percent in 2009 to 22.4 percent by 2017. This includes women-owned and -led businesses engaging in supply chains; including in the logistics, information, and communication technology, infrastructure, and public works sectors, all of which are critical to reconstruction.

And as women workers and their businesses earn more, especially in the formal economy, they can mitigate the otherwise dampening domestic resource mobilization associated with reduced economic activity, investment, and government administration during conflict or destabilization. Women’s greater participation in the economy during conflict and reconstruction can also increase consumption and income utilization (including from cash transfers or other social protection mechanisms) as women recirculate their earnings with spending on their families.

How to wield prosperity and peace dividends with and for women

Gender inclusion cannot be an afterthought. Policymakers must address the immediate economic security and income needs of women during conflict, while empowering them to contribute to and benefit from recovery, reconstruction, and growth. This means providing context-specific, targeted social protections and addressing the issues that undermine women’s economic participation. It requires mitigating and responding to gender-based violence, as well as improving accessibility and affordability of child and elder care. It also means supporting women entrepreneurs and women-led small businesses, closing education or skill gaps, and addressing social and cultural norms that limit career choices or workforce participation with conflict or fragility-sensitive knowledge, design, and delivery mechanisms.

Depending on the type, level, and stage of FCV, as well as the economic landscape, certain FCV-specific interventions can also make a difference in women’s economic empowerment. These include, for example, enabling women’s earning, employment, and entrepreneurship by expanding opportunities in gig and home-based economies and increasing safe and reliable transportation to and from work or school. Policymakers should also take steps to improve access to education and training with attention to language, as well as the demand for and portability of skills and certifications. In addition to addressing persistent systemic and policy hurdles, women business owners and entrepreneurs need targeted support with more risk financing, knowhow, and market entry and development.

This includes leveraging sizable development and humanitarian assistance and procurement. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), for example, bought over $1.8 billion worth of goods and services in 2022 from suppliers worldwide, with 56 percent local spending. Aligned with system-wide UN gender-responsive procurement initiatives, UNOPS is piloting and beginning to scale programs to train and prepare women business owners to successfully bid and execute their tenders. These women can then use the investment, experience, and credibility gained from working with UNOPS to obtain other public and private sector contracts and optimize supply chain opportunities.

Increasing digital inclusion can be transformative for women’s financial inclusion and economic participation, as well; including by training women for information and communication technology jobs in the digital economy, like the World Bank-Rockefeller Foundation’s Click-On Kaduna project in Nigeria. Policymakers should prioritize increasing women’s access to and utilization of digital tools and platforms, including digital money and financial services, as well as remote learning and government technology. Digital mechanisms can also serve as useful aspects of larger initiatives that empower women’s participation and leadership, which is critical for conflict mitigation and durable peacebuilding. 

The evidence that expanding economic opportunities for women is intertwined with building inclusive and sustainable growth, as well as peace and social progress, is only accruing with time, experience, and data. On this International Women’s Day, aptly themed “Invest in Women: Accelerate Progress,” it is incumbent upon all leaders, investors, and policymakers to heed this call. Public and private sector actors would do well to invest and enable increased women’s economic participation to catalyze prosperity and peace.

Nicole Goldin is a nonresident senior fellow at the GeoEconomics Center.

The post Investing in women accelerates prosperity and peace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

More than a decade after the revolutions collectively known as the Arab Spring, several countries in the Middle East and North Africa are undergoing democratic backsliding and a return to authoritarian rule, including Egypt under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Libya under General Khalifa Haftar, and Tunisia under President Kais Saied. This trend and some shifts in sentiments about the West in these and other MENA countries have given Russia openings to undercut Western influence in the region and frame Ukraine as a Western puppet, using its state media and public diplomacy to influence opinion.

This is playing out in the context of growing internal polarization in many countries in the region and, among the citizenry, rising disenchantment with the West and democracy as a workable governing system for them. These developments enable Russia to offer an alternative alliance to authoritarian leaders who aim to diversify their country’s resources and reduce reliance on the West and the United States in particular.

Russian state media has had a presence in the Arab World since the 2007 launch of Russia Today Arabic (now just RT Arabic), and its influence expanded with the 2014 start of Sputnik Arabic, which maintains a regional office in Cairo. Today, RT Arabic is one of the region’s top three most-watched news broadcasters after Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera. As reported in the DFRLab’s previous Undermining Ukraine report, Russia signed cooperation agreements with local media in Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco to formalize official cooperation on joint projects and information exchanges.

Some Arabic-speaking media outlets post the exact text of articles published on RT Arabic’s website, allowing for the spread of narratives promoted by state-run Russian media to Arabic speakers. A short RT article from January 13, 2023, pushing claims that Ukrainian soldiers were carrying chemical weapons, was posted verbatim on the news websites of Egypt’s Al-Ahram, Yemen’s Al-Ayyam, and Dubai-based news aggregator Nabd. An August 2023 RT Arabic article repeating Putin’s claim that the ban on Russian media was due to the West’s fear of the truth was also reposted by Yemen’s Al-Ayyam and Emirati newspaper Al Khaleej. An article published in state-aligned Syria’s Al-Watan and Egypt’s Al-Ahram in September quoting State Duma Member Anna Kuznetsova saying that the “Kyiv regime uses the same methods used by the terrorist organization ISIS [Islamic State group] to recruit children” was originally published in RT Arabic.

By cooperating with local media, Russia is able to spread its propaganda to a broader audience in the Arab world. The narratives amplified by Russian state media and local media partners are framed in a way that appeals to audiences in the region and their complicated history with the West. In line with authoritarian Arab leaders’ statements about the West’s interest in their countries, local media amplify narratives suggesting that the West attempts to demonize Russia in order to maintain Arab nations’ reliance on the West. Additionally, narratives about Zelenskyy being a puppet of the West and Putin standing up to them appeal to many in the Arab populations who viewed their former authoritarian leaders as puppets supported by the West at their own expense. Moreover, regional audiences point to Western hypocrisy in considering Russia’s war in Ukraine with a different lens than the US invasion of Iraq or Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip.

As Western states imposed a ban on RT and Sputnik and blocked their YouTube channels to minimize the impact of their propaganda, Russian media was further emboldened in the region as it became increasingly considered an alternative source of information after decades of Western influence in their countries. While there is some sympathy expressed online among Arabic speakers for the Ukrainian people, there is also support for Russia and Putin expressed by media and individuals, resulting from internal polarization and disenchantment with democracy and the West.

Russian media and its social media accounts capitalize on such resentment toward Western countries to gain support for Russia in the region. The X accounts of Sputnik and RT Arabic produce more content than BBC Arabic and Al Jazeera, regularly posting content that appeals to Arab audiences. For instance, on June 29, 2023, one day after an incident of Quran burning in Sweden, the three X accounts posted similar videos showing Putin holding the Quran during a visit to a mosque in the city of Derbent, Russia, while criticizing Western countries like Sweden for allowing the burning of the holy book.

Arabic-speaking journalists and influencers promoting pro-Russia narratives

X also serves as a major social media platform for several Arabic-speaking Russian state media personalities as well as unaffiliated online influencers. Many of these accounts with large followings consistently post news content aligned with the Kremlin’s preferred narratives. There are differences between the two groups, however, as affiliated journalists openly state their ties to Russian media and use their real identities, while influencer accounts appear to more frequently use stolen images and show signs of coordinated posting and engagement.

The DFRLab identified and analyzed thirty accounts of influencers and self-proclaimed journalists boasting large follower counts and posting Arabic content, mostly in the form of news updates. These accounts often promoted similar pro-Russia, anti-Western messaging and celebrated partnerships between Russia and Arab nations. Specifically, the accounts created content that would resonate more with an Arab audience and sometimes expand on regional resentment toward Western countries, accusing them of double standards following their pro-Ukraine narratives.

An analysis of the accounts revealed several suspicious indicators, including similarities in how they present themselves and the content they post. The bios of twenty-three of thirty accounts highlighted interest in Russian news, Russia-Ukraine news, or general political and war news. Many of the accounts often published similar posts on the same day or within a short window. One example showed accounts attempting to attract interest from Arab and Muslim users after Russian general Sergei Surovikin visited Algeria, with six accounts using very similar text and the same photo of Surovikin reading the Quran in an Algerian mosque, all published within a two-hour period on September 15, 2023.

These X accounts routinely promoted disinformation related to the Russia-Ukraine war as well. In one example, on October 4, 2023, three accounts used identical or nearly identical text falsely claiming that Zelenskyy was attempting to recruit Islamic State fighters held in Iraqi and Syrian prisons to join the Ukrainian army in its fight against Russia.

The DFRLab also noticed some degree of coordination between some of the accounts, such as liking, retweeting, and replying to each other’s tweets. For instance, reviewing @russiaArb4’s post engagement revealed many retweets from the same three accounts. Moreover, some of the accounts created posts to promote other accounts and asked users to follow them.

Several of the identified accounts appeared focus on retweeting other accounts, alongside retweeting specific and possibly new Arabic media accounts. This apparent coordination around retweeting could be seen in the almost identical timelines with the same set of retweets between accounts.

Furthermore, five accounts that claimed to be either media figures or Russian citizens living in Russia or somewhere else had additional suspicious indicators. According to monitoring tool Twitter ID Finder, four of these accounts were created in October 2022: three on October 20—two of them just twenty minutes apart—and one on October 28. A reverse image search also confirmed that four of these accounts reappropriated publicly available images of attractive women as their avatars. This tactic appears to be similar to one previously used by a set of pro-Russia accounts, as documented by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, in an attempt to target Arab male users to follow and engage with them. 

Russian public diplomacy in the region

As in Latin America, Russia uses the social media presence of its diplomatic missions in the Middle East and North Africa to promote its preferred narratives about the war in Ukraine. Most of the diplomatic missions post updates to their official Facebook and X accounts at varying frequencies, focusing on diplomatic affairs with the host country. Most repost content from other diplomatic missions and the Russian Foreign Ministry’s English, Russian, and Arabic X accounts about international affairs and the war in Ukraine, routinely posting falsehoods and exaggerations about the war. These include describing the war as a “special military operation” or fighting Nazis in Ukraine.

The X and Facebook accounts of Russia’s diplomatic mission in Egypt post regular international affairs updates. The accounts posted regularly about Ukraine throughout 2023 with the hashtag #الحق_مع_روسيا (“Russia is right”). Among its posts, Russia’s embassy in Egypt posted statements to Facebook about “Ukrainian Nazis” allegedly firing missiles at a hospital in Pervomaisk, Ukraine, using US-provided High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) missiles. Economic and military ties between Russia and Egypt have strengthened in recent years, especially as the latter’s government seeks to reduce its dependence on the United States, which provides Egypt with $1.3 million in annual military assistance. Egypt currently imports the majority of its wheat from Russia and has been working with Russia to construct a Russian-built nuclear plant since 2022.

The increased cooperation and aligning of economic and military priorities between the governments of Egypt and Russia allows the latter to be more aggressive in promoting its narratives to Egyptian audiences through its official channels and getting positive engagement with social media users. The embassy’s messaging about the war in Ukraine sometimes plays on anti-Western sentiment among some audiences.

On February 24, 2023—the first anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—the Russian embassy in Egypt tweeted a statement from the ambassador expressing gratitude to Egypt for “fully understanding the reasons for the confrontation over Ukraine and for supporting Russia despite the torrents of lies about our actions launched by the West.”

In September of that year, the embassy posted about a US announcement that Russia characterized as providing tanks to “Ukrainian Nazis” and depleted uranium shells to “expose our land to radioactive pollution. Exactly what they did in Iraq.” Russian diplomatic missions reference the Iraq War as part of its strategy to capitalize on anti-Western sentiment fueled by lingering distrust of the United States.

Diplomatic missions also capitalize on holidays and other public events by posting statements promoting Russian narratives. For example, the Russian embassy in Egypt evoked its fight against “Nazis” in Ukraine in a tweet on Defenders of the Homeland Day, then repeated the same rhetoric in another tweet on Russia’s Victory Day.

The Russian embassy in Algeria posted a statement from its ambassador on the occasion of Russia Diplomats’ Day, suggesting that the West was engaging in an “open anti-Russia campaign,” adding, “In a time like now when we witness tremendous pressure on Russia by the so-called ‘collective West,’ it becomes clear who our real friends are.” The ambassador also posted on Russia’s Victory Day, saying that “our great Homeland will win this time, will once again rid the world of fascism and Nazism.”

In other posts, Russian diplomatic missions in the region promoted narratives related to specific incidents of concern to Muslim audiences, such as a post from the Russian Embassy in Egypt showing a picture of a praying hand and a copy of the Quran with a tweet condemning the alleged burning of the Quran by Ukrainian soldiers. The post stated that the soldiers did so, knowing there are Muslims fighting in the Russian army, referring to a video that appears to show Ukrainian soldiers burning copies of the Quran.

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